Nationalism and Modernization in Post-Socialist Romania

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Abstract

In the wake of the communist break-down there was a strengthening of nationalism across East-Central Europe. Through a socio-historical analysis of Romania's experience of modernization and economic development viewed in the aspect of the transition period is the emergence of the appeal of extreme nationalists illuminated. The arguments presented here are that marginal nationalist movements and main-stream nationalist sentiment increased in post-socialist Romania as a response to the insecurity and the socio-economic decline. Although the presumption between modernization and nationalism is at the core of the debate here, the focus lies at why economic decline might create the breeding ground for extreme nationalism, and how economic progress might undermine marginal groupings and ethno-political language. To understand the nationalist awakening in the 1990s it is important to illuminate these factors, without ignoring the social and political implications to nationalism.

ABBREVIATIONS: *

AUR	Alianţa pentru Unitatea României / Alliance for Romanian Unity	
CDR	Convenţia Democrată Română / Romanian Democratic Convention	
DR	Dreaptei Română /Romanian Right	
FSN	Frontul Salvării Naţionale / National Salvation Front	(NSF)
MPR	Mişcarea Pentru România /Movement For Romania	
PCR	Partidul Comunist Român / Romanian Communist Party	(RCP)
PD	Partidul Democrat / Democratic Party	(DP)
PDN	Partidul Dreaptei Naţionale /The Party of National Right	
PDSR	Partidul Democraţiei Sociale din România / Romanian Social Democratic Party	
PNL	Partidul Naţionale Liberal/ The National Liberal Party	
PNTCD	Partidul Naţionale Tărănesc Creştin Democrat /National Party of Christian Democrats	
PPDR	Partidul Popular Democrat Română /Romanian Popular Party	
PRM	Partidul România Mare / Greater Romania Party	
PUNR	Partidul Unităţii Naţionale din România / Party of Romanian National Unity	
PUR	Partidul Umanist România /The Humanist Party	
SRI	Serviciul Român de Informaţii / Romania's Information Service	
UDMR	Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România / Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania	(DAHR)

*Throughout the document all abbreviations are given in the Romanian form, although some studies and sources sometimes use the English abbreviation of it (put in parentheses on the right) if existing, however this is not the standard norm. To not create confusion I consequently stick with the Romanian abbreviation. Since there is no consensus on the English translations of these names, they might vary throughout the text.

Introduction

The process which began after the fall of communism in December 1989 until the date of EU accession, January 1st 2007, marked an end to a transitional period from socialism to democracy, from planned-economy to free-market. The accession to the European Union has undoubtedly put pressure upon Romania, speeding up the process of transition, democratization and modernization. But the transitional period was also a period of an upsurge in marginal nationalist parties and ethno-political language. Nationalism can be defined as the *sentiment* carried by a *movement* for attaining or maintaining the congruence of a political and national unit (Gellner 1983: 1; Smith 1991: 73). The sudden death of socialism left East-Central European citizens in a state of insecurity. The resurgence of nationalist movements in the 1990s can be clearly linked to the issues of transition and modernization the countries had to go through: re-establishment of a political and intellectual order, the creation of a democratic society, and economic transition from state planned-economy to capitalism; and last but not least, European integration. Modernization can be seen as the *long-term* process of industrialization, democratization and the capitalization of the economy. As such modernization bears many similarities to the *short-term* project of the transition. The transition was to implement economic, political and social changes within one decade that had taken more than a century in other more developed countries to do. The transition was followed by economic hardship, socio-economic decline, power struggles of new elites and populist/nationalist rhetoric. In the 1990s East-Central Europe saw a strengthening of nationalist movements taking place all around the post-socialist states[1]. Some people argue that the fall of communism had 'taken the lid off' ethnic hatred, but others argue that it is more

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[1] This is not to say that nationalism didn't exist in West Europe, it certainly did and populism in the western discourse strengthened their positions throughout the 1990s as well.

complicated than that, that the roots were elsewhere[2]. Some of these have pointed out that an upsurge in populism actually took place all over Europe, and that it was not a post-socialist phenomenon.

I have argued in an earlier work that economic and democratic instability have been important factors in the intensification of marginal parties and ethnic tension in Romania, and that improvements in economic relations between Hungary and Romania have underplayed ethnic tension in the region (Andersen 2005). This analysis will go further, but still not depart from such a conclusion. Although nationalisms existed in the Eastern-bloc during Communism, my argument is that populism/nationalism can be explained by problems with modernization in the wake of the socialist collapse. In other words, the instability of political and structural changes were the root of nationalism which threatened the smooth transition, the democratic consolidation and the socio-economic stability. The transitional period became complicated in Romania in the 1990s in regard to the process of democratization and modernization. Alfred Stepan points out that neither nationalism theories nor transitologists have done much to incorporate ideas from each other; it seems as if the two fields of study have ignored each other (see Stepan 1998: 219). The aim is to develop the incorporation of nationalism and transition in the light of modernization, by focusing upon socio-economic development. The research will challenge the argument that modernization creates nationalism showing that the *correlation* between the two does not indicate *causation*. 2007 marks the end of a chapter of transition, the process had started earlier, and only in the last five years has it really progressed towards reaching the stipulated goals. The period from the revolution in 1989 to approximately 2001 was a period when instability, insecurity and nationalism were sweeping most corners of the country, while the process of democratization, the economy and much else seemed to be failing. It was only in the last five years that the transition and European integration was taken seriously throughout most

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[2] Most famous is Robert Kaplan (1994) of this formulation of 'ancient hatred' in regard to the Yugoslav conflict. However, the presumption took root in regard to other post-socialist countries as well, but for a more thorough discussion of the origin and common use of this see Dejan Jovic (2001: 103-104).

political spectres in Romanian politics (see Gallagher 2005). It is mainly the earlier period of transition which will be examined here thoroughly, while only before the conclusion will a shorter view of the consequences of the European integration process be illuminated to show how extreme nationalism turns into European populism.

Not only was progress slow in the first years of democratization, but in an aspect of security and geopolitics, Romania also found itself threatened by war and dissolution on both sides; war in Yugoslavia and the dismantling of the Soviet Union[3]. The period also saw a re-awakening of interwar figures, such as Antonescu, Codreanu, and other Iron Guard intellectuals. Michael Shafir has illuminated this discourse from main-stream politicians, nationalist and populist parties, and to minor marginal extreme nationalist parties and organizations. While main-stream politicians often focused on the 'return to Europe' and Euro-Atlantic integration in both political, economic, individual and historical spheres. Thanks to European integration and economic progress and stability, nationalism did not emerge as a threatening, destabilizing force as it was feared it would in the immediate years after the fall of socialism.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Romania went through a societal change which produced a short-term process of 'reversed modernization', which was accompanied by 'heightened' nationalism. The 1990s had a period of de-modernization which can be explained by looking at the socio-economic decline coupled by de-industrialized, re-agriculturalized and an increase in illiteracy. A 'reversal' of modernization can also be seen in historical cases in regard to the flourishing of totalitarian regimes in the interwar period, as well as in the breakdown of modern institutions under revolutionary regimes, such as Communism (Eisenstadt 1973). The imprecise coining of modernization as 'failing' or 'succeeding' is problematic, since neither can be properly measured or defined. Both nationalism and modernization have broad, multi-faceted and contested meanings. Nationalism is everywhere, and in that sense can be said to be very

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[3] For an elaborate analysis of Romanian security issues in the begin of the 1990s and relations to neighbouring countries, as well as the Romania's response to the Yugoslav Wars, see Tzifakis Nikolaos (2001) "The Yugoslav Wars' Implication on Romania Security".

'successful'. Although such value-loaded language both to nationalism and modernization is problematic, authors on nationalism and modernization have been prone to use it (Gellner 1983; Greenfeld 2001; Eisenstadt 1973; Sztompka 1994). If such value-loaded language is mentioned here, 'reversal or failing modernization' connotes primarily socio-economic decline, while nationalism is in regard to the upsurge of nationalist *sentiment* in main-stream politics, and (their connection to) the growing number of marginal nationalist *movements*, which can be viewed as a *symptom* of social unrest. The main claim which will be posed here is that *failing* modernization, and not *modernization*, fostered ultra-nationalism and ethnic conflict. The main question to answer is *why* socio-economic decline is accompanied with extreme nationalism, and if this claim holds true. The debate on modernization and nationalism is often cited and taken for granted; while the correlation is existing, it is contested and critiqued. Nevertheless, either side does not take the other into account to a great extent.

In order to understand East-Central European nationalisms, theory will be contextualized in a sociological-historical analysis of Romania. Since Romania shows both one of the worst starting points of transition and international concerns of the 'upsurge' of nationalism during the 1990s, makes it a perfect case-study. Although *one* case-study is *a*theoretical, it still gives valid details and contributions to theory. The research does not aim solely at making theory, but rather testing a presumption in theory.

Chapter 1 deals with these theoretical approaches and existing literature on nationalism and modernization. By reviewing and discussing concepts and different approaches it leads to a construction of a new approach to nationalism and modernization theories. Although 'modernization' is a broad and high-level definition, the historical analysis focuses on low-level and socio-economic aspects of modernization linked to nationalist categories of actions. Thus besides this chapter, modernization is mainly limited to economic aspects in the society. In the low-level definition of modernization, the short-term implications are valued rather than the more general long-term ones which are so pertinent to the general understanding of

modernization. Most importantly, the link between attitude and economy has been attempted by many[4], but has never been really fluid in a socio-historical context, which is the aim throughout the analysis.

Chapter 2 examines the roots of nationalism on congruence with modernization and socio-economic data from the interwar period through socialism to the transition period, before introducing a socio-historical comparative analysis. It shows the historical legacies nationalism and the progress of modernization has had in post-socialist Romania, focusing of historical diversity as a factor of influencing development. In the post-socialist era one saw a revival of interwar history, while at the same time a continuation of nationalist indoctrination from the socialist era. Nationalism was always there; just as communism exploited nationalist ideology from the interwar period, the post-socialist period did it more. The socio-economic analysis focuses upon how nationalism was used as a response or a tool in periods of economic deprivation and to quell social unrest, both in the interwar period, gradually increasing from the 70s to the 80s, and consequently after the revolution in 1989 and the 90s. Comparatively, it looks out how the diversity of history shapes development, and that Romania was not unique, and can be compared to other countries as well.

Chapter 3 deals with the main question through the transitional period and how economic decline and breakdown of industrial production, which included increased unemployment, temporary ruralization, growth of illiteracy, gave way to growth in nationalist sentiment. Insecurity and deprivation affects political attitudes, and in this period, a re-articulation of national doctrine, collective memory and a discourse on the geo-political situation of Romania in Europe took place. Using analytic categories such as political parties, the question is what

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[4] Mainly John R. Lampe (esp. 1982 and 2003) separates the analysis in two parts, the historical and economically failing to contextualize the two, while Daniel Daianu (1998) deals mainly with economic aspects of the transition, Katherine Verdery (1991;1996) and Tom Gallagher (1995; 2005) the social and historical sides, although they do not dismiss or ignore the economic implications. In more general aspects, this is followed up Liah Greenfeld (2001) study of economic nationalism which, similarly to an earlier study of Morris Silver (1967) on the relationship between GDP and nationalism, concludes that nationalist forces might accelerate economic progress as seen in England, France and United States. However, as Alok Yadov (1993-1994) points out on the relation of nationalism and political economy that most such works have been undertaken by economists, not by social or political analysts (see p. 155 and f3 for various economic analytic contributions). Similarly, as we shall see, Mary E. Fischer (1991) recognizes the importance of the relation of socio-economic data and modernization to that of nationalism, but fails to give a convincing analysis of how they are interlinked.

ideological roots they had (communist continuation or interwar revival) and who were behind the establishment and connected to them. Put in a context of political realities, much of the nationalist outbursts coincided with economic decline, and nationalist parties seemed to have a stronger economic incentive, when established, rather than an ideological one.

Chapter 4 aims at discussing how nationalism changed face in the prospect of European integration. A limited sample of discourse analysis of the media the last five years is used to analyse the progress in the fields of economy and democratization. During this progress it aims to show how Romanian nationalism took the form of more European populism. Although economic progress was one of the factors here, the aspect of European integration was central to this shift. But on the other hand, democratic consolidation, economic stability and socio-economic progress are not a result of European integration, but one of the pre-requisites to it.

Conclusions gives a lengthier summery of the findings through revising and reassessing theory in an attempt to identify any pattern from the findings. This is done to see if any applicable rules or lessons can draw any future predictions. Romania was not unique, but is peculiar at times. Although the findings are sensitive to generalization, the attempt is to see if any general lessons can be learned. It is dedicated to answer the question: Why economic decline is accompanied by extreme nationalism. In short, the conclusion will go through a short summary of the findings, before presenting the concluding remarks on the research.

Chapter I

Nationalism and Modernization

Literature Review and Theoretical Innovation

By reviewing existing literature and theory on the topics of nationalism and modernization, the aim is to come up with a plausible theoretical framework, which will be tested throughout the paper. Although much of the theories introduce problematic, contested and criticized material, it is still highly used today. By merging two different fields of study, and test the validity of the presumed connection between nationalism and modernization, this part aims at illuminating theoretical aspects in light of the pro-and con- arguments, while underlining the value it has for this analysis. The literature review tries to collect theories from a wide range of fields, to see if any innovation of theory across specializations can be helpful in understanding of the convergence of modernization, transition and nationalism.

In a historical setting, modernization can be explained by what Ferdinand Tönnies described in a different time and context as the move from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, or in other words the shift from the communal collective life to the more individual urban setting. In less developed countries a fusion between the models of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, with predominating stronger elements from the former than the latter[5], has often been the

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[5] This has been shortly mentioned by many scholars, but here it represent an idea close to what Andrew C. Janos (1982) formulated in *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945*, p. 315.

generalization. Keith Hitchins in *Rumania 1866-1947* (1994) points out that of particular

importance to the emergence of nationalism opposed to modernization has to be seen in light of

> Tönnies's *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887) which exalted 'community', based on as it was upon tradition and 'natural' links among its members, as the primary, organic form of social life, and rejected 'society', which was seen as composed of individuals joined together merely be 'exterior' and 'mechanical' relationships (Hitchins 1994: 298).

A sense of 'mechanic solidarity' of the *Gemeinschaft* was preferred over the 'organic' one of

Gesellschaft. Accordingly, the new society should be grounded in 'inspired' culture instead of

'soulless' civilization (Blokker 2003: 13). Similar to the interwar period, Romania had to choose

between traditionalism and modernization after the fall of communism (Hitchins 1992).

Therefore, to understand the societal changes and problems related to modernization in the

1990s it is valuable to look back at the interwar period (see Blokker 2004a/b). Consequently in

both periods, rapid societal changes produced massive insecurity which in turn fostered a need

for a strong political authoritarian saviour to protect them from threatening forces, accompanied

with xenophobia, intolerance towards ethnic groups, extreme nationalism and a stronger belief in

religion (Inglehart 1997). As we will see, the issues involved moving from a traditional agrarian

society to a modernized and industrial society, can produce insecurity when faced with problems.

Taylor points out that taking western modernity for granted and introducing it directly

into a new setting might give the feeling of conquest, and thus "there grow presumptions of

superiority and inferiority which the conqueror blithely accepts, and the conquered resists"

(Taylor 1998: 206). In this sense, nationalism can be interpreted as a reaction to a need to catch-

up in regard to the 'other'. Modernization, or the escape from 'backwardness', enforces this, and

a need to differentialize themselves or protect themselves from this saddened judgment or

realization of not being *on par* with someone else can lead to extreme nationalism. Thus, the elites

try to find their own path to regain their dignity. The question is either how to adopt the changes

in their own way suitable for the given environment (traditions and history) or to reject it, like

many nationalists have done. The defence of dignity, one's self-worth, is what "gives nationalism its emotive power". Further, this "is what places it so frequently in the register of pride and humiliation" (Taylor 1998: 207). When what constitute the sentiment of the nation becomes threatened (perceived of imagined), nationalism can become a force through a (mass) movement. The core of the nation is often that of (real and invented) traditions. Following this path of argument, modernization is what threatens the traditional life, and it is also what makes the push for the preservation and creation of traditions in the name of nationalism. Another aspect is that the import of foreign models of modernization is producing incompatible components to a new environment, and creates the mechanism of national defence from Western superiority. In this path of argument, one should implement, but also analyse, modernization in regard to the specificity of the given country.

On the other hand, although western organization advising on the changes implemented during the transition did take into account the specificity of the given country, they largely tried to continue the traditions of copying western standard and implement them in the given environment. As such, westernization had been given up, but replaced by 'Europeanization' in the aspect of Euro-Atlantic integration. Thus, transition studies have largely dealt with how post-socialist societies may converge towards a European standard, instead of exploring the diverse implications of political and social history of the given country (Blokker 2005b: 504). Since diversity can be "seen as the result of reproduced legacies in the present" (*ibid.* 510), the dissertation looks especially at Romania's legacies to the present to understand the implications of the transition period. The transition period can be seen as imposed models of political, economic, legal and financial institutions, largely dictated by 'assessments and recommendations' from the IMF, World Bank, European Union, OECD and others, which often was conflicting in nature (see Blokker 2005b; Gallagher 2005). In turn, the nationalists often rejected dictates from the West as a treat to their sovereignty, increasing the emotional power of nationalist discourse.

1.1 Nationalism and Modernization

Many theories about the emergence of nationalism have evolved from cultural aspects which emphasize the importance of a shared language, history, tradition and myths. Some have discussed the emergence of nationalism with modernization, the move from an agricultural society to industrial society. Most of these scholars on nationalism have dealt mostly with the emergence of nationalism in regard to national awakening and consciousness in the process towards nationhood. Although modernization theories were largely discredited in the 1960s and 1970s, after 1989 they where heavy revived in the aspect of transition and change in post-socialist societies. The debate which had preceded and discredited modernization theories where included and revised to include new aspects of development theory in the light of a non-linear understanding of separate national development. Modernization theories where not anymore at the core of the attention to social change, and the earlier theoretical mistakes where included reformulating a helpful theory of socio-economic development of the 1990s.

1.1.1 Theories of Nationalism

Two understandings have been made of the emergence of nationalism, one arguing that nationalism is old and primordial, mystifying the nation's origin, the second that the nation is modern and constructed, that the nation is economic and a process of modernization. By most counts, the former is most important, but at the same time, the nation should be looked in the light of both of them. Although the primordial argument hardly is perfect, it sheds light on the legacy of the past, how history is created, mystified and used. History does matter, created or real, for the nation it is projections into the past of its real of ideal divisions of society (Boia 1997: 34). Although myths only carry a kernel of truth, it represents the backbone of national history.

Benedict Anderson's "point of departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in the view of that word's multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are

cultural artefacts of a particular kind" (Anderson 1991: 4). For Anderson nationalism does not constitute an ideology, but nationalism certainly wishes to become one. The nation is rather an imagined community based on language, and through the history of national awakening, Europe became gradually "fragmented, pluralized, and territorialized" by the emergence of different written languages (*ibid.* 19). The means of this achievement was through the popularization of the language through the novel and the newspaper, and these "forms provided the technical means for 're-presenting' the *kind* of imagined community that is the nation" (*ibid.* 25). Thus people became acquainted with 'his' nation through these written forms, and nationalism is therefore not primordial but imagined. Anthony D. Smith criticizes Anderson's theory on the ground that "he fails to explain how nationalism can have such a profound emotional appeal, how the possibility of *imagining* the *nation* turns into the moral imperative of mass *dying for the nation*, and why imagined print communities should become prime candidates for nationhood and mass self-sacrifice" (Smith 1999: 8, original emphasis). Eric Hobsbawm in "Inventing Traditions" (1983) argues that the nation implies continuity with a suitable past, even if this continuity is largely fictitious. The core of his argument is that the notion of nationality is based on the creation of invented traditions, and that these inventions of traditions are presumed to occur more frequently in times of rapid societal change which weaken or destroy social patterns for which 'old traditions' had been designed. The liberal project had put *Gesellschaft* against *Gemeinschaft* (Hobsbawm 1983: 268), and thus social change created a mass-production of myths and traditions. He links this heavily up to the early stages of industrialization, but one wonders if it can also be applied to recent turnovers of socialist regimes in East-Central Europe? However, Anthony D. Smith argues that the term 'invented traditions' is a fact of the fabric (Smith 1998). Smith follows the direction of Hobsbawm in a different fashion, arguing that evolutionary changes like modernization, secularization, democratization and globalization are incomplete explanations for contemporary ethnic conflicts, the nation for survival is dependent upon the ability to cultivate a myth of ethnic election, or chosen people. Modern nationalism has a

tendency to reinforce these pre-modern election myths by secularizing or co-opting them, which can help to explain the persistence and endurance of nationalism and ethnic conflict through-out the world. Ethnic survival is incomplete without the awareness of "subjective elements […] such at ethnic memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions" (Smith 1999: 130). Further, he claims that nationalism "has secularized and universalized the old religious beliefs in chosen peoples" (*ibid.* 39). Thus, people come to believe in their nation as something bigger than themselves and worth preserving.

1.1.2 Defining Nationalism

In many ways these theories on the emergence of nationalism links it heavily to the early period of modernization and industrialization, but fail to explain the emergence of nationalism after the consolidation of nation-building. Nevertheless, they do present valuable definitions of the development of the nation, which to a great extent can still be used in analysis of modern nationalism. By definition, according to Anthony D. Smith one can "define national*ism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of it's members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'* " (Smith 1991: 73). Gellner defines nationalism as primarily as a political principle, "which hold that the political and national unit should be congruent," while nationalism as *sentiment* is "the feeling of anger aroused by the by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment [and a] nationalist *movement* is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind" (Gellner 1983: 1). Central for Gellner is that nations do not create nationalism, but that nationalism creates nations.

These definitions function well as a general understanding of the term 'nationalism'. In the case of Romania in the beginning 1990's, marginal nationalist movements can partially be described as promoters of "integral nationalism". It is important to keep in mind, that nationalism, and especially as such, did not ingrain the whole society in Romania, but was

preserved to mainly marginal groups and some in the main-stream nationalist parties. Integral nationalism is nationalism of a more extreme sort, which happens when a nation feels threatened by neighbours or has had a blow to their self-esteem and other factors. This kind of nationalism grows under extreme conditions, such as during or after a revolution. Integral nationalism is also a tool, which can create extreme conditions. It is a system where the individual belongs fully to the nation, and only to the nation. "Exponents of integral nationalism are prepared unscrupulously to assert the interest of their own nation at the expense of others" (Alter 1994: 26). The definition fits the Romanian political environment post-1989, since integral nationalism grows in extreme political environments when sentiments were generally preceded by a crisis of national self-confidence, extraordinary events from the outside, or a "real or self-perceived threats to the continued existence of the nation" (Alter 1994: 32). Throughout the decade, and especially later, integral nationalism soon faded away, but the definition works well as a description of the most extreme side of the nationalist movements in Romania. Central to the argument, is the emergence of such marginal nationalist movements, not because they reflect any main-stream trend, but rather because they reflect a symptom in the society which has a broader implication. Marginal nationalist parties, at times emerges as a response to dismay and social unrest in countries that experiences insecurity and instability, be it economic decline or political transition.

Today two types of nationalism can be recognised as historical changing over time, during the interwar period the dominant nationalist organizations had extreme tendencies with racial issues, biological components, authoritarian, and mass appeal, while in recent years nationalist organizations have rather taken populist roots, inside the confines of democracy, with a foundation of economic issues, employment, and corruption. Although a more narrow appeal than the former, both are xenophobic, intolerant and promoters of a strong state (see Delanty and O'Mahony 2002: 148-149; see also Blokker 2005a). The former type of nationalism still exist, and have taken the shapes of neo-Fascism and neo-Nazism, but are far from accepted in the

nationalist discourse. While populist parties rather have an appeal to the 'people' in a narrow sense on grievances of the failures in the society. The problems with the modern and populist definitions is that it is confined to politics aimed at a small segment of the population, while at the same time it is populist, meaning that it is directed to speak 'for the people':

> The label 'populist' is sometimes applied to certain *styles* of politics that draw on the ambiguous resonances of 'the people' – to politicians who claim to speak for the whole people rather than for any faction; to 'catch-all people's parties' short on ideology, elective in their policies, and prepared to accept all comers; to broad, amorphous, reformist coalitions crossing classes and interest groups (Canovan 1981: 261).

Margaret Canovan points out that the concept of people is lacking in precise meaning, since it is difficult to find a single people in a country, but rather different groups of people. Similarly Delanty and O'Mahony (2002) notes that the 'softer' definition of nationalist organizations given above is only typical in the West, and fails to recognize the emergence of such organization in post-socialist societies.

1.1.3 Ernest Gellner and the link between Nationalism and Modernization

Ernest Gellner in *Nations and Nationalism (*1983) follows up many of the points already introduced, that the nation is a product of shared culture, and by the move from agrarian society to the industrial society, the establishment of local 'high culture' institutionalized, created and standardized culture, myths and traditions (Gellner 1983: 54-57). Gellner argues that the more 'civic' nationalism to be found, the higher one is on the ladder of modernization (see Stepan 1998 on 'waves of nationalism' in Europe). These traditional theories on the historical impact of modernization link it in different ways to the emergence of European nationalism[6]. Although by the end of the 19th century nationalism can be said to be a response by the masses to the effects of modernization, the causes could just as well be elsewhere.

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[6] Roger Griffin (2007) makes this point in regard to the emergence of Nazism in interwar Germany, while Emilio Gentile (1996 and 2003) makes a similar analysis on the emergence of Fascism in Mussolini's Italy.

The link between modernization and nationalism presented by Gellner is that societies follow a linear development, and this development is accompanied with different forms of nationalism. Each society goes through three stages of development; the pre-agrarian, agrarian and industrial. Nationalism is logically based on the transition from agrarian – or agroliterate – societies to industrial ones. In other words, modernization is crucial to the emergence of nationalism and creation of nations. In the completion of the third stage, he sees that industrialization is needed for the establishment of nation-states. In this regard, one might point out that according to Gellner, Romania kept a sense of unrealized nationalism, since the country prevailed heavily rural. In agricultural communities the *sentiment* is turned inwards, and the concept of nationalism fails to take root. This can be confirmed by new findings that show that the rural population in Romanian (and to a lesser extent elsewhere in Europe) has a strong tradition of localism (or regionalism) and do not value the 'nation' as their primary identification marker (see Mungiu-Pippidi: 2002: 30-33). However, Gellner fails to take into account that the rural class, together with other strata of the society has been easily prone to manipulation by the nationalist elite, both now as in historical terms. Thus, nationalism is not reserved for industrial societies, as it emerged in rural societies as well.

Gellner attempts to explain how in the later stages of industrialization the creation of a homogenous 'high culture' might result in ethnic hatred and nationalism, especially during the transition from 'low' to 'high culture' as it triggers nationalism when national identity is becoming consolidated among the countries' citizens. If one sees Romania as being in a position constantly in the middle of the third stage where modernization is not finalized and still in progress, still in a transition between 'low' and 'high culture', nationalism has been constant in 20th century Romania. Since it "is nationalism which endangers nations, and not the other way around" (Gellner 1983: 55), much of the instability experienced in the interwar and post-socialist Romania can be attributed to this. In a later book, Gellner argues that constant economic growth can be good for the nation, but economic problems might develop social and regime instability (Gellner

1997: 25-26). Although he touches upon a fundamental point, he does not explicitly imply that economic decline might create nationalism.

Rightfully, Gellner points out that it is impossible to pick out one specific component – such as language, religion, territory, history etc. – alone to guarantee the 'success' or 'failure' of nationalism to emerged since no single component is necessary, but all might help to facilitate it (Gellner 1983: 46). As such, it is helpful to view each case historically, in a semi-linear (non-linear with a certain linear framework to follow) to understand its emergence in line with modernization and economic development. However, Gellner's assumption of nations and nationalism as a linear approach in regard to modernization misses several crucial points; he does not really define what he means with modernization as it remains a vague concept in his work. It refers either to economic growth and industrialization or everything that accompanies industrialization, notable westernization (Smith 1998: 37). It is important to illuminate the relationship between modernization and nationalism, since as we shall see; socio-economics can play a crucial role in the re-emergence and growth of extreme nationalism. However, nationalism also includes national identity and collective memory[7], since they are interlinked and complementary to each other. The upsurge of nationalism at the end of the 19th century can be viewed to the process of nation-building and self-determination sweeping across Europe at the time. However, most of the theories fail to explain the emergence of ultra-nationalism later in a nation's development, and only a few have recognized the importance of economic factors for its re-emergence[8]. The attempt that will be proposed here tries examining whether there is a pattern in modernization towards the emergence of nationalism.

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[7] This is a similar approach as Liah Greenfeld (1992) made and for a more thorough definition of this, see her introduction to *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*.
[8] See footnote 4.

1.1.4 Theories of Modernization Adapted

Modernization can be defined in the strains of three different paths; first, structural changes accounts for urbanization, industrialization, economic development, capitalism; second is institutional formations such as the creation of a nation-state and state formation, democratization and endurable democratic institutions, capitalist-political economies, power; and, third, cultural components such as growing occupational specialization and higher level of education, knowledge, literacy and intellectualization of culture (Eisenstadt 1999; Inglehart 1997; Delanty and O'Mahony 2002; Linz and Stepan 1996). Modernization is characteristic to countries which are most advanced technologically, politically, economically and socially, and 'modernization' is the process by which they acquire these characteristics (Black 1966: 6). Modernization should not be confused with 'Europeanization' or 'Westernization', although they are widely used interchangeable; modernization is a much broader term than that (*ibid.*). Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel stipulates that modernization should be viewed in the light of (1) socioeconomic data, while taking into account the influence of tradition and importance of history, (2) in a non-linear approach, meaning that the process goes through different phases, and does not follow the same line as others have done; in other words its uniqueness to each case has to be taken into account, and (3) the correlation between modernization and democracy, a point which will be elaborated later, shows that the social value-change will at a certain time make it difficult to *avoid* democratization (see Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 5-6); it is not deterministic but *probabilistic*. Modernization also includes the political and social changes that accompany industrialization (Black 1966: 6-7). Industrialization is widely equated with modernization, although the latter only refers to economic and technical aspects, it subsequently effects political and social changes.

Piotr Sztompka (1993) points out, the countries of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had promoted modernization 'from above' during Communism, and as a result the modernization seen in socialist countries represented a 'fake modernity':

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> What I mean by 'fake modernity' is the incoherent, disharmonious, internally contradictory combination of three components: (1) imposed modernity in some domains of social life, coupled with (2) the vestiges of traditional, pre-modern society in many others, and all that dressed up with (3) the symbolic ornamentsations pretending to imitate western modernity (Sztompka 1994: 137).

Although Sztompka does not clearly differentiate between modernization and modernity, his evaluation of socialist modernization is close to what is argued here that the Romanian post-socialist regime had experienced a 'failed modernization' which had reversed development by 1989 where this 'fake modernity' had in some respects returned the country to pre-modernity (Sztompka 1994: 138). Although, to coin is at 'fake' modernization is clumsy, it is based on that forced urbanization and industrialization with no regard to demand and supply were dictated from above. In the collapse of communism it proved itself incompatible to survive, and as data will show industrial output fell, unemployment grew and the country became more ruralized again.

The tendency of ultra-nationalism in the interwar period has often been seen as a response the societal changes modernization brought with it, such as industrialization, urbanization and other structural changes. However, it can be also attributed to the unstable regimes pursued by the institutional, democratic and economic instability nations of Europe experienced after World War I. In the wake of this, politicians tended to use nationalism as a stabilizing force to create followers in the process of state-building. When nation-building precedes that of state-building, this creates institutional instability (Linz and Stepan 1996: Ch. 2). As Cyril Edwin Black in *Dynamics of Modernization* points out: "Nation-building was essential to modernization, because it was the most effective way to mobilize the efforts of the people concerned, but it also caused some of modernization's most difficult problems" (Black 1966: 75). Further, industrial, economic, educational and cultural modernization rapidly changed and affected people's lives, but also created a new type of state that needed to consolidate itself differently from before. In other words: "In the period of economic and social transformation

nationalism comes to represent a jealous concern of almost psychotic proportions for the security of one's own society and at the same time, a systematic attack on loyalties of a local or ideological character that might threaten national cohesion" (Black 1966: 75). Thus, the language of nationalism became increasingly predominant to bind people collectively together to fight for *one* nation and *one* country. Nationalists planted seeds of fear of the 'other' so that the countries' inhabitants would find their collective identity opposed to the out-group. Modernization also includes a process of secularization, which poses a break with the past and to some extent homogenization. Modernization and nationalism correlate in this aspect, since they introduced new aspects to the people, such as a separate belief system. At the same time modernization threatened the traditional life of the nation. The traditional argument that modernization can create nationalism to its defences sounds valid. Although the early period of modernization coincided with nationalism, it becomes over-simplified to put as the *causes* on modernization by itself. In the long run it seems like modernization can diminish nationalism as it moves the nation and the *ethnie* out of the core centre of existence by slowly introducing a more international or cosmopolitan, which both creates supra-regionalism (such as Europeanism) and localism (such as strong emotions towards the local community, be it patriotism towards the village or the city). In this way it moves the importance of the Nation *per se* down the ladder[9].

1.2 Nationalism and Socio-Economic Progress

Institutional components such as democratization and state formation are political projects, but the dominant determinator of socio-economic development is that of capitalism which have roots preceding that of industrialization in the West (Delanty and O'Mahony 2002: 14). The relationship between nationalism and economy has often been viewed as a part of the structural changes attributed to the process of modernization. A focus on purely economic aspects of

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[9] See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2002) for a short discussion on statistical findings on Romanian regionalism, or Jack Citrin and John Sides (2004) on how European identity is emerging inside the EU.

modernization ignores the cultural aspects of it, but "culture represent a projection of the economic development" (Greenfeld 2002: 4). As such, socio-economic factors might be helpful to review to explain the underlying roots of heightened popularity of nationalism. However, economic factors have failed to explain the rise of nationalism alone, and should be viewed together with cultural political and social factors as well (Payne 1995: 489-494). As such, to reduce the causes to single components misreads the picture where the context took place, and the subject of political actors should be taken into account (see Jovic 2001: 101).

In Mary E. Fischer's chapter on "Politics, Nationalism, and Development in Romania" (1991), she points out the importance of socio-economic progress; economic stability and positive process of modernization in the role of maintaining political and economic stability. The Tîrgu Mures incident in March 1990, was a result of "the continuing economic scarcity that [exacerbated the] tension among the various ethnic groups" (Fischer 1991: 163). Katherine Verdery explains how society had become ethnically divided in the last years of communism (and reinforced in the transitional period) by what she called 'shortage economy', an ingredient crucial to the emergence of Romanian nationalism (Verdery 1991). Most important of all, and central to the scientific problem I will deal with, Fischer writes:

> Development implies a process of economic and technological change, a transformation of institutions and values in such a way as to increase the capacities of all members of society, and it *can often be measures by socioeconomic data*. Because development implies growth in the mental and physical capacities of most citizens, it can also be defined in terms of positive change in educational levels, productive power, vocational opportunities, access to resources, and living standards. These improvements must be in absolute terms and at a rate to keep up with the citizens' expectations *in order to maintain political and economic stability* (Fischer 1991: 136, my italics).

Others have argued that capitalism is a crucial factor in generating conflicts in societies that have nurtured nationalism since capitalism generates social inequality and conflicting interests (Delanty and O'Mahony 2002: 14).

Liah Greenfeld argues that nationalism is only presumed to be either a reflection or a functional prerequisite of economic modernization – as caused by capitalism and industrialization

– but rather that the orientation towards economic growth is a product of nationalism. Stating that Western countries have developed in tandem with economic nationalism, some countries such as Russia do not have a build in component of economic nationalism (2002: 475), Greenfeld ignores the possibilities that nationalism can also be seen as a response to the failure of economic growth, and that orthodox countries rather had an inbuilt incompatibility to promote such economic growth in the confines of nationalism. Her theory creates an East-West divide where the East is subsumed in nationalist aspects of cultural superiority, spirituality and anti-capitalism, while Western nationalism has an economic base of liberal market and capitalism at the core of the nation.

In recent years there have been the emergence of 'welfare nationalism' which have its roots in those who have fallen victims of the capitalist system, lost from transition and social change and whose place in society is filled with future insecurity and safety. These have often turned to extreme nationalist movements not so much out of conviction, but rather out of desperation to voice their dismissal of the system and lack of political alternatives (see Delanty and O'Mahony 2002: 15). 'Welfare Nationalism' is characteristic by those states where the dynamic of socio-economic distribution in nation-states which favour one or another ethnic group, and promotes ethnic networks in certain sectors of spatial areas (Verdery 1991; 1996; Delanty and O'Mahony 2002: 143).

To understand the underlying components to the upsurge of nationalism, one has to understand the socio-economic reality which lies beneath it. By integrating socio-economic data to the historical analysis a presentation of the process of modernization in regard to fluctuating emergences of nationalism will be shown. This has to be analyzed both in regard to economic progress, institutional and political stability, democratic endurance, educational level and the degree of centralization on these areas. Modernization does not necessarily lead to nationalism, although the process of modernization has led to side effects that might suggest otherwise. A general misconception is that modernization is a period belonging to the past, especially with its

heavy linkage to the age of industrialization and democratization. Modernization is also the long-term project which the transition wished to realize in less than a decade or two. For some, modernization is a never ending process, and only parts of the society moves into the spheres of post-modernization, which can be defined as a cultural shift in highly educated and urban societies which have moved beyond industrialization and economic insecurity, to a more immaterial state of being. In regard to post-socialist societies, modernization can not be said to have ended until endurable democracy is ensured.

Chapter II

Historical Diversity

Economic History and Development

Since modernization and transition theories have been too occupied with making a pattern of development to be studied, either by linear development to which all countries (should) follows, or by promoting 'westernization' or more recently 'Europeanization', the historical diversity and diverging paths of developments is analyzed. As such, diversity is a reproduction of legacies to the present (Blokker 2005b). To show that development is non-linear, a socio-historical empirical study of Romania's experience of modernization is adapted into a comparative analysis to the transition period. This includes both to see that different experiences in different times do not confirm traditional theories on modernization and nationalism, and to show that similar patterns can be found elsewhere. To measure modernization agriculture, industrialization, exports and foreign direct investment will be discussed, and conclusively literacy and education as indirectly influenced by the former factors, will be evaluated in different periods of time. In different historical periods, different factors are implemented as they are specific for their period and important to understand the implications it has on the other factors. Economic modernization is measured to that of nationalism to see how it affects ethno-political language and marginal nationalist parties when socio-economic data changes fundamentally.

The crudest assessment of Romania placed her together with Sudan, as the two countries in the world which are worst conditioned to become democratized (Huntington 1991: 278). All post-socialist countries had big challenges ahead; they where expected to transform their economy, social and political system in a few years, years which in the West had taken many

decades, if not more than a century. Romania "had one of the longest ways to go towards a market economy [and] was the least equipped sociologically and politically to go there" (OECD 1993: 11). The dept and the economic decline in the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe exceeded that of the economic crisis in the 1930s (Gallagher 2005: 16). Additionally, all these countries saw an upsurge of nationalism during their transition phase, but besides Yugoslavia, Romania possibly went to the most extreme. Through the 1990s Romania faced problems with economic decline, democratization, and European integration. Others have pointed out what bad effects policies of the World Bank and IMF did to the transition period (Gallagher 2005).

2.1 Socio-Economic History

To modernize their society Romania borrowed everything it could from Europe. Especially between 1860 and 1870 this took place in the institutional and legislative system, such as constitution, Parliament, responsible government, legal codes, the university, the academy and etc. (Boia 1997: 34). Titu Maiorescu noted at the time that it was 'substance without form' because the institutions were imitating the West and Romania lacked the established elites to ensure its functioning and success. In fact, the intellectuals were to exploit these simmering apprehensions towards westernization of Romanian culture and institutions. Change from traditional to modern society, from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, in heavily agriculture societies, created a conflict between 'real' and 'imposed' national values. Thus, from the interwar period, the cleavage between the rural and urban, the organic and modern, were the roots of nationalism which exploited the differences as it became a question of choice between modernization and nationalism which divided Romanian society. The nationalism which embarked on preserving the rural society and living according to traditions created a "mental brake that delayed modernization" (Boia 1997: 36). The problem that seems to be returning is that the cost of modernizing under-developed economies is a serious drain on already scarce resources. This

diminishes the purchasing power of the public and prevents the rise of a viable domestic market, and in turn giving precedent to social unrest and nationalist sentiments (see Janos 1982: 322).

2.1.1 Interwar developments

The expansion in Romanian territory after World War I marks a break in Romania history. Overnight Romania had become twice as big, and new land needed to be incorporated into the state-structure, new minorities were included, different historical experiences had to be shared and the country had to industrialize. Interwar Romanian development can be said to be in the early stage of industrialization, and according to modernizationist scholars, be a crucial moment of the emergence of nationalism (i.e. Gellner 1983). The first phase of modernization came as a response to the development that had already been undertaken in the West, and was often initiated from within (from the imperial center) or from above (from the political elite) and thus produced a weak and noncohesive social strata (Eisenstadt 1966: 68).

The land-reform initiated after World War I turned over 40 percent of all arable land to the peasants (Fischer 1991: 141). The main problem was that the land-reforms which had been implemented to solve this problem from 1918 to 1920 in many ways failed as many of the poor peasants consequently had sold their land as they were unable to make ends meet (Stavrianos 1958: 701). Access to mortgage credit plagued the land reforms of the 1920s (Lampe 2005: 273), which was only exacerbated by the agriculture tax that was meant to subsidize industrialization, and in turn ruined the farmer. Between 1919 and 1928 this prevented the peasants from accumulating wealth which would have lessened the impact of the depression. Still the Romanian peasant did enjoy a certain amount of prosperity as agriculture prices were a little lower than industrial ones (Seton-Watson 1945: 9). Signs of 'reversal' of development could be seen across some nations due to the economic decline after 1929. However, the 'reversal' was mainly seen in social and political institutions which were paralleled by further economic stagnation (Eisenstadt

1973: 49). As the crisis led to the breakdown of modern institutions they were accompanied by nationalistic and totalitarian regimes. The breakdown of development happened in countries with relatively advanced levels of development such as Japan, Germany, Italy and elsewhere in the 1920s and 30s. Thus, this 'halted' or 'reversed' modernization, coinciding with the rise of nationalism, it is not a product of lack of modernization, but rather the faults and opposition to the existing level of it (*ibid.* 51). The depression might not have had such a great impact on the Romanian society as first thought, since it was already poor and reliant on self-sufficiency – however, a few strong companies did survive in the cities – it should not be neglected.

Romanian agriculture also showed the least efficiency to turn over land but in using potential agriculture labour in the process, and Romania's wheat yield was only better than Greece's (Stavrianos 1958: 701). The Liberals attempted to solve this 'backward' agriculture society through industrialization, but did so at the burden of the peasants by changing the tax structure to take four times more from the peasantry than from the landlords (Fischer 1991: 143). The result was that while these measures were taken to promote industrial growth, the peasantry sank deeper into economic misery. Productivity remained low, as well as social mobility and urbanization. Between 1920-1940 Romania had an average population growth around 30 percent, and a significant decrease in death rate around 15-25 percent in East-Central Europe (Berend and Ranki 1977: 102) Overpopulation of the land worsened the economic hardship of the Romanian peasants. As we shall see, this was not solved by the land reform in the 1920s as the plots were small and further divided up among the peasants' offspring. There was a higher surplus of rural labourers than could be absorbed by urban industry, exacerbating the rural overpopulation in an already stagnant agriculture (Chirot 1978: 458). Romanians had predominantly been peasants living in the country side, while towns and cities had become centres for foreign merchants, miners and traders, who were predominantly Germans and Hungarians in Transylvania, and Greeks, Armenians and Jews in the Old Kingdom.

The declining aristocracy (after the land reforms and reduction in landowners) in the 1920s and 1930s were increasingly being replaced by a class of intellectuals, professional's and top civil servants. Of all the members of parliament (in both chambers) between 1922 and 1937, 20.6 percent were school or university teachers or writers and journalists, 7.1 percent were doctors, pharmacists or engineers, and 35.5 percent were lawyers, while only 6 percent were peasants (Chirot 1978: 462). A problem which has to be seen in light of this is not only the over-represented rural class guided by an urban political elite, which did not take into account the rural problems solely, but rather the fact that Romania had been doubled in size after World War I (which created a bureaucratic dilemma, political challenges and introduced a whole new spectre of minorities). While Romania in 1912 showed that the Old Kingdom had a population of 7.2 million which over 92 percent where Romanian, the territorial expansion of Greater Romania showed that by 1930 the population exceeded by almost 18 million and only 73 percent of which were Romanians (Stavrianos 1958: 705). As will be discussed further in the conclusion, this produced insecurity about how to handle the new territories and new minorities. Romanian identity felt threatened by out-groups, and needed to redefine their national identity.

Although industrialization began late in Romania, and agriculture remained the foundation for 80 percent of the national income and livelihood of people until World War II (Hitchins 1992: 1069), traces of the first wave of modernization can be found in this period. The industrial labour force was growing at a rate of three percent during the 1930s. After 1932 annual industrial output rate was at ten percent (Chirot 1978: 458-459). The interwar period saw a high degree of industrialization, urbanization, but also showed one of the highest numbers of higher education in Europe. Romania had just a few decades before scarcely no higher level of education, but by the 1930s Romania had a higher ratio than most European countries – 2.2 students per 1000 population (see Verdery 1991: 44). The validity of the findings can be compared with the United Kingdom. While in 1925 United Kingdom had 10.7 university students per 10,000 people, Romania had 6.8, but by 1932 the proportion had changed

respectively to 21.1 and 19.7 (Stavrianos 1958: 707). The great majority of the students who were able to continue to higher education avoided much needed expertise in the fields of technical and agricultural professions which could have helped in the industrialization process (*ibid.*).

The success in education was also the source of instability since supply exceeded that of demand. When the "newly literate masses could not only recognize their misery but also formulate and express demands" (Fischer 1991: 145) this gave new tremendous power to extreme marginal groups, such as the fascists. The structure in the educational system seemed to be rather cylindrical than pyramidal, and balanced since elementary education remained under-funded and neglected, with only 5.4 percent of children, and university numerically swollen, academically lax and politically overheated (Rothschild 1971: 383-385). The pattern in education also resulted with more people graduated from the law faculty than the state bureaucracy managed to absorb, resulting in a strata of high educated unemployed people. As a person with a diploma was expected to automatically be employed by the bureaucracy, this increased the social tension. It was mainly the discrepancy between supply and demand of the newly educated, together with the cleavage between urban and rural life, that nationalists found themselves in (i.e. unemployed intellectuals with rural heritage) and voiced their critique of. Together with the large peasant class in Romania, modernization was perceived as an imposed threat by the outside, and nationalists (often supported and lead by the unemployed and educated young strata) played upon these notions to create fear of minorities (Hungarians, Germans and Jews) and began a propagation of anti-modernist language built upon the idea that the rural class presented the true Romanian soul and traditions, and urbanization, industrialization and democracy – in other words, modernization – posed a treat to the true Romanian identity. These fractions were represented by a wide range of nationalists who built upon an organic society to preserve the rural society which was the root of Romanian national identity. Most notable among these are, Nicolae Iorga, Nichifor Crainic, Nae Ionescu, Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran. Romanian Fascism offered a radical project for national emancipation which other political parties had not managed

to offer, and the young intellectuals were lead astray to discard liberal democracy for Fascism, since the latter proposed a messianic role of the Elite (Ricketts 1988: 670). It might be wrong to say that the Fascist called for a return to the past, even anti-modernist. Indeed, one can point out that they tried to include the peasants in the process of modernization while at the same time presenting traditional indigenous values.

The interwar period "suffered from the same vicious circle common to all underdeveloped regions – a weak economy, an overcrowded bureaucracy, low salaries, and widespread corruption" (Stavrianos 1958: 708). A pattern that would be reinforced through communism, and complicate the transition period in the 1990s. Romania's late-industrialization and modernization, political immaturity and 'backwardness' can be traced back to the interwar period, as well as far back to (but not so pertinent to this analysis) the Ottoman Empire. Change is not linear, and change in Romania met strong obstacles due to its predominantly agriculture nature and socio-economic problems. As we shall see, the socialist rule did much to change this, but also due to its mischief worsened the situation in the 1980s, which again was solved with an increasing focus on nationalism. Modernization in late-coming countries such as Romania can be seen as falling victim to conflicting demands of development from different groups as well as the impossibility of satisfying every group's demands, together with a lack of full coordination of changes (Eisenstadt 1973: 52-53). However, as we will see, the grab for power and economic means became even more intensified and characteristic of the 1990s when democracy and capitalism was to be introduced in a few years. The interwar legacy both to modernization and nationalism played a crucial role in the post-socialist Romania and its transition.

2.1.2 Socialist Development or 'False Modernization'

Although, undoubtedly development happened according to modernizationist theories during communism, the end of communism might also be a testimony to the 'falseness' of the progress.

During the development, nationalism was reinforced along the lines of interwar rhetoric to legitimize the regime faced with economic problems and institutional instability. Undoubtedly, one can argue that modernization progressed during communism[10]. However, the modernization project undergone in communist societies often inherited the former period of 'social retardation' together with the development of a large scale bureaucratic organization supervised, regulated, manipulated and controlled by the communist political elite (Eisenstadt 1966: 105-106). Thus the modernization was initiated from above through state routinization, forced industrialization, social uprooting and collectivization of agriculture. All of which is a testimony to what can be identified as 'false' modernization (Sztompka 1994). However, periods during communism also represented one of the heights in Romanian history, as the regime was liberalized at the end of the 1960s it was tightened again after 1971. A questionnaire in 2000 showed that while 34.3% believed it went better for Romania during the 1965-79 years than now, 13.5 thought so about the interwar period (Gallagher 2005: 245). Tismaneanu points out that it "has become increasingly obvious that large social strata resented communist ideology without detesting the state socialist guarantees of security and stability. Yes, there was scarcity, but there was no unemployment, and there was also a feeling that the future was predictable within an unchangeable universe" (Tismaneanu 1998: 38).

In 1930 Romania had seen a division where as many as 79.4 percent of the population belonged to the rural class and only 20.6 lived in municipalities and towns, industrialization and urbanization during communism reduced this number by 1990 to 45.7 percent in rural areas and 54.3 percent living in an urban environment (including suburban areas)[11]. As all European

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[10] As Hitchins points out "historians will undoubtedly point to those aspects of development in the Communist period that suggest continuity with the interwar years. They may note, for example, similar strivings to industrialize and to attain economic independence from Western Europe (and after 1960s from the Soviet Union) and may cite the role of the state as economic coordinator. There will be those, too, who see *Communist rule as having contributed to the century-long process of modernization* through forced industrialization, the reordering of agriculture and rural society, and the introduction of extensive collective social benefits. Yet, whatever the judgment may be in the future, it is evident now that the overall experience of Communism for Romanians was traumatic. In the economy, it substituted central control for the entrepreneurial spirit; in political and social life, it submerged civil society in institutions lacking integrity; in intellectual life, it stifled the free expression of human spirit; and, gravest of all, it did incalculable injury to the collective moral sense by proliferating law and disdaining Law" (Hitchins 1992: 1080-1081).
[11] The socioeconomic data provided here (if nothing else given) are compiled from data available from Foreign Trade Promotion Centre, ANEIR (http://www.aneir-cpce.ro), National Institute of Statistics, "Chapter II: Population" (http://wwww.insse.ro), UNDP in Romania: "Poverty in Romania" and "Informal Sector in Romania" (http://www.undp.ro/publications/poverty.php), and The European Commission on Agriculture:

countries, Romania experienced a rapid industrial growth between 1948 and 1953 averaging 18.2 percent; this was accompanied with an urban growth which raised the demand for housing and food which was neglected as investment funds were exclusively channelled towards industries (Chirot 1978: 467-468). Industrialization and urbanization decreased the agriculture employment sector, while at the same time increasing output of edible goods. In 1950 the agriculture sector upheld of 74.3 percent of the population working force (similar to the rural population during the interwar period), awhile industry occupied 14.2 percent of employment, while by 1970-71 this had respectively changed to 49.3 percent and 33.5 percent, showing an substantial increase in industries (Lampe 2005: 218).

At the same time, living standards did rise markedly in 1953-55, although average food consumption was still not at pre-war level. It was not until the 1960s that trade, such as in merchandise would reach its level of the interwar period (*ibid.* 468). Romanian industrialization had a lower starting point than most other countries, and, consequently, had a bigger growth potential than countries such as Czechoslovakia or Hungary. While from 1953 to 1968 Romania had an increase in industry of 545 percent, most comparable countries such as Bulgaria or Greece had respectively 458 and 362 percent increase in industries, while Yugoslavia and Hungary had an increase of 446 and 279 percent respectively (see Chirot 1978: 471). However, it is hard to measure the progress of modernization during the communist era, since much of its numbers are distorted and manufactured.

Most important in this analysis are the years of Ceausescu's rule from 1965 to 1989. Mainly because the period first saw one of economic boom in the 1970s, a reinforcement of national-communism as the regime converted into economic hardship of the 1980s, which ruined much of the progress and social conditions earned through decades of industrialization, urbanization and improvements of living standards. Ceauşescu had been more totalitarian than

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"3.5.1.3 Employment in agriculture and in other sectors" (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/agrista/2005/table_en/en351.htm).

any other East-European communist regime. Communism was a specific attempt of modernization since it forced it to create a mental break from the rural past (Boia 1997: 37). By the end of the Communist era, it also contributed to the gross failure of the modernization process, since Communism was ingrained in all aspects of life (the society was completely totalitarian) and the structure of industry was inadaptable to post-socialist economy and open markets and Romanian infrastructure was shattered after its fall. As we shall see, the post-socialist years had to deal with its historical legacies in many ways, as well rebuilding its economy, starting almost the entire modernization process anew.

By the end of the 1950s, but more so in the 1960s, Romania turned away from Soviet dominated policies and centred itself on independent national development. In the 1970s Romania began borrowing substantial money from Western institutions to boom its industries. However, industrial location was not determined by efficiency, but by political considerations, and in many districts one firm accounted for the majority of employment (OECD 1993: 11). As an example, the district around the Jiu Valley was heavily subsidized by the state, but was also the birth place of Ceauşescu himself. However, as factories were built around the country, preventing a few major centers from consuming all the investments, it also smoothed the process of urbanization as factories were available to a large number of commuting villagers (Chirot 1978: 475). Most of the new industries were very industrialized in the fields of oil refining, chemicals, metallurgy and machinery, which demanded a high degree of energy consumption. This resulted in lack of electricity and gas in the private sphere. Compared to 1950 when the industry consumed 14.3 percent of the labour force and 74.3 percent in agriculture and forestry, in 1974 industry consumed as much as 37.7 percent and agriculture only 40 percent (see Chirot 1978: 473). The investment in industry reached 30 percent of GDP by 1970 and by 1980 the rate was over 35 percent (OECD 1993: 12).

Throughout the 1970s corruption and illegality actually increased, and in 1971 Ceausescu's policy began "gradually to retreat from inclusion and back to mobilization" and a

radical reorientation towards technical education began (Fischer 1991: 154-155). The two oil crises throughout the 1970s and the termination of lending by Western financial institutions, lead to the inability of Romania to produce prices compatible in the international market and termination of foreign debt (OECD 1993: 12). There existed a limited ability to deal with the economic and political problems at the time, which gave way to repressive dictators and demagogues propagating different solidity symbols – be it socialist or nationalist (see Eisenstadt 1973: 57). It can be characterized as a 'failure' of moving smoothly from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* as the older frameworks of solidarity became undermined (Eisenstadt 1973: 59). The long-term structural problems reached its crisis only after 1979 (Fischer 1991: 158). During the 1980s Ceausescu's Romania became increasingly xenophobic and integral as imports were minimized to an absolute minimum, exports increased and national self-sufficiency propagated to the masses. Ceauşescu solved the economic crisis by political repression and an increase in agriculture exports leaving Romania by the end of the '80s debt free, but poor. By 1980-81 the industries employed 33.5 percent of the population, while agriculture had sunken to 38.5 percent (Lampe 2005: 218). The tremendous investment in industrialization had structural deficits, as well as consuming more energy than Romania could produce, which resulted in energy cuts in the public sphere. While GDP per capita (US$ at commercial exchange rate for exports) numbered 2,446 in 1980, in 1985 and 1989 it numbered almost the half, respectively 1,336 and 1,571 (OECD 1993: 12).

Although Romania had been openly nationalistic since the early 1960s, the year which can be said to mark the beginning of Ceausescu's nationalism, is the year after his inauguration; in 1966 abortion was made close to illegal by law. It was produced by an extreme burst of nationalism in the perception of falling birth rates (see Chirot 1978: 458), and his wish to create a big and powerful Romania which could resist foreign threats as well as keeping up with expanding industrialization. The propagation of population increase is a typical nationalist tool in many societies. Ceausescu's attempts to legitimate his huge industrialization, urbanization (systematization), and economic deficit "paved the way for identifying the Romanian Communist

Party [PCR] not just with the proletariat but with the entire Nation" (Verdery 1991: 118).

Romanian writing and teaching had four different pillars on which national history was based after the PCR's program was imposed in 1974: (1) the ancient roots of the Romanians; (2) continuity; (3) unity; and (4) independence (Petrescu 2004). In order to build up domestic legitimacy the PCR opened for the free float of nationalism which had remained in the general population, especially among the intellectuals some of which were rehabilitated and revived from the interwar period (Chirot 1978: 491). This came at the same time the PCR announced their attempt to create a "new socialist man", which included the reshaping of national identity. "Consequently, one of the major lessons of national history as taught until December 1989, was that the Romanian unitary nation-state has been continuously contested and threatened, and that it was the patriotic duty of all responsible people to defend it at all cost" (Petrescu 2004). Since the communists had created the picture that they were the protectors of Romanian unity and independence, a rise of nationalist parties naturally replaced the gap created because of the revolution. "More precisely, socialism produced a characteristic organisation of the self – one characterised by an internalised opposition to external "aliens," seen as "them"; it also produced specific conditions from which scape-goating emerged as an effective political tactic, one that uses stereotypes of other nationalities as means to explain social problems" (Verdery 1996: 97). Communist indoctrination can be partly stipulated as the blame for the attempts of "cleansing history in regard to the interwar period" (Shafir 2003: 177). Since communism had not dealt thoroughly with its past, while at the same time promoting indirectly a continuation of ideas from the past, but also in the 1990s communism to some extent was 'tainted' after its dissolution, and in lack of a 'usable past' the interwar period was viewed as the last time of attempt of democracy with nationalists 'heroes' that fought communism. This has created a resurrection of interwar theories and personalities in an attempt of redefining national identity. As such the Iron Guard and Marshall Antonescu were seen as heroes who had fought communism and defended the

Romanian nation-state. Also, nationalist parties were founded on ideas inherited from interwar nationalists and intellectuals such as Nichifor Crainic and Nicholae Iorga.

Nationalism had also been a tool to legitimate power in difficult periods of economic decline, political instability and social rupture. Non-democratic regimes – such as communism – have had a tendency to do this, especially in periods of political opposition and economic decline. When such problems have been over-come, extreme nationalism looses its direct appeal as it is no longer necessary to use to legitimate and preserve ones power or policies.

2.1.3 Post-Socialist Development

Three major historical challenges for the post-socialist societies in 1990s were a) institutional construction (transformation); b) economic catching-up; and c) ensuring social stability (Daianu 1998: 22). But the "socialist regime [had] left Romania with an economy that was underdeveloped, inefficient, and irrational. It suffered from important structural distortions, including an orientation towards self-sufficiency" (UNDP [2001]: 19). Since the population had suffered enough during the last decade of Communism, consumer goods were imported and the FSN advocated for a more 'gradualist approach' to the transition (OECD 1998: 1). The transition period involved the changing of property rights, economic restructuring, macrostabilization and especially modernization (Daianu 1998: 275). "As economic reform began, the population seemed to be ready to accept the goal but to resist the means" (Datculescu 1992: 129). The transition period needed to ensure quality of institutions, privatization, liberalization and de-regulation of the market. As the implementation of legitimate institutions and values of modernity was still were under construction in post-socialist societies in the 1990s, areas such as democracy, market, education, rational administration, self-discipline, work ethos etc., had to be constructed. And thus, escaping 'fake modernity' through a process of becoming modern defends the capability of revised theories of modernization (Sztompka 1994: 140).

In 1930 Romania saw a division; whereas 79.4 percent of the population belonged to the rural class, only 20.6 lived in municipalities and towns. Due to (forced) industrialization and urbanization during communism this number had been reduced by 1990 to 45.7 percent in rural areas and 54.3 percent living in an urban environment (including suburban areas).[12] A shift which is less than many other Communist countries, since much of the industries were located in rural areas in close proximity for commuting villagers. In 1990 the GDP per capita was half of what is was in 1980, numbering 1,257$ and the year after when the first effects of the transition was felt, it plummeted further down to 1,137 (OECD 1993: 12).

The communists had guaranteed employment, social functions and had given a certain degree of predictability, security and stability which the transition had erupted. In the nationalist discourse nostalgia of the past was prevalent. People looked back at the security provided by the Communist, disregarding the problems it had on the society. The sense of insecurity felt immediately after the Revolution can be illuminated through the increase in agriculture workers which were steadily increasing throughout the 1990s. Much of this was because the industry and factories fell apart during the hardship of the 1980s, and the industrial output had small demands on the international market. Although Romania relied on traditional export partners in the first immediate years after communism, this soon dwindled. The resultant holdings after the land-reforms were typically under 25 acres, but the delay of clear titles of ownership made it difficult to obtain mortgage credit for investment equipment to develop the land (Lampe 2005: 273). The transformation of the agriculture sector through land-reform and privatization of cooperate lands did not only increase the share of self-employed farmers, but also laid-off workers in the agriculture sector which otherwise would have been hired by the industrial sector. This 're-individualization' of lands happened in a period when Romania did not go through a process of industrial construction, but of industrial reconstruction, which resulted in that both the agriculture and industrial sector produced lay-offs, unemployment and social-unrest (Şerbănescu

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[12] See footnote 11.

1999: 578). However, the meandering economic transition sought by FSN was endorsed by many rural voters since the slow privatization maintained agricultural collectives together with continued support to the inefficient and large-scale industrial projects, which many peasants regularly commuted to (Kideckel 1992: 75). In 1989 as few as 28.6 percent worked in agriculture, but as the unemployment rate climbed from 3-4 percent in 1990, to a peak of 10.9 percent in 1994, and 11.8 percent in 1999, consequently by 1998 employment in the agriculture sector had grown to 37.4 percent and in 2001 it reached its peak of 44 percent[13]. Between 1992 and 1996 net employment declined by as much as 40 percent, a share of the working force that represented a total of 200,000 jobs that were lost (OECD 1998: 16). Although nationalism is primarily an urban problem, the waning of local power in rural areas was easily replaced by nationalist cant and scape-goating (Kideckel 1992: 77). To summarize, this increase is attributed to laid-off workers in the industrial sector, unemployment, economic hardship, which the return to agriculture both produced employment and self-sufficiency. In this aspect, Romania can be said to have evolved backward in the wave of modernization.

Other measures included reduction in the work week, a diversion of much needed energy from the industry to the population and a gradual reform of the price system both to protect jobs and to meet basic needs during the transition. The transition went through a two-stage process: "decentralization to be followed by sufficient investment and restructuring to allow for privatisation without the loss of jobs or production" (OECD 1993: 14). However, much of this did not work as planned. The policy of keeping the budget in more or less balance was achieved at the cost of imposing high taxes on state enterprises (*ibid.* 5), which in turn undermined their profitability. While inflation in 1991-1992 continued around 150-200 percent annually, it not only undermined the confidence in the currency (*ibid.*) but also made Romania less attractive for foreign investment.

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[13] See footnote 11.

The transition had seen the industry implode due to the abandonment of state subsidies and market reforms, and the decrease in industrial output also made mining unproductive. In the spring 1990, the interim government (FSN) used the old communist infrastructure to secure their victory, and they were "endorsed by those who feared to lose from change – change to a competitive market economy or to political democracy." Further, this "constituency included not only bureaucrats, security agents, and apparatchiks, but also miners working low-grade seams, blue-collar workers in inviolable 'rust belt' plants, peasants whose work ethic had been sapped, rhetorical technocrats and so fourth" (Rothschild & Wingfield 2000: 249). The opposition to the economic transition comes 1) from a psychological fear of the unknown, and 2) the perception of social difficult preceding that of fundamental change (Datculescu 1992: 130). These groups were also predominant in nationalist formations, and nationalist groups such as *Vatra* and PUNR which included a high percentage of 'former' agents, implying that the secret service was still operational on a certain level in the penetration or cohabitation of these nationalistic movements. Katherine Verdery labels PUNR and PRM as "unruly coalitions," and that these groups were led primarily by local "officials of the [old] Communist Party, one or another fraction of the old/new Secret Police, members of the local police, and the henchmen of all these" (Verdery 1996: 197). Since many in *Vatra* and FSN had dual membership, therefore the victory of FSN can not be viewed as a defeat of the nationalists, since several such elements were present in FSN's politics and apparatus.

The numbers on poverty shows the same shocking results. Estimates from 1989 show that seven percent lived under the poverty line, both the periods of economic hardship in 1993 and 1997 was followed with an increase in up to 40-45 percent of the population living, at one point, below the poverty line[14]. The extreme poverty rate, according to *United Nations Development Program* showed that 16.6 percent of the population, at one time, lived below it. Numbers indicates that most of the poverty is to be found among the agriculture workers – hence the

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[14] See footnote 11.

growth in the agriculture sector and reliance on self-sufficient farming – which of between 50 to 60 percent of the workers live in poverty. This indicates that the increase in the agriculture sector was from those who had lost from the transition and the lay-offs in the industries. The *United Nations Development Program* ([2001]: 31) continues:

> A survival strategy developed in response to the economic crisis, the underground economy may itself become a source of underdevelopment. It has given birth to highly persistent social and cultural structures characterised by poverty, exclusion and chained activities, which are not easily absorbed to the wider society.

The rural population sought first of all to ensure their own necessary social, political and economic security on a local level, which resulted in a resemblance of 'clan' and family politics based on self-sufficiency and survival (Kideckel 1992: 69). In 1990 was the first time that 80 percent of the rural population wished to remain in their village rather than move to town (Datculescu 1992: 130). Peasant societies interfere as a serious obstacle to modernization and successful transition since it promotes in-group solidarity confined to family, clan, neighbourhood and village (Diamandosrous and Larrabee 2000; Ciobanu 2003a). As seen, Romania is both highly rural in demography and has a high number of people who identify themselves primary with their local community prior to the nation.

Much of the economic hardship of the transition period was owed to the inherited corruption and black market under communism. A few got rich, while the rest were left to live like they did. The illegal breaches on the UN embargo during the Yugoslav wars exacerbated this, although hardly a source of widespread hardship, it did reduce trade and industrial output, while at the same time enriching of some very few in the underground economies in Romania. Much of the underground economy was staged by state-official, former Securitate agents, and actors involved in nationalist organizations. Much of their involvement coincided, and nationalist parties often had more economic resources than main-stream parties, due to their members' involvement in economic activities. However, as we will see, the relationship between main-

stream parties and marginal ones were often blurred and over-lapping. The economic hardship, gave the elites both political and economic incentives to use nationalism to enhance power.

Privatization is crucial in the transition period, and the lack of it promotes continued instability. Privatization means the "development of a strong middle class as the social backbone of the new economic system" (Daianu 1998: 16), and stability and security will safeguard the consolidation of democracy. During PDSR (former FSN) Romania showed the slowest pace of privatization in any East-Central European country. By the time Iliescu left office in 1996, only twelve percent of what had been under state control had been privatized (Gallagher 2005: 114). However, nationalist organizations such as *Vatra* opposed foreigners to buy land in Romania, since it allegedly meant selling out the country to foreign interests (Gallagher 1995: 206). A similar echo can be heard from Vadim Tudor who insisted that it was really the foreigners who controlled Romania.

In the process of privatization, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plays a crucial role since it offer benefits for the economy. But the transition had been complicated by legal and administrational uncertainty, and frequent changes and delays in the form of implementation, which made Romania unreliable in international financial markets (Phinnemore 2001: 260). Although there are innumerable ways of measuring FDI, generally from 1997-2004 numbers show a general positive development[15]. As FDI allows a country to increase import, and helps a country industrial, technological and infrastructural to rebuild. In early 1997 the new government under President Emil Constantinescu committed itself to "Shock therapy", sought foreign investment to restructure the economy and granted foreigners the right to buy land (OECD 1998: 3-4). The year the economic crisis started in 1997, FDI initially improved remarkable but in 1998 fell to its lowest since 1993 (Smith 2001: 136). By July 1998 an EU Commission stated that Romania had the worst economic performance of any EU applicant over the past years, and by

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[15] See OECD "FDI statistics in Romania" at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/39/36945575.ppt, or Liviu Voina "Revisiting FDI pattern in transition: the case of Romania" at http://euroest.economia.unitn.it/Eaces/work/Papers/Revisiting%20FDI.pdf.

the end of that year major international rating agencies were placing Romania in a high-risk category (Gallagher 2005: 179-180). This discouraged investments which would had made ease at the budget constraints. In 1998 it only allowed a deficit of just over two percent in a year the GDP had slumped 5.4 percent, additionally the balance in trade was the worst in nine years as FDI had dropped by 18.6 percent compared to previous year (Gallagher 2005: 222). IMF only worsened it by insisting on tight and high tax policies that as a result depressed economic activity (*ibid.* 223).

Although the IMF and the World Bank demanded conflicting economic measures to be taken, some which hurt more than helped in the transition process, Romania seemed more eager than many other East-Central European countries for European integration. In October 1992 Romania regained her status as Most Favoured Nation trading status by the US Congress. When trade with Western Europe had reached a certain level in November that year, EU granted her an association agreement (Lampe 2005: 274), and in October 1993 she became admitted to the Council of Europe. It seems like these were only small steps in the right direction, and affected Romanian internal politics less than expected. Romania did not stabilize much during these years, the transition remained hard, and economic hardship continued. Neither did it quell nationalist upheaval. Overall, the transition can early be judged as been insufficient in coherence, credibility and transparency (OECD 1993: 15). Although, in 1998 Romania became an associated member of NATO, still the main prospects of full acceptance into NATO and EU seemed far away[16]. The immediate result of the initial first steps of European integration in 1993 main-stream politics and the PDSR government began emphasizing stronger ties to Europe and adherence to Western institutions[17], while toning down its cooperation with nationalist parties[18].

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[16] At the time of NATO acceptance in March 2004, and more recently EU membership January 2007, the immediate prospects together with economic progress coincided with the 'weakening' of nationalist euphoria in Romania.

[17] For example see Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu "Security in Central Europe: A Positive-Sum Game" (*NATO Review*, Vol. 41, No 5 (October) 1993, pp. 12-18. Available at: http:www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9305-3.htm), or much later President Ion Iliescu's speech "Romania's Return to its Western Identity: Internal Reforms and International Security Contribution". (Speech Transcript, February 7, Meeting Report #247, 2002. Washington: Wilson Center Director's Forum. Available from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/) where he both stresses Romania's Central Europeaness and defends Marshall Antonescu.

[18] Both PUNR and PRM were included in a coalition government with PDSR between 1992 and 1996, but after 1994 when relations to Hungary

2.2 Socio-Historical Comparative Analysis

Undoubtedly did the socialist period have huge impact on post-socialist transition, but two historical periods are better suited for comparison: the interwar period (1918-1940) and the post-socialist era (1990-present). The two main periods before and after communism shared important parallels; both tended to look back at their history to redefine their group beliefs and memories in a period of rupture and change (although, produced by two different factors), both periods tried to (some extent) consolidate democracy, and experienced problems with modernization; both in the 1990s and 1930s the nationalists voiced the critique to the *problematique* the system was facing; both periods had a decline in socio-economic situations; unemployment, poverty and an unsatisfied rural class; attempted western models of modernization, (to some extent in the 1990s de- or re-) industrialization, transition to capitalism and democratization; land-reform/privatization, and; foreign investment. Also, the 1990s saw a reawakening of interwar national personalities and theories, which flowed into the Romanian post-socialist period's discourse and discontent to the changes the transition produced. Interwar Romania experienced an upsurge in extreme nationalism, while the post-socialist period at best saw an attempt of the extreme nationalists to gain power, pertinent dissimilarities contributed to their radical differences.

2.2.1 Contextualizing History

Romania's territorial gains after World War I did not only procreate internal problems of consolidating national identity, but since most of Romania's neighbours held irredentist claims to Romania "it is not surprisingly that Romanian nationalism in defence of the newly acquired

improved both would pull out of the coalition over disagreement with PDSR on policy matters.

territories played a major role in the country's domestic and foreign policies in the interwar years" (Fischer 1991: 141). In other words, the discourse on the nation became the core of the debate before the state had managed to stabilize and, subsequently, democracy failed. Similar to the post-socialist era, Romania experienced a period of social rupture, transition and democratization which brought to life extreme nationalism. But while democracy failed in the interwar period and nationalism 'won', the progress became somehow reversed in the 1990s, although the initial experience was the same.

As mentioned earlier, if the process of nation-building began before that of state-building this can result in stifling democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996: Ch. 2). This is widely applicable to what happened with the new states of interwar Europe, who failed in their attempt of establishing democracy, and turned overwhelmingly into nationalist states. Because of the weakness of the state, the nationalists had great support in all corners of the society. The nationalists gained what the state should have; the resources derived from the psychological identification of the people who represented them. Since the state was surviving on external conformity, the nation required some internal identification. In other words, the problems of consolidation in interwar Romania can be reduced to the fact that they began nation-building before state-building, and for a successful democracy to be established, the process of state-building is a significant one. As Linz and Stepan points out: "One could historically analyse how, in a number of cases, the priority given to nation-building in the state contributed to democratic instability, crisis, and sometimes demise in later decades of the state itself" (1996: 24). Although an East-West dichotomy as this can be interpreted, it is not preferable to this discussion. Countries of East-Central Europe were a product of disintegrating empires that disappeared off the map after World War I. This made it more difficult for them to establish a homogenous state-nation and forced them to create state traditions in a short time. The West have often been said to have started state-building before nation-building, and East-Central European nations started the process of nation-building at the same time as that of state-building.

By the 1990s the state had, in many ways, established itself but it also needed to transform dramatically and a process of renewed state-building can be recognized. In the same pattern, the first years of the 1990s seemed like the process of nation-building would again precede that of state-building. This can be identified as a historical legacy of the interwar period, since the post-socialist era was taking up from were it had left democratization in the 1930s. However, democratization theories have often neglected the geopolitical situation and historical legacies. However, some point out the inherited democratic immaturity in Romania, largely a legacy from the Ottoman Empire and the continued rural state of Romania (Diamandosrous and Larrabee 2000; Ciobanu 2003a).

Similarly in the 1990s, one has to take into account the geographical position of that country and what security threats this posed. The beginning of 1991 Romania was a "sandwich between two disintegrated states" (Pascu 1994: 153); war-torn Yugoslavia in the south and an unstable Soviet Union in the north. They found themselves locked between regions in dissolution, and shaped their politics thereafter. Romania geographically found herself in three geo-political spheres, that of Central-Europe, Eastern-Europe and the Balkans/South-Eastern Europe. Subsequently, a quest for re-identifications inside this symbolic geographical reality pursued, at the same time as the geo-political situation of Romania "intensify[ed] Romania's insecurity, and heighten[ed] its risk of instability" (Pascu 1994: 153). However, others argue that Romania has succeeded, though not easily, to avoid the contamination by the 'virus of instability' and should be treated thusly (Tudor 1993: 65). To understand the security issues related to Romania's response it is necessary to look at political realities neighbouring Romania. The immediate threat and pursuing fear from bordering Yugoslavia in dissolution was the aspect that a similar ethnic strife could explode inside of Romania.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia threatened the violability of international borders respected since the Versailles Treaty and confirmed by the Helsinki Final Act (see Nikolaos 2001: 50; Pascu 1994). This created a fear in Romania that international law might be changed opening

the possibilities for any secessionist plans for Transylvania (and other parts of Romania acquired after WWI). This fear was reinforced by the escalating demands of the Hungarian minority who demanded territorial autonomy and minority rights, which, in Romanian eyes were easily read as irredentist, revisionist, and secessionist claims by the Hungarians. Hungary was also demanding more minority rights for the Hungarian minority in Romania. Also the president of Hungary, József Antall (1991-1994) pressed for nationalistic policies and declared that all fifteen million Hungarians (including those in Romania and other countries) belonged to the Hungarian nation, starting a long debate on granting every person of Hungarian ethnicity Hungarian citizenship. This gave way to a stronger fear of an irredentist and revisionist Hungary in Romanian eyes, and ideas of a war between Hungary and Romania circulated[19]. But on most counts, the most worrying aspect was the internal and escalating conflict with the Hungarian minority inside of Romania. At one point this escalated into interethnic violence in March 1990. In the 1990s the "stereotypical image of the arrogant and insensitive Hungarian, which had been reinforced by years of emphasising the oppressive aspects of Hungarian control over pre-1918 Transylvania, began to be revived" (Gallagher 1995: 80). The historical and political connection, such as the upsurge of violence in Targu Mures in March, 1990, is comparable to the "societal response to the territorial losses of Romania in the summer of 1940 with societal reaction stirred by the perceived threat of loosing Transylvania […], one must conclude that while the ethnic majority was passive in face of a genuine threat in 1940, in 1990 a great proportion was active when faced with a manipulated danger of an allegedly similar threat" (Petrescu 2004). This implies that the fear of territorial losses and Hungarian irredentism had stronger roots in Romanian national identity in 1990 than in the interwar period, a fear that had been imprinted by the communists for decades during the 1970-80s. But as Romania was searching for stability and peace in the eyes of western and European institutions, and aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration became

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[19] Linden argues that "since Romania enjoys substantial military preponderance over Hungary, parity arguments do not apply and we should no expect conflict" (2000: 132). However, Nikolaos is arguing that Romania's military was in so bad shape, and under equipped, in 1990, that Romania in itself could not defend itself properly or was capable to fight any external war (2001: 46-47). However, there is no doubt that there were little chances of an escalation into war between Hungary and Romania, and most circles in both countries saw no benefits of doing so.

increasingly important for each year. This produced better relations to Hungary as well, especially after Antall's departure in 1994.

2.2.2 Socialist Heritage and Transitional Issues

Socialism had promoted: i) the monopoly of market modernization, production and technology which created constraints in development; ii) it "conjoined economic and political monopoly" – or in other words, socialist system made a fusion of the two; and iii) the fusion of party and state blurred the difference between independent state institutions with those of party institutions, which resulted in a socialist *party-state* that had "dyadic linkages between appointed positions" from the bottom to the apex of the system (Bunce 1999: 21-23). Basically the party controlled every aspect, was heavy centralized and did not have free institutions. As seen in the 1990s, there were a few instances of severe breakdown of existing levels of the economy in Romania (1993 and 1997). It is a pivotal problem when the state is incompatible to carry out its function and compounds the problems of economic reform and of democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996: 13). Economic decline was prevalent in socialist countries from early 1960s but became more entrenched in the end of the 1970s (Bunce 1999: 34-35). Poland had taken up huge foreign debts to accommodate the people demands for consumer goods from the West, without investing in new industrial techniques. Romania did likewise, but invested in 'dirty' industry with little potential for profitable export markets. Yugoslavia went through an economic crisis, much felt by the high unemployment prevalent through the '80s.

All of these aspects have been analysed by various scholars to determine why socialism disintegrated, and at the core of this was nationalism. It seems like the better economic conditions socialist countries had at its dissolution (except Yugoslavia), and the better (faster) the transition period went and, the less prevalent nationalism was at the core of its main-stream politics. Romania did not belong to this 'good' group. In Romania's case, the relaxation of the

regime in the 1960's was conjoined by rise in living standards and economic prosperity, while when the regime was tightened again in the 1970s, thus becoming more totalitarian and nationalistic, the economy went in recession throughout the 1980s. In other words, the period of the 1960s resembled a period of modernization from the bottom, while the 1970s returned to modernization from above. Thus, the main hypothesis in this study can be turned on its head, saying that nationalism was not what legitimated the regime in the wake of economic rupture, but rather that the tightening of the regime under Ceaușescu and the strong nationalist sentiment it brought with it, predetermined the economic decline seen in the 1980s.

The rise in the agriculture sector in the beginning of the 1990s was a result of the economic crisis, and therefore can be seen as a measure stick to how the transition was. The rural economy in Romania was the only one to increase substantially through the 1990s among the East-Central European countries. Although Bulgaria saw a small increase from 19.1 percent of employment in agriculture in 1991 rise to 24.2 percent in 1996, countries such as Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia all experienced a decrease in the rural economy (Swain 2007: 4), and also feared better through various forms of transitions (they were either better prepared for the transition such as Hungary, or implemented a 'shock therapy' such as Czech Republic). Poland, which both by size of its country and population, and percentage of workers in agriculture resembled Romania, had rather stable numbers fluctuating around 25 percent in the same period, while Romania saw an increase from 28.9 percent in 1991 to 37.3 percent in 1996 (*ibid.*)[20]. In sum, better economic terms in the beginning of the transition period, as well as a successful process towards consolidating democracy, together with a modernized state and rise in income and employment can prove to diminish nationalism. However, this is not to imply that nationalism didn't exist in other post-socialist societies or other more developed countries.

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[20] "The reason why the number of Polish farmers remained constant […] has little to do with farming. For one thing, as in Romania, 'farmers' did not benefit from unemployment benefit. For another, the first post-socialist government introduced very attractive social security benefits for 'farmers'. It thus made financial sense to remain registered as a peasant, even if you hardly produced. […] However, the fact that the majority of Polish farmers did not engage in serious farming did not diminish the rhetorical strength of the word 'peasant' as a basis for political identification" (Swain 2007: 4-5).

The state in the interwar period Romania was highly centralized both politically and educationally by Bucharest's political elite (Biro 1992; Livezeanu 1995), while in the immediate aftermath of the revolution it was even more so. Although decentralization can diminish ethnic tension in mixed regions, as we will see below, decentralization can also create the opposite early in the transitional period. Paul Newman (1991) argues that ethnic-political conflict is not triggered by modernization, but by centralization. His research is based on data from Quebec and Brussels, and points out that centralization created concern in regions, and thus awakened or re-institutionalized regional ethnic conflict. Similarly, Cyril Edwin Black points out that political modernization have taken the form of the "increasing centralization of the administrative organs of the state" (Black 1966: 13).

What is meant by centralization is that the state, as in the welfare state, education and other social policies grows so big and far-reaching that it over-run regional initiatives or power. Although Newman's cases were limited to that of Quebec and Brussels, it might be applied to Romania and other East-Central European cases, which suggests that centralization rather than modernization created the outburst or re-articulation of nationalism in the 1990s. One can easily depict other factors as well, such as globalization and modernization which created the *means* to ethnic conflict, or liberalization (similar to Taylor's (1998) argument) which made it *possible*, centralization can be said to have intensified it. In the case of Romania, the centralization together with the prevalence of unstable democracy gave root to ethnic tension. On the other hand, it is under new-required liberalization of press freedom, introduced by revolutionary or sudden change towards the implementation of democratic reform, that countries often get acquainted "with bloody outbursts of popular nationalism" (Snyder and Ballentine 1997:62). When this happens it is too early to decentralize, since institutions become so weak or lack the required professional norms, the press might propagate ethnic hatred and nationalism. Therefore, "centralized regulation, especially if it is subject to democratic control or held accountable to international standards, may be preferable to an imperfect, unregulated marketplace" (Snyder and

Ballentine 1997: 79). This might prevent the outburst of popular nationalism since it regulates the nationalist forces' discourse in the media, and thus might keep the nationalist orators away from reaching the masses riddled in insecurity. Research shows that Romanian media have been heavily in favour of PDSR and nationalist parties, or at times have decided to consequently support those in power, thus leaving little room for independent thinking and valuable critique of processes undergone in the transition. This is implying that the media has remained predominantly centralized and indirectly controlled by the state and the judiciary[21].

In the case of Yugoslavia one can rather say that it was due to its decentralized structure, which was sought be recentralized by Milosevic in the end of the 1980s that lead to the increase of nationalism in the constituent republics. Dissolution of states, such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, happened when crisis over power and weak regime prevailed, which can be seen as the effects the homogenization (or 'systematic uniformity') inherited from socialism, national federalism and regime transition (Bunce 1999: 29 and 98). Although all these federal states ended with nationalism at its hearth (*ibid.* 100), the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia response were rather anti-socialist, while in Yugoslavia Serbia became the preserver of socialism and for that turned to nationalism in its defence (*ibid.* 122). Similarly, Romanian nationalists wished to preserve certain aspects of socialism. In the short term, the initial centralization and continuation of (ex-) communists in power might have helped to control the nationalist forces in Romania, while the controlled and slow decentralization which took place during the 1990s might have diminished the shock effect nationalist forces might have exploited. In this regard, the internalization of nationalism in FSN and later PSDR, and other main-stream political parties, might have undermined the possible attractiveness that the marginal extreme nationalist parties in Romania could have achieved. Thus, centralization might enhance ethno-political language, but a quick decentralization, especially in periods of social rupture and

[21] See for example Monica Macovei and Manuela Stefanescu (2001) *Romania, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information.* [source not retrievably any more], and Oklobdzija, Mira (1998) Media in Romania. *Press Now Dossier.* Amsterdam.

regime change might have the opposite effect, and a slow and controlled process should be adapted.

There is little world-wide correlation between ethnic conflict in aspect of low income countries and high income countries, neither does inequality necessary create ethnic conflict (Mungiu-Pippidi 2004: 33). However, valuable lessons from studying fiscal policies to trade and investment can be helpful (see Gligorov 2004). The dissolution of Yugoslavia can not be explain from the aspect of the economic argument, without taking into consideration Ante Markovic's government actually showed economic improvements (Jovic 2001: 102). However, the different national projects in Yugoslavia might be said to have been a result of the long economic decline throughout the 1970-80s, which short-term and 'superficial' economic progress in the end of the 1980s was too little to reverse the antagonizing effects of economic decline and unemployment. Economic decline can create similar patterns of ethnizitation of society as 'shortage economy' can produce, an example to be found not only from Romania, but also Macedonia (see Knaus, Bender and Cox: 2004).

The interwar period had seen a remarkable increase in university graduates, which, to some extent, gave root to much of the intellectual nationalism at the time. The post-socialist years produced similar patterns; it closely tripled university graduates in ten years, but on the other hand, it is difficult to see that this gave any significant contribution to the nationalist movements. Romania had one of the lowest ratios of university-educated citizens in Europe in 1990 numbering 193,000 students, but by 2003-2004 the number had grown to 621,000 students (TOL 6 September 2006). UNESCO figures show that in 1990 ten percent of Romania's school-age population enrolled to post-secondary schools, while by 2003 it was 35 percent (the 1990 average in the European Union was around 39 percent) (TOL 9 June 2006). However, the last numbers might imply improvements, since the transition increased illiteracy (Gallagher 2005: 161), and a higher ratio of students who continue education after secondary school is today considered as a prerequisite in modern societies. At the same time, Romania's educational budget

has, for years, been one of the smallest in Europe (Gallagher 2005: 342). Romania spends only 0.5 percent of gross domestic product on research and development, other transitional countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland spend around 0.6-0.7, while the European Union averages 1.9 percent (TOL 6 September 2006). Consequently, the universities have turned from elite to mass institutions, especially since that greater admission has not been counterbalanced by more rigorous exams (TOL 9 June 2006). As the output of university students have increased, the demand for unskilled labour is higher. This can be illustrated by a press release in January 2006 of the Employment Agency from Bucharest which offered 263 jobs for the unskilled unemployed, but only 61 jobs for university graduates (Nine O'clock 16 January 2006). Although the transition did see an increase in nationalist sentiments and marginal nationalist parties, there is little to connect this with the increase in unemployed university graduates. Both the interwar period and the transition had high unemployment, economic rupture and geopolitical insecurity, but the overproduction of students in the two periods shows different patterns. In fact, the young and educated tended to vote for the center-right coalitions of Constantinescu and Băsescu rather than on more nationalist sentimental parties and the extreme right.

Interwar Romania was in an early stage of industrialization, while post-socialism experienced a break-down in a late stage of industrialization. Over-simplified, one might say that the interwar period saw a 'failure' of modernization which was accompanied with a 'success' of nationalism, while the post-socialist era initially experienced a 'reversal of modernization', but while progress gave results, nationalism 'failed'. Although, the transition and the interwar period saw both anti-democratic and authoritarian elements, this can be attributed to historical experience and preferences. The discrepancy between rural, urban and industrial society does not prove any causal linkage to nationalism, nationalism seems to grow at times during problems of modernization, and thus it seems to be little to support any argument that modernization predominates the emergence of nationalism.

2.3 Theoretical Observations

During communism modernization was indeed implemented from above and can be said to constitute a 'fake modernization' (Sztompka 1994). The post-socialist period saw a period resembling de-modernization due to the 'failure' of it inherited from the socialist era, especially the 1980s. In the end of the 1990s, and more remarkable the last few years, Romania has shown signs of re-modernization. Modernization can be seen as an attempt of analyzing the current situation in the light of long-term social transformations, and the varieties of nationalism can be attributed to the responses and experiences to the different paces of modernization (Delanty and O'Mahony 2002). Post-socialist Romania lacked the experience of partial liberalization of socialism as other East-Central European nations had undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s, and together with the economic hardship of the 1980s, Romania was "neither materially nor psychological prepared" for the transition period (OECD 1993: 11). Although, in the interwar period Romania can be said to have entered the early stage of modernization, still predominantly agriculture, but heavy processes of industrialization and educational measures were undertaken, the last period of communism can be seen as have distorted much of its success. Socialist countries experienced economic decline from as early as 1960-70s, but one can trace back Romania's economic instability to the mismanagement and oppressive regime to the 1970-80s. Economic decline, product scarcity and shortages created what Katherine Verdery (1991) has defined as 'shortage economy' which ethnicized the accessibility to goods. The economic decline correlated with intensification on nationalist indoctrination by the Ceausescu's socialist state. It is possible that the communist tried to exploit the nationalist conditioning of the population, "in order to manage political change on their own terms" and thus nationalism posed a sense of power which whoever manage to tap its emotional strength legitimates the gulf between the ruler and the oligarchy with the largely peasant households in the society (Gallagher 1995:195). Thus, socio-economic disruption becomes legitimated through nationalist sentiment by the political elite. Although the attempt has been to see the congruence of economy and nationalism, social

and political implications have to be taken into consideration to understand the emergence of marginal nationalist movements and stronger nationalist sentiment in main-stream politics.

As we have seen, Romanian development did not follow a linear development, but rather like any other country experienced disrupted modernization with decline in the 1930s, economic rupture after World War II and the revolution in 1989. The diversity of history gives the specificities of each countries development. Romanian nationalism was not a product of modernization. However, economy alone cannot explain the rise of nationalism, economic progress can be helpful in diminishing extreme nationalism and undermine marginal nationalist groupings. Historically, interwar West-Europe also went through an economic decline, but did not result in Fascism and nationalism as seen in Germany, Italy and other East-Central European countries in the same period (Payne 1995: 494). Similarly, unemployment in post-socialist countries and Romania did not exceed that of countries in the West during the 1990s. However, nationalism and populism came increasingly onto the stage also in the West during this period, not only did one see the emergence of Le Pen in France and Haider in Austria, but also a rise of neo-Nazism in Germany and Sweden. Although the latter constitutes marginal nationalist groupings, as we will see, they do constitute a symptom in the society which should not be neglected.

Chapter III

The Nationalists

Social and Political Implications

The main argument so far has been to illuminate the aspects of modernization in regard to socio –economic development in the 20th century in congruence of the emergence of extreme nationalisms. However, economic data have to be seen together with social and political implications to nationalist appeal. Further, social and political institutions were strongly affected by modernization and the transition. By analysing this, a closer look at main-stream politicians' connections to nationalist groupings and the marginal nationalist parties' legacies will be reviewed. Politics and economy affects each other, and therefore shouldn't be analysed primarily separately. The revolution was followed by rapid societal changes that produced massive insecurity accompanied by intolerance towards ethnic groups and extreme nationalism (Inglehart 1997). The transition was to further create political and economic instability and unpredictability. In the wake of this, marginal nationalist parties established itself, and their appeal was sought by the people.

During the 1990s the political environment in Romania had created an increasing number of government agencies instead of less so. Political institutions did not only employ more individuals than before, but also where established for different political means, with opposing agendas which diluted the decision-making process (Șerbănescu 1999: 584). The creation of a huge bureaucracy also lacked any incentive to make modernization work (Gallagher 2005: 180).

There was also a tradition where the state became a source of economic accumulation by those in charge of the transition where state assets where privatised under doubtful criteria (Gallagher 1995: 232). Since sudden societal changes produce insecurity and instability, and the effects to identity can be seen when change is sudden, as the outcome often is the "reduced confidence in group beliefs [which] may shatter group members' reality" (Bar-Tal 1998: 101). This produces a need of creating an out-group as counter to one's self, to discover 'who' one is[22]. The consolidation of national identity coincided with the consolidation of democracy. The process of modernization can create (cf. Taylor 1998 on conqueror and the conquered) a "continuous invention of enemies and hatreds [which] aggravates the climate of insecurity and makes many honest individuals despair about the future of their societies" (Tismaneanu 1998: 68). There is also a need for someone to play the nationalist narrator to stir up the nationalist *sentiment* in the people, so it can become a strong *movement*. As Inglehart points out, communism had "provided a sense of predictability and reassured people that infallible leaders where in charge" and when insecurity swept the nation after the system subsequently fell in 1989, an "Authoritarian Reflex" producing ultra-nationalism and ethnic intolerance grew (Inglehart 1997: 38). The Communist regimes had left a 'power vacuum' that was easily absorbed by nationalist who had little in common with traditional nationalism (Delanty and O'Mahony 2002: 150; Chirot 1991). However, nationalism also manifested itself in the West at the same time through populist parties and the re-emergence of extreme sub-groups of a neo-Nazi or neo-Fascist character.

3.1 Nationalist Legacies

As nationalism had been a source of legitimating ones power and quells social unrest in a difficult period in the past, it was continued early in the transition period by the FSN and later PSDR:

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[22] Well founded theories on identity from Anthony Smith (1991) and Jose Miguel Salazar (1998 are good examples on how identity and national identity is shaped in a congruent and in a multilayer functionality, and the former especially on the relation, to nationalism.

> Events would also reveal that Iliescu found it difficult to abandon the long-standing state tradition of using nationalism in order to win popular backing. But the nationalist character of the NSF only became apparent when it faced overt competition from groups that denied its right to rule. […] Hardline nationalist were able to return to the limelight as soon as the NSF showed a readiness to exploit anti-democratic elements in political culture rather than encourage voters to become familiar with the expression of differences and the arrangement of compromises to minimise their impact. Iliescu showed a preference for restoring an ethnic state that combined symbols and values from the two political systems that had existed in post-1918 Romania rather than building afresh by seeking a genuine accommodation between different ethnic, political and regional interests that might have enabled Romania to move towards being a polity shaped by civic and representative values" (Gallagher 1995: 75 and 95).

Similar to Iliescu, Vadim Tudor and Funar were that they possessed a certain amount of authoritarian qualities favoured among Romanians. The lack of democratic tradition in Romania and the "basic authoritarianism in much of the working class and the peasantry" was the main reason for the return of communists (though former) to power (Gilberg 1990: 412) and the success of nationalist parties. The more authoritarian experience there has been the greater is the opposition in the administration to give up instruments for power and privileges (Gallagher 2005: 69). In the 2000 election, Vadim Tudor promised to introduce a six month dictatorship to solve the problems of the old regime and stabilize the economy (*ibid.* 254). Communism had "provided a sense of predictability and reassured people that infallible leaders where in charge" (Inglehart 1997: 38), when the system subsequently fell in 1989 insecurity swept the nation, and an 'Authoritarian Reflex' producing ultra-nationalism and ethnic intolerance grew. The 'Authoritarian Reflex' can be seen as a response to save the nation from insecurity and instability, which is rooted in history, backwardness and political immaturity. The nationalists together with mainstream politicians have created a state of "flourishing […] mythologies promising immediate solutions" which have created "strange alliances whose basis is the shared hostility to modernity, popular sovereignty, civic rights, and tolerance for diversity" (Tismaneanu 1998: 8). Due to the insecurity felt, nationalist nostalgia to either the communist past or the interwar legacy swept the nation. Consequently figures such as Antonescu or Ceauşescu "are seen as heroes because their mission was to preserve the nation in time when difficult decisions needed to be made" (Gallagher 2005: 288). It was "not for Ceauşescu that Romanians [were] expressing their regrets,

but rather for the age of predictability and frozen stability, when the party state took care of everything" (Tismaneanu 1998: 57).

The interwar authoritarian past can be seen as a model for solving the traditional problems of the present (Shafir 2003: 177). The 1990s saw the "growing political appeals and uses of myths and the omnipresent selective memory (and forgetfulness) [which] have led to the resurrection of historical phantoms, such as […] Iron Guard 'Captain' Corneliu Zelea Codreanu [and] Marshal Ion Antonescu" (Tismaneanu 1998: 48). In connection to justifying the use of interwar and fascist policy, a discourse on the Jews' involvement in the establishment of communism took place. Saying that the communist (i.e. the Jews) have perpetrated much greater crimes towards Romanians, than regimes during the interwar period (see Shafir 2001e: 1-2). Thus, Iron Guardist and Antonescu supporters had their right to use nationalists, fascist and Nazi ideologies drawn from the interwar period since they were fighting the Communists. Since communism to some extent was 'tainted' after its dissolution, and in lack of a 'usable past' the interwar period was viewed as the last time of attempt of democracy and a resurrection of 'heroes' which fought communism. Also, prevalent in most parties, but especially those with direct heritage from the interwar period, is that of the need for a strong leadership. The findings prove that an 'Authoritarian reflex' was produced by the insecurity, instability and transition of the decade in a wide spectre of political groupings. There was a continuous invention of 'Others' to blame, such as the Hungarians and Roma, which again created "enemies and hatreds [which] aggravates the climate of insecurity and makes many honest individuals despair about the future of their societies" (Tismaneanu 1998: 68). This insecurity and reduced confidence in group beliefs might create extreme nationalist movements (Inglehart 1997; Bar-Tal 1998).

The nationalists promoted economic reform, stabilizing processes and protectionist policies from foreign competition. However, they often had an economic interest themselves. Just to give a few typical examples on how nationalist ideologists were involved in the economy, one was the Caritas pyramid scandal in Funar's Cluj in 1993-1994, and the other how nationalist

politicians where involved in economic backing of marginal parties and embezzlement of party funds. It was no coincidence that the pyramid banking-game that took place in Cluj, the man behind it was a good friend of Funar, and PUNR made good revenues that shattered many people's savings (see esp. Verdery 1996; but also Gallagher 2005: 33, 38-39). Former vice chairman of PUNR, Cornel Brahas, was expelled from the party when it was discovered that he was embezzeling funds from the Bucharest branch he headed. He later joined the PDN (The Party of National Right). As Brahas was a businessman he pumped funds into PDN's coffers, but before the 1996 elections he was again expelled for having embezzled party funds (Shafir 2001a: 1-2). It was quite normal that marginal nationalist parties with their well connectedness in the underground business world and (former) secret agent background possessed more funds and intelligence than larger main-stream parties in the 1990s. Similarly, there are numerous examples on how FSN (and later PDSR) politicians, from Adrian Năstase's private assets and million dollars art collection to mayors who lived like middle-age boyars, gained from their political connections and the transition process.

In post-socialist Romania the defects of the educational system, which again can be seen as a result of the lack of economic resources by the state, had starved the system of its resources and in 1998 illiteracy had again become a problem as the rate climbed to six percent (Gallagher 2005: 161). The wide-spread implication of socio-economic decline, from individuals to state level, both affected the level of political and social modernization as well as the economic one. Although, this can be dubbed as a short-term 'reversal of modernization', modernization is a long-term process. Nationalism breeds in situation of social unrest, as explained so far, and should be viewed together with that of transition.

The fact that nationalist parties increased their ethno-political language and nationalist sentiment when insecurity replaced ethnic cooperation during the Revolution, and the fact that many of the marginal parties were either established in the wake of interethnic conflict (such as PRM, PUNR and to some extent *Vatra*) or in periods of heightened economic hardship, seems

like no coincidence. As such, marginal nationalist parties can be seen as a symptom to increased socio-economic hardship, social immobility, political instability and geo-political insecurity.

3.2 Marginal Nationalists and Links to Main-Stream Politics

The 1990s saw an incredible in marginal nationalist parties, some who revived icons from the interwar period, and others who had a direct linkage to the Communist past. Many of them owed their existence to main-stream politicians; others again had been enjoyed top positions in the post-socialist bureaucracy or had been ranking members in main-stream political parties. The parties which have a direct linkage to the interwar period can be said to be especially the Movement for Romania (MPR), Party of the National Right (PDN) and the neo Iron-Guardist 'For the Fatherland Party' (Shafir 2003: 182). Set up by Marian Munteanu in late 1991 the "MPR became the first radical return formation to wholly embrace the Legion's model, preceding Sorescu's PDN by nearly two years" (Shafir 2001b: 2). The party set forward to create a 'New Generation' similar that to the Legion's aim in the interwar period, and was further based on an organic history based on communitarian values and religious fundamentalism. It stated that its aim was a long-term one, to slowly educate the youth and attracting it to its political outlook, similar to that of the Legion's interwar strategy (Shafir 2001c) 1). Similar language was seen among many prominent nationalists during the interwar period, focusing on the rural agrarian heritage as the roots of the true Romanian identity, thus seeing urbanization and modernization as a threat to national identity. In other aspects, MPR drew similar lines as national-communism's four pillars, that of unity, continuity, independence and roots. Even if Munteanu was a former *Securitate* informer, this did not refrain him for denying MPR had any legacy to national communism. In fact there is no coincidence that Ceausescu's nationalist indoctrination drew heavily from similar discourses as in the interwar period to legitimate his power, just as these ideas gathered strong support in the 1990s. Although Munteanu was proud of the similarities

between MPR and the Legion, including the anti-democratic sentiments that followed, he did declared that the party is not against democracy, but that MPR rather see democracy as "a means, rather than an aim in itself" for his party (cited in Shafir 2001b). Although, other ideologist in the party uttered that if MPR is considered an extremist movement: "If historic necessities demand replacing democracy with military authoritarianism … one should not consider this extremism" (cited in *ibid.*). Although, not consistent in their leanings, a wish for strong leadership built on nationalist and legionary values, similar to the process of the Legion's political success in the interwar period (by using democracy indirectly to gain power) was prevalent in their language. Later in the 1990s, friendship with liberals such Vasile and Stoica made him considering becoming (and he was even being welcomed as) a member of PNL. However, by the 2000 elections he joined former Intelligence Chief Magureanu and PUNR in the establishment of the National Alliance.

The Party of the National Right (PDN), represented in Parliament in 1995, resurrected Nichifor Carainic's 'ethnocratic state' and rejected democracy on the ground that it was too individualistic and rather whished for a state built on "the will of the Romanian people" (cited in Shafir 2001a: 1). Following this line of argumentation, Hungarians must be expelled, there is no recognition of the legitimacy of European forums, and with a direct heritage from the fascists, they propagated for the re-enaction of the Axis, 'international order' and wishes for "military and economic orientation towards Germany and Japan" (cited in *ibid.*). The party was not only outright fascist, but also highly anti-European in language. Further, PDN was linked with the paper *Noua Dreapta* (New Right) which shared the same name as a journal published in the interwar period. The paper promoted the creation of a paramilitary 'Civic Guards' next to a picture of Codreanu, the leader of the interwar Iron Guards. However, before the 1996 election PDN did not manage to gather enough signatures to register for the elections. Another similar movement was *Groupul Noua Dreapta* (Group of the New Right) which also revived the idea of Crainic's state, and placed "the nation and communitarian values at the core of its ideological

credo" (Shafir 2001d: 2). The party had strong similarities to the historical traditionalists and radical agrarianist of the interwar period. Also, it was strongly anti-Gypsy. The Fatherland Party was formed by former Iron Guardist, on direct order from Horia Sima (still alive in exile), the predecessor of Codreanu. The party consisted of (returned) survivors from the interwar period.

Romanian Right (DR) was established in 1997, and followed an anti-communist and anti-cosmopolitan thought. Similar to PDN they believed that the state must be 'authoritarian' because such a state "rapidly settles" and will solve the problems posed by minorities (cited in Shafir 2001a: 3). However, by 2000 the party merged into Romanian Popular Party (PPDR) supported by former Prime Minister Radu Vasile and ten of his supporters from the National Party of Christian Democrats (PNTCD), defectors which some had parliamentary representation.

During the 1990s, 6-8 statues of the interwar dictator Marshall Antonescu was put up around Romania, and 25 streets and squares were named after him (see Shafir 2003). This was to some extent indirectly supported, accepted or defended by main stream political leaders such as Iliescu and President Emil Constantinescu[23] (1996-2000). In one case the former defended Antonescu internationally saying that he "had some merits" as well (cited in Shafir 2003: 195), while the latter at least on one count participated in the inauguration of founding ceremony for Antonescu (Shafir 2001d: 1). In 1999, there was a 'rehabilitation trial' for the Marshall and members of his cabinet, which gather broad political support. Even if Emil Constantinescu "denied interference with the judiciary, it was obvious that without his interference, the rehabilitation […] would have gone on 'full steam' rather than, as it actually happened, in semi-secrecy" (Shafir 2001e: 1). Even the National Liberal Party (PNL) voiced a "long post-1989 record in support of Antonescu's rehabilitation drive" (Shafir 2001d: 6), and its party chairman Campeanu insisted on ignoring "evidence considering Romania's nationalism a 'benign' and necessary' form of identity searching (*ibid.*). Similar to other nationalist parties, PLN came close

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[23] Constantinescu had been a good bargain in 1996, since he both was a former member of the Communist Party and had been president of the University of Bucharest during the 1990 demonstrations, showing sympathy with their anti-communist message (Ciobanu 2003a: 7).

to calling for a short-term dictatorship. As seen, the PNL offered former leader of PRM to join their ranks in 1998-1999, but as early as in 1995 PNL had also "accepted to its ranks former Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) leader Radu Ciontea" (Shafir 2001b).

An attempt by President Ion Iliescu[24] in 1993 to prohibit interwar nationalist publications and parties was not successful. Nationalists in close connection to the interim government (FSN and then more so the later PSDR), chose PRM (Greater Romania Party) and Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) as coalition partners in 1992. The Foreign Minister of Romania during Ilescu's first presidency, Teodor Meleşcanu (1992-1996), established his own nationalist party, Alliance of Romania (APR)[25] in the end of the 90s. As seen, the cultural organization *Vatra* (Hearth) included many members from all these parties. The language of appeal that *Vatra* and other nationalist groups used is similar to the language of propaganda used during the years of Ceausescu's rule. Romanian nationalism is based on this external fear fostered during communism, and it was this fear who prompted the creation of *Vatra*, "as indeed its president, Radu Ceontea has pointed out [:] Mistrust of Hungarian motives, fear of Hungarian revisionism concern about an erosion of Romanian dominance in Transylvania, general unease about the future of the economy; all these factors have contributed to the climate of interethnic tension" (Deletant 1991: 29). It was easy for nationalists to create this fear in the Romanian mind when the Hungarians demanded more cultural, educational and linguistically rights. *Vatra* played on the typical aspects of Romanian nationalism that build up under this fear, and especially in the belief that Transylvania is the "Hearth" (the meaning of the word *Vatra*) or the cradle of the Romanian civilization. The two most prominent figures in the weekly *Greater Romania* were editor in chief Corneliu Vadim Tudor (party president from the establishment until today) and its director

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[24] Ion Iliescu was educated "in Moscow for five years in the early 1950s, he had been minister of youth and secretary of the party's central committee in charge of ideology until 1971, when his rapid progress up the party hierarchy was abruptly stalled after he registered some respectful dissident from Ceausescu's increasingly doctrinaire policies. After 1971, Iliescu held a series of minor party posts: secretary in charge of propaganda in the Timis county party committee and then first secretary of the Iàsi county party committee. In the early 1980s, he became Chairman of the State Committee for Water before being further pushed into obscurity by being assigned a job in state publishing" (Gallagher 1995: 74).

[25] "Third place in terms of mayors, local councillors, and county councillors was taken by the Alliance of Romania (APR), which has 283 mayors. The PDSR, the Democrats, and the APR are all "descendants" of the National Salvation Front and, as such, all three belong to the category of "successor parties" to the former Communist Party. Come the fall elections, they may well form the next coalition" (Shafir 2000).

Eugen Barbu. The two writers are "renowned for their conspicuous contribution to hagiography under former dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu [and] for their links with the former secret police (Shafir 1991: 25). Both of them were skilful journalists and therefore managed to achieve many supporters, and by their success they were encouraged to establish its political wing, PRM, in May 1991. "The party's emergence owes much to the support of the National Salvation Front and, in particular, Prime Minister Petre Roman[26]" (Shafir 1991: 25). PRM and Tudor would achieve blooming support throughout the beginnings of the 1990's.

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[26] "Petre Roman, the forty-three-year-old lecturer who would be his [Iliescu's] partner as crucial decisions were taken over the next two years was the son of Walter Roman, a former Spanish Civil War veteran who, until his death in 1983, had been a member of the RCP central committee and the director of the party's publishing house, Editura Politica. Roman was fluent in Spanish and French, and he held a doctoral degree from the Polytechnical School in Toulouse" (Gallagher 1995: 74).

Chapter IV

Developments in the New Millennia

Economic Stabilization and Populist Rhetoric

The only game in town has become NATO and EU (Rupnik 2000). The fact that this seemed like the only possible path for post-socialist countries, made the realization that economic transition and democratization was the only possible way towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Since Central European nations developed faster than that of Romania, she has been considered to be lagging behind in the integration process to EU and NATO, and in many ways, Romania suffered on the behalf of the other Central European nations, as Romania became 'latecomers' who had to compete with lower prices for similar goods to sell (Smith 2001: 147). At the same time, Euro-Atlantic integration has often meant that the transition has been dictated along a pattern of western modernization, and thus to some degree continuing a linear approach to development where the East should take after the West (Blokker 2005b). After the last economic crisis from 1997 to 1999 was over in Romania, from approximately 2001 optimism was to be seen in the economy together with a positive development in most spheres. This coincided with the acceptation into NATO and prospects of European Union membership. The period marking the new millennia did also fulfil most of these wishes as democracy can be said to have, if not consolidated, at least reached a level of certain 'endurance', as stability and security has begun to

spread its wings around Romania (cf. O'Donnel 1996 on democratic endurance vs. consolidation).

Romania's initial foreign policy after 1989 was perceived as being far more concerned with combating threats from immediate neighbours rather than promoting cooperation with them (Phinnemore 2001: 245), the government between 1996-2000 firmly put Romania on the track of Euro-Atlantic integration. Constantinescu's government also realized that Romania were far from full fulfilment of the requirements to enter EU, and that the economy were yet too weak to compete on the internal market (*ibid.* 259). But Emil Constantinescu's presidency went through three governments drawn from the same pool of the Democratic Convention, and together they failed in restraining economic decline, fighting corruption, smoothing transition and quell social unrest was a main factor in the resignation from power in 2000, and the return of Iliescu to his presidency from 2000 to 2004. Although, in 1997 Romania was not nominated among the first wave of admission to NATO, the government's program of the same year on transition and European integration had made some important breakthroughs. Lagging behind in the integration process to EU and NATO, has exacerbated the frustration and disappointment among Romanians, and possibly stirred up more nationalist sentiment than otherwise (Phinnemore 2001: 245). After 2000 Iliescu continued to put Romania on the path of membership in the EU and NATO, which closely supervised effective implementation of economic reform (OECD 2002: 7). Constantinescu blamed everyone but himself for the failures. By 2000, after ten years of transition and democratic experience, both the Iliescu and Constantinescu presidency had been a disappointment, and prior to the 2000 election there was a dramatic decline in the support for democratic institutions (Ciobanu 2003a: 8). Subsequently, Constantinescu's PNTCD, failed to pass the threshold to obtain any seats in the 2000 election, while PNL, the Democratic Party and UDMR all gained around seven percent votes each.

Iliescu strove to portray himself as rational and distanced himself from xenophobic ideas (Ciobanu 2003b: 2). In the presidential run-off Iliescu gained 67 percent of the vote, while Vadim

Tudor gained the remaining 33 percent. Overall, Tudor's PRM gained more than twenty percent of the votes for parliament[27]. Many voted for PRM and Vadim Tudor since they promised radical change, strong power, and they were largely untainted by any previous government. But on the other hand, Iliescu safe victory was also a sign than many voted for Iliescu in opposition to Vadim Tudor. The success of a nationalist party such as PRM should not be interpreted as ingrained nationalist sentiments throughout the society, but rather that the two only viable ruling coalitions in Romania had each in turn failed to bring Romania out of economic hardship, and the votes for the nationalist parties can be interpreted as a critique to them (see Gallagher 2005). Overall, the nationalist's victory in the 2000 election was purely a critique to the failures of the two previous presidencies.

4.1 Stability Finally in Sight

In 2001 the economy recovered from the transitional burst, and the economy grew at a rate of 4.5 percent as an indirect consequence of the drop in internal debt from 13.1 percent to 9.3 percent in 2000 (Gallagher 2005: 309). NATO membership was finally achieved in March 2004. By that year, numbers indicated that 32 percent of the population was employed in the agriculture sector, and the rural and urban division has then stabilized on similar numbers as in 1990[28]. But the agriculture sector remains inefficient as the land is divided into small plots of 2 or 3 hectares, and constitutes a self-consuming sector in the economy (Nine O'clock 30 October 2003). The price of the land is so low that it would not benefit the farmer to sell, and thus buying up the farmers land would only "prolong the farmers' agony and fail to solve the situation" (*ibid.*).

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[27] "The 2000 elections demonstrated clearly that the PDSR's electoral support is concentrated among the rural population, inhabitants of small towns, and the elderly. In the first presidential round Iliescu obtained 55% of the votes of those aged sixty and over, and 48% of the rural vote. By contrast, the PRM's electoral support is spread fairly even across all age groups, except the elderly: in the first presidential round Vadim got 33% of the 18-29 and also the 30-44 age group; 26% of the 45-59 age group, but only 16% of those aged sixty and over; in terms of location, Vadim performed most strongly in small and medium-sized towns (31% respectively), and in terms of education it is individuals who remained in school from thirteen to eighteen who were the most attracted to his cause. Vadim's support was distributed fairly evenly across the four main regions of Romania whereas Iliescu got 46 and 48% support in Muntenia and Moldovia but only 22% in Transylvania and 34% in Bucharest" (Gallagher 2005: 305).
[28] See footnote 11.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) quadrupled between 2000 and 2004, and inflation has stabilized (from a peak in deflation of negative 18.3 percent in 1991 and negative 22.8 percent in 1997) to around positive one percent[29]. However, Romania's 're-industrialization' is not a matter of resources, but a matter of management, and its success depends on FDI, stated Minister of Finance Mihai Tănăsescu in October 2003 (Nine O'clock 20 October 2003). Although the economy has evolved in a slower pace than seen in 2001 and 2002, the economy continued a positive development the next years, by simplifying tax codes and laws which have made it easier for investment, and at the same time eroding the discrimination between Romania and foreign companies (Nine O'clock 28 December 2003). If these developments prove to continue, stability is enforced and as insecurity dwindles this will in turn affect the social and human values in Romania, and both affect the process of modernization and democratization in positive terms. Romania who initial relied on traditional East-bloc trading partners in the 1990s are now dependent on the European Union, which has become the destination of 70 percent of Romania's exports and the main source of FDI (Gallagher 2005: 310). When FDI and the privatization speeded up, the state frees money and increases income which can be used for other expenses such as the health system, defence, education or investment (Nine O'clock 30 October 2003). Although the private sector is growing, some due to the privatization which have been undertaken, a great amount of these are inefficient companies that survives by not paying companies what they owe or the state the tax revenues they are entitled to (*ibid.*). However, for the first time since the revolution large companies with over 500 employees became profitable in 2005 (Nine O'clock 17 November 2005).

The economic growth in 2005 was between 4.2 and 4.5 percent, which was less than anticipated due to the floods that year (Nine O'clock 18 January 2006). The economic growth in 2005-2007 was predicted to be twice as high as the European Union average, much due to privatization of big companies and EU funds (Nine O'clock 17 November 2005). Romania has

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[29] See footnote 11.

also taken the action of listening more to EU advisors than to IMF, which often has been contradictory (Nine O'clock 1 November 2006). The industrial output has been picking up, much in regard to a booming trend in constructions. In 2006, construction authorizations numbered over 51,000, an increase of 17.3 percent from 2005 (Nine O'clock 12 February 2007). Inflation rates have been decreasing from 8.7 percent in 2004 down to 4.87 percent in 2006, and is still decreasing (Nine O'clock 12 February 2007).

4.2 Escaping Nationalism and Embracing European Integration.

After the 2000 elections PSDR worked hard to change its image from a post communist party with nationalist and authoritarian touches, and to adjust more towards a European-style social-democratic party (Ciobanu and Shafir 2005: 4). The name change in 2001, dropping the *R* for Romania, to PDS is only one of these indicators. At the same time, PM Adrian Năstase grew better relations to social-democratic colleagues in the European Union, and all together made Romania a more serious partner of the accession to the EU. Still, a poll conducted in 2001, showed that almost one third of the population supported the belief in getting rid off parliament and elections, and rather have a strong leader (Ciobanu 2003b: 2-3), numbers which equals Vadim Tudor's support in 2000 when he promised a six month dictatorship if he was to win. The first decade of the new millennia has shown progress in all sectors of the economy, and there are lesser extremes prevalent today. In turn, nationalism did not seem to be as ethnic and exclusive as it was throughout the 1990s, and parties such as PRM – however, still carrying some nationalist sentiments – dressed in the fashion of European populism in the aspects of general economic prosperity and European integration. Nationalism was toned down in most parties, and the appeal of marginal parties declined.

In the 2004 election, PSD went in an 'electoral' coalition with the Humanist Party (PUR) which was to become a miscalculation on their behalf. The PSD-PUR National Union gained 37

percent of the votes, against PNL-PD, the Justice and Truth alliance, which gained 31 percent. However, as no one gained majority, and PUR switched sides on December 29, and abducted 30 out of 149 deputies and senators from PSD-PUR coalition, Romania was again ready for a center-right collation (Ciobanu and Shafir 2005). PRM gained 13 percent of the votes. UDMR initial in support of PSD, would support anyone who was ready to support its agenda (*ibid.* 3). PSD attempts of cleansing itself of nationalist rhetoric coincided with Tudor's attempt of getting rid of his 'extremist' image. By doing this PRM counteracted on their position on the European Union, from being an 'anti-European' party PRM now declares the importance of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration and offer solutions to it (Nine O'clock 26 November 2003). Vadim Tudor only alienated the ultra-nationalist supporters, while Trajan Basescu[30] from the Justice and Truth alliance played the populist card, gained both votes from PDS and PRM's electorate. Băsescu managed to play both his national card and on equality between citizens, together with the promise of eradicating corruption. Thus he gained both Hungarian votes and nationalist (populist) ones. Băsescu and the Justice and Truth alliance draw most of the support from a growing urban class, better educated and younger people, while PSD and their presidential candidate was backed by the elder, less-educated and rural population (*ibid.* 9). The same year, Funar lost his hegemonic power in Cluj-Napoca to the PNL politician Emil Boc, ending over a decade of nationalist power in the city.

However, the last two years have rather resembled the political environment of 1997-2000 when scandals came in row after row and new governments were drawn again and again from the same alliance. However, the current president has not had to deal with the 'heritage' of the previous administration of economic hardship, but rather the opposite. The economic development the last few years is actually what eases the political crisis Romania is currently going through (Nine O'clock 24 January 2007). The fact that the economy keeps growing

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[30] Basescu was a former captain of the NAVROM (Romanian Navy) commercial fleet prior to 1989. Between 1991 and 1993 he served as transport minister under the FSN government. From 1996-2000 he continued the same post under Constantinescu, and from 2000-2004 he served as Bucharest's mayor (Ciobanu and Shafir 2005: 7).

disregarding political unrest in the wake of President Basescu's impeachment is both a testimony to political and democratic maturity, and economic stability (Nine O'clock 7 May 2007).

Although official statistics says that 1.5 million Romanians live in extreme poverty, unionist put the number that at least 50 percent still live under the poverty rate and of these five million live in extreme poverty (Nine O'clock 16 January 2006). "The gap between positive evolution on paper and the stagnating situation in 'real Romania' – the one on the streets" is becoming more and more prevalent (Nine O'clock 30 October 2003). Although improvements in the economy are underway, to some extent this has only benefited the few, and social problems and low wages still prevail.

4.3 Recent Political and Economic Developments

Băsescu pointed out that the accession to European Union has not meant that Romania can fall into the trap of relaxation, and it is not the end of integration, but rather the actual beginning of it (Nine O'clock 31 January 2007). The forecast of economic growth in 2007 is set to seven percent, which is higher than first predicted (Nine O'clock 11 May 2007). However, while 2006 saw a current account deficit of nine percent, this is expected to increase to more than ten percent in 2007 (Nine O'clock 23 January 2007). Although the economy is blooming it will take Romania 30 years to reach GDP per capita level of the European average, provided that economic growth remains 6-7 percent in Romania and do not exceed the 2-3 percent in other EU countries. Of fifty countries analyzed, Romania is ranking 45th in terms of GDP per capita (calculated on purchase parity) with USD 8,166 and 42nd out of exports per capita and 46th in terms of corruption (Nine O'clock 4 April 2007). Although economic stability and growth has been good, Romania has still much to improve, especially in regard to repeating concerns over the development of justice reform and the measures taken against corruption (Nine O'clock 19 April 2007).

However, the employment rate in Romania is higher than it is in reality due to the high number of Romanian people living abroad. In 2003 it was reported that 1 out of ten families has someone working abroad (Nine O'clock 18 November 2003). Although, this leads to more money coming into Romania by increasing FDI, it also has a negative impact on the productivity of national private companies, something the Government is currently envisioning by making a program that will attract the Romanian labour force back to the country (Nine O'clock 7 May 2007).

As economic prosperity took roots and democratic consolidation became more predominant in the aspect of European integration, marginal nationalist parties lost appeal or re-evaluated their rhetoric towards that of European populism. From at first being anti-Europeanist in language, Romanian populism rather dealt with how Romania could and should improve in the aspect of European integration. At the same time, main-stream parties purged themselves of their identification with extreme nationalism, and rather began to use populist and inclusive language to gain votes in Romania and acceptance by European partners. The road through the transition, and how it often was dictated by Western institutions, had been a long and hard one. But nevertheless, Romania pulled through it faster than any had predicted or expected considering the starting point in 1989. However, one lesson should be drawn, and that is that the specificities and diversity of a country should be taken broader into account when theories of transition are adjusted.

Conclusions

Theory Reassessed

The analysis so far has been to socio-historical comparative analysis of Romania's experience of modernization and economic development in regard to the transition period and nationalism. The research has been threefold approach to development theories. First, modernization has been examined as a long-term progress of development, but as we have seen the communist period modernization was imposed from above and became incompatible on the international market as early as the 1970-80s. After the revolution in 1989 the system needed to be reconstructed, and adapted to free-market and capitalism. Second, transition has been viewed as the short-term process of modernization, but although modernization theories have disregarded western imposed models and 'westernization', transition studies have continued a renewed form of 'Europeanization' in the aspect of Euro-Atlantic integration. Although successful in the end, they have largely ignored the historical diversity as well as social and political implications in the given country they have advised. Third, to measure and analyse this, there have been an incorporation of mostly socio-economic analysis. Since modernization and nationalism is much more than economics, social and political implications have been taken into consideration. However, economy affects these spheres indirectly, and they are thus interlinked. All of these aspects have been tried to be linked up to a theory of nationalism, to see how the effects of and problems with development have influenced the rise of marginal nationalist parties and ethno-political language.

Socio-economic progress shows that there is an inclination of undermining marginal parties and extreme nationalist sentiments. Although economic factors cannot be explain without

taking into social and political aspects, nationalism has also taken the form of inclining itself towards economic development as a positive factor in 'civic' society. Nationalism "actively promoted economic growth within this environment only when economic achievement, competitiveness, and prosperity are defined as positive and important national values" (Greenfeld 2001: 23). In Romania, opposition to economic reform was greatest from the nationalist when they did not see prosperity for themselves, but rather perceived that outside countries could benefit from such reforms. Although Romania post-socialist conditions were worse than other post-socialist countries in the region, all countries faced problems during the transition. Since modernization had been imposed from above, instead through market forces from below, the industrial conditions were resting on a 'fake' pillow that could not handle the transition to market economy. This created a restructuring of industry, a return to agricultural society, and increase in unemployment. The insecurity created by the transition was accompanied by in increase of ethno-political language, extreme nationalism and xenophobia. As discussed, nationalism had been at the core of the society at least from the 1970s and on, only reinforced by the exacerbating of the economic decline in the 1980s. Nationalism had been a tool to legitimate those in power, and as the ex-communists were over-represented in the new post-socialist regime, and they often too turned to nationalism to legitimate their power in the wake of transitional problems.

Nationalism does exist everywhere, and it was not an isolated phenomenon in Romania or other post-socialist countries. The argument articulated here, is that Romania saw a stronger socio-economic rupture than other places, and therefore possibly also experienced stronger nationalist movements than elsewhere. The implications and effects socio-economic disintegration had on political and social aspects widens the range it had on nationalism. As mentioned, the economy is only one factor and cannot be used alone. Economic decline cannot predetermine the rise of extreme nationalism, but economic prosperity does have the possibility to take away its appeal when people end worrying about their economic situation and realizes the potential in economic cooperation. The economic situation created instability, insecurity and

social unrest which made people prone to nationalist manipulation. Some of the nationalists and economic elite, as well as main stream politicians, exploited simmering apprehension of those who could loose from or feared change during the transition from socialist planned economy to capitalist market economy. Nationalism also legitimated the power of those in government (or those wishing to become so), as nationalism was used as a (false) 'stabilizing' force to quell social unrest and the effects of social rupture.

Economy of shortages creates jealousy of those who have more, and a tendency to search for the 'other' to blame for ones hardship and misery, instead of changing it from within. Although the Romanian economy is improving rapidly and has recently been accepted into the European Union, she is still decades away for reaching the economic average of other European countries. Additionally much work is left in the field of judiciary and corruption for the transition to be announced over. Although far away from the European average, the fact that Romania is currently seeing economic stability under political duress and problems is a testimony to the maturity and security seen in both economic and political spheres. In one way, they have become two independent endurable institutions, a result of the end of the transition.

When Romania reaches a certain level of economic prosperity it seems more likely that she can afford to implement a broader aspect of human and minority rights. Granting Hungarians cultural and linguistics rights in fields such as education is not only a question of willingness, but economy. When Romania is barely capable to secure Romanians a satisfactory education, it is hardly likely that she will afford to do this in Hungarian language as well. To Romanians human rights refer to the economic situation such as wages or jobs and not so much to social and environmental issues as other Europeans do (Nine O'clock 8 January 2007). Thus, as the economy is getting better, it is possible that Romania can 'afford' to pay more attention to human rights, coupled with diminishing popularity of marginal nationalist parties. So, when a certain economic level is reached, it is likely that Romanians will consider human rights not by economic terms, but rather in cultural and social ones.

Although it is *a*theoretical to use one case-study to make theory, the relevance of the connection between nationalism and modernization to broader cases has been to show that modernization and nationalism are not necessarily as connected as normally presumed. As economic conditions improved, and the effects of the 'shock therapy' introduced in 1997 had passed over, stability and democratic maturity and endurance strengthened, which in turn undermined much of the nationalist sentiments which had been prevalent throughout the 1990s. Thus, the last stages of modernization or completion of the transition might imply the change to a 'healthier' civic and economic nationalism to emerge in Romania. General economic prosperity, especially in a more matured and consolidated form, tends to bury old ethnic problems and protectionist nationalism in prospect of further increased economic development through cooperation, trade and development[31].

Although authors such as Gellner (1983) and Linz and Stepan (1996) make a good point that nationalism often takes root in the early stages of industrialization or when nation-building precedes that of state-building, problems are faced with viewing development as a linear process, and it fails to explain the upsurge of marginal nationalist groups later in the process of modernization or in a period of democratic transition. Although the interwar period was marked as an early stage of industrialization, the 1980s was riddled with social and economic problems. Thus, Romania can be said to need to go through a process of re-modernization during the post-socialist transition when society needs to re-structure itself in the fields of institutions, laws, market and industry. As the fields of nationalism and transitology often have neglected each other, and there has been a need to see the convergence between the two (Stepan 1998), one lesson that can be drawn is that transition can produce more extreme nationalism and ethnic tension since it produces economic change, social rupture and political changes which needs time to consolidate themselves. A fact not only seen from Romania, but also from the break-up of

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[31] For an analysis of England, France, United Sates and other countries growth of economic nationalism as a way to enhance development and cross-border cooperation see Greeenfeld 2001.

Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and more extremely in Yugoslavia, as well as the increase of anti-Semitism in a homogenous country such as Poland.

Nationalism can be seen as a short-term cost of the transition. Stability and economic progress together with European integration undermines extreme nationalism. The slow integration into the Euro-Atlantic sphere can be said to only exacerbate problems of democratic consolidation, foreign investment and smoother transition, and in turn fuel the nationalist opposition. This was seen in Romania, and can to some extent be seen in other countries today in South-East Europe which are not yet members of NATO and the European Union. Both PRM and PDS tried to rid themselves of (extreme or xenophobic) nationalism when the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration was close to materializing, while marginal nationalist groups lost their appeal. The last few years, legal and economic reforms have simplified the market for investments, there as been an increase in cross-border cooperation and interethnic cooperation, a tendency which only will become more dominant the next few years.

When the tide turned in 2001, economic reform and European integration started to be endorsed by nationalist and populist parties to solve the economic crisis and seen as good for future prosperity. In a decade, Romanian nationalism had taken a u-turn slowly purging itself in the wake of economic prosperity and European integration. Much of the problems in the first decade of transition were due to both the contradicting elements of demands of change from the World Bank and IMF and the half-hearted attempts to implement legal and administrative changes from the Romanian government (see Gallagher 2005; OECD 1993). The transition period was characteristic of "imitation of 'tested' Western political and economic models as well as a 'return to Europe' was the only viable form of emancipation, and, on the other, the shape this 'return to Europe' took in the conditionality of the accession process" (Blokker 2005b: 518). Further, the transition in the 1990s was influenced by the American belief that free-trade alone could benefit everyone, not taking into account the interest of those countries concerned. The policy adapted forced countries to liberalize their economy, facing penalties for those who

resisted and rewards to those who complied, a project that at times exacerbated the transitional economies in some countries, instead of helping it (Greenfeld 2001: 478). Modernization theories had been revived in the prospect of usefulness in transitional cases to democracy, and were supplemented by new theories on transition, consolidation of democracy, globalization and development theories.

Theories on modernization and transition have neglected to incorporate that of nationalism to a full extent. Theories of democratic consolidation, an important aspect of both modernization and transition, underestimated the importance of several key elements such as geography, political historical relations, political culture and democratic legitimacy (Ciobanu 2003a: 1). Nationalist theories have either presumed a linear development strategy from agriculture societies to modern economic societies (Gellner 1983; Greenfeld 1992; 2001) or focused on more culture or primordial issues of nationalism (cf. discussion on Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1983; Smith 1999). As we have seen in the Romanian case, a non-linear development happened with breaks in modernization as a consequence of World War II and the revolution in 1989. Although, nationalism was restrained in the first years of communist rule, economic failure has rather predetermined the rise of extreme nationalism prior and during the transition period.

To reduce the causes of nationalism to one factor misrepresents the picture. Economic factors have historically failed to explain the upsurge of extreme nationalism, social and political actors should be taken into account (see Jovic 2001: 101; Payne 1995: 494). The narrative here has followed such an approach, by looking at the convergence between socio-economic development to nationalist political actors. A few patterns have emerged: first by the threat of change posed by modernization has resulted in nationalism, secondly that the problems or 'failure' of modernization has created social unrest, insecurity and instability which have been breeding ground for extreme nationalists, and third, when the completion of modernization nationalism losses its direct appeal, as it did after 2001. It did not do so in the interwar period and

the first decade of transition, when marginal nationalist movements increased and nationalist sentiments increased.

Although socio-economic decline might prove to affect the upsurge of marginal nationalist parties and main-stream nationalist sentiment, it is hard to prove any direct linkage between nationalism and modernization. Problems of modernization can produce demographical changes which give breeding ground for short-term conflict between the shift from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*, especially when forced and pushed from above. As such, modernization from above and its incapability to adjust to free-market competitions produced the socio-economic rupture that exacerbated the transitional problems in the 1990s, might be a sign of 'fake' modernity produced under communism (Sztompka 1994). Economy of shortages seems to have produced stronger clan relations, extended family and in-group pattern of economic cooperation. This separated ethnic groups, and antagonizing them, which in turn created an increase in ethno-political language and extreme nationalism. In turn, this resulted in problematic cross-border and interethnic relations in Romania, which could have eased and hastened the transition.

Areas such as privatization and land-reform (the re-individualization of land) have proved to create fear or jealousy that the 'other' ethnic group would receive more than the other. Thus, the transition in itself reinforced ethnic divisions and ethno-political language. The transitional period was marked as a period of change from planned economy to creating a whole new class of capitalist entrepreneurs; a process which had taken decades or centuries in other countries was to be undertaken in a little more than a decade in Romania. Nationalist parties either were a way of gaining political and economic power and influence, or a voice of critique from those loosing from the transition. This is similar to what can be called 'welfare nationalism' in developed countries as those who fall outside of the society tends to turn to nationalism. This produced conflict of those who where going to receive the resources allocated for privatization.

The implications the findings have on nationalist theories (as well as that of transitology and modernization) is that nationalism emerges disregarding any pattern of predetermined linear

development, but can be seen in periods of economic deprivation in any 'stage' of development. However, the findings also show that economic instability, transitional problems, the lack of a developed modernized society also, are all elements that can determine an increase in nationalist sentiments and popularity. Although marginal nationalist parties and nationalist sentiments still prevail in Romania today, their appeal have been in decline as economic stability has improved and democracy has gradually strengthened itself. Thus to understand the emergence (or re-emergence) of extreme nationalism historical diversity, sensitive to regional specificities, have to be taken into account. Modernization is as such good for prosperity, and as economic disintegration has the possibility of fuelling marginal nationalist sentiment, economic prosperity and modernization have the power of quelling (or transforming) extreme nationalism. As such, in future research on social change, historical experience, regional understanding and sensitive to each specific case should be adopted to understand either the emergence of nationalism or how to transform the economy, judiciary or political system in transitional studies. Implementation from the outside should only be attempted through dialog, cooperation and historical understanding of the given country.

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