CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2007
| Author | Karalashvili, Nona |
|---|---|
| Title | Essays on (In)dependence of Judiciary |
| Summary | I analyze choice made over dependent and independent judiciary emerged through interactions of the judiciary and other branches of the government. Prevailing judicial institution is modeled from two different standpoints. In Part I, the government decides whether to give up power over justice. I explore deviations of governmentally chosen institutional arrangement from the efficient one. In case the government is able to fully align preferences of judges to its own, the dependent judiciary is chosen more frequently than it is socially efficient. However, constraint on actions of the government places its choice closer to the efficient institutional arrangement. In contrast, Part II explicitly allows the judiciary to either surrender or keep its independence, depending on which arrangement offers higher gains. Judicial independence is shown to be more likely to be observed under separated executive and legislature than under their unification. The theoretical results of the models are supported by existing empirical evidence and illustrative case studies. |
| Supervisor | Grajzl,Peter |
| Department | Economics MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2007/c05kan01.pdf |
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