Factors Contributing to the Emergence of Different Kinds of Parties Representing Ethnic Minorities in Eastern and Southeastern Europe

By

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Abstract

This thesis examines the influence of institutional and political factors on the type of parties representing ethnic minorities in six states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. This work classifies the parties representing ethnic minorities based on their stance towards integration and majority-minority relations. That allows to test whether such factors as electoral systems, ethnic politics regulations and characteristics of the party systems produce integrationist ethnic minority parties, particularistic ethnic minority parties or accommodative majority parties. Using comparative case study this thesis finds that electoral designs and ethnic politics regulations, such as reserved seats, grand coalition requirements and closed lists PR electoral systems, favour the emergence of particularistic ethnic minority parties, while ethnic party ban and open lists PR systems favour the emergence of integrationist ethnic minority parties or accommodative majority parties. The results also suggest that the party system stability and consolidation favour accommodative majority parties over integrationist ethnic minority parties. The results based on the research of six countries: Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and North Macedonia.
Acknowledgements

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Table of Contents

Abstract...........................................................................................................................................1
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................................................2
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................1
Chapter I: Theoretical Framework......................................................................................................5
   The Types of Ethnic Minority Parties ..............................................................................................5
   Electoral Systems ............................................................................................................................9
   Regulations of Ethnic Minority Politics .........................................................................................13
   Political System and Competition .................................................................................................14
   Methodological framework ...........................................................................................................16
Chapter II: Empirical Analysis ..........................................................................................................19
   Electoral System.............................................................................................................................21
      Type of Electoral System .........................................................................................................21
      Closed vs Open Lists ...............................................................................................................23
      Electoral Threshold ...................................................................................................................25
   Ethnic Politics Regulations ...........................................................................................................27
      Ethnic Parties Bans ..................................................................................................................27
      Reserved Seats for Minorities: .................................................................................................29
      Grand Ethnic Coalition Requirement ......................................................................................31
   Political Systems and Party Competition ......................................................................................34
      Intra-Ethnic Competition ...........................................................................................................35
      Ethnic Majority Rivals ..............................................................................................................36
   Chapter Summary ...........................................................................................................................37
Chapter III: Analysis and Discussion of Results ..............................................................................38
   Integrative Analysis .......................................................................................................................38
      Integrationist Party Without Competition ..............................................................................39
      Integrationist and Particularistic Parties ...................................................................................40
      Accommodative Party ..............................................................................................................43
      Particularistic Parties ...............................................................................................................45
      Centripetalism and Consocialism ...............................................................................................46
   The Future of the Ethnic Minority Parties ......................................................................................47
   Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................51
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................55
Introduction

Ethnic politics are often thought of and researched in their association with such important and pressing issues as conflict, competition and hostility. The outbidding mechanism states that in the situation where there are several parties appealing to the same ethnicity, there is a very high risk that those parties would radicalize to be seen as the major defenders of particular ethnicity (Mitchell, 1995). Using the similar logic, Bates (1974) suggests that political competition undoubtedly arouses ethnic conflicts in the worst cases leading to civil wars.

The nationalism as an ideology is thought to be the main driving force behind ethnic parties and ethnic politics. Despite the first impression of the mainly destructive and alienating nature of nationalism, different kinds of nationalism have been distinguished and studied by many prominent political scientists and scholars of other merging disciplines. Anderson (1983) distinguished between creole, ethnolinguistic and imperial nationalisms, Kohn (1985) between “liberal, civic Western” and “illiberal, ethnic Eastern” nationalisms. There are many other dimensions which make important distinctions between various subtypes of nationalism and emphasizing different ideas and dimensions of nation and nationalism. Even though it is difficult to imagine one exhaustive conceptualization and classification of nationalism, at least we can say about some consensus on the complexity and multeity of that issue.

At the same time, such differentiating logic is usually not represented in the classification of the minority parties. Very often ethnic parties are imagined to be similar in their goals and actions – protecting their ethnicity interest and differing only in the identity they represent. For example, Gunther and Diamond (2003) in their typology describe ethnicity-based parties as the non-programmatic parties using existing state structures to channel benefits
towards their particularistically defined electoral clientele and seeking the votes only within their ethnic group. The authors argue that any attempt of those parties to run candidates in other geographic constituencies, or raise larger national or even ideological issues, are made to half-heartedly hide their true goals and identity (Gunther and Diamond 2003). Those parties do not support the outright separation and try to acquire benefits through the existing state system. As the electorate of those parties is limited to a population of a particular ethnic minority, they rarely become mainstream parties and as they do not have specific programmatic claims, politics of those parties are usually centered around charismatic individuals (Gunther and Diamond, 2003).

Kitschelt (2001) reports similar characteristics labelling ethnic parties of Eastern Europe as particularistic sociocultural parties which serve the interest of very specific segments of the society with limited and identifiable constituencies and avoidance of economic policy questions in order to avoid any splits in their electorate. Horowitz (1998) claims that ethnically based parties oriented exclusively toward the welfare of the group represented are common in the divided societies where ethnic politics are seen as a zero-sum game for redistributing the resources. All those images of ethnic minority parties make the existence of inclusive ethnic minority parties serving not only the interests of particular ethnicity, but of the whole society at least unexpected and at most impossible. Horowitz (1998) even claims that even the parties which start as pan-ethnic or multi-ethnic will eventually become ethnically based, irrespective of the initial wishes of party leaders and often in explicit contradiction to their ideas as the electorate would always prefer monoethnic parties.

However, other researchers point to the differences between various ethnic minority parties. Rovny (2014) distinguishes between economically right and left ethnic minorities and between ethnic minorities coming from a federal and unitary state of the origin finding that those differences shape the political axis of competition of those states. Moreover, the empirical
cases drawn from the Eastern European politics show some examples of intra-ethnic party competition, when the same ethnicity may be represented by ethnic political parties different along non-ethnic lines (Bochsler, 2012) and examples of inclusive or accommodative ethnic parties which manage to overcome strict ethnic boundaries and become major political forces, as in the cases of Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016).

Many studies in that field consider how electoral rules and institutional designs influence ethnic politics and more specifically types of the parties that emerge in different institutional settings. There are several studies finding the factors causing the emergence of several ethnic parties from the same ethnicity (Bochsler 2012) or the mixed-ethnic parties (Bochsler 2006), economically right or left oriented ethnic minority parties (Rovny 2014). At the same time, there are not many studies identifying the emergence of different on their views on integration and majority-minority relations ethnic minority parties. One of those studies is the comparative study of four countries of Central and Eastern Europe by Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) explaining the emergence of different ethnic minority party types in those states.

Using the typology of ethnic parties developed by Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) which captures the attitudes of ethnic parties towards integration and cooperation between ethnic majorities and minorities this thesis aims to find the characteristics of the political systems in Central and Eastern Europe favouring different types of ethnic parties. The study partially replicates the study of Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) adding additional cases of Bulgaria and North Macedonia into the sample and analysing the factors as electoral systems, ethnic minority politics regulations and the competition with other ethnic parties. Some of those features were not analysed in that context before and thus may shed a new light on the understanding of the different types of ethnic minority representation.
The differences between states, which may influence the type of the ethnic party, are studied using the comparative case study. The Methods of Agreement (MoA) and Difference (MoD) (Landman 2005) are used to distinguish the factors necessary and facilitating for the emergence of specific ethnic party type.

The results of this study generally support the previous findings of Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) which suggest that the particularistic ethnic minority parties are likely to emerge in the states which positively discriminate the ethnic minorities, encouraging their political representation while even-handed approach enables the emergence of integrationist ethnic-minority parties.

At the same time, this thesis establishes the effects of ethnic party bans, grand coalition requirements not discussed by Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016), finds significant effect of the ballot structure and finds some evidence on the influence of the party system consolidation on the emergence of integrationist minority and accommodative majority parties.

The first chapter of this thesis explains the typology of the parties representing ethnic minorities, discusses the factors as characteristics of electoral systems, ethnic politics regulations and competition in the ethnic politics which are expected to affect the ethnic party type. The chapter concludes with additional information on the research design. The second chapter proceeds with testing the effect of the factors discussed in the first chapter on the type of ethnic representation. The third chapter analyses those factors together as sets identifying the effects of different systems. The short discussion of the results considering consocialist and centripetalist approaches and some predictions of the future of the ethnic parties in Central and Eastern Europe close the third chapter. Conclusions state the main findings of the work, highlight the author’s contribution, answer possible criticism and suggest the ways for future research.
Chapter I: Theoretical Framework

The Types of Ethnic Minority Parties

This work uses the typology of ethnic parties offered by Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) which distinguishes between four types of parties, in relation to ethnic minority populations based on the source of the impetus of the party (majority/minority) and on the view towards minority integration (inclusive/exclusive). This classification offers four types: particularistic EMP, integrationist EMP, national (exclusive) ethnic majority party and accommodative ethnic majority party.

That distinction serves well to describe the integrationist strategies of minority parties in Eastern and Central Europe. The widespread distinction between moderate and radical minority parties serves well to describe the parties’ stands on the use of violence and unconventional tactics. Even though parties which use moderate tactics may often correlate with minority inclusive parties and vice versa, it is important to keep the distinction between classifications of parties based on tactics and views on integration. Another possible alternative is the differentiating between ethnic minority parties and mixed-ethnic parties (Bochsler 2006) which in practice often coincide with the particularistic and integrationist parties typology, but that distinction still does not inform us on the motives and goals of those parties on the ethnic inclusion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Types of Parties, in Relation to Ethnic-Minority Populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impetus from minority group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic ethnic-minority party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impetus from majority group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben, 2016)
The authors of the typology do not describe each type separately, but rather locate the ethnic parties along the two axes (Table 1). The vertical axis distinguishes between parties that articulate ethnic-minority interests and those that do not. The horizontal axis distinguishes exclusivity or inclusiveness in terms of the party’s broader electoral appeal (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016, 386).

The typology could benefit from more specific criteria which I suggest identifying in the next paragraphs (Table 2). Following Sartori (1984) I suggest dividing the defining and contingent features of the different types of the concepts which in my case are integrationist and particularistic ethnic-minority parties. I also suggest distinguishing common attributes of the different kinds of ethnic minority parties which unlike contingent features describe rather external attributes of the different kinds of ethnic-minority parties.

At a very important level, there are defining features suggested by Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016, 388) without which the party cannot be classified as integrationist – the promotion of cooperation between minority and majority groups, and the appeal to voters outside of that group. It is also important to mention that those parties must be initiated and created by the ethnic minorities, otherwise, the parties with the same features with the impetus from the ethnic majority would be classified as Accommodative Majority Party. That means that the Accommodative Majority Party may be very similar to the Integrationist Ethnic Minority Party and many of the features of the electoral, legal or political systems of states would be favourable for the both types of the parties.

Beyond these defining features represented in the Table 2, integrationist minority parties may or may not share and promote some common features and attributes which I suggest analysing in order to enhance and contribute to the basic typology suggested by Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016). For example, those common features for the integrationist
parties may be bilingual education, biculturalism, requirements for the same rights and rules for the representativeness of ethnic minorities, religious freedoms, weak links with the kin state. Those elements may vary from country to country and from party to party and even when all integrationist EMPs resemble each other, they are not the same.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of the Party</th>
<th>Integrationist ethnic-minority party</th>
<th>Particularistic ethnic-minority party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defining Features</td>
<td>• Promotion of cooperation between minority and majority groups, • Appeal to voters outside of the ethnic group • Impetus from the ethnic minority</td>
<td>• Promotion of the minority interests • Appeal to the voters within the ethnic group • Impetus from the ethnic minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent Features</td>
<td>• Bilingual education, • Biculturalism, • Promoting the same rights and rules for the representativeness of ethnic minorities • Religious freedoms • Weak links with the kin state</td>
<td>• Education in the language of minority or bilingual education • Cultural autonomy • Minority rights • Strong links with the kin state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Attributes</td>
<td>• Non-ethnic party name • Emphasis on the cooperation, integration in the party name • Bilingual party name • Party members of different ethnicities</td>
<td>• Ethnic party name • Use of the minority language dominates • Party consists predominantly from the ethnic minority politicians • Use of kin state symbols (flags, anthems)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Defining features by (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben, 2016)

Furthermore, there are many common attributes which are often shared by the integrationist EMPs but are not necessary and are rather external. For example, many of those parties, unlike their particularistic counterparts, do not include the name of the ethnicity into the name of the party. Ishiyama and Breuning (2011) studied the values of the supporters of the ethnic parties in the post-communist politics which did and did not include any notion of ethnic exclusivity in their names and found that the supporters of the latter were more supportive and satisfied with democracy in their countries. The study of Ishiyama and Breuning
(2011) also gives an idea that there is a special cluster of ethnic parties defined by non-ethnic names with the different from the other ethnic parties' views on democracy and citizenship.

The names of many of the integrationist parties emphasize the value of cooperation and mutual understanding. There are several ethnic parties from the region with the names in translation referring to harmony, coexistence, bridge. That may be a clear marker, to recognize the integrationist EMP. However, as the naming may depend on the very specific national context that attribute should not be part of the definition.

One more common feature of the integrationist EMPs is the presence of the politicians of different ethnic backgrounds in the party lists. It can be often easily observed as the family names often signal the ethnicity of the politicians and it may be an instrument for parties to show their integrationist and multi-cultural values by including the candidates of the different ethnicities into their party lists (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016, 388).

Integrationist EMPs seem to contradict the mainstream ideas about ethnic and ethnic minority politics discussed in the introduction. In some sense, that is an unusual study, as integrationist political parties are not very widespread and are not represented in many countries. At the same time that is a useful unique study to explain the nature of ethnic politics in general.

The understanding of the integration and integrationism may also be discussed as that work uses the civic understanding of integration which presuppose the incorporation on the level of individuals while integration can alternatively be understood as the process that incorporates autonomous societies or regions.

Unlike the traditional image of particularistic ethnic parties, the integrationist ones are not or less limited to the nominative ethnic categories of the voters, have wider political interests than only extracting the benefits for their community and in some cases may become
the major political forces of the country. That type of ethnic political party may be contributing to the lower levels of ethnic violence and less sharp ethnically based political conflicts in the political systems where they operate.

The supporters of the integrationist EMPs would prefer the integrationist and stabilizing effect of those parties emphasizing the multicultural cooperation while the opponents may argue that the integrationist EMPs deprive smaller ethnicities of representation because bigger minorities usually take the leading roles in the integrationist EMPs and that integrationist EMPs may lower the chances of the ethnic minorities to protect their collective rights by justifying the assimilative actions of the states. Even though those questions are not in the focus of that study, the results of that research may contribute to the debate.

**Electoral Systems**

Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) examine which electoral systems and demographic characteristics contribute to the emergence of the integrationist EMPs and come to the conclusion that electoral systems and territorial concentration on their own do not seem to adequately explain which type emerges in particular cases. Nevertheless, as that study heavily relies on their research, it would be helpful to discuss their assumptions and findings in a more detailed way.

First, before the analysis, Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) expect PR systems to favour small ethnic parties in general, disregarding their views on ethnic integration or autonomy, but they also expect more specific characteristics to have an additional effect. Firstly, if the size of the ethnic minority is less than or close to the electoral threshold, then a particularistic ethnic party may have difficulty being elected without exceptional mobilization or reaching out to other segments of the society. Secondly, if the entire country is treated as one large electoral district, minorities cannot capitalize on their geographic concentration in a specific region. The
authors claim that the more PR districts are available in the electoral structure of the country, the bigger the chances of the ethnic parties, especially small and regional particularistic parties. Some of the variants of the PR system which allow voters to choose individual candidates on the party lists could encourage the selection of the candidates whose ethnic origin is visible in some densely populated by the ethnic minorities regions. The same effect may be reached with the Mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems in the districts where the ethnic minority dominates (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016).

Among other characteristics, authors analyse the order in which party lists are made, as in the Latvian case selection of the party list is done first and determines the final outcome while In the Estonian case it is opposite and is more favourable for the ethnic parties, because the selection of the individual candidate is done first, and this determines the proportional distribution between parties (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016). Another important factor is the presence of the reserved seats in the legislature for the ethnic minorities, which are not represented otherwise (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016).

Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) assume that despite the expectations to see the emergence of a particularistic ethnic minority party in Estonia and Latvia, due to the nature of the PR system and the larger share of the ethnic minority groups in the voting population (among the four parties they analysed including Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania) they find Hungarian ethnic particularistic parties have constantly entered national parliaments in Romania, but not in Latvia and Estonia.

To explain those results which contradict the expectations Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) refer to the way that states and majority political parties treat those minorities and the way in which it shapes the kind of ethnic minority representation that emerges. By that broad category, they mean factors broader than just electoral systems as the policies of the state.
towards ethnic minorities. They categorize those types of treatment into the three categories which include: (1) instances where the state and its policies discriminate between different minority groups; (2) cases where the state seeks to asymmetrically co-opt portions of a particular minority ethnic group; and (3) situations in which the state pursues an even-handed approach to different ethnic groups and subgroups within particular ethnic minorities (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016).

The authors conclude that in the cases, where states practice asymmetric approaches towards ethnic minorities, ethnic particularistic parties were emerging, while in the situation, where the approach was non-discriminative, inclusive ethnic minority parties were more likely to emerge (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016).

Following the call of Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016, 399) for the confirmation in further cases in future studies. I suggest replicating their study according to the recommendations of King (2006) with the additional cases of Bulgaria and North Macedonia from the same region and with additional factors considered. I plan to revisit some of the characteristics of the electoral systems which have proven to influence the type of the ethnic minority parties emerging in those states. Some of the factors from the previous studies as the share of minority population and the number of electoral constituencies are not discussed in this thesis as they did not demonstrate significant effect on the outcomes.

The study of the electoral systems in the context of divided societies is often concerned with answering the question, how different electoral designs would influence the ethnic party politics and which designs are the best to stimulate democracy and stability in the divided societies. The commonly used concept of ethnic engineering reflects that idea emphasizing the role of the institutional design on ethnic politics in a state (Bochsler, 2012). Lijphart (1991) declares
that there is a consensus among scholars that list PR electoral systems are most favourable options for democracy in divided societies because it:

*makes it possible for minorities to be fairly represented, and it encourages the development of a multiparty system in which coalition governments, based on compromises among the minorities, have to be formed. Parliamentary systems entail collegial cabinets that are the best sites for coalitions of the leaders of the minorities (Lijphart 1991).*

Centripetalists enhance the mechanism called vote pooling which occurs when political leaders try to attract the votes of different that their own group (Bogaards, 2019). In terms of institutional designs vote pooling can be encouraged when there are not enough voters from the same group to form a party which can be elected so political actors are encouraged to search for support outside of their group. Based on that logic, centripetalists, including Horowitz, favour the majoritarian alternative vote system or PR single- transferable vote (STV) system as those designs encourage vote pooling (Bogaards 2019). Centripetal institutions based on AV and STV are rare (Bogaards 2019); however, some mechanisms encouraging at least some degree of vote pooling and though multi-ethnic cooperation are more common. For example, Bochsler (2018) analyses the elections in the cities of South-European countries as runoff elections have many similar features, as candidates are elected only with an absolute majority of votes in the first round, and voters have the opportunity to express a second preference if the second round of voting takes place. The candidates with few votes leave the elections and the leading candidates are encouraged to compete for their votes. So, if we agree that the integrationist EMPs follow the centripetal logic in the divided societies, it is very likely that such electoral designs as AV, STV and in some cases the runoff elections would be a good soil for integrationist parties.

The findings from Bochsler’s (2011) analysis of the ethnic parties in the Central and Eastern Europe also suggest that the electoral systems with large electoral thresholds and small
electoral districts usually favour large ethnic minorities who live at certain territory where they are a local majority. Sometimes, the parties of the larger minorities may even incorporate the representatives or interests of the smaller minorities as the parties of the smaller minorities cannot pass the threshold. Alternatively, small and dispersed minorities can get to the parliament through the reserved minority seats.

As the electoral systems have many various characteristics, I suggest concentrating on several of them as the general type of the electoral system (Proportional Representation, Plurality/Majority, Mixed, STV), type of the party lists (open or closed) and the ability of the voters to choose within those lists and the presence and size of the electoral threshold.

**Regulations of Ethnic Minority Politics**

First of all, I agree that the electoral system factors are not enough to explain the discrepancies between those countries, but at the same time the explanation of the treatment by the state and major political parties by Nedelcu & DeBardeleben is too broad, lacks clarity and preciseness and can clearly be divided into several explanations (for state and major political parties separately).

I suggest that institutional arrangements and regulations of ethnic minority parties act in the similar way to the electoral rules and affect the emergence of specific type of ethnic minority parties in a very similar way. Surprisingly, Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) only superficially mention the concept of the consocialism in their work and do not include it into their analysis even so their results may be easily interpreted through the lenses of consociationalism and centripetalism.

For example, Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) distinguish the significant influence of the asymmetric approaches towards ethnic minorities as preferential reserved seats which are usually associated with the corporate consocialism which according to McCulloch (2012)
accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria, such as ethnicity or religion. As result of the Nedelcu & DeBardeleben’s (2016) study demonstrate, those policies were the most favourable for the emergence of particularistic EMPs. At the same time, the symmetric state policies with no special rules for the ethnic minorities contributed to the emergence of integrationist EMPs in Slovakia and Latvia (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016). There is a temptation to analyse those institutions as centripetalist, but we must be very careful, as the absence of consocialism does not automatically mean centripetalism (Bogaards 2019). However, if we look deeper into individual cases and see how the representatives of the other ethnic minorities as Romas, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Belarusians were supporting the integrationist EMPs in Latvia and Slovakia as they did not have a legislative representation of their own minorities (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016), 398), we would see a clear example of vote pooling favoured by the centripetalists and high electoral thresholds at the level of 5% allowing the functioning of that mechanism.

I suggest studying the effect of the ethnic minority politics regulations which in the cases analysed are represented by the ethnic minority ban, reserved seats mechanism and the grand coalition requirement.

**Political System and Competition**

Another dimension, in which Nedelcu & DeBardeleben’s (2016) analysis can be improved, is the analytical separation of state and political factors influencing the patterns of ethnic representation. If the state influence can be conceptualized as the electoral system and legal institutions of the different states, the political factors are affiliated with the less formalized political landscape of different countries which does not have to be legally determined, however, may still have common patterns.
One of the suggestions regarding which political system factors are important for the emergence of integrationist EMP comes from the Koev’s (2014) study of Bulgarian parties which explains the success of the integrationist Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) partly as a backlash from the activities of national (exclusive) ethnic majority party Ataka. To be more precise, respondents among scholars and political actors were pointing to the interplay between exclusive Ataka and integrationist DPS as a key factor in the favourable electoral outcomes achieved by both parties as the controversial statements made by the leaders of those parties would mobilize their electoral bases (Koev 2014, 162). On a more theoretical and generalized level that would mean, that the active and salient exclusive ethnic majority party would justify integrationist EMP. Such model is possible and especially relevant for the post-communist and post-socialist systems where the ethnic cleavages of the politics coexist with the economic or social ones. The importance of those cleavages may change with time due to the instability of the political system (Zsolt & Bértoa 2018) and the situation within one cleavage can influence the party competition in the others (Rovny 2014).

Another mechanism that may contribute to the emergence of the integrationist ethnic minority party is the intra-group ethnic competition in which integrationist EMPs compete with their more particularistic counterparts from the same ethnic minority (Bochsler 2012). That would mean that the integrationist EMP would not emerge in the situation where there is or were no more particularistic parties representing the same ethnicity, while the existence of the particularistic parties without their more integrationist competitors is possible.

Researching the factors contributing to the emergence of the ethnic minority parties it is not feasible to cover all the potential reasons. Having that in mind I suggest focussing on the most measurable and generalizable factors which would reoccur in different cases. At the same time, I am aware that there are many other important factors which cannot be fully discovered in my study due to the limits in time, space and the need to be precise and concise. Those
factors highlighted in the literature are the extensive, professional and the organizational structure, quality of the leadership (Koev 2014), financing regimes, membership strategies (Sikk 2006).

**Methodological framework**

This paper uses a comparative case study to examine conditions for the emergence and success of integrationist ethnic-minority parties. The design of this work includes the use of both Methods of Agreement (MoA) and Difference (MoD) (Landman 2005). The method of difference is used to compare similar countries where minority inclusive parties did or did not emerge and gain success. That would allow answering the questions what characteristics are needed for the emergence of the outcome. The method of the agreement would make possible to specify which conditions are necessary and would help to understand the mechanisms behind them.

The outcome or the independent variable in the study is the presence of the specific type of ethnic party in the political system of the state. The party is defined present when the representatives of that party are elected to the legislature of that state. The participation in the governmental coalitions may serve as an additional sign of success and used in addition to the main successful presence variable.

The study includes a few dependent variables divided into three categories: electoral rules, ethnic minority politics regulations and the competition with the other ethnic parties. The study of electoral systems is aimed at capturing the characteristics of the electoral systems and institutions which may contribute to the emergence and success of the electoral parties such as the electoral system, structure of the ballot and the electoral threshold. Ethnic minority politics regulations analysed include reserved ethnic minority seats, legal ban on ethnic parties and grand coalition requirements. The political factors include the active particularistic ethnic
majority party or particularistic ethnic minority party representing the same ethnicity as competitors. The general plan of the study is summarized in the Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Ethnic Politics Regulations</th>
<th>Ethnic Competition</th>
<th>Ethnic Minority Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Electoral System</td>
<td>Threshold</td>
<td>Encourage</td>
<td>Exclusionist MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Integrationist MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Particularist MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accommodative MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
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</table>

A comparative case study is going to be followed by more in-depth studies of some cases to see how the examined factors work in the cases where specific types of parties emerged and what happens in the cases in which there are some unsuccessful attempts of some type of ethnic minority representation.

The cases of the study have some shared characteristics which allow to unite them into specific category. The states analysed are young post-communist or post-socialist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The common trait of the countries studied is the large share of ethnic minorities with predominant ethnic minority in each case living densely in some regions of the respected countries. Those characteristics are important for the effects of the factors analysed and even though the countries were not compared across such factors as the presence
of ethnic minority populations and the patterns of their settlement because they are similar for those countries, they are still important for the effects of the factors analysed.

The selection of cases was done with the intention to have varying outcomes with the emphasis on the systems with the rare and varying institutional and political characteristics. That means that the frequencies of the specific outcomes and scenarios cannot be extrapolated and generalized to the other cases. For example, even though the cases with the integrationist EMPs are rare, they represent the half of the cases within that study.
Chapter II: Empirical Analysis

This chapter offers a comparison of the six states on eight criteria. Analysing those features of different cases and matching those features with different outcomes allows us to detect, which factors are necessary or supportive for the emergence of the integrationist or particularistic EMPs. Even though there are six states, the number of cases for some comparisons may be bigger as some states are studied as different cases in different points of time according to their characteristics.

The independent variable in each of the cases is the emergence of a particular type of ethnic party according to the Nedelcu & DeBardeleben’s (2016) typology. Table 5 offers the parties following one of the four types of the typology in all six countries studied since the emergence of those parties since the first post-communist or post-socialist elections and until 2020. Table 4 explains the process and the logic behind the classification of the parties. The parties were classified as one of the types of ethnic parties if they were matching the main features. The comments on the most difficult coding decisions are represented in the footnotes for the Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4</th>
<th>Classification of the Parties Based on their View on the Integration of Ethnic Minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Party is initiated by the ethnic minority</td>
<td>Party supports special ethnic minority rights for the minority and some degree of ethnic autonomy, represents minority interest, does not attract the votes of other ethnicities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrationist EMP</td>
<td>Nationalist (exclusionist) MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic EMP</td>
<td>Accommodative MP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on the typology of Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Integrationist EMPs</th>
<th>Particularistic EMPs</th>
<th>Accommodative EMPs</th>
<th>Exclusionist majority Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement – Coexistence, MKP: Hungarian Coalition Party (before radicalization in 2008)¹, Most-Hid (Bridge)</td>
<td>MKP: Hungarian Coalition Party since 2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Slovak National Party, Kotleba's People-People's Party Our Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Our Home is Estonia</td>
<td>Estonian Centre Party</td>
<td>Conservative People's Party of Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greater Romania Party, Romanian National Unity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>Democratic Union for Integration (DUI)³, Movement Besa, Alliance for Albanians, Democratic Party of the Albanians (DPA)</td>
<td>Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM)⁴</td>
<td></td>
<td>TMORO-VEP, TMRO, the People's Movement of Macedonia⁵</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data on the presence or absence of certain parties in the sample is retrieved from the database “Parties and Elections in Europe” Nordsieck (2020)

¹MKP: Hungarian Coalition Party is present in the study both as Integrationist and Particularistic ethnic minority party. Before 2008 the party seemed to be more similar to a integrationist SMP. After 2008 leading members of MKP including the leader of the party accused MKP of the ethnic radicalization and left to create a new and less radical party Most-Hid. For more information see Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016)

²PCTVL is also difficult to classify as it was the coalition of both particularistic and integrationist Russian parties which split into different parties later

³Despite the name, Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) seems to be a typical minority interest Albanian party in North Macedonia formed by former insurgency leaders. The integrationist component is seen rather on the level of elites, where DUI politicians cooperate with the Macedonian mainstream parties. For more details see Irwin (2006)

⁴There seem to be no stable accommodative majority parties, but there is a common practice of forming electoral coalitions where major Macedonian parties as Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity and Social Democratic Union of Macedonia would run together with smaller Roma political parties of, Turks, Vlachs, Serbs or even would try to reach pre-electoral agreements with some Albanian parties. For more information see Andeva 2015

⁵All of those parties participated in the coalitions with Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity for more information see Saveski and Sadiku 2012
**Electoral System**

The previous analysis by Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) concluded that the type of electoral system and territorial concentration on their own do not seem to adequately explain which type of ethnic party emerges in particular cases. This expanded analysis includes cases of Bulgaria and North Macedonia and compares them on such characteristics of electoral systems as the type of electoral system, whether there are open or closed party lists and the electoral thresholds.

**Type of Electoral System**

First, we will discuss the type of the ethnic minority party with relation to the type of the electoral system. In Table 6 each case represents the country with particular electoral systems (for example, Bulgaria with list PR and with Parallel systems would be different cases). According to the expectations stated in the first chapter, the PR electoral systems should contribute to the emergence of particularistic ethnic minority parties, while the electoral designs as AV, STV and in some cases the runoff elections would contribute the integrationist parties.

All the cases, in which integrationist EMPs emerged were either List PR or Mixed systems. Nevertheless, accommodative majority party was also successful in Estonia which has List PR electoral system. Particularistic EMPs were emerging in all kinds of electoral systems present in the study including list PR, parallel and plurality systems.

The case of North Macedonia is particularly interesting to the study as during different elections it experienced Plurality, Parallel and List PR electoral systems, but those changes still did not change the types of ethnic minority representation in the country. Even during the plurality election in 1990 and 1994, the Albanian ethnic minority of the country was
represented by particularistic parties and the eventual change towards PR electoral system
despite expectations did not radically change the representation of Albanians in national
politics (Wagner 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Years of Election</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Integrationist EMPs</th>
<th>Particularistic EMPs</th>
<th>Accommodative MPs</th>
<th>Exclusionist MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2008, 2012,</td>
<td>Mixed (MMP)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2008, 2012</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>1990, 1994</td>
<td>Plurality/ Majority</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1990, 1994</td>
<td>As part of electoral coalitions</td>
<td>As part of electoral coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Parallel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>As part of electoral coalitions</td>
<td>As part of electoral coalitions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data on the electoral systems is retrieved from the "Electoral System Design Database | International IDEA;
data on the presence or absence of certain parties in the sample is retrieved from the database “Parties and Elections in Europe” Nordsieck (2020)

⁶ Since Romania has bicameral legislature, the lower chamber is represented in the analysis
The similar situation happened in Romania, where even in the situation of the mixed system candidates of Hungarian ethnic parties were managing to gain representation through the majoritarian electoral districts populated mostly by ethnic Hungarians (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016).

There is also a case of STV system used in Estonia in 1990 even before the restoration of independence (Taagepera 1996). Taagepera (1996) indicates that this case offers only limited insights because of the haphazard way of adopting STV in Estonia, and very short period of using it.

Closed vs Open Lists

Within PR electoral systems, there are significant differences in the way party lists are formed which may influence the results for ethnic minorities. The next section compares whether different states have open or closed lists PR systems and how it corresponds to the type of elected minority party.

Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) have noticed that the way how PR works in different states may contribute to the explanation of conditions needed for the emergence of ethnic parties. As it was suggested in the first chapter, different types of ballot structures may emphasise the choice of parties over candidates and vice versa.

The analysis of the ballot structures in Table 7 displays strong evidence that integrationist MPs or accommodative MPs emerged in all the cases, where either open lists or some degree of preferential voting is practised. Contrary to this, we can see a complete dominance of particularistic ethnic minority parties in the closed lists systems as well as majoritarian systems.
Table 7
Type of PR System and type of the ethnic party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Ballot Structure</th>
<th>Integrationist MPs</th>
<th>Particularistic EMPs</th>
<th>Accommodative MPs</th>
<th>Exclusionist MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Single preference option for proportional part of the voting</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>1990, 1994</td>
<td>Plurality (33%)</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>1990, 1994</td>
<td>As part of electoral coalitions</td>
<td>As part of electoral coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Closed Lists</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>As part of electoral coalitions</td>
<td>As part of electoral coalitions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data on the type of electoral system is retrieved from the IFES Election Guide (2020) and ODIHR reports; data on the presence or absence of certain parties in the sample is retrieved from the database “Parties and Elections in Europe” Nordsieck (2020)

The only exception from the rule is the accommodative majority party in Estonia which did also emerge in the open list PR system. Nevertheless, it does not ruin the general pattern of PR closed lists systems favouring particularistic parties as integrationist ethnic minority parties and accommodative ethnic majority parties share many similarities and as the analysis shows,
the accommodative party may emerge in the same electoral systems, as particularistic and integrationist EMPs.

It is quite surprising that Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) did not consider the ballot structure as one of the major conditions cooccurring with the integrationist MPs. That may have happened due to the treatment of accommodative majority and integrationist minority parties as the very different types expecting to see clearly diverse conditions favouring those two types of parties. Another detail which did not allow Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) to make a clearer conclusion on that matter in the case of Slovakia. Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016, 389) code Slovakia as PR and not as a list or personalized PR as they code Latvia and Estonia in Table 3 of their article summarizing the electoral systems of their cases. At the same time, the authors (2016, 391) do highlight the preference voting and increase of its importance since 2004 when the threshold for the candidate to be able to influence the order in his or her political party was lowered.

The addition to the cases of Bulgaria and North Macedonia to the sample makes the tendency even more representative as Bulgaria with the ability to indicate preference in the party-list has successful integrationist party and North Macedonia with the closed lists PR system has many particularistic parties and some tendencies towards accommodative coalitions as well (Andeva 2015).

Electoral Threshold

The influence of electoral thresholds on the success of the ethnic parties discussed in the first chapter helped to establish some expectations about its effects on the success of the integrationist EMPs. According to the expectations, higher thresholds are expected to encourage vote pooling (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016, 398). At the same time, higher thresholds are often benefitting larger ethnic minorities, populations of which allow those
parties to pass the threshold, threatening the representation of the smaller ethnic minorities at the same time (Bochsler, 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Legal Threshold</th>
<th>Integrationist MPs</th>
<th>Particularistic EMPs</th>
<th>Accommodative MPs</th>
<th>Exclusionist MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (electoral coalitions)</td>
<td>Yes (electoral coalitions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data on the electoral systems is retrieved from the "Electoral System Design Database | International IDEA; data on the presence or absence of certain parties in the sample is retrieved from the database “Parties and Elections in Europe” Nordsieck (2020)

The data on the electoral thresholds is summarized in Table 8. Despite the initial expectations, the method of differences does not allow us to conclude the necessity of the high threshold for the emergence of the integrationist EMP as that kind of party was elected through the electoral systems with both electoral thresholds of 5% and 4%. At the same time, the particularistic EMPs were emerging in the systems with electoral thresholds on the level of 5% and with absent legal thresholds.

Nevertheless, legal thresholds appeared to be contributive to the vote pooling in combination with the absence of special ethnic seats for ethnic minorities not large enough to have their ethnic parties passing the threshold. In Slovakia that situation resulted in Hungarian ethnic parties taking on the responsibility to represent Roma or Ruthenian minority interests (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016, 396). In Bulgaria the predominantly Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms also campaign in the Roma and Pomaks (a group which has a Bulgarian

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ethnicity but Islamic religion) regions (Spirova, 2016). The similar situation also happens in Latvia and Estonia where Ukrainian and Belarusian ethnic minorities not able to secure their own ethnic representation in the legislatures usually side with the Russian ethnic minority due to similar interests, language and cultural proximity (Sikk & Bochsler 2008).

It can be concluded that the electoral threshold does not have a decisive effect on the emergence of particular type of the ethnic party but may be a favourable condition in combination with the other factors, as the absence of guarantees of representation for the small minorities.

In general, the results suggest that the electoral systems do not completely predetermine the type of the ethnic parties, however, there are some significant tendencies which allow us to say that some of the elements of electoral systems. For example, open lists PR systems with the ability of voters to show their preferences for particular candidates are more favourable for the integrationist EMP. The case of Bulgaria also demonstrates, how the ban on ethnic parties, not allowing for the emergence of particularistic EMPs, may compensate for the unfavourable effects of the closed lists system for the integrationist parties. Closed list PR systems appear to favour the emergence of particularistic EMPs.

**Ethnic Politics Regulations**

**Ethnic Parties Bans**

There are different views on how the bans on the formation of electoral parties affect conflicts and democracy. As the ethnic conflicts are often associated with the particularistic nature of the ethnic politics, the bans on the ethnic party ban often aimed to offset negative effects of the ethnic polarization of the society (Bogaards 2007). At the same time, researchers find such measure as bans of the ethnic parties not the best mechanism (Bogaards 2007), or
even mechanism that rather promotes than mitigates the ethnic conflicts (Basedau and Morooff 2011).

Among all the observed cases, the ban on the ethnic parties exists only in one state – Bulgaria and is absent from the other cases (Table 9). The Constitution of Bulgaria in article eleven, part four states that there “shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines” (National Assembly Of The Republic Of Bulgaria – Constitution, translated into English).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Ban on Ethnic Parties</th>
<th>Integrationist MPs</th>
<th>Particularistic EMPs</th>
<th>Accommodative MPs</th>
<th>Exclusionist MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (electoral coalitions)</td>
<td>Yes (electoral coalitions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data on the presence or absence of certain parties in the sample is retrieved from the database “Parties and Elections in Europe” Nordsieck (2020)

Despite the ban on the ethnic parties, there is a functioning integrationist EMP - The Movement for Rights and Freedoms. The party was formed immediately after the democratic transition in 1989, has been present in all parliaments since 1990. Despite the fact the party was formed as a Turkish minority party, it was successful to win a share of vote and seats often well above the proportion of the Turkish minority in the country (Spirova, 2016, 154).

The details on the Movement for Rights and Freedoms avoiding the ban is also interesting and contributing to the study. Although Bulgarian constitution allows for the minority language schools and other elements of minority cultural life, there is no emphasis on consociational power-sharing at the executive level or any other institutional mechanisms by
which the political participation of Bulgaria’s ethnic minorities could be guaranteed. The legality of the existence of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms was questioned during several occasions including the petition to the Constitutional Court from ninety-three parliament members claiming to declare the Movement for Rights and Freedoms unconstitutional because of its ethnic base. The petition was rejected by the constitutional court (Spirova 2016, 155-156). It is impossible to imagine whether the party would be different without the ban, but the shift of the party towards the particularistic minority politics is not possible in the current situation because of the ban.

The cross-case analysis allows us to conclude that the ban on ethnic parties is not a necessary condition for the emergence of the integrationist ethnic party. At the same time, the Bulgarian case demonstrates how that condition can be favourable to the emergence of such party, while the cases of Slovakia and Latvia prove that Integrationist EMP’s can emerge without that condition. The case of Bulgaria also suggests that the ban on the ethnic parties may be stricter towards particularistic EMPs prohibiting their functioning than towards the integrationist MPs.

Reserved Seats for Minorities:

The reserved seats mechanism is designed to secure the parliamentary representation for ethnic minorities. That creates the paradox when the required share of votes for securing one seat for ethnic minority parties is smaller than the required share of votes necessary to obtain the parliamentary seat by mainstream parties. That instrument is a clear but rear example of consocialist mechanism giving additional advantages towards ethnic minority parties.

Among all the cases studied, there is only one case of Romania, which has reserved seats for ethnic minorities (Table 10). To evaluate the effects of that mechanism on the type of
ethnic parties in the country. A detailed study of that case would help to understand how that mechanism affects ethnic politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Reserved seats</th>
<th>Integrationist MPs</th>
<th>Particularistic EMPs</th>
<th>Accommodative MPs</th>
<th>Exclusionist MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (electoral coalitions)</td>
<td>Yes (electoral coalitions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data on the type of electoral system is retrieved from the IFES Election Guide (2020); data on the presence or absence of certain parties in the sample is retrieved from the database “Parties and Elections in Europe” Nordsieck (2020)

The mechanism allows small ethnic minorities of the country to enter the lower house of the legislature quite easily. All of the national minorities which do not pass the threshold (only Hungarian national minority has been able to pass the threshold and be elected directly) automatically receive a seat in the lower chamber if they win 5 per cent (10 per cent after 2004) of the average number of valid votes cast for the lower house representatives in single-seat constituencies. To pass that requirement ethnic minorities needed just 1,300 votes prior to the 2004 changes and circa 2,100 votes after them (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016).

Liberal registration norms and very low vote requirements for gaining representation through reserved seats encouraged a growing number of group claims for ethnic minority status with the number of minority seats growing from 11 minority seats in 1990 to around 18 since 2000 (Protsyk and Matichescu 2010). That increase was partly due to split in some of the ethnic groups previously acting together as Ruthenians & Ukrainians, Turks & Tatars and partly due to the registration of some groups which were not even present in the long list of minority groups published after the 1992 Romanian census as Croats, Slav Macedonians, Hutsuls, Secuis (Protsyk and Matichescu 2010).
Besides the direct effect of the representation of small ethnic minorities, which would not be able to gain enough votes to get their ethnic minority parties into the legislature, the reserved seats mechanism also influenced the other parties’ strategies towards ethnic minorities. Majority of the mainstream parties as well as Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) do not target ethnic minority electorate and do not employ the representatives of the other ethnic minorities into their parties as the minority parties and the reserved seat candidates are already in competition for minority votes and have some advantage on that field as they need less votes to be elected to the parliament (Protsyk and Matichescu 2010).

That effect seems to be unfavourable to the emergence of integrationist ethnic minority and accommodative majority parties as they do not have incentives to attract the votes and form the alliances with the small underrepresented groups. Alionescu (2004) even suggests that the reserved seats mechanism in Romania was introduced by the political elites in order to counterbalance the political parties of the Romanian minority by securing the constant representation for the smaller minorities. It is also important to note that that effect of the reserved seats mechanism in Romania is considerably amplified with the high electoral threshold for regular parties at the level of 5% as only Romanian and Hungarian populations of Romania can pass this threshold.8

Grand Ethnic Coalition Requirement

The Grand ethnic coalition is another clearly consociational institutional arrangement mentioned by Lijphart (1991) as one of the core features of consocialism. Similarly to the reserved seats mechanism it sacrifices the equal weight of each citizen’s vote to make all

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the significant groups of the society present in the decision-making. In terms of ethnic parties that mechanism is expected to incentivise particularistic ethnic parties more than other types of ethnic parties.

As with the reserved seats mechanism, there is only one case of North Macedonia in the sample which has the requirement of the ethnic coalition in the government (Table 11).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Ethnic Coalition Requirement</th>
<th>Integrationist MPs</th>
<th>Particularistic EMPs</th>
<th>Accommodative MPs</th>
<th>Exclusionist MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (electoral coalitions)</td>
<td>Yes (electoral coalitions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data on the presence or absence of certain parties in the sample is retrieved from the database “Parties and Elections in Europe” Nordsieck (2020)

It is important to mention that the requirement of the grand ethnic coalition is not institutionalized, but all the governments in North Macedonia even before the Ohrid Framework Agreement introduction (OFA) in 2001 included the biggest Macedonian and Albanian parties (Aleksovska 2016). Even though OFA settle the main features of power-sharing in Macedonian politics, only the general concept of "just and equitable representation" can be found in the text of the agreement without any specific regulations on the coalition building ("Ohrid Framework Agreement" 2001). The Albanian and Macedonian political parties usually campaign among their electorate without crossing ethnic lines and only after the winners of the election of both camps come together to form a government (Andeva 2015). Some scholars as Andeva (2015) and Spirovski (2001) point at rather dualistic than grand nature of the coalition in North Macedonia as it includes only Macedonian and Albanian sides and does not include any other minorities present in the country.
The case of the 2006 election may illustrate how the tradition of the ethnic coalition requirement in North Macedonia works. After the elections the winning party of the Macedonian segment IMRO-DPMNU decided to form the government not with the winning within the Albanian sector DUI-PDP (Democratic Union for Integration and Party for Democratic Prosperity) but with another Albanian Party – Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), causing a governmental crisis (Irwin 2016). DUI claimed itself to be the true representative of Albanians as it had received the most of Albanian votes and considered it as a violation of OFA and the principles set forth by the international community. DUI also insisted that all future governments should be formed by two winning parties from each sector and not by the decision of the future prime ministers and earlier coalitions (Ambarkov 2016). After that, the negotiations between IMRO- DPMNU and DUI took place leading to the dissolution of the parliament and to early elections (Spirovski 2012)

The effect of the grand coalition requirement, which despite being not legalized, exists as a strong tradition could be compared to the effect of the reserved seats of the minorities. The parties know that to enter the government they have to be seen either as the main Macedonian or the main Albanian party and competing outside those two directions and seeking for the votes among other ethnic segments seems to be unreasonable when the requirement of the grand coalition exists. It created an unfavourable environment for the integrationist and multi-ethnic parties, as getting additional votes from different ethnic sectors may bring additional seats in the parliament but will not necessarily bring them the place in the coalition and government unless they also prove to be the party with the largest support of at least one of those camps.

At the same time, the case of North Macedonia also demonstrates an interesting tendency of forming accommodative electoral coalitions by major Macedonian parties. First of all, it is important to remember that despite the dual coalition of ethnic Macedonians and
Albanians, North Macedonia is also populated by other smaller minorities seeking for political representation: Roma, Turks, Vlachs, Bosniaks, Serbs seeking for political representation (Andeva 2015). The political organisations of those minorities are not able to secure constant and influential representation on their own so they usually get elected either as members (leaders) of ethnic parties placed on a list of established pre-electoral coalitions with Macedonian parties or on the lists of basically Macedonian parties as party-members (Andeva 2015). The coalitions as “For Macedonia together”, “For better Macedonia” or “For your future“ can be compared to the accommodative parties which are led by the ethnic majorities but include the leaders of the ethnic minorities and perform as defenders of ethnic minority interests. However, the accommodative coalitions of Macedonia are different from the type of accommodative party described by Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) as they do not include the largest minority of the country (ethnic Albanians) and are not institutionalized into parties performing as the electoral coalitions formed before the elections.

That situation allows us to analyse the case of North Macedonia as two cases, where the ethnic parties of Albanians, which have a secured place in the coalition and the government function as ethnic particularistic parties, while the ethnic parties of other small ethnicities, which are not involved in the grand coalition, engage in multi-ethnic and accommodative coalitions. That allows us to conclude that the grand coalition is a strong predictor for a formation of particularistic EMP, while the absence of it is favourable for the emergence of the accommodative majority party.

**Political Systems and Party Competition**

Among the potential political factors favouring the emergence of a certain type of ethnic party, I have discussed the intra-ethnic competition and the presence of exclusive majority parties. Both of those factors are more dynamic than the institutional features so could have
some advantage in explaining the emergences and failures of integrationist minority parties, some of which were similarly emerging and fading.

**Intra-Ethnic Competition**

To check the effects of intra-ethnic competition, I have gathered information on the presence of the ethnic minority rivals representing the same ethnicity and gaining seats in the national legislatures (Table 12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Minority Analysed</th>
<th>Intra-ethnic competition</th>
<th>Integrationist MPs</th>
<th>Accommodative MPs</th>
<th>Particularistic MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes(coalitions)</td>
<td>Yes(coalitions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data on the presence or absence of certain parties in the sample is retrieved from the database “Parties and Elections in Europe” Nordsieck (2020)

The comparison of the cases based on intra-ethnic competition does not demonstrate any significant tendencies. The competition is present in all of the countries with particularistic ethnic minority parties and with the majority of the countries with the integrationist ethnic minority parties except for Bulgaria, with the ban on ethnic parties and Estonia where the minority ethnic politics are channelled through the accommodative party.

It does not let us infer any significant effect of intra-ethnic competition on the emergence of integrationist or particularistic parties. Some other effects, however, can be observed from that comparison.

The cases of Slovakia and Latvia demonstrate that once the integrationist ethnic minority party emerges in the political system of the country, it tends to be effective in the competition with the particularistic parties within the same sector with eventually leaving the
particularistic ethnic minorities parties without the share of votes enough to pass the threshold. Nevertheless, that conclusion has the risk of being affected by selection bias (Collier and Mahoney 1996) as we know only about successful cases of integrationist parties and to make decisive conclusions, we need a more systematic study of attempts to create integrationist EMPs.

The case of Estonia demonstrates that the absence of Intra-ethnic competition coexists with the presence of accommodative majority party. At the same time, the accommodative coalitions also emerge in North Macedonia with a high degree of intra-ethnic competition.

Ethnic Majority Rivals

This section is aimed at assessing the effect of the presence and activity of the exclusionist ethnic majority rivals on the type of the ethnic minority parties. It analyses, whether there were exclusionist ethnic majority parties in the cases and whether it had an influence on the type of ethnic party emerged. The general observations are summarized in Table 13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Exclusionist Majority Rivals</th>
<th>Integrationist MPs</th>
<th>Accommodative MPs</th>
<th>Particularistic EMPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Yes (SNS and SNLS)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Yes (National Alliance since 2010)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Yes (EKRE since 2015)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Yes (Ataka since 2005)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Yes (GRP before 2008)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>Yes (as coalition partners)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (as coalitions)</td>
<td>Yes(as coalitions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data on the presence or absence of certain parties in the sample is retrieved from the database “Parties and Elections in Europe” Nordsieck (2020)

There seems to be no robust relationship between the presence of exclusionist majority parties and the type of the ethnic minority party present. It is difficult to find any difference as
exclusionist minority parties were present at each of the cases at some point in time. So, despite
the anecdotal evidence from the Bulgarian case and the plausibility of the argument, there is
no systematic proof that the presence of exclusionist ethnic majority rival may determine the
type of the ethnic minority party. Moreover, there is also diverse evidence of exclusionist and
Integrationist parties emerging in different time periods which does not let us conclude that one
of those events triggers the other one based on that comparison.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have analysed the influence of different factors on the emergence of
integrationist ethnic minority parties. Some of the factors such preferential forms of voting and
ethnic party bans were found strongly encouraging the emergence of the integrationist EMPs
and accommodative majority parties and discouraging the emergence of particularistic EMPs
respectively, while the factors as the reserved ethnic minority seats and grand coalition
requirements proved to be favourable for the particularistic ethnic parties. Electoral thresholds
did not seem to have a strong influence on their own but proved to be favourable for the
integrationist and accommodative parties in the combination with other factors, as for example
the absence of reserved ethnic minority seats. Some factors as the intra-ethnic competition and
exclusionist majority parties did not prove to have a significant effect on the type of the ethnic
party. Almost all the cases analysed have PR electoral systems, but some of the exceptional
cases with Parallel or even Plurality systems (North Macedonia) did not differ in the results.

Since the effects of some of the factors seem to be increased or decreased by the other
ones, the next chapter also offers the integrative analysis of the factors and potential sets of the
factors influencing different kinds the ethnic parties emerging at particular cases followed by
the discussion of the findings.
Chapter III: Analysis and Discussion of Results

Integrative Analysis

The previous chapter analysed the effects of institutional and political factors on the types of ethnic minority parties emerging in a country. The analysis has demonstrated, that in some situations, it is also important to analyse the sets of the factors together, not only the factors separately. This chapter examines the interplay of these factors, followed by a discussion of the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Balot Structure</th>
<th>Threshold (%)</th>
<th>Ban on ethnic parties</th>
<th>Reserved seats</th>
<th>Grand Coalition</th>
<th>Intra-ethnic competition</th>
<th>Integrationist MPs</th>
<th>Particularistic EMPs</th>
<th>Accommodative MPs</th>
<th>Exclusive MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>Open Lists</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>Open Lists</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>Open Lists</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>List PR/Parallel</td>
<td>Single Preference</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>List PR/Parallel</td>
<td>Closed Lists/FTP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>List PR/Parallel</td>
<td>Plurality/ Closed lists</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes^{9} Yes^{10}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data on the presence or absence of certain parties in the sample is retrieved from the database “Parties and Elections in Europe” Nordsieck (2020); data on the electoral systems is retrieved from the "Electoral System Design Database | International IDEA, IFES Election Guide (2020) and ODIHR reports.

^{9} As accommodative coalitions
^{10} Inside accommodative coalitions
To understand, how different factors combine and work together, I suggest analysing them in combinations. Despite the fact, that there are six cases in the study, they can be grouped into a smaller amount of combinations. All those sets are presented next starting from the most favourable towards integrationist ethnic party and ending with the most favourable towards particularistic ethnic minority parties. The general results of the study are summarised in the Table 14.

Integrationist Party Without Competition

Among all the cases analysed the case of Bulgaria is the most favourable towards the integrationist minority parties and unfavourable towards the particularistic ethnic minority parties. As a result, the integrationist party Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) was present in all the legislatures since 1990 and no other ethnic minority parties were being elected to the Parliament on their own. however, there were ethnic movements and parties as Evroroma and other small ethnic minority parties not able to secure representation on their own but able to gain it through the alliances with the other major parties including DPS (Law and Kovats 2018).

Bulgaria has list PR electoral system with the single preference option ballots in 31 multi-member constituencies\textsuperscript{11}. The short-term change to a mixed system with the majoritarian and proportional components during 2009 elections did not change the political representation of ethnic minorities\textsuperscript{12}. The system does not have any privileges towards the ethnic minority parties and even more, prohibits the formation of political parties on the ethnic or religious principles.


The last principle is decisive and allows us to suggest that the ban on ethnic parties promotes the integrationist ethnic parties. However, to have that effect those bans should be loose enough to allow the integrationist ethnic parties which may be also banned based on the same logic.

Integrationist and Particularistic Parties

The cases of Slovakia and Latvia are the most similar in both the factors and ethnic parties represented. Both states have similar electoral systems varying only in details as Slovakia has a single nationwide constituency while Latvia is divided into five multi-member constituencies and electors in Slovakia can choose only up to four candidates from the party list, they are voting for while the electors in Latvia can express support or reject as many candidates as they wish on the ballot of the party, they vote for. Both countries have large thresholds of 5% and no special regulations about the ethnic parties as bans, reserved seats or coalition requirements. Even the ethnic parties in both states are very similar as both have integrationist minority parties and particularistic ethnic minority parties.

Even the genesis on the integrationist parties in both states is similar as they similarly emerged from the same parties and organizations with particularistic parties which they would compete with after the separation. The integrationist party of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia was formed out of former members of the particularistic Hungarian Coalition Party while the "Harmony" Social Democratic Party in Latvia used to be the part of the Alliance for Human Rights in a United Latvia together with other more particularistic Russophone ethnic parties (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016)

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It allows us to conclude, that the similar institutional characteristics as the absence of special rules and exceptions towards ethnic minorities together with high electoral threshold and open lists systems would cause the emergence of integrationist parties in the other systems as well. That system despite being favourable towards integrationist ethnic minority parties also allows the existence of particularistic ethnic minority parties leading to the competition of integrationist and particularistic parties in both cases studied. It also seems as the integrationist ethnic minority parties have some advantage over the particularistic counterparts in that competition as they generally have a higher representation in the national legislatures.

The reason explaining it may be the strategies of those parties in attracting votes, as the integrationist parties have a larger pool of potential voters as they are not as limited to the ethnic vote as the particularistic parties and in addition to the core ethnic minority votes may attract the votes of the other minorities and the ethnic majority voters supporting integrationist minority parties. The open lists system in theory only strengthens that effect by allowing integrationist party to attract the voters with different priorities and interests, both ethnic and non-ethnic, which would be more interested in the individual politicians they chose rather than the general identity associated with the party. It allows us to conclude that even though that set of factors allows for the existence of both integrationist and particularistic ethnic parties, it gives the advantage to the integrationist minority parties.

It also explains the tendency of integrationist parties to lower the role of the ethnic agenda becoming the mainstream party representing particular ideology by integrating the idea of the ethnic rights into the general idea of “common good” (Trencsényi et al. 2008). For example, Harmony Centre party was even able to win the largest amount of the seats in the Parliament in 2011, 2014, 201815 presenting itself as not only as the integrationist ethnic party

but also as a social-democratic force (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016). Most-Hid in a similar manner is often described as a liberal-conservative party (Trencsényi et al. 2008) and an integrationist party DPS from the previous scenario is also known for presenting itself as liberal and pursuing alliances and policies to secure that role (Spirova 2016).

Accommodative Party

There is only one case with a stable presence of the accommodative majority party in Estonia and some short-term accommodative coalitions not becoming the stable accommodative party in North Macedonia. In terms of the institutional characteristics and the electoral system, the Estonian system is very similar to the Latvian and the Slovak systems. The major differences are 12 smaller electoral districts (while Slovakia has 1 nationwide and Latvia has 5 larger ones and the electoral systems which puts a larger emphasis on the individual politicians instead of the party comparing to the Latvian and the Slovak ones (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016).

Despite the very similar characteristics, which can be united under the same category of the absence of any instruments clearly promoting or hindering ethnic parties as in Latvia and Slovakia, the outcome of ethnic party representation in Estonia is different. There were several other minority parties or parties mainly supported by Russian minorities as the Constitution Party, Estonian United Left Party, Our Home is Estonia which unlike the Centre party did not succeed to maintain the stable representation for more than one term.

The other minor difference in the Estonian case is the only recent emergence of the exclusionist majority party Conservative People's Party of Estonia which is present in the national legislature. That allows suggesting that the ethnic divisions are not so central to the Estonian politics comparing to Latvia and Slovakia as both the particularistic minority and exclusionist majority parties in Estonia did not get so much support as in the other cases.
However, the factors analysed in the study still cannot answer the question of why the ethnic issues were faded by the general socioeconomic issues. Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) explain that by the fact that state policy and at least one major party pursued a cooptative and integrationist approach. Those assumptions do not seem to be wrong, however, they do not allow to distinguish and establish clear and categorizable criteria predicting one or another type of minority party.

If we remember the characteristics of integrationist minority and accommodative majority (Table 4), we will see that they have a large degree of similarity in the part of including both the minority and majority interests. Sometimes it is even difficult to establish whether the party is the integrationist or accommodative. The cases of Latvia, Slovakia and Estonia prove that the institutional designs without the instruments stimulating or downgrading the minority politics, open lists PR systems and high electoral threshold cause the high degree of the vote pooling benefiting the integrationist and accommodative parties. However, the type of party emerging in that situation (integrationist or accommodative) depends on the other factors.

The weaker representation of the particularistic and exclusionist parties in Estonia are the signs of one of the characteristics differentiating Estonia from the other similar cases (Nakai 2014). The Estonian party system is significantly less polarized and fragmented while parties are more institutionalized (Bértou 2016). Nakai (2014) suggests that it is the consolidated party system which allows for the inclusion of the Russophone voters and their interests by the major parties. Nedelcu & Barbeleben (2016) and Nakai (2014) also point at the more inclusive policies towards minorities in Estonia compared to Latvia making the ethnic issues less sharp.

The case of North Macedonia and especially the Macedonian sector of it may serve as an additional argument for the role of the effects of the party consolidation on the type of the ethnic party. If we do not include the Albanian parties in the analysis, the Macedonian political
system is dominated by two large political parties on the centre-right and centre-left, which can organise powerful coalitions accommodating ethnic minority parties and organisations.

Overall, that section suggests that the integrationist minority and accommodative majority parties may emerge in the same or very similar electoral systems with PR open list electoral systems, high threshold and absence of specific regulations on the minority parties. At the same time, comparison of Estonia with Latvia and Slovakia and insights from the case of North Macedonia suggests that the accommodative parties are more likely to emerge than the integrationist parties in the more consolidated and less fragmented party systems.

**Particularistic Parties**

Among all the cases analysed there are two states where the particularistic parties dominate among the ethnic political parties – Romania and North Macedonia. The main factor unifying those two cases is the presence of the special rules promoting the activities of the ethnic parties: reserved seats in Romania and the grand coalition in North Macedonia. There are also several differences between those two cases as both countries have used different electoral systems in the past, Romania has a high electoral threshold while North Macedonia does not have it.

In terms of the outcomes, both states are similar in having the large ethnic minority parties representing Hungarians in the case of Romania and Albanians in case of North Macedonia. However, while the Hungarian minority in Romania is represented only by one parliamentary party, Albanians in North Macedonia have a high degree of intra-ethnic competition with several parties claiming to be the main representative of the Albanian minority. The high electoral threshold in Romania helps to explain that difference as several Hungarian minority parties would risk not to pass the electoral threshold (Protsyk & Matichescu 2010).
There is also a difference in the way how the smaller ethnic minorities are represented in both cases. While in Romania they can enter the legislature through the special reserved seats directly, in North Macedonia the smaller minorities usually seek the representation through the alliances with the larger parties.

It allows us to suggest that the special instruments securing the ethnic representation in the national legislatures as the reserved seats and grand coalition requirements are highly favourable conditions for the emergence of the particularistic ethnic minority parties.

Centripetalism and Consocialism

The results discussed in the previous sections shed new light on the discussion of the centripetal and consocialist institutional designs. The mechanisms favoured by supporters of the consocialism aimed at the proportional representation of ethnic minorities and cooperation of the elites of different segments of the society as the party-list PR electoral system, reserved minority seats and the grand coalition (Lijphart 1997, 25) prove to contribute to the emergence of particularistic parties.

On the other hand, such instruments as ethnic party bans, open lists PR system and to some extent the high electoral thresholds proved to cause vote pooling and the dominance of the more moderate integrationist minority and accommodative majority parties. Even though those electoral rules and regulations are still not the most typical examples of the centripetal systems as Alternative Voting or Single Transferable Vote (Bogaards 2019). Open lists PR electoral system similarly to Alternative Vote and STV allow electors to express their individual preferences not only towards the parties but towards the candidates within those parties as well giving additional incentives to choose politicians based on their characteristics against their descriptive identity. The electoral ban eliminates the most extreme ethnic parties giving an obvious advantage for the moderate parties. The results in general terms follow the
theoretical assumptions of both approaches. At the same time, the results demonstrate that open lists PR electoral system may also be considered as a centripetal instrument.

The emphasis on ethnic moderation as the value of centripetalism often comes with the trade-off in the representation of the minorities and vice versa. For example, in the countries where the ethnic politics are dominated by the integrationist minority parties, the smaller minorities as Roma in Bulgaria and Slovakia, Ukrainians in Slovakia and Latvia, Belarusians in Latvia can be represented only through the collaboration with the larger minorities putting those minorities in the dependent from the larger minorities situation, while the Romanian reserved seats mechanism secures small minorities with the stable representation but create the non-favourable conditions for the cooperation of different ethnic minorities.

The cases analysed also suggest the consociational mechanisms are often used in societies with very sharp ethnic divides and conflicts. The most obvious example comes from the study of North Macedonia which was on the edge of the civil war in 2001. In that country the consociational design of grand coalition is thought to be the important factor of preventing similar situations in the future and any change from it is perceived as a threat to the peaceful coexistence of Macedonians and Albanians in the country (Ambarkov 2016). The reserved seats mechanism in Romania was also introduced in 1990 following the March 1990 ethnic violence in Tirgu Mures and fears of the Romanian elites to follow the scenario of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia (King & Marian 2012).

**The Future of the Ethnic Minority Parties**

This section provides possible changes in the type of ethnic minority representation in the future based on the results of the study of the factors promoting specific types of the ethnic party. The ideas from that section may be used for future research.
As we have discussed previously, while the electoral systems and ethnic politics regulations are more important to determine the emergence of particularistic vs integrationist/accommodative party, the party system consolidation and institutionalization serves better to predict whether the integrationist or accommodative party would emerge in that system. While electoral rules are comparatively stable, the characteristics of the party system are more likely to change. Enyedi and Bértoa (2018) find partial evidence for the consolidation of the party systems in the post-communist states, as the fragmentation declined, the closure of the governmental arena slightly increased, and the number of parties in the parliaments became smaller. That allows us to suggest, that if the consolidation would continue in the countries with the electoral systems with the factors supportive towards the integrationist and accommodative parties, there may be a tendency towards the dominance of the accommodative parties or at least the integrationist parties shifting their attention from the ethnic and minority issues towards the general issues relevant to the whole population of the country.

The cases of Latvia, Slovakia and Estonia are the most interesting in that way as there is a relatively high chance in the change of the ethnic representation type due to the changes in the party systems. The most recent development in Slovakia in that way is the parliamentary elections of 2020 in which both the particularistic and integrationist minority parties did not pass the electoral threshold and will not be represented in the parliament (Vass 2020). Those results suggest that the national issues, such as government corruption, which was the main issue during the 2020 elections, can override ethnic cleavages (Vaski 2020). It is too early to make conclusions about case of Slovakia yet, but the absence of Hungarian minority parties in the national legislature may be a sign of the emergence of accommodative parties as some of the Hungarian candidates from the main Slovak parties claim to represent the interests of Hungarians in the new parliament (Szabo 2020). Szabo (2020) also hypothesize that the loss
of the seats by the Hungarian integrationist party may even signal about the success of that party in eliminating or at least putting to the background the frictions between Slovaks and Hungarians. In theory, it may be even generalized, that any integrationist party would become useless when it would reach its goals and the ethnic questions would not be problematic.

The Latvian integrationist party Harmony made some significant steps to avoid the reputation of Russian ethnic party by stopping the collaboration with Russian political parties from Russian Federation and by joining the Party of European Socialists, a European political party representing social democratic parties from different countries (Policy shift in Harmony Social Democratic Party 2018). Even though the party has won several parliamentary elections, it never gets to form the government as the other parties are not willing to collaborate with the party associated with the minority and the Russian state. The recent actions may signal about the party’s slow shift from the minority party towards the party claiming to represent the whole nation (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben 2016).

The nature of ethnic politics in Estonia has the risk of losing the previous stability and lack of fragmentation as right-wing exclusionist Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) gained significant electoral support in the previous year questioning the inclusion of Russian minority into the Estonian society. As Estonian comparativist Pettai suggests in the interview to Puddington (2019) the emergence of EKRE may cause the loss of trust of Russophone voters to the Centre party engaged into the coalition with EKRE and the turn of those voters towards the particularistic Russian parties.

The cases of Bulgaria, Romania and North Macedonia with very strong factors supporting the integrationist or particularistic ethnic representation do not seem to change at least without the significant changes in those regulations. However, there is a possibility for
further institutionalization of Macedonian electoral coalitions which may turn into accommodative parties.

It may be concluded that there are several possible changes, especially in the middle cases without obvious tendencies towards particularistic or only integrationist parties as Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia. The consolidation of the party systems in those is likely to create more favourable conditions for the accommodative parties or for the integrationist minority parties becoming mainstream parties while the opposite processes may create favourable conditions for the particularistic parties.
Conclusion

Contrary to the common image of the homogeneity of the ethnic minority parties and ethnic politics, this work offers a study of Eastern and Southeastern European minority parties differing in their approach towards the relations between majority and minority. Building on the typology of ethnic parties developed by Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) this thesis deepens the understanding of the particularistic and integrationist minority parties by identifying the defining features, contingent features and common attributes of the integrationist and particularistic ethnic minority parties. That facilitates a better understanding and provides easier recognition and classification of different kinds of ethnic parties.

Using those characteristics, the thesis classifies the ethnic parties in the six states of the Eastern and Southeastern Europe providing a set of parties in those counties according to their type creating the first set of parties classified using the Nedelcu & DeBardeleben’s (2016) typology.

The main goal of this work was the study of institutional and political factors influencing the type of ethnic representation in each country. It is important to highlight that all of the cases studied are selected based on specific criteria as all of the states in the study are young post-communist or post-socialist states going through the process of transitions and development of institutions with significant ethnic minorities usually concentrated in some regions of those states. That means that any attempt to generalise those results to another case should be done considering those factors.

The findings suggest that the institutional instruments aimed at securing ethnic representation in the legislative body including closed lists proportional representation electoral systems, reserved seats for ethnic minorities and the requirements of the grand coalition are highly favourable conditions for the emergence of particularistic ethnic minority
parties while the institutional designs aimed to offset the ethnic minority representation such as party bans are highly favourable for the emergence of integrationist ethnic minority party. The designs which do not give clear incentives for the ethnic minority representation but do not prohibit it and encourage vote pooling by proportional representation with open party lists electoral systems and high electoral threshold allow the emergence of integrationist and particularistic ethnic minority parties and accommodative majority parties, slightly favouring the integrationist minority or accommodative majority parties.

There is also some weaker evidence of the influence of the party system stability and consolidation suggesting that the more stable and consolidated party systems without strong exclusionist majority parties are more favourable for the emergence of the accommodative majority over integrationist minority parties.

The general argument of the study follows the findings of Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016), which was used as a main point of reference and the source for partial replication. However, including the cases of Bulgaria and North Macedonia into the sample allowed to make more generalisable conclusions made on the basis of more cases. It also allowed to analyse the influence on the type of the ethnic parties of such instruments as the ethnic party ban and grand coalition requirement which are not represented in the original sample of Nedelcu & DeBardeleben (2016) which included Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania.

Revisiting the data on electoral systems and the ways how the party lists are formed with the additional cases allowed for noting the significant tendency of open party lists systems and the systems allowing voters to cast their preferences to promote the emergence of the integrationist or accommodative parties. That factor was overlooked in the previous study.
This thesis has also attempted to check the influence of the intra-ethnic party competition and majority exclusionist parties on the type of ethnic minority representation. The analysis provided only weak or no evidence of those factors.

The findings were discussed in the light of the main approaches towards electoral designs as consocialism and centripetalism. The results confirmed the theoretical expectations of the approaches as the instruments and designs associated with centripetalism were favourable for the emergence of integrationist parties and the instruments and designs associated with consocialism predictably served better for the ethnic minority representation through the particularistic parties. This thesis incorporates the already known information on the ethnic minority parties of different types and the conditions favourable for their emergence together with the new findings into the general knowledge on the institutional designs in the divided societies.

The possible criticisms may relate to the coding decisions according to the typology of ethnic parties. Some of them were difficult to make. To allow the ways to evaluate those decisions and spot potential problems this study provides the reasons for the most difficult decisions and the open set of results.

Another possible criticism may emphasise the small size of the sample in which the support for some effects of specific factors was found only in one case as in cases of ethnic party ban in Bulgaria, reserved seats mechanism in Romania and grand coalition requirements in North Macedonia. Having the support for the effects of specific mechanism in several cases is always desirable but is not always possible with such rare mechanisms and limited amount of cases. To avoid the influence of the random outcomes, any conclusions based on the factor present only in one case were made only in case of strong theoretical explanation and empirical evidence within the case proving the effect of that factor.
The results are useful in understanding of ethnic minority representation in the specific Eastern and Southeastern European countries. Based on the dependencies established and proved in this thesis it is possible to suggest how different electoral designs, ethnic politics regulations and party system characteristics and their changes may influence the ethnic representation in a specific country. Using that knowledge, the third chapter of this thesis suggests some expectations how the ethnic minority representations may change in the countries analysed.

There are still many ways to contribute the knowledge of the issue. Similar studies including other countries from different regions with a significant minority population would help to analyse whether the factors working in Eastern and Southeastern European countries are applicable for the other regions. Even though this study established factors determining the emergence of particularistic versus integrationist and accommodative parties, the factors determining the former two types are still very similar. More in-depth studies of the party system consolidation and the other factors may establish a clear understanding of which factors would incentivise the integrationist minority parties, and which would incentivise accommodative parties.

The other important question answering of which would make even this comparative study more salient and applicable towards the institutional designs decisions is whether the integrationist parties serve their goals and contribute to the lowering of the ethnic inequality and conflicts. Assessing the results of activity of the particularistic and integrationist minority and accommodative majority parties not by their goals but by the outcomes of their work could bring us closer to the consensus on which types of ethnic representation and politics leads to a more peaceful, open, equal and democratic society.
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57
