BALANCING ON A KNIFE EDGE: ETHNIC BARGAINING VERSUS NATION-BUILDING IN THE CASE OF HUNGARIANS IN UKRAINE

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**ABSTRACT**

This thesis analyzes the ethnic mobilization of the Russian and Hungarian minority groups in Ukraine with the support of the theory of ethnic bargaining. For this purpose first the theories of ethnic mobilization are presented with a thorough assessment of their strengths and weaknesses in explaining the selected cases. A brief historical background of the minority issues in Ukraine is also provided for a comprehensive account on the causal effect of the minority radicalization and the nation-building as well as the time of their occurrence. Finally the thesis examines the behavior of the states through the lens of the ethnic bargaining model.

The model suggests, that the kin state behavior is the key for minority behavior and the latter selects its step on the basis of the perceived leverage. If there is no outside support, the minority is not likely to radicalize its demands. On the other hand, if the minority is certain of outside support, it will radicalize despite the host state is non-repressive.

The thesis argues that in the ongoing Ukrainian war the external kin states use the ethnicities inhabiting the territory for strategic reasons, and the minorities respond to differential levels of kin state support by radicalizing or moderating their demands. In this way, kin states help to mobilize or suppress minority claims for their own strategic purposes. In this game, the players are the minorities, the core group and the kin states. The minority is the only player choosing its positions on the basis of core group and the kin state signals.
# Table of Contents

**ABSTRACT** ........................................................................................................................................................................... i

**LIST OF FIGURES** .................................................................................................................................................................. iii

**INTRODUCTION** ....................................................................................................................................................................... 4

**CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL CONCEPTS** ........................................................................................................................................... 10

1.1 *Structural theories of minority radicalization* ......................................................................................................................... 11

1.2 *Dynamic theories of minority radicalization* ............................................................................................................................... 16

1.3 *Ethnic bargaining theory* ............................................................................................................................................................. 21

**CHAPTER 2: HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF THE MINORITY-MAJORITY QUESTION IN UKRAINE** ......................................................... 28

2.1 *Political shifts and the Ukrainian-Russian language question* ..................................................................................................... 29

2.2 *Relation between Ukraine, Hungary and the Hungarian minority* ............................................................................................. 34

**CHAPTER 3: TRIADIC NEXUS – ETHNIC BARGAINING IN PRACTICE** ........................................................................................... 39

3.1 *Interlinkage between the Russian minority the Ukrainian majority* .............................................................................................. 39

3.2 *The Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia* ................................................................................................................................. 41

3.3 *Comparison of the minorities in Ukraine* ....................................................................................................................................... 43

3.4 *Hungarians in Vojvodina and in Transcarpathia* ............................................................................................................................ 45

**CONCLUSIONS** .............................................................................................................................................................................. 47

**REFERENCE LIST** ........................................................................................................................................................................ 50
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Triadic nexus between the players of the ethnic bargaining game...............p. 22.

Figure 1.2 Scale of the extremity of minority demands..........................................p. 23.

Figure 1.3 Four states of the world: conflict, opportunity, vulnerability, and peace........p. 24.

Figure 2.1 Ukrainian territorial changes in the 20th century.................................p. 30.

Figure 2.2 Ethnic map of Transcarpathia (1989).......................................................p. 35.

Table 3.1 Russian demands in Eastern Ukraine......................................................p. 41.

Table 3.2 Hungarian demands in Transcarpathia.....................................................p. 43.
INTRODUCTION

No one writing about Transcarpathia can resist retelling the region’s favourite anecdote: A visitor, encountering one of the oldest local inhabitants, asks about his life. The reply: ‘I was born in Austria-Hungary, I went to school in Czechoslovakia, I did my army service in Horthy’s Hungary, followed by a spell in prison in the USSR. Now I am ending my days in independent Ukraine.’ The visitor expresses surprise at how much of the world the old man has seen. ‘But no!’, he responds, ‘I’ve never left this village!’

Judy Butt

The collapse of the European multinational great empires in the beginning of the 20th century introduced a large number of quasi-nation states; however, these new states were nowise homogenous in terms of ethnicities and national identities. The end of the Cold War and the decomposition of several federal structures like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia made the situation more complicated by spreading the nationalism ideologies across the newly formed borders. The political transition of the early 90s resulted in a constant negotiation among ethnic groups in several multinational states over access to resources and institutional representation. Many of the minorities were temporarily accommodated by the core groups, but in other cases the intergroup tension led to bloodshed. In the first fifteen years following the end of the Cold War, 116 armed conflicts in 78 countries were recorded globally, while except of seven wars almost all were considered as intrastate armed conflicts.2

The wars and conflicts among the former socialist countries have a special significance because for many decades the nationalist tension was under the Soviet control and only after these multinational federations started to fall apart, the former compatriots started to hate each other. The wars waged in the Caucasus, except for the Azeri-Armenian conflict, all featured Russian interference. The outburst of the hybrid war in the East of Ukraine is clearly following the broader regional pattern of minority mobilization with Russian involvement.

The broad literature dealing with ethnic conflicts focuses on state-level processes and can be divided into theories arguing that ethnic identity is given in society, and those claiming that it is politically constructed. It is reasonable to argue that the former have multiple useful elements which explain the permanent or temporary differences in societies which ultimately may lead to conflicts. However, they fail to give an account of how and when the groups radicalize or remain quiescent. Dynamic theories, on the other hand, do a better job of providing the conditions for minority mobilization or appeasement.

Most theories of ethnic conflict predict mobilization of the minorities in Ukraine, but some of them cannot explain important features of the conflicts. For instance, theories based on ethnic and linguistic differences would predict the mobilization of the Hungarian minority but not the Russian minority, due to greater ethnic differences between the former and the

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Ukrainian majority. Group traits, such as territorial compactness, would predict the mobilization of both the Russian and Hungarian minorities simultaneously, however only the Russians radicalized. Modernization theories would predict the assimilation of all the minorities, which is also missing. Economic theories would expect that many other rich ethnic regions would try to secede besides Donetska and Luhanska, including Kharkivska, Dnipropetrovska, Zaporizka and Odeska. Ethnic fears theories provide an explanation to the post-2014 intergroup relations, namely, that due to a number of uncertainties in the political situation of Ukraine the Russian minority radicalized to protect against fears of Ukrainian repression. However, the Hungarian minority has not radicalized extremely in response to fears from the center, even after the discriminatory language laws of 2017 and 2019, and the reasons for its absence remain unaddressed. Also, it is not clear, why minorities of the same state behave differently within the same conditions, as well as behave similarly within different conditions.

The shifts in power relations between different groups in Ukraine is particularly important for understanding the nature of the country’s multinational and multilingual composition in addition to its heritage of being divided between different Eastern and Western

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European states. Undoubtedly, foreign powers have had an influence on the development and continuation of the armed conflict. Several scholars see the turbulent changes since 2013 as a result of the strong macro level competition for the relative control over Ukraine. Consequently, they explain the Ukrainian internal conflict as a culmination of a long-term crisis in relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation. However, they tend to oversimplify the struggle, leaving Ukraine out as an active political actor, while underestimating the power of psychology and the nationalist sentiment on both the Russian and the Ukrainian sides. Political leaders on all the involved sides did everything possible to create conflict in those realms where they did not existed earlier. The language issues in Ukraine appeared only in the beginning of the 2000s, but reached a critical level only around the Euromaidan uprising.

It is essential to give a more comprehensive account of the Ukrainian war using a model that can account for the multi-layered shape and bridge the intergroup and interstate relations. Jenne argues that minority mobilization may be understood as a game in which a given ethnic group use demands as bargaining chips to negotiate for greater resources in the state. In this game the players are the elites of the minorities, the core group and the kin states, who closely scrutinize the steps of each other’s and raise or lower their stakes accordingly.

This paper provides a detailed examination of the Hungarian minority behavior in relation to the core group, exploring the effects of signals of support from the kin state for the minority group on the dynamics of minority-majority bargaining. Ethnic bargaining presents the process of the radicalization or moderation of demands in accordance with the triadic

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15 Ibid. 38.
relation between the minority elites, the Ukrainian government and the Hungarian government. The model of the ethnic bargaining suggests that the kin state leadership behavior is the key for minority behavior and the host state attitude is of lesser importance. Also, if there is no outside support, the minority is not likely to radicalize its demands. On the other hand, if the minority is certain of outside support, it will radicalize despite the host state being non-repressive.

After using the model to account for the differences in minority behavior between the Hungarian and Russian minorities, an earlier case study is brought in for comparison for further tests of robustness. The parallels between the evolution of the processes in Serbia and Ukraine are presented to identify the cornerstones of the minority policy shifts as the reaction of majorities and behavior of the minority elites. The case comparison of Hungarians in Vojvodina with those in Transcarpathia allows us to assess the impact of the same lobby actor (Hungary) on minority mobilization in two different states, whereas the primary comparison of Hungarian and Russian minorities in Ukraine allows to assess the majority’s attitude. In both cases, there were systemic transformations that provided opportunities to minority leaders to challenge the center. Both host states acted in a repressive manner, but only the Albanian minority in Serbia and the Russian minority in Ukraine escalated demands. The Hungarian minority in both cases remained quiescent, even when facing serious repression form the Centre. In both cases the Hungarian government offered a limited support which in the case of the Hungarians in Vojvodina was later withdrawn, but in the case of the Hungarians in Transcarpathia at the current stage it materializes on the EU and NATO level.

In order to analyze the situation thoroughly, first I present the theories of ethnic mobilization and underline their strengths and weaknesses with examples. In the second chapter I describe the background of the Ukrainian-Russian language policy shifts as an indication of a broader political conflict and the brief history of the Ukrainian-Hungarian cooperation to protect the Hungarian minority. In the last chapter I use the ethnic bargaining model to assess
the predicted behavior of the Russian minority in Ukraine, and the Hungarian minority in
Ukraine and Serbia.
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

The territory and the boundaries of the states provide the basis of the modern state system.\textsuperscript{16} However, the boundaries of the states and the nations are rarely coinciding. According to the often cited definition of Max Weber, the state is a “political organization” existing on a well-defined territory where the “administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.”\textsuperscript{17} The nation, on the other hand, is defined by Ernest Gellner as “the artefact[s] of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities” which enables the members of a community to “recognize certain mutual rights and duties.”\textsuperscript{18} Nationalism is defined by him as a “political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”\textsuperscript{19} The state and the nation are tied together because the “internally fluid and fairly undifferentiated, large-scale, and culturally homogeneous communities appear as the only legitimate repositories of political authority.”\textsuperscript{20} The incentive of the majority to uphold a smooth ruling, therefore, explains the policies of nation-building and the political principle of the ‘one state one culture’, but it is not sufficient to give an explanation of the minorities’ choice to challenge the majority instead of assimilate and take their share in ruling.

In the extensive literature on nationalism there is a historic debate about whether ethnic identity and, thus, the eternal divide were originally coded in and between groups or created by elites to support their power struggle. It is essential to understand whether it is a deep-rooted ethnic divide (if such does exist) which leads to outburst of a conflict or it is a strategic manipulation of an elite group. The primary question is that if the former one exists, than what

\textsuperscript{16} Miles Kahler and Barbara Walter, eds. \textit{Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. p. 1.
explains that groups live together in peace for a long time? The other question is that if different
groups have the same adversary, why do they react differently to the out-of-the-group threat?
To find the answer to these main questions I list the most relevant theoretic groups of ethnic
mobilization and underline their strengths and weaknesses in explanation of the Ukrainian
crisis. Depending on the factors which change the status quo between the groups I broadly
divide these theories into structural and dynamic theories of minority mobilization.

1.1 Structural theories of minority radicalization

The first among the structural theories is the primordialism. According to primordialist theories,
ethnic boundaries are relatively static, and it is only a matter of time until these “primordial
sentiments” come to the surface and the community will seek for national self-determination.21
Furthermore, the more distinctive are the national identities of the majority and minority, the
more likely the latter one will be excluded, and following the logic, the easier it will mobilize
around separatist demands. These theories do not support our cases since there are no serious
ethnic differences between the Ukrainians and the Russians, who come from the same branch
of the Eastern Slavic family. Also, Hungarians, who are distinct from the Slavic groups didn’t
radicalize considerably their demands in Ukraine so far.

A different set of theories are based on the psychological approach to ethic
radicalization. Roger Petersen originates the ethnic conflict in fear, hatred, resentment and rage
which emotions are “inherent in human nature.”22 Based on beliefs, he divides emotions into
three categories: event-based emotions, object-based emotions, and emotions with no specific

Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. (New York:
Free Press of Glencoe. 1963)
Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002)
cognitive antecedent. Petersen also suggests that these feelings may occur as a result of “changes of status hierarchies”, when a previously dominant group becomes dominated. Thus, the past relations and the shift in leadership between the groups conditions the state policies. The psychological approach might explain the prompt change in Russian-Ukrainian ethnic relations during the turbulent events at times of the ‘Maidan revolution’. These events were directed against the pro-Russian president and the government who pursued a closer cooperation with Russia. Therefore, the opposition to the Russian elites might be explained through both the event-based and object-based emotions. The status reversal for the Russian minority led to radicalization against the new Ukrainian anti-Russian elites and resulted the secession of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR), as well as almost teared Kharkiv from Ukraine. The Hungarian minority did not have the same high level status as the Russian minority, thus, the status reversal part do not apply to this group. Furthermore, this theory doesn’t explain why Hungarians did not mobilize against the controversial language and education law.

The third set of theories hold that group traits including ethnic group size, territorial concentration and its location are crucial characteristics that determine the wish of a minority to challenge the host state. Monica Duffy Toft, for instance, claims that “[e]thnic groups will seek to rule territory if they are geographically concentrated in a particular region of a country, especially if that region is a historic homeland.” She also argues that the direction of this relation may be changed, namely, if the concentrated minority group is threatening to the core group, it is more likely to be repressed. Stephen Van Evera uses a different lens and argues

that based on the location of Russian nationals in Ukraine “[their] rescue is easy, [therefore] it may not be attempted, since the threat of rescue is enough to deter abuse of the diaspora.”

However, this doesn’t explain the timing of Russian minority mobilization, which happened only after 2014. As the historic evidence shows, the concentration argument is strong, because Russians of Doneck and Luhansk regions pursued secessionist agenda. However, it does not explain why other territories with high Russian population density or Hungarians concentrated on the western border of Ukraine didn’t follow the same pattern.

According to the scholars of modernization theories, nationalism is a by-product of urbanization, increased mobility, communication industrialization, and political development. Benedict Anderson, for instance, holds that the birth of ‘imagined communities’ “was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity.”

Gellner specifies that the “growth-oriented industrial society is strongly impelled towards cultural homogeneity within each political unit.” Accordingly, a passive homogenization is explained by the melting pot theory which posits that minorities are likely select assimilation for economic reasons, striving for success in the host state. These theories are helpful in the Ukrainian case, in those situations when the minority inhabiting an ethnically highly intermixed region. Population in multilingual places will select the majority language of communication intuitively. David Laitin, for instance highlights the importance of linguistic homogeneity in family networks within the Russian population in Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

Thus, all Russians, Ukrainians and Hungarians in Ukraine have assimilated over 1-2

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generations in those cases when they moved from a minority to a majority region, or as a result of intermarriage.

A further set of theories of minority mobilization are economic ones which hold that economic disparities between the groups over time cause secessionism. Thus, “advanced groups” in “backward regions” are likely to demand self-determination, because the group wishes to avoid discrimination.32 Equally, the “backward groups” in “advanced regions” based on their relative weakness “struggle for relative group worth” which leads to clashes and in the end the group mobilizes for independence to avoid victimization and exploitation.33 These theories would explain the secession of the Eastern region of Ukraine, since the industry is concentrated on this territory and, thus, it produces a considerable share of the Ukrainian GDP, but Fearon and Laitin confirmed based on empirical analysis that “state weakness” is a better predictor of conflict than the “measures of grievances such as economic inequality.”34 A different theory dealing with grievances, namely relative deprivation theory, works in a similar way. It holds that if a community is economically discriminated or financially inferior, it will radicalize, but only when the political or financial circumstances are supportive. Ted Robert Gurr claims that “the greater the intensity and scope of relative deprivation, the greater the magnitude of collective violence.”35 These theories help to explain a part of the question because differentiation along ethnic or linguistic lines between Ukrainian and Russian population appeared only the mid-2000s for the time of the pro-Ukrainian Yushchenko government and the pro-Russian Yanukovich era but achieved significance only after the Euromaidan events.36

Finally, according to the institutionalist theories the national identities converge around social focal points such as symbols, myths, and other structures. Yuri Slezkine explains that the Soviet Regime didn’t oppressed the nations of the state per se, however, imposed on them a narrated common history and promoted the Russian language with the aim that in the future the national sentiment will disappear.\textsuperscript{37} Ronald Grigor Suny extends this explanation and argues that during the Soviet times, the nation-making had been specific because the state intended to “overcome nationalism and the differences between nations” but instead assisted to create conscious “politically mobilizable nationalities.”\textsuperscript{38} Suny divides the period into seven distinct trends. According to him the first policy – the nativization – was prevalent in the early 1930s and “contributed to the consolidation of nationality in three important ways: by supporting the native language, by creating a national intelligentsia and political elite, and by formally institutionalizing ethnicity in the state apparatus.”\textsuperscript{39} At the time of Economic and Social Transformation an intensive russification was introduced. The territorialization created distinct political elites which with a limited independency led their own nations.\textsuperscript{40} The imperialism contributed to a “Russocentric empire, in which Russian was most closely identified with Soviet, proletarian, and progress.”\textsuperscript{41} As opposed to the imperialism the traditionalism was characteristic to many distant rural areas. After the death of Stalin the member-states were led by “national mafias.”\textsuperscript{42} The ‘official nationalism,’ helped to spread the ideas of “ethnic chauvinism or political separatism” but also “periodically reined in the more vocal proponents of local nationalism.”\textsuperscript{43} Consequently, when the Soviet regime started to decay, movements


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid3. p. 102.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. p. 111-112.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. p. 112.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. p. 118.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid. p. 122.
began to form around institutionalized national identities in pursuit of secessionist agenda. These theories are important for explaining the process of the change of Ukrainian-Russian double identity. While the Soviet nationalism assisted in Russification of the elite and the economically advanced regions, it nonetheless did not limited the development of the Ukrainian nationalism and separatism ideology. It might be assumed that the two nationalisms get in a confrontation at a certain point of time, however, the theory does not predicts the time of this conflict.

Hence, structural theories of minority mobilization do not, at least by themselves, answer the question why certain groups in the same society radicalize their demands but others not. Furthermore, they do not give an account why a minority group at times remain peaceful and at other times challenges its core group. The dynamic theories of the next subchapter provide a better, however, separately incomplete explanation.

1.2 Dynamic theories of minority radicalization

The first among the dynamic theories of mobilization is given by “The Dark Side of Democracy” theory, developed by Michael Mann. This theory is based on modernization theories, nonetheless, it is distinct from them because it argues that instead of peaceful domestic assimilation of the minority, the system transformation during modernization urges the core group to accelerate the ethnic homogenization which ultimately leads to ethnic cleansing. Mann suggests that “[m]urderous ethnic cleansing is a hazard of the age of democracy since amid multiethnicity the ideal of rule by the people began to entwine the demos with the dominant ethnos, generating organic conceptions of the nation and the state that encouraged the cleansing of minorities.”44 Alina E. Volkova based on Mann’s concept and comparing the Ukrainian

situation to the Yugoslavian of the 80-90s quite convincingly argues that there is an ethnic cleansing on the East of the country.\textsuperscript{45} She lists five assumptions which underline that “the concept of the dark side of democracy is fully realized on the territory of Ukraine” and concludes that “[t]he key role in [its realization] is played by the presence and spread of ethnic conflict, the involvement of the population, elites, paramilitary associations, as well as a whole range of ways to implement ethnic cleansing.”\textsuperscript{46} Despite Volkova’s arguments in my opinion are pretty radical because there are other regions of Ukraine where the Russian population is in high proportion, but there are no mass murders similar, for instance, to the Rwanda genocide. The Ukrainian forces are fighting with the armed rebels and not exterminating Russian civilians. Nevertheless, the bases for the shift from demos to ethnos are laid down in Ukraine.

Secondly, the ethnic fears theories provide a somewhat better explanation for minority mobilization. These theories can be divided into ethnic security dilemma and credible commitment arguments. The former holds that groups engage in conflict in order to avoid victimization by another group or ethnic majority at times of the state collapse. Barry R. Posen, for example, argues the “[i]solated ethnic groups - ethnic islands - can produce incentives for preventive war. Theorists argue that perceived offensive advantages make preventive war more attractive: if one side has an advantage that will not be present later and if security can best be achieved by offensive military action in any case, then leaders will be inclined to attack during this ‘window of opportunity’.”\textsuperscript{47} He argues that both the Russian regime of the nineteenth century and the one of the twentieth century did everything possible to Russify Ukraine and break the Ukrainian identity-building which after the independence intensified the anti-Russian nationalism movement but.\textsuperscript{48} He adds that “[i]nitially, both of the large political parties in

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. p. 167. (Translated by me).
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. p. 96.
Ukraine tried to accommodate all groups in the country” and that “[t]here is no record of Ukrainian persecution of resident Russians.”\textsuperscript{49} Posen argues that because Russia has bigger population and stronger military, Ukraine is not likely to persecute Russians because it would result a conventional rescue operation and Russia does not intervene because it can do it any time, however this mission would cost a lot. He concludes that “although there are some danger signs in Russian-Ukrainian relations the security dilemma is not particularly intense in this case”, Posen’s findings about the ‘window of opportunity’ are particularly precise.\textsuperscript{50}

The credible commitments arguments holds that during the period of a political transition the core group does not provide credible commitment to minority protection, the elites of the kin state on the contrary, offer credible commitments, thus, the minority will likely choose secession before the threatening core group fully gain power. In regard to the post-Soviet countries James D. Fearon argues that “the collapse of Communist central governments has in several places created a commitment problem that arises when two groups find themselves without a third party that can credibly guarantee agreements between them. The problem is that in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, ethnic majorities are unable to commit themselves not to exploit ethnic minorities in a new state.”\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, the Orange Revolution of 2004 accelerated the spread of the pro-Ukrainian and consequently the anti-Russian ideology. The most important aim of the Yushchenko government was to secure the Ukrainian as the state language. Later the government introduced a strong Ukrainization to balance out the overall influence of the Russian on the governmental level.\textsuperscript{52} Both ethnic fears theories might explain why Russians of Ukraine have chosen the secession and armed conflict

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. p. 98.
scenario when the anti-Russian sentiment was growing, the central Ukrainian government had been in chaos and Russia assured them in support. Nevertheless, as already asked above, it is a puzzle, why certain Russians and other minorities who might felt being in danger under the new rule, but who are unsupported by their kin state, did not rebel.

The third set among the dynamic theories are the elite theories. They hold that political elites play ethnic card and use ethnic cleavages in order to promote their own personal agenda. Their triggers might be domestic political crises or international power shifts and, thus, their aims may include the reinforcement of power or gaining wealth. V. P. Jr. Gagnon argues that “violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity.” He adds that “by constructing individual interest in terms of the threat to the group, endangered elites can fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilize the population against the status quo, and can better position themselves to deal with future challenges.”

Gagnon builds up the theoretical framework for the link between ethnicity and international conflict based on four premises. The first one is the domestic arena, which is important for the elites because their power is tied to a territory which they rule. The second is the efficiency and cost effectiveness of decision-making. The third focuses on the ruled actors, because public support is essential to remain in power. The fourth is the justification of the collective actions, which should coincide with their own interest. Gagnon sets eight conditions which, based on his research on the Serbian case if Yugoslavia, will lead national leaders to conflictual policies. Among them there is only one which might be helpful for to explain the lack of the Hungarian mobilization. This one is

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54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. p. 134.
56 Ibid. p. 134.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
the observation of the benefits which should overweight the internal costs of radicalization. But others cannot explain the behavior of the elites. For instance neither elites provoked outside conflict; they did not try to neutralize the opposition (however, in the Ukrainian majority case the Euromaidan resulted exactly neutralization); grievances are not strong enough in Ukraine; information is not controlled by a particular group; the radical parties are pretty weak, but nationalist tendencies grew after the Euromaidan considerably.

Daniel Treisman, building on Gagnon’s arguments analyses the demands of the Russian ethnic leaders of the early 90s. He also argues that regional leaders are negotiating and bargaining with the center and select between radicalization and quiescence only after a careful rational calculation of potential costs and benefits. Gagnon finds that the better the minority leaders relation with the centers (i.e. if they are members of a national party) the less they wish to lose their exceptional position. He continues, that “by contrast those who have lost their institutional supports in the center may seek a new basis of legitimacy in a newly ‘rediscovered’ local ethnic identity.” He finds that separatist demands of certain non-core groups have had a spillover effect on others who observing the gained benefits of radicalization themselves decided to radicalize, although he adds that this radicalization was also the result of a strategic calculation, thus, “[i]t is unlikely that many of the most adamantly separatist regional leaders desired actual secession.” These theories to a great extent might be applied for the pro-Russian elite-led separatism on the East of the country as well as the Ukrainian nation-building under Poroshenko presidency. Furthermore, they may get us closer why László Brenzovics, the leader of the KMKSZ – the biggest Hungarian political party of Transcarpathia – after receiving his

\[\text{References}\]

60 Ibid. p. 139.
63 Ibid. p. 247.
64 Ibid. p. 222.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. p. 247.
parliamentary mandate from the president Poroshenko party is not seeking radicalization. Nevertheless, further factors should be considered to account for the radicalization of the Russian minority which required high costs on both the Russian minority and Ukrainian majority sides.

### 1.3 Ethnic bargaining theory

Finally, the ethnic bargaining theory is a model that explains the directions of group mobilization based on a triadic relationship between the elites of the minority, the core group and the kin-state. The theory is based on the earlier study of Rogers Brubaker, focusing on the triadic nexus between the national minorities, core groups who form the governments, and kin states supporting the minority. He explains this triadic nexus as a “relation between relational fields”, where all the three sets of stakeholders “closely and continuously monitor relations and actions” of each other and react accordingly. (Figure 1.1 depicts Brubaker’s model of the triadic nexus between the players of the ethnic bargaining game). Brubaker concludes that “[i]n the post-Soviet case, for example, it was predictable that nationalizing stances of some kind would prevail among successor state elites; that successor state Russians would tend to represent themselves as a national minority; and that Russian Federation elites would engage in “homeland” politics, asserting Russia's right, and obligation, to protect the interests of diaspora Russians.” However, his theory couldn’t give an elaborated account when the tension will escalate or de-escalate.

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68 Ibid. pp. 67-68.
69 Ibid. p. 76.
A more nuanced framework is developed by Erin Jenne in the ethnic bargaining theory to explain the phenomenon of the changes in groups’ demands over time and answer the question why do these groups sometimes remain quiescent even when they are oppressed, but mobilize when there is no serious internal security threat.\textsuperscript{70} She argues that group demands are expressed primarily by minority elites who enjoy public support, but highlights that they use these demands strategically, where the bargaining power largely depends on the leverage of the outside supporter, therefore, the focus should be on the bargaining leverage and not the group demand itself.\textsuperscript{71}

Jenne argues that the structural and relatively constant circumstances such as grievances, economic inequalities and cultural differences are insufficient to explain the sudden shifts in minority demands.\textsuperscript{72} However, the relative and absolute group size is important in the perceptions of increased power and the ability to challenge the center, but also in limiting the

\begin{quote}
\textit{Figure 1.1 Triadic nexus between the players of the ethnic bargaining game}

\textit{(reproduced from Jenne, p. 39.)}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. p. 41

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. p. 38.
extremity of group demands. In this regard, the minority demands are ordered on a scale of the extremity of the challenge to the state. The least extreme demands, thus, are the moderate claims of affirmative action; then come the demands for linguistic or cultural autonomy; they are followed by the more extreme demands of a regional autonomy; and finally, the most extreme are secession and irredentism, which challenge the territorial integrity of the majority state. (The visualization of the scale is presented in Figure 1.2). As argued, groups may fully cooperate with the Center as well as may shift to the radical stance of this continuum and pursue secession or irredentism. Therefore, according to Jenney, radicalization of demands is solely a temporary state of mind based on the induction about the other stakeholders’ abilities and preferences.

Based on the logic of the bargaining model, when the state transition begins the minority makes the first move. This initiation happens for two reasons: it is the minority who intends to challenge the already set status quo and because the minority is inferior in capacity and strategic possibilities in comparison to the state level players as well as the minority is the player

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73 Ibid. p. 41.
74 Ibid. p. 40.
expecting any action from the other two.\textsuperscript{77} The next moves are made by the other players but these involve a broader range of political and strategic issues which in most of the cases are selfish pursuit of gain and, therefore, they tend to widen the scope and the depth of the controversies.\textsuperscript{78} The minority, then, begins every round of ethnic bargaining in accordance to the expected responses of the other two players. These responses in turn may be repressive or non-repressive on behalf of the core-group, and supportive or non-supportive on behalf of the kin-state.\textsuperscript{79} (The combination of the majority and kin state attitude toward the minority is shown in Figure 1.3.)

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Kin state} & \textbf{Majority} \\
\hline
\textbf{Supportive} & \textbf{Repressive} & \textbf{Non-repressive} \\
\hline
State of Conflict & The minority radicalizes, risking inter-ethnic conflict & State of Opportunity & The minority radicalizes, receiving concessions \\
\hline
State of Vulnerability & The minority accommodates suffering repression & State of Peace & The minority accommodates, facilitating inter-ethnic cooperation \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Four states of the world: conflict, opportunity, vulnerability, and peace (reproduced from Jenne, p. 43.)}
\end{figure}

The minority decides on radicalization or moderation based on the perception of its position in the state of the world.\textsuperscript{80} Jenne finds, that in the \textit{state of conflict}, the kin state is likely to back up the minority within its level of leverage. At the same time, the core group oppresses all the outsiders, thus, the minority is not in the position to cooperate with the majority. Instead, it radicalize its demands and expect the kin state to support the intention and step in when it is

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid. p. 41.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. p. 42.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid. p. 43.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
necessary. The core group in order to avoid confrontation with the kin state will grant the minority concessions.\footnote{Ibid. p. 44.} This state has a high likelihood of intergroup and – with the interference of the kin state – interstate war, because the majority may choose to target the minority instead of granting concessions.

In the \textit{state of opportunity} the minority group possesses the agency to bargain. Jenne finds that the majority expecting a harmonious cohabitation and cooperation is likely to provide concessions to the minority. At the same time, the minority has close ties with the kin state.\footnote{Ibid.} In this state the minority considering its exceptional bargaining position, prefers radicalization. The majority, on the other hand, refrain from repression and prefers to provide concessions to minority in the view of peace with the supportive kin state.

In the \textit{state of vulnerability}, the minority has almost no chance to achieve concessions. Jenne argues that in this state the majority tends to exploit and oppress the minority if it accommodates. The other way the minority should be gradually exterminated due to the absence of international or foreign support.\footnote{Ibid.} In this state the minority remains quiescent and chooses suffering instead of annihilation but keeps to monitor the opportunities to challenge the center.

In the \textit{state of peace}, the cooperation between the majority and minority is possible. In this stance the pursuit liberal values by both parties outpace the intentions for dominance. In the case the minority contributes to the majority’s intentions, the peace between the two is guaranteed. In addition, the minority has no out of border support which would manipulate the status quo.\footnote{Ibid.} In this state minority has no reasons to radicalize, therefore, it engages in active cooperation with the center.

The only problem with these clear-cut states of the world that minorities can never be certain in which of them they fall. Jenne underlines that elites of the minorities are vigilantly
follow the attitude of the other two players. However, their incentives are barely straightforward therefore, “the minority must infer these preferences from signals of behavioral intent.” The minority is playing for survival, therefore it is essential to precisely interpret the signals of the other two players and shift the course of actions accordingly.

In sum, the model of the ethnic bargaining suggests, that the kin state behavior is the key for minority mobilization. Jenne identifies that when the minority has no kin state support, it will stay quiescent even when the host state exercises fierce repressions, and vice versa, if there is a chance for kin state support, the minority will radicalize its demands in spite of the non-repressive attitude of the core group. Also, on the other line of interlinkage, she identifies that when any of the other two players project nationalist intent, the minority’s elites would form coalitions within their own ethnicity at the domestic level, but when there is no confrontation between the kin state and the host state, the minority would cooperate with other groups. Furthermore, since the minority elites are in a constant negotiation with the center, their adaptability to the signals of the kin state is essential for their political survival. Finally, Jenne’s argument on the elites’ behavior is that they may remain in power only if they are able to adjust their position to the shifts in minority radicalization, but if they pursue exclusivist position they are more likely to be deprived of their leadership.

Summarizing, dynamic theories explain some aspects of Russian minority radicalization, which clearly respond to intense Ukrainian nation-building better than the structural ones. Nonetheless, neither the elite theories which predict that if the costs are high the minority leadership will not likely radicalize, nor the theory of ethnic bargaining which predicts radicalization if there is an internal repression and kin state support are sufficient to

85 Ibid. p. 45.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid. p. 46.
88 Ibid. p. 48.
89 Ibid.
provide a comprehensive account on the causal effect of the minority radicalization and the
nation-building as well as the time of their occurrence. The elite theories predict the lack of
radicalization of the Hungarian minority as a pure calculation of costs and benefits as well as
the political and power interlinkage between the ruling elite and the minority elite. However,
the theory of ethnic bargaining explains the broader picture of the processes leading to the war
in Ukraine better, including the behavior of Yanukovich in 2013, who relied on the signals
arriving from the Russian Federation; the reaction of Ukrainian masses in the end of the same
year, who (mis)interpreted the signals from the European Union; the irredentism of Crimea, the
secession of Novorossiya. Therefore, I examine the behavior of each of the players in the triadic
interrelation and introduce the ethnic bargaining theory with a stronger agency of the minority
leader to select between his loyalty to the kin state or the majority.
CHAPTER 2: HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF THE MINORITY-MAJORITY QUESTION IN UKRAINE

In the previous chapter I introduced the theories of ethnic mobilization and argued that the structural theories do not provide enough information on the possible mobilization on ethnic lines. Dynamic theories, however, predict the possibility of mobilization, but only a combination of these theories may explain the different dynamics of ethnic mobilization within the Russian and Hungarian minorities as well as the Ukrainian majority. In this context the escalating tension between the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian elites between 2004 and 2014 in the end resulted an intense Russian propaganda on behalf of the kin state, the rescue of Russian nationals in Crimea, and support of secessionist movement in the east of Ukraine. After 2014, on the other hand, the escalating conflict intensified the Ukrainization on all the levels of the state including the restriction of minority rights primarily in terms of the free use of their mother tongue in communication and education. Finally, the Ukrainization resulted a strong critique from the Hungarian government, which used its international leverage and since 2017 have banned all accession negotiations between the European Union and the NATO and Ukraine. In line with the predictions that the Hungarian minority with a supportive kin state and restrictive host state would radicalize similarly to the Russian minority, there are signs of only a moderate radicalization from no claims to affirmative action but not autonomy which is suggested by the kin state or secession observed in the case of the Russian minority. This phenomenon led me to analyze the two cases from the combined perspective of the bargaining theory and the elite theories through the divisive nation building policies of the Ukrainian government.
2.1 Political shifts and the Ukrainian-Russian language question

Ukraine - the 28 years old independent state – has been located between East and West, on the borders of empires, regimes, ideologies, and worldviews for long centuries. The south-eastern part of the country, earlier known as Novorossiya, has been conquered by Russia in the eighteenth century from the Ottoman Empire and was folded into the new Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922. The Western territory, earlier known as Galicia, was originally a Polish land which first was added to Austro-Hungarian Empire later returned to Poland but in 1939 was occupied by Stalin, following the division of the area according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Northern Bukovina, earlier part of Romania, was incorporated to the Ukrainian SSR in 1940. Transcarpathia, the territory lost by Hungary after the First World War and detached from Czechoslovakia after the Second World War was incorporated in 1945. Crimea was part of Russia until 1954, when it was handed over to Ukraine. (Figure 3.1 shows the Ukrainian territorial changes). All these border shifts as well as the numerous population exchanges ensured the ethnic mixture across the country and their compactness along the borders. The intermixture of all these nations also resulted a heterogeneous approach to the language question.

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Somewhere deep inside, language have been always closely tied to the identity and self-determination of the ethnic groups. As Elana Shohamy underlines, language is a “free tool that enables personal and individual freedom of expression and its manifestation,” and a “powerful symbol and indication of belonging and membership and an identifier of inclusion and exclusion.”

Taking into account the central role of the languages in groups’ consciousness, it becomes evident that as of today in Ukraine it is one of the most important fields of control over the population, thus, the language issue grew into a crucial topic for both the nationalizing government, the minorities and the kin states. Shohamy argues that language “play[s] a major

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95 Ibid. p. 27.
role at the center of the debates and at the center of the arena of the battles for power, control, manipulation and domination by central government.”

At the same time, “various groups in the society use language to seek and create their own individual personal or collective identities in the form of recognition, visibility, consideration, manipulations, imposition and power, through languages.”

Kulyk emphasizes the cohabitation of the Ukrainian and Russian languages was smooth in the first decades after the Ukrainian independence but the power politics created the deep linguistic divide artificially for serving its own purposes. Gradually, this linguistic divide led to the post-2014 ethnic divide and alienation of all Russians. Therefore, given the core group’s current attitude toward the Russian minority the best way to understand the conflict is the analysis of the language policy shifts across the last two decades.

For a long time during the Soviet times the Russian language was the dominant in Ukraine. Kulyk argues that “[t]he Russifying dimension of the policy ensured predominant use of the Russian language in prestigious social domains and places with high percentage of ethnic Russians who were no longer required to learn and use the languages of people among whom they lived.” He continues that for the urban areas of the south-eastern region of Ukraine, where most of the migrants settled for economic reasons the Russian language became prevalent in communication and when the Ukrainians arrived from the rural areas they assimilated and adopted the Russian quickly. Thus, as an effect of the Soviet Russification, in the first decade of the Ukrainian independence the majority of the population still preferred the Russian language communication. According to Anatolii Fomin the 1989 census showed that “37.5 million of [the] 51.5 million inhabitants (72.7 per cent) were Ukrainian, and 11.3 million (22.1

96 Ibid. p. 39.
97 Ibid. p. 41.
99 Ibid. p. 282.
100 Ibid.
percent) were Russian.”

He continues, that “about 33 percent – that is, every third citizen of Ukraine – considered Russian his or her native language” which added up resulted that “56 percent of those surveyed preferred Russian.” The census of the late 2001 shows the same pattern: “17 per cent of the population, i.e. 8.5 million inhabitants, classified themselves as ethnically Russians”, furthermore, 14.8 per cent which is roughly 5.5 million Ukrainians also declared the Russian language as their mother tongue.

Gradually the bilingualism in Ukraine became a political issue. Kulyk stresses the in the beginning of 2000s “[i]t was complicated to balancing the statuses and scopes of use of the country’s most widespread languages, Ukrainian and Russian.” Nevertheless, in the beginning Yushchenko did not see any problems with the widespread use of the Russian language, but criticized the limited use of Ukrainian. The political competition in this period happened along the right-left divide and not the ethnic ideologies, but signs of the linguistic question already started to appear. For instance during the campaign period prior the Orange revolution of 2004 Yushchenko held a nationalist position while Yanukovich “called for granting Russian and official status.” As a result the focus shifted on the language question, because the former candidate was popular in the Ukrainian community, while the latter was supported by the Russian population. Consequently, the victory of Yushchenko brought a strong pro-Ukrainian approach and the primary aim of the newly formed government was to secure the Ukrainian as the state language. Thus the post-Orange revolution Yushchenko government enforced the status of the Ukrainian language to challenge the de facto reality, that

102 Ibid.
105 Ibid. p. 287.
the majority of the population speak more than one language, and tried to promote the de jure situation, that Ukraine is a monolingual state in line with the Constitution.\(^\text{107}\)

An opposite shift occurred when Yanukovich after winning the controversial elections of 2010 started to fulfill his earlier campaign promise to raise Russian to the state language status. The Party of Regions submitted a draft law according to which the Russian language would obtain official status and in several regions would be raised to an equal level with the State language.\(^\text{108}\) According to a poll conducted in 2012, most of the Ukrainian-speakers preferred their own language as the dominant in the whole country but they did not have serious objections against the widespread use of Russian; Russian-speakers preferred an upgrade of the status of Russian to a kind of an official bilingualism.\(^\text{109}\) Thus, the population held rather neutral position about the language issues prior the Euromaidan.

Finally, the Euromaidan completely shifted the power relations. As Kulyk emphasizes, the events of the early 2014 brought “dramatic change in Ukrainian national identity.”\(^\text{110}\) The “consolidation of Ukrainianness” enforced the anti-Russian sentiment and led even to enmity not only in relations with Russia but also in interpersonal relations.\(^\text{111}\) Since then the Ukrainian nation building continues unabatedly. In the recent two years there were introduced two laws regulating the status of the Ukrainian language and limiting the use of other languages. These laws were aiming to replace the earlier versions by a Ukrainian-centered laws. The Law of Ukraine “On education”\(^\text{112}\) and The Law of Ukraine “On provision of the functioning of the


\(^{111}\) Ibid.

Ukrainian language as the State language”, 113 therefore, are exclusionary for the Ukrainian language and as a result, they induced a serious debate among the Ukrainian government and the minority kin states. In fact, the hasted approval of these laws should be accounted as a reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war between Ukraine and the Russian rebels of Novorossiya. In the view of the crisis the increasing Ukrainization against the Russian influence is not surprising.

2.2 Relation between Ukraine, Hungary and the Hungarian minority

During the twentieth century the present-day Transcarpathian region belonged to multiple different states. Before the First World War it was a part of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, between the First World War and Second World War it was incorporated into Czechoslovakia, during the Second World War it returned to the Hungarian Kingdom, after the Second World War the Soviet Union claimed the region, and finally after the collapse of the Soviet Union it remained within Ukraine. Csernicskó and Laihonen argue that “the status of what counts as a minority and a majority language has changed each time the state affiliation has been changed.”114 The population and their identities show the same colorful picture as its history.

Transcarpathia as a whole has a mixed Ukrainian-Rusyn majority, while south-western strip bordering with Hungary and Romania has a Hungarian majority which provides some 12.5 per cent of the total population.115 In Berehove district they make up the majority of the population by 67 per cent.116 Up in the Carpathian Mountains, on the south border with Romania there is a small but ethnically concentrated region with several Romanian villages. As a result

115 Ibid.
of the multitude of border and dominance shifts and the ethnic groups inhabiting the region, the identity of the local population “is still in the making.”

Judy Batt emphasizes that “Transcarpathia’s contested position at the junction of no fewer than five states (today Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania) has ensured its exposure to the nationalizing efforts of the rival states that claimed it over the course of the twentieth century.” But she also adds that the “local atmosphere of goodwill and pragmatic accommodation among the various ethnic groups. Neither during the Second World War, nor when the Soviet Union collapsed, did Transcarpathia see the kind of inter-ethnic tensions and conflict that occurred elsewhere.”

But, the state authorities oftentimes interfered into this peace. In the beginning of Soviet times many of the former elites and people from the middle class were forced to flee because the authorities stigmatized and purged the Hungarians and Germans on ethnic basis.

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117 Ibid. p. 2.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid. p. 157-158.
At the times of the collapse of the Soviet regime and the ‘nomenklatura’ incentive across the state the Transcarpathian elite came up with the idea of a regional economic autonomy due to the proximity of multiple state borders. Later, when the independence referendum was organized in Ukraine, in addition, people of Transcarpathia were asked about their intentions on “the status of a ‘special self-governing administrative territory’ within an independent Ukraine.” Despite 78 per cent of the voters supported this initiative, in the end it was not implemented. The beginning of the 1990s opened new perspectives for the Hungarians. A Hungarian umbrella cultural association was established, new primary and secondary schools and a High school were opened in Transcarpathia. Strangely enough, within the poll conducted in the summer of 1996, for the questions about “how much Transcarpathian Hungarians are attached to the Transcarpathian Hungarian community, to the Hungarian nation and how much they feel they do not belong to anywhere” people responded in a controversial way. More than 75 per cent answered that they feel ‘very little’ or ‘no attachment’ to Ukraine, while almost 65 per cent responded that they are ‘very much’ or ‘attached’ to Hungary as a state. The most striking was that almost 92 per cent responded that they ‘very much’ or ‘attached’ to Transcarpathia as a region.

The good status of the Hungarian minority was ensured by the early efforts of the Hungarian state, which has assumed a so-called national policy after its political transition.

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123 Ibid.
126 Ibid. p. 60.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
Veres argues that this policy materialized in a strategy targeting improvement of the conditions of the Hungarians living outside the borders. Furthermore, Hungary signed a similar bilateral treaty with Ukraine which it was able to sign with Slovakia and Romania who committed themselves to “recognize the collective rights of minorities, in addition to the individual rights of their members.” Dmytro Tkach also emphasizes that these agreements reinforced the position of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine and guaranteed the rights of the Hungarian minority at cultural, educational and national levels, and at early stage even anticipated a certain level of autonomy. However, “collective rights” in Hungarian interpretation was the de facto autonomy of all the ethnically concentrated regions which finally led to the 1991 referendum on changing the status of Berehovo district to a Hungarian Autonomous Region. In spite more than 81 per cent of the locals, including many non-Hungarians voted pro this initiative, the status later was not granted. A further highly influential step was the introduction of dual citizenship for the representatives of Hungarian minorities, but the constant financial support given to Hungarian schools and cultural institutions should be also taken into account. Most recently Hungary announced “Cultural expansion” with a financial support of 7.5 million euros.

The turning point in the good relations between Hungary and Ukraine arrived only in the post-Euromaidan era first with the introduction of the exclusionary law “On education”.

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133 Ibid.
Hungary expressed a severe critique through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, and openly threatened Ukraine with the ban of the Hungarian support toward EU integration in the case the adopted law will be implemented.\textsuperscript{136} Since then Hungary started to use its veto power in both the European Union and the NATO and bans every negotiation on Ukraine’s accession. The law “On provision of the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the State language”\textsuperscript{137} did not change the status quo in the relations between Hungary, Ukraine and the other two international institutions.

All in all, the historic information shows that the relation between the Ukrainian majority and its minorities shifted sometimes gradually, sometimes suddenly. As a result of all these political shifts, the Russian minority feeling threatened by the Ukrainization nation building policies and with the strong support of the Russian kin state suddenly resulted irredentism in Crimea the secession of two districts on the East of the country. The question is that if the minorities were generally threatened by repressions of the host state, why only the Russian minority radicalized extremely, but the Hungarian have taken a more moderate approach?

In the next chapter I use the model of ethnic bargaining to analyze the differences in behavior between the Hungarian and Russian minorities in Ukraine. By controlling the host state approach to minorities it is possible to monitor the kin state influence over time. In order to test the robustness of my findings an earlier case study from a different region is brought in. Controlling the provided support of the kin states over time helps to identify the minority leaders behavior and the level of expected radicalization.


CHAPTER 3: TRIADIC NEXUS – ETHNIC BARGAINING IN PRACTICE

In the previous chapter I briefly introduced the major historical events leading to the radicalization of the Russian minority, their effect on the Ukrainian nation building, and the phases of the Ukrainian-Hungarian relations. This chapter serves as a test for the bargaining model in the Ukrainian context. Within Ukraine I provide a comparative analysis of the minority-majority-kin state interrelation in different periods of time. For this purpose I analyze separately the Ukrainian-Russian relations in the period beginning after the independence until today dividing the timeframe into three distinct phases. The next part assesses the Ukrainian-Hungarian relations to analyze the pattern of group demands. Next, I compare the Russian and Hungarian minorities’ mobilization to find the reasons for the different dynamics between their behaviors. The last part provides a comparison of the mobilization of Hungarians in Transcarpathia and Vojvodina. (Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show different demands of the minority elites in response to the kin states’ and core groups attitude.)

3.1 Interlinkage between the Russian minority the Ukrainian majority

As already discussed in the theories chapter under the institutionalist theories section and the previous chapter, during the Soviet times Ukraine underwent a serious Russification. Because in this period the Soviet Union was considered as one entity and the Russian was the majority and the Ukrainian the minority, I did not include this period into the analysis.

The first phase, therefore, starts with the independence of Ukraine and ends with the Orange revolution of 2004. In this period the Russian kin state had been preoccupied with its internal economic problems and did not interfere in the politics of its neighbor. In Ukraine the majority of the population had no objections against the wide use of the Russian language, inherited from the Soviet times. In the elections of 1994 the pro-Russian Kuchma won the mandate for presidency thus the Russian elites obtained a wider participation in politics of
Ukraine. For the situation when the kin state is not supportive and the host state is not repressive the theory of ethnic bargaining predicts the state of peace. Accordingly, there is a cooperation between the Ukrainian and the Russian elites because neither party is looking for domination nor Russians have no reason to radicalize.

The next phase is the decade between the Orange revolution and the Euromaidan upheaval. First the Yushchenko government turned from non-repressive to rather repressive in relation with the Russian speakers, and Putin started to build cross-border relations. For the situation when the kin state is supportive and the host state is neither repressive nor non-repressive, based on the significance of the kin state attitude, the theory of ethnic bargaining predicts the state of opportunity. The minority has the bargaining power which was used by Yanukovich on behalf of the Russian population to radicalized its demands and obtain political and linguistic dominance in the regions with a considerable Russian population. Despite Yanukovich was not able to completely achieve his plans, the close relations with Russia were established.

The last phase is the post-Euromaidan period which is well known for its Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Thus, in the state of conflict, when the core group represses the minority and the kin state supports within its competencies, the inter-ethnic conflict in the form of interstate war is very likely. Russia interfered in Crimea and supported radicalization of demands on the east of the country. On the other hand, responding to the Russian propaganda and military interference, Ukraine introduced a fierce nation building policy which clearly aimed to target the Russian population.

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Table 3.1 Russian demands in Eastern Ukraine (based on Jenne, p. 161.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Secession/irredentism</th>
<th>Territorial autonomy</th>
<th>Cultural/linguistic autonomy</th>
<th>Affirmative action</th>
<th>No claims</th>
<th>Support from kin state (Russia)</th>
<th>Host state repression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-2004</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2014</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Limited, neutral and significant show the level the kin state support or the host state repression perceived by the minority in different periods.*

### 3.2 The Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia

The soviet times brought little positive conditions for the Hungarian minority. The NKVD in Transcarpathia stigmatized and purged people on ethnic basis. All contacts with the kin state were cut off, no printed issues appeared in Hungarian, and the Roman and Greek Catholic Religions, to which most of the population belonged, were persecuted.\(^{140}\) In late 1944, “preparing the region to join the Soviet Union” tens of thousands of Hungarian men were deported to Stalinist camps, half of whom never returned.\(^ {141}\) Hungary, on the other hand, after the traumas of the Second World War had different issues to deal with. Thus, without a supportive kin state and a repressive host state, the theory of ethnic bargaining predicts a state of vulnerability. The Soviet rule exploited and even exterminated the minority considerably and people had no chance to counter it. In line with the predictions, Hungarians remained quiescent and suffered for the survival.

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The next period, between the Ukrainian independence and the Euromaidan revolution the Hungarian minority enjoyed a great extent of freedom provided by the Ukrainian authorities and support on behalf of the Hungarian state. In the case of non-repressive host state and a supportive kin state the bargaining model predicts the state of opportunity. Indeed, the Hungarian minority possessed the bargaining power within Ukraine and used it to receive concessions. In different times the idea of autonomy came up and in the beginning there were discussions about its form. However, as Butt concludes, “the 1996 Ukrainian constitution ruled out the creation of ‘Autonomous Regions’.” Nevertheless, this was the time of the harmonious cohabitation and cooperation between the minority and majority.

Finally, the post-Euromaidan period brought considerable changes on behalf of the majority. The language and education rights were strictly limited which according to the supportive kin state need to be returned to the status quo. Therefore, in the case of the repressive majority and a supportive kin state the Transcarpathian minority would be in the state of conflict. The first part of the prediction of the model is true, since Hungary as a kin state fully stands for the protection of the minority rights in Ukraine through its leverage on the international level. Despite the ban of the EU and NATO integration negotiations seriously harm the interest of Ukraine, there are no signs that it will step back from its language policy. It is also obvious, that the minority will not cooperate with the host country after the restrictions, however, the leader of the minority holds his mandate in the Ukrainian parliaments thanks to the signatory of the mentioned laws – Petro Poroshenkos party. Thus, the prediction would be that the minority radicalizes its demands and expect the kin state to support the intention and

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step in when it is necessary. However, the current position is rather a weak demand of an affirmative action but not a strong autonomy or secession claim.

### Table 3.2 Hungarian demands in Transcarpathia (based on Jenne, p. 161.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Most extreme</th>
<th>Least extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secession/irredentism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial autonomy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/linguistic autonomy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative action</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No claims</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from kin state (Hungary)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host state repression</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Limited, neutral and significant show the level the kin state support or the host state repression perceived by the minority in different periods.

### 3.3 Comparison of the minorities in Ukraine

Undoubtedly, the Ukrainian minorities share several features but at the same time they are differ. Comparing their history it turns out that the Russian minority was in a considerably stronger position because of its decade long Soviet nation building during which the Hungarian minority was cruelly repressed. Also, Russia as a kin state in terms of instantly deployable militarily is obviously stronger. It is enough to consider the Russian naval bases located on the territory of Ukraine and the military troops constantly deployed at the border with the Caucasus region. Thus, in terms of kin state power and its support to the Russian minority was better at time of the Ukrainian governmental break-down. The levels of intervention by kin states account may also account for the difference.

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The cultural, religious and linguistic differences would suggest the radicalization of the Hungarian minority and not the Russian. The historic account shows that the question of autonomy was always on the agenda of the Hungarian minority, but the issue was never raised by the Russian population until the actual secession. Strangely enough, the autonomy disappeared from the discourse of the Hungarian elites after the Euromaidan revolution. According to a recent survey only 4 per cent of the Transcarpathian population would support the autonomy of the region and only 1 per cent the accession to Hungary.\textsuperscript{145} It is a significant shift from the 78 per cent of the 1989 poll.\textsuperscript{146}

The location of the minorities on the borders of their kin states would suggest the same level and intensity of radicalization, but they behaved differently. The group size puts the Russian minority again into a better position because while Russians make up about 23 per cent of the total population, Hungarians share only 0.3 per cent. The credible commitment theories explain the Russian radicalization to the extent that Orange revolution of 2004 accelerated the spread of the pro-Ukrainian and consequently the anti-Russian ideology. The Ukranization was introduced to balance out the overall influence of the Russian on the governmental level. Thus, ethnic fears theories might explain why Russians of Ukraine have chosen the secession and armed conflict scenario when the anti-Russian sentiment was growing, the central Ukrainian government had been in chaos and Russia assured them in support.

Finally, the theory of ethnic bargaining has managed to clearly predict both the time and the criteria of the ethnic mobilization of the Russian minority. It also helped to predict the mobilization of the Hungarian minority, but with a lower degree of mobilization. The theory, furthermore, confirmed that the kin state role in the bargaining is stronger than the host state’s.

\textsuperscript{145} Krisztina Bursza. Survey: 4% of Transcarpathians would support the autonomy of the county [Felmérés: a kárpátaljaiak 4%-a támogatná a megye autonómiáját], 30.01.2019. 

For the gap of the different intensity of mobilization, however, might be responsible the circumstances predicted in the elite theories with their cost-benefit approach and the assumption that Hungary is not that powerful kin state as Russia and the Ukraine has a different repressive attitude towards the Hungarian minority and the Russian. For instance, the Hungarian double citizenship issue, if it would be properly investigated, would result fines for many Transcarpathians and in extreme cases the termination of the Ukrainian citizenship. The other possible explanation for the anomaly is the strong belief of the minority that Hungary with its better international leverage may help to improve their position.

### 3.4 Hungarians in Vojvodina and in Transcarpathia

The comparison of the mobilization of two different Hungarian minorities possessing almost the same attributes, facing almost the same challenges but being in different host states helps to identify the exact role of the kin state and the dynamic of distinct mobilization in the case of Hungary. Thus, the Vojvodina comparison with the Transcarpathia may assist to further strengthen the model of the ethnic bargaining.

The cultural, linguistic and religious differences between the Hungarian nation and the Slavic host states are identical in both cases. The geographic features like the compactness, location and size are also similar. Both regions are located on the periphery of the kin state and the host state, both groups are concentrated, and both groups have almost the same relative size (Hungarians make up 17 per cent of the total population of Vojvodina\(^{147}\) and 12 per cent in Transcarpathia\(^{148}\)). Thus, they both might request autonomy as it was suggested by Hungary or

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join Hungary as a territorial correction. Their grievances were of the same scale because they suffered similar repression and deportations during and after the Second World War.

The economic theories show some differences. Vojvodina has a better economic situation than Transcarpathia, therefore the secession of Vojvodina would be predicted by economic theories because its developed stance, but Transcarpathia is not that backward that it would secede. Nevertheless, neither if the two expressed strong intentions of secession. The elite approach show further differences. The Vojvodinan Hungarian elites were not integrated into the Serbian government and did not receive kin state support, while, the Transcarpathian elites have a considerable integration and a full support.

Ethnic fears theories would predict radicalization in both groups after the strong Nationalization policies arriving from the core group, however only the Vojvodinan minorities did a serious mobilization, but later moderated their claims. The bargaining theory, however, gives almost precise prediction on the group mobilization in both cases. Accordingly, when the kin state was not supportive but the host state was repressive, both groups endured serious repression and did not radicalized. Also, when the kin state was supportive but the host state was not restrictive, radical claims were put forward by both communities. The difference is, therefore, in the case when the kin state was supportive and the host state repressive. The Vojvodinan Hungarians radicalized but the Transcarpathians did not.
CONCLUSIONS

In the thesis I argued that in the ongoing Ukrainian war the external kin states use the ethnicities inhabiting the territory for strategic reasons, and the minorities respond to differential levels of kin state support by radicalizing or moderating their demands. In this way, kin states help to mobilize or suppress minority claims for their own strategic purposes. In this game, the players are the minorities, the core group and the kin states. The minority is the only one player choosing its positions on the basis of core group and the kin state signals.

In the thesis, I provided a detailed examination of the minority behavior in relation to the Ukrainian government, including signals of support arriving from the Hungarian and Russian governments. Based on the theory of ethnic bargaining, the paper explained different minority mobilization by tracing the process of the radicalization or moderation of demands, showing how these vary in accordance with the triadic relation between the three players of the ethnic bargaining game.

The model of the ethnic bargaining suggests, that the kin state behavior is the key for minority behavior and the minority selects its step on the basis of the perceived leverage. If there is no outside support, the minority is not likely to radicalize its demands. On the other hand, if the minority is certain of outside support, the minority will radicalize despite the host state is non-repressive. The Ukrainization of the government has an indirect effect on the Hungarian minority’s chance to radicalize, because it created grievances around which movements can mobilize. However, perceived leverage determines whether the minority does in fact mobilize, and in the case of the Hungarian minority, the kin state at the current stage supports only the reestablishment of the status quo, namely the opportunity of the Hungarian language use and the guarantee of the unhindered Hungarian education in Transcarpathia. There is no kin state support for separatism, unlike the case of Russians in eastern Ukraine.
The theory of ethnic bargaining has managed to clearly predict both the time and the criteria of the ethnic mobilization of the Russian minority. It also helped to map the mobilization of the Hungarian minority, but with a lower degree of mobilization. The theory, furthermore, confirmed that the kin state role in the bargaining is stronger than the host state’s.

In recent weeks, there have been hints that Hungarians might calls for Transcarpathian autonomy, but until now the Hungarian minority elite requested only reestablishing the pre-2017 status quo. Nevertheless, like the theory of ethnic bargaining suggests, the radicalization might happen rapidly, therefore, one never knows what we can expect of the behavior of the elites in the following period. In line with the theory, however, it is predictable that if as a result of the recent presidential elections and the upcoming parliamentary elections the kin state will start to normalize the relations with the new host government, the minority elite will start to establish inter-ethnic coalitions instead of radicalization.

In order to test the findings on the Hungarian minority behavior I brought in an earlier case study for comparison. The parallels between the evolution of the processes in Serbia and Ukraine are presented to identify the cornerstones of the minority policy shifts and the reaction of minorities. The case comparison of Hungarians in Vojvodina with the ones in Transcarpathia, allows to make solid predictions about the situation and its possible outcomes. In both cases there were systemic transformations which provided opportunities to minorities to challenge the center. Both host states acted in repressive manner, but only one minority escalated demands. Hungarian minority in both cases remained quiescent, even facing with serious repression form the Centre. In both cases the Hungarian government offered a limited support which in the case of the Hungarians in Vojvodina has been later withdrawn, but in the case of the Hungarians in Transcarpathia remains rather rhetoric.
As the multileveled comparison suggests, the Russian minority radicalized in 2014 due to the secession-supporting attitude and signals coming from Russia. I also argued the there is a similar behavior of the two Hungarian minorities because Hungary still supports the autonomy of all the former Hungarian borders.


