National Identity
and its
Affect on Policy Creation
in the context of Hungary and Romania

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Submitted to
Central European University
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In partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Arts in Public Policy

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Budapest, Hungary
2007

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Abstract

Due to the diversity in national identities among the member states in the European Union (EU), many problems arise, particularly in policy (for example, policy gridlock). This paper addresses the role these differing national identities undertake within policy-making and answers how national identity affects policy. Specifically I use the case studies of Hungary and Romania to conduct an analysis and comparison of their current national identities. Within this analysis I discuss factors which have influenced their identities throughout history, influences in the pre and post-accession years to the EU and finally, how these identities have then influenced policy. I chose these particular nation-states because each contribution of national identity is important to the overall EU identity. In addition, Hungary and Romania's transition from communism in the late twentieth century and recent and present entry into the EU makes for an interesting analysis of identity.

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INTRODUCTION:

The current European Union (EU) policy process involves many actors with the member states found at the core. Although the member states remain independent sovereign nations, they delegate some of their decision-making powers to shared institutions they have created, so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at the European level (Europa 2007). This is done in order to gain a strength and world influence none of them could have on their own (Europa 2007). However although they pool their sovereignty to create policy, in many EU projects differences between the member states occur and in result prevent the creation of policy.

Particularly one EU project which is affected by the differences between member states is the ongoing enlargement. This project attempts, among other things, to create easier and enhanced governance (Europa 2007). One way in which it endeavors to do so is through the promotion of a single European identity, with the intentions to increase cohesiveness between the member states (Europa 2007). This cohesiveness may lead to understanding and cooperation and in the end, better governance. However a main hurdle in the enlargement project is the existence of the many member state identities. These identities are very different and distinct from one another and rightly so they should be acknowledged and respected, although doing so makes finding similarities (and cohesiveness) between them difficult. Most importantly these difficulties must be overcome because they create incredible policy problems (e.g. gridlock) for the EU and stand in the way to reaching goals in the enlargement process. In addition, the lack of

cohesion among member states creates the problem of attaining legitimacy both at home and abroad (Chandler 2004)!

For centuries people have struggled over the answers to questions of identity such as "what constitutes a Frenchwoman?" or "how do you define a European?" and still in this era more questions of identity are emerging. Not only are these questions continuously debated by theorists and scholars, but they are vital because they deal with today's core issues of the EU (Europa 2007). For example, identity relates to the area of foreign policy (a core issue within the EU) and at present there is the idea that without a shared understanding of identity national powers find it difficult to formulate a clear foreign policy to legitimize the projection of power abroad (Chandler 2004). Currently commentators from a variety of theoretical perspectives argue that the most developed nation states increasingly see themselves as having moral obligations to international society and so it is very necessary that they have legitimacy when taking action abroad (Chandler 2004). Further examples of issues in which the notion of identity matters are that of EU governance projects and policy-making (Europa 2007). These are important issues because often the labeling or identification of an individual is what persuades them to act in a certain manner and creates a pathway of action (Wallerstein 1991). This is also called creating an "incentive framework" for policy action (de Soysa & Jutting ---, North 1990). If you apply this concept to a nation-state or a larger entity such as the EU, you may see that once the nation-state is labeled with an identity, you are able to predict its actions and prepare appropriately thus enhancing governance. Also having a shared understanding of national identities may increase cooperation in the intricate processes

that are EU governance and policy-making. That is, if a nation-state such as Germany agrees on its national identity and that identity is then understood by other member states in the greater EU, Germany may be able to more effectively operate in the EU policy process as there is agreement on its collective identity. In this way, appropriate policy can be implemented and future actions can be predicted in order to continue on a successful path in projects such as the enlargement. However, prior to this success it is necessary to understand the basic EU policy process and components of national identity as well as how that identity can affect policy.

Analyzing the differences between the formations of national identities offers various explanations as to why the national identity of an individual is often related to and then how it affects policy. But how did these strong national identities come about and what makes them so? The term "fictive" ethnicity is an alternative notion, but provides a similar idea as national identity (Balibar & Wallerstein 1991, Jacobs & Maier 1998). In this paper I compare and contrast these two means of identification and build upon the existing work (Balibar 1991, Wallerstein 1991, Banks 1996, Barth 1996, Chandler 2004, Connor 1994, Coser 1994, Csepeli 2000, Jacobs & Maier 1998, Jenkins 1997, Kantor ----, Kellas 1991, Kosztolányi 2000, Levine 1999, Marsovszky 2000, Reisenleitner 2001, Remington 2000, Smith 1991, Taras 1995, Weber 1996, West 2000) to analyze two very specific cases of identity—Hungary and Romania. In sum, this paper addresses the issue of identity and more specifically asks how and why does the existence of the national identity (or "fictive" ethnicity) affect policy making within the EU. This analysis is important to conduct because with the large number of diverse nation-state identities

existing and entering into the EU, policy formation becomes an almost impossible task. This kind of obstacle cannot exist if the EU is to continue its hold on the slogan of "unity through diversity", let alone progress in projects such as the enlargement. Therefore there needs to be an understanding in how the different national identities affect policy so that strong and relevant policy prescriptions are constructed leading to a more cohesive and thus legitimate European Union. My main contribution to the existing work is a comparison of how the identities of Hungary and Romania in the context of the EU have affected policy creation.

I begin the paper with a literature review of various authors and theorists, discussing the differing definitions of the concepts of national identity and fictive ethnicity. This understanding is necessary so to maintain clarity on the concepts. In the same section, although I make the distinction between the two terms, I also come to a conclusion on whether that distinction is so crucial that it continue to be made or rather conglomerate the terms to refer to one encompassing notion. Next I briefly outline the current EU policy process. My main contribution is located in this section as I show the role of national identity in policy making and answer how it affects policy. This is vital to show because of the present policy problems within the EU which eventually affect its overall cohesiveness and legitimacy. Following this section I conduct an analysis of the Hungarian national identity as of the present and discuss the factors which have influenced it. I also determine the differences between pre-accession policy and post-accession policy and note how the influences have changed. Next is an analysis of the Romanian national identity, a pre-accession EU member state. Possibly there is a change

in policy demands imposed from the EU because of the current status of both countries. I will determine this by comparing the relationship of identity and policy between the two countries. A further reason for incorporating these nation-states is because each contribution of identity is important to the overall EU identity and their recent and present entry into the EU makes for an interesting analysis. Following these case-studies, I conclude with remarks on the two case studies and comment on future member states and future policy issues.

CHAPTER ONE

NATIONAL IDENTITY VS. FICTIVE ETHNICITY:

This section is a comparison which in addition elaborates on the definitions of national identity and fictive ethnicity. This is necessary so as to determine the distinction between the two which is also declared here. Moreover elaboration is necessary in order to understand why I use one term over the other as my tool of analysis. Following this I discuss national identity in the context of Hungary and Romania.

1.1 National Identity:

Identity is regarded as a cultural phenomenon, and its construction is both symbolic and social (Reisenleitner 2001). This phenomenon is given meaning through the language and symbolic systems by which they are represented (Reisenleitner 2001). In this paper, national identity is defined as one means of identification (of people) through traditions, symbols, values, culture and ideology which fasten its members together under an umbrella-like idea (Boerner 1986, Connor 1994, Herb & Kaplan 1999, Remington 2000, Smith 1991, Taras 1995).

Within the EU there are many competing national identities and each identity acts as the main legitimating force for social order and solidarity in the member state (Smith 1991). To every national identity there are certain fundamental features (Boerner 1986, Connor 1994, Herb & Kaplan 1999, Smith 1991, Taras 1995). These may include the possession of historic territory, common myths, historical memories, symbols and traditions,

common mass public culture with an ideology, understanding and sentiments, common legal rights and duties for all members, and finally, a common economy with territorial mobility for members (Boerner 1986, Connor 1994, Herb & Kaplan 1999, Smith 1991, Taras 1995). It is with these features that members become socialized and bonded together (Boerner 1986, Connor 1994, Herb & Kaplan 1999, Smith 1991, Taras 1995). Tools such as compulsory standardized mass education systems as well as flags, anthems, monuments and ceremonies are also used to conjure feelings of national devotion and a distinctive homogenous culture. The main components of identity are all common to the "core" community and run deep, resulting in a binding force which unites the members and excludes the non-members (Csepeli 2000, Marsovszky 2000, Smith 1991, West 2000). The communist/socialist regimes of Hungary and Romania are examples which illustrate how these tools were used to foster such sentiments and influence national identity (Csepeli 2000, Kantor ----, Kosztolányi 2000).

National identity can be divided into two models, with the first model mainly defining and molding the term through the use of law and territory. Through law, national identity involves a sense of political community and agencies such as public schools help ensure a common public (Smith 1991). In terms of territory, in accordance with the fundamental features, a main ingredient to national identity is the possession of homeland (Herb & Kaplan 1999, Smith 1991). This is so because the act of holding common territory creates a feeling of unity and identity for its members (Herb & Kaplan 1999). The rural landscape especially, which expresses continuity, holds significance in national discourse

because it connects the nation to the land (something which is tangible) as well as to the shared past (not tangible) (Herb & Kaplan 1999).

The second model of national identity is different in that it holds that the members are forever stamped by their birthplace which implies a lack of flexibility in identity (Smith 1991). Similarities such as generations of shared memories and experiences spring from this initial characteristic of common descent. This is different from the first model in that there is less emphasis on creating a national identity through socialization and more emphasis on descent lines which Smith (1991) claims as the binding force.

A main component to national identity lies in the process of self definition (as briefly mentioned in the above paragraphs), that is, in distinguishing members from non-members ("others") to create unity (Smith 1991). The national identity is defined by the presence of "them" (Remington 2000). However, an awareness of self must exist before one can recognize "them" (Remington 2000). Parallel to this exclusion process, identity must have the strong community history and destiny mentioned earlier to steer people into a collective duty to the community (Smith 1991). As one might expect, because of this notion of common history or distinct idyllic past (which is based on traditions, myths and customs), the identity is revealed as one of specific fate (Smith 1991) and is one reason why one particular national identity does not necessarily understand or identify with its neighboring identity (Boerner 1986, Connor 1994, Herb & Kaplan 1999, Taras 1995). Additionally, in this way national identity acts as a means of defining individuals in the world through the collective and distinct culture. This rediscovering and sharing is

important because it acts as a cohesive element for the members, giving the community political legitimacy as well as reaffirming the national identity (Csepeli 2000, Marsovszky 2000, Remington 2000, Smith 1991, West 2000).

This idea of self definition introduces the theory of constructivism into the discourse. Within this theory, scholars define a nation as possibly being a product of structural change, a project of the elites, discourse of domination, or a bounded community of exclusion and opposition (Herb & Kaplan 1999). This "project of the elites" came into light most forcefully post World War II, when there was an emphasis on the crucial role in political development of elites (Boerner 1986). Boerner (1986) argues that there is a significant difference in the national identity if the elites of that nation shared in it and then could use it as the basis of an appeal to the larger population. Through this way there is unification.

1.2 Fictive Ethnicity:

Although they appear similar notions, "fictive" ethnicity and national identity are actually distinct. However the difference is not crucial for the purposes of this paper as to continue to be made and this will be explained in this section. The definition of "fictive" ethnicity which is used in this paper is the following: it is a means of identification which is instituted from above and fabricated, yet binds its members through a common will and other similarities such as culture, traditions and ideology (Anderson 1983, Balibar & Wallerstein 1991, Banks 1996, Barth 1996, Coser 1994, Jacobs & Maier 1998, Kellas 1991, Weber 1996).

As created by Balibar and Wallerstein (1991), fictive ethnicity is claimed to be the community instituted by the nation-state, meaning that the ethnicity was given and not innate. The authors explain

> No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalized, the populations included within them, divided up among them or dominated by them are ethnicized—that is, represented in the past or in the future *as if* they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions (p.96 1991).

Jacobs and Maier (1998) have built upon this definition and claim that fictive ethnicity is a multicultural community united within the frontiers of the nation-state. They hold that the nation-state combines *ethnos* ("we-groups" having an imagined commonality) and *demos* (a general will). This combination can be seen to encompass the two key features of language and race. Together these features operate to make it possible for the people to be represented as an absolutely autonomous unit (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991). The concepts of language and race are also claimed to be the means of transcending actual individuals and political relations (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991). However there are many other cultural traits which can provide a basis for creating an ethnicity (Weber 1996). Such traits as ritual, economic way of life, division of labor, lifestyle, shared behavior and ideologies are fundamental features of ethnicity, in this way making it similar to the notion of national identity (Barth 1996, Coser 1994, Weber 1996). In addition there must also be the existence of distinction between ethnic groups, meaning there must be "others" to solidify the group together (Anderson 1983, Balibar & Wallerstein 1991, Banks 1996, Barth 1996, Coser 1994, Jacobs & Maier 1998, Kellas 1991, Weber 1996). Barth (1996) builds further and argues that ethnicity is about the

social processes which produce, reproduce and organize boundaries of identification (Coser 1994, Jenkins 1997, Levine 1999, Weber 1996). Fictive ethnicity in this way is a flexible concept as opposed to the more concrete notion of national identity. There is no unchangeable feature within fictive ethnicity which binds its members together as common homeland or common descent lines in national identity do. Instead a fictive ethnicity can be shaped and reshaped , encompassing many diverse members and sometimes resulting in a multicultural community (Barth 1996).

1.3 Comparison of National Identity and Fictive Ethnicity:

From the previous descriptions one can see that national identity and fictive ethnicity share similar components and appear analogous. However one final attempt to highlight the distinction between the two terms is made here.

It is more relevant to use national identity as my tool of analysis within this paper because of the fact that the term provides a more definitive and sturdy structure of identification than fictive ethnicity, a term which has been described by various scholars as flexible (Barth 1996, Coser 1994, Jenkins 1997, Levine 1999, Weber 1996). Identity creates this strength by stressing the components of common descent and homeland among its members, things which cannot be chosen or changed (Smith 1991). In ethnicity on the other hand, the boundaries are reproduced and reorganized time and again, by and through socialization (Barth 1996, Coser 1994, Jenkins 1997, Levine 1999, Weber 1996). Although both terms utilize socialization concepts (e.g. the “others”) to help create boundaries and definitions, I argue that national identity is less prone to change because it is based on common descent lines and homeland. Since these features cannot be

reorganized, I argue that they are a stronger adhesive force than fictive ethnicity and therefore I am more apt to see how national identity affects policy making and implementation as the stronger structure implies that it may stand up to outside forces of influence and possibly affect policy. Fictive ethnicity is too much of an influenced notion for the purposes of this paper and I hypothesize that it may actually be affected by policy since its means of identification can be changed and reorganized.

Additionally, the term national identity is more relevant for the purposes of this paper when analyzing such communist/socialist regimes as in Hungary and Romania during the second half of the twentieth century due to the fact that the regimes imposed tangible (monuments, flags, statues) and intangible (ideology) notions. I argue that in doing so, these components socialized Hungarians and Romanians and influenced their identities. However it is important to note that there was already an existing identity which was available to be influenced. My belief is that this identity was tied to the common homeland and descent lines of its members (for example, which may be why the Treaty of Trianon affected Hungary so deeply), as well as their common traditions, culture, myths and language. The communist/socialist regimes could not impose common descent lines or homeland upon the identities because these were already in place to unify the people. In sum, because of this pre-existence I argue that an identity was not given to the Hungarians or Romanians (especially during the years of communism); the identity was *influenced* and therefore I use national identity. Moreover I believe that if I were to use the term fictive ethnicity, it would inaccurately portray the Hungarian and Romanian identities as unnatural and "given" by the recent communist regimes. Although common

myths, traditions, and ideology were used to unite members (as similar to how fictive ethnicity unites members), national identity proves to be the more appropriate term to describe the identities because of the stress within the identities on the common descent lines and homeland as major components. Thus despite being comparable to one another, national identity, rather than fictive ethnicity, is the term more appropriate for use in this paper due to the fact that Hungary and Romania already possessed strong identities tied largely to common descent lines and homeland.

The definition now used for national identity is the following: A means of unifying identification beginning with fixed common descent lines and homeland, accompanied by common traditions, ideology and culture which are created throughout history and can be incrementally changed (Boerner 1986, Connor 1994, Herb & Kaplan 1999, Remington 2000, Smith 1991, Taras 1995). This term will now be used to analyze how national identity affects policy making within the context of Hungary and Romania.

CHAPTER TWO:

POLICY MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:

2.1 General Process of EU policy-making:

For the purposes of this paper, I will briefly outline the basics of the European Union policy process which consists of four main stages (Europa 2007). In the initial stage policy demands are made and articulated to the appropriate EU actor. Formally, the Commission is the only power able to initiate a proposal, but informally there are other possible sources, some being institutional and non-governmental. Following this stage, the demands are translated into proposals to be brought to the attention of the relevant actor. Once the proposal has been initiated by the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament have the opportunity to amend it, giving all three institutions roles in this stage. Third, the policy proposals either agreed to or rejected by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Finally the proposal is implemented, although this is the longest stage of the process (Europa 2007). The Commission is in charge of all implementation, which is done at the national level, most generally through national implementing legislation. This means that the Commission usually can only assist and monitor national actors to insure that they comply with their responsibilities. The Court of Justice assists in making sure member states comply, handing out fines for non-compliance. Although this is a brief summary of the EU policy-process, I argue that the identities play a (not so brief) role within this process which the next subsection will be devoted to analyzing.

2.2 General role of identity in policy making:

In the context of policy making, it is my stance that the general role of identity is two-fold. One role consists of defining the "others" who contrast to your own identity to increase understanding and acts as a reaffirmation– essentially this role is that of self definition and how *not* to act so as to contrast to the excluded "others" (Barth 1996, Coser 1994). This is done, for example, to project that identity abroad and exert power or influence (Coser 1994). In this case the national identity uses the "others" to mold strong, effective foreign policy which rests upon that identity's position in the world in comparison to these "others" (Barth 1996, Hill & Wallace 1996). This is use of power abroad also aids in legitimizing the identity (Barth 1996, Hill & Wallace 1996).

The second role of identity is this: identity serves as the norm-conforming social structures or codes and "rules of the game" in policy-making. Defining this identity decreases the amount of uncertainty then when it comes to policy making because it then acts as the "incentive framework" for human action (de Soysa & Jutting ---, North 1990). The policy process is influenced by these norms and codes (which are based on features such as lines of descent or homeland and cannot be changed) which create a pathway of action (Boettke 2006, de Soysa & Jutting ---, North 1990) to reaffirm the collective identity which is understood by members and non-members.

However in order for this pathway of action to operate smoothly, there should be monitors. That is, following North (1990),informal institutions such as identity are largely self enforcing through mechanisms of obligation, such as in patron-client

relationships or clan networks, or simply because following the rules is often in the best interests of individuals who may find themselves in a "Nash equilibrium" where everyone is better off from cooperation (de Soysa & Jutting ---, North 1990). As an additional means of enforcement to the pathway of action, the policy-making process is constrained by the identity as it has to accommodate the selection of the past traditions (Priban 2003). For example, the policy-maker can abide by the structure and social codes (reaffirm the identity), or else choose not to adhere and face consequences such as deligitimation of the particular institution (Boettke 2006). From this perspective within policy-making, identity (if accommodated) is a tool to serve as a legitimating force and constraint (de Soysa & Jutting ---, North 1990 Priban 2003). However, this constraint was not necessarily for the better as various political thinkers warned against the future being shaped by the past in post-1989 Central Europe (Habermas 1994) and resulting in feared ethnic nationalist traditions. It was to combat these fears that they called for reinvention of the political tradition of constitutionalism, republicanism and civil society (Priban 2003). However it is not easy to separate the past and present as I discover and show in this paper by determining historical influences on the identities of Hungary and Romania. Ernest Renan (1882) pointed to the mutual dependence of a nation's past and present in his *Qu'est -ce qu'une nation* when he said:

> '... [A] nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other is in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common.' (Renan 1882).

In sum, building upon previous work I assert that the roles of identity are to act as a means of self-definition (and reaffirmation) through the use of the "others" and to act as a constraint which sets the codes and "rules of the game". These govern how a nation functions in the present and create the pathway of action for the future (Boettke 2006, Priban 2003). When a clear pathway of action exists, it decreases the uncertainty in action which makes for easier governance. These social codes and norms act also as a frame of reference created from the past and the present memories (Assman 1995) and in comparison to the identified "others" (Barth 1996, Hill & Wallace 1996).

2.3 The effects (good and bad) of national identity on policy:

To refresh, the national identity is defined as a means of unifying identification through common traditions, ideology and culture which is created throughout history and based on concrete features of descent lines and homeland—features which cannot be changed (Boerner 1986, Connor 1994, Herb & Kaplan 1999, Remington 2000, Smith 1991, Taras 1995). But the question of how this identity affects policy is left unanswered still in this paper. Therefore in this section I propose one answer:

With the roles of identity established in the previous section, identity is effectual because in economic terms it is a tool for the self-regulation of behavior, meaning it is a constraint, and as such it either lowers or raises the costs of enforcing the rules of the game and affects development (Boettke 2006, de Soysa & Jutting, ---, Harrison 2002, Islam 2001). These norms and codes which make up the identity are relatively more important in poor countries and small, traditional communities where formal institutions

are less developed and the reach of formal law and state power relatively weak as well as has limited financial resources (Bardhan 2001). Moreover, poor people in developing countries are often ill-served by the limited formal institutions available. In these countries in particular, informal institutions substitute more frequently for formal institutions (Bardhan 2001). The effectiveness of formal law, even in rich countries, however, may depend to a large extent on how well the law corresponds with norms, making enforcement less costly, thus norms and attitudes matter for how well even formal institutions can work (Posner 1998). Accordingly, while rules can be changed relatively easily by actors that come together in some activity, norms, values, and attitudes change only slowly, even if they originate as 'constructed' entities that have persisted, outlasting the original intent for their formulation (Bardhan 2001).

I argue that this theory of identity as effectual in a constraining manner applies in social terms as well. Some scholars see the operation of formal institutions as moderated by available civic traditions (informal institutions) that are in turn shaped by their history (Evans, Jacobson & Putnam 1993). As actions are taught to individuals through the codes and social norms which are a feature of the identity, future actions can then be predicted (Assman 1995, Priban 2003). Thus by acting as a monitor or constraint, a stronger identity leads to lower social costs (e.g. lack of cohesion, disloyalty) when enforcing the rules of the game.

Finally, identity is effectual in that it either legitimates or delegitimates institutional structures. That is, a weaker identity leads to higher costs because in this case the rules

of the game are perceived as illegitimate (meaning identity is not acting as a cohesive force or constraint) and additionally those rules will be violated unless there are the previously mentioned strong and usually expensive monitors (Boettke 2006). These monitors run up costs so that the supervision becomes unaffordable and thus must come to an end, just as the now illegitimate institution and policy must as well.

2.4 What these effects mean for the future of the EU:

As was shown, national identity has a certain amount of power (Evans, Jacobson & Putnam 1993). This can result in affecting policy either positively or negatively. In the context of the EU, this means that identity could not only affect the nation-state, but also the EU as a whole, making it pertinent to highlight next.

Since identity acts as a force of constraint and legitimation but also differs from region to region (Boettke 2006), it is in the best interest of the actors in power to adapt policy according to the interest of the people who subscribe to the national identity. This is so for the sake of progress and development **(**Harrison 2002). As time moves on and the national identity changes, policy must adapt to these changes or else those being in the majority will no longer give consent to the policy institutions and in the same breath, remove legitimacy (Boettke 2006). This issue of legitimacy is vital in the EU because of, among other things, their large influence and actions abroad (Europa 2007).

CHAPTER THREE:

THE CASE OF HUNGARY'S NATIONAL IDENTITY:

The Hungarian national identity has been shaped by many different forces and actors throughout its existence. One force of influence is the "others", that is, the Jewish population living within Hungary, who have played a contrasting role and consequently helped to shape the Hungarian national identity (to know what it is *not*) (Csepeli 2000, Marsovszky 2000, West 2000). However I argue most significantly influencing the Hungarian identity is the communist/socialist era of 1956-1989, which imparted sway upon the national identity in ways which are described in the following paragraphs. This section also analyzes these factors' influence and effects on the contemporary Hungarian national identity.

3.1 Background

Since 1526 when the Turks invaded the country, Hungary has little experience being sovereign (except but for a brief period) as the Turks were followed by the Hapsburgs, the Germans and finally the Soviets (Forward Studies Unit 1998). In the wake of this constant foreign presence, Kosztolanyi (2000) highlights the sentiment within Hungarian identity as a nation accustomed to "being on the losing side" throughout European history, as well as having to make sacrifices (e.g. territory) to foreign occupiers. This sentiment was reinforced through the Trianon Treaty of 1920, which although awarded full independence to Hungary, removed two-thirds of its territory and three-fifths of its population (Forward Studies Unit, 1998, Marsovszky 2000). In addition, Trianon was the cause of a great deal of anxiety, and a fear of the "death of the nation" became prevalent

(Hankiss 2007, Marsovszky 2000). The idea developed that the racially pure Hungarian culture was threatened and must be defended (Marsovszky 2000).

3.2 Identity in contrast to the "other"

After Hungary gained independence in 1920, the country experienced "golden years" which among other things, fostered nationalist notions (Marsovszky 2000). During this era the official definition of "Hungarian" was not only subject to arbitrary judgment, it was also dependent on the actual pattern of discourse on national culture and ethnic identity. At that time discourse took on an exclusive nature, particularly seen in a series of anti-Jewish laws aimed at the exclusion of persons with Jewish origins from the national community (Csepeli 2000). For example, although universal suffrage was introduced in 1920 the right to vote in national elections was severely restricted (Csepeli 2000). In this case the Jewish population played the role of the "others" quite well because according to the definition of national identity used in this paper, identity is largely based on common homeland and descent lines—features of the Jewish population which cannot be changed (Boerner 1986, Connor 1994, Herb & Kaplan 1999, Remington 2000, Smith 1991, Taras 1995) to match the "true" Hungarian identity so exclusion became easier (Marovszky 2000). Due to these concrete-like features of homeland and descent, there was no way that "true" Hungarians, with bloodlines tied for centuries to Central Europe, could be considered liberal, western, and cosmopolitan—qualities usually associated with the Jewish minority (Csepeli 2000, Marsovszky 2000, West 2000).

Even years later, a key factor shaping the identity today is this conservative power now in place post-1989 which operates in contrast to the left wing political parties. As if in repeat, the post-communist right wing has turned back to the brief golden age of the twenties and thirties as the main source of its ideals, and fosters populist nationalism (Marsovszky 2000). The struggle to install a Christian Magyarism and a conservative movement striving for an organic Hungarian culture coincides with anti-Semitic notions (Marsovszky 2000). One example of this conservative coalition influencing the Hungarian identity is that of former Prime Minister Viktor Orban (1999) who claimed that Hungarians have been searching for some way to express properly their identity post-communism. This search is occurring as a result of the confusion with the expectations of the new system which stressed entrepreneurship, risk-taking, achievement, responsibility and self-help (Csepeli 2000). These were values which were aimed at engineering an economic transition (as well as the political one), which moved the centrally planned economy towards a market economy and required new economic institutions, the emerging of new economic elite and a redistribution of property and material well-being (Kolosi & Rona-Tas 1992). These values were not well suited for the old system of state socialism, but were more associated with the western world and the Jewish population within Hungary (Csepeli 2000).

With the redistribution taking place the social structure was also profoundly altered (Hankiss 2007) meaning that while some people lost, some gained power and wealth. Some saw their life chances improve dramatically and others saw a marked deterioration in their opportunities (Kolosi & Rona-Tas 1992). The citizens who were on the losing side came to feel threatened, confused and disoriented. They simply suffered the changes

without being empowered to mature into a community of responsible citizens with the self-organizing potential of a democratic society, and instead infusing more nationalistic feelings (Hankiss 2007).

3.3 Identity Under Communism:

In addition to the Jewish population, Magyar identity is defined in contrast to various foreign regimes, a sentiment which continued to function throughout the entire era of communism (Marsovszky 2000). Kosztolányi (2000) describes the Hungarian identity under the communist/socialist rule during 1956-1989 as centralized, prescribed and imposed from above. Standardization of the language, official culture, mass-education and ethnic cleansing led to further homogenization and strengthened the significance of national identity (Kantor ----). Its fixed categories were not open to discussion and adherence to the ideology was rigidly enforced. Paternalism was greatly preferred to risk-taking and the assumption of individual responsibility (Csepeli 2000). The state, church and other institutions were considered as major agents for the wellbeing of the individual; the individual was not supposed to do anything in order to improve his or her lot. It was not easy to break away from the presence of the state as official promotions of communist identity were ubiquitous, serving both as a reminder of the demand for conformity and an implicit warning of the penalties for transgressing acceptable boundaries (Kosztolányi 2000). Generations were brought up experiencing the futility of achievement and motivation (Csepeli 2000). Regularly repeated economic collapses (in 1918–20, in 1944–45 and in 1989–90) demonstrated that there is no way to escape. People came to learn that both curse and blessing stem from the state (Csepeli 2000). It was also a deeply hypocritical affair, with mass parades and demonstrations carefully

orchestrated to give the appearance of spontaneous manifestations of popular sentiment and solidarity with the cause; "going through the motions" was raised to a supreme virtue (Kosztolányi 2000). What developed was a learned helplessness that made it impossible for the individual to believe in the possibility of controlling his or her own destiny through internalized drives, such as motivation, effort, knowledge or skills (Csepeli 2000). In addition, this communist/socialist rule was perceived as legitimate because of its organizing factor on the Hungarian society (Kantor ----).

In addition to conformity, survival in Hungary also depended upon roles and values which were opposed to those of democracy and a full-fledged market economy (Csepeli 2000, Forward Studies Unit 1998, Hankiss 2007). People inclined to behave as democrats were persecuted or forced into exile, with no place in the public sphere, being labeled as rebels or dangerous deviants (Csepeli 2000). Modernization was not an organic change but a series of forced and ill-fated acts of coercion. Hankiss (2007) characterized modernization under state socialism as a negative process which was more successful in abolishing the remnants of a feudal social structure than in creating new institutions with a potential to produce intense economic growth. State socialism was based on the rational redistribution of goods and resources and in this system of social reproduction no space was left for public control, individual responsibility and initiative (Csepeli 2000, Forward Studies Unit 1998). Because there were no autonomous communities, and civic society was not allowed to strengthen, individualization proved to be a trajectory where individual actors played their zero sum game according to the rules of the prisoner's dilemma (Csepeli 2000). The Church was deprived of its earlier privileges and secularization took place as did a loss of values (Csepeli 2000).

As a consequence of the fear of retribution from the State, the strategy of negative self-presentation in the Hungarian identity was developed as a means of survival. People assumed a peculiar style of discourse, enabling them to present themselves more negatively than they really were (Csepeli 2000). This indulgence in negative self-presentation permeated the dominant patterns of discourse on the individual and the collective identity but on the other hand, there were no financial institutions willing to provide credit and so strategies of positive self-presentation could not develop because there were no incentives (Csepeli 2000). Hungarian Count István Széchenyi pointed out the fatal socio-psychological consequences of the lack of credit: the complete lack of personal trust! Had institutions such as banks and markets provided credit, the patterns of complaint would have failed and anyone interested in getting credit would have had to present him or herself in positive terms (Csepeli 2000). Success, the drive to succeed or to dwell on achievements, would have become leading motifs in a self-image. As a result of the negative modernization, identity also became negative (Csepeli 2000). When confronted with the question "Who am I?" instead of referring to themselves in affirmative terms, people formulated negative statements. They knew only who they were not, who they were contrasted against—Jews (Csepeli 2000, Marsovszky 2000, West 2000). Other official categories of self-identification such as gender, class, professional group, generation, religious affiliation, region, political value orientation, cultural preference were not to be communicated in public (Csepeli 2000).

However the tide began to turn especially in the last decade, the period of the so-called “soft dictatorship,” and it was then that the population’s identity formed a euphoric unit, as the democratic opposition was able to achieve a certain amount of progress;

widespread resistance has been noticeable despite violent and brutal reprisals (Marsovszky 2000). This opposition was often cultural, and art served as an ersatz for political action. Literature, film and visits to museums and the theater-thanks to government subsidies-were affordable for everyone, and there was generally more freedom than in other East Bloc countries (Marsovszky 2000). In spite of everything, a relatively active cultural life was able to develop and as a reaction to all-intrusive socialist doctrine in which the particular national characteristics were in danger of submerging, literature, the traditional core of the national identity, and folk art and culture, as the origin of all Hungarian culture, flourished. Political cabaret and the avant-garde experienced a high point, as a result of which socialist realism was left with nothing more than empty rhetoric (Marsovszky 2000).

From 1989 and after, the Soviet troops left, the constitution was rewritten and for the first time in the history of the country the rule of law was established. Freedom had arrived but the people of Hungary, however, had not experienced self-liberation. They may have felt liberated, but could not claim that victory was the result of the efforts of Hungarians themselves. It was the foreigners—Gorbachev, Reagan, Kohl. Freedom was again brought by others, just as it had been in 1945 (Csepeli 2000).

Because no causal relation was seen between people and freedom, there was no drive to reduce the cognitive dissonance resulting from the harsh economic measures introduced and the ensuing hardships. The new system was not chosen, it was given to the people by a stroke of fortune which turned into misfortune. Frustration and resentment deepened and nostalgia for the days of socialism (when there was no unemployment, no

delinquency and equality was the dominant value) developed. Security grew to be more important than liberty and people were increasingly anxious because of their living conditions. Anxiety repressed the desire to be free (Csepeli 2000).

In the 1990s during the beginning of the accession process, attitudes within Hungary seemed to shift away from old mindsets as illustrated in the subsequent excerpt from Kosztolanyi (2000). He paints one picture of how the national identity was understood in the EU environment during the early years of the accession process.

> For Hungary, accession to the EU represents the ultimate recognition of having returned to the fold after four decades of enforced exclusion, moving from the periphery to the centre, an opportunity to reap the rewards of having made the sacrifices necessary to fit Hungary for integration. Self-determination, freedom and the right to cultivate the unique national heritage and identity without fear of persecution or reprisal combine with the strength inherent in co-operation and solidarity between partners in a bond of mutual respect (Kosztolanyi 2000).

However, there are other pictures of the national identity and the shift to capitalism and the EU. Communism, to some, represented stability, security and predictability (Virag 2006). Under this rule Hungarians were convinced that their country was, "the happiest barracks in the socialist camp" (Csepeli 2000, Marsovszky 2000). Hungarians evaluated their standard of living, satisfaction with the socialist system, sense of justice, human rights, and even freedom by comparing Hungary to other countries under Soviet control such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania or Bulgaria. The comparisons in all dimensions and at all times were unequivocally positive. But with the collapse of communism in 1989, this Eastern frame of reference was no longer valid and was suddenly replaced by a Western frame of reference (Csepeli 2000). This shift of frames of reference immediately caused frustration because of the lack of change—the

individual remained the same as did his car and salary. Comparing themselves to Austrians, Germans or to the Dutch, Hungarians could not help but feel frustrated (Csepeli 2000). In their transformation to capitalism, changes have been imposed on the people, who pay the price in job losses, high unemployment, lack of opportunities to live a decent life, poverty, and a growing gap between the new rich and the many poor (Virag 2006). Hungarians are cynical about the argument that, in spite of all the problems, they at least have democracy and a functioning market economy (Csath 2004). A general sentiment is that the system change only means that those who once had been devoted followers of Karl Marx have transformed themselves into neoliberal capitalists and kept all the capital for themselves (Csath 2004).

In sum, the contemporary Hungarian national identity is marked by various features—a strong attachment to its history of "being on the losing side", the contrast of the Jewish "other", and the communist/socialist regimes of the twentieth century. Leftover from these is an attitude of wariness of higher authority as well as frustration with the lack of change after the fall of communism in 1989 (Csath 2004, Csepeli 2000, Virag 2006) and the entry into the European Union in 2004.

3.4 Pre-accession Hungary and policy:

In the 1990s policy in Hungary shifted from an oppressive and limiting nature under communism, to that of a liberal one with the protection of basic freedoms and assurance of equality and transparency (Forward Studies Unit, 1998). Decentralization was a significant policy issue because of the suspicion and distrust of the centralized state from the communist era (Fowler 2001) which I assert created a pathway of policy action. The basic post-communist impulse regarding sub-state reform was shared across the region of

Central and Eastern Europe: political and administrative decentralization was seen as an essential element in the replacement of communism with democracy (Fowler 2001). Due to their recent experiences Hungarians were wary about the state but felt that

> if the rule of law prevails not only in the spirit of the constitution and in its institutions, but if it also becomes part and parcel of state bodies and the everyday behaviour of citizens... If public administration develops into a professional, autonomous body serving society and... ceases to show devotion to the parties currently in power. And furthermore, if the political parties themselves can also bring themselves in line with Europe […], by elaborating clear concepts and an identity comparable to those of their European sister parties, and by ensuring that they respect civilised standards in their leadership and in practice, then the functioning of our institutions will also become Euro-compatible (Kulcsár 1995).

Although the present Hungarian identity embraced democratic values so as to align with the EU accession process, memories of the communist past remain for example, as seen in Hungary's cautiousness to hand over total power to the state and to the greater EU (Agh 2001). Although a portion of the Hungarian nation (about 45 percent) was hopeful in the quest to become "Euro-compatible" (Fowler 2001, Judt 1992, Kosztolanyi 2000, Kulcsar 1995, Wallace 1992), in the early 1990s 22.5 percent were neutral, 4.3 percent were negative and 28 percent did not actually know how they felt about accession (Kurtan, Péter & Vass 2000). To combat this wariness various features of the national parliament were utilized. In particular the representative function of the parliament, including interest representation and aggregation, had the potential to increase levels of trust in Hungary (Agh 2001). One might think with the inclusion of professionals and the extension of their own independent expert-base in the law-making process, an increase in the level of trust in the government was bound to occur through the enhancement of representation. However, to include more actors proved more difficult than initially thought because the Hungarian government has almost completely monopolized the

representation of national interests (Agh 2001) which may mean that the "incentive framework" for policy has done its job too well and allows no deviation from its set historical norms produced in the communist era. Possibly the powers in place are wary of too much variety and choice, therefore creating certainty through monopolization of representation. I argue these acts exacerbate the wary sentiments in trusting the state or foreign power and always "being on the losing side" of situations, thus in doing so reaffirm the Hungarian identity as the historical framework of action is manifested.

It is important to note that this distrust and hesitance is of concern because the degree of total trust available in a society affects development and substitutes for formal systems of monitoring and enforcement, making collective action easier (Coleman 1991, Evans, Jacobson & Putnam 1993, Woolcock & Deepa 2000). Because of need for development within Hungary I assert the country felt pressure to become a member of the Union. In addition, post-communist Hungary had a small amount of bargaining power within Europe and thus was in a vulnerable position due to the fact that the EU can be perceived as a club where members obey a social norm because they believe that failing to do so will result in expulsion or penalization by members and in Hungary's case, a lack of development (de Soysa & Jutting, ----).

Under state socialism in Hungary, there was a sense of security in both living conditions and in the epistemology of life as well as hardly any experience of choice (Csepeli 2000). With the arrival of freedom of speech, competing values and ideas emerged in public; newspaper readers, radio listeners and television viewers were confronted by the diversity of messages. Epistemological security was lost forever and an abundance of new

questions were raised in the public sphere and most significant of all, people were irritated to discover that, except for the sciences, there is no belief which could be proven as false or true and it is up to the individual to choose among ideas and values (Csepeli 2000). Lacking the deeply-embedded political and ideological value systems that stem from mainstream European political ideologies (such as social democracy, liberalism, and conservativism), tendencies such as populism, demagoguery, ethnocentrism disguised as nationalism and racism developed and resorted to nationalism as a means to finding answers to all questions (Csepeli 2000). It is here that I argue the Hungarian identity also influenced policy via the Jewish "others." Post-1989, I argue actors such as Orban, were able to use these "others" to create norm-conforming social structures or codes and "rules of the game" in order to affect Hungarian policy in a conservative fashion. Orban, as a founding member of Fidész (*Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége*, the Alliance of Young Democrats), proclaimed that the proper Hungarian identity is emerging, albeit very slowly, but warned that if the Hungarian people could not produce a convincing image that captured the essence of the nation, then others (for example, Jews) would be sure to produce it in their stead. Orban (1999) urged a revival of the identity (that is, a reaffirmation of identity) to lead Hungary out of a period of uncertainty which he asserted the world was in (Barth 1996, Coser 1994, Orban 1999). As a result, the government's influence on strategically important cultural areas, the state-owned media and the basic institution of cultural financing, the National Cultural Fund, grew (Marsovszky 2000). In addition, a commissioner for affairs relating to the millennium was appointed and a center for promoting the national image was established. Disguised as a "transparent cultural policy," ultra-modern cultural-marketing methods were employed in public

relations work, such as direct mailings of propaganda on the millennium in the form a newspaper and a brochure (Marsovszky 2000). The powers that be once again issued definitions of what is genuine and what is inauthentic, what is Hungarian art and what is not and appeals to the conscience of "true Hungarians" and "true Christians" found a sympathetic audience, often as a result of the long period of suppression (Marsovszky 2000). In addition, unpopular opinions are rejected and brushed aside, and critics of the government and its policies are usually denounced with various code words for Jewish: "Liberal Bolsheviks," "cosmopolitans" and "sham Hungarians" are described as being "out of tune spiritually and intellectually"; in the recent past, even the term "traitors" has been used in radio broadcasts (Assmann 1995, Boettke 2006, Forward Studies Unit 1998, Marsovszky 2000, Priban 2003). Attempts to defend themselves against this "state-supported Jew-baiting" result in government accusations of hysteria. The radical right-wing MIEP supports these efforts. According to malicious rumors, this party serves as an ideal mouthpiece for the government, saying the things the government cannot afford to say, as the latter feels obligated to obey EU regulations (Marsovszky 2000).

Therefore I believe that there were two different strands of policy created within Hungary which were influenced by the national identity—one strand created was influenced by the communist/socialist era (historical sentiments and experiences) and dealt with issues such as decentralization and transparency, illustrating wariness towards trusting the state and foreign powers. In this strand, the role of identity as a pathway of policy action in the post-communist years was fulfilled due to the historical sentiments and experiences of Hungary.

The second strand of policy was influenced by the Jewish identity (and its supposedly negative features), and in turn implemented also an "incentive framework" for conservative policy, decreasing the amount of uncertainty (de Soysa & Jutting ---, North 1990) within Hungarian public policy. I argue that with the definition of the "others" one could predict the course of Hungarian policy due to the fact that there was such a strong contrast made between "true" Hungarians and Jews. In this strand, the role of identity is to set a pathway of action and also to utilize the Jewish "other" as a means for further definition of the Hungarian identity.

3.5 Post-accession Hungary and policy:

In the years since Hungary has become an official member of the EU, the country has gone from post-communist chaos to orderly EU membership due to the leverage the EU had during the accession process over the Eastern European governments, meaning that it could always opt to send a country to the back of the accession queue in case its reform efforts slackened; however actual accession reduced this leverage removing the clout of the threat of exclusion or delays to the accession process (Barysch 2006, de Soysa & Jutting ----). Therefore the objective of joining the EU served as a monitor and glue which held together Eastern Europe (de Soysa & Jutting ----). However, after accession this glue resolved leaving policy-making more controversial and antagonistic, with the newcomers, such as Hungary, showing signs of "reform fatigue" (Barysch 2006). The rest of the section is devoted to an analysis of the role the Hungarian national identity plays in this policy scenario.

For Hungary, membership in the EU promised to deliver security, democratic stability and economic prosperity (Barysch 2006, Csepeli 2000, Fowler 2001, Kulcsár 1995). But before these promises were to manifest into reality, Hungary needed to complete changes in their public policy such as tariff reduction, the selling off of state-owned companies, an overhaul of the banking sector, cuts in state subsidies, the opening of the telecoms and energy markets and a clamp down on cronyism and corruption (Barysch 2006). On top of all this Hungary took over the 80,000 pages of rules and regulations that constitute the EU body of law (Barysch 2006, Europa 2007). Now after the accession process and policy changes Hungarian entrepreneurs are unhappy about growing macro-economic risks, limited access to funding and feel that the tax burden is getting heavier while business environments are deteriorating (Barysch 2006). I argue that the Hungarian identity plays a role here because with the growing economic risks in conjunction with the hand-over of power to the EU exacerbates the history of hesitance to place trust in the higher power. In addition, I affirm many citizens felt that under communism/socialism they had a sense of security and predictability. Now with the economic transition and increase in economic risk-taking, that security is fading and in turn Hungarians grow more cautious, a feeling which is manifested in conservative parties and policies. I also believe this hesitance operates in correlation with the generations who were brought up during communism, those who experienced the futility of achievement and motivation in conjunction with penalties for transgressing acceptable boundaries (Csepeli 2000, Kosztolányi 2000). I believe the pressure to conform from years past remains in mindsets today and results in Hungarians becoming caught "going through the motions", with few deviating from the unpopular ideas and norms. For example, Hungarian

politicians are bound to become more critical of the EU's more liberal policies, now that they no longer have to fear repercussions for their accession prospects and upcoming elections could give them opportunity to capitalize on widespread voter dissatisfaction by blaming the EU for local problems (Barysch 2006) resulting in the rise in popularity of extremist parties and leaders such as Orban.

Another way in which identity plays a role in post-accession Hungary is through the reinforcement of the sentiments of always "being on the losing side", which I believe to be an example of the negative self-talk as seen during the communist regimes and thus a reaffirmation of identity. This feeling was only exacerbated post-accession due to the fact that the Union which Hungary joined in 2004 bore scant resemblance to the peaceful and prosperous club they had been looking forward to—the EU looked exhausted from slow economic growth and disagreement over the Iraq War as well as the EU constitution all equated out to a less than welcoming entry (Barysch 2006). In addition, most of the old EU members decided to keep restrictions on jobseekers from the new member-states, thus depriving them of one of the fundamental freedoms of the single market (Barysch 2006). This was what Hungarians had feared in joining the EU—just another example of "being on the losing side." What is more, the June 2005 EU summit ended in acrimony as EU leaders fell out over how to distribute scarce EU budget resources among the club's enlarged membership and when finally agreed upon, it turned out smaller than expected, with most money still going to previous beneficiaries, such as French farmers or poorer Spanish regions (Barysch 2006).

CHAPTER FOUR:

THE CASE OF ROMANIA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY

4.1 Background:

Similar to Hungary's sentiment of being deeply European in its thousand year presence, the present-day Romanian national identity is closely associated with the feeling of being a "great European" nation, because of the resolute identification of Romanian national identity with European culture. Romanians are said to be descended from the Dacians—an ancient, diverse people who settled in the Carpathian-Danube basin during the first and second century AD and pride themselves on clashing with Rome during the reign of Julius Caesar (Forward Studies Unit 1998, Thiesse 1999). Later under the rule of Aurelian, intense Romanization of the ethnically diverse Dacians occurred via the Latin language and Roman administration set up to harvest the precious metals and grains natural to the region (Thiesse 1999). From the point of withdrawal of Aurelian, the fate of those Romanicized and their original territory is in dispute even today, especially with the Hungarian population and the region of Transylvania (Thiesse 1999). Although the Romanians insist that their ancestors have occupied a territory that includes Transylvania uninterruptedly for 2,000 years, the Hungarians deny any continuity between the Dacians and the Romanians, claiming that the earliest presence of Romanians in Transylvania is attested several hundred years after the ancestors of the Hungarians established themselves there (Thiesse 1999).

The modern state of Romania was not formed until 1859, gaining its full independence in 1877 (Thiesse 1999). Later after the First World War, Romania became a nation state

that encompassed all Romanians, who prior to 1918 lived in different empires, but 28 per cent of the population was members of national minorities: Hungarians, Germans, Jews, Ukrainians and Russians (Bideleux & Jeffries 1998, Kantor ----). The presence of large quantities of minorities within the country has not made governance easy and the major problem of Romanian governments was to create an identity and legitimacy in a territory consisting of historically diverse and ethnically mixed regions (Flora, Szilagyi & Roudometof, 2005). It was the existence of these national minorities which hindered the project of the Romanian state in achieving a (wanted) homogeneous nation state and identity during this time (Bideleux & Jeffries 1998, Kantor ----).

4.2 Identity and the Orthodox Church:

After 1918 the Romanian state started a nationalizing process in response to the presence of the minorities, forcefully asserting "the national idea" (Bideleux & Jeffries 1998, Kantor ----), which often conflicted with general democratic ideals (Flora, Szilagyi & Roudometof, 2005). Aiding this nationalizing process was the Orthodox Church. Its role was the perpetuation of essential ethno-national values, thereby legitimating the Romanian nation-state. In this fashion, Eastern Orthodox identity became a major source of Romanian national ideology and thus a large influence on identity since 87 percent of the population is of the Orthodox faith (Flora, Szilagyi & Roudometof 2005, Tomiuc 2004). Orthodox priests were allowed to take leave of absences for up to four years to pursue a political career, lending moral authority and great influence to a party (Tomiuc 2004). This influence was pertinent during the years of communism, as the Church was accused of close collaboration with the powerful regimes, and of doing nothing to stop the demolition of churches under Nicolae Ceausescu (Tomiuc 2004). However, the fall

of communism in 1989 granted a sudden freedom to the churches, so that all the various denominations experienced revived activity, also opening the door for disagreement between the socially more progressive advocates, with changes toward western European culture, and the traditionalists, who distrust western values and want to return to eastern practices (Prochnau 2001).

Overall, there is great distrust and little cooperation between the various church denominations, resulting in an atmosphere which is competitive and combative, with tremendous pressure from family and friends, tradition and politics to be affiliated with the Orthodox Church (Prochnau 2001). Culturally, one needs to be Orthodox to be considered a good Romanian and within the faith, in contrast to modern western values, family, community, and tradition are valued highly with a prevailing feudal world view enduring from nineteenth-century serfdom which holds that the individual is not able to fend for their self or alter their status or condition in society (Prochnau 2001). Thus they have to ally with a person or entity more powerful who will be a protector—the Church (Prochnau 2001)! Combined with the feudal world view are European animism, fatalism, and materialism from the west, and communist distrust from the east, resulting such sentiments as lack of initiative, lack of education, and lack of thinking for oneself (Prochnau 2001).

4.3 Identity under Communism and Ceausescu :

During the first decade of Soviet-imposed communist rule, the population suffered the misery of expropriations, the disruptions of rapid industrialization and forced collectivization, and the "Sovietization" of society (Bachman 1989). As in Hungary,

conformity was forced, there were penalties for transgressing boundaries and people were caught “going through the motions” (Lupsa 2006). The result was an increasing bitterness toward the Soviet Union and the Romanian Communist Party itself, which was directly controlled by Moscow. In the late 1950s and early 1960s de-Stalinization and a more liberal atmosphere prevailed in Moscow under the leadership of Ceausescu. In 1965, concomitant with Ceausescu's rise to power in the PMR (Romanian Workers' Party), a new Constitution proclaimed Romania a socialist unitary state and a campaign for self-determination and de-Sovietization was accompanied by increasing Romanian nationalism in domestic policy. Interestingly, Ceausescu’s immediate actions of loosening censorship policies were assumed to be liberal and he was initially accepted by a West that was hopeful of change in Eastern Europe (Bideleux & Jeffries 1998). However, the Romanian brand of socialism was heavily corrupt and not until the end of the reign did the world understand its intensity (Bideleux & Jeffries 1998).

In 1976, a nationwide campaign dedicated to the glorification of the Romanian homeland—the "Hymn to Romania”— was launched, of which all nationalities were expected to join (Bachman 1989, Lovatt 2000). Given the socioeconomic structure of pre-communist Transylvania, when Hungarians and Germans were much more urbanized and economically advanced than the mostly peasant Romanian majority, the changes wrought by the modernization program negatively affected the position of the minorities (Bachman 1989). As the needs of industrialization brought more and more peasants from the countryside to the factories, the ethnic composition of Transylvania's urban places shifted—Romanians became the growing majority in cities that had long been Hungarian and German enclaves (Bachman 1989). These changes were not solely the result of

natural migration, but were carefully engineered by the state (Bachman 1989, Kubilius 2006, Lovatt 2000). Through a program of systemization, discrepancies between rural areas and more developed regions of Romania were erased in order to create a more homogenized social structure, as well as root out any opposition to Ceausescu (Kubilius 2006, Lovatt 2000). Secret internal regulations ordered major minority centers such as Cluj, Oradea, and Arad to be virtually sealed off to the largest ethnic minorities and encouraged their outmigration while directing an influx of ethnic Romanians (Bachman 1989). Fervent emphasis on Romanian language, history, and culture, designed to enhance Ceausescu's popularity among the Romanian majority, continued unabated into the 1980s. Thereafter, the country's multinational character was largely ignored, and the problem of cohabiting nationalities officially was considered resolved (Bachman 1989, Bideleux & Jeffries 1998). The regime maintained the appearance of minority representation at all levels of government, and official statistics showed that the proportion of people from ethnic minority communities employed in government duly reflected their numbers (Bachman 1989). In reality, minorities had little real power or influence. At the local level, minority representatives, who were generally quite Romanianized, were mistrusted by their constituents (Bachman 1989).

In 1989, the mobilization of mass national sentiment resulted in the overthrow of Ceauşescu and his nepotistic system of rule (Lovatt 2000). This overthrow was expected to maintain the unity that had been seen in the upheaval of the government, but instead various ethnic groups clashed against each other (Lovatt 2000). In accord with the overthrow of Ceauşescu and the collapse of communism in 1989, Romanian aspirations and desires were raised to pursue the “Western ideal”—prosperity, wealth, freedom,

everything that had been concealed, prevented, or restricted in Romania during communism (Lovatt 2000). The political, social and economic weaknesses that the country now faced, as well as the decrease in power of the Orthodox Church, encouraged them to seek Western assistance, rather than turn back to the disintegrating Soviet Union (Lovatt 2000, Prochnau 2001).

Now, more than a decade later, Romania does in fact turn to the West and Romanian nationalism has been confronted by the overwhelming desire to join the EU –a goal that would have been inconceivable in 1989 (Lovatt 2000). The strength and influence of the Church may also have helped push public opinion toward the integration with the EU (Guth & Nelson 2005). However despite this desire, the EU, World Bank, NATO, and the IMF are all setting tough entry requirements resulting in further economic, political and social hardships for Romania. Nonetheless, there is a massive push for membership and rather than being defined within its own national boundaries, the Romanian identity is transforming to include a wider "European identity" (Lovatt 2000).

In sum, I conclude that the present day Romanian national identity harbors attachment to its dynamic history with long ties to the Carpathian-Danube Basin, while relying on the Orthodox Church to institute influence and values to the majority of the Romanian people (Flora, Szilagyi & Roudometof, 2005, Guth & Nelson 2005, Lovatt 1999). In addition, the strong emotional identification with Europe makes it difficult for ordinary Romanians to understand measures in place which seem to exclude them from being part of Europe (or the rest of the West), for instance with visa restrictions or EU entry requirements (Forward Studies Unit 1998).

4.4 Pre-accession Romania and policy

Romania is now on the verge of gaining membership to the European Union and the political and economic foundations are undergoing a process of transition towards democracy and a market economy (Europa 2007, Lovatt 2000). In this transition, I argue Euro-Atlantic institutions in correlation with the collapse of communism and decrease of power by the Orthodox Church have influenced the direction in which the Romanian identity has developed and consequently also affected policy. The remaining section will be devoted to this discussion.

Interestingly, despite low levels of trust in the state, the majority of Romanians tend to view the EU as a "knight in shining armor" that will rescue the country from its social and economic ailments (Lupsa 2006). This hope for a protector or provider may be sentiments engrained from the Orthodox faith, carried over, which urge the individual to ally with a stronger entity in order for survival (Prochnau 2001). Moreover, no longer driven by communist state rhetoric, perceptions of Romanian national identity are transforming (with the help of Euro-Atlantic institutions) to encompass the wider concept of the European Union and a "European identity" (Lovatt 2000). In this way, the Romanian identity plays the role of an accommodator because if Romania wants entry into the EU, it must be flexible and willing to accept the entry requirements and other EU stipulations (de Soysa & Jutting ----). As evidence of this willing role, according to a Eurobarometer poll, 68 percent of Romanians trust the EU and half expressed unhappiness with the present and optimism about their future as part of the body (Europa 2007). Joining the EU could allow Romanians to work in other countries for better pay,

for example, but there is concern over member states being willing to open their borders (Lupsa 2006). This concern leads to the conclusion that if the EU doesn't turn out to be the savior Romanians are expecting, the blow could be fatal. This reliance on the government, while at the same time fearing it or distrusting due to memories of the Ceausescu regime, will add to the disappointment of the reality of being part of the EU which might send Romanians running to the extremist parties and again decrease the level of trust in the government (Lupsa 2006). This scenario could also see the rise in influence of the Orthodox Church and its value system as well, which being in conflict with western values, may also send Romanians towards extremist parties (Prochnau 2001).

I argue another role within the pre-accession process which the Romanian national identity plays is that of legitimator of state authority. My claim here (with the help of Thiesse 1999) is that the collapse of communism raised the urgent problem of forging a new social link that could serve as the basis for rebuilding civil society and could promote the idea of a collective interest with a view to establishing democracy and democratic policy (Thiesse 1999). However there is an obstacle to this role, that is, the reality of the situation presented itself differently than hoped for as the demands for democracy were diverted by drumming up nationalist passions and policy allegedly due to the current existence of variety and choice after the end of the communist era (Lovatt 2000). As was the case during communism, the state had influenced perceptions of Romanian national identity and once it ceased functioning much propaganda that had driven the idea of “Romania” and being “Romanian” also ceased (Lovatt 2000). However after the collapse in 1989, rather than being the domain of the state, national

identity became the concern of individual political parties and the Romanians themselves, sometimes resulting in bouts of nationalism (Lovatt 2000).

In addition to nationalistic notions, other memories (e.g. corruption, immorality, oppression) from the former era linger within the identity and consequently trust in the state remains low (Lupsa 2006). In fact, a Eurobarometer poll indicated only one-third of Romanians trust their justice system and true justice is such a foreign notion that, the Open Society Foundation (OSF) report noted, "[I]t is worrisome that ... the defendant's rights to personal freedom and fair trial are still seen as tricks instead of being considered fundamental procedural rights" (Lupsa 2006). I argue the result of these sentiments—the wariness toward trusting the state and political institutions—affects policy creation in the present by demanding the rebuilding of institutions within Romania (Geoana 2003, Lupsa 2006). An EU readiness review for accession by the OSF found that many of the statutes under which the Romanian judiciary operates are confusing, and scandals in the last decade highlighted a cozy relationship between the parties in power and the judiciary and have crushed public trust in the rule of law (Lupsa 2006). The reconstruction of governance towards entry to the EU must change this situation so that the state serves society and provides a framework of social solidarity for its citizens (Geoana 2003). Guaranteeing transparency in governmental activities, ensuring the responsibility of administration, decentralization and improvement of the civil service are essential preconditions for success (Geoana 2003).

4.5 Comparison and Contrast of Hungary and Romania

Interestingly, although the identities of Hungary and Romania both exhibit low levels of trust in the state in the years of post-communism and pre-accession (Agh 2001, Coleman 1991, Evans, Jacobson & Putnam 1993, Lovatt 1999, Lovatt 2000, Lupsa 2006, Woolcock & Deepa 2000), the two countries are split in terms of their feelings on becoming a member of the European Union, and for different reasons taken up in discussion here.

In the case of Hungary, as mentioned earlier, about 45 percent of the population was hopeful in the quest to become "Euro-compatible" (Fowler 2001, Judt 1992, Kosztolanyi 2000, Kulcsar 1995, Wallace 1992), meaning 22.5 percent were neutral, 4.3 percent were negative and 28 percent did not actually know how they felt about accession (Kurtán, Péter & Vass 2000). This split was due to the transition to new economic and political systems which increased the risk-taking and decreased the level of security felt under communism/socialism (Barysch 2006). This simply added to the history of distrust in the state and high percentage of the population which exhibited either neutral or unknown feelings about becoming a member of the EU.

In addition to the low level of trust in Hungary, I avow the conservative powers in the post-communist parties used those historical notions to push nationalist agendas of "true" identity to use to their advantage, as seen with Orban. I assert that such powers seemed to provide answers at times during major transition involving risk, uncertainty and an abundance of choices, ideas and thoughts (Csepeli 2000)—unfamiliar notions to the

Hungarian people after living under communism for forty years. These may have contributed to the high percentage of neutral or unknown attitudes towards EU membership.

The case in Romania was different. While Hungarians were split between hopeful and neutral/unknown attitudes most likely due to transition resulting in uncertainty, Romania viewed the EU as its "knight in shining armor" with 68 percent of the population showing trust in the EU (Lupsa 2006). In contrast to its history of homogenizing minorities, in the pre-accession years they have worked to encompass the broader concept of the European Union and the international scene (Lovatt 2000). I believe that this quest for membership is partly a want for a protector and provider—feelings originally stemming from the powerful Orthodox Church which has seen a decrease in influence as compared to the years of Ceausescu (Prochnau 2001) – and partly a want to remain attached to Europe because of strong historical ties dating back to the Dacians and the Carpathian-Danube region. Sadly this quest for EU accession and success in governance is somewhat deteriorated due to the corruption prevalent in such significant governmental bodies as the judiciary (Geoana 2003, Lupsa 2006).

Despite these differing sentiments from Hungary and Romania towards the European body, the policy within the countries during the pre-accession process was fairly similar. There was a focus on decentralization and transparency as policy issues (Coleman 1991, Evans, Jacobson & Putnam 1993, Lupsa 2006, Thiesse 1999, Woolcock & Deepa 2000). Vulnerability (as well as flexibility), because of the lack of development and positive

change occurring, also affected the policy because this weakness meant that the countries relied on the EU for such improvements—thus policy changes of a more liberal democratic nature occurred in order to meet EU entry requirements and regulations (de Soysa & Jutting ----, Geoana 2003).

Also in both countries, nationalistic notions resurfaced and right-wing leaders such as Orban in Hungary became popular by promoting "true" ideas of identity (Csepeli 2000, Lovatt 1999, Lovatt 2000, Marsovszky 2000). As mentioned earlier, in the pre-accession years Hungary lacked the deeply-embedded political and ideological value systems that stem from mainstream European political ideologies (such as social democracy, liberalism, and conservativism), so sentiments of nationalism and racism developed as a means to finding answers to all questions during the years after the fall of communism in Hungary (Csepeli 2000).

In Romania, I assert that due to the strong influence of the Orthodox Church, which instituted values in contrast to the West, nationalist parties became popular post-communism. Although with the fall of communism doorways to other faiths, ideas and religions opened, so did the discrepancies between them which resulted in nationalist parties (Prochnau 2001). Ideas such as in order to be a "true" Romanian, one must adhere to the Orthodox faith identity were pushed as were "non-western" values such as the importance of family and tradition (Prochnau 2001).

CONCLUSION:

Overall, within this paper I have shown a number of things. Firstly, I have made the distinction between national identity and fictive ethnicity, and determined that while they are similar notions, national identity was more relevant for the purposes of this paper as I came to the conclusion that it is a more stable notion than fictive ethnicity. This is so because the definition of national identity relies on identification by common descent lines and homeland, two very stable and unchangeable features (Smith 1991). I believe common homeland to be a feature which makes up a large part of Hungary and Romania's national identities and therefore that is why I utilize national identity rather than fictive ethnicity. While fictive ethnicity is very similar, its boundaries of identification, by definition, are allowed to be reorganized and redrawn resulting in a flexible manner of identification (Barth 1996, Coser 1994, Jenkins 1997, Levine 1999, Weber 1996).

Secondly I illustrated the general roles of identity in policy—those being to set a pathway of policy action and "incentive framework" as well as a means of legitimation of state authority at home and abroad through the use of the "others."

Thirdly, I show that national identity, specifically in the context of Hungary and Romania, does play a role in the policy process (and especially in their pre-accession and post-accession years). In the case of Hungary, with the help of such features as historical sentiments leftover from the communist/socialist era and the concept of the "others" (Assmann 1995, Boettke 2006, de Soysa & Jutting ----, Lovatt 2000, North 1990, Priban 2003), policy was influenced in a conservative fashion. It was also influenced towards a

more democratic nature due to the vulnerability of the country post-communism, and such policy issues as decentralization, transparency and citizen representation were stressed.

In the case of Romania, identity influenced policy in two different ways through hopeful quest to become an EU member and remain attached to Europe, a want for a provider and protector due to the influence of the Orthodox Church and finally by memories of the communist regime led by Nicolae Ceausescu. In the hope for EU membership, policy was created to be of a more democratic, pro-EU fashion in order to comply with rules and regulations. This is in contrast to the rise of extremist parties with the fall of communism and the presence of the Orthodox Church pushing influence and non-western values at policy makers.

This analysis was beneficial to conduct because with the diversity of the many nation-state identities, policy formation becomes an almost impossible task. This kind of obstacle cannot exist if the EU is to continue its hold on the slogan of "unity through diversity", or to move forward on projects such as the enlargement. Therefore there needs to be this understanding in how the different national identities affect policy to achieve strong and relevant policy prescriptions for the future, leading to a more cohesive and thus legitimate European Union.

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