RUSSIA AND THE WEST

THREE LEVELS OF REGIMES: ECONOMIC, SECURITY, AND RULE

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Submitted to
Central European University
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In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations and European Studies

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Word count: 17,112

Budapest, Hungary
2007

Abstract

This paper analyses the relations between Russia and the West in the light of international regimes theory. The particular aim of this research is to test the hypothesis put forward by Czempiel, which underlines the importance of the issue-areas and their role in regime-conduciveness. International issue-areas, which fall in to three broad policy domains, namely as economic, security and rule, have different levels of regime-conduciveness. Specifically, the hypothesis claims that economic domain is the most amenable to good co-operation; rule domain is the least regime-conducive, and security domain is in the middle. Thus, three kinds of regimes between Russia and the West - economic, security, and rule are evaluated within the relations of the country with the EU, NATO and the OSCE, and the Council of Europe respectively. The research supports the hypothesis in general and claims that with recent deterioration of relations between Russia and the West possible weakening of all three regimes does not alter the hierarchy of the regimes with economic on the top, rule on the bottom and security in between.

To the memory of Elmar Huseynov

Table of Contents

Introduction

Since the beginning of the enlargement of the Muscovite state on the periphery of the West the relations between the two has taken an important place in their foreign policies. Through out history periods of close collaboration have given place to intense rivalry. The end of the Cold War marked the transition from harsh opposition to another stage of cooperation between Russia and the West. Depending on the various regimes established by the parties since the end of twentieth century the relations between them has evolved differently.

After the end of the Cold War and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union both parties strove towards the establishment of closer cooperation. In the very beginning of the 1990s Russia, being in a situation of a euphoria, sincerely believed that its membership in the main European organizations (above all in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) was a matter of several years. However, while the West never excluded the possibility of future Russia's membership in these organizations it was not ready to admit Russia without tangible results of the substantial political and economic reforms in the country. The short 'romantic' period in Russia's relations with the West ended by 1993 and the Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union and regional power insisted on special status in the relations with its counterpart. The set of mechanisms and institutions, established by Russia and the West in the course of their cooperation within the European organizations, led to the formation of various regimes.

In this research I will analyze the relations between Russia and the West through international regimes theory. Advanced in the 1970s international regimes theory is a comparatively new paradigm. There is a logical explanation to this fact. Although international regime type relations existed for several centuries (for example, free trade navigation in the high

seas) only in an era of globalization particular relations between the states in various spheres turned into the phenomenon which scholars call today "international regime". Today states cooperate in the framework of different kinds of regimes – economic, environmental, security, communication, human rights and others.

The most quoted definition of the international regime was put forward by Krasner, who defines the international regime as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations".[1] Another recognized international regime researcher Keohane identifies regimes along with international organizations and conventions as one of the three main forms of the international institutions; whereas differentiation among them is blurred.[2] At the same time, as he asserts, almost all international organizations are built into the international regimes, mainly to maintain and alter the regime. Moreover, he argues that even though there is theoretical differentiation between the organizations and the regimes, in practice they "may seem almost coterminous".[3] Thus, although the regime is a broader concept than the organization, the former, nevertheless, should be accompanied by the organization, which with all its inherent structures such as budget, personnel, and facilities to maintain the regime.

International regimes theory has been a subject of a broader neo-neo debate. However, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger in addition to rationalist school using also a reflectivist paradigm identify three approaches to study international regimes: interest-based, power-based and knowledge-based.[4] Each of the mentioned approaches has different directions, but for the purpose of this research I will use the hypothesis put forward by Czempiel within the framework

[1] Stephen Krasner, *International Regimes*, Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 2
[2] Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, Westview Press, 1989, p. 3
[3] Ibid
[4] Andreas Hasencleves, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 1-2

of the interest-based approach. He underlines the importance of the issue-areas and their role in regime-conduciveness. International issue-areas fell in to the three broad policy domains – economic, security and rule. Thus, the hypothesis claims that economic domain is the most amenable to good co-operation; rule domain is the least regime-conducive, and security domain is in the middle. The aim of this research is to test above hypothesis in the relations between Russia and the West.

I will analyze three kind of regimes between Russia and the West, namely economic, security, and rule. These regimes have been managed, monitored and modified by the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (COE). These four organizations make a symmetry in sense that Russia is the full-fledged member of the two of them (the OSCE and the COE), whereas two of the organizations are purely European (the EU and the COE), and the rest two dealing with the European issues have the US as their members (NATO and the OSCE). Although one of the three dimensions of the OSCE's activities is human rights, for rule regime I will analyze relations between Russia and the COE. The reason for that is Russia's own attitude to the organization, which has regarded the OSCE in addition to NATO as mainly a security organization. Moreover, Russia as a member-state has aspired for radical reformation of the OSCE and its transformation into the umbrella organization for hierarchical pan-European security system.

To carry out my research I will evaluate different stages of the cooperation of Russia with all four mentioned organizations. There are a number of papers have been produced which analyze the history and current state of affairs of the relations between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War, however, it should be also mentioned that, there is no research dedicated purely for the evaluation of the relations between the parties in the light of these three regimes. For this purpose I will employ "content analysis" method, which will enable me to evaluate the

research giving an overall analysis of the relations between Russia and the West, with an aim to find the facts supporting the hypothesis above.

The thesis consists of four chapters. In Chapter I an introductory review of the theories of the international regimes will be presented. After an overview of the definition and explanation of the fundamental elements of the regime and presentation of similarities and differences between neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches towards the theory, I will shift to three approaches developed by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger within which the hypothesis, to be tested in this research, is presented.

Chapter II will evaluate the activities of the EU and Russia to form and strengthen a regime within the economic policy domain. I will mainly focus on a legal basis for such cooperation and institutions and mechanisms. Special attention will be also dedicated to the energy cooperation which has been increasingly playing a significant role in economic relations between the EU and Russia. I will argue that the economic cooperation between the parties steadily develops since the beginning of the 1990s.

The security regime set up in the context of Russia-NATO and Russia-OSCE relations will be evaluated in the third chapter. Successes and failures in maintaining and adapting the security regime to the challenges such as NATO enlargement, the Kosovo crisis and September 11 will be analysed in the light of the distribution of relative gains, since it is alongside with cheating is one of the main obstacles in preserving the security regime.

Finally, I will evaluate the relations between Russia and the COE from the perspective of a rule regime in the fourth chapter. It will be asserted that issue-areas in the rule domain (best epitomized by human rights issues) are the least regime-conducive, because cooperation between the parties is jeopardized by a values gap revealing different identities of Russia and the organization.

This research strives to complement the area of research on the relations between Russia and the West and to be of some additional value by presenting supplementary angle to analyse the interactions between the two.

Chapter 1 - Theoretical Perspective

International regimes theory is a comparatively new paradigm which emerged in International Relations Theory in the 1970s. In this chapter I will give an overview of main ideas in the international regimes theory. First, definition of the international regime will be presented. Second, the correlation between international regime and international organization will be discussed. Third, I will dwell on different approaches within the rationalist camp to the international regimes in the context of the neo-neo debate. Finally, three schools of thought – interest-, power-, and knowledge-based - that form the discussion on international regimes will be evaluated. I will argue for the hypothesis put forward by Ernst-Otto Czempiel within an interest-based school which is based on the neo-liberalist approach. Szempiel claims that economic issue-areas are the most propitious, the security ones are the second best and the area of rule are the worst for regime formation.

1.1 What is an international regime?

Almost all scholars in the area of international regimes assume Krasner's definition of the international regime as a basis of their research.[5] In his famous book entitled "International Regimes" Krasner defines them as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations".[6] He further explains each of four elements of the regime. Principles are "beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude"; norms are "standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations"; rules are "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action"; and decision-making procedures are "prevailing practices for making and implementing collective

[5] Andreas Hasencleves, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: the Study of International Regimes", Mershon International Studies Review, 1996, p. 179
[6] Stephen Krasner, *International Regimes*, Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 2

choice".[7] Krasner distinguishes principles and norms form rules and procedures. Principles and norms should be regarded as the foundation of the regime, whereas rules and decision-making procedures are kind of a superstructure.[8] Proceeding from this, Krasner argues that changes in rules and decision-making procedures happen within the regime and do not lead to the change of the regime, while changes in the principles and norms automatically result in the regime change. Krasner identifies five main "basic causal variables" which account for regime development: 'egoistic' self-interest, political power, norms and principles, habit and custom, and knowledge.[9] Habit and custom as well as knowledge are auxiliary to fundamental "forces related to interest, power, and values".[10]

1.2 International regime and international organization

As Keohane maintains, regimes along with international organizations and conventions are one of the three main forms of the institutions.[11] He argues that differentiation among these three forms of institutions is blurred.[12] Keohane asserts that almost all international organizations are "embedded within international regimes: much of what they do is to monitor, manage, and modify the operation of regimes".[13] Besides, he argues that although one can distinguish organizations and regimes analytically, in practice they "may seem almost coterminous".[14] The regime is a broader concept than the organization, but anyway regime should be accompanied by the organization which with all its inherent structures such as budget, personnel, and facilities maintains the regime.

[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid, p.3
[9] Ibid, p. 11
[10] Ibid
[11] Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, Westview Press, 1989, p. 3
[12] Ibid, p. 5
[13] Ibid
[14] Ibid

1.3 International Regime in the neo-neo debate

International regimes theory is one of the elements of a broader contemporary debate between neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Both schools belong to the meta-theory called rationalism, and thus they share certain theoretical assumptions. Both paradigms agree that the states are rational units of the international system which is anarchic. Since the states are the primary actors they set up regimes in order to promote international order. Baldwin identifies four strands within liberalism – commercial, republican, sociological and liberal institutionalism.[15] Referring to Krasner, Baldwin labels theories of international regimes as the "immediate intellectual precursors of liberal institutionalism".[16] Thus, in this chapter the arguments of Liberal Institutionalism will be heavily relied on.

Despite above common ground Liberal Institutionalists and Realists approach regime theory differently. The starting point for Liberal Institutionalists is that regimes are necessary to mitigate the problems posed by anarchic international system.[17] Liberal Institutionalists use microeconomics and game theory to explain why anarchic structure of the international system hinders formation of regimes. On one hand, according to microeconomics, anarchy in the market encourages rational economic units to compete with each other and produce goods and services at the optimum price and this concept is not compatible with anarchy in the international system, which impedes regime formation.[18] On the other hand concept of market failure used in microeconomics, helps Liberal Institutionalists to explain why economic units collaborate rather than compete, for example preventing the production of 'public bads'.[19] According to

[15] David Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate*, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 4
[16] Ibid
[17] Richard Little, "International Regimes", John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 377
[18] Ibid
[19] Ibid

microeconomics collaboration among economic units happens because of the intervention of the state; however there is no world government which could intervene in case of the market failure in the international system. Nevertheless, existing regimes demonstrate that collaboration among units within anarchic international system is also possible, but anarchy poses problems for states to achieve collaboration.[20] In order to explain this phenomenon Liberal Institutionalists use game theory. Liberal Institutionalists argue that Prisoners' Dilemma game where two actors are given only two possible options - either to cooperate or to compete, clarifies why "a wide range of irrational outcomes in the international arena can be explained in rational terms".[21] Game's logic extrapolated on the international system shows that states do not collaborate because they presume that other states will choose competition, and, thus, they cannot achieve Pareto optimal outcome and are content only with suboptimal outcome.[22]

Liberal Institutionalists argue also that a hegemon or dominant actor may use its power to enforce a regime by pressing the states to join it.[23] However, as Burchill argues, this school "employing rational choice and game theory" also recognizes that regime can be established by the states without hegemonic actions of one of them.[24] In this regard Liberal Institutionalists claim that Prisoners' Dilemma overstates the difficulty to achieve collaboration in the anarchic international system; actors play the game once, whereas in the real life states will play the game many times in future, so they can take a risk to cooperate in order to reach the optimum outcome.[25] Thus, Little concludes that principle of reciprocity rather than activities of the hegemon is the main mechanism through which regime is established and maintained.

[20] Ibid, p. 378
[21] Ibid
[22] Ibid
[23] Ibid, p.379
[24] Scott Burchill and ed., *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave, 1996, p. 39
[25] Little, "International Regimes", p. 380

Realists also recognize the importance of international regimes. Stein argues that the "existence of regimes is fully consistent" with Realism which regards the states as sovereign and self-reliant.[26] Moreover, he maintains that the "very autonomy of states and their self-interests lead them to create regimes when confronting dilemmas".[27] Realists criticize Liberal Institutionalists on two issues: first, Realists do not agree with the Liberal Institutionalists that hegemon state can play in the international system the role comparable to the role of the state tackling the problems emerged as the result of a market failure; second, realists do not agree that regimes spring up in the result of the attempts of the state to surmount the inevitability of the competition in the anarchic international system.[28] Realists argue that, regimes emerge as the result of interaction of uncoordinated strategies in order to produce suboptimum outcomes.[29] For Realists regimes are epiphenomena and depend on the power structure of the international system.[30] Power for Realists plays an important role, but not in the sense of forcing the states to collaborate, but as the mechanism to shape the regime during the bargaining process.[31] Like Liberal Institutionalists, the Realists use a game theory (Battle of Sexes) in order to show that the states attempting to establish a regime face the problem of coordination rather than a problem of collaboration.[32] The logic of the Battle of Sexes game underlines not the risk of defection to a competitive strategy, but the risk of failure to a coordinate strategy, which leads to the loss of the intention to cooperate wished by both parties.[33]

[26] Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Cooperation: Regimes in an Anarchic World", in David Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate*, Columbia University Press, 1993, p.53
[27] Little, "International Regimes", p. 380
[28] Ibid
[29] Ibid
[30] Bas Arts, "Regimes, Non-State Actors and the State System: a 'Structurational' Regime Model", European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6 (40), 2000, p. 518
[31] Little, "International Regimes", p. 384
[32] Ibid, p. 381
[33] Ibid

1.4 Three approaches to study international regimes

Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger in addition to rationalist school use a reflectivist paradigm to identify three schools of thought that form the discussion on international regimes. First, is neoliberalism with emphasis on the constellation of interests; realism which traditionally focuses on power relationship; and cognitivism with emphasis on "knowledge dynamics, communication, and identities".[34] In other words these scholars call these approaches as interest-based, power-based and knowledge-based approaches respectively.[35]

Power-based theories of regime assume that states are interested both in absolute and relative gains and are "least inclined to ascribe a considerable degree of causal significance to international institutions".[36] Some Realists insist that power is equally important in conflict between the states as well as in cooperation between them and thus power distribution among units heavily influences the process of emergence and the nature of the regime.[37] The other group of realist scholars emphasize that in the anarchical international society where states are mainly concerned with survival and preservation of sovereignty, considerations of relative power set up barriers for international cooperation that cast doubt on the international regimes' effectiveness.[38]

Knowledge-based theories of regime explore the idea of interests as realized by the states, underlying "the role and causal beliefs of decision makers".[39] One strand of this school called 'weak cognitivism', which is not considered as fundamental challenger of neoliberalist and realist approaches, explains how preferences and interests are formed.[40] Another approach, called 'strong cognitivism' argues that full explanation of the regime can be reached through

[34] Andreas Hasencleves, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 1-2
[35] Ibid
[36] Ibid, p.3
[37] Ibid
[38] Ibid, p.4
[39] Hasencleves, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge", p. 207
[40] Ibid

understanding of the "nature of institutionalized practices or their repercussions on the identities of international actors".[41] 'Strong cognitivists' maintain that in many cases the states are "better understood as role-players than as utility-maximizers".[42]

Interest-based theories of regimes have been extremely influential so far and can be regarded as predominant school of thought in international institutions' analysis.[43] Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger describe four approaches in the interest-based theories of regimes: contractualism, situation-structuralism, model of institutional bargaining, and problem-structuralism.[44] The subject study of contractualism is influence of the international regimes over the actors' ability to cooperate in cases resembling Prisoner's Dilemma and explain the creation and maintenance of the regime.[45] Situation-structuralism analyzes the whole range of "strategic situations in which actors might cooperate through regimes" and in addition to regime formation this approach examines institutional form of regime.[46] Model of institutional bargaining makes an effort to amend the trend of rationalistic theories to give preference to the structure over process.[47] Problem-structuralism attaches significance to the nature of the issues and highlights their role in the probabilities of regime formation.[48]

1.5 Czempiel's hypothesis

Within the framework of last approach German scholar Ernst-Otto Czempiel identified a typology that organizes international issue-areas into three broad policy areas: security,

[41] Ibid
[42] Hasencleves, Mayer and Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes*, p. 5
[43] Ibid, p. 4
[44] Hasencleves, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge", p. 183-184
[45] Ibid, p. 183
[46] Ibid
[47] Ibid, p. 184
[48] Ibid

economic, and rule.[49] Whereas, security domain is understood as the "protection of physical existence against internal and external threats", economic domain as the "allocation of economic gains as well as opportunities for achieving such gains", and rule domain as the "allocation of opportunities for exercising freedom and for political participation".[50] Based on this classification problem-structuralists formulated a hypothesis which argues that issue-areas where the ground for rivalry is economic values will be most propitious for regime formation since "divisible 'gain' rather than indivisible 'power' is at stake"; following the same logic, security issues will be the second best and the area of rule the "least amenable to cooperative treatment".[51]

In the following three chapters I will test this hypothesis on Russia's relations with the EU regarded as the economic regime, the OSCE and NATO as security regime, and the Council of Europe as the rule regime. Since Czempiel's hypothesis provides very general understanding of the possibilities for regime-conduciveness I will apply neo-liberal, realist and constructivist assumptions on cooperation between the actors on the international arena to form and sustain economic, security and rule regimes respectively.

In case with the economic and security regimes main emphasis will be made over different approaches to the problem of absolute and relative gains. As far as economic regime is concerned, according to Stein, neo-liberals argue that actors, which share common interests, search for mechanisms to maximize their absolute gains. The states enjoy their share of the gains regardless of the share gained by their counterparts, hence issue-areas in the economic domain are the most regime-conducive. Some researchers suggest that absolute gains considerations are important for economic issues, whereas relative gains essential in security realm.[52]

[49] Ibid, p. 192
[50] Czempiel quoted in Hasencleves, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge", p. 192
[51] Ibid
[52] Lipson quoted in Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, p. 6

Indeed, realists, in contrast to neo-liberal institutionalists, argue that it is not easy to achieve cooperation and more difficult to sustain it even in the case when parties share common interests. According to Grieco, realists identify several impediments for cooperation and the one, which I will apply to the cooperation between Russia and the West in the framework of the security regime, is the problem of relative gains.[53] As he further argues, there is high probability that the state will abandon international cooperation if it sees that its counterpart gain more from the arrangement. Thus, issue-areas in the security domain are less regime-conducive in comparison with those of the economic domain and, moreover, it is important to keep more or less proportionate distribution of relative gains in order to preserve the regime.

Constructivism in contrast to rationalist school emphasizes ideational constructs rather than material ones in relations among the actors of the international system. Thus, it argues that ideas, norms and values matter and shape state behaviour. Constructivists also argue that ideas and norms not only constrain states but also define state interests.[54] Interests and identities are not given and fixed, but are the outcomes of discourses through which they are constructed. In case of Russia-COE relations, when the actors possess different identities, cooperation between them becomes difficult because of two reasons: 1) it touches the basics of the identities of both parties and 2) actors' refusal to give up their identities.

[53] Joseph Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics", in Michael Doyle and John Ikenberry, *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, WestviewPress, 1997, p. 175
[54] Michael Barnett, "Social Constructivism", in John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 253

Chapter 2 – Russia-EU cooperation as an economic regime

Czempiel's hypothesis claims that economic issues come under the policy domain within which the propensity to form a "regulated model of conflict management", or in other words the formation of international regime is the highest.[55] Besides this, according to neo-liberal approach, actors in the economic domain are concerned predominantly in absolute gains, so they try to develop mechanisms which will further enable them to maximize their absolute gains. In this chapter I will evaluate the activities of the EU and Russia to form and strengthen a regime within the economic policy domain. After short historical background I will mainly focus on the legal basis for such cooperation and institutions and mechanisms which have been constantly developed in order to sustain this regime. I will start with the basic document regulating the relations between the two parties - Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Then I will assess two strategies – the Common Strategy of the EU on Russia and the Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of relations between the Russia and the EU. Particular attention will be given to the development of the Common Economic Space starting from the EU's Common Strategy till the adoption by the parties of the of four Common Spaces Road Map. As energy has been playing an enormous role in bilateral economic relations between the EU and Russia this sphere will be evaluated as well. Since trade and investment lie in the heart of modern international economic relations, positive development well-defined in figures will be presented in the end. I will argue that in spite of the negative assessments by some political leaders of the present situation, the economic cooperation between the EU and Russia, started in the beginning of the 1990s, steadily develops in general.

[55] Hasencleves, Mayer and Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes*, p.62

The history of the relations between the Soviet Union and the EU starts only in the end of 1980s when Mikhail Gorbachev introduced 'New Thinking' strategy aimed at improving relations with the West. In 1989 the parties signed a ten-year trade and cooperation agreement, which by 1991 led to the elimination of several trade barriers on both sides.[56] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia adopted the 'New Thinking' strategy and continued pursuing closer relationship with the EU.[57]

According to Likhachev, Russian Ambassador to the EU, the partnership between the EU and Russia is exhaustive and "deals with various, if important, pragmatic objectives"[58], or as Light characterizes it – there is an obvious predominance of 'low politics' in these relations.[59] She also observes that so far Russia has concluded more agreements with the EU than with any other international organization, and the intensity of the cooperation between the two parties is the highest in comparison with Russia's cooperation with any other organization.

2.1 The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

The basic document regulating the EU-Russia relations is the PCA, which was signed in 1994 and came into force in 1997 for an initial period of 10 years. Article 1 of the PCA envisages cooperation between the parties in many directions falling under political, economic, scientific and cultural realms. Nevertheless, Kempe and Smith argue that the PCA mainly focuses on economic cooperation, disregarding political one.[60] The PCA laid down the institutional

[56] Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, "Trade and Peace: a Classic Retold in Russian", European Foreign Affairs Review, 2004 (9), p. 310
[57] Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, "Explaining Russian Endorsement of the CFSP and the ESDP", Security Dialogue, vol.33, no. 4, December 2002, p. 449
[58] Vassily Likhachev, "Russia and the European Union", International Affairs (Moscow), 49/1, 2003, p. 55
[59] Roy Allison, Margot Light and Stephen White, "Putin's Russia and the enlarged Europe", Chatham House Papers, 2006, p. 69
[60] Iris Kempe and Hanna Smith, "A Decade of Partnership and Cooperation in Russia-EU Relations: Perceptions, Perspectives and Progress – Possibilities for Next Decade", Strategy Paper, Centre for Applied Policy Research, Helsinki, 2006

framework of the EU-Russia relations and includes summits twice a year, permanent partnership council, parliamentary cooperation committee, political dialogue, and different working groups.[61] There are also various agreements and other mechanisms of cooperation in such areas as steel and textiles, energy, transport and others set up to complement the provisions of the PCA.[62]

However, the PCA regime was recognized relatively weak and new documents aimed at deepening and broadening the EU-Russia relations were adopted: the EU and Russian strategy documents of 1999 and Road Maps for the development of four 'Common Spaces' in 2005.[63]

2.2. Mutual Strategies

In 1999 the European Council accepted the Common Strategy of the EU on Russia, which outlined various objectives and means to strengthen the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia. The strategy outlined four main areas of cooperation: consolidation of democracy, rule of law and public institutions in Russia; integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space; cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and beyond; and tackling common challenges on the European continent.[64] As far as economic cooperation is concerned the strategy recognizes that the EU is Russia's main trading partner, and confirms the EU's commitment to the integration of Russia into the European and world economy by supporting the country's activities to meet WTO membership requirements. Moreover, the strategy commits the EU to set up necessary conditions for the creation of the free trade area between the two parties and encourages the harmonization of legislation and standards in order to facilitate the establishment of a common economic area.

[61] The EU official web-site available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm (last accessed on May 4, 2007)
[62] Ibid
[63] Michael Emerson (ed.), *The Elephant and the Bear try again: options for a new agreement between the EU and Russia*, CEPS, November 2006, p.72
[64] Common strategy of the EU on Russia available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/russia_99.pdf (last accessed on May 4, 2007)

Russia responded to the EU's Common Strategy with Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of relations between the Russia and the EU also adopted in 1999. Hansen assesses this document as a positive response on the Russian side.[65] This strategy clearly declares that "it is possible and desirable" to achieve the objectives outlined in the Common Strategy of the EU on Russia.[66]

Both documents, first of all, consolidated the achievements reached by that time and secondly showed the commitment on the both sides to further develop mutually beneficial economic cooperation.

2.3 Common economic space

In 2003 the initial four-year period of the EU's Common Strategy on Russia expired and was not extended. Instead of this document the parties at the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003 agreed to further deepen and broaden their co-operation through the establishment in the long term of four 'common spaces' in the framework of the PCA.[67] At a later Summit in May 2005 the parties decided to create a common economic space; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space of co-operation in the field of external security; as well as a space of research and education, including cultural aspects.[68] Vague and general directions of the cooperation indicated in the PCA reflected in more precise common spaces which shows a progressive development in

[65] Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, "Russia's Relations with the European Union: a Constructivist Cut", International Politics, December 2002, p. 412

[66] Medium-Term Strategy for development of relations between the Russian Federation and the EU (2000-2010), 22 October 1999 in Melville Andrei and Shakleina Tatiana ed. *Russian foreign policy in transition: concepts and realities*, New York: CEU Press, c2005

[67] The EU's official web-site available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm (last accessed on May 4, 2007)

[68] Ibid

relations between the EU and Russia. According to Emerson, Tassianri and Vahl the parties are in the process of setting up the various 'dialogues' mostly in the economic sphere.[69]

Another important aspect of bilateral relations between the EU and Russia has been the EU's assessment of the status of Russian economy. Here, there is clear progress. If in 1994 when the PCA was signed the status which was given to the Russian economy was that of economy in transition, then in the EU's Common Strategy on Russia adopted in 1999 Russia economy was characterized as 'operational market economy'. In 2002 Russian economy was given by the EU the status of 'market economy'. It should be noted that Russia had made great efforts in order to be recognized as a market economy by raising that issue at different levels in its relations with the EU and there were political considerations behind that decision but it clearly showed also that both the EU and Russia were interested in further development and enlargement of their economic cooperation.

According to Barysch the EU and Russia "have put economic integration at the heart of their efforts to build a stronger partnership" and since the beginning of 1990s the parties have been extensively elaborated on the idea of 'common economic space' (CES).[70] Thus CES has become another important economic realm of the cooperation between the EU and Russia. The term was first mentioned in the EU's Common Strategy on Russia and the idea was that the EU agreed to provide Russia with access to the EU's single market if Russia harmonizes its legislation and standards with *acquis communautaire*.[71] In 2001 the parties established a High-level Group (HLG) to develop a concept for a closer economic relationship between Russia and

[69] Michael Emerson (ed.), *The Elephant and the Bear*, p.73
[70] Katinka Barysch, "Is the Common Economic Space Doomed?", in the EU-Russia Review, Issue 2, Eurussia Centre, 2006, p.12-13
[71] Katinka Barysch, "The EU and Russia: Strategic Partners or Squabbling Neighbors?", Center for European Reform, 2004, p. 25

the EU.[72] As the HLG confirms in one of its reports "the overall aim of the CEES, in broad terms, is to link the EU and Russia in a privileged relationship, focusing on regulatory and legislative convergence and trade and investment facilitation".[73] With the adoption of four Common Spaces Road Map the CES became one of these spaces and included among others measures for building common economic space in the areas of cooperation such as regulatory convergence, public procurement, competition, investment, economic and industrial policies, agriculture, trade and customs.[74]

In July 2006 the EU proposed to start talks on a free trade agreement, as part of the negotiations on a post-PCA agreement (PCA expires in December 2007). Although Barysch observes that Russia has not yet shown much interest to this suggestion[75] it is likely that Russia will actively engage into the talks with the EU in the second half of 2007 as part o tots preparations to the vital presidential elections in March 2008. The logic is simple - in case of a mutually beneficial new agreement between the EU and Russia the Russian ruling elite will gain the support of both the EU and domestic business circles interested in deepening and broadening the economic cooperation with the EU member-states.

2.4 Energy

Energy plays an enormous role in the EU-Russia economic relations and important for both parties. As Monaghan confirms, the EU is Russia's largest energy market – a market which supports broader growth of the Russian economy.[76] Despite all crisis situations in EU-Russia

[72] The EU's official web-site available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/summit_11_02/eespace.htm (last accessed on May 4, 2007)
[73] Ibid
[74] Road Map for a Common Economic Space – Building Blocks for Sustained Economic Growth available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/summit_05_05/finalroadmaps.pdf#ces
[75] Barysch, "Is the Common Economic Space Doomed?", p.15
[76] Andrew Monaghan, "EU-Russia Energy Cooperation", in the EU-Russia Review, Issue 2, Eurussia Centre, 2006, p. 27

relations the latter has proved to be a reliable energy supplier.[77] Moreover, the proportion of Russian energy in the EU's total energy import rose from 24 % in 2001 to 27.5% in 2005, whereas gas imports alone increased from 41 to 50 %.[78] At the EU-Russia Summit in Paris in 2000 it was decided to launch a regular 'energy dialogue' in order to discuss all the issues in this sphere including the "introduction of cooperation on energy saving, rationalization of production and transport infrastructures, European investment possibilities, and relations between producer and consumer countries".[79] The dialogue involves both regular meetings of experts and discussions at the biannual EU-Russia summits.[80] Barysch admits that the parties are still in the process of disagreement on such important issues such as pipelines, gas supply contracts, electricity sector restructuring, but at the same time she underlines some successes such as the establishment of an energy technology center in Moscow, plans for an EU-funded investment guarantee scheme, and the start of pilot projects for energy savings.[81] The parties also agreed to produce regular joint progress reports and they have produced seven such reports so far.[82] The seventh progress report issued in November 2006 underlined important areas in EU-Russia energy cooperation such as an "improvement of the investment climate, promotions of infrastructure projects of common interest and enhancing the trade in energy products".[83] Two important pipeline agreements concluded by Russia with the EU member-states can regarded as another success story in EU-Russia energy cooperation for the last years. One is an agreement on the construction of gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, signed in 2005 between Russia and

[77] Ibid
[78] Allison, Light and White, "Putin's Russia and the enlarged Europe", p. 65
[79] Joint Declaration of the Summit available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/summit_30_10_00/statement_en.htm
[80] Barysch, "The EU and Russia: Strategic Partners or Squabbling Neighbors?", p. 31
[81] Ibid, p. 32
[82] EU's official web-site available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/overview/index_en.htm (last accessed on May 5, 2007)
[83] EU-Russia Energy Dialogue Seven Progress Report, available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/joint_progress/doc/progress7_en.pdf

Germany, which will link the Russian port of Vyborg and the town of Greifswald in Germany. The second is an inter-governmental agreement signed by Russia, Bulgaria and Greece in March 2007 on the construction of the oil pipeline from Bulgarian seaport Burgas to the Greek seaport Alexandroupolis. Long-drawn anxiety in Europe over the future of the output from the one of the world's largest gas field Shtokman situated in the Russian portion of the Barents Sea seemed finally addressed when President Putin in October 2006 confirmed that the gas from this field would be directed to the Europe instead of being transported to the US in liquid form as originally planned.[84]

2.5 Trade and investment

Barysch confirms that trade together with energy are the areas where "mutual and shared interests" of the parties are the strongest.[85] For the period of 2001-2006 the value of EU-Russian trade grew by more than 70% and by 400% for the period of 1996-2006.[86] According to the EU DG Trade Russia is the EU's third trading partner, after the USA and China.[87] Based on information provided by the DG Trade, more than 52% of Russia's trade accounts to the EU, which makes the latter the main trading partner of Russia. DG Trade confirms that EU's total trade with Russia in 2005 amounted to €166 billion which is as twice as much to that of 2003 (€85 billion). As the result Russia has a trade surplus of €53 billion.[88] Along with trade in goods, trade in services (which mainly includes transportation and travel services) also increasing on average 6-7% annually for both EU exports and imports of services for the period of 1995-

[84] Katinka Barysch, "The EU and Russia: from Principle to Pragmatism?", Policy Brief, Centre for European Reform, 2006
[85] Barysch, "Is the Common Economic Space Doomed?", p.12
[86] Ibid
[87] The EU's official web-site available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/russia/index_en.htm
[88] Ibid

2004.[89] It should be also noted that Russia enjoys the status of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN), which grants the Russian exporters with trade advantages such as low tariffs for example. Another area of progressive development of the EU-Russia economic cooperation is investments. According to the Eurostat EU-25 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Russia increased from €7.7 billions in 2003 to €9 billions in 2005, and Russia's FDI into EU-25 increased from €0.7 billions in 2003 to €4.1 billions in 2005.[90] FDIs primarily go to the oil and gas sector, with the energy sector accounting for nearly 60%.[91]

The progressive development of the economic cooperation between the EU and Russia in recent years, nevertheless, was also marked by disagreements especially under Putin's presidency. Light observes that concerns from the 'high politics' area hindered progress over issues from 'low politics' area.[92] EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson claims that main cause of the recent controversies is mistrust between the parties and in order to overcome it Russian economy should be anchored in the EU's single market and the international trade system.[93] However, Barysch argues that despite frictions in the EU-Russia relations in the recent years there have been also "multiple small successes".[94] In economic sphere the EU and Russia achieved a success in agreeing the terms of Russia's WTO accession; extending the PCA to the new EU members; facilitating the movement of people and goods between Russia and Kaliningrad; agreeing to develop four 'common spaces'; establishing 'permanent partnership

[89] Ibid
[90] Eurostat available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-07-055/EN/KS-SF-07-055-EN.PDF
[91] The EU's official web-site available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/russia/index_en.htm
[92] Allison, Light and White, "Putin's Russia and the enlarged Europe", p.46
[93] "EU-Russia relations at low ebb", article at the BBC, 20.04.2007 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6574615.stm (last accessed on May 6, 2007)
[94] Barysch, "Is the Common Economic Space Doomed?", p.12

council' on transport issues and an expert group on eliminating the trade barriers; facilitating visa requirements; and signing a declaration on a tax issue.[95]

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has evaluated the economic cooperation between the EU and Russia. Although EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson in his recent speech stated that the trust in the relations between the EU and Russia has reached the lowest level,[96] overall assessment of the relations between the parties in economic sphere since the beginning of 1990s shows steady progress both in terms of developing of legal basis and necessary institutions and increase in trade, investment and energy cooperation. This supports the theoretical assumption put forward in the first chapter that in case when the states share common interests over economic issues they are interested in establishing and developing the mechanisms aimed at maximization of their gains, regardless the amount of the benefits gained by the counterpart.

However, in order to fully test the hypothesis put forward in the first chapter the regime established in the economic policy domain between the EU and Russia should be compared to the other two ones – security and rule. In the following chapter I will analyse the regime in the security policy realm established between Russia and the West within the framework of their cooperation in the OSCE and NATO.

[95] Ibid
[96] Quoted in the BBC, 20.04.2007 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6574615.stm (last accessed on May 6, 2007)

Chapter 3 – Russia-NATO and Russia-OSCE cooperation as a security regime

According to Czempiel international issue-areas are divided into three broad policy areas: security, economic, and rule.[97] He identifies the security domain as the "protection of physical existence against internal and external threats" and claims that security regime is the second most regime-conducive after the economic one, which states establish while cooperating in order to protect themselves from various security threats.[98] In this chapter I will evaluate the activities of Western members of NATO and the OSCE and Russia to form and maintain a regime within the security policy domain. The chapter consists of two parts – the first will assess NATO-Russia cooperation since the end of the Cold War to build a security regime, while in the second part those activities between the OSCE and Russia will be evaluated. Since the problem of distribution of relative gains is one of the main impediments to preserve the security regime I will analyse achievements and crisis in relations between the West and Russia through this prism.

3.1 Russia-NATO

In the first part of the chapter I will focus on certain periods of NATO-Russia relations which started right after the collapse of the Soviet Union and lasted till 1994. Then the first crisis situation posed mainly by NATO's aspiration to enlarge and consequent improvement of relations culminated by the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 will be assessed. The creation of the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and its activities will be evaluated. Special attention will be devoted to the Kosovo crisis; however, it will be argued that both parties and especially Russia, despite all its rhetoric and symbolic protest moves, acted quite cautiously in order to preserve the fundamental elements of the regime. The impact of the

[97] Hasencleves, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge", p. 192
[98] Ernst-Otto Czempiel quoted in Hasencleves, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge", p. 192

terrorist attacks of September 11 on the improvement of not only US-Russia but also consequently NATO-Russia relations will be assessed. A new phase in NATO-Russia relations marked by the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) will be assessed in the end of the first section.

Russia, as the successor of the USSR, has had very versatile relations with NATO. In the period of more than half a century the parties have managed to transform harsh confrontation of the Cold War period into close cooperation starting from the 1990s.

3.1.1 'Honeymoon' period

In December 1991 Russian leader Boris Yeltsin sent a letter to the leaders of NATO member-states where he stated that the long-term goal of his country was membership in the Alliance.[99] Smith argues that although the Western countries never responded to the letter with a specific answer, the letter contributed in the creation of a 'honeymoon' atmosphere in NATO-Russia relations.[100] Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) set up in December 1991. Russian expert Glinsky-Vasiliyev asserts that Russia did not fully used the potential of NACC which had almost the same list of member-states as the CSCE, the organization to which Russia rested its main hopes at that time.[101] However, the consultations within the NACC played a positive role in facilitating of the signing of the Tashkent agreement in May 1992 between the former Soviet republics (except for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) on the succession of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.[102]

[99] Martin Smith, "A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination? NATO-Russia relations, 1991-2002", European Security, vol.11, no. 4, Winter 2002, p. 59
[100] Ibid, p. 60
[101] Dmitri Glinsky-Vasiliyev, "NATO Eastward Enlargement as a Russian and European Security Problem" in Dmitri Trenin ed., *Russia and European Security Institutions: Entering the 21st century*, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2000, p. 112
[102] Ibid

3.1.2 Worsening of relations

By the beginning of 1994 when Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched the 'honeymoon' period in NATO-Russia relations was over. Although initially Russia perceived the PfP with an enthusiasm as an alternative to NATO enlargement[103] later Russia regarded the PfP as a preparation for admitting new members from the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to the Alliance.[104] Another Russian concern was its unwillingness to be treated on equal footing with the rest of former socialist block countries. Russia signed the Framework Document of the PfP only in June 1994 and presented its Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) only a year later. However, Russia did not participate on a regular basis both in the events within the PfP and those approved in the IPP and when in 1998 the IPP expired Russia refused to develop a new one.[105] Obviously, Russia was not satisfied with the format of cooperation with NATO on the same footing with small countries whose total armed forces were equal to one division of Russian armed forces. However, alongside this attitude towards the PfP, Russia, working on bilateral basis with the US, agreed to send its troops into the NATO-led Implementation Force and then Stabilization Force in Bosnia to serve under NATO command.[106] Moreover, the parties were negotiating on creation of a special framework for cooperation and by May 1997 they agreed to sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Obviously, Russia was dissatisfied with the situation and regarded the trend as giving unfair advantage to the opposite side, so it accepted a Western invitation to participate in the peacekeeping mission in the Balkans and regarded NATO's

[103] Ibid, p.114
[104] Yekaterina Stepanova, "Russia and NATO's Post Cold War Crisis Management Strategy" in Dmitri Trenin ed., *Russia and European Security Institutions: Entering the 21st century*, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2000, p. 114
[105] Ibid, p. 149
[106] Robert Hunter, "NATO-Russia Relations After 11 September", Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol.3, no. 3, 2003, p. 33

acceptance to negotiate special status for NATO-Russia cooperation as, at least partial, restoration of the balance of the distribution of the relative gains.

3.1.3 The NATO-Russia Founding Act

At a special summit meeting of NATO with participation of the Russian President Yeltsin in Paris in May 1997, a Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russian Federation was signed. The parties worked under strict time pressure since it was important to sign the document before formal invitation to join NATO for Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic was issued.[107] Taking into account Russian concerns NATO clearly stated that it had "no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members".[108] In general, ex-ambassador of the US to NATO Robert Hunter asserts that the NATO-Russia Founding Act on one hand was a concession to Russian vanity and on the other hand it reiterated that NATO was committed to preserving its military capacity and considering the interests of the central European countries.[109] A new institution entitled NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was established. It was envisaged that PJC would engage in activities on three main directions: regular consultations on a broad range of political or security related matters; development of joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel; provided there was consensus making joint decisions and even taking joint action.[110] It was agreed that the PJC would meet regularly on ministerial and ambassadorial levels, so toward that end Russia had to set up a mission to NATO.[111]

[107] Stepanova, "Russia and NATO's Post Cold War Crisis", p. 152
[108] Section IV, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russian Federation, 27 May, 1997
[109] Hunter, "NATO-Russia Relations After 11 September", p. 34
[110] Section II, the NATO-Russia Founding Act
[111] Smith, "A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination?, p. 65

The NATO-Russia Founding Act envisaged dozens of areas for cooperation including arms control, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, combating terrorism, military-to-military cooperation, cooperation in Theatre Missile Defense, air traffic safety and others. However, Hunter argues that this wide-range areas for cooperation "only served to obscure the major issues", and time showed that both parties were ready to "implement in major measure what they had agreed at Paris".[112] During the two years after the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act the parties limited themselves to the development of working plans and the discussion of organizational issues.[113] Russia was concerned that it was isolated from participation in major discussions and NATO decision-making process since the Founding Act stipulated that parties could not veto the independent actions of each other.[114] As Stepanova claims, the main failure of the PJC was that it did not become an institution where the parties could have consultations in crisis situations.[115] Partly this claim was confirmed by serious disagreements between NATO and Russia over Kosovo crisis. However, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and discussions within the framework of PJC were a step forward in reviving the security regime which was created between NATO and Russia after the deterioration of the relations in 1994-1996.

3.1.4 The Kosovo crisis

The Kosovo crisis posed the most serious disagreements between Russia and NATO since the end of the Cold War. Although Russia, along with the US, the UK, France, Germany, and Italy, was fully engaged into so-called 'Contact Group' which conducted the negotiations with

[112] Hunter, "NATO-Russia Relations After 11 September", p. 36
[113] Stepanova, "Russia and NATO's Post Cold War Crisis", p. 152
[114] Hunter, "NATO-Russia Relations After 11 September", p. 36
[115] Stepanova, "Russia and NATO's Post Cold War Crisis", p. 153

the government of the FRY, it was strongly against NATO military operation.[116] Stepanova argues that military operation against FRY was regarded in Russia as part of the process which also included two other elements: the admission of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in NATO and adoption by the Alliance of a new Strategic Concept which enhanced its zone of responsibility including the whole Euro-Atlantic area.[117] Moreover, Russia perceived NATO's decision on military operation against FRY in absence of appropriate mandate of the UN Security Council as an extremely dangerous international precedent and as the last blow to the legacy of the post-World War II world order.[118] All these factors only strengthened Russia's perception of imbalanced distribution of relative gains.

As a consequence, the Russian government responded to NATO-led air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in March 1999 by cutting off its structural links with the Alliance.[119] Russia withdrew its mission to NATO, put off talks on establishing a NATO mission in Russia and stopped participation in the PJC. While Kennedy-Pipe characterizes these measures as just largely symbolic,[120] Smith goes further and asserts that the Russian actions were carefully checked and targeted and it did not have serious consequences.[121] It is equally important, as Smith highlights, to mention what Russia did not do. Despite strong calls within Russia the Yeltsin government did not terminate its military presence in Bosnia as part of NATO-led SFOR.[122] Besides this, on a bilateral level Russia kept maintaining normal relations with the US and the rest of NATO member-states.[123] At the same time in certain cases Russia acted at first

[116] Hunter, "NATO-Russia Relations After 11 September", p. 36
[117] Stepanova, "Russia and NATO's Post Cold War Crisis", p. 154
[118] Ibid
[119] Smith, "A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination?, p. 68
[120] Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, "Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", in Mark Webber, ed., *Russia and Europe: Conflict of Cooperation?*, Houndsmills: MacMillan, 2000, p. 61
[121] Ibid
[122] Ibid
[123] Ibid

sight emotionally and irrationally like with much-talked-of 'dash to Pristina' by a 120-man military contingent of Russian militaries from SFOR in Bosnia. However, this kind of actions, most likely, was calculated for Russia's domestic political processes.

Smith identifies three main reasons why Russia chose the path of a limited disruption of relations with NATO. First, Russia was very cautious not to jeopardize the financial and economic support provided by the West.[124] It is worth mentioning that at peak of the crisis on Kosovo the Russian government was negotiating with the IMF for new loans and accepting next lots of food assistance from the EU.[125] Second, is the powerlessness of Russia, which was not in a position to stop bombardment of FRY.[126] Finally, Russia clearly was eager to avoid isolation[127] and to keep a security regime which had been developed by NATO and Russia since the end of the Cold War. Partly the last reason explains also Russia's decision to involve the Special Representative of the Russian President in Balkans ex-prime-minister Victor Chernomyrdin into the shuttle diplomacy to negotiate with Milosevich the plan which was called in Russia just 'NATO and world community plan'.[128] Consequently, Russia's decision to participate in the KFOR operation was another demonstration of its eagerness to remain positively engaged in security cooperation with its Western partners.[129]

Hunter regards the Kosovo crisis as the low point in NATO-Russia relations in the period after the NATO-Russia Founding Act; however, due to the reasons of mutual advantage – "if not of necessity – led to compatibility if not coalescence of positions over Kosovo"- the parties managed to restore their relations.[130] The frozen relations between the parties limited only to

[124] Smith, "A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination?, p. 68
[125] Kennedy-Pipe, "Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", p. 61
[126] Smith, "A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination?, p. 68
[127] Ibid
[128] Stepanova, "Russia and NATO's Post Cold War Crisis", p. 156
[129] Dov Lynch, "Russia faces Europe", Chaillot Papers no. 60, ISS, 2003, p.33
[130] Hunter, "NATO-Russia Relations After 11 September", p. 37

issues related to SFOR and KFOR started to melt after Secretary-General Lord Robertson's visit to Moscow in February 2000 by Putin's invitation.[131] In May of the same year Russia resumed its participation in the EAPC and parties agreed on reviving the PJC as well. The Kosovo crisis showed that Russia, although deeply concerned with the developments in the Balkans and further loosing to NATO in relative gains, was not ready to break the security regime, since this could have led to total weakening of its positions in military aspects of the security issues in Europe. At the same the West understood that Russia should be engaged into security cooperation and thus the former always considered the ways to meet certain Russian demands, which would preserve the security regime and at the same time would not constrain NATO's further strategic development.

3.1.5 September 11

The terrorist attacks on September 11 influenced the security cooperation between and among different players let alone NATO-Russia relations. The process of improvement of NATO-Russia relations got new incitement. The day after the attacks the North-Atlantic Council at its extraordinary meeting invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The very same day PJC gathered as well and issued a strong statement of support to NATO. Putin was among the first world leaders who called Bush and offered assistance; he also did not refuse US use of military facilities in former Soviet republics of Central Asia in war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Lynch argues that substantive cooperation in the global war against terrorism "emerged as a bridge between Russia and NATO",[132] moreover improved US-Russia relations could only have a positive impact over NATO-Russia relations. As a consequence, parallel to this cooperation, the parties negotiated deepening and enlarging of the institutional framework of

[131] Lynch, "Russia faces Europe", p.33
[132] Ibid, p. 34

NATO-Russia cooperation. As a result in May 2002 NATO and Russia agreed to set up a NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

3.1.6 The NATO-Russia Council

White, Korosteleva and Allison regard the establishment of the NRC as an attempt to "move beyond the frustrations of the PJC".[133] They assert that, for the West the hidden purpose of the NRC was to shift Russia's fixation on enlargement to the exploration of new possibilities for cooperation with NATO. Thus, since 2002 the NRC has become the key institution for the development of new agenda for cooperation between the two.[134] The parties agreed on nine areas of cooperation: struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and defense reform, civil emergencies, and new threats and challenges.[135] The NRC has been a significant step forward in comparison to the PJC since the former was based on the requirement for joint-decision making in a '20'[136] format, the format which does not exists for any other non-NATO country.[137]

Lynch argues that in many respects the NRC differs little from the PJC and even the nine areas of cooperation for the NRC in general repeat those discussed in the PJC.[138] Nevertheless, there are some significant changes, thus the NRC is chaired by the NATO Secretary General, member states consult the topics before meeting with Russia, and moreover any member state

[133] Stephen White, Julia Korosteleva, and Roy Allison, "NATO: the View from the East", vol. 15, no.2, June 2006, p. 167
[134] Allison, Light and White, "Putin's Russia and the enlarged Europe", p. 105
[135] NATO-Russia relations: A New Quality: Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b020528e.htm
[136] There 19 NATO member-states in 2002, so '20' format decisions meant decisions taken in a round-table with the participation of Russia on an equal footing
[137] White, Korosteleva and Allison, "NATO: the View from the East", p. 167
[138] Lynch, "Russia faces Europe", p.36

may withdraw a topic from discussion at the NRC.[139] At the same time, as White, Korosteleva and Allison argue, Russia also preserved what it understands under sovereignty, namely the parties agreed that the NRC would not discuss the domestic affairs or political values of each other.[140] These authors assert that Russia aspires for pragmatic cooperation with NATO on an equal footing, and is interested in deepening of relations with the Alliance unless these relations constrain its domestic politics or flexibility to pursue its strategic goals. Proceeding from this logic, it was not surprising that Russia rejected the proposal to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO. IPAP was introduced in 2002 with aim of supporting domestic reforms in wide range spheres, including defense, security and military realms, in the countries, which have a political will and ability to deepen their cooperation with NATO, through existing mechanisms of interaction with the Alliance.[141] However, White, Korosteleva and Allison stress that in the areas beyond domestic issues the parties discuss a variety of topics which fell under nine areas of cooperation within the NRC in about 20 NRC working groups, committees and expert groups.[142] According to them, Russia's signing in 2005 of the NATO PfP Status of Forces Agreement, which regulates the legal status of the parties' armed forces on the territory of each other, should be regarded as significant improvement of the interoperability between NATO and Russia in military activities. They also point to the fact that in the years 2004-2006 a significant number of NATO-Russia exercises were held aimed at improving military-to-military cooperation.

Starting from 2007 the relations between NATO and Russia entered into another phase of deterioration, which happened mainly because of two big areas of disagreement – the adapted

[139] Ibid, p. 37
[140] White, Korosteleva and Allison, "NATO: the View from the East", p. 168
[141] NATO's official web-site available at http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html
[142] White, Korosteleva and Allison, "NATO: the View from the East", p. 168

CFE Treaty and strategic missile defense. Arms control has been the area of discrepancy between NATO and Russia mainly due to the issue of a non-ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty by the Western countries. Besides this, Russia considers for a long time Baltic States' as new NATO members joining the CFE as extremely important. This problem is two fold: on one hand the Baltic states declared their readiness to join the CFE, but it is not possible until the treaty enters into force after the ratification by all signatory states, and on the other hand NATO member-states which have to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty regard the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova in accordance with the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit decision as a prerequisite for ratification.[143] Putin on April 26, 2007 in his annual address to the nation stated that Russia should announce a moratorium on its implementation of the CFE Treaty. Partly Russia's decision on the CFE can be regarded as a response to US decision to base the facilities of anti-missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic. On April 27, 2007 both issues were discussed at the NRC meeting in Oslo and it seems that parties still have serious disagreements over these problems.

As the research shows, NATO-Russia cooperation is a sequence of phases of good relations and phases of deteriorations of these relations, which can be explained by periodical shifting of the distribution of relative gains in favor of the West and Russia's attempts to resist this process.

The second pillar of Russian policy towards European security has been the OSCE.

3.2 Russia-OSCE

In this second part of the chapter I will focus on OSCE-Russia relations which date back to the beginning of 1970s. However, this section will deal with the developments in Russia-

[143] Danilov, "Russia and European Security", p. 91

OSCE relations started after the end of the Cold War. It will be argued here that after the short period of idealism in the relations between the parties, Russia pursued the path of radical reforms in the OSCE in order to transform the latter into the umbrella organization for a pan-European security system. Special attention will be devoted to the Russian attempts get the OSCE's agreement for third-party peacekeeping (i.e. use of CIS peacekeeping mechanism) in the settlement of the regional conflicts under the auspices of the OSCE in the former Soviet republics and to Russia's activities over the Charter for European Security. An evaluation of Russia-OSCE relations under Putin will be presented in the end of the section. As an overall conclusion it will be argued that Russia's reluctance to break the organization and the West's partial acceptance of Russia's demands in order to keep a more or less balanced distribution of relative gains have preserved the regime so far.

For decades the OSCE (since 1 January 1995 the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became the OSCE) has taken a significant place in the Russian foreign policy. The OSCE is the only international organization, among those which are considered in this paper, of which the Soviet Union was a co-founder in 1975. Benediktov claims that foundations for the CSCE were laid down five years earlier in 1970 in Geneva when the Soviet Union and the West conducted negotiations which resulted in the signing of several security agreements including the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1).[144] According to him, although the CSCE was the framework for establishment and development of a security regime between the Soviet Union and the West, in the period from its foundation in 1975 till the end of the Cold War the Conference used to be more an instrument for public policy, rather than acting component part of

[144] Kirill Benediktov, "Russia and the OSCE: Real and Perceived Possibilities for Cooperation", in Dmitri Trenin, ed., *Russia and European Security Institutions: Entering the 21st century*, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 2000, p.173

the European security policy. However, the end of the Cold War led to the adaptation of the CSCE to new realities.

By the 1989 the CSCE became a main pillar of the Soviet European policy when the concept of a 'common European home' became a central idea of Gorbachev's 'new thinking'.[145] Global changes resulted in the adoption in 1990 of one of the CSCE's cornerstone documents of the post-Cold War period – the Paris Charter. Dunay argues that there was a fundamental difference of a new agreement from the principles agreed upon during the 1970's.[146] If during the Cold War two opposing systems had to compromise in order to reach an agreement, then in the Paris Charter all participating states unanimously shared the basic principles of the new European system, which leads Dunay to assert that strategic partnership prevailed among former adversaries.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, its successor state Russia pursued a clear goal to transform the CSCE into the European security organization, since this was the only organization where Russia and other major players were equal members.[147] Dunay identifies three phases of the evolution of the Russian foreign policy since 1991: first, the Yeltsin-Kozyrev phase (1991-1996) based on a weak Russia and a dependent foreign policy; second, the Yeltsin-Primakov (1997-2000) phase characterized as a weak Russia and an independent foreign policy; third, the Putin era (since 2000) described as a strong Russia and an independent foreign policy.[148] According to Dunay these three phases are observed in Russia-OSCE relations as well.[149]

[145] Dov Lynch, "Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe", in Mark Webber, ed., *Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation?*, Houndsmills: MacMillan, 2000, p. 101
[146] Pal Dunay, "The OSCE in crisis", Chaillot Paper No.88, Institute for Security Studies, 2006, p. 21
[147] Hans Hokkerup, "Russia, the OSCE and Post-Cold-War European Security", Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 18, no.3, 2005, p. 371
[148] Dunay, "The OSCE in crisis", p. 68
[149] Ibid, p. 69

3.2.1 'Romantic Westernism'

Lynch describes the very early period of cooperation between the OSCE and Russia as 'romantic westernism' on the part of the latter.[150] He observes that Russian foreign policy was focused on the development of 'all-azimuth partnership', which led to the downgrading of the importance of the CSCE. The Yeltsin government were eager to develop closer relations with NATO considering even full membership. At the same time, Russia pressed towards involving the CSCE in mediation in armed conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet republics since by March 1992 they all had joined the CSCE.[151] Thus, the CSCE became engaged in the conflict in Transdnestria (Moldova) and in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. There is no doubt that pursuing such a policy Russia actively involved itself in all these peacekeeping policies. As Lynch notes Russia's peacekeeping policy was "explicitly inclusive" and it supported a decision to discuss procedures for the CSCE peacekeeping at the CSCE Summit held in Helsinki in July 1992.[152]

At the Helsinki Summit the member-states also decided to establish a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). Russia, at that time was quite concerned over the 20-million Russian-speaking minorities in the former Soviet republics and proposed to launch the OSCE field missions in Estonia and Latvia to deal with the problems of national minorities in these countries, where unlike in Lithuania Russian speakers were not granted citizenship.[153] Benediktov assesses the HCNM activities positively and as consistently defending the rights of Russian speakers in the Baltic States.[154] Although Russia's minority protection policy is more

[150] Lynch, "Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe", p. 106
[151] Ibid, p. 107
[152] Ibid
[153] Wolfgang Zellner, "Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment", Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 18, no.3, 2005, p.395
[154] Benediktov, "Russia and the OSCE", p.206

likely an instrument to criticize the West, the latter's attitude toward Russia's demands can be characterized as an effort to keep more or less the balance in the distribution of relative gains.

3.2.2 Deterioration of relations

Lynch characterizes the relations between the CSCE and Russia as worsening after the Helsinki Summit.[155] Dunay points that it was related to Moscow's policy to transform the CSCE into the main forum for European political coordination and decision-making.[156] Ghebali explains Russia's attempt to create an OSCE-based European security system as the response to NATO's enlargement plans.[157] He identifies three main directions through which Russia strived to upgrade its status within the CSCE which it wanted to strengthen. According to Ghebali, first, Russia proposed that the CSCE be transformed into an international legal organization with an 'Executive Committee' on the top to consist of permanent and rotating members; second, Russia suggested that all three security dimensions of the CSCE be strengthened with an establishment of a fund to finance 'CIS peacekeeping'; third, Russia insisted on a division of labour among all European security organizations through signing of formal agreements. He argues that partly Russia's proposals were met, namely the CSCE Budapest Summit renamed the CSCE into the OSCE.

The CSCE Helsinki Document of 1992 envisaged the possibility of seeking a support of international institutions and organizations, such as the EU, NATO, and the WEU and as well as the CIS peacekeeping mechanisms.[158] This clause can be regarded as a sign to provide a proportionate distribution of relative gains as suggested by the hypothesis in the first chapter of

[155] Lynch, "Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe", p. 107
[156] Dunay, "The OSCE in crisis", p. 69
[157] Victor-Yves Ghebali, "Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Pan-European Expectations", Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 3, 2005, p. 377
[158] The Challenges of Change, CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4046_en.pdf

this paper in order to preserve the regime. Russia was denied the membership in the EU and NATO, so it was necessary to make it clear to Russia that it was not excluded from the security arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Soviet Union just collapsed and Russia, which had already lost its influence in the CEE, strove for the West's recognition of Russia's exclusive rights over the territory of former Soviet republics as its exclusive zone of interest and influence.

Thus, Russia actively promoted this idea and tried to get the CSCE's support for its peacekeeping.[159] At the Budapest Summit in 1994 Russia's proposal for third-party peacekeeping in the settlement of the regional conflicts under the auspices of the OSCE, i.e. use of CIS peacekeeping mechanisms, faced almost unanimous harsh criticism and failed. However, Russia did not abandon from its attempts to transform the OSCE into the umbrella organization for the pan-European security system. Proceeding from this, Russia proposed to develop the Charter for European Security.

3.2.3 From Lisbon to Istanbul

Thus, the Charter for European Security became the main issue around which the relations between the OSCE and Russia evolved prior and after the Lisbon Summit. Lisbon Summit Document noticed that the OSCE would consider developing a Charter for European security[160] which was regarded by Russia as a success.[161] After the Lisbon Summit the parties agreed to draft a Charter for European Security. Russia did not give up its plans to transform the OSCE into the pan-European security organization and continued proposing a revision of the OSCE's structures, an upgrade the political role of the Secretary General, the establishment of a mechanism which would deal with economic and environmental challenges, and the development

[159] Lynch, "Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe", p. 109
[160] Lisbon Summit Document 1996 available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1996/12/4049_en.pdf
[161] Benediktov, "Russia and the OSCE", p.190

of the OSCE's capacity for peacekeeping operations. However, Russia did not gain the support from the other OSCE countries and as a result the negotiations of the Charter for European Security "represented for Russia a trying and frustrating exercise".[162] The OSCE's failure to prevent or condemn NATO-led military operation in Kosovo was more serious blow to Russian ambitions for the OSCE.[163] As Danilov notes, Russia's attempts to create a hierarchical structure for a pan-European security system under the OSCE proved to be not only unsuccessful but also counter-productive.[164] Zellner agrees with this argument and, moreover, claims that Russia after the Kosovo crisis had to accept that the OSCE even became to be an instrument of NATO.[165]

For Lynch, it is not surprising that Russia became more critical of the OSCE; however Moscow did not abandon from its attempts to pursue, although with less energy and enthusiasm, the OSCE's reform agenda with two aims.[166] As he observes, first, Russia continued its activities to create a pan-European security system with the OSCE on the top; second, Moscow has clearly tried to allow the other states to use the OSCE against Russia.

Danilov asserts that at the Istanbul Summit Russia finally abandoned from the idea to make the OSCE the primary organization in a hierarchical European security system.[167] Russia along with other member-states approved a non-hierarchical model of interlocking security organizations in Europe, where the OSCE was responsible mainly for human rights monitoring, the all-European political dialogue, possible peacekeeping missions, and as an arena for disarmament and arms control negotiations. However, Ghebali points that Russia also gained two concessions at the Istanbul Summit. The first, was a signing of the adapted CFE Treaty – an "instrument whose provisions were expected to limit the destabilizing effects of NATO's

[162] Ghebali, "Growing Pains at the OSCE", p. 378
[163] Lynch, "Russia faces Europe", p. 41
[164] Danilov, "Russia and European Security", p.91
[165] Zellner, "Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment", p.393
[166] Lynch, "Russia faces Europe", p. 42
[167] Danilov, "Russia and European Security", p.92

enlargement"; and the second, the OSCE countries condemned terrorism in all its forms in North Caucasus and reaffirmed the acknowledgement of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.[168] These concessions can also be evaluated as the West's deliberate sharing of relative gains in the course of maintaining the security regime.

As a result, as Danilov observes, Russia began to lose interest in the OSCE, which became for Moscow just another security organizations.[169] He explains also Russia's loss of interest in the OSCE by the general weakening of the organization. Danilov rightly observes that the main functions of the OSCE have been shifting to other European organizations. It especially became so after the enlargement of NATO and the EU, development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as well as more active role by the Council of Europe (COE) in human rights area.

3.2.4 OSCE-Russia relations under Putin

Freire argues that Russia, being one the principal supporters of the OSCE, is at the same time one of its most "controversial" members.[170] She also emphasizes that Russia has opposed the OSCE's role in peacekeeping and arms control further spreading in the CIS, which can lead to limitation of its freedom of action in the former Soviet republics, especially in peacekeeping. Although, as Freire observes, Russia did not veto the OSCE's decision to involve the latter in the former Soviet Union, Moscow has succeeded in preventing the OSCE's full participation in the problems on the territory of the CIS. At the same time President Putin has underlined that the OSCE should regard all crisis situations in the member-states in a balanced way and should be engaged not only in the former Soviet Union area but also in former Yugoslavia or Northern

[168] Ghebali, "Growing Pains at the OSCE", p. 379
[169] Danilov, "Russia and European Security", p.94
[170] Maria Raquel Freire , Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union, Aldershot: Ashgate,2003, p. 100

Ireland as well.[171] According to Danilov, the Putin government after the period of relative loss to the OSCE has chosen the path of reviving the OSCE with the main objective of strengthening the organization.[172] He asserts that Moscow believes that if the OSCE is reformed the potential of the organization can be extended. He also argues that promoting such reform, Moscow has directed its criticism towards the state of affairs in the OSCE. Only this time Russia, taking into account its previous negative experience of isolation, managed to build a coalition with some CIS partners to propose to remove functional and geographic imbalances in the OSCE's activity. In sum, as Ghebali concludes, Russia under Putin has subordinated the continuation of its cooperation with the OSCE to the reforms of the organization.[173] In response, the Western countries agreed to improve certain areas of the OSCE's activities. Ghebali also argues that, as a result, the OSCE took three kinds of measures. First, he mentions decisions aimed at increasing the governments' control over OSCE institutions and activities. As the second, he identifies the decisions with an aim to 'rebalance' the three security dimensions of the OSCE activities, especially in favour of economic and environmental issues. Finally, Ghebali points to the decisions with the purpose to enhance the political and security relevance of the OSCE. All these measures did not meet the high expectations of Russia but can be again regarded as another effort of the West to satisfy at least some demands of Moscow in order to decrease the concerns of the latter about unbalanced distribution of the relative gains.

Ghebali asserts that the future of the OSCE depends on the "real political value" that the West attaches to it and on Russia's position not to demolish the only all-European security organization where Russia's participation is fully legitimate. In principle, despite all disagreements and crisis in relations between the OSCE and Russia both sides has followed so far

[171] Ibid, p. 101
[172] Danilov, "Russia and European Security", p.93
[173] Ghebali, "Growing Pains at the OSCE", p. 388

the Ghebali's recommendation and preserved the fundamentals of the security regime which foundations were laid down more than three decades ago.

3.3 Conclusion

The security regime between the West and Russia based on their cooperation in the framework of NATO-Russia and OSCE-Russia relations has been assessed in this chapter.

The main feature of the cooperation between Russia and both of the organizations is a recurring deterioration of the relations. As it was claimed in the theoretical part it is explained by the problem of the relative gains, which is one of the main impediments for cooperation of the actors in the security filed. In case with Russia-NATO cooperation, after each phase of worsening of the relations the parties tried to establish and develop mechanisms which were aimed at meeting Russia's concerns over the disproportionate distribution of relative gains. The relations between the OSCE and Russia have evolved around Russia's consistent pursue for the OSCE's reformation and transformation of the latter into the umbrella organization for the pan-European security system. By pursuing this policy Russia aspired to compensate unfair advantage (in Russia's view) which the West gained as a consequence of NATO's both quantitative and qualitative enlargement.

Nevertheless, both cases the West and Russia have shown their commitment to maintain the security regime. Even at the peak of the crisis situations, like for example during the Kosovo crisis, Russia resorted to the actions and measure characterized as mainly symbolic, which did not damage the fundamentals of the regime. The research has also shown that the intensity of OSCE-Russia cooperation is lower than that of NATO-Russia, which is explained by the overall crisis in the OSCE caused by shifting of main functions from all three dimensions of the organization's activities to the enlarged NATO and the EU, and the exclusion of the OSCE by the

COE in the fields of human rights and rule of law. Exactly the regime identified by Czempiel as rule will be evaluated in the framework of COE-Russia relations in the next chapter.

Chapter 4 – Russia-Council of Europe cooperation as a rule regime

The third broad policy area identified by Czempiel is *rule*, defined as the "allocation of opportunities for exercising freedom and for political participation".[174] He argues that issue-areas belonging to this domain, best epitomized by human rights issues, are least amenable to cooperation out of three considered in this thesis.[175] As it was argued in the first chapter, rule regime is the most fragile since cooperation is threatened because it reveals a values gap or, in other words, exposes differences in identities of Russia and the COE. In this chapter I will evaluate the relations between Russia and the COE from the perspective of a rule regime. First, Russia's path to the admission into the COE, which started with the Cold War, will be evaluated. Then Russia's compliance with the obligations it undertook upon admission will be assessed. Special attention will be given to the Chechen war as vivid example of gross violations of human rights. I will also evaluate the outcomes of the Russian chairmanship in the COE in 2006. In the end it will be argued that identity concerns play the main role in making the rule regime least amenable.

In the second half of the 1980s new Soviet leadership introduced a 'New Thinking' strategy in their foreign policy. Hansen argues that it strove for recognition of the Soviet Union as a 'normal country' and thus for restoration of the status of the 'civilized' state.[176] He asserts that the new interest of the Soviet Union was to "redraw the boundaries between 'us' and 'them" in order to adopt a new identity, the identity of the former rival. Namely within the precincts of the COE Gorbachev outlined his vision of a 'common European home' while delivering a speech at the session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE (PACE) in 1989. One month later the

[174] Hasencleves, Mayer and Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge", p. 192
[175] Hasencleves, Mayer and Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes*, p. 63
[176] Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, "Explaining Russian Endorsement of the CFSP and the ESDP", Security Dialogue, vol.33, no. 4, December 2002, p. 449

Soviet parliament was granted a pre-membership 'special guest status' in the PACE.[177] In March 1990 the COE's Committee of Ministers at its special meeting welcomed the 'important reforms' conducted by the Soviet Union and decided to start closer cooperation with the USSR.[178] As a consequence the Soviet Union joined seven COE conventions covering the sphere of culture and started to take part in a number of COE expert committees.[179]

4.1 Russia's thorny path towards membership

After the collapse of the Soviet Union special guest status was extended to the Russian parliament and in May 1992 the Yeltsin government officially applied for full membership in the COE. Webber notes that after Russia's application the Committee of Ministers of the COE in June 1992 agreed unanimously to support the membership of Russia provided that Moscow conducted reforms to improve the situation in the fields of human rights, democracy and rule of law.[180] However, this favourable trend of developments was interrupted by two major domestic problems within Russia and the accession process was delayed till February 1996. First, the conflict between President Yeltsin and the parliament erupted, which decreased Russia's interest in the COE. The conflict was solved with use of armed forces, when battle tanks shot point-blank at the building of the parliament in the centre of Moscow. Despite non-peaceful resolution of the conflict between the executive and legislative branches, the COE Vienna Summit in October 1993 issued a 'Declaration on Russia' which supported President Yeltsin's democratic leadership.[181] The second problem was the war in Chechnya. Russia invaded Chechnya in December 1994 and in February 1995 PACE adopted a resolution in which it unreservedly

[177] Mark Webber, ed., *Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation?*, Houndsmills: MacMillan, 2000, pp. 126-127
[178] Ibid
[179] Ibid
[180] Ibid, p. 129
[181] Ibid

condemned the "indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by the Russian military, in particular against the civilian population" and decided to suspend the procedure concerning Russia's membership in the organization.[182]

PACE continued its harsh criticism of Moscow's policy in Chechnya during the whole period of the war. The negotiations on Russia's admission were resumed by the end of 1995 when the officials of the COE were allowed to visit Chechnya and fragile cease-fire agreement was achieved.[183] In its resolution PACE, recognizing that Russia was "seeking a political solution to the Chechnya conflict", decided to restart procedures for an "opinion on Russia's request for membership".[184]

On February 28, 1996 Russia was admitted into the COE as the 39th member. The attitude towards this decision was different on the side of human rights groups and key members of the Committee of the Ministers of the COE. In fact, human rights groups, as Jackson observes, insisted that Russia's admission was premature due to the gross human rights violations not only in Chechnya but all over the country.[185] However, key members of the COE, being aware about the real situation in Russia, nevertheless, as Jackson argues, they inclined to regard Russia's admission as a strategic political decision that would involve Russia in Europe and the COE's human rights regime and uphold Yeltsin and the nascent human rights regime in the country. Massias calls this twofold approach a combination of 'geopolitical pragmatism' and 'democratic hope'.[186] The presidential elections in June 1996 in Russia played a role in taking a decision to

[182] Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1055 (02 February 1995), available at http://assembly.coe.int//main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/documents/adoptedtext/ta95/eres1055.htm#1
[183] William Jackson, "Russia and the Council of Europe: the Perils of Premature Admission",Problems of Post-Communism, vol.51, no.5, September/October 2004, p. 25
[184] Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1065 (29 September 1995) available at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc96/edoc7443.htm#Footnote4
[185] Jackson, "Russia and the Council of Europe, p. 25
[186] Jean-Pierre Massias, "Russia and the Council of Europe: Ten Years Wasted?", French Institute of International Relations, Paris, 2007, p. 6

admit the country into the organization since the communists together with the anti-Yeltsin political groups posed quite serious challenge to the president. It should be noted that Russia's commitment to settle the conflict with Chechnya on the basis of negotiations was an indispensable condition for the admission into the COE.[187]

Being admitted in the COE, Russia committed itself to dozens of obligations reflected in the PACE's opinion no. 193. These obligations covered wide range of issues in almost all spheres of political, economic, social, cultural, religious life in Russia. Most important for the purpose of this chapter among dozens of others, Russia undertook an obligation to join the European Convention on Human Rights, abolish the death penalty, settle internal disputes by peaceful means, and adopt a new legislation providing freedom of assembly. Moscow also agreed to refrain from using the term 'near abroad' in relation to former Soviet republics, which Russia still considers as its zone of special influence, but unfortunately mentioned phrase is wide-used by the Russian political establishment and political commentators in the state-run television channels. Russia also agreed to withdraw its armed forces from the territory of Moldova till the end of 1997, however, 10 years later and despite identical commitment in accordance with the decision of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit this obligation has not been yet fully fulfilled.

One of the issues which has attracted much criticism is the Russia's attitude towards capital punishment.[188] Russia signed Protocol 6 to the ECHR requiring the abolition of the death penalty but has not yet ratified it. In August 1996 Yeltsin introduced a moratorium and in 1999 in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court cannot be applied without introducing of civil juries in all regions of the country, and the latter created a gap in the legal system which made capital punishment impossible. However, in accordance with new Criminal Procedural

[187] Jackson, "Russia and the Council of Europe, p. 25
[188] Massias, "Russia and the Council of Europe: Ten Years Wasted?", p. 11

Code entered into force since 1 January 2007 civil juries are expected to be introduced in all subjects of the Russian Federation which eventually could lead to the restoration of the capital punishment. Massias notes that in 2006, 74% of Russians supported the death penalty[189] which shows that even ten years after admission into the COE Russia's attitude has not changed.

4.2 Second War in Chechnya

Despite a peaceful agreement signed by the Russian officials and the Chechen leaders in 1996 and elections of Maskhadov as President of Chechnya, Russia boycotted the official government of Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya and supported Chechen criminal groups in order to destabilize the situation in this de-facto independent country. By second half of 1999 the relations Russo-Chechen finally deteriorated and Russia launched a military attack breaking the obligation to resolve all disputes by peaceful means, which it undertook upon admission into organization. As a consequence, Jackson notes, in April 2000 PACE adopted a resolution which suspended the voting rights of the Russian delegation to the PACE and recommended that the Committee of Ministers start the process of expulsion of Russia from the COE.[190] However, the Committee of the Ministers and especially leading governments of 'old' Europe refused to follow PACE's recommendation and in 2001 the Russian delegation's voting rights were restored.[191]

Jackson argues that this decision was partly influenced by Russia's consent to set up a PACE task force to restore a peace in Chechnya, to be chaired by Lord Frank Judd, chair of the PACE committee on human rights issues in Chechnya and Dmitrii Rogozin, head of Russian delegation in PACE. However, as he observes, the group made little progress,[192] which is not surprising taking into account that Rogozin is one of the well-known nationalist politicians who

[189] Ibid
[190] Ibid, p.29
[191] Ibid
[192] Ibid,

was sued for using in his election campaign a clip in which the immigrants from the Caucasus were deliberately insulted. In comparison with the Yeltsin government Russia under Putin became less susceptible to criticism on the side of the West. Moreover, as Jordan argues, after 11 September 2001 Russia even further disregarded reprehension and Putin himself "made clear that they would not accept strong criticism of the way Russia authorities are waging war in Chechnya".[193]

4.3 Russia's Chairmanship

In 2006, for the first time, Russia chaired the Committee of Ministers of the COE for six month. It happened on the tenth anniversary of Russia's accession into the organization and as Melzer observes event after a decade as full member of the council the country still fell short of all three COE's objectives: human rights, democracy, and rule of law.[194] As Melzer notes, human rights organizations protested against Russia's chairmanship in the Committee of the Ministers of the COE since the country fails to comply with the decisions of the European Court on Human Rights and still refuses to settle the conflict in Chechnya by peaceful means. However, Terry Davis the Secretary General of the COE in his article supported the Russian chairmanship listing the benefits which both parties had gained and pointing to great expectations which the COE had from Russia's chairmanship.[195] Melzer notes that Russia during its six-month chairmanship conducted 30 various events: conferences, high-level meetings of European judges and prosecutors, workshops, and several committee sessions in Moscow, which dealt with issues

[193] Pamela Jordan, "Russia's Accession to the Council of Europe and Compliance with European Human Rights Norms", Demokratizatsiya, spring 2003, p. 291
[194] Olaf Melzer, "Poor Record. The Russian Chairmanship of the Council of Europe 2006", in Russian analytical digest, no.12, 19 December 2006, p. 3, available at http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/details.cfm?lng=en&id=26950
[195] Terry Davis, "Russia Deserves to Lead the Council of Europe", International Herald Tribune, 24 May 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/24/opinion/eddavis.php

including democracy, civil society, human rights, NGOs and others.[196] Although Russia had chosen a wide range of directions in the COE's activities as priorities for its chairmanship, Melzer indicates that the largest number of events fell into the priority area which covers spheres of culture, education, science, youth and sport. He stresses that this is an area which does not include controversial issues. Based on Russia's policy during its chairmanship Melzer argues that Russia subtly tried to "dilute the core competencies" of the organization.[197] He notes minor but very important 'mistakes' in both oral and written statements of the Russian officials, for example 'the common European legal space' becomes a 'common European space' or democratic principles of the COE turns into 'traditional democracy'. Melzer concludes that Russia's chairmanship record was poor and was aimed at shifting COE core competencies away from human rights towards economic, social, and cultural issues. Moreover, he underlines that the value gap between Russia and the COE has become even more obvious. The values gap is recognized both by Russian and European scholars. Well-known Russian researcher Karaganov admits that there is difference in political cultures which is historically given.[198] Nevertheless, Russians repel any partnership with the EU as far as normative convergence is concerned and regard it as an encroachment on their sovereignty.[199] Thus, Russia's chairmanship revealed once again that the country cooperates with the COE to a degree which does not undermine the fundamentals of "unique" Russian identity.

[196] Melzer, "Poor Record. The Russian Chairmanship of the Council of Europe 2006", p. 3
[197] Ibid, p. 4
[198] Sergey Karaganov, "Realniye dogovory i pustiye declaratsii" (Real agreements and empty declarations), 09 April, 2007, available at http://globalaffairs.ru/redcol/7225.html (last accessed on 09 April, 2007)
[199] Allison, Light and White, "Putin's Russia", p. 76

4.4 Two constituents of regime preservation

The rule regime established between Russia and the COE is fragile. The COE's ability to stop Russia from fully slipping into harsh authoritarianism, as recent years show, has been quite weak. Despite all efforts to speed up the transformation of the identity of Russia into the democratic one, Russia still remains strongly authoritarian with poor human rights record and weak rule of law. Only atrocities committed by the Russian authorities in Chechnya have been more than enough in order to expel the country from the organization. Nevertheless, it has not yet happened because of two main reasons identified by Webber.

First, the COE has a certain effect through its human rights instruments.[200] He argues that acceptance by Russia of the right of the citizens for individual petition to the European Court on Human Rights leads to the situation when judgements of the Court form negative opinions on Russian authorities and create standard against which Russia's adherence to democratic changes can be evaluated. Russia clearly understands this and evidently its reluctance to join the Protocol 14, aimed at improving the efficiency of the Court in the light of the continuing increase in the workload of the Court, can be explained from this perspective. Besides, Russia is the only COE member which has not yet ratified this Protocol and blocked the budget increase for the Court in spite of the agreement reached in 2005. All these developments prove that the Russian authorities have no intentions to change its behaviour which eventually can lead to reshaping of its identity and international interests.

The second reason, to which Webber points, is the Russian-COE relationship, which involves the "consolidation of Russia's European orientation and its integration into European institutions".[201] For Weber, Russia's desire for membership in the COE stems from the pragmatic

[200] Webber, *Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation?*, p. 144
[201] Ibid, p. 145

considerations of the former to avoid isolation and to have a say in European politics. He also argues that, once admitted, Russia is eager to stay in and wants to be regarded as playing by the rules of the organization because otherwise the risk of being rebuked and even expelled highly increases. As we can see thought-out purposeful policy to change its identity does not fit into pragmatic foreign policy of Russia.

4.5 Conclusion

The rule regime established between Russia and the West in the framework of their relations within of the COE is fragile. The regime lasts mainly because of Russia's pragmatic interest to be involved into European politics and the COE's belief that by keeping Russia in organization it can exert, albeit weak, influence over Russia through its human rights mechanisms. The COE which was supposed to play an important role in helping Russia to transform into fully democratic state has failed to prevent the country's de-democratization in recent years. The notion of "sovereign democracy" introduced by the Kremlin in 2006 shows that Russia after ten years of membership in the COE is reluctant to change its identity. There is democracy based on principles of human rights, democratic governance and rule of law adhered to by the Western countries. Although, Russia's "sovereign democracy" neither contest nor rejects democratic values but it subordinates them to its national interests.[202] Thus, the weakness of the rule regime is conditioned by the Russia's reluctance to deepen cooperation since it touches upon the fundamentals of its identity which is clearly different from that of the West and which Russia is not yet ready to give up.

[202] Massias, "Russia and the Council of Europe: Ten Years Wasted?", p. 14

Conclusion

This thesis has tested the hypothesis put forward by Czempiel, who divided issue-areas of the international politics into three broad policy domains (economic, security and rule) and argues that economic domain is the most amenable to good cooperation, rule domain is the least regime-conducive, and the security domain is between the other two. In particular, I have analyzed Russia-EU relations as an economic regime, Russia-NATO and Russia-OSCE relations as a security regime, and Russia-COE as a rule regime.

The cases of the EU, NATO and the COE have showed that Russia right after the collapse of the Soviet Union by declaring its European choice aspired to become full member of these European organizations. After a short period of 'romantic westernism' Moscow faced a firm Western demand for fundamental political and economic reforms with real outcomes in order to allow Russia in.

However, as this research shows, conditionality on side of the West has not precluded the establishment of steadily progressing economic cooperation between Russia and the EU. Basic legal documents, as well as mechanisms and instruments set up by the parties have been served for the maximization of economic benefits, since the parties have not been concerned with relative gains and have been purely interested in absolute gains. As the research demonstrates even at the peak of the confrontation since the end of the Cold War over the Kosovo crisis, Russia and the West maintained normal economic relations on a bilateral level, and exactly in those months of crisis the Russian government was negotiating with the IMF for new loans and in keeping with their obligations did not interrupt the energy supply of the EU countries. This shows that issue-areas in the economic domain are the most regime-conducive.

If in case of the economic regime actors with common interests search for the ways to maximize absolute gains, in the security regime distribution of relative gains becomes one of the main obstacles to sustain the regime. The relations between the OSCE and Russia have evolved around Russia's consistent pursue for the OSCE's reformation and transformation the latter into the umbrella organization for the pan-European security system. The research shows that in both cases the West and Russia have shown their commitment to maintain the security regime. The relations between the parties have been exposed to more crisis situations in comparison with the economic regime. It is explained mainly by Russia's concerns over disproportionate distribution of relative gains in case of NATO eastward enlargement, NATO-led military campaign in Kosovo, NATO's new strategic concept which enhanced its zone of responsibility including the territory of the former Soviet Union. Those Russian concerns led to the deterioration of the relations with the West, and the latter proposed certain mechanisms which have been aimed at re-balancing of the relative gains.

Russia decided to make up the losses of relative gains in the relations with NATO in the relations with the OSCE. Since Russia was the full member of the OSCE its main idea was to form a hierarchical all-European security system with the OSCE on the top. Obviously, the Western countries never allowed to supplement NATO as the main security organization in the Euro-Atlantic area, but at the same time partially met certain Russian concerns such as sighing of the Adapted CFE Treaty, taking decisions with the purpose to enhance the political and security relevance and consequently the profile of the organization, support for Russia's fight against 'terrorism' in the North Caucasus. This is another illustration of the importance of the relative gains problems for the security regime. Overall, I claim that distribution of relative gains is not proportionate and it is not in favour of Russia, nevertheless, it is on level, which keeps Russia in the security regime and precludes it from breaking.

The research has also shown the difference of the intensity of Russia-OSCE cooperation from that of Russia-NATO. The intensity of Russia-OSCE relations is obviously lower, which can be explained by the overall crisis in the OSCE caused by shifting of main functions from all three dimensions of the organization's activities to the enlarged NATO and the EU, steady development of the ESDP, and the exclusion of the OSCE by the COE in the fields of human rights and rule of law.

The last regime examined was rule, and I have argued that rule regime is the most fragile since cooperation is threatened because it reveals a values gap or, in other words, exposes differences in identities of Russia and the COE. Analysis of Russia's compliance with the obligations it undertook upon admission, atrocities committed by the Russian authorities in the Chechen war, and the outcomes of the Russian chairmanship in the COE in 2006 has supported the hypothesis and proved that rule domain is the least regime-conducive. The main obstacle has been the identity concerns, expressed in Russia's heavy opposition to adopt new norms and rules which could eventually lead to bridging the values gap.

Putin's deliberate policy of the deterioration of relations with the West, which has become obvious since the beginning of 2007, appears to be aimed at, among other objectives, further damaging relations with the West in order to isolate the country from any foreign penetration in the coming year. From now on and till the Presidential elections in March 2008 the main task of the Russian elite will be to support smooth power handover to Putin's successor. If such a scenario prevails, then weakening of the economic, security and rule regimes are not excluded, but in any case, as the findings of this research show, the hierarchy of the regimes will remain the same.

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