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**THE LATIN TRADITION OF ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA* (1120-  
1270): THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEXT AND  
COMMENTARY**

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between Text and Commentary**

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# **The Latin Tradition of Aristotle's *De anima* (1120-1270): the Relationship between Text and Commentary**

By

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This study aims at an examination of the importance of medieval philosophical translations based on a methodological experiment which consists of a comparative textual analysis of different Latin translations of Aristotle's *De anima* (James of Venice, William of Moerbeke and Johannes Argyropulos) and some related commentaries (Themistius, Philoponus, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas). The two constitutive elements of this comparison were important components of medieval philosophical learning. Translations into Latin were the elementary prerequisites for the spreading of Greek philosophical works, and the commentary was the most widespread genre of philosophical writing, providing the framework in which the interpretation of Aristotle's work developed.

The analytical part of our thesis is concerned with the interactions between these two elements. Thus, the investigation led us to two entirely opposite directions:

1. the relationship between medieval Latin translations and ancient commentaries: the commentary as auxiliary tool for translation;
2. the relationship between medieval Latin translations and medieval commentaries: the influence of the Latin version on the medieval interpretations.

Concerning the structure of the thesis, based on the elements which were subject of examination, we divided our material into lexical and grammatical analysis. In the first part we are investigating the different versions of problematic philosophical terms, while in the second part the selected passages are interesting because the different interpretations of grammatical structures led to various interpretations on the semantic level as well.

The interactions proved to be more complex than we supposed. In the case of William of Moerbeke there are certain elements which indicate that he used the ancient commentaries to revise his previous translations. We also encountered

situations where the obscure old translation confused medieval commentators and cases where the exegesis was governed by the understanding of the translator. It turned out that in the specific case of the *De anima* the rival Arabico-Latin translations and commentaries (Averroes) were widely influential. Nevertheless, certain results of our investigation may give us a warning about the overestimation of the translations in the context of medieval philosophical learning. Moreover, certain problems related to the transmission of these texts call our attention to the limits of our approach.

But certainly our partial results should be controlled on other translations as well: the study of the (in)dependence of the translation, the relative prestige of text and commentary are promising directions for further research. The comparative analysis of medieval and humanist translation, the detailed investigation of which was beyond the scopes of the present thesis, would also open new questions and perspectives in the study of medieval philosophical translations.

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## II. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

*A* - Johannes Argyropulos' translation of Aristotle's *De anima* as it appears in the Bekker edition of Aristotle

*DA* - Aristotle's *De anima*

*N* - The *Nova translatio* of William of Moerbeke as it appears in the commentary of Thomas Aquinas

*P* - William of Moerbeke's translation of Philoponus' commentary on the *De anima*

*T* - William of Moerbeke's translation of Themistius' paraphrases to the *De anima*

*V* - The *Vetus translatio* of James of Venice as it appears in the commentary of Albert the Great



*“Few things more beautiful and more pathetic are recorded in history than this Arab physician’s dedication to the thoughts of a man separated from him by fourteen centuries; to the intrinsic difficulties we should add that Averroes, ignorant of Syriac and of Greek, was working with the translation of a translation. The night before, two doubtful words had halted him at the beginning of the Poetics. These words were tragedy and comedy. He had encountered them years before in the third book of the Rhetoric; no one in the whole world of Islam could conjecture what they meant.*

*[...] Something had revealed to him the meaning of the two obscure words. With firm and careful calligraphy he added these lines to the manuscript: «Aristu (Aristotle) gives the name of tragedy to panegyrics and that of comedy to satires and anathemas. Admirable tragedies and comedies abound in the pages of the Koran and in the mohalacas of the sanctuary».*

*[...]I remembered Averroes who, closed within the orb of Islam, could never know the meaning of the terms tragedy and comedy. [...] I felt that Averroes, wanting to imagine what a drama is without ever having suspected what a theatre is, was no more absurd than I, wanting to imagine Averroes with no other sources than a few fragments from Renan, Lane and Asin Palacios.”*

(Jorge Luis Borges: “Averroes’ Search”)

### III. INTRODUCTION

The principal issues of medieval philosophy had their sources in ancient Greek philosophical texts. In the thirteenth century, among the many great philosophical-theological debates, one of the most important was that on the unity of the intellect. In their argumentation the medieval philosophers relied on the main works of Aristotle and the ancient commentaries on them. From the middle of the twelfth century, the philosophers of the Middle Ages had one more or less good translation of Aristotle from Greek and one from Arabic (and the commentaries of Averroes). But since the issues were becoming more and more problematic, they had to return to the original texts and what ancient commentators said about it then. William of Moerbeke, who had undertaken this task of revising the old translations, had access to better manuscripts than his predecessors, and he had a new instrument of work: the Late Antique commentaries on Aristotle, of which he made extensive use during his revisions of others and his own translations. His Aristotle is a more exact and a less obscure one, than previous Latin versions.

In the 1250s Albert the Great, while writing his commentary on the *De anima*, made some interesting remarks about the translations he was using: *Graeca autem translatio discordat ad hac, ut puto, est mendosa [...] Et si deberet concordare cum Arabica. Again: in multis invenimus Graecas emendatiores quam Arabicas translationes. Again : quae autem haec vera sint quae dicta sunt, testatur Aristotelis translatio Arabica, quae sic dicit...*<sup>1</sup>

These comments contain important information about the use of translations in the mid-thirteenth century. First of all, we should note that Albert made use of two translations: one from Greek,<sup>2</sup> and one from Arabic.<sup>3</sup> Second, we can see that he is disappointed by both versions, neither of them being reliable and authoritative enough. We can imagine, therefore, how difficult it was to work using two

<sup>1</sup> Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, in *Opera Omnia* 7, 1, ed. Clemens Stroick (Aschendorff: Monasterii Westfalorum, 1968), 8, 59-60, 65-69, 72-73.

<sup>2</sup> As pointed out by the general editor, this was the *Translatio Vetus*. See Clemens Stroick, "Prolegomena" in Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, 5-6.

<sup>3</sup> The translation of Michael Scotus as it appears in the Averroes commentary. See Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in De anima Libros*, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1953).

unsatisfactory translations, and based on them to give a truthful interpretation of Aristotle.

These kind of situations caused the emergence of a demand for a new translation directly from Greek. What was unsatisfactory in the old versions? In the case of the Arabic, the answer is simple: it was a translation of a translation. In the case of the old Graeco-Latin translation, it was its obscurity, which often made the commentators turn back to the Arabic versions.

William of Moerbeke's great achievement was not a development of a terminology, as scholars often erroneously emphasise. The university masters were talking about the soul and intellection long before his translation appeared. As we will see in the following pages, he rarely changes the terminology of the old translation. Nevertheless, he makes a more exact version which was to serve for university use many years even after the appearance of the new Humanist translations. The success of his work was not only a result of his talent as a translator, but also of his access to better manuscripts than his predecessors.<sup>4</sup>

In this paper we will try to detect the interaction between text and commentary in the Latin tradition of Aristotle's *De anima*. Far from being a mechanical transposition, the work of the medieval translators was an interpretation which was shaped by the Ancient commentaries and, on its own turn, it influenced the commentaries of the Medieval thinkers.

Attempts to analyse medieval translations are a recent concern in the scholarship. A relatively new achievement is the study of their development on levels other than stylistic one. We will try to find out in this paper to what extent made Moerbeke use of the interpretations of Ancient commentaries in shaping his translations. Another important aspect of the study of philosophical translations would be the way these texts were used by the contemporary philosophers.

Therefore our investigation is concerned with two major questions:

1. how did the medieval translators make use of Ancient commentaries on Aristotle?
2. how did the translation influence the medieval commentaries?

For the *verbum e verbo* technique of the medieval translators, the basic semantic unit of a text is the single, unbound lexeme, that is, the word. Therefore the

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<sup>4</sup> See Minio-Paluello, "Le texte du *De anima* d'Aristote: la tradition Latine avant 1500," in *Opuscula* (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1972).

main issue medieval translators were concerned with was terminology – the specific words – used to explicate certain themes. The lexical tools with which medieval and modern European philosophers operated for centuries were improved in this way by the translators, who struggled to hand over to Western Europe the cultural inheritance of the ancient Greeks. We hope that in the following pages it will be illustrated by our examples that the medieval translators were aware of the importance of larger semantic units as well, as preserved by different grammatical structures. The thesis will be organised based on this distinction of the lexical and grammatical problems which occur in the translation.

### **A.     *The verbum e verbo method***

The problem of Borges' Averroes as reflected in the quotation which opens this thesis<sup>5</sup> is the eternal problem of translation: to make a text accessible for a foreign audience requires more than linguistic transposition. It is a change of context: the different time, space, culture, language and audience are determinants which influence the result. How to keep it as close as possible to the original and at the same time to make it comprehensible for the new readers: this is the basic paradox which makes the translation a very difficult task. Through the centuries of lively translating activity, from extreme literality to free interpretation, a variety of different solutions were elaborated to this problem.

In this paper we will focus on philosophical translations which used the method called *verbum e verbo*, the word for word technique, the basic technique of the medieval translators. The origins of this method can be traced back at least to the first biblical translations: this was the text the authority of which allowed not even a change in the word order.<sup>6</sup> In the case of the Aristotle translations of the Middle Ages there was a double authority which tied the hands of the translators: the respect for the one who was called the Philosopher, and the prestige of the Greek language. However, there was much more in the promotion of this technique than respect for authorities. Such a technique was supported by a philosophy of language that stated

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<sup>5</sup> See page iv.

<sup>6</sup> "Owing to the prestige of this ideal of literal biblical translation, it eventually became the norm for virtually all translation from Greek into Latin until the Renaissance." See Sebastian Brock, "Aspects of Translation Technique in Antiquity," in *Syriac Perspectives on Antiquity*. (London: Variorum, 1984), 70.

that “language is there only to give external expression through a system of conventional signs to the thoughts or concepts which the mind conceives within itself, and which refer to external realities.”<sup>7</sup> According to this theory, there was no possibility of any given language misinterpreting thoughts expressed in another language: both are just vestments, which will lead us to the reality expressed by them. As Charles Burnett expressed it, this was “the faith that the medievals had in the ability of a literal translation to preserve not only the sense of the original, but - in an almost mystical way - the very words of the original author.”<sup>8</sup>

The word for word method used by the *fidus interpres* is a method which tries to preserve not only the meaning, but also the words, the word order, the grammatical constructions and the expressions of the original as exactly as possible. We will not concentrate on what this expression meant in Classical Latin theories of translation (Cicero, Horace), nor in late Antiquity (Jerome).<sup>9</sup> For medieval translators it meant a concern for lexical consistency and a great respect for the authority concerned, which in this case was Aristotle. As representative and exemplary for the case of the philosophical translations is Boethius’ approach:

I fear that I have incurred in the fault of the literal translator since I have rendered (each) word by a word extracted and obtained from it. The reason for this approach is that, in these writings, in which knowledge of things is sought, it is not the charm of limpid speech, but the unsullied truth that has to be expressed. Therefore I feel I have been most useful if, in the books of philosophy composed in Latin language, through the integrity of a completely full translation, no Greek literature is found to be needed any longer.<sup>10</sup>

It was to be criticised in the Renaissance, but the fact is that medieval audience could handle these artificial Latin texts, which corresponded exactly to the original that sometimes it can be reconstructed from the translation. These texts were

<sup>7</sup> James McEvoy, “Language, Tongue and Thought in the Writings of Robert Grosseteste,” in *Robert Grosseteste, exegete and philosopher* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994).

<sup>8</sup> C. Burnett, “Translating from Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages: Theory, Practice and Criticism,” in S. G. Lofts and P. W. Roseman, ed., *Éditer, traduire, interpréter: essais de méthodologie philosophique*, Philosophes médiévaux 36 (Leuven: Éditions Peeters, 1997), 72.

<sup>9</sup> For an excellent analysis of this problem, see Rita Copeland, *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics and Translation in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>10</sup> “Secundus hic arreptae expositionis labor nostrae seriem translationis expediet, in qua quidem vereor ne subierim fidi interpretis culpam, cum verbum e verbo expressum comparatumque reddiderim. Cuius incepti ratio est quod in his scriptis in quibus rerum cognitio queritur, non luculentae orationis lepos, sed incorrupta veritas exprimenda est. Quocirca multum profecisse videor si philosophiae libris Latina oratione compositis per integerrimae translationis sinceritatem nihil in Graecorum litteris amplius desideretur.” Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii Commentorum*, ed. Schepps and Brandt (Leipzig: F. Tempsky, 1906), 135 (passage translated into English by C. Burnett, *Translating from Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages*).

made not for the laity, but for scholars well trained in philosophy, and what seems now obscure and confusing in this philosophical Latin did not lead to erroneous interpretations by the medieval philosophers.<sup>11</sup>

### **B. Medieval Philosophical Translations: the context of the Aristoteles Latinus**

To their monumental project *The Cambridge History of Late Medieval Philosophy* the editors Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg gave the subtitle *From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism*.<sup>12</sup> This clearly reflects the enormous importance Aristotle had in the development of medieval thinking. It is a sharp and simplified, but for our purposes a useful, distinction that while the philosophy of the Renaissance was marked by Platonism, the thinking of the medieval philosophers, especially thirteenth-century scholasticism, was highly influenced by Aristotle.<sup>13</sup> While from Plato there are only a few fragments translated, the Aristotelian corpus was entirely transposed into Latin and continuously retranslated during the centuries.

In contrast with ancient Classical civilisation, where the language of the culture was, for the most part, Greek, the “official” language of Christian medieval Europe, at least in the West, was Latin. It was the language of the Catholic Church, the language of education and learning, but also the language of public administration and legislation. The division of the Roman Empire into two caused a cultural differentiation as well. Knowledge of Greek was less and less of a requirement in the

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<sup>11</sup> See the affirmation of an anonymous twelfth-century commentator (commenting on Boethius’ *Arithmetica*): “There are three kinds of translating. The first is when only the substance (*materia*) is transmitted; the second is when the substance is transmitted and the sense of the words (*sensus*) is preserved; the third gives the substance and the sense and is a word-for-word (*verbum e verbo*) translation.” Quoted from an unpublished source by Charles S. F. Burnett, “Translation and Translators, Western European,” in the *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. Joseph R. Strayer, vol. 12 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982), 136-142.

<sup>12</sup> N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, ed., *The Cambridge History of Late Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: CUP, 1982).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. for example Carlos Steel: “Le historiens de la philosophie avaient toujours en tendance à considérer la Moyen Age comme une période dominée par l’aristotélisme. Ce n’est qu’à partir de la Renaissance qu’on redécouvert Platon, et cultivé sa philosophie divine comme un antidote contre la scolastique, considérée comme un aristotélisme dégénéré.” In *Rencontres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale*, ed. J. Hamesse et M. Fattori (Louvain-la-Neuve: Publications de l’Institut d’Etudes Médiévales, 1990), 301.

West – even for scholars. As a result of this, translation from Greek into Latin became correspondingly more important, in order to preserve the cultural values of the ancient world.

The educational system was still based on the same disciplines as in Ancient Greece and Rome, but the texts had to be translated. The enormous material in the domain of philosophy required a great effort from the few translators of philosophical texts. After Boethius was executed in the sixth century, the flow of Greek philosophical texts translated into Latin diminished. In contrast to this, a burst of translating activity started in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, with scholars such as James of Venice, Henricus Aristippus, Burgundio of Pisa, Robert Grosseteste and William of Moerbeke. There are two major figures who rendered texts from Arabic: Gerardus of Cremona and Michael Scotus.

Concerning the languages involved in the translation of scientific-philosophical texts, the most important were Latin, Greek and Arabic. Since the education at the universities was in Latin, it was the most important target language of the translations. While this was the receptor language in the case of learned texts, the main source language was Greek. The role of Arabic is important in a few cases where Greek sources were translated via the Arabic translations and of course in the rendering of Averroes' and Avicenna's commentaries. In this paper, however, we will concentrate on the direct translations of Aristotle from Greek into Latin.<sup>14</sup>

The list of major achievements in this field begins with Boethius and his translations of the so called *Logica vetus*, which included the *De interpretatione*, *Categoriae* and Porphyry's *Isagoge* and later, after a rediscovery of his other translations in the twelfth century, the *Prior Analytics*, *Topics* and *Sophistici elenichi*. At the beginning of the twelfth century, thanks to the activity of James of Venice,<sup>15</sup> there became available in Latin the *Physics*, the *Metaphysics*, the *De anima* and parts of the *Parva Naturalia*. The thirteenth century marks a new stage in the history of the

<sup>14</sup> For further information on the topic of Arabic translations, see Marie Thérèse d'Alverny, "Translations and Translators," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. R. L. Benson, G. Constable, C. D. Lauham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

<sup>15</sup> We know little about his life: he was a Venetian Greek cleric and philosopher from the twelfth century. The most comprehensible article on him is L. Minio-Paluello, "Iacobus Veneticus Grecus: Canonist and Translator of Aristotle," *Traditio* 8: 265-304.

*Aristoteles Latinus*: the *Nichomachean Ethics* and several related commentaries were translated by Robert Grosseteste.<sup>16</sup>

The last<sup>17</sup> and the most famous figure of the medieval philosophical translations was William of Moerbeke, the subject of the present thesis. He not only revised the existing translations, but rendered anew several works of Aristotle such as the *Politics* and the *Poetics*, as well as some important ancient commentaries such as those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Philoponus, Ammonius and Simplicius.<sup>18</sup> Almost all the Aristotelian texts having already been translated, he revised and continued the translation of the Aristotelian corpus (approximately between 1260 and 1280), these translations quickly becoming the most popular versions. With him the medieval Latin Aristotelian corpus became fixed, the next attempts to retranslate belonging already to the new expectations and new ideals of the Humanist period.

The medieval Latin versions of Aristotle are documents of medieval thinking as important as the original works of medieval thinkers. As soon as this was realised by modern scholars, the edition of these texts started. This project was started in 1930 by the Union Académique Internationale and it contains two parts. The first is the publication of a catalogue of the translations by G. Lacombe et Lorenzo Minio-Paluello,<sup>19</sup> and the second the series of *Aristoteles Latinus*, which contains critical editions of these texts, as well as the *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum*, which contains the translations of ancient Greek commentaries on Aristotle. All these are ongoing projects, which still are far from completion.

### **C. The life and work of William of Moerbeke**

As it was already pointed out, William of Moerbeke was the most prolific translator of the thirteenth-century Latin West. From the few data about his life we can draw a

<sup>16</sup> James McEvoy, "Language, Tongue and Thought."

<sup>17</sup> There can be several reasons to the fact that we have the last great translating enterprise in the second part of the thirteenth century, and that the next project of retranslation belongs already to the Renaissance. It is not the task of the present thesis to discuss this issue, yet, we can observe that the outburst of translation activities is a concomitant phenomenon of periods of cultural prosperity.

<sup>18</sup> For a detailed description see Appendix II.

<sup>19</sup> G. Lacombe, ed., *Aristoteles Latinus. Codices: pars prior* (Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1939); G. Lacombe, ed., *Aristoteles Latinus. Codices: pars posterior* (Cambridge: CUP, 1955); L. Minio-Paluello, ed., *Aristoteles Latinus. Codices: Supplementa altera* (Desclée de Brouwer, 1961).



picture of an extremely tireless Dominican friar, the most important preoccupation of whom (besides his ecclesiastical duties) was the translation from Greek into Latin of the most relevant Greek philosophical and scientific texts.

The most exhaustive study about his life is still the book of Martin Grabmann, *Guilelmo di Moerbeke, O. P. il traduttore della opera di Aristotele*.<sup>20</sup> As a result of the lack of documentation there are still more questions than answers regarding Moerbeke's life.

We have no precise information about his exact date of birth: it can probably be dated between 1215 and 1220; the date of his death is around 1285-1286. He originated from the Flemish areas (Moerbeke is nowadays a village in Belgium).

About his activity as an ecclesiastic we know that he held the office of penitentiary of the pope from 1272 to 1278 at the papal court at Viterbo. In 1274 he took part in the Second Council of Lyons, where the main issue was the reunion with the Greek Church. From 1278 until his death he was archbishop of Corinth.

For the purposes of this paper much more important are the data about his translating activity. He was concerned exclusively with philosophical and scientific texts of the Ancient Greeks. His defined goal was "to provide Latin scholars with new material for study," "in order that my efforts should add to the light to which Latins have excess."<sup>21</sup> His task was a difficult one, not only because of the early and unelaborated stage at which medieval translation was at that time, but also due to the fact that none of the languages he worked with was his mother tongue.

From the philosophers he translated mostly Aristotle: he reviewed all the existing translations and engaged himself in making the missing ones as well as the related commentaries (for a detailed description of these works see Appendix II). But apparently closest to his own ideas was the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus: we have his Latin version of the *Elementatio Theologica*. Because he tried to translate the commentaries of Proclus on Plato, we have several fragments from the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus* as well. Many translations have survived from the works of Archimedes, but one can find in Moerbeke's repertory scientists as Ptolemy and Galen as well.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae* 11 (Rome: Pontifica Universita Gregoriana, 1946).

<sup>21</sup> As quoted by L Mino-Paluello "Moerbeke, William of," in *Dictionary of Scientific Bibliography*, ed. Charles Coulston Gillespie, vol. 9 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), 435.

<sup>22</sup> For a detailed list of all his works see Minio Paluello, "Moerbeke, William of," 436-438 and P. Thillet, *Alexander Aphrodisias' De fato ad imperatores* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1963), 28-36.

Although attempts like his in the Middle Ages were isolated,<sup>23</sup> he certainly was in contact with many important scholars of his age. Henry Bate of Malines dedicated his treatise *Magistralis compositio astrolabii* to him. From the dedication of Witelo's *Perspectiva* we even can glean information about Moerbeke's philosophy.<sup>24</sup> Moerbeke in turn dedicated his Galen translation to Rosellus of Arezzo, a physician.

It has long been a debated issue whether Thomas Aquinas and Moerbeke knew each other.<sup>25</sup> Different and extreme opinions have been offered at this point and it is not our task to decide on this question. One thing is sure – Aquinas made use of Moerbeke's translations: the Moerbekian versions of the *Politica* books 1-3, *Metaphysica*, *Meteorologica* books 1-4, *De caelo* books 1-4, *Physica*, *De generatione et corruptione*, *De anima*, *De sensu*, *De memoria* can be found in the commentaries of Aquinas. He also refers to Themistius' paraphrases on Aristotle's *De anima* in his *De unitate intellectus*.<sup>26</sup>

Moerbeke's influence on philosophical learning through his translations is considerable: he provided Western scholars with material for centuries. Greek being a language not accessible for most of them, Moerbeke's translations were the only instruments through which ancient philosophical ideas could influence medieval thought.

Though vehemently contested by the Humanist translators, his works continued to be edited in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; printed editions were made in the sixteenth and later centuries. These translations were also material for further translation into vernacular languages up to the twentieth century.

#### **D. The commentaries**

<sup>23</sup> "Greek scholarship among Latins in the thirteenth century was not the product of a long tradition and well organised schools, but the hard-won possession of isolated individuals." (Minio-Paluello, "Moerbeke, William of," 436.)

<sup>24</sup> Moerbeke has one original work which has come down to us. It is called *Geomantia*, and it has not yet been edited and studied. Witelo's dedication, in which he praises his friend's book, is an evidence of Moerbeke's authorship (see Minio-Paluello, "Moerbeke, William of," 435). However, modern scholarship doubts the originality of this work, maintaining that it is a compilation.

<sup>25</sup> See Carlos Steel, "Guillaume de Moerbeke et Saint Thomas," in *Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. J. Brams and W. Vanhamel (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1989).

<sup>26</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus*, in *Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. 43 (Rome: Editori di San Tomaso, 1976), 291-396. See passages I, 39, 2, 51; II, 53, 54, 56; III, 77; 4, 86; V, 120, 121.

John of Salisbury in his Letter 201 asked Master Richard l'Évêque, archdeacon of Coutances: "And once again I ask you to provide glosses on the more difficult points in Aristotle's works, since I do not altogether trust the translator."<sup>27</sup> This quote illustrates not only the strong relationship between text and commentary, but also the proportions of this relationship: the translation and the commentary were complementary to each other. The commentary, as a genre of philosophical writing, was one of the favourite modes of expression of the Late Antique and medieval philosophical literature. Modern scholars concerned with medieval translations many times have to reconstruct the Latin Aristotle versions based on quotes from commentaries. This fact clearly illustrates how closely related text and commentary was. Translations in fact were made to be commented on. The study of this special relationship will be the main task of this thesis.

Between the years 200 and 600 AD the object of these commentaries was almost exclusively Aristotle. These Late Antique commentaries are in fact the battlefield of different religious and philosophical systems: Neoplatonism, Stoicism, Christianity. That is the reason of their importance in the Middle Ages: they "prepared" Aristotle for the Christianised interpretations of the thirteenth century. The importance of these writings is described by Richard Sorabji as follows:

The Latin-speaking Middle Ages obtained their knowledge of Aristotle at least partly through the medium of the commentaries. We have already seen how that medium could pass on a transformed Aristotle, one whose God became the Creator of the world, and whose active intellect, it may be added, provides the hope of immortality for the human soul. Without knowledge of the commentaries, we can not understand the Aristotle of the later Middle Ages.<sup>28</sup>

In the case of Aristotelian noetics, there are three major commentaries from the Late Antiquity which were known by the medieval philosophers: the authors in chronological order are Alexander of Aphrodisias<sup>29</sup> (second and third century), Themistius (fourth century) and John Philoponus (sixth century). The commentaries

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<sup>27</sup> "Precor etiam iterata supplicatione quatinus in operibus Aristotilis, ubi difficiliora fuerint, notulas faciatis, eo quod interpretem aliquatenus suspectum habeo..." See W. J. Millor and C. N. L. Brooke, ed., *The Letters of John of Salisbury*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 294-295.

<sup>28</sup> Richard Sorabji, "Introduction", in Richard Sorabji, ed., *Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and their Influence* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 25.

<sup>29</sup> The *De intellectu* of Alexander (Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima Liber cum Mantissa, Supplementum Aristotelicum*, 2,1, ed. I. Bruns, Berlin, 1892) was translated in the twelfth century from an Arabic version by Gerardus of Cremona, but its content was known to Albert the Great, Siger of Brabant and Thomas Aquinas only through the commentary of Averroes to Aristotle's *De anima*.

of Themistius and Philoponus were translated by our translator directly from Greek, therefore they are the objects of our investigation. The Paraphrase of Aristotle's *De anima*<sup>30</sup> by Themistius had an important role in the debates of the thirteenth century on the unity of the intellect.<sup>31</sup> It is quoted by both sides in the support of their arguments. As to the commentary of John Philoponus,<sup>32</sup> it seems that in spite of the fact that Moerbeke translated it when the debate was going on and probably with the intention of offering a new source material for the debate,<sup>33</sup> nobody had the chance to consult it: we cannot find references to it in the treatises on this subject.

From the thirteenth-century commentaries on the *De anima* we are concerned here with two major works: the commentary of Albert the Great and the one of Thomas Aquinas. They are representative for the purposes of this thesis in the sense that they use different translations: while Albert is relying on the Arabico-Latin version and the *Vetus translatio*, Aquinas uses the new translation of Moerbeke.

Both the Ancient and the medieval writings are textual commentaries: they follow Aristotle's text as close as possible. But while the Ancient ones made use of the Greek original, Albert and Thomas had at their disposal only translations. Our future investigation is concerned with the importance of this fact.

### **E. Description of the sources**

The basic source material for our study is a fragment from the third book of Aristotle's *De anima*, namely the chapters about the cognitive faculties of humans:

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<sup>30</sup> Themistius, *Librorum "De anima" paraphrasis, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 5, ed. R. Heinze, (Berlin: Georgius Reimerus, 1899). The Latin version: *Commentaire sur le "De anima" d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum* 2, ed. G. Verbeke (Leiden: J. Brill, 1973, hereafter cited as Verbeke 1973).

<sup>31</sup> For the interpretation by Aquinas of the famous *illustrati et illustrantes* see the article of G. Verbeke, "Saint Thomas et Themistius," in his edition of the Latin Themistius.

<sup>32</sup> Philoponus, Johannes, *Commentarium in "de Anima". Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 15, ed. M. Hayduck, (Berlin: Georgius Reimerus, 1897). The Latin version, which is not identical with the Greek, is *Commentaire sur le De anima d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum* 3, ed. G. Verbeke (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1966, hereafter cited as Verbeke 1966). There is an English translation of this fragment: *On Aristotle on the Intellect (de Anima 3.4-8)*, tr. William Charlton (London: Duckworth, 1991).

<sup>33</sup> Moerbeke wrote at the end of his translation of Philoponus: "puto qui hoc legerit, ad intellectum litterae Aristotelis plus quam ante lumen habebit." (Verbeke 1966, 120).

DA Book III, chapters 4-8.<sup>34</sup> These four short chapters were widely influential in the Middle Ages: they provided the terminology with the help of which medieval philosophers were discussing the problem of intellection. For the debate in Paris about the unity of the intellect, a dispute between Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant, this was the text on which they based on their arguments.

The main part of this thesis will consist of an analysis of Moerbeke's *De anima* translation and its interaction with the related commentaries. This was apparently the most widespread book of the Philosopher in the Middle Ages. If we examine the number of surviving manuscripts we can observe that it had even more exemplars in use than the *Metaphysics* (see Appendix II). Although we will try to focus on Moerbeke's activity, we will use abundant comparative material from different periods. To determine the characteristic features of a medieval translation technique, we will compare Moerbeke's attempt with the *Vetus translatio* of James of Venice, one similar work from the Humanist period, namely the translation of Johannes Argyropoulos of the *De anima*, as well as with modern English translations such as those of J. A. Smith, D. Ross and D. W. Hamlyn.

The first group of source material consists of the versions of the *De anima*. The main difficulty in our analysis is caused by the fact that the Latin *De anima* is not Moerbeke's own translation, but a revision of a former translation made by James of Venice in the twelfth century. The version of James has not yet been critically edited. The translation we have used is reconstructed by Clemens Stroick in his edition of Albert the Great's commentary on the *DA*.<sup>35</sup> The exact date when this translation was achieved is unknown, but the activity of James of Venice is usually fixed between 1125 and 1150. The approximate date of Albert's commentary is 1259-1260.<sup>36</sup>

There are some difficulties in the dating of the Moerbekian versions of the *De anima*. As it has been demonstrated through a detailed analysis by Robert Wielockx,<sup>37</sup> Moerbeke revised his version of the text. At the first stage he revised the already existing translation of James of Venice around 1260 and at a later stage he revised his own between 1266 and 1269. This revision is the so-called revision of Ravenna, which was treated by R. A. Gauthier as belonging to the first revision. But according

<sup>34</sup> For the text of the original and the translations of these chapters see Appendix III.

<sup>35</sup> Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, ed. Clemens Stroick (Aschendorf: Monasterium Westfalorum, 1968, hereafter cited as Stroick).

<sup>36</sup> See Stroick, 1.

<sup>37</sup> Robert Wielockx, "Guillaume de Moerbeke, réviseur de sa révision du *De anima*." *Recherches du theologie ancienne et médiévale* 54 (1987): 113-185.

to Wielockx, the differences are significant, and the methods and style used are characteristic of Moerbeke's later translations. There is one more partial revision of the text, as appears in the lemmas of Philoponus's commentary. As was pointed out by Minio-Paluello, this is a rather independent version, based on a different Greek manuscript edition.<sup>38</sup> The first version was reconstructed and edited by R. A. Gauthier in Aquinas' *DA* commentary.<sup>39</sup> The version we find in John Philoponus' commentary, in form of lemmas, was edited by Gerard Verbeke.<sup>40</sup> For the purposes of our thesis, the differences between the first revision and the Philoponus lemmas are relevant, therefore these will be the two variants we will reflect on.

The commentary of John Philoponus is fragmentarily translated, Moerbeke concentrating on the *De anima* 3.4-3.8, affirming that *reliqua huius operis non iudicavi oportere transferri*.<sup>41</sup> In this case we know the exact date and place of the translation as given by Moerbeke: Viterbo, 17 December 1268. This fragment, entitled *De intellectu*, was edited twice: by Marcel de Corte in 1934<sup>42</sup> and by Gerard Verbeke in 1966. We have used here the later edition, and in analysing this text we took in consideration Fernand Bossier's emendations to this edition as they appear in the English translation of William Charlton.<sup>43</sup> The other problem with the text of Philoponus is that we no longer have the original of this chapter, but only for the first two books. In the edition of the Greek text<sup>44</sup> there is another variant of the third book, which is not identical with the one used by Moerbeke. It seems that it was a later replacement.

The paraphrase of Themistius is translated in its entirety and we also possess the Greek original.<sup>45</sup> Again, the exact date and time is known: Viterbo, 22 November,

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<sup>38</sup> Minio-Paluello, "Le texte du *De anima* d'Aristote: la tradition Latine avant 1500," in *Opuscula* (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1972), 263. According to him, the Greek manuscripts Moerbeke was using were most probably from the group SUX (U- Vaticanus Grecus 260, S-Laurentianus 81.1, X-Ambrosianus H. 50, all from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries), seemingly in the first version mainly in accordance with X, while in the Philoponus version mainly U. These manuscripts are used also by D. Ross in the establishing of the Greek critical edition of the *De anima*.

<sup>39</sup> *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. 45, 1: *Sentencia Libri De anima*, ed. R. A. Gauthier (Paris: J. Vrin, 1984, hereafter cited as Gauthier).

<sup>40</sup> Verbeke, 1966.

<sup>41</sup> Verbeke 1966, 119.

<sup>42</sup> Marcel de Corte, *Le commentaire de Jean Philopon sur le troisième livre du Traite de l'âme d'Aristote*, (Liège: Faculté de philosophie et lettres, 1934).

<sup>43</sup> John Philoponus, *On Aristotle on the Intellect (de Anima 3.4-8)*.

<sup>44</sup> M. Hayduck, ed., *Commentarium in "de Anima."*

<sup>45</sup> R. Heinze, ed., *Librorum "De anima" paraphrasis*.

1267. This translation was edited by Verbeke in 1973.<sup>46</sup> In the manuscript of this translation we can also find a fragment of Philoponus' commentary (a few pages from the beginning), which was probably the first attempt of Moerbeke to render this writing as well.

The next version from the tradition of the Latin *De anima* is the translation of Johannes Argyropoulos from the fifteenth century. He was a Byzantine scholar in Florence at the court of the Medici, and he "translated more works of Aristotle than any other fifteenth-century scholar and, in terms of output, compares favourably with William of Moerbeke."<sup>47</sup> Although he belongs already to a period with a new and radically different type of ideal of translation, his work is important in our investigation as a revision of the same Latin version. He returned to this text twice: first around 1460 and second around 1485. We do not have a critical edition of his work; therefore the text we have used is his second version published in the Bekker edition of Aristotle.<sup>48</sup> From the point of view of our investigation it is interesting to see how he reshapes the medieval translations, and under what kind of influence.<sup>49</sup>

While Albert the Great still used for his commentary the *Translatio Vetus*, supplemented by the Arabico-Latin version, Thomas Aquinas was the first who had at his disposal the new version made by William of Moerbeke in the *Sententia libri de De Anima* (1267-1268) and the *De unitate intellectus* (1270). We shall see whether the use of different versions lead to different understandings of the text in Albert's and Aquinas' commentaries.

Another important reference material is the Arabico-Latin translation made by Michael Scotus around 1220-1235.<sup>50</sup> It was translated as part of the commentary of Averroes. Although we are mainly concerned with the Graeco-Latin tradition, this

<sup>46</sup> Verbeke, 1973. There is a recent article of Guy Guldentops, "Some Critical Observations on Moerbeke's Translation of Themistius' Paraphrase of *De anima*," in Rita Beyers and Jozef Brams, eds., *Tradition et traduction: les textes philosophiques et scientifiques grecs au Moyen Âge Latin* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), 239-263, article which contains important emendations to the text edited by Gerard Verbeke.

<sup>47</sup> Charles B. Schmitt, *Aristotle and the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).

<sup>48</sup> *De anima*. tr. Johannes Argyropoulos, in *Aristotelis Opera*, ed. I. Bekker, vol. 3 (Berlin: Georgius Reimerus, 1831, hereafter cited as Bekker).

<sup>49</sup> We have to distinguish between the two types of translations of the Humanist period: there were works which still followed the Medieval practice of the *verbum e verbo* method, and there were translations which tried to apply the new *ars poetica* of the Humanists, based on the ideal of the revival of the Classical Latin. The first group was concerned mainly with translations for university usage, as was Argyropoulos, who even had a course at the University on the *De anima*.

<sup>50</sup> Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*. There is a French translation accompanied by a study on Averroes by Alain de Libera: Averroes, *L'Intelligence et la Pensée*, (Paris: GF Flammarion, 1998).

translation is important for our thesis as a complementary text, which was used by the medieval commentators. We can not judge about its value as a translation, but we are interested in its influence on the reading of medieval philosophers.

Since we possess several versions of the same text from different periods, and several treatises from the same field, by comparing them we have the opportunity to observe a medieval translator at work. We can detect his methods, his translating strategy, the development of his terminology.

Modern English translations could be useful in terms of comparison as well, especially if they are accompanied by textual commentaries. In this way, we can see whether the problematic terms and passages were the same for all of them, and if not, which are the parts which are accentuated differently, and how they relate to Aristotle's original work.

The first translation to examine is the one made by J. A. Smith in 1931.<sup>51</sup> The most important text to be considered is the commented translation of David Ross, which accompanied his critical edition of the Greek text, published in 1961.<sup>52</sup> The other commented translation is the one of D. W. Hamlyn, published in 1968,<sup>53</sup> the most recent one I know of. This translation is concerned only with Books II and III, and several fragments of the first book.

## ***F. Review of the literature***

Research into medieval scientific and philosophical translations is an attempt that started at the beginning of the twentieth century. A century is a period long enough to realise important achievements and also to pose some questions which need further investigations. This survey will concentrate mostly on the literature about Moerbeke, but still, some important works of general interest for the whole field of medieval philosophical translations should be mentioned.

Among the first scholars who realised the importance of these translations as a way of transmission of cultural values, the most important was Charles Homer

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<sup>51</sup> In Aristotle, *The complete works. The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1984, hereafter cited as Smith).

<sup>52</sup> D. Ross, ed., *Aristotle: De anima* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961, hereafter cited as Ross).

<sup>53</sup> D. W. Hamlyn, tr. *Aristotle: De anima Books II, III* (Oxford: OUP, 1968, hereafter cited as Hamlyn).



Haskins. In his remarkable book on medieval science,<sup>54</sup> he was the first who “realised the impact of translations on the development of learning during that period, and he endeavoured to set them in their historical background.”<sup>55</sup> His work concentrated mainly on the twelfth century. Nevertheless, we can find an excellent survey of thirteenth-century translations in the article of B. G. Dod: *Aristoteles Latinus* in the *Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*.

Probably because of the variety of the problems regarding medieval philosophical translations, there is no systematic study of this issue, scholars concentrating mainly on individual case studies. It is worth mentioning the great number of conferences that have been held lately on the topic of medieval philosophical and scientific translations.<sup>56</sup> Among these, the most important are the publications of the *Lessico Intellettuale Europeo* and of the *Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale*. While the first one is concerned with philosophical terminology in general and in the large cultural context of intellectual history, the later deals only with the philosophical language of the Middle Ages.

The first step in “Moerbekian” studies was the identification of his translations, and later on the establishment of a chronological order followed. After the translations had been edited, this philological-historical approach was followed by an interest in his methods and on the influence of his work. The development of his translating strategy and the philosophical vocabulary elaborated by him are the main problems of present-day research.

Regarding the literature of the activity of Moerbeke one should start with Martin Grabmann and his study from 1946, *Guilelmo di Moerbeke, O. P. il traduttore della opera di Aristotele*. According to Minio-Paluello it was for that time “by far the most exhaustive study of Moerbeke’s life and the best collection of evidence,

<sup>54</sup> Charles Homer Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1960).

<sup>55</sup> Marie Thérèse d’Alverny, op. cit., 421.

<sup>56</sup> Rita Beyers and Jozef Brams, eds., *Tradition et traduction: les textes philosophiques et scientifiques grecs au Moyen Âge Latin* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999). Contamine, G. *Traduction et Traducteurs au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1989). R. Ellis, *The Medieval Translator. The Theory and Practice of Translation in the Middle Ages* (N.p.: n.p., n.d.). M. Fattori, *Il vocabolario della République des Lettres. Terminologia filosofica e istoria della filosofia. Problemi di metodo* (Florence: Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, 1997). J. Hamesse, and M. Fattori, ed. *Rencontres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale. Traductions et traducteurs de l’antiquité tardive au 14e siècle* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’études médiévales, 1990). J. Hamesse, ed. *Aux origines du lexique philosophique européen. L’influence de la Latinitas*. Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 8 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’études médiévales, 1997). J. Hamesse and Carlos Steel, ed., *L’élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Age*, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000).

information on the works which he translated and on the opinions expressed on them through centuries, and references to modern scholarly studies.”<sup>57</sup>

Intense interest on his work started as the result of the edition of his translations in the framework of the *Aristoteles Latinus*, which started in the first half of the twentieth century. The first to be mentioned here is Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, who was the initiator of the series together with G. Lacombe in 1939. (Among the editors of Moerbeke’s work next to Minio-Paluello one has to mention the names of Jozef Brams, B. G. Dod, H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, Pierre Michaud-Quantin, Carlos Steel, P. Thillet, Gerard Verbeke and others.<sup>58</sup>)

Minio-Paluello was the one who developed the so-called *particula* method: based on the statistical analysis of the connectives and other particles, scholars are able to set a chronological order among Moerbeke’s translations and also to determine his authorship when we have no other evidence for it.<sup>59</sup>

This method was used also by Fernand Bossier, in order to study the way Moerbeke worked. Bossier was the first who tried to make an attempt to compare medieval translations with Humanist versions.<sup>60</sup> His cautious philological work had as a result also the correction of some of the mistakes of the critical editions. He also called the attention on the limits of the *particula* method regarding the establishment of the chronology.<sup>61</sup>

From the older generation of researchers Verbeke has to be mentioned, as the editor of several translations and author of numerous studies about Moerbeke’s methodology. For our study his works are important, because one of his major fields of interest was the *De anima* and the related commentaries. Not only his editions of

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<sup>57</sup> Minio-Paluello, “Moerbeke, William of,” 439.

<sup>58</sup> For a detailed list of the Aristotle editions of the *Aristoteles Latinus* see Appendix II.

<sup>59</sup> The most important works of Minio-Paluello on this field are the following: “Guilelmo di Moerbeke, traduttore della *Poetica* di Aristotele”, *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscholastica* 39 (1965): 1-17. *Opuscula*. (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1972), “Moerbeke, William of,” In *Dictionary of Scientific Bibliography*, ed. Charles Coulston Gillispie, vol. 9, 434-440 ( New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974).

<sup>60</sup> His major works from this field are: *Filologisch-Historische Navorsingen over de Middeleeuwse en Humanistische Latijnse Vertalingen van den Commentaren van Simplicius*. Doctoral thesis (Leuven Catholic University, Leuven, 1975).

<sup>61</sup> See F. Bossier, “Méthode de traduction et problèmes de chronologie,” in Brams and W. Vanhamel, ed., *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études a l'occasion du septième centenaire de sa mort* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1989), 257-295.

Philoponus' and Themistius' commentaries,<sup>62</sup> but also his article about the *De anima* translations are important for this thesis.<sup>63</sup>

An important achievement in this field was the appearance in 1989 of a book for the seven hundredth anniversary of Moerbeke's death.<sup>64</sup> This is a collection of essays edited by Jozef Brams and W. Vanhamel, with studies by Bossier, Brams, Verbeke, Vanhamel, Steel and others. It contains the most detailed bibliography, compiled by Vanhamel, with all the works which had appeared up to then about Moerbeke.

The most important contemporary scholars concerned with the works of Moerbeke are Brams and Steel. Steel is the editor of Moerbeke's translations of Proclus. His articles also reflect his interest in the Platonic translations of Moerbeke<sup>65</sup>, but at the same time he wrote the most exhaustive essay about the relationship between Moerbeke and Thomas Aquinas.<sup>66</sup> Professor Brams' main concern at the present is the Latin translation of the *Physics*, but his articles comprise a wide-ranging research in the field of medieval philosophical translations: the terminology of the translations, the influence of these works, the methods of the translators, the manuscript tradition as well as chronological problems.<sup>67</sup>

## G. Methodology

The study of philosophical translations, situated on the borderline between philosophy and philology, implies an interdisciplinary approach. My thesis, as a methodological experiment, is built on a comparative textual analysis of the different versions of the same text and the related commentaries. The core of the examination consists of comparison in two main, and entirely opposite directions: detecting the influence of the Ancient commentaries on Moerbeke's *DA* translation and detecting the influence

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<sup>62</sup> See Bibliography.

<sup>63</sup> G. Verbeke, "Les progrès de l'Aristote Latin: le cas du *De anima*", In J. Hamesse and M. Fattori, ed. *Rencontres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale*, 186-201.

<sup>64</sup> Brams and W. Vanhamel, ed., *Guillaume de Moerbeke*.

<sup>65</sup> See Carlos Steel, "Proclus comme témoin du texte du *Parménide*," in Rita Beyers and Jozef Brams, eds., *Tradition et traduction*.

<sup>66</sup> See Carlos Steel, "Guillaume de Moerbeke et Saint Thomas," in *Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. J. Brams and W. Vanhamel.

<sup>67</sup> See Jozef Brams, "L'influence de l'*Aristoteles Latinus*: Boèce et Jacques de Venise," in J. Hamesse and Carlos Steel, ed., *L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Age* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000); "Guillaume de Moerbeke et le commentaire de Simplicius sur la *Physique*," in Rita Beyers and Jozef Brams, eds., *Tradition et traduction*; "Guillaume de Moerbeke et Aristote," in J. Hamesse and M. Fattori, ed., *Rencontres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale*.

of Moerbeke's translation on medieval commentaries. This comparison involves several strata of texts: one needs first to compare the Greek original with the Latin translation, the Moerbeke translations with other Latin or vernacular, Ancient, medieval or modern translations, in order to grasp his way of working and the importance of these translations as exactly as possible.<sup>68</sup>

The main part of the thesis will be divided in two according to two levels of problems raised by the texts: lexical and grammatical analysis. In the lexical part I will concentrate on Greek philosophical terms and their different Latin variants<sup>69</sup>, while in the grammatical part there will be selected several passages where the different Latin translations of Greek grammatical structures caused a change in the meaning of the sentence.

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<sup>68</sup> In the evaluation of medieval translators' methods, it is necessary to keep in mind Guy Guldenstop's warning: "It is necessary to formulate some appropriate criteria by means of which to evaluate Moerbeke's translation. The criteria to be applied must be searched in the expectations of Moerbeke's contemporaneous reading public. It would indeed be inequitable to condemn his work for failing to measure up to our modern humanistic or philological norms. It is evident that this translation was not based on a linguistic and historical study of a critical text edition. It is also clear that Moerbeke did not aim at emulating the rhetorical style of the author he translated." Guy Guldenstop, "Some Critical Observations on Moerbeke's translation of Themistius' Paraphrase of the *De anima*," in *Tradition et Traduction*, ed. Rita Beyers and Jozef Brams, 241.

<sup>69</sup> For the lexical part I can use the results of the *particula* method, which was applied to most of my sources, as well as the Graeco-Latin, Latin-Greek and Latin-English indexes provided by the text editions.

## IV. LEXICAL ANALYSIS

At the beginning of Book III, when discusses the problem of imagination, Aristotle affirms “There are, too, various kinds of judgement - science, opinion, practical knowledge, and their opposites; let us discuss later the differences between these.” (Aristotle: *De anima* 427b 23-26)<sup>70</sup> About the meaning of this “later” medieval and modern scholars had different opinions: while contemporary scholars consider this as referring to the *Nichomachean Ethics* 6, chapter 3-7<sup>71</sup>, Ancient and medieval commentators thought that Aristotle is already consistently differentiating between these terms already in the *De anima*.

Although Aristotle’s main concern in the *De anima* III was to grasp the mechanism of intellection based on analogy with sense perception, he indeed makes use of a variety of verbs apart from νοεῖν, denoting intellectual activities. The grasping of the terminology of different cognitive activities was one of the major preoccupation of Moerbeke, who tried to consistently differentiate between the terms involved in the discussion.

The reason why he distinguished between terms like γινώσκω, γνωρίζω, διανοεομαι, εὐρίσκω, θεωρεῶ, μανθάνω, ὑπολαμβάνω and φρονεῶ can be

1. the practice of using Ancient commentaries as additional help for the translation
2. his high concern for terminological consistency

In the following analysis we will point out some of the different interpretations comparing Moerbeke’s versions with the *Vetus* and Humanist as well as with Modern translations and we will see, how these distinctions were commented upon by medieval commentators.

<sup>70</sup> εἰσι δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν πολλῶν διαφορῶν, ἐπιστημῆ καὶ δόξα καὶ φρονήσις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τούτων, περὶ ὧν τῶν διαφορῶν ἕτερον ἐστὶ λόγος. English translation by D. Ross.

<sup>71</sup> For example D. Ross in his commentary to the *DA*, p. 284.

### A. γνω=σις and φρο/νησις: DA 429a 10

William of Moerbeke, translating the third chapter of the *De anima* of Aristotle, translates the passage περι= δε= του= μορι/ου του= τη=φ ψυξη=φ %R γινω/σκει τε η( ψυξη= και= φρονει= (429a 10) as follows: *de parte autem animae qua cognoscit anima et sapit*. But translating the commentary of Philoponus on this passage, he changes the *sapit* to *prudentiat*: *de parte autem animae qua cognoscit anima et prudentiat*. The question arises as to what led the translator to change the words. What was the nuance he neglected the first time? In order to ascertain his understanding of the word we will analyse a few selected passages from his translation and compare it with humanist and modern English translations.

The restricted family derived from the root φρον- contains three words: the verb φρονε/ω, the noun φρο/νησις, and the adjective φρο/νιμος.<sup>72</sup> Next to these many other related terms exist as well: φρο/νημα, φροντι/ζειν, σωφρω=ν, and ευ)φρω=ν.

According to the dictionary, the verb φρονε)ω means in the first place *to have understanding, to be wise, to be prudent, to think rightly, to comprehend, to be minded to do*. The noun φρο/νησις means *purpose, intention, thought, judgement, pride, practical wisdom, prudence*, and the adjective φρο/νιμος *wise, sensible, and prudent*.<sup>73</sup>

In the dictionary of Peters only the noun-form is given. According to the author, at the origin of this term is the belief that there is always “some sort of intellectual control in virtue.”<sup>74</sup> In Plato this term does not have any ethical and practical nuance; rather, it designates the contemplation of the Ideas, as a supreme type of knowledge. In Aristotle there are many senses of the word: in a first phase we can observe a platonic type of usage, and starting with the *Nicomachean Ethics* this notion regains its moral dimension, theoretical knowledge being designated with the term σοφ)α. Plotinus retains the moral sense of the word as well, considering it a virtue.

<sup>72</sup> These are the only terms which occur in the *DA*.

<sup>73</sup> Regarding the etymology of the term, we should start with the noun φρην, φρενο/φ, which means diaphragm. The ancient Greeks thought that we feel and think with the heart, the location of these powers being the diaphragm.

<sup>74</sup> Francis E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms* (New York: New York University Press, 1967) 224.

Pierre Aubenque wrote a theoretical analysis of this problem, in his book *La prudence chez Aristote*.<sup>75</sup> The starting point for him is a genetic distinction between the two usage of Aristotle. He detected passages from the works of the initial period where Aristotle makes use of the so-called platonic sense of this word, in contrast with opinion and sense perception. In these fragments *φρο/νησιφ* is usually accompanied by *ε)πιστη/μη* or *γνω=σιφ*, in order to designate the highest form of science, which is in fact identical to *σοφι/α*.<sup>76</sup> But starting with the *Nicomachean Ethics* it is no longer a science, but a dianoetic virtue.<sup>77</sup> It is “degraded” and turns, from being a supreme science, into a virtue of the opinative part of the soul, which operates in the contingent world. According to Aubenque, this latter sense of the term occurs only in the moral treatises.<sup>78</sup> The author concludes that the usage of the term in Aristotle has two origins: a platonic one and one taken from the archaic Greek tradition. In the following we are going to use the terms *platonic meaning* and *traditional meaning* to distinguish between the two senses. The platonic meaning refers to the highest science of the Supreme Being, with the same reference as *ε)πιστη/μη* or *γνω=σιφ* or *νου=φ*. The traditional sense is a moral one. Trying to define it, Aristotle said that it is neither science nor art, so it has to be a practical disposition. It is at the same time a virtue, one which determines the rules of choice, choice belonging to the field of moral virtue. What distinguishes it from science and wisdom is that while wisdom is concerned with absolute Good and Evil, the domain of *φρο/νησιφ* is good and evil for humans, being a type of knowledge of a limited area.

After this short historical presentation of the term we will try now to analyse the role of this word in the *De anima*, its commentaries and the Latin translations of these made by William of Moerbeke. The sources we are going to analyse are the following: fragments from the Latin *De anima* made by Moerbeke (the so called *translatio Nova*) contrasted to the *translatio Vetus* of James of Venice, and the

<sup>75</sup> Aubenque, *La prudence chez Aristote* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963).

<sup>76</sup> *ε)πιστη/μη τι/νοφ και= φρο/νησιφ* (*Metaf. M, 1078b 15*)

*γνω=σιφ η© φρο/νησιφ* (*De coelo, III, 1, 298b 23*)

*δια/νοια ε)πι/σταςθαι και= φρο/νειν* (*Fizica, VII, 3, 247b, 11*)

*φρο/νιμον και= ε)πι/στημον* (*Fizica, VII, 3, 247b, 18*)

*προ/φ τε γνο/σιν και= τη/ν κατα= φιλοσοφι/αν φρο/νειν* (*Topic. VIII, 14, 163b, 9*)

<sup>77</sup> dianoetic (as opposed to noetic) denotes discursive reasoning: *E. N.*, I, 13, 1103a, 6; VI, 2, 1139a 1; VI, 5, 1140b 1;

<sup>78</sup> Aubenque, *La prudence*, 23.

commentaries of Themistius and Philoponus, comparing these with the Humanist translation of Johannes Argyropulos and modern English translations. The way Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas commented on these passages will also be examined.

According to a statistical analysis<sup>79</sup> the terms φρο/νεω, φρο/νησιφ and φρο/νιμοφ appear in the *De anima* thirteen times, prevalently in the verbal form.<sup>80</sup> The commentary of Philoponus is translated only from the fourth chapter of the third book, and so we have only one reference to this term (429a 11). As far as Themistius' commentary is concerned, we have more data, the translation being complete.

On first examination we can already observe several synonyms in the translation variants.

404b 5:  
ου) φαι/νεται δ' οἷ γε κατα< φρο/νησιν λεγο/μενοφ νου=φ πα=σιν ο(μοι/ωφ υ(πα/ρξειν τοι=φ ζ%/οιφ, α)λλα ου)δε< τοι=φ α)νθρω/ποιφ πα=σιν.

T: *non qui secundum sapientiam intellectus dicitur, non omnibus similiter inest animalibus.*<sup>81</sup>

421a 22: διο/ φρονιμω/τατον ε)στι τω=ν ζ%/ων

T: *propter quod et prudentissimus animalium est homo.*<sup>82</sup>

417b 8–11: διο/ ου) καλω=φ ε©ξει λε/γειν το< φρονου=ν, οἷταν φρονω=, α)λλοιου=σθαι, ωἷσπερ ου)δε< το<ν ο)ικοδο/μον οἷταν ο)ικοδομω=.

T: *propter hoc non bene habet dicere habentem prudentiam quando prudenter agit alterari; neque enim aedificatorem quando aedificat;*<sup>83</sup>

427a 18-23:  
Ε)πει< δε< δυ/ο διαφοραι=φ ο(ρι/ζονται μα/λιστα τη/ν ψυχη/ν, κινη/σει τε τω= κατα< το/πον και< τ%= νοει=ν και< φρονει=ν και< αι)σθα/νεσθαι, δοκει= δε< και< το/ νοει=ν και< το/ φρονει=ν ωἷσπερ αι)σθα/νεσθαι τι ειΠναι (ε)ν α)μφοτε/ροιφ γα<ρ του/τοιφ κρι/νει τι η( ψυξη< και< γνωρι/ζει τω=ν

<sup>79</sup> Gerald Purnelle, *Aristote: De anima: index verborum* (Liege: C.I.P.L., 1988).

<sup>80</sup> The complete list of appearances: 404b 5 (φρο/νεσιφ), 417b 8 (φρο/νη), 417b 8, 417 b 11 (φρονου=ν), 421a 22 (φρονισμω/τατον) 427a 18, 427a 19, 427a 22, 427a 24, 427a 28, 427b 7 (φρονει=ν), 427b 10, 427b 25 (φρο/νεσιφ), 429a 11 (φρονει=).

<sup>81</sup> Verbeke 1973, 25.

<sup>82</sup> Verbeke 1973, 156.

<sup>83</sup> Verbeke, 1973, 129.



οἰστων), καὶ οἱ γὰρ ἄρξαι οἱ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι  
 ἰταυτοῦ ἐῖπναι/ φασιν [...] οἷτι με οὐ πν οὐ) ταυ)το/ν ε)στι το/ αἰ)σθ  
 α/νεσθαι καὶ τοῦ φρονεῖν, φανερο/ν.

T: *Quoniam autem dicimus non solum sensu cognoscere et iudicare, sed et  
 ratione et mente, quid utique differant iudicatoria haec ab invicem,  
 considerandum deinceps. Quod autem non inutilis inquisitio sit, palam ex  
 antiquioribus physicis; fere enim isti faciunt sensum idem rationi;*<sup>84</sup>

From these passages it is already obvious that the translation in Latin can be difficult, because the actualisation of the platonic and the traditional meaning at the same time is impossible. Transposing this notion to a different linguistic surrounding had as a result the loss of some nuances. From the passages analysed it becomes obvious that the translator was conscious of these two meanings. The proof that he felt something from the polyphony of the word is that we can find many variants in the texts, which try to catch the manifold meaning of the Greek term.

The main passage where we have more variants is 429a10:

περιδεῖ τοῦ μορι/ου τοῦ τη=φ ψυξη=φ %π γινω/σκει τε η( ψυξη  
 ⌵ καὶ  
 φρονεῖ=

We can find the following versions:

V: *De parte animae autem, qua cognoscit anima, et sapit.*<sup>85</sup>

N: *De parte autem animae qua cognoscit et sapit*<sup>86</sup>

P: *De parte autem animae qua cognoscit anima et prudential*<sup>87</sup>

T: *De parte autem animae qua utimur ad theoriam et actionem*<sup>88</sup>

We have here three varying translations of the same word. But before judging which one is more appropriate, we should define to which category of usage this verb belongs in this context. The translator tries to keep the semantic resonance of ethics and practical knowledge. But the way this term appears here reminds us of the platonic usage. It appears in the same sentence, in syntactic and semantic parallelism (indeed, almost a formal redundancy based on synonymy) with γινω/σκει, just as it does in the passages quoted by Aubenque as examples of platonic meaning. To the same argument we can add that while in the *Nicomachean Ethics* the prevalent form is

<sup>84</sup> Verbeke, 1973, 201.

<sup>85</sup> Stroick, 177.

<sup>86</sup> Gauthier, 202.

<sup>87</sup> Verbeke 1966, 1.

<sup>88</sup> Verbeke 1973, 213.

that of the noun, in the cases with platonic usage we find more verbs, as in the present case. The same synonymy appears in the passage below: νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν (427a 18). According to these arguments and similarly in concordance with the relevant fragments from the *De anima* (417b 8-11, 427 a 18-b 25), we can conclude that the meaning as detected in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is irrelevant in the case of the *De anima*, where νοεῖν and φρονεῖν are at the same level and in the same category of intellectual cognition, as opposed to perceptive cognition.

However, the commentators, who knew very well the moral writings of Aristotle, perhaps even knowing the sense of the word from current usage, tried to reflect on this dimension of the word. For example, Philoponus, commenting on the passage 429a 10, says the following:

*Cum dixisset de vegetativa anima et sensitiva et phantastica, ut simpliciter autem dicatur de irrationali, transit ad doctrinam de rationali anima. Prius autem de existimatione facit sermonem, dico autem de opinativo et meditativo. Quod enim non sit nunc sermo de speculativo intellectu et de vocato secundum habitum insinuat per hoc quod dicit qua cognoscit anima et prudentiat. Prudentiare enim circa agibilia fit, circa haec enim prudentia; speculativus autem intellectus non negotiatur circa agibilia.*

*Per cognoscit cognitivas animae potentias significat, per prudentiat autem activas; in duo enim haec potentiae animae dividuntur, scilicet in speculativum et activum. Prudentia autem circa practica vel agibilia: hoc enim consuevimus prudentiam vocare, circa contingentia aliter se habere bene gerere.<sup>89</sup>*

This passage could have influenced Moerbeke to change the term he had once chosen and to stick with *prudentia*. R. A. Gauthier, arguing that the moral of Aristotle is an intellectualist one, does not agree with the translation by *prudence* in modern languages, which for him neglects the theoretical nuance of this term, considering that *wisdom* would be more appropriate. Moerbeke tried this with the term *sapit*, which seemed to provide a good balance between (or combination of) theory and practice, but the problem is that the noun which was derived from this verb, *sapientia*, became identical with *scientia*, both meaning in fact σοφία, the supreme science. This was in fact the association made by Albert the Great, who commented on a version of the *Vetus* as follows:

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<sup>89</sup> Verbeke 1966, 1-2.

*De parte autem animae rationalis, qua ipsa anima cognoscit distinguendo et formando agibilia et factibilia, quae pars intellectus activus arte et prudentia perfectus vocatur, et de parte animae, qua anima sapit prima et vera et ea quae per prima et vera accipiunt fidem - quae pars sapientia et intellectu principiorum perficitur et scientia et vocatur intellectus contemplativus - quaerere intendimus...*<sup>90</sup>

Albert arrived at an original differentiation, which contradicts the distinction made by the Ancient commentators and which was followed by Moerbeke in his translation of the lemmas in Philoponus' commentary. For Albert, as for all ancient and medieval commentators, these terms signified two different types of cognition. Albert inverts the two concepts in his interpretation. For him, the concept related to *prudentia* is *cognoscit*, and *sapit* is the one which implies theoretical, contemplative knowledge, clearly related here to *sapientia*.

Thomas Aquinas also, in his commentary, considered it necessary to distinguish between the two terms, in spite of the fact that he used the version with *sapit*:

*Supra autem dictum est quod differt inter sapere et intelligere: nam sapere pertinet ad iudicium intellectus, intelligere autem ad eius apprehensionem.*<sup>91</sup>

The variant from Themistius is in fact a periphrasis: *utimur ad actionem* which reflects the opposition between theory and practice,  $\phi\rho\omicron/\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varphi$  meaning not only a faculty but the exercise, the operation, of such human faculties. It might be that at this stage Moerbeke had still not come to coin the verb derived from this *prudentia*, a verb which did not exist in Classical Latin. This presupposition seems to be confirmed by the other analytic form, the one of *prudenter agit*, which again tries to keep the active and practical character of this type of knowledge. The verb *ago* (here “to act”) is not the only form from his family of words: the objects of that mode of cognition which is  $\phi\rho\omicron/\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varphi$  are  $\tau\alpha\Leftarrow\pi\rho\alpha/\kappa\tau\alpha$ , which is translated into Latin by *agibilia*,<sup>92</sup> that is to say, objects of action, operation, in contrast with *factibilia*, objects of production. Another term used by Moerbeke, which appears in the translation of Themistius' work, is *ratio*. The choice of this term could have been motivated by the fact that in

<sup>90</sup> Stroick, 177.

<sup>91</sup> Gauthier, 202. As Gerard Verbeke pointed out, this is a different distinction. The ancient commentators distinguished between theoretical and practical knowledge, Thomas is referring to the difference between understanding and judgement.

<sup>92</sup> *Prudentiare enim circa agibilia fit* (Verbeke 1966, 1).

the context quoted above our term is opposed to the senses. If this is the sense of the passage than this option for *ratio* is justified in this given context.

We can see that it would be hard to choose one ideal option. This is first of all because φρο/νησιφ has a lot of meanings, from which the two used by Aristotle appear to preclude each other: the platonic meaning of the theoretical science and the traditional sense of the practical science, which implies activity and a moral nuance may be mutually incompatible. The Latin version always tries to take into consideration both senses of the word, but Aristotle never used the term with both meanings intended or implied at the same time. The sense in question is usually activated by the context: in the *Nicomachean Ethics* it is almost always the practical meaning. The frequency of the noun form shows to us that we have a well-defined concept, the basis of part of a system of morality for Aristotle. In this case *prudentia* is an appropriate solution, even taking in consideration Gauthier's criticism: the Latin word has a much more intellectual character than the French or English 'prudence'. But in the case of the *De anima* there is no need to accentuate the traditional meaning. The semantic parallelism confirms it, as does the occurrence of verbal forms, which are characteristic of these kind of structures. Of course with the appearance of several terms like *ratio*, *sapio*, *iudicare*, and so on, together with the fact that we use different terms for the nuances of the same term, we lose any other different possibilities of interpretation, such as any connection with notions like σωφρως/νη.

Modern English translations, like that of David Ross, are not concerned with this term. Ross translated the problematic passage as follows: "with regard to the part by which the soul knows and thinks."<sup>93</sup> He obviously understood this pair of terms as synonyms. Moreover, there are no comments on this fragment in the textual commentary which follows the translation, while we can see that both Philoponus and Themistius felt it important to reflect on this part of the text.

Basing our analysis on Argyropulos' translation, we should compare now the Humanist technique with the medieval one.<sup>94</sup> The main passage we are concerned

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<sup>93</sup> Ross, 289.

<sup>94</sup> We are aware of the fact that it is dangerous to make general statements on the basis of one example. Johannes Argyropulos was a Greek scholar: his attitude towards the Latin language and culture has to be examined from this point of view as well. Thus, representing a different type of intellectual, having a neutral position in the clash between the university masters and Humanists, one can argue to what extent is his work representative for the Humanist ideal of translation. See the remark of F. E. Cranz on Greek translators: "it is worth noting that the fifteenth-century translations of Aristotle were largely the work of Byzantine rather than of Latin scholars, with the notable exception of Leonardo Bruni. The

with is the same: *De animae autem ea parte qua cognoscit atque sapit*. This is similar to Moerbeke's first version, the one used by Thomas Aquinas. The first thing to be observed is that in the Greek and medieval Latin we had the word *anima* twice, while here it occurs only once. We also have a demonstrative pronoun related to *parte*, which I suspect serves to replace the Greek article. Concerning the important terms from this passage, *sapit* needs to be examined. Why did he prefer this form?

Fortunately, the whole translation of Argyropulos has survived, and therefore we have the opportunity to check the other twelve occurrences of the term.<sup>95</sup> As we can see from the examples from the passages 404b 5, 421a 22, 427b 10 and 427b 25, Argyropulos knew about the term *prudentia* and he even made use of it in a consistent way. But he used only the noun form. Whenever the verb form occurred in Greek, he rendered it by *sapere*. We can observe here an application of one of the ideas of humanist translation theory. The term *prudentiare* is a neologism invented by Moerbeke in order to face the challenges of the Greek text, while the noun is a Classical Latin word already used by Cicero. Wherever he needed the noun form, he replaced the Greek with *prudentia*. But when a verbal form occurred, he used the classical term *sapere*. It is an example of the attempt of the humanists to return to Classical Latin, which, according to them, was seriously damaged by the horrifying practice of Latin in the Middle Ages.<sup>96</sup>

### **B. νο/ησιφ and δια/νοια: DA 429a 22-24**

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explanation may lie in the fact that the Byzantine tradition of learning included philosophy in a way that Latin humanism did not." F. E. Cranz, "The Renaissance Reading of the *De anima*," in *Platon et Aristote a la Renaissance* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1976), 360.

<sup>95</sup> "at ea mens tamen, et intellectus cui prudentia tribuitur, non modo universis similiter animalibus, sed ne hominibus quidem omnibus esse videtur" (404b 5); "quocirca non recte se habet dicere ipsum sciens, cum scit, alterari, sicut nec aedificatorem cum aedificat" (417b 8-11); "quapropter et prudentissimum est animalium" (421a 22); "videtur namque tam intelligere quam etiam sapere veluti quoddam sentire... veteres idem esse sapere sentireque censent... sentire simili similo arbitrantur et sapere... id est prudentia et scientia atque opinio vera... scientia et opinio et prudentia, et ea quae sunt his contraria" (427a 18 - 427b 25).

<sup>96</sup> Still, our conclusion seems to contradict the common belief about Renaissance translations. The version of Argyropulos, as we will try to show with further examples, is not so different from the medieval one: there are no different stylistic features, the same methods of structuring can be found in both of them, and one can note the same care concerning the consistency of the terms. As a first supposition we can suggest major discrepancies, or at least differences, between Humanist theory and practice, and posit continuity with the medieval traditional methods, especially in the case of Aristotle.

Along of the five chapters describing intellection, the terms νοεῖ=ν and νοῦ=φ are the ones which occur most often. As the key term of the whole Book III, it requires a special attention. There are no discrepancies between the solutions of the translators: every version has the Latin *intelligere* and *intellectus* as their counterparts. The difficulty is caused by the fact that while for νοεῖ=ν there is just the term *intelligere*, the Latin *intelligere* can be equivalent to several Greek terms.

For example, in chapter four we find the two following expressions denoting intellectual activities:

ο( αἰσθητικῶν καλῶν/μενοφ τη=φ ψυξη=φ νοῦ=φ (λε/γω δεῖν νοῦ=ν %ῥ διανοεῖται  
καί=ν υ(πολαμβα/νει η( ψυξη/) ου)θε/ν ε)στιν ε)νεργει/# τω=ν οἰστων π  
ρι=ν  
νοεῖ=ν. (429a 22-24)

V: *Sic vocatus utique animae intellectus (dico autem intellectus, quo opinatur et intelligit anima) hoc nihil actu horum quae sunt, ante intelligere.*<sup>97</sup>

N: *Vocatus itaque anime intellectus (dico autem intellectum quo opinatur et intelligit anima) nihil est actu eorum quae sunt ante intelligere.*<sup>98</sup>

P: *Qui ergo vocatur animae intellectus (dico autem intellectum quo meditatur et existimat anima), nihil est actu entium antequam intelligere.*<sup>99</sup>

A: *Is igitur qui intellectus animae nuncupatur (dico autem nunc eum quo rationatur<sup>100</sup> anima et existimat), nihil est actu prorsus eorum quae sunt, antequam intelligat ipse.*<sup>101</sup>

In the first Latin version υ(πολαμβα/νει is translated as *intelligit*, in this way becoming synonymous with νοεῖ=ν. Moerbeke in his first version agreed with the choice of his predecessor, but in the lemmas from Philoponus we can already see another solution, namely *meditatur* for διανοεῖται and *existimat* for υ(πολαμβα/νει. If we are searching for the reason which caused this change, we will find in Philoponus the following remarks:

<sup>97</sup> Stroick, 177.

<sup>98</sup> Gauthier, 201.

<sup>99</sup> Verbeke 1966, 1.

<sup>100</sup> Argyropoulos changed the term used by Moerbeke: in all the cases where the noun form appears, he prefers *mens* (404a 17, 415a 8, 421a 25, 427b 15, 433a 18), and in the case of the verb (408b 3, 9, 14, 15, 427b 13, 429a 23) he translates *rationare*. This way he draws near to the family of λο/γοφ and λογ/ζω, terms translated with *ratio* and *rationare*. He rejected the *meditatio* probably because it is a loaded term, it implies a spiritual, contemplative type of cognition, while the Aristotelian usage does not justify this load.

<sup>101</sup> Bekker, 223.

Meditari quidem ipsam significat meditationem, existimare autem opinionem; quoniam intellectum communius usque nunc appellavit, merito nunc distinxit qualem intellectum dicit, quia non quo phantasiamus, sed quo existimamus et meditatur.<sup>102</sup>

Thus, we can observe again a medieval translator at work: revising his first versions on the basis of his readings. He makes comprehensible through his terminology a distinction which Philoponus thought exists in Aristotle: namely an inner distinction within the intellection, one which we could now call thinking and judging.<sup>103</sup> The terms probably used by Aristotle now are carefully distinguished by the commentator, and this interpretation of Philoponus is transparent through the Latin text of the *DA* as well. According to Philoponus, there are three levels of modes of cognition: *existimari*, *meditari* and *intelligere*: the three Greek concepts involved here are  $\delta\omicron/\chi\alpha$ ,  $\delta\iota\alpha/\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ , and  $\nu\omicron\upsilon=\varphi$ .<sup>104</sup>

In the passage 431a 14-15 the *Vetus* and the *Nova* used by Saint Thomas for the expression  $\tau\omega=\delta\epsilon\Leftarrow\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\epsilon\tau\iota\kappa\omega=\psi\upsilon\zeta\omega$  the Latin *intellectivae animae*<sup>105</sup> is substituted, while in the lemmas from Philoponus we can find *meditativae animae*.<sup>106</sup> If we compare the Themistius paraphrase with the Philoponus commentary we can observe an increasing interest in delimiting and differentiating the semantic field of  $\delta\iota\alpha/\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$  and  $\nu\omicron\upsilon=\varphi$  as well as the terms derived from them. In the Themistius text, which was translated a year before the Philoponus commentary (1267), the term *intellectus* is often used for  $\nu\omicron\upsilon=\varphi$ ,  $\delta\iota\alpha/\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$  and even  $\nu\omicron/\eta\sigma\iota\varphi$  as well as *intellectivus* for both  $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\eta\tau\iota\kappa\omicron/\varphi$  and  $\nu\omicron\eta\tau\iota\kappa\omicron/\varphi$ .<sup>107</sup> In the lack of the Greek original in the case of Philoponus it would be hazardous to claim a clear and consistent distinction. Still, in the light of Philoponus' theories it would be reasonable to consider as important the fact that here he at least considered this term problematic. In the relevant passage from Philoponus concerning the concept of  $\delta\iota\alpha/\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$

<sup>102</sup> Verbeke 1966, 11.

<sup>103</sup> These are in fact Ross' terms: "that by which the soul *thinks* and *judges*."

<sup>104</sup> As presented by G. Verbeke in his edition of the Latin text, XLIV-XLV.

<sup>105</sup> "Intellective autem anime phantasmata ut sensibilia sunt." Gauthier, 229.

"Sed intellectivae animae phantasmata ut sensibilia sunt." Stroick, 211.

<sup>106</sup> "Meditativae autem animae phantasmata velut sensibilia existunt." Verbeke 1966, 95.

<sup>107</sup> An excellent analysis of the different interpretations of the relationship between these two terms based on their translations is given by Alain de Libera in his translation of Thomas' *De unitate intellectus* (Paris: GF-Flamarion, 1997), 219-222. He compared the Arabico-Latin versions with the Graeco-Latin ones, and observed that the Arab version, in the passage 414b 18 translating  $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\eta\tau\iota\kappa\omicron/\varphi$  by *distinguens* (also  $\delta\iota\alpha/\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$  by *distinctio* and  $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota=\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$  by *distinguere*), makes possible even a contrast with  $\nu\omicron\upsilon=\varphi$ , *intellectus*, while the Graeco-Latin *intellectum* offers a synonymical structure.

Moerbeke offers several versions for this term, but keeping everywhere the original as well: *dyania, id est mentem vel meditationem vel ratiocinationem; dyaniam, id est mentem vel meditationem*.<sup>108</sup> He keeps the original term and offers several synonyms in Latin: this can reflect the fact that he understood that for Philoponus this concept is important. Therefore he preferred this long list of words rather than translating it with one inaccurate word, loosing this way the polisemantism of this word.

For the family of the concept of νοῦς (νο/ησις, νοητο/ς, νο/ημα) the terms used are usually derived from *intelligere*, but there are some differences to be pointed out.

The term νο/ησις occurs in our fragment only once as denoting the process of intellection.<sup>109</sup> In the medieval versions it is translated as *intelligentia*, while in the Humanist one it appears as *intellectio*.<sup>110</sup> What was the reason Argyropulos changed the term used by his predecessors? Probably because of his awareness of the Arab tradition. As Jean Jolivet pointed out,<sup>111</sup> in the Arab commentaries there was a distinction between *intellectus*, meaning human intellect, and *intelligentia*, a separate substance. At the time Moerbeke was translating, this differentiation was not yet widely influential. He probably had no opportunity to consult the translations made by Michael Scotus from Arabic.<sup>112</sup> As for Argyropulos there are many elements in his translation which lead us to the conjecture that he knew the Latin translation of the *De anima* as it appears in the Averroes commentary.<sup>113</sup> If he knew about the special

<sup>108</sup> Verbeke 1966, 19-20.

<sup>109</sup>

430a

26:

η( με<ν ουΠν τω=ν α)διαίρε/των νο/ησις ε)ν του/τοις περι< α) ου<κ ε)στι το/ ψευ=δοφ.

<sup>110</sup> V: "Indivisibilium igitur in his est circa quae non est falsum." Stroick, 207.

N: "Indivisibilium quidem igitur intelligentia in his circa quae non est falsum." Gauthier, 224.

P: "Indivisibilium quidem igitur intelligentia in his circa quae non est falsum." Verbeke 1966, 64.

A: "Indivisibilium igitur intellectio in iis constituit circa quae falsitas non est." Bekker, 223.

<sup>111</sup> Jean Jolivet, "Intellect et Intelligence. Note sur la tradition Arabe-Latine des XIIe et XIIIe siècles," in *Philosophie médiévale arabe et Latine* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1995).

<sup>112</sup> In the Philoponus commentary he uses this term systematically for νο/ησις.

<sup>113</sup> Although in the present thesis we will try to focus on the Graeco-Latin tradition of the *DA*, it would be interesting to point out the influence of the Arabic versions on the Latin translations and commentaries. We have compared the Humanist translation with the Arabico-Latin version as it appears in the Averroes commentary: Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*. Comparing the terminology used by Moerbeke and the revision of Argyropulos, we observe that in the places where he differs from Moerbeke he follows in fact the Arabico-Latin version from Averroes' commentary. Thus, he prefers *forma* to *species*, *instrumentum* for *organum*, *passionis expertus* for *impassibilis*, *quidditas* for *quod quid erat esse*, *contemplativum* for *speculativum*, *imago* for *phantasmatis*. The lack of a critical edition of Argyropulos' text makes rather speculative this kind of analysis, but even with possible variations, the influence of the Arabic version is striking on the terminological level. The influence of the Averroes commentary and the translation of Michael Scotus on Argyropulos' work would be an interesting subject for further study.



Arabico-Latin meaning of *intelligentia*, he had to find a new term describing the activity of the human intellect.

## V. GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS

### A. *The receptivity of the intellect: DA 429a 20*

The Latin version of this fragment demonstrates the importance of translations in the history of commentaries on Aristotle. There are passages in translations which restrict and limit the manifold meanings and the ambiguities of the original. I will try to demonstrate that Thomas Aquinas could arrive at a different interpretation of the passage, like modern English commentators and translators, only because he made use of Moerbeke's version while he commented on the *De anima*.

We will try to describe the problem with the help of the article of Joseph Magee, who observed this difference.<sup>114</sup> Here he argues that the Aristotelian νοῦς receives forms. This argumentation is needed because some scholars, like Richard Sorabji and D. W. Hamlyn, have a different point of view, according to which the analogy between sense perception and intellection regarding the receptivity of forms is just a starting point in Aristotle's theory, which will be abandoned later. In fact Sorabji's position, which starts the discussion, can be summarised in one sentence: "although Aristotle says that νοῦς possesses forms, according to Sorabji, νοῦς does not receive such forms, much less are they received without matter."

Magee starts his argumentation with the statement that Sorabji is wrong: "Aristotle's account of νοῦς incorporates an Aristotelian formula that Sorabji claims applies only to sensation." That is to say that, just as in the process of perception the sense organ receives the form of the perceived object, the operation of the mind implies the receiving of the form of the object to be understood. It is stated as such in *DA* 429a 15-16:

α) παθεῖν αὐτὸν δεῖ εἰπεῖν, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἰδέναι καὶ δύναμει  
τοιοῦτον α)λλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ο(μοιῶς ἐξείν, ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ  
)σθετικὸν προφταῖ σθηταῖς, οὕτω τὸ νοῦν προφταῖ ν  
οηταῖς.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>114</sup> Joseph Magee, "The Receptivity of νοῦς in the *De anima* 3.4", [http://www.aquinasonline.com/Magee/nous.h], March 26 1998.

<sup>115</sup> "It must, then, while itself impassive, be receptive of form and potentially like its object, but not identical with it; reason must be related to its object as the perceptive faculty is to perceptible things." (transl. Ross).

According to Sorabji, this analogy will be abandoned, because for the receptivity theory an organ is needed, but intellect does not have one. It is not our purpose to present the whole debate, but only one argument of Magee against this theory, which is interesting in our case, namely the reinterpretation of the passage from *DA* 429a 20: παρεμφαινο/μενον γὰρ κωλύει τοἷον α)λλο/τριον καιἰντιφρα/ττει. The passage in the quoted English version of D. W. Hamlyn is as follows: “For the presence of what is foreign to its nature hinders and obstructs it.” Magee observes the obscurity of this: “if something is present to this non-bodily power, then either it is constitutive of itself (in which case is not foreign), or it is the intellect’s object (in which case the intellect is not hindered).”

We are going to present now several versions of the passage, in order to see the possible interpretations and their implications regarding the receptivity of the intellect.

In English, the understanding of the passage implies that if anything foreign is present in the intellect, it can no longer function. The Latin version implies that something present in the intellect hinders the understanding of something else. If this something else is translated as an object, it clarifies the predicates, which without an object could suggest a complete non-functioning of the intellect, a block caused by the presence of something foreign in it. The Classical interpretation states that intellect has no nature, in order to receive every nature. It cannot have anything present, because it will hinder the receptivity of the intellect (although not its operation.)<sup>116</sup> As Magee pointed out, in the case of *De anima* the attributes of the intellect (separable, unmixed, eternal) logically imply that it can not be stopped by something external in its activity.<sup>117</sup>

The first Graeco-Latin translation, the *Vetus* of James of Venice, offers the following solution: *Apparere enim prohibet extraneum et ei obicitur*.<sup>118</sup> As we can see, the word order is strictly preserved, but not the grammatical status of the components. The most confusing is the rendering of the participle

<sup>116</sup> “ ‘To hinder,’ then, as Aristotle is using the term, does not mean ‘fails to function’, as Smith’s translation would leave one to believe, but rather means ‘impedes or blocks the reception of something.’” Magee, 3.

<sup>117</sup> See J. Magee, 4.

<sup>118</sup> Stroick, 178.

παρεμφαινο/μενον by the infinitive *apparere*. Albert' explanation of this passage based on this translation is as follows:

*Si enim esset aliqua forma informatus<sup>119</sup> ad hoc quod esset hoc aliquid, tunc hoc ipsum prohiberet, ne appareret ei in cognoscendo alienum et contrarium ab illa forma et impediret cognitionem omnis rei, quae obicitur ei, quia contrarium et diversum ab illa forma recipi in eo non posset, eo quod nec contraria nec disparata possunt esse in eodem, et id quod inesset ei, non haberet in potentia.<sup>120</sup>*

According to Albert, it is clear that it is the reception of other forms which would be blocked if the intellect would have a nature anything else but potential. However, he takes the *apparere* as related to the *extraneum* and both governed by the predicate *prohibet*. As a result of this reading, he reaches the conclusion of the impossibility of cognition if the intellect would be *forma informatus*.

The version of Moerbeke of this passage offers a new reading, based on a different interpretation of the syntax. He translates *intus apperens enim prohibebit extranem, et obstruet*.<sup>121</sup> If we contrast it with modern English translations, like the one of J. A. Smith, we will notice some important differences: “the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block.”<sup>122</sup>

One can observe the exact correspondence between the word order and the word number of the original and the Latin version. Moerbeke emphasises the opposition between the two problematic terms by translating with *intus* and *extranem*. An important nuance of the *extranem* is that it does not imply, like *foreign*, that the

<sup>119</sup> Concerning this first part of the sentence, some interpretation variants should also be pointed out. The passage from 429a 18 quotes Anaxagoras: α)να/γκη α©ρα, ε)πει← πα/ντα νοει=, α)μυγη= ειΠναι, ω©σπερ φησι←ν Α)ναχαγο/ραφ, ι©να κ ρατω=, του=το δ'εστι←ν ι©να γνωρι/ζη. The *Translatio Vetus* has for this fragment the following solution: “Necesse itaque est, quoniam omnia intellegit, immixtum esse, sicut dicit Anaxagoras, ut imperet. Hoc autem est, ut cognoscat despectum.” (Stroick, 178) We can only speculate, why the translator introduced this rather strange term *despectum*, but we can see, that Albertus found a perfect justification for it: “et hoc est, ut cognoscat omne despectum ab ipso; despectum enim vocat id cuius forma non informatur; has enim formas omnes despicit intellectus tamquam indignas sibi, quasi prohibentes ipsum intellegere.” One possible reason to introduce it would be the implications of the term *imperet*, used by the *Vetus* as well as by the *Nova*. It implies for the Latin commentators a supremacy, a superiority of the intellect. No wonder then, that Aquinas in his commentary offers a rather unique interpretation of the same passage, identifying this intellect with the Divine Intellect, which moves everything, a kind of a First Mover: “...ut imperet, id est suo imperio omnia moveat.” (Gauthier, 203) “...intellectu dei, qui non est in potentia, set est quodam modo actus omnium, de quo intellectu Anaxagoras dixit quod est inmixtus ut imperet.” (Gauthier, 204) This obscurity could be the reason why Moerbeke in the Philoponus lemmas changed the *imperet* to *obteneat* (Verbeke, 10), a term which does not imply by itself a hierarchical separation of the intellect from the intelligibles.

<sup>120</sup> Stroick, 179.

<sup>121</sup> Gauthier, 201.

<sup>122</sup> Smith, 682.

intellect would have a particular nature. *Foreign* implies that there is also something *not foreign*, some inner characteristic of the intellect. *Extranem* implies only that there are things inside and outside the intellect. The most important thing to be pointed out is that he translated to το/ α)λλο/τριον as the object of the predicate. In the Greek participles and adjectives ending in -ov according to their form can be either nominative (if they are neuter) or accusative (for either masculine or neuter). This has to be decided according to the context. The modern English version opted for another version, grammatically also possible. In this interpretation the participle παρεμφαινο/μενον governs the adjective το/ α)λλο/τριον. It suggests that anything foreign to the intellect's nature blocks its activity. It is an interpretation of the text, which uses interpolations in order to clarify the meaning. For example the word *nature* does not exist in the original, but Smith felt a need to explain the term *foreign*. His use of a nominative predicate makes the statement intransitive, with a complement rather than an object.

Another English version is that of D. Ross, the editor of the Greek text of the *De anima*: “for the intrusion of anything foreign to it interferes with it”.<sup>123</sup>

We can see here that he opted also for the variant which considers the two terms as related to each other, the syntagm of adjective and participle in Greek being the subject of the sentence. He knew about the other interpretation as well, as we can find out from his commentary to this passage:

το/ α)λλο/τριον has sometimes, e.g. by Alexander (De an. 84. 15) been taken to be the object of the verbs, but it is plainly subject. α)ντιφρα/ττει, primarily used of the blocking out of the sun's or the moon's rays in an eclipse (Anal. Post. 87b 40, De Caelo 293b 25, Meteor. 345a 29), is here used metaphorically.<sup>124</sup>

The choice of the *intrusion* seems to be inappropriate, because it suggests an aggressive and disturbing presence, not indicated in the Greek version. On the other hand, he uses only one predicate, by *interferes* making the meaning more obscure. If Smith's version was too strong, here the role of the predicate is too weak.

Let us turn now back to Moerbeke's version. He translated the *De anima* at least twice, as we already pointed out above. His variants are proofs of continuous correction. The variants to this passage are different, but in all of them to

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<sup>123</sup> Ross, 290.

<sup>124</sup> Ross, 292.

το/ α)λλο/τριον is rendered as the object of the predicates. It seems that in this interpretation the two commentators who reflected on this passage, Themistius and Philoponus, influenced him. In Themistius' commentary it appears as follows:

T: *prohibebit enim et obstruet species quae inexistit alia tamquam aliena. Necessarium ergo talis intellectus non esse naturam propriam nullam neque formam nisi hanc, quod possibilis est comprehendere alienas naturas et formas, et nullam habere speciem determinatam, quoniam comprehendere omnia natus est.*<sup>125</sup>

It is a paraphrase, but it reproduces almost identically the Aristotelian passage in the first line. From Themistius' passage the accusative status of το/ α)λλο/τριον is much more evident, because the predicate is in the singular and the neutral object in the plural (both in Latin and Greek). It is evident for Themistius that it is not the intellect itself which is hindered, but the reception of the other forms.

In Philoponus the text of Aristotle is not present in the lemmas, but only incorporated in the text:

P: *Deinde hoc inapparens quod habet in se ipso, species scilicet, prohiberet et impediret aliarum specierum certam notitiam, sicut color qui est in vitro colorato impedit transitum aliorum colorum per vitrum.*<sup>126</sup>

Paraphrasing is not a characteristic of Philoponus, but this is the present case, where he rebuilds Aristotle's sentence, to make it more comprehensible. According to him, what is present in the intellect is the form, the species of something, and this can hinder the understanding (*notitiam*) of other (foreign, external) species. Here again it is clear that for the Classical commentators in this problematic sentence an object is needed.

It is in this sense that it is interpreted by Aquinas as well. In his commentary of the *De anima* there appears *intus apparens enim prohibebit cognoscere extraneum et obstruet*, with the following commentary:

*idest impedit intellectum, et quodammodo velabit et concludet ab inspectione aliorum. Et appellat intus apparens aliquid intrinsecum connaturale intellectui, quod dum ei apparet semper impeditur intellectus ab intelligendo alia, sicut si diceremus quod humor amarus est intusapparens lingue febrienti.*<sup>127</sup>

<sup>125</sup> Verbeke 1973, 215. The first sentence in Greek: κωλο/ει γα←ρ και← α)ντιφρα/ζει το/ εἶνυπαρχον ει©δοφ τα/ α)λλα ωἩσπερ α©λλοτρια.

<sup>126</sup> Verbeke 1966, 11.

<sup>127</sup> Gauthier, 204.

The inserted infinitive *cognoscere* makes even clearer that we have an object there. In the *De unitate intellectus* the quote is *intrus apparens enim prohibebit extraneum et obstruet*.<sup>128</sup> In the commentary which follows, Thomas compares this with the process of seeing. If a colour were to be in the eye, it would hinder it from seeing other colours:

*Similiter, si aliqua natura rerum, quas intellectus cognoscit, puta terra aut aqua, calidum aut frigidum, aut aliquid huiusmodi, esset intrinseca intellectui, illa natura intrinseca impediret ipsum et quodammodo obstrueret, ne alia cognosceret.*<sup>129</sup>

The tradition of interpreting this sentence as having an object is broken with in the Renaissance, when the Humanist Johannes Argyropulos translates as follows:

*alienum namque, cum apparet iuxta, prohibet atque seiungit.*

This is in concordance with the modern interpretations, taking the Greek participle and adjective as referring to each other. We can observe a totally different choice of words. He refused the Moerbekian *intusapparens*.<sup>130</sup> At the same time, not being able to recreate in Latin synthetically the Greek compound, he had to render it by analytical ways. Keeping the verb *apparet* he changed the adverb to *iuxta*, which is reminiscent of Smith's solution (co-presence).

The two interpretative traditions argue here in fact about the nature of the intellect. The version of Moerbeke makes possible an argumentation about the total potentiality of the intellect, while the version of the *Vetus*, Argyropulos and the Modern English translations contrast the inner nature of the intellect with something which is foreign to it.

To decide whose version is correct is difficult, because grammatically both versions work. It was not our purpose to judge, but rather to show the importance of translating philosophical texts and the translation's influence on commentaries and interpretations.

## **B. Self-understanding and understanding at will: DA 429b 9**

<sup>128</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus*, chapter I, paragraph 20.

<sup>129</sup> Idem, *ibidem*.

<sup>130</sup> We know from the article of R. Wielockx that there were also much more complicated versions in the previous ones, such as *secusinapparens* and *secusintusapparens*. See R. Wielockx, "Guillaume de Moerbeke, réviseur de sa révision du *De anima*", *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 56 (1987), 140.

An interesting, but difficult research would be to try to identify the Greek manuscripts which medieval translators were using. Although this is not the task of the present paper, we will try now to illustrate, through one example, the differences it can cause in interpretations.

In the passage 429b 9 και αυ(το<φ δι' αυ(του= το/τε δυ/ναται νοει=ν there is a discrepancy between Ancient and modern interpretations, as resumed by David Ross:

The MSS., Themistius, Philoponus (lemma), and Simplicius read δε< αυ(το<ν, but there would be no point in a reference here to self-knowledge. The point of the sentence is to indicate that there are two stages in the advance from ignorance to knowledge (1) the stage in which we can know if we want to (1.7) and (2) the advance from this state to that of actually knowing - an advance which depends only on ourselves. Bywater's emendation is supported by δι' αυ(του= in 1.7 and by Sophonias' α)φ' ε(αυτου= (125.13) and is clearly right.<sup>131</sup>

According to this interpretation, Ross translates as follows: "He can than know at will."<sup>132</sup> D. W. Hamlyn follows his example: "and than it can think by itself."<sup>133</sup> But even in the English tradition there are translators who do not agree with this solution. J. A. Smith prefers the reading δε< αυ(το<ν: "and thought is then able to think of itself."<sup>134</sup>

If we turn now to the Latin tradition of the *De anima*, we have to begin with the *Vetus* as it was known to Albert the Great. The reconstruction of Stroick illustrates the δε< αυ(το<ν reading: *et ipse autem seipsum aliquando potest intelligere*.<sup>135</sup> But if we look at the commentary of Albert, we can observe the following combination:

*et tunc etiam per se potest intelligere, quia omnis potentia receptiva potest operari, quando reducta fuerit ad actum. Et tunc etiam intelligit seipsum; sicut enim sentimus nos videre et audire potentia, quae est sensus, ita intelligimus nos intelligere eadem potentia quae est intellectus.*<sup>136</sup>

As one can immediately realise, Albert's reading in fact activates both readings: the instrumental δι' αυ(του as *per se* and the reflexive δε< αυ(το<ν as

<sup>131</sup> Ross, 292.

<sup>132</sup> Ross, 290.

<sup>133</sup> Hamlyn, 58.

<sup>134</sup> Smith, 683.

<sup>135</sup> Stroick, 198.

<sup>136</sup> Stroick, 199.



*seipsum*. He comments on the passage by suggesting that it refers both to the self-governed activity of the intellect and to self-intellection. Albert sees these two moments delimited by *per se* and *se ipsum* as logically following one another: the intellect which can think by itself necessarily is able to think about itself. Rather than to suppose that Stroick's reconstruction is wrong, it would be more plausible to admit that here Albert relies both on the Graeco-Latin and on the Arabico-Latin<sup>137</sup> version as well.

Moerbeke's version follows the *Vetus* both in the *Nova* and in the lemmas from Philoponus: *et ipse autem se ipsum tunc potest intelligere*.<sup>138</sup> If we consult the commentaries he knew about, than we can see that this reading is a continuation of a long tradition. Already in the Themistius commentary we can read

*Nihil enim aliud intellectus est quam noemata, idest intellecta vel conceptus. Factus igitur idem his quae intelliguntur, intellegit tunc et seipsum*.<sup>139</sup>

And he continues this argumentation through the next paragraph, explaining self-knowledge as a result of the identity of the intellect and intelligibles in the act of the intellection.

Philoponus' arguments are similar at this passage to that of Themistius: he says that by understanding others, the intellect in fact understands itself.

*Si igitur intellectus est quae intelliguntur, merito utique intellectus intelligens se ipsum intellegit*.<sup>140</sup>

The Ancient commentators did not consider the δε<= αυ(το<=ν reading as not fitting in the logic of the present context. They related this statement to the identity between intellect and intelligibles, as presented in the opening affirmation of the paragraph:

οἷταν δ' ουἷτωφ εἷκαστα γε/νηται ω(φ ο( ε)πιστη/μων λε/γεται ο( κατ'

ε)νε/ργειαν... (429b 5-6).<sup>141</sup>

<sup>137</sup> This, in the translation of Michael Scotus, appears as follows: *Et ipse tunc potest intelligere per se* (Crawford, 419).

<sup>138</sup> Gauthier, 208 and Verbeke 1966, 20.

<sup>139</sup> Verbeke, 1973, 217. In Greek:

και<= αυ)το<=φ δε<= ε(αυτο<=ν τηνικαυ=τα δυ/ναται νοει=ν! ου)δε<=ν γα<=ρ α©λλο ο( νου=φ ε)στι<=ν η© τα<= νοη/ματα. γινο/μενοφ ουΠν ο( αυ)το<=φ τοι=φ νοουμε/νοιφ νοει= τηνικαυ=τα και<= ε(αυτο<= ν.

<sup>140</sup> Verbeke, 1966, 21.

Although the *se ipsum* reading appears in the commentaries of Aquinas as well, his reading will not connect these statements anymore with the problem of the identity of the intelligible and intellect.<sup>142</sup> In the *Sententia Libri 'De anima'* Aquinas says

*intellectus factus in actu non solum potest intelligere alia, set etiam tunc potest intelligere se ipsum.*<sup>143</sup>

One can see from the construction *non solum... sed etiam*, that for Aquinas there was no causal relationship between the two parts of the sentence. The reason for this might be related to the translation of the 429b 5-6. The *Vetus* offers a quite obscure solution:

*Cumque autem unaquaeque sciat, sciens dicitur, qui est secundum actum.*<sup>144</sup>

As Gauthier pointed out,<sup>145</sup> instead of *fiat*, as a possible version for γε<νεται, the *Vetus* offers *sciat*, and takes the *sciens* as referring to *intellectus*. Neglecting the connective ω(φ, the *Vetus* misses the comparison between intellection and science.<sup>146</sup> Albert the Great offers again a reading which is probably a mixture of the two translations he had at his disposal:

*cum autem possibilis intellectus fiat speculative unaquaeque intellecta secundum actum, tunc talis intellectus secundum actum factus dicitur sciens; fit enim intellectus possibilis ipsum intellectum, sicut fit potentia actus, quando ad actum mutatur.*<sup>147</sup>

He reads *fiat* instead of *sciat*, but he considers the *dicitur sciens* as explaining *intellectus*. Aquinas possessed Moerbeke's corrected version:

*Cum autem singula fiat ut sciens, dicitur qui secundum actum.*<sup>148</sup>

<sup>141</sup> In Ross' translation: "When it has become each of its objects as one who is actually a man of science is said to do..." (Ross, 290).

<sup>142</sup> In the *De unitate intellectus* Aquinas uses the statement from 429b 9 to argue against the possible intellect as separate substance; he relates the sentence in question to the previous *addiscere aut invenire*: "Quamvis et hoc ipsum irrationabile videatur, quod substantia separata a phantasmatis nostris accipiat, et quod non possit se intelligere nisi post nostrum addiscere aut intelligere; quia Aristoteles post verba praemissa subiungit: «et ipse seipsum tunc potest intelligere», scilicet post addiscere aut invenire." (Gauthier, 209)

<sup>143</sup> Gauthier, 209.

<sup>144</sup> Stroick, 198.

<sup>145</sup> Gauthier, 208.

<sup>146</sup> Here Aristotle is referring to the character of the science as expressed in 430a 4-5: η( γα<ρ ε)πιστη/μη η( θεωρητικη< το< ου< θεωρ ε)πιστητο/ν το< αυ)το/ ε)στι. (In Ross' translation: "theoretical knowledge and that which is theoretically known are the same.")

<sup>147</sup> Stroick, 199.

<sup>148</sup> Gauthier 208.

But he still did not perceive the differences offered by this solution, following the old interpretations. Moerbeke, by inserting the connective *ut*, kept the comparative meaning of the original. In spite of this fact, Aquinas wrote in the *Sententia libri 'De anima'*

*Cum autem sic fiat singula, id est sic reducat in actum specierum intelligibilium, quemadmodum sciens, id est habens habitum scientiae, habet species in actu, tunc dicitur intellectus qui est secundum actum.*<sup>149</sup>

As Gauthier pointed out, we can find the right interpretation only in the *De unitate intellectus*, 4, 92:

*cum sic singula fiat (scilicet in actu) ut sciens dicitur qui secundum actum, id est hoc modo sicut scientia est actus et sicut sciens dicitur esse in actu in quantum habet habitum.*

In the first version he takes *in actu* as referring to an inserted *intellectus*, which has the disposition of science. In the second he understands that there is a comparison between the intellect in actuality and science in actuality. According to Gauthier, although Aquinas had the correct version of Moerbeke, Averroes' interpretation was still needed to draw his attention to the correct reading. This reminds us the method of commenting of Albert, who also based his comments on a parallel usage of two translations and probably the commentary of the Arab philosopher as well.

### C. The agent and the receptive intellect: DA 430a 14-15

Introducing the concepts of the agent and the receptive intellect, Aristotle affirms in 430a 10-15:

ε)πει< δ' [ω<σπερ] ε)ν α(πα/σ< τ<= φ</σ< ε)στι< [τι] το< με<ν υ<λ<η  
η ε<κασ< γ<ε/ν<ει (του=το δε< ο<σ< πα/ν<τα δυ<να/μ<ει ε)κει=να), ε<τερον  
δε< το< αι<τιον και< ποιη<τικο/ν, τ<= ποι<ει=ν πα/ν<τα, ο<ριον η( τε/ξ<  
ν<η προ<φ< τη<ν υ<λ<ην  
πε/πον<θεν, α)να/γκ<η και< ε)ν τ<= ψ<υ<ξ<= υ(πα/ρ<ξειν ταυ</τα<φ< διαφο<ρα/  
φ<.  
και< ε)/στιν ο( με<ν τοιου<τοφ< νο<υ=φ< τ<= πα/ν<τα γ<ι/νε<σθαι, ο( δε< τ<  
%<= πα/ν<τα ποι<ει=ν, ω(φ< ε<ξ<χιφ< τιφ<, ο<ριον το/ φ<ω=φ<!

<sup>149</sup> Gauthier, 208.

In the structure of the Greek text there is a clear parallelism: in the first part he discusses matter as potentiality and the active cause, which creates everything. Several lines below he distinguishes between the intellect which becomes everything on the one side and the intellect which creates everything on the other side. Thus the agent and the receptive intellects are defined in terms of potentiality and actuality.

If we examine the *Vetus* as reconstructed based on Albert's commentary, we will observe that Albert probably had great difficulties in grasping this parallelism.

*Quoniam autem, sicut in omni natura, erit aliquid aliud quam materia in unoquoque genere (hoc autem omnia potentia illa), altera autem causa est et efficiens quidem est et omnia facit, ut ars ad materiam sustinuit, necesse est et in anima has esse differentias. Et huiusmodi est intellectus, quo omnia fiunt. Ille vero, quo omnia est facere, sicut habitus quidam est ut lumen...*<sup>150</sup>

The basic problem of this passage, as pointed out by R. A. Gauthier, is the use of relative pronoun *quo*: in the case of the potential intellect, an ablativus instrumentalis turns the meaning into the opposite of what Aristotle was about to say: instead of "the intellect, which became everything," the *Vetus* offers the reading "the intellect through which everything became."<sup>151</sup> This way the translator confers the attributes of the agent intellect to the receptive intellect. The other part of the parallelism is again obscure, if we try to correlate the parts of the sentence *omnia est facere*, where the presence of the infinitive obscures the meaning. If we take a look at Albert's commentary, we will find the following remarks:

*Et per hunc modum in anima rationali necesse est esse has differentias ita, quod unus intellectus sit in ea, in quo omnia fiat intellecta, qui formatur et distinguitur ab intellectis et alius sit, quo omnia intellecta facit et confert eis formas, unde movere possint intellectum possibilem.*<sup>152</sup>

In the introduction we have already seen that Albert, according to his own testimony, if the Graeco-Latin translation was unsatisfactory, made use of the Arabico-Latin version of Michael Scotus<sup>153</sup> as well. Whether he could understand the fragment based on his reading of the Scotus translation, or whether he personally emended the text with the preposition *in*, is impossible to say. It may also be the

<sup>150</sup> Stroick, 203.

<sup>151</sup> In the English translation of Ross: "one kind of reason exists by becoming all things, the other by making all things."

<sup>152</sup> Stroick, 204.

<sup>153</sup> "Oportet igitur ut in ea sit intellectus qui est intellectus secundum quod efficitur omne, et intellectus qui est intellectus secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne." Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, 437.

case, that his version of the *Vetus* was already an ameliorated one.<sup>154</sup> In any case, his uses of the preposition *in* re-establishes the correct meaning of the sentence. In the second part of the text, he changes the infinitive *facere* to *facit*. The Greek usage of infinitives after prepositions puzzled the translator, who, in his word for word rendering, made use of the same grammatical forms as the source language, without taking into account the linguistic differences.

Moerbeke's translation used by Thomas Aquinas<sup>155</sup> has the same solutions as the corrected version of Albert the Great:

*Quoniam autem sicut in omni natura est aliquid hoc quidem materia in unoquoque genere (hoc autem est potencia omnia illa), alterum autem causa et factivum, quod in faciendo omnia ut ars ad materiam sustinuit, necesse est in anima esse has differentias, et est huiusmodi quidem intellectus in quo omnia fiunt, ille vero quo omnia est facere, sicut habitus quidam, ut lumen.*<sup>156</sup>

In addition, the reading of Moerbeke offers amelioration on several important points: he changes the *efficiens* to *factivum*, which is a better solution for what Aristotle expresses here by ποιητικο/ν. To correct the misreading of James of Venice, he adds to the problematic *quo* the preposition *in*, as we have seen it in Albert's commentary: the *through which* becomes *in which*.

Furthermore, by the time he translates Philoponus, his translation draws nearer to the original and in spite of this fact, it becomes even more clear.

*Quoniam autem sicut in omni natura est aliquid, hoc quidem materia unicuique generi (hoc autem quod potest omnia illa), alterum autem quod causa et factivum, in faciendo omnia (quale ars ad materiam sustinuit) necesse et in anima esse has differentias. Hoc quidem tale in omnia fieri, hoc autem in omnia facere. Ut habitus quidem, velut lumen.*<sup>157</sup>

The major achievement is the appearance of the passive infinitive *fieri*, which makes possible a concise expression of the content, the nature of the two intellects being expressed by the passive and active voice of the verbs, as in the Greek version (γιν/νέσθαι and ποιει=ν). There is no more need for relative clauses or pronouns; the

<sup>154</sup> As Alain de Libera pointed out, the quotes in Albertus' commentary differ in a few places from the translation as reconstructed by Stroick. See Alain de Libera, *Thomas Aquinas: Contre Averroés* (Paris: Flammarion, 1997) 209, 222.

<sup>155</sup> Gauthier offers a list of quotations from the early works of Thomas Aquinas, where he made use of the *Vetus*, and he argues that in the later writings at many points, although he already possesses a version of the *Nova*, keeps quoting the older version, which he already knew very well. See Gauthier, 180\*.

<sup>156</sup> Gauthier, 218.

<sup>157</sup> Verbeke 1966, 42.

parallelism of the original is now clear even on the structural level. This result, as we can see, was achieved by a strict application of the *verbum e verbo* method: he applied the Greek structure of the preposition and infinitive to the Latin text as well.

Argyropulos was aware of the Moerbekian version and he made use of it in his own work to such an extent that we can talk again about a revision of a previous translation. He respected at many points the terminology developed by James and William, and he also accepted their interpretation in most of the cases. Nevertheless, it is a work of a new period, with new ideals of interpretation and fidelity.

*Cum autem in omni natura sint quaedam quorum alterum quidem unicuique generi materies est, quod id esse patet quod est potencia illa cuncta, alterum vero causa et efficiens omnia, efficiendo atque agendo talem subiens rationem qualem ars condicionem ad materiam subit, necesse est et in anima differentias has easdem inesse. Atque quidam est intellectus talis ut omnia fiat, quidam talis ut omnia agat atque efficiat, qui quidem ut habitus est quidam et perinde ac lumen.<sup>158</sup>*

What is striking at very first sight in Argyropulos' text is its dimensions. From the pure fact that it is longer than the medieval ones, one can already see the shifting of *translatio* towards a paraphrasing tendency. As for the differences, he did not find proper the term *facio* to approximate the meaning of ποιει=ν. He selected a synonymic couple for this term: *efficiendo atque agendo* and *agat atque efficiat*. As we can see, he picked the solution of the *Vetus* for ποιητικο/ν, *efficiens* and he applied it to the predicate as well, supplementing it with *ago*, in this way trying to catch several levels of meaning inherent in the complex Greek term. This method of using synonymic structures is one of the characteristic methods of Humanist translation. He rejects the solution with the passive voice as well, probably based on the consideration that this type of usage of the infinitive is not characteristic for Classical Latin.

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<sup>158</sup> Bekker, 223.

## VI. CONCLUSION

We started this thesis with an optimistic conjecture about the importance of the translations in the Latin tradition of the *De anima*. As a demonstration of this fact, we aimed to show that there existed a close relationship between the text and its commentaries and that they influenced each other in a very complex way. Thus, Moerbeke's translation was influenced by the Ancient commentators he read; Albert's reading was influenced by the *Vetus* and by the *translatio Arabica*; Thomas' new interpretations were based on the *Nova*; the Humanist translator preferred the terminology of the Arab version. Certainly we could illustrate that the interaction between text and commentary was during this (rather long) period a complex relation of influences, many reciprocal, which developed on different layers. Nevertheless, there is place in this concluding chapter for some critical remarks as well.

The reason why there is no supreme ideal of translation is that the demands which bring about a translation are changing. Every generation has a different understanding of what a faithful translation means: this is why all the important writings of the human culture are retranslated over again. Up to the 1260s there were two Latin translations available in the case of the *De anima*: the Graeco-Latin version of James of Venice and the Arabico-Latin version of Michael Scotus.<sup>159</sup> The first was criticised for its obscurity, while the second was problematic due to its vicarious nature as a translation of a translation. Commentators like Albert the Great based their exegeses on both texts; using them as complementary to each other. However, the increasing interest in the problem of the soul in the second part of the thirteenth century had as a result the retranslation of the text. The version of William of Moerbeke was a clearer one, and thus remained in use for centuries.

From the point of view of this thesis one of the most interesting features of Moerbeke's methods of translation is the use of Ancient commentaries. Comparing his first revision with the lemmas of Philoponus' commentary, we notice that wherever he modified his previous version, it was done as a reaction to what the commentators affirmed about the subject matter. We may arrive at this conclusion

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<sup>159</sup> See Appendix I: Chronology.

simply by analysing a couple of terms<sup>160</sup> and some passages which appeared as obscure and problematic in the *Vetus*.

Concerning the terminology, we may conclude that there is an attempt at uniformity in Moerbeke's word choice: after several versions using *sapere*, *iudicare*, *agere*, *prudentiare* for the verb  $\phi\rho\nu\epsilon/\omega$ , and *ratio*, *sapientia*, *prudentia* for the noun  $\phi\rho\omicron/\nu\eta\sigma\iota\phi$ , in his last translation he opted for the *prudentiare*, *prudentia* forms, and henceforth used them consistently everywhere. In the case of  $\delta\iota\alpha/\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$  he did not find any such ultimate solution; nevertheless, with the exactitude of a modern philologist, while offering several Latin terms, he also keeps the Greek original. We can detect here a conscious attempt to create a philosophical terminology, while at the same time he paid less attention to the context, since the translation did not always need this level of precision. Nothing in the Greek text justifies such distinctions, which means that Moerbeke knew about the meanings of the words from elsewhere. He probably modified his terms because of the interpretation of the commentaries which reflect upon these terms.<sup>161</sup> It seems that although he rarely changes the terms which are fixed in the *Vetus*, whenever he does so, it is in accordance with the Ancient commentators he consulted. In this respect the works of Themistius and Philoponus were his tools of translation.

In the case of the first analysis we observed that medieval commentators also distinguished between the terms involved in the discussion. Although both the *Vetus* and the *Nova* gave *sapit* for  $\phi\rho\nu\epsilon/\omega$ , Albert gives an interpretation which conflates the two terms, based on a connection between *sapit* and *sapientia*.

An interesting addendum to this complex relationship between texts is the problem of the term *intellectio-intelligentia*, as reflecting the influence of the Arab interpretation on the translation of Argyropoulos and his preference for the terminology established by Michael Scotus.

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<sup>160</sup> Otherwise terminology is the area where Moerbeke shows the greatest respect to his predecessor's choices.

<sup>161</sup> It could be also possible that he revised Grosseteste's version of the *Nicomachean Ethics* between the first and the second revision of the *De anima*. We can not prove this presupposition, but it might help as an auxiliary argument for an already established chronology. There were a few attempts to find out the chronological order of the translations, like those of L. Minio-Paluello, P. Thillet, G. Verbeke, Jozef Brams, F. Bossier, and R. Wielockx. According to the latest results, there were two revisions of the *De anima*: in 1260 Moerbeke revised the version of James of Venice, and in 1266-1269 his own version. Another phase of development is represented by the *De anima* lemmas from the Philoponus commentary. The revision of the *Nicomachean Ethics* took place presumably before 1270.



As a concluding remark about the ideal of the regular lexical correspondence of the medieval translators, we cannot but agree with Alain de Libera's affirmation: "Les textes latins d'Aristote sont donc plus systématiques que l'original - plus exactement, ils en durcissent ou en atténuent alternativement les oppositions lexicales."<sup>162</sup>

In the chapter on grammatical analysis we encountered, for the most part, differences between the *Vetus* and the *Nova*. As John of Salisbury observed about the translator of the *Vetus*: *licet interpretes eloquens fuerit alias (ut saepe audiui), minus tamen fuit in grammatica institutus*.<sup>163</sup> Thus he grasped the major problem of the old version: its obscure readings of different grammatical structures. The major achievement of William of Moerbeke was to correct and to clarify these problematical passages. But this was due not only to his better knowledge of Greek and Latin and Greek palaeography, but to his opportunity to use better manuscripts as well.

In the case of το/ α)λλο/τριον we had an example where one can see that translation - on the strictly grammatical, or rather syntactical, as opposed to the semantic, level - in fact can influence interpretations: Albert and Aquinas had different readings based on their texts. From the translations which we examined, only Moerbeke applied in his version the interpretation of the Ancient commentators about the relationship of grammatical government between το/ α)λλο/τριον and παρεμφαινο/μενον.

The problem of the *per se* as opposed to *se ipsum* illustrates once again a difference between the Ancient and medieval interpretations in contrast to Modern ones. It should be noted that at origin, this problem is not due to a choice of translation, but a manuscript reading. This draws our attention to the fact that for a detailed and reliable analysis on medieval translations one needs to deal with palaeographical problems as well.

Our last example shows that it is worth remembering the importance of parallel translations: the use of the *translatio Arabica* for Albert was an important auxiliary tool in understanding the meaning of the passage analysed. And not only for Albert, but even for the readers of the *Nova*, the analytical Arabico-Latin translation was an invaluable instrument, the influence of which deserves further study.

<sup>162</sup> See Alain de Libera, ed., *Thomas Aquinas: Contre Averroés* (Paris: Flammarion, 1997), 220.

<sup>163</sup> This is the opinion of John of Salisbury, as expressed in his *Letter 201*. See W. J. Millor and C. N. L. Brooke, ed., *The Letters of John of Salisbury*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 294.

Concerning the other levels of interaction between text and commentary, we compared the comments of Albert on the *Vetus* with the comments of Thomas on the *Nova*, continuously referring to the Humanist and Modern English translations and commentaries as comparative and occasionally correlative, or even corrective material.

The importance of a medieval translation resided in its usage for commentaries, in the way that it offered new perspectives for the one who interpreted it. However, in the analytical part of our thesis we noticed some particular situations: apart from the cases where the commentaries influenced the translator, or where the translations influenced the commentators, there were examples where

- a) even though the commentator had a bad translation, he arrived at a correct interpretation and gives it in his writing;
- b) even though the commentator possessed a correct and clear rendition of the text, in his commentary he reflects on the previous obscure version.

In many places, although Albert made use of the *Vetus*, he still offers a correct interpretation. There are two options: either he corrected his text according to his own understanding, or he made use of the Arabico-Latin version, which, in the examples analysed in this thesis, always offers a correct reading. There was even one passage where Albert combines the readings of the two translations.

In the case of Thomas Aquinas we have many elements to take into consideration. He was the first to make use of the *Nova* in his commentary on the *De anima*. Gauthier, in his introduction to the *Sententia libri 'De anima'* affirms:

Saint Thomas fut le premier à commenter, dès qu'elle eut paru, la *Translatio nova* de Guillaume de Moerbeke: là est l'originalité, et peut-être la raison d'être, de son commentaire.<sup>164</sup>

Nevertheless, in those of his writings which can be dated before 1260 he could have known only the *Vetus*. Therefore this version on which he built in his

interpretation, and even after the acquisition of the *Nova*, he refers to some passages as they appear in the older version, not responding to the innovations of Moerbeke. Moreover, we should not forget that he was a mindful reader of Averroes, and therefore he could have been influenced by the Arabico-Latin translation as well.

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<sup>164</sup> Gauthier, 129\*.

According to C. B. Bazán, the extent to which Thomas uses the *Nova* could provide a criterion when establishing the chronology of Thomas' work.<sup>165</sup> As a possible exemplification of this we could see in one of our chapters how Moerbeke's corrections, not taken note in the *Sententia libri 'De anima'*, appear in the *De unitate intellectus*.<sup>166</sup> One can therefore conclude, that although Thomas possessed already a version of the *Nova* at the time when he was composing the *Sententia libri 'De anima'*, in some cases he neglected the corrections of Moerbeke. Rather than to presume a careless reading of the new version, we can assume that he was familiar with the *Vetus* for a long time before obtaining the *Nova*, and he did not change his interpretations on first contact with the new text.

Therefore, in the case of both Albert and Thomas the Graeco-Latin translation was not the only text they relied on. Although they did not know the original, there was a long tradition of interpretation which shaped their understanding. Both were familiar with the Arab version and the commentary of Averroes as well. In this sense we have to avoid an overestimation of the role of translations in medieval learning.

Also the relative prestige of the texts and the commentaries has to be taken into account. In the case of the *Nova* it is necessary to reflect on the fact that the interval which we are trying to cover is the initial period of the spreading of the new translation. At this stage it had not yet entirely replaced the old version: we can observe with Thomas Aquinas an alternative use of the two versions. The authority of the old version was even more intensified by the fact that it was considered the work of Boethius. For a more "global" picture of the use of the *Nova* one should analyse other commentaries from the end of the thirteenth century and from the fourteenth century. Moreover it would be interesting to study the competitive-alternative use of the *Nova* and the new Humanist versions in the Renaissance.

Comparing the changes observed in the Latin translations, we were looking for possible methods and motivations which led to these transformations. In the case of

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<sup>165</sup> B. C. Bazán, "Introduction," in Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, in *Sancti Thomae Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, 24, 1 (Paris: Cerf, 1996), 10\*-13\*.

<sup>166</sup> On the ideological importance of the new translation, see the affirmation of C. B. Bazán: "C'est en meilleur connaisseur de la tradition aristotélicienne que saint Thomas se présente au public universitaire parisien; il veut montrer non seulement qu'il est capable de proposer une interprétation doctrinale plus profonde des textes d'Aristote, mais aussi qu'il est mieux au courant des dernières découvertes scientifiques (surtout des traductions) qui rendent possible une meilleure exégèse de ces textes. Cette façon de mettre en relief son érudition n'est pas un geste de vanité, mais un moyen de montrer qu'il a derrière lui les meilleurs interprètes d'Aristote, et que les arts qui avaient adopté l'exégèse averroïste pour des raisons philosophiques pouvaient trouver en lui, Thomas d'Aquin, un meilleur connaisseur du Philosophe." B. C. Bazán, 18\*.

William of Moerbeke we may conclude that it was a strong influence from Ancient commentaries which shaped his understanding.

Comparing different Latin medieval commentaries, we were looking for possible textual influences which led them to different interpretations. We encountered situations where Albert and Thomas reached different exegeses because of the different translations they were using.

Nevertheless, we have to be aware of the limits of our methodology. The texts used in the academic milieu of the Middle Ages were often transformed either simply by accident by scribes who copied erroneously, or even quite consciously, by the masters of the university, where they considered such changes to be necessary. We cannot arrive at any “original” translation of James of Venice or William of Moerbeke: even as their versions were spreading, they were continuously being transformed.<sup>167</sup> The case of *per se* and *se ipsum* is but one example of how one might illustrate the difficulties encounters in analysing medieval philosophical translations. The palaeographical problems should give a warning about the limited possibilities of our approach.

However, the same problems can open up new fields for further study. The differences between the various versions of the *Vetus* and the *Nova* as they appear in commentaries, and the parallel usage of different translations, deserve detailed research. The comparative study of the Graeco-Latin and Arabico-Latin versions was only touched upon in this paper, but it appeared from this that the Arab interpretations of Aristotle were influential not only on the level of commentaries, but also as a means of understanding the Aristotelian text itself.

Applying this approach to other translations and commentaries may lead us to interesting findings concerning the (in)dependence of the translation: to what extent the text precedes the interpretations, to what extent the commentaries influence the translations, and which elements are which influence this interaction, are just a few fascinating questions which are still to be answered.

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<sup>167</sup> Gauthier, 129\*.

## VII. APPENDICES

### A. *Appendix I: Chronology*

|                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| <b>1120-1150</b>   | James of Venice's translation of the <i>DA</i>                           |
| <b>1182-1193</b>   | Averroes' Aristotle commentaries   |
| <b>1220-1235</b>   | Michael Scotus' translation of the <i>DA</i> and of Averroes' commentary |
| <b>1259-1260</b>   | Albert the Great's commentary on the <i>DA</i>                           |
| around <b>1260</b> | Moerbeke's first revision of the <i>DA</i>                               |
| <b>1267-1268</b>   | Thomas Aquinas' <i>Sententia Libri DA</i>                                |
| <b>1266-1269</b>   | Moerbeke's second revision of the <i>DA</i>                              |
| <b>1267</b>        | Moerbeke's translation of Themistius' paraphrases of the <i>DA</i>       |
| <b>1268</b>        | Moerbeke's translation of Philoponus' commentary of the <i>DA</i>        |
| <b>1270</b>        | Thomas Aquinas' <i>De unitate intellectus</i>                            |

***B.***



### C. Appendix II: Aristoteles Latinus Moerbekianus

(based on data from Minio-Paluello, Thillet, Dod and Brams )

| Author    | Title                    | Date, place of translation | MSS  | Nr. of MSS | Editions  | Old translation              |
|-----------|--------------------------|----------------------------|--|------------|---|------------------------------|
| Aristotle | Politica                 | Orvieto around 1270        |  | 110        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>books 1-2.11: P. Michaud-Quantin, Bruges, 1961</li> <li>books 1-3.8 with Aquinas commentary: H. F. Dondaine and L. Batallion, Rome, 1972</li> <li>complete: F. Susemihl, Leipzig, 1872</li> </ul>        |                              |
| Aristotle | Poetica                  | 1278                       |  | 2          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Valgimigli, Erse, Ezio Francheschini, and L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer, 1958</li> <li><i>Cum Averroes expositione</i>, L. Minio-Paluello, Brussels: Desclee de Brouwer, 1968</li> </ul> |                              |
| Aristotle | Metaphysica              | 1265-1268?                 | Specimen: Aristoteles Latinus I, 150-152 (Vaticanus Latinus 2083 f <sup>os</sup> 1 r <sup>o</sup> ; 53 v <sup>o</sup> )        | 218        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Venice, 1562 and in Aquinas</li> <li>Vuillemin-Diem, Gudrun, Leiden: Brill, 1995</li> </ul>  |                              |
| Aristotle | De motu animalium        | before 1266                | Specimen: Aristoteles Latinus I, 177-178 (Vaticanus Latinus 2083 f <sup>os</sup> 77 v <sup>o</sup> ; 76 r <sup>o</sup> )       | 172        | L. Torraca, Naples, 1958  |                              |
| Aristotle | De progressu animalium   | before 1266                | Specimen: Aristoteles Latinus I, 176-177 (Vaticanus Latinus 2083 f <sup>os</sup> 204 r <sup>o</sup> ; 208 v <sup>o</sup> )     | 101        | Unpublished   |                              |
| Aristotle | Historia animalium       | before 1266                |  | 41         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>books 1 and 10.6: G. Rudberg, Uppsala, 1908-1911</li> <li>books 1-5: Beullens, Pieter and F. Bossier, Leiden: Brill, 2000</li> </ul>   |                              |
| Aristotle | De partibus animalium    | Thebes 10 Jan. 1260        | Specimen: Aristoteles Latinus I, 179b-180 (Parisinus B. N. lat. 14724, f <sup>os</sup> 69 r <sup>o</sup> ; 97 v <sup>o</sup> ) | 42         | Unpublished   |                              |
| Aristotle | De generatione animalium | before 1270                |  | 43         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>two recensions: H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, Bruges, 1966</li> <li>L. Dittmeyer, Dillingen, 1915</li> </ul>   |                              |
| Aristotle | Meteorologica            | before 1266                | Specimen: Aristoteles Latinus I, 135 (Vaticanus Latinus 2083 f <sup>os</sup> 53 v <sup>o</sup> ; 76 r <sup>o</sup> )           | 177        | in Aquinas  | partial: Henricus Aristippus |



|           |  |             |  |  |   |                           |
|-----------|--|-------------|--|--|---|---------------------------|
| Aristotle | De caelo   |             | Specimen: Aristotles Latinus 130 (Vaticanus lat. 2083, f <sup>os</sup> 134 r <sup>o</sup> ; 156 v <sup>o</sup> )                 | 188  | in Aquinas  | b. 1-2 Robert Grosseteste |
| Aristotle | Categoriae   | 1266?       | text in Simplicius' commentary   | 10   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges, 1961</li> <li>first half: A. Pattin, Leuven, 1971</li> <li>partial: J. Isaac, Paris, 1953</li> </ul>                | Boethius                  |
| Aristotle | De interpretatione   | 1268        | text in Ammonius' commentary   | 4  | G. Verbeke and L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges, 1965  | Boethius                  |
| Aristotle | Rhetorica  | 1270-1278   |  | 100  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>first recension: unpublished</li> <li>second recension: L. Spengel, Leipzig, 1867</li> <li>Schneider, Bernhard, Leiden: Brill, 1978</li> </ul> | anonymous                 |
| Aristotle | Analytica posteriora   | before 1270 | Specimen: Aristotles Latinus II, 792b-793b (Parisinus B. N. lat. 16080, f <sup>os</sup> 95 v <sup>o</sup> ; 112 v <sup>o</sup> ) | 4  | L. Minio-Paluello and B. G. Dod, Bruges, 1968   | James of Venice           |
| Aristotle | De sophisticis elenchis  | before 1270 | Specimen: Aristoteles Latinus II, 791b-792b (Parisinus B. N. lat. 16080 f <sup>os</sup> 60 r <sup>o</sup> ; 70 v <sup>o</sup> )  | 4  | L. Minio-Paluello and B. G. Dod, Bruges ?   | Boethius, James of Venice |
| Aristotle | Physica  | around 1270 | Specimen: Aristoteles Latinus I, 126b-127b (Vaticanus Latinus 2083 f <sup>os</sup> 93 r <sup>o</sup> ; 133 v <sup>o</sup> )      | 234  | in Aquinas  | James of Venice           |
| Aristotle | De generatione et corruptione  | around 1270 |  | 192  | in Aquinas  | anonymus                  |
| Aristotle | De anima   | around 1270 | Specimen: Aristoteles Latinus I, 136b-137b (Vaticanus Latinus 2 083, f <sup>os</sup> 176 r <sup>o</sup> ; 189 r <sup>o</sup> )   | 270  | in Aquinas  | James of Venice           |
| Aristotle | Parva naturalia:<br>1. De sensu, 2. De memoria,<br>3. De somno et vigilia,<br>4. De insomniis, 5. De divinatione,<br>6. De longitudine, 7. De iuventute, 8. De vita et morte, 9. De respiratione, 10. De coloribus | around 1270 |  | 1. 163,<br>2. 162,<br>3. 164,<br>8. 152,<br>9. 150,<br>10. 1 | 2. in Aquinas<br>3. H. J. Drossart Lulofs, 1943<br>4. _____, Leiden, 1947<br>9. Venice, 1496  | anonymus, James of Venice |
| Aristotle | Ethica Nicomachica   | before 1270 |  | 246  | R. A. Gauthier, Leiden-Brussels, 1973   | Robert Grosseteste        |



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| Alexander of Afrodiasias | <i>In de Sensu</i>                    | 1260-1270                |  | 4  | C. Thurot, Paris, 1875   |                    |
| Alexander of Afrodiasias | <i>In meteorologica</i>               | Nicea<br>12 April 1260   |  | 9  | A. J. Smet, Leuven, 1968   |                    |
| Themistius               |                                       | Viterbo<br>22 Nov. 1267  |  | 8  | G. Verbeke, Leuven, 1957   |                    |
| Ammonius                 | <i>De interpretatione</i>             | Viterbo<br>12 Sept. 1268 | Specimen: <i>Aristoteles Latinus I</i> , 200-201 (Parisinus B. N. lat. 16000, f <sup>os</sup> 83 r <sup>o</sup> ; 136 v <sup>o</sup> ) | 4  | G. Verbeke, Leuven, 1961   |                    |
| Philoponus               | <i>In De anima</i> (1.3 and 3.4- 3.9) | Viterbo<br>17 Dec. 1268  |  | 3  | G. Verbeke, Leuven, 1968   |                    |
| Simplicius               | <i>In categorias</i>                  | 1266                     |  | 10 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Venice 1516</li> <li>first half: A. Pattin, Leuven, 1971</li> </ul> |                    |
| Simplicius               | <i>In De caelo</i>                    | Viterbo 15<br>June 1271  |  | 4  | Venice 1540, 1544, 1555, 1563, 1584  | Robert Grosseteste |

**D. Appendix III: Texts**

| <b>Aristotle: <i>De anima</i><br/>Book III, chapters 4-8</b>   | <b>Vetus translatio</b>  | <b>Nova translatio</b>   | <b>Philoponus Lemmas</b>  | <b>Argyropulos</b>   |
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| <p><b>Chapter 4: 429a 10-430a 10</b><br/> περι&lt; δε&lt; του= μορι/ου τ<br/> ου=<br/> τη=φ ψυξη=φ %R γινω/σκε<br/> ι<br/> τε η( ψυξη&lt; και&lt; φρονει=<br/> ',<br/> ει@τε ξωριστου= ο@ντοφ ε<br/> ι@τε μη &lt;ξωριστου= κατα<br/> &lt;<br/> με/γεθοφ α)λλα&lt; κατα&lt;<br/> λο/γον, σκεπτε/ον τι/ν'<br/> ε@ξει διαφορα/ν, και&lt; πω<br/> =φ ποτε&lt; γι/νεται το&lt; νοε<br/> ι=v. ει) δη/ ε)στι το/ νοει=v<br/> ω@σπερ<br/> το/ αι)σθα/νεσθαι, η@<br/> πα/σξειν τι α@ν ει@η υ(πο<br/> &lt;<br/> του= νοητου= η@ τι τοιου=<br/> τον ε@τερον. α)παθε&lt;φ α<br/> @ρα δει=<br/> ει]ναι, δεκτικο&lt;v δε&lt; το<br/> υ=<br/> ει@δουφ και&lt; δυνα/μει<br/> τοιου=τον α)λλα&lt; μη&lt; το<br/> υ=το, και&lt; ο(μοι/ωφ ε@ξει<br/> ν, ω@σπερ το/ αι)σθητικο/ν<br/> προ&lt;φ τα&lt;<br/> αι)σθητα/, ου@τω το&lt;v νο<br/> υ=v προ&lt;φ τα&lt; νοητα/. α<br/> )να/γκη</p> | <p>De parte animae autem,<br/> qua cognoscit anima et<br/> sapit, sive separabilis<br/> sive inseparabilis<br/> secundum<br/> magnitudinem, sed<br/> secundum rationem<br/> solum, et si ad eandem<br/> est, quam habet<br/> differentiam et quomodo<br/> sit forte ipsum<br/> intelligere. Si igitur est<br/> intelligere sicut sentire,<br/> aut pati aliquid sit ab<br/> intelligibili, aut aliquid<br/> huiusmodi alterum sit.<br/> Impassibile autem<br/> oportet esse,<br/> susceptivam autem<br/> speciei et potentia<br/> huiusmodi, sed non hoc<br/> est, et similiter se habere<br/> sicut sensitivum ad<br/> sensibilia, sic<br/> intellectivum ad<br/> intelligibilia. Necesse<br/> itaque est, quoniam<br/> omnia intellegit,<br/> immixtum esse, sicut</p> | <p>De parte autem anime<br/> qua cognoscit anima et<br/> sapit, sive separabili<br/> existente sive non<br/> separabili secundum<br/> magnitudinem set<br/> secundum rationem,<br/> considerandum quam<br/> habet differentiam et<br/> quomodo quidem fit<br/> ipsum intelligere. Si<br/> igitur est intelligere<br/> sicut sentire, aut pati<br/> aliquid utique erit ab<br/> intelligibili aut aliquid<br/> huiusmodi alterum.<br/> Impassibilem ergo<br/> oportet esse,<br/> susceptivam autem<br/> speciei et potencia<br/> huiusmodi set non hoc,<br/> et similiter se habere,<br/> sicut sensitivum ad<br/> sensibilia, sic<br/> intellectum ad<br/> intelligibilia. Necesse<br/> est itaque, quoniam<br/> omnia intelligit,<br/> immixtum esse, sicut</p> | <p>de parte autem animae<br/> qua cognoscit anima et<br/> prudential, sive separata<br/> ente, sive inseparabili<br/> secundum magnitudinem<br/> sed secundum rationem,<br/> considerandum quam<br/> habet differentiam, et<br/> quomodo quandoque sit<br/> intelligere. si itaque est<br/> intelligere sicut sentire,<br/> aut pati utique aliquid erit<br/> ab intelligibili, aut aliquid<br/> tale alterum.<br/> Impassibilem ergo oportet<br/> esse, susceptivam autem<br/> speciei, et potentia talem,<br/> sed non hanc. et similiter<br/> se habere sicut sensitivum<br/> ad sensibilia, ita<br/> intellectum ad<br/> intelligibilia. necesse<br/> ergo, quoniam omnia<br/> intelligit, non mixtum<br/> esse, sicut ait anaxagoras,<br/> ut obtineat, hoc autem est,<br/> ut cognoscat [...] quare<br/> neque ipsius esse aliquam<br/> naturam neque unam, sed</p> | <p>De animae autem ea parte<br/> qua cognoscit atque sapit,<br/> sive separabilis ente, sive<br/> non separabilis<br/> magnitudine, sed ratione,<br/> considerandum deinceps<br/> est quam differentiam<br/> habeat, quoque pacto<br/> tandem fiat intelligere. Si<br/> igitur intelligere sit ut<br/> sentire, aut pati quoddam<br/> erit ab ipso intelligibili, aut<br/> aliquid aliud tale. Vacare<br/> igitur ipsam passione, sed<br/> formae susceptivam esse<br/> oportet; et potentia talem<br/> sed non illam esse; et<br/> similitudinem subire cum<br/> sensu, ut quemadmodum<br/> sese habet ad sensibilia<br/> sensus, sic se habeat ad<br/> intelligibilem intellectus.<br/> Quare necesse est ipsum,<br/> cum universa intelligat,<br/> non mistum esse, sicut<br/> Anaxagoras dixit, ut<br/> superet atque vincat, id est<br/> ut cognoscat atque<br/> percipiat. Alienum</p> |

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| <p>α@ρα, ε)πει&lt;= πα/ντα νοει=<br/>,<br/>α)μιγη= ειΠναι, ω3σπερ<br/>φησι&lt;=ν Α)ναχαγο/ραφ,<br/>ι3να κρατ@=, του=το δ' ε)σ<br/>τι&lt;=ν ι3να γνωρι/ζω<br/>(παρεμφαινο/μενον γα&lt;=ρ<br/>κωλυ/ει το&lt;= α)λλο/τριον κ<br/>αι&lt;= α)ντιφρα/ττει): ω3στε<br/>μηδ' αυ)του= ειΠναι φυ/σι<br/>ν<br/>μηδεμι/αν α)λλ' η@ ταυ/τη<br/>ν, ο3τι δυνατο/φ. ο( α@ρα<br/>καλου/μενοφ τη=φ ψυξη=φ</p> <p>νου=φ (λε/γω δε&lt;= νου=ν %<br/>η<br/>διανοει=ται και&lt;=</p> <p>υ(πολαμβα/νει η( ψυξη/)<br/>ου)θε/ν ε)στιν ε)νεργει/#<br/>τω=ν ο@ντων πρι&lt;=ν νοει=<br/>ν. διο&lt;= ου)δε&lt;= μεμι=θαι ε<br/>υ@λογον<br/>αυ)το&lt;=ν τ%= σω/ματι: ποι<br/>ο/φ τιφ γα&lt;=ρ α@ν γι/γνοιτο<br/>, η@<br/>ψυξρο&lt;=φ η@ θερμο/φ, κα<br/>@ν<br/>ο@ργανο/ν τι ει@η, ω(/σπερ<br/>τ%= αι)σθητικ%=: νυ&lt;=ν δ'<br/>ου)θε&lt;= &lt;=ν ε@στιν. κα@ &lt;= ε<br/>υΠ δη&lt;= οι(<br/>λε/γοντεφ τη&lt;=ν ψυξη=ν<br/>ειΠναι το/πον ει)δω=ν πλη<br/>&lt;=ν ο3τι ου@τε ο3λη α)λλ'<br/>η(<br/>νοητικη/, ου@τε ε)ντελεξει/<br/># α)λλα&lt;= δυνα/μει τα&lt;= ει</p> | <p>dicit Anaxagoras, ut<br/>imperet. Hoc autem est,<br/>ut cognoscat despectum.<br/>Apparere enim prohibet<br/>extraneum et ei obicitur.<br/>Quare est nec ipsius esse<br/>naturam neque unam sed<br/>aut hoc, quia possibilis<br/>est. Sic vocatus utique<br/>animae intellectus (dico<br/>autem intellectus, quo<br/>opinatur et intellegit<br/>anima) hoc nihil actu<br/>horum quae sunt, ante<br/>intellegere. Unde neque<br/>miscere est rationabile<br/>ipsum corpori. Qualis<br/>enim aliquis fieret aut<br/>calor aut frigus? Aut<br/>organum aliquod sit<br/>sicut sensibili; nunc<br/>autem nullum est. Et<br/>bene iam dicentes sunt<br/>animam esse locum<br/>specierum, nisi quod<br/>non tota, sed<br/>intellectiva, neque actu,<br/>sed potentia esse<br/>species. Quod autem<br/>non similis sit sensitivi<br/>et intellectivi<br/>impassibilitas,<br/>manifestum est ex<br/>organis et sensu. Sensus</p> | <p>dicit Anaxagoras, ut<br/>imperet, hoc autem est<br/>ut cognoscat. Intus<br/>apparens enim<br/>prohibebit extraneum et<br/>obstruet. Quare neque<br/>ipsius esse naturam<br/>neque unam, set aut<br/>hanc quod possibilis.<br/>Vocatus itaque anime<br/>intellectus (dico autem<br/>intellectum quo opinatur<br/>et intelligit anima) nihil<br/>est actu eorum que sunt<br/>ante intelligere. Unde<br/>neque misceri est<br/>rationabile ipsum<br/>corpori: qualis enim<br/>aliquis utique fiet aut<br/>calidus aut frigidus, si<br/>organum aliquod erit,<br/>sicut sensitivo; nunc<br/>autem nullum est. Et<br/>bene iam dicentes sunt<br/>animam esse locum<br/>specierum, nisi quod<br/>non tota, sed<br/>intellectiva, neque actu<br/>set potencia species.<br/>Quoniam autem non<br/>similis sit impassibilitas<br/>sensitui et intellectui,<br/>manifestum est ex<br/>organis et sensu. Sensus</p> | <p>aut hanc quia possibilem.<br/>qui ergo vocatur animae<br/>intellectus (dico autem<br/>intellectum quo meditatur<br/>et existimat anima), nihil<br/>est actu entium ante<br/>intelligere, propter quod<br/>neque mixtum esse<br/>rationabile est ipsum<br/>corpori. Qualis quidem est<br/>frigidus vel calidus<br/>[...]et bene utique dicentes<br/>animam esse locum<br/>specierum, verumtamen<br/>neque tota sed<br/>intellectiva, neque actu<br/>sed potentia species. quod<br/>autem non similis<br/>impassibilitas intellectivi<br/>et sensitivi, manifestum in<br/>sensiteriis et sensu.<br/>[...]<br/>quando autem sic singula<br/>fit ut sciens, dicitur qui<br/>secundum actum, hoc<br/>autem mox accidit quando<br/>potest operari per se<br/>ipsum. est quidem<br/>similiter et tunc potentia<br/>aliqua, non tamen<br/>similiter et ante addiscere<br/>aut invenire. et ipse autem<br/>se ipsum tunc potest<br/>intelligere. Quoniam</p> | <p>namque, cum apparet<br/>iuxta, prohibet atque<br/>sejungit. Quo fit ut neque<br/>ulla sit ipsius natura nisi ea<br/>solum qua possibilis est. Is<br/>igitur qui intellectus<br/>animae nuncupatur (dico<br/>autem nunc eum quo<br/>ratiocinatur anima et<br/>existimat), nihil est actu<br/>prorsus eorum quae sunt,<br/>antequam intelligat ipse.<br/>Quocirca neque cum<br/>copore mistum ipsum esse<br/>consentaneum est. Qualis<br/>enim quidam fieret, calidus<br/>aut frigidus, et<br/>instrumentum aliquod<br/>ipsius esset, sicut est<br/>sensus. Nunc autem ipsius<br/>nullum prorsus est<br/>instrumentum. Atque bene<br/>recteque censent qui<br/>formarum locum animam<br/>inquiunt esse. Attamen<br/>neque tota est locus, sed<br/>intellectiva; neque est actu,<br/>sed potentia, formae.<br/>Atqui passionis vacuitatem<br/>non similem esse sensitivi<br/>atque intellectivi, patet in<br/>sensuum instrumentis<br/>atque in sensu. Sensus<br/>enim ex vehemente</p> |
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| <p>©δη.<br/>οἷτι δ' ου)ξ ο(μοι/α η( α(πα/θεια του= αι)σθητικο υ= και&lt; του= νοητικού=, φανερο&lt;v ε)π&lt; τω=v αι)σθητηρι/ων και&lt; τη=φ αι)σθη/σεωφ. η( με&lt;v γα&lt; ρ αι)/σθησιφ ου) δυ/ναται αι)σθα/νεσθαι ε)κ του= σφο/δρα αι)σθητου=, οiϑo v ψο/φου ε)κ τω=v μεγα/λων ψο/φων, ου)δ' ε)κ τω=v ι)σξυρω=v ξρωμα/των και &lt; ο)σμω=v ου©τε ο(ρα=v ου©τε ο)σμα=σθαι: α)λλ' ο( νου= φ οἷταν τι νοη/σπ σφο/δρα νοητο/ν, ου)ξ ηϑιτον νοει= τα&lt; υ(ποδεε/στερα, α)λλα &lt; και&lt; μα=λλον: το&lt; με&lt; v γα&lt;ρ αι)σθητικο&lt;v ου) κ α©νευ σω/ματοφ, ο( δε&lt; ξωριστο/φ. οἷταν δ' ουἷτωφ εἷκασ τα γε/νηται ω(φ ο( ε)πιστη/μω v λε/γεται ο( κατ' ε)νεργει αν (του=το δε&lt; συμβα/νει οἷταν δυ/νηται ε)νεργει=v δι' αυ(του=), ε©στι με&lt;v κ αι&lt; το/τε δυνα/μει πωφ, ου )</p> | <p>enim non potest sentire ex valde sensibili, ut sensus ex magnis sonis, neque ex fortibus odoribus et coloribus videre neque odorare, sed cum intellectus intelligat aliquid valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit infima, sed magis. Sensitivum enim non sine corpore est. Hic autem separatus. Cumque autem unaquaeque sciat, sciens dicitur, qui est secundum actum. Hoc autem accidit, cum possit operari per seipsum. Est tunc quidem similiter potentia quodammodo, non tamen similiter est sicut et ante addiscere et invenire, et ipse autem seipsum aliquando potest intelligere. Quoniam autem aliud est magnitudo aut magnitudinis esse, et aqua et aquae esse, et sic in multis aliis, non autem in omnibus (in quibusdam enim est</p> | <p>enim non potest sentire ex valde sensibili, ut sonum est magis sonis, neque ex fortibus odoribus et coloribus neque videre neque odorare; set intellectus, cum intelligit aliquid valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit infima, set magis; sensitivum quidem enim non sine corpore est, hic autem separatus est. Cum autem singula fiat ut sciens, dicitur qui secundum actum. Hoc autem confestim accidit cum possit operari per se ipsum. Est quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodam modo, non tamen similiter et ante addiscere aut invenire. Et ipse autem se ipsum tunc potest intelligere. Quoniam autem aliud est magnitudo et magnitudini esse, et aqua et aque esse et sic in multis alteris (non autem in omnibus: in quibusdam enim idem est esse carni et</p> | <p>autem aliud est magnitudo et magnitudini esse, et aqua et aquae esse. [...] in quibusdam enim idem est. carnem et carni esse, aut alio aut aliter se habente, iudicat. caro enim non sine materia, sed sicut simum, hoc in hoc. sensitivo quidem igitur calidum et frigidum discernit, et quorum ratio quaedam caro. alio autem aut separato aut ut fracta se habet ad ipsam quando extensa fuerit, carni esse discernit. Rursum autem in his quae in abstractione sunt, rectum ut simum, cum continuo enim. Quod quid autem erat esse, si est alterum recto esse et rectum, aliud. sic enim dualitas. alio ergo aut aliter se habente discernit. omnino ergo ut separatae sunt res a materia, ita et quae circa intellectum. Dubitabit autem utique aliquis, si intellectus simplex et et impassibilis et nulli nihil habet commune, sicut ait Anaxagoras, quomodo</p> | <p>sensibili sentire non potest. Auditus namque non audit sonum post magnos sonos, et visus non videt atque odoratus non olfacit post vehementes colores atque odores. At intellectus aliquo valde intelligibili intellecto non minus sed magis percipit intelligitque inferiora. Sensitivum enim non est sine corpore. At intellectus ab eo est separabilis. Factus autem unumquodque, perinde atque si qui dicitur actu sciens (quod quidem tum accidit, cum ipse per se ipsum operari potest), est quidem et tunc quodammodo potentia, sed non perinde ut erat antequam didicisset vel invenisset. Atque tunc se ipsum intelligere potest. Cum autem aliud sit magnitudo aliud magnitudinis esse, et alia aqua aliud aquae esse, et aliis itidem multis (non enim universis hic modus accomodatur, sed sunt in quibus haec ipsa sint eadem non diversa), aut</p> |
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| <p>μη&lt;v ο(μοι/ωφ και&lt; πρι/v<br/> μαθει=v η&lt; ευ(ρει=v: και<br/> &lt;= αυ)το&lt;φ δι' αυ)του= το/τε<br/> δυ/ναται νοει=v. ε)πει&lt; δ'<br/> α&lt;λλο ε)στι&lt; το&lt; με/γεθο<br/> φ<br/> και&lt; το/ μεγε/θει ειΠναι, κ<br/> αι&lt; υ&lt;δωρ και&lt; υ&lt;δατι ε<br/> ιΠναι<br/> (ου&lt;τω δε&lt; και&lt; ε)φ' ε(τε<br/> /ρων πολλω=v, α)λλ' ου)κ ε<br/> )πι&lt;= π&lt;α/vτων: ε)π' ε)νι/ων γ&lt;α&lt;ρ<br/> ταυ)το/v ε)στι), το&lt; σαρκι<br/> &lt;= ειΠναι και&lt; σα/ρκα η&lt; α<br/> &lt;λλ% η&lt; α&lt;λλωφ ε&lt;ξοντ<br/> ι κρι/vει: η( γ&lt;α&lt;ρ σα&lt;ρχ<br/> ου)κ α&lt;νευ τη=φ υ&lt;ληηφ, α<br/> )λλ' ω&lt;σπερ το&lt;= σιμο/v, το/δε ε)ν τ%&lt;δε. τ%<br/> = με&lt;v ουΠν αι)σθητικ%&lt;= τ<br/> ο&lt;= θερμο&lt;v και&lt; το&lt; ψυξρ<br/> ο&lt;v κρι/vει, και&lt; ω&lt;λ λο/γωφ τι<br/> φ η( σα/ρχ! α&lt;λλ% δε&lt;=, η<br/> &lt;τοι<br/> ξωριστ%&lt;= η&lt; ω(φ η( κ&lt;εκ&lt;λασμε/v η ε&lt;ξει π&lt;ρ&lt;φ<br/> αυ(τη&lt;v ο&lt;ταν ε)κταθ&lt;=, το&lt;= σαρκι&lt; ειΠναι κρι/vει.</p> | <p>idem ut esse carnis et<br/> caro), aut ergo alio aut<br/> aliter se habente<br/> discernit. Caro enim non<br/> est sine materia, sed est<br/> sicut simum hoc in hoc.<br/> Sensitivo enim calidum<br/> et frigidum iudicat,<br/> quorum ratio quaedam<br/> est caro. Alio autem ,<br/> aut etiam separato, aut<br/> sicut circumflexa se<br/> habet ad seipsa, cum<br/> extensa, carnis esse<br/> discernit. Iterum autem<br/> in his quae in<br/> abstractione sunt,<br/> quoniam sicut rectum<br/> sic simum, cum<br/> continuo est enim. Quod<br/> autem quid erat esse, si<br/> alterum est recti esse et<br/> rectum aliud, sic enim<br/> dualitas. Altero iam aut<br/> aliter se habente iudicat.<br/> Omnino igitur sicut<br/> separabiles res a<br/> materia, sic et quae circa<br/> intellectum sunt.<br/> Dubitabit autem aliquis,<br/> si intellectus simplex est<br/> et impassibile et nulli<br/> habet in commune, sicut<br/> dixit Anaxagoras,</p> | <p>carnem), aut alio ergo<br/> aut aliter habente<br/> discernit. Caro enim non<br/> sine materia, set sicut<br/> simum, hoc in hoc:<br/> sensitivo quidem igitur<br/> calidum et frigidum<br/> iudicat, et quorum ratio<br/> quedam caro. Alio<br/> autem, aut separato aut<br/> sicut circumflexa se<br/> habet ad ipsam, cum<br/> extensa sit carni esse<br/> discernit. Iterum autem<br/> in hiis que abstractione<br/> sunt, rectum sicut<br/> simum: cum continuo<br/> enim; quod autem quid<br/> erat esse, si est alterum<br/> recto esse et rectum,<br/> alio; sit enim dualitas.<br/> Altero itaque aut aliter<br/> se habente iudicat.<br/> Omnino ergo sicut<br/> separabiles res a<br/> materia, sic et que circa<br/> intellectum sunt.<br/> Dubitabit autem utique<br/> aliquis, si intellectus<br/> simplex est et<br/> impassibile et nulli<br/> nichil habet commune,<br/> sicut dixit Anaxagoras,<br/> quomodo intelliget, si</p> | <p>intelligeret, si intelligere<br/> pati quoddam est.<br/> Adhuc si intelligibilis et<br/> ipse. Aut enim aliis<br/> intellectus inerit, si non<br/> secundum aliud ipse<br/> intelligibilis, unum<br/> aliquid intelligibile<br/> specie; aut mixtum<br/> aliquid habebit, quod facit<br/> intelligibilem ipsum, sicut<br/> alia. Aut pati quidem<br/> secundum commune<br/> aliquid, divisum est prius.<br/> [...]<br/> et ipse autem intelligibilis<br/> est, sicut intelligibilia.[...]<br/> scientia enim speculativa<br/> et quod sic scibile idem<br/> est. eius autem quod est<br/> non semper intelligere<br/> hunc, causa consideranda.<br/> in habentibus autem<br/> materiam, potentia solum<br/> unumquodque est<br/> intelligibilium [...] intellectus<br/> vero sine materia potentia est<br/> talium,</p> | <p>alia parte, aut eadem<br/> quidem sed aliter se<br/> habente carnem et esse<br/> carnis discernit. Caro<br/> namque non est sine<br/> materia, sed perinde atque<br/> simum, hoc est in hoc.<br/> Sensitiva igitur parte<br/> calidum discernit et<br/> frigidum, quorum quaedam<br/> est ratio caro. Alia vero<br/> esse carnis discernit, aut<br/> separabili, aut se habente<br/> ad se ipsam perinde atque<br/> se habet cum extensa fuerit<br/> linea flexa. Rursus in iis<br/> quae in abstractione<br/> consistunt, eadem esse<br/> videntur. Rectum enim se<br/> habet ut simum. Est enim<br/> cum continuo semper.<br/> Quodsi quidditas sit<br/> diversa, aliud est esse<br/> recti, aliud rectum, ut ibi.<br/> Sit enim dualitas. Quare fit<br/> ut haec etiam alia vel alio<br/> modo se habente parte<br/> discernat. Omnino igitur ut<br/> res separabiles sunt a<br/> materia, sic se habent et ea<br/> quae sunt circa intellectum<br/> ipsum. Dubitabit autem<br/> non iniuria quispiam,<br/> quonam modo intelligat</p> |
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| <p>πα/λιν δ' ἐπι&lt; τω=ν ε)ν<br/> α)φαιρε/σει ο©ντων το/ ευ)<br/> θυ&lt; ω(φ το&lt; σιμο/ν! μετα<br/> /<br/> συνεξου=φ γα&lt;ρ! το/ δε&lt;<br/> τι/ ηΠν ειΠναι, ει) ε©στιν<br/> εΞτερον<br/> το&lt; ευ)θει= ειΠναι και&lt;<br/> το&lt;<br/> ευ)θυ/, α©λλο! ε©στω γα&lt;<br/> ρ<br/> δυα/φ. ε(τε/ρ% α©ρα η©<br/> ε(τε/ρωφ ε©ξοντι κρι/νει.<br/> οΞλωφ α©ρα ω(φ ξωριστα<br/> &lt;<br/> τα&lt; πρα/γματα τη=φ υΞλη<br/> φ,<br/> ουΞτω και&lt; τα&lt; περι&lt; τ<br/> ο&lt;=ν<br/> νου=v. α)πορη/σειε δ' α©ν<br/> τιφ, ει) ο( νου=φ α(πλου=v<br/> ε)στι&lt; και&lt; α)παθε&lt;φ κ<br/> αι&lt; μηθενι/<br/> μηθε&lt;=ν ε©ξει κοινο/v,<br/> ωΞσπερ φησι&lt;=ν<br/> Α)ναχαγο/ραφ, πω=φ νοη/σ<br/> ει, ει) το&lt; νοει=v πα/σξειν<br/> τι/<br/> ε)στιν (πλ γα&lt;ρ τι κοινο<br/> &lt;=ν<br/> α)μφοι=v υ(πα/ρχει, το&lt; μ<br/> ε&lt;=ν<br/> ποιει=v δοκει= το&lt; δε&lt;=ν<br/> πα/σξειν), ε©τι δ' ει)<br/> νοητο&lt;φ και&lt; αυ)το&lt;φ; η<br/> © γα&lt;ρ τοι=φ α©λλοιφ νο<br/> υ=φ<br/> υ(πα/ρχει, ει) μη&lt; κατ'</p> | <p>quomodo intelliget, si<br/> intelligere pati aliquid<br/> est. Inquantum enim<br/> aliquid commune<br/> utriusque est, hoc<br/> quidem agere videtur,<br/> illud vero pati. Amplius<br/> autem, si intelligibilis et<br/> ipse est; aut enim aliis<br/> intellectus inherit, si non<br/> secundum aliud ipse<br/> intelligibilis est (unum<br/> autem aliquid<br/> intelligibile ipse est), aut<br/> mixtum aliquid quod<br/> facit intelligibile ipsum<br/> sicut alia. Aut pati<br/> secundum commune<br/> aliquid est, unde dictum<br/> est prius, quoniam<br/> potentia quodammodo<br/> est intelligibilia<br/> intellectus, sed actu nihil<br/> est antequam intelligat.<br/> Oportet autem esse sicut<br/> in tabula, in qua nihil est<br/> actu scriptum. Quod<br/> quidem accidit<br/> intellectui. Ipse autem<br/> intelligibilis est sicut<br/> intelligibilia. In his enim<br/> quae sunt sine materia,<br/> idem est intellectus et<br/> quod intelligitur.</p> | <p>intelligere pati aliquid<br/> est: in quantum enim<br/> aliquid commune<br/> utrisque est, hoc quidem<br/> agere, illud vero pati<br/> videtur. Amplius autem<br/> si intelligibilis est ipse,<br/> aut enim aliis inherit<br/> intellectus, si non<br/> secundum aliud ipse<br/> intelligibilis est, unum<br/> autem aliquid<br/> intelligibile specie est; si<br/> autem sit mixtum,<br/> aliquid habebit quod<br/> facit intelligibile ipsum<br/> sicut alia. Aut pati<br/> quidem secundum<br/> commune aliquid<br/> divisum est prius,<br/> quoniam potentia<br/> quodam modo est<br/> intelligibilia intellectus,<br/> set actu nichil, ante<br/> quam intelligat. Oportet<br/> autem sic sicut in tabula<br/> nichil est actu scriptum,<br/> quod quidem accidit in<br/> intellectu. Et ipse autem<br/> intelligibilis est sicut<br/> intelligibilia. In hiis<br/> quidem enim quae sunt<br/> sine materia, idem est<br/> intelligens et quod</p> |  | <p>intellectus, si ipse quidem<br/> simplex sit ac passionis<br/> expers, nihilque habeat<br/> cum ulla re prorsus<br/> commune, sicut<br/> Anaxagoras asserit;<br/> intelligere autem pati<br/> quoddam sit, ut diximus.<br/> Quo namque quippiam est<br/> utrisque commune, hoc<br/> alterum agere alterum pati<br/> videtur. Praeterea ambiget<br/> quispiam si ipse etiam<br/> intelligibilis sit. Nam aut<br/> ceteris rebus inherit<br/> intellectus, nisi alia ratione<br/> sit intelligibilis ipse,<br/> intelligibile autem unum<br/> quoddam est specie; aut<br/> aliquid ipse mixtum<br/> habebit, quod ipsum<br/> intelligibilem perinde<br/> atque cetera facit. At enim<br/> ipsum pati divisum est<br/> prius, una quadam ratione<br/> communi. Atque<br/> intellectus potentia quidem<br/> est quodam modo<br/> intelligibilia ipsa, actu vero<br/> nichil est eorum antequam<br/> intelligat ipsa. Oportet<br/> autem in ipso nihil esse,<br/> perinde atque in tabula<br/> nichil est actu scriptum,</p> |
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| <p>α@λλο αυ)το/φ νοητο/φ, εἰ<br/> ν δε&lt;= τι το&lt;= νοητο&lt;=ν ει@<br/> δει, η@<br/> μεμιγμε/νον τι εἴχει, οἷ<br/> ποιει= νοητο&lt;=ν αυ)το&lt;=ν<br/> ωἷσπερ ταἷλλα. η@ το&lt;=<br/> με&lt;=ν<br/> πα/σξειν κατα&lt;= κοινο/ν τι<br/> διω/ρηται προ/τερον, οἷτι<br/> δυνα/μει πα/φ ε)στι τα&lt;=<br/> νοητα&lt;= ο( νου=φ, α)λλ'<br/> ε)ντελεξει/ν ου)δε/ν, πρι/ν<br/> α@ν νοῦ=! δυνα/μει δ' ουἷ<br/> τωφ ωἷσπερ ε)ν γραμματει/<br/> % %ἷ μῆθε&lt;=ν ε)νυπα/ρξει</p> <p>ε)ντελεξει/ν γεγραμμε/νον!<br/> οἷπερ συμβαι/νει ε)πι&lt;= το<br/> υ= νου=.</p> <p>και&lt;= αυ)το&lt;=φ δε&lt;= νοητ<br/> ο/φ<br/> ε)στιν το/ νοου=ν και&lt;= το<br/> &lt;=</p> <p>νοου/μενον! η( γα&lt;=ρ<br/> ε)πιστη/μη η( θεωρητικη&lt;=</p> <p>και&lt;= το&lt;= ουἷτωφ ε)πιστη<br/> το&lt;=ν το&lt;= αυ)το/ ε)στιν □<br/> του= δε&lt;=</p> <p>μη&lt;= α)ει&lt;= νοει=ν το&lt;= αι<br/> @τιον</p> <p>ε)πισκεπτε/ον□! εν) δε&lt;= το<br/> ι=φ ε@ξουσιν υἷλην δυνα/<br/> μει</p> <p>εἷκαστον ε@στι τω=φ<br/> νοητω=v. ωἷστ' ε)κει/νοιφ<br/> με&lt;=ν ου)ξ υ(πα/ρχει νου=<br/> φ □α@νευ γα&lt;=ρ υἷληφ δυ</p> | <p>Scientia namque<br/> speculativa et quod<br/> speculatum est, idem<br/> est. Non autem semper<br/> intelligendi causa<br/> consideranda est. In<br/> habentibus autem<br/> materiam potentia<br/> uumquodque<br/> intelligibilium est.<br/> Quare illis quidem non<br/> inerit intellectus. Sine<br/> materia enim potentia<br/> est intellectum talium;<br/> illi autem intelligibile<br/> inerit.</p> | <p>intelligitur; scientia<br/> namque speculativa et<br/> sic scibile idem est. Non<br/> autem semper<br/> intelligendi causa<br/> consideranda: in<br/> habentibus autem<br/> materiam, potencia slum<br/> unumquodque est<br/> intelligibilium, quare<br/> quidem illis non inerit<br/> intellectus (sine materia<br/> enim potencia est<br/> intellectus talium), illud<br/> autem intelligibile erit.</p> |  | <p>antequam in ipsa scribatur.<br/> Hoc enim in ipso fit atque<br/> accidit intellectu. Est etiam<br/> intelligibilis et ipse<br/> ut intelligibilia cuncta.<br/> Nam in iis quidem quae<br/> sine materia sunt,<br/> intelligens et id quod<br/> intelligitur idem est.<br/> Etenim idem est<br/> contemplativa scientia et id<br/> quod ita sub scientiam<br/> cadit; sed cum non semper<br/> intelligat, consideranda est<br/> causa. In iis autem quae<br/> materiam habent,<br/> unumquodque<br/> intelligibilium potentia est.<br/> Quare illis quidem non<br/> inerit intellectus. Nam<br/> intellectus talium potentia<br/> sine materia est. Ipse<br/> autem intelligibilis<br/> rationem subibit.</p> |
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| /ναμιφ ο( νου=φ τω=ν τοιο<br>υ/των□,<br>ε)κει/ν% δε<= το<= νοητο<br><=ν<br>υ(πα/ρχει. |  |  |  |  |
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| <p><b>Chapter 5: 430a10-430a25</b><br/> ε)πει&lt; δ' [ωδσπερ] ε)ν<br/> α(πα/σθ τω= φυ/σει ε)στι&lt; [τι] το&lt; με&lt;ν υδλ η ε(κα/ στ%<br/> γε/νει (του=το δε&lt; οδ πα/ν τα δυνά/μει ε)κει=να), εδτερον δε&lt; το&lt; αι@τιον και &lt;<br/> ποιητικο/ν, τ%= ποιει=ν πα/ντα, οδιον η( τε/ξνη προ&lt;φ τη&lt;ν υδλην πε/πονθ εν, α)νά/γκη και&lt; ε)ν τα&lt;φ τω=<br/> ψυξω= υ(πα/ρξειν ταυ/ταφ διαφορά/φ! και&lt; ε@στιν ο ( με&lt;ν τοιου=τοφ νου=φ τ% = πα/ντα γι/νεσθαι, ο( δε&lt; τ %= πα/ντα ποιει=ν, ω(φ εδ χιφ τιφ, οδιον το&lt; φω=φ! τρο/πον γα&lt;ρ τινα και&lt; τ ο&lt; φω=φ ποιει= τα&lt; δυνά/μει ο@ντα ξρω/ματα ε)νεργει/# ξρω/ματα. και&lt; ουδτοφ ο ( νου=φ ξωριστο&lt;φ και&lt; α)παθη/φ και&lt; α)μιγνυμιν, τω= ου)σι/# ω@ν ε)νε/ργεια(α)ε ι γα&lt;ρ τιμω/τερον το&lt; ποιου=ν του= πα/σξοντοφ και&lt; η( α)ρξη&lt; τη=φ υδληφ. [το&lt; δ' αυ)το/ ε)στιν η ( κατ'</p> | <p>Quoniam autem, sicut in omni natura, erit aliquid aliud quam materia in unoquoque genere (hoc autem omnia potentia illa), alterum autem causa est et efficiens quidem est et omnia facit, ut ars ad materiam sustinuit, necesse est in anima has esse differentias. Et huiusmodi est intellectus, quo omnia fiunt. Ille vero, quo omnia est facere, sicut habitus quidam est út lumen, quodam enim modo et lumen facit potentia colores actu colores. Et hic intellectus separatus, immixtus et impassibilis, substantia actu est. Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente et principium materia. Idem autem secundum actum scientia rei; quae vero secundum potentiam est, tempore prior in uno est, omnino autem neque tempore. Sed non</p> | <p>Quoniam autem sicut in omni natura est aliquid hoc quidem materia in unoquoque genere (hoc autem est potencia omnia illa), alterum autem causa et factivum, quod in faciendo omnia ut ars ad materiam sustinuit, necesse est in anima esse has differentias, et est huiusmodi quidem intellectus in quo omnia fiunt, ille vero quo omnia est facere, sicut habitus quidam, ut lumen: quodam enim modo et lumen facit potencia existentes colores actu colores. Et hic intellectus separabilis est et impassibilis et immixtus, substantia actu ens. Semper enim honorabilius est agens paciente et principium materia. idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei. Que vero secundum potenciam tempore prior in uno est, omnino autem neque</p> | <p>quoniam autem sicut in omni natura est aliquid, hoc quidem materia unicuique generi (hoc autem quod potest omnia illa), alterum autem quod causa et factivum, in faciendo omnia (quale ars ad materiam sustinuit), necesse et in anima esse has differentias. hoc quidem tale in omnia fieri, hoc autem in omnia facere. Ut habitus quidem, velut lumen; modo enim quodam et lumen facit potentia colores actu colores. et iste intellectus separatus et non mixtus et impassibilis. substantia ens actus. semper enim honorabilius est faciens patiente et principium materia. idem autem est quae secundum actum scientia rei; quae autem secundum potentiam, tempore prior est in uno. Totaliter autem neque tempore. sed non quandoque quidem intelligit, quandoque autem non intelligit. Separatus autem est hoc</p> | <p>Cum autem in omni natura sint quaedam quorum alterum quidem unicuique generi materies est, quod id esse patet quod est potencia illa cuncta, alterum vero causa et efficiens omnia, efficiendo atque agendo talem subiens rationem qualem ars condicionem ad materiam suit, necesse est et in anima differentias has easdem inesse. Atque quidam est intellectus talis ut omnia fiat, quidam talis ut omnia agat atque efficiat, qui quidem ut habitus est quidam et perinde ac lumen. Nam et lumen, colores qui sunt potencia actu colores quodammodo facit. Et is intellectus separabilis est et non mistus, passioneque vacat, cum sit substantia actus. Semper enim id quod effigit atque agit, praestabilius est eo quod patitur, et principium omnino materia. Scientia autem ea quae est actu, est idem quod res; ea vero quae est potencia, in uno</p> |
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| <p>ε)νε/ργειαν ε)πιστη/μη τ%=<br/> πρα/γματι! η( δε&lt; κατα&lt;<br/> δυ/ναμιν ξρο/ν% προτε/ρα<br/> ε)ν τ%= ε(νι/, οἷλωφ δε&lt; ο<br/> υ)δε&lt; ξρο/ν%, α)λλ' ου)ξ<br/> ο(τε&lt; με&lt;ν νοει= ο(τε&lt; δ<br/> ' ου) νοει=.]<br/> ξωρισθει&lt;φ δ' ε)στι&lt; μο/<br/> νον του=θ' οἷπερ ε)στι/, κ<br/> αι&lt;<br/> του=το μο/νον α)θα/νατον<br/> και&lt; α)ι/διον (ου)<br/> μνημονευ/ομεν δε&lt;, οἷτι τ<br/> ου=το με&lt;ν α)παθε/φ, ο( δ<br/> ε&lt;<br/> παθητικο&lt;φ νου=φ φθαρτ<br/> ο/φ)! και&lt; α©νευ του/του<br/> ου)θε&lt;ν νοει=.</p> | <p>aliquando intelligit,<br/> aliquando vero non<br/> intelligit. Separatus<br/> autem solum est hoc<br/> quod vere est et hoc<br/> solum immortale et<br/> perpetuum est. Non<br/> reminiscimur autem,<br/> quod hoc quidem<br/> impassibile sit; passivus<br/> autem intellectus<br/> corruptibilis est et sine<br/> hoc nihil intelligit.</p> | <p>tempore. Set non<br/> aliquando quidem<br/> intelligit, aliquando vero<br/> non intellegit. Separatus<br/> autem est solus hoc<br/> quod vere est. Et hoc<br/> solum immortale et<br/> perpetuum est. Non<br/> reminiscimur autem,<br/> quia hoc quidem<br/> impassibile, passivus<br/> vero intellectus<br/> corruptibilis, et sine hoc<br/> nichil intelligit.</p> | <p>quod quidem est, et hoc<br/> solum immortale et<br/> perpetuum. Non<br/> memoratur autem quia<br/> hoc quidem impassibile;<br/> passivus autem intellectus<br/> corruptibilis, et sine hoc<br/> nihil intelligit.</p> | <p>prior est tempore: absolute<br/> autem non tempore. Sed<br/> non nunc quidem intelligit,<br/> nunc autem non intelligit.<br/> Separatus vero id est solum<br/> quod est, atque id solum<br/> est immortale<br/> perpetuumque. Non autem<br/> recordamur, quia hoc<br/> quidem expers est<br/> passionis, intellectus vero<br/> passivus exstingitur, et sine<br/> hoc nihil intelligit.</p> |
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| <p><b>Chapter 6: 430a 26- 430b 30</b><br/> η( με&lt;v ουΠν τω=v<br/> α)διαίρε/των νο/ησιφ εν)<br/> του/τοιφ περι&lt; α3 ου)κ ε<br/> ©στι το&lt; ψευ=δοφ, ε)ν οι<br/> ϩφ δε&lt; και&lt; το&lt; ψευ=δο<br/> φ και&lt; το&lt; α)ληθε/φ συ/v<br/> θεσι/φ τιφ η©δη<br/> νοημα/των ω3περ ε3ν ο©<br/> ντων – καθα/περ Ε)μπεδοκ<br/> λη=φ ε©φη “ϩϩ πολλω=v<br/> με&lt;v<br/> κο/ρσαι α)ναυ/ξενεφ<br/> ε)βλα/στησαν”, ε©πειτα<br/> συντι/θεσθαι τω= φιλι/#,<br/> ου3τω και&lt; ταυ=τα<br/> κεξωρισμε/vα συντι/θεται,<br/> οι(=ον το&lt; α)συ/μμετρον<br/> και&lt; η( δια/μετροφ – α©v<br/> δε&lt;<br/> γενομε/vων η© ε)σομε/vων,<br/> το/v ξρο/vον προσεννοω=v<br/> [και&lt;] συντι/θησι. το&lt; γα<br/> &lt;ρ<br/> ψευ=δοφ ε)ν συνθε/σει α)ει<br/> /! και&lt; γα&lt;ρ α©v το&lt; λε<br/> υκο&lt;v<br/> μη&lt; λευκο&lt;v &lt;φϩ, το&lt;<br/> λευκο&lt;v και&lt; &lt; το&lt; μη/<br/> λευκο&lt;v συνε/θηκεν!<br/> ε)νδε/ξεται δε&lt; και&lt;<br/> διαί/ρεσιν φα/vαι πα/vα. α<br/> )λλ’ ουΠν ε©στι γε ου3<br/> μο/vον το&lt; ψευ=δοφ η©<br/> α)ληθε/φ ο3τι λευκο&lt;φ<br/> Κλε/ων ε)στι/v, α(λλα&lt; κα<br/> ι&lt; ο3τι ηΠν η© ε©σται. τ</p> | <p>Indivisibilium igitur<br/> intelligentia in his est<br/> circa quae non est<br/> falsum. In quibus autem<br/> et falsum iam et verum<br/> est, compositio quaedam<br/> iam intellectuum est,<br/> sicut eorum quae insunt,<br/> quemadmodum<br/> Empedocles dixit: Vere<br/> multorum quidem capita<br/> sine cervice<br/> germanorum, postea<br/> composita sunt<br/> concordia. Sic et haec<br/> separata composita sunt,<br/> ut quod est symmetros<br/> et diametros. Factorum<br/> autem et futurorum<br/> tempus intelligens et<br/> componens. Falsum<br/> enim semper in<br/> compositione. Et<br/> namque, si album non-<br/> albo falso composurit,<br/> continget autem et<br/> divisionem dicere<br/> omnia. Si igitur non<br/> solum falsum aut verum,<br/> quod albus Cleon est,<br/> sed et quod erat et erit.<br/> Unum autem faciens,<br/> hoc intellectus est<br/> unumquodque.</p> | <p>Indivisibilium quidem<br/> igitur intelligentia in hiis<br/> est circa quae non est<br/> falsum, in quibus autem<br/> et falsum iam et verum<br/> est, compositio iam<br/> intellectuum est, sicut<br/> eorum quae unum sunt.<br/> Quemadmodum<br/> Empedocles dixit: “Vere<br/> multorum quidem capita<br/> sine cervice<br/> germinaverunt” postea<br/> composita sunt<br/> concordia. Sic et hec<br/> separata composita sunt,<br/> ut assimetron et<br/> dyametros aut symetrum<br/> et dyametros. Si autem<br/> factorum et futurorum,<br/> tempus cointelligens et<br/> componens: falsum<br/> enim in compositione<br/> semper est, et namque si<br/> album non album aut si<br/> non album album<br/> composuit; contingit<br/> autem et divisionem<br/> dicere omnia; sic ergo<br/> est non solum fasum aut<br/> verum quod albus Cleon<br/> est, set et quod erat aut<br/> erit. Unum autem<br/> faciens unumquodque,</p> | <p>indivisibilium quidem<br/> igitur intelligentia in his<br/> est circa quae non est falsum.<br/> in quibus autem et falsum<br/> et verum compositio iam<br/> quaedam conceptuum. si<br/> autem factorum aut<br/> futurorum, tempus<br/> cointelligens et<br/> componens. falsum enim<br/> in compositione semper.<br/> etenim si album non<br/> album, non album<br/> composuit. contingit<br/> autem et divisionem<br/> dicere omnia. si igitur non<br/> solum falsum aut verum<br/> quia albus cleon est, sed<br/> et quia erat aut erit. unum<br/> itaque faciens, intellectus<br/> hoc unumquodque<br/> indivisible autem,<br/> quoniam dupliciter, aut<br/> potentia aut actu, nihil<br/> prohibet &lt;intelligere&gt;<br/> indivisible, quando<br/> intelligit longitudinem.<br/> non igitur est dicere, in<br/> dimidio aliquid intelligit<br/> utrumque; non enim est,<br/> si non dividitur, sed aut<br/> potentia. Tunc autem<br/> veluti longitudes. Si<br/> autem ut ex ambobus, et</p> | <p>Indivisibilium igitur<br/> intellectio in iis constituit<br/> circa quae falsitas non est.<br/> At in quibus falsitas iam et<br/> veritas inest, in iis<br/> compositio quaedam iam<br/> est conceptuum intellectus,<br/> quasi ipsi sint unum. Atque<br/> ut Empedocles dixit<br/> “multorum certe capita,<br/> admirabile dictu, cervice<br/> adsque fuere exorta in<br/> luminis aura: illa tamen<br/> dulci post hoc concordia<br/> iungit,” sic et haec separata<br/> componi solent, ut<br/> incommensurabile et<br/> diameter. Quodsi eorum<br/> etiam quae fuerunt vel<br/> erunt fit compositio,<br/> tempus insuper intelligitur<br/> atque additur. Falsitas<br/> enim in compositione<br/> semper consistit: nam si<br/> album non esse album<br/> dicat, ipsum tum non<br/> album componit. Licet<br/> autem divisionem etiam<br/> omnia dicere. attamen<br/> falsitas aut veritas non<br/> solum cosistit in hoc,<br/> Cleon est albus: sed in his<br/> etiam, Cleon erat vel erit<br/> albus. Id vero quod</p> |
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| <p>ο/δε&lt;= ειν ποιου=ν εικασ<br/> τον, του=το ο(νου=φ. το/α<br/> διαι/ρετον ε)πει&lt;= διζω=φ,<br/> η© δυνά/μει η©<br/> ε)νεργει/#, ου)θε&lt;=ν κωλυ/ε<br/> ι νοει=ν το&lt;= διαιρετο&lt;=ν<br/> π(=&gt;<br/> α)διαι/ρετον, &lt;οι)ρον&gt; ο)τα<br/> ν<br/> νοπ= το&lt;= μη=κοφ<br/> (α)διαι/ρετον γα&lt;=ρ<br/> ε)νεργει/#), και&lt;= εν) ξρο/ν<br/> % α)διαιρε/τ%! ο(μοι/ωφ γ<br/> α&lt;=ρ ο( ξρο/νοφ διαιρετο&lt;=ν<br/> φ και&lt;=ν<br/> α&lt;=διαι/ρετοφ τ%= μη/κει.<br/> ου©κουν ε©στιν ει)πει=ν ε<br/> &lt;=ν<br/> τ%= η(μ/σει τι/ε)νο/ει<br/> ε(καστε/ρ%! ου) γα&lt;=ρ ε©σ<br/> τιν, α©ν μη/ διαιρεθπ=, α)<br/> λλ' η© δυνά/μει. ξωρι&lt;=φ δ<br/> ,<br/> ε(κα/τερον νοω=ν η(μ/σεω<br/> ν διαιρει= και&lt;= το&lt;=ν ξρο/<br/> von<br/> α)μα, το/τε δ' οι(ονει&lt;= μη<br/> /κη! ει) δ' ω(φ ε)χ α)μφοι=ν<br/> , και&lt;= ε)ν τ%= ξρο/ν% τ%<br/> = ε)π'<br/> α)μφοι=ν. [το&lt;= δε&lt;= μπ/κ<br/> ατα&lt;=ν<br/> το&lt;= ποσο&lt;=ν α)διαι/ρετον<br/> α)λλα&lt;= τ%= ει©δει νοει=<br/> ε)ν<br/> α)διαιρε/τ% ξρο/ν% και&lt;=ν<br/> α)διαιρε/τ% τη=φ ψυξη=φ]<br/> . κατα&lt;= συμβεβηκο&lt;=φ δε</p> | <p>Indivisible autem<br/> quoniam dupliciter<br/> dicitur: aut potentia aut<br/> actu, nihil prohibet<br/> intelligere indivisible,<br/> cum intelgat<br/> longitudinem.<br/> Indivibilis enim<br/> actualiter est et in<br/> tempore indivisibili.<br/> Similiter enim tempus<br/> divisibile et indivisible<br/> longitudine est. Non<br/> ergo est dicere in medio<br/> aliquid intelligere<br/> utroque; non enim esset,<br/> nisi dividatur, sed aut<br/> potentia. Seorsum autem<br/> intelligens utrumque,<br/> dividit et tempus simul;<br/> tunc autem est ut in<br/> longitudine; si vero est,<br/> sicut ex utrisque, et<br/> tempore, quod est in<br/> utrisque. Quod autem<br/> non secundum<br/> quantitatem indivisible<br/> est, sed specie, intelligit<br/> indivisibili tempore et<br/> indivisibili anima.<br/> Secundum accidens<br/> autem et non in quantum<br/> illa divisibilia sunt, quod<br/> intelligit, et in quo</p> | <p>hoc intellectus est.<br/> Indivisible autem,<br/> quoniam dupliciter,<br/> potencia aut actu, est,<br/> nihil prohibet intelligere<br/> indivisible, cum<br/> longitudinem intelligat:<br/> indivibilis enim<br/> actualiter est; et in<br/> tempore indivisibili:<br/> similiter enim tempus<br/> divisibile et indivisible<br/> longitudini est. Non<br/> igitur est dicere aliquid<br/> in medio intelligere<br/> utrumque: non enim<br/> esset, nisi dividetur, set<br/> aut potencia. Seorsum<br/> autem utrumque<br/> intelligens dimidorum,<br/> dividit et tempus simul<br/> tunc ut in longitudine. Si<br/> vero est sicut ex<br/> utrisque, et in tempore<br/> est quod in utrisque.<br/> Quod autem non<br/> secundum quantitatem<br/> indivisible est set<br/> specie, intelligit<br/> indivisibili tempore et<br/> indivisibili anime.<br/> Secundum accidens<br/> autem et non in quantum<br/> illa divisibilia quod</p> | <p>in tempore quod in<br/> ambobus. quod autem non<br/> secundum quantum<br/> indivisible sed specie,<br/> intelligit in indivisibili<br/> tempore et indivisibili<br/> animae. secundum<br/> accidens autem et non qua<br/> illa, divisibilia, quo<br/> intelligit, et in quo<br/> tempore, sed qua<br/> indivisibilia. inest autem<br/> in his aliquid indivisible,<br/> sed forte non separabile,<br/> quod facit unum tempus<br/> et longitudinem. punctus<br/> autem et omnis divisio et,<br/> quod sic indivisible,<br/> declaratur sicut privatio.<br/> et similis ratio in aliis,<br/> quomodo malum<br/> cognoscit aut nigrum: eo<br/> enim quod contrarium<br/> aliquahter cognoscit.<br/> Oportet autem potentia<br/> esse quod cognoscit et<br/> inesse in ipso. si autem<br/> alicui non est contrarium<br/> talium, ipsum se ipsum<br/> cognoscit, et actu est<br/> separatum. est autem<br/> dictio quidem aliquid de<br/> aliquo, sicut affirmatio, et<br/> vera aut falsa omnis.</p> | <p>singulos dictos conceptus<br/> componit unumque facit,<br/> ipse est intellectus. Cum<br/> autem dupliciter<br/> indivisible dicatur, aut<br/> potentia aut actu, nihil<br/> prohibet intellectum, cum<br/> longitudinem intelligit,<br/> indivisible intelligere, et<br/> in indivisibili tempore. Est<br/> enim indivibilis in actu.<br/> Et tempus perinde atque<br/> longitudo divisibile atque<br/> indivisible est. Non igitur<br/> dici potest quid in utroque<br/> temporis dimidio intelligat:<br/> non est enim, sinon divisio<br/> fiat, nisi potentia. At cum<br/> utrumque seorsum<br/> intelligit, dividit simul et<br/> tempus; atque tunc ut<br/> longitudines illa intelligit.<br/> Quodsi longitudinem ut ex<br/> utrisque constantem<br/> intelligat, in eo quoque<br/> tempore ipsam intelligit,<br/> quod ex utriusque pari<br/> modo temporibus constat<br/> atque componitur. Quod<br/> vero non quantitate sed<br/> forma est indivisible, id in<br/> indivisibili tempore et<br/> animae indivisibili percipit<br/> atque intelligit, per</p> |
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| <p>             &lt;=,<br/>             και&lt; ου)ξ πρ ε)κει=να,<br/>             διαιρετα&lt; οζ νοει= και&lt;<br/>             ε)ν %ρ ξρο/ν%, α)λλ' ηρ &lt;<br/>             ε)κει=να&gt; α)διαι/ρετα! ε)νε<br/>             στι γα&lt;ρ<br/>             κα)ν του/τοιφ τι<br/>             α)διαιρετον, α)λλ' ι©σωφ<br/>             ου) ξωπιστο/ν, οζ ποιει=<br/>             εζνα το&lt;ν ξρο/νον και&lt;<br/>             το&lt;=           </p> <p>             μη=κοφ. και&lt; του=θ' ο(μο<br/>             ι/ωφ ε)ν αζπαντι/ ε)στι τ%<br/>             =           </p> <p>             συνεξει=, και&lt; ξρο/ν% κα<br/>             ι&lt; μη/κει. &lt;το&lt; δε&lt; μη&lt;<br/>             κατα&lt; το&lt; ποσο&lt;ν α)δι<br/>             αι/ρετον α)λλα&lt; τ%= ει©δ<br/>             ει νοει= ε)ν<br/>             α)διαιρε/τ% ξρο/ν% και&lt;<br/>             α)διαιρε/τ% &lt;τ%&gt; τη=φ<br/>             ψυξη=φ.&gt; η( δε&lt; στιγμη&lt;<br/>             και&lt; πα=σα διαι/ρεσιφ, κ<br/>             αι&lt; το&lt;=           </p> <p>             ουζτωφ α)διαι/ρετον, δηλο<br/>             υ=ται ωζσπερ η( στε/ρησι<br/>             φ.<br/>             και&lt; οζμοιοφ ο( λο/γοφ ε)<br/>             πι&lt;=           </p> <p>             τω=ν α©λλων, οιρρον πω=φ<br/>             το&lt; κακο&lt;ν γνωρι/ζει η<br/>             © το&lt;=           </p> <p>             με/λαν! τ%= ε)ναντι/%γα<br/>             &lt;ρ πωφ γνωρι/ζει. δει&lt; δε<br/>             &lt;=           </p> <p>             δυνά/μει ειπναι το&lt;=           </p> <p>             γνωρι/ζον και&lt; ε)νει=ναι ε<br/>             )ν αυ)τ%=. ει) δε&lt; τινη μηδ           </p> | <p>             tempore, sed inquantum<br/>             indivisibilia sunt. Inest<br/>             enim et his aliquod<br/>             indivisibile, sed fortassis<br/>             non separabile, quod<br/>             facit unum tempus et<br/>             longitudinem; et hoc<br/>             similiter est in omni<br/>             continuo et tempore et<br/>             longitudine. Punctum<br/>             autem omnique divisio<br/>             et huiusmodi indivisibile<br/>             monstratur, sicut<br/>             privatio. Et similiter<br/>             ratio in aliis est, aut<br/>             quomodo malum<br/>             cognoscit aut nigrum.<br/>             Contrario enim<br/>             quodammodo cognoscit.<br/>             Oportet autem potentia<br/>             esse cognoscens et esse<br/>             in ipso; si vero alicui<br/>             non inest contrarium<br/>             causarum, seipsum<br/>             cognoscit et actu est<br/>             separabile. Amplius<br/>             autem dictio aliquid de<br/>             aliquo sicut affirmatio<br/>             vera aut falsa omnis est.<br/>             Intellectus autem non<br/>             omnis, sed qui est ipsius<br/>             quid est, et secundum<br/>             quod aliquid erat esse,<br/>             verus est, et non est           </p> | <p>             intelligitur et in quo<br/>             tempore, set in quantum<br/>             indivisibilia: inest autem<br/>             utique hiis aliquid<br/>             indivisibile. Sic forte<br/>             non separabile quod<br/>             facit tempus unum et<br/>             longitudinem, set hoc<br/>             similiter in omni est<br/>             continuo et tempore et<br/>             longitudine. Punctum<br/>             autem et omne divisio et<br/>             sic indivisibile<br/>             monstratur sicut<br/>             privatio. Et similis ratio<br/>             in aliis est, ut quomodo<br/>             malum cognoscit aut<br/>             nigrum: contrario enim<br/>             aliquo modo cognoscit.<br/>             Oportet autem potencia<br/>             esse cognoscens et esse<br/>             in ipso. Si vero alicui<br/>             non inest contrarium,<br/>             ipsum se ipsum<br/>             cognoscit et actu est<br/>             separabile. Est autem<br/>             dictio quidem aliquid de<br/>             aliquo, sicut affirmatio,<br/>             vera aut falsa omnis;<br/>             intellectus autem non<br/>             omnis set qui est<br/>             secundum hoc quod<br/>             aliquid erat esse verus<br/>             est, et non aliquid           </p> | <p>             intellectus autem non<br/>             omnis, sed qui eius quod<br/>             quid est, secundum quod<br/>             quid erat esse, verus, et<br/>             non aliquid de aliquo. sed<br/>             sicut videre proprii verus,<br/>             si autem homo &lt;album&gt;<br/>             aut non, non verum<br/>             semper, sic se habent<br/>             quaecumque sine materia.           </p> | <p>             accidens autem, et non hoc<br/>             quo illa divisibilia sunt, id<br/>             quod intelligit, et tempus<br/>             in quo intelligit, sed hoc<br/>             quo indivisibilia sunt. Inest<br/>             enim in his indivisibile<br/>             quiddam, at fortasse non<br/>             separabile; quod quidem<br/>             unum tam tempus ipsum<br/>             quam ipsam longitudinem<br/>             facit. Atque id in omni<br/>             sane continuo et tempore et<br/>             longitudine similiter inest.<br/>             Punctum autem omnisque<br/>             divisio, et id quod est sic<br/>             indivisibile, perinde atque<br/>             privatio cognoscitur<br/>             manifestumque evadit.<br/>             Hoc enim modo malum<br/>             cognoscit, atque etiam<br/>             nigrum: contrario namque<br/>             quodammodo cognoscit. Id<br/>             autem quod cognoscit,<br/>             potentia esse, et in ipso<br/>             potentiam inesse oportet.<br/>             Quodsi causarum alicui<br/>             nullum sit omnino<br/>             contrarium, illa se ipsam<br/>             cognoscit, et est actus, et<br/>             separabilis. Est autem<br/>             dictio quidem quippiam de<br/>             quopiam, quemadmodum<br/>             affirmatio. Atque omnis<br/>             vera vel falsa. At           </p> |
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| <p>ε&lt;v<br/> ε©στιν ε)ναντι/ον [τω=v<br/> αι)τι/ων], αυ)το&lt; ε(αυτο&lt;v<br/> γινω/σκει και&lt; ε)νεργεια/<br/> ε)στι και&lt; ξωριστο/v.<br/> ε©στι δ' η( με&lt;v φα/σιφ τι<br/> κατα&lt; τινοφ, ω3σπερ και<br/> &lt; η( α)πο/φασιφ, και&lt; α)<br/> ληθη&lt;φ η© ψευδη&lt;φ πα<br/> =σα! ο( δε&lt; νου=φ ου) πα<br/> =φ, α)λλ' ο( του= τι/<br/> ε)στι κατα&lt; το&lt; τι/ ηΠν ε<br/> ιΠναι α)ληθη/φ, και&lt; ου)<br/> τι&lt; κατα/ τινοφ! α)λλ' ω3<br/> σπερ το&lt;v<br/> ο(ρα=v του= ι)δι/ου α)ληθε<br/> /φ,<br/> ει) δ' α©νθρωποφ το&lt;v<br/> λευκο&lt;v η© μη/, ου)κ α)λ<br/> ηθε&lt;φ α)ει/, ου3τωφ ε©ξε<br/> ι α©νευ<br/> υ3ληφ.</p> | <p>aliquid de aliquo. Sed<br/> sicut videre proprii<br/> verum est, si autem<br/> homo album aut non,<br/> non semper verum est,<br/> et sic se habent,<br/> quaecumque sine<br/> materia sunt.</p> | <p>dealiquo, set sicut videre<br/> proprii verum est, si<br/> autem homo album aut<br/> non, non verum semper.<br/> Sic autem se habent<br/> quecunque sine materia<br/> sunt.</p> |  | <p>intellectus non omnis, sed<br/> qui est ipsius quid est, ad<br/> formam accomodati, est<br/> verus; et non quippiam de<br/> quopiam dicit. Sed ut visio<br/> proprii ipsius est vera, si<br/> vero album hominem esse<br/> dicat aut non, non semper<br/> est vera, sic sese habent ea<br/> quae sine materia sunt.</p> |
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| <p><b>Chapter 7: 431a 1-431b 20</b><br/> το&lt; δ' αυ)το/ ε)στιν η( κατ<br/> , ε)νε/ργειαν ε)πιστη/μη τ%=<br/> πρα/γματι. η( δε&lt; κατα&lt; δυ/ναμιν ξρο/ν% προτε/ρα ε)ν τ%= ε(νι/, ο)ζλωφ δε&lt; ο υ)δε&lt; ξρο/ν%! ε)στι γα&lt; ρ ε)χ ε)ντελεξι/# ο)ντοφ πα&lt;ντ α<br/> τα&lt; γιγνο/μενα. φαι/νεται δε&lt; το&lt; με&lt;ν αι)σθητο &lt;ν ε)κ δυνά/μει ο)ντοφ του= αι)σθητικου= ε)νεργει/# ποιου=ν! ου) γα&lt; &lt;ρ πα/σξει ου)δ' α)λλοιου =ται διο&lt; α)λλο ει)Πδοφ τ ου=το<br/> κινη/στεωφ! η( γα&lt;ρ κι/νησιφ του= α)τελου=φ ε)νε/ργεια, η( δ' α(πλω=φ ε)νε/ργεια ε(τε/ρα, η( του= τετελεσμε/νου. το&lt; με&lt;ν ου)Πν αι)σθα/νεσθαι ο)μοι ον τ%= φα/ναι μο/νον και &lt;<br/> νοει=ν! ο)ταν δε&lt; η(δ&lt; η) λυπηρο/ν, οι)ρον καταφα= σα η) α)ποφα=σα δια)κει η)<br/> φευ/γει! και&lt; ε)στι το&lt; η)δεσθαι και&lt; λυπει=σθ αι το&lt; ε)νεργει=ν τω= αι)σθητικω= μεσο/τητι προ</p> | <p>Idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei; quae vero secundum potentiam, tempore prior in uno, omnino autem neque in tempore. Sunt enim ex eo quod actu est, omnia quae fiunt. Videtur sensibile ex potentia existente sensitivum actu agens; non enim patitur neque alteratur actu agens. Unde alia haec species motus est. Motus enim imperfecti actus erat, simplex autem actus alter est, qui et perfecti. Ipsi quidem sentire simile est dicere solum et intelligere. Cum autem laetum aut triste, ut affirmans aut negans, imitatur aut fugit. Et est laetari quidem et tristari agere sensibili mediante aut bonum aut malum aut huiusmodi. Et fuga et appetitus idem est secundum actum; et non alterum est appetitivum et fugitivum neque ad invicem neque ad</p> | <p>Idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei, quae vero secundum potenciam, tempore prior est in uno, omnino autem neque tempore: sunt enim ex actu ente omnia quae fiunt. Videtur autem sensibile ex potencia existente sensitivo actu agens: non enim patitur neque alteratur. Unde alia hec species motus: motus enim imperfecti actus, simpliciter autem actus alter, qui perfecti. Sentire quidem igitur simile est ipsi dicere solum et intelligere; cum autem delectabile aut triste ut affirmans aut negans, persequitur aut fugit. Et est delectari et tristari agere sensitiva medietate ad bonum aut malum in quantum talia. Et fuga autem et appetitus hoc, quae secundum actum. Et non alterum appetitivum et fugitivum neque ab invicem neque a sensitivo, set esse aliud</p> | <p>Idem autem est quae secundum actum scientia rei, quae autem secundum potentiam, tempore prior in uno, omnino autem neque tempore: sunt enim ex actu ente omnia quae fiunt. videtur autem sensibile quidem ex potentia ente sensibili actu faciens. non enim patitur neque alteratur; propter quod alia species haec motus. motus quidem enim imperfecti est actus. sentire quidem igitur simile ei quod est dicere solum, et intelligere. Quando autem delectabile aut triste, velut affirmans aut negans, persequitur aut fugit. et est delectari aut tristari operari sensitiva medietate ad bonum vel malum inquantum talia. Et fuga autem et appetitus &lt;idem&gt; qui secundum actum et non alterum appetitivum et fugitivum, neque ab invicem, neque a sensitivo; sed esse aliud. meditativae autem animae phantasmata velut</p> | <p>Scientia autem ea quae est actu, est idem quod res; ea vero quae est potentia, in uno prior est tempore, simpliciter autem neque tempore. Sunt enim universa quae fiunt, ex eo quod actu est. Sensibile autem ad actum ex potentia sensitivum ipsum deducere actuque videtur efficere: non enim patitur ac alteratur. quapropter alia quaedam est haec species motus. Nam motus actus est imperfecti: at actus simpliciter, qui quidem est rei perfectae, alius est omnino diversusque ab illo. Sentire igitur ipsi dicere solum ac intelligere simile est. Cum autem sensus iucundum aut molestum discernit, quasi affirmavit vel negaverit, tum persequitur aut fugit. Atque delectari aut dolere est operari medietate sensus ad bonum aut malum, ut talia sunt. Et non aliud est appetitivum aut fugitivum; nec alia sunt ista a sensitivo, quanquam ipsorum ratio non est</p> |
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| <p>             &lt;φ το&lt; α&gt;γαθο&lt;ν η&lt; κα<br/>             κο/ν, πῆ<br/>             τοιαυ=τα. και&lt; η( φυγη&lt;<br/>             δε&lt;<br/>             και&lt; η) ο&lt;ρεχιφ ταυ)το/,<br/>             η(<br/>             κατ' ε)νε/ργειαν, και&lt; ου)<br/>             ξ εἴτερον το&lt; ο)ρεκτικο&lt;<br/>             ν και&lt; το&lt; φευκτικο/ν, ου<br/>             &lt;τ' α)λλη/λων ου&lt;τε του=<br/>             αι)σθητικου=! α)λλα&lt; το<br/>             &lt; ειΠναι α&lt;λλο. τω= δε&lt;<br/>             διανοητικω= ψυξ= τα&lt;<br/>             φαντα/σματα οιῶν<br/>             αι)σθη/ματα υ(πα/ρξει,<br/>             οἷταν δε&lt; α)γαθο&lt;ν νοει<br/>             = ηῖ<br/>             κακο/ν φη/σθ η&lt; α)ποφη/σ<br/>             π, φευ/γει η&lt; διο/κει! διο/<br/>             ου)δε/ ποτε α&lt;νευ<br/>             φαντα/σματοφ η( ψυξη/.<br/>             ωῖσπερ δε&lt; ο( α)η&lt;ρ τη<br/>             &lt;ν<br/>             κο/ρην τοιανδι&lt; ε)ποι/ησε<br/>             ν, αυῖτη δ' εἴτερον, και&lt;<br/>             η(<br/>             α)κοη&lt; ω(σαυ/τωφ, το&lt; δ<br/>             ε&lt;<br/>             ε&lt;σξατον εἴν, και&lt; μι/α &lt;<br/>             η( μεσο/τηφ, το&lt; δ' ειΠν<br/>             αι<br/>             αυ)τω= πλει/ω... τι/νι<br/>             ε)πικρι/νει τι/ διαφε/ρ<br/>             γλυκυ&lt; και&lt; θερμο/ν<br/>             ει&lt;ρηται με&lt;ν και&lt;<br/>             προ/τερον, λεκτε/ον δε&lt; κ<br/>             αι&lt; ωῖδε. ε&lt;στι γα&lt;ρ εἴ<br/>             ν τι,           </p> | <p>             sensibili; sed esse aliud<br/>             est. Sed intellectivae<br/>             animae phantasmata ut<br/>             sensibilia sunt. Cum<br/>             autem aut bonum aut<br/>             malum est dicere aut<br/>             negare, aut fugit aut<br/>             persequitur; ex quo<br/>             nequaquam sine<br/>             phantasmate intellegit<br/>             anima. Sicut enim aer<br/>             pupillam huiusmodi<br/>             fecit, hoc autem alterum<br/>             est et auditus similiter.<br/>             Sed ultimum unum est et<br/>             una medietas, esse vero<br/>             plura. Quo autem<br/>             discernat, quid differat<br/>             dulce et calidum, dictum<br/>             est quidem et prius;<br/>             dicendum autem et nunc<br/>             est. Est enim unum<br/>             aliquid, sic autem ut<br/>             terminus est. Et hoc in<br/>             analogia et numero<br/>             quidem, quem habet ad<br/>             utrumque, sicut illa ad<br/>             invicem. Quid enim<br/>             differt opponere,<br/>             quomodo similia genera<br/>             iudicat aut contraria, ut<br/>             album et nigrum? Sit<br/>             igitur d sicut dulce, a<br/>             album et b nigrum, c           </p> | <p>             est. Intellective autem<br/>             anime phantasmata ut<br/>             sensibilia sunt: cum<br/>             autem bonum aut<br/>             malum affirmat aut<br/>             negat, et fugit aut<br/>             persequitur; propter<br/>             quod nequaquam sine<br/>             phantasmate intellegit<br/>             anima. Sicut enim aer<br/>             pupillam huiusmodi<br/>             fecit, ipsa autem<br/>             alterum, at auditus<br/>             similiter, set ultimum<br/>             unum et una medietas,<br/>             esse autem ipsi plura.<br/>             Quo autem discernit quo<br/>             differt dulce et calidum,<br/>             dictum est quidem et<br/>             prius, dicendum autem<br/>             et nunc: est enim aliquid<br/>             unum, sic autem et<br/>             terminus (et hec in<br/>             proportionali aut<br/>             numero) ens unum habet<br/>             ad utrumque sicut illa ad<br/>             invicem. Quo enim<br/>             differt non homogenea<br/>             iudicare aut contraria, ut<br/>             album et nigrum? Sit<br/>             igitur sicut A album et B<br/>             nigrum, G ad D sicut illa<br/>             ad invicem; quare et<br/>             permutatim. Si igitur           </p> | <p>             sensimata existunt.<br/>             quando autem bonum<br/>             &lt;aut malum&gt; dicit vel<br/>             negat, et fugit aut<br/>             persequitur. propter quod<br/>             nunquam intelligit sine<br/>             phantasmate anima. sicut<br/>             autem aer pupillam talem<br/>             fecit, haec autem altera, et<br/>             auditus similiter,<br/>             extremum autem unum et<br/>             una medietas, esse autem<br/>             ipsi plura. Quo autem<br/>             discernit quo differt dulce<br/>             et amarum, dictum est<br/>             quidem et prius;<br/>             dicendum autem et hic;<br/>             est enim unum aliquid, sic<br/>             autem et terminus. et haec<br/>             unum proportionalitate et<br/>             numero quem habent ad<br/>             utrumque, ut illa ad<br/>             invicem. quid enim<br/>             differt dubitare qualiter<br/>             &lt;non&gt; congenaea iudicat,<br/>             aut contraria, puta album<br/>             et nigrum. sit itaque ut a<br/>             album ad b nigrum, c ad d<br/>             ut illa ad invicem, quare<br/>             et permutatim. si itaque<br/>             cd uni sunt inexistencia,<br/>             sic se habebunt sicut et<br/>             ab, idem quidem, esse<br/>             autem non idem; et illud           </p> | <p>             eadem sed diversa. Anime<br/>             autem quae principium est<br/>             ratiocinandi, ipsa<br/>             phantasmata perinde atque<br/>             sensibilia sensui ipsi<br/>             subiiciuntur. Atque cum<br/>             bonum et malum esse dicit<br/>             affirmando vel negando,<br/>             tum fugit aut persequitur.<br/>             Quapropter ipsa anima sine<br/>             phantasmate nunquam<br/>             intelligit. Fit autem et hic<br/>             perinde ut ibi: nam aer<br/>             quidem pupillam talem<br/>             efficit, ipsa autem aliud, et<br/>             auditus simili modo. Ipsum<br/>             vero ultimum unum<br/>             quidem est et medietas<br/>             una: at ipsius plures sunt<br/>             rationes. Quo verio<br/>             diiudicet atque discernat<br/>             calidum a dulci differre,<br/>             dictum et prius est, et nunc<br/>             etiam est dicendum. Est<br/>             enim unum quid ipsum, et<br/>             ita unum ut terminus.<br/>             Atque haec ipsa unum sunt<br/>             aut similitudine rationis,<br/>             aut numero quem habent<br/>             ad utrumque, ut illa inter se<br/>             habent. Quid enim interest,<br/>             si quonam pacto discernat<br/>             aut ea quae sub eodem<br/>             genere collocantur aut           </p> |
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| <p>ουτω δε ω(φ ο( οζροφ, και= ταυ=τα, εζν τ%= α)να/λογον και= τ%= α)ριθμ%= ο@ντ α, ε@ξει &lt;ε(κα/τερον&gt; προ&lt;φ ε(κα/τερον ω(φ ε)κει=να προ&lt;φ α@λληλα! τι/ γα&lt;ρ διαφε/ρει το&lt; α)πορει=ν πω=φ τ α&lt; μη&lt; ο(μογενη= κρι/νει η@ τα&lt; ε)ναντι/α, οiθον λευκο/ν κ αι&lt; με/λαν; ε@στω δη&lt; ω (φ το&lt; Α το&lt; λευκο&lt;ν π ρο&lt;φ το&lt; Β το&lt; με/λαν, το&lt; Γ προ&lt;φ το&lt; Δ [ω(φ ε)κει=να προ&lt;φ α@λληλα! ωστε και&lt; ε)ναλλ α/χ. ει) δη&lt; τα&lt; ΓΑ ε(νι/ ε ι@η υ(πα/ρξοντα, ου@τωφ εζχε ι, ωσπερ και&lt; τα&lt; ΔΒ, τ ο&lt; αυ)το&lt; με&lt;ν και&lt; εζν, τ ο&lt; δ' ειΠναι ου) το&lt; αυ)το/ – κα)κει=να ο(μοι/ωφ. ο( δ' αυ)το&lt;φ λο/γοφ και&lt; ει) τ ο&lt; με&lt;ν Α το&lt; γλυκυ&lt;ει@ η, το&lt; δε&lt; Β το&lt; λε&lt;πκο/ν . τα&lt; με&lt;ν ουΠν ει@δη το&lt; νοη&lt;κο &lt;=ν ε)ν τοι=φ φαντα/σμασι νοει=, και&lt; ω(φ ε)ν ε)κει/νοιφ</p> | <p>and d sicut illa ad invicem; quare et communicabiliter. Sic igitur c.d. cum unum sint, sic habebunt sicut a.b. Idem enim sunt et unum. Esse autem non idem sunt; et illud similiter est. Eadem autem ratio, et si a quidem dulce sit, b vero album. Species igitur in phantasmatis intellectivum intelligit. Sicut in illis determinatum est, sic imitabile et fugiendum est et extra sensum existens, cum in phantasmatis movetur ut sentiens, quod fugiendum est, quia ignis est, communius cognoscit videns, quod movetur et quoniam proelia sunt. Aliquando autem, quae sunt in anima, phantasmatis aut intellectibus, tamquam videns, ratiocinatur et deliberat futura ad presentia; et cum dicat tamquam ibi laetum aut triste, ab hinc</p> | <p>GD uni sunt existencia, sic habebunt sicut et AB, idem quidem, esse autem non idem, et illud similiter. Eadem autem ratio est et si A quidem dulce sit, B vero album. Species quidem igitur intellectivum in phantasmatis intelligit, et sicut in illis determinatum est ipsi imitabile et fugiendum, et extra sensum cum in phantasmatis fuerit, movetur. Ut sciens quod fugiendum est quia ignis, communi cognoscit, videns quod movetur, quoniam impugnans. Aliquando autem quae sunt in anima phantasmatis aut intellectibus, tanquam videns ratiocinatur et deliberat futura ad presentia, et, cum dixerit ut ibi letum aut triste, hic fugit aut imitatur. Et omnino in actione et quod sine actione verum et falsum in eodem genere est bono et malo. Set in eo</p> | <p>similiter. species quidem igitur intellectivum in phantasmatis intelligit. et ut in illis determinatum est sibi persequibile aut fugibile. puta sentiens terribile quia ignis, communi cognoscit, videns moveri, quia adversarius. Quandoque autem in his quae in anima phantasmatis, vel noematibus. et quando dicit ut ibi delectabile aut triste, hic fugit aut persequitur. et totaliter in actione. et hoc sine actione autem, verum et falsum, in eodem genere est bono et malo; sed per simpliciter differt et per cuidam. quae autem in abstractione dicuntur intelligit sicut si simum, qua quidem simum, non separate, qua autem curvum, si quid intelligebat actu, sine carne utique intelligebat curvum. sic mathematica non separata, ac si utique separata intelligit, quando intelligit illa. totaliter autem intellectus est qui</p> | <p>contraria, dubitemus, ut album ac nigrum? Sit igitur ut est A quod est album, ad B quod est nigrum, sic C ad D. Quare mutato ordine comparisonem etiam eorundem vere facere licet. Siigitur CD sint unum, ipsa se habebunt perinde atque AB, ut sint idem et unum, non eandem autem habeant rationem, et illa simili modo. Eadem erit omnino ratio et si A sit dulce, B vero album. Intellectivum igitur ipsas formas in phantasmatis ipsis intelligit. Et ut in illis ipsi definitum est id quod fugiendum vel sequendum, sic et sine sensu cum in phantasmatis est, movetur. Sentiens enim signum face datum ignem esse, vidensque ipsum communi sensu agitari motu, cognoscit hostem accedere. At nonnunquam iis quae sunt in anima phantasmatis, aut mentis conceptibus, quasi videns, ad ea quae sunt presentia ratiocinatur atque deliberat de futuris. Et cum dixerit</p> |
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| <p>ωδρισται αυ)τ%= το&lt;= διωκτο&lt;=ν και&lt;= φευκτο&lt;= ν, και&lt;= ε)κτο&lt;=φ τη=φ αι)σθη/σεωφ, οδταν ε)πι&lt;= τω=ν φαντασμα/των πΠ, κινει=ται! οιθον, αι)σθανο/μενοφ το&lt;=ν φρυκτο&lt;=ν οδτι πυ=ρ, τω= κοινω= ο(ρω=ν κινου/μενο ν</p> <p>γνωρι/ζει οδτι πολε/μιοφ! ο (τε&lt;= δε&lt;= το=ιφ ε)ν τω= ψυ ξω= φαντα/σμασιν η© νοη/μασιν, ωδσπερ ο(ρω=ν , λο/γιζεται και&lt;= βουλευ/τα ι τα&lt;= με/λλοντα προ&lt;=φ τ α/ παρο/ντα! και&lt;= οδταν ει© πω ω(φ ε)κει= το&lt;= η(δυ&lt;= η© λυπτηρο/ν, ε)νταυ=θα φευ/γει η© διω/κει – και&lt;= οδλωφ εδν προ/χει. και&lt;= το&lt;= α©νευ δε&lt;= προ/χεωφ, το &lt;= α)ληθε/φ και&lt;= το&lt;= ψευ= δοφ, ε)ν τ%= αυ)τ%= γω/νει ε)στι&lt;= τ%= α)γαθ%= και&lt;= τ%= κ ακ%=! α)λλα&lt;= τ%= γω/α(π λω=φ διαφε/ρει και&lt;= τινι/. τα&lt;= δε&lt;= ε)ν α)φαιρε/σει λεγο/μ ενα &lt;νοει=&gt; ωδσπερ, ει© &lt;τι</p> | <p>fugit aut imitatur, et omnino in actione. Et sine actione verum et falsum in eodm genere est bono et malo, sed in eo quod simpliciter est, differunt in quodam. Abstractione autem dicta intelligit, sicut simum, secundum quod simum et, non separate. Inquantum autem est curvum, si aliquod intellexit actu, sine carne utique intelliget, in qua est curvum; sic mathematica non separata, tamquam separata sint, intelligit, cum illa intelligat. Omnino autem intellectus est secundum actum res intelligens. Utrum autem contingat separabilium aliquod intelligere ipsum existentem non separatum a magnitudine aut non, considerandum est posterius.</p> | <p>quod simpliciter differt et quodam. Abstractione autem dicta intelligit sicut si simum secundum quod simum non separate, in quantum autem curvum si aliquod intellexit actu, sine carne utique intellexit in qua curvum, sic mathematica non separata tanquam si separata sint intelligit cum intelligat illud. Omnino autem intellectus est, qui secundum actum, res. Utrum autem contingat aliquod separatorum intelligere ipsum existentem non separatum a magnitudine, aut non, considerandum posterius.</p> | <p>secundum actum res. utrum autem contingit separatorum aliquid intelligere ipsum entem non separatum a magnitudine, aut non, considerandum posterius.</p> | <p>hic aut ibi rem eam esse quae voluptatem aut dolorem affert, tum fugit aut persequitur, et omnino aliquid agit. Ipsum etiam verum ac falsum, quae sine actione sunt, in eodem genere sunt in quo sunt bonum ac malum: sed absolute differunt, atque cuiuspiam ratione. At vero res eas quae vocitantur ob abstractione abstractae, hoc pacto intelligit. Nam ut si quispiam simitatem non ut est simitas, quo quidem pacto percipi separata non potest, sed ut concavitas est, intelligeret actu, sine ea tum ipsam intelligeret carne in qua concavitas est: sic cum res intelligit mathematicas, tum separatas ipsas ut separatas intelligit. Omnino autem is intellectus qui actu intelligit, res ipsae est, uti diximus. Possitne vero fieri ipse non separatus a magnitudine separatarum rerum intelligat, necne, considerandum est postea.</p> |
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| <p>φ) το&lt;=</p> <p>σιμο&lt;=ν πλ με&lt;=ν σιμο&lt;=ν</p> <p>ου©,</p> <p>κεξωρισμε/νωφ δε&lt;= πλ</p> <p>κοι=λον [ει© τιφ] ε&lt;=νο/ει</p> <p>[ε)νεργει/#], α©νευ τη=φ</p> <p>σαρκο&lt;=φ α©ν ε)νο/ει ε)ν</p> <p>πλ το&lt;= κοι=λον – ουζτω</p> <p>τα&lt;=</p> <p>μαθηματικα/, ου)</p> <p>κεξωρισμε/να &lt;ο©ντα&gt;, ω(φ</p> <p>κεξωρισμε/να νοει=, οζτα</p> <p>ν νοπ= &lt;πλ&gt; ε)κει=να. οζλ</p> <p>ωφ δε) ο( νου=φ ε)στιν, ο( κ</p> <p>ατ’</p> <p>ε)νε/ργειαν, τα&lt;= πρα/γματ</p> <p>α. αΠρα δ’ ε)νδεξεται τω=v</p> <p>κεξωρισμε/νων τι νοει=v</p> <p>ο©ντα αυ)το&lt;=ν μη&lt;=</p> <p>κεξωρισμε/νον μεγε/θουφ,</p> <p>η© ου©, σκεπτε/ον υζστερ</p> <p>ον.</p> |  |  |  |  |
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| <p><b>Chapter 8: 431b 20-432a 15</b><br/> νυ=ν δε/, περι&lt; ψυξη=φ τα<br/> &lt;= λεξεθε/ντα<br/> συγκεφαλαιω/σαντεφ,<br/> ει@πωμεν πα/λιν οστι η(<br/> ψυξη&lt; τα&lt; ο@ντα πω/φ ε<br/> )στι πα/ντα! η@ γα&lt;ρ αι)σ<br/> θητα&lt;= τα&lt; ο@ντα η@ νοητα/, ε@<br/> στι δ' η( ε)πιστη/μη με&lt;ν τ<br/> α&lt;= ε)πιστητα/ πωφ, η( δ'<br/> αι@σθησιφ τα&lt; αι@σθητα<br/> /!<br/> πω=φ δε&lt; του=το, δει= ζητ<br/> ει=ν. τε/μνεται ουΠν η(<br/> ε)πιστη/μη και&lt; η(<br/> αι@σθησιφ ει)φ τα&lt;= πρσ/γματα, η( με&lt;ν<br/> δυνα/μει ει)φ τα&lt;= δυνα/με<br/> ι, η( δ'<br/> ε)ντελεξει/# ει/φ τα&lt;= ε)<br/> ντελεξει/#! τη=φ δε&lt; ψυ<br/> ξη=φ το) αι)σθητικο&lt;ν κα<br/> ι&lt;= το&lt;= ε)πιστημονικο&lt;ν δυνα/μει<br/> ταυ)τα/ ε)στι, το&lt;= με&lt;ν &lt;<br/> το&lt;=&gt; ε)πιστητο&lt;ν το&lt;= δε&lt; &lt;τ<br/> ο&lt;=&gt; αι)σθητο/ν. α)να/γκη η@<br/> αυ)τα&lt;= η@ τα&lt;= ει@σθη ει<br/> Πναι.<br/> αυ)τα&lt;= με&lt;ν δη&lt; ου@! ο<br/> υ) γα&lt;ρ ο( λι/θοφ ε)ν τω=</p> | <p>Nunc autem de anima dicta recapitulantes dicamus iterum, quod omnia quae sunt, quodammodo est anima, aut enim ea quae sunt intelligibilia, aut ea quae sensibilia sunt. Est autem scientia scibilia quodammodo, sensus autem sensibilia. Qualiter autem sit hoc, oportet quaerere. Secatur autem scientia et sensus in res; quae quidem potentia est, in ea quae sunt potentia; quae vero in actu, in ea quae sunt actu. Animae autem sensitivum et quod scire potest, potentia haec sunt; hoc quidem scibile, illud autem sensibile. Necesse autem aut ipsa aut species esse. Ipsa quidem enim non sunt; non enim hic lapis in anima est, sed species. Quare anima sicut manus est; manus enim est organum organorum, intellectus autem species speciorum, et sensus</p> | <p>Nunc autem de anima dicta recapitulantes, dicamus iterum quod omnia ea que sunt quodam modo est anima: aut enim sensibilia que sunt aut intelligibilia, est autem scientia quidem scibilia quodam modo, sensus autem sensibilia. Qualiter autem hoc sit, oportet inquirere: secatur igitur scientia et sensus in res, que quidem potentia est in ea que sunt potentia, que vero actu in ea que sunt actu; anime autem sensitivum et quod scire potest potentia hec sunt, hoc quidem scibile, illud vero sensibile. Necesse est autem aut ipsa aut species esse. Ipsa quidem igitur non sunt: non enim lapis in anima est, set species. Quare anima sicut manus est: manus enim organum organorum, et intellectus species specierum et sensus species sensibilium. Quoniam autem neque res nulla est preter magnitudines, sicut</p> | <p>nunc autem de anima quae dicta sunt summam colligentes, dicamus iterum. qualiter autem hoc, oportet inquirere. secatur igitur scientia et sensus in res. animae autem sensitivum et scientionale potentia hoc habet, hoc quidem scientionale, hoc autem sensitivum. quare anima sicut manus est; etenim manus organum est organorum, et intellectus species specierum, et sensus species sensibilium. quoniam autem neque res nulla est praeter magnitudines, ut videtur, sensibiles separata, in speciebus sensibilibus intelligibilia sunt, quae in abstractione dicuntur, et quaecumque sensibilium habitus et passiones. phantasmata autem velut sensibilia sine materia. est autem phantasia altera a dictione et negatione; complexio enim conceptuum est verum et falsum. prima autem</p> | <p>Nunc autem de ea quae de anima dicta sunt, quasi ad quaedam capita redigentes rursus dicamus animam ipsam ea universa quodammodo esse quae sunt. Nam ea quae sunt, aut intelligibilia sunt aut sensibilia. Atque scientia quidem est res eae quodammodo quae sub ipsam scientiam cadunt, sensus autem ipsae sensibiles. Verum quo pacto id ita sit, quaeratur oportet. Scinditur igitur in ipsas res scientia atque sensus. Is quidem qui est potentia, in res potentia tales, is vero qui est actu, in actu tales. Et scientia pari modo. Sensitivum autem animae, et id quod scientiis affici potest, haec potentia sunt. Hoc quidem, id quod sub scientiam cadit, illud vero sensibile. Atqui necesse est aut res ipsas aut formas in anima esse. At non sunt in ea res ipsae: non enim ipse lapis in anima, sed forma lapidis inest. Quare anima est ut manus: manus enim</p> |
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| <p>             ψυξω=,<br/>             α)λλα&lt; το&lt; ειΠδοφ! ωΞσ<br/>             τε η)<br/>             ψυξη&lt; ωΞσπερ η( ξει/ρ ε)<br/>             στιν! και&lt; γα&lt;ρ η( ξει&lt;ρ<br/> <br/>             ο@ργανο/ν ε)στιν ο)ργα/νω<br/>             ν, και&lt; ο( νου=φ ειΠδοφ ε<br/>             ι)δω=v<br/>             και&lt; η( αι@σθησιφ ειΠδο<br/>             φ<br/>             αι)σθητω=v. ε)πει&lt; δε&lt; ο<br/>             υ)δε&lt; πρα=γμα ου)θε&lt;ν ε<br/>             @στι παρα&lt; τα&lt; μεγε/θη,<br/>             ω(φ δοκει=, τα&lt; αι)σθητα<br/>             &lt; κεξωρισμε/νον, ε)ν τοι=<br/>             φ ει@δεσι τοι=φ αι)σθητοι<br/>             =φ τα&lt; νοητα/ ε)στι, τα/ τε<br/>             ε)ν α)φαιρε/σει λεγο/μενα<br/>             και&lt; οΞσα τω=v αι)σθητω<br/>             =v<br/>             εΞχειφ και&lt; πα&lt;θη. και<br/>             &lt; δια&lt; του=το ου@τε μη<br/>             &lt;<br/>             αι)σθανο/μενοφ μηθε&lt;ν<br/>             ου)θε&lt;ν α@ν μα/θοι ου)δε<br/>             &lt;<br/>             χυνει/η, οΞταν τε θεωρω=,<br/>             α)να/γκη αΞμα φα/ντασμα/<br/> <br/>             τι θεωρει=v! τα&lt; γα&lt;φ<br/>             φαντα/σματα ωΞσπερ<br/>             αι)σθη/ματα/ ε)στι, πλ&lt;ν<br/> <br/>             α@νευ υΞληφ. ε@στι<br/>             η( φαντασι/α εΞτερον<br/>             φα/σεωφ και&lt; α)ποφα/σεω<br/>             φ! συμπλοκη&lt; γα&lt;ρ           </p> | <p>             species est sensibilem.<br/>             Quoniam neque ulla<br/>             extra magnitudines,<br/>             sicut videtur, sensibilia<br/>             separata sunt, et in<br/>             speciebus sensibilibus<br/>             intelligibilia sunt, et<br/>             quaecumque<br/>             abstractione dicuntur et<br/>             quaecumque sensibilem<br/>             habitus et passiones. Et<br/>             ob hoc non sentiens<br/>             nihil utique addiscet<br/>             neque sciet. Sed cum<br/>             speculetur, necesse est<br/>             simul phantasmata<br/>             speculari. Phantasmata<br/>             enim sicut sensibilia<br/>             sunt, praeter quod sunt<br/>             sine materia. Est autem<br/>             phantasia alterum<br/>             negationis et dictionis.<br/>             Complexio autem<br/>             intellectuum verum et<br/>             falsum. Primi autem<br/>             intellectus quid differunt<br/>             ab ipso non phantasmata<br/>             esse? Aut neque alia<br/>             phantasmata sunt? Sed<br/>             non sunt sine<br/>             phantasmatis.           </p> | <p>             videntur sensibilia<br/>             separata, in speciebus<br/>             sensibilibus intelligibilia<br/>             sunt, et que abstractione<br/>             dicuntur et quaecumque<br/>             sensibilem habitus et<br/>             passiones. Et ob hoc<br/>             neque non sciens<br/>             nichil, nichil utique<br/>             addiscet neque intelliget,<br/>             set cum speculetur,<br/>             necesse simul phantasma<br/>             aliquod speculari;<br/>             phantasmata autem sicut<br/>             sensibilia sunt praeter<br/>             quod sunt sine materia.<br/>             Est autem phantasia<br/>             alterum a dictione et<br/>             negatione: complexio<br/>             enim intellectuum est<br/>             verum aut falsum. Primi<br/>             autem intellectus quid<br/>             different ut non<br/>             phantasmata sint? Aut<br/>             neque alii phantasmata<br/>             , set non sine<br/>             phantasmatis.           </p> | <p>             noemata, id est<br/>             conceptus, quid<br/>             different a non<br/>             phantasmata esse? aut<br/>             neque alia phantasmata<br/>             sunt, sed non sine<br/>             phantasmatis.           </p> | <p>             instrumentorum est<br/>             instrumentum, et<br/>             intellectus formarum est<br/>             forma; et sensus itidem<br/>             sensibilem forma. Cum<br/>             autem nulla res sit praeter<br/>             magnitudines separata, ut<br/>             videntur res ipsae<br/>             sensibiles, in ipsis<br/>             sensibilibus formis ipsae<br/>             sunt intelligibiles formae,<br/>             tum earum rerum quae<br/>             abstractae vocantur, tum<br/>             eorum sensibilem quae<br/>             sunt habitus atque<br/>             affectus. iccirco et qui non<br/>             sentit, nihil discere vel<br/>             intelligere potest. Et cui<br/>             contemplatur necesse est<br/>             una cum phantasmate<br/>             contemplatur. Ipsa namque<br/>             phantasmata veluti<br/>             sensibilia sunt, attamen<br/>             sine materia. Est autem<br/>             aliud phantasia ab<br/>             affirmatione negationeve.<br/>             Verum enim falsum<br/>             complexio est conceptuum<br/>             intellectus. At mentis<br/>             primi conceptus quo<br/>             quaeso different, ut non<br/>             phantasmata sint? An ne<br/>             ceteri quidem sunt<br/>             phantasmata, non tamen           </p> |
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| <p>νοημα/των ε)στι&lt;= το&lt;=</p> <p>α)ληθε&lt;=φ η© ψευ=δοφ. τα</p> <p>&lt;= δε&lt;= πρω=τα νοη/ματα τ</p> <p>ι/</p> <p>διοι/σει του= μη&lt;=</p> <p>φαντα/σματα ειΠναι; η©</p> <p>ου)δε&lt;= ταυ=τα φαντα/σμα</p> <p>τα, α)λλ'</p> <p>ου)κ α©νευ φαντασμα/των</p> <p>.</p> |  |  |  | sine phantasmatisbus sunt? |
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