BETWEEN GREEK NATIONALISM AND OTTOMANISM:
CONTESTED LOYALTIES OF OTTOMAN GREEKS IN THE
PERIODICALS OF TANZIMAT PERIOD (1869-1877)

by

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Abstract

The modern Greek identity is mostly known for the attachment to the Greek state. However, the identification of the significant number of Greek Orthodox people that used to live in the Ottoman Empire remain unobserved.

This study sets the question of the Ottoman Greek identity formation by considering its’ role in the wide prism of the Ottoman imperial space. The thesis argues that during the Tanzimat period in Ottoman Empire started a process of Ottoman Greek identity formation which would intersect both the imperial and the communal levels. The perception of Ottoman Greek identity was mainly developed along with the attitudes of community toward the imperial power centers, Patriarchate and Sultan, and the Greek Kingdom.

In order to investigate this identity perception and the common loyalty of Ottoman Greeks, discourse and content analysis of two leading periodicals of that time, Konstantinoupolis and Thraki, were employed. Hence, the main outcome of the research indicates that after the Bulgarian schism, the trans-ethnic Christian solidarity gradually transformed to an Ottoman Greek one. Important finding of the research also shows that in the process of forging an imperial identity for the Ottoman Greeks Anatolia played crucial role as fatherland.
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Introduction

The liberal and national waves that overflowed empires in the early and mid-19th century were for many historians the catalyst to the modern arrangement of power inside empires. In other words, the different national ideologies came to challenge the existence of empires. The formation of nation-states around the Balkan Peninsula from the devolution of empires is a phenomenon that should be mentioned under its own complexity. Therefore, in order to understand the most indispensable category of the 19th century, one way is to view it through the two main approaches that groups of scholars had followed in the field of Nation and Nationalism theories. On the one hand, it can be considered the approach of primordialists that assumed the reviving of a nation from a long condition of hibernation. On the other hand, the modernists, adopting a second approach, define nation through the socioeconomic transformations and the emergence of political institutions. While in this approach the emphasis is given to the dynamic role of the modern state in the former approach nation is rather perceived as a historical unit and a source of cultural memory. Nevertheless, besides these two theoretical categories that dominate the field there are also other comprehensive approaches for the concept of nation that avoid seeing it as a single theory such as the discursive construction of nation. As an example of this method, Craig Calhoun underlines that to offer a coherent meaning of who in a collective action is an arduous interpretive issue as there are “ambiguities inherent in the relationship between the singularity of a personal identity and the multiplicity of social identities that may be borne by a person.” From another

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perspective, Hroch in an interesting analysis follows the different phases of nationalism to notice the integration of previously heterogeneous communities into nationalist movements through political mobilization.\(^3\)

Despite the above theories, for further understanding of the history of empires, it should be clear that the assumption of chaos assigned to Southeastern Europe in the 19th century played for a long time a debatable role since it was seen as a teleological end that caused the formation of nation-states. Allegedly, from the ancient *imperium sine fine* all at once empires had to die. The understudied political settings in the indeed labyrinthine structures of empires together with the lack of a broader perspective that could assist to overpass this obscurity, prevented until 1990s, the scholars from approaching empires as something different than intolerant devices and mechanisms of suppression. Thus, breaking of empires became the most controversial point in relation to the existence of nations. The recent scholarship highlights the place of empires in the discussion of the imperial ideology and the emergence of national identities by applying the division of core-periphery and researches the evolution of nation-building in the center of empires.\(^4\)

In relation to the tug of war among nation-states and empires, many scholars view the notions of empire and nationhood as basically incompatible concepts, or even as types of statehood

\(^3\) Miroslav Hroch, *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)

diametrically opposed. According to Gellner the modernization or otherwise the transition from the agrarian to industrial societies had as a result the homogenization of many aspects of life. Therefore, the homogenization of culture and the building of nations were perceived as a process that would be decidedly completed only with the formation of nation-states since empires are considered as pre-modern entities. Contrary to the above determinist approach and without underestimating the concept of modernity, the aim of this study is to describe how diverse models of nation-formation appeared synchronously in the newly established Greek state and within the Ottoman Empire.

It is necessary to mention here that the main feature of empires in distinction from nation-states was in the administration of their multinational – or, multireligious – character and the multinational character of empires was instantly connected with the question of belonging. For examining the belonging of imperial subjects, firstly, it is important to define the historical framework. In this process, empires can be found on the other side of the dichotomy and can strikingly resemble the nation-states in which the homogenization act in favor of one ethnic group. Given these points, this thesis also seeks to explain the identification of Greek Orthodox community in the 19th century in-between the modern Greek identity and the imperial identity within the Ottoman Empire.

On one side, the emergence of modern Greek identity and the War of Independence which occurred with the support of Great powers had as a result for the Greek Orthodox population of Morea peninsula the successful foundation of a nation-state. The formation of Greece created an

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5 For example, Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the origin and spread of nationalism*, (London: Verso, 2006), 93: He refers to the “Inner incompatibility of nation and empire”

unprecedented explosion of national questions and showed the way to the development of their respective irredentist plans. On the other side, the Ottoman Empire, in comparison with other empires, was a complicated paradigm of how political legitimacy functioned since the Ottoman ruling tradition was based on the concept of confessional communities -millets- which also had organically political role. This distinctive structure of entanglement, which hierarchically was dominated by Muslims, included all the Christian and Jewish subjects of the Sultan.

Taking this into account, the development of imperial ideology prompted by the Tanzimat reforms between 1839 and 1876 was the result of a substantial transformation in the fundamental terms of existence of the Empire itself. A notion of uniform citizenship among the members of millets emerged as an imperial mission of survival. A common Ottoman belonging and through this, a modality to transform the - Muslim and non-Muslims- subjects to citizens and ipso facto to Ottomans. This formation of imperial ‘people’ consisted of a two-level process. While the common imperial loyalty was forged in the name of Sultan for all citizens, the millets in full contradiction had to be internally secularized and ‘nationalized’. In the case of the Greek Orthodox -Rum- community, which consisted of all the Christian Orthodox population of the Empire, the desirable objective was the construction of imagined communality for the millet. In this way the Ottoman Empire did not downplay the discourse of ‘nation’ but rather combined it with its political sovereignty. The ‘nationalizing’ homogenization alluded to an imperial nationality in the name of millet, even though, the millet’s members had often different linguistic characteristics which played a role to the evolution of their identity construction.

With this phenomenon in mind, there is a unique paradox that was posed by the parallel existence of Greek nation-state and the Greek Orthodox millet in the Empire. The existence constituted an interesting duality, a nation-state oriented national project in tandem with the imperial oriented
one from the Ottoman center that both were claiming the representation of the Greek Orthodox communities. The traditional Greek historiography which based mainly on Greek written sources and served the expansionist purposes of state mechanism, emphasized on the emergence of nascent Greek state and neglected the identity making process or the ‘nationalizing’ role of the Patriarchate, which was located in the imperial capital and was the political authority of Greek Orthodox world.

Therefore, I argue that there is an intimate relationship between the idea of nationhood that sprang out of millets and the idea of empire, since each of them required the other to validate its legitimacy. The imperial institutions and administrative practices shaped the principles that formulate the bounds of millets and the millets ensured the imperial loyalty of their members. Certainly, the very same fundamental problem came across in other diverse empires: how to create unity without undermine multiplicity and how to continue effective cohabitation of linguistic, ethnic, religious, and other identities while constructing a common political allegiance. In this study, I adopt the approach of empires’ literature by considering the empire as a nation-builder, however, not only for the dominant ethno-religious group but also for the others.

Subsequently, this thesis is an attempt to reply to the question of how after the Tanzimat reforms, the Greek Orthodox millet perceived its communal identity in the same time with the imperial loyalty. Another supplementary question that seeks to find an answer in the lines of this thesis is the question of how the Greek Orthodox community identified themselves towards Greek state. In order to answer these questions, I use historical discourse approach to have an analysis of the periodicals published in the center of the Empire that during that period (1869-1877) had a significant Ottoman Greek-speaking community. Moreover, I try to distinguish the position of the Greek Orthodox millet towards the Ottoman Empire and follow their strategy of identification.
The focal point of the analysis is the implementation of the reforms of 1856 and the upcoming events, which coincide with the transformation of Empire and the re-legitimation of the millet as an institution. Accordingly, the frame of the analysis covers the promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution and the period posterior to that in which the imperial loyalty of the Greek Ottomans was tested. This thesis aims to bring a new perspective of understanding nation-building within empires and beyond nation-states.

Throughout the study, I use the term Greek Orthodox millet or ‘Greek’ to refer the Ottoman Greek community in contrast with the Greeks of Greek Kingdom. However, it must be remembered that the Greek Orthodox millet was initially considered a blended group of people that consisted of many ethnic and linguistic backgrounds within the territories of the Empire. Thus, the living multilinguality conventionally overlapped with the imperial identity of millet. Ultimately, I refer to the community as Ottoman Greeks especially after the recognition of Bulgarian Exarchate (1870) which crystallized the division within the Orthodox community.

The overall structure of the study takes the form of three chapters. In the first part, I show the appearance of the Greek nation with the main elements of the national identity as paradigm of “reviving” nation. Additionally, I indicate that the irredentist project of the Megali Idea was based on a perception of transborder Hellenism. In the second chapter, I describe the Ottoman reform period and the institutionalization of heterogeneity on its boundaries. I show the emergence of Ottomanism as an imperial ideology of common belonging originated in the spirit of Ottoman reforms. Moreover, this part intends to show the re-invention of legitimacy in the Empire and the transition to the so called ‘nationalizing empire’. I also point out the structural transformation inside the community of the Greek Orthodox millet. In the final chapter, I analyze the findings of the research in the periodicals by considering the Greek language a form of political instrument of
promoting legitimization and mobilization. Consequently, I try to shed light to the position of the Ottoman Greeks towards the policies of both imperial center and the Greek state which were shaped under the influence of \textit{Megali Idea}.

\textbf{Chapter 1. The Formation of Modern Greek Identity and its Impact}

Nationalism is considered as a driving force by having both destructive and constitutive impacts. In the territories of the Ottoman Empire particularly the spread of national ideas and movements which had abrupt consequences has always viewed as an exemplary case for the study of nation formations. In the case of the Ottoman Empire political claims of different groups which consisted of the Rum millet living under the Empire caused the formation of nation-states. The inspiration for unexceptionally all the movements which provoked the creation of the nation-states within the Empire, was found in the principles of the French Revolution that carried out the political base of liberal values.

Essentially, Hroch considers the role of past, cultural and linguistic ties and the future of being organized in a civic society as significant factors for this formation.\textsuperscript{7} In this regard, the Greek nationalism set its origin on cultural continuity of nation through the influence of Enlightenment and Romanticism. The survival of language was the reference point of the Greek national movement together with the persistence of religion. The Orthodox religion was the common ground for the allegiance of the new citizens to Greek nation.

The first part of this chapter describes how the transition from one part of the Greek Orthodox millet to the modern Greek nation happened. Particularly, I examine the genesis of modern Greek identity and its strong relation with the religion as the main source of its legitimacy. Furthermore, in the second part, I show how the Greek state after its foundation, set the frame of Hellenism and included the members of the Rum millet in its imagined community.

1.1 Making the Greek National Identity and the Foundation of the Greek Nation-state

In the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had under its dominion significant parts of the Southeastern Europe and in particular the Rumeli, the historical name for the western provinces of the Empire. In these lands broke out in 1821 the Greek War of Independence and had as a result the foundation of the Greek nation-state that was the first fully independent state appeared in the Ottoman territories right after the uprisings of 1804-1829.

In its very early phase, the Greek national movement faced the opposition not only of the Ottoman authorities but also of the Ottoman Greek elites and of Patriarch Gregory V himself who was hanged as the result of the revolution.8 Greek elites of imperial center also known as the Phanariotes were in the administration of Ottoman controlled principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia under the service of the Sultan. Therefore, the Independence war was extremely disastrous since it made them lose the favor of Sultan and subsequently they were dismissed from accessing to imperial bureaucracy. Thus, the Phanariotes and the ‘Great Church’ as the heads of

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the community were against the liberal principles of the Independence because it put their privileges at risk. With this in mind, it should be mentioned that the dominant ruling system of the confessional communities in the Empire was the reflection of a long-lasting tradition on the basis of the Islamic law in which the term of community’s existence was *ius religionis*.

This religious reality was seen by the admirers of liberal values as an obstacle for the plan of reviving the “Hellas” which denoted the territory and the common cultural values of Classical Greece. Romanticism assisted the movement by showing the claims as legitimate right of the descendants of ancient Greeks. Hence, the necessity for a modern Greek identity was satisfied with a ‘reconnection’ of Ancient Greece to a ‘Modern’ one. As Roudometof shows that intellectual Korais had aim to surface and inject the idea of Ancient Greece as it was presented to him during his studies in France to the ‘modern’ Greek identity. According to Korais, Orthodoxy was symbolizing Ottoman despotism and as long as it was against the ‘modernization’ of nation, it had to be kept out of the identity making. Under the threat of the secular cultural rebirth, the millet authority resisted strongly by claiming that the national emancipation undermined the loyalty of Orthodox community and of Sultan since the only tolerated identity was the religious one and any other identification could not be accepted.

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However, the revival of Greek nation was a result of the ideas of Enlightenment and as such it focuses on the construction of a self-image strongly attached with Ancient Greece. According to Liakos, the concept of historical time and the sense of cultural changes are the main components of this revival process that can be perceived as a “myth of historical renovation”. The narrative of Ancient Greece as a fundamental myth remodified the collectively experienced history and established a discourse of the past that makes the nation the starting point and the Greek Orthodox population, the national subjects. It is certainly undeniably that the creation of the modern Greek identity in great extent shaped due to the contact with the Western Europe and the intellectual contribution of the Philhellenism movement. In the same way, Anderson notes that the centers of Philhellenism in the Western Europe undertook the ‘debarbarizing’ of the modern Greeks and turned them to being worthy of Pericles and Socrates. Likewise, Lowenthal asserts “the past remains integral to us all, individually and collectively. We must concede the ancients their place […] but their past is not simply back there, in a separate and foreign country, it is assimilated in ourselves and resurrected in an ever-changing present.”

Another alternative approach which indicates the hinted dichotomy progress-backwardness, claims that the Greek plan, which outlined a single nation with its own historical embeddedness, was rather a conflicting project between two rival narratives on one side of the dominant Hellenist

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13 Benedict Anderson, 72.
and on the other of ‘Romeic’ (Rum). The Romeic narrative in contrast to the above explained mythomoteur considered of the starting line with the Byzantium and the Medieval Christianity. Taking this into account, Hertzfeld illustrates that the influence of Europe and the consideration of Ancient Greece as its mythical ancestor shaped the boundaries of what was acceptable for the Greek identity and what was not. Furthermore, for the Greek plan, there appeared a binary complexity of being both sacred and ‘polluted’. Thus, the revival of Hellas was not only an attempt to restore a ‘glorious’ past but also a European present.

Regardless of the discussion around it, after the radical breaking away with the establishment of the Greek state in 1830, the notion of being Greek obtained a more pragmatic dimension with which the re-invention of ancient past compromised with the Orthodox faith. Focusing on the transformation process of -one part of- Rum millet to ‘modern’ Greek is important to realize that the identity of the majority of population throughout Southeastern Europe until at least the end of the 19th century was largely local on the one hand and religious on the other. In the light of this, the concept of being Greek crystallized exclusively through the understanding of being Christian Orthodox. Furthermore, the Greek state in its first steps endowed the Church with a privileged status as the official religion, in other words a recognition of church guaranteed its new role as “guard of ethnoreligious unity.”

Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the emergence of autocephalous Orthodox Church (1833) which formed a homogenizing tool under the legitimacy of nation-state unavoidably

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provoked schism in the political hegemony of the Patriarchate since its authorization field was limited.\(^{17}\) The role of religious identity and the special pattern of its association with national identity can be found in the statement of the first Greek Constitution of Epidaurus in January 1822: “The autochthonous residents of the Greek territory who believe in Jesus Christ are Hellenes and enjoy all the civil rights without any limitation and difference.”\(^{18}\) Thus, it can be also perceived that all Orthodox who fought for the Independence after the emergence of the Greek state could join the nation.\(^{19}\) According to Anagnostou, the space of the Greek nationhood was shaped by the bond of Greek language along with Orthodox faith and this can be also observed in the first nationality law which classified the criteria of origin, Greek language and Orthodox religion as a \textit{ius sanguinis} and in parallel \textit{ius soli} notion of nationhood.\(^{20}\)

In order to understand the transition of Rum to Greek apart from the split of the ‘national’ church from the Patriarchate, attention should also be shed to the absence of non-Christians in the boundaries of the nascent Greek state. All the Ottoman Muslim and Jewish communities that used to live in the Morea peninsula after the war were killed as an act of reprisal or converted to


Christianity and some others escaped to areas under the Ottoman control. In this way the development of modern Greek identity was occurred in an environment with absolute majority of Christians. Meanwhile, the alienation and stigmatization of Muslims perpetuated with the image of Muslim as tyrant against the national right of ‘Greek race’. Interestingly, the capitation of the Patriarch which was the head of millet, in the aftermath of the Greek War of Independence, performed as myth justifying the anti-Muslim feelings and all the actions during the years of war. Nevertheless, the foundation of nation-state molded the Hellenic identity and set the boundaries irrevocably between the Greek Orthodox of Greek Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire by forging a form of national discipline during the process of nation building.

1.2 The Megali Idea and the National Inclusion of the ‘Unredeemed Brothers’

In the post-independence era, the Greek state had to formulate a national identity for its nation or otherwise a common understanding of the Greek modern identity. What is important to realize is that the religious division of Orthodox Christians from Muslims could not sufficiently act as it was in the Ottoman Empire but at the same time within the borders of the Greek Kingdom, a Greek-speaking peasant could still designate himself primarily as Christian. Considering this, the Greek state had to produce a unique notion of Greekness for its citizens. The declaration of the autocephaly of Greek church and the association of faith with the nation turned the religion into sui generis

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21 During the Greek War of Independence there were several events of massacres mainly by Ottoman army and followed by reprisal of Greek revolutionaries, for further information see also: David Brewer, The Greek War of Independence: The Struggle for Freedom and from Ottoman Oppression, (New York: Overlook Press.2001), 235-237.

national identity. Furthermore, the adjusted ‘Hellenic-Christian thesis’ which reconciled Hellenism and Orthodox Christianity embodied into the official narratives and gradually mission of state became the spread of Greek national ideology even though it undermined the ideas of the intellectuals like Korais. In other words, the Greek Orthodox transformed to national Greek in a similar way as the Weberian paradigm of peasants to Frenchmen.  

The newly founded state was located in the southern part of Balkans and did not include any major Ottoman city with considerable Greek Orthodox population. The first citizens were, as it mentioned before, the autochthonous residents of the Morea peninsula that believe in Jesus Christ. However, the fruition of the Greek question was far from being solved. Continuing on this line, significant fact is that only a small proportion of the provinces which tend to be considered as ‘historical Greek space inhabited by a majority of Greek Orthodox was incorporated to the Greek Kingdom. The presence of Ottoman Greek Orthodox communities-heterochthons- was a conundrum for the foreign policy of the newly established state since it was difficult to pass without noticing the common religious heritage. For this reason, the externalization of this scheme of instrumentalizing the religion by overlooking to a certain extent language and ethnicity generated the claim upon all the Ottoman Christians. This political vision that envisaged the expansion of borders of Greek state became known as the Megali Idea.

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More specifically, proclamation of the Megali Idea was the result of a discussion on articles of the constitution draft in the Greek National Assembly of 1844. The discussion was an attempt to correspond to the question of who should be defined as a Greek citizen and abstractly who can be essentially defined as Greek. Prime Minister Ioannis Kolletis argued that the Megali Idea was both a Western and Eastern project, in his vision Constantinople occupies a central place in the imaginary of the Greek nation. Kolettis offered to the new state a national dream to believe by stating “The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece. It constitutes only one part, the smallest and feeblest. The name Hellenes describes not only those who live in this kingdom, but also those who live in Janina, in Thessaloniki, in Serres, in Adrianople, in Constantinople, in Trebizond, in Crete, in Samos and in any territory associated with Hellenic history and the Hellenic race. […] There are two prime cores of Hellenism: Athens, the capital of the Hellenic Kingdom, and the City (Constantinople), the vision and hope of all Hellenes. […] And, of course, you have the same belief, and the same wish, because each of you has in himself the idea of his glorious Hellenic origin; every one of you feels that this Assembly was held in Athens, the glory, grandeur and inimitable monuments of which have been admired for centuries and will continue to be admired. Athens and the whole of Greece divided in ancient times in separate states, fell, and having fallen enlightened the world. What hope is offered today by Greece, reborn and united in one State, in
one cause, and one force, in one religion, and, lastly, in one constitution, which we are now bringing about?"\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, the main debate was related with the social-cultural competition in Greek capital between the auchthonon and heterochthon -Ottoman Greek origin- people. \textsuperscript{26} The ideological support for the irredentist policy of the Greek state was motivated by the work of historians who determined the historical boundaries of the modern Greek identity. This process granted the material to build the ‘geography of nation’ and additionally the nation backed with the ancient history and religion respectively the “Greek classical past” and “Orthodox unity”.\textsuperscript{27} The historians selected also specific aspects from Greek culture that would promote the unity of the “autochthons” and “heterochthons” Greek Orthodox along with reinterpreting all the myths, symbols, memories and traditions by attaching a new value and meaning to them.\textsuperscript{28}

The imagined political community was from its debut quite inclusive since according to the ideas of the time, the Greek Orthodox people who ‘remain’ in the Ottoman Empire were turned into kin population in the eyes of the Greek state. As Clogg shows after the evolution of the state institutions, there was a strategy also of propagating the shared notion of the Greek identity among


\textsuperscript{27} Noteworthy is the works of Paparrigopoulos and Zambelios who established a historical school that elaborated different phases of history in a unified corpus of national genealogy.

Ottoman Greeks. Consequently, the members of Rum millet that were claimed by the small Greek nation-state as “co-national brothers” urged to embrace the Hellenic culture. Nevertheless, the porous identity of being Greek and the assumption that all Rums were, by definition politically Greeks was clearly problematic. By examining the contents of the plan, Kitromilides argues that such a project with the potential turn to the Anatolia can be perceived as a perspective union of nation and of imperial church. In the same fashion, the Megali Idea has also been analyzed for its versatile purposes besides of its irredentist nationalist ideology as also western civilization mission and utopian imperial project of a Greater Greece.

In essence, the Megali Idea, which was an official articulated irredentist plan, anticipate that all the ‘Greek’ subject of the Ottoman Empire would be included to the Greek Kingdom shortly in the next warfare with the Empire when the circumstances would be in favor of a new drawing of map. Similarly, in 1871 the same discussion came from another prime minister who wrote in his instructions to Greek consuls in the Ottoman Empire that: “it is time that the people in Anatolia also realized that they have a homeland and common interests.”

Keeping this in mind, a new situation emerged for the former Ottoman subjects resided in the territories of Thessaly and Arta that were annexed by Greek state in 1881. In the end of the 19th century, the Greek state under the influence of Megali Idea offered the option of Greek nationality only to those Ottomans who resided in these territories with the condition that they were Orthodox

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Christians. Thus, in the heyday of Greek irredenta, the inclusiveness started to meet its limitations. Hence the annexations of new places to Greek state have had two main impacts: On one hand, large number of “homogenis” (non-indigenous kin population) who automatically acquired Greek nationality and on the other hand the remained Ottoman subjects or “allogenis” (non-kin population) who were granted a time limit to stay in the Greek state before their departure to the Ottoman Empire. In the course of this century, the code of Greek nationality could be understood in the following formulation: ‘Greek is whoever has been born to a Greek father accepting in this way gradually the absolute dominance of ius sanguinis. Since then, being Christian Orthodox has been a fundamental feature of Greek nationhood. As it was seen, the discrepancy between autochthonous and non-autochthonous populations abandoned and the new division line slipped between homogenis and allogenis.32

This part illustrated the evolution of Greek identity outside of the Ottoman Empire in the boundaries of the Greek nation-state. However, except this form of ethno-religious nationhood through the transition from the Greek War of Independence to the consolidation of the Greek state, in the next chapter I intend to show the nationalization process within the imperial borders after the introduction of Tanzimat liberal reforms. It is important to realize that the identity making in the Greek experience was not a fait accompli process but a constantly negotiation of national character which did not crystallize until the 20th century.

Chapter 2. Launching the Imperial Identity in the Ottoman Empire

The dawn of the 19th century had come in sight with a tremendous loss of balance through wars and uprisings for the Ottoman Empire. Concurrently, the emergence of the ‘Eastern Question’ discussions in the European royal courts introduced a circle of political crises. The contingent partition of territories and even the further loss of control on them brought, as instant needs, the transformation of state relations with its subjects and the emergence of an imperial identity. The prelude to the Tanzimat reforms that were designed to be a shift in the dissolution process was the declaration of the Edict of Gulhane (1839) which together with the Imperial Reform Edict (1856) had strong reference to the civil liberties for the subjects of the Empire.

In this chapter, there is no intention to examine the stimuli which generated the reforms; instead, there is an aim to focus on the content of political reforms and to trace the development of imperial identity of Ottomanism. Within this framework, initially, I examine the arrangement of political reforms during the peculiar process of transition from the confessional based belonging to a civic citizenship by also explaining how the Empire adapted the liberal request for Enlightenment with the emergence of Ottomanism. In the second part of this chapter, I describe the development of imperial ideology together with the re-invention of state legitimacy till the eve of the 20th century to demonstrate the interdependency of different types of Ottomanism. Finally, in the last part, I approach the institutional change inside the Greek Orthodox millet in order to indicate the impact of transition on the community.
2.1 From Subjecthood to Ottoman Nationhood

“Wishing today to renew yet more the new regulation instituted for the purpose of obtaining a state of affairs in conformity with the dignity of my empire and the position which it occupies among civilized nations, I desire to increase well-being and prosperity, to obtain the happiness of all my subjects who, in my eyes, are all equal and are equally dear to me, and who are united among themselves by cordial bonds of patriotism, and to assure the means of making the prosperity of my empire grow from day to day.”

Sultan Abdulmecid, February 18, 1856

The period known in history as Tanzimat had started with these words which were stated in front of all the bureaucrats and community leaders in the opening speech of the Imperial Reform Edict by the Sultan Abdulmecid. Besides the fact that Ottomans were seated next to the Great Powers in the Congress of Paris (1856), the much coveted ‘stability’ was to be realized through a vast program of reforms in all fields of state and society. The aim of this formative process was to create an imperial framework that would encompass the components of the fragmented society of that time to a unified political body under the central authority. It was simply the reorganization of the institutions and the introduction of new imperial politics. It is said that till the arrival of the 19th century for Ottoman elites, the meaning of modernization was mostly perceived as a part of military reforms. However, the Ottoman statesmen, in the mid of the 19th century, realized that the governmental system previously guided by customs had to follow rational planning and systematization complying with modernity. The passage from a traditional to a rational authority

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meant that the power of the Sultan had to meet with the limitation of force of law and indeed Tanzimat was the soul of this idea.

A brief examination of the texts of Tanzimat period explicitly displays the arrangements under the modern settings. For instance, the Edict of Gulhane (1839) starts by underlining the need of a structural change in its preamble as: “The empire in consequence increased in strength and greatness […] In the last one hundred and fifty years a succession of accidents and diverse causes have arisen which have brought about a disregard for the sacred code of laws and the regulations flowing there from, and the former strength and prosperity have changed into weakness and poverty; an empire in fact loses all its stability so soon as it ceases to observe its laws.”

While this preamble indicates the reflection of the mentality on the status quo of the Ottoman world of that moment, in the following part, the Gulhane Edict defines the core civic liberties to life, honor and property as the main objectives of Tanzimat. According to the Edict, the institutions had to insure the guarantees of security for life, honor and fortune to the subjects of the Empire as well as fair economic distribution and equal treatment for military service. Nevertheless, a narrative that interestingly does not demonstrate the principles as a typical map of political modernity, as it is indicated in the following statement, yet exists as an exact explanation of how the egalitarianism between Muslims and non-Muslims aim to work: “And, in fact, are not life and

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36 Tanzimat Fermani: Gulhane Hatti Humayunu (1839).
honor the most precious gifts to mankind? [...] These imperial concessions shall extend to all our subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be; they shall enjoy them without exception.”

The Reform Edict of 1856 would enhance in a more apparent way the political and social equality together with the removal of Muslims’ legal privileges and encourages further representation of non-Muslims in the local administration and central bureaucracy. Within this scope, the Edict defines the operational framework of the ethnoreligious communities and the Patriarch which was the main institution based on the previous ‘patrimonial right’ is identified as the representative authority of the Greek Orthodox community. Moreover, the Edict also mentions the legitimacy of the Sultan over the Orthodox Church by markedly accepting them in the officialdom of state ipso facto as an organic part of it. Likewise, in the field of social changes, the Edict recognizes the rights of a non-Muslim community to preserve property as a collective legal entity and defined as well the terms of its living condition by stating that: “The property, real or personal, of the different Christian ecclesiastics shall remain intact” [...] “In the towns, small boroughs and villages, where the whole population is of the same religion, no obstacle shall be offered to the repair, according to their original plan, of buildings set apart for religious worship, for schools, for hospitals, and for cemeteries [...] where different sects are mingled together, each community, inhabiting a distinct quarter, shall, by conforming to the above-mentioned ordinances, have equal power to repair and improve its churches, its hospitals, its schools, and its cemeteries.”

37 Tanzimat Fermani: Gulhane Hatti Humayunu (1839).
39 Gumus, 222.
In addition to all those changes, in 1869, Ottoman citizenship law (Tabiiyet Kanunu) was passed and defined who the Ottoman subjects are as: “Individuals born of an Ottoman father and an Ottoman mother, or only an Ottoman father, are Ottoman subjects”.\textsuperscript{40} Irrespective of the religion or ethnicity the reformer bureaucrats wanted to fabricate not just a common loyalty to the dynasty but also a common loyalty to state. Ultimately, the fundamental moment that demonstrates the genesis of a new model of legitimacy as novelty is the declaration of the Constitution of 1876. The Ottomanism came to characterize the common citizenship and belonging of all Ottoman subjects -Muslims and non-Muslims - under the dominion of the Sultan. It can be said chiefly that Ottomanism was also a form of an imperial identity renovated the state.\textsuperscript{41} Based on the article 4: “The Sultan as a Caliph is the protector of Islam and in tandem he is the Sovereign and Monarch of all the Ottoman subjects”. In the article 11, Midhat Pasha, one of the most liberal bureaucrats, who was in charge of the Constitution tried to comprise and accommodate the modern sense of citizenship along with the religious tradition of the Empire and it is stated in the Constitution as: “Religion of Ottoman state is Islam. Based on this principle the state protects the free practice of all recognized religions of empire and the privileges of different communities as long they do not violate the public order and the ethical values.”\textsuperscript{42}

Consequently, the Ottoman state recognized the previously fragmented religious communities as ethnoreligious one and institutionalized them. All the components of the new Ottoman political context were formed on the basis of the millet system and the administration, the justice and the


\textsuperscript{41} Ottoman Constitution (Kanun-I Esasi), (Istanbul: Voutiras Publications, 1876).

\textsuperscript{42} Ottoman Constitution.
education of their community stayed on their hands. Modernization for the Ottoman Empire was also a parallel process of secularization and this was the reason why Tanzimat reforms regulated this *sui generis* duality. While Ottoman bureaucrats managed to establish institutions in the paradigm of western world which they were in competition with, they also kept the character of religious tradition. The tackling of nationalism inside the Empire by accepting these reforms was nothing more than an attempt to internalize the principles of Enlightenment and French Revolution. Ottomanism like other imperial ideologies, was sustained by a language of “reciprocity” ready to correspond to demographic realities. Simply, it was an effort of a nation-building with imperial face. Pressures of the Great powers of whom anecdotal statement had been recorded prior to the Congress of Paris, along with the durable threat of the dissolution of the Empire acted as driving force for the structural transformation of it.43

In the Tanzimat period frequently the main argument for opposing Ottomanism as a common belonging is that it was underestimated by its own propaganda of “living like brothers” - which was clearly far from being sincere. Even the main architects of the project like Midhat Pasha had essentially two different understanding of nation and Empire: On one hand as identification with dynasty and state and on the other hand as an unfolding of an inner mentality of being Turk and Muslim confusing the millet with race.44 This approach is rather complicated one because it treats Ottomanism simply with a single teleological ethnocentric vision. Thus, this opinion fails to see the formation of “national” centers inside the Empire which has competed or incorporated at a

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43 Davison, 52-3.

later time with the nation-states formed in Balkans. Within this perspective, the concept of Ottoman fatherland can be analytical frame only by including the “people of the Empire” particularly, in this case of non-Muslims. According to the Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, the term Ottomanism was designed to counterbalance the national movements that triggered disastrous effects in Balkan Peninsula and advocated the subjects of Sultan to develop a sense of loyalty to the Empire. The main religious difference seemingly would exist only when subjects of the Sultan enter their worship places, thus a loyalty above ethnic and religious distinctions would bring a secular ideal of fatherland devotion. Admittedly, the political transformation should be seen as a codification of the already existed system of confessionalism since Ottomanism regulated the millets. The millet system during Tanzimat period was institutionalized and became the bond of Ottoman identity, a personal autonomy without territorial aspect. It must be also pointed out that Ottomanism was effective, as long as the imperial center of power bestowed to Ottomanism the same meaning with the heads of millets which composed also part of the Empire’s officialdom. Therefore, the ‘national’ feeling of the millets in this process was accommodated mainly by its leadership against intra-group social and political centrifugal powers.

Differently from the nation-state, the Empire had no direct aim to assimilate its subjects and create a symmetric national space. In this level the discussion of federalization inside empires could not be started since the political applicants who speak in the name of ethnic or ethnoreligious groups are in the stage of formation. For instance, even though the scheme of federalization as foreign


policy was suggested from the Ottoman side, Romanian principalities together with Serbia could be connected to the Ottoman in the pattern of Bavaria attached to the German Empire. However, the plan was rejected immediately by the Russian delegation.\textsuperscript{47} This plan undoubtedly recalls the preceding dualism of Augleich in Austria-Hungary which reverted politically -not, socially- the different constitutional experiments and accepted the national principle -only- for the Hungarians but in a broader imperial ground. A redefined common belonging found its legitimacy in the outmoded pre-modern ‘material’ and as Judson describes, this did not mean the full acceptance of minorities as political collectivities, but rather that at the same time they benefited from an inclusion to a liberal empire.\textsuperscript{48} In the case of the Ottoman Empire, inclusion denoted the acceptance of millets à la carte in the multilayer imperial structure as a binary of pre-modern and modern categories.

After the announcement of the Constitution of 1876 which signified the first constitutional era of the Empire, it can be said that the political situation was not certainly the one which would show the way to a well-protected atmosphere to boost and promote the spirit of Tanzimat.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, the reforms as a response to global modernity had to cope with the integration of Ottoman economy in the global markets except the separatist national movements in the European territories of Empire. The outcome of this effort to reorganize the state was also the fabrication of new classes: The modern educational institutions produced new educated bureaucratic elites and in parallel the newly founded banks and commercial firms having relations with the international trade presented

\textsuperscript{47} Davison, 290, According to Davison, Ignatyev sabotaged the plan of Midhat Pasha.

\textsuperscript{48} Pieter Judson, \textit{The Habsburg Empire: A New history}, (Harvard University Press, 2016), 268.

a new upper merchant class. In relation with this, Gocek shows the economic transformation of the period and asserts that the non-Muslims were the majority of the latter category and as a result they turned to a new urban oriented social group. However, in regards to imperial ideology, she considers in a determinist socioeconomic analysis that their location in the Ottoman society, the utilization of their capital and the fact of religious prohibition of mix marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims played a role in the setback of Ottomanism. In opposition to this approach, there are new studies about the port-cities of the Empire which shows that these Tanzimat-led emerged upper or middle classes were the bearer of Ottomanism.

Another well-known scholar of Ottoman and Turkish studies, Feroz Ahmad also defines Ottomanism as the new patriotic identity anchored in the dynastic loyalty that would replace the religious one for all Ottomans in a secular approach. He also emphasizes the fact that even the nation-states of the Balkan region built their national identities in full compliance to the religion.

From the other side, the main unpleasant factor for Ottomanism is that there was not any common point to be based on such as language.


52 Gocek, 34-35.

53 As an example, Malte Fuhrmann and Vangelis Kechriotis, “The Late Ottoman port-cities and Their Inhabitants: Subjectivity, Urbanity, and Conflicting orders”, Mediterranean Historical Review, N. 2, (December 2009):71–78.

54 Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities, (Logan: Utah University Press, 2014), 5.
Imperial ideology should be seen as an ‘antidote’ to the secession of the people especially of Greek-Orthodox and Armenian communities.\(^{55}\) Furthermore, Findley describes the recognition of millet in 1860 and 1863 (and 1864 for Sephardi Jews) as the principal foundation, more precisely “the communal reforms progressed, Tanzimat statesmen attempted to foster the new “patriotic bond” to hold all Ottoman subjects together.”\(^{56}\) Besides, Julia Cohen discusses Ottomanism as a concept which was not so much strictly imposed from up to down. As a matter of fact of the understanding that she proposes Ottomanism as an imperial citizenship based on negotiations. Through the example of the Ottoman Jews, she shows a different model of instilling the ‘love for the homeland’ and focuses on the state and local institutions.\(^{57}\) In the end, by dividing the initial Ottomanism as civic and according to the later bifurcation as Islamic, Cohen opens the debate over the different meanings of Ottomanism in the post-Tanzimat period.

### 2.2 Multifaceted Ottomanism: Evolution of Imperial the Identity

The liberalization tendency of Tanzimat was driven in the end among other factors by the state bankruptcy (1875) which was triggered from the Vienna Stock Exchange crash of 1873 and the equally disastrous Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1878. The ‘War of 93’ as it is alternatively known caused the first serious territory loss for the empire and opened the door for long-term crises in the Balkans with the explosion of various “Questions”. Ironically, the Constitution and the first

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\(^{56}\) Findley, “Tanzimat”, 29.

effort to make the imperial ideology ceased politically function by the new Sultan Abdulhamid who used his constitutional right to declare martial law. According to the Article 113 of the Constitution, “in the case of the perpetration of acts, or the appearance of indications of a nature to presage disturbance at any point on the territory of the Empire, the Imperial Government has the right to proclaim a state of siege there. The state of siege consists in the temporary suspension of the civil laws.”

During the reign of Abdulhamid II not only the constitution but other newly established political novelties including Parliament ceased to function. The main aim of the Red Sultan as he is well-known because of the Armenian massacres was to build strong bonds in priority with his Muslim subjects also due to the new demographic realities. This was in opposition to the wish of the Tanzimat bureaucratic elites - the Young Ottomans- who still advocated for a patriotic civic “Ottomanism”. As Serif Mardin indicates in his work, the Young Ottoman movement was formed with the intention of saving the Ottoman Empire from Western assault and internal disintegration. Agreeing with the plan of saving the Empire, Abdulhamid II brought up to date the nature of this intention by replacing the secular emphasis with the religious one. Hence, the main element of Hamidian policy was the religion of Islam and the downplay of any other difference. Meanwhile, this emphasis on Islam shifted the focus from Balkans to the Ottoman lands in Middle East. As it also stressed in Kemal Karpat’s *The Politicization of Islam*: “This is the reason for which the Sublime Sultanate should place on a higher level the national fate [kadr-i

58 Ottoman Constitution.
millet] but also respect the Arabs, with whom we share the language of faith … instead of addressing them as “fellahs” as our ignorant officials insult them in Arabia … naturally makes the Arabs hate the Turk”.⁶¹ In contrast to that, in the “imagined” world of the Empire, the Sultan recognized the ‘Turks’ only as a part of the millet-i hakime (the governing millet).

In a resourceful comparison of Turkism with Arabism, Hasan Kayali depicts Ottomanism as an evolutionary political ideology that primarily Young Ottomans, who were the first generation of Tanzimat, presented for the strengthening of subjects-state relationship.⁶² Ottomanism was carrying two messages, for Muslims, the binding was in supported of the Islamic character of state and for the non-Muslims was in support of common interests to a fatherland. Subsequently, Abdulhamid established a different relationship with his Muslim subjects by elevating the institution of the Caliphate and by constructing a centralized state on it. The emphasis on Islam together with the loss of territories put in risk the civic equality of Ottomanism and the position of non-Muslims. According to Hasan Kayali, Islamism did not depose Ottomanism moreover Islamism generated Turkism and Arabism as competing allegiances. The alternation of these imperial types of nationalism also shows the legitimization crisis in the Ottoman Empire.

In the time of a gradually developing public sphere, Abdulhamid II was in need of powerful symbols in which he could base his legitimacy. In order to achieve this, the Sultan managed to expand the political sphere from the symbolic presents to holy cities to the highlight of the “glorious” dynastic genealogy and for a long time succeeded to keep this sphere strictly under his

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⁶² Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks- Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in Ottoman Empire 1908-1918, (Berkeley: California University Press, 1997), 17.
own directives. Moreover, his own understanding of Rechstaat concluded with a modern type of autocracy filled with the spirit of Islamic justice. The control of state transferred once again to the absolute control of Sultan and as hierarchical in top, step by step, he transformed to the source of legitimacy. Keeping this in mind, it is necessary to underline that the novelty of his regime was the redefinition of Ottoman modernity, since he used Islam as the medium of modernization without subverting its process. Thus, the Sultan tried to guide the Muslims to modernity by transforming the Ottoman framework into a political expression of Islam. To a great extent resembling with Pan-Slavism, Pan-Islamism with the use of Caliphate developed cohesive symbolic characteristics. However, Pan-Islamism’s universal religious community in the borders of Empire could not be seen individually from Ottomanism which functioned supplementary.

The period of Abdulhamid II, in the broader context of empires, implicitly recalls features of Czars’ use of religion and autocratic rule. Especially in relation with Pan-Islamism, there are significant similarities with the Russian ‘Official Nationality’. However, as Brisku points out, the Official Nationality doctrine and the discussion of ‘Modernity without modern institution of Monarchy’ which coincided with the early Ottomanism were products in a degree of identical causes with distinct transformation routes. Considering that fact, it can be observed that the Russification did not have largely equivalent to the Ottoman Empire mostly because of the ‘permeability’ of Islam and the absence of an official definition of nation. Lastly, it can be also noticed an analogy of the bureaucratic cadre in power. In both Empires, there was an existence of

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64 Karpat, 8.

a ruling class disciple of modernization either as dichotomy Westerners-Slavophiles in Czarist Russia or in the form of Moderated Muslims and fiercely Westerners or Liberal Muslims in the Ottoman Empire.

The sides of opposition against the regime of Abdulhamid II started to make their appearance more obvious since the cult of the Sultan and the apotheosis of Muslim millet brought as a result a less flexible imperial identity. The opponents of the Sultan were a blend of ulema, bureaucrats, and nationalists who shared a common target to act against him.\footnote{Sukru Hanioglu, \textit{The Young Turks in Opposition}. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 47-50.} In fact, in the top of this pyramid there was the organization of Young Turks which acted as constitutionalist group which included both Muslims and non-Muslims. The main worry of the Young Turk movement was how to deal with Abduhamid’s autocracy.\footnote{Sukru Hanioglu, \textit{A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire}. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 145.} Nevertheless, the debate ended in a division of two major factions which, were mostly Muslim and non-Muslim in support of external intervention with the assistance of the Great Britain, and, on the other hand the Muslim-dominated group in support of independent action from within. Hanioglu argues that the existence of these two groups is the reason the civic Ottomanism together with a Muslim variant Ottomanism gained once more popularity.\footnote{Hanioglu, 145-146.} By and large, the watershed moment for the political future of the Empire undoubtedly came with the Young Turks’ Revolution which happened in July 1908.

At first, the Young Turks were successful in creating a convergence between the communities and the state elites, thus turning their original ideological coherence into political commitment. One advantage they had over the Sultan, was that they could imagine a community which included non-
Muslim ‘compatriots’ who were kept out by Abdulhamid’s Islamic Ottomanism. However, in 1904, Yusuf Akcura, an intellectual migrated from Czarist Russia with strong affiliation with Young Turks, described based on the public discussions the three potential ideological paths open to the Ottoman political ideology: Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turkism. Rejecting all three, he supported the idea that the best was “to pursue a Turkish nationalism based on race.”

Notably, the Young Turks in their second phase after the disaster of Balkans wars in between 1912 and 1913, were strongly inspired from that and accommodated the Hamidian Muslim belonging discourse to a racial unity one. The slipping way of Ottoman rule opened the path to entirely divergent national projects.

The case of Ottomanism as imperial identity formed also a versatile concept for the historians of Eastern Mediterranean. In the eve of the Young Turk revolution, a new awakening of Ottomanist discourse reappeared as the last chance for the survival of the Empire. The Young Turks promised without distinction that they would accept the honor, property and lives of their Christian brothers. The Ottoman Christians restored their place in parliament and took part in the protection of “shared national right”. However, after Balkan wars the short indulgent period finished with a dismantled Empire and in the place of liberal Ottomanism came a hard-line Pan-Turkism with Islamic elements focused mainly on Anatolia.

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2.3 The Patriarchate and the role of Ethnarchy

The replacement of *dhimmis* protection status that was in force from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire was a radical restructuring of the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. In contrast to the spirit of the liberal reformations, as Davison shows, the attitude of the majority of Muslim millet - or, millet-i hakime was quite different from what was expected after reforms.\(^1\) Moreover, it can be observed that, apart from the perception of Muslims towards Christians as inferior citizens, that the character of power system in the pre-Tanzimat era also created troubles for the Christians internally.\(^2\) Subsequently, applications of reforms for the Greek-Orthodox millet was a contentious issue towards Western modernity since the previous regime provided different type of rights and obligations which in accordance to the Tanzimat directives, meant the gradually abolition of all of the privileges that religious communities per se enjoyed.\(^3\) In a more intrinsic understanding, this intended to be the emancipation verdict of the non-Muslim population. However, it concluded a fundamental antinomy. There is an emphasis on a patrimonial right in Tanzimat decree as: *“All the privileges and spiritual immunities granted by my ancestors ab antiquo, and at subsequent dates, to all Christian communities or other non-Muslim persuasions established in my empire under my protection, shall be confirmed and maintained.”*\(^4\) Therefore, as in the case of Muslims subjects, the bearer of modernity and in the same time of the secularization of millet automatically became the Church. This novelty led to the formation of a modern political role for the institution. The reforms for the Rum millet were outlined in the

\(^{71}\) Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 114-115.

\(^{72}\) Davison. See also: Dimitris Kamouzis, 29-30.


\(^{74}\) Quoted in Faroqui, 220.
“General Regulations of Arrangement with Reference to Church and Nation” immediately after the negotiations of Imperial Council in 1862.

The regulation described the requirements of a priest to be Patriarch or member of Holy Synod and defined the scope of the relations between the community and Patriarch himself. It also engendered the “National” Mixed Council which was in charge of revenues of the Patriarchate, the administration of the monasteries and the charitable institutions. In comparison with the previous organs of the Patriarchate, the current novelty was the representation of the people outside clerical body. Thus, the religious community turned into an ethnoreligious one with the introduction of those non-clerical members and in tandem it also consolidated the social mechanism since the members happened to be the pre-Tanzimat Christian elites.

Furthermore, the contradictory factors of legitimizing a power from scratch were more than expected. Firstly, the Rum millet was embracing all the Orthodox Christians of the Empire, a heterogeneity that included not only Greeks but also Bulgarians, Serbs, Romanians, Vlachs, Albanians and Arabs. Up to that time, the new categories that appeared, were indifferent for the trans-ethnic Christian Orthodox elites that dominated in the hierarchy of the Ottoman Christian ‘society’. This old cast of power was motivated from the pre-Tanzimat sense of loyalty and did not hesitate to offer their services to the Sultan in any opportunity by also not having devotion to any specific nation. Second important parameter that raised after the establishment of the

75 Genikoi Kanonismoi gia peri Dieuthetiseon ton ekkliasiastikon kai ethnikon pragmaton [General Regulation of Arrangement with Reference to Church and Nation]. (Istanbul 1862), National Mixed Council had 12 members from which 8 non-priests and 4 priests.
76 General Regulation of Arrangement with Reference to Church and Nation, 5.
“National Mixed Council” was the distance between the social trans-ethnic strata in Istanbul and the provinces since the membership in this council was strictly unrequited and the members had to be elected only from the different parishes of the capital. Thus, the economic elites granted ipso facto the character of the political delegation. In a two thirds system of power which was designed with the aim to secularize the community, the devolution of power from the *papocaesarism* of Patriarchate and Holy Synod did not immediately expect to pass in reactionary alliances.

The Patriarchate had the dominion in the life of every Christian that inherently was considered as member of the Rum millet within the Ottoman power structure. According to Clogg, the national movements of the other Christian people in Southeastern Europe were a reaction not only to “Ottoman hegemony but also to Greek ecclesiastical and cultural oppression.” Despite the aim to create unitary centralized form of self-government and an idea of autonomy in the reformed millets, an “unprecedented” antithesis came in sight. Having in mind the conditions described above, the Bulgarian and other ethnic groups had to be represented by the same National Mixed Council of the Rum millet. The emerged Bulgarian intelligentsia, however, opposed this together with the general aversion to the Greek-Orthodox institutions. In this direction, the Greek language from lingua franca converted to a language of imposition. This attitude was the main reason of the

78 General Regulation of Arrangement with Reference to Church and Nation, 43.
80 Clogg, 191.
“radical break” in the homogenization objective of the Tanzimat and in synchronous understanding the double practice of the emancipation principle.  

Following the Greek schism which triggered with the territorial partition of the Morea Peninsula and the foundation of the Greek nation-state, the Bulgarian faction in the core of the Rum millet became autonomous from the “Great Church of Jesus” in 1870 with an Imperial Edict. The Patriarchate as in the case of Greek autocephalous church, condemned the emergence of the Bulgarian Exarchate with anathema and emphatically defined it as devilry of Ethnofyletistai (Chauvinists).

Compared with this, the Greek-Orthodox people of the Empire who ‘emancipated’ under the regulations of the Tanzimat by confirming the Ottoman legacy, were in contrast with the Greek state in which the Orthodox population was ‘ethnicized’ as a ruptured continuity of the Rum millet. Given these points, it is important here to underline the existence of two different centers as Istanbul and Athens for the Greek-Orthodox population since it shows the dualism of the Modern Greek identity. Kofos also shows the antagonism between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Patriarchate of the Rum millet with the latter developing the policy of ecumenism which aimed to tackle the ‘ethno-racial’ way of thinking and emphasized the ethnarchic role over the Christians of Empire. Equally important, it can be observed similar parallelism with Abdulhamid’s Pan-Islamism. While the Sultan was implementing his policy over the Muslims, the Patriarch Joachim

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III as a sort of “small sultan” was practicing the same in his “homogenized” flock. In the Ottoman state the Patriarchate acted as the ‘apostle’ of Ottomanism since this was the only context for defining and surviving its power.

Finally, Davison brings another point in the analysis of the millet that by deduction referring also to Ottoman individuals who were members of one or the other millet, since the religious belief was overlapping with the “millet” civil status even though the point where eventually the millet influence stopped was not visible.  

Ottomanism as a concept of common citizenship created a set of new relations between the individuals, the government and the millets. These relations intended to infuse the loyalty of belonging to the Ottoman Empire in return with protection of the rights and freedoms by accommodating the individual’s cultural preferences. Thus, a loyalty to the Ottoman state could be seen as form of fulfillment of the millet identity.

Chapter 3. The Reflections of Ottoman Greek identity perception in Periodicals in 1869-1877

One of the ways to track and identify the discourses of nation beyond the research of state or personal archives is the critical analysis of the newspapers. Disappointingly, in the literature of Ottoman studies there are no many academic researches that explore the Ottoman Greek identity through the examination of periodicals in the Tanzimat era. Most of the researchers that approach the identity of the Ottoman Greek community turn exclusively to periodicals of the later period as


84 Kemal Karpat, 166.
1900s-1910s. Thus, the vacuum that coincides with the implementation of liberal reforms in the Empire stays understudied. The 19th century denotes except of the state modernization of the Empire also the starting point of the press for all the communities, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. According to Marina Marks, the amount of Ottoman Greek newspaper circulated, exceeded the total numbers of newspapers published by all the other communities - 36 newspapers for the Greek Orthodox community and 27 for Muslim, Jewish and Armenian communities.\(^8^5\)

The center of the Ottoman Greek press was based on Istanbul and Smyrna, both port-cities, with ideal environment for the development of high standards publications. In this thesis, I will focus on the analysis of two newspapers, the *Konstantinoupolis* and the *Thraki*. The *Konstantinoupolis* was a triweekly newspaper published between 1869 and 1873 by Dimitrios Nikolaidis in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul. Nikolaidis was a well-known journalist and editor that participated in other publications not only in Greek but also in Ottoman language. As it can be seen from the subheading of the newspaper: *Efimeris ton Laon tis Anatolis* (Newspaper of the People of Anatolia), the viewpoint was in favor of the unity of all Ottoman citizens. However, the newspaper tragically was closed due to the crisis of 1872 which triggered by the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate that *Konstantinoupolis* was firmly against. The closure of *Konstantinoupolis* followed the launching of *Thraki* on daily basis again by Nikolaidis who supported the ecumenic vision of Patriarch and kept a distance from the radical nationalists. The *Thraki* maintained a moderate and pragmatist position during the predicament of the Russo-

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Ottoman war of 1877-1878. Even though it managed to survive the political and economic atmosphere reflected during war, Thraki could not escape from a short censorship period of one month from August to September of 1876. The Ottoman Greek press was dependent on the subscriptions and one part of circulation was ‘consumed’ inside the cafes, clubs and associations. The size of newspapers was broadsheet and the contents shared in four pages that included 4-5 columns. In detail, in the first page of the newspapers an editorial article on community concerns or a translation of a significant correspondence was taking place and the following pages were divided to external and internal news that were coming along with various advertisements of the last page. Important to mention here is that the news related with the Greek Kingdom was generally found in the external coverage or there was often an independent column called “News from Greece”. Lastly, the language of publications was closer to the ‘katharevousa’ official form used by the Church and far from the vernacular Greek.

In this part, I approach the ideas and the political attitude of the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul as a collective body integrated in the broader Ottoman public sphere. Notably, for the convenience of analysis, there is a division of two periods for each newspaper that are connected with the major events of the publishing time: The formation of Bulgarian exarchate and the consequent ethnocultural schism of the Greek Orthodox millet, the promulgation of the Constitution and the first sessions of the Ottoman parliament. On a final note, the Russo-Ottoman adversary also played a role in the formation of Ottoman Greek identity.
3.1. Konstantinoupolis – I efimeris ton Laon tis Anatolis (1869-1872)

Two significant issues for the Greek Orthodox community that took several times place in the pages of newspaper’s volumes were the investigation of the Eastern question and the situation of the Christians in Anatolia. As mission of newspaper was defined the reconciliation of people of ‘our country’ against the assumptions of Europeans for the future of Anatolia. The editors of Konstantinoupolis asserted that the wrong understanding and conclusions that the travelers’ memoirs created could only be tackled with the proper ethnographic methodology and learning each of Anatolian nations. In relation with the belonging of Anatolia they considered: “Anatolia is neither under the exclusive belonging of Greeks nor of Ottomans [Muslims] as the European monographs declare, among the inhabitants are Ottomans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Slavs, Albanians, Armenians, Jews, Drouzes, Tatars and others.” Furthermore, it compared Anatolia with Europe: “Let’s remember that Europe is the blend of barbarians destroyed the Roman state and managed to rebirth in the 19th century. These liberal ideas that helped Europe to rebirth emerged out of the Ancient Greek spirit, so we should also concentrate to ‘Hellenism’ however not as a nationality but as a principle for our enlightenment.”

The Eastern Question obviously became an internal topic of discussion that brought ipso facto in surface the other discussion of the ‘origin’ of Anatolian nations.

As previously mentioned the main event that provoked a significant conflict to the core of the Greek Orthodox community was the formation of the Bulgarian exarchate in 1870 that

86 “Oi Laoi tis Anatolis upo Istorikon, Ethnografikon kai politikon apopsi” [The Anatolian People – Historical, Ethnographic and Political View], Konstantinoupolis, June 18, 1869.
subsequently ended up with the creation, in ethnoreligious terms, of the Bulgarian millet. The request for a separate church prior to the existence of the Bulgarian nation-state initiated the path for the extraordinary recognition of a nationality which relied not only on religious but also on linguistic distinction. As it was expected, this situation caused to result in a reaction from the Patriarch and the Mixed Council as the ‘national’ authorities of the Orthodox millet.

Initially, the first impact of this reaction can be found in the arguments of an article titled “Some words for the Bulgarian Question” in which the situation was explained from the view of loyal to Patriarch editors. From this perspective, Konstantinoupolis refers to Bulgarians as the ‘poor educated brothers’ that were exploited by foreign powers and turned against the ‘Great Church’. Accordingly, emphasis is given to the causes of the reactions together with the historical relations between Patriarchate and Bulgarians which originated in the time that Bulgarians arrived in Anatolia. The newspaper also adds that the Bulgarian tribes in the region did not stop the progress of ‘Hellenism’. In this point, the narrative of otherness towards Bulgarians forced to a new perception of national and religious membership that confused all the existing Weltanschauung.  

After the official declaration of Bulgarian church by the Sultan, there were articles which regularly proposed alternative solutions for the Question. In one editorial article, the author acknowledged, in a diplomatic manner, its appreciation for the “paternal provision” of Imperial government and the efforts of solving the Bulgarian Question at the same time he warned that: “the ancient right of Orthodox people’ that is under protection of Sultan since Mehmed II cannot be violated […] and the Eastern church has history of nineteen centuries, for this reason it should not fragment into

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87 “Lexeis tines peri Voulgarikou Zitimatos” [Some words for the Bulgarian Question], Konstantinoupolis, June 23, 1869.
pieces”. Similarly, the author showed the Patriarchate as a father institution consented to recognize autonomous (autocephalous) churches by country or area as Greece, Russia and Alexandria but not by nation. He also discussed the frustration about the name ‘Greek Church’ which sometimes was given to the Patriarchate and explained that had only attributed to the fathers of Church since its foundation. Remarkably, *Konstantinoupolis* advised to stop the national division and to work harder to stay together by questioning the problem: “What if all the ethnic groups demand a different church or if the Greeks demand a church”. The rhetoric question here with all its irony acts as a sort of re-legitimation mechanism by trying to persuade that the Church would stick to the status quo. 88

Evidently, the multiplicity of terms can only guide to a serious controversy of the former ‘people of Anatolia’ and the latter conflict of ‘Bulgarian’ versus ‘Greek’. In fact, authors insistently tried to keep mentioning the ecumenic character and also underline the importance of Greek language as a lingua sacra not as a tool of assimilation. It can be said that this duality serves two different myth inventions produced by the Greek Orthodox elites at that time. The first one saw the institution of Church per se as continuity from Byzantine emperors to Ottoman rulers with the ‘nomimos arxin’ legitimate power and the ‘pronomia’ the privileges that were guaranteed by Sultans. In this narrative the word ‘Hellenic’ replaced essentially with the word ‘Graikikos’ that connotates exclusively the Greek population under the Ottoman rule, to demonstrate the exceptional character of the Orthodox Christians as the successor people of the Eastern Roman Empire and as fundamental consisting part of Anatolia. The second myth came to complete the

modern requirement for an identity especially one that would correspond to the ‘nationalizing’
process that started with the Tanzimat reforms.

The ‘omogeneis’ kinship understanding began with the protection and demarcation of the ‘loyal’
to Patriarchate Greek-Orthodox population in the time that the main concern in the Bulgarian
Question was the categorization of the provinces as ethnoreligious ‘Bulgarian’. In the editorial
article with the title ‘Bulgarian Provinces’ the debate of national principle in the provinces of
Bulgaria, Macedonia and Thrace introduced another aspect of the critical question: Who is the
Ottoman Greek? The author argued that there was no alternative to the respect and preservation of
ethnic groups without the authority of Patriarchate. He literally asked who guaranteed that the
Bulgarian church would respect the ethnic groups and would not assimilate the Greeks. In the same
fashion, the author disputed the national dimension of the Bulgarian Church since there was not
any definition of who was member of that ‘national’ communion: “What would happen with the
Bulgarians in the above provinces that spoke the Greek language? Someone would say that they
were not Greek-Orthodox and it happened for them accidentally to speak Greek”. According to
the author, Turkey should have accepted that the high decree – Decree for Bulgarian Church– was
not the method to respect the national principle since it functioned as a masque of religious
warfare.89 Furthermore, Konstantinoupolis compared Islam with Orthodoxy and illustrated as
similarities the existence of many ethnic groups under one religious order. This could not go
without attention since Greek Orthodox elites were aware that the Ottoman Empire was till that
time only with slight majority inhabited by Muslims. With this in mind, the references to ‘people
of Anatolia’ may come to negotiate this specific balance of power. Konstantinoupolis continued
with exemplifying the argument of one and only ethnoreligious order and the other empires and

89 “Ai Voulgarikai Eparxiai” [Bulgarian Provinces], Konstantinoupolis, March 21, 1870.
nation-states in 19th century Europe were used as an example to explain why spiritually second religious order in the Ottoman Empire could not be ‘rational’ measure. Lastly, the author discredited once more Bulgarians this time by calling them as the ‘Wahhabi of Rumeli’ (Balkans).90

Besides to the intra-imperial understanding of the Ottoman Greek, in the columns of newspaper there was news for the Greek Kingdom periodically with high criticism for its bad administration. The author frequently stated that Greek nation-state was not the whole nation and the only solution to the Eastern Question and particularly he thought that the solution for the Christians of the Empire would come with the declaration of political equality together with liberty and, as final plan, the federalization of the country.91 Therefore, Konstantinoupolis obeyed to the ideology of Patriarchate and turned down the irredentist plan of Megali Idea. The ‘national’ awareness in this step began only in distance to the Greek nation-state and with main reference point to the constant criticism of Bulgarians who broke the ecumenic project for all Ottoman Christians. This proto-national conflict drove the Patriarchate to re-consider its position for the ‘people of Anatolia’ and re-conceptualize the Rum millet.

Afterwards, in 1872, the realization of the Ottoman Greek identity occurred from the pages of the newspaper in more concrete way. On May 15, Konstantinoupolis published an article of Patriarch Anthimus in which the words “ecclesiastic and national interests” appeared three times.92 Another

90 “Voulgariko Zitima”, Konstantinoupolis, December 14, 1870.
91 “Ellas”, Konstantinoupolis, May 2, 1870; “Pou Egkeitai I Alithini Dunami tis Tourkias” [Where the true power in Turkey stands], Konstantinoupolis, September 27, 1871.
article mentioned that “whoever baptizes in the name of Jesus is part of the nation and whoever does not accept the Holy spirit or shows Voltairean indifference should be excommunicated from it”. Additionally, the author pointed out that secular interests were mutual with the religious one and the Church had been exhausted with the latest ‘ethnophyletic’ activities. He added that “we should take lessons from what happened, and we should focus on the glory of civilization”. The Ottoman tradition of ethnoreligious communities was, as it can be seen, much deep in the core of the Ottoman Greek identity.

Significantly, in another article, *Konstantinoupolis* took attitude against the Ottoman government by saying that: “The imperial government interfered to an ecclesiastical issue and turned it to political and now threats the Patriarch with removal, our privileges inherited from Glorious Mehmed II who knew Greek and helped ‘our nation’ […] our church considers him ‘Graikos’ (Greek) emperor as well […] Grand vizier should reassure us that there is no plan to deprive us from our rights and there is not any intention to provoke the disintegration of the Eastern Church […] for the felicity of Anatolia we should show to the West that State and Church cooperate.” It can be said that Bulgarian Schism created an atmosphere of fear for the Greek Orthodox elites since they were frightened that the privileges of Rum millet could disappear. Consequently, the ‘national perception’ developed in parallel with the re-negotiation of the political position of Church in the power system of Empire.

In the meantime, more editorial articles against the actions of the Russian Empire showed up in the aftermath of schism. Authors alerted the Mixed Council of community and the imperial

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93 “Neoi Thrasulloi”, *Konstantinoupolis*, June 16, 1872.
94 “Voulgariko Sxisma kai Autokratoriki Kuvernisi”, *Konstantinoupolis*, May 19, 1872.
95 “Eswterika”, *Konstantinoupolis*, August 4, 1872.
government for the efforts of Russians due to their increased activities in some monasteries of Mount Athos and also their attempt to interfere in Bulgarian Question under the ideology of Panslavism.96 Seemingly, Konstantinoupolis practiced opposition and pressure to the community leaders and the Patriarch himself by reminding his words which he said that he would be the Patriarch to solve the Bulgarian issue. Likewise strongly inspired from the spirit of Tanzimat, they pointed that the destiny of Ottoman Greek nation was in the hand of the Mixed Council and the Holy Synod obliged to understand the General Regulations.97 In this frame, the fact that Patriarch Anthimus was forced to resign after his ‘unsuccessful’ attempt for dealing with the schism shows the power that newspapers started to have in this period and the further involvement in the shaping of the public sphere. This also indicates that the ‘national’ activism developed a dimension also out of the high echelons of church and the members of community actively try to participate in the ‘vasana’ torments of nation.

Another important topic that proves this attitude in 1872 was the educational affairs and according to authors “education was the national nectar”. The article “Public Education in Anatolia” included an insight that the schools would cultivate the national feeling, for this reason by acting more progressive than its time Konstantinoupolis supported that the attendance to school should have been obligatory. Additionally, it instructed for a better secondary education that would build the basis for the future and a ‘national education’ that should have been worthy of our ancient culture.98

97 “Patriarxika”, Konstantinoupolis, July 12, 1872.
During this period, a change can be observed to the display of news from Greek state, the journalists started to devote more space in the second or third page of newspaper for news related to the political developments in the Greek Kingdom. Regardless this shift, the position of writers stays similar: “Greece suffers from the same problem with our country ‘Anatolia’, we need more -constitutional- reforms and better administration.” In tandem with the news for Greece, the editorial articles were focus more and more on the governmental changes in the capital of the Empire. For instance, on August 7, an article with the title “New Grand vizier” provided the summary of the life of Midhat Pasha who was from the few people, according to author, that could implement the radical reforms for the coveted ‘Europeanization of the Ottoman state.’ In another article that placed in the column of internal news, with the title “Report to Grand vizier” the author informed that the Mixed Council asked for a meeting with the new vizier for whom the Council expressed to the Sultan its admiration for this appointment. It should be mentioned here that Konstantinoupolis was giving place to letters of thanks or announcements that were coming from the Greek Orthodox communities of provinces. On August 23, one article manifested the purpose of Istanbul based ‘Asia Minor’ Educational Association which, except from spreading the Greek language and education, as it was declared, to all the ‘homogeneis’ communities, was to collect information for the social economic status of the Ottoman Greek communities. On the other hand, on August 8, there was a response editorial article tried to explain that even though the Ottoman Greek of provinces did not have the right of representation in the Mixed Council – which

99 “O Neos Megas Vezyr”, Konstantinoupolis, August 7, 1872.

100 “Anafora Pros to M. Vezuri”, Konstantinoupolis, August 14, 1872.

it started to be named emphatically National Council- their complaints about the role of Patriarch and the Holy Synod were taken seriously.\textsuperscript{102}

To sum up, \textit{Konstantinoupolis} from 1869 to 1872 found the Greek Orthodox community in a formative process. Having in mind that the development of press was in its initial phase, the concept of nationhood is only discernable in its specific context. Markedly, the authors of the newspaper used quite inclusive terminology to cover all the Ottoman Christians when they were referring to people of Anatolia. This strong emphasis on Anatolia can also indicate the primary stage of imperial integration of the subjects or the effort to highlight the native character of Greek-Orthodox population. The ethnic adjectives are omnipresent for all the linguistic communities nevertheless the utilization demonstrates a divergent understanding from what someone could think in the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The word ‘Ottoman’ was something dedicated to Muslims without any distinct connotation, simultaneously the word ‘Greek’ was not used only for the Greek people of Kingdom. Moving from this point of view, the Bulgarian Schism certainly created a unique momentum for the leadership of Rum millet, it obliged to redefine clearly its relationship with the Greek culture and to determine the population that can -or, not- infuse the ‘new spirit’. In the end, it can be said that we are in front of the transition from the Ottoman Greek Orthodox -Rum- to Ottoman Greek.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Konstantinoupolis} August 8, 1872.
3.2. Thraki – ekdidomeni kath’ekasti (1876-1877)

The opening of a newspaper with new name was in some way a process to overpass a long-term closedown. The main reason of this closure was the alleged aggressive attitude of Konstantinoupolis towards the Bulgarian issue. Nevertheless, one of the supportive voices of modernization of the Empire inherited its writing style to Thraki since it also maintained the strong attachment to the reforms. Throughout 1876, there were several uprisings occurred in the European part of the Empire and they increased the suspicion between the Ottoman government and the Ottoman Christians.

On July 26, Thraki hosted a provocative article which was published in Salonica from a newspaper called Zaman and accused the [Ottoman] Greeks who were preparing to revolt against the authorities.103 One of the characteristic phrases that the newspaper used to insult the Ottoman Greeks and to increase the mistrust on them was: “Greeks, the eternal trouble makers of Anatolia”. The authors of Thraki replied by reminding that the enemy of state was Russia and Panslavism along with the underline that the Greeks, as one of the cohabitant people of the Ottoman state, had worked for the progress of the Empire and their main aim was the education of the Ottoman Greek ‘nation’. In next paragraph, Thraki stated that: “This accusation cannot be accepted, if there is problem with the Greek Kingdom, we should clarify that indeed we are from the same ‘race’ with the Greek people and we never tried to hide it. Greeks of that Kingdom are free to work for their destiny as we the Greeks of ‘Turkey’ who originated in the land of Anatolia and live under the excellency of Sultan Murad V”.104 Thraki also replied to Zaman that the fanaticism and the

103 Thraki, July 26, 1876.
104 Thraki, July 26, 1876.
regressive ideas that the newspaper represented could not stop the ‘patriotism’ of the Ottoman Greeks. However, in the following lines, *Thraki* tried to advise the Ottoman press not to participate in journalist fight with the Greek Kingdom’s newspapers since the rumors which were being generated by their articles along with their nationalist rage were only aiming to harm the ‘fraternal’ and ‘harmonic’ cohabitation in the Empire. Additionally, it warned the president of the Greek Letters Association to stop ‘evangelize’ the Greek irredentism in province of [Ottoman] Macedonia.105 Subtle responses of *Thraki* as the above could be found in the front pages of the newspaper, this shows openly that the newspaper was expressing the voice and the political views of one share of the Greek community who was loyal to the Ottoman state.

Another controversy that reflected and ended up as a debate in the pages of *Thraki* was the ‘Circassian settlements’ in the borders between the Greek Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire. According to the news that *Thraki* presented through the Athenian newspapers, the Circassian settlements were planned to stop the potential ‘expansion’ of Greece. The Circassians, who were described as a wild mountainous tribe, was a hot topic for the Ottoman Greek community as well since they were also appalled by the idea of demographic change of the so called ‘Greek’ provinces of the Empire.106 The extensive cover of this subject included, except from the apprehension of Athenian newspapers, also the Ottoman government’s official responses. When, according to the correspondence, Greece started to threat that the rumor -or, plan- of Circassian settlements might increase the ‘resisting’ tension in other places of the Empire like Crete, *Thraki*, downplayed without delay the scenarios and took the responsibility to investigate the validity and the intention

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105 *Thraki*, July 26, 1876.
of the Ottoman government. Similarly, during the Balkan uprisings in 1876, the foreign policy of Greece was in the main agenda of Thraki. Transferring news without commenting on them was a method to spy out the land for the possibility of Greece entering in a conflict with the Empire, an issue that was quite worrying for the newspaper. Explicitly, it can be also seen that the publication even of a simple article respecting the relations of the two countries could take immediately great dimension. Therefore, Thraki had a dual role: On one side, firefighting wrong news that could damage its interests and, on the other side, searching for the argument that fit closer the position of the community. Based on this in-between stance, it can be assumed, that the Ottoman Greek identity, as it was conceived by Thraki apparently stayed on the surface in which the imperial environment permitted and escaped from entrapping in a hardline approach.

On September 11, the editorial article came out with an open letter of the Serbian nationalist leaders from Herzegovina who were calling the English people to understand the ‘pain’ of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The anti-Turkish argumentation of the original article was not counterbalanced with any positive one; on the contrary, Thraki showed an unexpected compassion to the ‘drama’ of Christian people in Herzegovina which was in parallel comparison with the ‘drama’ of Cretan Christians. The expressed repulsion to the English government that supported the Ottoman Empire in the suppression of these revolts stressed in every sentence. In comparison to that, on September 18, an English foreign policy analysis described that the inadequate administration and the religious character of the conflict in European parts of the Empire downgraded the place of Christians. However, it turned to the assumption that dissolution of the

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107 “Exwteriki Politiki tis Ellados”, Thraki, August 5, 1876; “Exwteriki Politiki tis Ellados”, Thraki, August 8, 1876.

108 Thraki, September 11, 1876.
Empire was not the solution by mentioning that: “The problem in Empire is between the ‘races’ since it is not homogenous […] The solution of the Eastern Question cannot come by pushing the Turks in Asia […] Let’s understand the intervention of Europeans is exclusively philanthropic.” Notably, the main reason of reproducing articles as the above, can be related to a hinted grievance about the ‘disputed’ promises of Tanzimat that the Ottoman Christians expected. The reference to religion appeared to be a way to emphasize the solidarity of all Ottoman Christians and aimed intentionally to create pressure for more reforms.

The attitude of Thraki to publish articles straightforwardly controversial for the interests of the Ottoman state let the newspaper to be fined with closure of a month. As a result, the new publishing viewpoint of newspaper changed into more imperial tolerant lines and focused on manifestation of an unusual patriotism. On September 12, Thraki informed the Ottoman Greeks that the new Sultan Abdulhamid II had the improvement of ‘their’ country in the center of his policy and subsequently analyzed some points of the new imperial decree. Thus, according to the newspaper the fellow Ottomans should have expected prosperity and justice, however, the analysis coupled with some observations such as: “If only the implementation of rule of law achieved earlier, we did not have to make a new imperial decree”. Further, Thraki also spotted that the new efforts to promote individual rights and enhance the educational system of the Empire would be the beginning for a period of stability. Lastly, it can be marked an apotheosis of the Sultan as a modality of loyalty: “Let’s hope that the pacifist voice of the new Sultan will reach the hearts of all the people of Anatolia”.

Moving from this point it can be seen that the development of the new conditions and the demonstration of loyalty to the state were accompanied by the emergence

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109 Thraki, September 18, 1876.
110 Thraki, September 12, 1876.
of a new phraseology as well. Therefore, together with the national adjectives or the religious references there was a growing tendency for usage of words like ‘Ottoman nations’. 111

After the suppression of the revolts in the Balkan followed the Conference in Istanbul (1876) that aimed at providing protection to the Ottoman Christians and guarantee that the reforms in the Ottoman Empire would continue. Nevertheless, the political confrontation of British and Russian Empires for the future of the Ottoman in combination with their expansion plans shadowed the discussions. The main arrangement of the Conference concentrated on the predicament of Bulgarians especially after the atrocities that Ottoman committed, and which shocked the European public.

Based on the above agreement there was provision for two autonomous Bulgarian provinces. The occasion of two Bulgarian provinces in the place of the considered ‘Greek’ provinces panicked the authorities of the Ottoman Greek community. On December 11, Thraki notified that Patriarchate collected reports and was ready to complain about the violation of the ‘Greek’ rights in the provinces of Macedonia and Thrace that were under danger of ‘Slav-Bulgarian’ intrigues. 112 Likewise, Thraki added that: “We are not ready to accept this Slavic plan, after the sufferings in Anatolia a new turmoil is coming for the Greeks […] The Greek populations of these provinces are aware of their national consciousness, many local communities of the region sent reports to Patriarchate and rejected the theories of autonomous Bulgaria […] The Patriarchate and the National Council will submit to the government its objections as the history and the traditions of ‘our nation’ worth it”. Additional to that Thraki also included the topos of catastrophe as a nation-building narrative: “The ‘God of Hellenes’ will advocate for the right of the people […] The

111 “O Othwmanikos Typos peri tou Fylladiou tou Gladstonos”, Thraki, September 20, 1876.

112 “To Pneuma ton en Tourkia Ellinikwn Eparxiwn”, Thraki, December 11, 1876.
communities of Filipoupolis (Plovdiv) are already facing the ‘fear of Bulgarization’ […] whoever usurps the right of the Orthodox Greeks should know that we will demand our legitimate right and we will show what the freedom and humanism that our culture taught them, are.”

In some other articles, the discourse of nation continues with references to other cases from Europe by directly targeting the enemies: “We will not let the Greeks of Filipoupolis to have the destiny of Polish and Circassians […] Panslavism will not transform the ‘ancient Greek provinces’ to a Russian outpost […] The Slavic policy pressed down the heroes of Eastern rebirth”. In similar fashion goes the pleas to the government: “We listen the wish of the nation and we want the imperial government not to destroy its future, our nation always supports the peace and the reforms”. As it can be noticed, the narrative of nation becomes stronger and starts to resemble the official one of the Greek state from which it copies the ancient tradition narrative, which was missing from the post-Byzantine imagination of nation, as a stronger factor for fabricating an Ottoman Greek consciousness. Less frequent usage or the completely absence of any Christian eschatological symbolism as national narrative is also equally interesting. It is a fact that the parallel development of a Greek national ideology of Ottoman face which focuses on people of Anatolia.

After the declaration of Ottoman Constitution in December 1876 which presumably was an act of showing a good will and in the eve of the second phase of the Balkan crisis that caused evidently the Russo-Ottoman war, the tensions brought out new dilemmas for the Ottoman Greek

113 “To Pneuma ton en Tourkia Ellinikwn Eparxiwn”, Thraki, December 11, 1876; “To Pneuma ton en Tourkia Ellinikwn Eparxiwn”, Thraki, December 14, 1876.
114 “Eswterika – Oi Ellines kai Thraki”, Thraki, December 12, 1876; “Eswterika – Errei to Dikaio”, Thraki, December 23, 1876

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community. The pages of *Thraki* were filled with news gave attention to the interests of the community, on March 3 in the article “Upomnima tis Ellinikis Kuvernisews” (Memorandum of Greek government) the newspaper commented the reaction of the Greek Kingdom to the plan of Bulgarian autonomy.\(^{115}\) According to the article, the Greek government turned its attention to the ‘Greek’ subjects of the Sultan not because they wanted to take the [Ottoman] Greeks under their protection but only just they wanted to prevent the consequences which the ‘Greek nations’ of Empire might face. Greece as kinship and co-religionist nation asked justice to be implemented in the [Ottoman] ‘Greek’ provinces which they had harsh conditions in the recent past. Together with this, *Thraki* acknowledged its gratitude to the King of Greeks that helps the people of Anatolia and warned that the Greek government should have obeyed the policies of Great Powers.\(^{116}\)

From another perspective, *Thraki* covered the public display of the Grand vizier’s confidential letter to the province of Edirne which was inhabited by a great number of the Ottoman Greeks. The article noted in rather friendly manner that: “[Ottoman] Greeks and ‘Turks’ as the constituent people of the Empire have a common interest to protect the state against Panslavism which acts against our ‘national’ existence”.\(^{117}\) In the same frame of mind, on March 13, the newspaper also covered the meeting of the Ottoman ambassador Fotiadi Bey, who was Ottoman Greek, prior to his appointment in Greek Kingdom, and the Sultan. Furthermore, in the same page, it praised the compassionate character of the Sultan Abdulhamid after the visiting of another important figure of the Ottoman Greek community, Christaki Efendi Zografos, who was among the great donors to

\(^{115}\) “Upomnima tis Ellinikis Kuvernisews”, *Thraki*, March 3, 1877.

\(^{116}\) “Upomnima tis Ellinikis Kuvernisews”, *Thraki*, March 3, 1877.

\(^{117}\) “Empisteutiki Egkuklios Vezourou”, *Thraki*, March 1, 1877
the Ottoman army during the war.\textsuperscript{118} The news and the contents of the news disclose, as it can be observed, a new rapprochement of the Ottoman Greek community by keeping in the same time the regular subtle distance. Markedly, the worship of Sultan takes a form of a new ritual to the expression of loyalty. Some of devotion moments that can be found in typical ‘wishes to Sultan’ columns were starting with “a ‘powerful King’ that shows father provision to his subjects” and moreover these wishes were even embedded to the Sunday’s congregations in an ‘Orthodox Christian’ divine right legitimation.\textsuperscript{119}

The friendly atmosphere, that \textit{Thraki} wanted to embrace, continued with an article titled “The Solution of the Eastern Question” in which the newspaper proposed the coalition of the ‘three main components’ of the Empire: Turkish, Greek and Armenian. Based on it, \textit{Thraki} described what considered as the ‘pleasant’ solution of the Eastern Question that would undermine the power of the ‘artificial products’ of Panslavism that: “The expectations that Serbia will be the ‘Piedmont’ of Illyrian continent was disapproved […] Who thinks that Bulgaria, a province, can be an independent country […] the future of small states that Panslavism wants to establish cannot be combined with liberalism. This is against ‘our’ -Turkish, Greek and Armenian- interests, this will vanquish the freedom from the Mediterranean”. And it was also surprisingly, added that: “Only Midhat Pasha realized the political importance of power sharing […] Turks have great military courage and know the art of governing why not the Greeks and Armenians, who have the diplomatic skills and whatever else the Turks lack of, participate in the administration of the

\textsuperscript{118} “I eis ton Soultano Parousiasi tou Fotiadi Bey” and “Episkepsi para ti M. to Soultano”, \textit{Thraki}, March 13, 1877

\textsuperscript{119} “Euxi Uper tou Soultanou imwn” \textit{Thraki}, May 24, 1877; “Euxaristiria pros ton Soultano” \textit{Thraki}, May 30, 1877.
Empire […] We should take Hungary as an example: The Magyarized Germans and Jews are in all the ministries, the Turks are like the Hungarians but the Hungarians know to accept the assistance when it is needed […] The ‘Greeks’ as the first of the Anatolian Christians should be ready for their patriotic mission”.\footnote{120} In this point, \textit{Thraki} expresses the idea of the Ottoman Greek elites, who knew the political arrangement of Austro-Hungarian monarchy and were in search of a similar model that could apply to the weak Ottoman Empire.

Notwithstanding, the optimist expectations of ‘Greeks’ met the disappointment in the first elections for the Ottoman parliament. The elections that were based on a system of a curia that was responsible to vote the candidates did not bring the desired results and put in risk the relations of ‘Greeks’ with the other groups of the Empire. In accordance to \textit{Thraki}, from the curia of 40 electors -20 Muslims and 20 non-Muslims-\footnote{121} that was responsible to vote for the ten places available for Istanbul province, only one ‘Greek’ managed to be elected.\footnote{122} Significantly, \textit{Thraki} discussed the improper behavior of a ‘Greek’ elector in the first phase of the elections to quit from the procedure due to his ‘national consciousness’ that by words he claimed that “did not allow him to see the destruction of ‘Greek people’”.

In the following paragraph, the newspaper disputed the procedure not only because of the fact that inside the ten places there were three Armenians who were proportionally less than Greeks in the capital of the Empire but because in respect with the results which Muslims voted preferably only for the other non-Muslims.\footnote{123} The results of the elections spread a dissatisfaction to the Greek

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{120} “I Lusi tou Anatolikou Zitimatos”, \textit{Thraki}, March 13, 1877.
\item \footnote{121} From them, 9 Greeks, 6 Armenians, 4 Jews and one ‘Western’
\item \footnote{122} “Eswterika – To Apotelesma twn Eklogwn tis Prwteousis”, \textit{Thraki}, March 2, 1877.
\item \footnote{123} “Eswterika – To Apotelesma twn Eklogwn tis Prwteousis”, \textit{Thraki}, March 2, 1877.
\end{itemize}
population of Istanbul who were only going to be represented by Sarakioti, a man that according to *Thraki* had great ‘Greek’ consciousness and respect to his ‘nation’. This incident was the reason for publishing many articles in the Ottoman Greek newspapers. The complaints were including comments such as: “How the most wealth, powerful and populous center of ‘Turkish Hellenism’ could elect only one member of parliament” or “Now Ignatyev can use this in the Europeans royal courts against the Empire […] The elections had to be based on the ‘nationality’ since the current regulation creates an unquestionable Muslim majority.” Meanwhile, a mutual article of all the Greek newspapers of Istanbul showed the political decision of the ‘Greeks’ by touching some of the most crucial points for the community: “This for the -Ottoman- Greek nation is humiliating from all of the aspects […] The promise of the political arrangement of 18th May 1876 gave ‘us’ hope and we showed respect to the government, especially we supported the ‘Turkish’ position in the Conference of Istanbul and the only benefiter was the Muslim sovereignty in Anatolia […] We called for a cooperation with Muslims against our great common threat -Panslavism- which offered us to destroy ‘Turkey’ and doubled the territory of current Greek Kingdom […] We faced persecutions and we became exhausted but we all the time see the interests of Anatolia and Europe”.

Equally important, the mutual article continued with a striking concluding part: “Unfortunately the elections happened under these circumstances, our fellow Muslim citizens exhibited ‘national arrogancy’ together with this disrespect by giving to the ‘Greeks’ a bad place in the parliament.

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124 “Eswterika – To Apotelesma twv Eklogwn tis Prwteuousis”, *Thraki*, March 2, 1877; “I Eklogi twv Vouleutwn Kwnstantinouopolis”, *Thraki*, March 5, 1877.

125 “Eswterika – To Apotelesma twv Eklogwn tis Prwteuousis”, *Thraki*, March 2, 1877; “I Eklogi twv Vouleutwn Kwnstantinouopolis”, *Thraki*, March 5, 1877.

126 “Dilwsis tou Ellinikou Typou”, *Thraki*, March 14, 1877.
Nevertheless, the ‘Greeks’ will accept their humble position in the parliament since it’s the first time the nation can express freely. The feeling of fellow Muslims in this serious moment should have been in cooperation with the ‘Greeks’ for the rebirth of Anatolia. [...] We come to this statement by honestly and consciously believing in our patriotism.” In one of the few declarations of the Ottoman Greek community as whole through a mutual article someone can see the understanding of nation and the position that ‘Greeks’ thought they have inside the Ottoman state.127

In the aftermath, Thraki published an article included correspondence from Athens about the issue of the ‘national’ representation of ‘Greeks’ in the Ottoman parliament and the attitude of the Greek Kingdom to the Russo-Ottoman war. According to Thraki, the “Melon” an Athenian newspaper stated that the ‘Greeks’ of Istanbul committed crimes against ‘Hellenism’ in contrast to the “Ora”, another newspaper from Athens, that praised the attitude of the Ottoman Greeks towards the national question of Hellenism and considered this political stance as the beginning of a great policy of Hellenism.128 “Melon” responded that: “What is this policy, the Turkification, the denial of language and religion [...] this Byzantine policy will make Hellenism disappear.” Last to this dialogue of the newspapers, “Ora” concluded that the ‘Greek minority’ along with its press protect the right of language with courage. The Thraki also questioned the above discussion with the following concluding words: “They have to tell us who protect the Greek language better, ‘our’ schools and associations or the ‘poor’ Athens. Do not be ungrateful!” 129

127 “Dilwsis tou Ellinikou Typou”, Thraki, March 14, 1877.
128 Thraki, May 9, 1877.
129 Thraki, May 9, 1877.
From the imperial public sphere outlook, the Ottoman Armenian newspaper “Masis” inquired the ethnic origin of ‘Greeks’ and wondered about the similarity between them and the Greeks of ‘Hellenic’ Kingdom by asking the question: “Should the Ottoman ‘Greek’ named as Greek?”

Moreover, Masis supported that the Empire had only religious communities without ‘races’ and suggested that all the elements of society in the name of Ottoman constitutionalism should have stayed ‘national’ indifferent. As a response, Thraki challenged the Armenians by asking: “All of these centuries Armenian meant only a religious doctrine but not any national connotation?”. Furthermore, Thraki stated that “The ‘Greeks as devout Orthodox Christians never misunderstand their ‘natural’, ‘racial’ and ‘historical’ name […] We think Armenian journalists cannot separate the Greeks of Turkey from those of Greek Kingdom”. Last but not least, the newspaper clearly underlined the way how the community members identified themselves as it is indicated in the following statement: “We do not deny that we are Ottoman subjects but in the same time we are also ‘Greek’ alike the German Austrians who are Germans and Austrian citizens […] The right to national self-existence is alienable so we believe that we are ‘good citizens’ of the Ottoman state and ‘good patriots’ of Anatolia.”

Given these points, the Ottoman Greeks from the process of identification transition, as it was depicted in the Konstantinoupolis, reached to the formation of, in a body, ‘Greek’ identity. The first phase of the imperial Greek identity construction was the boundary setting process by focusing on the interests of community along with primary steps of targeting the other, in this case once again the Bulgarians and Panslavism. However, the attitude of creating an ‘enemy’ overpassed the simple power conflict in the Ottoman governing system and extended to the level

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130 Thraki, March 27, 1877.
131 Thraki, March 27, 1877.
of national mobilization. The discourse of othering was, in parallel, a making process which shaped the subject and the space of community. Thus, the newspaper of Thraki contributed to the formation of the Ottoman Greek space in and out of the Empire. In the frame of this, with the contribution of the editorial articles, this space started to acquire specific characteristics and it can be said that the appearance of the Christian solidarity turned to a national one.

Notably, the territorial location of ‘Greek provinces’ and the connection of the origin of Greeks in a further chronological range with the ‘Ancient Greek culture’ galvanized the Ottoman Greek identity. In essence, the imperial level of this identity appeared with the expression of loyalty to the Sultan and the inception of Anatolia as fatherland. As the journalists of Thraki showed the belief to a common future and the denoted ‘rebirth’ of Anatolia served as a purpose for the community. Nevertheless, the quintessential moment of activation of the imperial Greek identity came evidently with the intersection of state and community’s interests, the political representation and the promise for a joint alliance with other groups of the Empire against a common external enemy. During this process in the pages of Thraki, the previous reference to Muslims or Turks as Ottomans diminished. In the end, for the trans-Greek nation the Ottoman Greek community defined itself as a national center which could claim the leadership of Hellenism.

**Conclusion**

The Greek national identity emerged in the Ottoman Empire was a distinctive and unique phenomenon. The formation and the development of the Greek identity focused exclusively on the foundation of Greek nation-state by neglecting the importance of rest of Greek-Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire together with other empires in Europe was under the
pressure and the threat of the national movements and for this reason the attempt to internalize the
national request of ethnic groups brought as a result, empires which, in a certain extent, functioned
as nation-states.

From another aspect, the realization of the ‘liberation of nations’ came with the establishment of
the first nation-states in European parts of the Ottoman Empire. The beginning of the dissolution
of the Empire motivated, to the same purposes, the entirely leadership of the -hibernated- ethnic
groups or some parts of the ethnoreligious groups – millet - such as in the case of the Greek
Orthodox population in Morea Peninsula. From this perspective, the emergence of the Greek
country-state which performed a new distinguishing narrative for the Greek Orthodox people tried
out to determinate the substance of Greek identity especially its development outside of the
imperial settings. However, the Orthodox belief that remained one of the main nationalization tools
combined uniformly together with a widespread new idea of Ancient Greece as the starting point
of the Greek nation.

The discussion of Greek identity, as it was developed from the viewpoint of Greece, inside and
outside the borders of the Empire commenced with Megali Idea. The plan was aiming to consider
all the Greek Orthodox used to live in the Ottoman Empire as kinship population that potentially
had to be united with the Greek state. The Megali idea which was an irredentist project of Greek
nationalism, proclaimed as priority policy.

Nevertheless, from the other side, after the 1848 uprisings which were the indicator of self-
determination based on national principle and the idea of freedom, empires became more flexible
to accommodate different groups in their state officialdom. A transition period found the Ottoman
Empire amidst reformation and threat of collapse. The change in the structure of the Empire
followed a radical shift in the relations with the subjects. The imperial identity of Ottomanism that
generated with the reforms was an effort to re-integrate Empire’s groups under a civil loyalty and a common belonging. In these circumstances, I showed that the construction of the Ottoman Greek identity was a different process of ‘nationalization’ under the Ottoman Imperial system.

To examine the perception of the Ottoman Greek community and its attitude towards Ottoman Empire and Greece, I analyzed the discourses that appeared through the articles of the two newspapers, *Konstantinoupolis* and *Thraki*, which were published in Istanbul. The analysis of the Ottoman Greek newspapers which should not be seen just under the simple label of Greek newspapers, aimed to set the space and the historical time of the Greek-Orthodox community and explained how the community in the center of Empire perceived its identity between 1869 and 1877. In other words, the objective was to restore the historical context and shed light to the Ottoman Greek public sphere of Istanbul in the 19th century.

Based on the analysis of the discourses in newspapers, the Ottoman Greeks conceived and showed themselves as a constituent part of the Empire by emphasizing their nativity as people of Anatolia. Their future orientation was mostly correlated with the future of empire and they had great concern about the role they could play inside the Empire. The analysis indicated that the higher the level of imperial integration the more the Ottoman Greek community acquires discern character from the Greeks of Greece, so it can be said ultimately that there is a different mode of national understanding.

This thesis was an attempt to approach the imperial identity perception of Greek Orthodox community. The future research on this topic should expand the time frame to include comparatively also the second constitutional period of Empire. Additionally, in order to have a greater picture for the non-Muslim communities and their identification strategy inside the
Ottoman state, a study should also investigate, for the same period, the development of Armenian and Jewish identity formations.

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