Far from Right: Pathways and Prevention to Lone Wolf Radicalization

By

Mitch Legato

Submitted to Central European University
School of Public Policy

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MA in Public Policy

Supervisor: Professor Nikolai Sitter

Budapest, Hungary

2019
Copyright notice

I, the undersigned Mitch Legato hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language. This is a true copy of the thesis, including final revisions.

Date: June 14, 2019

Name (printed letters): Mitch Legato

Signature: ..........................................................
Abstract

Terrorism in Europe and North America is increasingly being carried out by lone wolves. These individuals operate independently from terrorist groups and thus pose a problem for counterterrorism experts. To get a better idea of why lone wolves resort to terrorism this thesis examines the radicalization pathways that Timothy McVeigh and Anders Breivik took. By studying the two deadliest lone wolf attacks of the past three decades it is possible to see the route each individual took towards terrorism and a retrospective look at how these attacks could have been prevented or mitigated. By doing so this paper hopes identify weak links in the radicalization pathway that are susceptible to prevention and intervention of counter extremism programs. The paper concludes that in each case lone wolves develop slowly over a lifetime and as a result are vulnerable to interventions throughout the radicalization process, but this requires greater emphasis on local level outreach and engagement by civil society, not law enforcement.
Acknowledgments

First, I would like to thank my advisor Nick Sitter for helping me sift through ideas and for providing me the opportunity to write and learn about this subject. I would also like to thank my friends and family, especially my mother Teri for all her help during the last 25 years and Anya, Frauke, and Shurma for their friendship.
Table of Contents

Copyright notice............................................................................................................................................ i

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... ii

Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................................... iii

Table of Contents......................................................................................................................................... iv

Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 1

Theoretical framework ................................................................................................................................. 5
  Background on Terrorism............................................................................................................................. 5
    Definitions................................................................................................................................................ 5
    Terrorism ............................................................................................................................................... 5
    Lone Wolf Terrorism ............................................................................................................................. 9
    Extremism .......................................................................................................................................... 12
    Radicalization .................................................................................................................................... 14
    Countering Extremism .......................................................................................................................... 16
  Pathway to Terrorism: The Individual Radicalization Process ............................................................... 16
    The Sympathizer – Step 1 ..................................................................................................................... 18
    The Radical – Step 2 ............................................................................................................................. 20
    The Terrorist – Step 3 ........................................................................................................................... 21

Literature Review......................................................................................................................................... 24

Case Studies.................................................................................................................................................. 30
  Timothy McVeigh .................................................................................................................................... 30
    The Gun Sympathizer .......................................................................................................................... 30
    The Disgruntled Radical ....................................................................................................................... 34
    The Militant Terrorist .......................................................................................................................... 37
  Anders Breivik .......................................................................................................................................... 40
    The Reclusive Sympathizer ............................................................................................................... 40
    The Online Radical ............................................................................................................................ 41
    The Loner Terrorist ............................................................................................................................. 43

Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................... 46

Bibliography.................................................................................................................................................. 48
Introduction

The world is still full of inquisitors and heretics, liars and those lied to, terrorists and the terrorized. There is still someone dying at Thermopylae, someone drinking a glass of hemlock, someone crossing the Rubicon, someone drawing up a proscription list. And nothing suggests that these things will stop repeating themselves (Michnik 2007, 68).

Terrorism, as part of history, repeats itself. The Ku Klux Klan was reborn twice (Gordon 2017); after the failure of the Third Reich, neo-Nazi groups appeared across the United States and Europe (Tenold 2018). Such groupings resurface time and again, and with them the same old fears, arguments and pretexts are reproduced: A conspiracy theorist walks into a synagogue to fight against a fictitious New World Order (Roose 2018); white nationalists create narratives of defending their American or European homeland against foreign invaders, viewing themselves as one-man crusaders retaking their ‘Holy Land’ from Saladin (Hoffman 2019b); an assassin apocryphally shouts “sic semper tyrannis”¹ then shoots US President Lincoln, and over a century later, a man is arrested with the same phrase on his t-shirt the day he blows up a federal building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people (Cohen 2010, Jameson 2013). Sixteen years later, a terrorist fearful of multiculturalism in Norway uses explosives similar to those used in the Oklahoma City bombing to mark the beginning of a rampage that would leave 77 dead (Juergensmeyer 2011).

For terrorists like these, violence is a means to an end, the only recourse available to show dissatisfaction with the current societal system and thereby push for change.² Throughout history, countless individuals and groups have walked analogous paths to political violence, using similar means of communication, recruitment and warfare. While there are vast chasms between these groups in terms of their ideologies, motives and tactics, what remains the same...

---

¹ Latin for “thus always to tyrants”, the account of John Wilkes Booth shouting this prior to shooting Lincoln comes from his own diary, though no other witnesses have corroborated this account (Kauffman 2007).
² The continuation of terrorist attacks implies a belief that these tactics will work. However, studies suggest that nonviolent movements are twice as likely to succeed than violent ones (Hedges 2015, 113).
is that they all reached the conclusion that “an act of terror is the best idea they can think of to achieve their goals” (Laqueur and Wall 2018, 31).

However, acts of terror violent acts were neither spontaneous, nor produced in a vacuum independent of society, but rather built on a lifetime of observing how violence has enacted change. Knowing that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”, terrorists have seen the efficacy of violence time and again (Tse-Tung 1960, 13). Israel was born from the violence of Irgun, proving that terrorism can lead to state formation – a development which has plagued Israel for decades as it remains embroiled in conflict with Hamas (Satloff 2006). Infighting and scandals in the KKK led to the creation of dozens of offshoot organizations seeking to establish white supremacy in America (McAndrew 2017). Antisemitism remains pervasive in society and a focus of anger from both the white power movement and Islamic extremists (Chaliand and Blin 2007). Jihadists still seek “revenge for the wrongs the West had supposedly inflicted on Muslims stretching back to the Crusades” (Boot 2013, 523). Each group fights what they see as an eternal struggle against their foe, believing that one day their vision of the future will become a reality.

As the world becomes more globalized, surveilled, and securitized, groups and individuals are increasingly adapting their use of violence in order to reach their vision. Airplane hijackings like those of the 1960s and 1970s by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine are no longer feasible today given tightened airport security (Szyliowicz and Zamparini 2018). Instead, novel approaches have been developed, drawing on the successes and failures of past attacks (Forsyth 2006, Shane 2017). As part of this development, terrorist attacks are losing the character of “coordinated, carefully plotted events” like those of 9/11 and are increasingly based on “a helter-skelter approach where lone wolves use low-tech means to attack soft targets” (Halsey III 2018). In the last three decades there has been an increase in lone wolf terrorism in both the United States and Europe (Spaaij 2010). Respective attacks often do not
come from abroad but from “homegrown extremists [who] develop their plots in secret” (Straub, Zeunik and Gorban 2017, 6) – two such cases are American Timothy McVeigh and Norwegian Anders Breivik, who used their independence and anonymity to elude authorities (Spaaij 2012).

This creates problems in counterterrorism, as deterring “a single person motivated by a cause and a desire to kill” with no prior proclivity or association with terrorism is no easy task (Pitcavage 2015, 1656). The prevention of attacks is further complicated by the often-short gestation period, with some attackers seemingly appearing out of nowhere (Hoffman 2019a, Hoffman 2019b). Furthermore, even if there is information on the perpetrator, it is often lost in the haystack of intelligence gathered by domestic security agencies. Finally, it is a challenge to prevent attacks without erasing individual freedoms (UK Home Department 2018, 8). In sum, the fact that lone wolf attacks tend to be both sporadic and seemingly random means that even states with robust counterterrorism programs will be prone to attacks (Phillips 2017).

Against this backdrop, a deeper understanding of this rising form of terrorism is indispensable. To prevent attacks, it is particularly crucial to explore the pathways of individuals becoming lone wolf terrorists. This includes understanding their motives and ways of “adopting an extremist ideology, thinking about engaging in violence, acquiring the necessary materials and/or training, and finally committing the offense” (Gill, Horgan and Deckert 2014). Put simply, how and why do individuals resort to terrorism, what does the path of radicalization look like, and which sections in this pathway are susceptible to intervention to weaken the chances of violent extremism? This paper will address these questions by examining the cases of Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and Anders Breivik whose attacks in Norway included a bombing outside the prime minister’s office which killed 8 and a shooting on an island killing 69. These attacks constitute the two
most deadly right-wing lone wolf terrorists in the past three decades and provide a unique lens from which to view the change processes of radicalization. Additionally, because of the similarities in both their attacks and ideology, these cases highlight the persistent problems presented to counterterrorism agencies in preventing lone wolf attacks.

The theoretical background of terrorism and the radicalization process will be presented first. This will be followed by a literature review of existing studies into the subject. It will then move into a discussion on the background of McVeigh and Breivik while identifying the pathways which these individuals took to violent extremism and possible methods of intervention. By examining the paths to radicalization, it is possible to identify weak links during the lead up to previous attacks, including the radicalization and organizational components. Thus, this paper contributes to providing policy makers and government officials with a better understanding of how to prevent or counter lone wolf radicalization and violence in the future.
Theoretical framework

[The terrorist] is noble, terrible, irresistibly fascinating, for he combines in himself the two sublimities of human grandeur: the martyr and the hero. And if the people, ill-counselled, say to him ‘Be a slave,’ he will exclaim ‘No;’ ... certain that justice will be rendered to him in his tomb. Such is the terrorist (Stepniak 1883, 42)

Background on Terrorism
McVeigh, a disgruntled United States army veteran, becomes responsible for the deadliest terrorist attack in modern America prior to 9/11 after detonating a truck laden with explosives next to a federal building in Oklahoma City. Breivik, a disillusioned Norwegian fed up with multiculturalism, kills 77 people, many of them young adults and children, while pretending to be a police officer (Gullestad 2017). Despite their different rationale and routes, the crux of these attacks’ terrorism remains the same – the communication of grievances which seeks to both frighten individuals into complacency and spur a broader movement into action (Huff and Kertzer 2017). McVeigh hoped to reduce the tyrannical US government to rubble, Breivik hoped to prevent multiculturalism in Norway and Europe. And while both attacks seem to fail, each attacker indicated a belief that they would become martyrs for their cause in subsequent decades (Juergensmeyer 2003, Libell 2016).

Before moving forward to further explore the motives and pathways of these lone wolf actors, the theoretical foundation of this study will be presented. This includes explicated definitions of key terms such as terrorism, lone wolf terrorism, extremism and radicalization, as well as a more complete background on the radicalization process.

Definitions

Terrorism

The term terrorist originates from the use of violence against civilians during the Reign of Terror in 1790s France which “laid the foundation for revolutionary terrorism and inspired the first use of the word ‘terrorist’” (Law 2016, 7). Since the 18th century, the definition of
the term has been fiercely debated amongst governments, scholars, and organizations (Chakravorti 1994, Cronin 2015, Juergensmeyer 2013, Schmid 2004, Teichman 1989). Most succinctly, terrorism can be defined as “violence – or… the threat of violence – used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim” (Hoffman 2006, 2). This definition emphasizes the central role of violence for political means, a component of terrorism on which there is a general consensus in terrorism studies. Similar suitable definitions are suggested by Laqueur and Wall (2018), for whom the “key facet[of terrorism] is the use of violence and the fear generated from it to force some sort of political change within a society” (118), and Berger (2018) who saw terrorism as “public violence targeting noncombatants, carried out by nongovernmental individuals or groups, in order to advance a political or ideological goal or amplify a political or ideological message” (Location 1523-1525).

In particular, the use or threat of violence upon indiscriminate populations is an important component of terrorism – in terrorist attacks, there is often a deliberate “targeting of civilians” rather than a focus on security forces for the “purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause” (Richardson 2006, 8, Staniforth, Ratcliffe and Rabenstein 2010, 5). By carrying out an attack, a terrorist seeks to both damage the target group but to also “create a psychological effect through these acts” (Hutchinson 1972, 385). The attacks on abortion providers killed few but spread a vast amount of fear throughout a segment of society. The goal of this widespread fear is to lead to a change such as criminalizing abortions, the overthrowing of the federal government, reducing the number of non-white immigrants allowed in a country, or any multitude of goals terrorist individuals and organizations have (Fromkin 1975).

---

3 Location refers to the position of the quote in a Kindle eBook reader and is used when page numbers are not available. Hereafter referred to as loc.
For as long as there has been political violence there have been attempts to assess the reasons for and facets of respective behavior. Starting with ancient civilizations there was a distinction between the use of terror as a tool of war versus terrorism, which was seen as “an illegitimate weapon used by immoral agents” (Law 2016, 14). This created the boundaries for acceptable and unacceptable violence, which in modern ages was dictated by the state. Setting this boundary, the state had “a claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber 2009, 154). However, “since the state defines crime, the question arises whether states can commit crimes” just like individuals or groups (Schmid 2004, 198). This is a thorny question, since states throughout history have used violence to reach political goals – from the genocide of Native Americans across the US to Stalin’s Siberian Gulags – which has created definitional problems in terrorism (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014, Solzhenitsyn 1974). Speaking to Alexander the Great, a pirate summarized this paradox, quipping that since he “[molests the world] with a little ship, I am called a pirate. You do it with a great fleet and are called an emperor” (Law 2016, 34). Thus, it may be argued that states can indeed be called terrorists. However, this is conceptually unhelpful because following this perception, nearly every state in existence would be a terrorist (Wight 2018). Furthermore, legally speaking, the state has “unlimited authority and jurisdiction over all areas of life, even to the extent of totalitarian control within its area of domestic sovereignty” (Sproat 1997, 142).

Thus, the term terrorism focuses on non-governmental actors. Terrorism in this way is a tactic for “the weak aimed at exploiting chinks in the armor in of the more powerful” (Cronin 2009, 198). Because of the power imbalance between terrorists and the state, they cannot attack it head-to-head and instead must resort to attacking soft targets which will cause the most political, symbolical, or economical damage. As a result, terrorism can be viewed as an “act” of violence [that] is also an act of communication” (Houen 2002, 16). Cronin (2009)
identified “three strategic actors” in terrorist campaigns – “the group, the government, and the audience”, highlighting the importance of the communicative act in terrorism (7). From attacks on the Internal Revenue Service or police officers by sovereign citizens to attacks on mosques and synagogues – without a message these would just be random acts of violence or personal grudges being settled. The communicative political motive is what separates terrorism from random crime or even some assassinations (Berger 2018).

Terrorism should not be confused with other acts of violence that may appear similar at first sight but are based on different motivations. Some acts are directed against political actors but lack political motivation nonetheless. For example, attacks may be carried out by individuals with serious mental health issues who cannot be considered terrorists. This includes the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan by John Hinkley Jr. who tried to kill Reagan in order to impress the actress Jodie Foster, and the troubled Charles Guiteau who shot and killed US President James Garfield after believing he had been overlooked by Garfield for political positions (Byman 2011, Millard 2011). Moreover, terrorism should not be confused with organized crime, despite some similarities. The main difference between the two forms of violence is that terrorists are “ideologically or politically motivated” rather than profit driven – one would be hard pressed to find a Mafioso willing to carry out a suicide bombing (Schmid 2011, 66).

Debates surrounding definitions of terrorism are further fueled by disagreements regarding the scope and range of the term. This is particularly true for the blurred lines between the idea of terrorism and other concepts like guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and state terrorism. The clearest difference is the scale at which guerrillas and insurgents act, compared to terrorists: Guerillas and insurgents tend to be “numerically larger groups of armed individuals who operate as a military unit … and seize and hold territory”, whereas terrorists “do not function in the open as armed units, … do not attempt to seize or hold territory, … [and] avoid
engaging enemy military forces in combat” (Hoffman 2006, 35). However, these groups are not mutually exclusive, with overlap and movement occurring between the categories. For example, groups which originate as terrorist organizations can gain land and popularity and become an insurgency or guerrilla movement such as FARC in Colombia or the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (Bell and Evans 2011).

An additional problem with defining terrorism is related to a high degree of subjectivity. Often, the understanding of the term depends on the historical context and the perspective of those prescribing a definition, including “the labeling of ‘terrorism’… that nearly always serves a powerful agent’s agenda” (Law 2016, 6). This means that despite being platitudinous, the adage “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” rings true (Laqueur 1987). Former Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev caustically echoed this sentiment during a visit to meet Muammar Gaddafi in 1981, saying that “Imperialists have no regard either for the will of the people or the laws of history. Liberation struggles cause their indignation. They describe them as ‘terrorism’” (Cline and Alexander 1986, 24). This designation can impact public perceptions of a group and may be used to politically or legally “delegitimize groups … deemed deviant or dangerous by the dominant powers” (Law 2016, 7, Workneh 2019).

In sum, terrorism can be understood as political violence from non-state individuals or organizations, which can include lone wolf terrorism, a form which has become increasingly frequent in recent years (Simon 2016).

**Lone Wolf Terrorism**

With a robust counterterrorism system most developed nations have greatly increased their ability to prevent largescale, organized attacks by terrorist groups. Respective attacks are increasingly being carried out in the name of an ideology or group by individuals – rather than by a group (Hofmann 2018). Next to effective surveillance measures, the rise of lone
wolf terrorism has been attributed to a variety of factors, including the “democratization of technology”, with new means to kill becoming more widely available, and the increasingly polarized and isolated online world in which individuals are susceptible to radicalization (Hamm and Spaaj 2015, Kilcullen 2013, 230).

Lone wolf terrorism is characterized by individuals “acting alone, or with minimal support from one or two other people” carrying out political violence (Simon 2016, loc 522). Thus, due to their small size lone wolf attackers have the ability to remain undetected by law enforcement agencies (Simon 2016, loc 521-525). Attacks by lone wolf terrorists have been carried out in the name of various ideologies across time, from the Luddite Unabomber with leftist leanings to white supremacist Dylann Roof (Ghansah 2017, Gupta 2018). As such, there is no one profile of a lone wolf terrorist, though some studies have suggested they are typically more educated and socially isolated than group-based terrorists (Smith, Gruenewald, et al. 2015, Spaaij 2010). This was the case of Breivik who spent years obsessively playing the computer game World of Warcraft while neglecting his offline social networks and eventually even withdrawing “from virtual friends he had been close to” (Seierstad 2015, 157).

The idea of a few individuals carrying out attacks independent of a greater organization was greatly promoted by right-wing ideologues, such as Louis Beam in the 1980s, who advocated for leaderless resistance to carry out “a new form of asymmetric warfare… in order to circumvent the superior military strength” of the federal government (Belew 2018, Morris 2016, 57). This allowed individuals to act without direction, creating their own battle plans which could largely evade law enforcement. Additionally, by working alone individuals could carry out plans without fear of being turned in to police by informants or being placed on watch lists by associating with known radicals. Breivik was especially concerned about
this, saying that an attacker should “do absolutely everything” alone and that the chances of apprehension increase by “100% for every person” involved (Berwick 2011, 853).

The need for additional knowledge or help during an attack has now been fulfilled by the internet, which can provide any would-be terrorist information on how to plan and carry out attacks, along with how to procure “sophisticated weapons… [and] make various explosives” (Simon 2016, 249). Omar Mateen, the lone wolf behind the Pulse Nightclub shooting, used Google to look up how to spell ‘allegiance’ and how to unjam his assault rifle during the three-hour standoff with police (Li 2019). Breivik used YouTube videos to guide his creation of the bomb used in his attack (Seierstad 2015). Additionally, the use of the internet allows lone wolf actors to spread their message more efficiently: Breivik uploaded a 1500+ page manifesto which was cited by Christchurch shooter Brenton Tarrant and was being used as a model for attack by Christopher Hasson, a “self-identified white nationalist” who was arrested with a cache of weapons before he could carry out an attack (Berger 2019, Bui 2019).

In this way, lone wolves are only constrained by their imagination and are free to attempt an act of violence without the political blowback or group infighting that occurs in larger terrorist organizations. Without an external check on the violence, or a moderating influence from an organization that might reel in more extreme members, lone wolf terrorist attacks are able to be more indiscriminate than would normally be acceptable for some groups. Additionally, because many lone wolf actors believe their attack to be inherently suicidal, without the option for escape, they can focus on creating the most damage as possible to receive the most attention. Both McVeigh and Breivik went into their attacks believing they

---

4 Writing under the pseudonym Andrew Berwick, Breivik posted his 1500+ page manifesto shortly before his attack, titled *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, and sent it to emails he had amassed through social media. The document laid out his ideology and motivation for the attack, as well as providing the details for how he carried out his attack. The document has sections ranging from “Creating chemical or biological weapons - easier than creating explosives” to “The name of the devil: cultural Marxism, multiculturalism, globalism, feminism, emotionalism, suicidal humanism, egalitarianism - a recipe for disaster” (Berwick 2011).
would likely be captured or killed during these attacks and as a result had nothing to lose (Knausgaard 2015, Vidal 2001).

Despite some of the benefits that lone wolf attacks have for terrorists, lone wolf terrorism also has its drawbacks. The reliance on oneself to carry out every step of an attack can lead to errors and miscalculations and make a lone wolf actor visible to law enforcement, especially if they act irrationally due to paranoia of being caught or watched. Furthermore, because it lacks a firm organizational framework, lone wolf terrorism also lacks the institutional knowledge and influence terrorist organizations have. As a result, lone wolf terrorists have little “staying power and are unlikely to groom successors” which can be advantageous to counterterrorism experts who understand that a lone wolf will not be a prolonged problem but a one-off danger (Cronin 2009, 98).

**Extremism**

Long before terrorists carry out attacks they become involved or interested in extremist ideologies through radicalization. These extremist ideologies set the rules for “who is part of the in-group, who is part of an out-group, and how the in-group should interact with the out-group” (Berger 2018, loc 531). The in-group is made up of individuals with a shared set of beliefs, traits, or practices (Berger 2018, loc 922). Prior to extremism an individual might view an out-group neutrally but once radicalized they view themselves and the out-group as diametrically opposed foes.

When this happens these individuals become extremists, i.e. individual actors whose “political preferences … [are] not widely shared within their own societies” and who “lack the means or power to obtain their goals” (Lake 2002, 16). Even if they have a common set of

---

5 Austrian bomber Franz Fuchs had the police called on him after he began following two women who drove by his house twice (Simon 2016). Upon the arrival of the police Fuchs attempted to kill himself using an improvised explosive device believing the officers were there to arrest him for the bombings, instead he blew off his hands and injured a nearby officer before being arrested and convicted for as string of bombings in the 1990s (Nationalrat 1998, Spaaij 2012).
shared beliefs they set themselves apart from the rest of the populace by using violence or other extreme measures. For example, in India, where cows are considered sacred by the Hindu majority, some Hindu nationalists have taken extreme measures based in this shared belief and have attacked Muslims suspected of killing cows (Griswold 2019). However, while many may be drawn to extremist ideology, this does not necessarily mean those individuals are violent extremists, i.e. those who use “acts of violence that are justified by, or associated with, an extreme religious, social or political ideology” (OSCE 2018, 18).

For extremists, the dividing line between in-groups and out-groups is often along identity lines, such as nationalism, religion, or ethnicity. Extremist ideology can dictate a wide range of beliefs and values, from the separation of genders to much more rhetorically violent ideas such as racial supremacy (Borum 2011). Often extremist categories overlap each other and end up “self-reinforcing such as the pairing of a religion with a national identity, or the adoption of antigovernment tenets by racists” (Berger 2018, loc 567). However, differences between in-group and out-group can become blurry and change over time. The KKK, for example, arose in opposition to blacks and their white Republican allies in the South during reconstruction. They were reformed in the 1920s as a group opposed to blacks but with additional emphasis on Irish, Italian and Polish immigrants, along with Catholics, and Jews (Gordon 2017). Finally, the third iteration of the Klan kept fighting against blacks in America but lowered their ire towards Catholics and immigrants from Western Europe (St-Amant 2016).

Extremists also span the ideological spectrum, from environmentalist’s monkeywrenching industrial sites to religious violence (Kifner 1995). Amongst right-wing extremists there is variance of beliefs, from anti-tax and anti-federal government militias found in the US to the Aryan Nations or other neo-Nazi groups. Some of their common components are “white supremacy, anti-Semitism, and race hatred” (Law 2016, 306). These groups make clear
delineation between who is the in-group and who is the out-group. McVeigh saw himself as a patriot and the federal government as his enemy. Breivik believed himself to be a modern-day crusader, protecting white Europe from “the Islamisation of Norway” and those who would enable multiculturalism (Seierstad 2015, 359).

**Radicalization**

McVeigh and Breivik both came to these extremist views through radicalization, “the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs” (Borum 2011, 8). McVeigh read conspiracy theories and white supremacist literature, such as *The Turner Diaries*, a novel depicting the United States succumbing to a “conspiracy of global control from which it needs to be liberated through terrorist actions” (Juergensmeyer 2004, 5). Breivik, meanwhile, spent years online on extremist websites before carrying out his attack in Oslo, with many ideas gathered during this time ending up in his manifesto (Ravndal 2013).

The process of radicalization, either to an extremist or violent extremist, can occur in a variety of ways and for different reasons. For most, individuals are radicalized young, in their teens or early twenties, when their identities and worldviews are forming. In the past, many on the right were radicalized in the aftermath of the Vietnam war and due to the poor treatment soldiers experienced upon returning from the war (Belew 2018). Nowadays, teenagers are exposed to radical ideologies online through literature and videos recommended by sites such as YouTube, creating a “dangerous on-ramp to extremism” (Roose 2019). This has fundamentally changed the way in which individuals are radicalized – they no longer face societal pushback for expressing fringe views, but instead have their views reinforced by likeminded individuals online. This environment facilitated by the internet has allowed lone wolves such as Dylann Roof to never need to “meet another activist to be radicalized by the white power movement” (Belew 2018, 237).
Radicalization towards violent extremism happens when “negative attitudes toward out-groups grow more intense until the perceived conflict between in-group and out-group becomes so urgent that hostile action becomes mandatory … [and] eventually leads to violence” (Berger 2018, loc 1231-1233). This transition to the view that violence is a necessity is what differentiates violent extremists from extremists (Stephens, Sieckelinck and Boutellier 2018). Many extremists never delve into violence and are content with “less harmful acts such as discrimination or shunning” against an out-group (Berger 2018, loc 759).

Individuals are drawn towards extremist ideology and radicalization for a variety of reasons. Some are less interested in the actual ideology and may be attracted to the comradery of extremist group or ideology. Groups such as the KKK draw “in members by offering the pleasures of male bonding” (Belew 2018, 94). Additionally, many groups simply prey upon emotionally vulnerable people. For example, the neo-Nazi group Atomwaffen has focused on recruiting disillusioned veterans who returned from unpopular wars “animated by a degree of nihilism” (Thompson 2018). This is akin to the path that McVeigh took upon returning home from Desert Storm – without real job prospects he grew increasingly interested in aspects of the white power movement (Meloy and Yakeley 2014). Others are attracted to groups after traumatic experiences or hardships, such as the death of a loved one or job loss, which can create “a need for identity that is fulfilled by extremist narratives or causes” (National Academy of Sciences 2017). Additional apolitical reasons individuals join extremist ideologies include personal grievance against the out-group, because friends or family are part of the group or because of the thrill or status associated with the group (McCauley and Moskalenko 2014, 72).


**Countering Extremism**

To counter the radicalization process there has been a recent trend towards more “soft-power approaches” which aim at “intervention before violence occurs” (Stephens, Sieckelinck and Boutellier 2018). These approaches seek to stop terrorism by preventing people from becoming terrorists in the first place. These methods have focused on preventing violent extremism (PVE) and countering violent extremism (CVE), collectively known as P/CVE approaches (Jackson, et al. 2019). Current trends in P/CVE are noteworthy because they emphasize services outside of law enforcement to address extremism, such as social welfare and educational programs. These programs seek to “counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize … and to address specific factors that … enable violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence” (OSCE 2018). Much of modern scholarship on the subject believes that “law enforcement should not be viewed as the first resort for addressing the needs of individuals who are at risk of radicalizing” (Jensen, Seate and James 2018, 19). This moves away from harsh punishment models surrounding retribution and incapacitation towards one which focuses on winning the hearts and minds of extremists so that they want to reintegrate into general society (Cullen and Jonson 2012).

Looking at the steps that McVeigh and Breivik took in the individual radicalization pathway will enable the identification of some P/CVE programs which could have prevented or mitigated their attacks, while also looking at counterterrorism measures that could have been used to do the same. This, in turn, may help to inform future preventative measures. Therefore, the next section will discuss the framework which this paper will utilize to examine the paths which took McVeigh and Breivik towards terrorism.

**Pathway to Terrorism: The Individual Radicalization Process**

In analyzing the case studies of McVeigh and Breivik this paper will heavily rely on the work of Berger (2018) and his individual radicalization pathway (see Figure 1, 14). It should be
noted that it is not necessary for individuals to follow these steps in order or to follow all of them. However, Berger (2018) notes that an absence of all these steps should result in questioning whether attack perpetrators “should be properly understood as extremist adherents or as pathological mass killers” (loc 1916).

Radicalization happens in stages, with violent extremism as the final level. However, it should be said that it is a fluid process with ebb and flow at different times depending on the individual. One may quickly enter the first levels of radicalization and move on to violent extremism, while in other cases, the violence can take years to surface. This model and others which map the pathway individuals take to join group-based terrorism provides a good way to map the process of radicalization through the case studies.

These steps have been separated into three broader categories which have different approaches to intervention. They go from entry level interest in extremism as a sympathizer, to engagement and participation in extremism as an extremist, to the most involvement as a terrorist who carries out violent acts against an out-group. Jackson, et al. (2019) similarly identified the three phases as early, middle and late which roughly corresponds to the framework of this paper. These three categories can be then used to look at the different methods of intervention and how they could apply to real world scenarios. This will provide insights into the pathways that right-wing extremist take, along with how and why individuals radicalize. While the model is simple, it remains useful as a benchmark for conceptually structuring a “problem that is multifaceted, contextually driven, and constantly evolving” (Jensen, Seate and James 2018, 18).
The Sympathizer – Step 1
An individual at the lowest level of involvement in extremism is called a sympathizer. These are people who identify with the in-group and have negative views towards the out-group (Berger 2018). Propelling them toward the ideology is often the belief that there is a crisis “affecting the eligible in-group” in which actions need to be taken to prevent negative consequences (Berger 2018, loc 1888). This crisis can be real or fictional, from American
presence in the Middle East to white genocide and Jewish cabals. In either case the in-group believes it needs to defend itself from the out-group.

Once individuals are aware of the in-group/out-group dynamic, either consciously or subconsciously, they grow increasingly interested in the extremist in-group. They start reading literature, going to events, or even meeting and talking with extremist in-group members (Berger 2018). People at this stage may attend a meeting or rally to get more information on a group. For modern lone wolves, this is when individuals start visiting extremist websites. This step can even happen inadvertently, as a person watching YouTube videos could be introduced to extremist ideologies after being recommended extremist content by YouTube algorithms (Roose 2019).

The last step before an individual really becomes part of the extremist group comes when they consider their place within the group. This is the point at which individuals either invest themselves in a group further – by attending a rally or joining an online forum to communicate with other extremists, for instance – or retreat and keep extremism at a distance. These low levels of engagement are where individuals “perceive injustice” and displace their anger into “rigid, us-versus-them thinking” which catalyzes individuals towards increased extremism (Moghaddam 2005, 164).

At this initial stage of extremism, individuals have not fully formed their identity, so they are susceptible to PVE, which would deter them from deeper engagement in extremism. At this level individuals are just starting to develop “antipathy toward a target group” and thus interventions should be aimed at preventing individuals from becoming engrossed in extremist ideology (Borum 2011, 26). Recently this has taken the form of content providers, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, removing extremist content and vowing to take steps to reduce the presence of extremists on their platforms (Martineau 2019).
The Radical – Step 2

Once an individual decides that an extremist ideology is attractive they become more involved; instead of staying quiet they speak up and advocate. This shift from being a passive observer to becoming an active participant in an ideology marks a middle level of involvement where the individual is identified as a radical or extremist. Already steeped in extremist ideology, these individuals not only read extremist texts but help disseminate or add to it. They can post on online forums and start reaching out to other extremists about ways to further the cause of the in-group, or alternatively, how to harm the out-group. This harm can take a variety of forms from the more menial discrimination to rhetoric advocating violence, however it should be noted that these individuals have not yet, and may never, take violent action. In this step they have fully identified with the extremist in-group and agree “that the extremist in-group offers a solution to the crisis” (Berger 2018, loc 1899).

Even at this stage individuals can hide their involvement in the ideology and compartmentalize it to one sphere of their life. They might use pseudonyms online or create separate accounts for anonymous communication or begin to withdraw from their social circle for fear of being ‘outed’ (Townsend 2019). Conversely, radicals may repel their social circle with incessant extremist talking points and politics which are exacerbated as they become more engrossed in radical participation (Mills, et al. 2019). And for many, their new-found extremism can consume them and begin to define who they are, such that they live two separate lives, extremist in one but wearing the mask of a non-radical in the other (Moghaddam 2005, 165).

This stage acts as a fork in the road to violent extremism, where individuals reflect on the adequacy of their current actions in supporting the in-group. Many believe that raising awareness and spreading the ‘gospel’ is enough and there is no need to “escalate their involvement” within the extremist movement (Berger 2018, loc 1899). Others feel that there
is more to be done to address the crisis and as such are inclined towards violent political action and move to the third step to become a terrorist (McCauley and Moskalenko 2014).

Since individuals have already been radicalized in this step there is no hope for prevention. Often, any communicative prevention techniques used would be ignored or dismissed as propaganda. One example of this is attempts by federal governments to set up literature and websites aimed at preventing radicalism. These prove ineffective, because using the FBI or other law enforcement agencies as the spokesperson for the dangers of extremism does not reach the target audience (Sidahmed 2016). Rather than having law enforcement or the federal government deal with this, intervention needs to happen at a local level, using levers of trust to open up dialogue to bring individuals back into the community. An example of common CVE programs is to use deradicalized individuals to bridge gaps between society and extremists in an effort to discuss the personal grievances of an individual (Jackson, et al. 2019).

The Terrorist – Step 3
The final stage of extremism is violent extremism, when an individual assesses the situation faced by the in-group and decides that they must do something. Pittsburgh synagogue shooter Robert Bowers posted online: “I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in” exemplifying the belief that the crisis had reached a tipping point, and someone needed to do something about it (Turkewitz and Roose 2018). By deciding during the self-critique that further measures should be taken to support the in-group the radical escalates their actions to include more hostility against the out-group (Berger 2018).

When this occurs, an individual is dedicated to carrying out violence and sets their plan in motion. This can take years, as in the case of Breivik, and involves choices such as target selection, method of attack and preparation (Lindekilde, O’Connor and Schuurman 2019). Many attackers plan their route – both McVeigh and Breivik scouted out their targets ahead
of time –, looking for potential weak spots and obstacles they might encounter on the day of the attack (Seierstad 2015, Vidal 2001). Others plan attacks before shying away from them or are caught in the planning process (Bui 2019). The acts of violence chosen depend on the person, their goals and the availability of targets. McVeigh had considered a number of targets, including assassinating prominent politicians or individuals in law enforcement, before choosing the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City (Michel and Herbeck 2001). Breivik wrote extensively about targets and tactics in his manifesto, urging followers to do the same as he did, while providing a roadmap to similar attacks (Berwick 2011).

For many lone wolves, their attack is the final assault against the out-group. Modern day surveillance combined with robust counterterrorism operations make escape difficult, and many do not even consider it an option (Simon 2016). Often, they kill themselves or are killed in a gunfight with law enforcement (Law 2016). McVeigh had explosives in place that he could shoot at close range if his fuses failed, which would ignite the explosives and likely kill him as well (Michel and Herbeck 2001). Breivik noted in his manifesto that he would likely be killed the day of his attack but that he would be willing to sacrifice his life for his cause (Berwick 2011, 1403).

Because of the finality of many of these attacks and the destruction they can incur, counterterrorism is focused on preventing attacks while still in the preparation phase. Some countries have taken to banning guns or restricting gun ownership as preemptive measures against mass shootings, or as the result of one (Masters 2016). These restrictions create a barrier for would-be terrorists looking to buy a firearm for an attack. By seeking out a gun illegally an extremist puts themselves in danger of being caught by police. In the case of

---

6 Many of the lone wolf attackers who were able to escape did so because they used bombs to carry out attacks – Ted Kaczynski, Franz Fuchs and David Copeland among others eluded detection this way (Simon 2016).
Breivik, he bought his guns legally and put extensive effort into concealing his plans from everyone around him (Seierstad 2015). In the US, where guns are more readily available, law enforcement have difficulty assessing who owns what kinds of guns and for what purpose. Additionally, the materials to make bombs are readily available to anyone with enough know-how and patience, even with restrictions put in place following the Oklahoma City bombing and attacks elsewhere in Europe (Berwick 2011). Programs such as “If You See Something, Say Something” can be useful for law enforcement, giving them extra eyes at a local level, though finding an actual threat can be akin to finding a needle in a haystack (Department of Homeland Security 2019).
Literature Review

The modern concept of a terrorist organization is often cited as starting with Narodnaya Volya, or the People’s Will, in late 19th century Russia (Hoffman 2006). The group is credited as “pioneering the use of explosives by terrorists as a tool of the weak against the strong” in their fight against Tsarist rule in Russia (Revill 2016, 25). After multiple attempts at killing the Tsar the group succeeded on the seventh try in 1881 and as a result the “militant, centralized, underground organization” became the "prototype of virtually all subsequent terrorist groups in the world” (Marks 2004, 16). By recognizing the symbolic significance of such killings and their “emotional and political responses”, Narodnaya Volya became the template which terrorist organizations and individuals, including McVeigh and Breivik, would replicate up until present day (Rapoport 2001, 419).

This group typically marks the first wave of modern terrorism as laid out by Rapoport (2004). This scholarship identifies the four waves of terrorism which occurred in modern history (Simon 2016). The first, the Anarchist Wave, which included Narodnaya Volya, killed its way through Prime Ministers, Presidents and Tsars from the end of the 19th century up until World War I. The second, the Anti-Colonel, began in the 1920s, with liberation movements in Ireland, Cyprus, and elsewhere, but as “empires dissolved, the wave receded” (Rapoport 2004, 53). The third, the New Left, started in the 1960s, with groups such as the Red Brigades and Red Army Faction seeing “themselves as vanguards for the Third World masses” (Rapoport 2004, 53-56). The fourth, the Religious Wave, started with the Iranian revolution and persists to present day. This wave marks the rise of Islamic jihadism including the 9/11 attack and a myriad of lone wolf attacks from followers of ISIS (Bloom and Daymon 2018, Juergensmeyer 2016, Wood 2015).

Much literature of the fourth wave focuses heavily on Islamic terrorism, which has dominated headlines for over two decades, with groups such al-Qaeda and ISIS carrying out largescale
attacks across the world (Sedgwick 2010, Warrick 2015, Wright 2006). Also in this wave, but less studied, is white Christian terrorism and the white power movement, a category many scholars would put Breivik and McVeigh into (Belew 2018, Bergen 2016, Juergensmeyer 2011, Michel and Herbeck 2001, Schager 2017, Stern 2009, Vertigans 2016). In recent years, though, the white power movement and associated Christian terrorism have become a point of focus again, following widely covered shootings of mosques and synagogues in Pittsburg and New Zealand (Cordero 2019, Roose 2018).

These shootings and attacks across Europe and America have once again brought up debates around lone wolf terrorism and what exactly this term means (Alghorra and Elsobky 2018, Hoffman 2006, Hofmann 2018, Pitcavage 2015, Simon 2016). Some debate come from the misappropriation of the term lone wolf. This stems from a misattribution of the term to attackers who are acting at the direction of an organization but carrying out an attack alone, a mistake that can be attributed to public and media misunderstanding of the nuances of terrorism scholarship (Lister 2014). Most agree that a lone wolf attack is any individual acting independently or without direction from a broader organization (Berntzen and Sandberg 2014, Hamm and Spaaj 2015, Meloy and Yakeley 2014, Smith, Gruenewald, et al. 2015). However, what exactly constitutes an independent attack is disputed.

Blurred lines can cause issues for scholars looking into terrorism. Many would argue that McVeigh is not a lone wolf actor because he relied on the assistance of a small circle of friends who had some form of knowledge of the impending Oklahoma City bombing (Michel and Herbeck 2001, Hoffman 2006, Spaaij 2012). However, there remains uncertainty regarding how much these individuals knew and the role that coercion played in their participation (Michel and Herbeck 2001). Furthermore, many scholars have reworked lone

---

7 Some debate remains that there were additional individuals involved with the attack including a “mysterious ‘John Doe #2’ who was with McVeigh when he rented the Ryder truck” used in the bombing, this however has never been substantiated further and the US government “considers the case closed” (Law 2016, 310)
wolf definitions so that McVeigh fits in this category, or alternatively, have identified him as a ‘lone wolf pack’ because he carried out the attack with a small group of individuals (Bakker and Graaf 2011, Hofmann 2018, ICST 2012, Lindeklde, O’Connor and Schuurman 2019, Simon 2016, Stern 2009).

Related debates hang on semantic definitions of ‘lone’ – arguing that no one can act alone because they are always part of a wider network (Sageman 2017). Breivik might have acted alone, but he interacted with those who sympathized and reinforced his abhorrence of multiculturalism, so should he be considered a lone wolf (Patalong 2011)? These unseen actors – online and elsewhere – guided him to carry out attacks, goading him into radicalization and echoing his violent convictions (Berntzen and Sandberg 2014). However, even if acknowledging that no one acts in a vacuum, there must nevertheless be a distinction between attackers who are part of an organization and told what to do and how to do it, and individuals who act independently but are influenced by others (Bergen 2016). This has caused even further differentiations to be made between the lone wolf and the loner (Berger 2018, Holt, et al. 2019). In this case the loner would be an individual who has never belonged to or associated with an extremist group, whereas a lone wolf has some operational contact with other extremists (Pantucci 2011). According to this, Breivik would be a loner because he did not associate or coordinate with extremists offline and likely did not ever reveal his plans online either (Ravndal 2013).

Much of the focus on lone wolf terrorists deals with counterterrorism strategies (Bakker and Graaf 2011, Hamm and Spaaj 2015, Straub, Zeunik and Gorban 2017). Because lone wolves act without the discretion of others, there is no possibility to infiltrate groups and monitor radicals. Instead, lone wolves “are often not on anybody's radar, as they quietly plot” (Simon 2016, loc 705-707). Further complications arise because lone wolf actors do not need to
consider the political consequences of violence, making the calculus of attack different (Cronin 2009, Gill, Marchment, et al. 2018).

As mentioned previously there is much debate over what terrorism is and who is a terrorist. Similar to early studies of criminology, early terrorist literature focused on the profiles of terrorists – often depicting them as poor, slovenly or deranged (Cullen and Jonson 2012, Law 2016). However, modern scholarship consensus is that there is no common profile of terrorists. Some scholars have put forth various psychological, sociological or economical explanations but ultimately the data suggests that attacks do not occur because individuals are economically disadvantaged or mentally unfit (Berger 2018, Gullestad 2017, Hoffman 2006, Horgan 2014, Jenkins 1979). As Bandura said, this suggests that “given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can do extraordinarily cruel things” (2002).

Terrorism in this way is nondiscriminatory – everyone can commit it, and everyone can be a victim. In other words, there is no such thing as an innate terrorist (Archetti 2015). Despite outdated views that terrorists are poor or uneducated, historically this has not been the case, as terrorism has been “a largely bourgeois endeavor, from the Russian anarchists of the late nineteenth century to the German Marxists of the Baader-Meinhof Gang of the 1970s, to the apocalyptic Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo of the 1990s” (Bergen 2016, 49).

As discussed previously, lone wolves are more socially isolated than other terrorists, which may increase the chances of developing mental disorders (Humaidi 2012). Corner and Gill (2014) found that lone wolf terrorists were 13.49 times more likely to have a mental illness than individuals in a terrorist group (2014). However, another study found no causal connection between mental illness and engagement in terrorist activity (Weatherston and Moran 2003). McVeigh and Breivik were both considered psychologically stable and neither considered insane (Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich 2013). As such, “terrorism… is not the
product of a single decision [or cause] but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment to violence over time” (McCormick 20003, 492).

Within the study of radicalization there exist competing theories similar to the one used in this paper by Berger (2018). Among these are the five staircases to the terrorist act discussed by Moghaddam (2005). Using the idea that as individuals radicalize they move up the floors towards terrorism, Moghaddam identifies various levels of involvement and engagement with extremism and some of the psychological factors which can lead individuals towards terrorist groups. In the end these individuals “find themselves engaged in the extremist morality of isolated, secretive organizations dedicated to changing the world by any means available to them” (Moghaddam 2005, 165). Another study (McCauley and Moskalenko 2014) used an ‘action pyramid’ to conceptualize how the different levels of radicalism get smaller as one moves from those with radical opinions to those carrying out radical actions. A further study (Rekawek, et al. 2019) examined the individual pathways to terrorism of 56 jihadists in Europe. Amongst one most common pathways identified for radicalization was a “‘dissatisfaction with current reality’ or ‘moral outrage’” (Rekawek, et al. 2019, 6). This closely resembles both McVeigh, who was disgusted by the way the US government handled the Waco siege, and Breivik, who was angered by growing Muslim populations in Europe (Law 2016).

Scholarship into P/CVE has started to advocate for mimicking a model of counterterrorism present in the New York Police Department, which has shifted away from large federal apparatuses towards local approaches – which follows a general trend in law enforcement towards more community, local level policing (Dahl 2014). This is to address a number of problems with previous counterterrorism strategies that focused on minority communities and thereby further marginalized them (Staniforth, Ratcliffe and Rabenstein 2010). Additionally, responses to terrorism can often be “agnostic to the ideology because … a lot of the drivers
are similar” across ideologies so a model which works on jihadists in New York can theoretically apply to militia in Montana (Jackson, et al. 2019, Teubner 2019, 10).

Further P/CVE has focused on addressing the different levels of extremist engagement (OSCE 2018). This has been done by first creating interventions which seek to prevent people from wanting to engage in extremist ideology in the first place through a variety of ways, including community outreach to marginalized populations and moderating extremists’ presence online (Jensen, Seate and James 2018). Second, intervention programs for those involved in extremist circles have been put into place. Jackson, et al. (2019) identified three types of intervention – community, social services and criminal justice – to best address the situation. Third is the move to rehabilitate extremists to prevent further violence or an escalation of violence – for some this step is irrelevant, but for groups engaging in violence, reducing recidivism is an essential component of P/CVE (Jackson, et al. 2019).
Case Studies
Timothy McVeigh

Think about the people as if they were storm troopers in Star Wars, they may be individually innocent, but they are guilty because they work for the Evil Empire.
(McVeigh, quoted in Michel and Herbeck 2001, 216)

The bombing in Oklahoma City shook the nation. It was the largest domestic terrorist attack and was carried out by a white Christian army veteran (Juergensmeyer 2003). Timothy McVeigh had long resented the US government and feared that it would remove guns from American life in order to subdue the population into accepting tyrannical rule. Catalyzed by Waco, McVeigh took matters into his own hands. With the assistance of two army buddies, Terry Nichols and Michael Fortier, he built a bomb which he detonated in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (Belew 2018). The blast killed 168 people, including agents in the offices of the FBI and ATF and 15 children at a daycare in the building, which McVeigh claimed to be unaware of, though he said this knowledge would have done little to impact his decision (Law 2016, Michel and Herbeck 2001). He was arrested on an unrelated charge until it was discovered he was the bomber; following a trial he received the death penalty and was executed in 2001 (Branson-Potts 2015). Nichols was given life in prison and Fortier was given a reduced sentence and immunity for his wife in exchange for testifying against McVeigh and Nichols (Smith 2011).

The Gun Sympathizer
Timothy McVeigh was born in 1968 to a typical American working-class family near Buffalo, New York (Smith 2011). McVeigh became fascinated with guns at an early age, an interest shared by many Americans (Lester 2004). This interest was further nurtured by his grandfather, who bought McVeigh his first firearm and would take him to shoot guns in the woods. This hobby soon became an obsession for McVeigh and his eventual casus belli for the attack in Oklahoma City (Post 2008).
As guns became more important to McVeigh he began to read magazines and books on the subject, many of which were either subtly or explicitly anti-governmental (Vertigans 2016). This marked the start of his in-group identification (himself and others protecting gun rights) versus the out-group (federal government). After graduating high school with poor grades, McVeigh’s interest in guns had also morphed into an interest in survivalism and he began to prepare for a widespread disaster or catastrophe, amassing supplies and learning self-survival skills (Smith 2011).

This idea is one which is closely associated with members of the white power movement especially the militia and Christian patriot movements. These groups believe that a “great confrontation between freedom and a government-imposed slavery was close at hand” and thus training would ensure that their “militant efforts could threaten the evil system and awaken the spirit of the freedom-loving masses” (Juergensmeyer 2003, 26). This interest created a natural affinity for the military for McVeigh, who could shoot guns, learn survival skills, and protect his country while getting paid (Michel and Herbeck 2001).

Joining the army in 1988 McVeigh excelled as a soldier, with years of shooting practice making him an outstanding marksman (Lester 2004). It was in the army when McVeigh first met Nichols and Fortier who would go on to aid his attacks in Oklahoma City to varying degrees (Michel and Herbeck 2001). McVeigh reenlisted in the army in 1990, months before the Gulf War broke out, which sent him to the Middle East. During this time, McVeigh got his

---

8 Before joining the military, McVeigh worked for an armored car company which frequently drove through poor, often African American neighborhoods, and he made comments that they were lazy and overly dependent on welfare (Lester 2004). This, along with racist remarks and actions while in the military and a one-year membership in the KKK, led many to believe he was a racist and interested in white supremacy, although McVeigh himself has denied being racist (Michel and Herbeck 2001). This denial could be entirely possible. His views on race, interest in The Turner Diaries, and membership in the KKK could be credited to the overlap between white power and antigovernment movements (Belew 2018). Ultimately, because his attack had no racial component, this part of his ideology is less relevant for this paper but worth noting.

9 Both knew he intended to bomb a federal building by late 1994 (Smith 2011). Nichols helped assembled the bomb and collect the materials for making the bomb but was absent during the actual bombing. Whereas Fortier helped with raising cash and logistical help renting storage units, in which McVeigh and Nichols would store bomb making materials (Lester 2004).
first combat experience in a war which bothered him greatly (ICST 2012). He disliked getting involved in a conflict that did not threaten America and also had great distrust for the United Nations, which he thought was trying to take over the world (Smith 2011). Months after being sent to the Gulf War he was ordered to report for Special Forces training which he had long wanted to be a part of. However, the war had taken a toll on his body and he was not fit enough to pass the first stages of the training (Michel and Herbeck 2001). Following this disappointment, McVeigh became dejected, rejecting a promotion offered by a battalion commander and instead choosing to quit the military altogether (Lester 2004).

From the time he started taking interest in antigovernment literature to his time after military service, preventative measures to push McVeigh away from extremist ideology could have been deployed. Because his radicalization occurred prior to widespread use of the internet, and since there is no evidence he used it extensively for communicating with extremists, McVeigh provides a good case study in looking at how to counter extremism born offline (Michel and Herbeck 2001).

The first pathway to extremism which could have been addressed is McVeigh’s engagement with antigovernmental texts found in the gun magazines and literature he read (Zeskind 2009). McVeigh also discovered one of the most important and influential white power texts, *The Turner Diaries* written by neo-Nazi William Pierce. The novel was a fictional “how-to manual” for bringing about a war with the federal government and minorities which would lead to a white utopia (Belew 2018, 110-111). This propagated the belief that the federal government wanted to restrict gun rights and disarm the population. At this stage there is little to do in terms of preventing extremism. McVeigh was expanding his worldview and experimenting with ideologies, a healthy and normal process for young adults. However, there are ways in which prevention methods can attempt to mitigate the pull factors extremist ideologies have.
The Danes have approached this question by applying preventative measures targeted at the general population of students, while also identifying at risk populations (Ramboll 2017). By doing this they hope to reduce anyone from wanting to even engage in extremist ideology in the first place through mentor programs and relationship building exercises between teachers and students (Ramboll 2017). Lacking a close family life, outside of his sister and grandfather, McVeigh could have used more guidance in school, and despite the fact that he excelled at computer programming, he never took this skill further into college (Michel and Herbeck 2001). If he were given a mentor akin to one under the Danish model, this individual might have recognized McVeigh’s skills and pushed him to pursue a career in the burgeoning programming field, and perhaps he would have felt less alienated or unmotivated in school (Lester 2004, UNDP 2016). Additional programs could have utilized his interest in survivalism to help him gain useful vocational skills (Glaser, et al. 2017). This lack of guidance played a role in McVeigh’s attack and in those of other extremists, such as Roof. Creating a sense of purpose could mitigate individuals’ feelings of frustration and anger or redirect these into healthier outlets.

Because many individuals engage with extremist ideology but fall out before becoming radicals, this level of prevention is difficult. Overhauling the already overworked educational systems in America is problematic and giving each student individualized attention and care is just not feasible (Ramboll 2017). Conversely, some European countries such as Denmark and Sweden already have programs in place and can provide a model for schools hoping to teach students about topics such as diversity, identity and conflict management (Kallis, Zeiger and Öztürk 2018).
The Disgruntled Radical
Once McVeigh was in the military he had already formed his ideology, giving away copies of *The Turner Diaries* and saying that every soldier should have to read it (Lester 2004). Within the military he found like-minded individuals and began to only socialize with these people (Smith 2011). Right-wing extremism has been a problem in both the US and European militaries (Department of Homeland Security 2009, Deutsche Welle 2019). This is partly because the rhetoric right-wing extremist use has “symbols of patriotism” which appeal to individuals with nationalistic traits, who want to protect their country through military service (Jones 2019). White nationalist Louis Beam furthered this link in the 1980s by advocating for those wanting to join the white power movement to first join the military, so they could learn useful skills against their enemies (Belew 2018).

While McVeigh was not a violent extremist during his time in the military, the experience solidified his views and did little to deradicalize him (Zeskind 2009). One factor in this was his social circle, wherein like-minded individuals, such as Nichols and Fortier, reinforced his ideas and repeated them back to him, creating an echo chamber in which the only viewpoint was extremism (Michel and Herbeck 2001, Mills, et al. 2019). During this time, he had been told repeatedly to stop sharing *The Turner Diaries* and even wore a shirt with “White Power” written on it but received no formal punishment (Lester 2004). In the US, preventing extremism in the military is difficult, though the military has made some moves towards addressing this issue. Recently, it has told recruiters to look for tattoos of white power symbols and not enlist these individuals; additionally, it has discharged individuals who participate in extremist ideologies (Jones 2019). These measures should be combined with greater engagement with civil society to work towards creating programs on diversity and tolerance to further reduce the spread of extremism in the military (RAN 2018).
McVeigh returned home to nothing—no job, no family, and no prospects. He failed to find work with the US Marshals and spiraled into depression, while blaming the government for his circumstances (ICST 2012). During this time events started to unfold around America that would greatly impact McVeigh. First, Ruby Ridge\textsuperscript{10} in 1992, and then the disastrous government response in Waco\textsuperscript{11} in 1993, which would transform his anger at the government to violent hostility (Michel and Herbeck 2001). McVeigh was so irritated by the siege of the Mount Carmel Center that he drove from Arizona to Texas to witness it firsthand (Vidal 2001). While there, he sold antigovernment bumper stickers and literature (Lester 2004).

As the flames of Waco settled, McVeigh viewed this matter as his personal crisis. He felt he had not done enough to protect the in-group, so he chose to escalate his role and bring violence to the “crooked politicians, overzealous government agents, … [and] gun laws” on the behalf of the aggrieved in-group (Michel and Herbeck 2001, 28). This is another moment when McVeigh could have been deterred. His psychiatrist after the attacks said, “had there not been a Waco, there would not have been an Oklahoma City” (Vidal 2001). Had the government acted more carefully and thoughtfully, the attack may have been avoided. This puts a lot of responsibility on governments to not provoke communities and to treat all people with respect no matter how different or strange they seem. This can be seen in the case of Nidal Hasan and other jihadists who view the treatment of Muslims abroad by America as offensive and crass (Bergen 2016). Certainly, governments will make mistakes, but they must

\textsuperscript{10} The eleven-day siege of a cabin in Idaho left one US Marshal and the wife and 14-year-old child of white supremacist Randy Weaver dead (Belew 2018). The siege and subsequent deaths enraged the white power movement around the country, which amassed at Ruby Ridge protesting government overreach and warning of impending gun restrictions (Walter 2012).

\textsuperscript{11} The 51-day siege in Waco, Texas left 82 Branch Davidians and four Alcohol Tobacco and Firearm agents dead (Belew 2018). Governmental action was first sparked by reports of child abuse and illegal firearm possession by the religious group (Zeskind 2009). Following an initial raid by the government, which ended in a bloody gunfight and government retreat, the Branch Davidians were besieged for over six weeks. During this time, the FBI got involved and the siege was widely reported across America, which once again catalyzed antigovernmental activists to the scene (Law 2016). The siege ended when the FBI used tanks to shoot tear gas into the building, which either caught fire or was set on fire, engulfing the compound in flames and killing 76 people inside (Zeskind 2009).
be cognizant that their actions can especially impact certain communities and realize “effective counter radicalization … depends on effective community engagement” (Bakker and Graaf 2011, 47).

The lack of job prospects along with no relationship success frustrated McVeigh and left him feeling deprived of the glory and excitement that he had felt while in the military (Smith 2011). This loss of stature and subsequent failure is a common trend during the radicalization process (Kruglanski, et al. 2014). Thus, there could have been interventions during this time to halt or mitigate this factor. Chief among them would be a program to better help veterans reintegrate into everyday life following their service (Department of Homeland Security 2009). This would include job programs which provide routes to fulfilling careers or, akin to programs in Finland, provide individuals with a path to non-violent social activism (Ramboll 2017). Instead of McVeigh feeling lost and alienated, he could have been put on path towards law enforcement or security work, or even for organizations supporting gun rights (Jones 2019).

Some complications arise here: First, those distrustful of the government may resist further assistance from the government. Hence, local partners are an important step in this process to ground an individual within their community and build a sense of togetherness. Alongside this, there needs to be a greater focus on the mental health of individuals. Within the US there remains a stigma around mental health in many communities, which can prevent individuals from seeking the assistance they need (Corner and Gill 2014). McVeigh likely suffered from what we understand now as post-traumatic stress disorder, but at the time it was left untreated and played a pivotal role in his depression and anger (Michel and Herbeck 2001).

Furthermore, steps need to be taken to ensure intervention is not overrun by the agenda of the security sector. If law enforcement is the main actor in intervention it can just push individuals towards extremism. In the case of McVeigh, if he had had opportunities for work
he could have begun a normal life and settled down. Instead, he spent his time driving to gun shows and becoming more radicalized, as he grew more frustrated with his situation and by this time “he was not simply an ‘antigovernment’ activist. He was a soldier who had switched enlistments from the United States Army to the white nationalist underground“ (Zeskind 2009, 456).

The Militant Terrorist
To carry out his attack McVeigh decided he would target a federal agent or building (Smith 2011). He first thought of individuals he could kill but ultimately settled on blowing up a building – creating a shortlist of targets before ultimately settling on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City which had both the FBI and ATF regional offices (Law 2016). After choosing his target, he quickly set about devising a plan and built a bomb, which he detonated on the two-year anniversary of the fire that ended the Waco standoff (Zeskind 2009). Driving a rented truck to the front of the Murrah building at 9 am, a time which he hoped would do the most damage since most would be at work by then, he lit the two fuses and exited the vehicle to a getaway car he had bought (Michel and Herbeck 2001). The explosion shook the city, leaving a gaping hole in the building and killing 168 people (Smith 2011).

Along the way there were multiple times when interventions could have occurred. For one, he had told multiple people, besides Fortier and Nichols about his plan, and would often speak of taking revenge on the government for Waco (Lester 2004). No one ever reported him, and he had been “less than discreet with his remarks around law-enforcement officers” including undercover agents at gun shows (Michel and Herbeck 2001, 190). Had they dug into his background they might have found the capacity and know-how to carry out an attack and kept a closer eye on his whereabouts (ICST 2012). But this being the 1990s, before surveillance
was carried out through cellphones and the internet, it is likely he would have just been another name on a list until it was too late.

When compared to other lone wolves, McVeigh truly was not alone. He had both Nichols and Fortier, along with their friends and family, who knew on some level he was carrying out an attack (Smith 2011). Members of militia groups had even turned him away because he was seen as too extreme for them (Law 2016). He was writing to his sister frequently as well, telling her he would break the law and need to disappear, and to destroy letters he had previously written her, which she dutifully did (Michel and Herbeck 2001). This is an especially weak link in his path to terror and one which can be exploited. The need to discuss plans or ideas and socialize should be harnessed as a CVE measure. Raising community awareness within the population that threats like these should be taken seriously can be an effective way to spread the type of “see something, say something” reporting (Department of Homeland Security 2019).

Additionally, both Nichols and Fortier helped him carry out multiple crimes, include the theft of explosive material and breaking into an armory (Lester 2004). Because of the nexus between crime and terrorism, due diligence policing can be a very effective form of counterterrorism. By catching individuals committing petty crimes or crimes which lead to a greater crime, law enforcement can catch violent extremists before they act (Cullen and Jonson 2012). McVeigh was pulled over after the bombing because he had no license plate and was arrested for illegal firearms possession (Smith 2011).

Part of the best way to ensure attacks do not take place is to ensure targets are more difficult to attack (Cordero 2019). McVeigh chose his target in part because he could park right next to it and it had a glass façade “which would maximize injuries” (Smith 2011, 62). In response to the bombing and the ease with which McVeigh could reach an important federal building, the government started installing bollards and using tighter security to prevent vehicles from
simply driving up to any building (Law 2016). Pennsylvania Avenue was closed for drivers in the aftermath and has remained closed to this day, preventing anyone from trying to drive a car bomb in front of the White House (Michel and Herbeck 2001). By hardening ‘soft targets’, counterterrorism efforts can make attacks less appealing or less successful. This requires anticipating where a potential attack could occur and employing safety measures before an attack ever occurs (Bakker and Graaf 2011).

In addition to making targets harder to attack, measures to reduce the likelihood of an attack can be useful, “such as limiting the availability of potential bomb making materials, and other weapons that could be used in attacks” (Kallis, Zeiger and Öztürk 2018, 41). In America this is difficult, since guns are so accessible, but for European countries, gun restrictions have meant that terrorists are resorting to weapons such as knives and vehicles. These attacks are nearly impossible to stop, as owning a knife or driving car cannot be regulated, so one way to diminish the chances of attacks is by making attacks less communicative, to reduce the fear and attention that such attacks get. Ted Koppel summed this up by saying “without television, terrorism becomes rather like the philosopher’s hypothetical tree falling in the forest: no one hears it fall and therefore it has no reason for being.” (Zulaika and Douglass 2016, 7).

The ease with which one can purchase guns in America certainly contributes to political violence, and current measures fail to stop terrorists using guns. Dylann Roof purchased a gun despite a drug possession charge, which should have barred him from doing so (Stevens 2018). Other individuals, such as Omar Mateen, bought their guns legally (ICST 2012). The solution to this question is currently more of a political problem than a counterterrorism one (Astor 2019). Evidence suggests that with fewer guns there would be less gun violence, though this is debated (Brueck 2018, Fox 2018, Malcolm and Swearer 2018). However, because of the scope of this problem and how ingrained guns are into American culture, this paper will not go into a deeper discussion of this (Byman 2017).
Anders Breivik

This is only the beginning. The civil war has started. I don’t want Islam in Europe, and my fellow partisans share my views…. My operation has succeeded one hundred per cent, which is why I’m giving myself up now. But the operation itself is not important. These are just the fireworks. (Breivik, quoted in Seierstad 2015, 359-360)

Anders Breivik lived an extremely mundane life prior to the terror attack that took place in Oslo and on Utøya (Knausgaard 2015). After spending years working on his lengthy manifesto, procuring weapons and equipment, and building a bomb using YouTube tutorials, he first detonated a bomb outside the prime minister’s office in Oslo (Seierstad 2015). From there he drove to the island of Utøya, which was holding a Labour Party youth camp. Wearing a faux-police uniform he pretended to be an officer to protect the young adults at the camp, prior to opening fire indiscriminately and killing over 60 people (Juergensmeyer 2003). The manifesto he posted online laid out all his grievances, against women and the feminist movement, against Muslims and the Islamization of Europe, and against those who let this happen, governments and politicians complicit in these perceived injustices (Berwick 2011). He was arrested on Utøya an hour and a half after the shooting began without a fight, and is currently serving the maximum 21-year sentence which can be extended indefinitely (Knausgaard 2015).

The Reclusive Sympathizer

Born in Oslo in 1979 Breivik was mostly raised by a single mother whose psychological instability, marked by bouts of chaotic delusions and neuroticism, made for a difficult childhood (Gullestad 2017, Kernberg 1967). The State Center for Child and Youth Psychiatry in Norway recommended that for Anders wellbeing he should be taken away from his mother, a recommendation rejected by the court, which allowed Anders to be kept with his mother (Borchgrevink 2013).
Despite this, Breivik himself noted that he “came from a typical Norwegian middle class family” (2011, 1387). Regardless, his upbringing had a significant impact, creating an odd and at times aggressive young boy (Seierstad 2015). It is likely that being raised away from a mother who took her sexual fantasies and fears out on the young boy would have benefited Anders, who was marked, as a psychologist said, by a “complete lack of spontaneity and appearance of joy and pleasure” (Gullestad 2017, 3, Knausgaard 2015). Some argue that his beliefs stem not from prejudice but from psychosis, which can highlight the importance for proper care to assist individuals struggling with their mental health, which benefits all of society (Gullestad 2017, Rahman, Resnick and Harry 2016).

Besides minor run-ins with the police for graffiti during his teen years, Breivik was not on the radar of law enforcement and used this banality to his advantage during his later years. Furthermore, he was never integrated into any social circles during this time, always remaining on the fringe of a group and never quite fitting in (Seierstad 2015). This isolation and alienation could have contributed to the resentment towards women and foreigners that appeared as an adult (Turrettini 2015). And much like the case of McVeigh, Breivik was a lost child. Having better programs to give him guidance could have allowed him to flourish more in childhood and build relationships with more stable adults. At this time, he showed no indication of the racism or misogyny that would come to define him later. Thus, prevention techniques at this stage of his life would have centered on providing Breivik with a more stable home life and giving him the emotional support and attention children need to thrive (Winnicott 1984).

**The Online Radical**

After a falling out with a Pakistani friend as a teenager, which included an incident where Breivik was beaten up, which he claims was at the order of his former friend, Breivik became increasingly hostile towards Muslims (Turrettini 2015). This was initially a fairly pedestrian
hostility and raised no red flags; besides this, he showed no indication of having extreme views (Seierstad 2015). He made friends and led a social life typical for a young adult in Oslo. During this time he also grew increasingly interested in politics, joining the right-wing Progress Party, and dreamt of raising 3 million USD to contribute to the Norwegian Defense League (ICST 2012). To do this he began selling fraudulent diplomas but abandoned the effort when he realized he could not raise the money, and instead turned to writing a series of books on the topic of multiculturalism and the decline of Europe (Seierstad 2015).

During this time, his radicalization process and the defining of Breivik’s in-group (traditional white Europe) and out-group (feminism, multiculturalism and perpetrators of cultural Marxism) hastened (Turrettini 2015). In part, this was because of his total withdrawal and isolation from his social circles, as he spent most of his days playing the computer game World of Warcraft (ICST 2012). When friends or family tried to get him to socialize or spend time away from the computer he was hesitant and often just ignored their requests (Seierstad 2015).

It was online where Breivik found he could express himself. He started visiting white power websites like the Gates of Vienna and began commenting on articles and emailing extremist authors, his views growing more radical and extreme with time (Juergensmeyer 2003). He began calling for the deportation of all Muslims from Europe as the only way to save European cultures (Seierstad 2015). All the while he continued writing his books and conducting research in topics like “the rise of cultural Marxism/multiculturalism in Western Europe, why the Islamic colonization and Islamization of Western Europe began, … and finally solutions for Western Europe and how the resistance should move forward in the coming decades” (ICST 2012, 30).

12 “Cultural Marxism” can be difficult to define, but antisemitism and racism permeate discussions about this specter. Broadly speaking, it is the belief that Marxism will not stop at economics, and instead aim to devour cultures with multiculturalism and political correctness, resulting in a “lack of cultural self-confidence (nationalism)” and eventual erasure of white cultures (Berwick 2011, 12, Neiwert 2019).
Countering extremism online is a difficult task, because of the ease of access individuals have to materials and people’s resistance to opposing views. The EU has proposed tackling terrorist group recruitment by placing filters on what can be uploaded and imposing new laws requiring tech companies to remove terrorist content (Porter 2019). Similarly, in the US, companies are moving to ban content from white nationalists and ban or deplatform extremist domains (Liptak 2018). This leaves much of the onus of counter extremism on large companies and does not address the core issues behind extremism. Once again local community level approaches of engagement and outreach could be more beneficial. For someone as isolated as Breivik reaching him would have been difficult, but other lone wolves may have benefited from a program.

Part of the problem with this type of extremism is that these individuals are not part of a group and are generally insolated in their community, so any external assistance needs to be recommended by people close to the extremist. Many friends of Breivik knew he held radical views, but these are not inherently dangerous (Seierstad 2015). His mother was aware he was writing a book on the computer but did not fully understand the subject (Turrettini 2015). These were the only people around him, other than those he spoke to online, who could have realistically intervened had they known the depth or seriousness of his extremism (Tenold 2018).

The Loner Terrorist
As Breivik wrote his manifesto, he realized that raising awareness was not enough to solve this perceived crisis and that something needed to be done (Juergensmeyer 2003). He began to plan and compile research for an attack – a process he documented in the manifesto, including details on choosing targets, cover stories individuals can tell to prevent suspicion and pitfalls to watch out for to avoid being caught (Borchgrevink 2013). This was the most damning piece of evidence against him at the time and virtually the only thing that could have got him in
trouble, but by this point he was so isolated that the only person he contacted frequently was his mother (Ravndal 2013).

At this level of extremism, especially for lone wolves, the most effective counterterrorism tactic is human intelligence passed to law enforcement by family, friends, and bystanders who see something odd and report it (Bob 2018). His mother never asked too many questions and when she did, he gave her a convincing cover story (Seierstad 2015). Upon renting a farm to build the bomb, he generally avoided his neighbors, but he noted that if he acted personable, but distant it would lower any suspicion they might have about his odd behavior (Berwick 2011).

Breivik knew “that most attempted acts of terrorism failed … [and that] they were insufficiently planned” (Seierstad 2015, 195). To avoid this, he took painstaking care to not raise any eyebrows. He never spoke of his plan to anyone and conducted almost all aspects of the preparation phase in total seclusion (Borchgrevink 2013). He rented a rural farm so that he could start preparing his bomb and created cover stories for the weapons and equipment he was amassing (Vertigans 2016). Rather than raising suspicion by trying to hide what he was doing, he made cover stories and used his video game hobby as an excuse not to see people, when in reality he was traveling to purchase guns, fertilizer and other supplies (Belew 2018). When he bought aspirin, which contains components needed to make the bomb, he did so by buying small amounts spread over a length of time from multiple locations (Seierstad 2015). Even though the fertilizer he bought to make the bomb was flagged by law enforcement he was cleared because it was thought to be for farming (Slack 2011). Counterterrorism does not work if the only person who knows about the plan is the person conducting the plan.

One of the biggest lessons learned from the Breivik attack is that counterterrorism agencies need to be prepared for anything and have protocols in place to timely assess the situation and distribute information (ICST 2012). Following the detonation of the bomb an individual
called the police and described Breivik in great detail, including giving them the license plate number (Borchgrevink 2013). This information was passed through the channels but ultimately was overlooked and never dispersed (Seierstad 2015). In the two hour drive it took for Breivik to drive to Utøya he passed by a number of police stations and patrols in the area which could have halted the attack (Turrettini 2015). Instead, with the distraction of the bombing, he was able to get on the island and carry out his attack, which lasted another hour and a half (Berntzen and Sandberg 2014).

For a case like Breivik, counterterrorism must rely on individuals getting impatient, paranoid, or making mistakes. It took him over 80 days, working 7-8 hours a day, to build the bomb (ICST 2012). On multiple occasions he thought he was caught and was prepared to resist arrest (Seierstad 2015). It was his dedication to inflicting violence which allowed him to carry out his attack. Other normal means of capture were absent from his case, as he bought his guns and ammo legally, in some cases through the mail (Epstein 2011). He was careful to not violate any minor laws, such as traffic, while driving to the prime minister’s office. Thus, he was a unique lone wolf in that there were virtually no signals to the outside world that an attack was coming (Seierstad 2015). This made preventing or intervening in the bombing extremely difficult, however it was an abject failure of the Norwegian security forces which allowed Breivik to continue his attack and provide a tragic lesson in counterterrorism (Turrettini 2015).
Conclusion
This paper sought to examine the ways in which individuals radicalize and why they resort to violence by using the case studies of Timothy McVeigh and Anders Breivik. By looking at radicalization as a process with steps towards violence it is possible to identify links in the radicalization chain which can be exploited by counter extremism and counterterrorism programs. Furthermore, by taking a close look into terrorism and especially lone wolf terrorism, it allows for a better understanding of these phenomena and the complex set of issues which arise when trying to address them. Because of some of the differences between group terrorism and lone actor terrorism it can be beneficial for discussions of counter extremism to differentiate between those who join a group and those who carry out attacks alone. In doing so, this thesis found multiple steps at which community level engagement and outreach to lone actor extremists could have weakened extremist ties and counteracted the radicalization process. In addition, by finding these steps in the case studies, similar actions can be taken to preemptively counter extremism and prevent future attacks from happening at such a magnitude.

McVeigh as a sympathizer could have been steered away from antigovernment literature earlier in life and mentored in computer programming turning him away from forming extremist in-group/out-group dynamics. As a radical he could have been given opportunities or a support system following his life in the army in an effort to get him to avoid escalating his extremism. As a terrorist could have been turned in by any number of people aware of his increasingly violent rhetoric and those with explicit knowledge of the plan. Perhaps these individuals thought it was just talk and were afraid to call law enforcement if he was just blowing of steam (Smith 2011). Regardless, during his radicalization process there were ample chances for his path to diverge from violent extremism, but these never came to fruition.
Breivik could have been raised in a more nourishing environment rather than an often-toxic household. As a sympathizer there could have been more efforts to reach out and understand why he never quite fit in. Rather than being isolated, playing video games all day, he could have been pushed to be social and make friends instead of playing video games all day and visiting extremist websites which consumed his life for years and formed the basis for his understanding of in-group/out-group (Seierstad 2015). Because Breivik concealed much of his extremist activity from the outside world, he would have been difficult to stop during his radical phase – his crisis was internally played out with no external display. As a terrorist he was dedicated and steadfast in his self-described mission, which made deterring him from carrying it out difficult. However, once the original bombing took place, the security apparatus should have responded much faster and with more clarity (Borchgrevink 2013). Instead of the bungling mess that occurred, they should have been able to quickly identify what they were looking for and closed off the city so that he could not continue his terror spree to Utøya.

Unfortunately, patterns of radicalization will always continue. Alienation and isolation will lead to frustration, which gives way to anger and hostility and may eventually manifest into violence. So, the question for counter extremism programs is not how to stop all terrorism, but instead how to reduce the likelihood of them occurring. People will always have grievances, and some might even resort to violence, but if counterterrorism is even slightly more effective, it can have a large impact, saving lives and mitigating damage. Understanding the process towards violence can have an impact on this. The solution to solving terrorism is not stopping terrorist attacks, it is stopping people from ever becoming terrorists in the first place.
Bibliography


Archetti, Cristina. 2015. "Terrorism, Communication and New Media: Explaining Radicalization in the Digital Age." *Perspectives on Terrorism.*


*Journal of Moral Education* 101-119.


Brueck, Hilary. 2018. "Switzerland has a stunningly high rate of gun ownership — here's why it doesn't have mass shootings." Business Insider, December 11.


—. 2011. "Al-Qaeda as an Adversary do We Understand Our Enemy?" *World Politics* 139-163.


Glaser, Michaela, Frank Greuel, Dr. Maruta Herding, Sally Hohnstein, and Joachim Langner. 2017. Young and radical: Political Violence during Adolescence. München: Deutsches Jugendinstitut e.V.


RAN. 2018. *Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism.* Radicalisation Awareness Network.


Teubner, Meghann, interview by Paul Cruickshank. 2019. *A View from the CT Foxhole: Rebecca Weiner, Assistant Commissioner for Intelligence Analysis, NYPD, and*
Meghann Teubner, Director of Counterterrorism Intelligence Analysis, NYPD (January).


