RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN THE BALTIC

The Implications of Citizenship for Economic Integration

by

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For my grandmother Nijolė
(Močiutei Nijolei)
Abstract

The link between citizenship and economic integration, as well as between the lack of citizenship and economic exclusion, has been assumed by the literature that deals with the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states. This seems to be intuitively justified: less political inclusion means less economic integration. This thesis sets out to test that intuition within the timeframe of the first decade of regained independence of the Baltic states (1989-1999). The first part of the thesis is concerned with legal analysis of primary sources – citizenship laws – from the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The analysis shows, in more detail than before, that there indeed exists a dichotomy between Estonia and Latvia on the one hand, and Lithuania on the other hand. While in Estonia and Latvia the citizenship laws happen, or perhaps are even intended, to exclude form citizenship the Russian-speaking minorities in those countries, the initial citizenship law of Lithuania was designed specifically with the intent to include as many Russian-speakers as possible. The second part analyzes the economic situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in all three of the countries by means of ethnically differentiated aggregated data from the New Baltic Barometer social surveys conducted in 1993, 1995, and 1996. Not far into the second part of the thesis, it becomes more and more apparent that the answers to the questionnaires by Russian-speakers in relation to the ethnic majorities do not produce a clear or even vague dichotomy between Lithuania on the one hand, and Estonia and Latvia on the other hand. This thesis finds that, in the case of Baltic Russian-speaking minorities, the presence or absence of citizenship is not in itself sufficient to improve or deteriorate the situation of those minorities relative to the situation of the ethnic majorities. It will be concluded that other factors, e.g. social, potentially influence the equation in question and must be considered in further research. The findings are also important for nationalism and minority studies in general as they show that the link between political inclusion and the degree of economic integration cannot be taken for granted in all situations.
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INTRODUCTION

Under Soviet occupation, many immigrants from various parts of the USSR, mostly Russian-speakers, settled in the Baltic states. Upon regaining independence, the Baltic states not only could once again decide their own immigration and citizenship policy, but had to find a solution as to how to treat Soviet-era immigrants. Decisions taken in Estonia were very similar to those taken in Latvia. The initial citizenry was to be composed of those who were citizens before the occupation, and their descendants. This meant that those who came to Estonia or Latvia under the Soviet regime would not be automatically granted citizenship in the newly re-independent states. Meanwhile, in Lithuania, a very different decision was made. Virtually everyone who was a permanent resident when the citizenship law came into effect had the right to opt for Lithuanian citizenship. My intention is to explore in this thesis whether this difference in legal regulation of citizenship has resulted in differing degrees of economic integration into the Baltic societies by the Russophone minorities in the three different countries. In other words, the question is: “In the case of the Baltic states and their Russophone minorities, is political integration through its basic expression of citizenship important for economic integration?”

Since Estonia and Latvia introduced and maintained citizenship laws that are exclusive towards the Russian-speaking minorities, while Lithuania offered the “zero option” (citizenship to virtually all permanent residents), my hypothesis is that the results with regard to economic integration will be different in Estonia and Latvia one the one hand, and Lithuania on the other hand. I expect that although the Russian-speaking minorities are economically integrated to a large degree in all three Baltic states, integration will be more pronounced in Lithuania, where the citizenship law is more inclusive, than in Estonia and Latvia, where citizenship laws are less
inclusive. I will test this hypothesis by examining survey data that point to indicators of economic integration of the Russophone minorities in the Baltic states.

My thesis will not be a normative one, and therefore I will not focus on the vast general normative literature on citizenship or on integration. As the available space does not allow for a grand theoretical discussion of citizenship and of integration, which are areas of study in their own right, I will focus on legal texts and sociological surveys. A part of this thesis is dedicated to an investigation of the citizenship laws and related legal provisions of the three Baltic states. While the existing literature does provide overviews of Baltic citizenship laws, as well as general theoretical analysis, there is a gap in that the existing literature does not attempt to extensively analyze the link between citizenship regulation and minority integration. Also none of the literature links the theoretical discussions about Baltic citizenship with sociological data in a substantial way. It will be my goal to fill these gaps and find the relevant trends by connecting legal analysis with quantitative sociological data.

My thesis will rely mostly on the New Baltic Barometer series of surveys for sociological data. These quantitative surveys were commissioned by Professor Richard Rose at the University of Strathclyde in all three Baltic states in 1993, 1995, and 1996, (and also in 2000, 2001, and 2004). The questionnaires are composed of many questions in all areas of life with multiple-choice answers, and results are grouped by the self-identified ethnicity of respondents. The sections on the economy will be of most interest to me as they contain such questions as where people work, how much they make, and how well-off they are. The questions repeat in every survey year, and therefore I will able to identify trends in addition to static pictures form every given year. Since I intend to consider the question from the point of view of the minorities, I will base my results on the answers given by the Baltic Russian-speakers. In addition, I will also
compare the responses by the minorities to the answers given by the ethnic majorities in order to see the relative position of the Russian-speakers.

The chosen timeframe for this study is the first decade of the Baltic independence, and it stops at the year 1999.

I will not use complex terminology in this thesis. However, the usage of “citizenship”, “ethnicity”, “Estonian”, “Latvian”, “Lithuanian”, “Baltic” and “Russian” must be clarified at the outset. By “citizenship” I do not mean civic engagement in society and politics. For the purposes of this study, “citizenship” means nationality in the passport sense, i.e. the legal bond of an individual’s belonging to a state. The word “ethnicity” in general can have various meanings. In the context of this work, it should be assumed to mean ethno-national belonging. Here, by “ethnicity” I mean what would be understood as “nationality” in Estonian (rahvus), Latvian (tautība), Lithuanian (tautybė), and Russian (natsional’nost’). Such choice of terminology allows subdividing the citizens of a single country, say Lithuania, into several ethnic groups – Lithuanians, Russians, etc. “Estonians”, “Latvians” and “Lithuanians” are always used in this thesis in the ethnic sense. Sometimes I refer to these three ethnicities collectively as “Balts” or “Baltic people”, although linguistically Estonians do not belong to the Baltic, but rather the Finno-Ugric language group. The word “Russians” is also always used in the ethnic sense. “Russian-speakers” is a broader category. This in essence includes all non-Baltic Soviet ethnicities that immigrated into the Baltic states during Soviet occupation, but the group is dominated by ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians.
LITERATURE REVIEW

There are three types of sources that are important for the present thesis to consider. First, academic literature shows us what has been discussed in relation to the topic, what can be taken from the existing debate, and what needs to be investigated further. Various works by Brubaker, Barrington, and Kalvaitis, as well as reports by Järve and Poleshchuk, Krūma, and Kūris are some of the most prominent literature in the field of Baltic citizenship. Second, the citizenship legislation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from 1989 to present is the primary source to be used in the present thesis to see what kind of legal regime exists when it comes to citizenship for minorities. Third, the New Baltic Barometer surveys, the only ones of their kind, will be employed in order to determine the economic integration of the Russian-speaking minorities into the national societies in the Baltic.

Academic literature on the topic of citizenship in the Baltic is not vast and seldom goes into investigating the implications of the citizenship policies beyond the fact that these policies disadvantage the Russian-speaking populations in Estonia and Latvia. This being said, I see three differences within the literature. First, there is the distinction between descriptive and analytical literature. Extensive descriptive citizenship policy reports have been drawn up on each country: on Estonia by Järve and Poleshchuk, on Latvia by Krūma, and on Lithuania by Kūris.¹ Similar

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Kristine Krūma, “Report on Latvia” (report, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, 2010).
reports by Järve on Estonia, and by Krūma on Latvia and on Lithuania appear as chapters in a book edited by Bauböck. These reports attempt to be neutral and simply describe the evolution of Baltic citizenship laws since the regaining of independence around 1990. Nevertheless, in the cases of work on Estonia and Latvia it is impossible to offer any meaningful writing without addressing the issue of the citizenship-deprived minorities. This is where a difference between Järve and Poleshchuk on the one hand, and Krūma on the other hand, can be seen. While Järve and Poleshchuk are simply reporting on the issues and statistics related to the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, Krūma at times seems to be on the defensive for Latvian policies. For example, Krūma claims that the awarding of citizenship to all residents in cases of succession is not a standard practice, and even cites Muižnieks that the Latvian majority is ‘not well-placed’ to coexist with a large, post-imperial minority that has a non-democratic kin-state. Nevertheless, these are very useful reports that in general serve their important purpose of clarifying what the actual policies in the Baltic are. There are also some analytical articles from the early 1990s by Egidijus Kūris, “Report on Lithuania” (report, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, 2010).


Ginsburgs that concentrate on the technical aspects of the transition from Soviet citizenship to citizenship of the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{4}

The remaining, mainly earlier literature, is not so focused on description, and is mainly analytical. Brubaker’s seminal article on citizenship in Soviet successor states proposes that the reason why there are different citizenship policies in Lithuania on the one hand, and Latvia and Estonia on the other hand, is that the ethno-demographic situation in Lithuania is much more secure when compared to Latvia and Estonia, meaning that the Russian minority is significantly smaller in Lithuania, and therefore not perceived as such a threat to the nation and to the state.\textsuperscript{5}

On a similar path, Barrington also tries to understand why the difference in policy exists, and comes up with several domestic and external factors. For him, what matters when deciding to extend citizenship to minorities or not is whether the nation in question is ethnically or politically defined, whether it is considered a state of one or more than one nation, whether the nation feels that its culture is threatened, whether there is a kin state, whether there is pressure from international organizations, and also whether there is pressure from émigré communities.\textsuperscript{6}

Kalvaitis as well as Groenendijk have also written analytical pieces on Baltic citizenship. Both authors, though Groenendijk more openly, state that the citizenship situation in the Baltic is not

\textsuperscript{4} George Ginsburgs, “The Citizenship of the Baltic States,” \textit{Journal of Baltic Studies} 21, no. 1 (1990);
in compliance with international law. However, the two authors have different approaches. Kalvaitis accepts the Baltic argument that in international law illegal actions cannot create legal situations, but gives supremacy to another principle of international law, namely that long standing situations (even if created by illegal actions) do acquire the property of legality. Therefore, the presence of Russian-speakers in the Baltic cannot be seen as an illegal fact.\footnote{Ruta M. Kalvaitis, “Citizenship and National Identity in the Baltic States,” Boston University International Law Journal 16 (Spring 1998).}

Groenendijk’s approach is that the Baltic states are applying, though indirect, but nevertheless ethnic discrimination with regard to citizenship. This is obviously illegal, and prohibited by a number of instruments that the countries in question are parties to.\footnote{Kees Groenendijk, “Nationality, Minorities and Statelessness: The Case of the Baltic States,” Helsinki Monitor 4, no. 3 (1993): 20, doi: 10.1163/157181493X00236.}

Second, there is the distinction between the varying degrees to which the literature finds the situation to be unacceptable. While Kūris and Barrington are largely not concerned with the acceptability of the situation, authors express their views either explicitly or implicitly. Groenendijk and Kalvaitis are the least accepting of the citizenship situation in the Baltic. Groenendijk even provides recommendations to the Baltic governments on how to eliminate the issue, while Kalvaitis urges peaceful debate between the majorities and the Russian-speakers.\footnote{Kees Groenendijk, “Nationality, Minorities and Statelessness,” 3: 21-25. Ruta M. Kalvaitis, “Citizenship and National Identity,” 271.}

Third, there is also the distinction between the varying degrees to which the authors consider the situation to be ‘normal’. By ‘normality’ I mean the non-specificity of the situation to the Baltic region. It should be noted that this is not related to how acceptable the same authors consider the situation to be. While Brubaker is not surprised by the situation in the Central and Eastern European context, and Barrington talks as if in general about citizenship decisions in new states, it is only Groenendijk who states that although there are important differences, in
general the situation is similar to that in the West. According to Groenendijk, both in the Baltic and in the West there is a situation where there are large groups of immigrants who have problems getting the local citizenship.\textsuperscript{10} The rest of the authors seem to assume that the situation is very specific to the Baltic.

Finally, an interesting observation can be made that although only Rose, Kalvaitis, and Krūma talk specifically about the ethnic segmentation of the Baltic societies (even separate publics in the case of Rose), practically all authors assume that the societies in the Baltic lack unity.\textsuperscript{11}

Instead of depending on secondary sources for the description of the citizenship regimes in the Baltic, the present author will analyze citizenship legislation in all three countries with a particular interest in how it affects the Russian-speaking national minorities. In the case of Estonia, the first major point of interest is that the original citizenship act in 1992 did not confer Estonian citizenship on those who immigrated into Estonia following its occupation in 1940. As most such immigrants were Russian-speakers, and most Estonian Russian-speakers are such immigrants, this is how the issue of no citizenship for Russian-speakers was originally created. Other points of interest are within the area of naturalization policy. For example, the length of residency requirement (which has a history of being increased with time) can only be fulfilled by residing in Estonia since 1990.\textsuperscript{12} Also, children born to two stateless parents (who, in case of Estonia, are most likely to be Russian-speakers) do not automatically acquire Estonian citizenship, which runs counter to standard international practice and to conventions ratified by

\textsuperscript{10} Kees Groenendijk, “Nationality, Minorities and Statelessness,” 3: 13-16.
\textsuperscript{11} Richard Rose, “New Baltic Barometer II: A Survey Study,” (survey study, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Galsgow, 1995), 3.
\textsuperscript{12} Priit Järve and Vadim Poleshchuk, “Report on Estonia.”
Citizenship legislation in Latvia is very similar to that in Estonia. However, in Latvia there is also the “non-citizen” status. “Non-citizens” of Latvia are more than permanent residents in that their status is much more stable as it cannot be taken away as easily as a residence permit. On the domestic level, non-citizens do not enjoy political and other rights that are reserved solely for citizens, but abroad they receive diplomatic protection of Latvia, and are sometimes treated as Latvian nationals for the purposes of international treaties. This status of semi-citizenship can be seen as one that creates a disincentive for the Russian-speakers to naturalize in Latvia as many feel betrayed by Latvia due to not getting automatic citizenship, and as “non-citizen” status gives visa-free travel to Russia on the initiative of the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. In Lithuania, the types of issues created by citizenship legislation are very different. Although Lithuania’s naturalization policies are similarly stringent to those of Latvia and Estonia, this does not create problems for the Lithuanian Russian-speakers since in 1989-1991 everyone permanently resident on the territory of Lithuania was offered the country’s citizenship.

The New Baltic Barometer Surveys can show us some very interesting results when it comes to the economic integration of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. For example, in 1993, a question was asked “[i]n the past month, what was your income?” The results are as follows: Estonian-speakers – 951 krooni, Russian-speakers in Estonia – 950 krooni; Latvian-speakers – 49 lati, Russian-speakers in Latvia – 48 lati; Lithuanian-speakers – 186 litai, Russian-speakers in Lithuania – 225 litai. This is shows that

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13 Ibid.
with respect to income levels the economic position of Russian-speakers at that time was either equal to the majority populations (in Estonia and Latvia), or better (in Lithuania). That is just one example of the interesting statistics offered by the New Baltic Barometer surveys, which are a crucial source of information for this thesis.

By combining academic literature, legislation, and surveys, one can get a good picture of the state of citizenship legislation in the Baltic, and of how it affects the Russian-speaking minorities there. However, there is presently a lack of investigation into how the degree of political integration impacts the degree of economic integration of the minority. This will be the focus of the pages that follow.

METHODOLOGY

Timeframe

The chosen timeframe for this research is the first decade of the renewed independence of the Baltic states. The beginning of this timeframe is 1989 as this is when Lithuania passed its citizenship law in preparation for its declaration of independence. The cutoff is at the end of the year of 1999. Such timeframe is dictated not only by the length of this paper and the availability of consistent data, but also by the objective stages of development in the political and economic lives of the newly independent Baltic states. Politically, the first decade of independence was the most turbulent one. This resulted in frequent amendment of laws and changing attitudes of the population. By the break of the new decade, things had somewhat settled and politics became more day-to-day. Economically, the first decade of independence was also very dynamic in the Baltic states due to reforms, privatization, the first foreign investments and other factors. This resulted in growth, which was thwarted around the end of the decade by the Russian economic crisis. What the chosen timeframe means, then, is that the stably growing economic situation from around 1990 to around 2000 provides a better sample. It is easier to see results of political decisions when the background is not obscured by economic instability. Furthermore, a few years later the Baltic states joined the European Union (in 2004), which introduced a whole set of new dynamics in citizenship legislation, migration trends, and the economic and political situation in general. Therefore, different factors and dynamics would need to be considered for study of this or many other topics with regard to the Baltic states that extends much beyond the year 1999.
Legislation

There is obviously a vast amount of legislation in each of the chosen countries that is related to the rights and duties of citizens and other residents. The space available dictates that only the most crucial legal acts be studied in detail. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, only those legal acts will be considered which are intended directly for the definition of citizenry, and, in the case of Estonia and Latvia, procedures for naturalization, as well as the status of “non-citizens” in Latvia. This is so because of the specific situation in each of the Baltic states. In Lithuania, where Russian-speakers had virtually no difficulties in becoming citizens, the only legislation that really concerns their status is the one that grants them citizenship, and those passages of later laws which ensure a trouble-free transition to Lithuanian citizenship. Meanwhile, in Estonia and Latvia, where the majority of Russian-speakers were not granted citizenship, the scope of relevant legislation becomes much broader. It encompasses not only citizenship laws that exclude the Russian-speaking minority form citizenship, but also a whole set of documents concerning procedures and testing for naturalization. Moreover, the existence of the “non-citizen” status in Latvia, makes also the laws on “non-citizenship” relevant for inquiry. I will therefore focus on the types of laws and governmental resolutions listed above. I will analyze only those parts of the legal texts which directly affect large percentages of the Russian-speaking minorities. In practice this will result in detailed analysis of the relevant articles in the type of texts described above.
Surveys

There are numerous surveys that concern the economic situation in the Baltic. However, I have chosen to use only the New Baltic Barometer surveys from the years 1993, 1995, and 1996. The available space does not allow for detailed examination of more than one set of surveys. In fact, even using the one set of surveys, only very few most pertinent questions will be analyzed. One of the advantages of the New Baltic Barometer surveys is that they were commissioned by a social scientist. The questions are designed and results are meant for use by other social scientists. The goal of these surveys, unlike of many others is not marketing or other economic purposes. Therefore, the data provided by the New Baltic Barometer surveys is the most adequate for the purposes of this research. Finally, the most important reason for choosing these surveys over others is that the response data are aggregated on ethnic basis. This means that at a single glance we can see the difference (or lack thereof) in the responses of the majority ethnic groups and those of the Russian-speakers in each country.

Since the comparison is of the political versus the economic, the survey questions chosen for analysis will be those which show what the situation is with regard to the most important economic indicators for an individual. Questions will be chosen in the areas of income & means of subsistence, employment, and economic wellbeing. A detailed analysis of the responses to these questions by representatives of the majority ethnic groups and by the Russian-speaking minorities will reveal whether there exists a significant economic divide between those groups.
PART 1. Legal Regulation of Citizenship in the Baltic States

Restoration of independence of the Baltic states meant that the citizenries of these countries had to be defined anew. Intense debates surrounded the drafting of citizenship laws in all three countries. Following the principle of continuity with the pre-war states, the legislators in Estonia and Latvia decided to reenact pre-war citizenship laws and reconstitute the old citizenry to a large degree. In Lithuania, although the same legal principle was followed in general, when it came to citizenship, it was decided to grant a “zero option” to everyone resident in the republic. The difference, argues Brubaker, is explained by the relative ethno-demographic security of Lithuanians in comparison to that of Latvians an Estonians.16

Estonia

The Estonian legislator, after intense pressure from nationalist political groups, chose to regulate the country’s citizenship by reinstating the 1938 Citizenship Act. This meant in practice that only those who had Estonian citizenship before the Soviet occupation and their descendants would be considered citizens. Any immigrants who came between the date of occupation and the date of the restoration of independence (a period of 50 years), would be excluded. For them, the only path to citizenship would be regular naturalization under tough Estonian naturalization procedures. The beginning of aturalization would be delayed, and the meanwhile such people (who were mainly members of the Russophone minority) and their children would remain stateless even if they were born in Estonia.

On 26 February, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia passed the Decision on Implementation of the Citizenship Act. This decision, in its Article 1 proclaims that the Estonian Citizenship Act (of 1938), as it stood on 16 June 1940, shall be in force. Article 2 states that those people are citizens of Estonia, who acquired Estonian citizenship at birth in accordance with the Citizenship Act or who will be naturalized according to its provisions.\textsuperscript{17} These passages meant that approximately a third of Estonian population at independence did not qualify for Estonian citizenship.\textsuperscript{18} This is clearly a consequence of the anti-immigrant stance of the Estonian nationalists who pushed the law through. Two important implications can be found. The first is that since a great majority of immigrants to Estonia belonged to the Russian ethnic group, and an even greater majority of them spoke Russian, the citizenship law is thus obviously targeted against the Russian-speaking community. Second, since there was no republican citizenship in the USSR, this resulted in mass statelessness. This was done so as to ‘avoid power-sharing with minorities.’\textsuperscript{19} The only available solution for those who did not qualify for Estonian citizenship now was naturalization. The requirements for naturalization were regulated by later legislation and there is a consensus within literature that they are tough. There exists a view that naturalization was made intentionally difficult so as to have as little Russian-speakers naturalize as possible. This is reinforced by such evidence as a statement by an Estonian government


\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 4.
minister who hoped that a third of the non-Estonian ethnics would leave, a third become Russian citizens, and only the remaining third naturalize in Estonia.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Regulation of naturalization}

The new Estonian Citizenship Act was adopted on 19 January 1995, and then amended a number of times. This section will analyze those passages of the act which are the most important to the Russian-speaking minority.

Paragraph 2 of Article 1 establishes a prohibition of multiple citizenship.\textsuperscript{21} For the Russian-speakers in Estonia, this means that if they already have or plan to acquire Russian citizenship as a remedy to their statelessness, this is not compatible with naturalization in Estonia. Chapter 1 (General Provisions) is immediately followed by a chapter on the conditions for acquisition of Estonian citizenship, which is mainly concerned with naturalization. This shows how prominent the issue of naturalization is in Estonia. Article 6, outlines the requirements for applicants for naturalization:

\begin{itemize}
\item An alien who wishes to acquire Estonian citizenship by naturalization shall:
\item 1) be at least 15 years of age;
\item 2) have a residence permit of a long-term resident or the right of permanent residence;
\item 2\textsuperscript{1)} have lived in Estonia on the basis of a residence permit or the right of residence for at least eight years prior to the date on which he or she submits an application for Estonian citizenship and permanently at least the last five years;
\end{itemize}


2) have legally and permanently resided in Estonia on the basis of a residence permit of a long-term resident or the right of permanent residence for six months from the day following the date of registration of the application for Estonian citizenship;

2) have a registered residence in Estonia;

3) have knowledge of the Estonian language in accordance with the requirements provided for in § 8 of this Act;

4) have knowledge of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia and the Citizenship Act in accordance with the requirements provided for in § 9 of this Act;

5) have a permanent legal income which ensures his or her own subsistence and that of his or her dependents;

6) be loyal to the Estonian state;

7) take an oath: “In applying for Estonian citizenship, I swear to be loyal to the constitutional order of Estonia.”

The implications of this article are mixed. Some of them do not appear to be problematic. The age limit laid down in Paragraph 1 is not a problem as parents of those under 15 can apply for naturalization of such minors. Although the requirement to have permanent residency set out in Paragraph 2 can normally be satisfied only after at least 5 years of residence in Estonia, in the case of Soviet-era immigrants, residence permits were issued unconditionally and without delay as will be shown later in this chapter. Paragraph 2 – the requirement of having a registered residence – should also not pose an obstacle in the great majority of cases. Finally, Paragraph 7, which requires a candidate to take a short oath, is also rather reasonable. However, the remaining paragraphs present problems of varying degrees to those applying for naturalization. The requirement on the length of residence prescribed in Paragraph 2 was gradually increased with several amendments of the act, and went up from the initial 3 years to 8 years. Having in mind that residence was counted only from 30 March 1990, this mounts evidence that the legislation was designed to prevent Russian-speakers from naturalizing since the residence criterion was proved.

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22 Republic of Estonia, Citizenship Act, art. 6.
increased a few times just when it could have been met by potential applicants. The requirement in Paragraph 2\(^2\), namely that the applicant must reside in Estonia for six months following the submission of their naturalization application, means in practice that the application is frozen for half a year after its submission, at the end of which period the applicant has to confirm that they still meet all the requirements. The basis for this regulation is difficult to understand, and it seems that the paragraph is aimed at further delaying the application process and erecting more hurdles for the applicant.

Further problems are caused by Paragraphs 3-5 of Article 6. Paragraph 3 of Article 6 establishes that the applicant shall know the Estonian language, and Article 8 defines the extent of this knowledge. The requirements are summed up by paragraph 1: “For the purposes of this Act, knowledge of the Estonian language means general knowledge of basic Estonian needed in everyday life.”\(^23\) This would seem fine if it were not for what happens due to Paragraph 4 of Article 6 in conjunction with Article 9. Paragraph 4 of Article 6 requires applicants to know the Estonian Constitution and the Citizenship Act presently being discussed. Article 9 provides the procedure for the fulfillment of this requirement. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 provides that the exam shall be carried out in Estonian. While this may seem to be reasonable at first, it contradicts Article 8. Whereas Article 8 requires that a person have ‘everyday’ proficiency in Estonian, the fact that the legal exam is in Estonian means that actually everyday proficiency is not enough, and the person must be able to read, understand, and explain complicated legal texts in the Estonian language.

Even further complications arise due to the requirement to have a permanent source of income and that requirement’s interaction with language laws. According to Estonian laws, for

\(^{23}\) Ibid., art. 8.
most jobs, proficiency in the Estonian language is required. This means that the Russian-speakers, who are already disadvantaged because they do not have Estonian citizenship and therefore cannot work in civil service jobs, experience more difficulties in finding and holding down jobs, which in turn prejudices their citizenship application. A vicious circle is created this way. Article 7 on what counts as legal income does include support by a family member with a permanent legal income in Estonia.\textsuperscript{24} Thus one could say that having employment is not a necessary condition. However, one must take into account those living by themselves, single parents, or even larger families where everyone has difficulties finding a job due to less-than-perfect knowledge of Estonian. The only exceptions available were established by the Requirements for Applicants for Citizenship to Know Estonian Act passed on 10 February 1993. Article 1 of this act establishes that those applying for naturalization must know the Estonian language. At the same time, Article 3 provides an exemption for those people who learned the language in school, are certified as proficient in Estonian, are disabled, or are of old age (born before 1 January 1930).\textsuperscript{25}

Article 8\textsuperscript{1} of the Citizenship Act is concerned with compensation for language training.\textsuperscript{26} On the positive side, this article provides for reimbursement by the state to the naturalization applicant of Estonian language tuition fees. On the negative side, the process is lengthy (up to 2 months for reimbursement) and the requirement that in order to have the tuition fee reimbursed, the applicant must pass not only the language exam, but also the constitution and citizenship law exam seems somewhat disproportionate.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., art. 7.
\textsuperscript{26} Republic of Estonia, Citizenship Act, art. 8\textsuperscript{1}.
Article 12 of the Citizenship Act establishes what documents must be submitted in order to apply for naturalization. Besides what one might expect – an application form and supporting documents – as per Subparagraph 4 of Paragraph 2, the applicant must submit a holographic *curriculum vitae* written in Estonian which sets out the applicant’s career, the time and the circumstances under which he or she settled in Estonia, any persons who arrived in Estonia together with the applicant, the applicant’s marital status and any changes therein during his or her residence in Estonia, all previous residences in Estonia, information concerning immediate family, and also any ties with foreign military, intelligence or security organisations; if the applicant was born in Estonia, the time and circumstances under which his or her parents settled in Estonia shall also be set out.\(^{27}\)

This is obviously surplus information, and it is difficult to justify why the state would need such details (that would normally be required only for issuing a clearance for classified information) in a naturalization application.

Article 21 provides grounds on which naturalization applications are to be refused. Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 1 is concerned with service in foreign military service, and is in essence meant to prevent those who came as Red Army personnel and their spouses from acquiring Estonian citizenship. The only exception, provided by Paragraph 2, is if such person has been married for five years to a natural-born Estonian citizen.\(^{28}\) It appears then from the above that Estonian naturalization requirements, although not as exclusionary as Latvian naturalization requirements were until 1998, are not easy to meet even for people who have been living in Estonia for many years or were even born there.

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\(^{27}\) Ibid., art. 12.
\(^{28}\) Ibid., art. 21.
“Privileges”

On 8 July 1993, the Aliens Act was adopted. Its Article 21 states:

A residence permit may be issued outside of the immigration quota to an alien to
whom the issue of a residence permit is justified and does not damage the
interests of the Estonian state and who settled in Estonia before 1 July 1990 and
has thereafter not left to reside in another country.  

This passage ensures that in principle all those who entered Estonia during the Soviet period remain legal residents of the country although they are not citizens and the naturalization procedure is difficult. The unconditional leave to remain was, according to Järve and Poleschchuk, the only privilege accorded to Estonia’s Russian-speakers.

In Estonia, becoming a citizen is not easy if you are someone who immigrated into the country between 1940 and 1990. The only privilege such people have is the leave to remain as legal residents. Otherwise, naturalization requires that many conditions, some of them untypical, be satisfied. Documents that go beyond proving conformance to the requirements must be submitted. The “everyday” level of Estonian language needed for naturalization is an illusion as the Constitution and Citizenship Act exam requires extremely good knowledge of Estonian. However, as will be seen, the situation is Latvia was even more difficult until the end of the first decade of independence.

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Latvia

Latvian citizenship legislation is based on the principle of legal continuity with the pre-war Republic of Latvia. This meant that the 1919 Law on Citizenship was put back into force, only those who were pre-war citizens and their descendants received Latvian citizenship, and the Russian-speaking minority was left out. Naturalization laws provided for an incredibly slow naturalization system, and in the meanwhile some Russian-speakers chose to settle for a semi-citizenship status as “non-citizens” unparalleled anywhere else in the world.

Restoration of the 1919 Law on Citizenship

On 15 October 1991, the Supreme Council (parliament) of the Republic of Latvia adopted a resolution entitled “On the Restoration of the Rights of the Citizens of the Republic of Latvia and on the Principles of Naturalization”. The preamble of this document is the most telling of Latvia’s citizenship policy towards its Russian-speakers out of all legal documents.

Although the Republic of Latvia was occupied on 17 June 1940, and the state lost its sovereign power, the community of citizens of the Republic of Latvia in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Latvia on Citizenship of 23 August 1919 continues to exist.

As a result of prolonged and internationally illegal annexation, a large number of citizens of the USSR, whose entry and residence have not been approved by any treaty between the Republic of Latvia and the USSR, settled in the territory of Latvia.

In order to eliminate the consequences of the occupation and annexation by the USSR present in Latvia, and to restore to the citizens of the Republic of Latvia their legitimate rights,

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia resolves:

Article 1 goes on to declare the blanket grant of Soviet citizenship to Latvian citizens on 7 September 1940 by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR null and void
*ab initio*.\(^{32}\)

Article 2 sets the criteria for the reconstitution of Latvian citizenry. First, those who were citizens on 17 June 1940 and their descendants shall be citizens if they are resident in Latvia. Second, those who were citizens on 17 June 1940 and their descendants who are not resident in Latvia can become citizens upon renunciation of their present citizenship. Third, multiple nationality is not permitted.\(^{33}\) The provisions of this article created a situation very similar to that in Estonia. Anyone who came to Latvia under Soviet occupation, or who was born in Latvia to immigrant parents during the Soviet period, did not qualify for Latvian citizenship. As in Estonia, in Latvia the absolute majority of those who immigrated during the Soviet era were Russian-speakers, and the majority of Russian-speakers were immigrants of the Soviet era. Thus, a situation was created where the law affected a specific group by excluding them from citizenship *en masse*. As in Estonia, in Latvia too, this group of people was left stateless. All further legislation of significance to the Russian-speaking minority would be that concerning naturalization.

*Regulation of naturalization*

Article 3 of the same Resolution on the Restoration of the Rights of the Citizens of the Republic of Latvia and on the Principles of Naturalization concerns naturalization. Paragraphs

\(^{32}\) Ibid., art. 1.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., art. 2.
1-3 are not in general of significance to the Russian-speakers of Latvia. According to those paragraphs, citizenship may be granted in three cases. First, for special merit. Second, to those who were legal permanent residents in Latvia on 17 June 1940 and continue to be permanent residents at the time of coming into force of the resolution, as well as their descendants who are permanent resident in Latvia on the day of the resolution coming into force. Since this may apply to some Russian-speakers who came as a result of the Mutual Assistance Pact of 5 October 1939 between the Republic of Latvia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is specifically listed in Paragraph 2 that it does not apply to such persons. Although this pact was signed before Latvia’s occupation, it is generally considered, especially in Latvia, that the pact, which was a result of Soviet threats to Latvia and allowed the stationing of Soviet army and navy in Latvia with nothing in return for Latvia, marked the beginning of the end of Latvian independence. Third, citizenship may be granted to those who were eligible for it under the provisions of the 1919 Law on Citizenship and to their descendants if such persons are permanently resident in Latvia at the time of coming into force of the resolution, renounce their previous citizenship, and are able to speak the Latvian language to a conversational level.

The rest of the decision is what is really of importance to Russian-speakers wishing to naturalize. It is worth quoting at length:

3.4 Persons not falling within the categories defined in Articles 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of this resolution, and who at the time of this resolution coming into effect were resident and permanently registered in Latvia, shall register by 1 July 1992 and may be admitted to citizenship of the Republic of Latvia in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Law of the Republic of Latvia entitled “On Citizenship” if they:

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34 Ibid., art. 3.
35 Ibid., art. 3.
36 Ibid., art. 3.
37 Ibid., art. 3.
1) have acquired knowledge of the Latvian language at conversational level, the procedure for testing which shall be provided by special regulations approved by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia;

2) have submitted an application for renunciation of their previous citizenship and secured an expatriation permit from the state of previous citizenship if so required by the laws of that state;

3) by the time this decision comes into effect, have lived and been permanently registered in Latvia for no less than 16 years;

4) know the basics of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia;

5) taken the oath of citizen of the Republic of Latvia.

In order to acquire citizenship, it is necessary to comply with all of these provisions and the provisions of Article 3.5.

3.5 Citizenship of the Republic of Latvia shall not be granted to persons who:

1) have acted through unconstitutional methods against the independence of the Republic of Latvia, the democratic parliamentary state system, or the existing state power in Latvia, if this has been found by a decision of a court;

2) have been sentenced to imprisonment for the committal of deliberate crimes, or who are held criminally liable, at the time of the decision on the question of granting of citizenship;

3) were in the Armed Forces of the USSR, or the internal military or security service of the USSR, as well as persons who, after 17 June 1940, chose the Republic of Latvia for their place of residence after demobilization from the Armed Forces of the USSR, or the internal military or security service of the USSR and who were not permanently resident on the territory of Latvia at the time of enlistment in the respective service;

4) have committed crimes against humanity, international or war crimes, or participated in mass repressions, if this has been found by a decision of a court;

5) spread chauvinist, fascist, communist or other totalitarian as well as class dictatorship ideas, incited national or racial discord or hatred, if this has been found by a decision of a court;

6) were sent to Latvia after 17 June 1940 as CPSU or Komsomol employees;

7) are in the registers of drug addiction institutions;

8) live without a legal source of income.

3.6 With the exception of instances provided for in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of this resolution, naturalization will begin no earlier than 1 July 1992, and shall be carried out in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Latvia entitled “On Citizenship”.38

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38 Ibid., art. 3. My translation.
Let us take a look at what these provisions mean for Latvia’s Russian-speakers.

Subparagraph 1 of Paragraph 4 requires only “conversational” level of knowledge of the Latvian language, similarly to Estonia. However, just as similarly to the situation in Estonia, there is Subparagraph 4, which requires knowledge of the Latvian Constitution. The constitution test is conducted in Latvia, and therefore in Latvia as well there exists the situation where the “conversational” level language requirement is an illusion since the applicants have to learn the constitution and be able to answer questions about it in Latvian.

Identically to the Estonian situation, Subparagraph 3 of Paragraph 5 bans former Soviet military and national security personnel from Latvian citizenship.

Subparagraph 3 of Paragraph 4 sets an extremely lengthy residence requirement of 16 years prior to the adoption of the resolution. Furthermore, there is no provision for fulfilling the residence requirement after the coming into force of the resolution. This means that those who came after 1975 could not naturalize while this document was in force. Such a situation was arbitrary and obviously disadvantaged the Russian-speaking minority.

On 22 July 1994, the Law on Citizenship was adopted, which changed the situation with regard to the residence requirement. It was now required that those applying for naturalization had lived in Latvia for 5 years beginning on 4 May 1990. This created a situation where many representatives of the Russian-speaking minority had to wait at least until 4 May 1995 before they could apply for naturalization.\(^{39}\) This is almost 3 years after what was promised in the original resolution of 1991.

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As if the possibility to naturalize were not delayed enough, amendments to the Law on Citizenship made in 1995 introduced a “window system”, which meant that those who were born in Latvia had priority over those born outside of Latvia, and the younger had priority over the older. The earliest possible naturalization was again postponed, this time to 1 January 1996. The naturalization schedule was established in Article 14 of the Law (as of 1995), which read as follows:

(1) Applications for naturalization shall be reviewed in accordance with the requirements of Articles 11 and 12 of this Law in the following order:  
1) starting from 1 January 1996 – the applications of those persons who were born in Latvia and are 16 to 20 years old on the submission date of their application;  
2) starting from 1 January 1997 – the applications of those persons who were born in Latvia and are up to 25 years old on the submission date of their application;  
3) starting from 1 January 1998 – the applications of those persons who were born in Latvia and are up to 30 years old on the submission date of their application;  
4) starting from 1 January 1999 – the applications of those persons who were born in Latvia and are up to 40 years old on the submission date of their application;  
5) starting from 1 January 2000 – the applications of all other persons who were born in Latvia;  
6) starting from 1 January 2001 – the applications of those persons who were born outside of Latvia and who entered Latvia as minors;  
7) starting from 1 January 2002 – the applications of those persons who were born outside of Latvia and who entered Latvia up to the age of 30;  
8) starting from 1 January 2003 – the applications of all other persons.  
(2) The applications for naturalization by the persons listed in this Article, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 1-7 shall be reviewed in the order of their submission.  
(3) The order for reviewing the applications for naturalization by persons listed in this Article, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 8 shall be determined by giving precedence to those persons who have resided in Latvia for the longer period.  
(4) Amendments to this Article which accelerate naturalization or amendments to Paragraph 4 of this Article shall come into force no earlier than one year after their adoption.\(^{40}\)

What this article means is that the luckiest of the Russian-speaking minority could apply for naturalization 6 years after Latvia’s independence, while the least lucky ones would have to wait for 13 years even if they met all the eligibility criteria. Furthermore, should there be any amendments to this order or attempts to abolish it, there would be a year-long “cool-off period” for the legislator to change their mind.

On 22 June 1998 the Saeima adopted a new edition of the citizenship law. The most important provision concerning the Russian-speaking national minority was the abolition of the “window system” for naturalization. Latvia’s Russian-speakers could finally apply for naturalization. It is then no surprise that in 1999 the level of naturalizations approximately trebled in comparison to pre-1999 levels.

“Non-citizenship”

12 April 1995 saw the adoption of the Law on the Status of those Former U.S.S.R. Citizens who do not have the Citizenship of Latvia or that of any Other State. This act introduced the possibility for Russian-speakers to apply for a status unparalleled anywhere else in the world – that of “non-citizen”. This status may more accurately be described as semi-citizenship. It gives the bearer a semi-passport (a “non-citizen’s” passport), diplomatic protection

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abroad, in some cases treatment equal to Latvian nationals before international law, certain domestic rights such as land ownership, but leaves the bearer without political rights. This phenomenon is important to consider because it provides disincentives to naturalize. It is easier to acquire the status of non-citizen than become naturalized, provides all the rights an average person really needs, and offers not only freedom of movement within the EU, but also visa-free travel to Russia (which is not available to Latvian citizens).

In post-independence Latvia, Russian-speakers were not only systematically excluded from citizenship, but until 1998, naturalization procedures were set up in such a way that people from this minority could not apply in most cases, or had to wait a long time before applying. In the meanwhile the significantly-easier-to-achieve “non-citizen” status was introduced which was yet another disincentive for naturalization. With the final regulation of naturalization procedures in 1998, the number of applications for naturalization took off as could be expected.

Lithuania

The review of Lithuanian citizenship law will be somewhat shorter than the reviews of Estonian and Latvian legislation were. This is mainly so because of the “zero-option” provided by Lithuania to its Russian-speakers. As Lithuania’s Russian speakers were able to acquire Lithuanian citizenship from the outset of independence, the analysis of naturalization procedures becomes unnecessary.
Citizenship law of 1989

The initial Lithuanian citizenship law was passed in 1989. This can be somewhat confusing as Lithuania only declared its independence in 1990, and started gaining factual independence only in 1991. Formally, the 1989 law made Lithuania the first Soviet republic to have a republican citizenship law as what was formally regulated in that act was republican citizenship of LSSR, and not citizenship of independent Lithuania which did not at that time yet exist. However, in reality this was a preparatory move by the Supreme Soviet of LSSR before declaring independence. It made sense to regulate citizenship (and many other important matters), thus initializing the democratization of Lithuania, within the framework of Soviet Lithuanian law, before declaring independence so that once independence was declared, all attributes of a democratic state would be present. Upon inspecting the 1989 citizenship law, one can see that it establishes a connection with pre-occupation Lithuanian citizenship, and that it was a transitional law before the sovereignty of the Lithuanian state would be restored. The following paragraphs will offer an analysis of how the 1989 Lithuanian citizenship law affected the Russian-speaking minority in Lithuania.

Although the 1989 law formally creates categories of citizens, the main principle is that everyone living in Lithuania could become a Lithuanian citizen. Article 1 of the law reads:

The following persons shall be citizens of the Lithuanian SSR:

(1) Persons who were citizens of the Republic of Lithuania, children and grandchildren of such persons, as well as other persons who were permanent residents on the current territory of the Lithuanian SSR prior to 15 June 1940, and their children and grandchildren who now are permanent residents on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR;
(2) Persons who have a permanent place of residence in the Lithuanian SSR, provided they were born on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, or have provided evidence that at least one of their parents or grandparents was born on said territory, and provided that they are not citizens of another state;

(3) Other persons who, up to and including the date of entry into force of this Law, have been permanent residents on the territory of the Republic and have here a permanent place of employment or another constant legal source of support; such persons shall freely choose their citizenship during two years following the entry into force of this Law; and

(4) Persons who have acquired citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR under this Law.\(^44\)

While Paragraph 4 was only applicable in the future, the first three paragraphs were what defined Lithuanian citizenry on the day of its coming into existence. Four categories of citizens can be seen here. Paragraph one creates the first two categories: those who were citizens in 1940 and their descendants, and those who were not citizens, but permanent residents in 1940 and remained residents until the coming into effect of the law as well as their descendants if they too were permanent residents in 1989. This is what appears to be the intended core of the citizenry – people with ties to the “old” Lithuania. Only those Russian-speakers who are descendants of the small Russian-speaking minority that existed before 1940 would be affected by this paragraph. What was really relevant to the great majority of Lithuania’s Russian-speaking minority were paragraphs 2 and 3. Paragraph 2 established fairly unrestricted retrospective \textit{ius soli} – those born in Lithuania and permanently resident there (and their permanent resident descendants) were almost unconditionally entitled to Lithuanian citizenship. While a number of the country’s Russian-speakers were affected by Paragraph 2, an even greater number became citizens under Paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 provides for Lithuanian citizenship for the fourth category – those who have no other grounds to citizenship, but are permanent residents on the day of the coming into

effect of the citizenship law. On the one hand, the restriction that the permanent resident concerned must be employed or have another source of income may have possibly excluded some applicants. On the other hand, having in mind the very high employment rate in the USSR and the fact that the Soviet-era immigrants into Lithuania mostly came there to work, the number of applicants who were excluded because of this was very low. Furthermore, the lack of definition of what constitutes “other” sources of income means that anything went. It appears that the measure was meant more to exclude those attempting to fake their permanent residency than those who were unemployed. When coupled, the Paragraph 2 *ius soli* and the Paragraph 3 “zero option” meant that practically all of Lithuania’s Russian-speakers were eligible for Lithuanian citizenship under the initial 1989 citizenship law.

There are two more provisions of the 1989 law worth mentioning. Firstly, Article 35 establishes that during the two years that residents have for opting for citizenship, they can enjoy the rights of Lithuanian citizens.\(^{45}\) This creates a seamless transition from Soviet to Lithuanian citizenship. Secondly, in various part of the law, multiple citizenship is prohibited. This was initially done mostly so as to avoid dual Russian and Lithuanian citizens after the eventual disintegration of the USSR.

*Subsequent legislation*

On 5 December 1991, the Supreme Council – Reconstitutive Seimas passed the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Citizenship, which replaced the LSSR Law on Citizenship. The 1991 law does not contain any provisions that would appear to have a discriminatory effect on

\(^{45}\) Ibid., Article 35.
the Russian-speaking minority. In its Article 1, Paragraph 3 it confirms that “persons, who by 4 November 1991, acquired citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania in accordance with the Law on Citizenship that was in force until the passing of this law” are citizens of Lithuania. On 10 December 1991, the Supreme Council – Reconstitutive Seimas passed an amendments law to the Law on Citizenship, in which one of the provisions was that for those who chose Lithuanian citizenship on the basis of the 1989 law the validity of citizenship certificates would be extended until Lithuanian passports begin to be issued. This was a further measure to ensure an unproblematic transition from Soviet to Lithuanian citizenship. All other amendments of the Law on Citizenship made until the end of 1999 are either of technical nature or concerned with regulating citizenship for Lithuanian émigrés. They have no direct effect on the Russian-speaking minority in Lithuania.

As the analysis of Lithuanian citizenship legislation from 1989 to end of the first decade of independence shows, the Russian-speaking community in Lithuania was included almost without exception under the “zero-option” legislation. There was a two-year window to opt for citizenship, and before the decision was made, qualifying individuals could enjoy the rights of a Lithuanian citizen as per Article 35 of the 1989 law. Provisions were made for validity of provisional documents before the issuing of Lithuanian passports began.

The above analysis of the position of the Russian-speaking minorities with regard to citizenship legislation in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania helps see more clearly the dichotomy in the approaches taken by Lithuania on the one hand, and Estonia and Latvia on the other hand. While completely inclusive initial law was passed in Lithuania, in Estonia and Latvia exclusionary laws that condemned many Russian-speakers to the fate of statelessness or at best “non-citizenship” were adopted. The next part of this thesis will look into the economic integration indicators with respect to Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic in attempt to confirm the existence of a link between citizenship and economic integration.
PART 2. Indicators of the Economic Integration of the Russophone Minorities

This part of the thesis will investigate the socioeconomic situation of the respective majorities and the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states through a comparison of survey data. I rely on three of the six of New Baltic Barometer surveys, which are a set of consistent surveys, conducted in 1993, 1995, and 1996. Several questions are selected, and the responses are analyzed here. I will attempt to see whether, in each country, the Russian-speaking minority is advantaged or disadvantaged and whether its position is improving, staying the same, or deteriorating. The expected outcome of the analysis is that the position of the Russian-speaking minority in Lithuania will be better than that of the Russian-speaking minorities of Estonia and Latvia.

Amount and structure of income

First, let us consider the question about income. A question was asked “In the past month, what was your income?” The mean average results in 1993 were as follows. Estonians in Estonia: 951 krooni vs. Russians in Estonia: 950 krooni; Latvians in Latvia: 49 lati vs. Russians in Latvia: 48 lati; Lithuanians in Lithuania: 186 litai vs. Russians in Lithuania: 225 litai. In 1995 the results were the following. Estonians in Estonia: 1428 krooni vs. Russians in Estonia: 1333 krooni; Latvians in Latvia: 63 lati vs. Russians in Latvia: 57 lati; Lithuanians in Lithuania: 259 litai vs. Russians in Lithuania: 298 litai. In 1996, the mean average answers were as follows. Estonians in Estonia: 2461 krooni vs. Russians in Estonia: 1996 krooni; Latvians in Latvia: 63
This data shows that the relative position of the Russian-speakers in comparison with the majority ethnic group was deteriorating uniformly throughout the Baltic states. Although in 1993 the incomes of Russians and Balts were practically the same in Latvia and Estonia, and Russians in Lithuania had better incomes than Lithuanians in Lithuania, by 1996, we can see that the majorities in Latvia and Estonia were making noticeably more than the Russian-speakers, and in Lithuania, Russian-speakers were now making the same as Lithuanians. Perhaps the deteriorating relative level of income of Russian-speakers could be linked to difficulty in keeping and obtaining employment due to language laws. However, in any case, it appears that although the relative situation was better in the citizenship-liberal Lithuania, it was deteriorating in all of the Baltic states, and therefore this presents a problem for linking citizenship with economic integration of the Russian-speaking minorities.

Another question was about what the household made their living from. As the answers present many options, for simplicity, tables are provided here taken directly from the surveys.


Table 2. Sources of subsistence in 1995. Source: Richard Rose, “New Baltics Barometer II: A Survey Study,” (survey study, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 1995).

The above tables show that in general there are no big differences within and between the different Baltic states with regard to the means of subsistence of the ethnic majorities and the Russian-speaking minority. Furthermore, there are no identifiable trends that would show an improving or deteriorating situation of the Russian-speakers. There appears to be a stable equality of the Balts and the Russians in the area of sources of subsistence. This is a very important indicator of structural economic integration that shows that the Russian-speaking minorities are not in a position where they have to make their subsistence from sources that are different from those of the majorities. Those Russian-speakers who moved to the Baltic states virtually always came as employees of various ranks, and thus were not disadvantaged with regard to employment. Therefore it may not be surprising that their initial position was equal, but what is surprising is that the Russian-speakers maintained equality in this respect after being denied citizenship and facing other kinds of discrimination.
Employment

It is also very important to consider the employment situation of members of the majority and the minority. The following tables present the aggregated responses to the question about employment status.

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<th>Economic Status</th>
<th>Est</th>
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<th>Lit</th>
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<th>LaR</th>
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**Table 4. Employment situation in 1993.** Source: Richard Rose and William Maley, “Nationalities in the Baltic States.”

<table>
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<th>Employment Situation</th>
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<th>EstRus</th>
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**Table 5. Employment situation in 1995.** Source: Richard Rose, “New Baltics Barometer II.”
The most important statistic within tables 4, 5, and 6 is that of unemployment. With regard to unemployment, we can see that with the only exception of Latvia in 1995 (where there was an equal number of unemployed Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers) the percentage of unemployed Russian-speakers is higher than that of Balts in all three countries in each year. This is an indicator that the position of the Russian-speakers is not quite equal to that of the majority ethnicities in the Baltic states. However, the fact that there is no significant difference between Estonia and Latvia on the one hand, and Lithuania on the other hand, once again shows that in this case too there is no correlation between the citizenship status and the economic status of the Russian-speaking minorities.
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For tables 7, 8 and 9, it is necessary to sum up the many lines into broader categories in order to see a better picture. The first two lines, “Professional, director” and “Trained supervisor” will be combined into “Management”. “Trained non-manual without subordinates” and “Routine non-manual” will be combined into “Non-manual”. “Skilled manual” and “Unskilled manual” will be combined into “Manual”. Finally, “Agricultural worker” and “Farmer” will not be analyzed since it is natural that less Russian-speakers are working in the agricultural sector because they tend to be immigrants who settled in urban centers. For the new category “Management”, we can see from tables 7, 8, and 9 that in 1993 there were more Estonian than Russian managers in Estonia, almost the same percentage of Latvian and Russian managers in Latvia, and less Lithuanian than Russian managers in Lithuania. In 1995, the ethnic distribution of managers was equal or almost equal in Lithuania and Latvia, and remained to be in the favor of Estonians in Estonia. In 1996, the percentages were almost equal in Lithuania, while in Latvia and Estonia they disfavored Russian-speakers. In the management category, the situation was initially and remained not in the favor of Russians-speakers in Estonia. Meanwhile in Latvia and Lithuania the position of the Russian-speakers deteriorated overall. With regard to
the category of “Non-manual”, in 1993 the situation was as follows: In Latvia and Estonia there were more native non-manual workers than Russian-speaking ones, while in Lithuania there were more Russian-speaking non-manual workers than native ones. In 1995, in Latvia there were more Latvian than Russian-speaking non-manual workers, in Estonia there were equal percentages of Estonians and Russian-speakers doing such jobs, and in Lithuania the situation remained in favor of Russian-speakers over Lithuanians. In 1996, the percentages were equal in Lithuania, but favored natives in Estonia, and especially Latvia. From this data it is difficult to identify trends, but it can be said that the situation of the Russian-speaking minority in Lithuania was overall better than that of the counterpart minorities in Estonia and Latvia. In the category of “Manual”, in 1993, there were significantly more Russian-speakers than natives working in each of the three countries. The situation remained the same in 1995. It also was the same in 1996 with the exception of Lithuania where the number of Lithuanian manual workers was now higher than that of Russian-speaking manual workers. The overall substantially higher numbers of Russian-speaking manual workers indicate the disadvantaged position within the job market of these minorities. However, the uniformity of this situation throughout countries and survey years with only one exception to the trend points towards a disconnect between citizenship and economic integration.

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</table>

From tables 10, 11, and 12 we can identify three types of most common employment for both the majorities and the minorities. These are factory workers, state health and education sector employees, and private sector employees. For the factory workers category, the data from 1993 shows that in all three countries there was a significantly higher number of Russian-speakers working factory jobs than there were Baltic people working the same jobs. This remained unwaveringly so in 1995 and 1996. This is connected to the previous question, where we saw that Russian-speakers were more likely to work manual jobs, which are, unsurprisingly, likely to be in factories. As for health and education sector jobs, in general they seem to be dominated by Balts. In 1993, this was undoubtedly so in all three Baltic states. In 1995 the situation remained the same. However, in 1996, while the advantage remained with the Latvians in Latvia and with the Estonians in Estonia, in Lithuania, Russian-speakers caught up and equal percentages of Lithuanian-speakers and Russian-speakers were employed in state healthcare and education. The improving situation in Lithuania could be explained by the fact that Lithuania’s Russian-speakers have citizenship, which may be required for certain public sector jobs. However, that does not explain why the situation of Russian-speakers in Latvia and
Estonia, where they at that point mostly did not have citizenship, did not deteriorate in the public healthcare and education sector. This may be linked to language requirements and the fact that Russian-speakers in Lithuania are more likely to know the local language than the Russian-speakers in Latvia or Estonia. Finally, let us take a look at the private sector employee category. In 1993 this sector was still small, and therefore the numbers are low for all ethnicities. However, we can already see that while in Estonia there were more natives in private jobs, in Latvia and Lithuania, a larger percentage of Russian-speakers held private jobs than did natives. This remained the same in 1995. In 1996, the situation stayed the same in Latvia. However, in Lithuania and Estonia the percentages equalized or almost equalized, meaning that in Estonia the situation of Russian-speakers improved, while in Lithuania it deteriorated. This runs directly counter to what one would expect under the assumption that citizenship means more economic integration.

**Economic wellbeing**

Another important part of the story is the economic wellbeing. This indicator is in large part related to what has already been discussed. The relative and objective wellbeing of minority families and households depends to a very large degree on the situation of those minorities on the job market and on how much they earn. At the same time, these statistics are the ones that allow for most personal subjectivity in the respondents’ answers, and therefore must be viewed with certain care. It is best to interpret these results as the self-reflective evaluation of their position by the minorities (and the majorities) themselves. The first question that will be examined is how satisfied the respondents were with their family’s economic situation.


For the purposes of this paper, the answers “Very satisfactory” and “Fairly satisfactory” will be interpreted as positive answers, and the answers “Not very satisfactory” and “Very
unsatisfactory” will be interpreted as negative answers. Because the option “Don’t know” was available in years 1993 and 1995, it becomes possible that the same ethnic group gives both negative and positive answers slightly more often than the other group. This is what happened in all three countries in 1993. In 1995, the trend becomes clear that Russian speakers in all three countries become noticeably less satisfied and more unsatisfied than the native Baltic majorities. At this point situation seems to stabilize as in 1996, Russian-speakers are again uniformly less satisfied and more unsatisfied. This would seem to show that the economic wellbeing or at least the self-perceived economic wellbeing of the Russian-speaking minorities had deteriorated in all three Baltic states, and again this too was not connected to the type of citizenship policy.


Table 16 shows that in 1993, the self-assessed relative standard of living of households of Baltic-speaking respondents was slightly better than that of the households of Russian-speaking respondents. The only piece of data that points otherwise is that in Latvia 2 percent of Latvian-speakers said that their household’s standard of living in “above average”, while the same answer was given by 3 percent of Latvia’s Russian-speakers. All other numbers point to the slightly worse position of Russian-speakers in all three countries. On a cross-country average, and in each country individually, more Russian-speakers answered “below average” than did representatives of the ethnic majorities. As can be seen from table 17, in 1995, the results for “above average” are better for Baltic-speakers than for Russian-speakers. However, if we look at “average” and “below average”, we find that while the situation remained largely the same in Latvia and Lithuania, in Estonia, Russian-speakers now were doing better than Estonian-speakers. Table 18 gives the same result: the standard of living of Russian-speakers was worse than that of the respective majorities in Latvia and Lithuania, but better than that of the ethnic majority in Estonia. Here we see that the situation of the Russian speakers was the best in Estonia, which is the most restrictive of the three countries with regard to granting of citizenship to that minority.
The detailed examination of the social survey data in this part of the thesis has shown that the situation appears to run counter to the initial hypothesis. I had expected to find convincing proof that in Lithuania, which is citizenship-liberal with regard to its Russian-speaking minority, that minority would be much better integrated economically than its counterparts are in Latvia and Estonia, citizenship-restrictive countries. However, this does not seem to hold. Answers to the six survey questions that are the most important for the purposes of this research were analyzed. These questions were from the areas of income and subsistence, employment, and economic wellbeing. With regard to income, although the Russian-speakers in Lithuania were in a better relative situation than the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia, the situation was deteriorating equally in all three countries. As for types of means of subsistence, the results showed good and stable integration of the Russian minorities in all three states being researched. In all three countries Russian-speakers were slightly more likely to be unemployed, which points to the perhaps somewhat disadvantaged position of that minority. However, once again there is a lack of a dichotomy between countries within the survey results. The data on the type of employment are the only ones that could provide some support for the hypothesis, as in some years in Lithuania there were higher percentages of Russian-speakers working in more prestigious jobs and higher percentages of Lithuanians working in less prestigious job. However, overall, pattern and trends with regard to type of employment were difficult to determine, and once again, there was no dichotomy. With regard to type of employer, the only clear pattern was that Russian-speakers were more likely to be factory workers. In the citizenship-liberal Lithuania the employment of Russian-speakers in healthcare and education increased, but that in the private sector decreased. Meanwhile in the citizenship-exclusive Estonia, the position of Russian-speakers improved in the private sector. So in this case too, the trends are mixed and
there is no clear indication of the connection between citizenship and economic integration. Satisfaction with one’s family’s economic situation was in general lower for Russian speakers in all three countries. Finally, with regard to relative economic position of households within the context of the respective countries, Russian-speakers seem to be making most gain in Estonia, the most restrictive of the three countries when it comes to citizenship. The above data shows only that more often than not the economic position of Russian-speakers in the Baltic is deteriorating, but this cannot be linked to citizenship as the results do not produce a dichotomy between Lithuania on the one hand, and Estonia and Latvia on the other hand.
CONCLUSION

The post-independence interplay of political and economic integration and exclusion in the Baltic states with regard to the Russophone minorities is a new topic of research. Most of the literature up to now has concentrated on either citizenship aspect or on integration/exclusion aspect. Sometimes it has been simply assumed by authors in both of these fields that the lack of citizenship causes exclusion without further analysis. It was the aim of the present author to test this intuitive hypothesis by a detailed analysis of the legal citizenship regimes and survey data on economic questions. The link would either be proved or disproved.

In Part 1 of the thesis we saw that the legal regulation of citizenship is very different in Lithuania on the one hand, and in Latvia and Estonia on the other hand, when it comes to the Russian-speaking minority. In Estonia and Latvia, the majority of the Russian-speakers are excluded from citizenship by laws that give automatic citizenship only to pre-war citizens and their descendants, and in addition set strict regulations for naturalization. In addition, in the first decade of regained independence, these laws were designed to postpone naturalization by as much as possible. Meanwhile, the legislator in Lithuania adopted such a law that entitled everyone permanently resident in the republic – thus the Russian-speaking minority as well – to Lithuanian citizenship. Subsequent laws were also designed to provide seamless transition from Soviet to Lithuanian citizenship. It is clear then that the citizenship situation with regard to the Russian-speaking minorities was radically different, even opposed, in Estonia and Latvia and in Lithuania. Such a dichotomy being present with regard to citizenship, the most important foundation of political inclusion in a national society, it indeed can be intuitively expected that Lithuania’s Russian-speakers enjoyed having a better position within Lithuania economically.
than did Latvia’s or Estonia’s Russian-speakers in their respective countries. This being the hypothesis, a close inspection of the economic situation of individuals belonging to the Russian-speaking communities of the Baltic is warranted and necessary in order to prove or disprove the assumption.

In Part 2, I analyze the economic position of the Russian-speakers in the Baltic states by examining ethnically differentiated response data of the New Baltic Barometer surveys. I examine such indicators as income and means of subsistence, type of employment, and economic wellbeing of families and households. The answers indicated that the situation of the Russian minorities has more often deteriorated than improved or stayed the same, and that they are more often disadvantaged than they are advantaged. Nevertheless, with certain small exceptions, there was no sufficient data to show an overall dichotomy between the situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in Lithuania on the one hand, and in Latvia and Estonia on the other hand.

I had set out to research the position of the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic expecting that it will be connected to their citizenship status. I assumed that political integration through its most basic form – citizenship – would result in better economic integration. My hypothesis has been proven wrong.

The findings have wider implications for nationalism and minority studies. It is often assumed that citizenship and legal protection of minorities influence the position of these minorities in an essential way. It is argued that without citizenship and minority laws, minorities are disadvantaged. And although the economic survey data has shown that in the Baltic states the Russophone minorities are somewhat disadvantaged, it is very difficult to link these disadvantages to the citizenship regimes. The three countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are very similar societies, with very similar recent history, and the same reasons for Russian-
speaking immigration in the past. The only differences being the size of the minority and the citizenship regime, it is then difficult to understand why the results with regard to economic integration are more or less the same when in one country the Russian-speaking minority is politically integrated, and in the other two its counterparts are almost completely excluded. That is, it is difficult to understand if we look through the prism of only the relationship between politics and economics.

Further research on this topic should expand on this work and include social factors, which, it could be, are influencing the equation. Perhaps this triangle should also not be viewed only through the post-independence lens. It may be that the Soviet legacy has had a much stronger post-independence effect than it has been so far assumed. Or perhaps, on the contrary, it is the societal intolerance of this legacy that caused the deteriorating position of the Russophones throughout the first decade of independence in all the three countries regardless of formal legal inclusion or exclusion through citizenship or lack thereof. Wherever the answer lies, an expansion on this thesis could offer not only more answers on this particular topic, but also shed a new light on the position of other minorities. It is my hope that such research will indeed be conducted.
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