The dynamics of Polish patriotism after 1989:
concepts, debates, identities

by

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degrees, in any other institutions. The thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by any other person, except where appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

Dorota Szeligowska
30 June 2014
Abstract

During rapid social changes, such as democratic transition, both intellectual and political elites discuss the essence of key political concepts. After 1989, in Poland, during such intellectual debates academics, editorialists and politicians have discussed extensively the legacy of the communist regime, and the nature of the new democratic regime, and have redefined important concepts. Particularly, discussions over the concept of patriotism or its re-definition have occurred with astonishing frequency since 25 years.

Already in 1990, the renowned historian of ideas Andrzej Walicki suggested that “a new kind of Polish patriotism must be developed: a patriotism free from the archaic features of the democratic legacy of Old Poland, critical of Romantic illusions, but no less critical of [Roman] Dmowski’s version of political realism.” This statement built on the idea of civic patriotism, proposed by a dissident left-wing intellectual Jan Józef Lipski, in his significant essay “Dwie ojczyzny, dwa patriotyzmy (Two fatherlands, two patriotisms),” published in 1981. Since 1989, many other important intellectuals of various ideological allegiances have debated the desirable new formula of patriotism adapted for the times of peace and for future (Marek A. Cichocki, Dariusz Gawin, Jerzy Jedlicki, Marcin Król, Wojciech Sadurski, Władysław Stróżewski, Jerzy Szacki, Magdalena Środa, etc.).

This research project analyzes a number of public debates in which the meaning of patriotism was discussed. The approach is indebted to applied political theory, and history of political thought, using the methods of conceptual history. In order to grasp the entire contestation over the meaning of political concepts and
conceptual change, the analysis is threefold: textual, contextual and morphological. The use of concepts and changes in their meaning is not only due to individual authorial attempts and the influence of contextual elements, but also to the situating of concepts in specific constellations, broader chains of concepts and counter concepts. The work of interpretation, to be complete, needs to address both synchronic and diachronic perspectives of political languages/discourses and their continuous or discontinuous use in political arguments.

Understanding the dynamics of these debates, the nature of the contestation over the meaning of patriotism, and why and how patriotism is made into a politically relevant concept makes it possible to explain the importance of this concept for the public sphere, political culture and thought in Poland after 1989, linking it to earlier developments. The analysis contributes to a better understanding of the reconstruction of political community at the critical juncture of regime change, and of intellectual preoccupations linked to the foundations of a democratic regime.

Starting from the definition of patriotism as ‘love of one’s country,’ I show how in the first decade of the democratic transition the uncertainty linked to the social, political and economic transformation pushed the discussion towards the ‘country’ aspect of the definition, the object of the allegiance. Later ‘discursive events’ offered different openings for discussing the ‘love’ aspect of the definition and the nature of allegiance. While discussions prior to 2000 attempted to find a compromise solution and middle ground in the quest for the conceptual definition, later on the debate gradually became increasingly polarized. However, despite conservative attempts at monopolization of the concept, a discursive closure has not

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happened, and a variety of ideological positions are still available, and continue to be put forward by emerging strong circles of conservative, left-wing or liberal intellectuals.
Acknowledgments

First of all, I want to thank my supervisors. Without their steady support I would probably not make it to the end of this long and sometimes-bumpy road. I want to thank Nenad Dimitrijevic for his support in the initial phases of my project and Lea Sgier for her patient and thorough help with cutting through the jungle of my sometimes entangled, and often verbose arguments. Last, but not least, my endless gratitude goes to Balázs Trencsényi, for being there all along, and serving as a compass and a reality check for my research, making me believe it would come to a successful end at some point. Much of my gratitude goes to Kriszta Zsukotynszky and Robert Sata, for having a fast and efficient answer to any question. I would like to thank John Harbord from the Centre of Academic Writing, for his precious help with polishing the linguistic edges of this thesis. I also want to recognize the importance of the support of the International Visegrad Fund in the initial years of my doctoral studies.

I would like to thank all teachers and researchers who have inspired me and helped me to attain this milestone. I’m deeply indebted to Hans-Dieter Klingemann, the first professor who, by his genuine excitement for working with ever new generations of students, inspired me towards an academic career. I also want to thank Georges Mink for inciting me to do a PhD at CEU. I will not be able to thank everyone who provided me with advice in the thesis writing process, but I want to express my appreciation towards those whom I had a pleasure to meet during my studies or at conferences, and who took their time to discuss my research and share their thoughts in order to help me advance: Jan-Werner Müller, Joanna Michlic, Geneviève Zubrzycki, Joanna Kurczewska, Maciej Janowski.

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Budapest will always feel like home to me and I hope to be back soon.

Mamo, Tato, dziękuję Wam za wszystko!
Cioci Irce i babci Czesi
“To może być patriotyzm (It can be patriotism)”, © Andrzej Mleczko³

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<table>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>Akcja Wyborcza 'Solidarność' – the Electoral Action 'Solidarność'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBWR</td>
<td>Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform – the Non-partisan bloc for support of reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOS</td>
<td>Centrum Badania Opinii Publicznej – Public Opinion Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GW</td>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPN</td>
<td>Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu – the Institute of National Memory – Commission of prosecution of crimes against the Polish nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLD</td>
<td>Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny – the Liberal-Democratic Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPN</td>
<td>Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej – the Confederation of Independent Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LiD</td>
<td>Lewica i Demokraci – the Left and the Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>Liga Polskich Rodzin – the League of Polish Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Muzeum Historii Polski – Museum of Polish history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKiDN</td>
<td>Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego – Ministry of Culture and National Heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPW</td>
<td>Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego – Museum of Warsaw Uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Narodowa Demokracja – the National Democracy (fam. Endecja)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Porozumienie Centrum – the Centre Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – the Law and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Platforma Obywatelska – the Civic Platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Polska Partia Socjalistyczna – the Polish Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRL</td>
<td>Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa – the People’s Republic of Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – the Polish Peasants’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PZPR</td>
<td>Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza – the Polish United Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>Ruch Odbudowy Polski – the Movement for reconstruction of Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej –the Alliance of Democratic Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Tygodnik Powszechny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>Urząd bezpieczeństwa – the (communist)Security Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>Unia Demokratyczna – the Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Unia Pracy – the Labour Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>Unia Wolności – the Freedom Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSL</td>
<td>Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe – the United People’s Party</td>
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1 Chapter One – Introduction

The concept of patriotism is strongly embedded in the political languages of some countries, such as the United States of America. It also has been an object of theoretical reflection in the field of political theory, over the past 30 years, and a number of conceptualizations have been proposed to establish the grounds for a stable and viable political allegiance of citizens to their respective polities. One of these is ‘constitutional patriotism,’ a conceptualization that emerged in Germany in the 1980s, in the context of the Historikerstreit, or ‘Historians’ debate,’ about the approach to the nation’s war past. The idea of constitutional patriotism, looking beyond a purely national framework of reference, was later suggested as a possible desirable version of political allegiance to the European Union, perceived as a post-national community.

In 1989, the political changes that swept the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, leading to the dislocation of the Soviet Union, placed a number of countries that had only a vague, if any, experience of democracy, on the road to democratic transformation. It seems natural that debates about the nature of allegiance and national identity ensued. Yet in Poland in particular, the persistence of discussions about the concept of patriotism reaches beyond merely understanding questions related to national community and statehood, and provides insights concerning broader political culture and nature of contestation.

On a theoretical level, the concept of patriotism is important for most countries of the world, as it provides a basis of political allegiance and identification of the citizens with the state. In Poland, however, its usage in political contestations
can have important repercussions on the county’s foreign, cultural or historical policies, making it relevant also for its neighbors and the entire European Union. It is therefore interesting to study how it can, within changing political and intellectual circumstances, shift and evolve in unexpected ways.

A recurring contestation over the concept of patriotism within a number of public debates has marked the last 25 years of Polish public discourse. After 1989, the re-opening of the discursive field in general, and of that related to nationhood and statehood in particular, fostered an open discussion about topics that were previously taboo, thus re-enabling the contestation concerning key concepts previously distorted by the hegemonic communist discourse. This is especially the case with patriotism, a concept which continues to provoke heated debates. The opening of the discursive field over Polish national identity prompted a new iteration of the ‘culture war’ on a symbolic battleground, where the proponents of “the old ethno-religious understanding of Polish nationhood stood against adherents of a more civic definition.” While some authors expected the civic option (already proposed by some dissident thinkers in the 1980s) to triumph in the new democratic context, this has not been the case, and different political languages still clash in the contestation over the meaning of patriotism. For this reason it is crucial to understand how and why different actors turn patriotism into a politically relevant concept.

2 Ibid.
3 It was notably the case of Jan Józef Lipski and Adam Michnik. Michal Kopeček, “Human rights facing a national past,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 38, no.4 (2012): 577.
4 Jan Tomasz Gross, “Poland: from civic society to political nation,” in *Eastern Europe in revolution*, ed. Ivo Banac (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1992). Gross did not imply that a political understanding of nation would replace an ethnic one, but that the regime transformation would allow for the passage from the communist reality, in which the citizens organized themselves in a civic society parallel to the state, to a political nation, where the citizens would become a true polity within the newly sovereign state.
The present study looks at a series of hitherto unanalyzed intellectual public debates in Poland during the democratic transformation from 1989 to 2010. In these debates, held on pages of opinion-setting daily, weekly and monthly publications (introduced in section 2.2) the meaning of patriotism was contested, and the concept turned into a political weapon. By studying the dynamics of these debates in the context of a strong embedding of the concept of patriotism in a broadly understood public sphere, it is possible to interpret its persistence in the public discourse in Poland. The research addresses the question of how the concept of patriotism has been debated and what influence the extensive debates about its meaning and their dynamics exerted on the broader Polish public sphere and political culture. In a wider perspective, the analysis enables a discussion of whether the conjunction of the democratic transition and the willingness of intellectual elites to redefine the concept of patriotism resulted in the formulation of a new patriotic formula that would extend the boundaries of previous theoretical reflection.

Answering these questions can help understand the importance of the concept of patriotism for the Polish public sphere; providing a novel interpretation of the evolution of the country’s political culture, intellectual landscape, politics, its languages (discourses), and key concepts after 1989. A critical analysis of different understandings of patriotism and of the mechanisms of their use in public and political debates, enabling or disabling different types of intellectual or political arguments can provide an intellectual mapping of different ideological positions and their relationship to the questions of national allegiance, the heritage of the

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5 The cut-off of analysis is 2010 and the debate that occurred following the Smolensk crash, in order to conclude whether prior intellectual developments provided lasting conceptual tools for a heavily emotional period of the national mourning.
communist regime, the nature of the political community, and by extension, democracy.

1.1 The importance of the concept of patriotism for Polish public discourse

In Poland, the concept of patriotism has always been an important feature of public debates. Historically speaking, it was important in the country’s fight for independence and sovereignty: during the partitions, when the country disappeared from the map for 123 years, through two world wars, and under communist rule.

For this and other reasons, patriotism was sometimes grandiloquently called a “school of practical thinking about politics,” or a “philosophy of life” or even a historical paradox: “[Poland is] a nation marked by its fervent patriotism which has been under foreign domination for most of the past two centuries.” The lack of a territorial reference during the partitions did not lead to the disappearance of patriotism, understood as ‘the love of one’s country.’ Its survival can be linked to the change of the meaning of the concept, or of its object of allegiance, from country to nation, as will be further discussed in Chapter 3, providing a historical contextualization for a better understanding of debates in question.

After the collapse of communism, patriotism remained a strong, structuring, element of the Polish public discourse. Already in 1990, the eminent historian of ideas Andrzej Walicki suggested developing a new conceptualization of patriotism that

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6 The expression ‘partitions of Poland’ is used to describe the period between 1795 and 1918 when the country ceased to exist after a sequence of three partitions (1772, 1793 1795), performed by the Russian Empire, the kingdom of Prussia and the Habsburg Austria.
would go beyond the three main historical patriotic traditions (republican, Romantic and realist):

“a new kind of Polish patriotism must be developed: a patriotism free from the archaic features of the democratic legacy of Old Poland, critical of Romantic illusions, but no less critical of [Roman] Dmowski’s version of political realism.”

Other intellectuals responded to the call for a new patriotic ‘formula’ that would be suitable for times of peace (insofar as the threat to national sovereignty had disappeared) or for the future. These recurring calls for a re-definition of patriotism can be seen as a kind of continuation of the initial reflection of dissident intellectuals such as Jan Józef Lipski, who discussed a dichotomous opposition between two types of patriotism in 1981. He opposed a modern and civic version of patriotism (which needed to be developed, in his opinion) to one grounded in uncritical love of the nation and national megalomania. While Lipski described national megalomania as one of the possible, yet undesirable, variants of patriotism, it should rather be called by the name of nationalism. This treatment of nationalism as a variant of patriotism brings to light yet another consideration, that of the semantic and conceptual entanglement of these two concepts. This entanglement will need to be addressed in order to reach an understanding of the concept of patriotism itself. Furthermore, the question of which approach to patriotism should be called ‘modern’ became a heated debate after 1989, among both intellectual and political elites. Usually, when someone seeks to frame her idea as modern, such a move aims to discredit the ideas of the opponent by implying that they are archaic or outright wrong.

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11 It is also called ‘patriotism in good times’, e.g. Wojciech Sadurski, “O patriotyzmie w czasach dobrych (About patriotism in good times),” Rzeczpospolita, 29 September 2004.
Discussions about the meaning of patriotism regularly take place in Poland on the occasion of two national holidays: 11th November (Independence Day, commemorating the end of the First World War in 1918 and the end of the partitions) and 3rd May (commemorating the adoption of the first Polish Constitution in 1791). Apart from these usual occasions, after 1989 the concept of patriotism has been discussed within a number of broader public debates. In the first decade of the democratic transition, more concentrated intellectual exchanges provided for the discussion of patriotism individually (1998), or in connection to related concepts, such as fatherland (1992) or nationalism (1997). Further debates were provoked by specific discursive events: the exhibition “Heroes of our liberty (Bohaterowie naszej wolności),” prepared in 2000 by the rising circle of conservative intellectuals; the publication of Jan Tomasz Gross’s books about Polish-Jewish relations, in 2000, 2008 and 2011; the conservative ‘politics of history,’ deployed in the sphere of public policies between 2005-2007, by the conservative government of PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Law and justice); or the crash of the plane carrying President Lech Kaczyński to Smolensk in 2010 for the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre of Polish officers by NKVD. All these debates will be introduced in detail and analyzed in the following empirical chapters.

The concept of patriotism is also strongly present in broader public and cultural spheres, besides politics and Publizistik (intellectual journalism, publicystyka, which is expressed within the editorials and op-ed sections of opinion-setting newspapers). This is not surprising, given that much of political and philosophical thought throughout Polish history, and particularly during Romanticism or communism, was developed within historiography and literature (using historical
arguments) and not only within the field of philosophy.\textsuperscript{14} Since 1989, the concept of patriotism appears not only in literature,\textsuperscript{15} but also in satirical comic strips published in daily or weekly press; it is discussed in the broadly understood blogosphere,\textsuperscript{16} or featured in television production and cinematography. All these examples show a recent growth of interest in historical reflection and heroic motives.\textsuperscript{17}

The prominent presence of the word ‘patriotism’ in public discourse in Poland over the past twenty years testifies to its importance among key political concepts, yet the more often the term is employed, the more confused its definition\textsuperscript{18} becomes. The starting point of this project is to accept that the concept of patriotism is a vessel that can be filled with a variety of meanings, some of which can generate strong leverage for intellectuals and political actors in their quest for, and exercise of, symbolic and political power.

Under the partitions, during two world wars, and throughout the communist period, Polish collective identity developed within an ever-present threat to the country’s sovereignty and the nation’s existence. After 1989, the removal of this structuring element of threat provoked insecurity in the matter of identity. I argue that the interest in patriotism in public discourse, especially in the initial phase of the democratic transition, results from the uncertainty about the nature of the new regime and its values, and about the impact of the democratic transformation on the status of individual, society, political community and national identity. Resorting to the

\textsuperscript{14} Marcin Król, “History instead of philosophy,” in \textit{Intellectuals and the politics of the humanities}, ed. Anna Wessely (Budapest: Collegium Budapest, 2002), 174-175.
\textsuperscript{15} E.g. Dorota Wodecka, \textit{Polonez na polu minowym} (The polonaise on the minefield), (Warszawa: Agora S.A. 2013). It is a collection of interviews about Polishness with 15 renowned Polish writers.
\textsuperscript{16} Magdalena Kania-Lundholm, “Re-Branding A Nation Online: Discourses on Polish Nationalism and Patriotism,” (PhD Diss., University of Uppsala, 2012).
\textsuperscript{18} Different theoretical approaches and definitions of patriotism will be presented in Chapter 3.
concept of patriotism allowed intellectuals, in the initial years of the democratic transition, to discuss the legacy of the former regime, the desirable form of the new regime and of the relationship between people (citizens) and the state. I then posit that progressively various actors turned the concept of patriotism – strongly embedded in the public discourse and heavily value-laden – into a political weapon that they constructed, de-constructed and re-constructed in order to achieve specific political goals and interests.

The use of the concept of patriotism is marked by attempts at gaining exclusivity over its definition (a process otherwise called de-contestation, fixing or monopolization), which mirrors the growing polarization of the public and political spheres, particularly acute after the rise to power of the conservative party PiS in 2005, corollary to the crystallization and stabilization of the political landscape. However, even if the conservative intellectuals and politicians progressively claim a monopoly over the definition of ‘true’ patriotism, competing conceptualizations remain available in the public sphere, enabling other ideological positions to participate in the discussion and use the concept of patriotism to their ends. These specific constructs (conceptions) of the concept are historically, geographically and biographically dependent, and a neutral usage of these conceptions cannot be expected; rather they need to be situated in the broader context of preceding patriotic traditions and wider theoretical and conceptual debates.

1.2 The theoretical and methodological framework of the dissertation
The analysis of public debates about the meaning of the concept of patriotism that continue to occur in Poland since 1989 belongs to the field of both political theory and history. While the relationship between these two disciplines is sometimes seen as
controversial, they meet in the territory of history of political thought. Although political theory is often associated with a normative approach or moral philosophy, in this project it will be understood in its applied aspect, as a branch of the social sciences. Michael Freeden proposes a definition of political theory as “the study of actual political thinking (or thought) … its patterns, its subtleties, its languages and the processes it permeates,” making it distinct from both normative political philosophy and history of ideas that focuses on canonical texts. For this purpose Freeden distinguishes two dimensions: thinking politically, and (durable forms of) thinking about politics, that is, ideologies. Both of these dimensions are “expressed through language, verbal and written, and are structured through political concepts, [which are] political thought’s basic units of meaning.” In order to grasp these two dimensions, the analysis must include the canonical texts, yet go beyond these and focus on (more common) political writings, parliamentary debates, newspaper editorials, literature and other instances of everyday political thinking. Furthermore, it is necessary to focus both on meaning (semantic aspect) and structural constraint (morphology) of political thinking resulting from the assembly of the concepts that constitute it, as key political concepts are necessarily located within broader ideological formations. Hence, in terms of approach, the focus should be on “scrutinizing the meaning and value of key terms in our contemporary political vocabularies.”

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21 Michael Freeden, “Thinking politically and thinking about politics,” in Political Theory: Methods and Approaches, op. cit., 197.
22 Idem., 199.
23 And not on making recommendations to public policy or recovering traditions of political thought which David Leopold and Mark Stears name as its alternatives. “Introduction,” in Political theory, methods and approaches, op. cit., 2.
the contestation and possible change in their meaning over time can contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of a given society, its history and practices, and ways of discussing politically. This research will propose such an explanation for the Polish case after 1989.

Freeden characterizes political concepts and the languages within which they are deployed as indeterminate and vague. This means that their boundaries are open to contestation, and that there are always competing definitions of their meaning. Different ideological strands attempt to impose their meaning of given concepts as the “correct” ones (decontestation), but such a fixing of meaning cannot be achieved once and for all. Rather, different actors and ideologies will use the same concepts, but prioritize and weigh them differently, promoting a specific conception of a given concept, choosing among different plausible ones. The triumph of one specific meaning in a given debate is conditioned by both the logical and cultural constraints of a specific context, and the discursive strategies of participating actors. In the light of this, the longitudinal study of public debates about the concept of patriotism in Poland seems most appropriate, as these constitute episodes of concentrated ideational contestation among different actors of the symbolical elites about the meaning of the concept. This will make it possible to focus on debates as units of analysis, analyzing their dynamics, and comparing different sub-periods of time.

In order to grasp the entire contestation over the meaning of political concepts and potential conceptual change, three aspects of analysis need to be combined: textual, contextual and morphological. For an accurate identification of the continuous or discontinuous use of concepts and changes in their meaning, the study of conceptual contestation and change needs to explain the importance of putting

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24 Freeden, *Ideologies and political theory*, 13-139.
concepts in a specific constellation, or their broader interaction within semantic fields, i.e. combinations or chains of different concepts and their counter concepts.\textsuperscript{25} The work of interpretation, to be complete, also needs to address both synchronic and diachronic perspectives of political languages/discourses and their use in political arguments.

In terms of the composition of the data body used in the analysis, in keeping with the aim of analyzing broadly understood political thought, preference was not only given to canonical texts or thinkers, but also to sources of a broader nature. Given that the analysis focused on a number of public debates, mostly the written texts that were part of these debates were analyzed. The aim was to gather a comprehensive array of sources identifying key voices and topics in the intellectual field, coming from mainstream newspapers, rather than from sensationalist or extremist publications. Care was taken to provide a balanced representation of different political profiles of publications, and a comparable number of sources per debate.

1.3 Outline of the thesis
Developing an understanding, and providing an explanation of the usage of the concept of patriotism as a political weapon and of the attempts at fixing its meaning with specific ideological tenets, entails analyzing the debates about its meaning in both synchronic (more contextual) and diachronic (historical) aspects. The theoretical and methodological framework for this analysis will be discussed in Chapter 2, which will also describe the nature and the extent of the empirical data body used within the analysis. Furthermore, to understand the continuities and discontinuities of these debates with the previously established positions and strategies present in the

\textsuperscript{25} Koselleck, \textit{Futures past}, 155-191.
intellectual and political battlefield, the relevant theoretical, historical and political contextualization of the debates will be provided in Chapter 3. Four subsequent chapters (Chapter 4-7) will advance an analysis of the empirical sources, from specific public debates about the meaning of the concept of patriotism. These chapters will construct the building blocks of the argument that will culminate in the conclusion (Chapter 8).

The empirical chapters will present the debates both in their chronological and thematic aspects. The main conceptualizations of the concept of patriotism will be analyzed in depth, as will the dynamics of particular discussions. This will make possible the mapping of the process of the contestation, and enable the decoding of different meanings of the concept of patriotism. It will also discuss the role of crucial actors, and instances of contestation, determining the crucial moves that enabled specific meanings to emerge and persist, or disappear.

Chapter 4 will deal with the first decade of the democratic transition, and three initial debates about, respectively, the concept of fatherland, the relationship between nationalism and patriotism, and the changing nature of patriotism. It will show how the ideational aspect of discussions dominated, exemplifying that the nature of discussion among the intellectuals was open and deliberative, allowing them to propose new readings of key political concepts previously distorted by the hegemonic official communist discourse.

Chapter 5 will show how the emergence of new strong intellectual circles, of conservative philosophers and left-wing intellectuals, and the increasingly strong ties of the former to the political sphere and the conservative party, laid the foundations for the polarization of the discussion. Two specific debates occurring in 2000-2002
and 2005-2007, both provoked by concrete conservative projects in the realm of public policies, will show the process of polarization of opinions and the promotion of an increasingly ‘affirmative’ approach to the national past and to patriotism.

Chapter 6 will feature an analysis of the contestation over the concept of patriotism within the debates that followed the publications of books by Jan Tomasz Gross about Polish-Jewish relations, in 2000, 2008 and 2011. The analysis will reinforce the case built in the previous chapter concerning the progressive polarization of the discussions. The chapter will also discuss in detail a new conceptualization of patriotism, ‘critical patriotism’, its potential commonalities and differences from constitutional and ethical patriotism, and consequent re-labeling as ‘mature patriotism.’

Finally, chapter 7 will evaluate the public debate that followed the plane crash in 2010 near Smolensk in Russia, killing President Lech Kaczyński and 95 other people on board, on their way to the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre. The chapter will propose an analysis of the return of a strong Romantic language, featuring such discursive tropes as ‘two Polands’ and ‘two nations.’ It will also provide the closure to the argument about the polarization of the public discourse.

Taken together, the analysis of these selected Polish debates over the meaning of patriotism allows not only to better understand the meaning assigned to the concept by different actors, but also entails decoding the mechanisms of the contestation and provides a better understanding of Polish political sphere and disagreement over its values, discourses and concepts.
2 Chapter Two – Theoretical framework and methodology

2.1 Theoretical framework
The analysis of public debates about the meaning of the concept of patriotism that have continued to occur in Poland since 1989 belongs to the fields of both political theory and history. These two disciplines meet in the territory of history of political thought,¹ which can be described as applied political theory.² The following section constructs the theoretical framework used in this dissertation, presenting an approach allowing for an analysis of political thought (2.1.1), as expressed within public debates (2.1.2), by intellectual elites (2.1.3). It is followed by the description of the methodology (Section 2.2).

2.1.1 History of political thought
An analysis of debates over the meaning of patriotism can be grounded in various historically oriented theoretical perspectives. One could think of an approach from the standpoint of history of ideas, intellectual history, conceptual history or history of political thought. There are no definitive borders between these approaches, but they might be differentiated with respect to their object of focus.

The history of ideas denotes an internalist approach to ideas, exploring patterns of thinking over time, and investigating the thought of major theorists and their most salient (canonical) texts. In the internalist approach, the ideas are taken as an essence and the text is perceived as containing in itself all the information needed for developing a proper interpretation. Intellectual history can be described as the

¹ Philp, “Political theory,” 137.
² Jan-Werner Müller uses the expression ‘applied political theory’ to describe his analysis of public debates led by West German intellectuals about re-unification. Jan-Werner Müller, Another country. German intellectuals, unification and national identity (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2000), 5.
study of intellectuals, ideas and intellectual patterns over time.\(^3\) It attaches specific importance to the fact that ideas do not develop in a vacuum, or in detachment from the men and women who formulate them and deploy them in different contexts. There is no clear disciplinary boundary between intellectual history and history of ideas. Some authors point to a difference between them,\(^4\) and define intellectual history in a narrower way as the attempt to study and understand intellectual patterns of specific individuals. Others perceive them as almost interchangeable; the sole difference being that the term ‘history of ideas’ is growing obsolete in use, or is more commonly accepted and less ‘hair-raising’ than intellectual history, the more recent term.\(^5\) Still others maintain that the difference is a matter of degree, and of the focus of the research design:

> “intellectual history can be seen as defining a large spectrum ranging from the most restricted history of ideas - as defined by Arthur O. Lovejoy, using rather internalist/intellectualist approach and taking ideas on their own terms – to the most expansive and theoretical efforts to relate human efforts to a larger collective reality (…) – using rather externalist/contextualist methods, treating ideas as, at least, derivatives of a particular cultural context.”\(^6\)

Generally speaking, intellectual history focuses on the change of ideas in the specific context of intellectual work and universe. For this reason, it develops a strong interest in the relationship between texts (which are historical artifacts, relevant to historical problems) and the ‘world of experience’ and human activity,\(^7\) in both synchronic and diachronic perspectives. The synchronic approach studies an object at a given moment in time, while the diachronic approach focuses on the evolution and change over time of the object under analysis.

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\(^4\) Idem.


A related approach of conceptual history focuses on the contestation over the conceptual meanings in specific historical circumstances. One can even point to a certain nuance between the terms themselves: conceptual history and history of concepts. J. G. A. Pocock (who qualifies himself as a historian of political thought, or more precisely of discourse, but is often associated with the Cambridge school of contextual conceptual history, alongside Quentin Skinner) criticizes the history of concepts as being similar to history of ideas, trying to develop histories of specific concepts throughout time. Terence Ball concurs and ascribes to such a historical approach the name of conceptual analysis, which would be more linguistic in nature, opposing it to conceptual history, of a more historical nature, concerned with conceptual and political change. There is no clear delimitation between conceptual and intellectual histories either. One can rather perceive a growing tendency to use the term ‘intellectual history’ as an umbrella term encompassing other sub-disciplines, such as history of concepts, of ideas, or of political thought. In such a perspective, the disciplinary boundaries would oppose intellectual history (concerned with analysis of texts in specific contexts) to social (concerned with study of societies and ordinary people’s life strategies) or cultural histories.

There are broadly speaking two schools of conceptual history. In the formative German approach of Reinhart Koselleck (and the studies undertaken by the school of *Begriffsgeschichte*), conceptual history dealt rather with theorizing about the historical semantics of paradigmatic terms and ideas. It attached particular importance to a *longue durée* perspective, trying to formulate general hypotheses about history,

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8 The lack of clear disciplinary boundaries applies also to classification of scholars to their respective disciplines: the approaches developed by Reinhart Koselleck, John G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner are sometimes perceived as three distinct approaches to intellectual history, as different school of conceptual history (German and Anglo-Saxon), or as contributions to history of political thought.

and a macro-theory of conceptual change during the Sattelzeit (1750-1870) in Germany. In his works, Koselleck sustained that ‘without common concepts there is no society, and above all, no political field of action.”¹⁰ This German school of conceptual history relied on a “decontextualizing move in which concepts are turned into specific units of study, each of them forming a diachrony of its own,”¹¹ producing a kind of Encyclopedic collection of histories of some 120 concepts, in eight volumes, over more than 7000 pages.¹²

The Anglophone strand of conceptual history is linked to the Cambridge school mentioned earlier, which Ball calls ‘critical conceptual (or new) history.’¹³ It is less encyclopedic in its approach, and uses a variety of methods. Its two prominent representatives, Pocock and Skinner, may differ in their approaches, focusing respectively on languages or authorial intentions, but they both are rather skeptical about the possibility of developing histories of particular concepts, underscoring the need to focus on the analysis of the use of concepts as tools or weapons in the political argument. They agree that concepts acquire their meanings in specific historical contexts, combining both synchronic and diachronic influences, which may be difficult to disentangle.

Kari Palonen has analyzed different approaches to conceptual history developed by Koselleck, and enumerated six possible acceptations of conceptual history:¹⁴ a sub-section of historiography, a method of historiography, a strategy of textual analysis, a micro-theory of conceptual change, a macro-theory of conceptual

¹⁰ Koselleck, Futures past, 74.
change, or a revolution in understanding of concepts, taking into account the
contestation of their meaning in specific contexts, not describing them as
unambiguous or ahistorical units of meaning. In theoretical terms, conceptual theory
sets itself the objective of analyzing and theorizing about the moment(s) when the
most significant change in conceptual meanings occurred. Perceived as a method, it
combines textual with contextual analysis, underscoring the necessity of putting ‘texts
into context.’ This method helps to highlight the importance of conceptual
developments within political thought and broader political field, in the process of
contestation over conceptual meanings.

The discipline of history of political thought can be understood as the field in
which political theory and history meet. For this reason, it can be described as
applied (and not normative) political theory, taking account of a certain tension
between purely historical or theoretical approaches. As Freedan suggests

“The history of political thought brings to the study of political theory an overriding concern
with the genealogy of arguments, with the conditions of their stability and the causes for their
transformation, with contexts, reconstruction of intentions, and changing horizons of
interpretation.”

For him, history of political thought, as a discipline, should study political thought in
relation to politics, engaging in its understanding and interpretative mapping. Some

15 Philip, “Political theory,” 137.
16 Müller, Another country, 5.
17 While political theory would be often assimilated with political philosophy, Michael Freedan rather
defines it as one among possible options. He describes the contribution of political philosophy to
political theory as a discussion of the logical validity and argumentative coherence or of the moral
rightness of specific political prescriptions. “What should the ‘political’ in political theory explore?”
The Journal of Political Philosophy 13, no. 2 (2005), 113.
18 According to Dario Castiglione and Iain Hampsher-Monk “within the more general discipline of
politics and government, the history of political thought has appropriated to itself (or depending on the
point of view, it has been relegated to) the role of ‘political theory’ – a place, however, never fully
assured”. “The history of political thought and the national discourses of politics,” in The History of
19 For Stefan Collini, the history of political thought developed since 19th century at the intersection of
four related academic disciplines: philosophy, law, history and politics. “Discipline, canons, and
publics,” 287.
20 Freedan, “What should the ‘political’ in political theory explore?” 113.
would call this field of studying political ideas found ‘in the wild’ a political theory of ideologies,\textsuperscript{21} or a political theory of conceptual change.\textsuperscript{22} It results from the premise that ideologies, in their non-Marxist understanding, can be perceived as ubiquitous forms of thinking about politics, clusters of concepts.\textsuperscript{23}

In this dissertation, the analysis of the debates about the meaning of the concept of patriotism is neither normative, nor does it focus solely on historical or theoretical narratives of outstanding individual thinkers, or on the canon of political theory. Rather, it studies the ubiquity of political thought understood as “an elected form of discourse through which a society asks itself philosophical questions about politics,”\textsuperscript{24} and the variety of conceptual and intellectual arguments deployed within its realm. The analysis pays attention to the fact that concepts “constitute tools and weapons of ideological debate,”\textsuperscript{25} by putting them in their political and argumentative context. Such a study cannot be detached from a given polity,\textsuperscript{26} but needs to be grounded in its (national\textsuperscript{27}) political culture, understood in turn as a “‘set of discourses and practices’ through which members of a political community make claims upon each other and interact politically.”\textsuperscript{28} This is why this dissertation focuses on Poland and its specific context, and uses the analysis of public debates about the key concept of patriotism led by intellectuals to advance a broader argument about the nature of Polish political culture and public sphere.

\textsuperscript{21} Alan Finlayson, “Rhetoric and the political theory of ideologies,” Political Studies 60, no.4 (2012).
\textsuperscript{24} Castiglione, Hampsher-Monk, “The history of political thought,” 7.
\textsuperscript{27} Collini argues that the study of history of political thought should pay due attention to the variety of intellectual, academic and national (political) cultures. Collini, “Discipline, canons, and publics,” 281.
\textsuperscript{28} Castiglione, Hampsher-Monk, “The history of political thought,” 2.
For this research, the above conceptual distinctions between history of ideas, intellectual history, conceptual history and history of political thought do not constitute a real obstacle. Prominence is given both to concepts and arguments through which they acquire meaning in specific texts, and to individuals (broadly understood as intelligentsia, intellectuals, or symbolical elites) who create, discuss, write about, and influence ideas (or meanings),\(^{29}\) over time, in various contexts. For the present purpose, the development of conceptual histories is used as a method of textual analysis, in the framework of history of political thought, and further presented in the section discussing methodology. The analysis tackles the question of how text creates meaning and the relationship between reality and its linguistic representation, important also for the matter of epistemology. As underscored by Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, language is the field in which different actors fight over the categorization and naming of different phenomena, the same as for giving specific meaning to concepts.\(^{30}\) Such categories and labels cannot be taken for granted, but need to be properly decoded and explained. Consequently, the importance of intellectual, political, cultural and social contextualization must be recognized, because even if the context cannot directly explain the text, it is necessary for its full understanding.\(^{31}\) The analysis also includes the exploration of the meaning-making practices of actors and their attempts at achieving hegemony within public debates, through their quest for ‘meaningful interpretation’ of concepts.

In short, this dissertation subscribes to the discipline of history of political thought, in a contemporarily oriented approach that can be called applied political

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\(^{31}\) Kelley, ‘Intellectual history,” 156.
theory, because it focuses on an analysis of public debates about patriotism in both historical and theoretical aspects. The analysis pays attention to the content, the context and the actors of the conceptual contestation. It does so by looking at public debates led by the intellectual elites, which constitute moments of concentrated ideational contestation challenging the old meanings of political concepts and promoting new meanings, potentially leading to the conceptual change. The intellectual elites are the main protagonists in the public debates, in which they exercise their intellectual journalism, publicystyka, on the pages of the opinion-setting publications subscribing to different ideological editorial lines.

2.1.2 Analysis of elite-led public debates
A public debate can be succinctly defined as “an episode of concentrated public ideational contestation among (political) elites reported in the media on a particular subject of some controversy.”32 A debate usually follows a conflict, an event, a publication, or a speech, in other words, a “discursive event.”33 While Piotr Forecki subscribes to a rather idealistic vision of the role of the public debate, stating that its function is to “resolve the controversy”34 over some questions, and that its participants mutually address their respective statements, one can also witness debates in which participants do not necessarily exchange with one another, but try to promote their own view or interest, not aiming at resolving the controversy, but at fostering it, for their own needs.

32 David Art, The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 27. See pages 13-49, for a framework of analysis of public debates and political change.
34 Idem.
When it comes to studying public debates (the boundaries of which might sometimes be difficult to draw clearly), Jan-Werner Müller’s\(^{35}\) analysis of German debates about national identity, citizenship and re-unification, by subsequent generations of Western German intellectuals, is masterly and presents useful observations and methodological inspirations for the study of the debates about the meaning of patriotism in Poland. Müller insists on the role of intellectuals within such public debates, taking into account not only the positions of different intellectual and political camps, but also of specific ‘public’ intellectuals.

Public debates over the concept of patriotism can be understood, following Piotr Tadeusz Kwiatkowski’s suggestion, as an example of debates in which academics, editorialists and politicians discuss questions concerning the legacy of the communist regime and redefine important concepts.\(^{36}\) The present focus on public debates about the meaning of patriotism in Poland was motivated by the working hypothesis that patriotism is one of the key political concepts in Poland, and the negotiation of its meaning throughout the democratic transition can help reach a broader understanding of the structural and ideational evolution of the Polish public sphere. This assumption can only be reinforced by the fact that patriotism was discussed within very significant (if not the most important) public debates during the post-communist transition, such as the Jedwabne debate (about the 1941 pogrom in Jedwabne described by Jan Tomasz Gross in his book *Sąsiedzi*) or the debate

\(^{35}\) Müller, *Another country*, particularly pages 1-20 and 266-286, for methodology, analysis of public debates and crucial political concepts.

\(^{36}\) Piotr Tadeusz Kwiatkowski, *Pamięć zbiorowa społeczeństwa polskiego w okresie transformacji* (Collective memory of the Polish society during the transformation) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar, 2008), 312.
surrounding the conservative ‘politics of history,’ under the short-lived government of the PiS.\textsuperscript{37}

While the nature of debates or discussions analyzed in this dissertation is diverse, ranging from an exchange of letters between two intellectuals to hundreds of editorial, op-ed and opinion articles in a two-year-long public debate concerning ‘politics of history,’ the importance of intellectuals and of their arguments is everlasting, and needs to be properly taken into account.

\subsection*{2.1.3 Intellectuals as political actors in Poland}

In the scope of this dissertation, the intellectuals, or broadly speaking intellectual elites, are of double importance. First, the intelligentsia, since its emergence in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, has played an important role in defining patriotic ethos and sustaining national identity in Central Europe. Secondly, the intellectuals are important protagonists of public debates.

Without entering too deeply into the debate about intelligentsia as a concept, it is important to mention that this (ambiguous and porous) term developed predominantly in Poland and Russia in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, where it came to signify a group entrusted with a particular mission in society.\textsuperscript{38} While in Russia the concept of intelligentsia had a slightly radical (social and political) connotation, it was not necessarily so in Poland, where a member of the intelligentsia could equally well be a religious conservative, adhering to the ‘national patriotic’ engagement.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37} These two debates, together with the one on the legacy of the communist People’s Republic of Poland, constitute three great debates among historians after 1989 that reached well beyond purely historical circles. Rafał Stobiecki, “Historians facing politics of history. The case of Poland,” in \textit{Past in the making}, ed. Michal Kopeček (Budapest: CEU Press 2008), 179.

\textsuperscript{38} According to Isaiah Berlin (\textit{Russian Thinkers} (London: Penguin, 1978), 116) this feeling of mission differentiated Eastern intelligentsia from Western intellectuals who ‘only’ shared an interest in ideas, and were creators and promoters of culture. Nowadays these two terms are used interchangeably.

renowned historian Jerzy Jedlicki, a pillar of Polish scholarship on intelligentsia, advises against including such a feeling of ‘mission’ into the definition of the intelligentsia, however, as it would imply an ‘idealization’ of its image.\textsuperscript{40} According to Jedlicki, the intelligentsia, understood as a specific class\textsuperscript{41} united by a moral code, constituted a phenomenon peculiar to societies that were subject to difficult historical circumstances,\textsuperscript{42} where the educated class was a substitute for the non-existent or under-developed bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{43} During communism, intellectual work and action came to be understood in political terms, either supporting or opposing the regime. After 1989 one can observe in Poland a corollary phenomenon to the one described by Müller for Germany, that the intellectuals’ biggest concern became the discussion over their (no longer obvious) role and position in the new political reality.\textsuperscript{44} They nevertheless continue to participate in public debates, attempting to redefine important concepts.

Freeden discusses the distinction between intellectuals and intelligentsia,\textsuperscript{45} and rightly implies that currently the noun ‘intelligentsia’ is used as a plural for intellectuals, and that they no longer constitute a specific class. He distinguishes

\textsuperscript{40} Jerzy Jedlicki, “Kłopoty z inteligencją (Troubles with intelligentsia),” \textit{Polityka, Niezbędnik inteligenta}, July 11, 2009.

\textsuperscript{41} According to Charles Kurzman and Lynn Owens, in terms of sociology of intellectuals there are, broadly speaking, four approaches to the consideration of intellectuals. (“The sociology of intellectuals,” \textit{Annual Review of Sociology}, 28 (2002), 63-90.) They can be perceived as a class in itself (Julien Benda, \textit{La trahison des clercs}, 1927), class-bound (Antonio Gramsci, \textit{Selection from the prison notebooks}, 1929-1935), class-less (Karl Mannheim, \textit{Ideologie und utopie}, 1929) or the New Class (Milovan Djilas, \textit{The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System}, 1957). Jedlicki’s position, which seems to be prevailing in Poland, comes close to the view that intellectuals qua intelligentsia are a class-in-itself.


\textsuperscript{43} Tomasz Zarycki, “Cultural capital and the political role of the intelligentsia in Poland,” \textit{Journal of Communist studies and transition politics} 19, no.4 (2003), 93.

\textsuperscript{44} It can be noted that the debates about intelligentsia and its role have happened regularly every 8-10 years since early 1950s. Jerzy Jedlicki, “Przedmowa (Foreword),” in \textit{Dzieje inteligencji polskiej do roku 1918} (The history of Polish intelligentsia until 1918), t. 1 ”Narodziny inteligencji (Birth of intelligentsia) (1750-1831),” ed. Maciej Janowski (Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 2008), 7-10.

between two ideal-types of the possible mission of intellectuals: provision of (hermeneutic) understanding or (missionary) stimulation of action. This he frames as an opposition between more neutral ideologists (public intellectuals) and rather doctrinarian ideologues (politically minded intellectuals, who have a specific ideational agenda, and try to attain it with the exercise of their discursive power). The discussion over the definition of intellectuals and of the collective nature of the intelligentsia (e.g. perceived as a class) is no longer the key controversy, the notion of intellectual elites can encompass academics, journalists, Publizists, and other participants of the public debates. However, the question of the role of intellectuals in discussing ideas, providing readings of social reality, and engaging in political contestation remains of key importance.

While Müller considers that a number of his assumptions about elite-led public debates about German re-unification are limited to the analysis of the German case itself, those related to intellectuals and their strategies and actions are also relevant for Poland, where intellectuals can be perceived as self-conscious participants of debates, willing to acquire ‘cultural hegemony’ within the public sphere. In order to assess their positions, their interventions have to be placed in a broader intellectual, political and social context and referred to their personal trajectories. Even though there is no definitive scholarly agreement about the role of intellectuals and their possible influence on society, they can be seen as crucial actors who challenge or change the meaning of key political concepts by setting them in new contexts. However, what matters are not only isolated intellectual arguments, but also more systemic considerations, such as generational conflict. While intellectuals choose their positions, they do not choose the context of particular debates (even if

46 Müller, Another country, 14.
they influence it by their interactions), and they react to pre-existing opinions in the intellectual field.

Müller describes the intellectual field as an arena of conflict where the interaction between intellectuals and their thought plays a crucial role, yet the boundaries of which are constantly contested. The focus on the intellectual field, its functioning, relation to politics and struggle for (symbolic) dominance, rather than on isolated individuals, allow us to detect the most important protagonists in the power struggle, those who influence opinions and positioning of other participants of the debate. Moreover, ideas expressed by agents in the field are influenced both by the views that have affinities with them, and even more by those that remain in opposition. Fritz Ringer underscores that these agents can be of multiple natures: individuals, groups, “schools,” or even disciplines. According to Müller, writers, academics and journalists (opinion leaders – editorialists) populate the intellectual field, aiming at influencing the public discourse, and contesting each other’s positions. Despite the fact that their stances tend to be idiosyncratic, they also influence weeklies and daily newspapers in which they publish, exercising intellectual journalism (Publizistik). Müller believes that there is a particular German tradition of Publizistik, “with the Publizists writing in newspapers and magazines, while often not being a professional journalist, and publishing scholarly books, while not being an academic,” that is not equaled elsewhere in Europe (despite some similarities in France) or the United States. In Poland, however, the publicystyka of intellectuals has very similar characteristics, and can be defined as “a type of writing that presents

47 Müller insists on the interactionist dimension of the field, leaving aside the question of domination.
50 Müller, Another country, 14.
important current problems of social, political, economic, cultural life etc., from a
definite point of view, aiming at shaping the public opinion.” For this reason, this
dissertation focuses particularly on publicystyka as an important outlet for the
intellectual production of the elites.

Nowadays, intellectuals can hardly be perceived as a coherent and monolithic
category; rather, often they form ideological groups, which imbue their specific
arguments with strength and enable them to acquire more weight in specific instances
of contestation. In Poland, unlike in Germany (where Müller discussed the cases of
specific importance of such prominent public intellectuals as Jürgen Habermas,
Günther Grass, Ralf Dahrendorf, or Martin Walzer), there are no intellectuals of such
prominent standing as to establish themselves as leaders of the discussion. There have
been examples of established intellectuals with high influence on public discourse,
already under communism, both in the émigré circles: Czesław Miłosz, Jerzy
Giedroyc, Józef Czapski, and in the dissident intelligentsia: Jan Józef Lipski,
Bronisław Geremek, etc. More importantly, however, a number of different
intellectual groupings can be identified in Poland, all of which voice their opinion on
patriotism. The most prominent are an older generation of intellectuals coming from
Warszawska Szkoła Historii Idei (The Warsaw School of the History of Ideas); a
young generation of conservative intellectuals, born in the mid-1960s, gathered in
Warsawski Klub Krytyki Politycznej (The Warsaw Club of Political Critique); and
the ‘new left’ youngest intellectuals from Krytyka Polityczna (Political Critique).

The Warsaw School of the History of Ideas was a circle gathering renowned
philosophers and sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s, who for many, turned from

51 It is the encyclopedic definition of publicystyka, from Mała Encyklopedia Powszechna, quoted by
Geneviève Zubrzycki in “We, the Polish nation”: Ethnic and civic visions of nationhood in Post-
Communist constitutional debates,” Theory and society, 30 (2001), 634.
revisionist Marxist positions towards more liberal ones. Leszek Kołakowski, Bronisław Baczko, Jerzy Szacki, Tadeusz Kroński, Barbara Skarga, Zygmunt Bauman and Andrzej Walicki can be numbered among its most prominent members. While they do not constitute an united group in the debates over the meaning of patriotism after 1989, the arguments of several of these prominent intellectuals, notably Jerzy Szacki, Andrzej Walicki, or Jerzy Jedlicki can be seen as particularly important, not only because of their academic prestige, or the frequency of their participation in the discussions, but also because of their influence on arguments of other intellectuals and Publizists.

Young conservative philosophers and historians, born in the 1960s, created the Warsaw Club of Political Critique in 1995, in reaction to the election of the post-communist politician, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, as President of Poland. Its prominent members, such as Marek A. Cichocki, Dariusz Karłowicz, Tomasz Merta or Dariusz Gawin, are predominantly linked to Warsaw University and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Apart from their academic work in the field of political philosophy, these authors also participate in daily Publizistik, and write articles in a number of right-wing dailies and weeklies, as well as in Kraków’s Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej (Centre of Political Thought). Cichocki, Gawin, and Karłowicz are united in their communitarian criticism of liberalism and of the nature of consolidation of Polish democracy after 1989 that to their mind did not achieve a proper break with communism. They criticize the

52 Piotr Kieżun concludes that post-political liberalism aiming at transforming politics into administration is the main enemy of the conservatives, in their Christian approach voiced in Teologia Polityczna. The field of fight is culture and memory that conservatives use to create symbols that bring together political community. (“Konserwatyzm w cieniu apokalipsy (Conservatism in the shadow of apocalypse),” Znak 668 (2011)).

alleged lack of political community in Poland that prevents the emergence of a strong republic. They believe that the Church has sometimes filled this void, and that theses about the incompatibility of religion with modernization or about growing secularization are mistaken. The name of their flagship publication, *Teologia Polityczna* (Political Theology) reveals their intention to bring together the political and religious spheres, from which they derive values or ethics on which politics and democracy are to be founded. They also point to republicanism as the ideal political form that could guarantee Polish ‘political subjectivity (*podmiotowość*)’ and taking ‘truly’ political decisions.

*Krytyka Polityczna* is a club created in Warsaw in 2002 by young left-wing intellectuals, around Sławomir Sierakowski. It holds vibrant local discussion clubs all over Poland. It publishes articles on its website and has edited books since 2007, promoting different traditions of the leftist thinking. *Krytyka Polityczna* sets itself the aim of promoting a strong leftist political language, as a complement to the liberal and the conservative ones. It distances itself from the post-communist social-democrat party SLD, and from members of the post-Solidarity left, such as Adam Michnik. While it shares many of the pro-European, economic and social postulates of these left-wing camps, it differs from them by accentuating the need to promote deep change in political culture, for example by promoting the cultural rights of discriminated minorities. While these three intellectual groupings are of crucial importance for further analysis, the opinions of other, more stand-alone yet

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54 [www.teologiapolityczna.pl](http://www.teologiapolityczna.pl)
57 [www.krytykapolityczna.pl](http://www.krytykapolityczna.pl)
prominent, intellectuals, such as Marcin Król, and intellectual groups such as young liberals from Liberte! are also taken into account.

The distinction, introduced by Freeden, between public and politically-minded intellectuals\textsuperscript{58} is useful in the analysis of Polish debates over the meaning of patriotism, in that the newly emerging circles of conservative and leftist intellectuals belong rather to the category of politically driven actors using discourse and political concepts to promote their ideas, while the older intellectuals belong more to the category of public intellectuals, discussing ideas for the sake of providing meaning and broader understanding of political and social reality. The question of how intellectuals engage with a broader public, however, is beyond the scope of the present analysis.

2.2 Methodology

The methodology adopted in the present analysis will combine three elements: first, a synchronic focus on specific debates, their contexts and arguments; second, the textual analysis of sources advancing elements of a morphological analysis of the concept of patriotism, by placing it in the constellation of other political concepts; and finally, a diachronic reference to different political languages and traditions of patriotic discourse, and how they change over time. The work of interpretation of empirical sources will focus on understanding and explaining the modification of the meaning of concepts within their use in political argument, and instances of ideological contestation in public debates. The analysis studies the contestation of the meaning of the concept of patriotism that takes place during public debates by tracking the occurrences of the word patriotism, the way in which it is employed, and

\textsuperscript{58} Freeden, “Intellectuals.”
different understandings and conceptualizations of the concept that are discussed, in
selected written publication outlets.

2.2.1  **Textual, contextual and morphological analysis of political concepts**
To answer the question of how intellectuals debate the concept of patriotism in Poland
during the democratic transition and whether it leads to the formulation of a new
patriotic formula, I will adopt the method of conceptual history,\(^59\) in line with the
theoretical framework of history of political thought. This methodology proposes a
threelfold analysis, combining textual with contextual and morphological analysis.

2.2.1.1  **Textual-contextual analysis**
Conceptual history provides a number of methodological orientations that can be
perceived as a strategy for textual analysis. The representatives of the contextualist
approach, Pocock and Skinner, stress the linguistic constitution of the political reality
and political constitution of language, and see concepts as necessarily taking their
meaning from specific patterns of discourse within which they are deployed. These
discourses, understood as languages of politics, imply a community of relatively equal
and autonomous actors sharing a common inventory of references.\(^60\) This conceptual
historical approach combines a synchronic focus on particular texts and their structure
with a diachronic focus on a broader context. The series of debates about the meaning
of patriotism will then be analyzed in a longitudinal way, so as to assess their
dynamics across the period under scrutiny, and compare different sub-periods of time.
The analysis will examine different conceptualizations of the concept of patriotism
put forward by intellectual elites in specific texts, and the context of the change of
meaning. This approach helps to detect the main protagonists of successive debates,

\(^{59}\) Palonen, “An application.”
\(^{60}\) Toews, “Intellectual history,” 893.
their key maneuvers in re-orienting the debates, and key political languages and frames.

2.2.1.2 Morphological analysis
Michael Freeden suggests that political concepts have both ineliminable and quasi-contingent features. By ineliminable features, he understands those that are present in all known linguistic usages of a particular concept, the loss of which would deprive that concept of its intelligibility. Yet even the ineliminable features are not able to carry the concept on their own; it also has to possess other, quasi-contingent (to historical and social contexts), logical or cultural features. For Freeden, political concepts constitute units of analysis (of meaning and of structure) of political thought, and their meaning, to be fully comprehended, needs to be scrutinized in three dimensions: temporal, spatial and morphological: 61

“[p]olitical concepts acquire meaning not only through accumulative traditions of discourse [temporal], and not only through diverse cultural contexts [spatial], but also by means of their particular structural position within a configuration of other political concepts [morphological].”62

For this reason, Freeden advocates that morphological analysis of networks of concepts and their interlinkages63 should complement the contextualist approach, composed of a diachronic focus on historical traditions of political thought and political languages, and of a synchronic focus on the use of concepts within a given cultural context. The morphological analysis also has strong synchronic aspects, because it can only be performed at a given moment in history and culture. The morphological approach needs to take into account that the meaning of individual concepts is influenced by their relationship to other, both complementary and

61 Freeden, Ideologies and political theory, 13-139.
62 Freeden, Ideologies and political theory, 4.
antithetical concepts, and their chains and sub-concepts. To better understand the idea of complementary and antithetical concepts, it is useful to refer to Koselleck’s idea of asymmetrical counter-concepts.\textsuperscript{64} He defines common concepts as instrumental to the group’s self-definition, unity, and recognition of a functioning agency. The adoption of specific concepts by a group also fosters the emergence of counter-concepts in the process of ‘othering.’ Such binary counter-concepts (examples provided by Koselleck include Greeks and barbarians, or Christians and pagans) are used to define otherness, and exclude the other from the discursive field, by not recognizing him as a partner in negotiation, and negating the counterposition. While counter-concepts try to propose binary readings of the reality, which might be too restrictive, they have the value of illustrating how the promotion of a counter-concept by a group can be used with the aim of pushing one’s opponent out of the discursive field of the accepted argument, and agreement.

2.2.1.3 \textit{The contestability of political concepts and the work of interpretation}

A study of political concepts and of their relevance in a political argument has to address the question of their contestability. W. B. Gallie in 1956 challenged the consensus over the fact that one could define key political concepts in a neutral and stable way, by stating that some concepts are ‘essentially contested.’\textsuperscript{65} This meant that

\begin{quote}
“continuing disagreement over their meaning and application is an essential and ineliminable feature of their functioning in the discourses in which they figure.”\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}

However, a claim that a particular concept is essentially contested would entail taking a timeless view of the character and of the function of political concepts (in a rather internalist fashion). Rather, the essential contestability thesis can hold for a political

\textsuperscript{64} Koselleck, \textit{Futures past}, 155-191.
\textsuperscript{66} Ball, “Political theory,” 34.
language (or thought) perceived as a discourse. In this sense, conceptual contestation is a possibility, but rather a contingent and not a permanent one. Freeden considers the analysis of political concepts is indebted to Gallie’s notion of ‘essentially contested’ concepts,’ but he finds more appropriate to talk about ‘essentially contestable’ concepts, because their contestation is possible, rather than ‘mandatory.’ For Freeden, political concepts are relatively vague and ambiguous, in line with Koselleck’s idea that ambiguity paves the way for conceptual disagreement and contestation.

In order to develop an understanding of a concept, it is necessary to pay attention to “conceptual contests in which older meanings are challenged and arguments are advanced in favor of new understandings.” Different ideologies (and their ramifications) with their competing epistemologies attempt to impose specific interpretation to particular concepts, in a process of de-contestation (fixing) of their meaning. Taking due account of the thesis of essential contestability, it needs to be recognized that the de-contestation of the meaning of concepts, even if central to political arguments, cannot ever be proclaimed conclusive; it remains a permanent possibility that can occur under propitious conditions. The same concept can be used in different conceptions or configurations within different ideological strands, and, depending on its importance, can be a core, adjacent or peripheral for a given ideology. For that reason, interpretation will be needed to provide an understanding of the mechanism of contestation over conceptual meanings, and of possible, even if temporary, fixing of the meaning of a concept.

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67 Emphasis added.
68 Ball, “Political theory,” 36.
70 Freeden, “What should ‘political’ in political theory explore?” 119.
Theories of ‘essential contestability’ of concepts prompt the reference to hermeneutics, dealing with unpacking ideological components of conceptual contestation. The hermeneutical approach contributes to an interpretation of the contestation, by mapping, understanding and explaining the arguments and the meanings of given concepts or their constellations. For that reason, a certain dose of hermeneutics seems inherent to the contextualist approach, which implies that “textual interpretation is largely a matter of restoring a text to the historical context in which it was composed and the question(s) to which it was offered as an answer.”

With regard to interpretive approaches, it is reasonable to accept that “there is no understanding without interpretation, and no interpretation without the possibility of multiple (mis)understandings.” The process of developing an understanding and explanation of a text is a move from what it says to what it talks about. For this reason, producing a plausible interpretation necessarily constitutes a work of triangulation between the text and its different interpretations. Interpretive approaches underscore that understanding and explaining actions and events can only be based on intentions, beliefs, concepts and ideas which are constitutive of them, and deployed by different actors, in contingent historical and linguistic contexts. The reliability or validation of such a meaning-focused approach is a matter of probability more than of empirical verification, and can be assessed in terms of rigor, trustworthiness and authenticity criteria. The convincingness of an interpretation is rooted in its

\[\text{References}\]

\begin{enumerate}
\item Freeden, “Ideology,” 14.
\item Ball, “History and the interpretation of texts,” in Handbook of political theory, op. cit., 27. Even if Ball used this assumption with respect to the classical texts, it is reasonable to apply it to a broader corpus as well.
\item Ball, “History,” 19.
\item Paul Ricoeur, “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as a text,” New Literary History 5, no.1 (1973), 127.
\item Nahid Golafshani, “Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research,” The qualitative report 8, no.4 (2003), 597-607.
\end{enumerate}
plausibility, which can be understood as producing an account which is more probable than others. Other aspects of a plausible interpretation include the ability to connect with the reader, and criticality, that is, the ability to lead the reader to reconsider taken-for-granted knowledge.77

Historians of political thought who abide by methods of conceptual history stress the need to set specific ideas or concepts in their broader context, and to pay attention to synchronic, morphological and diachronic aspects of their evolution. In Skinner’s focus on ‘speech acts,’ the intentional rhetorical power of their authors is considered crucial. However, there might be two problems with this approach. Firstly, it would neglect the fact that political actions and writing often provoke an unintended ‘surplus of meaning,’78 which is the gap between the meaning intended by the author and the understanding of the readers.79 For that reason, the interpretive understanding must go beyond the subjective intentions of actors and take into account that ideas are also embedded in social practices.80 Secondly, often, the intentionalist approach would imply that engagement in conceptual and political contestation is a simple act of fighting for ascendancy, which can obscure other motivations for which actors engage in discursive contestation, such as convictions and promotion of specific values.81 This is why Ball underscores that no single method is adequate to answer all the questions related to conceptual contestation: the context of the creation is important, but that of reception too. For this reason, adopting an intentionalist approach would not allow for the full understanding of the conceptual contestation.

80 Idem., 8.
81 Philip, “Political theory,” 140.
The textual, contextual and morphological method of analysis proposed in this dissertation focuses on the concept as its unit of analysis (as will be further discussed in section 2.2.2.1). The usage of conceptual history as a method of analysis, with its textual, contextual and morphological layers, provides a viable alternative to semiotics, content analysis or radical hermeneutics, even if, as discussed above, it does not exclude the insights of the latter, related to explaining and understanding meanings in a process of interpretation. Further methods pertinent to the study of political thought (or of ideologies) include, for example, discursive approaches. These focus on the signifier and analyze the fixing (de-contestation) of the signification of a concept as an outcome of social and historical acts expressing (political) power, and aiming at reaching hegemony. Such a fixing of meaning would occur, for example through specific practices of ‘naming.’ For this reason, a number of authors have suggested that concepts and conceptual architecture are meeting points between discourse analysis and conceptual history, and linking these two approaches could be conducive to understanding better the meaning of a given concept and the processes through which it is negotiated or contested. Finlayson discussed the connection between the approaches of Freeden and Laclau in his proposition of analysis of political arguments. Others have found commonalities in Koselleck’s and Foucault’s visions of historiography as a discourse, and in their recognition of agency in ideological contestations. Indeed a number of insights from more discourse-oriented studies are extremely useful for a better understanding of mechanisms and results of contestation over meanings of key concepts.

82 Ball, “History,” 18.
83 Finlayson, “Rhetoric,” 5.
84 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso 1996), 107.
85 Finlayson, “Rhetoric.”
This is particularly true for an approach proposed by Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier and Mieke Verloo, who, in their work related to gender equality, explored processes of contestation and attribution of meaning to concepts. They suggested that political actors can, intentionally or unintentionally, stretch, shrink or bend concepts.\textsuperscript{87} If stretching and shrinking denote, respectively, the incorporation of new meanings, or restriction of some meanings, the bending of a concept would imply its being linked to other goals than originally foreseen, often at the expense of its original meaning.

Combining textual with contextual and morphological analysis allows us to go beyond an internalist approach to ideas, interpreting text without a necessary reference to context; and also beyond a purely contextual approach, deriving the meaning of the text from the context. The three-fold methodological commitment makes it possible to observe and analyze all the relevant elements of the contestation over the concept’s meaning in both synchronic and diachronic perspectives, and to analyze the mechanisms of contestation, resulting in potential fixing of the meaning, due to the actions of specific individuals.

\textbf{2.2.2 Public debates and source selection}
In order to explain these methodological choices, a short discussion of the delimitation (or operationalization) of the unit of analysis, as well as a justification of the selection of the data corpus is necessary.

\textbf{2.2.2.1 Operationalization of the unit of analysis}
The reconstruction of the debates, as instances of contestation over the concept’s meaning, starts inductively from the word ‘\textit{patriotyzm} (patriotism).’ The usage of this word is taken as a proxy for the concept itself. Nevertheless, while the word remains

the same, the meaning of the concept changes within the process of conceptual contestation by different actors. To capture these different conceptualizations of the concept, and their meaning, the analysis will focus on the process of the contestation and its mechanisms: how, when, why, and with what effect the contestation happens. For the same reason, it is not patria that is analyzed, or its abstract understanding, but the definitions of patriotism that are proposed by symbolical elites in specific circumstances.

For many important representatives of both the German and Anglo-Saxon schools of conceptual history the difference between words and concepts is a key question. Koselleck suggests that words do not necessarily coincide with ideas, meanings or concepts,⁸⁸ they become concepts only when they condense a wide range of possible meanings. In this case, the distinction would be that words have an unambiguous denotation, while concepts call for interpretation, making them a unit of study, linked to their usage in specific political and cultural contexts.⁹⁰ The ‘new historians’, from the Cambridge school of contextualists such as Pocock and Skinner, object to the very possibility of developing histories of words, or even of concepts (ideas). Pocock suggests that one should deconstruct and understand the languages in which politics is discussed without separating the study of langue (languages) and paroles (words), as each could contribute to understanding of the other.⁹⁰ Skinner, in

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turn, advocates studying the history of the use of concepts in political argument, focusing on intentional ‘speech acts,’ rather than languages.91

These approaches certainly have their intellectual merit, especially when it comes to Skinner’s call for taking into account political usage of concepts; however, for the purposes of this analysis arguments for relaxing such a strict differentiation between words and concepts seem more appropriate. Farr among others suggests that the distinction between words and concepts

“frequently need[s] not to be drawn, because our language is so richly developed that most of our concepts – especially our political concepts – express themselves with matching words which name them explicitly and uniquely.”92

Hence, it seems reasonable to accept that while linguistically a concept is denoted by a word, the interpretation of its meaning should discuss its possible alteration in the course of its usage, specifically within political arguments.93 This approach, and the definition of the unit of analysis as the concept of patriotism and the instances of political argument in which its meaning was discussed (and potentially altered), is adopted in this research. The analysis of public debates about the meaning of patriotism does not seek to develop a fully-fledged conceptual history of patriotism (which would be the task of a macro-theory of conceptual change), but rather focuses on the dynamics and mechanisms of the contestation over its meaning in the context of the democratic transition in Poland by taking the use of the word ‘patriotism’ as a operationalization or proxy for the concept itself.

2.2.2.2 The strategy of source selection for the analysis of the concept of patriotism in political thought
In studying the usage of the concept of patriotism in political contestation, ideally one would take into account all the existing debates on patriotism that occurred during the

92 Farr, “Understanding conceptual change,” 27.
93 Ball, “Political theory.”
era of interest, and thus cover the entire universe of cases. Taken from this perspective, despite the evidently prominent place of intellectuals, they are not the only ones who create ideologies and contribute to political thought. Conceptual contestation and change is driven by the participation of a wide number of actors, from both intellectual and political elites. Political thought is widely expressed in debates, interviews, editorial articles, opinion articles, speeches, statements, pamphlets, blogs, social media, or even artistic production and representations. For obvious reasons, covering the entirety of these expressions of opinion on patriotism is not a feasible enterprise. Given that the main public debates in Poland were and continue to be played out on pages of opinion-leading newspapers, where the new ideas are created and spread, the focus on publicystyka of the broadly understood intellectual elites should provide a representative picture of the intellectual evolution of the contestation over the meaning of patriotism in political usage.

Publizistik exercised by intellectual and political actors within editorials, op-ed sections, press debates, and interviews will be taken into account in the present analysis. In such sources the authors present their ideas, discuss others’ ideas and influence the public opinion. Furthermore, Farr underscores that different political concepts are found in different sources, and the concept of patriotism, in particular, plays almost exclusively in the scenes of more ordinary political discourse and rhetoric. Hence, it is necessary to study texts from these ‘mundane’ fields, to capture the contestation over its meaning. This is why texts in major mainstream outlets of written press are critical for the analysis of political thought.

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2.2.2.3 *The nature of outlets from which the data body was selected*

Circulation figures of individual publications can serve as a proxy for determining whether they can be considered major, although, in the context of *intellectual* debates in particular, circulation is not the sole determinant of a publication’s importance for its audience. Daily or weekly publications with high circulation figures are usually perceived as the opinion-setting ones in terms of number of quotation in other media.\(^{96}\) Monthlies have a relatively lower circulation, but will also be taken into account in the present analysis, because of their intellectual influence.

Given that the main concern is with intellectual, hence opinion-setting, discourse on key political concepts, the tabloid publications *Fakt* and *Super express*, however important in terms of circulation (they are respectively the first and third most widely sold dailies in recent years), are not included in the analysis. The same is true for extremist publications, *Nasz dziennik* or *Gazeta Polska*, which have lower circulation numbers. This leaves us with the following dailies: *Gazeta Wyborcza*,\(^ {97}\) *Rzeczpospolita*\(^ {98}\) (respectively the second and fourth most widely sold dailies\(^ {99}\)), and

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\(^{96}\) According to the Institute of Monitoring of the Media, the print press remains the most opinion-setting medium of information, in terms of number of citations in other media. [http://www.instytut.com.pl/monitoring_prasy](http://www.instytut.com.pl/monitoring_prasy), accessed on 30 March 2014.

\(^{97}\) *Gazeta Wyborcza* (GW) began publication on 8 May 1989, following the Round Table agreements. It was created by liberal dissident intellectuals, and served as the voice of the Solidarity movement during the campaign prior to the legislative elections of 4 June 1989. Its name, which means the *Electoral newspaper*, comes from this fact. Adam Michnik remains its editor-in-chief since 1989. The paper became fully independent in 1990, when after the conflict within *Solidarność* Lech Wałęsa prohibited GW from using the *Solidarność* logo. The authors publishing in *Wyborcza* participated in most of the important discussions throughout the democratic transition, defending liberal and open-minded intellectual positions.

\(^{98}\) The title of a national daily *Rzeczpospolita* means ‘Republic,’ bringing to mind the full name of the Polish state, *Rzeczpospolita Polska*. A newspaper of this name existed both in the Interwar period, and under communism, as an official government publication since 1982. In 1989 *Rzeczpospolita* became an independent publication. Its political profile is conservative, since mid-2000, and the nomination of Paweł Lisicki as its editor-in-chief (2006-2011), even more so. *Rzeczpospolita* can be perceived as an editorial opponent of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, in the segment of daily press, though it has slightly lower circulation figures. Since 2013 Bogusław Chrabota is its editor-in-chief.

\(^{99}\) Other most-sold dailies are specialized publications, either in economy (*Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, Puls biznesu, Parkiet*) or sports (*Przegląd Sportowy*). Readership figures can be found on the online portal *Wirtualne media* (Virtual media) [http://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/wiadomosci/prasa/wyniki-sprzedazy-prasy/page:1](http://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/wiadomosci/prasa/wyniki-sprzedazy-prasy/page:1).
Throughout the 2000s, the weeklies *Polityka*, *Wprost*, and *Newsweek* could be called the ‘Holy Trinity’ of the weekly press. For that reason they will be featured in the analysis, alongside other intellectually influential weeklies: *Gość niedzielny*, *Przegląd*, *Przekrój*, and *Tygodnik Powszechny*. A fact worth noticing is the emergence of a number of strongly conservative weeklies after 2011 (*W sieci*, *Tygodnik Do Rzeczy*, *Uważam Rze*, a weekly spin-off of the conservative daily *Rzeczpospolita*), and an extremist daily *Gazeta Polska codziennie* (a daily spin-off of the weekly *Gazeta Polska*), parallel to the radicalization of public sphere after

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100 Between 1996 and 2002, a conservative daily *Życie* (Life) of Tomasz Wolek also had a decent readership, between 70,000 and 150,000. Due to financial problems it was closed in 2002, and temporarily re-activated between 2004 and 2005. Since 2007, another daily *Polska The Times* also gathers important number of readers, but this is due to popularity of its regional editions. It has a centrist line, under its editor-in-chief Paweł Fałara.

101 *Polityka* (Politics) is a centre-left weekly, leading in terms of circulation among the weeklies. It has a left-liberal intellectual profile, which sets it apart from a more conservative *Wprost* and glossier *Newsweek*. *Polityka* was established in 1957, following the post-Stalinist thaw, and managed to maintain a moderately critical journalistic profile during the communism. *Polityka* supported the Round Table talks and remained supportive of the democratic transformation of the regime. Jerzy Baczynski’s is its editor-in-chief since 1994.

102 *Wprost* (Straight talk) is a weekly, established in 1982 in the Greater Poland region. After 1989 it became a nation-wide magazine. Its editorial line was rather right-wing, until Tomasz Lis became its editor-in-chief in 2010 and pushed it more towards the center. Its current editor-in-chief is Sylwester Latkowski. For a thorough analysis of *Wprost*’s editorial line, see Ewa Stańczyk, “Caught between Germany and Russia: memory and national identity in Poland’s right-wing media post-2004,” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 91, no.2 (2013), 293-296.

103 *Newsweek Polska* is a weekly magazine, local Polish edition of the American *Newsweek*. It was created in 2001, and since then is a popular weekly, strongly established in the top three in terms of copies sold. Currently its editor-in-chief is Tomasz Lis, and it has a centrist approach.

104 Stańczyk, “Caught between Germany and Russia,” 293.

105 *Gość Niedzielny* (Sunday’s Guest) is a weekly Catholic news magazine. It was created in 1923 and exists continuously until today. It is linked with Silesia, where it is edited, but is distributed nationwide in press kiosks, and diocese shops. After *Polityka*, it has the highest number of distributed copies. It is of rather right-wing editorial line, and besides religious questions, it also publishes articles on social, political and economic topics.

106 *Przegląd* (Review) started in 1999 as the successor of *Przegląd Tygodniowy* (Weekly Review), which had been published since 1982. It has a left-wing editorial line, criticizing right-wing and liberal policies and the role of the Church in the public sphere. Its current editor-in-chief is Jerzy Domański.

107 *Przekrój* (Cross-section) was established in 1945 in Kraków, by writer and graphic-artist Marian Eile-Kwaśniewski. It had a record circulation in the 1970s, reaching almost 700,000 copies per issue. Since the 1990s, in the reality of falling readership, *Przekrój* tried a number of strategies, and changed editors-in-chief, making its editorial lines fluctuate, but remained closer to liberal left. The publication was suspended in the autumn of 2013.

108 *Tygodnik Powszechny* (General Weekly) is a Catholic weekly, published in Kraków since 1945. It focuses on social and cultural issues. It has had a reputation for launching and contributing to important public debates. Under the communism, it could keep a relative margin of independence, thanks to the support of the Church’s hierarchy, and it was one of the main outlets for publications of the intellectual dissidents. An influential writer Jerzy Turowicz was its editor-in-chief until his death in 1999. Currently Father Adam Boniecki occupies this position. *Tygodnik Powszechny* maintains its open intellectual line of progressive ‘open’ Catholicism, trying to reconcile faith with liberal values.
the Smolensk crash. However, given that the present analysis ends in 2010, these new right-wing publications will not be taken into account.

When studying political thought, the obvious aspect to control for in a sample is the political color and editorial line of selected publications, so as to avoid over- or underrepresentation of certain political orientations. The aim here is to gather a comprehensive array of sources identifying key voices and topics in the intellectual field. An approximate placement of daily and weekly publications on the political spectrum, based on their general editorial line, can be proposed as follows:

Right-wing: *Gość Niedzielny, Rzeczpospolita, Wprost*

Center-lining: *Tygodnik Powszechny, Newsweek*

Center-left and left: *Gazeta Wyborcza, Polityka, Przekrój, and Przegląd.*

A number of opinion-setting monthlies or quarterlies are also taken into account, where relevant: *Teologia Polityczna* (conservative right), *Więź* (center, progressive Catholic), *Znak* (center, progressive Catholic), *Przegląd Polityczny* (liberal center) and *Krytyka Polityczna* (left-wing online publication).

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109 As mentioned earlier, after the change of ownership of *Wprost*, and of its editor-in-chief, the weekly evolved towards a more centrist editorial line post-2010. 

110 *Teologia Polityczna* (Political theology) and *Krytyka Polityczna* (Political critique) were introduced in section 2.1.3, because of their strong links to new intellectual groupings, respectively the conservative and the left-wing one. 

111 *Więź* (Sign) is a social-cultural publication of ‘open’ Catholic tradition, the same as *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Znak*. Lay left-wing Catholic intellectuals established it in 1958 in Warsaw. The circle of *Więź* participated in the democratic opposition and Solidarity movement. In 2013, from a monthly *Więź* became a quarterly. From a left-wing position it evolved towards a liberal one, and its editor-in-chief Zbigniew Nosowski underscores that it wants to contribute to open and critical Catholicism.

112 *Znak* (Sign) was created in 1946, by an informal intellectual circle linked to *Tygodnik Powszechny*. It had the Church’s blessing, but remained formally independent. *Znak* can also be linked to the open, progressive strand of Polish Catholicism. It has a publishing house which subscribes to the same mission. Currently many young philosophers contribute to its publications, and Dominika Kozłowska is its editor-in-chief.

113 *Przegląd Polityczny* (Political review) is a quarterly, edited since 1983. Before 1989, it was one of the ‘second circulation’ publications. It describes itself on its website as an intellectual publication of the centre.
The editorial line of publications is not the sole factor that allows to determine ideological positions. Intellectual positions tend to be idiosyncratic, and specific to particular intellectuals, who might publish or intervene in different outlets. To make it easier to place ideas and authors on the political spectrum, sources (the full list of which is provided in Appendix 1) will be numbered when invoked, and the title of the publication from which they originate will be provided where necessary.

All the sources were published in Polish. Whenever excerpts are mobilized in the analysis, for argumentative or illustrative purposes, I provide an English translation. The translation aims to best express the original meaning of the text, but some corrections of wording are performed, if necessary, to better convey the idea of the text or explain the linguistic usage and meaning of some terms.

2.2.2.4 The process of selection of articles: the description of specific debates
The construction of the data body was guided by the goal of capturing different, yet regular, occurrences of discussion over the meaning of patriotism. In order to maintain conceptual clarity, the debates were selected for analysis if they included elements related to construction, de-construction or re-construction of the meaning of the concept of patriotism. Other public debates, on topics such as national identity, Polishness, or the role of intellectuals, were not considered the main sources in the analysis. They were mobilized at times, but rather to illustrate points of broader contextual relevance.

Nine instances of discussion that occurred during the period under scrutiny (1989-2010) were analyzed in the four empirical chapters that follow (Chapter 4 to

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114 While the official cut-off of analysis is 2010 and the debate that occurred following the Smolensk crash, a debate from 2011 following the publication of Jan Tomasz Gross’s book *Golden Harvest* was also used, in the relevant chapter, in order to draw full conclusions on the contestation over patriotism in the scope of discussing Polish-Jewish relations.
7). These debates offer a comprehensive picture of the changing nature of the contestation over the concept of patriotism.

Chapter 4 will offer an analysis of three discussions that reflected on the links between the concepts of fatherland, nationalism and patriotism and occurred respectively in 1992, 1997, and 1998. These discussions can be described as more thematic. They constitute a background for the analysis of later fully-fledged debates, because they incorporate a number of texts that were mobilized later on. The first discussion about the form that the fatherland should take after the communism was conducted between February and October 1992 in Tygodnik Powszechny: 20 articles (of 1-2 pages length each) constitutive of this exchange were analyzed. The second discussion occurred in 1997 in a thematic issue of Znak, and was composed of 7 articles (90 pages in total). It concerned the question of nationalism and its relationship to patriotism. Finally, the third discussion, concerning the transformation of the concept of patriotism, was constituted by an exchange of letters between writer Gustaw Herling-Grudziński and archbishop Józef Życiński (6-7 pages each), published in Więź in 1998.

Chapter 5 will focus on an analysis of two debates linked with the activity of the rising circle of conservative intellectuals. The analysis will show how the conservatives’ initiatives in the domain of public policies from 2000 and 2005-2007 prompted the discussion over the meaning of patriotism, and initiated a progressive polarization of the public sphere. In 2000, the billboard campaign and exhibition “Bohaterowie naszej wolności (Heroes of our liberty),” organized by Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego, MKiDN (the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage) under the conservative lead of Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski, prompted the debate. Nine shorter opinion articles (1-2 pages) published in the direct aftermath of
the exhibition, together with further six, more extensive pieces (80 pages in total) from a thematic issue of *Znak* of 2002 were chosen to present the main axis of the controversy between liberal ‘patriotism of minimal means’ and a communitarian conservative proposition. The second ‘discursive event’ is linked to the political transposition of the ideas of conservative philosophers, by the conservative government of PiS, between 2005 and 2007. The PiS implemented its political program in the realm of public policies, under the umbrella of ‘polityka historyczna’ (politics of history).’ It included, among others, a program “*Patriotyzm jutra*” (Patriotism of tomorrow),” aiming at promoting the conservative, ‘affirmative’ vision of patriotism, in opposition to ‘critical patriotism,’ in the domain of history, education or literature. 212 articles from the opinion-setting publications listed in the previous sub-section were used in the analysis, on average 3-4 pages long.

Chapter 6 will offer an analysis of a series of debates over Polish-Jewish relations before, during and after the Second World War, prompted by the publication of books of Jan Tomasz Gross: *Sąsiedzi (Neighbors)*\(^{115}\) in 2000, *Strach (Fear)*\(^{116}\) in 2008 and *Złote żniwa (Golden Harvest)*\(^{117}\) in 2011, and of their impact on different conceptualizations of patriotism, in the context of uncovering the dark pages of national history. It will further elucidate the growing polarization of the public discourse and the solidification of the opposition between the ‘affirmative’ and ‘critical,’ also called ‘mature,’ approaches to patriotism. 131 articles from these three instances of debate were chosen for analysis. These opinion articles or interviews averaged 5-6 pages in length. A number of secondary historical sources, focusing

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\(^{115}\) Jan Tomasz Gross, *Sąsiedzi (Neighbors)* (Sejny: Pogranicze, 2000).


\(^{117}\) Jan Tomasz Gross, *Złote żniwa (Golden Harvest)* (Kraków: Znak, 2011).
mostly on the influential debate following the publication of *Neighbors* were also used in the analysis, helping to deal with its magnitude.

Finally Chapter 7 will focus on the analysis of the debate that occurred in aftermath of the crash of the presidential airplane in 2010, which gave grounds to the analysis of ‘patriotism in action’ or rather Romantic ‘patriotism in national mourning.’ The catastrophe was followed by a nine-day long national mourning period, during which the fast-proclaimed unity of people dissolved over the question of burying the deceased president in the crypt of the Royal Castle Wawel in Kraków. The main part of the analysis in this chapter focuses on the period between the crash and the anticipated presidential elections, showing the resurgence of Romantic templates, leading to re-opening the discussion about patriotism. Given its context, this debate offers the opportunity to assess whether earlier theoretical developments concerning patriotism were used, transformed or discarded in a critical moment for the community. 204 articles and interviews were analyzed, on average 3-4 pages long.

The nature of the debates and of empirical sources varies throughout the period under analysis. The initial debates (1992, 1997, 1998, and the 2000 one related to the conservative exhibition “Heroes of our liberty”) were more concise and mostly occurred within one given publication. However, the participants themselves presented a wide array of positions, ensuring a variety of ideological points of view. Later debates (related to Polish-Jewish relations, the ‘politics of history’ and the Smolensk crash) were truly ‘public,’ engaging many actors, and diverse publications with various editorial lines. For this reason, the comprehensive selection of sources

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included leading opinion-setting publications. At times, more stand-alone publications, their special editions or books\textsuperscript{119} were also used in the analysis. At the same time, in the later debates the authors often voiced their isolated opinions, without engaging in a more polemical exchange of views. This can be related to the transformation of the role of intellectuals and of the public sphere, characterized by an increasing polarization of opinions and the end of intellectual and political consensus among members of the former democratic opposition.

The focus on broader political discourses, debates about patriotism, their participants and the concept of patriotism itself, will permit the study of the interlinkages between the concept of patriotism and other political concepts (and their constellations) present in the debates (fatherland, state, nation, citizenship, community, being rooted, belonging, solidarity, responsibility, pride, shame, affirmation, criticism, legitimization, heroism, sacrifice, freedom, liberty, democracy). This in turn will help to reveal different possible patterns of definition of patriotism and their uses by different members of the symbolic elites.

\textsuperscript{119} E.g. Krytyka Polityczna, Źaloba (Mourning) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej 2010).
Chapter Three - Theoretical, historical and political contextualization of the debates about patriotism in Poland

As discussed in the previous chapter, constructing an understanding of the contestation over the meaning of a concept requires combining textual with contextual and morphological analysis. This chapter will provide the background elements necessary for setting the public debates about the concept of patriotism in their proper context. It will start by reviewing a number of theoretical approaches to patriotism present in academic literature, as their ideological tenets are crucial in understanding specific usages of the concept in the public debates (Section 3.1). Section 3.2 introduces a number of historical elements related to Polish statehood that are necessary to grasp the importance of the concept of patriotism in Poland. Finally, to provide a political contextualization for the debates, an insight into the transformation of the political landscape during the democratic transition in Poland will be provided, given that the immediate political context influences the success or failure of specific arguments regarding key political concepts (Section 3.3). These three dimensions will allow the reader to better grasp the synchronic (theoretical and political), as well as the diachronic (historical), aspects of the contestation over the meaning of patriotism.

3.1 The concept of patriotism in the academic literature
There are many definitions and theories of patriotism. Andrew Vincent lists three important dimensions:¹ “local emotive identification” with the country (the well-known ‘love of one’s country’), “abstract legal entitlement” traducing the Roman

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notion of citizenship and attachment to the respublica, and finally a political dimension linked to the development of the state.

Given that ‘love of one’s country’ seems a vague category, some authors try to specify it in more detail. Stephen Nathanson sees it as made up of four interrelated phenomena: special affection for one’s country; a sense of personal identification with that country; special concern for the well-being of the country (and that of compatriots); and/or willingness to make sacrifices to promote the good of the country. Indeed, most often, theoretical definitions of patriotism elaborate on a particular relation to one’s country and, to a lesser extent, one’s compatriots.

However, there are different potential objects of patriotic allegiance, and the concept of patriotism can be defined in relation to a country, a (nation-) state, or the common good (in a Republican vein). Furthermore, there is no broadly shared definition of patriotism, but different academic disciplines (e.g. philosophy, political theory and social psychology) approach it in different manners. These are discussed below.

3.1.1 Patriotism as an object of debates in moral philosophy and political theory
The recent rise in the interest of philosophy and political theory in patriotism can be linked to the revival of communitarianism, notably Alasdair MacIntyre’s response to the developing influence of liberal political and moral philosophy, epitomized by John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. This interest proved durable also because of the outbursts of ethnic nationalism in the late 20th century, in former Yugoslavia, for instance.

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4 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Is patriotism a virtue?” The Lindley lecture (University of Kansas, 1984).
The normative discussion of patriotism in the field of philosophy concerns its moral standing, such as the question whether it is a virtue or even a duty, and whether it is morally permissible or not. The controversy is polarized, broadly speaking, into two extremes: the proponents of liberal impartial morality (that excludes any particularistic attachments, such as patriotism, or any other form of special concern) on the one side, and those promoting particular attachments on the other. MacIntyre, for instance, maintains that there is no universal morality, but that morality can only be developed in the framework of a particular community. He implies that patriotism is not only permissible, but also a moral virtue. George Kateb, in contrast, criticizes patriotism as an expression of willingness not only to die and kill for one’s country, but also because one’s country is in his view an invented kinship, a mere abstraction, thus should not be preferred over other communities.

These two approaches, however, are not necessarily incompatible, and some liberals try to construct positions reconciling universal and particular concerns. These proponents of ‘moderate’ or ‘liberal’ patriotism maintain that under specific circumstances a patriot can promote her country’s interests, but not in an unconditional and uncritical manner. However, it is not clear how to measure this recommended ‘moderation.’ In consequence, some authors conclude that while such approaches to patriotism could be perceived as permissible, in moral terms it would be difficult to demonstrate that patriotism is morally required or virtuous, let alone mandatory.

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8 Nathanson, “Is patriotism like racism?”
Primoratz contrasts these ‘worldly’ (non-moral) or even mundane conceptions of patriotism, concerned with the interest and achievements of the patria, with an ethical approach to patriotism concerned with a country’s moral record. He holds that while the former can at best be morally permissible, ethical patriotism might be a moral duty, because of its commitment to the country’s moral integrity and concerns about the country’s past, present and future situation. The critical scrutiny of the past would primarily concern the uncovering of dark chapters of history, acknowledging wrongdoings and retribution.

On the side of political theory, the interest in patriotism, reinforced by the compromise of nationalism during 20th century, comes from the point of an ethos of a well-functioning polity. The most influential theories of patriotism developed recently link it to republican, or constitutional positions.

3.1.1.1 Republican ‘patriotism of liberty’
For Maurizio Viroli, republican love of one’s country is synonymous not with the love of a language or an ethnicity, but with the love of political liberty and civic virtue. He argues for a ‘patriotism of liberty’ that would revive the tradition of republican patriotism that “over the centuries (…) has been used to motivate individuals to work together to make their communities more similar to republics (of) free and equal citizens.” Such patriotism would “instill [in people] a culture of liberty, an interest in the republic, a love of the common good.” Viroli grounds his claim in the necessary pursuit of the common good, in the name of civic virtues.

11 Maurizio Viroli, For love of country: an essay on patriotism and nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 16-17. Jan-Werner Müller shares this opinion by saying that “the language of republican patriotism (…) had existed prior to the nineteenth century, when the language of nationalism drove it out of European discourse.” While Viroli wants to recreate it within his paradigm of ‘patriotism of liberty,’ Müller points to it as a source of constitutional patriotism promoted by Jürgen Habermas. Müller, Another country, 97.
12 Viroli, For love of country, 16.
Political liberty can survive, he claims, if it is based on civic virtue, because only citizens are capable of passionately committing themselves to the defense of the common good. The stress on civic virtues is supposed to resolve the question where to find the roots for a demanding commitment. Viroli discards any vision of irreplaceable bonds of language, culture or history, as promoted by nationalists and communitarians. This is an interesting position, given that the republican and communitarian thinking are considered closely related and are often conflated, also because of their common uneasiness with liberalism.\textsuperscript{13} Viroli argues for moving towards a “political unity, sustained by the attachment to the ideal of the republic”\textsuperscript{14} grounded in a common practice of citizenship. In this perspective only a good democratic government promoting justice can inspire ‘right’ kind of patriotism. Alas, it would be a kind of conditional attachment, because “modern citizens too can love their republic, if the republic loves them, if it protects their liberty, encourages political participation, and helps them to cope with the inevitable hardships of the human condition.”\textsuperscript{15}

3.1.1.2 Constitutional patriotism
Dolf Sternberger proposed the paradigm of Verfassungspatriotismus, or ‘constitutional patriotism’\textsuperscript{16} in Germany in the late 1970s. The concept was further developed during the Historikerstreit or ‘Historians’ Debate’ in the mid-1980s. Jürgen Habermas, its main proponent, insisted that “a German liberal democratic national identity could

\textsuperscript{14} Viroli, \textit{For love of country}, 13.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 184.
\textsuperscript{16} According to Jan-Werner Müller (“On the origins of constitutional patriotism,” \textit{Contemporary Political Theory} 5 (2006)), Sternberger gave the term of constitutional patriotism the significance of “‘protective’ and state-centered patriotism” whereas its further developments offered by Habermas went in the direction of the “‘purifying’ patriotism.” Müller also mentions post-nationalism as the third possible option of constitutional patriotism. Müller, \textit{Another country}, 276.
only be elaborated through critical confrontation with the nation’s past.”

This approach privileges the respect of the constitution and fundamental democratic rights over ethnic nationhood. Allegiance is due neither to a national culture (as in nationalism), nor to the “worldwide community of human beings” (as in cosmopolitanism), yet constitutional patriotism does not seek to cut itself off from national or regional frameworks of reference. Loyalty is due to abstract procedures and principles, but has to be interpreted in relation to national traditions and histories. In the German case, constitutional patriotism was supposed to be non-nationalist or even anti-nationalist, and to put an accent on the need for deliberate political socialization, in which “unconditional or even unreflective identification becomes replaced by dynamic and complex processes of identity formation – or, put differently, by open-ended political and legal learning processes.”

The concept of constitutional patriotism has been subject to extensive criticism, based on its alleged abstract neutrality or willingness to detach political allegiance from (national) culture. Cécile Laborde for instance, in her attempt to replace it with ‘civic patriotism,’ has challenged two of its interpretations (neutralist and critical), as not taking the particularities of national cultures enough into account. In the end, however, she fails to explain how civic patriotism would differ from more robust interpretations of constitutional patriotism discussed by Müller.

21 Laborde, “From constitutional to civic patriotism.”
22 Jan-Werner Müller, “Three Objections to Constitutional Patriotism,” Constellations 14, no.2 (2007), 197-207. Müller suggests that constitutional patriotism has initially been seen as a ‘poor’ substitute for national identity in the postwar divided Germany, but its renaissance in the 1990s has also depicted it as “a normatively attractive form of civic attachment for increasingly multicultural societies” or proposed it as “a form of belonging in deeply divided, postwar societies.”
the eyes of the proponents of constitutional patriotism, such criticisms stem from the failure of its critics to understand its very premises. As explained by Justine Lacroix, constitutional patriotism cannot be associated either with legal patriotism, because it shows a strong attachment to history, or with historic patriotism, because it does not praise history, but rather subscribes to a critical approach to it.

3.1.2 Patriotism as an object of study within social psychology
Social psychology offers a number of typologies of patriotism, underlining its role in individual identification and feelings of belonging to a specific group or community. One basic approach differentiates between symbolic, constructive and blind patriotisms. Symbolic patriotism would convey pride in one’s nationality, flag and anthem. Constructive patriotism would be linked to a critical attitude towards one’s nation, if one believes that it transgresses universal values, while blind patriotism would denote an uncritical loyalty to the nation, potentially leading to discrimination against others. The difference between blind and constructive patriotisms is often illustrated by a sentence pronounced on February 29, 1872, by the Senator for Wisconsin, Carl Schurtz, in his remarks to the American Senate: “My country, right or wrong: if right, to be kept right, and if wrong to be set right.” While a blind patriot would use only the first clause of this sentence: “my country, right or wrong,” a constructive patriot would insist on the second clause as well. Other approaches differentiate between nationalism, inducing feelings of national superiority, and blind patriotism, which does not immediately call for a comparative approach.

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Socio-psychological analysis points to a related issue, the monopolization of patriotism. Daniel Bar-Tal, among others, links this phenomenon to totalitarian regimes, where it is particularly salient.\textsuperscript{27} It translates for him the willingness of the political power to control the subjective understanding of patriotic beliefs and set specific models of it.

3.1.3 \textbf{Patriotism-nationalism: a real dichotomy?}

While in the field of social psychology the difference between nationalism (eagerness for the superiority of one’s nation over others) and patriotism (positive feelings towards one’s community) seems straightforward, on the conceptual level it is not so.

A number of typologies oppose ‘good’ patriotism to ‘bad’ nationalism, presenting them as an opposition between defensive and aggressive approaches. Often, the very concept of nationalism is negatively connoted, and replaced by patriotism, especially that it is easier to see the (‘bad’ or ‘aggressive’) nationalist in someone else than in oneself. Michael Billig impeccably summarizes this discursive move: “‘our’ nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, surplus and alien. A new identity, a different label, is found for it. ‘Our’ nationalism appears as ‘patriotism’ (…).”\textsuperscript{28}

The opposition between ‘good’ patriotism and ‘bad’ nationalism resembles that between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalisms. The former can be characterized by civic inclusion and benign love of one’s country, the latter by aggression, chauvinism and racism. One of the best known examples of this dichotomy was advanced by Hans Kohn, who proposed a spatial mapping of these concepts, placing the ‘good’ (political and civic) nationalism in the West, and opposed it to its ‘bad’ Eastern, ethnic

counterpart. This spatial distinction has been questioned among others by Andrzej Walicki. Walicki discussed the foundations of modern Polish nationalism, which “originated, like its counterpart in Western Europe, in the atmosphere of the universalist ideas of Enlightenment, as an ideology not of the pre-political folk community, but of the nation-state, that is of political community formed by a common political history.” Interestingly, this approach, challenging the geographical opposition between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalisms, maintains the ‘civic’ – ‘ethnic’ divide, and aims to demonstrate that Poles have also experienced the tradition of civic nation (like their Central European neighbors), but that, due to historical context, it evolved into a cultural form. Such conventional differentiations constitute ideal-types rather than strong analytical categories though.

3.1.4 Conceptual and intellectual history of patriotism
The conceptual history of patriotism traces its origins back to antiquity, starting with the word ‘patriot’, derived from patria, which in Ancient Greece stood for the city or polis. Being a patriot (even though the word was not widely used) meant showing a deep attachment to and pride in one’s city. Under the Roman Empire, patria became the symbol of all values for which a soldier or a citizen would live and die. The notion of self-sacrifice thus became important in defining a patriot; as Cicero put it, “fatherland is dearer to me than my life.” Later, with the growth of the Roman

Empire, a kind of double allegiance developed, one towards the local *patria (patria sua)*, the other one to “the more abstract public Rome (*communies patria*)”\(^3^3\).

With the growing importance of Christianity, the meaning of being a patriot shifted to the spiritual level. The idea of the self-sacrifice of the warrior was replaced by figures of martyrs, saints and holy virgins. A return to a more emotional acceptance of the patriot occurred in the 12\(^{th}\) and 13\(^{th}\) centuries as a corollary to the construction of national kingdoms and the institution of a tax for the defense of the king. *Patria* became a territorial reference embodied in the person of the king.

Subsequently, in the late 16\(^{th}\) and early 17\(^{th}\) century, the words ‘*patriote*’ in French\(^3^4\) and ‘patriot’ in English entered into common use, initially referring to one’s fellow countrymen. The term ‘patriot’ really developed in Great Britain at the end of the 17\(^{th}\) century in the discourse of the radical Whigs, especially during the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It became associated with the defense of liberty and the rights of the Englishmen against tyranny. Other crucial principles took over the allegiance to the king: liberty, constitutional rights and property. A similar process occurred in France, where values other than self-sacrifice were linked to ‘*patrie*,’ namely God, piety, faith, honor and liberty.\(^3^5\) A new perception of patriotism connected to Christian duties was thus developed.\(^3^6\)

The word ‘patriotism’ itself entered the political discourse with other ‘-isms’ in the 18\(^{th}\) century. While in late 17\(^{th}\)-century Britain, patriotism implied opposition to a tyrant king, in 18\(^{th}\)-century America it became opposition to *any* king, especially the

\(^3^3\) Vincent, “Patriotism,” 112.
\(^3^4\) In French, the word *patrie* comes indirectly from Latin, via its Italian counterpart. Later, it is followed by *patriote* and *patriotique*. Philippe Contamine, “Mourir pour la Patrice. Xe-XXe siècle” in *Les lieux de mémoire*, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1986).
\(^3^5\) Ibid.
\(^3^6\) Trencsenyi, Zaszkalicky, “Towards an intellectual history of patriotism,” 25.
British one (who embodied foreign domination). The partisans of the American independence were declared patriots, and its opponents – loyalists. For that reason, in England, the opponents of American independence could go so far as to call patriotism “the last refuge of a scoundrel.” But also in France many authors, from the beginning of the 18th century, maintained that the patriotic ideal was incompatible with a despotic monarchy and could only be fulfilled through a republican form of government. In consequence, patriotism became associated with a set of ideological, constitutional and political principles, such as the free republic, love of liberty, and sanctity of property.

The emergence of nation-states altered the acceptance of (early-modern) patriotism even further, as (modern) nationalism became a significant part of political discourse in the 19th century, and has “weigh[ed] heavily upon the meaning of patriotism” ever since. The nationalist discourse framed the nation as the object of political loyalty, and perceived the state as the embodiment of the nation. Since then, a growing amalgamation or even replacement of the republican tradition of patriotism by nationalism has occurred, and it is increasingly difficult to differentiate between patriotism as an institutional loyalty and nationalism as an emotional identification. The former perception of a patriot as “one who defends constitutional rights, reveres

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37 This sentence is quoted by the biographer of Samuel Johnson, Boswell, and dated on April 7th, 1775. It is often used as denigration of patriotic ideas; it is taken out of its original context though. Johnson clearly directed it against the American revolutionary patriotism that he considered fake, and not against patriotism as such.

38 La Bruyère “Il n'y a point de patrie dans le despotisme... (No fatherland under the yoke of despotism)”; or Montesquieu “Dans le gouvernement monarchique, l'Etat subsiste indépendamment de la patrie (In the monarchical government, the State exists independently from fatherland)”. Contamine, “Mourir pour la Patrie.”

liberty, agitates for an end to corruption, and struggles against the outrages of centralized power”\(^{40}\) is being eroded.

As this analysis has shown, patriotism has kept changing “across time and place.”\(^{41}\) The meanings of terms such as ‘patriotism’ and ‘patriot’ have changed according to the political reality of a country, as well as in times of war or peace. Nowadays, what some would describe as patriotism, others construct as nationalism, or a type of it, e.g. civic or “banal”\(^{42}\) (linking it to everyday ‘rituals’ of reproduction of national identity).

3.2 The historical importance of the concept of patriotism, and the question of statehood

Patriotism has been an important feature of public discourse throughout crucial moments of the country’s history. For this reason, the interpretation of the meaning of patriotism needs to be grounded in a diachronic perspective. The question of statehood, or of its lack, proves to be of crucial importance and gives the necessary historical contextualization for the analysis of these debates.

3.2.1 Statelessness

Poland is a country with a long tradition of statehood, starting in the 10\(^{th}\) century, and having had a relatively powerful position in Central Europe between the 15\(^{th}\) and 18\(^{th}\) centuries. Subsequently, however, it was stateless during 123 years of partitions (1795-1918), under foreign (Nazi and Soviet) occupation (1939-1945), and with a communist regime imposed from abroad (1945-1989). These moments could be characterized as the fight with the occupant state (under partitions and occupation) or for the state (during the phase of ‘imperfect’ statehood, e.g. communist times).\(^{43}\) This

\(^{40}\) Idem., 189-192.
\(^{42}\) Billig, *Banal nationalism*.
\(^{43}\) Rafał Matyja, “Przestrzeń powinności (The space of duty),” in *Patriotyzm Polaków*, op. cit., 244.
long period of statelessness and ‘imperfect’ statehood has an important impact on the understanding of patriotism and of its different conceptualizations.

The period of partitions is crucial in understanding a Polish political culture that came to be characterized by an eternal fear of being squeezed between Germany and Russia, overpowering neighbors and potential invaders. In consequence, Romantic templates developed at that time progressively became characteristic for Polish political culture. These structuring references include messianism, the fight for the survival of Polish culture, language and nation in a hostile environment, and a strong political self-identification into ‘us’ versus ‘them’ categories. As a result of the Romantic influence, “Polish culture, and in particular literature, art and historiography, is full of instances where the national imagination triumphs over realism.”44 Also at that time, the intelligentsia was established as a compensating element for lacking state structures.45 Romanticism offered an intellectual instrumentarium to imbue tragic historical events with sense,46 and the resulting ‘religion of patriotism’ framed the fatherland as a supreme value, sacralizing the national cause.47 Romantic codes continue to influence the collective memory, religiousness and identity of Poles.

Thus, the loss of independent statehood constituted a crucial change of parameters for the concept of patriotism that from a territorial notion, developed in a

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46 Dariusz Gawin, “Powstanie warszawskie a powojenne spory o kształt polskiego patriotyzmu (Warsaw uprising and later quarrels about the form of Polish patriotism),” in Patriotyzm Polaków, op. cit., 208.
multicultural polity, was progressively re-conceptualized as an attachment to the nation.

3.2.2 **Different traditions of Polish patriotism**
The long period of statelessness led to a transformation in the nature of allegiance, and to a change in the meaning of political concepts. In the specific case of patriotism, it is worth referring to two accounts that elucidate these changes: one proposed by the eminent liberal historian of ideas Andrzej Walicki, close to the circle of older left-wing revisionist intellectuals, and one proposed by a conservative historian of ideas Andrzej Nowak.

3.2.2.1 **Three patriotisms of Andrzej Walicki**
Walicki was one of the members of the Warsaw school of history of ideas, which developed revisionist Marxist positions in the 1950s and 1960s. In his seminal contribution, *Trzy patriotyzmy*, Walicki operationalized different Polish historical traditions of patriotism – republican, romantic and realist – with respect to the transformation of the definition of the nation. The ideal-types that he developed are often invoked in both the academic literature and *Publizistik*. The aforementioned inconsistent use of the terms patriotism and nationalism applies also to his work. In the Polish version of his text Walicki talks about different patriotic traditions and refers to nationalism only when it comes to the realist tradition of National Democracy (that he rightly qualifies as ‘integral’ nationalism). In the English version of his article he uses the terms ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ interchangeably, notably

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50 Walicki, *Trzy patriotyzmy*. 
because he conceptualizes different patriotic traditions with the help of different definitions of the nation.

The republican patriotic tradition
Walicki claims that even before the partitions, under the First Republic, patriotism was linked to the nation, but in its legal-political understanding (the nation was formed and composed of the gentry only, and patriotism was the expression of its will). Republican patriotism stressed the need for all estates to act ‘for the sake of the homeland, for the sake of the people.’ It did not promote economic modernization, or the construction of the ethos of work, but rather an archaic collectivization and the ethos of public service for the country. The disappearance of the state prompted the fear that, after the loss of sovereignty, the nation, understood politically, would also fall apart.

The Romantic tradition of patriotism
The subsequent Romantic patriotism became highly idealistic, and acquired a secretive and mystical meaning. At first, it preserved a more political vision of the nation, but given the enduring dematerialization of the country, and the lack of immediate perspectives for its reconstruction, it shifted to a vision of spiritual community, based on tradition and language. Romantic patriotism, together with the idea of (cultural) nation and messianism, linked the Polish case with a more general fight in the name of the brotherhood of nations, “Za wolność Waszą i Naszą (For your freedom and ours).” Insofar as it was difficult to find an outlet for patriotic public

51 Democracy of gentry, First Republic, alludes to the Commonwealth of Two Nations (Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów), Polish and Lithuanian created in 1569, by the Union of Lublin that existed until 1795, third partition.
52 Bogdan Suchodolski, Dzieje kultury polskiej (The history of Polish culture) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress, 1986).
activity, the ethos of public service of the gentry was replaced by the ethos of fight on
the battlefield. For Jerzy Jedlicki, this symbolical patriotism made up for political
powerlessness “by a feeling of being in the right, of faith in the meaning of sacrifice
and in the divine justice in history.” The Romantic conception of patriotism is still
very much alive among the Poles. Walicki points out that its focus on symbolic
gestures, love of heroic actions, and lack of a responsible calculation of chances of
victory makes it bound to degenerate into a cult of defeats and national martyrdom.

The realist tradition of patriotism
Finally, Walicki mentions the realist tradition of patriotism that emerged in the late
19th century in opposition to Romanticism, and drifted from the positivist program of
“praca u podstaw (work at basis)” and “praca organiczna (organic work)” towards
exclusive nationalist stances. It defined patriotism as faithfulness to the national
interest, and is commonly associated with Roman Dmowski and his nationalist party,
*Endecja* (*Narodowa Demokracja*, the National-Democracy). They promoted an
organic vision of the nation (seen as a product of ethnic differentiation), and preferred
to call themselves nationalists, because they perceived the term ‘patriotism’ as too
poly-semantic and related to the love of one’s country, not of the nation. Historian
Andrzej Ajnenkiel links this 19th century nationalism in Poland to a willingness of
reconstructing the lost statehood, but also observes that the restrictive vision of the
nation promoted by *Endecja* excluded from its realm a large number of former
citizens of the Polish Commonwealth, namely Lithuanians and Ruthenians.

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55 Jerzy Jedlicki, “Holy ideals and prosaic life or the Devil’s alternatives,” in *Polish Paradoxes*, op. cit.,
60.
56 Both of these ideas were developed during the partitions. ‘Work at basis,’ associated with positivist
and realist thought, underscored the need of education of all social classes, particularly the under-
privileged ones, for their integration into broader social structures, and maintenance of national
identity. The ‘organic work,’ of more Romantic connotation, insisted on the need of common work of
all estates towards the economic development, as a pre-condition for the regaining of sovereignty.
57 Andrzej Ajnenkiel, “Nationality, patriotism and nationalism: the Polish case from the mid-Eastern
European perspective,” in *Nationality, Patriotism, and Nationalism in Liberal Democratic Societies*,
These patriotic traditions, despite of the fact that they constitute ideal-types, remain important, because the reference to particular traditions can nowadays be perceived as a strategy of political localization, and references to them are sometimes combined, in different discursive sub-fields.\textsuperscript{58}

### 3.2.2.2 Three patriotism revisited by Andrzej Nowak

While Walicki’s conceptualization is one of the most widely known and used, other authors have also presented their versions of historical transformation of patriotism in Poland. Conservative Andrzej Nowak contributes by discussing three versions of patriotism developed during the partitions,\textsuperscript{59} because the critical context of the loss of independent statehood provoked a stir in political thought and a confrontation of different visions of how to achieve future modernization. Nowak’s three visions of patriotism are republican, independist-imperial, and modernization-oriented.

The first version mentioned by Nowak – republican patriotism – matches Walicki’s classification. It highlights positive liberty, and the community of citizens (associated with the gentry). Nowak’s account is characterized by a certain idealization of the First Republic and of the republican vision of patriotism, as subscribing to values, ideals, memory, and symbols, characteristic to the conservative approach. He underscores that the strength of republicanism came from the decentralization of power and activity on the regional level. This tradition, developed prior to the partitions, had to transform itself after the loss of independent statehood.

Nowak’s second tradition – independist-imperial patriotism – underscores the importance of the struggle to regain sovereign power and the greater fatherland, pushing for a common identity rooted in culture. In comparison to Walicki’s

\textsuperscript{58} Zubrzycki, “We, the Polish nation.”

\textsuperscript{59} Andrzej Nowak, “Polski patriotyzm wieku niewoli: trzy formuły? (Polish patriotism during captivity: three formulas?),” in Patriotyzm Polaków, op. cit., 73.
typology, dissociating Romantic and realist traditions, Nowak brings together elements of both Romanticism and realism in this conceptualization (even if *expressis verbis* he links the Romantic patriotic tradition to the republican one). This approach has the virtue of showing the fluid transformation of different traditions. The very qualifier ‘imperial,’ however, might not be the best choice, as it denotes the will to conquest and domination, while Nowak uses it as a signifier for seeking independence and confronting the partitioning imperial powers.

Finally, the third tradition presented by Nowak, – modernization-oriented patriotism – is linked to the positivist ‘*praca u podstaw* (work at basis, promoting education among lower social classes).’ It is characterized as the willingness to overcome social backwardness, instead of concentrating on the fight for independence or the defense of republican identity. He links it to the search for ‘liberal’ (negative) freedom, based in the law, as opposed to positive freedom, based in political participation that would be characteristic of the republican approach. In his description, this tradition focused on a smaller, not imperial, fatherland – Poland, and was skeptical towards the defenders of a specific Polish identity (considered as xenophobes), and the military fight for independence. This tradition can be also linked to the evolution of socialist thought, and its dissociation from Piłsudski’s *Sanacja,* when socialist philosophers and politicians Stanisław Brzozowski, Edward Abramowski, and Bolesław Limanowski began to condemn the Romantic tradition and promote modernization.

The patriotic traditions sketched in the previous two sections do not constitute strong analytical tools, but rather ideal-types of discourses about patriotism and

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60 Piłsudski started his political career as a socialist and leader of PPS, *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna,* Polish Socialist Party. However, after his 1926 *coup d’état,* his government wanted to ‘heal’ the moral and political sphere, and thus the name of his camp became *Sanacja,* from Latin *sanatio,* healing.
different conceptions of nation and social and political *ethoi* that provide historical background to further analysis. Both authors recognize that they provide mere snapshots of what they believe to be the leading approaches to patriotism over time. Furthermore these traditions are important for a better understanding of a number of myths linked to the question of statehood.

### 3.2.3 Statehood and its myths

The lack of pro-state attitudes is another lasting impact of statelessness and ‘imperfect’ statehood. This period also impacted on the rule of law, which was respected out of fear of the subjugating powers rather than out of true allegiance and commitment to the state. In consequence, national identification “was developed not based on state institutions, but in opposition to them, due to the fact that they were imposed on, rather than supported by, the Polish people.”\(^{61}\)

For these reasons, there were no strong state-oriented examples of behavior that could serve as models for the newly sovereign statehood, the Third Republic, after 1989. Rather, specific elements of Poland’s historical heritage and traditions were the objects of heated discussions, and contributed to the perpetuation of myths that can be understood as “sets of simplified beliefs (…) which give us a sense of our origins, our identity and our purposes.”\(^{62}\)

A number of such elements, related to statehood, will be discussed below.

#### 3.2.3.1 Republicanism

The First Republic, also called the gentry’s democracy, is often depicted in an idealized manner, as the cradle of the united political nation,\(^{63}\) with positive liberty\(^{64}\)

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\(^{61}\) Góra and Mach, “Between old fears and new challenges,” 222.

\(^{62}\) Davies, “Polish national mythologies,” 141.

\(^{63}\) The nation was supposed to be composed of gentry only, united in its myth of common descent from the ancient tribe of Sarmatians. Jan Dźięgielewski, “Od staropolskiego ‘miłośnika ojczyzny’ do ‘sarmackiego patriota’” (From an old-Poland “lover of fatherland” to “Sarmatian patriot”), in *Patriotyzm Polaków*, op. cit., 21-32.
as its most important feature. For this reason, the First Republic is often called a ‘Polish model of republicanism.’ After 1989, the reference to republicanism is used, even if relatively rarely, rather by the conservative intellectuals, who complain that it is not sufficiently put forward.65 They imply that positive liberty (as opposed to the liberal, negative one) is an axiom66 inherent to the habitus of the Poles.67 Following their recent interest in Sarmatyzm (the tradition of gentry from times of the First Republic), the conservatives suggest that in Poland republicanism is an indigenous concept, in opposition to civil society, which they see as a Western invention.68 A strong reference to the common good and the decentralized political nation tries to tie this reference to republicanism to conservative communitarian thinking, grounded in tradition, and present it as a third way between nationalism and universalism.

3.2.3.2 Nation and society
The distinction between the concepts of society (społeczność) and nation (naród), which will recur in the debates about patriotism, is important to note. The co-existence of these two concepts in Polish political thought and linguistic usage has been problematic, and they do not convey the same meaning as for example the concept of ‘the people’ used in English. Using the classical opposition between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nations, one can link the Polish usage of the term ‘nation’ to common culture, and language, thus putting it closer to the ‘ethnic’ understanding of the nation, while the usage of term ‘society’ would be closer to the idea of civic values, thus putting it closer to the political understanding of the nation.

64 Isaiah Berlin proposed this distinction in his lecture “Two Concepts of Liberty” delivered in the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958.
67 Marek A. Cichocki, “Powrót republikanizmu (The comeback of the republicanism),” Teologia Polityczna, 12 August 2005.
A long-lasting distinction between nation and society has been conceptualized ever since the partitions, when the non-existence of the state endangered the existence of the nation, yet enhanced its importance as a framework of cultural reference in the fight against the occupying powers. The partitions also cast into question the relevance of society, and its political and republican heritage. The belief also became widespread, ironically expressed by a Romantic bard Cyprian Kamil Norwid, that the Poles constituted a strong nation but a weak society. Norwid criticized the Poles for preferring big national feelings and slogans to everyday duties that characterize ordinary life in a (civil) society.

Since Romanticism, the national bond is considered stronger and valued more highly than the social bond. The distinction between the nation and society persists today and can be even described as a specificity of Polish political culture, whereby the nation, by virtue of its link to culture, is more valued than society, identified with the state. Resulting from the heritage of statelessness, the perception of the state remains ambiguous and a certain dissociation between loyalties to the nation and to the state occurs, such that national loyalties take precedence over statist ones.

3.2.3.3 The democratic heritage of the Second Republic
Poland re-emerged on the map of Europe in 1918, following the First World War. Its political landscape was structured by two earlier mentioned leading politicians and their camps: Dmowski and Endecja, and Piłsudski, the socialists, and Sanacja. Piłsudski’s vision of the state was multicultural, in which sense he opposed Dmowski's integral nationalism and essentialist view of the nation. Their political

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69 “Polska jest ostatnie na ziemi społeczeństwo, a pierwszy na planecie naród (Poland is the last society on Earth, but first nation on the planet),” Letter to Michalina Dziekońska, 14 November 1862.
70 Tomasz Słomka, “Patriotyzm konstytucyjny: próba identyfikacji zjawiska w warunkach polskich (Constitutional patriotism: attempt at identifying the phenomenon in Polish reality),” in Patriotyzm współczesnych Polaków (Patriotism of contemporary Poles), publication edited by the Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw 2012, 35.
camps were not only opposed on the question of the form of the nation, but also on the question of the state.\textsuperscript{71} Sanacja’s coup d’état in 1926 constituted an important caesura for this question, because before that date the lines of opposition on these two concepts (nation and state) cut across both camps. However, after the coup, and the radicalization of politics, the division started to coincide with the two camps, with the nationalist \textit{Endecja} gathering on the side of the ‘nation,’ and the progressively authoritarian \textit{Sanacja} on the side of the ‘state,’ which also translated into their respective visions of patriotism. In Dmowski’s thought, patriotism was a moral bond with the nation, and nationalism was its modern incarnation. In contrast, \textit{Sanacja} subscribed to a more civic position, and notably promoted the idea of ‘healing’ the society through work (and the ethos of public service), perceived as a foundation for the individual’s moral reconstruction and for patriotism. \textit{Sanacja}’s position was also grounded in heroic Romantic references.\textsuperscript{72}

The allegedly democratic nature of the Second Republic (1918-1939) was nostalgically praised as a basis on which to build the continuity of Polish democracy, especially in the beginning of the democratic transition after 1989. This idealized vision was mostly upheld by older intellectuals, many of whom were born in the \textit{Kresy}, the Eastern lands of the Second Republic, lost after the Second World War to the Soviet Union. The \textit{Kresy}, in a sense, were mythologized as the place of the foundation of Polish identity, and concurred with the vision of the fatherland in

\textsuperscript{71} Krzysztof Kawalec, “Problem patriotyzmu w myśli politycznej \textit{Endecji} (The problem of patriotism in the political thought of \textit{Endecja}),” in \textit{Patriotyzm Polaków}, op. cit., 153-156.

\textsuperscript{72} Andrzej Chojnowski, “Kwestia patriotyzmu w poszukiwaniach programowych piłsudczyków (The question of patriotism in the programmatic exploration of Piłsudski’s followers),” in \textit{Patriotyzm Polaków}, op. cit., 134.
danger. However, the process of debunking myths of the Second Republic and of its democratic nature (challenged by the 1926 coup and its sequels) is ongoing.74

### 3.2.3.4 The grandeur of the nation during the War

After 1945, the communists, lacking any strong popular legitimacy, tried to legitimize their power in a nationalistic way, referring to the nation and national symbols, despite the official rejection of the ‘nationalist deviation,’76 because it was the most efficient way to obtain popular legitimacy. Their tactic of nationalist legitimization of the regime relied on an instrumental use of patriotic references, attempting to create a semantic combination (semantyczną zbiętkę) of patriotism with socialism.77 The communists also strongly instrumentalized references to citizenship and society in their attempt to present themselves as the heirs of past patriotic traditions. This strategy made it very cumbersome after communism to recover these concepts for a more neutral use. Their strategy aimed to counterbalance the influence of the Catholic Church (and its vision of the ‘Catholic nation’), which maintained its position as a dispensary of values, and remained a strong opponent to the communists in the sense of enjoying a strong legitimacy in the eyes of the people.78

In the field of historiography, the communists also promoted a specific self-image of the Poles, and of their behavior in the Second World War. It depicted Poles

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75 After the war, the communists presented themselves as champions of the recovery of the Western lands, and of achieving a homogenous society. Krystyna Kersten, “Polska – państwo narodowe. Dylematy i rzeczywistość (Poland – nation state. Dilemmas and reality),” in *Narody, jak powstawały i jak wybijały się na niepodległość* (Nations. How were they created and how did they attain independence)? ed. Marcin Kula (Warszawa: PWN, 1989), 473-477.
as a nation united in suffering, but able to help others in need. According to the Jewish Polish-American historian Jan Tomasz Gross, the communist historiography created, in the first decade after the war, the canonical form of the discourse about the war, depicting it as a

“paradigmatic time, stigmatized by a calamity of partitions and loss of national independence, the sacrifice of its best sons on the altar of patriotism and the bloody defeat of a national uprising [the Warsaw Uprising of 1944].”

It can, to an extent, be understood that this vision was easier to accept and incorporate into Polish national memory, given the trauma of the German occupation, than any painful introspection concerning possible crimes committed by Poles during that time. This vision reflected a broader trend, pointed out by influential historian Krystyna Kersten, that war made the nation the dominant category.

The vision of the past promoted by communist propaganda focused on the Poles as the central victims of the German occupation. The memory of Holocaust was manipulated in the process, given that the communists promoted the figure of 6 million of Polish victims of the war, without mentioning that Polish Jews exterminated in the Nazi concentration camps constituted half of it. It also made the question of Polish-Jewish relations during or after the war, or of anti-Semitism, a

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80 Tony Judt underscores that this lack of painful introspection was a general approach used in many European countries in the post-war years: “two sorts of memories thus emerged: that of things done to ‘us’ by Germans in the war, and the rather different recollection of things (however similar) done by ‘us’ to ‘others’ after the war (taking advantage of a situation that Germans had obligingly if unintentionally made possible). Two moral vocabularies, two sorts of reasoning, two different pasts. In this circumstance, the uncomfortably confusing recollection of things done by us to others during the war (i.e. under German auspices) got conveniently lost.” Tony Judt, “The past is another country: myth and memory in postwar Europe,” in The politics of retribution in Europe, op. cit., 298.

81 Góra and Mach, “Between old fears and new challenges.”
taboo after 1945. It became commonly accepted that the vast majority of Polish people never did anything violent against the Jews during the war.

This image of the Poles as heroes and victims, replicating the simplified Romantic cliché of Polish messianism, relied on the idea of martyrdom and suffering (for other people’s freedom). The official state discourse underlined how much Poles had suffered, and how heroic they had been during the war. The memory of war became a part of the ‘backbone of Polish identity.’ This image only started to be challenged in the 1980s, following a certain liberalization of censorship after the first Solidarność. Even after 1989, the study of the Polish-Jewish relations during and after the war took long to start and to overcome the ‘conspiracy of silence.’ Gross was among the first historians to dramatically re-visit this field in the 2000s, accusing Poles of being de facto of assistance to the Nazis in the perpetration of the Holocaust of Polish Jews.

3.2.3.5 Unofficial love of the country
The commanded and officially expressed ‘love’ of the communist country was counterbalanced by an unofficial, even forbidden, expression of patriotism as opposition to the regime. This patriotism could be described as a love of the idealized vision of Poland, hostage of an unwanted, oppressive regime. At the same time, this

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83 This question will be further discussed in chapter 7 concerning the national mourning. This political myth of Poland as the Christ of nations has a religious and quasi-blasphemous overtone (Davies, “Polish national mythologies,” 150). Furthermore, its link with the myth of Polak-Katolik (Pole-Catholic) led many an author (though rarely Polish Publicists) to describe this messianic style of Polish Catholicism as backward and frightening. Tony Judt, Postwar (Penguin books, 2006), 684 (in Polish edition, Warszawa: Rebis, 2008).
85 Janowski, “Jedwabne,” 60.
patriotism was directed against the state regime and its institutions, which were perceived as imposed from abroad. *Solidarność*, and other expressions of the dissident movement, could in this case be perceived as a representation of this expression of patriotism, outside of formal channels.

In sum, then, during this long period of time (1795-1989, with the parenthesis of the Second Republic, 1918-1939), the understanding and expression of Polish patriotism can be seen rather to have developed outside formal political channels and often against the state, its regime and power.

### 3.3 Regaining sovereignty and constructing democracy – political context of the debates about patriotism

A broader political context and landscape is essential for the understanding of the debates about the meaning of patriotism, as it enables or disables the appearance and success of certain arguments in the public sphere.

#### 3.3.1 Slow consolidation of the political landscape

The changes initiated in 1989 marked the end of the communist regime, and the installation of a new, democratic form of government, and of a market economy. It was a gradual process, denoted by different names: liberalization, transition or transformation (semantic differences between them are not of relevance here). From 6 February until 5 April 1989, the Round Table talks between the representatives of the Communist Party in power and the opposition (representatives of workers, dissident intellectuals and Church) aimed at resolving the political and economic impasse of the late 1980s, but achieved a historical breakthrough, looking from today’s perspective.

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*Niezależny Samorządzny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność”* (Independent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity”) emerged on 31 August 1980 at the Gdansk Shipyard under the leadership of Lech Wałęsa. It was the first trade union in a Warsaw Pact country that was not controlled by the Party. The rapid increase in its membership led the Party to de-legalize it and declare martial law in 1981. The Round Table agreement between the government and the Solidarity-led opposition allowed for the re-legalization of the trade union and the organization of the semi-free elections in June 1989.
The resulting agreement settled the terms for the first semi-free parliamentary elections, which were held on 4 June 1989, resulting in a crushing victory for the anti-communist opposition, which prior to the elections had had to transform itself from a newly re-legalized trade union into a political party and conduct an electoral campaign in an apathetic society. This victory, however, was not the end of the difficult times, but rather the beginning of the unknown. *Solidarność* representatives had not even dreamt of such electoral success, and hence were not ready to govern. Eventually, a new government, with a number of communists in key posts, was formed in September 1989. Progressively, with the evolution of the internal and international situation, and the increasingly dramatic impact of the ‘shock therapy’ reform of the economy implemented on 1 January 1990, attempts to maintain the Round Table agreements started to divide the former opposition.

The intelligentsia and other classes, formerly united in their opposition to the communist regime, started breaking into different ideological camps, and political quarrels ensued. The clash called “*Wojna na górze* (The war at the top),” between Lech Wałęsa (leader of Solidarność) and Tadeusz Mazowiecki (an opposition intellectual who became the first democratic Prime Minister of Poland in September 1989) in the 1990 presidential elections marked the end of the unity of the former democratic opposition. The rise of a third man – a murky millionaire from nowhere, Stan Tymiński, from Party X (*Partia X*), who came second to Wałęsa and ahead of Mazowiecki in the first round of elections, demonstrated the populist potential of the newly pluralist polity, despite him finally losing to Wałęsa in the second round of the elections.

The results of the first fully free parliamentary elections in 1991 showed a strong fragmentation of the political scene: out of 111 participating electoral
committees, as many as 29 obtained mandates in Sejm (11 committees obtained only one mandate each). The strong fragmentation of the Parliament, induced by the system of proportional representation without threshold, made it difficult to achieve a stable governmental coalition, and the first Parliament only lasted two years. Political fights between Wałęsa and different political parties and their leaders marked this period. One of the significant political questions from that period was the first attempt at performing a lustration of politicians (verification whether someone had collaborated with the communist secret service), in June 1992, by the conservative government of Jan Olszewski. This rather chaotic attempt at de-communization remains controversial and became a point of further reference, both positive and negative, throughout the transition.

The subsequent anticipated parliamentary elections, called in 1993 by Wałęsa, brought, for him at least, an unexpected result: the return to power of the former communists, re-labeled in the meantime as Social-Democrats (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, the SLD, The Alliance of Democratic Left), in a coalition with the PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, the Polish Peasants’ Party), itself the successor to the ZSL (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, the United People’s Party), a former satellite of the Communist Party. It can nevertheless be pointed out that the SLD was already the second political force in 1991 elections, behind the UD (Unia Demokratyczna, the Democratic Union), the party of the former intellectual dissidents, Mazowiecki and Bronisław Geremek, among others. Thanks to the introduction of a 5% threshold (8% for coalitions) prior to the 1993 elections, the parliamentary landscape started to consolidate. However, the rapid return of the

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88 SLD 20.41% of votes, PSL 15.40%, UD, 10.59%, UP, Unia Pracy (the Labour Union) 7.28%, KPN, Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej (Confederation of Independent Poland) 5.77% and BBWR, Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform (Non-partisan bloc for support of reforms) 5.41%.
former communists to power led many a critic of the new regime to believe that the process of transition, and especially political and social cleansing after the former regime, had not been nor could ever be fully achieved.

Furthermore, not only did the SLD win the parliamentary elections in 1993, but in 1995, one of its leaders, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, achieved the presidency of the country, beating Wałęsa (who was seeking a second term), in the second round of the presidential elections. The SLD continued the process of reform, and of integration with the European Union and NATO, and contributed to the work on the new, democratic constitution, adopted in 1997 (preceded by the adoption of the “small Constitution (Mała Konstytucja)” in 1992). All in all, the political and intellectual discussions in the early 1990s were rather focused on achieving structural and economic reforms, and later accusations that history has not been thoroughly discussed are, in a way, understandable, if not entirely correct.

3.3.1.1 Consecutive waves of the right-wing politics
The relatively fast disaggregation of the former democratic opposition, and of Solidarność, was a significant event in the early stage of the democratic transition. David Ost, among others, has linked this fact to the weakness and arrested development of political liberalism in Poland.89 Rafał Matyja, in turn, refers to it in his analysis of different streams of right wing politics.90 The first stream with the Round Table agreements and the presidential victory of Lech Wałęsa in 1990. The second stream emerged with the creation of the AWS in 1996 (Akcja Wyborcza ‘Solidarność’) – The Electoral Action ‘Solidarność’) and lasted until the end of the 1990s and the dusk of its government. Finally the third stream emerged in the early

90 Rafał Matyja, Konserwatyzm po komunizmie (Conservatism after communism) (WAiP, 2009), 291-300.
2000s with the formation of three big right-wing parties: the PO (*Platforma Obywatelska*, the Civic Platform, conservative liberals), the PiS (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, Law and Justice, the conservative right, statist and focused on de-communization), and finally the LPR (*Liga Polskich Rodzin*, the League of Polish Families, traditionalists and promoting the nationalist option). It should be mentioned that the rise of these new, ‘third wave’ right-wing parties can be linked to the progressive change of political leaders: the eclipse of Geremek and Mazowiecki (strong in 1990s) and the rise, for example, of Jarosław Kaczyński, Ludwik Dorn, Kazimierz M. Ujazdowski, or Donald Tusk.

The AWS, a coalition of right-wing post-*Solidarność* parties, created in 1996, aimed at regaining power from the hands of the post-communists governing since 1993. Marian Krzaklewski, its founder and leader, built the AWS around a religious rhetoric of maintaining the prohibition of abortion and a call for introducing a strong reference to God into the Preamble of the 1997 Constitution, which was under discussion at that time. The AWS also managed to channel the disillusionment of workers with their poor economic situation, by presenting it as a result of the policies of the post-communist government. This rhetoric proved successful and the AWS won the 1997 parliamentary elections, forming a government with the UW (*Unia*...)

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91 The party was created under the leadership of Andrzej Olechowski (independent), Maciej Płażyński (from AWS), and Donald Tusk (from the Freedom Union).
92 The party was founded in 2001 by the Kaczyński twins, Lech and Jarosław, with participants from the PC (*Porozumienie Centrum*, the Centre Alliance), their previous party, and from the AWS.
93 While nowadays, there is a tendency to describe the PiS as ‘the’ conservative party, it is a certain shortcut of thought, but indeed progressively it took increasingly conservative positions. Conservatism cannot be subsumed to one party only, and prominent right-wing members of the PO also describe it as liberal in economy and conservative in the cultural sphere.
94 Ost interestingly analyzes the transformation of *Solidarność* from an open movement promoting liberal democracy and the concept of civil society as inclusive political community, into a self-proclaimed Catholic movement. Ost, *Kłęska Solidarności*, 21.
95 AWS 33,80% of votes, SLD 27,13%, UW 13,37%, PSL 7,31% and ROP (*Ruch Odbudowy Polski*, Movement for reconstruction of Poland), 5,56%.
Wolności, the Freedom Union) that lasted until 2000, when the UW left the coalition. The AWS’s Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek, was the first one after 1989 to remain in office for a full term of four years. The final failure of the AWS (it did not pass the 8% threshold for coalitions in 2001 elections, obtaining merely 5.6% of the votes) can be linked to its inability to transform itself into a stable party: it remained a coalition of different movements, a conglomerate of different interests and worldviews (as it was the case of the ‘original’ union as well). The end of its coalition with the UW in 2000, followed by the secession of other parts of the movement, and formation of the PO and PiS in 2001, contributed to its weakening. While in 2001 it was still too early for the new right-wing parties to attain power, the SLD won the elections again, and formed another coalition government with the PSL. Despite the fact that their government successfully concluded the process of European integration, crowned with EU accession on 1 May 2004, it progressively lost people’s trust and power (in the 2005 elections), due among other things to a political-media scandal called Rywingate.

3.3.1.2 ‘Polska solidarna’ versus ‘Polska liberalna’ (Solidary versus liberal Polands)
During the electoral campaign in 2005, the PO and PiS brandished a firm promise of forming a government coalition (PO-PiS) to ‘renovate’ the political scene and create the new, scandal-free Fourth Republic. However, the initial promise of cooperation was already endangered during the electoral campaign, when the PiS started using a structuring opposition between counter-concepts of ‘solidary’ and ‘liberal’ Polands,

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96 Two parties formed the UW in 1994: aforementioned UD (Democratic Union), and the KLD (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny, Liberal-Democratic Congress).
97 SLD 41% of votes, PO 12.68%, Samoobrona 10.20%, PiS 9.50% PSL 8.98% and LPR 7.87%.
98 Rywingate denotes a corruption scandal that started in 2002 when a known cinematographic producer Lew Rywin tried to obtain a bribe from the editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza (GW), Adam Michnik, in exchange for amending the draft proposal for revision of the Media law that would favor the interests of GW’s owner, Agora. Rywin claimed to be acting on behalf of the ‘Group holding the power,’ which supposedly included highest politicians from then-governing SLD. A special committee was created in the Sejm to investigate the circumstances of the affair, yet it did not reach firm conclusions. Rywin was nevertheless sentenced to two years in prison for ‘paid protection.’
presenting itself as ‘solidary’ and denigrating the PO as ‘liberal.’\textsuperscript{99} This opposition can be understood as a new iteration of the divide within society that some authors describe as ‘two Polands.’ It replaced the post-communist cleavage between the former communists and dissidents with a cleavage between liberalism (market-friendly and individualist) and solidarism (redistributionist and culturally traditionalist).\textsuperscript{100}

After the PiS won and the PO came second,\textsuperscript{101} coalition talks were initiated, but never succeeded. Instead, the PiS, after a period of minority government, signed a coalition agreement with two marginal parties: the extreme-right LPR (27 April 2006) and the populist \textit{Samoobrona} (Auto-defense, 5 May 2006), forming a radical, patriotic, populist,\textsuperscript{102} “anti-system coalition.”\textsuperscript{103} Since then, the PiS and the PO have become strong opponents and have progressively established a right-wing hegemony over the political sphere (and a peculiar type of right-right bi-partisan system).

The rise of the PiS can be linked to the progress of political conservatism, and enduring weakness of political liberalism. Matyja, in his slightly positive appreciation of conservative thought, speaks of the progressive maturity of the project of political

\textsuperscript{99} It has to be said that in parallel to the weakness of political liberalism, also in the economic sphere, liberalism became a kind of a scapegoat for all problems.


\textsuperscript{101} PiS 26.99\%, PO 24.24\%, Samoobrona 11.41\%, SLD 11.31\%, LPR 7.97\%, PSL 6.96\%.

\textsuperscript{102} Jan Kubik qualifies all these three parties as illiberal. He also interestingly explains that while one would expect an “antiliberal cultural backlash” rather in the beginning of the democratic transformation, in Poland this right-wing reaction only took place in the mid-2000s, but to his mind it does not constitute a strong threat to liberal democracy. However, the rhetorical and mnemonic strategies used by PiS can be seen as potentially dangerous, under this light. Jan Kubik, “Illiberal challenge to liberal democracy. The case of Poland,” \textit{Taiwan Journal of democracy} 8, no.2 (2012).

\textsuperscript{103} Aleksander Smolar, “Radykałowie u władzy (Radicals at power),” \textit{Gazeta Wyborcza} (Source 5.75). Smolar did not invent the expression “anti-system coalition;” it was used by the PiS itself. It led Smolar to describe the PiS as a radical party that throughout the democratic transition (even in its previous party formations) focused on resolving the problems of the past, linked to the remnants of the communist regime. In the first stage of the democratic transition this type of thinking oriented towards the past was not adequate to the society’s views and needs, hence they were marginalized. The return of this type of conservative thinking can be linked to the popularity of Lech Kaczyński as Minister of Justice (2000-2001) in the government of Jerzy Buzek, which also gave impetus to the creation of the PiS in 2001.
conservatism, linked to the increasing importance of cultural and educational policies in state activity.\textsuperscript{104} Ost, in contrast, links political conservatism to the growing radicalization of the PiS, consisting of using emotions in politics, and promoting exclusionary discourses and ideological ‘politics of history.’\textsuperscript{105} While both of these accounts present extreme views of this topic, the rise of ‘politics of history’ is significant. It can be linked to the role of Kazimierz M. Ujazdowski as Minister of Culture and National Heritage in the right-wing governments of Jerzy Buzek (2000-2001), Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (2005-2006) and Jarosław Kaczyński (2006-2007), and to the reflection of the conservative intellectual circle, from the Warsaw Club of Political Critique, that participated in the creation of the Museum of Warsaw Uprising (\textit{Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego}, MPW) and the Museum of History of Poland (\textit{Muzeum Historii Polski}, MHP).

The PiS coalition government lasted until 11 August 2007 when the Political Council of the PiS set in motion a procedure leading to anticipated parliamentary elections, following Kaczyński’s decision to break up the government coalition. The PiS lost these elections to the PO, which subsequently formed a government with the PSL.\textsuperscript{106} The same results were repeated in the 2011 elections,\textsuperscript{107} which further demonstrated the stabilization of the political landscape, when the same party, the PO, won two subsequent parliamentary elections, and Donald Tusk became the first Prime Minister in office for two consecutive terms.

In terms of presidential mandates, Kwaśniewski held the country’s presidency for two consecutive terms (1995-2005), the maximum allowed by the Constitution. In

\textsuperscript{104} Matyja, \textit{Konserwatyzm po komunizmie}.
\textsuperscript{105} Ost, \textit{Kłęska Solidarności}.
\textsuperscript{106} PO received 41.51% of the votes, PiS, 32.11%; LiD (\textit{Lewica i Demokraci}, Left and Democrats coalition), 13.15%; PSL 8.91%. Interestingly, neither \textit{Samobrona} (1.53%) nor LPR (1.30%), members of the previous government coalition, did not pass the threshold of 5% of votes.
\textsuperscript{107} PO received 39.18% of the votes, PiS 29.89%, \textit{Ruch Palikota} 10.2%, PSL 8.36%, and SLD 8.24%.
the elections in 2005, the two most important candidates were Donald Tusk for the PO and Lech Kaczyński for the PiS, who both made it into the second round, where Kaczyński beat Tusk 54% to 46%, despite the fact that Tusk won the first round 36% to 33%. Lech Kaczyński’s victory in the presidential elections was the beginning of a peculiar domination of the Kaczyński brothers over the executive power in Poland: in 2006 his twin brother Jarosław replaced Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz as Prime Minister and for the next two years the Kaczyńskis controlled both branches of the executive.

One additional event is worth mentioning about this election: a rumor used by Jacek Kurski, a member of the PiS, prior to the second round of elections, to discredit Donald Tusk: ‘the grandfather from the Wehrmacht.’ Tusk’s family comes from Gdańsk, and in the Pomeranian and Kaszuby region, as in Silesia, many Polish citizens had been forced into the occupier’s army. Kurski implied that Tusk’s grandfather volunteered to be a member of the Wehrmacht in the Second World War. Without presenting any conclusive proof of this fact, he managed to plant a seed of suspicion that also damaged the construction of the aforementioned PO-PiS coalition. There are even testimonies that Kurski himself did not believe in his story, but used it for purely electoral motives, which he allegedly confirmed to radio journalists, off the record.108 Furthermore, Kurski’s story was built on an assumption (often used by the conservatives in their strategy of denigrating the liberal and left-wing elites, for their links, or that of their parents, with the communism, that will be discussed later) that children, or even grandchildren, can or even should be held responsible for the deeds of their ancestors.

108 “Z tym Wehrmachtem to lipa, ale jedziemy w to, bo ciemny lud to kupi. (This Wehrmacht thing is a lie, but we roll with it, because the ignorant people will buy it).” 4 renowned journalists, Tomasz Lis, Wiesław Władyka, Tomasz Wolek and Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska, participating to a radio broadcast in TOK FM on 14 October 2005, confirmed that Kurski said so, even if he denied such a fact. Source: http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/gid,13818633,gpage,6,img,13818691,kat,1342,title,Sensacje-w-kampanii,galeria.html?ficaid=112105&_tcrsn=3 Consulted on 21 January 2014.
3.3.2 The controversy about the nature of the new regime among political elites

The initial years of regime transformation were characterized by uncertainty about its nature, the difficult reconstruction of a free and pluralist political culture, and fear of the potential rise of nationalism or other populist movements. All these questions provoked a number of public debates on important (political) matters and concepts, such as the fatherland, the heritage of the PRL or de-communization.

As discussed before, the change of the regime occurred in 1989 in a peaceful, negotiated way, which was once dubbed a ‘Refolution’ (combining ref(orm) and (rev)olution) by English historian Timothy Garton Ash. Such situation had good and bad points. On the positive side, it contributed to a rather smooth transition between the old regime and the new one. At the same time, people did not witness a clear break; neither was there a symbolic closure\(^\text{109}\) of the communist regime, nor a true foundational moment for the new state.

Consequently, the appreciation of the new regime among symbolic elites remains far from consensual. The most fervent critics of the new regime would call the Third Republic ‘PRL-bis’ and say that it was born of the original sin of the Round Table negotiations (or of the Magdalenka negotiations),\(^\text{110}\) where the party representatives concluded agreements with appointed opposition members, who were not elected in any way. The proponents of the Third Republic, in contrast, recognize the past necessity of leading Round Table negotiations and signing Round Table agreements, and claim that at that moment there was a high level of uncertainty over


\(^{110}\) The talks in Magdalenka, among a limited number of Round Table participants, contributed to the resolution of problematic issues encountered during the main negotiations. With time, and because they were not transparent, the critics of the 1989 agreement coined the ‘black legend’ of Magdalenka, implying that the participants of these talks concluded secret pacts; this was disproven by its participants, including Lech Kaczyński, and historical research, e.g. Jan Skórzyński, Rewolucja Okrągłego Stołu (Revolution of the Round Table) (Kraków: Znak 2009).
what might be achieved, and it is impossible to claim that the opposition could have fought for more. The mid-way position is that while the Round Table negotiations might have been necessary, after the victorious elections of 1989, at the first possible moment, the agreements should have been discarded and power taken over integrally by the democratic opposition, instead of creating a shared government. Here, the axis of criticism (by the conservative right-wing of the former opposition) is turned against these members of the democratic opposition (of central, liberal or left leaning) who, after the spectacular triumph in 1989, pushed for respecting the agreement. This position does not recognize the positive aspect of a gradual and peaceful take-over of power, and its proponents can be found among those who advocated ‘acceleration’ of the political transformation at that time.

The long period of problematic statehood (from the partitions to the communist times) was marked by concerns to regain independence and/or sovereignty, and pushed Polish political thought towards reflecting about the ways to do it, rather than into preoccupations about the potential form of the prospective polity.¹¹¹ In 1989, like in 1918, the state regained its sovereignty, but without ready-made solutions to the questions related to the concept of the ‘political,’ its place and foundations.¹¹² The uncertainty about the democratic nature of the Third Republic left a question hanging over the moral and spiritual foundations of the new state, the continuity/discontinuity between the old and the new regimes, and of the way of dealing with the communist past.

I suggest that all these contexts – theoretical, historical and political – allow us to grasp the meaningfulness of the usage of the concept of patriotism during the

¹¹¹ Matyja, “Przestrzeń powinności.”
democratic transition, when it served, among other things, as a tool to develop one’s theory of the state, its tradition, and continuity (or lack thereof) with the previous regime. At first, the concept of patriotism served the purpose of making sense of the fast changing reality, and of the democratic transition. A search for the right values, in order to ensure the right foundations for the emerging democracy, ensued. At the heart of this search lay the challenge of finding adequate values for a newly established democratic regime and developing an adequate approach to national values, trying to prevent their monopolization by one political force.

I will argue that the restoration of sovereign statehood in 1989 can be compared, with respect to its crucial contextual influence over the need of redefining the nature of patriotic allegiance, to the loss of independent statehood at the end of the 18th century that prompted the redefinition of the concept of patriotism from territorial to nation-oriented. After 1989, in the new democratic framework, the strong Romantic paradigm of heroic fight seemed obsolete at first, and came under fire from intellectuals. It prompted them to discuss other propositions, one of which, emerging around 2000, was to replace fight with work ethic. I suggest that this effort to change the focus of patriotism, from fight to work, did not aim to influence solely the adjacent elements of the definition of the concept of patriotism, but to affect its ineliminable core, pushing it towards a more civic definition.

All in all, then, the underlying significance of the discussion about patriotism is the reflection about the country, or rather, about the state, and the nature of this statehood, the Third Republic, that emerged in 1989. The position towards specific versions of patriotism taken by the participants of these debates can be linked to one’s position on the current regime, the nature of allegiance to it, its performance, and the relationship to the former regime, or even democracy, on the whole. These elements
will be demonstrated in the subsequent four empirical chapters, which analyze the nature of the contestation over the concept of patriotism during the democratic transition in Poland.
Chapter Four – The reopening of the ‘discursive space’ after 1989 and the reconquering of the key political concepts in order to legitimize the new democratic state

The three previous chapters have discussed the concept of patriotism and constructed a theoretical and methodological framework for the analysis of public debates addressing it in Poland after 1989. The next four chapters will present an analysis of the empirical sources, showing how the concept of patriotism was discussed across the democratic transition and how it helped intellectuals to push forward their ideas and goals, and become a useful tool for the assertion of dominance over the discursive field, leading to its progressive polarization.

Three discussions that occurred during the first decade of the democratic transition will be analyzed in this chapter. They all focused on a pluralist re-definition of a number of key political concepts: the fatherland (1992), nationalism (1997), and patriotism (1998), after decades of their manipulation by the communists. These debates were held in the context of rapid social and economic transformation, and showed how intellectuals suggested a way of dealing with the communist heritage, its discursive deformations and damages to political culture by providing ideational tools to approach the legacy of the past regime and the transition to democracy.

The conservative philosopher Ryszard Legutko lamented in 1992 that the Publizistik of the initial years of democratic transition allegedly did not deal extensively with important social and political topics and concepts. This accusation of lack of patriotic discourse after 1989 was taken up by many conservative Publizists in the 2000s. However, the occurrence and content of the debates analyzed in this
chapter contradict the assumption. I will show that the intellectual impact of these debates should not be overlooked, given that they constitute a reservoir of references for further utterances, and are invoked or built upon in later discussions concerning patriotism.

I argue that with respect to the definition of patriotism as ‘the love of one’s country,’ these three initial debates concerned the question of ‘country.’ I will discuss how the construction of the approach to the new reality starts from addressing the object of allegiance, the fatherland, and the community. Then the conceptual discussion of patriotism in relation/opposition to nationalism will allow me to show the willingness of intellectuals to link democratic values with national ones, in order to better ground the emerging democratic form of regime. Finally, the discussion of the transforming nature of patriotism pinpoints the desirable social behaviors it could foster, but also the undesirable attempts of its monopolization.

4.1 Laying strong foundations for the new democratic regime – debates about the fatherland, liberal nationalism and patriotism in the social-Catholic press in the 1990s

This chapter will focus on three instances of contestation over the meaning of patriotism that occurred in the first decade after the change of regime in 1989. The first debate took place in 1992 on the pages of Tygodnik Powszechny (TP),¹ and its

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¹ The article by Marcin Król “Ojczyzna (Fatherland),” published in Tygodnik Powszechny on February 9, 1992 launched the debate. After this publication, the editor-in-chief of TP, Jerzy Turowicz invited intellectuals to respond to Król. The reactions were published regularly until mid-August. The final article by Jan Nowak-Jeziorański appeared on October 11. The nature of the exchange was lively; authors referred not only to the initial theses of Król, but also to each other’s articles. The intellectuals who participated to this discussion belonged mostly to an older generation, born before the World War II (only three were born during or after the war: Król, Stefan Niesiolowski, and Tadeusz Sobolewski). Many of them participated in the democratic opposition to the communist regime. We count among them signatories of the “Letter of 59” against changes in the Constitution in 1976 (Król, Andrzej Drawicz), the only Member of Parliament who did not vote in favor of the proposed changes (Stanisław Stomma), as well as professors of the underground ‘flying university’ (Drawicz, Krzysztof Wolicki, Jerzy Jedlicki), and commentators of Radio Free Europe (Kazimierz Orłoś, Nowak-Jeziorański). Many of them were political emigrants who decided to leave Poland in opposition to the communist rule (Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, Stanisław Lem, Wojciech Wasiutyński, Janina
main topic was the concept of the fatherland, and its desirable form in the post-communist reality. The second took place in 1997, in a thematic edition of Znak dedicated to the question of nationalism and its compatibility with a democratic regime, and the third discussion was constituted by an exchange of letters among two intellectuals, published in 1998 in Więź concerning the evolving nature of patriotism. These three publications, Tygodnik Powszechny, Znak and Więź (introduced in Chapter 2) strove, under communism, to maintain their freedom, despite censorship, and had a reputation of sparking and leading important debates on social, historical, and philosophical topics. They were and continue to be perceived as outlets for intellectuals, and are closer to Catholicism, but not necessarily restricted to religious leanings.

These three discussions are important for the understanding of broad public debates about the meaning of patriotism held in the second decade of the transition, as the arguments of established intellectuals in these initial debates were often invoked later on. This was the case with Marcin Król’s article about the fatherland from 1992, and particularly with the discussion about the combination of democratic and liberal

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Kościałkowska, Nowak-Jeziorański, Zygmunt Marzys). The label ‘emigrant’ was commonly used in the 1992 debate, also by emigrants themselves, who described emigration as an important characteristic of their position, and of their relationship to the fatherland. While under the communism they took a conscious decision to leave the communist state and not to go back to “something that was gone forever,” they tried to work for their idealized version of country, from abroad. After 1989, they progressively started re-evaluating their position. Antonina Kłoskowska, “An epilogue on emigration,” in National cultures at the grass-root level, idem. (Budapest: CEU Press, 2001), 379-382.

2 This thematic issue of Znak included seven articles written by established historians and sociologists, such as Jerzy Szacki, Jedlicki, Andrzej Walicki, Król, Antonina Kłoskowska, Ryszard Radzik and Henryk Samsonowicz, specialized in the question of nations and nationalism. This edition of Znak is considered here as an instance of public debate. Later on, a number of other thematic dossiers of Znak will be analyzed within broader public debates.

3 This dialogue on patriotism is one among five that writer Herling-Grudziński led with one of the most esteemed Church philosophers, archbishop of Lublin, Józef Życiński. In 1999, all dialogues were published in a book, inspired by an Italian example, of a discussion between Umberto Eco and the Cardinal of Milan, Carlo Maria Martini (Belief or non-belief: a confrontation (Arcade Publishing 2000, for English translation)). This exchange between a believer and a non-believer, a Catholic and a secular humanist, was originally published in 1995 in Corriere della sera. While the Italian exchange focused on religious and philosophical topics, the exchange between Herling-Grudziński and Życiński included a critical moral assessment of the new political reality. One of its leitmotifs was the alleged lack of critical evaluation of the communist regime during the democratic transition.
values, liberal nationalism, advanced in 1997 by Andrzej Walicki, Jerzy Szacki and Król. The qualification of patriotism as a ‘silent virtue’ proposed by Gustaw Herling-Grudziński in 1998 will also be a reference in later debates. From a diachronic perspective, one can establish these intellectuals as leading actors in the intellectual field of the contestation over the meaning of patriotism.

These discussions illustrate the nature of debates in the first years of the democratic transition. The period following the change of the regime was one of uncertainty about the future, and about the stabilization of the new democratic regime, marked by a fear of a populist slide or the return of nationalism. For this and other reasons, topics such as the form of the fatherland, nationalism and patriotism were the object of intellectual discussions aiming at constructing solid foundations for the newly developing democratic regime. These discussions testify against an argument voiced later by the conservative right that topics related to identity and history were ‘silenced’ during the first decade of the transition.

Each of the three discussions will be presented in a separate section. The discussion about the form of the fatherland and the importance of the spiritual fatherland in a newly sovereign reality will offer an explanation of the emerging ideological oppositions related to the assessment of modernization and democracy (Section 4.2). The discussion about the relation between patriotism and nationalism will show the willingness to find stable and strong foundations for the democratic regime, by bringing together national and liberal values (Section 4.3). Finally, the discussion about the nature and the transformation of patriotism will show how this concept was used to advance reflection on desirable social behaviors (Section 4.4). Overall, I will show how the concept of community becomes one of the keywords or even ineliminable elements within the semantic field of all the concepts under
discussion: community came to be seen as the desirable form of the fatherland, and as
the basis of reflection concerning the nation. Care for the community was also
characterized as a crucial characteristic of patriotism.

4.2 The reconstruction of the spiritual fatherland, a pre-condition for a strong democracy
The concept of fatherland was the main object of the discussion in the newspaper
Tygodnik Powszechny in 1992. Twenty articles authored by different intellectuals
discussed what form the fatherland/country should take after communism.

In the article that launched the debate, the liberal philosopher Marcin Król
insisted on the necessity of discussing the concept of fatherland and proposing a new
definition, adapted to the new post-communist reality. The most relevant aspects of
this discussion were linked to different forms of fatherland, reflecting the
considerations about the level and object of patriotic allegiance.

There is no one clear vision of the fatherland that would triumph in this
discussion; rather there were multiple possible definitions of it, private, public and
spiritual. At the same time, the concept of community came to be an essential element
of the fatherland, but there was no agreement on its form, whether it should be
conceptualized as a nation or a society. The focus on the question of continuity of the
(spiritual) fatherland, and whether the People’s Republic of Poland and its legacy
should constitute a part of it, was one of the key elements of the debate, re-orienting
the discussion towards the dangers that post-communist society was facing.

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4 For a comprehensive analysis of this debate, see Dorota Szeligowska, “Intellectuals and Fatherland in
a newly sovereign country – the debate about fatherland in Poland in 1992,” Der Donauraum 3-4
(2010).
4.2.1 Private versus common fatherland
Król differentiated between private and common fatherland (Source 1.1). The former was commonly described as small, local and friendly, while the latter was depicted as big and shared with compatriots on the basis of similarities and common belonging. This image can be compared to the German distinction between *Heimat* (small, private fatherland) and *Vaterland* (big, ideological fatherland), or to that proposed by Herling-Grudziński between private and public fatherland (Source 1.3).

Private fatherland denoted the place where people were born, grew up and felt at home (Drawicz, Source 1.16). It also denoted the ideal vision of the fatherland (Porębski, Source 1.7), establishing a durable tension between the existing, everyday country and the idealized vision of it (Orłoś, Source 1.17), which was to come back on a number of occasions in this and later debates. What authors called ‘my fatherland’ was not necessarily linked to either the private or the common fatherland, but could refer to both of them. This ‘something mine’ (Sobolewski, Source 1.10) generally referred to a combination of territory, history and people.

An important element in the domain of the private fatherland was the recurring nostalgia for *Kresy* (Eastern lands of the Second Republic) that Poland had lost to the Soviet Union after World War II. A number of authors involved in this debate were born there and felt the loss of this land, and the expulsion of its population, as the loss of their *Heimat* (e.g. Lem described *Kresy* as his ‘true’ fatherland, Source 1.2). The nostalgic reference to *Kresy* was more often found in the texts of emigrants, and of authors coming from the older generation, who felt that they had lost their *coin de terre* (Marzys, Source 1.5). The transformation of territory was often discussed together with the transformation of the population of the fatherland. Prior to the Second World War, Poland was a multicultural country, with a number of national
minorities, who disappeared after 1945, due to the change of borders, transfers of population, and most importantly, the Holocaust. For that reason, a number of authors, subscribing to multicultural traditions of the fatherland, underscored the need to cultivate their traditions and heritage (Porębski, Source 1.7).

When it comes to the fatherland described as the birthplace, it was often stated that every person had a fatherland. It is commonsensical to say that everybody was born in a specific place, and most of the time received their initial socialization there. However, there is a difference between stating that everybody has a fatherland (i.e. a place of birth) and implying, in a strong communitarian vein, that “otherwise he would not be a man.”5 The left-wing liberal Krzysztof Wolicki (formerly a revisionist Marxist, and then member of the democratic opposition) criticized this type of reasoning, which he linked to attempts at a potential exclusion from the fatherland:

“We often hear that everyone has a fatherland and that those who do not have one are damaged or sub-human. This is not true, usually people have as much fatherland as their surroundings allow them to have.”6

In his view, ethnic or national criteria have, in extreme cases, limited inclusion in the fatherland. Furthermore, in his opinion, offering an old, anachronistic vision of the fatherland to young people, in the post-communist reality, would discourage them from developing a genuine feeling of allegiance to it.

In short, both of these images of fatherland, big and small, were introduced as important, in terms of individual and emotional allegiance. The opinions were not in conflict on this topic, as they were to be on the question of spiritual fatherland, which had even broader relevance in the discussion.

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5 “bez tego nie byłby człowiekiem.” (Wasiutyński, Source 1.8)
6 “Słyszymy nieraz, że każdy ma jakąś ojczynę, ci zaś którzy jej nie mają, są rodzajem ludzi niepełnych lub wręcz podludzi. Nieprawda, ludzie na ogół mają tyle ojczyzny na ile im pozwala ich otoczenie.” (Source 1.13)
4.2.2  **Spiritual fatherland**

Król (Source 1.1) and the conservative writer Jan Nowak-Jeziorański⁷ (Source 1.9) were the two authors who discussed at length the question of spiritual fatherland. The discussion about desirable values for a community can also be treated as a proxy for spiritual fatherland. For Król, the reconstruction of the fatherland had to go together with the reconstruction of community, in a conservative-liberal manner, which combined a readiness to suffer for one’s country and to fight for it, with the acceptance of the way of life of others. He opposed the option of ‘national fatherland’ to ‘(spiritual) fatherland as community’ that did not necessarily have to be linked to material aspects of the existence of the nation. Król advised people to accept the need of (re)construction of the fatherland, but this position was not shared by others, rejecting alleged constructivism that would deform the tradition. They agreed that the (spiritual) fatherland needed to be (re)defined, and that this re-definition would be the role of the intelligentsia, who were capable of elaborating new ethical values (Stomma, Source 1.19).

Nowak-Jeziorański presented a more conservative position and explicitly linked the question of the spiritual fatherland to the question of values developed under the partitions, i.e. at the time of Romanticism, in the 19th century (Source 1.9). He underlined that the survival of the spiritual fatherland under the partitions was only possible thanks to these values, and that the occupant powers and their regimes were not perceived as belonging to the fatherland. He deduced from this that the People’s Republic of Poland could not be treated as an instance of (spiritual) fatherland, because for him it was a country “enslaved by an enemy power,” and the

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⁷ Jan Nowak-Jeziorański was a member of the Home Army during the Second World War, and is known for being “The Courier from Warsaw” who transported many important messages from occupied Poland to the Government-in-exile. After the war he was actively opposing the communist regime in emigration, and most notably he was the head of the Polish section of the Munich-based *Radio Free Europe*. 
communists behaved like “Soviet puppets.” He compared the People’s Republic of Poland to the time of partitions to conclude that this regime was a breach in the country’s sovereignty and could not count as part of the fatherland. Due to the criticism of such a categorical point of view by a number of discussants from both younger and older generation (respectively Tomasz Nałęcz, and Janina Kościałkowska), Nowak-Jeziorański later softened his point, and said he did not mean to imply that the People’s Republic of Poland was not an incarnation of the Polish state, but that it was not part of his spiritual fatherland (Source 1.20).

The call for not excluding anyone from the fatherland and cultivating different heritages can be better understood with reference to the political situation of the moment. In mid-1992 Antoni Macierewicz, Minister of Interior in the conservative government of Jan Olszewski, attempted to lead the ‘wild de-communization’ of the political elites, unveiling a list of alleged collaborators of the communist secret services, involving the highest representatives of the state, including then-President Lech Wałęsa. A number of authors protested against such a drastic approach that could lead to excluding post-communists from the community (Sobolewski, Source 1.10), showing willingness to construct an inclusive community.

4.2.3 **Reconstruction of the community and the nature of patriotism**

The proposed reconstruction of the community prompted the discussion whether it should take the form of a nation or of a society. As discussed in the previous chapter, the distinction between the concepts of nation (*naród*) and society (*Społeczeństwo*) is important in Polish language and political thought. In Polish, saying that something, such as the fatherland, should have the form of a nation or of a society is value-laden and suggests broader political orientations. This distinction will be important also for the question of the community, the form of democracy and of patriotic allegiance.
The proponents of identifying the community with the nation relied on the Romantic ideal of the nation. They regretted the dissociation of the nation from the fatherland under the partitions, which to their mind did not occur in other countries (Wasiutyński, Source 1.8). The Romantic ideal was linked to a culturalist understanding of the nation, and tried to fuse it with religious allegiance, thus pushing towards conservative positions. The willingness to collapse the fatherland with the nation stems from the idea that the alleged ideological void of the post-communist reality prompted a need for strong national identification. Such a move would allow one to imply that love of the fatherland (i.e. nation) was natural, and not conditional. In such an approach the nation was perceived as more lasting than the fatherland, let alone society. In contrast, the preference for society over the nation was construed by Herling-Grudziński around the argument of the 20th century political transformation that he interpreted as a progressive abandonment of the Romantic ideal of a rooted nation for the benefit of society (Source 1.2). None of these visions triumphed once and for all at this point in the contestation; rather they revealed an emerging opposition of ideological positions that were later to grow even further apart.

With respect to the nature of patriotism, Król, in a more liberal vein of his argument, insisted that the fatherland was a matter of choice:

“If we are free, then freedom also implies that we can make a conscious choice of the fatherland and we are not condemned to any specific fatherland.”

For him, love of the fatherland was a feeling conditioned by moral rules and by a choice of values, thus it was neither simple nor natural. The linguist Krystyna Pisarkowa, and the writer Janina Kościalkowska, focused on a conceptual discussion and proposed a distinction between two types of love: the emotional, unconditional

8 “Jeżeli jesteśmy wolni, to wolność polega i na tym, że wyboru ojczysty możemy dokonywać świadomie, a nie jesteśmy na żadną ojczystę skazani.” (Source 1.1)
love of the heart, and the rational, conditional love of reason. Pisarkowa underscored that no love was easy, and concluded that love of the fatherland was an imperative, even if it went against reason (Source 1.6), contributing to the idea of its unconditional nature. Kościałkowska, in contrast implied that one’s fatherland was “a place chosen by love: by the love of both heart and reason.”

This opposition between the nation and society, and between the love of the heart and the love of reason, also impacted on the discussion of patriotism. Nowak-Jeziorański used in this respect the well-known sentence “my country right or wrong” to define the nature of patriotic allegiance (Source 1.9). It implied a quasi-obligatory love of one’s country that can be associated with blind patriotism. It was present in this debate mostly among the emigrants, who often had a nostalgic vision of the country, and felt an imperative to love the fatherland no matter what. It contributed to their rejection of the past regime, and the dissociation of the idealized vision of the country (worthy of unconditional love and missionary-like commitment), from the political reality. In a sense this position is coherent with the one describing the spiritual fatherland as embodiment of values, of a national rather than ethical nature.

The more liberal lawyer, politician and Publicist Stanisław Stomma suggested that the nature of patriotism was changing and that rational and ethical values, perceived in a categorical way, replaced the purely material objects of allegiance, such as one’s country:

“The conceptual elements – one could say metaphysical or ideational – come to the fore [of the definition of patriotism]. The regional, material, factors fade away. In consequence – paradoxically – patriotism becomes uniform.”

9 “miejsce wybrane miłością. Miłośćą serca (...) i miłością rozumu.” (Kościackowska, Source 1.15).
Stomma then suggested dissociating patriotism from the national framework of reference and proposing a more universal definition of it. He suggested stepping away from the Romantic sense of patriotism, cultivating the idea that the most authentic expression of patriotism could only occur in times of danger (as pointed out in a critical manner by Herling-Grudziński, Source 1.3), because the regaining of sovereignty annulled this danger. Stomma also suggested that cultivating this idea was reactionary:

“Conservatism without an open-minded intelligentsia is reactionary. Invoking the Romantic sense of patriotism is an expression of a conservative reaction.”

All in all, different patterns of defining the fatherland can be linked to the opposition between nation and society, and to the nature of the required love and commitment to the community. The emotional and unconditional love would be characteristic of a more conservative and traditionalist position, and the conditional love, dependent upon respect for moral values, and based on an open and critical approach to the community’s past, of the liberal position.

4.2.4 Emerging ideological dichotomies towards modernization and democracy

The discussion about the fatherland in 1992 included a number of elements related to the democratic regime. These insights concerned the past democratic traditions of the Second Republic, and the assessment of the post-communist democratic transition.

The question of the past democratic traditions was mostly discussed by Nowak-Jeziorański, who implied that there was a conflict of opinions between generations concerning the communist regime and the resulting democracy, because younger intellectuals did not have memories of the Second Republic (1918-1939) and only knew the People’s Republic of Poland. In his opinion, in order to make sense of

11 “Konserwatyzm bez elastycznej inteligencji to reakcja. Powoływanie się na romantyczny sens patriotyzmu jest przejawem konserwatywnej reakcji.” (Source 1.19)
their lives under the communist regime, the younger generation insisted on the continuity of fatherland, while the members of the ‘older’ generation, having known democracy before, did not settle for the communist reality, and sometimes emigrated, but remained closely linked to the cause of the country. Nowak-Jeziorański’s accusation seems unfounded, given that the search for the right values for a spiritual fatherland was initiated by Król, who was a member of the younger generation. Nowak-Jeziorański’s opinion was not widely shared even among older intellectuals. Kościłkowska, for instance, showed more sympathy to the young generation and to the idea that they tried to incorporate the People’s Republic of Poland into their spiritual biography. She also rightly pointed out the fact that the Second Republic should not be depicted as an ideal of democracy, given the coup d’état of 1926, and its subsequent authoritarian drift.

The reflection about the democratic transition was marked by a number of attempts at constructing ideal-types of opposed languages (Legutko), poles (Romanowski) or sets of values (Wolicki) that supposedly characterized the new post-communist reality, and its public sphere. The authors did not move forward to propose a third way of modernization between a ‘cold,’ procedural liberal-democratic modernization and ‘warm’ and traditional defensive exceptionalism. However, the idea of reconstructing the spiritual fatherland with a realist vision of the country in mind could potentially be seen as a third position, no longer subscribing to the idealization of the fatherland.

The conservative philosopher Ryszard Legutko accused the ‘neutralist’ liberal language of allegedly discrediting the fatherland (in his view it could weaken allegiance to the nation, or lead to nationalism) (Source 1.4). A more liberal literary historian Andrzej Romanowski referred to the opposition between two poles that he
called ‘rhetoric of gesture’ and ‘ethics of normality.’ These terms conveyed, respectively, a communitarian and an exaggerated liberal position, both of which impoverished the spiritual fatherland, to his mind:

“The first [communitarian] position reduces patriotism to void formulas, manifestations and celebrations of anniversaries (…) The [liberal] proponents of ‘normality’ – that means no less than ‘Europeanism’ – have the same sin towards ‘spiritual fatherland.’”

Finally, Wolicki referred to two sets of values – the first one linked to progress, expressing the willingness to put Poland on the track to development, but also potentially leading to copying the West, thus producing ‘cold modernism,’ and the other one associated to a fierce defense of national identity that he linked to ‘warm anachronism.’

The abovementioned dichotomies, even if proposed by intellectuals of different ideological leaning, share a number of elements. They tried to denigrate universalist and individualist liberalism as not adapted to the political and historical situation of Poland, and to suggest that any drastic way of obtaining modernization could have negative consequences. In this sense, they proposed a moderate, third way for achieving reforms.

Furthermore, Wolicki implied that the antagonistic camps exemplified that the Polish nation was divided (a motive which was to be strongly exploited in the 2000s). Indeed, a division can be noted over the question of attitude towards the Third Republic, and democracy as such. In this conflict over how to achieve progress, the concept of ‘normality’ (which described the wish for a ‘normal’ and predictable reality after the communism) constitutes an axis of contestation. Wolicki accepted that

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12 “Postawa pierwsza redukuje patriotyzm do pustych formuł, do manifestacji i świętowania rocznic. (…) Nie mniejszy grzech wobec ‘duchowej ojczyzny’ mają miłośnicy ‘normalności’, która znaczy tyle co ‘europejskość.’” (Source 1.12)
“progress is now more often called normality,”\textsuperscript{13} while Legutko offered a more critical reading of this concept. He linked ‘normality’ to his view that in the early years of the democratic transition \textit{Publizistik} allegedly focused on more ‘mundane’ topics, which deflected the reflection from more important questions, notably those connected to fatherland, mutual commitment, and political community. For him then, this search for ‘normality’ was rather a sign of ‘abnormality.’ He underscored that the fatherland needed something more than the concept of ‘normality,’ embodying modernization in a more liberal vein.

The ideological positions of the intellectuals did not differ much, either along generational lines, or along emigrant-non-emigrant division. The arguments put forward in the debate can be approximated either to a liberal or a conservative approach by specific definitions of community (seen either as a nation or society) that they put forward. In this sense, those who advocated the importance of the nation, underlined the need for a strong Polish national identity (Legutko, Source 1.4), conceptualized the community in terms of common descent and common culture, grounded it in religion (Wasiutyński, Source 1.8), and perceived the love of one’s country as unconditional (Nowak-Jeziorański, Source 1.9), were closer to the conservative position, and had a tendency to refer positively to the Romantic ideal of the nation. They were also likely to have a critical appreciation of the regime transformation, of the current form of Polish democracy, and of liberalism in general. In contrast, those who advocated the cause of society over the nation (Herling-Grudziński, Source 1.3), rejected Romantic ideals (Stomma, Source 1.19), described the love of one’s country as dependent upon respect for values (Król Source 1.1) or rights, and conceptualized the community in an open way, promoting the common

\textsuperscript{13} "postęp teraz nazywa się chętniej normalnością." (Source 1.13)
good (Drawicz, Source 1.16), were closer to the liberal position. However, this liberal position is not identical to the ‘minimalist’ liberalism that was criticized from both conservative and liberal positions (Legutko or Wolicki). Even Król, who is often perceived as a pillar of Polish liberal thought, depicted the fatherland as a community of common history and memory. He criticized a purely economic liberalism, associated with ‘cold modernism’ that could push people to retreat to ‘warm anachronism,’ assimilated with an obsolete form of Romanticism. To his mind it was one of the dangers of the transformation that people would retreat into Romantic forms, and disengage from the process of democratic transition. This could happen because of the lack of pride in the fatherland, provoked by a number of inherent dangers of transformation, such as those mentioned by Nowak-Jeziorański: the lack of a spectacular breakthrough in 1989 (Source 1.20), or a blurring the borders of the spiritual fatherland (Source 1.9).

In short, this discussion provided an intellectual reflection on key concepts and how to achieve modernization in a newly democratizing polity. In between a purely traditionalist approach and a strongly liberal one, a moderate liberal-conservative position insisted on the importance of the re-construction of the fatherland and linking it to the community. The question of how to provide a stable foundation for the new democratic regime was to further prompt the reflection on liberal nationalism.

4.3 Discussing liberal nationalism - an attempt at bringing together national and liberal values
In 1992 Król suggested that nationalism could be a potential danger for the newly constructed democratic community. In 1997, further reflection on this concept had real-life underpinnings, namely the nationalist outbursts in the Balkans. The discussion composed of seven articles in a thematic issue of the progressive Catholic
monthly Znak was two-fold: trying to answer the question whether the era of nations could come to an end, and introducing the burgeoning, Western academic literature on nationalism, to render it accessible and intelligible to the broader public.

The discussion of different theories of nation and of nationalism, and the attempt at distinguishing between the concepts of patriotism and nationalism led the authors to address the crucial issue in the beginning of the democratic transition: the values on which democracy should be founded. One crucial point of the debate was the discussion about the compatibility between the nation, (civil) society and democracy, and about the potential of liberal nationalism to reconcile national values with liberal-democratic ones.

The analysis in this section will first focus on the cultural and historical definition of nation, to which most authors subscribed. Their overall liberal-conservative stance will be further elucidated in the analysis of the attempt at dissociating the concepts of patriotism and nationalism. Finally, the concept of liberal nationalism that aimed at bringing together liberal and national values will be discussed. This debate will first be placed in the context of broader academic debates about nations and nationalism.

4.3.1 Theories of nation
The development of nationalism studies incited a number of intellectuals participating in the 1997 debate in Znak to convey it to the public. The interest of these historians (Henryk Samsonowicz, Andrzej Walicki), historians of ideas (Jerzy Jedlicki, Marcin Król) and sociologists (Jerzy Szacki, Antonina Klöskowska, Ryszard Radzik) in the question of nations led them to retrace different elements of the controversy within nationalism studies and propose their reading of the theories. By doing so, they engaged not only in an intellectual controversy, but also in a political one, by using
the discussion of theories of nations to express their views on the nature of nations and community and its importance for democracy.

The controversies that structure the nationalism studies belong to empirical (descriptive) and philosophical considerations.\textsuperscript{14} The opposition between primordialist and modernist views is crucial with respect to the emergence of nations. The primordialist account holds that humans have an evolutionary, natural propensity to develop into nations. Nations, in this account, are perceived as based on kinship and common ancestry, related to traditional societies. The modernist account of nations derives their emergence from the existence of modern societies,\textsuperscript{15} with the supporting economic and cultural conditions. In this view, the emergence of nations would be linked to the crystallization of modern individualism, and to the nature of political communities and sovereignty. Another point of controversy is the directionality of the causal chain of the emergence of nations and nationalism. A natural or historical view sees nationalism as a consequence of the emergence of nations, while the constructivist view would derive the existence of nations from the efforts of the nationalist ideologues or intellectuals. Broadly speaking, these two approaches can be seen as an opposition between non-constructivist and constructivist views of nation-building.

Another distinction concerns the question of the nature of the nation. Here, the most common dichotomy opposes ethnic to civic nations. The ethnic theory of nations underlines the ethnic or racial commonalities of its members. It defines a nation by common heritage, faith or culture of its members, linking citizenship to the idea of


common descent. The civic or liberal theory of nation, in contrast, focuses on the question of voluntary participation in a political community.\textsuperscript{16} In opposition to the ethnic, exclusive variant, this approach underscores the nation’s inclusiveness. It derives citizenship from territorial and political principles. These approaches constitute theoretical ideal-types that can also be used as labels in order to value or denigrate some realities. This is notably the case of efforts to link civic nationalism to Western culture, and label Eastern nationalism as ethnic,\textsuperscript{17} which was dismissed by other nationalism scholars as “conceptually ambiguous, empirically misleading and normatively problematic.”\textsuperscript{18}

The moral-philosophical debate over nationalism is concerned less with the aggressive nationalist incidents that are present in the media or under study in social sciences, and focuses on different theories of nationalism. These theories range from comprehensive communitarian accounts that stress the importance of cultural values, to less demanding, yet more plausible, liberal ones that question the cultural argument and try to reconcile nationalism with liberal political morality.\textsuperscript{19}

With respect to these tenets of theoretical considerations about nations and nationalism, it is interesting to see which ones the intellectuals use and to what end, in the specific debate. Their review of the recent developments of the literature on nationalism,\textsuperscript{20} highly concentrated around critical discussion of Ernest Gellner’s

\textsuperscript{16} Purely civic loyalties are often described as patriotism or ‘constitutional patriotism.’

\textsuperscript{17} E.g. Hans Kohn, \textit{The Idea Of Nationalism: A Study In Its Origins And Background} (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 1965).

\textsuperscript{18} Rogers Brubaker, \textit{Ethnicity Without Groups} (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2004), 5.


\textsuperscript{20} The review of literature on nations and nationalism was one of the objectives of that edition of \textit{Znak}. It was relatively rich, but not entirely representative. The authors discussed the contributions of Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Leah Greenfeld, Jürgen Habermas, Bolesław Malinowski, Zygmunt Balicki, Peter Alter, Ernest Renan, William G. Sumner, Eric Hobsbawm, John Dunn, Isaiah Berlin, and Charles Taylor.
Nations and nationalisms,\textsuperscript{21} touched upon a number of questions related to the nature and origins of nations, but also tried to build a case for a theory of liberal nationalism. The liberal historian of ideas, and sociologist, Jerzy Szacki, in his comprehensive account, initiating the discussion, pointed to the fact that Gellner shed new light on the question of nations, going beyond the main Polish understanding of this question, as he proposed

\begin{quote}
“a direct or indirect negation of many assumptions that we – initiated to those questions mostly in the circle of Romantic ideas – are prone to consider evident.”\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

In this sense, Szacki suggested that the main Polish approach to the question of the nation, the Romantic one, should not be perceived as the only one. However, the dominant reference for the definition of the nation remains history and culture, and the community was introduced as a common denominator for different definitions of the nation.

\textit{Support for a cultural and historical approach}

Overall, the historical position concerning the origins and nature of the nation gathered substantive intellectual support in the debate, as opposed to the constructivist approach. Interestingly, the cultural theory of nations was presented as a middle way in the distinction between ethnic and political nations. There were virtually no strong proponents of a purely political definition of the nation, even if the experience of the First Republic was quoted at some point as its example (Jedlicki, Source 2.3). This is not to say, however, that the ethnic definition would gather more support. Paradoxically, while the cultural theory could be perceived as closer to the ethnic theory of nation, the authors involved in this debate were wary of using any ethnic reference, because it would be linked to a more aggressive nationalism.

\textsuperscript{22} “Zawiera bezpośrednią, lub pośrednią negację wielu poglądów, które – wtajemniczeni w te kwestie głównie w kręgu idei romantycznych – skłonni jesteśmy uznać za oczywiste.” (Source 2.1)
The cultural theory was discussed in detail by the eminent sociologist Antonina Kłoskowska, who linked the emergence of nations to the emergence of the consciousness of a community, which she defined as common meanings and symbols (Source 2.5). On this point, she referred to the notion of the ideological fatherland developed by renowned post-war sociologist, Stanisław Ossowski, defined as the universe of common, national culture. She argued that for national culture to be genuine and long lasting, it needed to be rooted and reflected in people’s behavior and values. Kłoskowska also linked individual identity to national valence, which would refer to the level of assimilation of national culture. The contribution of Kłoskowska’s theory of national valence was to discuss possibilities of cultural polyvalence, denoting a situation in which an individual would possess knowledge and show a feeling of belonging to more than one (but rarely more than two) national cultures.

While other authors, notably Jedlicki, conceded that on the conceptual level, cultural theory was interesting, in practice, even people from the educated spheres of society, e.g. the technical intelligentsia, would show a very limited knowledge of the canon of national culture and use a reduced symbolical instrumentarium:

“many people need very few symbolical national instruments for their own self-identification: name, banner, slogan, anthem, and a stranger providing a contrast (…) the culturalist theory of nation seems to be rather a beautiful myth of the intellectuals.”

The Medieval historian Henryk Samsonowicz concluded that the concept of community could constitute a common denominator for different theories of nation. This community, based on a number of shared factors from different orders: language, territory, legal order, would be placed at an intermediary level between broader

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23 Stanisław Ossowski, O ojczyźnie i narodzie (About the fatherland and the nation) (PWN, 1984). Ossowski distinguished between small fatherland linked to the place of birth, and ideological fatherland, denoting a common national space, both geographically and figuratively. In a sense, this term of ‘ideological fatherland’ can be likened to the ‘spiritual fatherland’ discussed before.

24 “wielu ludziom dla celów ich duchowej samoidentyfikacji wystarcza bardzo ubogie instrumentarium symboliczne: nazwa, sztandar, okrzyk, hymn – i ktoś obcy dla kontrastu. (…) kulturalistyczna koncepcja narodu wydaje mi się pięknym mitem intelektualistów.” (Jedlicki, Source 2.3)
religious communities, and narrower local communities. The question of multiple levels of allegiance was linked to the initial question about the permanence of the era of nations. Virtually none of the authors thought that nations might disappear, because they were the place of ‘the political,’ the place where political decisions were made.

While the discussion gave much space to the question of the nature of nations, the circumstances of their emergence were also discussed, and the authors did not shy away from discussing the related question of nationalism. One could then say, that they were ‘nationalist-minded’\(^\text{25}\) (i.e. discussing and developing theories of nationalism), but avoiding association with aggressive and integral nationalism by advancing liberal-conservative approaches, such as liberal nationalism.

4.3.2 An attempt at dissociating nationalism from patriotism
The discussion of nationalism addressed the question of the negative connotation of the term nationalism in Polish, and the possibility of a more neutral, theoretical or philosophical use of the concept, as in English. Szacki underscored that

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\text{“Poland linguistic practice makes it impossible to capture common characteristics of national ideologies, because it treats nationalism as a necessarily nasty and extreme ideology. It also frames patriotism as such as a general formula that it could be applied to all members of the nation with the exception of those rare few who openly negate the meaningfulness of national belonging and of any bonds with one’s national community.”}\quad\text{\textsuperscript{26}}
\]

Jedlicki disagreed with Szacki on two points. First of all he claimed that the use of the concept of nationalism was not necessarily neutral in English. Secondly, he underscored that the lack of such a neutral term did not prevent Polish scholars from analyzing and developing theories of nationalism and patriotism (Source 2.3). To his mind, the development of a distinction between the concepts of nationalism and

\[^{25}\text{Miščević, “Nationalism.”}\]
\[^{26}\text{“polska praktyka językowa uniemożliwia w istocie uchwycenie wspólnych cech ogółu ideologii narodowych, ‘nacjonalizm’ traktuje się u nas bowiem jako ideologię z natury skrajną i paskudną, "patriotyzm" zaś jest formułą na tyle ogólną, że można ją, w gruncie rzeczy, stosować niemal do wszystkich członków narodu z wyjątkiem tych stosunkowo nielicznych, którzy otwarcie negują jakiekolwiek znaczenie podziałów narodowych i wszelkie zobowiązania wobec własnej grupy narodowej.” (Source 2.1)}\]
patriotism was important in order not to conflate potentially different phenomena under the same name.

The discussants put forward a number of strategies to overcome this conceptual deadlock and enable the use of the concept of nationalism as a more descriptive or analytical tool, helping to theorize and study different aspects related to national identity and national consciousness, not only to be understood as an aggressive agenda of self-determination. As such, they tried to dissociate themselves from aggressive nationalism, and promoted the argument that the concept of nationalism had an academic relevance, namely as an umbrella for studying issues related to the nation. To this end, the left-izing liberal historian Andrzej Walicki proposed the use of two distinct definitions to capture different aspects of nationalism: Nationalism A that would denote a broad and neutral use of the concept\textsuperscript{27} and Nationalism B, denoting nationalism in its narrow and pejorative aspect (Source 2.2). However, it is difficult to envisage that such generic terms as Nationalism A and Nationalism B could be used as analytically relevant concepts.

The idea of using the concept of nationalism in more neutral axiological terms was appealing to many authors, in order to allow the study of nations and national identity without fear of inciting nationalism. Disentangling the concepts of nationalism and patriotism would also enable the analysis to go beyond a simple dichotomy in which nationalism is always considered extreme and simply opposed to ‘benign’ patriotism (Source 2.2), and considerations on questions related to the nation are conducted under the label of ‘patriotism’ (e.g. those closer to thicker patriotic theories, integrally linked to nation/nationalist considerations).

\textsuperscript{27} However, even if the concept of Nationalism A were broad enough, it would still require qualifications, by the use of different adjectives (e.g. Romantic; Enlightened; cultural; civic; etc.).
A number of strategies were used to create this distinction between patriotism and nationalism, notably by assigning them different objects of focus. Walicki distinguished between nationalism, a concept focusing on national bonds and loyalty, and patriotism, referring to a specific territory or state (Source 2.2). By framing patriotism as a merely territorial notion, he qualified it as a traditional concept that had lost its connection to the nation in Poland in the context of the country’s de-territorialisation under the partitions. In consequence, he opposed the idea of calling ‘Romantic nationalism’ by the name of patriotism, which stands in contradiction with his seminal work on “Three traditions of Polish patriotism,” where he discussed the ‘Romantic patriotic tradition’ (cf. Chapter 3). Walicki also implied that there was a qualitative difference between modern nationalism and traditional patriotism, thus:

“[r]eplacing the word ‘nationalism’ with the word ‘patriotism’ gives an impression (which is false!) that Polish scholars are not aware of a qualitative difference between modern national ideologies, and traditional patriotism.”

These conceptual maneuvers are highly significant. They not only exemplify the authors’ willingness to disentangle the two concepts, but also rehabilitate the national level of allegiance, and ‘nationalist-oriented’ thinking (understood as ‘nation-oriented,’ not ‘integral’ or ‘aggressive’ nationalism), and relegate patriotism to a question of the state allegiance. This approach would imply that on the conceptual level patriotism was limited to a traditional territorial reference that became obsolete with the emergence of modern nations and the nationalist ideology. Labeling patriotism as traditional implied that it was not adapted to the new reality, where stronger types of allegiance were needed.

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28 “Zastępowanie słowa “nacjonalizm” słowem “patriotyzm” sprawia ponadto wrażenie (skądinąd najzupełniej mylne!), że uczeni polscy nie zdają sobie sprawy z jakościowej różnicy między nowoczesnymi ideologiami narodowymi a tradycyjnym patriotyzmem.” (Source 2.2)
Other authors also saw the value of promoting a more neutral use of the concept of nationalism, but did not want patriotism, understood as a territorial notion, to be superseded by the former, as to their mind patriotism would still have the value of promoting a more state-oriented allegiance. They either insisted that patriotism did not have to be linked to the theory of nations, but could relate to the fatherland or the state (or even nation-state) (Szacki, Source 2.1) or they developed more historical accounts to prove their difference. The liberal historian Jerzy Jedlicki, in his anti-anachronistic approach, underscored that patriotism was a one-century-older concept than nationalism and was used in a more general way, without being attached to a specific ideology (Source 2.3). In his view, the distinction between the two concepts was commonsensical and implied that patriotism was a feeling of (collective) affiliation, centered on the fatherland and traducing specific duties towards it, while nationalism was a doctrine linked to the syndrome of inevitable enmity between nations. He pondered how to “trigger the crystal of mature patriotism (osadzić kryształ dojrzałego patriotyzmu)” (supposedly enriching everyone’s spiritual life and ambition) among young people, and avoid the ‘monster of nationalism’ (implying national complexes and hatred). While he started from a historical account to make a distinction between the two concepts, he finished with a stereotypical and relatively grandiloquent opposition between ‘good patriotism’ and ‘bad nationalism,’ proving the difficulty of achieving a ‘neutral’ differentiation between them.

Finally, according to Samsonowicz, patriotism was a question of heritage that was not only material, but also spiritual (Source 2.7). He derived from it the need to maintain small communities alongside the big ones, to provide balance and specific

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29 Jedlicki criticized Walicki’s proposition to call the Romantics by the name of nationalists, because the concept of nationalism was not in broad use during Romanticism.
landmarks for individuals. In this mild communitarian argument, even if it was not clearly stated, he gave the impression that patriotism would correspond to an attachment to the small fatherland, while nationalism would correspond to the big(ger) fatherland. However, if patriotism were only associated with the small fatherland, it would be local in nature, and would not necessarily have to include the link to the country. Hence, an approach contrasting the scale of the object of allegiance did not make it possible to distinguish between the two concepts either.

The national attachment was overwhelmingly pictured as an emotional bond to a community of culture. Kłoskowska referred to the ongoing confusion between concepts such as nation, society and state to suggest that

“There is, by virtue of its culture, an auto-telic group. Its character of a community is based on culture, and this differentiates it from an instrumental society.”

The underlying assumption can be seen as paradoxical, because it would imply that the nation is superior because it is cultural, and society is inferior because of its political nature. This perception of society as inferior to the nation, explained in the previous chapter, was recalled also by Król, who quoted Norwid’s *bon mot* that Poland was big as a nation, but nothing as a society, that is, always more attached to big national values than to the everyday civic ones. Król suggested that this situation was changing, but criticized the slow pace of the change.

While the distinction between nation and society was already featured in the discussion about the fatherland in 1992, in this exchange the question of the relationship between nation (nationalism) and civil society was further discussed. This discussion was incited by insights from the literature on nations, such as the statement that in the Anglo-Saxon literature many authors equated the emergence of nations

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30 “Naród poprzez swoją kulturę jest zbiorowością autoteliczną. Na tym polega jego charakter, jako wspólnoty i to różni go od instrumentalnego społeczeństwa.” (Source 2.5)
with the creation of a modern, civil, democratic society, parallel to the modern transformation of the state. However, Walicki underscored that in Poland, the relationship between the ideal of civil society and nationalism would find itself in the domain of incompatibilities:

"The emergence of homogenous national societies can be correlated, in principle to the process of creation of a modern civil society. This correlation remains in striking contradiction to an opinion (spread particularly in Germany and Poland) that the ideal of civil society excludes any form of nationalism."31

However, the potential combination of liberal democracy, linked to the civil society, with national values, was suggested as an option of constructing stable foundation for a democratic regime.

4.3.3 Liberal nationalism – trying to reconcile national and liberal values
One of the key elements in this debate was the reflection about the amount of community needed for a viable democracy, which prompted the discussion of the possible nature and adaptability of liberal nationalism32 to the Polish context.33 The discussion concerned a potential need for common values that would guarantee social unity and solidarity in the newly democratic community. Szacki prompted this reflection by discussing Charles Taylor’s argument that values, which could best

31 "Powstawanie homogenicznych społeczeństw narodowych pokrywa się w zasadzie z procesem kształtowania nowoczesnego społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Jest to ruźząco sprzeczne z poglądem (rozpowszechnionym zwłaszcza w Niemczech i Polsce), wedle którego ideal społeczeństwa obywatelskiego wyklucza wszelkie postacie nacjonalizmu." (Source 2.2)
32 Liberal nationalism, as theorized by Yael Tamir, can be defined as a non-xenophobic form of nationalism that would be compatible with liberal values, such as freedom, tolerance, equality, and individual (or even cultural) rights. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton University Press, 1993).
33 Interestingly, proponents of constitutional patriotism posit that liberal nationalism is a contradiction in terms and can brings about illiberal consequences, while other authors assimilate liberal nationalism with what they call ‘cultural patriotism’ (e.g. Gal Ariely, “Constitutional patriotism, liberal nationalism and membership in the nation: An empirical assessment,” Acta Politica 46 (2011)). It is dependent upon the definition of patriotism, understood either as an attachment to political norms or to culture. In the latter case, the conflation of terms patriotism and nationalism seems almost unavoidable.
provide a basis for citizens’ identification with the polity to which they belong, were above all national values:

“A viable democracy needs not only to guarantee human and citizens’ rights, but also requires the existence of common values, enabling it to reach a necessary minimum of social unity.”

This assumption led other authors to discuss whether liberal democracy (under construction in Poland) could be compatible with some expressions of nationalism, of what kind, and with what aim. It can be observed that most of the liberal intellectuals of the older generation (Szacki, Jedlicki, Walicki, but also Król) did not discard communitarian theses and believed that democracy could not be dissociated from (national) community. This conclusion confirmed the earlier qualification of their position as liberal-conservative. Bringing together democracy and community would stem from the assumption that liberty was dependent on the feeling of sense that an individual could construct in the feeling of belonging to the community (Walicki, Source 2.2). The strategy defending the inclusion of the nation in this equation was to insist that it should be understood as a pluralist community. This approach allowed the authors to insist that reconciling national values with liberal-democratic ones would help to lay stronger foundations for the newly established democratic regime.

The potential marriage between national and liberal values also steered the discussion in the direction of a specific, open vision of the national community. Kłoskowska suggested that a true liberal democracy should accept volunteers into the national community (but it is unclear how this could be achieved if the nation was defined as a community of culture, as discussed before), and it should allow people an easy exit from the community, if they wanted, without blame or any mark of apostasy

35 “zdolna do życia demokracja wymaga nie tylko zagwarantowania praw człowieka i obywatela, lecz również istnienia wspólnych wartości, umożliwiających osiągnięcie niezbędnego minimum społecznej jedności.” (Source 2.1)
Walicki criticized the ubiquitous ‘politics of identity’ (that he defined as using national values in politics), or ‘battles of memory,’ which reflected badly on the political class. For him, in a liberal democracy, the state should not intervene in matters linked to memory (this assumption was to be strongly challenged in the first half of 2000s within the conservative ‘politics of history’). Walicki’s liberal conception of the nation encompassed respect for individuals, their convictions and choices. He further insisted that no one single group should usurp the right to embody national values or decide who the ‘real Poles’ were:

“It seems obvious that none of the groups within the nation should aim at monopolizing national values, or arbitrarily decide which part of the population belongs to the ranks of ‘real Poles,’ or formulate accusations of treason against their opponents, etc.”

Indeed, attempts at defining who belongs to the ‘real Poles’ have been very much present in more recent debates, as have attempts at monopolizing the reference to patriotism and fixing its meaning.

One of the most important conditions for such liberal nationalism to emerge is the development of political liberalism. This requires the development of a positive intellectual or ideological reference to liberalism, instead of using it as a scapegoat for the harshness of the economic reforms of the beginning of the democratic transition. Walicki’s conclusion, along these lines, was that liberal nationalism was possible (even in Poland), on condition that it brought together liberal democratic values and a broad understanding of nation, and that it convinced people that liberalism was not only economic, but also applied to matters of identity and memory, promoting more pluralism and less state dirigisme in these fields. Król also suggested that liberal and (national) particularist positions could be reconciled, because liberalism, in order to

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36 “Wydaje się rzeczą oczywistą, że żadna grupa wewnątrz narodu nie powinna dążyć do monopolizacji wartości narodowych, arbitralnie wyrokować o tym jaka część ludności należy do "prawdziwych Polaków," formułować nazbyt łatwo zarzuty zdrady i temu podobne.” (Source 2.2)
maintain its universalist aspect, should not underestimate the relevance of the existence of nation-states. He also referred to the idea of the self-determination of nations that under a certain light could be read as a liberal assumption and has been enshrined in the international law since World War I. For Król, the fact that ‘the political,’ the level where political decisions are taken, was still placed at the level of the nation-state was another argument for developing a liberal approach to nationalism.

All in all, the various authors did not seem to think that such problems as the rise of separatisms or an eruption of aggressive nationalism could occur in Poland. Instead, and with Poland in mind, they reflected on whether theoretically liberal values and nationalism could be combined, and whether such a combination could ensure a strong foundation to democracy. They also reflected on the European Union and its possible influence on the national question. While they tried to build on theory to propose a distinction between the concepts of patriotism and nationalism, they often ended up repeating ideological oppositions, which also proves that no straightforward distinction between these two concepts can be easily established. The confusion between patriotism and nationalism comes from the fact that patriotism is perceived as allegiance towards the fatherland, but in the situation when the fatherland becomes a nation-state, its focus turns to the nation, thus differentiating it from nationalism becomes increasingly problematic. The fact that the nation is mostly defined in cultural and historical terms in Poland, and not in political ones, also adds to this confusion. The discussion of liberal nationalism significantly tried to provide a bridge between liberal and national values and between cultural attachment and liberal practices, in order to construct a stronger state-oriented allegiance.
4.4 Patriotsim as silent virtue

The third exchange, concerning the changing nature of patriotism, took place on pages of Więź in 1998 and constituted one of the five dialogues between the writer Gustaw Herling-Grudziński and a progressive Catholic bishop, Józef Życiński. The two authors discussed an opposition between two types of patriotism akin to the one presented by Lipski in 1981, attacking the ‘loud’ nationalist variant of emotional allegiance, and siding with more silent expression of political allegiance. Even if they tried to frame the latter as civic, they also pointed to the inherent risks that it carried: by not being emotionally charged, it could fail to inspire civic behavior. In this sense, they acknowledged the accusation voiced earlier by more conservative thinkers that the lack of a ‘loud’ expression of patriotism in the public sphere, and of explicit attachment and reference to national values, could provoke a retreat to ‘warm anachronism.’

Herling-Grudziński used the concept of patriotism to comment on political and social reality, notably the increasing voters’ absenteeism. In his opinion this tendency could not be explained solely by the lingering influence of the former regime on people’s mentality (Source 3.1). For him, people’s failure to demonstrate their responsibility for the fatherland (i.e. refusal to vote) was also a sign of a change of consciousness, correlated to the change of Polish patriotism throughout the 20th century (that in the 1992 debate he described as a progressive change from nation to society). After Poland regained independence in 1918, he claimed, the reach of patriotism changed from elitist (strongly linked to the intelligentsia and its ethos) to general. The required form of patriotism also changed. While under the partitions and during the wars there had been a need for a crowd-mobilizing (loud, declamatory,

37 Lipski, “Dwie ojczyzny – dwa patriotyzmy.”
exalted and quasi-religious) patriotism, after the Second World War, this was no longer the case. Herling-Grudziński suggested that under the communist regime patriotism became marked by skepticism, distrust and suspicion. He attempted to depict the transformation of patriotism into a silent virtue as a positive effect, because it went against a loud patriotism:

“A loud, exulted, Romantic, and greedy patriotism – the heritage of the old times - contributed in the end to the creation of a kind of kitschy Polish cliché [gniot], in which the Catholic Church is mixed with the nation that is loved by God and that considers itself to be the center of the universe; where Polak-Katolik (Pole-Catholic) scowls at the Other; and Polishness is the measure of all things.”

For Herling-Grudziński, anything would be better than this ‘loud,’ Romantic language, fusing national references with religion, because it led Poland away from what he perceived as the right track at that moment, namely joining the EU and NATO. But he also recognized that such silent patriotism could turn people away from their civic duties towards the fatherland (e.g. voting).

Życiński’s response (Source 3.2) to Herling-Grudziński further played on the opposition between silence and loud patriotism (that could channel pathos or even hysteria). For Życiński, the deep experience of patriotism needed to be rooted in the sphere of values, and was best experienced in silence. He opposed this deep reflection to the game of appearances that often takes place in the political sphere, a fact already mentioned by Walicki in 1997. Silence, understood by him in a positive light, could be associated with a kind of spiritual experience, or religious act. It did not necessarily mean actual silence, but could rather imply avoiding drawing excessive attention to oneself. Życiński argued that not all emotional (‘loud’) behaviors were bad, indeed some could also be valuable in specific circumstances (for example, the common

38 “Patriotyzm głośny, egzaltowany, romantyczny, zachłanny – spadek po dawnych dziejach – przyczynił się w końcu do powstania swoistego “gniotu” polskiego, w którym Kościół uniwersalny, przemieszany jest z umiłowanym przez Boga narodem (oczywiście "pępkiem świata"), w którym Polak-Katolik spode łba patrzy na "obcych", (...) w którym "polskość" jest wszechmiarą wszechchrzeczy.” (Source 3.1)
prayers that many Poles held after the announcement of the Martial Law in 1981 and that brought them together in a difficult moment). This led him to suggest that at specific moments, the passion that people showed for a collective, spiritual experience translated their hunger for basic values.\textsuperscript{39}

Życiński expressed his approval for the silent expression of important values and frontally attacked the loud use of (nationalist) political slogans. He illustrated this situation with the quarrel between small Polish political parties, each of which presented itself as federating the ‘true’ patriots. This act of labeling oneself a ‘true patriot’ (already noted and criticized by Walicki in 1997), or a ‘real Catholic,’ or suggesting that there were ‘true patriots’ only in some specific political parties and not in others, would, he argued, not only express pathos and a lack of silent reflection on values, but also undermine ethical behavior and lead to an attempt of monopolization of patriotism. For Życiński such an attempt could be likened to the nationalist legitimization of their regime used by the communists. They were distorting the reality by using some adjectives excessively to monopolize the meaning and use of specific concepts, notably patriotism (e.g. when the party spoke about ‘true patriots’ or ‘patriot priests’).\textsuperscript{40} However, in this specific example, one could hardly talk about attempts of one specific ideology to de-contest the meaning of the concept, to include it in its realm (monopolize it) as the use of the concept was rather an instrumental, political game of small right-wing parties.

\textsuperscript{39} Such framing was also to appear in 2010, after the Smolensk plane crash, explaining the ways people behaved during the national mourning.

\textsuperscript{40} When it comes to the concept of patriotism, the communist discourse spoke about ‘true patriots,’ loyal to the regime, and supported the activity of ‘patriot priests,’ an organization particularly active in the first half of 1950, federating priests opposing the Catholic hierarchy, and collaborating with the communist state apparatus. The communists also supported the activity of \textit{PAX}, a pro-communist secular Catholic organization, created in 1947, by Interwar nationalists of \textit{Falanga}, notably Bolesław Piasecki, who led it until his death in 1979, even if its importance started waning after 1956.
Życiński believed that such a problem with the expression of patriotism did not only concern politicians and their quarrels over the question of who was a better patriot, but also ordinary citizens if it led them not to vote. In their case, Życiński talked about patriotism of ‘hurt individuals’ who did not believe in politicians, but did not take the initiative to change the reality that they did not find satisfactory. They rather preferred to retire to their private sphere. In this case, silence did not stand for virtuous reflection, but rather was closer to apathy. He concluded that there was a need to find new ways to help people to express their patriotic emotions without being grotesque or ridiculous, and without usurping patriotism.

The concept of patriotism was very important to both authors, who qualified it as a virtue or even ranked it as one of the highest (ethical) values, without necessarily building a strong philosophical case for such an argument. They conceptualized patriotism as a rational type of behavior that would be desirable, and condemned some expressions of patriotism, mostly linked to the Romantic heritage, that in their view were no longer appropriate in the present times. They also commented on the possible political misuse of patriotism, which happened for instrumental reasons of convincing the electorate of the worth of certain parties presenting themselves as sole incarnations of patriotism. However, they did not advocate that patriotism should belong entirely to the private sphere, because such a situation, besides deeper reflection, could also provoke social apathy.

In short, these three debates showed how, during the first decade of the post-communist transition, the intellectuals were appropriating for themselves the conceptual references and the public sphere. Their intellectual effort, without aiming at obtaining immediate benefits in the political sphere, led them to criticize the
political game of appearances, where specific (right-wing) actors tried to usurp the label of ‘true patriots,’ as the communists had before them. While they were not always in agreement, they subscribed to rather open deliberation. The liberal-conservative propositions related to the form of the fatherland, community and the nature of patriotism they put forward obtained a broad agreement. The nature of these debates was to change in the second decade of the transition, and the contestation over the concept of patriotism was to become increasingly political, as we will see in the next three chapters.
Chapter Five – Progressive polarization of the contestation over the modern form of patriotism

The previous chapter focused on three discussions between intellectuals that occurred during the first decade of the democratic transition and which fostered the re-definition of key political concepts, such as fatherland, patriotism and nationalism, and the recovery of their meaning after years of communist manipulation. I have shown how these discussions concerning the form of the new regime and the heritage of the former regime signaled the emerging opposition between liberal and conservative positions, but remained open in nature.

This situation was to change progressively, following the emergence of a new strong intellectual conservative circle and the growing impact it was to have both on the nature of public debates and on politics. The importance of this circle will be exemplified in this chapter by an analysis of two ‘discursive events’ that fostered the contestation over the concept of patriotism: one that took place in 2000 and the other one between 2005 and 2007.

The analysis will show that in the beginning of the second decade of transition the intellectual discussion was still relatively open and deliberative. However, it will also be shown how the conservatives managed to frame their communitarian proposition as the third, ‘modern’ way between liberal universalism and integral nationalism, which they successfully dismissed as extreme. The success of this framing was also to be dependent on the positive reception of their proposition by other intellectuals of more liberal leaning, such as Jerzy Szacki and Jerzy Jedlicki. However, later on, the nature of the contestation was to become increasingly polarized. The intellectual conservative circle increasingly influenced the political
discourse, because of its association with the conservative party PiS. Its leading representatives, such as Marek A. Cichocki, Dariusz Karłowicz, Dariusz Gawin or Tomasz Merta provided the conservative party with a conceptual framework, helping it not only to win the legislative elections in 2005, but also to frame the public discussion.

The contestation over the meaning of patriotism increasingly spread beyond the discussion of the regime form to encompass the discussion about the approach to be taken with regards to the past and national history. This extension of the discursive field towards the nature of patriotic allegiance, and a radicalization of positions (strong promotion of the ‘affirmative’ patriotism by the conservatives, against a ‘critical’ approach of the liberals) provoked a change in the intellectual constellation, and the alienation of earlier more liberal allies from the conservatives.

5.1 Conservative intellectuals and their projects creating ‘discursive events’

In the decade of 2000s, two important ‘discursive events’ were provoked by conservative initiatives in the sphere of public policies. First, an exhibition “Bohaterowie naszej wolności (Heroes of our liberty),”1 conceived by conservative intellectuals, took place in 2000. Second, the concept of ‘politics of history’ was deployed in the sphere of public policies by the conservative government, between 2005 and 2007, demonstrating a growing influence of conservative intellectuals over the public sphere.

1 The conservatives often quote this exhibition, together with Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego (the Museum of the Warsaw Uprising, inaugurated in 2004) as examples of ‘politics of history’ avant la lettre, i.e. before its ideational conceptualization.
“Heroes of our liberty” was a social billboard campaign organized by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage\(^2\) in November 2000, based on an idea by the conservative philosopher Dariusz Karłowicz. Around 350 billboards in the streets in main Polish cities presented seventeen people who participated in the fights for Polish independence, mostly during the Second World War, and were still alive (but not publicly known). According to the words of the proponents of this campaign the use of billboards was meant to bring together patriotic content with a market form of expression,\(^3\) and to pay respect to people who risked their lives for the country’s good. The conservatives claimed the need to remind people that patriotism was the foundation of any democracy.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Since 1989, the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage has had three different names. Between 1989 and 1999 it was Ministerstwo kultury i sztuki, Ministry of Culture and Art. This was a direct continuation of the name from the communist times. Between 1999 and 2001 it was renamed Ministerstwo kultury i dziedzictwa narodowego, Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, by conservative Minister Kazimierz M. Ujazdowski (in the AWS–UW government), who wanted to showcase the importance of national heritage for the question of culture. Andrzej Celiński, in the left-wing government (2001-2005), renamed it simply Ministerstwo kultury, Ministry of Culture, because to his mind the concept of culture encompassed any kind of art and national heritage. With the return of Ujazdowski to the ministerial seat in 2005, the Ministry came back to the name ‘of culture and national heritage,’ in line with the conservative ‘politics of history.’

\(^3\) “koncepcja zderzenia patriotycznej treści z rynkową formą zadecydowała o sukcesie całej akcji.” (Gniazdowski, Source 4.3)

\(^4\) http://www.mikolaj.org.pl/bohaterowie-naszej-wolnosci, accessed on 23 March 2014. This argument is very close to Charles Taylor’s one, who suggested that modern citizen democracies needed patriotic glue to promote greater solidarity towards compatriots than towards humanity in general. (“Why democracies need patriotism”, in For love of country, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum (Boston: Beacon Press 1996), 120.)
Figure 1 "Heroes of our liberty" example of billboard

Later on, the pictures from billboards were reassembled into a temporary exhibition hosted by the Royal Castle in Warsaw. The declared aim of the exhibition, explained by the Minister Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski (in a letter written for the inauguration of the exhibition on 11 November 2000), was to change representations of and stereotypes about martyrdom and patriotism in Poland, and to foster a wider debate especially among youngsters, about these concepts. The choice of ‘ordinary’ people for the billboards aimed to highlight that anyone could be a hero, not only renowned ‘national heroes.’ The opening of this exhibition triggered a short, polemical, exchange of opinions in the media among a number of intellectuals, concluded by a thematic issue of the progressive Catholic monthly Znak in 2002. These two episodes of discussion will be considered as part of the same ‘discursive event,’ as their breadth is limited and they addressed the same event.

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5 Picture available at the official page of the action http://www.mikolaj.org.pl/bohaterowie-naszej-wolnosci, consulted on 21 January 2014. The pictures were accompanied by billboards asking “Sacrifice life for the fatherland?,” as shown on the smaller image to the right.

6 This date was chosen, because it is the Independence Day, commemorating the regaining of independence in 1918; and because the year 2000 marked the 20th anniversary of Solidarność, and the organizers aimed to establish a strong bond between liberty and solidarity.

7 The exhibition remained a strong point of reference for the conservatives, throughout the 2000s. It was also used as a tool used to denigrate the critical approach to the past, e.g. Bronisław Wildstein, “Sprawa Wałęsy, czyli wojna o władzę nad symbolami (The case of Wałęsa: the war over symbols),” Rzeczpospolita, May 28, 2008.
The second debate concerned the time when the conservative party, the PiS was in power (2005-2007). It was much broader in scope than the previous debate and included a large number of intellectuals and journalists, who vividly discussed the initiatives of the new conservative government. Within its electoral program of 2005, the PiS implied that there was an alleged crisis of ‘Polonism’ and a lack of patriotism in the public sphere. The party thus called for reinforcing the role of family, schools and media in forming patriotic behavior rooted in Christian values and national traditions. This overarching plan for a strong offensive of promoting a specific, closed and nationalist vision of patriotism emerged after the PiS’ electoral victory in 2005, via ‘politics of history.’

The analysis will first address the contestation over the concept of patriotism with regard to the exhibition “Heroes of liberty.” It will show how the communitarian proposition advanced by the conservatives and labeled by them as ‘modern’ managed to establish itself as the leading one, thanks to the support of more liberal allies (Section 5.2). Then, the conservative ‘politics of history’ and its initiatives linked to patriotism will be scrutinized, showing the increasing polarization of discussion and alienation of liberal allies from the conservative intellectuals, due to the radicalization of the latter’s position (Section 5.3).

5.2 The successful framing of communitarian patriotism as the modern patriotic formula by the conservative intellectuals in the early 2000s
The exhibition “Heroes of our liberty” provoked a short, yet heated, exchange of opinions among intellectuals. Its concept was criticized from strong liberal positions for promoting an old-fashioned ‘spirit of militarism’ (which according to a left-liberal, moral philosopher Magdalena Środa could easily “transform into simplistic

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nationalism or refined but weak decadence”). The creator of the exhibition, the conservative philosopher Karłowicz, defended the idea as adapted to the changing nature of reality:

“These heroes [people depicted on the pictures] were not war lovers, but it so happened that in the times of their youth, one had to sacrifice all private plans, dreams, aspirations, or even life, for the common good.”

The defenders of the exhibition dismissed any criticism of its conception and format as ‘absurd,’ or as an alleged liberal rejection of patriotism. Jarosław Gowin, currently a conservative politician, who was at that time the editor-in-chief of Znak, presented such an opinion in conservative Rzeczpospolita:

“The billboards were surprisingly severely reprimanded by liberal Publizists. Some commentators even advanced an absurd accusation about propagating the spirit of militarism. How to explain this liberal reflex of reluctance towards promotion of patriotic values? Liberalism does not have to be contradictory to attachment to the fatherland (…)”

Further analyses were published in 2002 in a special issue of Znak, entitled “Jak być patriotą (How to be a patriot)?” in which the contributors were asked by the editors (i.e. Gowin) to expand on a number of questions: the modern sense of patriotism (in the context of globalization and Polish accession to the European Union), social solidarity, and ways of dealing with social exclusion. The reflection about solidarity was prompted not only by the question of democratic and economic transformation, but also by the 20th anniversary of Solidarność in 2000, when the exhibition was organized. The conservatives criticized the lack of a museum of

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9 “nieszczęsny duch militaryzmu, który tak łatwo przeradza się w prostacki nacjonalizm, lub wyrafinowany choć cienki dekadentyzm.” (Source 4.1)
10 “Bohaterowie nie byli miłośnikami wojen, TYLKO TAK SIE ZŁOŻYŁO, że w czasach ich młodości dla dobra wspólnego trzeba było poświęcić wszystkie prywatne plany, marzenia, aspiracje, a nawet życie.” (Karłowicz, Source 4.10, emphasis added).
11 “Billboardy (...) spotkały się z zaskakująco ostrą reprimendą liberalnych publicystów. Posunięto się do absurdalnego zarzutu o propagowanie ducha militaryzmu. Jak wytłumaczyć ten liberalny odruch niechęci przeciw propagowaniu wartości patriotycznych? Nie jest przecież tak, że liberalizm kłóc się z przywiązywaniem do ojczyzny (...)” (Source 4.5)
Solidarity to commemorate the place where the “new Europe was born”\textsuperscript{12} and to preserve this event in the memory of both Poles and other Europeans. These two episodes constituted the first fully-fledged debate about the concept of patriotism where younger generation of intellectuals (born in the 1960s) contributed, or even set the tone.

5.2.1 The competition between an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ vision of patriotism
The exhibition “Heroes of liberty” opposed a strong liberal approach put forward by Środa to a conservative approach proposed by Cichocki, as regards the assessment of the vision of patriotism it embodied. Left-wing liberal philosopher Środa, in the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny, conceptualized a binary opposition between ‘old’ (‘militaristic’) and ‘new’ patriotism (also called ‘patriotism of minimal means’) (Source 4.1) to express her criticism of the conservative-designed exhibition. She criticized the ‘militaristic’ aspect of the exhibition “Heroes of our liberty,” as it only featured people engaged in the military fight, thus promoting a link between the fight and patriotism. In a peaceful geo-political context, she argued, the love of one’s fatherland should not be linked to conflict. For that reason, she countered the ‘militaristic’ proposition with one focusing on universal civic virtues, a vision that she labeled ‘patriotism of minimal means.’ Środa insisted that instead of fighting for the community, an individual should contribute to its good by work, voting, paying taxes, and respecting the rule of law. Her attempt at labeling these different approaches was to a certain extent successful, as the label ‘militaristic’ stuck to the conservative proposition in this debate.

In response, the conservatives proposed their communitarian position as a third way between liberalism and nationalism, and tried in different ways to discredit

\textsuperscript{12} Dariusz Karłowicz, “Pamięć, świadectwo, polityka (Memory, testimony, politics),” in Koniec snu Konstantyna (The end of Constantine’s dream), (Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 2004), 187.
Środa’s ‘patriotism of minimal means.’ Karłowicz rejected Środa’s distinction between ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ approaches to patriotism, and her criticism of the exhibition, claiming that its intention was to show patriotism as such, not one specific type. For him, patriotism was an integral behavior, rooted in the idea of ultimate sacrifice, love and solidarity with others:

“Maybe the question lies in the understanding of the concept of patriotism. Isn’t it a form of solidarity? And if yes, then isn’t it always a type of sacrifice for the others (and a kind of love)? There is no greater form of love than giving your life for the brothers.”

Cichocki, in turn, suggested that the liberal, ‘minimal’ vision of patriotism relied on a political understanding of the nation and of civil society, and concluded that it could not triumph: first, because the proponents of the national tradition would not accept the idea of a political nation; and, second, because the liberals, with their pragmatic approach, would be unable to ground patriotism in the republican (or communitarian) tradition. For him, only bringing together national tradition with a political view on the nation could qualify as a civic version of patriotism. Furthermore, in a game of diachronic references, he associated Środa’s liberal position with an allegedly outdated positivism:

“Today, the proponents of liberalism in Poland talk much about their modernity. However, in their positive conception of ‘patriotism of minimal means’ they resemble the old-fashioned 19th century positivists.”

The conservative rejection of ‘patriotism of minimal means’ also included a derision of the nature of the civic virtues, on which it was supposed to be based. Gniazdowski called them ‘19th century bourgeois virtues’ (Source 4.3), and Gowin suggested that

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13 “Być może kwestia leży w zrozumieniu pojęcia patriotyzmu. Czy nie jest to forma solidarności? A jeśli tak to czy nie jest to zawsze jakaś forma poświęcenia za innych (a wicj jakaś forma miłości)? Nie ma większej formy miłości niż oddanie życia za braci.” (Source 4.10)

14 “Dzisiaj zwolennicy liberalizmu w Polsce, chociaż wiele mówią o nowoczesności, w swej pozytywnej koncepcji "patriotyzmu minimalnych środków” przypominają staroświeckich, dziewiętnastowiecznych pozytywistów.” (Source 4.7)
they were of second-rank (Source 4.5), and should not be opposed to the “readiness of sacrificing one’s life for the fatherland.”

Cichocki further developed the strategy to disavow ‘patriotism of minimal means’ by suggesting a standing opposition between the ‘dogmatic liberals’ (that he depicted as unrestrained individualists, disrespectful of tradition, and implicitly associated with the proponents of ‘patriotism of minimal means’), and the ‘defenders of national tradition,’ i.e. nationalists, who, to his mind, subscribed to defensive patriotism and depicted the nation as a besieged fortress. His conclusion was that ‘dogmatic liberals’ made patriotism narrower by their skepticism towards ideas of sacrifice and solidarity, while traditionalists mummified it:

“In essence, both sides perform a certain reduction of the idea of patriotism, each in their own way, [demonstrating] the inability of proposing a positive vision of patriotism adapted to the situation in which Poland is since 1989.”

He sought to frame these approaches as two extremes, in order to offer the communitarian position as a middle ground. His communitarian proposition aimed at attaining hegemony over the definition of patriotism by implying that the ‘minimal’ position should not be detached from the ‘maximalist’ one, and by making the idea of sacrifice an ineliminable element of patriotism. Liberal and national options would thus not constitute two binary counter-concepts of universal coverage, in a Kosseleckian understanding, because a third solution would be still possible, and preferable, according to the conservatives.

15 “Dlaczego wszakże te ‘cnoty drugorzędne’ mielibyśmy przeciwwstawiać gotowości do poświęcenia życia za ojczyznę?” (Source 4.5)
16 “Patriotyzm stał się zakładnikiem jałowego i nierzetelnego sporu toczonego między, powiedzmy umownie, polskimi zwolennikami liberalizmu a obrońcami tradycji narodowych (...) (Patriotyzm became a hostage of an unproductive and unreliable conflict between, conventionally speaking, Polish proponents of liberalism and defenders of national traditions).” (Source 4.7)
17 “W istocie, obie strony dokonują swojej redukcji idei patriotyzmu, każda na swój sposób (demonstrując) niezdolność do zaproponowania pozytywnej wizji patriotyzmu odpowiadającego sytuacji, w której Polska znalazła się po 1989 roku.” (Source 4.7)
Cichocki’s attempts at finding a new articulation for patriotism got positive appreciation from older liberals more sympathetic to conservative stances, such as Jerzy Szacki, who nevertheless disagreed with Cichocki’s thesis about the alleged conflict between liberals and proponents of ‘national tradition:’

“I disagree with Cichocki, when he writes about the “unproductive and unreliable conflict” about the understanding of patriotism. I do not want to say that this conflict is not unproductive or that it is not unreliable, but rather that such a conflict between ‘nationalists’ and mythical ‘liberals’ simply does not exist.”

Furthermore Szacki underscored that liberals were not necessarily cosmopolitans, nor did they reject all considerations related to the nation. Not only did classic thinkers of liberalism not discard these questions (e.g. Mill), but also there were recent theoretical developments of liberal nationalism, discussed in the 1997 debate. Even Środa herself called ‘patriotism of minimal means’ a ‘Siamese sister of heroism and sacrifice’; hence she did not fully reject a more traditionalist position. It is yet another proof that one cannot speak here of a ‘dogmatic’ liberal position, because even the most articulate liberal approaches were still well grounded in history and the idea of community.

5.2.2 Taking the need of patriotism for granted
The need of a modern, context-appropriate, or simply of a new patriotic model was taken for granted by the authors participating in the discussion. Most authors explained why patriotism would be beneficial, in a circular consequentialist way, by showing the positive consequences of its existence. Particularly, the conservatives underscored that the existence of patriotism supposedly “satisfie[d] natural needs (zaspokaja naturalne potrzeby)” of human beings of bonding with other people and

18 “Nie zgadzam się jednak z Cichockim kiedy pisze o “jadalnym i nierzetelnym sporze” o rozumienie patriotyzmu jaki toczy się rzekomo dziś w Polsce. Chodzi mi przy tym nie tyle o to, że spor ten nie jest ani jadalny, ani nierzetelny, przeciwnikami zaś “narodowców” nie są żadni mityczni “liberalowie”, ile o to, że wbrew pozożom takiego sporu de facto nie ma.” (Source 4.8)
19 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on representative government, 1861, e.g. Chapter XVI “Of nationality, as connected with representative government,” where he asserts that different nationalities are the proper source of free institutions and representative government.
belonging to a fatherland (Najder, Source 4.9). But in their view, the current state of Polish patriotism was insufficient to provide stable foundations for the democratic regime:

“Polish patriotism is in poor shape today. After 1989 (...) the social and political life was seized by a patriotic anemia (...) patriotism became an outdated and shameful concept (...) Is the Polish attachment to patriotism a myth?”

Cichocki insisted on the importance of patriotism, its language and symbols, for a viable democracy. He also linked the need of patriotism to the question of sacrifice for liberty, and to the need of maintaining social solidarity by fostering the feeling of responsibility for fellow citizens (Source 4.4).

Liberal historian Jerzy Jedlicki also claimed the need of patriotism (Source 4.11). He started from three assumptions: that any state needs a moral foundation; that any nation needs the feeling of historical continuity and heritage; and that any man needs the feeling of identification and belonging. These led him to conclude that patriotism, understood as love of the fatherland, was necessary, because it embodied these needs:

“The concept of fatherland links these three needs together, and the commotion in the fulfillment of these needs provokes crises. However, the concepts of fatherland and patriotism seem currently to fade away or even to provoke surprise.”

Other conservatives also wanted to attach the reflection about patriotism to the philosophical understanding of human nature and need of rootedness:

“Conflicts about patriotism will not be able to go beyond misunderstandings and ambiguity, if they are not grounded in a philosophical perspective starting from the vision of the human nature.”

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20 “Polski patriotyzm jest dzisiaj w kiepskim stanie. Po 1989r. (...) życie społeczne i polityczne ogarnęła patriotyczna anemia. (...) Patriotyzm stał się pojęciem niemodnym, a nawet wstydliwym. (...) Czy polskie przywiązanie do patriotyzmu nie jest mitem?” (Gowin, Source 4.5)
21 “Pojęcie i wyobrażenie ojczyny wiąże ze sobą te trzy potrzeby, natomiast zaborzenia w ich zaspokajaniu wywołują objawy kryzysowe. Tymczasem pojęcia ojczyny i patriotyzmu zdają się znikać z obiegu, a nawet bywa, że wywołują zdziwienie.” (Source 4.11)
However, in the case of the above-quoted position, one cannot help but notice that Najder’s conservative comment misconstrued the dissent over a concept’s meaning as mere misunderstanding, thus downplaying the political significance of the contestation.

5.2.3 The semantic field of the concept of patriotism
Within the debate provoked by the exhibition “Heroes of our liberty,” the discussion of patriotism was strongly linked to the question of finding the “right” object of allegiance. The interlinkages with other concepts such democracy, fatherland, community and its form, nation or society, will be discussed below.

5.2.3.1 The (problematic) relationship between patriotism and democracy
As underscored by historian Robert Brier, the meaning of democracy was discussed from the beginning of the democratic transition, with two leading paradigms among the (post-)Solidarity elite.23 The first interpretation, put forward by the liberals, saw it as a vessel of modernization and a means of catching up with the West, a set of procedures supposed to help building a civil society. According to the conservatives, this procedural understanding of democracy would be reduced and ‘cold’ and fail to attract people’s allegiance, or even could push people towards ‘warm’ anachronistic forms of nationalism. They therefore construed a rival, more substantive and comprehensive theory of democracy that was supposed to rebuild Polish politics on the foundation of “the moral community of the nation and the “purification” of the society from the remnants of the communist system.”24 However, given that these high expectations of a more comprehensive democracy were not (and could not be) met immediately after 1989, the conservatives’ disappointment turned into criticism

22 “Spory na temat patriotyzmu nie wyjdą z zarośli nieporozumień i wieloznaczności, jeżeli się ich nie ustawi, zaczynając od płaszczyzny filozoficznej. Od ustalenia, za jaką wizją człowieczeństwa się opowiadamy.” (Source 4.9)
23 Brier, “The roots of the “Fourth Republic,”” 76.
24 Ibid.
of ‘thin’ democracy, and of the democratic transition as a whole. In this context, they raised the question whether patriotism (understood as a kind of particularist and ‘warm’ attachment) could be compatible with democracy and its values.

This critical assessment of liberal democracy allowed the conservatives to attack the idea of civic ‘patriotism of minimal means,’ and advance a more robust communitarian definition of patriotism to fill in the gaps left by ‘cold’ democratic procedures. Cichocki claimed that Polish democracy under construction focused too much on procedures and too little on symbols, thus lacking a robust patriotic rhetoric and became ‘cold’ (Source 4.4). Karłowicz also criticized the current regime, concluding that

“in the process of building the Third Republic we limited ourselves to reconstructing cold elements of the state, such as market and democratic procedures.”

He advocated the need for the state to become a ‘warm’ institution, based on national tradition, and maintain the logic of superiority of the common good over the private good. Trying to establish the foundation of the common good in the ‘warm’ criteria, and not in more neutral, ‘cold’ and institutional ones, was consistent, in this debate, with an overall conservative approach constructing a robust communitarian proposition in opposition to the liberal one.

Another representative of the conservatives, Zdzisław Krasnodębski twisted the argument even further by asking whether patriotism was compatible with democracy at all. He built on Cichocki’s argument that ‘cold’ democracy was about procedures, lacking a thick, warm, symbolical background. If so, he claimed, the only version of patriotism compatible with such ‘cold’ democracy would be ‘patriotism of minimal means’ (Source 4.12). However, this understanding did not seem patriotic.

25 “budując III RP ograniczyliśmy się do rekonstrukcji zimnych elementów państwa, takich jak rynek i procedury demokratyczne.” (Source 4.10)
enough to him, because it furthered a skeptical stance towards martyrdom and national tradition. In this way, Krasnodębski criticized liberal democracy, because its values were allegedly incompatible with a strong form of patriotism. For him, another version of democracy, in its republican, yet close to communitarian aspect, would be needed, for a robust patriotism to flourish.

In contrast, the liberals defended the idea of liberal democracy and insisted on the value of more civic approaches to patriotism. Środa agreed that one may or may not like democracy, but if it was considered a value, one had to reflect about the nature of the virtues it implied:

“In a democracy ‘the military virtue’ is no longer linked with tymos (veneration, honor), but it is constituted by sofrosyne, being in full control of oneself (…) It means that if democracy is understood as a value and not as a lesser evil, then it is linked to an important transformation of interpersonal relations.”

Szacki, in turn, admitted that patriotism (which he significantly called ‘philosophy of life’) might become banal in a democracy, or even a silent virtue, unlike its loud Romantic predecessor. Here, he agreed with the conservatives that patriotism lacked a proper articulation in the public sphere. He deduced this from the confrontational nature of political culture and of political competition, which did not put forward common values. He also agreed, to an extent, with Krasnodębski, that ‘patriotism of minimal means’ narrowed the scope of the concept of patriotism, as civic virtues were not enough for a fully-fledged conception of patriotism, but suggested that:

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26 “W demokracji “cnota wojskowa”, nie wiąże się tedy z tymos, (cześć, honor), tworzy ją sofrosyne, pełne panowanie nad sobą. (…) Chodzi o to, że demokracja, jeśli ją rozumieć nie jako zło konieczne, ale jako wartość, wiąże się z ważną zmianą relacji międzyludzkich (…)” (Source 4.1)

27 It can be treated as a reference to Michael Billig’s reflection on reproduction of national identity by daily rituals and artefacts, such as flags. Billig, Banal nationalism.

28 This qualification of patriotism as a silent virtue is a direct reference to Herling-Grudziński’s diagnosis of 1998. Szacki complained about the fact that the prominent exchange on patriotism between Herling-Grudziński and archbishop Życiński did not inspire a broader debate.
“(…) in times of peace, these virtues seem more important than grand declamations, and the Fatherland, written with a capital F, needs them.”

While Szacki suggested that a strong patriotic narrative was lacking in the public sphere, this did not lead him to criticize the Third Republic, and its democratic regime, as was the case with the conservatives. On the contrary, he underscored the need of strengthening civic virtues that constituted a foundation of civic patriotism, and could help foster pro-state attitudes. Jedlicki further explained the alleged lower visibility of patriotism in a democratic regime by an apparent paradox suggesting that values that were not in danger got weaker, without necessarily disappearing. This also impacted the concept of patriotism:

“The crisis concerns open patriotism that cannot find an appropriate formula for the new times. Meanwhile, nationalist patriotism, which is characterized by the dominance of negative or even hateful emotions, over positive ones, is doing fine and does not lose its impetus.”

Jedlicki, in his commitment to civic virtues, not only criticized the nationalist approach, but also tried to link the relatively low participation in politics and responsibility for the state to the international context, such as the European Union that, to his mind, could undermine people’s attachment to their country. He was also highly critical of post-modernism and its rhetorical strategy of promotion of free choice, notably in the cultural domain, that might impede developing strong bonds to one’s country and its culture. This line of reasoning put him close to the communitarian position voiced by the conservatives, who tried to interpret civic virtues in a more republican vein. Hence, the support of older liberals for some of the theses developed by the conservatives allowed their middle ground communitarian proposition to emerge as a kind of compromise solution.

29 “(…) istotnie [te cnoty to] za mało, aby warto było mówić o patriotyzmie, ale w pokojowych czasach cnoty te wydają się ważniejsze od wzniosłych deklamacji i bardzo by się przydały Ojczyźnie przez bardzo duże O” (Source 4.8)

30 “Kryzys dotyczy właśnie (...) patriotyzmu otwartego, który jakoś nie umie znaleźć formuły na nowe czasy. Tymczasem patriotyzm nacjonalistyczny, który cechuje przewaga emocji negatywnych, wręcz nienawistnych, nad uczuciami pozytywnymi, ma się całkiem nieźle i wcale wigoru nie traci” (Source 4.11)
5.2.3.2 The link between patriotism and the fatherland

Patriotism was also discussed with relation to the concept of fatherland. Most authors agreed that a transformation of the fatherland was occurring, and that patriotic formula should be adjusted accordingly. Liberals, such as Majcherek, were open to this, and linked the change in the nature of patriotism to the transformation of the fatherland:

“The word ‘patriotism’ comes from ‘patria,’ i.e. fatherland, thus its meaning changes for at least two reasons: the fatherland evolves and it requires different forms of commitment.”

Not all participants approved of such changes. The conservatives preferred to maintain a more comprehensive vision of fatherland. For Krasnodębski, the term fatherland could not simply denote a territory because it changed over the centuries; nor was it a population, because it was difficult to feel patriotic towards it. To his mind, the fatherland could not even be identified with the state, because this would imply including the communist regime in its realm.

He thus preferred to identify the fatherland with the nation. On this point, he referred to elements of Isaiah Berlin’s analysis of nationalism and to Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory of patriotism as a virtue rooted in the loyalty to one’s nation. Krasnodębski’s preference for the nation relied mostly on the fact that belonging to this community was given rather than chosen, and

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31 “Słowo “patriotyzm” pochodzi od “patria”, czyli ojczyna, jego znaczenie zmienia się więc co najmniej z dwóch powodów: inna jest ojczyna i innych form oddania wymaga.” (Source 4.6).

32 The skepticism towards treating the communist regime as part of a (spiritual) fatherland, and the allegiance to it as patriotic was already discussed within the debate about the fatherland in 1992.

33 Without quoting Isaiah Berlin verbatim, Krasnodębski’s reflection is close to the following passage of Berlin’s “Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power,” in Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 333-355: “[Nationalism] entails the notion that one of the most compelling reasons, perhaps the most compelling, for holding a particular belief, pursuing a different policy, serving a particular end, living a particular life, is that these ends, beliefs, policies, are ours. This is tantamount to saying that these rules or doctrines or principles should be followed not because they lead to virtue or happiness or justice or liberty or are good or right in themselves, and therefore valid in their own right universally, for all men in a given situation; rather they are to be followed because these values are those of my group”. Krasnodębski does not perceive the intended negative meaning of this quote, where reasons for action do not need to be ‘good’, suffice they are ‘ours’. Furthermore, he implies that Berlin is mistaken in not taking into account that what is ours gradually acquires an ethical value for us.

34 MacIntyre, “Is patriotism a virtue.”
he tried to derive specific duties from it. Najder also expressed discomfort about the idea that the attachment to the fatherland would become conditional:

“The experience of the fatherland, formerly common, almost obligatory, becomes today an experience that is a matter of choice, of partly moral and partly emotional nature. We are patriots because we choose to be, not because we have to.”35

His criticism was that patriotism would become optional, and anyone could choose to be a patriot, but more importantly choose not to be one, destroying the quasi-obligation of being patriotic cherished by the conservatives.

With respect to the fatherland, liberals and conservatives also held opposing views concerning the nature of the patriotic commitment that it would require. However, all subscribed to a kind of personification of the fatherland. The attachment to Poland, the fatherland, seemed to them more important than the attachment to the political form of its regime, the Third Republic. The liberal vision of the love of one’s country sought to promote civic duties, the rule of law and the work ethic for the common good:

“Whoever loves the fatherland truly, wishes that She were free, strong, beautiful, happy, and not in danger. In today’s world, this can only be achieved by work.”36

The conservative approach insisted on enhancing the link between the fatherland and sacrifice, by implying that it would be impossible to instill in people the willingness to work for the fatherland without them accepting the need for sacrifice first:

“Who does not understand the fact that those sacrificing their lives for the Fatherland were not foolish, that one has to risk his or her life when She needs it, will never work for Poland.”37

35 “Przeżycie ojczyzny, dawniej powszechne, niemal przymusowe, staje się dzisiaj przeżyciem z wyboru, częściowo moralnego, częściowo uczuciowego. Jesteśmy patriotami, bo nimi chcemy być, choć nie musimy.” (Source 4.9)

36 “Kto szczerze kocha ojczyznę, ten pragnie aby była wolna, silna, piękna, szczęśliwa, i przez nikogo nie zagrożona. W obecnym świecie takie warunki zapewnić można pracą.” (Majcherek, Source 4.6)

37 “Kto się nie oswoi z tym, że ludzie oddający życie za Ojczyznę, nie byli wariatami, że jeśli Ona jest w potrzebie, to trzeba ryzykować i życie, ten nigdy dla Polski pracować nie będzie.” (Wojciechowski, Source 4.2)
Sacrifice was also strongly embedded in the conservative communitarian approach to patriotism.

5.2.3.3 Establishing the link between patriotism and the community
The conservative thinkers enthusiastically discussed the concept of community, and its links to the concept of patriotism, as it resonated well with their communitarian proposition. They tried to strengthen the link between the concepts of patriotism, sacrifice and solidarity, insisting that the paradigm of sacrifice was valid in a democratic regime too. Liberals did not shy away from the question of community, but pointed out that in the current situation there were multiple levels of communities to which people belonged, which required different types of loyalty and belonging.

While Cichocki claimed that a deep division characterized Polish community, and that it lacked solidarity, Najder suggested that the feeling of true responsibility for the community was the measure of patriotism (Source 4.9). He contrasted it with what he called a ‘formal’ responsibility for the community that would characterize people subscribing to universal virtues, independent from cultural and historical context. Finally, Karłowicz insisted that the community could only exist thanks to a combination of conservative habits and virtues. He also suggested that the discussion about sacrifice (also of life) was valid in times of peace:

“Undoubtedly the problem of death for the good of the community constitutes a critical barrier for individualist discourse. (...) It is easy to agree that the acceptance of sacrifice is also needed in a democracy and also in times of peace.”

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38 “Polską wspólnotę charakteryzuje głęboki podział, przewyższany jedynie w wyjątkowych momentach dzięki nieoczekiwanyemu zrywom solidarności (Polish community is characterized by a deep division that is only overcome in special moments thanks to unexpected impulses of solidarity).” (Source 4.7)
39 “Ta otulina konserwatywnych nawyków i cnót sprawia, że wspólnota trwa jeszcze.” (Source 4.10)
40 “Trudno wątpić, że problem śmierci dla dobra wspólnoty stanowi nieprzekraczalną barierę dla dyskursu indywidualistycznego. (...) Latwo zgodzić się z założeniem, że postawa poświęcenia potrzebna jest również w demokracji i również w czasach pokoju.” (Source 4.10)
In this way, Karłowicz, like other conservatives, frontally attacked the liberal discourse by sustaining that an individualist (read: liberal) approach led to the erosion of the idea of sacrifice, of the political, and in consequence, to the erosion of the common good.

Not everyone subscribed to the vision that the community needed to be rooted in (national) culture, even if this option seemed to prevail in the discussion, even among older liberals. Majcherek tried to salvage the point of multiplication of objects of allegiance by referring to the idea that Poles could nowadays be members of different overlapping communities (religious, local, regional, ethnic, and civic) and develop a multitude of allegiances. He thus thought that reducing this richness to one specific model of community, and allegiance, would be a mistake:

“Different communities require various types of belonging and loyalty. Today, requiring sacrifice or martyrdom from Poles is no longer adequate to the situation of communities in which they live.”

Środa also recognized the value of fostering loyalty to political community, but underscored that it needed to be oriented to the actual political community, the democratic regime constructed after 1989, with all its problems and shortcomings, not towards an idealized vision of the community or of the state (Source 4.1). This approach was consistent with Szacki’s suggestion about the need to develop patriotic allegiance towards the state, and the rule of law:

“The problem with [Polish] patriotism consists in the fact that it formed outside or even against the state, which most of the times was either an occupying state, or a state not resulting from the will of the nation. Such a state was obeyed to out of necessity, rather than out of will of heart or conviction. Being a patriot is still not frequently linked to being ‘state-oriented,’ because the state is still ‘them’ and not ‘us.’”

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41 “Každa wspólnota wymaga innego rodzaju przynależności i lojalności. Wymaganie dziś od Polaków ofiary czy męczeństwa jest nieadekwatne do sytuacji wspólnot, w których żyją.” (Source 4.6)

42 “Kłopot z patriotyzmem polega nade wszystko na tym, że ukształtował się on poza państwem, a poniekąd i przeciwko państwu, które (z wyjątkami) było już to państwem zaborczym, już to państwem niepochodzącym z woli narodu, a więc słuchanym bardziej z konieczności, niż z potrzeby serca i
In this way, the liberals objected to perceiving the rule of law or loyalty to the state as ‘cold,’ arguing that these elements were necessary for an effective democratic system.

5.2.3.4 Searching for the ‘right’ object of allegiance: nation versus society

In this debate, the opposition between the counter-concepts of society and nation corresponded to the opposition between liberals and proponents of national tradition. This opposition was particularly important for the conservatives, who insisted on establishing the link between patriotism and the nation, understood in cultural terms. Gowin suggested that because Poland became a nation-state after World War II, due to the extermination of its Jewish minority, the change of borders, and subsequent ‘exchanges’ of populations, it was not possible to dissociate patriotism from the nation any more:

“He even suggested rehabilitating the concept of nationalism as well. To do so, he condemned the aggressive version of nationalism, referring to its more commendable historical antecedents from the Jagellon times, or Romanticism, and to the theoretical reflection concerning liberal nationalism.”

przekonania. Bycie patriotą i dzisiaj rzadko kojarzone jest u nas z byciem “państwowcem”, ponieważ państwo to ciągle “oni”, a nie “my”.

43 “Jest rzeczą charakterystyczną, że w swej obronie patriotyzmu Marek Cichocki wystrzega się słowa ‘naród’ (…) Za rozdzieleniem patriotyzmu i nacjonalizmu przemawiają zresztą poważne racje. Patriotyzm odnosi się przede wszystkim do kraju, do wspólnoty narodowo-terytorialnej. Istnieją rozmaitie kręgi patriotyzmu (lokalny, ponadpaństwowy, bez identyfikacji narodowej, etc.) A jednak wszelkie próby rozdzielenia kwestii patriotyzmu od kwestii narodu byłyby w dzisiejszej Polsce zabiegiem pozornym. Odkąd staliśmy się krajem praktycznie jednonarodowym (co nie znaczy że jednoetnicznym, naród to nie wspólnota krwi, lecz kultury i historii, niepodobna głosić pochwały patriotyzmu bez rehabilitacji pojęcia narodu i nacjonalizmu.” (Source 4.5)
Cichocki suggested that a supposed hidden agenda of liberalism led in Poland to an arrested development of a strong civil society, because it rejected the republican tradition of active and solidary citizenship:

“This [liberal] type of modern civilization aims to develop a cultural, tolerant, good-natured and honest citizen. But it is consciously and ideologically constructed in opposition to the conception of active and solidary citizenship – burying the idea of civil society.”

This extract exemplified a number of conservative stances: Cichocki opposed republicanism (or rather its Polish tradition from the First Republic that he identified with endogenous Polish civil society) to liberalism, and accused liberalism of being an ideological construct of ‘modern’ civilization, focusing too much on individual citizens, instead of civil society. The creation of civil society, as a collectivist republican vision, was the mission he gave to patriotism. At the same time, he rejected the liberal attempt at fostering the development of civil society based in civic virtues, as discussed before.

Krasnodębski presented an even more radical reading of facts when it came to the society-nation dilemma. In his clear preference for the nation, he started by saying that: “today using the concept of the nation marginalizes and is considered extremist.” He wondered whether Romantic love of the country was still alive (in this sense he established the Romantic tradition of patriotism as the reference) or whether the Poles were becoming a society, thus ceasing to be a nation. He thus implied that a co-existence of society and nation was impossible in Poland. The conservative argument built a strong preference for the nation, described as the embodiment of one’s community’s history, culture and continuity. It depicted society

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44 “Warto jednak zauważyć, że ten typ nowoczesnej cywilizacji, którego efektem ma być kulturalny, tolerancyjny, dobroduszy i uczciwy obywatel, świadomie, z powodów ideologicznych, konstruowany jest w opozycji do koncepcji aktywnego i solidaritycznego obywatelstwa – ostatecznie grzebiąc ideę społeczeństwa obywatelskiego (…).” (Source 4.7)

45 “Dziś posługiwanie się pojęciem narodu marginalizuje i uskrajnia.” (Source 4.12)
as neutral in emotional and axiological terms, and based on voluntary participation, hence supposedly a worse option.

The opposition between nation and society constituted yet another element of the strategy of the conservatives to criticize what they called ‘dogmatic’ liberalism, and its promotion of individuality, which supposedly damaged solidarity and community.

5.2.3.5 Solidarity – a contextually contingent or ineliminable element of patriotism?
The discussion about solidarity and its potential link to patriotism further contributed to the conservative criticism of the Third Republic. The conservatives did not only consider solidarity essential to the intra-community relations, but insisted on its inter-generational significance, notably for the transmission of the tradition and morality. Karłowicz implied that social aspects such as solidarity were overlooked during the transition:

“It is difficult to negate that today we suffer from the deficit of the reflex of solidarity. The concept of the “costs of transformation” constitutes one of the most cynical formulas of the liberal theodicy of on-going modernization.”

Cichocki also attacked the principle of liberal equality as insufficient for constructing a strong democratic community. For him, that foundational role could be assumed by ethics of solidarity, providing an underlying ‘warm’ layer to ‘cold’ democratic institutions, by promoting the presence of patriotic symbols in the public sphere (Source 4.4). Solidarity among the members of a given community would ensure that no one was left behind in the process of modernization, especially not those who made a sacrifice so that this modernization could happen. Cichocki thus linked the

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46 “Patriotyzm bierze się z odruchu solidarności z członkami własnej wspólnoty i wykracza poza horyzont indywidualnej korzyści czy kalkulacji.” (Source 4.7)

47 “Trudno zaprzeczyć, że dziś cierpimy głównie na deficyt odruchu solidarnościowego, którego symbol stanowi jedna z najbardziej cynicznych formuł liberalnej teodycji dokonującej się modernizacji, a mianowicie formula “kosztów transformacji”. (Source 4.10)
concept of solidarity to the exhibition featuring ‘anonymous’ heroes of liberty. He also linked the question of inter-generational solidarity with seeking European Union membership, which he saw as the responsibility of the current generation for the common good of the future generations.

Liberal views clashed with the conservative theses on a number of points related to solidarity, notably EU accession. Środa’s angle differed from Cichocki’s and did not rely on sacrifice, but again on civic virtues. She considered that if Poland wanted to enter the EU, it should teach its youngsters how to work for the fatherland, not how to die for it.

Consequently, the concept of solidarity cannot be perceived as a new, ineliminable feature of the concept of patriotism overall, but is rather inherent to the conservative approach. It can thus be perceived as a contextually contingent reflection, prompted by the anniversary of Solidarność and the hardship of economic reforms.

5.2.4 The contestation over the modern patriotic formula
The participants of the debate seemed to agree that patriotism needed re-defining, and needed to be adapted to historical circumstances. Liberals, such as Szacki, Jedlicki and Majcherek, who suggested that “today being a patriot is different than before, we need to be more civil and modern, in other words, we need to find a new patriotic formula,” were committed to a pluralist approach to patriotism and accepted the idea of open contestation:

48 “być patriotą dzisiaj trzeba jakoś inaczej niż ongiś, bardziej cywilnie i nowocześnie, słowem musimy wymyślić jakąś inną formułę.” (Jedlicki, Source 4.11)
“Even if there are certain necessary and inalterable characteristics of patriotism, none of its forms can be considered as an absolutely binding norm.”

Jedlicki also speculated whether the intelligentsia would be able to propose such a ‘modern’ expression of patriotism:

“Will the Polish intelligentsia be able to create an idea of modern patriotism that does not enter into conflict with European affiliation and does not slide into ethnic xenophobia? Will it create an idea of patriotism that will become a strong and enriching element of individual identity, not something that limits anyone’s spiritual freedom (…) and that accepts ‘polyvalence,’ in the sense of a multiplicity of parallel identifications and cultural connections?”

For more left-wing liberals, such as Środa, modern patriotism had to move away from Romantic values, which impeded patriotism from focusing on everyday matters such as home, family or work (Source 4.1).

The most conservative authors used a number of arguments against the pluralist approach. Gniazdowski condemned Środa’s alleged “anti-Romantic paroxysms,” and criticized the ‘obligation’ of modernity. He further implied that the liberals subscribed to post-modernism (an implicit charge of moral relativism), thus accusing them of an inherent contradiction:

“What is supposed to be the ‘modern’ patriotism that the ‘modernizers’ [liberals] call for, if according to them ‘modernity’ has just ended?”

His attempt at amalgamating liberals with post-modernism is not consistent with the fact that older liberals held rather skeptical position towards post-modernism (e.g. Jedlicki). Gniazdowski also objected to the need to redefine patriotism, if it implied a

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49 “Wprawdzie są pewne patriotyzmu cechy konieczne i niezmienne, ale żadnej z jego form niepodobna uznać za absolutnie obowiązującą normę” (Szacki, Source 4.8)
50 “Czy polska inteligencja potrafi dopracować się idei patriotyzmu nowoczesnego, niekłócącego się z afiliacją europejską i niezeszczególniającego się w etniczną ksenofobię? Patriotyzmu, który będzie mocnym i wzbogacającym składnikiem indywidualnej tożsamości, nietłamiącym duchowej swobody człowieka. (…) I dopuszczającym ‘poliwalencję’, czyli wielość równoczesnych identyfikacji i połączeń kulturowych?” (Source 4.11)
51 “(…) spośród wielu założeń, sytuujących się za współczesnym rozumieniem sensu patriotyzmu, jednym z najistotniejszych okazuje się wymóg, ba, przymus jego ‘nowoczesności’” (Among many assumptions, behind the current understanding of the sense of patriotism, one of the most prevailing ones becomes the obligation of its ‘modernity’).” (Source 4.3)
52 “Jaki ma być ‘nowoczesny’ patriotyzm według ‘modernizatorów’, skoro według nich ‘nowoczesność’ się właśnie skończyła.” (Gniazdowski, Source 4.3)
change in the nature of the patriotic ethos, from fight and sacrifice to work and pragmatism (or other civic virtues). For him, such a change would affect the concept’s ineliminable core, altering it from patriotism to matriotism.\(^5\)

One can observe two key moves from the conservatives in this debate. The first established the structuring opposition between two ideal-types: defenders of national tradition and dogmatic liberals. The second promoted the conservative-communitarian position as a third way, claiming it was the truly civic approach, negating the civic nature of the strongly liberal proposition. While the opposition between traditionalists and liberals is certainly not new, the novelty in Cichocki’s approach was that he tried to frame liberalism as dogmatic, presenting it as an extreme option, so as to establish the communitarian position as a middle ground. By grounding the communitarian position in the republican understanding of civil society, he obtained a fair share of sympathy of older liberals such as Szacki or Jedlicki. The claim regarding the importance of solidarity allowed the conservatives to attack a slimmer liberal approach, grounded in the respect and promotion of ‘civic virtues,’ promoted by Środa. Szacki, while he commended the idea of a civic-communitarian patriotism proposed by Cichocki, considered that for it to be truly civic, it would need to be linked to the virtues promoted by ‘patriotism of minimal means,’ because “a citizen is not a hero dressed in a republican toga.”\(^5\) In a sense then, he promoted a mix between Cichocki’s communitarian position and Środa’s liberal one.

The debate about patriotism prompted by the exhibition “Heroes of liberty” provided a number of insights into the contestation over the meaning of patriotism by

\(^5\) In Gniazdowski’s argument, the opposition between patriotism and matriotism is a derision of the latter; it was not so in Środa’s article. She used the metaphor of Siamese twins to describe the relationship between militaristic patriotism (paternal) and minimal patriotism (maternal).

\(^5\) “obywatel to nie [jest] ubrany w republikański toga bohater.” (Source 4.8)
different ideological strands. If one wanted to assess the arguments by adopting the common definition of patriotism as ‘the love of one’s country’ as a baseline, the promotion of a comprehensive sacrifice-based definition of patriotism could be seen as an act of stretching the concept, and the ‘minimal means’ approach as narrowing its scope. If the ‘Romantic’ vision of patriotism, based on the idea of sacrifice, was considered the baseline, then the ‘militaristic’ approach would not be stretching the concept content-wise, but rather context-wise, aiming at convincing that it was also adapted to times of peace. In contrast, the ‘minimal means’ position would narrow and bend patriotism’s meaning, trying to fix it with the reference to civic duties and civil society in a liberal understanding.

This discussion testified to the emergence of a coherent conservative intellectual framework in the beginning of the 2000s. Later on, the progressive rapprochement of the conservative intellectuals with the PiS prompted a transposition of several concepts they developed into the political sphere, sometimes contributing to their simplification and radicalization. The political use of their concepts, such as ‘politics of history,’ provoked a relative transformation of the contestation over the concept of patriotism that became broad in nature, with participation of more actors than only intellectuals.

5.3 ‘Politics of history’ a case study of the transposition of the ideas of conservative intellectuals into public policies

The second instance of discussion about patriotism, linked to the rising influence of conservative intellectuals, happened during the government of the PiS, between 2005 and 2007. It concerned, among others, the governmental ‘politics of history (polityka historyczna),’

55 For a more detailed analysis of this concept see Stobiecki, “Historians facing politics of history. The case of Poland,” or Dorota Szeligowska, “La politique historique polonaise.”
patriotism, in opposition to what they called a ‘critical approach’ championed by the liberal camp. The affirmative approach is sometimes called defensive or apologetic, because it focuses solely on the promotion of positive and prideful elements of the national past, and does not admit the discussion of problematic questions (e.g. dark pages of Polish-Jewish war history that will be discussed in Chapter 6). The promotion of an ‘affirmative’ approach resulted from the aforementioned critical assessment of the conservative intellectuals of the democratic regime of the Third Republic, and their claim that the regime was not the state the 1980s right-wing opposition had fought for, because it inherited many laws and institutions of the former regime.\textsuperscript{56} They insisted that the nature of the state (sometimes called in a belittling way, the ‘Republic of the Round Table’\textsuperscript{57}) should be thoroughly changed and won back from the liberal-left-wing elites, or even that a Fourth Republic\textsuperscript{58} should be installed. This last idea migrated from conservative intellectuals and Publizists to the broader political discourse, where it became a key point of the electoral program of the PiS in 2005, alongside the ‘politics of history.’

The very concept ‘politics of history’ was initially an intellectual one developed by conservative philosophers in the early 2000s, inspired by the German term \\textit{Geschichtspolitik}, according to Cichocki.\textsuperscript{59} According to Alexei Miller, \\textit{Geschichtspolitik} was a derogatory term coined by the opponents of Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s revisiting of some elements of historical discourse in the early 1980s,

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Manifest Krajowego Komitetu Konserwatystów} (The Manifesto of the National Conservative Committee) 1998, quoted by Kwiatkowski, \\textit{Pamięć zbiorowa społeczeństwa polskiego}, 50.

\textsuperscript{57} Słomka, “Patriotyzm konstytucyjny.”

\textsuperscript{58} This concept was used the first time in July 1989, by the Chairman of Senat, Andrzej Stelmachowski, former member of the democratic opposition, in his critique of the election of Wojciech Jaruzelski, former communist head of state, as President of Poland. It was further conceptualized by Rafał Matyja in 1998, and by Paweł Śpiewak, in 2003. In the legislative campaign 2005, it was used by the PiS, PO and PSL, but it became progressively linked with PiS.

and was never adopted by his proponents.\textsuperscript{60} Polish proponents of ‘politics of history’ openly gave it the programmatic aim of promoting one specific vision of the past in society: an exclusively positive and heroic one.

The emergence of the concept of ‘politics of history’ was prompted by two debates about controversial historical questions. The first took place in 2000-2001 and concerned the uncovering of the pogrom of Jewish inhabitants of Jedwabne in 1941, by their Polish neighbors (to be analyzed in detail in the following chapter). The second debate was a lasting controversy (peaking in 2002-2003) about the construction of the research and educational institution ‘Centre against Expulsions’\textsuperscript{61} in Berlin, promoted by Erika Steinbach, a CDU member of the German Bundestag (center-right Christian Democratic party), and president of the German Federation of Expellees (\textit{Bund der Vertriebenen}). According to the conservative intellectuals, both of these debates ‘tarnished’ the image of Poland in the world, and prompted the rise of a “critical” approach to national history, according to which the Poles had been not only victims of the Second World War, but also wrongdoers. The alleged need for an active ‘politics of history’ affirming prideful historical moments was further reinforced by the allegation advanced by the conservatives that throughout the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{60} Alexei Miller, “Introduction. Historical politics: Eastern European convolutions in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century,” in \textit{The convolutions of historical politics}, ed. Alexei Miller, Maria Lipman (Budapest: CEU Press 2012), 1.
\item \textsuperscript{61} The controversy whether, how and where to commemorate Germans (and other nations), expelled from their properties in Eastern European countries after the Second World War, lasted until 2008, when the decision was taken to locate the memorial “Visible sign” in Berlin. The construction of the Centre started only in 2013, due to lasting controversy over its form. A number of promoters of ‘politics of history’ refer to the controversy over the commemoration of expellees to motivate the need of Polish ‘politics of history’ in international politics, to promote country’s vision of the past, and avoid adopting others’ national narratives or concepts, such as expulsions Dariusz Gawiń, “Krytyczny patriotyzm: próba bilansu (Critical patriotism: attempt at analysis),” \url{http://www.omp.org.pl/artikel.php?artikel=82}, accessed on 10 March 2012. It is an amended version of “O pożytkach i szkodliwości historycznego rewizjonizmu (About advantages and disadvantages of historical revisionism),” in \textit{Pamięć i odpowiedzialność} (Memory and responsibility), ed. Robert Kostro and Tomasz Merta, (Kraków: OMP, 2005), 1-29.
\end{itemize}
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democratic transition very little had been done in the domain of promoting positive historical references among society.

Having said that, the promoters of the term ‘politics of history’ did not define it very precisely, rather each of them applied it freely to his domain of interest: culture, national heritage, tradition, literature, or the role of state in determining national holidays and commemorations. A strong accent was put on memory, history and historical education, and their role in the transmission and reproduction of a positive national identity that, according to the conservatives, should be encouraged by the state administration. The idea of ‘politics of history,’ they argued, was prompted by the willingness of Poles to ‘affirm their history’ (Cichocki, Rzeczpospolita, Source 5.2), and the need to reinstate ‘just proportions’ between an ‘affirmative’ and a ‘critical’ approach to history, as they believed that the critical approach was overpowering the affirmative one (Karłowicz, Rzeczpospolita, Source 5.6).

Every government performs some elements of ‘politics of history,’ without necessarily calling it such: for example, the choice of national holidays and ways of commemorating important historical events from the past, the naming of streets, constructing statues or places of memory. In the case of ‘politics of history,’ the mental image of attempting to determine the ‘right’ memory put off many a professional historian. Historians showed a strong skepticism towards the name ‘politics of history,’ because they understood it as another kind of political propaganda, using historical arguments, bringing together politics and history, or even

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62 Tomasz Merta recognized that the name ‘politics of history (polityka historyczna)’ might not have been the most suitable in Polish, where putting together politics and history was likely to bring to mind the communist propaganda, manipulating history (in a debate organized by Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 5.38)
making history political. These doubts were ignited by statements of the promoters of the concept, who, in numerous debates organized by newspapers, defined it, among others as:

“the usage, by democratic (but not only democratic) societies, of their own interpretation of historical events, in order to achieve – among other things – immediate political goals.”

Furthermore, from many programmatic statements of its creators, one can deduce that the aim of the conservative ‘politics of history’ was to take away history (or rather memory) from the sole influence of historians, given that Cichocki claimed that:

“There is no place for historians as single masters of memory in a democratic society.”

The conservative creators of ‘politics of history’ dismissed any objection to this concept, advanced by historians, or Publizists of liberal and left-wing leaning, by accusing them of hidden agendas or negative intentions. A soft way of dismissing criticism was to imply that the concept of ‘politics of history’ became a “fashionable object of criticism” (Cichocki, Rzeczpospolita, Source 5.106), but many strategies went further, discussing the alleged motivations of the critics. Gawin, for instance, insisted that every criticism was psychologically based, allegedly resulting from the critics’ trauma with the communist historical propaganda, in which pride in national history often led to national megalomania and nationalism (Rzeczpospolita, Source 5.107). The conservatives also implied that the detractors of the ‘politics of history’ were criticizing it out of spite, because they did not do much in the 1990s to promote history and were jealous of those who tried to change this situation:

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63 Politics has here the negative connotation of acting according to one’s immediate interest, and not taking decisions concerning the community in the name of the common good.

64 “posługiwania się przez demokratyczne (ale nie tylko) społeczeństwa własnymi interpretacjami wydarzeń z przesłości do osiągania — między innymi — bieżących celów politycznych.” (Gawin in a debate organized by Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 5.36).

65 “roszczenie historyków do bycia jedynym gospodarzem pamięci w społeczeństwie demokratycznym jest nie do przyjęcia.” (in a debate organized by Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 5.37).
“It is difficult to lose the impression that the critics blame those who currently implement projects of ‘politics of history’ for their own failures.”

More harshly, Gawin accused the critics of ‘politics of history’ of attempting to discredit the concept of collective memory, prompting historical amnesia and contributing to a ‘cold democratic project’ of the Third Republic (Rzeczpospolita, Source 5.107). Cichocki, in turn, linked the alleged neglecting of history in the 1990s to the lack of recognition of the role of the Solidarity movement in the end of communism both in Poland and in Europe (Rzeczpospolita, Source 5.106). Radical right-wing Publicist Piotr Semka accused liberal and left-wing elites of reacting nervously towards attempts at reinstating real value to concepts such as patriotism and solidarity. In his nationalist line of argumentation, any criticism concerning historical memory demonstrated an “allergy to patriotism” (Teologia Polityczna, Source 5.118).

The conservatives seemed to have missed the point in directing their rejection of criticisms of ‘politics of history’ at the previous political elites who allegedly did not promote historical memory in the society, because the main rebuttal of ‘politics of history’ came from professional historians. This was not based on the rejection or undermining of national history, let alone post-national theses. Rather, liberal historian Andrzej Romanowski deplored the fact that ‘politics of history’ meant the promotion of one-sided, unequivocally right-wing historical discourse attacking the alleged ‘relativism’ of historians and ‘neutrality’ of the state (Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 5.69-70). Other renowned historians, such as Marcin Kula, reproached the ‘politics of history’ with instrumental use of history to achieve political goals, promoting one, ‘good’ version (in the debate organized by a historical publication

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66 “(…) trudno uwolnić się od wrażenia, że autorzy (krytyku) za własne zaniechania krytykują tych, którzy dzisiaj realizują projekty polityki historycznej.” (Cichocki, Source 5.106)

67 According to Aleksander Hall (in Tygodnik Powszechny, Source 8.16), it is difficult to qualify this project as truly conservative, because an affirmative approach to history is the antithesis of the most mature strand of 19th century Polish conservatism, Krakowska szkoła historyczna, Kraków’s historical school, highly critical of noble republicanism and opposed to the idealization of Polish past.
Mówią wieki, Source 5.127). Daria Nałęcz and Maciej Janowski objected to the fact that the government considered the promotion of a specific vision of the past as its task (in a debate organized by Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 5.37). While any government controls and approves school programs and/or the content of textbooks, thus influencing the vision of past, or memory of a population, the controversy here touched mostly upon the question of the role of historians with respect to politics, and the possible undermining of the objectivity and neutrality of their research.

The expansion of the ‘politics of history’ in public policies concerned particularly the activity of the Ministries of Education, and of Culture and National heritage. Patriotism ranked particularly high on the agenda of Roman Giertych, extreme-right wing politician from the LPR, Minister of Education between 5 May 2006 and 13 August 2007. Giertych tried to interpret the promotion of patriotism advocated by ‘politics of history’ in line with his nationalist worldview, proposing patriotic excursions, teaching of patriotism in schools, or amending the list of set texts. His ideas were too radical even for the conservative intellectuals and the PiS, and were often criticized, finally leading to his resignation. But it was the activities of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, led by conservative Minister Kazimierz Ujazdowski and Vice-Minister Tomasz Merta (conservative intellectual behind the cultural program of the PiS), that prompted the next iteration of contestation about patriotism.68

68 With respect to different strands of the conservative thought, Rafał Matyja distinguished between a conservative-institutionalist approach (linked to Ujazdowski and ‘Patriotism of tomorrow’), and an identitarian-communitarian one (linked to Cichocki, Karłowicz and Merta). Such distinction has a certain merit, but these two approaches are complementary, and they both contributed to the construction of the Museum of the Warsaw Uprising. Matyja, Konserwatyzm po komunizmie, 332.
5.3.1 “Patriotism of tomorrow”

In 2005 Ujazdowski created “Patriotism of tomorrow,” a new operational program of the Ministry for financing cultural projects. It replaced the funds previously allocated to the ‘third sector’ of cultural NGOs by Ujazdowski’s predecessor Waldemar Dąbrowski, from the left-wing SLD. This program, alongside “Dziedzictwo kulturowe (Cultural heritage),” was to promote various local initiatives in the domain of patriotism using different media (e.g. comic-books, films, festivals). Furthermore, the budget of the program “Cultural heritage” was extended, while the program “Znaki czasu (Signs of time),” designed to promote modern art was reduced. For the abovementioned reasons, Piotr Sarzyński concluded in Polityka that a far better name for the Ministry of Culture would be the Ministry of the Past (Source 5.89).

The implementation of the program “Patriotism of tomorrow,” and its vision of patriotic education, was promoted in January 2007 by 160 billboards displayed in the largest Polish cities. This was a kind of déjà vu, given that in 2000 the exhibition “Heroes of liberty” also featured the concept of patriotism on billboards, considered by the conservatives as a ‘modern’ form of social communication. The billboards in 2007 featured representatives of the older generation of fighters for independence from the Second World War,69 in the company of youngsters (Figures 2&3).70

69 In 2007, two persons chosen for billboards were not widely known fighters for independence: Janusz Brochwicz, a former Warsaw insurgent from 1944, and Kazimiera Kamińska an activist of underground anti-communist organization Zrzeszenie Wolność i Niezawisłość, WiN (Freedom and Independence), tortured by the communist secret police for conspiring in 1945 against the communist take-over.

70 The teenagers featured on the billboards were: Filip Wolski, a 19-year-old winner of an international IT competition, who declared that he would never emigrate from Poland; and 16-year-old Magda Giza, caretaker of small street chapels in Warsaw’s Praga district.
Ujazdowski underscored that the aim of the billboards was to show

“an alliance of two generations: an alliance between the heroes of an independent Poland and the creative part of the young generation.”

The absence of the intermediary generation between the war fighters and the teenagers is glaring. The promotion of history and of patriotism envisaged by the Ministry focused again essentially on the military fight for freedom during the war. The generation who fought against communism or just had to live under this regime was absent from the pictures; even Solidarność did not make the cut. The conservatives claimed that they wanted “the word ‘patriotism’ to be perceived as modern and fashionable, not old-fashioned,” and underscored that patriotism was an important element of civic activity. However, the traditions of dissidents under communism and their action towards constructing civil society were not showcased. Given that conservative intellectuals and politicians often claimed that after 1989 there was no proper settling of accounts with the communist past, potentially then, in

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71 The slogan of the action (in red on the picture) was “Łączy nas patriotyzm jutra (Patriotism of tomorrow brings us together).” Picture available on Gazeta Wyborcza, http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,3823325.html, consulted on 21 January 2014.
72 “(...) sojusz dwóch pokoleń, sojusz bohaterów niepodległej Polski oraz kreatywnej części młodej generacji.” Quoted by Agata Kondzińska, in Gazeta Wyborcza (Source 5.54).
73 It is so despite of the strong discourse of proponents of politics of history about Solidarność.
74 “Chcemy, żeby słowo patriotyzm nie było staroświeckie, ale nowoczesne i modne,” Marek Mutor, quoted by Agata Kondzińska (Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 5.54)
their idea of patriotism, the people who lived during that time could not be presented as role models of patriotism.

The epilogue of the program “Patriotism of tomorrow” took place after the PiS lost the legislative elections in 2007 to the PO, and liberal Bogdan Zdrojewski replaced Ujazdowski as Minister. Zdrojewski consulted independent experts to evaluate “Patriotism of tomorrow,” and his conclusions were highly critical:

“In the framework of the program “Patriotism of tomorrow,” a high number of pseudo-historical projects were realized. Their educational value was close to zero, but the budget invested substantial.”

At first Zdrojewski reduced the number of operational programs from twelve to four, in the name of expenditure ‘rationalization.’ The alleged dismantling of the program “Patriotism of tomorrow” was highly criticized by its creators, who accused the new minister of an “ideological aggression” against the interest shown by youth in history and tradition. Zdrojewski then clarified that the program was not being dismantled completely: the promotion of patriotism was to be performed within two of the four

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76 “(…) w ramach programu “Patriotyzm jutra” pojawiła się ogromna liczba projektów pseudohistorycznych, których wartość edukacyjna była zerowa, a wydatki ogromne” (Quoted by Jacek Lakanowski, in Przegląd in his highly critical article about “Patriotism of tomorrow”, Source 5.181).
remaining programs, by the Museum of Polish History. He openly criticized the past form of the program, calling it “anachronistic” and “random” (quoted in Przegląd, Source 5.181). While Zdrojewski’s criticism of the implementation of the program was directed at its conservative creators, the proposed solution showed a continuation rather than a break with the previous approach, given that the Museum of Polish History was among the institutions created at the height of ‘politics of history,’ by Ujazdowski, in 2006. Robert Kostro, one of Ujazdowski’s close collaborators, directs it.\(^77\)

The conservative intellectuals’ new episode of promoting patriotism on billboards, insisting on being ‘fashionable’ and ‘modern,’ focused on media used to promote it. It was rather the overall promotion of patriotism in the realm of public policies that provoked a vivid contestation over the meaning of the concept.

5.3.2 ‘Affirmative patriotism’ promoted by ‘politics of history’

5.3.2.1 ‘Affirmative’ versus ‘critical’ patriotism

Within their ‘politics of history,’ conservative intellectuals created a strong framework aiming at promoting the vision of patriotism rooted in heroic and war traditions, framing it as ‘modern.’ Historians criticized this dubious and controversial promotion of patriotism, because

> “the concept of patriotism popularized by political history supporters in most cases relates to nationalism in its narrow sense, based on the simple dichotomy “us-them” in its most extreme form, or patronizing “the others” in its gentler form.”\(^78\)

The liberal and left-wing critics of ‘politics of history,’ e.g. Romanowski, dubbed this approach as ‘affirmative’ (Source 5.69), because it insisted on a solely affirmative approach to the national past, but also because it was coined in binary opposition to an enemy – “critical” patriotism (Robert Traba, interviewed in Gazeta Wyborcza,

\(^77\) Szeligowska, “Politique historique polonaise,” 64.

\(^78\) Stobiecki, “Historians facing politics of history,” 186.
Critical patriotism (like ‘politics of history’) was a concept coined by the conservatives to discredit a critical or ‘revisionist’ approach to national history allegedly promoted throughout the democratic transition.

The conservative approach included a number of elements. Tomasz Merta’s explanation of the program “Patriotism of tomorrow” is exemplary for its stances. He focused on the dichotomy between the counter-concepts of ‘critical’ and ‘affirmative’ approaches that he called fatalism and triumphalism, and insisted on the need of coexistence of critical and heroic history:

“Critical history is a natural complement of heroic history, and it is not good when it tries to replace it.”

He referred to the earlier statement that patriotism in times of war was always more visible than in times of peace, concluding that in peaceful times it should be promoted by the intentional action of public administration, starting with historical education of young people in schools. Merta’s position can be qualified as moderate, in the sense that he promoted the co-existence of critical and affirmative approaches to history. Other conservative intellectuals and Publizists were not so benign, trying to frame critical patriotism as an extreme position, or not patriotism at all. Paweł Ukielski, deputy director of the Museum of Warsaw Uprising, was one of them. To his mind, the Museum:

“steps beyond the schematic conflict between the flatterers and the deriders. We believe that it is possible to navigate between critical patriotism, and the other extreme – praising anything that is Polish, only because it is Polish.”

Conservative historian Andrzej Nowak resorted to a strong communitarian proposition to reject both critical patriotism and the liberal call for impartial treatment

79 “Historia krytyczna jest naturalnym dopełnieniem historii bohaterskiej, choć niedobrze się dzieje, kiedy próbuje ją zastąpić.” (Source 5.116)

80 “(…) wychodzi poza schemat konfliktu między chwalcami a szydercami. Uważamy, że można poruszać się pomiędzy tym, co zwykle się nazywać patriotyzmem krytycznym, a drugą skrajnością – chwaleniem wszystkiego co polskie, bo polskie właśnie.” (Source 5.127)
of everyone, implying that such an approach would not favor the creation of a universal community, but rather reinforce the split into two communities: ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Source 5.126). It would exclude, he argued, some groups from the realm of the community, notably proponents of the “old fatherland,” who did not understand or accept ‘critical patriotism.’ The liberals used this accusation of exclusion in the reverse way: Bronisław Łagowski, for instance, suggested that the conservatives, within their affirmative conception of love of one’s country also excluded different groups of Polish population from the community, namely those subscribing to ‘critical patriotism’ (Przegląd, Source 5.98). Hence a mutual exclusion and feeling of being excluded arose between the opposed camps.

Nowak rooted his position in the strong communitarian stance developed by MacIntyre, claiming that belonging to a community was necessary to learn moral rules, and that moral and political judgements could not be abstracted from the interpretive frameworks provided by the community. Nowak put forward this proposition in his polemical answer to the provocative proposition of philosopher Tomasz Żuradzki, who, in Gazeta Wyborcza, defended a strong liberal position that moral impartiality was a sine qua non condition of moral philosophy and thus patriotism, favoring specific people or country, was like racism. Żuradzki, in a rare contribution engaging with the question of moral permissibility of patriotism, drawing on Peter Singer, concluded that

“[p]atriotism does not have any moral justification – it is a useless relic of the past, a residue of the forgotten ways of life.”

This strong, liberal rejection of patriotism was isolated. But there were many other criticisms directed specifically at the ‘affirmative’ version of patriotism from leftist
and liberal circles, focusing on the fact that the affirmative approach prompted the rejection of critical thinking (Traba, interviewed in Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 5.57), the concealing of the dark past, and an overly negative assessment of the democratic transformation (Anna Wolff-Powęska, Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 5.77). Cultural anthropologist Joanna Tokarska-Bakir qualified the affirmative approach, valuing positive experiences and concealing the negative and shameful ones, as ‘childish’ (in a debate organized by Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 5.37). To counter the ‘affirmative’ approach, she proposed to develop a ‘mature’ approach towards the past that would also accept dark moments. The motive of maturity of the nation was also invoked by Wolff-Powęska, who noted that concepts such as nation, identity and patriotism were over-used, and concluded that the more a nation was mature, the more it could be self-critical (Source 5.77).

However, the conservative intellectuals, backed by a newly emerging strong circle of national-conservative Publizists, gathered around Rzeczpospolita, continued to dismiss such criticisms. Terlikowski maintained that their robust communitarian approach constituted a third way between two extremes that he described as secular liberal (allegedly “distilling patriotism from any concrete, particularist national [and religious] characteristics”) and extreme national-Catholic (linked to the nationalist party LPR and its leader, Giertych, who pushed his nationalist agenda under the label of patriotism). He accused both ‘extremes’ of willingness to construct the national community and patriotism in a de-contextualized way, implying that the conservative approach was based on the rejection of such supposed constructivism, and on the concrete context of the specific community:
“The rejection of constructivism is linked to the fact that patriotism is not an idea of intellectuals or creation of artists, but constitutes the product of a concrete historical, social and cultural existence of a community.”

However, by the same token, the conservative ‘politics of history,’ promoting the intentional use of history to achieve political goals could be qualified as constructivist. This argument was notably used by Gazeta Wyborcza’s Adam Leszczyński, who claimed the conservatives also performed a choice of tradition in their arguments. He played devil’s advocate by implying that

“In the whole Teologia Polityczna, the choice of tradition is presented as evidence, but it is not an evident choice. Paradoxically, by writing incessantly about tradition and identity, these authors prove right the post-modern thesis that both tradition and identity are ideological constructs.”

Hence one can observe that the concept of constructivism served both liberals and conservatives to mutually accuse each other and reject their respective specific types of cultural or ideological references.

5.3.2.2 The entrance of a new contender in the contestation over politics of history – the left-wing

The intellectuals from the left-wing intellectual circle of Krytyka Polityczna that emerged in the early 2000s also participated in the contestation over ‘politics of history’ and ‘critical patriotism.’ Krytyka Polityczna set itself the task of saving leftist traditions from oblivion. Its 2007 book’s significant title Ile ojczyzn, ile patriotyzmów (How many fatherlands? How many patriotisms?) was reminiscent of the influential essay by the spiritual father of the new left, Jan Józef Lipski, “Dwie ojczyzny, dwa patriotyzmy (Two fatherlands, two patriotisms),” from 1981. The book

82 “Odrzucenie konstruktywizmu związane jest z uznaniem, że tym, co kształtuje patriotyzm, nie jest idea intelektualistów ani wyobrażenie artystów, ale konkret historycznego, społecznego i kulturalnego bytu partykularnej wspólnoty.” (Terlikowski, Rzeczpospolita, Source 5.114)
83 “W całej zreszczy “Teologii Politycznej” wybór tradycji – przedstawiany jest jako oczywistość – jest wcale nieoczywistym ideologicznym wyborem. Pisząc nieustannie o tradycji i tożsamości, autorzy paradoksalnie dowodzą postmodernistycznego poglądu, że i jedno i drugie jest naprawdę ideologicznym konstruktem.” (Source 5.201)
84 Krytyki Politycznej przewodnik lewicy. Idee, daty i fakty, pytania i odpowiedzi (Krytyka Polityczna’s guide to the left. Ideas, dates and facts, questions and answers) (Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie im. Stanisława Brzozowskiego, 2007).
presented the position of the left, concerning its identity and ‘politics of history.’ The left-wing intellectuals recognized the need to use references to history and acknowledged that memory was a political question. In the opinion of Rafał Chwedoruk, the left needed to lead its own politics of history to prevent the disappearance of the left-wing traditions that the conservative party had allegedly tried to annihilate by assimilating them to the communist regime. The leader of Krytyka Polityczna, Sławomir Sierakowski, further enumerated a number of leftist traditions worth saving, or even promoting: the idea of state patriotism, promoted in the Interwar period by the socialist party PPS, or the thought of socialist philosopher Stanisław Brzozowski (Dziennik, Source 5.139).

According to the authors of Krytyka Polityczna, only the revival of left-wing thought could transcend the impasse between conservatism and liberalism. They thus tried to position themselves as the third ideological option. In doing so, they intentionally tried to position the conservatives as nationalist and challenged the conservative’s attempt at presenting themselves as a viable third option between liberalism and nationalism.

In How many fatherlands? Maciej Gdula concluded that while ‘critical patriotism’ provided a tool to criticize the right-wing vision of history, it was not sufficient to build an alternative, positive ‘politics of history,’ because it only focused on the dark pages of history. Gdula pointed out that adopting this concept could contribute to perpetuating the conservative, ‘affirmative’ approach to history, rather than going beyond it. Indeed, the perspective of leading leftist politics of history just for the sake of preserving leftist heritage, would rather contribute to reinforcing

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partisan approaches to the past than to opening a new platform for dialogue. For that reason, he argued, the leftist project of politics of history needed to go beyond the horizon of national history and focus, e.g. towards the fight for emancipation of women or ethnic minorities.

It is noteworthy that young leftist intellectuals did not reject the idea of patriotism *en bloc*. A prominent left-wing feminist Agnieszka Graff, among others, presented in *Gazeta Wyborcza* a polemical response (Source 5.45) to the liberal refutation of patriotism advanced by Żuradzki (*Gazeta Wyborcza*, Source 5.79), whose rejection from the conservative standpoint by Nowak (*Rzeczpospolita*, Source 5.126) was discussed earlier. Graff concluded that Żuradzki’s objectivist argument about the lack of moral permissibility of patriotism did not reflect the reality, and that patriotism, contrarily to nationalism, did not have to lead to conflicts. Graff also objected to leaving the care for national tradition and its values to the conservative right and the Church (*Gazeta Wyborcza*, Source 5.150), because it would imply the victory of the extreme position, aiming at instilling in Poles the conviction that Polishness needed to be identified with Catholicism in its ‘Radio Maryja (closed Church)’ version, or with the male gender.87

“Instead of renouncing on patriotism entirely or describing it as an unnecessary ballast, we have to redefine this concept, link it to openness, diversity and justice. In a country where the Church and the conservative right consider themselves depositaries of communitarian emotions and symbols, this is easier said than done, but we have to try. (...) If we want to fight for the rights of women and minorities, we have to inscribe them into the new formula of Polish patriotism.”88

87 An early example of a gender-oriented reflection on the form of (national) political community comes from the contribution of Ewa Hauser “Traditions of patriotism, questions of gender: the case of Poland,” in *Post-communism and the body politic*, ed. Ellen E. Berry (New York: New York University Press, 1995). Hauser argued that the re-definition of the content of national identity had to be linked to restructuring the meaning of gender, away from the repressive patriarchal element of traditional patriotism, infused with religion and maintained by the Church’s hierarchy, denying real agency to women and perpetuating hetero-normativity.

88 “Zamiast rezygnować z patriotyzmu jako zbędnego balastu, trzeba go redefiniować; wpisywać weń otwartość, różnorodność, sprawiedliwość. W kraju, gdzie depozytariuszami wspólnotowych emocji i symboli pozostają Kościół i konserwatywna prawica, podobny projekt dużo łatwiej opisać, niż...”
Wanda Nowicka, another key left-wing feminist, shared Graff’s call for re-conquering the notion of patriotism from the conservative right and rendering it more open and equal. She nevertheless doubted whether promoting the rights of different segments of the nation would be modern enough, as it would not offer anything new to Polish citizens of other nationalities (Source 5.210). The fact that the left-wing intellectuals engaged in the debate over patriotism (even if it is not a concept naturally associated with their ideological stances), and linked it to their political agenda, testifies to the importance of this concept, and to the necessity of engaging in the debate over its meaning so as not to be marginalized in the political and ideological power struggle for the discursive domination.

The second decade of the transition was marked by the emergence and consolidation of new intellectual circles: the conservative one and the left-wing one, which set the tone of public debates. The debates that started in the second decade concerned rather the ‘love’ element of the definition of patriotism, and provided different ideas of what its essence and nature should be: fight or work, critical or unconditional. While in the beginning of the 2000s conservative intellectuals tried to present a rather moderate communitarian third way to modernization and patriotism (between liberalism and defensive nationalism), with time, they also drifted towards more ‘closed’ positions, rejecting criticism. They skillfully introduced specific conceptual constructions such as the ‘politics of history’ in the public discourse, proposing them as political ideas to the conservative party, during the period of its government (2005-2007), despite significant criticism from their liberal and left-wing opponents. The capacity of the conservatives to influence the public discourse was achieved in parallel to the

"przeprowadzić, ale trzeba próbować. (...) Jeżeli chcemy się upomnieć o prawa kobiet i mniejszości, to musimy je wpisać w nową formułę polskiego patriotyzmu." (Source 5.150)
discursive polarization and strengthening of the right-wing bipartisanism. The conservative’s ‘natural’ propensity to present themselves as the protectors of the community allowed them to master the act of definition or labeling of some concepts, notably patriotism, pushing some liberals, such as Środa, previously committed to the intellectual debate about patriotism, to conclude:

“Indeed, I am not a patriot, if by patriotism we understand a need for drawing accounts, revenge, constructing statues and museums or saying prayers.”

However, given that patriotism continued to be one of the key concepts in the public debate, other ideological strands did not abandon the debate over its meaning and tried to impose their counter-narratives, or counter-concepts to challenge the dominant conservative frame. The left-wing intellectuals tried to posit themselves as a third option between conservatism and liberalism. A growing perception of ‘discourses of exclusion,’ between proponents of ‘critical’ and ‘affirmative’ approaches, did not pave the way to any durable consensual solution. The emergence and strengthening of this polarization will be further demonstrated in the next chapter, analyzing the usage of the concept of ‘critical patriotism’ within the debates about Polish-Jewish relations.

89 “Rzeczywiście, nie jestem patriotką, jeśli przez patriotyzm rozumieć potrzebę rozliczeń, zemsty, pomników, modlitwy i muzeów.” (Walenciak, Przegląd, Source 5.100)
Chapter Six – The development of ‘critical patriotism’ within the debates about Polish-Jewish relations

The previous chapter has shown how the emergence of a consolidated conservative intellectual circle had a structuring impact on the discursive field of contestation of patriotism. The consolidation of the conservative mindset and its transposition onto the political sphere in the context of the conservative government of the PiS contributed to a progressive polarization of the public sphere on the whole.

This chapter will focus on the concept of ‘critical patriotism,’ coined by the conservative intellectuals to denigrate the critical approach to national history. The concept of ‘critical patriotism’ will be set in the context of three formative texts published in the 1980s that according to the conservatives were its alleged inspiration. The analysis will focus on the evolution of public debates following the publication of three books by Jan Tomasz Gross about Polish-Jewish relations (Sąsiedzi, 2000, Strach, 2008, and Złote żniwa, 2011). I will demonstrate the transformation of the nature of the contestation, which in the beginning of the 2000s was much more open and deliberative, and became increasingly polarized in the second half of the decade. I will show that while critical introspection into historical memory is incompatible with the conservative mindset, it has liberal and left-wing proponents who consider it ‘mature,’ and consequently intend to re-label ‘critical’ patriotism as ‘mature’ patriotism.

The subject and the nature of the Jedwabne debate1 in 2000/2001 provoked a number of commentators to liken it to the German Historikerstreit.2 I will discuss

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1 It is the usual name of the debate that followed the publication of Sąsiedzi.
2 Literally: “Historians’ quarrel”. It was an intellectual and political debate led in West Germany in the late 1980s, concerning the crimes of Nazi Germany.
whether ‘critical patriotism’ could be perceived as a Polish version of constitutional patriotism, reaching beyond traditional and historical objects of allegiance. Given that the debate and contestation over the concept of patriotism remains strongly rooted in history (opposing an affirmative to a critical approach), the conclusions on this last issue can only be mitigated, but I will suggest that critical patriotism could be rather understood as an attempt at promoting a form of (normative) ethical patriotism.

6.1 Uncovering the dark past within debates about Polish-Jewish relations

The post-war communist historiography forged a canonical image of the Second World War and of Polish participation in it: Poles were depicted as heroes and victims, whereas the self-critical attempts of certain intellectuals at proposing a different, more critical vision of Polish-Jewish relations between 1945 and 1948, were silenced\(^3\) until into the 1980s. The historian of Polish-Jewish relations Joanna Michlic suggests that a “narrative of symmetry between fates of Poles and Jews, and the solidarity and unity of the great majority of Polish society with its Jewish minority during the Holocaust”\(^4\) became the key element promoted by the official discourse regarding war relations between the two communities. This interpretation of facts implied that both communities suffered in the same way and that Poles were victims of the war, and not wrongdoers.

The first instances of re-interpretation of the communist historiography about the war, and of the Polish-Jewish relations, occurred in the 1980s in the still

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‘regimented’ public discourse,\(^5\) progressively liberalizing after the emergence of the Solidarity movement. These discussions took place on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw ghetto uprising (1983); following the release of Claude Lanzmann’s movie “Shoah” (1985); and following the publication of Jan Błoński’s article “Biedni Polacy patrzą na getto (Poor Poles look at the ghetto),” in 1987 in the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny (TP), which had been written in reaction to international conferences on Polish-Jewish relations,\(^6\) and to “Shoah.” Post-1989 examples of uncovering the dark Polish-Jewish war past include, among others, influential articles published in Gazeta Wyborcza. Michał Cichy’s article “Polacy – Żydzi: czarne karty Powstania (Poles-Jews: black cards of the Uprising)\(^7\)” about instances of killing of Jews by the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK) during the Warsaw Uprising is the first example. It was published a few months ahead of the Uprising’s 50th anniversary in 1994. Secondly, Hanna Świda-Ziemb’a’s 1998 article “Hańba obojętości (The disgrace of indifference),”\(^8\) further developed the arguments Błoński’s on the occasion of the discussion of the crosses of Auschwitz.\(^9\)

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\(^6\) The first conference took place in 1983 at the Columbia University in New York, and the next one in the following year in Oxford. Polonsky and Michlic, The neighbors respond, 14.

\(^7\) This article was published in Gazeta Wyborcza on 29 January 1994. Cichy later retracted from his accusatory stance. In the article “Przepraszam powstańców (I apologize to the insurgents),” (Gazeta Wyborcza, December 23, 2006), he stated that in 1994 he behaved like a lustrator (prosecutor) who did not pay attention to people’s pain. Forecki provides further details concerning the controversy surrounding Cichy’s articles, in Spór o Jedwabne, 10-13.

\(^8\) Gazeta Wyborcza, August 17, 1998.

\(^9\) In 1979, Pope John-Paul II, during his first visit to Poland as a pope, celebrated a mass in the surroundings of the former Nazi concentration camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau (Oświęcim in Polish), where one sixth of all the Jews killed in the Holocaust lost their lives. A commemorative ‘papal cross’ was planted on the scene. In the summer of 1998, rumors arose that the state administration wanted to remove this cross. It provoked a confrontation between the ‘defenders of the cross,’ and the people who believed that it should be removed, as it only constituted a symbol of the Catholic religion and not of the Jewish one. For a thorough analysis of this controversy see Geneviève Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz. Nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006).
The key push for a nation-wide discussion of the dark past came only in May 2000 though, when Jewish Polish-American historian Jan Tomasz Gross published his book entitled *Sąsiedzi (Neighbors).* Neighbors told a story about the pogrom of the Jewish inhabitants of Jedwabne, a small city in Eastern Poland, which happened on July 10th, 1941, and in the aftermath of the Second World War was blamed on the Nazis. Gross brought to public attention the fact that it had been the Polish inhabitants of Jedwabne who massacred their Jewish neighbors.

A very vivid public debate followed the publication of this book. In the discussion, the fact of the pogrom itself was not really contested, but its interpretation and the extent of Polish involvement was. This debate was important not only for Polish-Jewish relations as such, it also raised questions concerning collective responsibility, historical memory, collective identity and patriotism of the Polish people, then and now. The debates that followed the publication of Gross’s subsequent books, *Strach* (Fear) (2008) and *Złote żniwa* (Golden Harvest) (2011), provide helpful insights for assessing whether the debate about Jedwabne changed the self-perception of the Poles with respect to their behavior during the war, anti-Semitism, and the archetypal myth of Poles as heroes and victims (constructed in the 19th century, but reinforced later on, first during the Interwar

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10 Gross, *Sąsiedzi.*
11 Jedwabne should not be treated as an isolated fact, similar pogroms happened in Radzilów on 7 July 1941 and Wiśnosz on 5 July 1941. Bikont, 61.
12 Andrzej Romanowski in his review of Adam Michnik’s anthology *Przeciw Anti Semityzmowi 1936-2009* (Against Anti-Semitism 1936-2009) (‘Dwa najsmutniejsze narody na ziemi (Two saddest nations on Earth)’, Gazeta Wyborcza, February 5-6, 2011) said that using the term Polish-Jewish relations is misleading, because these communities were not separate, Poland was a place of meeting of cultures and Jews were its full right citizens.
13 Gross, *Strach.*
14 Gross, *Złote żniwa.*
period, and then by the communist propaganda). All three debates were very rich and engaged many actors.

Section 6.2 below analyzes the debate about Jedwabne. It shows the progressive emergence of opposed critical and defensive stances in this debate, and showcases the broad and open nature of the discussion in 2000/2001. The analysis will continue with the assessment of the debates concerning Gross’s two subsequent books in 2008 and 2011, so as to assess the evolution of the public sphere and the impact of the Jedwabne debate (Section 6.3). This part of the analysis will illustrate the change of the intellectual and institutional climate and how the defensive/conservative stance overpowered the critical/liberal one. Finally, the discussion of different conceptions of patriotism raised in the three debates will lay the ground for the argument regarding the growing polarization of the public sphere and its discourses (Section 6.4).

6.2 The nation-wide debate about the pogrom in Jedwabne as the beginning of uncovering the dark past (2000/2001)

As mentioned above, the image of Polish behavior during the Second World War promoted by the post-war communist historiography spread the ethos of bravery, non-collaboration with the Nazis (with the classical argument that there was ‘no Polish Quisling’) and a strong identification with the figure of the victim. Polish people would think of themselves as victims, not wrongdoers during the war. For a long time, Polish-Jewish relations during the war did not constitute an object of thorough academic research, even in émigré circles. The so-called ‘debate about

16 Tony Judt discusses how difficult and discomforting it was for Eastern Europeans to “come to terms with their past treatment of Jews” (Judt, “The past is another country,” in *The Politics of Retribution in Europe*, op. cit., 312).
Jedwabne’ that followed the publication of *Neighbors* shook previously established perceptions and initiated introspection and a slow re-interpretation of the popular image of Polish-Jewish war relations. This genuine debate lasted for almost two years, peaking between November 2000 and May 2001. Many different actors took part in the discussion, including academics, politicians, researchers from the Institute of National Memory (IPN), and journalists. Historian Maciej Janowski sees this debate not only as a political and cultural conflict, but also as a professional discussion of researchers.

Within the Jedwabne debate, a number of questions concerning the ‘collective massacre’ were discussed: the concrete facts (the number of victims and of perpetrators; who led and instigated the killing, German or Poles, and their social roles), Gross’s methodology and his use of sources of oral history, ethical issues of collective responsibility of the Poles for the crime and the consequences of

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18 This book was not Gross’s first attempt at discussing Polish-Jewish past to have sparked discussion. In 1998 it was the case of *Upiorna dekada. Trzy eseje o stereotypach na temat Żydów, Polaków, Niemców i komunistów 1939-1948* (The ghastly decade. Three essays about Jews, Poles, Germans and communists 1939-1948) (Kraków: TAiWPN Universitas, 1998).
19 There are different periodizations of this debate in the secondary literature, but an overall agreement can be reached with respect to the fact that its most intense phase started in November 2000. Forecki, *Spór o Jedwabne*, 25-28; Michlic, “The Polish debate about the Jedwabne massacre,” 11.
20 IPN, *Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu* (Institute of National Memory – Commission of prosecution of crimes against Polish nation) was created by the Polish Parliament in 1998 and started its activities in 2000. It is a research institute tasked with prosecuting Nazi and communist crimes; and the conservation of the documents of the communist secret police, UB (*Urząd bezpieczeństwa*, Security Office).
21 Janowski, “Jedwabne,” 71. Forecki presents a more nuanced perception of this question, suggesting that while the participation of historians in this debate was noticeable and significant, it was not dominant. Nevertheless, he also calls this debate a Polish *Historikerstreit*. Forecki, *Spór o Jedwabne*, 28.
22 This expression underscores the collective aspect of both victims and perpetrators. Bikont, *My z Jedwabnego*, 14.
23 There are different accounts of the number of victims in the pogrom: between 300 and 1600.
24 Concerning this matter, it is instructive to refer to a meeting of Polish historians of 24 November 2000. At this meeting Marek Edelman, one of the sole survivors of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in 1943, said that people were looking for a proof that Gross was a mediocre historian in order to be able to refute his theses without further investigation. Bikont, *My z Jedwabnego*, 19.
this knowledge. While the questions of genre, facts and methodology are important, for the purposes of the present analysis the discussion about the responsibility for the crime (among other moral issues raised) and the approach to national history will be the main focus, as they will be the most linked to the discussion about the concept of patriotism. The ‘Jedwabne debate’ was, among other things, described as a nation-wide discussion, a public and professional debate, leading to an unprecedented self-examination of the national consciousness. Renowned Polish historians qualified it as a national debate (Tomasz Szarota, on the pages of a progressive Catholic monthly Więź, Source 6.40), or as one of the most profound debates on any historical issue after 1989, or even one of the most important public debates in Poland after 1989 (Paweł Machcewicz, in centrist Catholic weekly, Tygodnik Powszechny, Source 7.14). Some Publizists went as far as suggesting that for starting this debate, Gross should receive some kind of (national) distinction (Agnieszka Sabor, in Tygodnik Powszechny, Source 7.24). Also post factum the debate was perceived as a step in the process of discarding ‘affirmative’ historiography, apologetic towards the past, for more critical and detailed studies or as a turning point that showed the maturity and the potential for

25 The alleged dualism of this book, partly historical and factual and partly moral, was a challenge for both the reviewers and Publizists.
26 For an analysis of these issues, see Janowski “Jedwabne,” Forecki, Spór o Jedwabne.
27 Zgliczyski, Antysemityzm po polsku, 74.
28 Robert Cherry and Annamaria Orla-Bukowska, “Na przekór negatywnym stereotypom (Against negative stereotypes),” in Polacy i Żydzi, op. cit.
29 Shana Penn, “Prasa amerykańska na temat roli Polski w Holokauście (The American press concerning the Polish role in the Holocaust), in Polacy i Żydzi, op. cit., 77.
30 Marcin Kula, unpublished “Refleksje na marginesie dyskusji o Jedwabnem (Reflections on the margin of the discussion on Jedwabne),” quoted in Polonsky and Michlic, The neighbours respond, 30.
31 The publication of Wokół Jedwabnego, ed. Paweł Machcewicz and Krzysztof Persak (Warszawa: IPN 2002), is an example of such new studies, a result of an investigation of IPN into the pogrom of Jedwabne. It deepened the questions raised by Gross, largely confirming his conclusions.
a sincere historical introspection of the society.\textsuperscript{32} The debate “generated the most emotions both among participants and the general public”\textsuperscript{33} after 1989.

\textit{Neighbors,} in an unprecedented, open and strong manner, accused Poles of assisting the Nazis in the perpetration of the Holocaust,\textsuperscript{34} rather than of being simple bystanders\textsuperscript{35} (as the official canon would have it). The book also challenged the myth that the Polish people would by and large have helped the Jews during the war. These accusations lead to a highly controversial reception of the book: the range of reactions included shock, disbelief, anger and hysteria.\textsuperscript{36} The Jedwabne pogrom shook people’s consciousness and put the Holocaust in the center of the attention of the public opinion. It challenged the Polish “obsession of innocence,” characterizing Polish-Jewish relations, according to a powerful expression coined by cultural anthropologist, Joanna Tokarska-Bakir, in her award winning essay under the same title, published in liberal \textit{Res Publica Nova} (Source 6.42). According to Michlic, Gross’s book reflected the position of liberal intellectuals who looked towards the future in a positive way and were not afraid to tackle difficult topics that did not show Poles in a positive light.\textsuperscript{37}

One of the main questions discussed was whether all Poles should accept the (moral and collective) responsibility for the crime committed in 1941 by the inhabitants of Jedwabne towards their Jewish neighbors. Critical and defensive positions, also called two Polish perspectives on the past,\textsuperscript{38} clashed sharply on this

\textsuperscript{32} Guy Billauer, “Stosunki polsko-żydowskie w Ameryce (the Polish-Jewish relations in America),” in \textit{Polacy i Żydzi}, op. cit., 104.
\textsuperscript{33} Janowski, “Jedwabne,” 59.
\textsuperscript{34} Justyna Woźniakowska, “Confronting history, reshaping memory: the debate about Jedwabne in the Polish press” (Master thesis, Central European University, 2002).
\textsuperscript{35} Even if the bystanders could also have their part of the blame for the crime.
\textsuperscript{36} Zgliczyński, \textit{Antysemityzm po polsku}, 75.
\textsuperscript{37} Michlic, “Czy antysemityzm w dzisiejszej Polsce ma jakieś znaczenie,” 183.
\textsuperscript{38} Janowski, “Jedwabne,” 81.
question. The (conservative) proponents of the defensive approach rejected responsibility for the crime, and focused on preserving national pride, while the proponents of the (liberal) critical approach pushed for accepting collective responsibility. Even if such a binary opposition was dominant in the discourse, historian Andrzej Paczkowski, in the right-wing daily *Rzeczpospolita*, formulated a more nuanced four-category typology of positions with regard to their approach to Gross’s theses and to national history that will be useful for assessing different arguments used in this debate.

A ‘communitarian’ argument was construed in favor of accepting collective responsibility, based on the combination of moral values with the question of community. It relied on the ‘pride for shame’ position, stating that if one wants to be proud of the past, one also has to accept responsibility for its dark moments and provide retribution. In this way, the proponents of the critical position pointed to the necessity of a new analysis of the canonical version of Polish collective memory of war, challenged by an emerging counter-memory. They praised Gross for initiating this process, challenging:

"the most important elements of Polish historical consciousness and its basic concepts, such as heroism, patriotism, feeling of being a victim and tolerance – by contrasting them with historical facts." 

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39 Paczkowski’s typology included four different receptions of Gross’s book: 1. positive towards Gross’s conclusions and self-critical towards history; 2. ‘defensive open,’ accepting some of Gross’s conclusions, but raising questions regarding Gross’s methods and the German instigation of the crime and moderately apologetic towards the past; 3. ‘defensive closed’ towards Gross’s theses, but radically apologetic towards national history, arguing for the smallest possible Polish participation in crime, supposedly orchestrated by the Nazis (the borderline between moderate and radical apologetic categories is difficult to draw clearly); finally, 4. ‘rejection tout court’ - also radically apologetic towards history, refusing all of Gross’s arguments about the Polish guilt or responsibility for the crime. Some of Gross’s opponents fully rejected his analysis (n°4 and to some extent n°3); others did not reject the facts, but tried to justify them by contextual elements (close to n°2). (Source 6.31)

40 Woźniakowska, ‘Confronting history,” 37.

In contrast, the proponents of the defensive position, including long-established conservative historian Tomasz Strzembosz, or younger historians with clear nationalist leaning, such as Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, Bogdan Musial, or Piotr Gontarczyk, suggested that two truths/memories, Polish and Jewish, existed in parallel, and did not match. They put forward a number of strategies, in order to allow for the rejection of collective responsibility: denial (of the crime, integrally), justification (of the crime, by its war-time contextual circumstances, and its allegedly exceptional and non-representative nature) and shifting responsibility (from Poles to Germans, when it came to the perpetration or, at least, instigation of the crime). Generally, conservative historians and commentators rejected the argument of collective responsibility, defending the innocence thesis, and thereby the ‘good name’ of the nation. It is symptomatic that while the (conservative) right-wing often promotes a strong communitarian approach, and underscores the importance of belonging to the inter-generational national community, it rejects the obligation of collective responsibility, also linked to the postulate of the intergenerational bond. Furthermore, as rightly pointed out by Janowski, many of Gross’s opponents criticized his emotional and moral approach to the topic, in the name of the necessary objectivity of the researcher; but at the same time, they also

42 Interestingly, on the Polish side, it was the second generation (children of killers) who defended the most eagerly Polish memory of innocence. Bikont, *My z Jedwabnego*, 156.

43 One of the most widespread justification strategies of the pogrom was to refer to the Jewish cooperation with the Soviets between 1939 and 1941. According to this argument, Jews allegedly collaborated with the Soviets by denouncing Poles, who were later on deported to Siberia. The follow-up question would be whether such cooperation with the Soviets of some could ever justify the extermination of all? Bikont, *My z Jedwabnego*, particularly 104, 243, 320, 474 and 480. Gross rejected all contextual arguments, but Janowski points to a number of elements that should not be discarded so lightly, because they can contribute to a better understanding of the circumstances of the massacre, without necessarily excusing it: e.g. Dariusz Stola’s analysis of the specificities of Jedwabne’s region (it was the single region under the Soviet occupation with predominantly Polish ethnic population), making Jews easily memorized and singled out by Poles, “Jedwabne,” 65.
used “sharp value-ridden and emotionally charged statements,” thus contradicting themselves on the method.

This visible dichotomy of positions can be best described by a metaphor of the stain, used by economist Robert Cherry and social anthropologist Anna Orla-Bukowska. They suggested that the Jedwabne pogrom was a stain on the Polish reputation and there were two possible reactions to the knowledge about it: to try to bleach it, linked to the defensive and apologetic approach to history; or to rub it deeper inside, by critically re-evaluating the past, revealing the dark moments and using them as a lesson for present and future generations. Indeed, the debate split Polish society into two loose groups, or ‘two Polands:’ those who accepted the moral challenge, for example by subscribing to the ‘pride for shame’ argument, and those who defensively rejected the discussion altogether, or even qualified it as another instance of a ‘Jewish attack,’ deploying anti-Semitic or straightforward nationalist arguments.

The Jedwabne debate promoted the development of the critical strand. It opened the way to dismantling old myths, notably that of the ‘innocent Poland.’ Throughout the debate, the opinions present in the press debate were polarized, notably on the question of an official apology, which would imply the recognition of the (collective) responsibility for the crime. Literary historian Andrzej Romanowski

45 “Czarna plama kala polską reputację, jedni wcierają ją głębiej, inni chcą ją wywabić” (A black stain tarnishes Polish reputation: some rub it deep inside, others want to bleach it).” Cherry and Orla-Bukowska, “Na przekór negatywnym stereotypom,” 34.
46 This powerful motive will be even more present in the debate that happened after the plane crash of the president in 2010. Its use here constitutes another attempt at presenting a binary opposition between a Poland that is ready to pick up the challenge and recognize the painful truth, and a Poland that is frozen in a syndrome of victim and hero, that tried to minimize the crime and defend own innocence. Forecki, Spór o Jedwabne, 135-136.
linked the willingness to apologize\textsuperscript{47} to the willingness of elites to “live without lies” (Source 9.21), but it can hardly be described as a generalized approach for the entire population, or even for its elites. The question of apology was discussed with relation to the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the pogrom on 10 July 2001. The representatives of the critical camp welcomed the commemoration as a necessary step in cleansing the dark past, while proponents of the defensive stance rejected it, sometimes using nationalist tropes, describing it as a scandal, serving Jewish interests. In the end, the commemorative event was held, and the left-wing president of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski offered an apology:

“Let us all be the citizens of Jedwabne today. (…) This is why today, the President of the Republic of Poland, I beg pardon. I beg pardon in my own name and in the name of those Poles whose conscience is shattered by that crime. In the name of those who believe that one cannot be proud of the glory of Polish history without feeling, at the same time, pain and shame for the evil done by Poles to others.”\textsuperscript{48}

Kwaśniewski apologized for the crime committed by Poles on their Jewish neighbors in presence of the Ambassador of Israel to Poland, Szewach Weiss, and left-wing and liberal politicians (from the SLD and UW), using the ‘pride for shame’ argument and the moral discourse. It is important to mention that no high representatives of the Catholic Church were present at that commemoration\textsuperscript{49} (while Jewish and protestant churches were represented), nor any representatives of right-wing parties. The inhabitants of Jedwabne did not take part either.

\textsuperscript{47} Such public apology can be understood as an instance of the ‘ritual of reconciliation’ (Bjoren Krondorfer, Remembrance and reconciliation: Encounters between young Jews and Germans (New Have: Yale University Press, 1995), 20) or as a ‘political ritual of atonement’ (Bartosz Korzeniowski, Polityczne rytuały pokuty w perspektywie zagadnienia autonomii jednostki (Political rituals of atonement in the perspective of individual autonomy) (Poznań, 2006), 19-20). Such apologies often serve current political needs, and do not necessarily correspond to the position of communities in whose name political actors perform them. Forecki, Spór o Jedwabne, 31-32.

\textsuperscript{48} Source of the quote: \url{http://www.radzilow.com/jedwabne-ceremony.htm}, consulted on November 17, 2011.

\textsuperscript{49} While the Catholic Church organized in May 2001 a common prayer of the Episcopate in Warsaw’s Church of All Saints, the absence of its representatives at the commemoration of the 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Jedwabne’s pogrom is telling for its overall position in this debate.
6.3 The backlash of discussion in the debates about *Fear* (2008) and *Golden Harvest* (2011)

Within his two subsequent books, Gross extended his scope of interest and argument to post-war anti-Semitism and to the indifference of the Polish society towards such acts of violence (*Fear*), and towards the question of economic profit on the victims of the Holocaust during and after the war (*Golden Harvest*). The fact that these subsequent books were published, discussed (although the extent of the follow up discussions did not equal the one about Jedwabne), and not completely rejected is surely due to the fact that the debate about Jedwabne transformed the public sphere, extending the scope of possible discussion.

*Fear*, published by lay Catholic publisher *Znak*, discussed among other things the pogrom of Kielce in 1946. Its publication provoked heated reactions, even if it was shorter and less polemical than the Jedwabne debate. Gross was criticized again for an allegedly ‘emotional’ treatment of the subject, and for using a ‘*Publizistik*,’ pamphlet-like style, instead of writing a pure historical (neutral) essay. Even more than in the case of *Neighbors*, a number of historians, who were in principle not opposed to discussing post-war pogroms of Jews, were skeptical towards Gross’s argument because they thought that his explanation was one-dimensional, based on the assumption of an intrinsic Polish anti-Semitism (e.g. Bożena Szaynok, in her publications in center-left *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Sources 7.10 and 7.26). Also Paweł Machcewicz suggested in his review of the book published in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, that Gross’s nonchalant, or even tendentious, attitude to sources was a gift for all those keen to reject his thesis (Source 7.14).51 Machcewicz

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50 Cardinal Dziwisz, and Jarosław Gowin, from the conservative wing of PO, said that to their mind, *Znak* should not have published this book, because it did not correspond to the profile of Catholic publisher (Source 7.29).
51 It can be likened to the reaction of historians, quoted in 2000 by Marek Edelman, trying to find flaws in Gross’s work, in order to discredit him as historian, and reject his difficult hypotheses. (Machcewicz
also thought that because of Gross’s harsh accusatory tone, *Fear* would not contribute to reflection or to further examination of collective historical conscience launched with the Jedwabne debate.

The liberal and left-wing defenders of Gross’s point of view claimed that he only used strong words and statements in order to provoke a debate among a non-specialist, broad public, about Polish-Jewish relations (historian Jerzy Jedlicki, in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Source 7.9). Furthermore, they pointed to the fact that valuable studies on Polish-Jewish relations had been published, but had gone unnoticed by the broad public because of their neutral, scientific style. Roman Kurkiewicz also commended Gross for shaking the foundations of ‘politics of history,’ by disintegrating the ‘affirmative’ patriotic integration (*Przekrój*, Source 7.12).

In this debate, the voices rejecting Gross’s arguments were particularly strong, and overpowered the critical ones, subscribing to the discourse of morality and responsibility, even if the latter could still be heard. A number of moves were used to discredit *Fear* (even without reading it), in order to circumvent the very need to discuss it, or present a proper response. They came not only from the defensive camp of historians or Publizists, but also from public institutions, which in the previous (left-wing) political constellation were more sympathetic to Gross’s claims. First of all, after the publication of *Fear*, IPN's historians and hierarchy strongly criticized it as unprofessional – Janusz Kurtyka, its president since 2005 went as far

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*repeated this position in an interview by Gazeta Wyborcza, sustaining that it was a pity that Gross gave such weapon to his opponents, Source 7.16)*

52 Eminent historian, Andrzej Friszke mentioned the example of the book of Anna Landau-Czajka, *W jednym stali domu... Koncepcje rozwiązania kwestii żydowskiej w publicystyce polskiej lat 1933-1939* (They lived in one house... The conceptions of resolution of the Jewish question in Polish Publizistik 1933-1939) (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Neriton, Instytut Historii PAN 1998), which to his mind was very good, but did not get much attention in the public sphere (Source 7.6).

as calling Gross a ‘vampire of historiography’ in a news emission of a popular radio station RMF FM (Source 7.22). IPN went so far as to publish a book, Po Zagładzie (After the Holocaust), written by a radical right-wing historian Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, promoting it as an alternative to Gross’s book (Source 7.7). One of the young radical IPN historians, Piotr Gontarczyk, reviewed Chodakiewicz’s book, and claimed that it was objective and analytical, in contrast to the supposed lack of knowledge and manipulation of historical facts in Gross’s work. Other renowned historians criticized Chodakowski’s book, notably two former IPN historians: Machcewicz and Dariusz Libionka, who stopped working at the Institute after the appointment of the new Director, Kurtyka, in 2005. Machcewicz criticized Chodakiewicz’s thesis that the Jews were responsible (for a number of reasons) for what happened to them, as well as his choice and use of the sources. He asked why IPN engaged money and public authority in promoting such one-sided and manipulative publication (in Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 7.15). Libionka described Gross’s work as valuable interpretative essay and used even stronger words against Chodakiewicz’s publication, calling it “ridiculous” and “mediocre,” agreeing with Machcewicz that it was shameful for IPN to promote such a propagandist approach over scientific research (Source 7.13). In another intervention, together with fellow historian of Polish-Jewish relations Bożena Szaynok, Libionka described Chodakiewicz’s book as written with an ideological thesis, “and if the facts did not comply with this thesis, then too bad for the facts.”

All in all, in the Jedwabne debate, IPN, and its historians, such as Machcewicz, were closer to the critical stance, and contributed with their research to

55 “Jeśli fakty przypadkiem do niej [tezy] nie pasują - tym gorzej dla nich.”(Source 7.27)
uncovering the dark past. However, once Kurtyka became director of IPN, the institute drifted towards the ‘affirmative’ stances of the ‘politics of history,’ promoted by the conservative government of the PiS since 2005. Many of its former historians left, and were replaced by young, radical and nationalist ones. This was clearly visible in the debate surrounding Fear, in 2008, during which IPN employees, such as Gontarczyk, were close to the defensive position.

Another interesting development followed the publication of Fear. The public prosecutor from Kraków, where Fear’s publisher Znak is based, was asked to review the accusation that the book was slanderous to the Polish nation, by imputing to it participation, organization or responsibility for Nazi crimes, such an offense being prohibited by the article 132a of the Penal Code. This article was introduced in the Penal Code by the lustration law of 18 October 2006, on top of the article 133, which already prohibited offending, disrespecting or deriding the nation or the state. The introduction of this article by the PiS government, at the request of the nationalist member of the government coalition, the LPR, was explicitly linked to Gross’s books. Furthermore, its unprecedented formulation (prohibition of accusing the nation of a crime) was broadly opposed because it could have created an obstacle to research by excluding a range of difficult historical topics from the

56 This change was in line with the wish expressed by conservative historian Andrzej Nowak in 2001 in the Jedwabne debate, when he said that the line of IPN under Leon Kieres was on the side of critical history (investigating Jedwabne) and not on the side of monumental, heroic history. Even though Nowak said that IPN should be doing ‘scientific’ history, he implied that it should reach the conclusions of monumental rather than critical history. (Source 6.27)

57 Article 132a, Penal Code: “Kto publicznie pomawia Naród Polski o udział, organizowanie lub odpowiedzialność za zbrodnie komunistyczne lub nazistowskie, podlega karze pozbawienia wolności do lat 3 (Whoever publicly imputes to the Polish nation the participation, organisation or responsibility for the communist or Nazi crimes shall be punished with imprisonment of up to three years).”

58 The type of legal provision expressed in article 133 is not novel in the Polish Penal code, and exists in other countries too, however the one proposed in 132a does not. Ireneusz Krzemiński, “Kontroversje prawne wokół przestępstwa polegającego na pomawianiu narodu o popełnienie zbrodni (Legal controversies around a crime of imputing a nation with committing a crime),” in Problemy Współczesnego Prawa Międzynarodowego, Europejskiego i Porównawczego 8 (2010), 6.

59 Gross’s book Neighbors was used as an example motivating this proposal in the parliamentary debate over this article. For that reason it can be called ‘lex Gross’. Krzemiński, “Kontroversje prawne.”
scope of scientific investigation. In the end, the case against Gross was classified without leading to prosecution, but Machcewicz qualified the very fact of launching this investigation as “a gloomy grotesque and disgrace of the Polish state.” Soon after, Janusz Kochanowski, the Ombudsman, referred the article 132a to the Constitutional Court, to assess its compatibility with the Constitution (notably with the article 54 protecting freedom of speech, and the article 73 protecting freedom of scientific research). The article 132a was deemed unconstitutional on 19 September 2008.

The most virulent and frontal attacks against Fear came from the extreme circles of nationalist Catholic Publizists and historians, and especially Jerzy Robert Nowak, who maintained that Gross’s book was “anti-Polish, and anti-Catholic” (Source 7.35). On his lecture tour of Poland, he held a number of rallies or conferences in churches (benefitting from, to say the least, implicit support of the Church’s hierarchy), during which he tried to mobilize Polish people against what he thought was a ‘Jewish attack,’ and against Gross who, in his words, was “willing to destroy real Polish patriotism” (as reported by the journalists of Gazeta Wyborcza, in Sources 7.18, 7.19).

Forecki qualified this situation, and the whole debate about Fear, as imbued with the theses of the conservative ‘politics of history’ led by the PiS, under its government between 2005 and 2007. The ‘politics of history,’ as discussed in the previous chapter, was characterized by the negation of ‘critical patriotism’ and the

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60 These opinions came both from historians and legal practitioners. Ex. Paweł Machcewicz, “Artykuł 132a godzi w swobodę badań historycznych (Article 132a impedes the freedom of historical research),” Gazeta Wyborcza, January 7, 2008.
61 “ponura groteska i kompromitacja państwa polskiego.” (Machcewicz, Source 7.16)
62 Interestingly Kochanowski was appointed as Ombudsman in 2006 by the PiS, but at times showed his ideational independence from the conservative party.
63 Request dated 15 January 2007, reference RPO-545868-II-06/ST.
64 Forecki, Od Shoah do Strachu, 420-421.
promotion instead of a patriotism affirming the national past. The impact of the ‘politics of history’ can be illustrated by a number of facts: the discussed before reconfiguration of the approach of IPN; the change of the tone of articles published in right-wing daily *Rzeczpospolita* (where the Jedwabne debate was more extensive than the one about *Fear*), linked to the emergence of a strong group of national conservative historians and *Publizists* (that Gross qualified as ‘kato-endecy (Catholic-national)’); and a general backlash of willingness to deal with problematic historical issues, despite the positive antecedents of the Jedwabne debate.

When it comes to the latest debate, following the publication of *Golden Harvest*, a handful of arguments that appeared before were used again in order to discredit or support Gross’s work. While his methodology of thick description was criticized by some for leading to too many generalizations, and his style of writing as being too emotional, and not scientific enough, he was praised by others for pushing the discussion further. Another parallel between *Golden Harvest* and *Fear* is that immediately after its publication, a complaint was lodged at the public prosecutor, this time based on article 133 of the Penal code, as the Constitutional Court had annulled article 132a in the meantime. The plaintiffs claimed that the good name of Poland was endangered by Gross’s book. Once more, however, the prosecutor did not find statements that would show the intention of accusing the whole nation of participation in Nazi crimes in Gross’s book. The prosecutor

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65 Critical connoisseurs of the topic discussed in *Golden Harvest* claimed that Gross was not a historian, because he did not uncover new facts (Source 8.33). Commentators more sympathetic to his argument, mostly on pages of centre-left *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Polityka*, said that no matter whether historian or not, or ‘historian from behind his desk,’ using mostly secondary sources (as stated by *Gazeta Wyborcza*’s deputy editor-in-chief, Jarosław Kurski, Source 8.24), Gross managed to play the social role of a *true* historian, provoking a debate about the past within the society (in the opinion of Adam Leszczyński, Source 8.25).
concluded that the book did not contain any insulting statements towards the Polish nation defined as “all citizens of Poland.”66

The crucial topic of *Golden Harvest* and of the surrounding debate was not whether the killings of Jews by Poles during the war had happened, but whether it had or had not been the social norm of that time and what this would imply (i.e. the inherent Polish anti-Semitism). Furthermore, the book focused on a new motive, bringing down yet another taboo – the question of the transfer of wealth from Jews to Poles during and after the war. The main discussion concerned the instances of killing of Jews by Poles during the war, and the appropriation of the wealth of those deported. Another theme of the book was the post-war ‘diggers’ of the collective Jewish tombs close to the concentration camps, searching for lost jewelry not retrieved by the Nazis. While many commentators tried to disprove the argument about the ‘diggers,’ allegedly inspired by a photo (Figure 4), the origins of which could not be properly corroborated,67 most of them rightly assessed that the topic of ‘cemetery hyenas’ was not the main question of the book despite of the fact that its title could have suggested otherwise. A constitutional lawyer and liberal, Wojciech Sadurski qualified the question of digging up gold from collective tombs as a matter of aesthetics, rather than ethics (Source 8.35). The polemical exchange of opinions


67 As explained by the editors of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, this photo was first used by its reporters Marcin Kowalski and Piotr Głuchowski as an illustration of their article “Gorączka złota w Treblince (Gold rush in Treblinka),” (June 4, 2008) which discussed cases of stealing from massive tombs around Treblinka. The reporters received it from Tadeusz Kiryluk, former director of *Muzeum Męczeństwa Żydów w Treblince* (the Museum of Jewish Suffering in Treblinka). Reporters of *Rzeczpospolita*, Michal Majewski and Paweł Reszka investigated this photo in two articles: “Zagadka starego zdjęcia (The riddle of an old picture),” January 21, 2011, and “Tajemnica zdjęcia z Treblinki (The mystery of the picture from Treblinka),” February 27, 2011. They presented two alternative explanations: that the photo depicted the cleaning of the grounds around the camp, after the chase after ‘diggers’ near Treblinka (which is based on a different testimony of Kiryluk than the one for GW), or that it was not necessarily taken around Treblinka and it did not picture the chase after ‘diggers’ (Source 8.19).
between Sadurski and Gontarczyk on pages of *Rzeczpospolita* was one of the strongest direct and personal polemics in this debate.

![Image](http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Złote_żniwa)

**Figure 4** The photograph of the alleged 'diggers' of Treblinka

For conservative *Publizists*, specifically from *Rzeczpospolita*, the combination of these two topics (killing of Jews and stealing from their tombs) served as an argument against the book, because they believed that Gross was putting them on the same level, in order to develop a general accusation against Poles and abolish any gradation of evil (Source 8.1). The conservatives even suggested that this book (together with its progressive Catholic publishing house *Znak*) should be boycotted, putting forward a fallacious freedom of speech argument that everyone can write a book he or she wants, and anyone else can call for boycotting such a book (*Zaremba, Rzeczpospolita*, Source 8.47). Once again, *Golden Harvest* was criticized by IPN, whose "militant historians," e.g. Gontarczyk, accused Gross of providing false information and over-interpretation of

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69 The expression ‘historien militant (activist historian)’ was coined by Georges Mink to illustrate the transformation of the nature of IPN, or at least the re-weighing of its priorities from a research institution, towards the prosecutor’s office. Georges Mink “Introduction,” in *L’Europe et ses passes douloureux*, ed. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer (Paris: La Decouverte, 2007), 21.
facts. IPN endorsed yet another book by Chodakiewicz, advertised as focusing on the matters that Gross ‘forgot’\(^{70}\) (i.e. Poles saving Jews).

Gross’s argument assumed that killing Jews was a social norm during the war, because oftentimes it was performed by people holding high social positions and prestige, and it was not performed secretly, as he explained in *Rzeczpospolita* (Source 8.15). However, many commentators, including those otherwise open to Gross’s work, like Machcewicz, were skeptical towards extrapolating such generalizations from individual examples and labeling it a social practice (Source 8.28), even in the countryside, despite the fact that society had indeed been passive or indifferent to such crimes.\(^{71}\) Machcewicz further suggested that Gross should put things in their historical context of atrophy of moral bonds (Source 8.28), and not judge them by today’s moral standards, as he allegedly did. The proponents of stronger defensive stances in this debate, such as *Rzeczpospolita*’s Zychowicz, wanted to justify these killings by something other than anti-Semitism, e.g. the expected wealth that Jews were supposed to possess (Source 8.49), yet it remains unclear how such argument would not be anti-Semitic in the first place or could constitute a valid moral justification.

The question of killing Jews as a social norm is crucial, because it fostered a discussion of generalizations that Gross was making on the basis of selected examples, by using the anthropological method called ‘thick description.’ His use of this method (alongside sources of oral history) was the object of heated polemics by the participants of the debate, such as the aforementioned back and forth between Sadurski and Gontarczyk, on pages of *Rzeczpospolita*. His hard-core conservative

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\(^{71}\) As underscored by historian Andrzej Żbikowski, in Source 8.2 and 8.43.
opponents, such as the right-wing *Publizist* Piotr Semka, also criticized him for allegedly distorting the historical reality (Source 8.37). However, as renowned historians of this period, Barbara Engelking and Jan Grabowski, rightly point out, the question of generalizations is tricky and asymmetrical (Source 8.39): it is most welcome to make positive generalizations about the wartime behavior of Poles and their help towards Jews (e.g. using the discourse of the ‘Just among nations,’ underscoring that Poles were the most numerous amid the nations whose help towards Jews during the war had been recognized by the Yad Vashem Institute), but it is perceived as utterly despicable to make negative generalizations. While Machcewicz suggested, not without reason, that Gross’s argument would benefit from being more balanced, because by being so critical it was merely a mirror image of the ‘affirmative’ stance and did not go beyond politically engaged historical account (Source 8.28), Sadurski defended Gross’s approach, implying that if one focused on the dark moments of the past, there was no obligation to mention the glorious ones too (Source 8.35).

The rejection of the argument about the social norm of killing Jews allowed the proponents of the defensive approach to maintain that only persons from the margins of society committed killings. This iteration of the defensive strategy, by putting the responsibility for the crimes on the back of the ‘mythical’ social margin, made it possible to preserve the ‘purity’ of the national community by excluding the criminals from its realm. The liberals criticized this ‘externalization of evil’ (Source 8.35).

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72 The figure of the ‘Just among nations’ is used in this context as a ‘magical’ weapon, a shield against any attempts of accusing Poles of war crimes towards the Jews. The article of Semka illustrates this typical defensive argumentation. He claims that the high number of Polish ‘Justs’ shows that Poles had passed their wartime exam (Source 8.38). Forecki calls this strategy ‘hiding behind the trees in Yad Vashem’ as for every Just the Institute plants a tree in Jerusalem (Source 8.26).
8.26), which aimed at dissociating Polishness from these crimes, anti-Semitism, and collective responsibility (Source 8.50).

In this debate, again, the alleged aims of Gross were discussed. His proponents maintained their previously voiced stance that the aim of his book was to change Polish memory.\(^\text{73}\) His opponents accused him, among other things, of a willingness to negate the Polish suffering during the war. Rzeczpospolita’s editor-in-chief, Piotr Lisicki, in his acrobatic defense of the behavior of Poles during the war, implied that “after all there is something like innocence of all victims of crimes. It is equal, solidary and undivided.”\(^\text{74}\) The conservatives rejected any option of accusing Poles of war crimes against Jews as implying the innocence of some (Jews) and diminishing the sufferings of others (Poles). To their mind, it would undermine the moral sense of the war. Another possible motive of Gross, according to his nationalist critics, was that he wanted to contribute to prospective Jewish claims for the restitution of goods.

Another set of accusations came from the most conservative Publizists, also on the pages of Rzeczpospolita, directed openly towards the proponents of the critical stance, those who believed that Gross’s work was important and could lead to a change of the society’s mind-set. According to Piotr Zaremba, only ‘leftist-liberal’ circles perceived Gross’s work as important, because they wanted Poles to be ashamed (Source 8.47). Rafał Ziemkiewicz, in turn, said that the same people who wanted to feel ashamed for the killings of Jews did not want to discuss the past

\(^\text{73}\) Brothers Filek concluded that this book shows to Poles their image from the perspective of others, e.g. Jews, in whose memory Poles strongly contributed to Holocaust. Hence, it could contribute to changing Polish memory of the war. It also showed that members of one community could be among the victims and the wrongdoers at the same time, a thing refused by many right-wing commentators (Source 8.7).

\(^\text{74}\) “Ostatecznie istnieje coś takiego jak niewinność wszystkich ofiar zbrodni. Jest ona równa, solidarna i niepodzielna.” (Source 8.27)
of their parents and their contribution to the communist regime (as an example, he invoked a famous Polish film director, Agnieszka Holland, whose father was a Stalinist for a certain period of time, before becoming a revisionist communist (Source 8.48)). Bronislaw Wildstein also frontally attacked *Gazeta Wyborcza*, and its open intellectual circle, deriding these ‘celebrities’ who tried to push for atonement over the Jews, but otherwise negated the assumption of collective responsibility with respect to responsibility for communism (Source 8.42). This argument covertly alluded to two assumptions: that children were responsible for their parents’ or even grandparents’ doings, and that Jews were responsible for communism, reviving the myth of Judeo-communism. Conservative Publizists, whose strong presence was already noticed in the debate about *Fear*, attacked Gross with barely camouflaged anti-Semitic stances in this debate.

The supporters of Gross’s arguments, namely in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, claimed that although Gross did not discover new historical facts, he uncovered a large part of the Polish war past for a broad ‘educated public’ (Leszczyński, Source 8.25) and challenged the willingness to forget about the painful past. Historian Marcin Zaremba maintained that Poles needed Gross because without him their comfort would be higher, but their intellectual life poorer (Source 8.45). And Juliusz Kurkiewicz concluded that while the debate concerning *Golden Harvest* consisted of a repetition of old arguments, leading to a rapid end of the discussion, it had a crucial value for Polish society, especially for the young generation, who thus grew gradually more used to the idea that Poles were massively indifferent or even hostile

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75 One of the notorious examples of this argument is the ‘grandfather from Wermacht’ of Donald Tusk, used against him by the conservative right in 2005 presidential elections, discussed in the previous chapter.

76 Liberal Pawel Śpiewak in his *Żydokomuna (Judeo-communism)* (Warszawa: Czerwone i Czarne, 2012) shows how after the First World War, the myth of Judeo-communism replaced other anti-Semitic clichés.
towards Jews during the war (Source 8.23). This was also the opinion of Dominika Kozłowska, the editor-in-chief of Znak (also this book’s publisher), who sustained that the debate following the publication of *Golden Harvest* was considerably different from its predecessors (Source 8.21). She believed that society was in a substantially different place during this debate than during previous ones, because despite all aforementioned controversies, no one questioned the active Polish participation in the killing of Jews anymore. She linked this change not only to previous debates about Gross’s books, but also to the earlier mentioned article of Błoński from 1987, saying that the work he had launched had finally started bearing fruit. Despite this positive appreciation, one could rather compare the debate about *Golden Harvest* to that about *Fear* than to the debate about *Neighbors*, in terms of massive domination of radically historically apologetic interventions rejecting Gross’s arguments over critical ones.

Without doubt, the breadth and the content of the three aforementioned debates allow us to conclude that dealing with the dark past in Poland is becoming part of building a revised national historical memory, but that a strong polarization of opinions on the approach to Polish history still prevails. Some even called this strand of historic research on Polish participation in killing Jews during the war, “*jedwabińska szkoła historyczna* (Jedwabne’s historical school),” in order to discredit its subject matter and achievements, equating it with the ‘politics of shame.’ On this note, the seventieth anniversary of the Jedwabne pogrom in 2011 permits us to reach only a mixed conclusion. While it was for the first time marked by the presence of a Catholic bishop, the speeches made furthered the idea of

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77 Sławomir Cenckiewicz, one of the militant historians of IPN used this expression to object inviting Gross to a panel discussion organized by IPN, about the Warsaw ghetto uprising. “Antypolonizm z kasy III RP (Anti-Polonism funded by the Third Republic),” *Historia Do Rzeczy*, July 31, 2013.
‘keeping the right proportions,’ in the words of Father Adam Boniecki, who is otherwise a representative of an open Church (Source 8.5). The conservative-liberal president in office, Bronisław Komorowski, from the PO, in his letter, read by his envoy for the occasion, the late Tadeusz Mazowiecki, took a slightly different angle from Aleksander Kwaśniewski 10 years before, when he underlined the question of keeping the right proportions:

“It took a long time before we understood that accepting the guilt does not cross out Polish martyrology and Polish heroism in the fight with German and Soviet occupiers. That it does not imply the relativism in the domain of guilt or reversing proportions in assessment of historical merits and sins.”

One thing did not change, the inhabitants of Jedwabne were still absent.

6.4 Critical patriotism – a possible Polish version of constitutional patriotism?
The debates about Polish-Jewish relations, and especially the one about Jedwabne, were important catalysts of considerations over the nature of patriotism. Before analyzing the precise arguments about patriotism that were raised in the three debates, the discussion needs to be set in the context of three influential essays published in the 1980s that provided bases for the conceptualization of ‘critical patriotism.’

6.4.1 The discussions over Polish-Jewish relations and patriotism, initiated in the 1980s
In the 1980s, a certain liberalization of the public sphere occurred and a number of important articles were published related to Polish-Jewish relations. Three significant essays, written by Jan Józef Lipski (1981), Jerzy Jedlicki and Jan Błoński (both in 1987) (Sources 6.A.1-3) discussed the collective responsibility of Poles, and their patriotism, in the context of their relationship with other nations in general and of Polish-Jewish relations in particular.

78 “Długo trwało, zanim zrozumiejszy, że przyznanie do winy nie przekreśla polskiej martyrologii i polskiego bohaterstwa w walce z niemieckim i sowieckim okupantem. Że nie oznacza relatywizacji win i wywrócenia proporcji w ocenie historycznych zasług i grzechów.” (Source 8.5)
6.4.1.1 True patriotism versus national megalomania – Jan Józef Lipski

The essay “Two fatherlands, two patriotisms” by Jan Józef Lipski, an important figure of the post-Solidarność left, was first published in the émigré Parisian Kultura, and then republished in Poland in Samizdat publications. It constituted one of the first calls for a modern re-definition of patriotism. His essay opposed two visions of the country and of the allegiance towards it. Lipski contrasted a closed, nationalist version of patriotism, based on national megalomania, to a ‘true,’ civic and liberal patriotism that for him was not only defined by the relationship towards one’s fellows, but also towards ‘others:’

“I think that chauvinism, national megalomania and xenophobia that constitutes a hatred towards everything that is foreign, i.e. national egoism, cannot be linked to the Christian obligation of love for your fellow, but patriotism can. (…) Patriotism results from love – and it should lead to love, otherwise it is an ethical deformation.”

Lipski started with this incompatibility statement, in order to contrast it with the “formula of national ‘patriotic stupidity’” that he defined as “miłość do wszystkiego co polskie (love of everything that is Polish).” For him, the idea of loving things just because they were Polish was contradictory to true patriotism, which implied respect and love for tradition, but required a critical evaluation of the past and the selection of elements of this tradition. He believed that silencing shameful elements of the past contributed to national megalomania and destroyed the national ethos. This brought him to discussing the importance of acknowledging Polish guilt for past wrongdoings, even if it were lesser than the guilt of the others. Lipski felt the need to make these recommendations, because according to him, different elements of

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79 Lipski participated in 1987 in the reactivation of PPS (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, Polish Socialist Party), which was banned by the communists in 1948, but remained active in emigration. He described himself as ‘social-democrat convinced that Christian ethics is the foundation of the European culture.’ Jan Józef Lipski, “Obrona socjalizmu (The defense of socialism),” in Pisma polityczne. Wybór (Political writings. Selection) ( Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2011).

80 “Sądzę, że szowinizm, megalomania narodowa, ksenofobia, czyli nienawiść do wszystkiego co obce, egoizm narodowy - nie dadzą się pogodzić z nakazem chrześcijańskim miłości bliźniego. Patriotyzm natomiast - daje się pogodzić. (...) Patriotyzm jest z miłości - i do miłości ma prowadzić; wszelka inna jego forma jest deformacją etyczną.” (Source 6.A.1)
‘national megalomania’ could be found in Poland, namely in the Romantic heritage of Polish messianism (the feeling of superiority from the simple fact of being Polish, combined with religious exultation). The critical approach was crucial for his argument, because it promoted the development of patriotism based on moral values against the development of national megalomania and xenophobia. Such an approach to patriotism can be likened to the philosophical stance of ethical patriotism, discussed before, underscoring the necessity of uncovering past wrongdoings and responding to them.

6.4.1.2 ‘Pride for shame’ – a liberal argument for accepting collective responsibility and the possibility of separating pride from shame – Jerzy Jedlicki

Jerzy Jedlicki is an important Polish intellectual who from revisionist Marxist positions evolved towards more liberal stances. In his article, published in 1987 in the newly legalized Res Publica (the publication had existed since 1979 as underground press), Jedlicki dealt more extensively with the question of collective responsibility and whether human communities could be held responsible for the deeds of their ancestors. He also discussed whether pride and shame could be separated, in other words, whether it was possible to reject collective responsibility for the past wrongdoings, while keeping pride in the successes of one’s ancestors intact.

Jedlicki came to the conclusion that pride could theoretically be dissociated from shame, but such a dissociation would imply a peculiar ‘choice of tradition.’ This ‘choice’ would not constitute a critical re-evaluation of the past, but rather a manipulation (silencing) of some parts of history with a specific political purpose, often activated as a defense against criticism. He quoted anti-Semitism as one such silenced question, and concluded that

81 Primoratz, “Patriotism.”
"The Polish intelligentsia, historians included, has been organically incapable to deal with the problem of massive anti-Semitism in Poland in the 19th and 20th centuries."\(^{82}\)

He also challenged the (defensive) assumption that anti-Semitism was only present on the margins of the population, and never infiltrated the ‘healthy core’ of the nation.

Jedlicki depicted Germany as an example of successful recognition of the collective responsibility of a nation, because it was also the case of those who were in no sense responsible for what happened under the Nazi regime, or were even persecuted during these times. This led him to discuss the question of the re-emergence of German patriotism in the mid-1980s. He referred to a meeting in Aschaffenburg in May 1986, during which German intellectuals reflected whether it was possible to be a German patriot after Auschwitz ("Patriotismus nach Auschwitz?")

\(^{83}\) to which the most common answer was that

\[\text{“(…)}\] the attachment to one’s fatherland implied not only the pride in its historical and cultural accomplishments, but also the shame for its crimes.\(^ {83}\)\]

Jedlicki suggested that the process of critical re-evaluation of heritage should begin in Poland and that the responsibility for the difficult past should start being accepted.\(^ {84}\) He concluded by saying that an affirmative approach to the past could sometimes be profitable for the collective morale of the community, but never for its further development, for which a sound knowledge of history was needed.

**6.4.1.3 Indifference as guilt in the Polish-Jewish war relations – Jan Błoński**

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, Jan Błoński initiated the process of ‘unlying’ Polish-Jewish relations in 1987 with his essay “Poor Poles look at the

\(^{82}\) "Polska inteligencja, historyków nie wyłączając, zdaje się od lat organicznie niezdolna do uporania się z problemem masowego antysemityzmu w Polsce XIX i XX wieku (...)" (Source 6.A.3)

\(^{83}\) "(…) przywiązanie do ojczyzny implikuje nie tylko dumę z jej historycznych i kulturalnych osiągnięć, ale także wstyd za dokonane zbrodnie.” (Source 6.A.3)

\(^{84}\) Public acceptance of national self-criticism seems to be a *sine qua non* condition to launch the process of uncovering the dark past and incorporating it into the collective memory. Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, *Frames of remembrance*, (New Brunswick and London, 1994).
Ghetto,” published in Tygodnik Powszechny: it started in a Catholic publication, by a Catholic writer. His essay was dedicated to Polish-Jewish relations. It started from the reflection over the words of Polish poet Czesław Miłosz, who advocated a purification of the Polish land, tarnished by blood, to be performed by Polish poetry. According to Błoński, Miłosz referred to the Holocaust, which happened on Polish land, even if the Poles did not instigate it. The national memory should be cleansed, but the genocide must be remembered, because a community is built thanks to the remembrance of the past. Błoński continued his argument with a reference to two significant poems of Miłosz: “Campo di Fiori,” discussing the behavior of the Poles towards the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943, and “Biedny chrześcijanin patrzy na getto (Poor Christian looks at the ghetto),” concerning the question of fear. He distinguished between four types of fear: fear of death and fear of guilt, respective corresponding to fear of the fate of the Jews, and fear of being condemned for what happened to them (or at least for being indifferent to it). He criticized the fact that the Poles rejected this reflection, in the name of their ‘good name,’ because they wanted to be beyond of the scope of condemnation.

Błoński implied that there was a need to understand both the guilt and people’s avoidance of it. He argued that Poles had to confront the ‘sin of indifference’ and stop justifying their passive behavior by the wartime context. They needed to say: “yes, we are guilty” and beg for forgiveness. He also discussed the difference between complicity in crime and sharing the guilt for it. One can be guilty

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85 The title of Błoński’s essay “Poor Poles look at the Ghetto” toys with the title of Miłosz’ poem. This powerful motive was often used in the aforementioned debates: Dominika Wielowieyska, “Biedny Polak patrzy na obcych (Poor Pole looks at aliens),” interview with Ireneusz Krzemiński, Gazeta Wyborcza, May 25, 2009; Adam Boniecki and Michał Okoński, “Biedny chrześcijanin patrzy na Jedwabne (Poor Christian looks at Jedwabne),” interview with archbishop Henryk Muszyński, Tygodnik Powszechny, March 23, 2010; Marcin Zaremba, “Biedni Polacy na żniwach (Poor Poles on harvest),” Gazeta Wyborcza, January 17, 2011; Piotr Semka, “Biedny Polak patrzy na Grossa (Poor Pole looks at Gross),” Rzeczpospolita, January 25, 2011.
of not doing enough to stop the crime, for instance. And for this reason, there is an obligation of cleansing.

The three texts of Lipski, Jedlicki and Błoński were the first ones to comprehensively and critically discuss the approach of the Poles towards their past and their relationship with the neighboring nations. They were invoked in the Jedwabne debate, as intellectual inspiration\(^{86}\) for Gross’s approach, deemed overly critical by his opponents. Later on, the conservative intellectuals labeled this approach ‘critical patriotism,’\(^{87}\) and debated it as part of the frame of their ‘politics of history’.

6.4.2  ‘Critical patriotism’ – from the 1980s to Jedwabne

The ideas of Lipski, Jedlicki and Błoński, were those of the ‘critical camp’ in the debate about Jedwabne in that they were all open to uncovering difficult truths concerning Polish-Jewish relations and to confronting anti-Semitism. These three authors paved the way for the ‘discourse of morality’\(^{88}\) and the acceptance of the collective responsibility for the crime. The question of accepting collective responsibility raised by Gross in Neighbours can be linked to Jedlicki’s ‘pride for shame’ argument and his suggestion to avoid strategies of denial or contextual justification of war crimes. Machcewicz, among others, subscribed to Jedlicki’s ethical theses, underscoring that

> “if we wanted to participate in the national community, and in the pride of what is praiseworthy, we also have to remember the crimes committed by our fellows, even if it was an act of those in the margins (...) We have to remember, commemorate the victims, and explain the circumstances of the crime.”\(^{89}\)

\(^{86}\) Gross critically discussed the articles of Błoński, and Lipski, e.g. in “A tangled web,” 75-80.
\(^{87}\) Gawin, “Krytyczny patriotyzm.”
\(^{88}\) Forecki, Spór o Jedwabne, 29.
\(^{89}\) “Jeśli chcemy uczestniczyć w narodowej wspólnocie, dumie z tego co chwalebne, to musimy także pamiętać o zbrodniach popełnionych przez rodaków, nawet jeśli to był margines (...) pamiętać, oddać hołd ofiarom, wyjaśnić okoliczności”. Paweł Machcewicz, Wokół Jedwabnego, 17.
The proponents of the critical stance rejected an affirmative approach to history, which was described by Lipski as impeding the improvement of the community.

The question of accepting responsibility (or not) for the dark past, discussed in the debate about Jedwabne touched upon the question what a patriot should do: whether he should adopt a critical approach or an affirmative approach to Polish history. The ethical, critical approach advocated “accepting the dark side of the national past [as] a sign of collective maturity and moral duty,”90 to study the past critically and learn the lesson by “being a patriot of the country, not of the assassins.”91 The ‘affirmative’ approach to history focused on the defense of the good name of the nation, and refused to acknowledge the crime.

The debate about Jedwabne paved the way for an (easier) acceptance of white spots of Polish history, and for a discussion of topics that had long been taboo in the public discourse. This debate also opened the way for patriotism of the old type (based on Romanticism and an ‘affirmative’ approach to history) to disappear.92 In this respect, even Zdzisław Krasnodębski (one of the most prominent conservative intellectuals) concluded that Jedwabne marked the end of a certain vision of ‘Polishness’ (polskość) and of the fatherland.93 This conclusion was surprisingly close to the liberal one voiced by Marcin Król in a debate organized by Res Publica Nowa in 2001, with participation of Paweł Śpiewak and Marek Zaleski (Source 6.1). These liberal authors voiced a criticism of the affirmative approach, and underscored the fact that an important part of the elites, particularly religious ones, was skeptical of revising their thinking. They presented a clear, strong and

91 Bikont, My z Jedwabnego, 248.
93 This opinion comes from his intervention in the debate following the exhibition “Heroes of our liberty” that was analyzed in the previous chapter (Source 4.12).
coherent case for liberalism, pluralism and for the eradication of any traces of ethno-nationalism and anti-Semitism. Furthermore, Król predicated that any community that wanted to invoke its ‘Polishness’ or consider itself as constituting a ‘fatherland’ after Jedwabne would need to be built almost completely anew.

However, relatively quickly, the ‘window of opportunity’ for open discussion closed. The opposition between the critical and defensive approaches became particularly acute. In this context, the conservative intellectuals conceptualized the idea of ‘critical patriotism,’ to give a catchy, yet derogatory, name to the liberal proponents of the ethical and critical approach. In the eyes of conservative intellectuals ‘critical patriotism’ was characterized by a “revisionist approach to Polish history,” because it promoted a critical re-evaluation of the past. While, interestingly, Lipski, Jedlicki and Błoński were not denied the label of patriotism altogether, they were accused of being too critical towards Polish national history. These three authors were accused by conservative philosophers of continuing the tradition of ‘myth destroyers,’ taking after 19th century writer Stefan Żeromski (who was indeed mentioned in Lipski’s article). The label ‘critical patriotism’ was presented as a counter-concept of the ‘affirmative’ approach to the past and history. Interestingly, the conservatives promoted it almost 20 years after

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96 Gawin, “Krytyczny patriotyzm.”
97 Moreover the tradition of critical approach to one’s history had strong antecedents in the conservative 19th century Kraków’s historical school, *Krakowska szkoła historyczna*, with Józef Szujski and Michał Bobrzyński. (Kurski, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Source 5.58).
98 The concept of critical patriotism was developed to discuss different approaches to discovering dark pages of Polish history. However, at other occasions, it was also used to discuss literary canon. In a special edition of *Dekada Literacka*, “Szkoła krytycznego patriotyzmu (School of critical patriotism)” (6 (220) 2006), a number of articles analyzed works of a few, selected, writers: Witkacy, Andrzej Bobkowski, Czesław Miłosz and Witold Gombrowicz. A number of articles followed the line of the book of the promoter of ‘critical patriotism,’ Dariusz Gawin, *Polska, wieczny romans (Poland endless romance)* (Warszawa: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 2005). They tested the literary canon for its appropriateness to political ideas, and wanted to build anew the ethos of Polish literature, by recovering the deconstructed myths from ‘leftist critics.’ Others promoted the radical approach of Gombrowicz, who proposed the concept of *synczyzna*, son-land to replace *ojczyzna*, father-land, and discussed its usefulness in the search of a new formula of patriotism.
the publication of these three texts, whose authors never claimed to be ‘critical patriots.’ The intention behind coining this label was to discredit anyone daring to question national myths and traditions.

Dariusz Gawin first theorized the concept of ‘critical patriotism’ in 2005, when he critically discussed all three texts by Lipski, Jedlicki and Błoński.\textsuperscript{99} While he conceded that the approach they promoted could contribute to civic behavior, he suggested that it was not adapted to the actual political reality, or to international relations. In his particularly critical discussion of Lipski’s thesis, he criticized him for promoting an excessively skeptical approach towards national symbols and their usages. The main axis of criticism towards Lipski’s approach, however, was aimed at his discussion of patriotism. According to Gawin, it mixed virtues coming from different orders: Christian caritas, which is the imperative of loving the other, with patriotism, which belongs to the political realm. In consequence, Gawin suggested that Lipski’s approach to patriotism would lead to political naïveté, because in politics it is impossible to love the other unconditionally, as countries participate in an international game of power, played according to the national interests. Gawin also criticized the construction of the ‘pride for shame’ argument concerning the collective responsibility. To his mind, it resulted from the fact that the liberals (i.e. Jedlicki) strove to link both pride and shame to accepting a moral responsibility for the past, because only in this way they were able to accept the community, and the nation. In consequence, to Gawin’s mind, the ‘patriotism of painful introspection’ would lead to the supremacy of ethics, making it impossible to use the category of national interest in politics. He characterized this approach as both humble (in recognizing one’s wrongdoings) and arrogant (because ethical unilateralism would

\textsuperscript{99} Gawin, “Krytyczny patriotyzm.”
prompt the belief that one’s will can not only transform one’s own community, but also others) at the same time, yet also naïve. The final objection he presented to such a critical ethical approach was that it would enable a de-contextualization of historical events from a cause-consequence chain, thus allowing other nations to impose their reading of history on others who did not lead a sufficiently strong politics of history. In his view, the ethical approach promoting the critical introspection had a damaging impact on the national community:

“The community of sure things was supposed to be transformed into a community of doubt and hesitations; the community of pride into a community of shame. The demythologization and the criticism of national tradition and memory were performed so vehemently and efficiently that not much is left of the old model of the collective identity of Poles.”

In a way, by promoting the label and the specific reading of ‘critical patriotism,’ the conservative intellectuals demonstrated that their understanding of patriotism could not embrace the critical ethical approach to one’s community. The opposition between ‘critical patriotism’ and ‘affirmative patriotism’ that they conceptualized allowed them to evade the debate about ‘dark’ moments of the Polish past. They relegated this dark past to the camp of ‘critical patriots,’ which they considered to be marginal, and whom they accused of wanting to destroy (odbrązować) Polish history, its symbols and its heroes. Any critical patriotism must, in their view be ‘moderate’ (according to historian Wojciech Roszkowski, renowned author of school textbooks, close to the conservative camp, Source 7.23), though they failed to specify what this moderation should consist of.

The ‘politics of history’ of the PiS, discussed in the previous chapter, promoted in the mid-2000s an affirmative approach towards Polish history and
rejected its nemesis, the critical approach. One of the strongest impulses for the very conceptualization of ‘politics of history’ was the discussion about Jedwabne that allegedly unbalanced what the conservatives called the ‘right’ proportions, focusing more on Polish wrongdoings than successes. Marek A. Cichocki, in one of his programmatic articles about the ‘comeback of history,’ published in Rzeczpospolita (Source 5.2), referred to Jedlicki’s ‘pride for shame’ argument, but in a reversed way. He tried to turn the axis of criticism against the liberals, implying that they rejected the collective memory during the democratic transition. From there he deduced that if there was no collective memory, then there could be no collective feeling of shame. Hence, to his mind, if one wanted people to accept the shame argument, then the pride argument had to precede it.

6.4.3 Is critical patriotism a Polish version of constitutional patriotism?
Clearly, the conceptualization of ‘critical patriotism’ by its conservative opponents was not a profound contribution to the debate about patriotism. Nothing comparable to the German debate about the sense of patriotism and on the proper object of allegiance took place in Poland. Both of these conceptualizations of patriotism, ‘constitutional’ and ‘critical,’ emerged in the context of a discussion of collective responsibility for the war crimes against the Jews, but the answers to the question whether traditional patriotism was possible after Auschwitz and after Jedwabne varied considerably.

In the German case, the intellectuals conceptualized the idea of constitutional patriotism, among other reasons, because many believed that a new source of (national) pride and allegiance had to be found. Jürgen Habermas expressed it acutely, saying that: “the only form of patriotism that does not exclude us [Germans]
from the West is constitutional patriotism.” Constitutional patriotism, which remains an object of vivid academic discussion, explored ways of going beyond traditional patriotism, by establishing the liberal-democratic regime or the constitutional order as the object of people’s allegiance.

In Poland, in the context of discussing Polish-Jewish war relations following the Jedwabne debate, references to constitutional patriotism were often patronizing, even when made by those close to the critical position, who actually accepted Gross’s arguments about the need of rediscovering the dark past. Historian and political scientist Anna Wolff-Powęska, an eminent expert of Polish-German relations, for instance, called constitutional patriotism a ‘prosthesis of patriotism,’ i.e. a meager substitute for a national form of patriotism. She implied that patriotism needed to be grounded in (pride of) history, because if it was not, then it was an Ersatz, unable to inspire political solidarity and the feeling of belonging. The uncovering of the Jedwabne pogrom, even if widely discussed, pushed the conservatives to coin the concept of ‘critical patriotism,’ giving it an openly negative connotation, and counter it with what they labeled an ‘affirmative approach.’ Other camps adopted the label ‘critical patriotism’ conceptualized by the conservatives. However, in this acceptation, ‘critical patriotism’ did not seek to replace traditional patriotism (apart from maybe for the most fervent proponents of the critical approach), but rather to be its complement, allowing the integration of negative elements to collective memory and identity. Thus, critical patriotism cannot be perceived as close to constitutional patriotism when it comes to finding a new

102 Wolff-Powęska, Pamięć, brzemię i uwolnienie, 305.
object of allegiance. Critical patriotism can rather be likened to ethical patriotism, which calls for a close moral scrutiny of one’s community.

6.4.4 The relabeling of critical patriotism into mature patriotism – further commitment to uncovering the dark past

The debate about Jedwabne was a broad and important discussion. It was a first step towards recovering the dark past and including it into national collective memory and identity. It also fostered a reflection over the nature of patriotism. The defensive conservative camp reacted to the process of uncovering the dark past by coining the label of ‘critical patriotism,’ trying to reject an allegedly too critical approach towards the national past. The impact of this concept, countered with an ‘affirmative patriotism’ (as explained in the previous chapter) within the conservative ‘politics of history,’ resulted in a backlash of discussion in the subsequent debates, following the publication of Fear and Golden Harvest. Within these debates the representatives of the defensive camp (critical to Gross) overpowered the critical camp. They focused on undermining the thesis of collective responsibility and the ethical approach, and on the rejection of the facts and interpretations put forward by Gross.

The contestation over the concept of patriotism, after the publication of Fear, and of Golden Harvest, continued mostly among Gross’s supporters from the ‘critical’ camp, challenging further the ‘obsession of innocence’ of the conservative camp. Adam Michnik, former intellectual dissident and editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, engaged in the controversy around Gross’s academic credentials in a discussion about Fear organized by Znak, the book’s publisher. Michnik supported Gross by saying that Fear was a book written by a Polish historian and patriot, going beyond patriotic-national-Catholic political correctness, in order to construct a better Poland without hatred (Source 7.2).
Adam Szostkiewicz, in his article published in *Polityka* with a significant title “*Gross egzorcysta* (Gross, the exorcist),” agreed that “Gross continued the great Polish tradition of ‘opening the wounds’ so that they did not scar without healing.” Szostkiewicz also challenged the accusation voiced by the extremist and nationalist circles that Gross lacked patriotism, or that he attacked Poland and the Church. Szostkiewicz, a liberal Catholic *Publizist* contributing to *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Polityka*, defended Gross’s critical ‘vision of patriotism,’ in a liberal vein:

"[Gross’s] patriotism, self-critical to the point of pain and exaggeration, has the same right to be expressed in Poland as other forms of patriotism. For the moment it is in the minority, but in 10-20 years we will see what approach to our modern history will gain society’s approval."

The proponents of the ‘critical’ stance recognized being in the minority. However, the publications where they voiced their views, such as *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Polityka* maintained their open editorial line, and commitment to critical stance and open discussion about patriotism. Interestingly, even if their ‘critical patriotism’ departed conceptually from traditional patriotism rooted in (unconditional) pride in one’s history, it remained defined as yet another kind of approach to national history, just a self-critical one.

In the debate that followed *Golden Harvest*, the proponents of the critical stance, recruiting from the same liberal and left-wing circles, insisted on the impact that Gross’s books and the follow-up debates had on the concept of patriotism. They re-labeled ‘critical’ patriotism as ‘mature’ patriotism. Dominika Kozłowska, the editor-in-chief of *Znak*, *Golden Harvest’s* publisher, underscored that only mature

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103 "Gross wpisuje się w wielką i ważną polską tradycję “rozdrapywania ran, aby nie zabliźniły się błoną podłości.” (Source 7.29)

104 "Lecz autokrytyczny, czasem do bólu i przesady, patriotyzm ma w Polsce takie samo prawo obywatelstwa jak inne patriotyczny. Na razie patriotyzm Grossa może się okazać mniejszościowy, ale dopiero za 10–20 lat przekonamy się, jakie podejście do naszej historii najnowszej ostatecznie zaskarbi sobie uznanie społeczeństwa.” (Source 7.29)
societies could deal with the uncovering of taboo topics through processes of open deliberation (Source 8.21). Jarosław Kurski, deputy editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, suggested that Gross taught Poles mature patriotism by arguing for the recognition of the duty of shame for dark moments of the past, and learning from them (Source 8.24). Kurski explained that

“mature patriotism consists of the right to be proud of the [community’s] achievements, inextricably linked to the obligation of shame for the disgrace that we have done.”

It is also interesting to note that this expression - ‘mature patriotism’ was the title of the section where Gazeta Wyborcza published all its articles concerning Golden Harvest. However, observing the semantic field of ‘mature patriotism,’ which continued to be defined with respect to the ‘pride for shame’ argument, it seems safe to conclude that it did not constitute a new conception of patriotism, but rather a relabeling of ‘critical patriotism.’ The use of the qualifier ‘mature’ to describe this approach implied a process of critical reflection, and insisted on a cumulative effect of debates over the uncovering of the dark past for the broader public, resulting in extending the scope of debate and of acceptable topics. The proponents of mature patriotism from Gazeta Wyborcza such as liberal sociologist Katarzyna Wigura linked its importance to the question of understanding one’s responsibility, and the fact that even if the Polish guilt towards Jews were lesser than the Nazi one, this would not absolve it completely (Source 8.41).

The open deliberation during the Jedwabne debate might have suggested the possibility that a critical approach to history would eventually replace the ‘affirmative’ one. However, from a diachronic perspective, the insights from two follow-up debates about Fear and Golden Harvest disprove this optimistic

105 “Dojrzały patriotyzm jest prawem do dumy z dokonań, ale nierazewalnie zespłonym z obowiązkiem wstydu za hańbę, jakiej się dopuściśmy.” (Source 8.24)
suggestion. Rather, after 2005, the Catholic-national *Publizists*, supported by a fraction of historians, seemed to use successful strategies to discredit Gross’s books, which made debates about them shorter, less content-based, and more polemical. In this essentially Polish-Polish quarrel, a strong polarization of opinions was again visible between those who accepted the moral challenge, and those who rejected critical theses. The latter proponents of the defensive approach tried to frame the conflict as a Polish-Jewish quarrel, in order to exclude those who accepted the critical approach from the realm of Polishness, often in a scarcely camouflaged anti-Semitic stance. As a result, the ethical ‘discourse of morality,’ and the acceptance of collective responsibility for past crimes, became largely limited to the pages of center and left-wing leaning publications.

All in all, the critical position did not disappear completely and its proponents re-labeled it as ‘mature.’ This act of conceptual relabeling did not promote a substantial morphological change in the nature of the concept, or its redirection towards constitutional positions. It rather testified to a willingness to present critical patriotism in a positive light without changing its essence, still very much rooted in national history, but accepting its dark pages. In sum, this conception of patriotism, even if close to the ethical position, did not challenge the *status quo* on the object of patriotism allegiance. Furthermore, because of the establishment of a coherent conservative intellectual framework that had a strong influence on public policies during the government of the PiS (2005-2007), focusing on an affirmative approach and maintaining the ‘right proportions,’ but also later, due to the consolidation of circles of conservative *Publizists* and historians, the critical approach struggles to become a powerful counter-concept in its own right.
7 Chapter Seven - The divisive effect of Romantic patriotism, resurgent during the national mourning following the Smolensk crash in 2010

The two previous chapters have shown the progressive polarization of the public discourse after 2000. This polarization stemmed from the emergence of a strong circle of conservative intellectuals, and its gradual involvement in politics. The conservative intellectuals provided the conservative party PiS with a conceptual framework, which proved instrumental for a PiS victory in the legislative elections in 2005. The polarization and radicalization of the discourse were reinforced by the emergence of a circle of right-wing Publicists, as well as the right-wing turn of public institutions such as the IPN after 2005. However, previous chapters have also epitomized the continuous vivacity of discussions about the concept of patriotism, and numerous attempts at proposing a new, or modern, vision of this concept.

This final empirical chapter focuses on the aftermath of the catastrophe of the presidential aircraft in 2010, near Smolensk, flying to Russia for the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre. This traumatic moment for the community will be used as a litmus test to verify whether earlier intellectual developments concerning patriotism provided a lasting cultural code and intellectual tools to deal with the national mourning.

Within the discussion of this last ‘discursive event,’ a number of topics will be singled out, in order to better assess whether the nature of the contestation over patriotism changed in this key moment. I will argue that despite a strong discourse about unity in the beginning of the national mourning, this unity dissolved quite quickly, following the decision to bury the presidential couple at Wawel Royal Castle
in Kraków. Even if the subsequent presidential campaign contributed to the appearances of reconciliation of opposed ideological positions, signs of a strong polarization of the discourse (the emergence of which precedes the crash, dating back to the mid-2000s as explained above) can already be observed at that time, within the resurgence of the Romantic language and its impact on key political concepts, such as patriotism.

I will discuss how the motive of ‘two Polands’ becomes a master-narrative, and reveals a deep cleavage between intellectual positions within the culture wars. The conclusions will illustrate that the previous intellectual attempts to go beyond the Romantic templates and propose a new definition of patriotism focused on civic virtues, lost their influence over the public discourse in the wake of this event. Moreover, the polarization of the political and public sphere and discourse of the second decade of transition grew stronger than ever after the Smolensk catastrophe. Nevertheless, it will also be shown that the dichotomy epitomized by the motive of ‘two Polands’ is reductionist, because beyond the two broad political languages: conservative and liberal, an ever stronger presence of a leftist language can be noted. Thus, the discursive domination that the conservatives manage to attain might not be permanent, as competing discourses and readings of the key concepts are still present in the Polish intellectual field.

7.1 The Smolensk crash in 2010
On 10 April 2010, an aircraft carrying the Polish President Lech Kaczyński, his spouse and 94 other political and military dignitaries and staff to the 70th anniversary
of the Katyn massacre of Polish officers in 1940,\(^1\) crashed nearby Smolensk, in Russia, killing everybody on board.

The public debate in the aftermath of the catastrophe had a number of episodes. The immediate reactions included shock and unanimous commemoration of the deceased officials. The nine-day period of national mourning (10-18 April) was marked by considerations about the spontaneous unity of the people. However, this unity was broken shortly after by the decision to bury the presidential couple in the crypt of the Royal Castle Wawel in Kraków. After the burial, the media devoted much attention to the electoral campaign that needed to be organised to replace the deceased president, and to its unexpectedly conciliatory nature. Some attempts at discussing the heritage of Lech Kaczyński were undertaken, and many commentators expected that the polarizing idea of a Fourth Republic (cf. Chapter 5) would be one of the key elements of the campaign - but it was not. This situation was partly due to a temporary metamorphosis of Jarosław Kaczyński, the deceased president’s twin and head of the PiS, in the campaign. Instead of his usual polarizing self Jarosław Kaczyński held unexpectedly appeasing discourse, calling for unity and compromise, and did not use the catastrophe and the death of his brother as a political weapon for electoral purposes.\(^2\)

\(^1\) In the beginning of April of 1940, NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) executed around 21000 of Polish prisoners of war, including more than 10000 officers of the Polish army captured after 17 September 1939. NKVD acted upon a secret order from the Politburo, adopted on 5 March 1940. The victims were buried in common graves in the forests surrounding Katyn, Kharkov, and Mednoe. After the discovery of the graves by Wehrmacht in 1943, the communists accused the German army of the crimes. This version of the facts had been promoted by the communists both in Poland and USSR until 1990. It is known under the name of the ‘Katyn lie,’ and the fight for the truth about Katyn was important for the dissidents. In 1990, USSR recognized that Katyn massacre was a Stalinist crime. Until today, however, many details of the massacre had not been fully researched, contributing to the perception that Russia continues to conceal the ‘truth’ about the massacre.

\(^2\) He later attributed his loss to the composed behavior he presented in the campaign, which was partly due to the communication strategy of the campaign, ‘softening’ his image, and partly to the pills he was taking to keep calm. Andrzej Stankiewicz, Piotr Śmiłowicz, “Jarosław Kaczyński: Chcę być premierem (Jarosław Kaczyński: I want to be Prime Minister),” Interview with Jarosław Kaczyński,
This analysis focuses on the way in which the tragic death of Lech Kaczyński and the subsequent national mourning were depicted in the public discourse, scrutinizing considerations about key political concepts, such as community, national identity and patriotism. By showing the processes leading to, and the mechanisms of, discourse radicalization and polarization I will analyze how patriotism was depicted in the wake of such a national ordeal and who tried to define the standards of patriotic behavior.

The analysis below starts by presenting the public debate in the direct aftermath of the catastrophe and its major shift, the controversy surrounding the Wawel decision (Section 7.2). It focuses on the period from the day of the plane crash, 10 April 2010, until the anticipated presidential elections of the successor to Lech Kaczyński held on 20 June (first round) and 4 July (second round). A chronological presentation is chosen in order to capture the evolving dynamics of the debate. Then, the analysis continues with a thematic discussion of the resurgence of the Romantic discourse in the public sphere (Section 7.3) and its impact on (de- and re-) construction of the concept of patriotism, with respect to previous debates on this concept throughout democratic transition (Section 7.4). Finally, it addresses the question of an increasing and subsistent discursive polarization (Section 7.5).

Newsweek, September 27, 2010. Furthermore, in the autumn 2010, Kaczyński excluded Joanna Kluzik-Rostowska, the head of his electoral campaign, and her close collaborators from the party.

According to Article 128 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997, the Marshal of the Lower chamber of Parliament, the Sejm, announces the date of the presidential election. In the case of a vacancy in the post of the President of Republic, provoked, for example by the death of the President in office, the date of the new presidential elections must be announced no later than 14 days after the office became vacant, and the elections must be held no later than 60 days after this announcement. According to the Article 131.2, in case of the death of the President, the Marshal of the Sejm assumes the duties of the President in the interim, until the election of the new President. The post-catastrophe situation was doubly problematic. Firstly, the deceased president was candidate for his re-election, due later in 2010, thus the PIS had to find a replacement. The Chairman of the party, twin-brother of Lech, Jarosław became the PIS’ candidate. Secondly, the Marshal of the Sejm who assumed the interim duties, Bronisław Komorowski, was the candidate of PO, thus it made his campaign more sensitive.
7.2 “The death united us, the burial divided us” – ephemeral national unity in the national mourning

A nine-day period of national mourning followed the crash. During this time, public discourse was first focused on the question of unity of the Polish people in the wake of the tragedy, but the decision to bury the deceased president at the Wawel Royal Castle, taken by Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz, led to a quasi-immediate dissolution of this unity. The important role played by the Catholic Church during the period of national mourning will thus be analyzed.

7.2.1 The nature of the national mourning

The public discourse during the first days of national mourning was dominated by the shock after the crash. The mourning period was supposed to be a moment of silent reflection and commemoration of all deceased officials as their remnants were successively repatriated and buried. Silent it was, because most cultural events were cancelled and cinemas and theatres were closed. Newspapers and their Internet websites also replaced their usual colors with different shades of grey, reduced their entertainment sections and dedicated their news sections entirely to the catastrophe (e.g. Gazeta Wyborcza, www.gazeta.pl, see Figure 5). Most TV channels also devoted a large share of their broadcasting time to the catastrophe and its investigation, and to commemorative eulogies of its victims. The commemoration of the deceased president marked a significant change, as before his death he was not very popular (his presidency had been assessed negatively by three fifths of the population ever since mid-2008), yet after the crash he was depicted as a great statesman.

Media attention was so much focused on the catastrophe that other news were almost not covered; for that reason, after the national mourning period, Agnieszka

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Zagner wrote an article in *Polityka* about what had been happening in the world while Poland was mourning (Source 9.78). No wonder one could go so far as to call this instance of national mourning an unprecedented “reality show” (Czapliński, in liberal *Przegląd Polityczny*, giving it an uncalled for negative overtone, Source 9.122).

‘National mourning’ is a relatively new concept, coined only in the 19th century, in the context of national uprisings against the partitioning powers. The Poles accepted it smoothly because – as it has been assumed in both center and left-wing press – they liked big gestures and symbols (Maj, *Wprost*, Source 9.163) or they even had a particular fondness for mourning (Zięba, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Source 9.18). The mourning period was described as a time when people became aware of the things that united them (Szacki, interviewed in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Source 9.152).

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6 In 1860, the 30th anniversary of the November uprising of 1830 provoked a number of patriotic manifestations in the Kingdom of Poland, ruled by tsarist Russia. The death of a number of participants of these manifestations led the Catholic Church to declare a period of national mourning, which continued throughout the January uprising (1863-64), and after its failure. The subsequent tough repression pushed many women to dress in black and wear patriotic jewelry. The tsarist government tried to ban the use of these symbols, but without success. Finally, the partial amnesty of 1866 led the underground Polish government to end the mourning.
or when they tried to ‘manage their fear’ together (Pawlicka, Wprost, Source 9.169). This latter possibility implied that in moments when people feel fear, or uncertainty about the political situation, they return to basic values such as patriotism, liberty, or solidarity, and to conservative and national feelings. Hence, in this light one can better understand a strong revival of the Romantic language with its melodramatic and martyrological features (Chwin, interviewed in Przegląd Polityczny, Source 9.125).

7.2.2 The (initial) community in the mourning
From the very beginning of the national mourning, the accent was put on the unity of the people. Poles en masse paid tribute to the deceased president. Their gathering was often called a ‘crowd’ in the media. Such a term seems pejorative, but it emphasizes the large number of those involved. While many Publizists spoke of a crowd, they were not sure whether there were one or more crowds (Erbel, Krytyka Polityczna, Source 9.57, Michalski, Wprost, Source 9.166) and what the nature of the crowd(s) was. A general feeling was that these gatherings were an expression of civic activity, a moment when otherwise often passive citizens became actors in public life (Florek-Moskal, Wprost, Source 9.164) and formed ‘patriotic groups’ (Miecik, Newsweek, Source 9.75), or a prototype of a (long-awaited) civil society. Right-wing commentators in particular tried to imbue this crowd with specific significance. Tomasz Terlikowski (Gość Niedzielny, Source 9.49) even claimed that this crowd could change Poland, and compared it to the crying and praying crowd that gave birth to the Solidarity movement.

The unity in mourning was analyzed from different angles, notably as the construction of a community, or a union of either the nation or society, with the state. The distinction between these two concepts, society and nation, recurrent throughout
the post-transition debates about patriotism as we have seen, was again important at this point. Their different implications and use can be interpreted as a positioning tool. The preference for society is often linked to (civic) patriotism, while the reference to the nation, most often conceptualized with reference to culture and history, is linked to ‘thicker’ patriotism (in line with the communitarian tradition proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre, cf. Chapter 3) or outright nationalism. With respect to the nature of the community during the mourning period, Marek Cichocki and Dariusz Karłowicz, conservative supporters of the deceased President, who kept guard over the coffins of the presidential couple when people came to pay their respects, concluded that those paying homage to the President were representatives of the nation (Source 9.192). This statement is consistent with their earlier, communitarian positions throughout the 2000s. Conservative interpretation of the mourning described it as a time when the society could consider itself a nation, and implied that the catastrophe would finally lead to the decisive break with the communist heritage that did not happen in 1989 (Kostro, Rzeczpospolita, Source 9.136). The perception of the nation as an axiom, put forward by the conservatives, was rarely successfully challenged. Left-wing feminist Agnieszka Graff (Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 9.17) offered one challenging opinion though, in line with her arguments in previous debates about patriotism: she criticized the state of Polish society for its lack of social capital and trust, impeding the creation of a strong civil society. She linked this state of events to the conservatives’ vision of democracy as the rule of the majority that can take decisions irrespective of the needs or interests of the minorities, and to what she considered the conservative ‘petrified idea’ of the nation. She also pointed to the heritage of the communist regime and the dissident opposition that, in her eyes, had both promoted the idea of the homogeneity of the nation. Graff has a point about the inherent problem of the ideal of unity that
does not allow for coexistence of different ideas or values. In the case of opposing views, those who maintain a vision of ideal unity react by excluding their opponents from the realm of the community, as was the case with the conservatives during the mourning period.

The overall tone of the public debate in the first days underscored the importance of coming together in order to process this unexpected event. However, different interpretations of this alleged community (as a nation or a society) show an underlying ideological cleavage of opinions that was only to be reinforced by the decision to bury the presidential couple on Wawel.

7.2.3 The burial on Wawel: the turning point of the debate
The decision to bury the presidential couple in the crypts of the Wawel Royal Castle in Kraków, taken by the Cardinal Dziwisz, dissolved the previously constructed community. Wawel is a highly symbolical place where the most eminent national heroes are buried. Burying the tragically deceased president there was seen as inappropriate by many mourners, because it elevated him to the rank of a hero.

Wawel, its cathedral and its crypts are a symbolical place, the closest to the idea of a national Pantheon. Polish kings (Stefan Batory, Zygmunt III Waza, Jan III Sobieski), national heroes (General Tadeusz Kościuszko, Marshall Józef Piłsudski and General Władysław Sikorski) and 19th century Romantic bards (Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki) 7 are buried there. Poland has other prestigious burial places, however: Krypta Zasłużonych na Skalce (the Crypt of the Meritorious in the Church on the Rock) in Kraków, 8 the crypt of the Archcathedral of St. John the

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7 In the same crypt there is a symbolic urn filled with the soil from the (common) Parisian grave of Cyprian Kamil Norwid, another great Romantic poet.
8 Eminent writers from different epochs rest there: Jan Długosz (15th century chronicler), Stanisław Wyspiański (19th century modernist playwright) and Czesław Miłosz (20th century poet and prose writer).
Baptist in Warsaw,\textsuperscript{9} the Pantheon of Great Poles in Świątynia Opatrzności Bożej (the Temple of Divine Providence) in Warsaw, the Cemetery \textit{Powązki} in Warsaw, and the Cemetery Rakowicki in Kraków.\textsuperscript{10} The existence of these multiple burial places, and lack of clear procedures of deciding where to bury important political and cultural figures, provokes a number of controversies that might have been avoided if one Pantheon existed or at least clear administrative rules for selecting one of the existing places were in place.

According to the recollection of Minister Michał Boni (interviewed by \textit{Polityka}, source 9.94), leading the work of the inter-departmental team for the coordination of activities connected with the Smolensk air crash, the first signal he received from the Chancellery of the deceased president was that the family wanted the presidential couple to be buried at \textit{Powązki} in Warsaw. Prelate Kazimierz Nycz then proposed the crypt of the Warsaw Archcathedral (where the first democratically elected, and shortly after assassinated, President Gabriel Narutowicz was buried in 1922). On 13 April 2010, however, Cardinal Dziwisz unilaterally announced the decision about the burial of the presidential couple at Wawel, after meeting Jarosław Kaczyński, and blind-siding the state’s administration:

\begin{quote}
“The final decision has been taken that Wawel is the most appropriate place, where [Kaczyński] will rest together with those who contributed to the good of our fatherland: from kings, to heroes, leaders”.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

Dziwisz expressed his wish that this decision would unite society. However, almost immediately it resulted in popular protests. Already two hours after the decision had

\textsuperscript{9} In the Archcathedral crypt there are tombs of the last Polish king from the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, Stanisław August Poniatowski; the interwar presidents Gabriel Narutowicz and Ignacy Mościcki; a Prime Minister from the same period, Ignacy Paderewski; and the Primate of the Catholic Church between 1948 and 1981, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński.

\textsuperscript{10} Participants of national uprisings, soldiers and intellectuals rest on these cemeteries.

\textsuperscript{11} “Ostatecznie decyzja zapadła, że tym miejscem najbardziej godnym jest Wawel, żeby tam spoczął razem z tymi, którzy się zasłużyli dla dobra naszej ojczyzny: od królów - po bohaterów, wodzów.” (Source 9.128).
been announced, around 500 people gathered to protest in front of the cardinal’s residence in Kraków. The protesters were not aggressive, or insulting anyone, they just carried signs reading: “Przesada (Exaggeration),” and they shouted “Powązki,” “Powązki, nie Wawel (Powązki, not Wawel),” “Hipokryzja (Hypocrisy),” “Kardynale zmień decyzję (Cardinal, change the decision).” Further protests were organized on the following day. Given that the protests were really important, also in the social media, Cardinal Dziwisz took care to clarify that burying the President at Wawel was not his decision, but that he was merely enacting the will of the family. He did not specify who exactly had expressed this will, whether it was Lech Kaczyński’s daughter Marta, or his twin brother Jarosław). He did endorse the decision though, by saying explicitly that in his opinion burying the presidential couple at Wawel was not an exaggeration, since the president “died as a hero,” hence “deserve(d) to be buried among heroes” (Wprost, Source 9.159). Nobody wanted to claim responsibility for this decision though. The curia was pointing at the family and the PiS (the party of the Kaczyński brothers), and the members of the PiS at Cardinal Dziwisz.

Dziwisz qualified the death of the president as heroic. To back this interpretation, the circumstances and reason of the death had to be turned into heroic event. One of the strategies to do so was to claim that given the timing and the place of the tragedy (on the way to the commemoration of the Katyń massacre), the crash was not a mere plane accident,\(^\text{12}\) but constituted a sacrifice for the Fatherland (with a capital ‘F’, e.g. by Dariusz Baliszewski, Wprost, Source 9.161). Another was to say that Kaczyński died in order to save the truth about Katyn. Such interpretation of the catastrophe would give it a promise of a durable memory. It also contributed to

\(^{12}\) The conspiracy theories about the crash, even if supported by the PiS, will not be examined here.
reinvigorating one of the strongest national myths, i.e. that Poles are a nation chosen for suffering (Jaskulowski, Przegląd Polityczny, Source 9.124).

A series of criticisms against the Wawel decision was voiced also in the left-wing press. First of all, the Wawel decision was not preceded by a public debate, in general, let alone about whether Kaczyński was heroic, or died heroically enough to be buried on Wawel. Furthermore, according to its critics, the Wawel mistake (e.g. Pilawski, Przegląd, Source 9.114) could contribute to the creation of a myth of President Kaczyński (who was on this occasion compared to important historical statesmen Piłsudski, and Narutowicz). Others called this decision precocious (Romanowski, Przegląd, Source 9.111), also because the Church violated tradition by deciding where to bury the deceased president and his wife. Also, the decision to bury the presidential couple in the crypt of Wawel went against the declaration of Cardinal Franciszek Macharski in 1993, after the re-burial of the remnants of General Sikorski, killed in a plane crash over Gibraltar in 1943, that there was no more place left in the crypt. With regard to this last question of lack of space in the Wawel crypts, the absence of plans or even discussions about creating a proper Pantheon of leaders of free Poland was deplored (Passent, a Publizists of Polityka, on his blog, Source 9.196). With Lech Kaczyński buried at Wawel, it will be impossible ever to create a symbolic Pantheon, and have all presidents of the Third Republic buried in the same place, when their time comes. Indeed, the short lapse of time between the plane crash and the burial did not allow for a profound reflection or debate on this topic. It also revealed that there were no administrative procedures deciding where to bury

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13 The last Polish president-in-exile (1989-1990), Ryszard Kaczorowski, who also died in the Smolensk crash, was buried in Warsaw’s Pantheon of Great Poles.
deceased state officials, and the existing plans were set aside\textsuperscript{14} because of the pathos of the situation.

Very soon, the significance of the Wawel decision was noticed in the debate, and strongly criticized by the left-wing, who underscored that this decision would reinforce the division of the society (Marody, interviewed by \textit{Polityka}, Source 9.82). It was even called, in an ironic play on words, a ‘cardinal mistake’ (Konarski, \textit{Przegląd}, Source 9.110). The Wawel decision showed that the hastily proclaimed community was elusive, and the elevation of Kaczyński to the rank of a hero stripped away the grieving willingness of those who had criticized him in the past to forget about his shortcomings (Widacki, \textit{Przegląd}, Source 9.115) or even transformed their compassion into anger. In other words, this decision proved that the unity was merely illusory.

There were three main reactions to the Wawel decision: one positive and two negative ones. On the positive side, some people, mostly of the center and right-wing, appreciated the decision. For instance, Jan Rokita, formerly a prominent conservative PO politician (interviewed in \textit{Tygodnik Powszechny}, Source 9.148), said that Cardinal Dziwisz was right in considering Kaczyński a national, modern hero of the Polish patriotic legend, and not just a deceased state official. He also implied that the burial on Wawel was the will of the people. Michał Łuczewski (\textit{Wprost}, Source 9.165) contributed to the argument of the ‘heroic’ death by referring to the theory of symbolic violence of René Girard:\textsuperscript{15} he concluded that the burial on Wawel was the

\textsuperscript{14} The question of creating a new Pantheon was not absent in 2010, even if it remained unresolved. Dorota Szeligowska, “The controversies over the Pantheon (of Great Poles),” \textit{Nouvelle Europe}, available on http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/en/controversies-over-pantheon-great-poles, 16 September 2013.

\textsuperscript{15} René Girard, \textit{Le bouc émissaire} (Paris: Grasset 1982).
culmination of a social dynamics of sacrifice, and people finally saw what a great statesman Kaczyński was, despite being derided in his lifetime.

On the negative side, the critics of the Wawel decision mainly came from the ranks of those who already criticized Lech Kaczyński when he was alive, and who refrained from voicing any criticism right after his death, out of respect for the dead. Two types of criticism were expressed. The first one straightforwardly criticized the Wawel decision as exaggerated and precocious. Those who voiced it called for a proper public debate in order to find the right way and place for burying the tragically (yet not heroically) deceased president. The second type of criticism also qualified the decision as excessive, but suggested a more conciliatory attitude: an appeal for accepting the decision in the name of national unity. (Cywińska, interviewed by Krytyka Polityczna, Source 9.61).

Almost immediately the (conservative) supporters of the Wawel decision excluded those who criticized it from the previously proclaimed community. In this sense, it was then difficult to take seriously the argument that the burial on Wawel was the will of the people. Its aim was not to unite the people (as Cardinal Dziwisz wished to claim), but to idealize and mythologize the deceased president. Those who opposed this decision felt that their initial mourning was overused for political reasons (de Barbaro, Tygodnik Powszechny, Source 9.150), marking the beginning of the presidential campaign for the conservatives.

The unity in the mourning period was visibly seen as much stronger by the conservatives and the right wing, because it was their mourning in many aspects. Firstly, it was their president who died in the crash (even though the delegation that accompanied him was composed of people of different political leanings). Lech
Kaczyński was not popular before his death, and was often criticized for his politics by his opponents. This is why the conservative Publizists proclaimed that the critics who mourned him did so in a kind of kitsch of reconciliation (Lisicki, Publizist of Rzeczpospolita, on his blog, Source 9.194). Secondly, the catastrophe was an opportunity for the conservatives to impose a vision of the community, based on communitarian and nationalist principles. In the long run, it was not a community of all Poles, but an exclusionary community of mourners gathered in front of the Presidential Palace, showing “the ugly face of the unity of which Poles are capable against something or someone”16 (Czapliński, Przegląd Polityczny, Source 9.122). This mechanism of exclusion became most clearly visible after the announcement that the Presidential couple would be buried at Wawel, because this decision broke the preceding silent agreement and provoked the raising of many critical voices. The call for an obligatory unity in silence is significant. From this moment onwards, any critical discussing of Kaczyński as a person and political figure was beyond discussion. The partisans of Kaczyński first used the ‘mourning blackmail’ (an expression used by Agnieszka Holland, quoted by Chwin, interviewed by Przegląd Polityczny, Source 9.125) to force everyone to mourn the deceased president and present his achievements in a hyperbolic way. Then, a second ‘blackmail into silence’ followed, after the decision of the place of burial (Nosowski, Więź, Source 9.157). This move allowed the conservatives to discursively exclude the critics of the Wawel decision from the community, claiming that such burial was an act of historical justice, and could not be contested (Zdort, Rzeczpospolita, Source 9.130). Bronisław

16 “Film był również upokarzający dla żałobników, ponieważ ich wypowiedzi, zmiksowane i podane w zblokowanej formie odsłoniły oblicze Polaków jako nienawistników zdolnych do jednoczenia się wyłącznie przeciwko komuś (nigdy za czymś).” Czapliński described in this way the film realized by conservative Publizist Jan Pospieszalski with Ewa Stankiewicz, interviewing people who mourned after the President in front of the Palace and expressed their radical opinions. This steered ‘documentary’ was also criticized by the Council of Ethics of the Media for lack of objectivism.
Wildstein even implied that Kaczyński’s critics were hypocrites because they pretended to mourn, whilst to his mind they contributed to dividing the nation by criticizing the Wawel decision (*Rzeczpospolita*, Source 9.132). Interestingly, the ‘blackmail into silence’ came also from people, who were, in principle, opposed to this type of consecration of Lech Kaczyński, notably on pages of the left-wing publications.

### 7.2.4 The Catholic Church: with or against the state?

The decision to bury the presidential couple at Wawel was controversial not only because it elevated the tragically deceased president to the rank of a national hero, but also because it remains unclear how and by whom it was taken. In the absence of clear administrative procedures concerning the place of burial of the state’s highest representatives, this burial at Wawel was not a breach of procedure. Surprisingly, during the mourning period and the controversy over the burial place, representatives of the state administration did not even voice their clear opinion on the topic. Allegedly, Cardinal Dziwisz consulted Minister Boni about the government’s position on the presidential burial at Wawel, but the government decided simply to respect the will of the families concerning the burial place for all victims. One could say then that the government abdicated from this responsibility, leaving it to the Church to play the role of *Interrex* in the period of national mourning.

Some right-wing *Publizists* considered the role of the Church in this whole affair as natural. Dominik Zdort, in an editorial in the conservative newspaper *Rzeczpospolita* (Source 9.131), stated authoritatively that in difficult times the Catholic Church (always) had to come together with the state. This proposition was seen by father Andrzej Dragula, as transgressing the idea of the impartiality of the state in matters of personal conviction, enshrined in the Constitution of 1997, Article
25. In Tygodnik Powszechny he critically discussed Zdort’s statement. Interestingly, a priest, on pages of a Catholic weekly (though known for its open and liberal religious approach) pronounced his dissident opinion on the assumed necessity of an alliance between the Church and the state, and its acceptance by society. He referred to the theory of the king’s two bodies of Ernst Kantorowicz,\(^{17}\) to show that

“(…) the republican state does not deal well with the dualism of the president’s death. It does not have own symbols, words, and rituals, at its disposal. In consequence, not only the nation (in its majority?), but also the authorities, instinctively drift towards the monarchical vision of the king’s “two bodies.””\(^{18}\)

Dragula did not advocate in favor of the Church as the decision-making institution in this specific case. Andrzej Waśkiewicz (in the liberal Przegląd Polityczny, Source 9.127) contested Dragula’s point concerning the comeback of the monarchical paradigm, and disagreed with the underlying the idea of ‘two bodies’ of the president. He argued that the president, in a republican form of regime, is the representative of the community, not its incarnation. He did, however, agree that secular funeral rituals seem insufficient in such a heavily emotionally loaded situation.

Three aspects of the discussion about religion and its links to the state need to be elucidated in the context of the national mourning. The first one concerns the aforementioned question of the burial at Wawel. The second one relates to the importance of religious rituals and the re-affirmation of the link between religion and national identity, and the alleged resurfacing of the Polak-Katolik (Pole-Catholic) stereotype. Finally, the third one concerns the cross that was installed in front of the Presidential Palace during the mourning. In fact, during the national mourning, on

\(^{17}\) Kantorowicz explained the transformation of the concept of sovereignty in the late Middle Ages. The king was perceived as possessing two bodies, a natural, mortal one, and a supranatural, enduring one, ensuring the continuity of the body politic. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The king’s two bodies: a study in mediaeval political theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1957).

\(^{18}\) “państwo republikańskie z dualizmem prezydenckiej śmierci sobie nie radzi. Nie dysponuje własnymi symbolami, słowami, obrzędami. Nie tylko naród (w większości?), ale i władza instynktownie dryfują więc ku monarchicznej wizji “dwóch ciał” władcy.” (Source 9.151)
April 15, the boy and girl scouts from the “Initiative for Poland and fellows”, created after the crash, spontaneously erected a cross in front of the Presidential Palace. Many people started gathering around it, lighting candles or praying. However, once the national mourning came to an end, and the burial of the Presidential couple had taken place, the cross became a real problem. The scouts, but also the self-proclaimed defenders (“Obrońcy krzyża”), insisted that the cross could only be removed after a statue commemorating the victims of the catastrophe would have been erected in front of the Presidential Palace. Slowly, the situation turned into another ‘war’ about the cross that lasted for the whole summer of 2010.

The parallel with the previous “war of the crosses” in Oświęcim comes to mind almost automatically. In 1979, Pope John-Paul II, during his first visit to Poland as a pope, celebrated a mass in the surroundings of the former Nazi concentration camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau (Oświęcim in Polish). To commemorate this event, a ‘papal cross’ was planted on the scene. In the summer of 1998, rumors arose that the state administration wanted to remove this cross. Self-proclaimed defenders of the cross protested against it and erected 322 more crosses nearby. Geneviève Zubrzycki analyzed how this conflict reflected the existence of different symbols for different religious groups (similar to the different symbolic of using the word Oświęcim for Poles and Auschwitz for Jews), and what characterized their use. She also critically discussed the relationship between Polish national identity and religion, and the Polak-Katolik stereotype. In the light of the peaceful removal of the crosses by the Army (though not the ‘papal cross’ itself), and of the compromise conclusion of the

19 “Inicjatywa Polsce i bliźnim”
20 Oświęcim is the city near Kraków, in Southern Poland, where the concentration camp of Auschwitz was located. The camp was created by the Nazis in 1940 to hold Polish political prisoners. It was soon transformed to perform the “Final solution” of the Jewish population. In consequence Auschwitz became a symbol of the Holocaust, for the Jews. Yet this name is rarely used in the Polish language that privileges Oświęcim, as an expression of Polish suffering under German occupation. Zubrzycki, *The Crosses of Auschwitz*, 98-140.
debate about the wording of the preamble the new Polish constitution of 1997. Zubrzycki concluded that the popularity of the Polak-Katolik figure was becoming obsolete, within the process of the renegotiation of the meaning of Polishness after 1989. The waning political influence of the Catholic Church, which no longer had to play the role of the protector of the national identity (and could not reinforce the links of national identity with religion, as during the partitions or under communism), strongly contributed to this process. This transformation can be linked to the change of the Church’s approach from a more open one, protective of dissidents, towards one pushing a conservative political agenda, thus alienating many of its earlier political allies. Only progressive Catholic publications such as Tygodnik Powszechny, Znak and Więź maintained their open editorial approach, which was also exemplified in the debates about patriotism.

The motive of Polak-Katolik came back, in force, in the period of the national mourning in 2010 notably within the ‘war over the cross,’ though not without challenge. Despite the fact that on 21 July 2010 the Chancellery of the newly elected President Bronisław Komorowski, the scouts and the representatives of the Church hierarchy agreed to transfer the cross to the nearby Church of St. Anne, the transfer never occurred. On 3 August 2010, when it was due to happen, both the state administration and priests who came to accompany the transfer of the cross were powerless in the face of the ‘defenders of the cross,’ who verbally abused the priests.

21 Zubrzycki qualifies the Preamble an expression of “(...) the textual representation of nationalists’ aspirations and of what nationalists claim the nation to be.” Zubrzycki, “‘We, the Polish Nation,’” 633. The controversy over the Preamble of the Polish Constitution of 1997, in the process of drafting, concerned the inclusion of an Invocatio Dei, which would underscore the strength of reference to natural law. Finally, the solution adopted was a Nominatio Dei, where the reference to God is juxtaposed with an evocation of humanist values, resulting from a compromise between the Church and liberal and left-wing circles.

and prevented the police from transferring the cross. The police did not want to use force against protesters, and so the deadlock continued. The ‘defenders of the cross’ were present 24/7 around the cross, and were not even satisfied by the installation of a commemorative plaque on the wall of the Presidential Palace. This impasse and the debate continued over the summer until 16 September, when the Chancellery decided to remove the cross and put it inside the Palace Chapel. This happened without the assistance of Church’s representatives because, as the Head of the Chancellery, Jacek Michałowski said, the Chancellery felt left alone with the problem (Source 9.173). Indeed, the Church’s interest in the cross’ transfer cooled down after the initial controversy, and this fact prompted the twilight of the short-lived domination of the Church after the catastrophe. Paradoxically, the Church hierarchy remained silent about the cross, as if it was not, in the first place, a religious symbol.

The deadlock concerning this particular cross (or its ‘unjustified’ removal, according to its ‘defenders’) showed that the cross was an instrument of political fight. The ‘defenders’ stood by their call for the construction of a statue in front of the Palace, and even threatened to erect new crosses in the same place. In their zealot commitment they disregarded the voice of the official Church’s hierarchy, but were supported by the most conservative and nationalist fractions of the political parties. Subsequently, the Church hierarchy abdicated from its responsibility of resolving the problem surrounding the cross, leaving it to the state administration. Finally, after the ‘defenders of the cross’ prevented the transfer of the cross in the beginning of August, they were confronted with counter-demonstrators, mostly youngsters, who, with help of the social media, were organizing happenings and mocking protests against the cross and its ‘defenders.’ This situation resembled a “grotesque theatre,” and the
opponents’ action can be understood as a challenge to the myth of intrinsic Polish religiosity\textsuperscript{23} or at least to the instrumentalization of the cross for political purposes.

The last act of the controversy concerning the cross occurred on 10 November 2010, on the seventh monthly anniversary of the Smolensk catastrophe. On this day, the cross was transferred from the Chapel of the Presidential Palace to the Church of St. Anne, and a statue commemorating the victims of the catastrophe was inaugurated at the \textit{Powązki} cemetery in Warsaw. This solution satisfied all three parties who signed the agreement in July, the scouts, the Church and the Chancellery. The ‘defenders of the cross’ objected to the fact that the date of the transfer was not known in advance, and they even cast the authenticity of the transferred cross to doubt. However this solution seems to have calmed the atmosphere since then.

Apart from the conflict around the cross, the \textit{Polak-Katolik} motive was also discussed with relation to the national mourning and patriotism because:

“\textit{The fusion of state commemorations with religious ones, linked to the ethnic homogeneity of the society, seems to prove that a real Pole is a Pole-Catholic}.\textsuperscript{24}”

Furthermore, the \textit{topos} of \textit{Polak-Katolik} was framed as part of the image of a politician who wanted to be perceived as a patriot, in this case Kaczyński. This maneuver tried to link patriotism with the nation and bend it towards a specific vision of Polishness fused with religion. The Church, using the funerals of victims of the catastrophe as a tool to strengthen its position, reinforced this framing.

The public debate in the direct aftermath of the plane crash was emotional and value laden. The analysis of its dynamics showed the discursive construction of a

\textsuperscript{23} For a more thorough analysis of the question of religiosity and national mythologies, see Geneviève Zubrzycki, “History and the national sensorium: making sense of Polish mythology,” \textit{Qualitative sociology} 34, no.1 (2011), 46-47.

\textsuperscript{24} “Stopienie uroczystości państwowych z kościelnymi, w połączeniu z etniczną homogenicznością społeczeństwa, zdaje się świadczyć, że prawdziwy Polak – to Polak-Katolik.” (Romanowski, Znak, Source 9.188)
community that immediately showed first cracks, and quickly dissolved over the question of the burial on Wawel. The division of opinions was not a black and white opposition between proponents and critics of the Wawel decision or of the president himself, but intellectual opinions became increasingly polarized. This polarization will be further exemplified in the remaining three sections.

7.3 **The resurgence of Romanticism**

7.3.1 **The Romantic code of Polishness**
The period of national mourning was characterized by much emotion in the public discourse, which is mostly associated with Romanticism. An assumption has it that even if Poles did not want to use the Romantic language it would be hardly possible, insofar as there is no other type of language beyond the patriotic-suffering-Romantic, to deal with such emotional situations (Warchała, *Znak*, Source 9.179). The conviction that Polishness is linked to Catholicism and to Romanticism re-emerged, especially given that the Romantic language with its symbols complemented the religious ritual very well.

The strong re-emergence of Romantic political vocabulary during the mourning period was a change compared to previous 20 years of the democratic transition, but it was not a change compared to the last 200 years (Chwin, interviewed in *Przegląd Polityczny*, Source 9.125). Such a strong resurgence of Romanticism can be rather perceived as a leap back to the 19th century, and its perception as a foundation of Polishness and its values – patriotism and attachment to the fatherland. It also proved, according to Jan Rokita (interviewed in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Source 9.148), that no alternative to the Romantic way of thinking about patriotism and love of the country (incarnated by Kaczyński) emerged after 1989.

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25 After 1989, the Romantic discourse has been critically discussed on a number of occasions, such as previous debates about patriotism.
There are a number of key elements of Polish Romanticism: exaltation, tragic death, sacrifice, a feeling of victimhood and of being in the moral right, a feeling of mission and messianism (the suffering Poland being the Messiah). All of them were present during the mourning period with more or less salience. The signs of Polish neo-Romanticism (or post-Romanticism)\textsuperscript{26} were the politics over coffins together with the compulsive need of unity that constituted the symbolical argument for the burial at Wawel, discussed in the previous section. The promoters of Romanticism can mostly be found on the right wing of the political spectrum. An expression used by Wojciech Wencel (\textit{Gość niedzielny}, Source 9.52) is symptomatic here: he described the catastrophe as an apocalypse that restored to Polish consciousness the experience of collective victimhood. Indeed, the members of the Polish delegation who died in Smolensk were sometimes called victims or martyrs for the ‘truth about Katyń.’ In this narrative, President Kaczyński was depicted as a patriot or a hero who wanted to preserve the true memory of Katyń, but was cornered by his enemies, and almost put to death, which would be in line with the aforementioned nationalist theory of symbolic sacrifice, and conservative’s burgeoning conspiracy theories about the causes of the crash.

Even the critics of the Romantic discourse had to recognize its strength, which did not prevent them from articulating harsh criticisms. The most critical voice came from the left-wing intellectual circle \textit{Krytyka Polityczna}: while the contributors to \textit{Krytyka Polityczna} did not reject Romantic templates altogether and even referred to left-wing socialist traditions of fight for freedom infused with Romantic templates in their programmatic documents, during the national mourning period they nevertheless deployed a strong and coherent rationalist anti-Romantic language. They criticized

\textsuperscript{26} The prefixes attached to Romanticism reflected whether someone had a more positive (neo-) or negative (post-) perception of the return Romanticism in such form.
emotions from the standpoint of the lack of rational thinking, and described Poles as ‘hostages of symbols.’ The main line of criticism, though, was the (alleged) fascination with death of the conservatives, and the society on the whole (Bielik-Robson, Source 9.59). Contributors to Krytyka Polityczna described death as a code of understanding for the Polish people (Gdula, Source 9.55). They also coined the term ‘politics of death’ (Michalski, Source 9.54), supposed to be a late intellectual consequence of the conservative ‘politics of history.’ This new concept allowed them to analyze the journey to Katyn as an expression of a martyrlogic-patriotic race (Kowalska, Source 9.58), in which the president travelled to Smolensk for a separate commemoration because he thought that the one with the participation of the Prime Minister Donald Tusk, on April 7, would not be enough.27

7.3.2 The motive of ‘two Polands’

The exclusionary potential of the neo-Romantic templates can be further exemplified by a new iteration of the motive of ‘two Polands’28 that, broadly speaking, contradicted the existence of any overarching national community. This time the motive of ‘two Polands’ was conceptualized by the conservatives, in the poem of Jarosław Marek Rymkiewicz “Do Jarosława Kaczyńskiego (To Jarosław Kaczyński)” (Rzeczpospolita, Source 9.133), and also in the articles of Tomasz Terlikowski (Gość

27 The commemoration on April 7, 2010 was organized by the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who invited his counterpart Donald Tusk to attend it in early 2010. Lech Kaczyński insisted that his presence at the commemoration was necessary, as he was the highest representative of the state. Russian invitation was issued at Prime Minister level, probably as a handy maneuver to invite Tusk instead of Kaczyński, as he was less critical of Russia. Finally, a compromise solution was found, and a second, Polish commemorative event was scheduled so that Lech Kaczyński could attend it.

28 Grzegorz Kucharczyk traces the use of this motive to 1990 and Gazeta Wyborcza (Polska myśl polityczna po 1939 (Polish political thought after 1939), (Dębogóra: Wydawnictwo Dębogóra, 2009), 284). It was also used, among others, by Pawel Śpiewak “Dwie Polski (Two Polands),” Wprost, 35 (2003). In the aftermath of the catastrophe, apart from the formulation ‘two Polands’, the expression ‘two nations’ was used, conveying the same message, e.g. Tomasz Terlikowski, “Jedno państwo, dwa narody (One state, two nations),” Gazeta Polska, August 8, 2012. The ‘two nations’ would not only have different approaches to patriotism, but also to politics. Norman Davies (Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland’s Present, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)) shows that the notion of two nations, opposing collaborators to rebels, is helpful to analyse the dichotomous worldviews and positions of Poles during the last centuries.
Niedzielny, Source 9.49), and Ryszard Bugaj (Rzeczpospolita, Source 9.138), both titled explicitly “Dwie Polski (Two Polands).”

Terlikowski distinguished between a righteous and an unrighteous Poland. To his mind, the representatives of the righteous, patriotic Poland stood on Krakowskie Przedmieście in Warsaw, in front of the Presidential Palace, waiting to see the coffins of the presidential couple. The representatives of the unrighteous Poland, allegedly hostile to patriotism, stood on Franciszkańska Street in Kraków, in front of Cardinal’s Dziwisz residence, criticizing the Wawel decision. Rymkiewicz, in turn, called upon the deceased president’s brother Jarosław Kaczyński to ‘save the righteous Poland’ from the hands of “thieves who would like to steal it from us, and sell it to the world.”

Bugaj used the concept of ‘two Polands’ in his polemic over the expressions ‘real Poles’ and ‘axiological patriots’ used, for example, by the eminent psychologist Janusz Czapiński (interviewed in Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 9.10). Bugaj accused Czapiński of contributing to the dividing the society in two groups: ‘axiological patriots’, obsessed with the Fourth Republic, and ‘others,’ whom he sarcastically called ‘Enlightened citizens’ (i.e. liberal and left-wing elites) who would be uncritical towards the Third Republic and its supposedly failing democracy. This interpretation is consistent with the conservative dichotomous vision of a society split into two opposed camps, yet this was not implied by Czapiński, who criticized the nationalist ‘axiological patriots,’ but pointed to the existence of different groups in society, and different worldviews. Bugaj conceded that the ‘axiological patriots,’ i.e. nationalist supporters of the idea of the Fourth Republic and of the PiS, existed, but claimed that they were in a minority. He did not propose any convincing reading of

29 “Nie można oddać Polski w ręce jej złodziei / Którzy chcą ją nam ukraść i odsprzedać światu.”
30 Allegedly he tried to publish his polemical article in Gazeta Wyborcza, but it was not accepted, and was finally published in the concurrent conservative Rzeczpospolita.
how it would be possible to dissociate them from the PiS, or go beyond the
dichotomous vision that he rather perpetuated.

The discursive division of the Polish people into different groups is far from
being a new phenomenon. But in this particular case, of a confrontation that also had
strong religious overtones, Adam Szostkiewicz interestingly drew a parallel between
the 2010 contestation and the Interwar period (Polityka, Source 9.86). Back in the
1920s and 1930s, the radical Catholics felt free to divide Poles into two groups: the
essential nation and Poles ‘by birth.’ The latter supposedly were a degenerated
category of the essential Poles, because they did not subscribe to the same Polish soul,
characterized by Romanticism, emotions and religion. They were said not to love
automatically what was Polish and not to hate automatically what the ‘essential Poles’
declared ideologically bad. In a way, a similar discursive division was operated in
2010, when the righteous, Romantic Poles confronted the ‘unrighteous’ critics of
Romanticism. Consequently, the critical approach, which had been strengthened by
the liberal and left-wing discourse throughout the democratic transition, notably in the
2000s (as shown in the preceding chapter), can be defined as a trait which separates
these two categories.

7.3.3 Two discourses of exclusion
The different ways of approaching the mourning, using Romantic templates or
rejecting them, as discussed in two previous sub-sections, radically excluded each
other. The conservative proponents of the Romantic templates used the motive of
‘two Polands’ soon after the end of the mourning to determine who had the right to
participate in the community and who did not. The main criterion for being excluded
was to have criticized Lech Kaczyński in the past, opposed the Wawel decision, or
approached the mourning differently from the Romantic way. According to the liberal
intellectual Wojciech Sadurski (Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 9.36), this approach showed a lack of understanding that saluting the deceased president, even if one criticized him during his lifetime, was an expression of patriotism. Paying respect to the deceased president expressed, to his mind, a civic homage to the institution symbolizing the national community.

The fervent left-wing critics of the ‘mystical’ unity, who diagnosed an atrophy of the rational and critical public sphere, and who criticized the Romantic religious-national discourse, also operated a discourse of exclusion, aiming at people living the mourning in the highly emotional way. The conservatives dismissed this rationalist discourse as ‘leftist hateful jabbering’ (Wildstein, Rzeczpospolita, Source 9.142), afraid of communitarian reflexes, lacking any understanding of community.

This situation could thus be best described as a co-existence of two discourses of exclusion. The first came from the conservatives, who were re-opening old wounds, and tried to exclude those who thought differently from the mourning community; the second came from the critical left, and was mostly present on the Internet. According to Zbigniew Nosowski, the editor-in-chief of the progressive Catholic Więź (Source 9.157), even if Polishness needed criticism, such a critical approach should not go so far as to accuse people of lack of rational thinking and compare their behavior to ‘tribal acts,’ because this contributed to the spiral of mutual exclusion. In the same vein, he deplored the fact that Publizists from both of these opposed and entrenched camps contributed to dividing instead of uniting the society.

In short, the re-emergence of the Romantic language provided Poles with tools to deal with an unprecedented shocking event. However, it also prompted the division of opinions and the creation of discourses of exclusion, either promoting or combating
Romantic references. This division of opinions will be further elucidated through the example of the concept of patriotism.

7.4 Patriotism in the mourning
Patriotism was broadly discussed within the public debate following the catastrophe. The first question one might ask is whether this ‘mourning patriotism’ (labeled as such by Witold Gadomski, Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 9.14) brought anything new, notably because of the newly reaffirmed ties between identity and religion. The liberal intellectuals showed a strong consistency of their arguments with previous debates, and maintained that there were different forms of patriotism (Jedlicki, interviewed in Gazeta Wyborcza, source 9.8), and that everyone could perceive their duties towards the fatherland in a different way, as proposed by Marcin Król in 1992 (Source 1.1). However, one of the strong keywords of the mourning was ‘true’ patriotism (Tokarczuk, Krytyka Polityczna, Source 9.65). It was not clear what this was, however, and how it related to other (‘untrue’?) forms of patriotism.

7.4.1 ‘True’ patriotism of ‘real Poles’
The label of ‘true’ patriotism was mostly used by the conservatives, and had a strong exclusionary feature. Jerzy Szczęsny (Rzeczpospolita, Source 9.143) thought that people from the left had problems with patriotism, given that they dared to voice a number of critical opinions that he enumerated: Marcin Król named Polish patriotism ‘poor,’ Janusz Czapiński called it ‘racially exclusive,’ Bronisław Łagowski ‘mythical’ and Andrzej Wajda ‘anachronistic.’ Not all the people he enumerated were linked to the left though – some were actually in the liberal camp. But calling them ‘leftists’ made it easier for him to discredit their critical stance. Dariusz Gawin, who previously coined the concept of ‘critical patriotism,’ maintained in this debate, in Znak, that the successors of the Enlightenment (among whom he enumerated liberals, leftists and
rationalists) had problems with ‘traditional’ (i.e. Romantic) patriotism. However, in his opinion, a traditional version of patriotism turned out to be necessary for the community to express their feelings during the national mourning:

“In this brutal and unexpected way, fate made us aware of the fact that we are a political community – and that by virtue of being its members we can express our feelings only in the form which is appropriate to its tradition, and in this case it implied the reference to historical, national Polish patriotism.”

He insisted on the national character of the tradition, and on the necessary link between patriotism and the nation, thus contributing to reinforcing this communitarian and conservative trope.

In the eyes of the conservatives, ‘true’ patriotism characterized ‘real Poles.’ As a parallel to the motive of two Polands, the conflict between ‘real Poles’ and ‘normal Poles’ (Hartman, interviewed in Przegląd, Source 9.117) was conceptualized:

“The RP [Real Poles], despite the overall call to focus on the mourning, put politics aside, organize burials in a dignified way, and explain the reasons of the catastrophe; immediately started a great patriotic offensive, which became political (…) The really real Poles reinforced themselves mutually.”

The left wing objected to the fact that these ‘real Poles’ felt in the right to decide who was Polish and who was not, attempting the monopolization of not only patriotism but also of Polishness. Jedlicki (Tygodnik Powszechny, Source 9.149) concluded that the ‘real’ patriots felt they were the only ones to perceive the greatness of the historical moment, thus it gave them the impression that they could measure the truthfulness of others’ feelings and gestures and, in consequence, grant or deny permission to participate in the national mourning and in the patriotic community. The left-wing

31 “W sposób brutalny i nieoczekiwany los uświadomił nam, że jesteśmy wspólnotą polityczną – i że jako jej członkowie możemy wyrazić swoje uczucia tylko w formie właściwej dla jej tradycji, a w tym przypadku oznacza to: w formie właściwej dla historycznego, narodowego polskiego patriotyzmu.” (Source 9.176)

32 “PP [Prawdziwi Polacy], mimo że mottem narodowej żałoby stało się wezwanie, żeby się wypłakać, by politykę na razie odsunąć na bok, godnie i sprawnie zająć się pochówkiem i wyjaśnianiem przyczyn katastrofy, natychmiast rozpoczęli wielką ofensywą patriotyczną, która stawiała się wprost polityczna. (…) Prawdziwie prawdziwi Polacy napędzali się nawzajem.” (Janicki and Władyka, Polityka, Source 9.81)
intellectuals implied that the ‘real Poles’ did not define their patriotism as an ethos of behavior, but as a mission or a ritual, and lacked critical reflection.

On this point however, one can notice a change in the strategy of the conservatives. While in previous debates they fought vehemently for the label ‘modern’ to be attached to their vision of patriotism, in this debate they proudly espoused labels such as ‘old-fashioned’ or ‘traditional’ patriotism. This turn can be linked to the strong resurgence of Romanticism that rehabilitated such a ‘traditional’ conception. The praise for the deceased president by Piotr Zaremba can be taken as an example of such approach. Zaremba insisted that Kaczyński was a proponent of politics in the old, Romantic style and of ‘old-fashioned’ patriotism (Tygodnik Powszechny, Source 9.147). Interestingly, in many people’s opinions, Kaczyński rose to become a symbol of this Romantic patriotism after his death, while during his lifetime, he was a lesser proponent of it than the hard core of the conservative party.

7.4.2 Romantic versus positivist patriotisms
In the aftermath of the Smolensk crash not only the Romantic tropes of living the national mourning were discussed, but also the everlasting, yet schematic, dichotomous opposition between Romantic (based on fight and sacrifice) and positivist (based on work for the community and civic virtues) understandings of patriotism. Sometimes more uncommon conceptualizations of patriotism were put forward. Rokita spoke of a re-emergence of a “current of Sarmatian-Romantic victorious patriotism”33 (Tygodnik Powszechny). It is unclear what this conceptual mix was supposed to mean exactly. Sarmatism was a Baroque cultural formation, dominating in Poland under the First Republic, between the 16th and 18th centuries,

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33 Aleksander Hall contested this vision of things in Znak, and concluded that the majority of Poles did not adopt this exalted approach proposed by Rokita, and did not stop to assess the reality critically. (Source 9.182)
based on the myth that the Polish gentry descended from the mythical ancient Sarmatian people, characterized by kindliness, hospitality, love for freedom and courage. Sarmatian Poland was supposedly characterized by republican virtues, and had a special role in defending freedom. The Romantic period followed the gentry’s ‘Sarmatian’ republic in the 19th century, after the disappearance of the state. The patriotic traditions of the First Republic and Romanticism differed, as discussed by Walicki in his conceptual history of Polish patriotism. Walicki distinguished between three patriotic traditions: the republican tradition, linked to the free noble Republic and gentry; the Romantic tradition, developed under partitions, and the ‘realist’ tradition, linked to Roman Dmowski’s nationalist party National-Democracy, Endecja. Conceptually mixing the republican and Romantic traditions is rather rare, and atypical. An example of such mix, put forward by conservative historian Andrzej Nowak, revisiting Walicki’s typology, was discussed in Chapter 3. Nowak linked the republican tradition with the early Romantic one in an attempt to present the latter in a positive light.

In the aftermath of the crash, ‘patriotism of victims and intentions’ became more popular, allowing the conservatives to progressively frame themselves as the ‘real’ patriots. Szacki (interviewed in Tygodnik Powszechny, Source 9.152) contested the monopolization of patriotism by the right wing, reiterating his previous stance about the compatibility between patriotism and liberalism (Source 4.8, cf. Chapter 5). Such was also the opinion of Jedlicki, who reiterated his vision of an inclusionary patriotism:

“I would like to see a patriotism based on responsibility for the common good, for the state, for the living chances of all citizens to emerge in Poland. A patriotism which is not aggressive, which does not exclude anyone, very critical towards our own history, but

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34 Walicki, Trzy patriotyzmy.
respecting our roots, and tradition, not only the ethnically Polish tradition, but also the heritage of all nations that lived and died under the realm of Polishness.”

The inclusionary aspect of patriotism furthered by Jedlicki was sharply derided by conservative *Publizist* Bronislaw Wildstein, who suggested that

“The call to not refuse patriotism to anyone is idiotic, because it implies that this concept ceases to mean anything. No one can be refused the right to try to earn the right to be called a patriot, but that is a completely different thing.”

Wildstein accused Jedlicki, and other members of the elite (or Salon, which would be the place where the intelligentsia allegedly conspires against nation’s interests), of trying to discredit the emotional essence of Polish patriotism:

“The Salon of the Third Republic has always had problems with the concept of ‘patriotism.’ The ideology of the Third Republic was constructed as a fight with xenophobic, regressive and backward Polishness. The correct, ‘modernized’ Poland, i.e. the Third Republic, was supposed to be a transitory stage preceding a higher form of existence, in which national identities would transform into a mystical European Union. Traditional patriotism could only damage this process. (...) After the catastrophe in Smolensk, which awakened national feelings, Salon intensified its action in order to pacify Polish patriotism.”

The conservatives strongly insisted on the value of ‘traditional patriotism,’ linked to emotions and intentions, rather than civic behavior. This position contributed to the fact that the liberals, identified with civic virtues, were not immediately perceived as patriots, because civic virtues were not perceived as part of patriotic behavior on the same footing as intentions. This type of patronizing accusation was previously advanced by the conservatives against the liberals on a number of occasions, notably

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35 “Chciałbym, żeby wykształcił się u nas patriotyzm oparty na odpowiedzialności za dobro wspólne, za państwo, za szanse życiowe dla wszystkich jego obywateli. Patriotyzm nie agresywny, nikogo nie wykluczający, surowo krytyczny wobec własnej historii, lecz zachowujący szacunek dla naszych korzeni, dla tradycji, i nie tylko tej etnicznie polskiej, ale dla dorobku wszystkich narodów, które pod władzą polskości żyły i ginęły.” (Source 9.8)

36 „apel aby nikomu nie odmawiać patriotyzmu, jest idiotyzmem, gdyż oznacza, że pojęcie to przestaje cokolwiek znaczyć. Nie można nikomu odmówić prawa do zasłużenia sobie na miano patrioty, ale to zupełnie co innego.” (Source 9.204)

37 „Salon III RP zawsze miał kłopot z pojęciem “patriotyzm.” Ideologia III RP budowana była na walce z ksenofobiczną, zaściankową i zacofaną polskością. Właściwa, czyli “zmobilizowana,” Polska, a więc III RP, miała być stadium przejściowym przed wyższą formą istnienia, w której tożsamości narodowej przetopią się w mistyczną europejską unii. Tradycyjny patriotyzm mógł w tym tylko przeszkadzać. (...) Po smoleńskiej katastrofie, która obudziła uczucia narodowe, salon zintensyfikował działania w kierunku spacyfikowania polskiego patriotyzmu.” (Source 9.204)
in 2000, against Magdalena Środa’s proposition of ‘patriotism of minimal means,’ (Source 4.1) focusing on fulfilling one’s civic duties such as paying taxes or going to vote (cf. Chapter 5). In consequence, sometimes, even if people valued civic virtues, they did not perceive them as part of patriotism, because if they did, patriotism would be ‘downgraded.’ The approach of perceiving patriotism as a basic value (to which people turn in situation of uncertainty and fear, according to the aforementioned ‘theory of managing the fear’) and as a duty, prevailed over the one seeing it as a civic virtue. Timothy Garton Ash (Znak) illustrated this position with the fact that after the catastrophe the deceased president was first and foremost described as a great patriot, as if patriotism was something of ultimate importance. This rhetoric was in line with Romantic discourses privileging patriotic declarations over positivist, everyday liberal patriotism.

7.4.3 A revival of civic patriotism?
It would be too early, however, to proclaim the disappearance of the liberal point of view in the contestation over the meaning of patriotism. Indeed, a civic plea to redefine patriotism resurfaced in 2010. Wojciech Sadurski, in Gazeta Wyborcza was the first to formulate such a call for patriotism to bring together emotions and civic duties:

“If patriotism is reduced solely to completing one’s duties towards a community, then its emotional dimension will be lost. Without this emotional dimension patriotism will become banal and trivial.”

Sadurski furthermore criticized the label ‘positivist,’ commonly used to describe the approach focusing on civic duties, as outdated. His call was complemented, in Gazeta

38 “Jeśli zostanie on sprowadzony do zwyczajnego wypełniania swych obowiązków - jakichkolwiek - wobec zbiorowości, to ztracimy jego wymiar emocjonalny. Bez niego zaś, patriotyzm (...) zostanie zbanalizowany i strywializowany.” (Source 9.36)
Wyborcza,\textsuperscript{39} by a series of publications “Czas patriotów (The time of patriots),” presenting different suggestions as to what formula and name for modern patriotism would be most appropriate. This series of publications further illustrated the commitment of this center-left publication to fostering open discussion. Among the contributors to this cycle was historian Tomasz Łubieński (Source 9.37), who proposed a ‘patriotism of peace.’ Jan Oldakowski, conservative director of the Museum of the Warsaw Uprising, countered this proposition (Source 9.42), and retorted that war patriotism was still relevant, and that it was modern and should not be abandoned, given the uncertainty over what the future would bring. The same argument had already been used by the conservatives philosophers in the early 2000s in defending their exhibition ‘Heroes for liberty:’ they too claimed that one could never assume that sovereignty and peace had been achieved for good (Source 4.13). Others contributors to this cycle proposed such names as ‘patriotism of cooperation,’ or ‘patriotism of constructive criticism’ (Wigura and Gutkowski, Source 9.39). In general, those willing to go beyond the Romantic manifestation of patriotism put the accent on the need of an open, liberal patriotism promoting the respect of law, the work ethic, and responsibility for the country and society.

In the contestation over the meaning of patriotism in the aftermath of the catastrophe, the pillar of the liberal approach, Marcin Król (Przegląd Polityczny, \textsuperscript{39} Jakub Zielinski noticed that Gazeta Wyborcza actively participated in the debate about patriotism following the crash, publishing many more articles discussing this concept than in other periods (e.g. before the admission to NATO, or to the EU). However, his analysis shows a strong negative bias against Gazeta Wyborcza, as he draws the conclusion that it was attempting to deform people’s understanding of the mourning and of patriotism, without any comparison to other sources or other interventions of intellectual elites. Jakub Zielinski, “Nie jestem wrażliwa na wzniosłą symbolikę polskiego patriotyzmu” – dyskurs wokół katastrofy smoleńskiej na przykładzie publikacji “Gazety Wyborczej” (“I’m not sensitive to the grandiose symbolic of Polish patriotism” – discourse surrounding the Smolensk catastrophe in Gazeta Wyborcza),” Working Paper prepared for Ogólnopolski Zjazd Socjologiczny Polskiego Stowarzyszenia Socjologicznego, Kraków 8-11 September 2010, available on http://www.pts.org.pl/public/upload/0055niejestemwrazliwainawznioslasymbolikepolskiwpatriotyzm u-f8709.pdf, accessed on 4 April 2014.)
Source 9.126), reconfirmed his rooted liberal views expressed over the past 20 years\textsuperscript{40} that patriotism (to the community of Poles) should be characterized by both free choice and some forms of obligation (because an individual is part of the collective). He concluded that, generally, in modern societies patriotism had not disappeared, but had gone through a process of pluralisation. In consequence, even if one accepted the liberal, pluralist patriotism, one needed to be aware that such choice was never the only one. Hence, the aforementioned conviction that there were two types of patriotism (two Polands, etc.) seems too restrictive in this light.

Among other examples of discussing liberal patriotism, it is worth mentioning a conference co-organized by 

_Gazeta Wyborcza_ with _Liberte!_ and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in September 2010 (Source 9.68). This conference testified to the consolidation, in the aftermath of the Smolensk catastrophe, of a coherent liberal approach to patriotism, in coalition with the left-wing, and in opposition to the Romantic approach. The conference participants built on the aforementioned idea of liberal patriotism presented by Król. Wojciech Przybylski described it as patriotism based on choice, acceptance of the fact that everybody loves the fatherland in his or her own way, and that no one should aim for a monopoly over Polishness:

“this form of patriotism implies the acceptance of the postulate that every Pole thinks about Poland differently and loves his imagined fatherland in a different way. Król underscores that no one can have a monopoly over Polishness, and patriotism is based on choice today. It is a liberal pleasure rather than a traditional duty.”\textsuperscript{41}

Przybylski advocated for a patriotic education that would instill respect for the institutions of liberal democracy. To his mind, this type of education was necessary to overcome what he considered to be ‘the handicap of Polish patriotism,’ i.e. a type of

\textsuperscript{40}Marcin Król, _Patriotyzm przyszłości (Patriotism of future)_ (Warszawa: Szklane domy, 2004).

\textsuperscript{41}“Taki rodzaj patriotyzmu oznacza przyjęcie założenia, że każdy Polak o Polsce myśli inaczej i każdy swoją wyobrażoną ojczynę kocha na swój sposób, niemożliwy do opowiedzenia we wspólnocie. Król podkreśla, że nikt nie może mieć patentu na polskość, a patriotyzm dzisiaj polega na wyborze. Jest więc liberalną przyjemnością, a nie tradycyjnym obowiązkiem.” (Source 9.198)
patriotism focused on fight, and not on work for the community, given that it developed mostly in parallel to or outside the state (during the partitions, wars and communism). In his opinion, fostering people’s attachment to democratic institutions would be profitable for the exercise of civic duties and more generally for the political culture of Poland. His position was an attempt, after the moment of Romantic exaltation, to reconnect with more nuanced and civic stances about patriotism that had been discussed throughout the democratic transition. In a similar vein, Leszek Jażdżewski, interviewed by left-wing outlet Przegląd Socjalistyczny, underscored how important it was to fill the concept of patriotism with new content, and go beyond the historical and cultural baggage that pushed Poles towards Romantic stances – a tendency that to his mind was no longer adapted to a free and liberal democratic Poland (Source 9.197). He also discussed the difference between liberal patriotism, developed in context of the existence of nation-states, and constitutional patriotism based on ‘openness’ (theorized by Jan-Werner Müller, among others) - which could only emerge in countries where there had been no strong community or the existing one had failed, prior to the creation of a new Constitution (Przybylski in Res Publica Nowa, Source 9.198). The framing of this distinction contributed again to the view that liberal, or critical, patriotism as conceptualized in Poland could not be perceived as a form of constitutional patriotism (cf. Chapter 6).

7.5 Progressive polarization of the public discourse
The debate that occurred in the aftermath of the Smolensk catastrophe (and its iterations on the occasions of its anniversaries) was highly complex, and brought together a number of intricate issues concerning national identity and the way of expressing it through language and gestures. Commentators discussed why people
cried after the death of the president, why they did it in the way they did it, what it said about their patriotism, and the symbols that were mobilized.

In 2010, it was possible to observe a spontaneous interpretation and expression of patriotism in what was a difficult moment for the community. In times of peace the everyday patriotic approach based on civic virtues could be seen as enough, or at least as a basis for intellectual discussion. It was not the case in a tense moment when people needed strong symbols and discourses, and this led quasi-automatically to a resurgence of Romanticism. A number of liberal intellectuals thus reiterated the call for a new, civic and open patriotic formula, going beyond the old Romantic one that resurfaced with great strength, and was turned into a kind of exclusive patriotism (or even nationalism, by the conservatives). This Romantic patriotism was critically analyzed by liberal and left-wing *Publizists*, who, even if they insisted on the need to bring together patriotism of form (of intentions) with patriotism of aims (focusing on everyday duties), were often reduced to reactive, critical stances towards the conservative view on patriotism, which achieved a hegemonic position:

“Patriotyzm – to może najmocniej zawłaszczone przez prawicę pojęcie. Obowiązuje model martyrologiczno-religijny, ofiarny. Do tego klubu nikt nie jest wpuszczany bez autoryzacji politycznego biura patriotów. Inne odmiany umiłowania kraju nazywane są patriotyzmem piknikowym albo bezobjawowym i uznawane za bezwzględnie albo szkodliwe.” Frequent contributors to left-wing weekly *Polityka*, Mariusz Janicki, Joanna Podgórska, and Ewa Wilk presented this acute conclusion in 2012, in their analysis of the supremacy of the conservatives over public discourse. (Source 9.105)

The martyrlogic patriotism of Jarosław Kaczyński should not be identified with the whole Romantic tradition, because it was rather a mix of selected frames that could prove useful in the political fight. The eruption of a martyrlogical narrative,
the references to Polish messianism and the awkward invocation of Sarmatian-Romantic patriotism were criticized not only from liberal or leftist positions but also, occasionally, from religious ones. In 2011, a conservative-Catholic *Publizist* Filip Memches, for instance, objected in *Rzeczpospolita* to the selective use of references to Romanticism, and expressed his reservations concerning a community built on emotions (Source 9.145). In his view, ‘neo-Messianists’ tried to sacralize Poland not in a religious way but as a kind of civic religion. One of his strongest objections was directed at “Sarmatian patriotism.” He considered that without the reference to Christ expected in messianic positions this type of patriotism becomes a pagan cult of heroes, politically useful but spiritually unproductive. It was one of the rare criticisms of political messianism from a strictly religious standpoint. Articles published on the occasion of anniversaries of the catastrophe confirmed the lack of a new political or patriotic language and the monopolization of the concept of patriotism by the conservatives, who managed to overpower the liberal Poles with their modern patriotism.

Indeed, the opportunity for a political reconciliation over coffins was lost, and the political divide between the PO and PiS kept growing deeper over time, despite the initial coming-together during the national mourning period. This was due partly to the radicalization of the PiS rhetoric since 2005, when it won the legislative elections and was in power for two years (cf. Chapter 5). The PiS progressively tried to monopolize the catastrophe, the mourning and its aftermath, and started using it instrumentally for achieving political goals, after Jarosław Kaczyński lost the

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43 Messianic positions are rather expected within Romantic tradition of patriotism, hence Memches also contributed to an attempt at blending together republican with Romantic patriotic traditions.

44 Geneviève Zubrzycki (“History and the national sensorium: making sense of Polish mythology,” *Qualitative sociology* 34, no.1 (2011), 27) shows how messianism became a narrative for interpretation of Polish history, when from a ‘blasphemous’ idea, it became interwoven with the myth of Polish intrinsic religiousness, and started being promoted by the Church itself.
presidential elections. It is significant that while the party did not use confrontational language during the electoral campaign, conservative Publizists, for example in Rzeczpospolita, did. But after the elections, PiS’ politicians again started dividing the political elites (and the society on the whole) into ‘patriots’ and ‘traitors’ (Gazeta Wyborcza, Source 9.27), and its representatives did not participate in the official commemorations of the catastrophe organized by the PO government (Polityka, Source 9.92). With time, they started embracing and developing conspiracy theories about the crash and its causes.

The division of Poland into two seems to have become a permanent fixture in Polish public discourse. For example, in a confrontational discussion between Publizists of different ideological leanings published in 2012 by the right-wing Catholic weekly Gość niedzielny, the two opposing camps were labeled ‘Wolni Polacy (free Poles)’ and ‘lemingi (Lemmings),’ which broadly corresponded to the aforementioned categories of ‘real’ and ‘normal’ Poles (Source 9.53). The former camp was positively linked to the defense of ‘classical (national) Polish values’ that were perceived to be in danger, and the latter to the supporters of the PO, and to an image of a society of self-contented consumers, depicted in a derogatory manner. Indeed, the opposition between two Polands (even if it was demonstrated before that there were more than two discourses) was at some point renamed the ‘Polish-Polish war’ (Tygodnik Powszechny, Source 9.156), and was used as a proof that there was no political nation (based on shared willingness to participate in the same community), because of the existence and permanence of this figurative, or at best discursive, civil war (as suggested in Teologia Polityczna, Source 9.200). This polarization on fundamental values has been framed ever since as an expression of ‘cultural wars.’
The division into true and false patriots operated by the PiS affected the party itself (where the right-wing ‘hawks’ started dominating closer to the centre ‘doves’) and so became a truly ubiquitous political weapon. It can be illustrated by the exclusion of the ‘Museum people’ close to Lech Kaczyński from the party in November 2010, and the ensuing conflict over the right to the intellectual and political heritage of Kaczyński between the ‘Museum people’ and Jarosław Kaczyński. To some extent, the party even entered into a conflict with the Church (its usual ally), over the question of perpetuating the influence of the catastrophe in the public sphere:

“Love determines the proper boundaries of any mourning. But a cemetery cannot become our temple or our home”.  

This statement, part of the letter of the Episcopate on the occasion of the first anniversary of the catastrophe, pointed to the fact that the time of mourning is an important spiritual experience after the loss of important people, but should not be perpetuated beyond the necessary time, and that the dead should not become the object of a cult. One year after the catastrophe, Prelate Nycz, known for his moderate position, explicitly suggested that the mourning should end, but Jarosław Kaczyński maintained that the mourning could not end before a statue of the deceased president would be erected in a central location in Warsaw. That way, the deadlock between the conservatives and the more moderate forces continued.

45 The circle of PiS members and associates called ‘Museum people’ included e.g. Joanna Kluzik-Rostowska, Jan Ołdakowski, Elżbieta Jakubiak, Marek Cichoń, Paweł Kowal and Dariusz Gawin. They cooperated with Lech Kaczyński while he was Mayor of Warsaw in the creation of the Museum of the Warsaw Uprising, and later in PiS. Since late 2010 those who were party members were progressively excluded from the party by Jarosław Kaczyński, and the others also ended their ideological alliance with PiS.

All in all, the crash strongly affected the Polish public and political spheres and continued to divide them. The analysis of the public debate in the aftermath of the catastrophe shows an increasing polarization of the public discourse. Once again, the community of Poles has proven to be a myth rather than a tangible reality. The conservative monopolization of the concept of patriotism, thanks namely to their skillful use of Romantic references, turned the motive of the ‘two Polands,’ into an actual political reality. Consequently, the ‘cultural war’ that pits the proponents of the national community against the proponents of civil society is likely to continue.
Chapter Eight - Conclusion

The concept of patriotism has enjoyed a sustained presence in the public discourse in Poland over the last 25 years, and has been a strong feature of a number of public debates. This analysis has focused on the usage of the word ‘patriotism’ itself by different intellectual actors and on the meaning that the concept thus obtained in specific contexts in function of who used it and with what intention.

While the renowned historian Aleksander Smolar concluded in the 2010 debate that it was more interesting to understand the phenomenon of constant debating about the nature of patriotism than the meaning of the concept itself (interviewed in Znak, Source 9.169), this project has also analyzed the content of the concept, using the tools of conceptual analysis in its textual, contextual, and morphological aspects. The analysis sought to study the dynamics of the contestation and establish which arguments managed to attain a certain level of importance qua domination at a certain point in time, and for what reasons. In this way, insights from a discursive perspective were combined with theoretical and conceptual ones. Thanks to this approach, the concept of patriotism could be linked to broader issues related to the Polish public sphere, political culture and public discourse. The analysis showed the evolution of the topics that were discussed with relation to and through the concept of patriotism. These topics included, among others, the nature of the political community, and democracy.

In the public debates over the meaning of the concept of patriotism, the involved actors oftentimes clashed over the question whether there was one or whether there were several (legitimate) conceptions of patriotism, and some of them called for a new definition of patriotism. Yet the real object of their discussion was
whether different conceptions of patriotism ought to co-exist, and, even more importantly, whether they could co-exist. The contention focused around determining which patriotic formula was best adapted to the current geopolitical situation, and to the newly established democratic regime. For this reason, the struggle to impose one’s vision of patriotism included the need to proclaim it ‘modern.’ This emphasis on the ‘modernity’ of patriotism mirrored a broader trend in the public sphere: a willingness of determining what modernity was, and what path of modernization the country should take after communism – whether it should be a liberal path associated with the West, or rather a traditional one rooted in national history and culture. It also illustrated a certain skepticism towards the concept of post-modernity, which supposedly entailed moral relativism and a questioning of religious and cultural dogmas.

The significance of the contestation over the concept of patriotism provided a number of contributions. The subsequent two sections will provide concluding remarks related to the contestation over different conceptualizations of patriotism (Section 8.1), and the interpretation of the significance of the concept of patriotism for the broader political sphere, its culture and its political languages (Section 8.2). Finally, the limitations and direction of further research will be discussed (Section 8.3).

8.1 Patriotism – a story of contestation
The concept of patriotism has been approached here from its common definition as ‘the love of one’s country.’ However, both of these ineliminable elements, love and country, were also objects of contestation. The discussions early in the democratic transition concerned mainly the idea and the nature of the country, and different possible forms of fatherland, community, and nation. Later debates focused more on
the nature of ‘love’ and the required allegiance, pondering whether it should be unconditional and rooted in (national) history and tradition, or rather conditional and dependent upon the respect for certain rules and values.

8.1.1 Discussing the ‘country’ – the object of patriotic allegiance
The newly rediscovered sovereignty in 1989 prompted a call for the development of a new definition of patriotism that would be able to reconcile the democratic regime with tradition and national values. Consequently, the discussions led by intellectuals about the fatherland in 1992, about the relationship between patriotism and nationalism in 1997, and about the nature of patriotism in 1998, sought to propose a way of dealing with the communist heritage, its discursive deformations and damages done to political culture. By rediscovering plural visions of the fatherland (private and public, spiritual, etc.) and multiple possible ways of creating a community, in a more civic (society) or national (but not nationalist) manner, the intellectuals tried to encourage people not to retreat into their private sphere, or to neglect their civic duties, such as voting. They also tried to foster the development of trust in the state and in politics, so that citizens felt compelled to contribute to its good. These debates clearly discussed the ‘country’ component of the definition of patriotism and provided intellectual tools and references for later debates.

The emergence of the ideological opposition between the conservative and the liberal positions can be traced back to the very beginning of the democratic transition, but at that time different intellectuals (coming from different generations: born before or after the Second World War; being emigrants under the communism, or not, etc.) were committed to finding a compromise approach to the new political reality. A liberal-conservative approach, proposed by Marcin Król in 1992, and further developed by older intellectuals, Jerzy Szacki and Jerzy Jedlicki in 1997, can be
considered such a solution. It implied the acceptance of a pluralist point of view and intellectual references, the selection of some elements of (national) tradition, and their rooting in (national) history and memory. Furthermore, it presented a certain skepticism towards the very possibility of a political definition of the nation, or of purely political type of national or patriotic allegiance, as opposed to a historical approach to this question. The importance of constructing a strong community was put forward in this respect, showcasing the need to redefine the relationship between the citizens and the state, promoting more civic engagement. A criticism of the Romantic frames and templates of the political culture and public discourse, that were deemed no longer appropriate for times of peace and the construction of a strong democratic regime, also characterized this approach.

The three debates in the initial years of the democratic transition (Chapter 4) discussed which way forward should be adopted. From the beginning of the democratization, the importance of reconstructing the fatherland, based on an ineliminable aspect of community rooted in history and culture, was shared. However, the assessment of the ongoing democratic transformation and of the way forward for achieving modernization was mixed. The liberal nature of economic and social reforms was criticized from conservative positions as the triumph of ‘neutral’ language, and of ‘cold’ procedural modernism, over community, deemed necessary to reinforce people’s attachment to the new regime. This alleged triumph of ‘cold modernism,’ pejoratively dubbed as ‘normality,’ was criticized by the conservative intellectuals for allegedly pushing people to retreat into ‘warm anachronism,’ described as more cozy, but archaic, and potentially nationalist. For this reason, intellectuals reflected on whether it was possible to bring together national values with (liberal) democratic ones to construct strong foundations for the new regime. In
such discussions patriotism was described as a more territorial notion, and to a certain extent an archaic one, superseded by the rise of nationalism, since the 19th century. No clear delimitation between the two concepts was offered nor was a rehabilitation of nationalism at the semantic level achieved. Patriotism continued to be used to describe different types of allegiance, including to the nation.

8.1.2 Discussing ‘love’ – the nature of patriotic allegiance

Until 2000, the ‘window of opportunity’ for an inclusive deliberation was still open; dialogue between different ideological positions was possible, even if it started becoming highly polemical. The situation changed progressively in the second decade of the transition. The new, strong intellectual circles, federating younger generations of intellectuals: the conservative one (that emerged around 1995, within Warszawski Klub Krytyki Politycznej, the Warsaw Club of Political Critique), the leftist one (in the early 2000s, Krytyka Polityczna, Political Critique) and the liberal one (around mid-2000s, Liberte), set the tone to further debates, leading to their progressive polarization. The debates in the second decade of the transition concerned rather the ‘love’ element of the definition of patriotism, as they focused on the nature of the necessary allegiance, and on what the essence of the good of the country should be: fight or work, critical or unconditional love, etc. Different attempts at fixing the meaning of patriotism, used to achieve the hegemony over this concept and public discourse, were strongly related to topics discussed in specific debates.

8.1.2.1 Communitarian patriotism

The debate sparked by the exhibition “Heroes of our liberty,” organized by the conservatives in 2000 on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Solidarity, opposed

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2http://www.omp.org.pl/stareomp/index6c84.html?module=pagesetter&func=viewpub&tid=1&pid=64
3http://www.krytykapolityczna.pl/
4http://liberte.pl
for the first time different visions of patriotism. The exhibition showed pictures of unknown heroes of the fight for independence from the time of the Second World War, and asked whether people would still be ready to die for their fatherland. The ensuing discussion included a fight between the liberal proposition of ‘patriotism of minimal means’ (based on civic virtues) and the conservative proposal for imposing itself as the modern approach. The conservatives, initially put on the defensive by liberal philosopher Magdalena Środa, managed to deny the label of civic and modern to the liberals, monopolizing it for themselves, and maintained that the necessity of accepting the possibility of sacrifice of life for liberty, even in times of peace, remained valid. This move allowed Marek A. Cichocki to frame their strong communitarian proposition as a third way between the ‘minimalist’ liberal option and the ‘maximalist’ nationalist one. This proposition achieved a certain intellectual prominence because of the positive approach of older liberals, such as Jerzy Szacki and Jerzy Jedlicki, who nevertheless underscored the importance of civic virtues, allowing for their permanence as an important element of reflection over type of patriotic allegiance.

It is worth noting that different liberal conceptualizations of patriotism in Poland remain strongly entangled with questions of national memory and history, prompting the conclusion that a purely political type of community or allegiance is not thinkable in the Polish political space as it exists today. The communitarian position, proposed by the conservatives, can be considered as closer to a compromise solution. The conservatives try to fix their proposal with the idea of ‘modern,’ patriotism, the perception of the fatherland as community and the republican understanding of civil society, linked to the tradition of the First Republic.
8.1.2.2 ‘Affirmative’ versus ‘critical’ patriotism

The Jedwabne debate, in 2000-2001, following the publication of Jan Tomasz Gross’s book *Sąsiedzi* about a pogrom in 1941 in which Polish inhabitants of Jedwabne murdered their Jewish neighbors, prompted another open discussion on patriotism. This debate initiated the revisiting of the self-image of Poles as heroes and victims of the war, and of the history of the Polish-Jewish relations. Two strong camps were opposed in this debate: the critical one (inclined to perform a critical re-evaluation of past, uncover the dark pages and accept responsibility for it) and the ‘affirmative’ one (defensive towards discussing the past in a critical manner, and denying responsibility). The breadth and impact of this discussion was many a time positively assessed as a first, important step in the ‘un-lying of the past,’ pointing to the importance of the critical camp. Within this debate, progressive Catholic intellectuals such as Jarosław Gowin, suggested the need for a more open understanding of patriotism that would encompass tolerance and responsibility for the other.

However, this discursive openness was reversed a few years later, when the conservative intellectuals labeled the open approach confronting dark moments of the past ‘critical patriotism,’ in an attempt to diminish its value. They countered it with what they called an ‘affirmative’ approach, within the conceptual framework of the ‘politics of history’ that they established for the conservative party PiS. The rise of PiS to power in 2005, and its governmental coalition with the populist *Samoobrona* and the nationalist LPR was characterized by the implementation of a number of ‘patriotic’ initiatives. Their “Patriotism of tomorrow” aimed at promoting an affirmative vision of the nation’s past and history. These initiatives illustrated the

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5 Gross, *Sąsiedzi*.
6 Gawin, “Krytyczny patriotyzm.”
7 Szeligowska, “La ‘politique historique’ polonaise,” 82.
transposition of intellectual propositions of the conservative philosophers to a political level via the introduction of specific public policies by the conservative party. It showed a simplification of ideas that gave basis to political initiatives, and their radicalization, also due to the participation of the LPR in the government. This enactment of a coherent ideological conservative framework, and its strong impact on the domain of politics and public policies, contributed to the increasing polarization of the public discourse. The impact of this discursive radicalization could be felt in the discussions over two subsequent books by Gross on Polish-Jewish relations, in 2008 and 2011, in which the critical stance and the associated ‘discourse of morality,’ strongly established in the Jedwabne debate, were overpowered by the ‘affirmative’ approach prompted by ‘politics of history.’ Also for that reason, the liberal proponents of the critical approach tried to re-label ‘critical patriotism’ as ‘mature patriotism,’ so as to defend and salvage its contribution to uncovering the dark past and incorporate the responsibility for it to the realm of collective identity.

Already in the debate concerning the ‘politics of history’ (2005-2007), the left-wing intellectuals from Krytyka Polityczna participated in the discussion about the desirable form of patriotism. Their publication How many fatherlands, how many patriotisms? linked to Lipski’s powerful 1981 essay about two types of patriotism commented on the current political and ideological situation, opposing the conservative to the liberal approach. The left-wing intellectuals tried to pave the way for a left-wing, third approach, which was even mildly critical towards ‘critical patriotism,’ considering that it was still framed as an approach to national history, hence insufficient to propose a new form of allegiance. Furthermore, they linked a number of pet topics to the discussion of patriotism, in order to ensure them a better

8 Syska, Ile ojczyzn? Ile patriotyzmów?
resonance and visibility in the public discourse at large, with some success. These topics included the question of combating the discrimination of minorities,9 or the reflection over the role and status of women in Poland, in an overly patriarchal and religious structure of domination, proposed by one of the leading feminist thinkers, Agnieszka Graff.10

8.1.2.3 Romantic patriotism
Finally, the discursive polarization with regard to the concept of patriotism culminated following the crash of the presidential airplane in 2010. The Romantic11 tropes, criticized in a number of previous discussions, were temporarily re-instated and imposed themselves as dominant in the public discourse, due to their use by the conservatives, implying that they embodied the ‘true’ patriotism of ‘real Poles.’ After the initial call for community and unity in the national mourning, the decision to bury the tragically deceased president in one of the symbolical national burial places, the Wawel Royal Castle in Kraków, fractured this community and contributed to reinforcing the ‘culture wars’ between the two camps: the conservative party and a group of Publizists supporting it, sliding more and more towards nationalism, and all the others who dared to have ‘dissident’ opinions. In this difficult moment for the community, the reference to patriotism was strongly colonized by a non-reflexive reversion to its Romantic tradition, sometimes curiously and confusingly mixed with the Sarmatian one (linked to the First Republic from the 16th-18th centuries). This move testified again to the conservatives’ attempt at shaping concepts, in this case republicanism, to abide by their preferred communitarian reference. This resurgence

10 Agnieszka Graff, “Feminizm, patriotyzm, religia (Feminism, patriotism, religion),” in Magma, idem. (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej 2010).
11 The proponents of Romanticism would tend to speak about neo-Romanticism, while its critics about post-Romanticism.
of strong Romantic tropes provoked young liberals close to *Liberte! And Res Publica Nova* to reinforce their efforts to protect the reference to liberal patriotism, and the left-wing intellectuals to call for salvaging rationality in the public sphere, against emotions prompted by Romanticism.

The competition for the dominance over the public sphere, initially deliberative and polemical, progressively became much more polarized. This contestation can be perceived as consistent with the aim of de-contesting the meaning of a given concept, by different ideologies, and with the discursive premise of a willingness to achieve a hegemony over the public discourse and over the definition of its constituent elements. Different ideological groups, the conservatives, the liberals and the left-wing, took part in the contestation. Even if the liberals consistently emphasized pluralism, also in the domain of identity and patriotism, their struggle with the conservatives over the recognition of their vision of patriotism as the modern one provided relatively little opportunity for the emergence of a genuine compromise solution, though it also allowed for the co-existence of different approaches in the public sphere.

8.2 Insights from the discussions of patriotism for public sphere and political culture

No single new definition of patriotism became dominant over the analyzed period. Rather, the concept of patriotism was increasingly used to promote a given political agenda, or to discredit the opponents. The conservative point of view started to achieve dominance in the public and political spheres in the mid-2000s, thanks both to a coherent ideological framework that the conservative party PiS deployed during its government (2005-2007), and to the emergence of a peculiar right-wing bipartisanism, between the conservative PiS and the more liberal PO. The
conservatives attempted to monopolize the concept of patriotism, and present themselves as its sole rightful depositaries, so as to exclude their opponents from the discursive field of contestation, a process that can be best understood with reference to Koselleck theory of creating counter-concepts.\textsuperscript{12} However, given that patriotism remained one of the key concepts, other ideological camps did not give up the contestation over its meaning and tried to impose their counter-narratives, linking them to a number of issues high on their political agenda to ensure them a stronger political visibility.

8.2.1 Loving the country more versus loving it better?
Despite the fact that the concept of patriotism was constantly used in the immediate political discourse and fight, the ideological contestation was deeper, and intellectuals used it to frame the public and political debate and impose their vision of society and common good to others.

The conservative proponents of the ‘real Poland’ claimed to love the country more than their opponents. In the aftermath of the plane crash the PiS chose to be the symbol of such rhetoric, in an attempt to achieve hegemony over the political sphere, but later on the party also became its hostage. The constant use of such divisive symbols pushed the PiS onto the path of unavoidable polarization of the discourse, leading also to the exclusion of more moderate members from its ranks. Intellectuals of liberal or left-wing leaning maintained their conviction that they loved Poland ‘better,’ or in a more ‘mature’ way. Hence, while the conservative post-Romantics used the concept of patriotism in the political realm to mobilize their supporters behind the ‘true’ Poland, the liberals tried to link it to a civic stance, and position it as a contribution to the common good by work, not by fight.

\textsuperscript{12} Koselleck, \textit{Futures past}, 155-191.
Their respective approaches towards democracy can also be best understood thanks to this conservative vs. liberal dichotomy. The liberal view held that only mature democracy would provide conditions for the development of open patriotism that would be self-critical and accept the coexistence of people of different ideological convictions. A not fully settled democracy would perpetuate the risk of a closed, defensive ‘patriotism of a besieged fortress.’ For liberals, democracy has an inherent value, its procedures are supposed to guarantee fairness, equal treatment and set the framework for modernization and development of civil society. The conservatives, to the contrary, believe that the ‘cold’ democratic project is inferior to the ‘warm’ community. They also value the national community more than the utility of (civil) society.

In a sense, the difficulty of distinguishing discourses of nationalism and of patriotism is linked to the preference for society or nation. The reference to the nation, so long as a historical or cultural definition is preferred to a political one, is linked to nationalism and remains to a certain extent in opposition to the liberal conception of democracy. The parallel between society and patriotism might be less obvious. Nevertheless, the potential association between the concepts of patriotism and society would imply a more civic approach, where (civil) society provides a framework for the exercise of civic virtues and duties (and liberal democracy).

8.2.2 Patriotism – a dividing or uniting concept
The dynamic of the debates about patriotism pushes us towards the conclusion that in Poland the concept of patriotism divides instead of uniting; paradoxically, it contributes to polarizing the people, rather than creating the community. The everlasting, and even obsessive dream of unity idealizes the short moments in the collective memory when unity existed (e.g. the opposition to communism,
Solidarność), but cannot make them last. One can thus concur with the opinion of political scientist Robert Brier that “few scholars analyzing politics and society in Poland’s Third Republic fail to recognize the deeply divisive influence that debates over collective identity, religion or history have on the country’s political discourse.”\footnote{Brier, “The roots of the “Fourth Republic,”” 63.} Indeed, the debates about the meaning of patriotism also contribute to such divisions and remain structured by a number of powerful cleavages, namely the motives of ‘two Polands’ and of ‘two nations,’ opposing ‘real Poles’ to ‘normal Poles’ or ‘real patriots’ to ‘traitors.’ Most of these oppositions were fleshed out recently, and the vast majority of them in the aftermath of the plane crash of 2010, and in the context of a resurfacing of Romantic ideals and discourses. It nevertheless proves that the political discourse remains an axiological conflict, confined to the symbolical sphere. While people, on the whole, voice a strong distrust of politics, politicians contribute to perpetuating the ‘Polish-Polish war,’ which does not generate dialogue or positive energy, but fosters exclusion and the dismissal of the opponents’ arguments.

**8.2.3 Permanence of multiple intellectual positions**

Despite the fact that often the intellectual or ideological oppositions over patriotism have been framed as an opposition between two ideological camps, conservative versus liberal, a strong third position emerged in the course of the 2000s, in the form of a leftist intellectual circle that since then has also engaged in the contestation. However, the liberal and left-wing groups of intellectuals or languages are often collapsed together by their opponents into one category that is opposed to the dominant conservative one, in order to create a simpler dichotomy. However, as this thesis has shown, this longstanding opposition between liberals and conservatives,
that structures the public discourse, actually reflects a deeper cultural conflict over the core values of a modern democracy.

The conflict over values between the liberals and the conservatives also coincides with the fact that the old cleavage between the left and right wings is being re-conceptualized. A rather conservative historian of political thought, Grzegorz Kucharczyk, suggests that in Poland, one of the main factors of this cleavage is the position towards the current regime, the Third Republic.\textsuperscript{14} While the right wing strongly criticizes it, calling it a faulty transformation of the communist regime into a post-communist one, and even aspires to transform it into a Fourth Republic, the left wing intellectuals and politicians are more appreciative of it.

The renowned Polish sociologist Mirosława Grabowska points out yet another dimension of the left-right cleavage. In her view, this cleavage is increasing about clashing worldviews,\textsuperscript{15} and understandings of the role of tradition. In other words, she sees the divide as being over the question of whether politics should be fought and defined in terms of civil society and liberal values, or rather in terms of the ‘nation’ and of national values. This opposition between the concepts of the nation and civil society reconfirms the conclusions of the analysis of debates about patriotism, showing that the newest face of Polish ‘culture wars’ is indeed related to the opposition between civic and national values.

However, the analysis of the contestation over the concept of patriotism led with a broader focus on political discourses (or ideologies) allows us to go beyond such schematic oppositions as between left and right wing or conservatives and liberals. The analysis clearly shows a growing radicalization of the political discourse

\textsuperscript{14} Kucharczyk, \textit{Polska myśl polityczna}.
\textsuperscript{15} Grabowska, Podział postkomunistyczny.
of the conservative party, but also elucidates a progressive transformation of the liberal approach. In the beginning of transition, the older liberals were more prone to search for a conciliatory position with communitarian stances put forward by the conservative intellectuals; later on, the younger liberal intellectuals underscored the need for maintaining a strongly liberal, and civic approach to patriotism. This shows that even camps that are not traditionally associated with patriotism, such as the liberals or the left-wing, cannot be disregarded in the conceptual contestation because they strongly voice their views (at least the intellectuals from Krytyka Polityczna and Liberte! do so) and do not want to become marginalized in debates about crucial political concepts.

These constant debates about patriotism also prove the sustained multiplicity of conceptual and political references that remain available to intellectual and political actors. As mentioned earlier, already in the 1980s, the members of the democratic opposition such as Lipski developed a reflection concerning two types of patriotism, in which they opposed a more civic version of patriotism to a nationalist pride in everything Polish. After the end of the communist regime, a number of actors discussed what was civic and modern. Liberally minded intellectuals suggested a reconstruction of the idea of the fatherland via a selection of different elements of tradition, settling with a kind of liberal conservative approach, firmly grounded in national history and memory. Around 2000, it was also a strategy of the conservative intellectuals to dissociate themselves from strict nationalism, and instead bring together their robust communitarian patriotism grounded in traditional references (sacrifice of life and solidarity) with a republican vision of civil society, understood as the positive freedom of political participation. While this approach opposed the liberal negative freedom, it nevertheless provided a viable discursive option for developing a
vision of allegiance to a community based on historical grounds, without sliding towards a nationalist approach. The emergence of such approach was enabled by earlier discussions concerning notably the possibility of developing a liberal nationalism in Poland (in the 1997 debate), combining national values and democratic liberal ones, and by the appreciation of this point of view by older liberals.

All the aforementioned conceptual developments occurred prior to or around 2000, in the form of a mainly intellectual debate. Only after that date that can one observe their progressive transposition into the political sphere, leading to a polarization of the discussion, and a slow but steady process of monopolizing the reference to concepts such as patriotism by the conservative PiS. Yet options other than conservative do not disappear and other political camps have different languages and conceptualizations of patriotism at their disposal to discuss the question of allegiance, and of political community. The liberal conservative party PO can distinguish itself from the PiS, by using a more civic liberal nationalist language without falling into the ‘affirmative’ category. The policies of President Bronisław Komorowski, since his election in 2010, constitute an example of such approach. On the one hand, he is promoting a vision of patriotism grounded in history (e.g. with an exhibition of historical Polish flags), and supporting initiatives joyfully celebrating the political community (e.g. Orzeł może, The Eagle can).

On the other hand, he also subscribes to the discussion about modern, civic patriotism by promoting a

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16 This social campaign was promoted by Gazeta Wyborcza and the Third Program of the Polish Radio, on the occasion of the Day of the Flag, celebrated in Poland on May 2, in order to fight with the stereotype of the sad and resentful Pole, and promote the living of participation in the political community is an open and cheerful way. Jarosław Kurski, „Orzeł może,” Gazeta Wyborcza, April 17, 2013.
reflection over the regime change, the state of today’s civil society and the achievements of 25 years of freedom.\textsuperscript{17}

The co-existence of different ideological and conceptual paths of defining patriotism also give space for other contestations of the conservative vision, such as the one proposed by Janusz Palikot’s party, \textit{Ruch Palikota}, rejecting post-crash Romantic tropes by building on the civic virtues approach developed by Środa. The left-wing intellectuals, in turn, try to revive the interwar traditions of left-wing thought, and link their perception of patriotism to the state, the promotion of civil society and to questions of minorities.

Hence, while the power dynamic shows the progressive domination of the conservative approach with respect to using and defining the main understanding of patriotism, it does not triumph integrally. Other patriotic ‘languages’ remain present in the field of contestation. They do not, at the moment, guarantee discursive or political hegemony to their users but they make it possible to discuss different important topics related to the community, its past and history, and open up the discussion over its critical reevaluation. Even if purely constitutional or liberal positions are rare, the moral and political discussion is still present and possible.

\textbf{8.3 The evaluation of the analysis and openings for further research}

Patriotism remains a key political concept in Poland. It has been debated by intellectuals of different ideological allegiance, aiming at fixing its meaning, in some of the most important Polish public debates of the last twenty five years. In order to understand the importance of the concept for broader political thought, the traces of these discussions as echoed in \textit{Publizistik} were analyzed under three main aspects:

\textsuperscript{17}\url{http://www.prezydent.pl/witryna-obywatelska/witryna-obywatelska/}
textual, contextual and morphological. The textual analysis assessed the content and dimensions of intellectual positions, on both synchronic and diachronic levels, while the contextual dimension made it possible to put them in a broader perspective. The morphological analysis of the concept of patriotism placed it in the network of other inter-related concepts, in order to assess different possible paths of its definition.

The application of these methods has focused both on the question of de-contesting (fixing) of the meaning of concepts by specific intellectuals, and on the hegemony that the social actors are looking to achieve. In this way, it has drawn both on the morphological study of concepts, as proposed by Michael Freeden in his study of ideologies,18 and offered a discursive focus on signifiers as proposed for example by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. In their work on hegemony,19 Laclau and Mouffe focused on specific tropes of naming (labeling) and defining concepts as strategies aiming at achieving domination over the public discourse and sphere.

This research has evaluated whether the intellectual efforts for re-defining patriotism in the context of the democratic transition produced novel conceptual understandings. No new fully-fledged theory of patriotism emerged after 1989. The new conceptual developments are nevertheless of key importance. Not only it is the case of the strengthening of the communitarian position developed by the conservative intellectuals, but also of its challengers, using liberal, ethical and civic arguments to develop positions that are able to confront the hegemonic position in specific intellectual constellations. Despite the recurring and intense efforts from intellectuals from all across the political spectrum there has not been any discursive closure.

18 Freeden, Ideologies and political theory, 13-139.
The empirical analysis of the dynamics of the public debates has provided insights on the nature of Polish political culture and public sphere. The crucial embeddedness of the concept of patriotism in the public discourse and the impacts it might have on the country’s cultural, historical and foreign policies made it a valid object of this research. Given that the concept of patriotism has been discussed within some of the most important public debates after 1989, concerning ‘politics of history,’ Polish-Jewish war relations and the approach to national history, and during the period of national mourning following the Smolensk crash, the conclusions allow to reach a better understanding of Polish political sphere on the whole and of the disagreement over its values, discourses and concepts. Here as well, the opposition between civic and national positions stands out. This opposition, often conceptualized using the motive of ‘two Polands,’ shows a deep and structuring divide on the question of values. The civic approaches underscoring the importance of (civil) society tend to have a positive appreciation of the democratic transition and liberal democracy as such. The national approaches, focusing on the importance of the nation, are skeptical, or occasionally outright critical, concerning these questions. This opposition has theoretically the potential to have illiberal consequences, because of the strength of discourses criticizing the liberal democracy. So far however, this has not been the case. To the contrary, the discursive contestation respects the rules of democratic polity, despite its growing polarization.

This analysis was a case study of an important case in Central and Eastern Europe. Its primary ambition was not to propose universally valid generalizations of its conclusions, but to look into the concept of patriotism, and most importantly into the re-negotiation of its meaning during the democratic transition. This does not preclude a comparative approach as an avenue for further research. Comparison with
other countries of the CEE region (Hungary, or Slovakia among others) would be especially relevant in order to put into perspective the complexity of Polish debates and the lasting presence of different ideological options. It would not be unreasonable to expect that these characteristics are unique to Poland within the region, given its historical intellectual legacies as well as political context. Future research on the topic of Polish debates about patriotism could also develop an approach not via concepts (patriotism), as was the case in this project, but via ideologies, in order to fully assess the importance and the place of the concept of patriotism in their respective conceptual morphologies. The analysis could also be enriched by a more semantic textual analysis or rhetorical approach, making explicit the strategies of individual intellectuals towards influencing the meaning of concepts.

As a case study in the history of political thought, concentrating on the concept of patriotism, this analysis focused on public debates as expressed in the intellectual field, represented by a comprehensive selection of the most important outlets of intellectual opinions (the leading newspapers, and their op-ed and editorial sections). This necessarily implies that other venues for the contestation over the concept of patriotism have been excluded, for instance: expressions of the broader public opinion, increasingly articulated on the Internet, or opinions voiced in tabloid press as well as in arts and culture. The fact that possible debates and contestations over the concept of patriotism in these fields were not taken into account by this dissertation, as they did not correspond to its aims, does not mean that they do not exist or are of lesser importance. In fact, they would constitute an interesting avenue for future research into different aspects of discussing Polish patriotism.

The analysis focused on a wide array of sources, from the mainstream press that were part of the selected debates over the meaning of the concept of patriotism.
While the editorial line of specific newspapers was considered one of the influencing factors, it has also been noted that it could change depending on the incumbent editor-in-chief. Such changes did not necessarily impact on the positions of specific intellectuals voiced in these titles. Nevertheless, the editorial line had an impact on the variety of intellectual opinions voiced within one specific publication, respectively enhancing or limiting the scope of the discussion. For instance, the conservative daily *Rzeczpospolita* can be taken as one of the crucial examples of the influence of the editorial line on the scope of the discussion with respect to discussing Polish-Jewish relations. In the Jedwabne debate (2000-2001), the daily contributed to a deep reflection over the question of Polish-Jewish relations and the responsibility for Polish crimes against the Jews during the Second World War. However, in mid-2000s, after the change of the editor-in-chief, *Rzeczpospolita* took more conservative positions, supporting the ‘defensive’ camp, and making the following debates in 2008 and 2011 much shorter, and more aggravated. The question of editorial lines of different publications was not analyzed in depth, and it could be a valuable element of further study, reinforcing the contextual dimension of the analysis.

The conclusion one can form on the question of the public sphere and political culture, based on the debates about patriotism, is that the mainstream discourse in Poland is undergoing a growing radicalization and polarization. It is commonly accepted that Polish political culture was formed under the partitions, and is based mostly on Romantic templates. This idea is coherent with the national mythology, imprinted with the question of national survival (linked to Catholicity) and the fight
for independence and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{20} Even if, throughout the democratic transition, in the debates about the meaning of patriotism, intellectuals of different ideological circles have challenged Romantic frames, no substantial change, in a liberal or civic vein, has occurred so far. This is exemplified notably by the references used during and in the aftermath of the national mourning in 2010. The strength of the Romantic model demonstrates that no new values or cultural codes for political culture were successfully created during the transition, and that the national reference still stands firm. To be called a ‘good patriot,’ or to monopolize the right to call someone ‘good patriot,’ remains a strong political leverage. Furthermore, the poetic of the Romantic pathos reinforces the tension between the real world and the sphere of idealized values. This dualism, which has risen to become the main characteristic of Polish political culture, impedes hopes for constructing a lasting unity, on social or political level, that would firmly support the liberal democratic regime.

\textsuperscript{20} Zubrzycki, “History and the national sensorium.”
Appendices

Appendix 1 – Sources used in the analysis

The Appendix 1 provides the full list of sources that were used in the analysis in the empirical chapters.

1. 1992 – The debate about the fatherland in Tygodnik Powszechny, launched by an article of Marcin Król “Ojczyzna”

The theme of the discussion in 1992 was the fatherland, what it was, and what it could or should be after communism.

The articles from Tygodnik Powszechny (1992)

1.1 Król, Marcin. “Ojczyzna (Fatherland),” 6/92, 9 February.
1.2 Lem, Stanisław. “Strach przed Ojczyzną (Fear of fatherland),” 8/92, 23 February.
1.3 Herling-Grudziński, Gustaw. “Społeczeństwo (Society),” Letter to Jerzy Turowicz, 10/92, 8 March.
1.4 Legutko, Ryszard. “Ojczyzna, słowo wstydliwe (Fatherland, a shameful word),” 11/92, 15 March.
1.5 Marzys, Zygmunt. “Cóż z tą Ojczyzną (What with this fatherland)?” 12/92, 22 March.
1.6 Piskorowa, Krystyna. “Język okrągły jak pomarańcza (Language as round as an orange),” 12/92, 22 March.
1.7 Porębski, Mieczysław. “Ojczyzna i ludzie (Fatherland and people),” 13/92, 29 March.
1.8 Wasiutyński, Wojciech. “Ojczyzna przeciw narodowi (Fatherland against nation),” 14, 5 April.
1.9 Nowak-Jeziorański, Jan. “Najdroższy wyraz (The sweetest word),” 15/92, 12 April.
1.10 Sobolewski, Tadeusz. “Co zrobić z Peerelem (What to do with PRL)?” 16/92, 19 April.
1.11 Brandys, Marian. “Ojczyzna (Fatherland),” 18/92, 3 May.
1.12 Romanowski, Andrzej. “Najmilszy okręt (The sweetest ship),” 19/92, 10 May.
1.13 Wolicki, Krzysztof. “W Ojczyźnie we szklanych paciorków (In the fatherland of glass beads),” 20/92, 17 May.
1.16 Drawicz, Andrzej. “Węż i coś jeszcze (Smell and something more),” 23/92, 7 June.
1.17 Orłoś, Kazimierz. “Polska nasza powszednia (Our everyday Poland),” 28/92, 12 July.
1.18 Żychniewicz, Tadeusz. “Ojczyzna (Fatherland),” 31/92, 2 August.
1.19 Stomma, Stanisław. “Ojczyzna (Fatherland),” 33/92, 16 August.
1.20 Nowak-Jeziorański, Jan. “Czy emigrant może zabrać głos (Can an emigrant take the floor)”, 41/92, 11 October.
2. 1997 - Nation, nationalism and patriotism – debate in Znak
The articles composing this discussion come from a thematic edition of Znak, from 1997, “Naród – przeszłość czy przyszłość? (Nation – past or future?)”, in which the authors reflected about the question of conceptual definition(s) of nation, nationalism and patriotism, and bringing together national and liberal values.

The articles from Znak, vol. 502/1997

2.1 Szacki, Jerzy. “O narodzie i nacjonalizmie (About nations and nationalism).”
2.2 Walicki, Andrzej. “Czy możliwy jest nacjonalizm liberalny (Is liberal nationalism possible)?”
2.3 Jedlicki, Jerzy. “Nacjonalizm, patriotyzm i inicjacja kulturowa (Nationalism, patriotism and cultural initiation).”
2.4 Król, Marcin. “Narodowy albo liberalny (National or liberal)?”
2.5 Kłoskowska, Antonina. “Skąd i po co naród (Nation – where from and what for)?”
2.6 Radzik, Ryszard. “Co to jest naród (What is a nation)?”
2.7 Samsonowicz, Henryk. “Bogactwo narodu (The richness of nation).”

3. 1998 – dialogue between Gustaw Herling-Grudziński and archbishop Józef Życiński

The exchange of letters between writer Gustaw Herling-Grudziński and archbishop Józef Życiński, on patriotism (one among five ‘dialogues’) was published in Więź, vol. 481, 1998. Both authors discussed the transformation of patriotism, its causes and consequences.

The articles from Więź, vol. 481, 1998

3.1 Herling-Grudziński, Gustaw. “Cicha cnota patriotyzmu (Silent virtue of patriotism).”
3.2 Życiński, Józef. “Polskie kolory ciszy (Polish colours of silence).”

The exhibition “Bohaterowie naszej wolności – Heroes of our liberty” (gathering pictures of unknown fighters for Polish liberty in the Second World War) organized by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage under the conservative Minister Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski took place in 2000. A number of reactions to the exhibition appeared in the press. In 2002, a thematic issue of Znak “Jak być patriotą (How to be a patriot)” collected more reflections provoked by the exhibition.

**A. Immediate reactions to the exhibition**

4.0 [http://www.mikolaj.org.pl/bohaterowie-naszej-wolnosci](http://www.mikolaj.org.pl/bohaterowie-naszej-wolnosci) Description of the project and the introduction of Minister Ujazdowski to the exhibition.


And reactions to it:

4.2 Wojciechowski, Piotr. “Polska z pawlaca zmartwychwstała (Poland resurrected from the attic)”. *Rzeczpospolita*. 6 December 2000.


And reactions to it:


4.8 Sulek-Kowalska, Barbara. “Są wśród nas (They are among us)”. *Niedziela*. 49/2000.


4.10 Cichocki, Marek. “Solidarystyczne podstawy patriotyzmu (Solidaristic bases of patriotism).”

4.11 Szacki, Jerzy. “O potrzebie patriotyzmu (About the need of patriotism).”

4.12 Najder, Zdzislaw. “Kto potrzebuje patriotyzmu (Who needs patriotism)?”

4.13 Karłowicz, Dariusz. “Śmierć i ojczyzna (Death and fatherland).”

4.14 Jedlcki, Jerzy. “List z czyśica (Letter from purgatory).”

4.15 Krasnodębski, Zdzisław. “O czasach postpatriotycznych (About post-patriotic times).”

Around the mid-2000s, the circle of young conservative intellectuals (Marek Cichocki, Dariusz Gawin, Tomasz Merta, Dariusz Karłowicz, Jan Oldakowski, Robert Kostro, etc.) developed and introduced into the public discourse the concept of ‘politics of history.’ It aimed at promoting an affirmative vision of the national past. The concept of ‘politics of history’ was incorporated into the political and electoral program of the conservative party PiS, and it contributed to its victory in both parliamentary and presidential elections of 2005.

A. Articles published prior to the electoral victory of PiS, concerning mostly the concept of politics of history:

5.5 Grzybowska, Krystyna. “Nacjonalistyczny patriotyzm (Nationalistic patriotism)”. *Wprost*. 51/2004
5.7 Kosela, Krzysztof. “Choroba na Polskę (Sickness for Poland)”. *Tygodnik Powszechny*. 27 June 2005.
5.12 Ostrowski, Marek. “Dobrzy, źli, nieobecni (The good, the bad, the absent)”. *Polityka*. 14 August 2004.
5.17 Tazbir, Janusz. “Służba ojczyźnie, służba sakiewce (The service to fatherland, the service to money)”. *Polityka*. 10 January 2004.

B. 2005-2007

The following articles were mostly published during the government of PiS, and relate to a number of its political initiatives, e.g. “Patriotism of tomorrow.”

*Dekada Literacka* 220 (2006) “Szkola patriotyzmu krytycznego (School of critical patriotism)”.
5.19 Kozicki, Marek. “Szkola patriotyzmu krytycznego (School of critical patriotism)”.
5.20 Robotycz, Czesław. “Wczoraj i dzis patriotyzmu (Patriotism today and yesterday)”.
5.21 Jarzębski, Jerzy. “Gombrowicz – patriota? (Gombrowicz – patriot?)”.
Urbanowski, Maciej. “Patriotyzm Bobkowskiego (Patriotism of Bobkowski)”.
Bocheński, Tomasz. “Jedyny czyn i tego nie móc spełnić (The only act – and not being able to do it))”.
Fiut, Aleksander. “Korzyści z bycia „gdzie indziej” (The advantages of being elsewhere)”. Majcherek, Janusz. “Patriotyzm miejsce (Patriotism of places)”.
Śpiewak, Paweł. “Kwestia lojalności (The question of loyalty)”.
Mencwel, Andrzej. “Senne marzenie (The dream)”.
Sowa, Janek. “Co dziś znaczy (dla mnie) patriotyzm? (What does patriotism mean (for me))”.
Piskor, Stanisław. “Komu szkodzi patriotyzm? (Who is damaged by patriotism?)”.
Wyka, Marta. “Czy z Polską da się romansować? (Can one have an affair with Poland?)”.

Dziennik

“Jak Polacy widzą patriotyzm (How Poles see patriotism)”. November 10, 2007.
“Polski nacjonalizm jest niezwykle łagodny (Polish nationalism is particularly mild)”, Interview with Ewa Thompson. 31 March 2007.
“Polski patriotyzm po przejściach (Polish patriotism after difficulties)”. (Debate with the participation of Cezary Michalski, Wiesław Chrzanowski, Dariusz Gawin, Tadeusz Łubiński). 10 November 2006.
Dudek, Antoni. “Coraz więcej Polaków dumnych z ojczyzny (More and more Poles are proud of fatherland)”. 10 November 2007.
Ołdakowski, Jan. “Oprócz zadumy potrzebujemy też radości (Apart from reflection we also need joy)”. 10 November 2007.

Gazeta Wyborcza:

“Po co nam polityka historyczna (Why do we ned politics of history)” (Debate with the participation of Dariusz Gawin, Tomasz Łubiński, Janusz A. Majcherek, Tomasz Merta, Milada Jędrysik)”, 30 September 2005.
“Po co rzędzić historią (Why to rule history)” (Debate organized by Fundacja Batorego, with the participation of Marek A. Cichocki, Maciej Janowski, Zdzisław Krasnodebski, Marcin Król, Joanna Tokarska-Bakir, Daria Nałęcz, Dariusz Stola, Zbigniew Bujak, Halina Bortnowska, Dariusz Gawin). 14 July 2007.
“Czy państwo ma rzędzić historią (Shall the state govern history)”, (Debate with the participation of Jerzy Jedlicki, Tomasz Merta, Barbara Engelking-Boni, Andrzej Friszke, Zbigniew Gluza, Daniel Grinberg), 16 June 2006.
Bachmann, Klaus, “Jutro patriotyzm (Tomorrow patriotism)”, 9 November 2008.
Graff, Agnieszka. “Polskość nie jest własnością endeków (Polishness is not owned by Endecja)”. 23 August 2007.
Graff, Agnieszka. “Patriotyzm to nie nacjonalizm (Patriotism is not nationalism)”. 24 August 2007.
5.50 Janowska, Katarzyna, and Piotr Mucharski. “Nie ma prawdziwych Polaków (There are no true Poles)”, Interview with Norman Davies. 31 March/1 April 2007.
5.51 Jarecka, Dorota. “Szukanie nowego patriotyzmu (Search for the new patriotism)”. 26 November 2006.
5.58 Kurski, Jarosław. „Ślepa miłość patriotyczna (Blind patriotic love)”. Interview with Jacek Bocheński. 2 July 2006.
5.60 Machcewicz, Paweł. “Jak polityka zaszkodziła polityce historycznej (How politics damaged politics of history)”. 14 September 2007.
5.62 Pawłowski, Roman. “Ministerstwo nauczy patriotyzmu (Ministry will teach patriotism)”. 13 January 2006.
5.65 Pezda, Aleksandra. “Sienkiewicz woli z Gombrowiczem (Sienkiewicz prefers with Gombrowicz)”. 2 June 2007.
5.67 Pezda, Aleksandra. “Gombrowicz won (Gombrowicz, go away!)”. 4 July 2007.
5.69 Romanowski, Andrzej. “Majsterkowicze naszej pamięci (Handymen of our memory) (1)”, 1 March 2008.
5.73 Skarga, Barbara. “Inteligencja zamilkła (Intelligentsia fell silent)”. 14/15 January 2006.
5.77 Wolff-Powęska, Anna. “Jak dziś być patriotą (How to be a patriot today?)”. 22 September 2006.
5.78 Zawada, Albert. “Patriotyzm niedorozwinięty (Handicapped patriotism)”. Interview with Krystian Lupa. 4 June 2007.
5.79 Żuradzki, Tomasz. “Patriotyzm jest jak rasizm (Patriotism is like racism)”. 17 August 2007.

Gość niedzielny
5.80 “Pytania o patriotyzm. Nikt za nas nie opowie następnym pokoleniom naszej historii i tradycji (Questions about patriotism. Noone will tell our history and tradition to future generations)”, Interview with Barbara Fedyszak-Radziejowska. November 19, 2006.
5.81 Ujazdowski, Kazimierz Michał. “Moda na patriotyzm (Fashion for patriotism)”. 1 January 2006.

Krytyka Polityczna
5.82 “Quo vadis szkoło (Quo vadis school)?”. 31 May 2006.
5.83 Gdula, Maciej. “Między patriotyzmem a faszyzmem (Between patriotism and fascism)”. 4 December 2006.
5.84 Smoleński, Jacek. “Polska niektórych Polaków (Poland of some Poles)”. 4 November 2007.

Polityka
5.87 Pietrasik, Zdzisław. “Pojedynek Gombrowicz z Sienkiewiczem (Duel between Gombrowicz and Sienkiewicz)”. 14 October 2006.
5.90 Tazbir, Janusz, “Dziejochciejstwo, dziejokrętactwo (Historical wishful thinking, historical falsifications)”. 10 February 2007.
5.91 Władyka, Wiesław “Elita musi pytać (Elite must ask questions)”. Interview with Jerzy Jedlicki. 9 September 2006.

Polska/The Times
5.93 Syrewicz, Klara. “Patriotyzm krytyczny (Critical patriotism)”. Interview with Norman Davies. 10 November 2007.
5.94 Sierakowski, Sławomir. “Z patriotyzmem problem mają elity (Elites have problems with patriotism)”. 10 November 2007.

Pressje
5.95 Lubelski, Jakub. “Czy patriota może nie być nacjonalistą (Can a patriot be nationalist)?”. 6-7 (2006).

And the reaction to these articles:
5.97 Staniłko, Jan Filip. “Dlaczego warto być (polskim) patriotą (Why is it worthy to be (Polish) patriot)?”. Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej. 13 February 2007.
**Przegląd**


5.100 Walencjak, Robert “Śmieją się z Kaczyńskiego (They laugh at Kaczyński)”. Interview with Magdalena Środa. 16 May 2006.


**Przegląd Polityczny**


**Rzeczpospolita**


5.108 Gawin, Dariusz. “Gombrowicz jako wychowawca Polaków (Gombrowicz as a tutor for the Poles)”. 10 November 2006.


5.114 Terlikowski, Tomasz, “Po diabła narody (Why the hell nations)?”. 15 September 2007.

**Teologia Polityczna**


5.117 Merta, Tomasz. “Patriotyzm jutra (Patriotism of tomorrow)”, re-edited on 9 April 2011.

5.118 Semka, Piotr, “Alergia na patriotyzm (Allergy to patriotism)”. 25 March 2006.

5.119 Żurawski, vel Grajewski, Przemysław. “Narody piszące i narody czytające historię (Nations that are writing and nations that are reading history)”. 4 (2006-2007).

**Wprost**

5.120 “Muzeum Historii Polski finansuje “Patriotyzm jutra” (Museum of History of Poland finances “Patriotism of tomorrow”)”. 14 January 2011.

5.121 “Tani patriotyzm (Cheap patriotism)”. 10 November 2007.
C. Post-2007 developments

In 2007, PiS lost the anticipated legislative elections. However, the controversy about the program “Patriotyzm jutra” continued as the new Minister of Culture and National Heritage, Bogdan Zdrojewski reduced it. The following articles were also used in the analysis, in order to assess the aftermath of PiS government and the approach of different political camps to patriotism.

Dziennik

5.135 Łagowski, Bronisław. “Patriotyzm, albo o potędze starych nawyków (Patriotism or about the power of old habits)”. 3 July 2009.

Gazeta Wyborcza
5.140 “Co ma państwo do historii (What has the state to do with history)?”. (Debate with the participation of Zbigniew Głuza, Jerzy Jedlicki, Dariusz Stola, Andrzej Friszke, Janusz Tazbir). 14/15 June 2008.
5.141 “Patriotyzm jutra, czyli brydż w ruinach (Patriotism of tomorrow or playing bridge in the ruins)”. 24 April 2008.
5.142 “Po co nam te narody (What for these nations)?”. (Debate with the participation of Robert Traba, Adam Michnik, Marc Nouschi and Gesine Schwan). 16/17 February 2008.
5.144 Blumsztajn, Seweryn. „Ponure miasto patriotów (Dull city of patriots)”. 24 April 2008.
5.145 Czech, Mirosław. „Moje obywateelskie doniesienie na IPN (My civic denunciation of IPN)”. 23 June 2008.
5.146 Czech, Mirosław. „Dwaj Żeromscy IV RP (Two Żeromskis of the Fourth Republic)”. 28/29 June 2008.
5.147 Czech, Mirosław. “Jeszcze historia nie umarła (History has not perished yet)”. ¾ January 2009.
5.148 Czuchnowski, Wojciech, and Adam Leszczyński. “Gontarczyk, maczuga na komunistów (Gontarczy, a club against communists)”. 21/22 June 2008.
5.152 Leszczyński, Adam. “Kiedy historyk może być ścieżwiodadem (Every historian can be a scoundrel)”. Interview with Karol Modzelewski. 24 April 2009.
5.153 Machcewicz, Paweł. „Śledczy w przebraniu historyków (Investigators dressed as historians)”. 18 June 2008.
5.154 Olszewska, Dominika. “Nie tylko prawica ma prawo do patriotyzmu (Not only the right-wing has right to patriotism)”, Interview with Bartosz Dominiak. 7 November 2008.
5.156 Romanowski, Andrzej. “Nie lubię 11 listopada (I don’t like 11 November)”. 7 November 2008.
5.157 Skowrońska, Małgorzata. “‘Dama’ rusza w podróż (“Lady” sets off on a journey)”. 8/9 August 2009.
5.159 Strąk, Beata. “Biskupi o patriotyzmie, pijanych i politykach (Bishops about patriotism, drunkards and politicians)”. 15 August 2009.

Krytyka polityczna
**Polityka**

5.167 “Dumania narodowe (National reflections)”. (Debate with the participation of Adam Szostkiewicz, Magdalena Środa, Tomasz Wołek). 04 (2009).


5.169 Kołodziejczyk, Marcin. “63 dni na minutę (63 days per minute)”. 8 August 2009.

5.170 Krzemiński, Ireneusz. “My, swojacy (We, the common people)”. 2 December 2008.


5.172 Paradowska, Janina. „Twierdza IPN (The stronghold IPN)”. 5 July 2006.


5.177 Szostkiewicz, Adam. “Strzał w plecy (Shot in the back)”. 5 March 2011.

5.178 Szostkiewicz, Adam. “Polska wykrzykników (Poland of exclamnation marks)”. Interview with Jan Ołdakowski. 2 May 2012.

5.179 Władyka, Wiesław. “Skumbrie w tomacie (Mackerels in tomato sauce)”. 21 March 2009.

**Przegląd**


5.181 Lakanowski, Jacek. “Patriotyzm jutra do śmieci (Patriotism of tomorrow to the garbage bin)”. Przegląd, 22 (2008).

**Przegląd Polityczny**


**Rzeczpospolita**

5.185 “Debata Rzeczypospolitej w 90. Rocznice odzyskania niepodległości (Debate of Rzeczpospolita on the occasion of 90th anniversary of regaining independence)”. 10 November 2008.

5.186 Baranowska, Kamila. “Między realizmem a idealizmem (Between realism and idealism)”. 8 December 2008.

5.187 Cieślak, Jacek. “Ciągle coś nas zniewala (Something always enslaves us)”. Interview with Agnieszka Holland. 3 December 2008.

5.188 Cieślak Jacek. “Rozmawiajmy z Sienkiewiczem (Let’s talk with Sienkiewicz)”’. Interview with Jan Klata. 20 February 2009.

5.189 Cisek, Janusz. “Wielki Polak i jego epoka (Great Pole and his epoch)”. 4 February 2009.

5.190 Kaczyński, Lech. “Polska jest jedna (There is one Poland)”. 31 December 2008.

5.191 Kuchniarz, Bartłomiej. “Polska we własnym pokoju (Poland in its own room)”. 7 March 2009.
Manys, Karol. “III Rzeczpospolita ma także dobre cechy (The Third Republic also has good characteristics)”. 12 November 2008.

Masłoń, Krzysztof, and Tomasz Stańczyk. “Czym innym jest pamięć, czym innym historia (Memory is one thing, history is another one)”. (Debate with the participation of Marcin Kuła, Paweł Machcewicz, Andrzej Paczkowski, Tomasz Szarota, Marcin Zaremba). 26 April 2008.

Migalski, Marek. “Wszyscy muszą być kibicami (Everyone has to be a supporter)”. 11 June 2008.

Mistewicz, Eryk. “Skradzione sztandary braci Kaczyńskich (Lost banners of the Kaczyński brothers)”. 7 April 2009.

Masłoń, Krzysztof, and Tomasz Stańczyk. “Czym innym jest pamięć, czym innym historia (Memory is one thing, history is another one)”. 26 April 2008.


Nowicka, Justyna. “Jak rozumieć sarmatyzm (How to understand Sarmatism)”. 17 February 2009.

Radziwiłł, Anna, Choińska-Mika, Jola. “Końca historii nie będzie (There will not be an end of history)”. 29 December 2008.


Cichocki, Marek “O afirmacji polskości (About the affirmation of Polishness)”. Interview with Jarosław Marek Rymkiewicz 5 (2009-2010)

Leszczyński, Adam “Narodowy sposób wiązania sznurowadel (National way of tying the laces)”. Gazeta Wyborcza. 8/9 August 2009.

Semka, Piotr “Brzydkie słowo “podmiotowość” (Ugly word “subject”)”. Rzeczpospolita. 12 August 2009.

Boniecki, Adam. “Ani miejscem, ani językiem, ani strojem (Not by place, nor by language, nor by dress)”. 23 June 2009.

Grabowska, Mirosława. “Za wolność naszą i waszą (For our and yours freedom)”. 23 June 2009.


Skurzak, Ludwik. “Genetyczny patriotyzm? (Genetic patriotism)”. Available at http://prawica.net/node/3045, accessed on 3 April 2012.

Staniłko, Jan F. “Dlaczego Polska potrzebuje neosarmackiego republikanizmu (Why does Poland need a neosarmatian republicanism)?”. Arcana 86/87 (2009).
Debates following the publication of Jan Tomasz Gross books

The decade of 2000s was marked by three debates that occurred in the aftermath of publication of books of Jan Tomasz Gross on Polish-Jewish relations:


A. The foundations of “Critical patriotism”: 

1. Lipski, Jan Józef. “Dwie ojczyzny, dwa patriotyzmy (uwagi o megalomanii narodowej i ksenofobii Polaków) (Two fatherlands, two patriotisms (comments on national megalomania and xenophobia of Poles))”. NOVA 1981


These three articles, published in the 1980s tried to launch a debate about Polish-Jewish relations during the Second World War and in its aftermath. In the middle of 2000s the authors of these articles were given the label of “critical patriots,” by the conservative intellectuals, coherent with their framework of an affirmiative ‘politics of history:’


6. The Jedwabne debate - following the publication of Neighbours in 2000:


6.4 Borównowska, Halina. “Gdy sąsiad nie ma imienia (When a neighbor has no name)”. Gazeta Wyborcza. 27-28 January 2001.

6.5 Bugaj, Ryszard. “Prawda historyczna i interes materialny (Historical truth and material interest)”. Gazeta Wyborcza. 6-7 January 2001.


6.7 Czaja, Dariusz, “To nie “oni”, niestety (Unfortunately it is not ‘them’)”. Gazeta Wyborcza. 16/17 December 2000.


6.44 Wilkanowicz, Stefan. “Kilka myśli o odpowiedzialności i patriotyzmie (A few thoughts on responsibility and patriotism)”. *Znak*. February 2001

6.45 Żakowski, Jacek. “Każdy sąsiad ma imię (Every neighbor has a name)”. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 18 November 2000.


7. Articles following the publication of *Fear* (2008):


7.4 Cichy, Michał. “Przepraszam Powstanców (I apologise to the insurgents)”. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 23 December 2006.

7.5 Davies, Norman. “‘Strach’ to nie analiza, lecz publicystyka (“Fear” is not analysis, but publizistic)”. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 21 January 2008.

7.6 Friszke, Andrzej. “Gross i chłopcy narodowcy (Gross and the nationalist boys)”. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 23 February 2008.


7.8 Gross, Jan Tomasz. “Wyjaśniam, że krew na moim ubraniu ...(I explain that the blood on my clothes...)”. *Tygodnik Powszechny*. 22 July 2006.

7.9 Jedlicki, Jerzy. “Tylko tyle i aż tyle (Only this, which is so much)”. *Tygodnik Powszechny*. 27 January 2008.


7.13 Libionka, Dariusz. “Ci nie są z ojczyzny mojej (These ones are not from my fatherland)”. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 23/24 February 2008.


7.18 Niemczyńska, Małgorzata I. “Żydzi nas atakują! Trzeba się bronić (Jews attack us! We need to defend ourselves)!”. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 11 February 2008.


7.26 Szaynok, Bożena. “Gross-moralista, a nie historyk (Gross is a moralist, not a historian)”. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 25 January 2008.


7.34 Zychowicz, Piotr. “Ludzi należy rozliczać indywidualnie (People have to be judged on individual basis)”. Interview with Marek Chodakiewicz. *Rzeczpospolita*. 11 January 2008.


8. Articles following the publication of *Golden harvest* (2011):


8.6 Bugaj, Ryszard. “Gross w niewoli stereotypów (Gross enslaved by stereotypes)”*. Rzeczpospolita*. 18 march 2011.


8.10 Gontarczyk, Piotr. “Wszyscy jesteśmy złodziejami (You are all robbers)”. Rzeczpospolita. 8 January 2011.
8.11 Gontarczyk, Piotr. “Jak złapią za rękę … (If they catch you red-handed)”. Rzeczpospolita. 19 February 2011.
8.12 Gontarczyk, Piotr. “Fachowcy od wszystkiego (Specialists of everything)”. Rzeczpospolia. 7 March 2011.
8.15 Gross, Jan Tomasz. “Przyjmijmy to z pokorą (Let’s accept it with repentance)”. Rzeczpospolita. 14 March 2011.
8.16 Hall, Aleksander. “Westerplatte i Jedwabne (Westerplatte and Jedwabne)”. Tygodnik Powszechny. 29 May 2012.
8.20 Kącki, Marcin. “Wszyscy kopali, tom i ja (Everybody digged, so I did too)”. Gazeta Wyborcza. 8 July 2011.
8.23 Kurkiewicz, Juliusz. “Rok biograficzny (The year of biographies)”. Gazeta Wyborcza. 30 December 2011.
8.27 Lisiecki, Pawel. “Kwestia odwagi (The question of courage)”. Rzeczpospolita. 7 January 2011.
8.31 Okoński, Michał. “Archeologia stodoly (The archaeology of the barn)”. Tygodnik Powszechny. 4 July 2011.
8.32 Olszewski, Michał. “Załoby nie było (There was no mourning)”. Interview with Irena Grudzińska-Gross and Jan Tomasz Gross. Tygodnik Powszechny. 8 March 2011.
8.36 Sadurski, Wojciech. “Gontarczyk, gęsty polemist (Gontarczyk, thick polemist)”. Rzeczpospolita. 11 March 2011.
8.38 Semka, Piotr. “O czym Gross nie wspomniał (What Gross did not mention)”. Rzeczpospolita. 31 March 2011.
8.39 Szczęsna, Joanna. “Jak Polska długa i szeroka (As Poland is long and wide)”. Interview with Barbara Engelking and Jan Grabowski. Gazeta Wyborcza. 8/9 January 2011.


8.43 Władyka, Wiesław. “To jest polska luka (This is the Polish gap)”. Interview with Andrzej Żbikowski. *Polityka*. 22 January 2011.


8.47 Zaremba, Piotr. “Gross musi się liczyć z bojkotem (Gross must count with a boycott)”. *Rzeczpospolita*. 23 March 2011.


8.49 Zychowicz, Piotr. “Złote żniwa na sowieckiej granicy (Golden harvest at the Soviet border)”. *Rzeczpospolita*. 29 April 2011.

9. 2010: Patriotism in the mourning

On 10 April 2010 a tragic plane accident took like of the President Lech Kaczyński and 95 members of the accompanying delegation, flying to Katyn for the commemorations of the 70th anniversary of the massacre of Polish officers by NKVD, during the Second World War. The debate that followed allows assessing how patriotism was depicted in an unprecedented moment for the national community and whether previous more theoretical debates bore their fruits in terms of developing its new, modern understandings. Below, within every specific publication, the sources are sorted by the date of their publication, not in an alphabetical order of authors, to showcase the development of themes of discussion.

Gazeta Wyborcza

9.3 Żakowska, Magdalena. “Śmierć, która wstecz sięgnęła (The death that reached to the past)”. Interview with Agnieszka Holland. 16 April 2010.
9.5 Włodek-Biernat, Ludwika. “Narodem się tylko bywa (We are nation only sometimes)”. Interview with Joanna Kurczewska. 19 April 2010.
9.6 Wiśniewska, Katarzyna. “Polskie społeczeństwo już jest bardzo patriotyczne (Polish society is already very patriotic)”. Interview with Miroslawa Grabowska. 23 April 2010.
9.10 Subbotko, Donata, “Prawdziwi Polacy idą na wojnę (Real Poles go to war)”. Interview with Janusz Czapinski. 29 April 2010.
9.15 Kalukin, Rafał. “Polaków łączy tylko ból (Poles are united only in pain)”. Interview with Stefan Chwin. 27 May 2010.
9.16 Leszczyński, Adam. “I jak tu być aktywnym obywatelem (And how can one be an active citizen)?”. Interview with Anna Giza-Poleszczuk. 5 June 2010.
9.21 Skowrońska, Małgorzata. “Nie ma drugiego Katynia (There is no second Katyn)”. 12 August 2010.
9.22 Skowrońska, Małgorzata. “Smoleńsk to nie Katyn (Smolensk is not Katyn)”. 13 August 2010.
9.23 Makowski, Jarosław. “Popóżałobę zaprowadzili (They have created pop-mourning)”. 20 August 2010.
9.24 “Hańba rządu, czy oczyszczenie atmosfery (The shame of the government of clearing out the atmosphere)”. 16 September 2010.
9.26 Wiśniewska, Katarzyna. “Straszny rok Kościoła (Horrible year of the Church)”. 16 April 2011.
9.27 Berendt, Joanna. “Działajmy, bo przestaniemy istnieć – profesorowie na kongresie z prezesem PiS (Let’s act, otherwise we will cease to exist – professors at the Congress with the president of PiS)”. 7 May 2011.
9.30 Beylin, Marek. “Gniew ludu smoleńskiego (The anger of the Smolensk’s people)”. 7 April 2012.
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9.37 Leszczyński, Adam. “Patriotyzm może być przyjemny (Patriotism can be pleasant)”. Interview with Tomasz Łubieński. 4 June 2010.
9.42 Wroński, Paweł. “Dwa patriotyzmy, oba potrzebne (Two patriotism, both needed)”. Interview with Jan Oldakowski, 8 June 2010.
9.43 Ruscał, Andrej. “Czym się różni patriotyzm po czesku od patriotyzmu po polsku (What is the difference between Czech and Polish patriism)” 9 June 2010.
9.46 Jakubowska, Anna. “Patriotyzmu nie można mierzyć (Patriotism cannot be measured)”. 10 June 2010.

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9.53 Łoziński, Bogumił. “Dwie wizje Polski (Two visions of Poland)”. Interview with Jacek Karnowski and Marek Zając. 8 March 2012.

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9.57 Erbel, Joanna. “Czy ulica ma prawo do żałoby (Does the street have the right to mourn)?”. 14 April 2010.
9.63 Szumowska, Małgorzata. “Boję się takiej żałoby (I am afraid of such mourning)”. 17 April 2010.
9.65 Tokarczuk, Olga. “Znowu zaczynamy przypominać plemię (We start resembling a tribe again)”. 19 April 2010.

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9.72 Michalski, Cezary. “Lewica po katastrofie (The left wing after the catastrophe)”. 9 May 2010.
9.74 Wilczak, Dariusz. “Kompleks Polski (The complex of Poland)”. Interview with Andrzej Zieniewicz. 16 May 2010.

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9.85 Smoczyński, Wawrzyńcic. “Nie możemy żyć fikcją (We cannot live in fiction)”. Interview with Andrzej Wajda. 22 May 2010.
9.90 Sarzyski, Piotr. “Dobre i ze pomniki (Good and bad monuments)”. Interview with Halina Taborska. 4 September 2010.
9.91 Szostkiewicz, Adam, “Godność i zaprzaństwo (Dignity and its lack)”. 29 January 2011.
9.94 Żakowski, Jacek. “Tamta mgła wraca (That fog keeps coming back)”. Interview with Michał Boni. 10 April 2011.
9.95 Paradowska, Janina. “Żałobna polityka (Mourning politics)”. 16 April 2011.
9.96 “Taka nasza pamięć (This our memory)”. 16 April 2011.
9.97 Zaremba, Marcin. “Program partii, programem narodu (The program of the party as the program of the nation)”. 30 April 2011.
9.100 Szostkiewicz, Adam. “Odcienie bieli i czerwieni (Shades of white and red)”. 26 November 2011.
9.104 Szostkiewicz, Adam. “Polska wykrzykników (Poland of exclamation marks)”. Interview with Jan Oldakowski. 2 May 2012.

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9.108 Przybylski, Wojciech. “Polacy to naród, nie społeczeństwo (Poles are a nation, not a society)”. 16 May 2010.

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9.115 Widacki, Jan. “Polska jest krypty (Poland is a crypt)”. 1 May 2010.
9.120 Walenciak, Robert. “Na Smoleńskich trupach po władzę (On Smolensk cadavers to power)”. 30 January 2011.
9.121 Piławski, Krzysztof. “Mity i Dolomity (Myths and Dolomites)”. 30 January 2011.

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9.122 Czapliński, Przemysław. “Dwa pogrzeby, jedna implozja (Two burials, one implosion)”. 
9.123 Hartman, Jan. “Oni zginęli w Smolensku, my nie (They died in Smolensk, not us)”. 

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9.158 “Jest plan pobytu premiera i prezydenta w Katyniu (There is a programme of the visit of Prime Minister and President in Katyn)”. 31 March 2010.
9.159 “Dziwisz: to nie ja proponowałem Wawel (Dziwisz: it was not me who proposed Wawel)”. 16 April 2010.
9.173 “Krzyż przed Pałacu Prezydenckiego usunięty! Trafil do kaplicy (The cross was removed from in front of the Presidential Palace! It was placed in the Chapel)”. 16 September 2010.
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