Governing the Muslim Communities: The Caliphate and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 1923-1926

By

Ivana Lazaroska

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Supervisor: Brett Wilson
Second reader: Tolga Esmer

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Abstract

This thesis examines the relationship between the Muslim communities of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and the institution of the Caliphate, between 1923 and 1926. It focuses on two particular events, one in 1923, when a delegation from the Kingdom was sent to Istanbul to take an oath of allegiance to the new and last Ottoman Caliph Abdülmecid II, and the other in 1926, when the Kingdom prohibited the Muslim communities to attend the Cairo Caliphate Congress. This thesis also shows how much of the Hapsburg and especially Ottoman infrastructure remained in the Kingdom. Transition from empires to a nation-state, as it argues, did not result in a profound break, but was a process that involved continuity. By focusing on, and shedding light on some of the neglected Ottoman continuities, in this case the relationship with the Caliphate as an institution and idea, the objective of this thesis is to contribute to scholarship that aims at integrating the Muslims of southeast Europe into scholarly debates about Islam, and reexamines the shared histories between the Middle East and this region.
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Lastly, I like to dedicate my work to my mother.
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<tr>
<td>DARM</td>
<td>Drzaven Arhiv na Raepublika Makedonija</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOA, OSSK</td>
<td>Istoriski Arhiv Ohrid, Okolski Sharijatski Sud Kicevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY</td>
<td>Archiv Yugoslavie, Belgrade, Serbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>BI</td>
<td>Bošnjački Institut, Sarajevo, BiH</td>
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<td>GHBB</td>
<td>Gazi-Hursev Beg Biblioteka, Sarajevo, BiH</td>
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<td>HL</td>
<td>Hoover Library, Stanford University</td>
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Introduction:

I realized that this country even now was more Turkish than many parts of Europeanized Turkey today; although the government is no longer that of the Sultan, the customs of this old regime change but slowly. (L.G.H. 1926)  

The following thesis examines the relationship between the Muslim communities of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and the institution of the Caliphate. The temporal scope is limited to the period between 1923, when a delegation from the Kingdom was send to Istanbul to take an oath of allegiance to the new and last Ottoman Caliph Abdülmecid II, and 1926, when the Kingdom prohibited the Muslim communities from attending the Cairo Caliphate Congress. It aims to enrich the historiography of this region on a micro level and the transnational history of the Caliphate on a macro level. By focusing on and shedding light on some of the “neglected Ottoman continuities,” in this case the relationship with the Caliphate as an institution and idea, the objective of this thesis is to contribute to scholarship that integrates the Muslims of southeast Europe into scholarly debates about Islam and reexamines the shared histories between the Middle East and this region.  

1 Lester George Hornby, *Balkan sketches; an artist’s wanderings in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes by Lester G. Hornby with illustrations by the author* (Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1927), 202, the author made this remark in the travel accounts of his tour throughout the Kingdom in the year 1926.  


the government of this post-Ottoman entity, “respected the ties between the Muslims and their spiritual leader.”

Within the framework of imperial legacies the following study will show how much of the Hapsburg and especially Ottoman modes of governing remained in the Kingdom. The transition from empires to a nation-state, as I will argue, did not result in a profound break, but was a process that involved continuity. In the limited scope of this analysis I do not provide in-depth analysis on the debates before and after the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey. Mona Hassan has a whole chapter dedicated to this in her book, and I used her research as a reference point for locating the similarities between the modernist intellectual circles especially in Bosnia and Turkey. With this in mind, it is also not the aim of this thesis to discuss the successfulness of the Cairo Caliphate Congress. Hassan has done extensive work on this and provides a nuanced analysis on the congress and its influence in the international discourse of the Caliphate. Building upon this, with my research I hope to offer a more nuanced understanding of the debates that emerged about the Caliphate between 1923 and 1926 within the Muslim communities of the Kingdom, and will show that “the quest for legitimate Islamic leadership,” as Hassan argues, “did not end with the demise of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924.”

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5 Hassan, Longing for The Lost Caliphate, 142-183.
7 Ibid, 4-6.
Literature Review

The failure of the first Kingdom is thoroughly examined in Christian A. Nielsen’s book *Making Yugoslavs: Identity in King Aleksandra’s Yugoslavia*. However, Nielsen’s top down history is focused primarily on the three dominant political parties of the kingdom: the Serbian Radical Party, the Croatian Peasant Party and the Slovene Peoples Party. Similarly, Ivo Banac’s seminal book, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History and Politics* analyzes the origins and different characteristics of Yugoslav ideology prior to 1918, and explores the unstable unification in 1918 which resulted with an adaptation of a centralist constitution in 1921. While Banac provides brief information about the minority politics of the kingdom at its inception, such as minorities’ political representation in the parliament, his analysis emphasizes the political and ideological divisions between the three major parties in parliament and the ultimate failure to build a strong state. Both of these books serve as a good reference for understating the political instability in the Kingdom during 1923 and 1926.

My research relies on recently published volumes on Muslim minorities in southeast Europe such as Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain’s *Islam in Inter-War Europe*, and Nathalie Clayer and Xavier Bougarel’s *Europe’s Balkan Muslims: A New History*, in order to conceptualize the historical contingencies of the Muslim communities in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Egdunas Racius and Antonina Zhelyazkova’s *Islamic Leadership in the European Lands of the Former Ottoman and Russian Empires*:

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Legacy, Challenges and Change, Inter-War Europe is a welcomed contribution for understanding to what extent these legacies linger in our contemporary societies. \textsuperscript{10} I also relied on Mona Hassan’s book Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History, for a better contextualization of the debates about the Caliphate within the Kingdom.

\textit{On Terminology}

The common abbreviation for the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is SHS. However, most of the documents used in this thesis, with the exception of one or two, use the term Kraljevina that translates to the Kingdom. I prefer the term “Muslim communities” and not “the umma” because none of the documents that I examine actually use or mention that term. The term muslimani is used almost exclusively, which simply translates to “Muslims.” In several occasions I came across the word “Muhammadeni” which translated to Muhammadans or “Arnauts,” which is the term used for Albanian Muslims. I find the term, “Balkan Islam” and “Balkan,” in the scope of my thesis, to represent a categorical error, especially because I deal exclusively with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The religious practices of the Muslim communities in the Balkan geographical region, were and still are as diverse as their ethnic and linguistic makeup. Moreover, the borders of where the Balkan region actually starts and ends are also contingent upon who is writing and at what point in history. The religious structures and religious representatives of the Muslim communities are also diverse and change throughout the history of the twentieth century. Lastly, I use the term

\footnote{Egdunas Racius, Antonina Zhelyazkova, Islamic Leadership in the European Lands of the Former Ottoman and Russian Empires: Legacy, Challenges and Change (Leiden: Brill, 2017).}
Muslims of Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims interchangeably because my sources do that as well.

**On Sources**

In trying to understand the 1923 trip to Istanbul and the ban on the Cairo Caliphate Congress in 1926, I rely mainly on archival documents from Serbia (Belgrade), and Macedonia (Skopje and Ohrid). I use correspondences between the Ministry of Religion of the Kingdom and the Supreme Mufti in Belgrade (1920 -1929) from the National Archive in Skopje, Macedonia. This also included a few documents from the Ministry of War and Navy. Additionally, I utilize a few documents that I collected in Ohrid, which were addressed from the Office of the Supreme Mufti in Belgrade to local muftis in South Serbia (Kičevo region in particular). At the Yugoslav Archives in Belgrade I recovered documents from the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which contained correspondences with Istanbul, in addition to a few from the Ministry of Religion, Muslim Department.

I recovered E.N. Bulbulović’s pamphlet *All-Islamic Congress and the Caliphate Question: Short and Informative Study About the Current Problems in Islam* (SveIslamski Kongres I Pitannje Halifeta: Kratka I Poucna Studija O Aktuelnim Problemima Islama) at the Bošniak Institute in Sarajevo. The pamphlet addresses the issue of the Caliphate in the wake of the Cairo Caliphate Congress. At the Hoover Library, I was able to locate an ethnographic booklet published in Serbo-Croatian in 1925, written by Dragiše Lepčevica, *About Our Muslims* (Драгиша Лепчевић, О Нашим Муслиманима). The two volume publication, titled *Reis Džemaludin Čaušević: Educator and Reformer* (Džemaludin Čaušević -Prosvjetitelj), edited by Enes Karič and Mujo Demirović, contains his writings
on different religious matters but also includes a variety of archival documents from his correspondences with the government while he was in office; this proved to be a valuable source in understanding his position in the Kingdom.

Finally, I use a few articles from the periodicals *Gajret* and *Politka* in order to capture voices outside of the archival documents. *Gajret*, as an association, was created in 1903 in Sarajevo, and in 1906 the first *Gajret* periodical was published. The editors and writers were Muslim intellectuals from Bosnia, but also South Serbia since the periodical was printed and distributed there as well.\(^\text{11}\) *Politika*, a newspaper published in Belgrade, which is still in circulation to this day, was more of a voice for the Serbian majority in the Kingdom, with strong nationalistic tendencies. All translations in the thesis are my own.

\(^{11}\) The Gajret association was labeled as “pro-Serbian,” however the publications in *Gajret* focused on “Muslim matters,” that involved but were not limited to, culture, literature, religious questions and topics. Every *Gajret* issue also had a section for translated literature from around the world such as: Persian, Arabic, Indian, German, etc.
Chapter I: Imperial Legacies, Islamic Religious Structures, and Internal Contingencies

This chapter provides an analysis of the internal social and political atmosphere in the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from its establishment in 1918 until 1923 when the decision to send a delegation of Muslim representatives to Istanbul was announced. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the internal dynamics of the Muslim communities in the Kingdom in relation to their government and to understand their structural arrangements and functionality. Throughout this analysis, I will introduce documents and newspaper articles from the period between 1919 and 1923 that will demonstrate an interactive relationship between the central government in Belgrade and Muslim communities across the Kingdom, Bosnia and Southern Serbia in particular. This interaction, however, more often than not failed to provide adequate outcomes, for the Muslim communities, but also for the government as well.

1.1 The Legacies of Empires and Islamic Religious Structures:

Using Sabrina Ramet’s argument about “élites failure to resolve the dual challenges of state building and legitimacy,” this section will examine the ways in which those failures were reproduced on the local level within the Muslim communities of the Kingdom. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes kept the Ottoman structure of organizing the Muslim communities in Southern Serbia, and the Austro-Hungarian structure of organizing the Muslims communities in the regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH), Croatia (including Dalmatia), and Slovenia. In BiH

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however, the Austro-Hungarian legacy overlapped with the Ottoman. The Islamic religious institutions following the unification of the Kingdom were influenced and regulated by three unconnected treaties. After the Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed BiH in 1908, the Muslim communities in this region were regulated according to the “Constitution for the autonomous administration of Islamic religious affairs, pious foundations and education in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” This legal document endorsed the Bosnian Muslims with a religious autonomy, which was codified in 1909 and continued to be valid even when this region became part of the Kingdom. In 1909 the Bosnian Muslims were also reconnected to the institution of the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Istanbul, a connection they had lost in 1878. The head of the Muslim religious community was the reis-ul-ulama, Džemaludin Čaušević.

The Kingdom of Serbia, which was politically dominant in the new state, entered the new Kingdom as an independent state, together with the Kingdom of Montenegro as another independent state. It is important to remember here that in Serbia, prior to its enlargement in 1913, but also in Montenegro, Islam was officially recognized in 1878,

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15 Technically, within the Kingdom, it was valid from 1918 until 1929, when the King suspended the constitution. More on this in chapter II.
16 The head of all religious affair in the Ottoman Empire.
17 In 1882 the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with the approval of Istanbul, established a new institution of religious leadership, reis-ul-ulama and a religious governing body, medžlis. Muftis were appointed and paid by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The religious governing body, the Council of Ulama (Ulema-medžlis) was in charge of electing muftis. After the creation of the Kingdom in 1918, the Bosnian reis-ul-ulema and Ulema medžlis gained nominal control over the small Muslim communities in Croatia and Slovenia. This administrative regulation also lasted till 1930. See, Racius and Zhelyazkova, *Islamic Leadership*, 15-16.
18 Čaušević was born in Bosnia in 1870. He finished law school in Istanbul, spent some time in the Hejaz and Yemen as a correspondent for an Istanbul-based newspaper, and then went to Cairo where he attended lectures given by Muhammad Abduh. Upon his return to Sarajevo, he worked as an Arabic teacher, and in 1913 was appointed as the reis-ul-ulama. He resigned in 1930. In 1938 he produced the first translation of the Quran in ‘Bosnian.’ He is one of the better-known Bosnian Muslim reformers of the twentieth century. See, Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain, *Islam in Inter-War Europe* (London: Hurts, 2008), 320-321.
and muftis, confirmed by the same *Sheikh-ul-Islam* in Istanbul, headed the Muslim population. The Supreme Mufti was situated in Niš, and served as administrator of religious and educational affairs.\textsuperscript{19} By 1913, the Muslim population increased when parts of Ottoman Macedonia, Kosovo and Sandžak were added to the Kingdom of Serbia, and with that the religious infrastructure transformed. By 1919, the office of the mufti in Montenegro was abolished and the Muslim communities of Serbia and Montenegro were united under the leadership of the Supreme Mufti in Belgrade.\textsuperscript{20} Mehmet Zekerijah–Zeki efendi,\textsuperscript{21} who had been a Supreme Mufti in the Kingdom of Serbia since 1914, was now the Supreme Mufti of the Muslim communities in South Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Sandžak.\textsuperscript{22}

The Treaty of Saint-German signed in September 1919 obliged the government of the Kingdom “to extend collective rights and equal treatment of racial, linguistic and religious minorities, in the spheres of education, culture, and law.”\textsuperscript{23} The Vidovdan Constitution of 1921 made this clause a permanent law within the Kingdom and the Muslim communities were recognized as a religious minority.\textsuperscript{24} In 1919 the Ministry of Religion was also established and all religious institutions, including the Islamic, were

\textsuperscript{19} Račius and, Zhelyazkova, *Islamic Leadership*, 19.


\textsuperscript{21} Zeki was born in 1878 in Montenegro, and between 1895 and 1908 received his education in Istanbul, in Islamic Theological Studies. In 1909 he was appointed a mufti in Niš. The same year, with the approval from the Sheikh-ul-Islam, he was also appointed as a qadi. In 1929 he was appointed as a supreme shari‘ah court judge in Skopje. After the 1946 abolition of the shari‘ah courts in Yugoslavia he retired, and died in Skopje in 1956. See, Ajdin Rakić. "Crnogorski Studenti U Carigradu" [Students from Montenegro in Istanbul], "ALMANAH - Časopis Za Proučavanje, Prezentaciju I Zaštitu Kulturno-Istorijjske Baštine Bošnjaka/Muslimana, 65-66 (2015):, 78-79, https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=532051.

\textsuperscript{22} Novaković, "Организација и Положај," 455.

\textsuperscript{23} Matthew Frank, *Making Minorities History: Population Transfers in the Twentieth-Century Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 44.\textsuperscript{24} Vidovdan Constitution 1921, p. 6-8, free online access arhivyu.gov.rs
under its clout. Conversely, more often than not, the inherited organizational diversity resulted in the failure on part of the Ministry of Religion to understand the local dynamics of Islamic governance, particularly when it came to managing Muslim communities.

Between 1919 and 1920, an interesting problem arose for the government. The question of “Who is a spiritual person in Islam,” and which spiritual individuals should be taken into consideration when granting them an exemption from army service, created some conflicting ideas on the ground. On the 28th of October 1919, the Ministry of War and Navy through the Ministry of Religion sent a list with two classifications: “spiritual people” and “candidates for spiritual people,” and requested the Supreme Mufti provide an assessment, in order for the government to issue exemptions from army service. On that list, imams (hočas), shari‘ah judges, and muftis were considered “spiritual people.” Students (tabil) at madrassas were also considered as “spiritual people.” Dervishes, however, could be considered “spiritual people,” only if their main preoccupation was religious service, which indicates that, some of them had other professions as well. I did not find an immediate response to this request but a document from the 10th of February 1920, reveals that the government was facing a problem with “a large number of Muslims [who] join in ‘spiritual orders’ in an attempt to avoid serving in the army.” This document also reveals that a lot of young students attended religious schools (medrasi) and intentionally prolonged their studies.

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25 Novaković, "Организација и Положај," 454, the author argues that after 1919 the Ministry of Religion had absolute control to make any decisions regarding financial or personnel questions for the waqfs.
27 The government uses the term “духовни-а лица” which translates to spiritual person/people.
But what is more interesting about this particular document is that it gives us an insight into the different organizational structures of religious institutions in the Muslim communities of the Kingdom. According to this document, at the time, in Bosnia, a student could not be accepted to study at a madrassa if he was above the age of sixteen, and he could not study at a madrassa for more than eight years. In South Serbia, however, students continuously abused the lack of regulations on madrassas, which prompted the Ministry of War through the Ministry of Religion to request “a detailed opinion” on how to regulate the madrassas in Southern Serbia.\textsuperscript{29} The Ministry of War, as the document uncovers, would then use this opinion, in order to create a “permanent law,” (\textit{stalnog zakona}), for Muslim conscript exemption.\textsuperscript{30}

This document hits on real discrepancies that existed between the religious educational systems in the Kingdom that were also part of an imperial legacy. Because of its connection to the Hapsburg Empire, Bosnia entered the new Kingdom with an already established “modern school system,” the strategic product of “a Hapsburg civilizing mission” in the region, which was aimed at controlling the province. At the beginning of the twentieth-century, apart from the already established religious schools, “thousands of Muslim boys were enrolled in the state school system.”\textsuperscript{31} Part of its successfulness, I would argue, is the fact that Muslims in Bosnia spoke one language, for the most part. Muslim communities in South Serbia were linguistically divided between Slavic, Turkish and Albanian. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in this region and the Balkan Wars,

\textsuperscript{29} I would like to point out here that even as late as February 1924, the Ministry of Religion was sending similar letters to the Supreme Mufti about this issue in South Serbia, DARM, fond: 0609 box: 0003, document 2877.
which happened only four years before the establishment of the Kingdom caused a massive exodus of different Muslim groups; consequently, the religious educational infrastructure suffered as well. According to the 1921 census of the population, forty eight percent of Southern Serbia was Muslim. Yet, it was not until 1924 that the King became a patron of a madrassa in Skopje – Madrassa of King Aleksandar. Before the school was opened, the government sent Zeki-efendi to “inspect South Serbia, wherever he finds it necessary… and to get rid of the ghosts among the Muslims.”

Regulating conscription was not the only challenge for the central government. Between March and September of 1920, in the region of Southern Serbia (Ohrid, Debar, and Raška are some of the places explicitly mentioned), numerous instances of “anti-government works,” are mentioned in the correspondences between the Ministry of Religion and the Supreme Mufti. Just as with the case of conscripts, the Ministry of Religion requested an opinion on a particular person or an explanation for the events that occurred. I would like to point out here that I am not in any way claiming that this is the only manner in which the government dealt with incidents involving Muslim dissidents. What I am trying to convey is that the government utilized the Supreme Mufti on issues such as those discussed in the documents.

On the 23rd of March 1920, the Supreme Mufti was asked to provide background information on two possible replacements for the local mufti positions in Ohrid and

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34 Clayer and Germain, *Islam in Inter-War Europe*, 346, the classes at this madrassa were taught in serbo-croatian-slovenian, which limited the number of students that would attended since the majority of the Muslims in this region spoke Turkish or Albanian.
36 DARM, fond: 0609, box: 0001, document 0950.
Debar and assess the situation in the region. The reason for this was that the current muftis from Ohrid and Debar have been “generating intrigues with the Albanians and working against our government,” as the document states. On the 27th of March of the same year, the Ministry of Religion, again, as in 1919, sent forward a letter from the Ministry of War to the Office of the Supreme Mufti, in which the minister of war and navy announced:

Upon a received report we feel there is some kind of movement between the Muhammadans in the district of Raško and in the general territory of Old Serbia and Macedonia, with a goal of producing political and religious autonomy. According to some information, hodžas contribute to this movement by holding secret meetings in mosques...Please advise your religious organs not to get involved in anti-government workings (рад), and share with me any information you are aware of.

Just months after the Supreme Mufti was asked to give his opinion on replacing local muftis in Ohrid and Debar, on the 23rd of September 1920, the Ministry of Religion informed Zeki-efendi that “Mehmed Rauf, a mufti from this region, joined the Albanian army...and escaped in Albania.” This document represented the realities on the ground not only for the local muftis but also for the government. It was not until 1922 that the borders between Albania and the Kingdom would be officially established. Here I would also like to highlight how the issue of these changing borders affected local Muslim populations. In a document from the 1st of February 1922 for example, a given village (Бела) ended up on the Albanian side of the border, which subsequently lowered the number of Muslims in the congregation (џемат) and with that the right to have a

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37 DARM, fond:0609, box 0001, document 0950.
38 DARM, fond 0609, box 0001, document 67.
39 DARM, fond 0609, box 0001, document 182.
religious school or an imam assigned to that congregation. The minimum requirement was one hundred Muslim inhabitants per village.\(^{41}\)

In addition to governing and regulating conscripts and dissidents, and securing borders, in 1921 the government was accused of having the tendency for treating Muslim priests in the southern part of the country “as priests who belong to a second class confession.”\(^{42}\) On the 29\(^{th}\) of May 1921, a letter signed by three “state employees” was sent to the Minister of Religion, which addressed the issue of discrepancy between government salary allocated for Christian and Muslim priests in Southern Serbia. From this letter I gather that this discrepancy was an ongoing problem generated by the Ministry of Religion:

> From the day of liberation till today Your Ministry...an imam has a daily allowance lower than that of a server or a cop, and a mufti, which belongs to a higher class of Muslim priests, has a daily allowance equal to that of his attendant in his office.\(^{43}\)

The issue of favoring Christians over Muslims will come up again in July on the same year, and in August of 1923 when the government had to review its national holidays and the ceremonies associated with the celebration of the same. On the 7\(^{th}\) of July 1921, in an attempt to regulate the working days of the national post office, the Ministry of Religion sent an official list of religious holidays recognized by the state and allocated through the territory of the Kingdom by population demographics.

One thing stands out in this document, which I argue, signals the government’s preferentialism not only of Christians over Muslims but also of Slav speaking Muslims over Albanian and Turkish speaking Muslims. While on the territory encompassing

\(^{41}\) AY fond: 370, box: 21 Document: 323

\(^{42}\) The Serbo-Croatian word for priest is “свештеник,” and that is the term that is used in this document, “муслимански свештеници,” which literally translates to Muslim priests.

\(^{43}\) DARM, fond 0609, box 0001, document: 31.
Sarajevo and the larger region of Bosnia, two Muslim holidays were recognized and received the appropriate day–off status, “the first day of Ramazan and first day of kurban-bayram,” in the territory of Serbia, encompassing Niš, Skopje, and Montenegro among others, only Christian holidays were recognized as religious holidays. As I stated in the previous sections, forty eight percent of the population in Southern Serbia was Muslim, and the majority of that population belong to non-Slav speaking Muslim communities. However, their representation in the parliament was limited to one political party, Cemiyet, which might explain the way the Ministry, as an extension of the government, was managing the Muslim communities in South Serbia.

The official political system of the Kingdom was a “parliamentary democracy.” Three political parties in the parliament represented the majority agrarian population: Radical Party (Serbian), HPSS (Croatian) and SLS (Slovenian) party. Aside from these three, two political parties represented the Muslim communities: The Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO), founded in 1919, represented the Slavic speaking Muslims of Bosnia, and at different times aligned with either the ruling Radical Party or the HPSS party. From 1921 the head of the party was Mehmet Spaho, who had ambitions of representing the Muslims of South Serbia but this never was actualized. Cemiyet was the representative party of the Muslim population in Southern Serbia (Macedonia, Sandžak, and Kosovo). Founded in 1919, the leader of Cemiyet was an Albanian from Kosovo, Ferhat Draga. After some internal divisions between the Turkish and Albanian factions,
Cemiyet dissolved in 1925 and while active, it was never as politically strong as JMO, nor was it aligned ideologically with JMO. It is safe to assert that the lack of political representation in the parliament, affected the social life on the ground, including the way holidays were allocated and celebrated.

Another instance, which we can also interpret as a sign of preferentialism but at the same time willingness to accommodate on part of the government, is exemplified in the order sent from the Ministry of Religion to the office of the Supreme Mufti on the 24th of August, 1923. This document demonstrates that there was an ongoing discomfort within the Muslim communities about the way certain national holidays were celebrated. In 1922, a government decision was put into place, through which mosques were required to perform prayers for two national holidays: St Kiril and Methodius, and Vidovdan. The inherited problem in this requirement is the fact that both holidays are fundamentally Orthodox Christian holidays. Additionally, Vidovdan was also being celebrated as the commemoration of the Battle of Kosovo against the Ottoman Empire in 1389, or victory of Christianity over Islam. The order sent on August 24th, revoked that requirement, as well as the requirement to commemorate King Peter, because as the order clarified: “Muslims cannot commemorate non-Muslims.” By this, he means they are not allowed by their religious stipulations. However, as the order goes on to explain, Muslims are required to give a speech, usually held by the oldest in the congregation, in their local mosque on the 1st of December, the day the Kingdom was united, “perform dova (prayer) for the King and Queen.”

47 Clayer and Bougarel, Europe’s Balkan Muslims, 100-101.
Following these examples throughout the documents, this period, I argue, is marked by a constant reevaluation and accommodation on part of the government that stems from an inexperience and unfamiliarity with the Muslim tradition, guidelines, and law, which can be also understood as an implicit Ottoman legacy, from the nineteen-century millet. What I mean here is that the new government of the Kingdom did not have any experience in ruling Muslim communities, because each religious group had its own system of administration under the Ottoman rule. On a local level, Christians and Muslims were probably more aware of their different practices, but also similar cultural traditions, which, I imagine were vital in “the historical production of their identities.”

Yet, on a state–administrative level, outside of the Muslim department which was under the umbrella of the Ministry of Religion, I cannot say how many state officials were truly familiar with Islamic laws and regulations. From the documents so far, I gather that managing the Muslim communities in the Kingdom consisted of, but was not limited to, continuous requests for clarifications, recommendations, expert opinions and direct ruling or orders that were sent between the Ministry of Religion, the office of the Supreme Mufti, and local mufti offices. By expert opinions and clarifications, I mean the documents that are usually sent from the Ministry of Religion to the Supreme Mufti when the government did not understand certain religious practices or rules, and needed a clarification or a recommendation for implementing policies, which would directly affect the Muslim population, such as the examples for conscription. Direct rulings were usually sent when the government had already issued a ruling on a given matter, whether that is directly or indirectly connected with the Muslim population.

communities, such as with the case of national holidays. When reading the documents it is quite clear that the remnants of the institutional legacy of the Ottoman Empire, are embedded in them. Yet, what the documents also often reveal is how disorderly and feeble the central government was at the time.

In the section that follows I will focus on the internal contingencies and identity politics that emerged in the Kingdom, presumably influenced by Pan-Islamism and outside forces, such as the changes in the Ottoman structure of governance during 1922, in order to contextualize the governments’ decision to allow a deputation from the Kingdom to the last Caliph of the Ottoman Empire in April, 1923.

1.2. Internal Contingencies and Muslim Communities

The news about the abolishment of the sultanate reached the public in The Kingdom on the 4th November 1922. That Saturday, Politika, the nation’s most widely circulated newspaper published a front-page article titled “Muslims or Turks?” Only four days earlier, Rafet Pasha made a short visit to the Yıldız Palace and informed Mehmet VI, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire at the time, that the Grand National Assembly reached a decision “to abolish the office of the sultanate. The sultan would also be stripped of his title as caliph…” One day after this visit the imperial government was dismantled, and “the Ottoman state and Turkey ceased to be interchangeable concepts of places. Turkey embodied a nation, an entity borne out of popular consent. The empire became a relic, emblematic of a painful recent and distant past.” 50 For the Kingdom, as the article will show, the abolishment of the sultanate was Kemal Pasha’s nationalistic

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response which embodied disrespect towards the “supreme religious leader of all Muslims…”51

By analyzing this article published in Politika, I argue that the abolishment of the sultanate instigated the newspaper to address the already reoccurring issue of identity politics in the Kingdom, specifically with respect to the Bosnian Muslims. In order to understand the article’s claim that by “exposing” Kemal Pasha’s political plan the “Serbian” Muslims of the Kingdom will be better equipped to form their opinions on the issues of the sultanate and the future of the Muslim community outside of the Kingdom,52 I will contextualize the article and show an underlying competition between the national projects between the Croats and the Serbs for “claiming” Bosnian Muslims “as their own.”53 Bosnian Muslims, unlike the majority of Muslims in South Serbia, which were predominantly Albanian- or Turkish-speaking, faced the opposing agendas of South Slav nationalism during the nineteen-century, because they spoke a similar Slavic language. These competing nationalisms continued within the structures of the Kingdom, which was “gradually defined by ethno-confessional nationalisms.”54

The article was written in Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian;55 however, it did not provide any information about who wrote it. Here I would assume that someone from the editorial team wrote it only because the newspaper at the time of this publication was run by non-Muslims and it was published from Belgrade.56

51 Politika, 4th November, 1922
52 Ibid.
53 Merdjanova, Rediscovering the Umma, 30.
55 I use this term because in 1921, the Vidovdan Constitution proclaimed serbo-croatian-slovenian as an official language.
56 All of the names of the editorial are Serbian, or possibly Croatian. I assume Serbian because in the article the term ‘Serbian Muslims’ is used explicitly, which would probably not have been the case if the writer was Croatian.
According to the latest news we have received, it appears that the supreme religious leader of all Muslims, the Istanbul’s Sultan, is having a difficult time at the moment. He’s been shown very little respect as if he is a just head (chief) of a low-level district. And this is not done by infidels (gavur), the sworn enemies of the Ottomans, who enjoy this highest institution. On the contrary, the creators of this new Turkey, the winners of the battlefields of war and diplomacy – Kemal Pasha and his government in Ankara, take this stand against the Sultan. They came to an agreement that the Sultan needs to go, and it seems that he agreed to it and abdicated. At first this degradation of the Caliph and Istanbul might appear incomprehensible. However, for those who know the politics of Kemal Pasha, this outcome is totally explicable.  

In order to understand the message of, and the intended audience for this article, a historical analysis for the period prior to 1922 is needed. Claiming Bosnian Muslims, for both the Serbs and the Croats as well meant a political majority in parliament and power to shape politics in times when the Kingdom’s government was trying to consolidate power after ratifying the constitution of 1921. The 1921 Vidovdan Constitution was centralist and pro-Serbian. Between 1921 and 1923 the government was divided between the Belgrade-Serbian Radical centralist and Croat-Slovenian anti-centralist. JMO in 1922 was part of the anti-centralist opposition, but was negotiating with the Serbian Radicals for more seats in the parliament at the time. It is during these internal political debates that the article was published and made the following argument:

We present this political plan to our Muslims and we hope that they will earnestly reflect on this. We also hope that they will reflect on Kemal Pasha’s central

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57 This is the Cyrillic (and Serbo-Croatian) version of the Turkish word gavur. At times it was used as an offensive term for Christians. Even today a lot of people use it in certain parts of the Balkans (Macedonia for example) but it does not hold the same offensiveness anymore.

58 Politika, 4th of November 1922, the article continued: “In March of this year, Kemal Pasha gave an interview for the Parisian newspaper ‘Opinion.’ In that interview, he said these words about the Sultan: ‘our army is not fighting for the Caliph anymore, but for independence. Turkish people do not want to be held back by religion anymore; they want tangible achievement, the shimmer had already cost us a lot.’ The shimmer is the Sultan, the caliph, and the one that up until now the Muslim world respected the most. Kemal Pasha has this same attitude towards Istanbul as well. ‘The political capital of the Turkish Republic can only be in the heart of Anatolia. Istanbul will be the city of our Caliph. We are keeping the Caliph and the Sultan – this Caliph, or another, it really does not matter, because we are dealing with a religious institution…’ The political plan cannot be made clearer than this: Kemal Pasha will overshadow (dim the light) of all the shimmer Istanbul and Istanbul’s Sultan hold.”

59 Banac, National Question in Yugoslavia, 165.
political concepts, which we will elaborate on in the following section. Kemal Pasha is a nationalist and his move is purely nationalistic. Religious momentum plays a secondary part in his move. Because the religious incentive is very strong in Muslims, Kemal Pasha is not opposing it, but using it. Following this, we can only come to a conclusion that his move is Turkish, not Islamic. Following this, we can also say, to support this move is not to declare that you are a Muslim, but Turk, it does not signify being an outstanding member of a religious community—Muslim, but a member of a nation, and a state—Turkish nation and Turkish state. In our state, there are Muslims that belong to a recognized religion. In our state, which is democratic, no one can have anything against that religious sentiment, and against manifestation of that sentiment. If admiration for Kemal’s move were only a manifestation of religious enjoyment, we would not have anything against it. But, as we have previously stated, Kemal’s move is a nationalistic, Turkish move, and admiring that move signifies a manifestation of national feelings and ideas. Against that kind of admiration, for a foreign nation and foreign state, a lot can be done.

In this case, our Muslim brothers from Bosnia are put in front of an interesting test. They are Serbs by race, and Muslims by religion. As Serbs, and as Muslims they should have good reason to be very unsatisfied with Kemal. As Serbs, because Kemal’s move is a Turkish move, as Muslims, as we have previously discussed in this article and showed, Kemal with much ease, denies the holiest Muslim symbols: the Sultan, the caliphate and Istanbul. This should be the case, however, in reality, something else is happening. 60

The tensions between centralist and advocates of federalism dominated the internal political discourse of the Kingdom in the early 1920s. 61 Religious debates within the Muslim community in BiH also affected public opinion and reactions from the government. The connection between language and ethnicity in the Kingdom became increasingly important during the early 1920s, because as empires collapsed and new states were formed, the government understood the “danger” that loyalty might not be confined within the borders of the state. In the case of the Kingdom, a state whose national ideology emphasized that South Slavs was bonded through language, this connection extended to the Muslims of Bosnia as well. 62 By emphasizing the nationalistic character of Kemal’s move, and the Serbian “racial” identity of Bosnian Muslims, we can locate some of the paranoia that materialized when the sultanate was abolished in 1922.

60 Politika, 4th of November, 1922.
62 Nielsen, Making Yugoslavs, 5.
This paranoia was amplified with the increased exodus of Muslims both Slav and non-Slav speaking to the Ottoman Empire and later on Turkey, during the early 1920s, and might have contributed to the publication of the article about the religious and nationalist implications of Kemal’s move.\textsuperscript{63} Similarly, published in Belgrade in 1925, the social and ethnographic notes by Dragiše Lepčevica, \textit{About Our Muslims}, produced over a period of ten years (1914–1924) emphasized the importance of acknowledging the Muslim community of Southern Serbia and BiH as an essential part of the South Slavic heritage and history.\textsuperscript{64} Written by a Serbian academic and published by a Serbian printing press in Belgrade, in the introduction, the author states, “the material and spiritual culture of our Muslims safeguards our medieval labor and the life of our people.”\textsuperscript{65} The text also indicates that at least on some level in the state structure, the hierarchy between different Muslims minorities groups occurred. Later sections in his ethnography also imply that the Slav Muslims community was understood, or should be understood, in terms of “our blood.” In his final pages, the author addresses the issues of increased exodus by the Muslim community to Turkey in the early 1920s by stating: “with this migration we have lost a large number of our countrymen and for us this is very hard.”\textsuperscript{66}

Lastly, I argue that the article is aimed at one person in particular, the Bosnian \textit{reis-ul-ulama} Džemaludin Čaušević. Only one year later, he will be excluded from the deputation to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{67} When Čaušević took office in 1913, a few months before WWI, he was already advocating for religious reforms, especially in education, by encouraging

\textsuperscript{63} Meridjanova, \textit{Rediscovering the Umma}, 10-12.
\textsuperscript{64} The author was mentioning the Slavic speaking Muslim of South Serbia, which in the region of Sandžak were identifying as Bosnians for the most part, and in the region of Macedonia they were identified as Torbeši.
\textsuperscript{65} Драгиша Лапчевић \textit{[Dragiša Lapčevida], O Нашим Муслиманима} \textit{[About Our Muslims],} (Београд: Извавачка Књижарица Гоце Кона, 1925), 5.
\textsuperscript{66} Lapčeviđa, \textit{About Our Muslims} (О Нашим Муслиманима), 65.
\textsuperscript{67} I explain this in detail in chapter II.
the introduction of non-religious subjects at the madrassas, which created a clash between him and the more traditional Bosnian elites at the time.\(^{68}\) More importantly, he was outspoken against the nationalization politics from both the Serbian and the Croatian camps.\(^{69}\) Finally, in November of 1921, only a year before the publication of the *Politika* article, Čašević “demanded from the new state authorities that all religious communities enjoy the same rights...any form of proselytism should be forbidden and that no religious symbols or holidays should be introduced in state institutions.”\(^{70}\) It is in this context of Bosnian identity politics that the next document should be evaluated.

On the 26th of 1923, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a three-page report from a certain “trustee” in Geneva, to the office of the Royal Mission in Istanbul, outlining the structure of the pan-Islamic movements and certain figures that operated in the region of the Balkans, and were from the Kingdom, particularly Bosnia. I would like to point out here that this report was generated on the 23rd of February 1923, a few weeks before the trip to Istanbul. The descriptions are quite captivating, because they show how complex people’s identities were at this time, and how loyalty could not be confined within the borders of the Kingdom precisely because identities were so multifaceted. One of the names, but not the only one, mentioned in the report is Rifat Ahmed Ogolu (Ahmetović) Begović. His background carries the markers of his complex identity and his entangled relationship outside of the Kingdom’s borders. The report describes him as follows:

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68 This was not something new. He came from a tradition of reformism dating back to the nineteenth century. See, Clayer and Bougarel, chapter 2 in *Europe's Balkan Muslims*; Amzi-Erdogdular, “Alternative Muslim Modernities,” p. 921-924

69 Čašević, p.138

70 Čašević, p. 274-279, Bougarel, p. 323
Bosnian Muhammadan, born 1894 in Bosna-Saraj, finished his studies in Italy. Speaks Serbian, Turkish, French and Italian… He is connected with the Bulgarian organization “BRATSTVO” (brotherhood) with Boris Abramović and various Turkish agitators. He is a supporter of the pan-Slav movement…”

Rifat’s background, just like everything else was historically contingent. Muslims in Bosnia, during the Hapsburg rule and definitely after it, were inspired by the Pan-Slavic, Pan-German, and Pan-Turkic movements, but also by Pan-Islamic movement, “in which Muslim intellectuals of Bosnia found issues comparable to those their own community wrestled with.”

Even as late as 1926, E.N. Bulbulović will claim, “I am not a pan-Islamist in a political sense of the word. I am sympathetic to Pan-Islamism as much as I am sympathetic to Pan-Slavism.”

Following these examples, I argue that the 1923 trip can be understood as a response to events which unfolded from 1918 onward within and between the Muslim communities and the government, and external requirements stipulated by the minority treaties which in 1921 became part of the Vidovdan Constitution. It is in the context of these constant internal negotiations, recommendations, accommodations, and orderings, that the decision to send a delegation to Istanbul was generated. However, one person became a subject of anxiety for the Kingdom, and that was the Bosnian reis-ul-ulama, Džemaludin Čaušević. The last two documents that I will provide here stress the importance of loyalty to the government and enjoyment of religious and civil freedoms, and can be seen as a response and a reaction to the events leading up to the trip in 1923. It

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71 AY, fond: 370, box 21, document: 2254.
73 I will discuss his writing at length in the following chapter, see E.N. Bulbulović, Svjetski Kongres I Pitamne Halifeta: Kratka I Poucna Studija O Aktuelnim Problemima Islama (Sarajevo: Islamska Dionička Štamparija, 1926), 20.
is in the context of these events and external stipulations granted to minorities, that the
government of the Kingdom sent the first delegation to perform an oath of allegiance.

In 1922 the last caliph of the umma ascended to the throne and assumed the title
prompting the Kingdom to plan an official delegation to Istanbul to perform *bay 'at* (oath
of allegiance). Announcing this visit, on 3 April 1923, the Supreme Mufti of Belgrade
Zeki-efendi, sent a letter to a local mufti in South Serbia, in which he stated:

> [T]he government of the Kingdom, states that this month, three Muslim
> representatives: the Mufti from Sarajevo, the Mufti from Kosovo, and the Mufti signed
> below, will be sent to Constantinople for bay-at to the Caliph. Upon my suggestion, the
> government of the Kingdom, as always, and at this particular moment, has shown full
> attention (пажњу) towards Muslims (најспремније) and enabled us to perform our
> religious duty towards the newly elected caliph of all Muslims.
>
> Please, Mister Mufti, let the Muslims from your district know about this
> previously mentioned government decision and use this opportunity to emphasize to
> them, how this is one of the many pieces of evidence that Muslims in our kingdom enjoy
> full equality and all civil liberties.⁷⁴

A document from the 6th of June 1923, sent from the Office of the Supreme Mufti in
Belgrade to the local mufti’s office in Kichevo–Southern Serbia, announced that the
delegation, sent on April 21st 1923 to Istanbul, was actually the first delegation to take an
oath of allegiance. The second part of the document went on to make several claims,
which allude to the idea that the Muslim communities of the Kingdom, at least for the
outside world, enjoyed their full privileges:

> … This proves that our believers in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,
> enjoy full religious freedom, respect and support from their government. The fact
> that the King and the King’s government allowed you to perform this religious
> obligation proves that our believers, who live in those borders, enjoy all civil rights.
> Please let the King and the King’s government knows that I am convinced, with all

my heart and soul, our believers will always be loyal subjects to the King and loyal citizens of the state.\footnote{IAO, Fond: OSSK, box: 1.24, document: 319.}

While the claim from Zeki-efendi and the last Caliph sound genuine and believable, we should remember that the end of the First World War the achievement of self-determination and the expansion of their territory created a subordinate level of citizenship for the rest of the population. Despite its heterogeneity, the Kingdom adopted the model of a joint\textit{ national state}, thereby eliminating the “minorities” claims to partnership in the state-building process.\footnote{Carole Fink, “Minority Rights as an International Question,” \textit{Contemporary European History} 9, no.3 (2000), 338.} The next chapter will provide examples about this elimination process. I will show, and will argue, that the government did not understand the significance of the 1923 trip to Istanbul. By thing I mean that the Ministry of Religion, did not understand the religious role and significance of the caliphate for its local Muslim communities, and for the rest of the Muslim world. This, however, only comes to light in the documents from 1925-1926, which I will examine in the following pages. I will also examine the circumstances under which the Ministry of Religion decided to prohibit Čaušević from joining the deputation in 1923.

By the end of 1923, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Republic of Turkey was established. In 1924 the Caliphate was abolished. Yet, this did not result in a termination of the longstanding link between these two new entities. On the contrary, I have retrieved documents from the following years that will show how the Muslim communities and the Kingdom’s government, in one way or another, continued to look at Istanbul and Turkey as a point of reference for the Muslim world. In the context of the
Cairo Caliphate Congress of 1926 and the subsequent ban that the Ministry issued, through which we can detect a certain continuous paranoia, I argue that ultimately the Kingdom was deliberately creating conditions in order to gradually isolate its Muslim communities from the rest of the Muslim world.
Chapter II:
The Curious Case of Džemaludin Čaušević, the Abolition of the Caliphate and the Cairo Caliphate Congress of 1926

The following chapter will interpret some clues as to why Džemaludin Čaušević, the reis-ul-ulama of the Muslims in Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia, was not allowed to attend the deputation to Istanbul in 1923. It will then turn to analyze some of the ways in which the abolition of the caliphate was reported and evaluated in the Kingdom in 1924-25. The last section of this chapter will examine a couple of publications in the Kingdom regarding the upcoming Cairo Congress of 1926, and through analyses of certain government documents will provide some plausible explanations for understanding the government’s decision to ban attendance at the Cairo Congress.

2.1. The Curious Case of Džemaludin Čaušević

When the Supreme Mufti of the Kingdom, Mehmet Zakerijah–Zeki, sent a letter to a local mufti’s office in South Serbia, reporting on the events that took place in Istanbul, one person was missing from the account that he provided – Džemaludin Čaušević, the reis-ul-ulama from Sarajevo. Zeki was revealing to the South Serbian Muslim communities, that the delegation, sent on April 21st 1923 from Belgrade to Istanbul, was actually the first delegation to take an oath of allegiance to the last Caliph of the Ottoman Empire:

…He [Abdülmecid II] was so touched, that he took the ‘hutba’[khutbah], which the chief of our delegation was conducting, into his own hands and stated: ‘From all the Muslim Communities, that live outside of the borders of the Turkish state, your deputation was the first to come with the obligation, and officially show bay ‘at” to the Caliph and straighten our moral religious connections…

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77 Sermon, public preaching in Islamic tradition.
78 IAO, fond: OSSK, box: 1.24 document 491
Bearing in mind that Čaušević was a religious leader of the largest Muslim community in the Kingdom the Bosnian Muslims, yet he did not partake in the deputation in Istanbul, the following section will focus on analyzing the conditions of the Kingdom, which might have contributed to him being excluded from this event. Additionally, by examining two articles that were published in 1924, one in Politka, a daily newspaper published in Belgrade, and another in Gajret, the Bosnian periodical published in Sarajevo, this chapter will also shed light on the ways in which the news of the abolishment was received in the Kingdom.

As argued in the first chapter, the 1923 trip can be understood as a response to events which unfolded from 1918 onward within and between the Muslim communities and the government, and external requirements stipulated by the minority treaties which in 1921 became part of the Vidovdan Constitution. Because the Muslim communities of the Kingdom had the status of an official minority, and Islam was one of the three recognized religions in the Kingdom (Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism, being the other two),\textsuperscript{79} they were entitled to maintaining a relationship with their religious leader and performing their religious duties, even if the religious leader resided outside of the borders of the Kingdom.\textsuperscript{80} Čaušević, familiar with his rights, on April 7th 1923, sent a letter to the Minister of Religion, Ljubomir Jovanović, requesting him to set up a meeting (audience) with the King, in order for them to discuss Čaušević’s plans for organizing a deputation for the caliph. The dates he provides in this document for meeting with the

\textsuperscript{79} See previous chapter on Vidovdan Constitution, here I am alluding to article IV.
\textsuperscript{80} See Treaty signed by the Kingdom of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire in 1914, and the minority stipulations by the League of Nations, which are explained in chapter I.
king are May 22\textsuperscript{nd} or May 23\textsuperscript{rd}, “before we leave to Istanbul,” as he explained. Furthermore, in the same letter, Čaušević expressed his disappointment for

Being deprived of the opportunity to perform my religious duty, as reis-ul-ulama approved by the caliph himself, and in doing so, depriving the Bosnian Muslims of doing the same through their religious representative, which hurts their religious sensibilities...\textsuperscript{81}

As shown in the previous chapter, another document sent from the office of Zekerijah to a local mufti office in South Serbia announced that three representatives from the Kingdom, “the mufti from Sarajevo, the mufti from Kosovo and the mufti signed below [Zekerijah], will be part of a deputation to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{82} The mufti from Sarajevo mentioned in the text was Čaušević. In government records and literature later on, the terms Grand Mufti and reis-ul-ulama\textsuperscript{83} were used interchangeably for the same function. It is obvious from this document that at least on April 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1923, he was still included as part of the official delegation, which on April 21\textsuperscript{st} visited Abdülmecid II. But his letter on April 7\textsuperscript{th} indicates that he knew that he would not partake in the trip, and appears that he was trying to organize another delegation by himself. From the current documents it is unclear whether Čaušević succeeded in organizing another delegation to Istanbul, but the Minister of Religion did not receive his letter until May 4\textsuperscript{th}, which is stated on the bottom of the document. A telegram sent from Zagreb on April 14\textsuperscript{th} that reached the Ministry of Religion on April 24\textsuperscript{th} reveals that the Muslim communities in Croatia were also dissatisfied, and wanted to complain and express their “deep sorrow” about the fact that

\textsuperscript{81} DARM, fond: 0609, box:0001,document. 360.
\textsuperscript{82} IAO, Fond: OSSK, box: 1.24, document: 319.
\textsuperscript{83} This position and the historical development of the institution of the reis-ul-ulama are discussed in the first chapter.
“the government decided to eliminate our religious leader from the deputation... and insists that he is included in this religious-autonomous issue and right...”

Lastly, on April 23rd, Čaušević sent another, elaborate letter to Jovanović, making the whole story even more puzzling. In the letter he claims:

You and the Minister of Foreign affairs both confirmed that there would be no issues with my planned visit to Istanbul. Even more so you promised that you would aid me if needed, just like in the case with the rest of the members... However today I received a notification from the police department stating: ‘we did not receive an approval from the designated institutions...Therefore we cannot issue a passport for you ... I am sorry for the inconvenience this has caused’... Other muftis are telling me that they have the same problem/ have been hindered....

Because I cannot understand why the police directory is making my trip difficult and not allowing me to preform this simple religious act, I would like the minister to explain:
1. Was it with your approval and with the cooperation of the police department in Sarajevo that my deputation to the caliph was interrupted?
2. If this is the case, I would like to know what was the reason for your sudden change of mind (position)?

None of the documents that I have found so far have provided any insight on the issue that Čaušević addresses through these correspondences. Nor was I able to locate any letters sent back from Jovanović to Čaušević, responding to his grievances. Jovanović, the fifth Minister of Religion since 1919, most likely never responded to Čaušević. By May 25th, 1923 he was out of the office. In order to contextualize my argument, in the following sections, I will provide a brief synopsis of the governmental chaos and instability that prevailed in the Kingdom between 1919 and 1929. By doing so I also want to highlight the possibility that one of the main reasons why the government of the Kingdom, willing to fund a trip to Istanbul for one of its minorities, who in return pledged an oath of allegiance (bay ‘at) to another sovereign, was precisely the continuous

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84 AY fond: 370, box 21, document 20507.
85 DARM, fond: 0609, box: 0001, document 457.
86 Banac, National Question in Yugoslavia, 412.
turmoil in the parliament and between the parties. Even as last as 1923, when this trip took place, the government was struggling with centralizing power.

Between 1919 and 1929, the government of the Kingdom had thirteen different ministers of religion, and none of whom were Muslims. In a timespan of a little over ten years, there were thirty-nine changes of government political structure, and none of the elected governments managed to accomplish anything from their four-year mandate plans. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Jugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) was the political party representing the Bosnian Muslim communities in the parliament. Mehmet Spaho was the leader of this party, who in 1921, by supporting the Vidovdan Constitution and entering into a brief coalition with the Serbian Radicals and Croatian Peasant Party was able to carve out a rather autonomous space for the Muslim religious institutions in Bosnia.\footnote{Branko Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije, knjiga I- Kraljevina Jugoslavija} However, by 1923, the Croatian Peasant Party (HRSS) became increasingly popular among the peasant voters, which threatened the Serbian centralist government. The elections in March of 1923 resulted in JMO and HRSS together with the Slovenian party to “reach a tentative agreement to propose less centralist state structure.”\footnote{Nielsen, \textit{Making Yugoslavs}, 45.} It is in the context of these political changes, and the JMO political decision to be part of the oppositional block, that the Čaušević issue developed. Spaho, the political representative of the Bosnian Muslims in the government, had become at this point a political liability for the Radicals.

In the context of this frequent political reconfiguration that resulted from governmental instability, a political reconfiguration of the Muslim communities in Kingdom was also frequent. For example, JMO as an already established political party...
in Bosnia, as I have argued in the previous chapter, strived to be a representative of all Muslims in Kingdom. However, this was opposed firstly by the centralist government of the Serbian majority, and secondly till 1925 by Cemiyet. For the centralist government, a political party with over 1.3 million constituents was probably too much to regulate. For Cemiyet and the Muslim communities in South Serbia, JMO never represented a party that would understand or deal with their grievances because as I stated in my first chapter, Cemiyet was a party representing Turkish and Albanian speaking Muslims, as well as Slavic speaking Muslims from the region of Macedonia, Kosovo and Sandžak, that did not necessarily see themselves as part of the Bosnian Muslim enclave.\textsuperscript{89} In 1925 Cemiyet, ceased to exist. Alternative “forms of mobilization” developed, such as the religious institutions in Skopje, and they served as substitutional, but also marginal political establishments.\textsuperscript{90} The fact that Čaušević was not allowed to partake in the deputation for the new caliph, was never of a concern for the Muslim communities or leadership, such as Mehmet Zekerijah, in South Serbia.\textsuperscript{91} Hence, the lack of analysis or documentation about this issue in certain parts of the Kingdom the issue was strictly “Bosnian.”

But how then, do the Muslim communities of Croatia and Slovenia, fit into the puzzle of the grievances raised for the government’s selective accommodation of Muslim religious rights? The government of the Kingdom considered the Muslims in Croatia and Slovenia as part of the Bosnian Muslims, historically and institutionally, even though prior to 1918 they had different institutional experiences, stemming from the fact that

\textsuperscript{89} Clayer and Bougarel, \textit{Europe’s Balkan Muslims}, 100-101.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, 104.
\textsuperscript{91} Mehmet Zekerijah was compliant with the Serbian government because he was, unlike Čaušević, part of the religious structure of the Kingdom of Serbia long before the creation of the Kingdom. See Chapter I, footnote 10.
they were part of different empires. This meant that limiting the autonomy of these institutions and their respective religious leaders was beneficial for both the Serbian and the Croatian political leadership. After 1919, the Ministry of Religion in Belgrade established the office for Islamic religious affairs in Zagreb and appointed Ismet Mustić as an imam under state salary. Over the next five years Mustić’s duties were expanded and Čaušević, the reis-ul-ulama of Bosnia, even granted him the permission to “perform all duties of imam including sharīʿah weddings, funeral rites, and religious education as a teacher of religion (mualim),” because unlike in Bosnia and South Serbia, in the region of Croatia there were no sharīʿah judges.

By 1921 his position was declared permanent, and in 1922 the imam’s office was upgraded to a status of Mufti’s Office for Croatia and Slavonia. What is very interesting and important to keep in mind about this office is the following. In 1919, when the office is first established the number of Muslims in this region is around two hundred. By the 1921 census, this number is already above three thousand, however, it is precisely in 1924 that the office of the Mufti was degraded to an office of the imam, and with that its function was limited. In a recently published editorial volume on the Islamic legacies of the Ottoman Empire in Yugoslavia, Dino Mujadžević argues, “on the administrative level, he [the imam] was responsible and paid by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Belgrade. In practice, in religious and sharīʿah issues he was under the oversight of the Bosnian reis-ul-ulama in Sarajevo… but these accommodations actually had no clear formal ground.”

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93 Račius and Zhelyazkova, Islamic Leadership, 127.
It is safe to assert, and conventional historiography of this period, however limited, agrees, that up until 1930, all of the Islamic institutions in the Kingdom, underwent an effective control of leadership only after 1930.\textsuperscript{94} This also meant that things could change very rapidly, and as we see in the correspondences with Čaušević, not much of an explanation was provided, or could have been provided with any certainty. As I stated before, so far I have not been able to discover any documents or secondary readings regarding the possibility of any debate in the parliament about the 1923 trip to Istanbul. However, an article published on the 11\textsuperscript{th} of March 1924, in the Belgrade newspaper \textit{Politika}, discussing the abolition of the caliphate, provides some interesting information about what went on in the parliament before the delegation was sent to Istanbul in April of 1923.

\textbf{2.2. Abolition of the Caliphate and Reactions in the Kingdom}

On the 3rd of March 1924, the Caliphate was abolished in the Republic of Turkey. On 9th of March 1924, \textit{The New York Times} published an article by Walter Littlefield, in which the author stated: “The new Turkey came to realize that as long as the Caliphate existed in the country, it would be the center of reactionary movement from within, and international conspiracies from without.”\textsuperscript{95} The abolishment of the Caliphate, as Caroline Finkel would later argue in her book \textit{Osman’s Dream}, was the most evident indication of the increasingly autocratic demand of Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues exerted over the

\textsuperscript{94} Račius and Zhelyazkova, \textit{Islamic Leadership}, 127-130.
Assembly.\textsuperscript{96} The abolition of the caliphate deprived the new Turkish republic’s citizens of a “familiar focus of loyalty.”\textsuperscript{97} In the Kingdom, a week later, B. Jevtič published a front-page article on this event and argued that for the Muslims, the caliph was not only a religious leader but “some sort of ideal political patron, even though his political power in the Angora’s republic equaled to zero.”\textsuperscript{98} What initially seems to be an informational article on the event turns out to contain more information about the internal politics of the Kingdom, and especially JMO and its leader Mehmet Spaho in relation to the caliphate. The following paragraph of the article also sheds some light on the discussion that took place in the parliament before a deputation was sent to Istanbul in 1923. Jevtič states the following:

\ldotsUp until now, JMO was able to gain its success and victory because it managed to use this persistent instinct of the Muslim masses and this persistent religious sentiment. But now there is a turning point: abolishing the caliphate that served as a base for ideas and religious continuity for the whole Islamic world means also abolishment of the spiritual community of the Muslim in the world. That goes for Bosnia as well. And for Mr. Spaho’s organization, this is a huge defeat. We only need to be reminded of the stubborn clash between the representative of the Bosnian Muslims and Belgrade’s government regarding the question of who will represent the Yugoslav Muslims during the kingdom’s deputation for the new caliph. That clash was not only about the prestige of one government or one party, but it had roots in real matters. For Mr. Spaho, participating in a deputation and visiting the new caliph meant not only establishing religious relationship, but also awakening new hope between the Muslims in Bosnia.

Part of this article seems to hint on the possibility that, the reason why Čaušević was not allowed to travel to Istanbul in 1923 had more to do with Spaho, or his politics than with Čaušević himself. Or this just might be how the writer of the article, B. Jevtič, saw and understood the issue at stake. But one thing is for sure, and that is that we can clearly locate a preexisting anxiety on part of the government connected with the 1923

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid, 546-547.
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Politika}, 11\textsuperscript{th} of March 1924, p. 1.
deputation to Istanbul, because it meant a possibility for “new hope between the Muslims in Bosnia.” This hope had larger implications not only in Bosnia but also in the rest of the post-Ottoman world, and was certainly crushed by 1924. Mona Hassan for example, mentions similar sentiments in her book when she discusses local reactions across the post-Ottoman space, following the abolition of the caliphate. According to Hassan and her reading of diplomatic sources:

Consulate in Sarajevo, Bosnia, reported profound bewilderment and indignation among religious scholars and educated Muslims there, whose hopes of the revival of the empire had been dashed by the eradication of the Ottoman Caliphate.\(^99\)

This hope according to the \textit{Politika} article was based on the Muslim perception of the caliphate, as the “ideal political patron” and the fact that he had no political power in Angora, had no impact on the ideal sentiment. Additionally, at least according to the author of the article, the caliphate had enough power outside of its borders to be used as leverage in internal political discussion in the Kingdom, as the second part of the article shows:

Mr. Spaho will now be deprived of the opportunity to give/provide his constituents with an illusion; the caliph does not exist anymore, the caliph from the royal ottoman family that up until yesterday represented an immense political power. Now what? The future of Mr. Spaho within the Muslims masses is deprived of support. He will either have to support the prosecuted caliph, who was a sultan after all, or for the Turkish republicans, stubborn and intense reformers, who anticipate a war against all conservative Islamic institutions, and who are now more than ever closing inward, (not the right wording) in their own house, even though the price for that is that they will be eliminating (terminating) all prior connection with the rest of the Muslim world. Unquestionably, the dilemma for Ms. Spaho is very hard, especially when it is well known that Bosnian Muslims, since janissary’s times, have been "more of a Pope than the Pope himself."\(^100\)

\(^{99}\) See Hassan, p152, in the following paragraphs of the same chapter Hassan also discusses the “hurt, sadness and indignation” that was expressed from Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Albania and India among other places.

\(^{100}\) \textit{Politika}, 11\(^{th}\) of March 1924, p. 1.
Finally, this text is also important because it shows yet again the inconsistency and turmoil that prevailed in the government of the Kingdom, and how that impacted the ways in which information and news were conveyed to the public. For the author, there is no difference between a caliph and a sultan. Yet, Politika was the same newspaper that only two years prior to this article reported on the abolition of the sultanate in the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{101} And only five days before Jevtič’s article, on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of March, Politika also published an interview with Abdülmeclid II, the already abolished Caliph. On his way to his exile in Switzerland passing through Vinkovci (in today’s Croatia), his train stopped and a journalist from Politika attempted to interview him. Instead he had an interview with Abdülmeclid’s personal secretary Dr. Nakib, who clarified:

… The rest of Muslim nations will decide: will the caliphate be abolished or not. After all, the Pope was also prosecuted, and some countries denounced him, yet he is still the spiritual leader of Catholics. This is exactly what is happening today to our Caliph…Do not forget that he is still a Caliph of the rest of the Muslims”

At the end of the interview Abdülmeclid II peeked through the window and the journalist (M.) asked him for a photo to which he agreed. A couple of days later, the photo of the exiled caliph and the interview were on the front page of Politika.\textsuperscript{102}

Politika was not the only newspaper in the Kingdom to cover the abolition of the caliphate. Between March 1924 and April 1925, Gajret published two articles that engaged with the topic of the abolition. The first one, titled “Several Reforms in Turkey and Abolishing of the Caliphate,” demonstrate the reformist sentiment that was part of the Gajret discourse since its inception, as discussed in the previous chapter. The article starts with the following:

\textsuperscript{101} See chapter I for this, Politika, 4th November 1922, “Muslims or Turks?”
\textsuperscript{102} Politka, 6\textsuperscript{th} of March, 1924, p. 1.
The latest events in Turkey have given the pretext for various combinations. Therefore, various newspapers are putting forward the news about how the Turks want to erase munare, ban ezane and abolish all Islamic symbols. This news is propagated to the general public by the opponents of the present Turkish regime with the intention of provoking animosity towards Turkey among the other Muslims. This may fool and surprise the uninformed masses at first, but those who know Turkey and the Turks, and especially those who know the people who are in charge of the fate of the Turkish Republic today, cannot for a minute believe in such rumors.

At first reading, the author seems to indicate that those who know the internal Turkish politics and know the people, who are part of the new Turkish government, found it hard to believe that Turkey is abolishing religion from its public sphere. It also implies that certain circles in Bosnia at this time were keeping up with the daily politics and changes in Turkey and knew how to distinguish “accurate” from “fake” information, which only better contextualized previously indicated anxieties that the government of Kingdom had about connections between its own Muslims and the new republic of Turkey.

But this section of the article also reflects a historical reality about the Muslims of Bosnia. Erdogdular, for example, argues, “Even upon separation from the Ottoman Empire, reformers remained within the intellectual spheres of the Ottoman and the Muslim World.” While tracing the development of a specific Bosnian Muslim modernity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, she points to the influence of Istanbul and Cairo on the reformist intellectual discourse in Bosnia. Erdogdular also makes a point that at the turn of the twentieth century, Turkish literature and Turkish

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103 Combinations in vernacular language at this period can be understood as malicious rumors.
104 Gajret, March 1924, no.6, “Several Reforms in Turkey and Abolishing of the Caliphate,” 96.
105 I am not sure who wrote this piece, there was no name attributed to it. This is not an unusual practice, because I came across numerous articles published without an author’s name in Gajret between 1919-1929.
106 This did not occur overnight in 1924. As Clayer and Bougarel have argued “Turk-Ottoman identification” existed in the urban areas of South Serbia, p.109, and Islamic modernist discourse which was associated with the new republic of Turkey was something Čaušević had been supporting and partaking in even before the formation of the Kingdom, p.71, 108.
107 Erdogdular, 924
modern writers were widely read, and most influential translations in Bosnia were those from Turkish, but also Arabic and Persian. This will be illustrated in the following sections when I discuss another publication pertaining to the question of the caliphate.  

The article also illustrates how the religious institutional and governmental transformations in Turkey were perceived in Bosnia, or at least how the author perceived them to be:  

These are, overall, very sudden and unusual changes. The Turks have called this reform “a war game”, because they claim that they are declaring war on everything, which goes against the original teachings of Islam and against common sense. We do not want, they say, the sultanate because it would divide the Turkish people. We do want neither caliphate nor meshihat (governing body), for we do need neither a pope nor a patriarch. They emphasize that Islam does not recognize intermediaries. We never, they say, had any use for titles, and we do not need them now. The Turkish Republic as an Islamic state, they say, should unify its judiciary, its education system, and allocate the Islamic common property in a way that would maximize its utility for the Islamic community. We do not want individuals giving us laws in the form of fatwas, which used to enslave us. We want, they say, to arrange the laws, which will be in line with original Islamic teachings, as well as common sense. What is most notable of these rapid reforms in Turkey, is that they are supported by the most respected and the most educated people in Turkey. In the great Turkish assembly, where there are a lot of ulema members, conclusions are drawn in this respect almost unanimously. That is how one can understand the Turks want to remove all those that have hindered their development and progress as a state. By abolishing the caliphate and removing the dynasty they have accomplished a lot...Now the question arises, who and where will the caliphate be?... How will things develop regarding the caliphate, it is not yet clear...

The rest of the article does not provide any opinion on what should be done with the future of the caliphate but only gives a brief overview of the history of the caliphate and the current division between the debates in the Hijaz and Egypt, and the unofficial discussions about a future congress in Cairo. Following this article, on December of

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108 Ibid, 925.
109 I am not claiming here that everyone or a majority of the Muslims in Bosnia agreed with this. However, since the reformist discourse in Bosnia, according to Bougarel, “focused on the need to reform the main Islamic religious institutions,” it is safe to say that others accept what the author says in this article, p. 318.
110 Gajret, March 1924, no.6, 97.
1924, another article was published on the same topic, which also offered a religious and historical analysis of the caliphate, but this time it also discussed the role of Turkey in the context of the abolition. The audience of this article was very clear, because the author, a shari’ah court judge Hafiz A. Bušatlić, states at the end of the article, that the editorial of Gajret recognized the necessity to discuss the caliphate issue at length and share with its readership the ongoing debates outside of Kingdom about the same, mainly to those who do not read Turkish or Arabic, since as the author claimed, “it is especially for those who do not possess a knowledge of Arabic or Turkish, and these languages are used for the current debates on this [the caliphate] question.” Bušatlić provided a more nuanced religious opinion about the aftermath and the rights and responsibilities of the Muslims on the question of the caliphate, by also expressing some interesting opinions about Turkey’s capacity to actually abolish the institution of the caliphate:

...And working to ensure that caliphate is reestablished, all Muslims are obliged, and especially independent Muslim states. Today it is said that the calipate was abolished by the Turkish state. This opinion is incorrect, since no one can abolish this title, not even the Turkish state. It is an internal principle, because it is deeply rooted in the Islamic faith. People can be betrayed, and even those who carry that title can be suspended and overthrown, but in such a case, the Muslims should act upon their religious duty, and select a respectable person who can than become a caliph...

Clearly there is a divergence in attitude and opinion between this article and the one published in March. One marker of difference is that this one was published by someone

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111 Gajret, March 1924, no. 21, p. 294.
112 I was not able to find any other writing that expressed this same sentiment about Turkey’s incapacity to abolish the caliphate. However this might allude to something that Hassan discusses in her book, when she says: “Indian Muslims expressed a collective sense of ownership in the Ottoman Caliphate as an Islamic Institution. It did not ‘belong’ to the Turks alone in order for them to have abolished it without consulting their Muslims brethren around the world.” Furthermore, Abdülmecid II himself, according to Hassan declared the act of abolition ‘fundamentally sacrilegious, null and void.” See Hassan, p. 153, p. 184
113 Gajret, December 1924, no. 21, 291.
who draws his arguments and conclusions exclusively from religious texts.\(^{114}\) Bušatlić does not accept the abolition of the caliphate but instead claims:

…The caliph is not abolished, but ousted, and the space has been vacated. A responsibility emerged for all Muslims now, regardless of their nationality, to elect a new caliph, and with that election to reestablish the power of the caliph…\(^{115}\)

It is important to highlight here that, Bušatlić’s discussion about the challenges and processes of electing a new caliph were part of a larger debate that happened across the Muslim world, after March 1924. Similarly, in the following weeks right after Abdülmeclid II was exiled in Switzerland, conversations about an Islamic conference were occurring. At this conference “Muslims from across the world could assess the situation as a collective body.”\(^{116}\) Bušatlić was also aware of the disagreement that emerged after the abolition of the caliphate, as to who has the right to claim the title, and more importantly which state would hold the seat of the newly elected caliph. Discussing the prevalent tensions between Turkey and Egypt,\(^{117}\) he stated: “We have to bring to the attention the fact that according to the Islamic doctrine, it is unacceptable for each Islamic state or given Muslim people in that state, to elect their own separate caliph.”\(^{118}\) For Bušatlić, it was important his readers to understand that even though the election would be a “delicate process,” the caliphate was not confined within any given state border, because “Muslims are spread out across the globe.”

\(^{114}\) On the first page of the article, as a footnote, the author cites the following sources: Tarihu Temedumil Islam, Tarihi hilafeta: El Kamil; Suruhu Akaid; Tenkih –kelam; Mukamidei Ibini Haludin; Tariki Turki i dr.

\(^{115}\) Gajret, December 1924, no.21, 292.

\(^{116}\) Hassan, 184-185.

\(^{117}\) “… To avoid complications of religious and political nature, it is inadvisable to allow the Caliph or members of his family to proceed to Egypt.” see Hassan, 189-190.

\(^{118}\) Gajret, December 1924, no. 21, p. 293.
Nonetheless, this article is significant because we can locate an emerging discussion and preparation for the future delegation that would be sent to Cairo in the upcoming Cairo Caliphate Congress of 1926, and the religious representative that would attend the same, that is, the Belgrade Supreme Mufti Zekerijah and the reis-ul-ulama Čaušević: 119

We came to a conclusion that we also have a responsibility to participate in this election, so now the question arises, how will we in Bosnia and the whole Kingdom, going to do this...We already have our elected religious representatives...M. Zakerijah... and Džemaludin ef. Čaušević...

Even more important than this is the following statement which should be kept in mind when we will discuss the events of 1926, because Bušatlić makes a claim that will later make a lot more sense in understanding how and why the government responded the way it did:

It is important for our governemnt to respect this, and with that caliph [the future elected caliph] make similar concordat (konkordatu) as the one that was made with the pope. Otherwise, electing a caliph for us would be illusory (iluzoran)...We think that our governemnt should finnacially support this delegation and enable our participation at the congress. 120

2.3. Subdued Hopes and the Cairo Caliphate Congress 1926

Similar ideas about the upcoming all-Islamic Congress in Cairo (Sveislamski Kongress) were published a year later, in Sarajevo. In March of 1926, E.N. Bulbulović wrote a twenty-three page pamphlet titled All-Islamic Congress and the Caliphate Question: Short and Informative Study About the Current Problems in Islam, and from it

119 In the article the author seems to be under the impression that the congress will take place sometime in March of 1925, however the congress will ultimately take place on May 13th 1926.
120 Gajret, December 1924, no. 21, p. 294.
we can draw several conclusions. For one, there was a continuous discussion about the future of the caliphate in the Kingdom, regardless of how limited in audience this was. Second, we can confirm that even in March, there seems to be an understanding that a delegation ought to represent the Muslim communities from the Kingdom at this congress, and in this regard the author also expresses some reservations and criticism about how this is approached by the government and certain religious leaders. And finally, the author makes an interesting assertion which, again provides an inside look into some of the options that religious intellectuals in Bosnia were considering. Here I would like to note that I am not sure who exactly is the author, in terms of his educational and social background, but his writing alludes to him being part of the reformer’s intellectual circle in Bosnia. I am not sure who the audience was and if it was limited to Bosnia or was it distributed in South Serbia. The pamphlet was not circulated as a free propaganda since there is a price on the front cover, but if we consider that Gajret was published and circulated in South Serbia there might be a chance that this pamphlet was as well.

The texts start by announcing the upcoming congress on the 13th of May, and event that according to the author “could be of epochal importance for the whole Islamic word.” He than goes on to state “the main task of this congress is to solve the caliphate quesiton…and to prepare the grounds for spiritual unity of all Muslims.” Citing both Arabic and Turkish sources, Bulbulović then discusses the development of the institution


122 E.N. Bulbulović is most likely Edhem Bulbulović, discussed as part of the reformist intellectual circles in Bosnia in the 1920s, See Fabio Giomi, “Reforma- The Organizaition of Progressive Muslims and its Role in Intervar Bosnia, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol.29, no. 4, December 2009, p. 503; Michael Kemper and Artemy M. Kalinovsky, *Reassessing Orientalism: Interlocking Orientologies During the Cold War* (New York: Rutledge, 2015), 158.

of the caliphate and the problems with misinterpretations and misappropriations of the title of the caliphate. He sees the upcoming congress as a chance to repair the existing state of affairs on a theoretical and practical level, by stressing the need for depoliticization (depolitizacija) of the Caliphate as an institution, and using it as a nexus for unity among all Muslims he claims:

The task of an All-Islamic congress should be to eliminate all that creates confusion and replace it with a simplified Islam, and to create the conditions for progress and civilization (civilizaciju) of Muslims. So far many obstacles of religious character, which should be abolished have been hindering this path. This includes the Caliphate, which was mixing politics with faith or faith with politics, blocking progress for Muslims. Such Caliphate needs to be destroyed, and his holders driven out…. Regardless the Caliphate being a traditional institution, I do want to see the Caliphate reestablished, but under these conditions…The Caliphate needs to exist as a spiritual center, around which all Muslims should concentrate. The Caliphate should become a living link for the spiritual unity of Muslims. In this respect, I am not aligned with the Turks and some of their supporters, who want to constrain this spiritual unity within the borders of the political and the national…

What is noteworthy to mention in this context is that the author sees Damascus or Istanbul, not Cairo as one of the best options for Caliphate’s seat, under a condition that “they are free, demilitarized, and autonomous cities.” Furthermore, Bulbulović’s proposals about the future reorganization of the Caliphate institution fits easily within the broader discourse of the time. The idea of a council composed of transnational representatives that will either assume or aid the duties of the Caliphate was traveling around the Muslim intellectual circles prior to the Cairo Congress of 1926. This particular section corresponds to that idea:

The Caliph needs to have a subordinate organ; one permanent council composed of the most educated Islamic scholars which will be delegated by designated Islamic

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124 Ibid, 3-14.
125 Ibid, 14-16, 17.
126 Ibid, 15-17.
127 Hassan, 214.
countries, and one strictly disciplined universal organization of priests (sveštenika) which will be centralized and subordinate\textsuperscript{128} to the Caliphate.\textsuperscript{129}

The pamphlet ends with the author pleading for a Muslim delegation from the Kingdom to be sent to Cairo, which would also necessitate “the prestige from our country.” The last paragraphs of the text signals some of the internal debates and struggles that the Muslim communities of the Kingdom endured right before the government sent its infamous decision to prohibit any official or unofficial attendance at the Cairo Congress.\textsuperscript{130} Bulbulović concludes with the following:

On this historical event, a Muslim representation from Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{131} is also necessary. This is part of the prestige of our country (prestiz naše države)...Holding an all-Islamic Congress will in any case be useful and in no way harmful...These are our views on the congress and the Caliphate. We bring them before the objective court of the public, in the hope that they will be adopted by our delegates who take part in this congress.\textsuperscript{132}

The delegates that Bulbulović is referring to in the last sentence and who were considered for attending the congress were, Džemaludin Čaušević and Mehmet Zekerijah (Mehmet Zek i efendi). In February of 1925, the president of the Cairo Congress, and rector of the Al-Azhar, Muhammad Abu-Fadil, sent an invitation to Čaušević.\textsuperscript{133} Following this invitation on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of March, Čaušević sent a couple of letters addressed to subordinate Islamic religious institutions in Bosnia asking for an opinion on three matters: if Muslims from Bosnia should participate at the congress, in what capacity, how many delegates

\begin{footnotes}
\item[128] This sounds a lot like the structure of the Catholic Church, and Bulbulović does mention in the text that the Caliph and the Caliphate should be to Islam what the pope and Vatican are for the Catholic faith. Abdülmeçid’s personal secretary also made similar comments about the pope in his interview. While this is an interesting topic to analyze, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. I would also like to point out that the word priest (sveštenik) was used in other documents and in different contexts, and is not limited to the Christian understanding of the word priest, see p.11 in this chapter and Chapter I.
\item[129] Ibid, 17.
\item[130] DARM, fond:0609 box:0003, document: 159.
\item[131] This is the first time I have actually come across this word in my documents, even though it was used in everyday conversations. For the most part, official documents, news reports and articles used the term Kraljevina that translates to the Kingdom.
\item[132] Bulbulović, 23.
\item[133] Čaušević, 327-330.
\end{footnotes}
should be sent, and who should be a delegate from Bosnia. On the 11th of March he also
sent a request for an official permission to yet another new minister of religion, Miloš
Trifunović, and the following day he asked for the same from the minister of foreign
affairs, Momčilo Ninčić.134

However, by March 8th, the government was already investigating this event, based
its information on an article published in Pravda, another Belgrade based newspaper.
Published on the 22nd of February, the article announced, “At the big pan-Islamic
congress in Cairo, that will elect a new caliph, delegates from our Muslims were also
invited.”135 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at a request made by the Ministry of
Religion, sent a letter to the Royal Mission of the Kingdom in Istanbul saying:

Because this is a very important question for our internal religious politics in our country,
I would like to ask you to provide me with the following information: Does this congress
have any political tendency in addition to its religious? Is its tendency Pan-Islamic, and
against the European superpowers England and France? What kind of stance do these
countries take about this congress, and what is the interest and stand of the Turkish
republic regarding this congress?136

The response that was sent on the 22nd of March, was comprised of the following and did
not include any information on England or France:

The Angora’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs doubts that Turkey will attend the congress. It
was said in confidence that Turkey was invited on similar events before and they always
refused… the Turkish delegation highly doubts that they will be invited at all. I even had
a conversation about this with the Egyptian minister, Hudija Pasa, and he told me that
except for one letter in the newspapers, he does not have any information from his
government about this information…137

It appears that the Ministry of Religion was not satisfied with this response because on
the same day, Trifunović sent a request to Čaušević which included some, but not all of
the subsequent questions: Is the Caliphate a political or purely religious institution, and

134 Ibid, 333-338.
135 Pravda. 22nd February 1926, no. 51, 2.
137 AY, fond: 370, box: 21, document: 133.
what is the nature of its authority? Who has the right to choose the Caliph? And finally, why Turkey, as a majority Muslim country, decided to not keep the institution of the Caliphate? After Čaušević’s response to this request, on the 1st of May 1926, the Ministry of Religion announced that no one from the Kingdom is allowed to attend the Cairo Congress, in an official or semi-official capacity.

What was this decision based on? The document claims that the congress was of a regional character, and there was no need for Muslims from the Kingdom to participate. This however, was not entirely true, because the organizers sent a total of six hundred and ten invitations. Poland sent one delegate, their Grand Mufti, and the Kingdom with close to two million Muslims sent none. Additionally, the document claimed, “…if our Muslims take part of that congress, they might generate resentment from other Muslims…and indirectly cause damage to their state.” This claim seems improbable, because for one, when Čaušević got the survey of questions from the subordinate Islamic institutions such as local mufti offices, local sharīʿah courts and waqfs committees, they overwhelmingly supported the delegation and Čaušević as its representative. While the government was seemingly concerned with the political aspects of Caliphate as institutions, most of the writings published during the period, stressed either the apolitical character of it, or the symbolic power that it holds in the last years of the Ottoman Empire.

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139 This response included a report with munities from the meeting that Čaušević had with the rest of the ulema in Sarajevo. On this meeting they all provided a five-page religious and historical explanation for all the questions that the minister had. See Čaušević, p. 342-346
141 See Hassan, p. 209, she explains that only twenty-nine foreign delegates showed, but there was nothing regional about them since they came from countries such as Sumatra, South Africa, Yemen, Iraq, and India.
143 Čaušević, 352-353.
In the case of Bulbulović’s pamphlet, which was published during the same period, March of 1926, during which time the Ministry of Religion was sending requests back and forth about the caliphate’s political significance, the author emphasized, “Categorically, the Caliphate needs to be depoliticized, and turned into an entirely religious institution.”

Corresponding with this statement was Čaušević’s report that he sent back to Trifunović on 29th of March, providing answers to his inquiries about the caliphate. Discussing the Caliphate’s nature of authority, Čaušević, in consensus with the rest of the Bosnian ulema, argued that the Caliph retained only religious authority for the Muslims living in other counties around the world. Thus, even the potential argument for justifying the ban, as a preemptive measurement does not seem convincing.

Based on the two documents that I will discuss in the following section, I argue that, just as the previous issue in 1923, which involved excluding Čaušević from the deputation in Istanbul, the reason for this prohibition was also closely connected with him. One reason for this is that Čaušević was the only Muslim officially invited to attend the Cairo Congress, and I base this claim on the fact that the invitation was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina and not Belgrade. The invitation was written in Arabic and when Čaušević sent a letter to request permission to attend the conference, he provided a translated version of the invitation for Trifunović; he then suggested two delegates to be sent from Bosnia and two from South Serbia. And in his closing statement he even proposed a meeting with Trifunović by stating: “if

144 Bulbulović, 17.
145 Čaušević, 346.
146 Hassan, 209.
you think that this issue concerns the interests of the state, I am willing to come and receive any instructions from you.\footnote{\v{C}au\v{s}evi\v{c}, 333-334.}

This meeting never happened even though the final decision to ban any attendance was based on a vague attempt to avoid possible damage to the state. Lastly, restricting the ban to only \v{C}au\v{s}evi\v{c} would have instigated internal disorder for a government that already functioned in a constant state of disarray and parliamentary instability. Ironically, it is \v{C}au\v{s}evi\v{c} who probably gave the Ministry of Religion the final impetus for the ban on all official and un-official delegations. Responding to a yet another letter from Trifunovi\v{c}, on the 31\textsuperscript{st} of March, \v{C}au\v{s}evi\v{c} begins by defending his decision to undertake a survey and ask for an opinion from his subordinate Islamic religious institutions, an action that Trifunovi\v{c} found problematic:

\begin{quote}
I am very sorry that you are expressing this unpleasantness (neugodnost) because of my decision to conduct this survey before I sent a request for your permission, as a representative of state authority. This only shows that you did not understand this all-Islamic congress as a purely religious act as the name suggests. Additionally, you did not consider my position as reis-ul-ulama, elected by the people. As such I had to know the opinion of my Muslims about the congress first.\footnote{Ibid, 347-348.}
\end{quote}

This segment also identifies the possibility that Trifunovi\v{c} was not convinced that the congress was of religious nature, even after reading all recommendations and reports. It also signals the reality of the time; even though the Muslim community of Bosnia had an autonomous status in the Kingdom in terms of electing its representatives, it was expected that the Ministry of Religion would have the first and last word on any issue. But more importantly this document shows the inconsistency of the Ministry of Religion in the ways in which it communicated with the \textit{reis-ul ulema} and the Supreme Mufti.
After all, Zekerijah was one of the delegates for the deputation to the last caliph in 1923. According to the same document, he also appeared to be unconcerned with the protocols for attending the Cairo Congress, because as Čaušević indicates, on the 19th of March 1926, he had already announced to his local muftis in South Serbia his plans for the congress. In addition, in the same document, Čaušević revealed the following to Trifunović:

Mister Supreme Mufti reports that he has decided to attend the congress as a delegate of the Muslims, and is requesting a signed authorization. Did he also pass the exam on those questions that you sent [about the caliphate], and did you sir Minister gave him a diploma about it, I am unaware about this. I would like for you, sir Minister, on this occasion, to accept my special respect.149

It was the day after this letter was sent that Trifunović announced the ban. The gradual move towards authoritarian rule in the Kingdom was illustrated in the ways in which the government dealt first with Čaušević, and second with the ban for the Cairo Caliphate Congress. The latter also demonstrates how the government, and especially the Ministry of Religion, deliberately attempted to create conditions in order to gradually isolate the Muslim communities in the Kingdom from the rest of the Muslim world. On January 6th 1929, King Aleksandar suspended the constitution, and established a centralized dictatorship.150 The end of the parliamentary system initiated the passing of the new law for regulating the Islamic religious institutions two days later. This law created a nation-wide Islamic religious community, gave power to the King to appoint all religious positions, and abolished the 1909 Status of Autonomy.151 The Ministry of Religion was abolished and all matters of religion were placed under the Ministry of

149 Čaušević, 348.
150 Nielsen, 73.
151 Bougarel, 323.
Čaušević, as expected, protested this law and between January and April sent numerous requests asking to retire even without the pension. On the 6th of June 1930, the Ministry of Justice approved his request.\textsuperscript{153}

\begin{flushright}
\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Nielsen, 158-159.
\item Čaušević, 144.
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Conclusion:

The relationship between the Caliphate as an institution, idea, and its subsequent debates after its 1924 abolishment, and the Muslim communities in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, has often been neglected in both Ottoman and Balkan or Southeastern Europe scholarship. This thesis examined this relationship within the framework of imperial legacies, and argued that the Caliphate was one of the Ottoman legacies that the Kingdom inherited after 1918. By examining the ways in which the Ministry of Religion, as an extension of the state, governed its diverse Muslim communities, this thesis maintained that the period prior to the 1923 trip revealed a more interactive relationship between the central government in Belgrade, and Muslim communities across the Kingdom. The inherited modes of governance together with the inherited religious structures of the Kingdom, from the Hapsburg and more so from the Ottoman Empire, contributed to the unofficial hierarchy between the different Muslim minorities. Bosnian Muslims, as the dominant Slavic speaking Muslim community, were caught between Serbian and Croatian nationalism, and as the article from Politka in chapter II showed, this identity politics was extended to the debates within the Kingdom, about the institution of the Caliphate.

Yet, as the documents in the chapters have shown, the interactive relationship, more often than not failed to provide adequate outcomes, exemplified in the case of Čaušević among others. The failure of the Kingdom’s government to resolve the dual challenges of state building and legitimacy, reproduced on local level. This reflected on the ways in which the Ministry of Religion was governing the Muslims communities, and how the government dealt with the institution and debates about the caliphate. The
gradual move towards the January 6th dictatorship, in the case of the Muslim minorities of the Kingdom, meant that the government was deliberately creating conditions in order to increasingly detach its Muslim communities from the rest of the Muslim world. Nonetheless, what this thesis also showed is that the Muslim communities of the Kingdom, engaged with larger debates about the caliphate, which materialized across the post-Ottoman space. It also showed that both, the Muslims and government of the Kingdom continued to look at Istanbul and Turkey as a point of reference for the Muslim world.

 Arnaldo Momigliano claimed, “Every story produced by a historian implies the elimination of alternative stories.”154 In the process of constructing my argument some sources needed to be left out of the story, which possibly resulted in elimination of some kind of alternative story. Unlike the story I told in the previous chapters, governing the Muslim communities in the Kingdom extended well beyond the issues of the Caliphate or Čaušević, such as conversion, or language. On 17th of October 1925, the Ministry of Religion sent a warning to Zeki-efendi alarming him of a reoccurring problem regarding converts. Apparently some Christian men would marry a woman in a church only to move in a region were predominantly Muslims lived and convert to Islam. The problem was not conversion, because this was allowed. The problem was that when a man converted to Islam he also married another woman in a sharīʿah court, without obtaining a divorce from his previous wife. This created a problem of “polygamy,” as the documents state. Interestingly enough, a woman was not allowed to do this, because if she converted and wanted to marry in a sharīʿah court “she needs to provide the court

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with the proper documentation proving her divorced status.” The Ministry required that Zeki-efendi send a letter to all subordinate institutions cautioning them “not to play with their religion.” According to the documents as early as 1920 the Ministry was actively trying to regulate conversion procedures, declaring “if someone converts they need to get permission before they change their last name, but many seem to ignore this and do it anyway.” But as late as 1927, the same Ministry kept addressing the issue of unsupervised conversions.¹⁵⁵

Conversion was one item on the list of prevailing issues during this period. The continuous practice of using Ottoman-Turkish language in official documents was another. On 19th of 1923, the Minister of Religion request to the office of the Mufti in Kichevo (southern Serbia), declaring that using Ottoman Turkish in sharīʿah court documents and verdicts was against state law. “If the Mufti feels incapable to fulfill and carry out the legal requirements and regulations,” the letter read, “or if he cannot find a way to comply with the order because he feels inept, or if his clerk is unfit for his duty, he should notify the Ministry of Religion, which will see to satisfy all legal requirements and provide the needed help.”¹⁵⁶ Using a language of accommodation, the Ministry was willing to work with the office of the Mufti and provide additional help for translating verdicts into the official state language.

Roughly two years later, on 25th of October 1925, the Ministry sent another letter of critique to the Mufti in Kichevo, but this time they accused the local sharīʿah judges of malice and disrespect of the constitution and state authority, “the continuous usage of Turkish language in the office of the Mufti is interpreted as mischievous disrespect

toward the constitutional regulations and superior authorities” the Minister complained. The document reveals a shift in the language that the state was using for addressing the persistent usage of Ottoman Turkish in the region. “Muftis who will go against this order,” the letter concluded, “will be punished.” Yet, documents with the same problem kept reappearing. The fact that even as late as 1929 judges still used Ottoman Turkish shows that whatever sanctions the government was imposing were not fully effective.

Time and again through these documents we see the inability of the government to assert itself on a local level. The reader might be under the impression that the government was concerned with some regions over others. While I would argue for that possibility, and I am sure it varied over time, this impression might also be generated by the limits of my source selection. Because I was not able to visit the archives in Kosovo and Montenegro, I perhaps eliminated other alternative stories and their relationship with the government, and the Muslims outside of the Kingdom’s borders. Future research on these regions can contribute to a better, encompassing story of all Muslim communities in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Moreover, that kind of research can perhaps provide us with alternative networks, and expand our scope for future contributions in connecting the Muslims of this region with other neglected Ottoman continuities.

157 IAO, fond: OSSK, box: 1.24, document 78.
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