THE IMPACT OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT ON PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

By

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ABSTRACT

The present research explores the impact of the form of government (the regime type) on party system institutionalization in post-communist European democracies. It is closely related to two topics in comparative politics. On the one hand, it is built on the literature which examines the impact of the party system on the stability and effectiveness of different constitutional regimes; however, it reverses the direction of the relationship. On the other hand, it is related to the literature which investigates the factors of party system institutionalization and its impact on democratic consolidation and the quality of democracy.

The hypothesis raised in the research is that everything else being equal, the level of party system institutionalization should be lower in more presidential systems. Three party system institutionalization dimensions are considered: the pattern of party competition, the strength of party roots in society, and the legitimacy of parties and elections. The paper rejects the traditional dichotomy or trichotomy of the forms of government and operationalizes the impact of the regime type by four indicators: the vote share of non-partisan presidential elections, presidential power and relationship between the presidency and parliament. Two methods are used to confirm the hypothesis: statistical analysis and the case study of Lithuania.

The paper finds significant support to the hypothesis: direct presidential elections and powerful presidencies impede party system institutionalization on all three dimensions. However, the impact of constitutional arrangements is mediated by such factors as the number of presidential candidates, the personalization of presidential elections, and the relationship between the presidency and parliament. Therefore, to achieve a better understanding of the relationship between party system institutionalization and the form of government, the further research should asses what determines the different values of these three variables.

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INTRODUCTION

Democracy today is not imaginable without political parties. The characteristics of political parties and their interactions in a polity determine how democracy works and may be crucial even to the survival of democracy, classical examples of which are the fall of the Weimar Republic in 1933 or the end of the democratic regime in Chile in 1973.

No wonder then that parties and party systems have gained an important place in the discipline of political science. However, time poses new challenges to the scholars interested in party politics. The third wave of democracy, being one of these challenges, has significantly influenced the party politics research area. One of the most important changes has been the shift from the more traditional party system characteristics, like the number of parties or ideological polarization, to the institutionalization dimension. The importance of party system institutionalization has been emphasized by Mainwaring and Scully (1995). Analyzing party systems in the third wave Latin American democracies, they claim that the degree of party system institutionalization directly influences the degree of democratic consolidation (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 1). Less institutionalized or inchoate party systems allow populist leaders to come to power, impede electoral accountability because citizens are unable to evaluate the vast number of individual politicians, aggravate governability because the chances of the executive support in parliament decrease, and in general increase the uncertainty in the political system to a dangerously high degree (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 21-28).

This argument has been challenged by scholars working in the post-communist context. As Markowski (2001) and Tóka (1997) argue, democracies in Central Europe were consolidated when party systems were still vastly under-institutionalized. However, Tóka also stresses the importance of party system institutionalization, because "the quality of democracy

would suffer in the absence of relatively cohesive and persistent parties" (1997, 56). The importance of party system institutionalization on democratic consolidation has also been accentuated by other authors, like Bielasiak (2002) and Lewis (2006).

Due to the impact on democratic consolidation party system institutionalization is an important topic of comparative politics. Therefore this thesis is devoted to the analysis of party system institutionalization in post-communist democracies. The definition of party system institutionalization used in the study is based on the definition suggested by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mainwaring (1999) and Mainwaring and Torcal (2006). It is assumed that party system institutionalization has three interrelated dimensions: the pattern of party competition, the strength of party roots in society, and the legitimacy of parties. The use of this widely used definition allows placing the study in the broad body of academic research on party system institutionalization in post-communist and other regions.

The main aim in this thesis is to explain party system institutionalization in postcommunist democracies. This approach is different from most other studies, which are more concerned with the description of party system institutionalization¹. Although wide, the existing literature does not provide the clear answer what determines the different levels of party system institutionalization in post-communist Europe. Three groups of explanations have been most commonly used. The significance of historical legacies (starting with pre-war regimes or even earlier periods and finishing with transition patterns) have been stressed by Innes (2002), Tworzecki (2003), Kostelecky (2002), Grzymala-Busse (2002), and Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Tokà (1999). The other two streams are more based on general party system theory, which explains party system outcomes by sociological and institutional

¹ Two contradictory views to party system institutionalization in post-communist democracies have been expressed in these studies. The *tabula rasa* perspective emphasizes "the newness of democratic experience and the propensity to form weak and fluid party configurations" while the *structure* perspective stresses "the coalescence of competitive politics around well-defined issues represented by established parties" (Bielasiak 2002, 189).

factors (Ware 1996). The sociological factors have been accentuated by Kitschelt (1992), Enyedi (2005), Rose and Munro (2003), and Djuvold and Berglund (2004), while Birch (2001), Carey (1997), Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (1999), Clark and Wittrock (2005), Horowitz and Browne (2005), and Ishiyama and Kennedy (2001) emphasize the importance of institutional factors.

The thesis solves this puzzle by demonstrating that institutional explanations are the most relevant in explaining party system institutionalization in post-communist Europe. The paper is based on neo-institutionalist ideas. The assumption is made that the existing institutional environment shapes political actors' preferences and actions, which consequently determine the process of party system institutionalization.

More precisely, the importance of the *form of government* (regime type) is emphasized. Hence, the study provides the first comprehensive research on the impact of the form of government on the institutionalization of post-communist party systems. However, differently than in most other studies, the conceptualization and operationalization of the regime type provides much more profound understanding of the relationship between party system institutionalization and the form of government. The thesis rejects the common dichotomous (parliamentarism vs. presidentialism) or trichotomous (parliamentarism vs. semi-presidentialism vs. presidentialism) understanding of the form of government: the regime type is perceived as a continuum between strongly parliamentary (for example, the Czech Republic) and strongly presidential systems (for instance, Russia). Moreover, the thesis considers not only constitutional arrangements (presidential power and the way the president is elected), but also the political practice (the number of presidential candidates, the personalization of presidential elections, the relationship between the presidency and parliament are taken into consideration). For this reason, the thesis is innovative comparing to similar studies. Hence, the research question raised in this study is: *what is the impact of the form of government on party system institutionalization in Eastern European post-communist democracies? I claim that constitutional arrangements regarding the form of government significantly influence party system institutionalization in post-communist Europe.* However, I also find that similar constitutional arrangements lead to the different political practices, which mediate the relationship between party system institutionalization and the form of government. By political practice I mean three factors in particular: party system fragmentation on the presidential level, the personalization of presidential election (both factors relevant in polities with popular presidential elections) and the relationship between the presidency and parliament. However, the thesis does not address the question why similar constitutional arrangements lead to the different practices: this requires much more extensive research than available here.

The hypothesis raised in the thesis is that *the more a system is presidential, the more it should impede party system institutionalization.* The hypothesis is divided to three subhypotheses according to the three dimensions of party system institutionalization. The first subhypothesis claims that *the pattern of party competition might be influenced by the personalization of party competition, the degree of the fragmentation in presidential elections, presidential power, and the parliamentary support to the president.* The empirical findings of the statistical analysis and the case study of Lithuania partly confirm the subhypothesis: electoral volatility, which is the main indicator of the stability in party competition, is not affected by the form of government. However, the personalization of party support to the presidential power, and the main indicates, presidential power, and the main presidential candidates, presidential power, and the main presidential power, the personalization of presidential power, and the main indicator of the stability in party competition, is not affected by the form of government. However, the personalization of presidential power, and the presidential candidates, presidential power, and the parliamentary support to the president influence the number of electoral parties, which is the main predictor of electoral volatility.

The second hypothesis makes a claim that *the strength of party roots in society may be influenced by the personalization of presidential elections, presidential power, and the parliamentary support to the president.* The empirical findings of the quantitative study provide evidence to the impact of the personalization of presidential elections and the parliamentary support to the strength of party roots in society.

The third subhypothesis assumes that *the legitimacy of parties might be affected by the personalization of party competition, presidential power, and the parliamentary support to the president.* The statistical analysis finds that the impact of all three factors is significant, although presidential power is only an intervening variable influencing the relationship between the legitimacy of parties and the parliamentary support to the president.

Understanding the complexity of the social phenomena and the drawbacks of all methods used in political science, in this study I employ the rather complex methodological approach. Two methods will be used to confirm the hypothesis and the subhypotheses: a statistical regression analysis (electoral data from ten new EU member states, Croatia, Russia, and Ukraine will be used) and the case study of Lithuania. The two methods complement each other: although the statistical analysis based on the quantitative data has much more causal power, the in-depth qualitative case study has significantly more illustrative capacity and provides the answer *how* the causal relationship between party system institutionalization and the form of government works.

On the conceptual grounds, the thesis is closely related and provides contribution to two topics widely discussed in comparative political science. First, the thesis contributes to the academic discussion on party system institutionalization. It gives the strong evidence that the institutionalization outcomes depend on the form of government.

Second, the study also contributes to the academic discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of different regime types. The study changes the direction of the widely

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discussed research question on the impact of the party system on the stability and effectiveness of presidential and parliamentary regimes (the problem has been discussed by Mainwaring (1993), Linz (1994), Shugart and Carey (1992), Sartori (1994), Horowitz (1990), for review of all related arguments see Elgie (2005)). I do not deny the strong relationship between the party system and governmental stability and effectiveness or the level of democratic consolidation, which has been proven in many studies (see above mentioned). However, the study is innovative because it shows that the opposite direction of the relationship is also significant and should be taken into consideration in the process of constitutional engineering. The study will demonstrate that one of the perils of the more presidential forms of government in post-communist democracies is the higher likelihood of less institutionalized party system.

The thesis has three major chapters. First, I will analyze the relationship between party system institutionalization and the form of government on theoretical grounds (with some empirical examples from the post-communist countries). Second, the statistical analysis will be presented. Third, the case study of Lithuania will follow.

CHAPTER 1: PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT

In this part of the study I do the following. First, I discuss the concept of party system institutionalization. Second, the forms of government in Eastern European post-communist democracies are analyzed. Third, the relationship between institutionalization and the form of government is explained. Fourth, the alternative explanations for party system institutionalization are presented.

1.1. Defining and explaining party system institutionalization

Party system in this study is defined as "the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition" (Sartori 2005, 44). Three elements are important in this definition: a party system has to have at least two parties, there must be some regularity in distribution of votes between parties, and there must be some continuity between parties (in other words, parties have to be institutionalized) (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, 205). Hence, according to Sartori, party systems which lack these elements are unconsolidated (meaning non-institutionalized) and might not be called systems at all.

Although Sartori himself used this definition in a rather restrictive manner, which would not allow claiming that most of the third-wave democracies have party systems, this study will follow Mainwaring (1999) and Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) in conceptualizing party systems. According to Mainwaring,

Contrary to Sartori's view, wherever open party competition exists for even a few years, a system always develops as politicians find it useful to create a label that helps establish a symbolic universe for voters and helps organize legislative affairs (1999, 25). Loosening Sartori's definition, Mainwaring also suggests a tool to conceptualize the

less structured party systems in the third-wave democracies, which according to Sartori should not be called party systems at all. The concept he suggests is *party system*

institutionalization: therefore, the non-systems in the Sartorian terms are called less institutionalized party systems by Mainwaring (1999, 25).

Mainwaring and his co-authors suggest four dimensions of party system institutionalization: considerable stability in patterns of party competition (meaning low electoral volatility), strong roots of parties in society and strong attachments of voters to parties, considerable legitimacy of parties and, finally, the existence of party organizations with the value of their own, without subordination to the interests of a few ambitious leaders (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 4-6; Mainwaring 1999, 26-27; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, 206-207). Furthermore, they also emphasize that party system institutionalization should be perceived as a continuum, not a dichotomy (Mainwaring 1999, 25).

Other authors offer rather similar definitions of party system institutionalization. Mair analyzes party system institutionalization in the context of Western European party systems. According to him, a party system is institutionalized when the wholesale alternation in government occurs (therefore parties from the previous government are absent in the new one), government formulae are persistent, and new parties have limited access to the executive (Mair 2001, 39). Rose and Munro note that institutionalization of the party system (or stable equilibrium) is achieved when the supply of parties and the demand of voters is stable (2003, 71). Randall and Svasand distinguish two dimensions of party system institutionalization (structural and attitudinal) and two levels of interaction (internal and external). Therefore a party system is institutionalized if on the structural dimension there is continuity among party alternatives (internal aspect) and "parties, collectively, and their activities are supported by public measures, such as public subsidies, access to media and legal protection for their existence" (external level). On the attitudinal dimension party system is institutionalized if parties accept each other as legitimate competitors (internal level) and there is a degree of trust in parties and the electoral process (Randall and Svasand 2002, 4-5).

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Finally, according to Bielasiak (2001, 7), a party system is institutionalized when: 1) rules regulating party competition and political behavior, 2) party competition, and 3) the extent of participation in the electoral process is well established and stable.

The given definitions are similar, because they all consider two main dimensions of party system institutionalization: the level of political elite (stable party organizations are important) and the level of voters (changes in party preferences, attitudes towards parties etc.). One of the major divisions between scholars is based on the question whether party system institutionalization should imply party institutionalization. As Randall and Svasand (2002) argue, in some cases strongly institutionalized parties may impede party system institutionalization (for example, if one party is extremely well institutionalized and others are weakly institutionalized, the process of party system institutionalization will be severely encumbered). However, in many cases party institutionalization is a precondition for party system institutionalization (Randall and Svasand 2002, 8).

In this paper Mainwaring and his co-authors' definition is used, because it has been extensively employed when exploring the relationship between presidentialism and party system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). However, for the reason mentioned above only the first three dimensions of institutionalization will be considered, excluding party institutionalization. Therefore three dimensions of party system institutionalization analyzed in this paper are: 1) *the pattern of party competition, 2) party roots in society, 3) legitimacy of parties and elections.*

This definition of party system institutionalization is very close to the concept "representative consolidation", used by Wessels and Klingemann, which refers "to the emergence of an intermediary system of parties and interest groups" (2006, 14). According to Wessels and Klingemann (2006), three dimensions of representative dimension might be discerned: 1) the organizational dimension, which is mostly concerned with "the

configuration of parties in relation to each other" (similar to the party competition dimension in Mainwaring's definition), 2) the linkage dimension, which refers to the relationship between citizens and parties (similar to Mainwaring's "stable party roots in society"), and 3) the rules of the game dimension, which is concerned with the support of citizens to free political competition and a multiparty system (similar to the legitimacy of parties dimension).

1.2. Forms of government: a continuum?

According to the most widespread typology of regimes, post-communist European democracies can be classified as either parliamentary or semi-presidential. Parliamentary regime, which is based on power sharing between parliament and government and the appointment, support, and in many cases discharge of government by parliament (Sartori 1994, 101), has been established in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovakia during the democratic transition (Slovakia introduced popular presidential elections in 1998). Semi-presidential regime², which according to Elgie is "the situation where a popularly elected, fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament" (1999, 11), has been established in Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Russia, Ukraine since the early 1990s, and in Slovakia since 1998³.

It is also often noted that Russia and Ukraine (at least until the constitutional reform in 2005) have had much stronger presidencies than the other countries in the region⁴. Therefore these countries may be called hyper-presidential (Arato 2001, 318) or super-presidential republics (Fish 2000, 22-23). According to Shugart and Carey's typology, Russia and Ukraine

² In general, three types of semi-presidentialism definitions may be distinguished (Elgie 2004, 316-317): the ones considering only actual powers of political actors (O'Neil 1993), the ones considering actual powers and constitutional arrangements (Duverger 1980; Sartori 1994), and definitions taking into account only constitutional arrangements (Elgie 1999).

³ These are the countries I concentrate on in this paper. The other democracies also fall into these two categories: for example, Albania and Moldova since 2000 are parliamentary regimes while Moldova until 2000, Macedonia, and Serbia may be regarded as semi-presidential regimes.

⁴ The same can be said about Croatia under Tudjman and Serbia under Milosevic.

are labeled as president-parliamentary regimes, marked by the primacy of the president over the prime minister, while the other semi-presidential systems in the region are premierpresidential systems, which are marked by the primacy of the prime minister over the president with significant powers (Shugart and Carey 1992, 24).

However, as Kitschelt et. al. note, "given that the power of the presidency may vary widely, the "presidentialism" of a democratic polity is more a matter of degree than a matter of regime type" (1999, 55). Hence, in order to explore the impact of the form of government on party system institutionalization it is not enough to assume that everything else being equal the degree of party system institutionalization should be different in parliamentary, semipresidential, and super-presidential republics. There is a strong incentive to argue that, let's say, the impact of semi-presidential constitutional framework on party system institutionalization in countries with rather strong presidencies, like Poland (particularly under the Little Constitution) or Romania than in countries with relatively weak presidencies (Slovenia or Bulgaria). Therefore "presidentialism" (the extent to which the polity has the elements of presidential form of government) can be perceived as a continuum.

The degree of "presidentialism" in this study will be measured by three indicators: constitutional presidential powers, the strength of presidential parties in parliament, and the way the president is elected⁵. This type of operationalization is based on the measurement of presidential strength, suggested by Lijphart. According to him, presidential powers

The impact of all three above mentioned factors is analyzed in the next subsection.

derive from three sources. One is the power of presidents defined in constitutions, consisting of "reactive powers", especially presidential veto power, and "pro-active powers", especially the ability to legislate by decree in certain areas. (...) The second source of power is the strength and cohesion of the presidents' parties in the legislature. Third, presidents derive considerable strength from their direct popular election and the fact that they can claim that they (and their vice presidents, if any) are the only public officials elected by the people as a whole (1999, 128).

⁵ There are other ways how to measure the degree of presidentialism. For example, Krouwel's (2000) level of presidentialism is computed by subtracting the strength of legislature from the strength of executive.

1.3. Relationship between party system institutionalization and the form of government

In this section I hypothesize how constitutionally strong and directly elected presidency may influence party system institutionalization⁶. Generally most scholars argue on theoretical and empirical grounds that systems with strong presidencies may negatively influence various dimensions of party system institutionalization (Linz 1994; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996; Kitschelt et al 1999; Tavits 2007; Tavits 2005; Birch 2001; Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1999; Clark and Wittrock 2005; Kubicek 1994; Linz 2002; Fish 2000). However, some authors do not find this effect (Ishiyama and Kennedy 2001; Horowitz and Browne 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Hence, in this section I review theoretical arguments about the impact of the form of government on party system institutionalization and find four ways in which institutionalization may be impeded.

It is possible to discern two ways how direct presidential election can influence the institutionalization of party systems: 1) popular presidential elections may encourage personalization of presidential competition, which may impede party system institutionalization; 2) popular presidential elections may increase party system fragmentation, which reduce the stability of party competition. Constitutionally strong presidency reduces incentives to politicians and voters to relate to political parties. Finally, presidents with insignificant parliamentary support will more likely intervene into inter-party and intra-party politics or take the anti-party stance. All these effects are addressed below.

1.3.1. The impact of direct presidential election

The first consequence of direct presidential election is the *personalization* of party competition. The major actors on the supply side in presidential elections are usually not

⁶ Certainly, the opposite relationship between party system and the stability and effectiveness of presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes also exists (Mainwaring 1993; Sartori 1994; Linz and Valenzuela 1994). However, this causal effect will not be analyzed in the current research.

parties, but presidential candidates. Voters in presidential elections usually choose according to candidates' personalities: as Linz notes,

The choice is often based on an opinion about one individual, a personality, promises, and – let's be honest – an image a candidate projects, which may an image chosen by advisers (who are not necessarily politicians) (1994, 11). Consequently, presidential candidates base their campaigns on the personal image.

This is even easier in the age of television: as Mainwaring notes, "[i]n the age of the mass electronic media, it is easier than ever for presidents to make appeals directly to the population, thereby increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis parties" (1999, 272). Hence, ambitious politicians have fewer incentives to build strong parties, because they can win without them. This stands into contrast to parliamentary regimes, where political leaders usually are party insiders (Linz 1994, 11; Mainwaring 1999, 272). Due to strong interaction effect between presidential and parliamentary elections in the systems with strongly personalized competition for presidency parliamentary elections should also be more personalized.

Personalization of presidential elections may be of different degree: on one end of the scale presidential candidates of parties might become less dependent on their parties while on the other end presidential candidates might have no party affiliation at all (political outsiders) and even represent the anti-party views. The best example of the first case is France, which changed its parliamentary system to semi-presidential in 1958-1962. After the constitutional reform major parties on the left and the right have become presidentialized, meaning that they transformed into rallies around their presidential leaders (Samuels 2002, 475). According to Suleiman, "[p]olitical parties have, in effect, become machines for nominating, supporting, and helping elect presidential candidates" (1994, 146).

The examples of the second, more extreme case come mostly from the Latin American democracies where independent candidates were strong in many elections (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). In Eastern Europe the success of non-partisan candidates has varied extensively

between countries. For instance, in Romania and Slovakia non-partisan candidates have not been successful while they have been more successful in Bulgaria (Stoyanov in 2001 and Beronov in 2006) and Croatia (Miksic in 2005), and have frequently dominated the electoral arena in Poland (Tyminski in 1990, Walesa in 1995, and Olechowski in 2000), Slovenia (Kramberger in 1990, Kucan in 1992 and 1997, and Brezigar in 2002), Lithuania (Lozoraitis in 1993, Paulauskas and Adamkus in 1997-8, Adamkus and Serenas in 2002-3, and Austrevicius in 2004), Russia (Yeltsin in 1996 and Putin in 2000), and Ukraine (Kravchuk in 1994, Kuchma in 1994 and 1999).

The success of independent candidates or in some cases the partisan candidates may may lead to the creation of new parties which serve as electoral vehicles for politicians with presidential ambitions. As Tavits argues:

Given that parties serve as primary mechanisms for launching one's bid for the presidency, systems that have a directly elected president provide a higher potential benefit from forming a party than systems that do not have such an office (2007, 5). New parties can be created from the scratch or from the fissions of other parties. In the

latter case the reason for fission might be internal clashes in party leadership over a right to run for the presidency and/or conflicts between former presidents and current candidates (presidents) (Linz 1994, 18; Suleiman 1994, 154-155; Kitschelt et. al. 1999, 55). New parties created by single politicians in order to run for the presidency or to use the popularity gained during the presidential elections have been successful in several countries in the region⁷.

What are the consequences of personalization of party competition? Personalization should impede party system institutionalization on all three dimensions. Due to the fact that presidential and possibly parliamentary electoral campaigns are personalized, the importance of both ideology and party organizations is reduced (Samuels 2002, 473). The diminishing

⁷ In Lithuania in 1998 a former presidential candidate Artūras Paulauskas created the New Union, which won 19,6 vote in the 2000 parliamentary election, and in 2002 the future president Rolandas Paksas created the Liberal Democratic Union, which won 11,4 percent of vote in the 2004 parliamentary election. In Poland Andrzej Olechowski's Civic Platform, formed after the presidential election in 2000, won 12,7 percent of vote in the 2001 legislative election while in Slovakia the Party of Civic Understanding, created by the future president Rudolf Schuster before the presidential election in 1999, won 8 percent vote in 1998 the legislative election.

importance of ideology makes clientelistic and charismatic linkages between voters and parties more important than programmatic linkages (Kitschelt et. al. 1999, 55). Both charismatic and clientelistic linkages between voters and representatives are inherently unstable: in case of charismatic linkages leaders' followers will eventually start requiring benefits and/or policy programmes (Kitschelt et. al. 1999, 47) while clientelistic linkages are too costly and can not be sustained in the long term (Piatonni 2001, 205-206). Therefore de-ideologization of party competition should impede the formation of *stable party roots in society*. The existence of partisan candidates not affiliated with any party also cause *instability in party competition*. Furthermore, the increase in the attention to personalities instead of ideologies should also lead to the decrease in *party legitimacy*, because voters will not perceive parties as the most important vehicles of representation and accountability.

Second, presidential elections have significant influence on the party system on the legislative level by increasing or decreasing party system fragmentation. The impact on party system fragmentation to a large extent depends on *the number of presidential candidates*. The more votes are spread between presidential candidates, the more party system on the legislative level should be fragmented (Golder 2006)⁸.

Though the institutional factors influencing the number of presidential candidates are not the direct concern of this paper, it is still worth to discuss them briefly, because they might increase or decrease party system fragmentation. There are two reasons why the number of presidential candidates should be high in post-communist democracies with directly elected presidencies. First, all semi-presidential systems in Eastern Europe have used

⁸ The reverse direction of causal relationship (from the fragmentation of the party system on the legislative level to the number of presidential candidates) is also possible. However, this possibility will be ignored in this study. It will be assumed that in all countries with directly elected presidencies presidential elections are important enough to have significant impact on legislative elections, more significant than the impact of the legislative elections on presidential elections. That is the assumption done by Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) as well.

In the ideal case this assumption should be confirmed or rejected by analyzing the perceptions of the political elite and voters about the relative importance of presidential and parliamentary elections. However, this will not be done due to the lack of the comprehensive data.

It is also important to note that the same assumption is done about the impact of personalization of party competition.

the majoritarian electoral formula, which increases the number of presidential candidates. The majoritarian formula create incentives to each party to nominate its own candidates for two reasons: 1) hoping to get into the second round, 2) improving the bargaining position with one of the two candidates in the runoff, perhaps by exchanging support for policy or office concessions (Shugart and Carey 1992, 210). Second, the existence of the institution of the vice-presidency might reduce party system fragmentation, because it creates incentives for electoral alliances (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 1999, 20). However, due to the fact that only Bulgaria has had the institution of the vice-presidency, in the other countries with direct presidential elections the non-existence of the vice-presidency should have increased party system fragmentation on the executive and legislative levels.

Indeed, the average number of presidential candidates in direct presidential elections was 3,33, which is a rather high number. In comparison, in 147 elections in 33 countries (including most post-communist democracies) the average of the number of presidential candidates was 2,98 (Jones 1999, 174-175).

What is the impact of fragmentation on party system institutionalization? Significant fragmentation may increase electoral volatility and therefore reduce the *stability in inter-party competition*, because if many parties are present in electoral competition, policy differences between them might decrease and voters would be more likely to switch their votes (Bielasiak 2001, 16).

It should be noted that an important intervening factor in both relationships is the *proximity between presidential and parliamentary elections*. In more proximate elections the impact of the personalization of presidential elections and the number of presidential candidates will be stronger. Therefore, for instance, in Romania the number of presidential candidates should have influenced the number of parties more than in other countries, because all presidential and legislative elections in the country were concurrent.

To sum up this sub-section, direct presidential election may influence party system institutionalization in two ways: by increasing the degree of personalization in electoral competition and by increasing party system fragmentation due to the high number of presidential candidates. The effect of both personalization and fragmentation is influenced by the proximity between the legislative and executive elections.

1.3.2. Impact of presidential power on party system institutionalization

It is not only direct presidential election which might impede party system institutionalization, but also the constitutional strength of the presidency. Constitutionally strong presidencies have strong impact on both politicians' and voters' strategic calculations which in turn might significantly influence the development of the party system.

In systems with the *constitutionally strong presidencies* parliaments are constitutionally weaker than in the systems with constitutionally weak presidencies. Due to the personalization of presidential elections parties are not able to control presidencies effectively and their basic channels of forming and implementing policies would still remain governments and parliaments. However, if the presidency has significant constitutional powers, the value of controlling parliament decreases significantly and therefore *reduces incentives for politicians to build strong parties* (Mainwaring 1999, 274-275; Clark and Wittrock 2005, 176; Ishiyama and Kennedy 2001, 1179; Linz 1994, 63). Furthermore, *voters might also perceive political parties as less important* and will establish their political attachments to politicians, bypassing political parties (Clark and Wittrock 2005, 177; Ishiyama and Kennedy 2001, 1179).

How these effects might influence party system institutionalization? If politicians have a few incentives to create strong parties and voters do not recognize parties as the most important players in democratic process, *stable party roots in society* and *party legitimacy* will be impeded. Moreover, the reluctance of politicians to relate their electoral fortunes with political parties might reduce their incentives to coalesce in electoral blocs and voters' strategic considerations to help one party to get majority in parliament. As demonstrated by Clark and Wittrock, this leads to the increase in party system fragmentation, which might in turn reduce *the stability in party competition* (Clark and Wittrock 2005, 182-183). Finally, the stability may be also reduced because voters with no strong attachments to parties might change their electoral preferences frequently.

1.3.3. Impact of presidents in office on party system institutionalization

Besides politicians' and voters' strategic computations, which are determined by the existence of constitutionally strong presidency, *the actions of presidents in office* also matter. Presidents in office may disassociate themselves from political parties and take the above-party or even the anti-party stance (Linz 1994, 35). They might also use pork-barrel policy and in that way interfere in inter-party or intra-party relations in order to acquire the parliamentary support for their policy objectives (Kitschelt et. al. 1999, 55-56). A classical example of an anti-party president is Walesa in Poland in 1990-1995; an example of the second type of actions was given by the non-partisan Lithuanian president Adamkus in 1998-1999, when he supported different factions in the ruling Conservative party (Matsuzato and Gudžinskas 2006, 161).

Two structural factors can be considered as crucial for the understanding how presidents' actions may influence party system institutionalization. First, constitutional presidential powers are important. As Linz points out, in parliamentary systems presidents should be considerably neutral toward parties and instead be concerned with the defense of democracy and the constitution, or the articulation of shared values (1997, 12). Differently, in semi-presidential regimes presidents might be the leaders of parliamentary parties or they present themselves as being above party politics.

Second, the strength of parliamentary support to the president may significantly influence how presidents act in office, and how their actions affect party system institutionalization. This effect may be particularly strong in semi-presidential systems. In case presidents do not have strong parliamentary support, there is a high possibility of the inter-branch conflicts. Under such conditions they will more likely try to acquire the ad-hoc support by some benefits to parliamentary factions and separate MPs. Presidents' interventions to intra-party and inter-party politics may increase party system fragmentation, which as discussed above would reduce the *stability in party competition*.

Another choice for presidents is to ignore parties and declare themselves as the most legitimate representatives of the people. As a result, the existence of the personal political institution with significant powers and the anti-party position would significantly reduce *the legitimacy of parties* and undermine the creation of *stable party roots in society*.

The parliamentary support to presidents is less important in parliamentary systems or semi-presidential systems with very weak presidencies. Still, parliamentary support to the presidents matters in these systems. A good example is the behavior of Hungarian president Göncz in his first term. Acting as a check to the right-wing government in 1990-1994, sometimes he was accused of not acting in the same way toward the socialist-liberal government (O'Neil 1997, 213-214)⁹. Therefore, it may be argued that presidents in parliamentary systems are more likely to get involved into inter-party politics and influence the pattern of *party competition* when their own parties are in opposition or when they are non-partisan. Furthermore, it can be similarly speculated that non-affiliated post-communist presidents who usually enjoy high popularity among the public (for instance, Havel, Göncz, Meri) may significantly reduce the *legitimacy of parties* and impede the creation of *strong party-voter relations* in newly created democracies. Differently, presidents who are clearly

⁹ President Göncz refused to countersign the governmental decrees on the appointment of new heads of national radio and television in 1992, when MDF-KNDP-FKGP coalition was in power; however, he countersigned similar decrees in 1994, when his party SZDSZ was in government (O'Neil 1997, 213-214).

affiliated to strong parliamentary party might contribute to the creation of party base and the increase in the legitimacy of the whole party system.

To conclude this sub-section, the influence of presidents' actions in office on party system institutionalization depends on the constitutional strength of presidency and parliamentary support to the presidency. However, the lack of parliamentary support to presidents should negatively influence the stability of party competition, the creation of stable party roots in society, and the legitimacy of parties in all post-communist democracies, though the effect should be stronger in semi-presidential democracies than in parliamentary systems.

1.4. Alternative explanations of party system institutionalization

This section briefly discusses other factors which may influence party system institutionalization in post-communist democracies. These factors are: the electoral system applied in the legislative elections, social and political divisions, and economic performance. All these factors will be addressed in both empirical parts of the study.

The *legislative electoral system* should have the greatest impact on the party competition dimension of party system institutionalization. The classical question of the relationship between the type of electoral system and the number of political parties is relevant at this point, because the high degree of party system fragmentation will more likely lead to the higher degree of electoral volatility (Bielasiak 2002, 16).

Lijphart (1994) distinguishes four main dimensions of electoral systems: electoral formula, district size, electoral threshold, and assembly size. Birch (2001) has demonstrated that electoral formula and threshold have significant impact on electoral volatility in post-communist countries while Tavits (2005) found the significant impact of district size. Hence, these three dimensions of electoral systems should have the most significant impact on the stability of party competition.

The impact of electoral formula in post-communist countries has been found to contradict to the classical Duverger's Law, according to which single proportional representation tends to create fragmented party systems while the plurality rule tends to produce a two party system (Duverger 1986, 70, cited in Clark and Wittrock 2005, 171). As Moser (1999) argues, due to the low level of party institutionalization in post-communist states voters and political elites are not able to act strategically, and therefore the plurality rule will not have reductive impact on the number of political parties. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that in mixed systems party system fragmentation and electoral volatility should be higher than in the PR systems.

The increase in the electoral threshold decreases the number of political parties and electoral volatility, and therefore increases the stability in party competition (Birch 2001). The increase in district size should make electoral outcomes more proportional and therefore decrease the stability of party competition¹⁰.

The impact of *social and political divisions* would require a discussion of the much larger scale than available here. However, it should be noted that the application of the Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) theoretical framework for Eastern Europe is rather problematic due to the different circumstances of party system emergence. As Rose and Munro note, six dimensions of party competition were most salient in ten CEE countries according to the New Europe Barometer of 2002: big personalities vs. political ideas, national traditions vs. Europe, old vs. new regime, market or government managed economy, big cities vs. rural areas and ethnic minorities vs. national culture (2003, 50-51). According to Kitschelt (1992), two major dimensions of party competition should emerge after the communist rule: the libertarian-authoritarian and the resources distribution axes.

¹⁰ However, Tavits (2005) finds the opposite sign of the relationship, and explains his findings by the survival of young parties. According to her, in systems with low district magnitude only few parties survive in the first few elections, and if voters are dissatisfied with these parties, in later elections they turn to newly formed political organizations. Just on the contrary, in systems with high district magnitude many parties survive the first few elections, and hence voters have more choices in later elections (Tavits 2005, 292).

In this paper I will follow Tavits (2005), who discerns the rural-urban and ethnic divisions as the most salient. I hypothesize that stronger urban-rural divisions should decrease party system fragmentation and make party competition more stable. Moreover, if urban-rural divisions are strongly expressed, voters should regard parties as a legitimate means of their interest expression and voter attachments to parties should be higher, meaning that parties will be able to create stable roots in society.

In respect to ethnic divisions, the higher degree of ethnic heterogeneity should increase party system fragmentation. However, the higher ethnic heterogeneity should also decrease the stability in party competition, the strength of party roots in society and the legitimacy of parties and elections, because in most countries in the region ethnic minorities may feel left behind or even discriminated politically (Tavits 2007, 9).

Economic performance also has a strong bearing on party system institutionalization. Poor economic performance will lead to the decrease of legitimacy of the political party system and the political regime in general. It will also undermine the formation of stable party roots in society and therefore should decrease the stability of party competition.

In this part of the study the relationship between party system institutionalization and the form of government has been explained in theoretical terms. In order to define party system institutionalization the first three dimensions in Mainwaring and his co-authors' definition have been used. These dimensions are: the stability in party competition, stable party roots in society, and party legitimacy. I approached the concept of a form of government as a continuum and used the strength of presidency (defined as the way the presidency is selected, its constitutional powers, and the parliamentary support) as a tool to measure the degree of presidentialism. It has been demonstrated on the theoretical grounds that the more the system is "presidential", the less institutionalized party system it should have. Therefore the hypothesis of this paper is: H: Certain properties of more presidential systems (directly elected and constitutionally strong presidencies) may impede party system institutionalization in Eastern European democracies.

Since the dependent variable (party system institutionalization) has three dimensions, it is possible to discern three subhypotheses. As discussed above, the degree of stability of party competition is influenced by the personal appeal of presidential candidates; the expected high number of presidential candidates; the constitutional strength of presidency; the parliamentary support to the presidency. Therefore the first subhypothesis is:

SH1: The stability in party competition might be influenced by the degree of the personalization of presidential election, the number of presidential candidates, the constitutional strength of presidencies and the parliamentary support to the president.

The creation and endurance of party-voter relationships (stable party roots in society) and the legitimacy of parties may be influenced by the degree presidential competition is personalized, the constitutional strength of the presidency and the parliamentary support to the presidency. Therefore the second and the third subhypotheses in this study are:

SH2: The creation and endurance of stable party roots in society may be affected by the degree of the personalization of presidential election, the constitutional strength of presidencies and the parliamentary support to the president.

SH3: The legitimacy of parties may be affected by the degree of the personalization of presidential election, the constitutional strength of presidencies and the parliamentary support to the president.

These assumptions will be tested using the statistical analysis and the Lithuanian case analysis. Alternative explanations to the variation in the level of party system institutionalization are: the electoral system for legislative elections, social divisions, and economic performance.

CHAPTER 2: IMPACT OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT ON PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES

In this part I seek to confirm or reject my hypothesis and subhypotheses by using statistical analysis. The structure of this part is the following. First, I discuss the measurement of the used variables. After that I present the results of statistical analysis.

2.1. Measurement and data

The statistical procedure I use is multivariate linear regression. Time-series crosssection data will be used. The unit of analysis is parliamentary election.

Concerning the case selection issue, I include ten Central and Eastern European countries (EU member states), Croatia, Ukraine, and Russia. The case selection is based on several criteria. First, most of the countries (notably, ten EU member states) included in the analysis were consolidated democracies for more than half of the analyzed time period (according to Freedom House ratings they could be attributed to the category Free). However, all these democracies are parliamentary and semi-presidential. To achieve the higher variation in the independent variable I also include three countries (Croatia, Ukraine, and Russia), which had strong presidencies for the most of the analyzed period and which were at least partly free (according to Freedom House data) during the whole analyzed time period. The inclusion of Russia and Ukraine is also justified by the size and importance of these countries.

The more comprehensive analysis would require including Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Moldova, which were partly free during the whole analyzed period. However, the inclusion of these countries would require additional control variables, because most of these five countries experienced severe internal and external military conflicts¹¹, which might have influenced the development of party systems; furthermore, some countries (Albania) have distinctive culture which also might be an important factor of party system

¹¹ Croatia also experienced the war in the early 1990s, but since it remained democracy during the war and rapidly democratized after 1999, it is included in the analysis.

development etc. Finally, the data availability is also problematic: it is hard to get reliable electoral data about elections in five above mentioned countries. Therefore, it can be concluded that the sample of thirteen countries represents the whole set of post-communist democracies relatively well and the exclusion of some countries should not have influenced the results significantly.

The choice of the time framework is based on the adoption of new significant constitutional arrangements after the regime change. Therefore the starting point is the year when a new non-communist constitution was adopted or, if the new constitution was not adopted, the date when the significant changes to the communist constitution (including the one dismantling the leading role of the communist party) were adopted. This choice is based on the assumption the constitutional arrangements may have impact on electoral outcomes only when they are established. The last year included in the analysis is the year when the last parliamentary or direct presidential election took place. The time framework for each country is presented in Appendix 1 while the data sources and the notes on the operationalization of the variables are provided in Appendix 2.

I operationalize my **dependent variable** (party system institutionalization) by four indicators (which also means I will use four multiple regression models). The **party competition** dimension will be operationalized by aggregate electoral volatility and party system fragmentation.

The use of *electoral volatility* to measure the stability of party competition is easily justified, because it shows how voters changed their preferences between elections. It has been used in many studies exploring the stability of party competition (Bartollini and Mair 1990, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, to mention only a few). Although aggregate electoral volatility can not precisely demonstrate how many citizens changed their votes, the lack of individual volatility data justifies the use of it. This study uses the conventional measure of aggregate electoral volatility – the formula suggested by Pedersen (1983), according to which $V = \Sigma |c_{i, t+1} - c_{i, t}| / 2$, where V is volatility, $c_{i, t+1}$ is a vote share for a party i at an election t+1, and $c_{i, t}$ is a vote share for a party i at an election t.

Party system fragmentation is not as suitable to measure the stability of party competition as electoral volatility is. However, party system fragmentation conceptually is closely related to electoral volatility, because more fragmented systems tend to be more volatile as well (Bielasiak 2001, 16). Therefore party system fragmentation is a good predictor of electoral volatility. As Bielasiak suggests, although institutionalized party systems can also be fragmented, "at the very least, then, the number of effective parties is an indicator of political fragmentation that has a strong bearing on the institutionalization of party regimes" (2001, 16). Furthermore, some independent variables (the number of presidential candidates) can influence electoral volatility only by changing party system fragmentation, therefore establishing the chain of relationships: the number of presidential candidates \rightarrow party system fragmentation \rightarrow electoral volatility. For all these reasons the use of party system fragmentation as a measure of party system institutionalization is justifiable.

In order to measure party system fragmentation I use the formula of the effective number of electoral parties, according to which $\text{ENEP} = 1 / \Sigma p_i^2$, where p_i is vote share of party i (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).

Party roots in society and voter attachment to parties is measured by *the vote share of new parties*. The assumption is done that if established parties have strong linkages with voters and voters feel attached to established parties, they will not vote for newcomers. This measure is similar to the indicators considering the party age and vote share of older parties, which have been used by Mainwaring (1999, 30-34). Latter indicators are not very proper to use in the current research due to the fact that time-series data is used (therefore a

sophisticated control variable would be necessary) and the short age of post-communist democracies. The other measures, based on the survey data (for example, voters' attachment to parties) are also not very relevant due to the lack of data availability for all years when parliamentary elections have occurred in post-communist countries.

For operational purposes I will define a new party as a party which did not participate in parliamentary elections before. For more detailed description of the measurement and the data, see the Appendix 2.

The **legitimacy** of parties and elections is measured by *the index of effective participation (IEP)*, suggested by Bielasiak (2001). According to Bielasiak, the higher values of this index is "an indication of citizens acceptance of the electoral mechanism and the party system" (2001, 29). The reason why I choose this indicator instead of the share of voters who have a positive attitude toward parties and who consider parties a necessary part of democratic regime (Mainwaring 1999, 35) is data availability (again, it would be complicated to collect the data for all years when parliamentary elections have been held in post-communist countries).

According to Bielasiak, IEP formula is the following: (number of voting citizens/adult voting population)*(1-invalid votes)*(1-unrepresented votes). However, for the purpose of this research the first component in the formula is electoral turnout, not the ration between the number of voting citizens and adult voting population. This simplifies the data collection procedures.

The **independent variable** (the form of regime) is operationalized by several indicators. As discussed at the end of the first chapter, the impact of the form of government on party system institutionalization can be measured by four indicators: the personalization of presidential elections, the number of presidential candidates, the constitutional strength of presidency, and the parliamentary support to the president. The operationalization of each of

these indicators is discussed below (all expected relationships are provided in the Appendix 3).

The personalization of presidential competition is operationalized by the variable *Nonpartisan*, which shows the vote share of non-partisan candidates in presidential elections. As mentioned in the first part of the thesis, voting for independent candidates is the more extreme manifestation of personalization of electoral competition. Furthermore, it is the easiest form of personalization to measure, because the measurement how strongly presidential candidates are related to their parties would require a lot of sophistication.

The high degree of personalization should negatively influence party system institutionalization. Hence, the higher value of the index should increase electoral volatility, party system fragmentation, the vote share of new parties, and decrease the IEP. The value of this variable for parliamentary regimes is settled to be 0.

The number of presidential candidates will be measured by the conventional variable *ENPS* (the effective number of presidential candidates). It is computed according to the formula ENPS = $1 / \Sigma p_i^2$, where p_i is a vote share by a candidate i (the same measure has been used by Amorim Neto and Cox 1997, Golder 2006 and other authors). As mentioned in the first part of the study, the number of political parties on the legislative level depends on the number of effective candidates – the increase in the number of presidential candidates should lead to the increase in the ENEP. The value of this variable for parliamentary regimes is settled to be 0.

The impact of both the personalization of electoral competition and the number of presidential candidates on party system institutionalization is mediated by the proximity between legislative and presidential elections. It will be measured by the variable *Proximity*, computed using the formula provided by Amorim Neto and Cox (1997, 158-159). The formula is: Proximity = $2^* | (L_t - P_{t-1}) / (P_{t+1} - P_{t-1}) - \frac{1}{2} |$, where L_t is the date of the

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legislative election, P_{t-1} is the date of preceding presidential election, and P_{t+1} is the date of the forthcoming presidential election. The formula expresses the idea that the least proximal legislative elections are those held in the middle of the presidential term. The value of this variable for parliamentary regimes is settled to be 0.

The strength of presidency is measured by the variable *Strength*. As mentioned in the first part, strong presidencies should have negative impact on all three dimensions of party system institutionalization; therefore, the increase in *Strength* should increase electoral volatility, the number of parties, and the vote share for new parties, and decrease the index of effective participation. The presidential power index suggested by Siaroff (2003) will be used.

The parliamentary support to the president is measured by the variable *Support*. As demonstrated in the theoretical part, presidents with no strong support in parliament will more likely impede party system institutionalization. However, measuring the impact of the parliamentary support on electoral outcomes is a complicated task. It is not the absolute support that matters the most, but the relationship between the presidency and the parliamentary majority. The president's party might have the absolute majority in parliament, be a member of the ruling coalition, have a large share of votes but remain in opposition, have no seats in parliament, or the president may not belong to any party at all. All these situations would lead to different strategic calculations and actions of the president. Furthermore, the pattern of the relationship between the president and parliament may change during the legislative term.

Mostly ignoring these refinements due to the complicated measurement procedures, I operationalize the parliamentary support by the absolute share of parliamentary seats the acting president's party acquires in the parliamentary election. If the presidential and parliamentary elections are concurrent, the winner of presidential election is considered as a president. If presidential elections are held less than six months after the parliamentary

election (for example that was a case in Poland in 2005), the share of seats a newly elected president's party has in parliament is considered.

The higher support to the president in parliament should decrease electoral volatility, the ENEP and the vote share for new parties, and increase the index of effective participation. However, as mentioned in the theoretical chapter, presidents' actions also depend on their constitutional powers; therefore, the interaction effect between the strength of presidency and the parliamentary support will also be included in the model.

All independent variables should influence all four dimensions of party system institutionalization with one exception. The number of presidential candidates should have the impact only on the effective number of parties, because the fragmentation of the party system on the presidential level should directly influence the fragmentation of the legislative party system.

The **control** variables are: electoral formula, electoral threshold, district magnitude, ethnic and urban-rural divisions, GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, and time.

As mentioned above, post-communist democracies are idiosyncratic because the PR electoral formula is usually more restrictive than the plurality formula. Therefore I code *electoral formula* as a dummy variable, where 0 stands for the PR system and 1 for the mixed system¹². The mixed systems should have the higher effective number of electoral parties, electoral volatility, the vote share of new parties, and effective participation.

Higher *electoral threshold* should reduce the ENEP, electoral volatility, the vote share of new parties, and increase the IEP. Since this variable has only 3 values (3 percent, 4 percent, and 5 percent), it is recoded to two dummy variables: *5 percent* and *4 percent*.

Higher *district magnitude* should increase the ENEP, volatility, the vote share of new parties, and increase the IEP. Since the variation of the variable is from 1,96 to 450, the

¹² Due to this reason the 1994 parliamentary election in Ukraine, for which the SMD system was used, has been excluded from the analysis.

logarithm of the variable is taken. The reason for this is that, for instance, it is more likely that the increase of the district magnitude from 2 to 3 should more significantly influence party system institutionalization than the increase from 50 to 51.

Ethnic fractionalization is measured by the variable *Ethnic*. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of ethnic fractionalization is used in the research. According to the index, $EF = 1 / \Sigma p_{ij}^2$, where p_i is a share of a group i in a country j. The higher values of the index should increase electoral volatility, the ENEP, the vote share for new parties, and decrease the index of effective participation.

The urban-rural division is measured by the variable *Urbanization*. In computing the values of the variable I follow Tavits (2005), who takes the absolute difference between the share of urban and rural population. The rationale behind this measure is that if the difference is high, the minority group will feel threatened, and the cleavage will gain more importance (Tavits 2005, 290). The higher value of the variable should decrease electoral volatility, the ENEP, the vote share for new parties, and increase the index of effective participation.

The improvement in all *economic performance indicators* should decrease the ENEP, volatility and the new parties' vote share, and increase the IEP. Three economic indicators might be included in the analysis: the GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment. However, since all three variables measure economic performance, their colinearity is highly probable¹³. However, all three variables are included in the analysis, because there is no perfect colinearity. In order to get more linear relationship, inflation index is logged, because there is a high probability that, for instance, the change of inflation from 5 to 55 percent will have higher impact on party system institutionalization that the change from 450 to 500 percent.

Finally, *temporal variation* will also be considered. I hypothesize that electoral volatility, party system fragmentation, and the vote share for new parties should decrease after

¹³ Indeed, the correlation coefficient between the GDP growth and inflation is 0,698 and it is significant at the 0,001 level while the correlation coefficient between the GDP growth and unemployment is 0,328 and it is significant at the 0,05 level.
the first few parliamentary elections. The most problematic is the temporal variation of the IEP, because electoral turnout decreased after the early 1990s in most post-communist countries while the share of invalid and non-represented votes should have decreased. Hence, I expect that temporal variation will not significantly influence the IEP (however, I will still check this assumption in the model). I also included time square in the models where it was significant¹⁴.

None of the basic assumptions of linear regression has been violated. Since the timeseries data is used, autocorrelation is possible. However, for all four models the values of the Durbin-Watson test were close to 2, so errors are sufficiently independent form each other. All relationships between independent and dependent variables (except when an independent variable is a dummy variable) can be regarded as linear. Due to the fact that Lithuania had deflation of 1.1 percent before the 2004 parliamentary election, a dummy variable was introduced to compensate for this. All dependent variables may be regarded as distributed normally. There were some signs of heteroskedasticity in two of the four models (the models with electoral volatility and new party vote as dependent variables). The robust error model was used to solve this problem (STATA program was used; for the other two models SPSS program was used). Colinearity between independent variables was rather high, but since the results were still significant, this limitation should not be considered as serious.

2.2. Results and interpretation

In this section the results of four regression models are presented. According to three subhypotheses the results are divided into three subsections. In the first subsection the results of the models with electoral volatility and party system fragmentation as dependent variables are presented, the results of the model with the new party vote share as the dependent variable

¹⁴ All variables and expected relationships can be found in the Annex 1.

are presented in the second subsection, and in the third subsection the results with the index of effective participation as the dependent variable are described.

2.2.1. Impact of the form of government on the pattern of party competition

The regression equation for the model with electoral volatility as the dependent variable is:

 $\begin{aligned} &Volatility = \beta_0 + \beta_1(nonpartisan) + \beta_2 (proximity) + \beta_3 (nonpartisan*proximity) + \beta_4 \\ &(strength) + \beta_5 (support) + \beta_6 (strength*support) + \beta_7 (elect_formula) + \beta_8 (4 \ percent) \\ &+ \beta_9 (5 \ percent) + \beta_{10} (ln(district \ magnitude)) + \beta_{11} (ENEP) + \beta_{12} (Ethnic) + \beta_{13} \\ &(Urbanization) + \beta_{14} (GDP \ growth) + \beta_{15} (Log(Inflation)) + \beta_{16} (Unemployment) + \beta_{17} \\ &(Time) + \beta_{18} (Time^2) + e \end{aligned}$

The results of the regression model can be found in Table 1. As seen from the results, the model is highly significant and has a quite high R-squared and adjusted R-squared. However, the results do not support the first sub-hypothesis, which claims that the form of government influences the stability in party competition. All variables related to the form of government have no significant impact on the level of electoral volatility, although all, except the presidential strength, have expected signs.

The only highly significant predictor of electoral volatility is the effective number of electoral parties. The ENEP has the expected positive sign: everything else being equal, the increase of the index by one should on average increase electoral volatility by around 3.2 percent. The scatter plot between electoral volatility and the number of parties is depicted in Appendix 4. The number of parties alone explains 26.7 percent of variation in electoral volatility.

None of the other control variables significantly influences the level of electoral volatility. The only variable which approaches the 0,1 significance is time. The significance of time variable is 0,103 while the significance of the time-squared variable is 0,111. Hence, ignoring this rather low significance, it might be claimed the relationship between the time

after the introduction of the new regime and electoral volatility is not linear: the number of effective parties increases in the first decade after the establishment of new constitutional framework and decreases after that.

ciectoral volutility)
β (SE)
2,159 (11,399)
8,337 (8,057)
-1,085 (17,310)
-0,160 (1,570)
0,070 (0,197)
-0,029 (0,041)
4,179 (5,470)
-2,614 (4,969)
-4,593 (5,305)
0,0468 (1,869)
3,198 (0,944)***
18,196 (13,131)
0,194 (0,166)
-0,577 (-,413)
-4,260 (2,751)
0,449 (0,463)
2,525 (1,508)
-0,137 (0,083)
-10,606 (12,593)
0,60 (0,38)
10,98 (0,000)

 Table 1: OLS regression (dependent variable – electoral volatility)

* p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01, N = 52

The results partly coincide with other studies on electoral volatility in European democracies. The number of parties has been found to be an important factor of electoral volatility in 38 European democracies (Lane and Ersson 2007); it also had moderate, but significant impact on electoral volatility in the study on electoral volatility in post-communist Europe (Tavits 2005).

The full regression equation (including all relevant independent variables) for the model with **the effective number of electoral parties** as the dependent variable is:

 $ENEP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (non-partisan) + \beta_2 (nonpartisan*proximity) + \beta_3 (proximity) + \beta_4$ (ENPS) + $\beta_5 (ENPS*proximity) + \beta_6 (strength) + \beta_7 (strength_squared) + \beta_8$ (strength*support) + $\beta_9 (elect_formula) + \beta_{10} (4 \ percent) + \beta_{11} (5 \ percent) + \beta_{12}$ $(ln(district magnitude)) + \beta_{13}(Ethnic) + \beta_{14}(Urbanization) + \beta_{15}(GDP growth) + \beta_{16}$ $(Log(Inflation)) + \beta_{17}(Unemployment) + \beta_{18}(Lithuania 2004) + \beta_{19}(Time) + e$

Variable	Model 1: β (SE)	<i>Model</i> 2: β (SE)	<i>Model</i> 3: β (SE)	Model 4: β (SE)
Vote share of non-partisan candidates				0,048 (0,026)*
Proximity between	1,226 (2,097)	1,420 (1,795)	1,983 (1,855)	0,959 (1,288)
presidential/parliamentary				
elections				
Nonpartisan*Proximity				-3,155 (4,040)
Effective number of	0,474 (0,261)*	0,628	0,592	
presidential candidates		(0,229)***	(0,232)**	
(ENPS)				
ENPS*Proximity	-0,479 (0,657)	-0,341 (0,559)	-0,487 (0,578)	
Presidential strength	0,066 (0,241)	-1,968	-1,906	-1,293
		(0,597)***	(0,600)***	(0,671)*
Presidential strength Squared		0,246	0,252	0,195
		(0,071)***	(0,072)***	(0,078)**
Parliamentary support	-0,019 (0,034)	-0,027	0,01 (0,031)	0,019 (0,031)
		(0,014)*		
Strength*support	-0,005 (0,007)		-0,006 (0,006)	-0,010 (0,006)
Electoral formula	0,451 (0,869)	-0,046 (0,770)	0,031 (0,774)	0,052 (0,755)
4 percent threshold	-0,869 (1,019)	-0,563 (0,879)	-0,746 (0,898)	-0,702 (0,884)
5 percent threshold	0,174 (0,924)	0,636 (0,824)	0,637 (0,824)	0,461 (0,823)
Ln (District Magnitude)	0,048 (0,277)	0,130 (0,245)	0,142 (0,245)	0,245 (0,251)
Ethnic fractionalization	2,917 (1,994)	3,220 (1,736)*	3,530	3,602
			(0,1763)*	(1,751)**
Urbanization	0,005 (0,024)	0,011 (0,020)	0,003 (0,021)	-0,005 (0,023)
GDP growth	0,053 (0,044)	0,047 (0,039)	0,049 (0,039)	0,041 (0,040)
Log (Inflation)	0,078 (0,705)	-0,186 (0,625)	-0,200 (0,625)	0,046 (0,647)
Unemployment	-0,063 (0,058)	-0,047 (0,051)	-0,050 (0,051)	-0,040 (0,050)
Lithuania 2004 election	-1,284 (2,706)	-0,960 (2,381)	-0,815 (2,385)	-0,150 (2,475)
Time	-0,173	-0,208	-0,207	-0,156
	(0,076)**	(0,067)***	(0,067)***	(0,070)**
Constant	5,978	7,925	7,811	6,388
	(2,078)***	(1,898)***	(1,901)***	(2,037)***
R-squared (adjusted R-	0,477 (0,249)	0,595 (0,419)	0,606 (0,419)	0,613 (0,430)
squared)				
F-test (Sig.)	2,095 (0,028)	3,372 (0,001)	3,242 (0,001)	3,343 (0,001)

 Table 2: OLS regression (dependent variable – the effective number of electoral parties)

 $p<0,1;\ ^{\ast\ast}p<0,05;\ ^{\ast\ast\ast}p<0,01,\ N=56$

Several slightly different versions of the model are reported in Table 2. The first model excludes the square of the presidential power, the vote share for non-partisan candidates and the interaction effect between *Nonpartisan* and *Proximity*; the second model includes the square of the presidential power, but excludes the interaction effect between the

Strength and *Support*, the vote share for non-partisan candidates and the interaction effect between *Nonpartisan* and *Proximity*; the third model excludes only the vote share for non-partisan candidates and the interaction effect between *Nonpartisan* and *Proximity*; the fourth model excludes the number of candidates and the interaction effect between *ENPS* and *Proximity*.

The reason why some independent variables are excluded from the models is high correlation between some variables. The correlation coefficient between *Parliamentary support* and *Strength_Support* is 0,888 and is significant at 0,000 level. The correlation coefficient between ENPS and Nonpartisan is 0,546 and it is significant at the 0,000 level. Hence, the inclusion of all relevant independent variables would give no significant results due to the high degree of colinearity.

All four models provide significant support to the subhypothesis about the relationship between the stability in party competition and the form of government. The most significant predictors of the number of parties are variables related to the form of government and time.

The most significant factor for the number of parties is the presidential power. However, as model 1 demonstrates, the relationship between the number of parties and presidential power is not linear, as hypothesized (the presidential strength is not significant). Only after the introduction of the square of the presidential power both presidential power and the square of presidential power are very significant. Graphically the relationship between the presidential power and the expected number of parties controlling for all other variables is demonstrated in Figure 1.

As can be seen, the number of parties is high when the presidential power is low and when it is high; however, it is lower when presidential power is moderate, and the lowest when the value of the presidential power index is equal to 4. This finding also holds using another indicator of presidential power - the modified Frye index (Armingeon and Careja 2004). Therefore, everything else being equal, the number of parties should be higher in strongly parliamentary systems (Estonia, Latvia, Czech Republic, Hungary), semi-presidential systems with weak presidencies (for example, Slovakia) and super-presidential systems (Russia, Ukraine until 2005, and to some extent Croatia in the 1990s), while in semi-presidential systems with moderately strong presidencies (Croatia after 2000, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) party system fragmentation should be much more moderate.



Figure 1: The Expected ENEP and the Constitutional Power of Presidency

This finding requires the more elaborate research than the one available here. The tentative explanation is that when presidential power or, in other words, the size of the electoral prize is very low, the parties have no incentives to coordinate their actions and try to capture the presidency without cooperation with other parties. However, as presidential power increases to the medium level, the worth of the office increases, and consequently parties have more incentives to coalesce.

Finally, when presidential power is very high, the number of parties increases again, because parties are not able to obtain the major role in the presidential elections. As

mentioned above, the high degree of personalization in presidential elections exclude parties as the viable actors in presidential elections. Therefore, parties are not constrained by the majoritarian nature of the presidential elections and mostly compete for the seats in parliament. This effect has been demonstrated in Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s, when the major presidential candidates were loosely related to political parties, and the number of parties mainly competed for parliamentary representation.

However, this can be only transitional effect – in the long perspective the consolidation of strongly presidential regimes should increase the importance of parties in presidential elections and therefore reduce the effective number of parties. For example, the number of parties in Ukraine dropped from 10,78 in 1998 to 7,95 in 2002 and 5,49 in 2006, while major presidential candidates are also clearly associated with party organizations. The other way is also possible – the prominence of strong presidents is consolidated, possibly in the authoritarian means (the example of Russia). However, even in the Russian case the number of parties decreased because the strong presidency managed to create the party of power, based on the personality of the president.

The second highly significant predictor of the number of parties is the number of presidential candidates. This variable significantly influences the number of parties in all three models and has the expected positive sign. Therefore, everything else being equal the increase in the number of presidential candidates on the average might bring the increase in the number of the effective number of parties by around 0,6. However, the interaction effect between the number of presidential candidates and the proximity between parliamentary and presidential elections has no impact on the number of parties. The insignificance of this interaction effect contradicts to the findings of other studies, exploring the impact of presidential elections on legislative elections (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Golder 2006). The assumption can be made that presidential candidates in post-communist countries manage

to keep the political capital acquired during the presidential elections for a relatively long period of time.

The third, less significant, but still important predictor of the number of parties is the support in parliament the president enjoys. This predictor is moderately significant when controlling for the square of presidential power (model 2). The parliamentary support variable is not significant when controlling for the interaction effect between the presidential power and the parliamentary support; however, it can be explained by the high correlation between *Parliamentary support* and *Strength*Support*. The elimination of the interaction effect almost does not change the results; therefore, it can be claimed that parliamentary support is a significant predictor of the number of parties.

This means that despite their constitutional powers presidents can influence the fragmentation of the party system. The sign of the relationship, as expected, is negative. Therefore, it can be claimed that everything else being equal the increase in the parliamentary support by 1 percent will lead to the decrease in the number of parties by 0,027 (it might seem an insignificant change; however, it means that if the support increases from 0 to 50 percent, the expected number of effective electoral parties will decrease by 1,35).

The vote share of non-partisan candidates is also an important predictor of the number of parties. As seen in the Model 4, the exclusion of the number of presidential candidates from the model (as mentioned above, there is highly significant and strong correlation between the two variables) makes the vote share of non-partisan candidates significant. Therefore, everything else being equal the increase in the share of votes of non-partisan candidates by one percent might increase the number of parties by 0,048 (which means that the increase by 50 percent might increase the number of electoral parties by 2,4). However, the interaction effect between the variables *Nonpartisan* and *Proximity* is not significant: therefore, the independent candidates are able to keep their political capital for a relatively long period.

The only other significant predictor (besides the time variable) of the effective number of parties is ethnic fractionalization. However, this variable has the expected sign and the rather high impact: the change from absolutely homogenous society to the maximally heterogeneous society on the average should increase the number of parties by 3,2-3,5.

Finally, the temporal variation is also very significant. As expected, the number of parties has decreased after the establishment of new democratic regimes. Each year after the significant constitutional changes has on average brought the decrease in the number of electoral parties by around 0,2.

To conclude, the first sub-hypothesis about the impact of the regime type on the stability of party competition has been confirmed only partly: the major indicator of the stability of party competition is not influenced by the form of government whatsoever. However, as predicted theoretically, the higher number of presidential candidates, the lower parliamentary support to the president and the higher vote share of independent candidates should increase the number of parties. If the operationalization of the regime type is valid, these findings indicate that the number of parties is affected by the personalization of presidential elections, the number of presidential candidates, and the actions of presidents in office. Furthermore, as expected, the presidential strength influences the number of parties; however, differently than expected, the relationship is curvilinear, not linear.

2.2.2. Impact of the form of government on the strength of party roots in society

The relationship between the form of government and the **strength of party roots** in society (measured as the vote share of new parties) is examined using the regression equation:

New party vote share = $\beta_0 + \beta_1(nonpartisan) + \beta_2(proximity) + \beta_3$ (nonpartisan*proximity)+ $\beta_4(strength) + \beta_5(support) + \beta_6(strength*support) + \beta_7$

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 $(elect_formula) + \beta_8 (4 \ percent) + \beta_9 (5 \ percent) + \beta_{10} (ln(district \ magnitude)) + \beta_{11}$ $(Ethnic) + \beta_{12} (Urbanization) + \beta_{13} (GDP \ growth) + \beta_{14} (Log(Inflation)) + \beta_{15}$ $(Unemployment) + \beta_{16} (Lithuania \ 2004) + \beta_{17} (Time) + e$

As seen from the results provided in Table 3, the model is highly significant and explains a lot of variation in the dependent variable (R-squared = 0,635, adjusted R-squared = 0,423). The model provides limited support to the second sub-hypothesis about the influence of the regime type on the strength of party roots in society.

 Table 3: OLS regression (dependent variable – the vote share for new parties)

Variable	β (SE)
Vote share for non-partisan candidates	-13,381 (13,24)
Proximity between presidential/parliamentary elections	0,807 (10,257)
Nonpartisan*Proximity	38,010 (22,576)*
Presidential strength	0,992 (1,627)
Parliamentary support	-0,525 (0,283)*
Strength*support	-0,035 (0,047)
Electoral formula	-4,290 (6,810)
4 percent threshold	3,517 (7,267)
5 percent threshold	3,014 (8,440)
Ln (District Magnitude)	-1,093 (1,923)
Ethnic fractionalization	41,711 (19,638)**
Urbanization	0,093 (0,266)
GDP growth	-1,174 (0,531)**
Log (Inflation)	-5,687 (2,825)*
Unemployment	1,259 (0,615)
Time	-0,724 (0,473)
Constant	4,129 (16,648)
R-squared (adjusted R-squared)	0,635 (0,423)
F-test (Sig.)	7,60 (0,000)

* p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01, N = 48

First, the new party vote share is significantly influenced by the interaction effect between the vote share of non-partisan presidential candidates and the proximity between presidential and parliamentary elections. The relationship has the expected effect – the more non-partisan candidates acquire votes in presidential elections and the more proximate the legislative and executive elections are the more successful new parties are. The change from the situation when in the presidential election non-partisan candidates got no votes and the elections were maximally distant from each other to the situation when all votes in presidential elections are acquired by non-partisan candidates and the legislative and presidential elections are concurrent should on average should increase new party vote share by 38 percent.

Second significant variable is the parliamentary support to the president. This relationship again has the expected sign – the increase in the parliamentary support to the president should decrease the vote share of new parties. The increase by one percent in parliamentary support should on average decrease the vote share of new parties by 0.525 percent, which means that the increase in parliamentary support from 0 to 50 percent should on average decrease the vote share of new parties by 27.25 percent.

The other variables related to the form of government do not significantly influence the vote share of new parties. The vote share of non-partisan candidates, presidential power, and the interaction effect between the presidential strength and the parliamentary support do not reach the 0,1 significance level.

Other explanations for the new party success are also notable. First, the level of ethnic fractionalization has the expected sign – the higher ethnic fractionalization, the higher new party vote share. Second, the performance of the national economy, more precisely, the GDP growth and inflation rate also has a significant impact on the vote share for new parties. Everything else being equal, the increase in the GDP growth rate by one percent should reduce the new party vote share by 1.17 percent while the increase in the logarithm of the inflation rate by one should also increase new party vote share by 5.68 percent. The unexpected direction of the relationship between the new party vote share and inflation can be explained by the fact that the highest inflation was reported in the beginning of transition, when the voters could still choose among existing parties. After several parliamentary elections, when the inflation rate has decreased dramatically, all older political alternatives

have also been tried. This increased the incentives of voters to turn to new parties, even if inflation was not high.

In conclusion, the second sub-hypothesis about the impact of the regime type on the strength of social party roots has also been confirmed only partly. Only parliamentary support and the interaction effect between the vote share of non-partisan candidates and the proximity between the legislative and presidential elections influence the new party vote share. Hence, if the operationalization of the form of government is valid, the strength of party roots in society is influenced only by the personalization of presidential elections and the actions of presidents in office.

2.2.3. Impact of the form of government on the legitimacy of parties and elections

The impact of the form of government on the level of **legitimacy** of parties and elections (operationalized by the index of effective participation) is measured using the following regression equation:

Index of effective participation = $\beta_0 + \beta_1(nonpartisan) + \beta_2(proximity) + \beta_3$ (nonpartisan*proximity)+ $\beta_4(strength) + \beta_5(support) + \beta_6(strength*support) + \beta_7$ (elect_formula) + $\beta_8(4 \text{ percent}) + \beta_9(5 \text{ percent}) + \beta_{10}(ln(district magnitude)) + \beta_{11}$ (Ethnic) + $\beta_{12}(Urbanization) + \beta_{13}(GDP \text{ growth}) + \beta_{14}(Log(Inflation)) + \beta_{15}$ (Unemployment)+ $\beta_{16}(Lithuania 2004) + \beta_{17}(Time) + e$

As seen in the Table 4, the model is highly significant and explains more than half of variation in the index of effective participation (R-squared = 0,677, adjusted R-squared = 0,536). The results confirm the third-subhypothesis, because the variables related to the form of government are significant with an exception of presidential power (however, the presidential strength influences the relationship between the effective participation and the parliamentary support).

The most significant predictor of the index of effective participation is the vote share of non-partisan presidential candidates and the interaction effect between the variables *Non-partisan* and *Proximity*. As expected, the increase in the vote share for non-partisan presidential candidates should decrease the index of effective participation as well. Everything else being equal, the increase in the vote share of non-partisan candidates from 0 to 100 should decrease the IEP by 0,52 - more than a half of the possible variation.

 Table 4: OLS regression (dependent variable – the effective index of participation)

Variable	β (SE)
Vote share for non-partisan candidates	-0,518 (0,138)***
Proximity between presidential/parliamentary elections	-0,085 (0,060)
Nonpartisan*Proximity	0,570 (0,202)***
Presidential strength	-0,016 (0,011)
Parliamentary support	-0,003 (0,002)*
Strength*support	-0,001 (0,000)*
Electoral formula	-0,004 (0,040)
4 percent threshold	0,055 (0,047)
5 percent threshold	-0,045 (0,043)
Ln (District Magnitude)	0,000 (0,013)
Ethnic fractionalization	0,113 (0,094)**
Urbanization	-0,002 (0,001)*
GDP growth	-0,001 (0,002)**
Log (Inflation)	-0,050 (0,035)*
Unemployment	0,002 (0,003)
Dummy for Lithuania 2004	-0,198 (0,131)*
Time	-0,007 (0,004)
Constant	0,826 (0,107)***
R-squared (adjusted R-squared)	0,677 (0,536)
F-test (Sig.)	4,803 (0,000)

* p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01, N = 56

The interaction effect between Non-partisan and Proximity is also very significant, although the *Proximity* variable is not significant (p = 0,165). Therefore, assuming that the regression coefficient of *Proximity* is equal to 0 and everything else is equal, the increase of the vote share of non-partisan candidates from 0 to 100 percent should reduce the index of effective participation by 0,518, which is more than a half of variation in the index. Furthermore, everything else being equal, in concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections the increase in the vote share of non-partisan candidates from 0 to 100 percent

should increase the index of effective participation by 0,052. Therefore, the results demonstrate that the strength of non-partisan presidential candidates significantly influences effective participation: in case of non-concurrent elections strong independent candidates reduce voter incentives to participate in parliamentary elections and decrease the importance of parties to votes while in concurrent elections independent candidates may boost voter participation.

Two other variables related to the form of government also significantly influence the index of effective participation. The variable *Parliamentary support* has moderate impact on the dependent variable; however, differently than expected, the sign of relationship is negative, not positive. The increase in the parliamentary support by one percent should reduce the index of effective participation by 0,003. One of possible explanations for this finding is that presidents with no parliamentary support use the appeals to the public more and this may increase the participation of the people in the elections.

The interaction effect between presidential powers and the parliamentary support has the negative sign as well. Even if the constitutional strength of the presidency does not have the significant impact itself (p = 0,150), it might be claimed that the constitutionally stronger presidents should manage to increase popular participation more than constitutionally weak presidents. For instance, assuming that the values of other independent and control variables do not change and the strength of presidency is 1, the increase in the parliamentary support to the president from 0 to 100 percent might decrease the index of effective participation by 0,1. However, if presidential power is equal to 7, the increase in the parliamentary support to the president from 0 to 100 percent might decrease the index of effective participation by 0,7. Again, the interpretation of this result requires more extensive research. A tentative explanation might be that in case the strong presidency also has strong support in parliament, it can restrict the possibilities of the other political forces to participate in the elections, which in turn would decrease the participation in elections.

Other variables also significantly influence the level of participation in new Eastern European democracies. As expected, higher ethnic diversity should increase participation. However, the clearly expressed urban-rural division will decrease the level of effective participation. Furthermore, the higher GDP growth and the higher inflation rate significantly reduce effective participation. Finally, time has moderate impact on the IEP: everything else being equal, each year the index on average should decrease by 0,007. As discussed above, this can be attributed to the decrease in voter turnout.

To conclude, the third sub-hypothesis has again been confirmed only partly. As expected, the increase in the vote share of non-partisan candidates (mediated by the proximity between the legislative and presidential elections) should decrease effective participation. However, differently than expected, the increase in the parliamentary support to the president (mediated by the presidential power) should also increase popular participation. Therefore, if the operationalization of the regime type is valid, the legitimacy of parties and elections is negatively influenced by the president.

The statistical analysis demonstrates that the regime type is one of the most important factors of party system institutionalization; however, it affects the three institutionalization dimensions differently. The form of government does not directly affect the main indicator of the stability in party competition – electoral volatility. However, the main predictor of electoral volatility is influenced by four variables related to the regime type: the vote share of independent candidates, the number of presidential candidates, presidential power, and the parliamentary support to the president. Party roots in society are significantly affected by the

parliamentary support to the president and the success of independent candidates. The major indicator of the legitimacy of parties is the vote share of independent candidates and the parliamentary support to the president.

The next chapter discusses the relationship between party system institutionalization and the regime type using the case of the Lithuanian party system.

CHAPTER 3: IMPACT OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT ON THE LITHUANIAN PARTY SYSTEM

This part of the study is devoted to the case analysis of the Lithuanian party system. In the first section I will present the importance and methodology of the case study. Second, the development of party competition in Lithuania in 1989-2006 and the impact of the semipresidential constitutional framework on it will be presented. Third, the findings of the Lithuanian case analysis will be summarized.

3.1. Methodology

The major rationale behind doing the case study of Lithuania is the illustration and the contextualization of the findings of the statistical analysis. Taking into consideration the inherent disadvantage of the single case studies – the low degree of generalization (Yin 1994, 10; Van Evera 1997, 53) - the in-depth study of one case can provide important information on *how* causal relationships work in a real context. Therefore the case study essentially describes the impact of the regime type (semi-presidentialism) on the Lithuanian party system (taking into consideration some competing explanations as well). In this respect the case study of Lithuania complements the findings of the quantitative study, which has more causal power, but less illustrative capacity.

Only the first dimension of party system institutionalization (the pattern of party competition) will be analyzed in the case study. This decision is determined by two reasons. First, the nature of the second and third dimensions (party roots in society and the legitimacy of parties and elections) of party system institutionalization requires the use of the survey data. However, the available micro-level data is not sufficient¹⁵ in order to explore what factors determined the changes in party roots in society and the legitimacy of parties. Second,

¹⁵The major problem is that all large-scale surveys (the third and the fourth waves of the World Values Survey, the second wave of the project Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, and the second wave of the project Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) in Lithuania were conducted in 1997-2001

the question how the regime type influenced all three dimensions of party system institutionalization in one and a half decades would require a study of a much larger scale than this one.

For these reasons, the question asked in this case study is "how semi-presidentialism in Lithuania influenced the pattern of party competition?". The selection of the Lithuanian case is based on several reasons¹⁶. First, it is not a parliamentary, but a semi-presidential system (Lithuania has direct presidential elections and the moderately powerful presidency, comparable to the Romanian and Polish presidencies). Parliamentary systems would not be relevant for the illustration of the relationship between party system institutionalization and the regime type, because their impact on party system institutionalization is more moderate in comparison with semi-presidential and presidential systems. As proven in the second chapter of the thesis, party system institutionalization is significantly influenced by direct presidential elections and strong presidencies – factors, which are not present in parliamentary systems.

The Lithuanian case is more suitable for the study in comparison with other semipresidential and super-presidential systems in the post-communist region as well. First, it has an unambiguous democratic record since 1991. Second, there have not been any significant constitutional changes in Lithuania since the adoption of the current constitution in 1992 while other countries (Poland, Slovakia, and Romania) have had important changes in their constitutions, which might aggravate the disclosure of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.

The pattern of party competition in the case study is operationalized as party system fragmentation. Therefore, the major statement of the case study is that *semi-presidentialism in Lithuania has increased party system fragmentation*. The effective number of electoral and

¹⁶ Since this study is not an independent research, the three reasons for conducting single case studies (the case should be unique, extreme or revelatory) provided by Yin are not relevant (1994, 38-41). For illustrative purpose any case should be appropriate.

legislative parties will be used to measure party system fragmentation. Moreover, electoral volatility data will also be provided, because according to the findings of the statistical analysis party system fragmentation affects electoral volatility. The time framework of the case study is from 1992 (the introduction of the new constitution) until 2006 (however, the formation of the party system in 1989-1992 will also be addressed for the higher clarity of the study).

	President	Election date	Term	Parliamentary
				terms
riod 1	Algirdas Brazauskas	Acting President	November 25,	November 25,
			1992 – February	1992 –
			25, 1993	November 24,
	Algirdas Brazauskas	14 February,	February 25,	1996
		1993	1993 – February	
			25, 1998	November 25,
Pe				1996 – October
od 2	Valdas Adamkus	21 December	February 26	18, 2000
	v uluus i luullikus	1997 and 4	1998 - February	
		Ianuary 1998	25 2003	O at all and 10
eri		Junuary, 1990	25, 2005	October 19,
F				2000 -
	Rolandas Paksas	22 December,	February 26,	November 14,
rriod 3		2002 and 5	2003 – April 6,	2004
		January, 2003	2004	
	Artūras Daulauskas	Acting President	April 6 2004	
	Alturas Faulauskas	Acting President	April 0, $2004 -$	
		12 I 2004	July 12, 2004	
	vaidas Adamkus	13 June, 2004	July 12, 2004 -	
		and 2/ June,	present	November 15,
Ρ€		2004		2004 - present

 Table 5: Presidents, dates of presidential elections, presidential and parliamentary terms in Lithuania in 1992-2004

Source: official website of Presidency, http://www.president.lt

The independent variable will be operationalized using the same indicators as in the statistical analysis: the vote share of independent presidential candidates, the number of presidential candidates, presidential power and the parliamentary support to the president. Thus, the impact of semi-presidentialism on party system institutionalization can be divided into the impact of the direct presidential election and the impact of presidents in office. For

this reason, the time framework of the case study will be divided into three major parts, according to the presidential terms, as seen in Table 5.

According to Yin, the case study should have its propositions, which would demonstrate what will be examined in the study (1994, 21). Since the case study is devoted to illustrating the results of the statistical analysis, the propositions of this study are derived from the conclusions of the second chapter of the thesis. Therefore, the following propositions will be explored: 1) the increase in the number of presidential candidates increases party system fragmentation on the legislative level, 2) the increase in the vote share of non-partisan candidates increases party system fragmentation, 3) the increase in parliamentary support to the president reduces fragmentation.

The major alternative explanation to party system fragmentation is sociological: the strength of the political and social divisions can structure party system. The study will also take into consideration the performance of the national economy and the electoral system on the legislative level.

3.2. Party system institutionalization and the impact of semi-presidentialism: the Lithuanian case

The study starts with the description of the early party system development in 1989 -1992. Then the impact of semi-presidentialism on the pattern of party competition is analyzed in all three periods.

3.2.1. Early formation of the Lithuanian party system: the emergence of bipolar competition and the adoption of the Constitution

In the comparative perspective the formation of the Lithuanian party system and democratic institutions in early 1990s can be analyzed using the model suggested by Kitschelt (Kitschelt 1992; Kitschelt et al 1999; Kitschelt 2001). The most important factor determining the pattern of party competition and the nature of democratic institutions is the properties of

the pre-communist and communist past and the mode of transition, because "in the early stages of democratic stabilization...institutions are endogenous to party competition" (Kitschelt 1992, 9).

Lithuania, as the other two Baltic states, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary and Poland are attributed to the category of the national-accommodative communism, which was characterized by medium levels of formal professional bureaucratization, medium-low levels of corruption and the prominence of the cooptation of social groups instead of repression (Kitschelt 2001, 315). According to the model, the transition to democracy process in national accommodative communist countries was determined by competition between the former communists and the liberal democratic/nationalist forces and protracted negotiations between the two groups. The institutional outcome of the negotiations is the compromise, meaning mixed electoral systems and moderately strong presidencies. The consequence on the party system is more programmatic than clientelistic competition and two dimensions of party competition - the economic and socio-cultural divides (Kitschelt 2001, 312-313). The twodimensional competition space creates the tripolar political divide between one, a secular, libertarian, and market-liberal camp, two, a secular and libertarian post-communist camp, and three, a national-authoritarian camp endorsing mixed economic positions (Kitschelt et al 1999, 73). However, the liberal non-communist camp is usually weaker than the other two camps (Kitschelt 1999, 74).

The Lithuanian case fits many features of the Kitschelt model. The emerging **political competition** since 1989 was dominated by two major forces: the reformist communists, who renamed themselves as the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party in 1990, and the popular opposition movement Sajudis, established in 1988. As a result, the communist/anti-communist divide became the major conflict line in the emerging party system. This conflict coincided with the divide over the geopolitical orientation, with former communists arguing

for apro-Russian stance while anti-communists taking a pro-Western stance (Ramonaitė 2003, 30-31).

Besides the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party and the Homeland Union, several other parties also had moderate influence in the early 1990s. The Liberal Union and the Centre Union, emerging from the moderate wing of the Sajudis, were pro-liberal parties supporting more liberal economic policies (particularly the Liberal Union) and trying to present the alternative to the existing value-laden division. Two historical parties were also important: the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party, representing the religious divide (to a large extent coinciding to the communist/anti-communist division), and the Social Democratic Party, which tried to present the non-communist social democratic alternative.

The socio-economic divide in the Lithuanian case was relatively insignificant in the beginning of transition, and got more prominence only in the end of the 1990s. The low level of marketization was a major reason for this. Both major parties emphasized the egalitarian values and the active stance of state in the economy (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004, 136). The minor difference between the two parties was that the Homeland Union supported the idea of the more rapid economic reforms than the Democratic Labor Party (Ramonaite 2003, 30-31). However, in the late 1990s and the early 2000s the Labor-Capital divide became one of the major conflict lines (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004, 146-147).

The **institutional outcomes** of the transition in Lithuania are also in accordance with the Kitschelt model. The compromise between the former communist and the anti-communist camps led to the introduction of the mixed electoral system. 71 or 50.3 percent of parliamentary seats are distributed in single member districts (the two round system has been applied in all parliamentary elections with an exception of the 2000 election, when the plurality rule was used), and 70 or 49.7 percent of seats are distributed according to the PR formula in one multi-member district with the 5 percent threshold (4 percent in 1992).

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Although it is argued that the mixed electoral system should increase the number of parties, Clark and Prekevicius (2001) demonstrated that the mixed system in fact worked in a restrictive manner in the Lithuanian case. Hence, the number of legislative parties should have been decreased by the electoral system.

The compromise between the two polarized camps was also the reason for the creation of the semi-presidential constitutional design with directly elected presidency, which has some significant powers¹⁷. According to the Siaroff presidential power index, the Lithuanian presidency gets 4 points (the minimum being 0 and the maximum 9) (Siaroff 2003) while according to the modified Frye's index the Lithuanian presidency gets 13.5 points out of a possible 27 (Armingeon and Careja 2004). The constitutional power of the Lithuanian presidency is most similar to the ones that the Romanian and Polish presidencies have, is significantly higher than presidential power in four parliamentary systems in the region (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Latvia) and Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria, and significantly lower than the power of the Croatian (until 2000), Russian, and Ukrainian presidencies. Therefore, according to the findings of the statistical analysis, the moderate powers of the Lithuanian presidency should decrease party system fragmentation, because parties have strong incentives to cooperate in order to acquire the prize of the presidential election.

To sum up, in 1992, when a new semi-presidential constitutional framework and the mixed electoral system were introduced, the Lithuanian party system already had a rather clear pattern of competition, based on the major conflict line – the approach to the communist part and the geopolitical orientation. The political division was represented by two major

¹⁷ The legislative presidential powers include: the highly restricted decree powers in the areas of formulation and implementation of foreign and national defense policy, and the appointment of some key judges, and veto power, which can be overridden by the absolute majority of the MPs. The non-legislative presidential powers include the nomination of the Prime Minister and ministers, and parliament dissolution power (in case the Parliament repeatedly fails to approve the governmental program or on the proposal of the Prime Minister, if Parliament expresses the non-confidence to the government) (The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/lh00000_.html).

competitors – the partly reformed communist successor party and the radical wing of the former popular movement. The other important parties included: the Social Democratic Party, which represented the social democratic alternative unrelated with the communist past, the Christian Democratic Party, which represented the religious divide, and the smaller Liberal Union and the Centre Union, which promoted more liberal agenda in regard to economic issues and neglected the value-laden political conflict. Hence, the configuration of the Lithuanian party system in the early 1990s roughly fits the Kitschelt model, although the communist/anti-communist divide was more prominent than other socio-cultural issues (like autonomy of the individual, universalistic norms of conduct etc.).

How did the introduction of the new constitutional and electoral institutions change the pattern of party competition? The answer to this question is provided in the following three subsections, which analyze three periods of the Lithuanian party system development.

3.2.2. Brazauskas in power: semi-presidentialism as the stabilizing factor of the party system?

There is strong evidence to claim that the presidential election in 1993 and five years of Brazauskas's term in office **significantly contributed to the low fragmentation and the stability of party competition** in Lithuania. The effect of the presidential election and Brazauskas's presidency are addressed below.

The results of both the 1992 parliamentary election and the 1993 presidential election were significantly influenced by the political division over the evaluation of the communist past and reflected the emerging bipolar competition (the results of parliamentary and presidential elections in Lithuania are provided in Appendixes 5 and 6). Both elections brought victory to the former communists: the parliamentary election was won by the Labor Democratic Party while its chairman Algirdas Brazauskas won the presidential election. Sajudis (the Homeland Union since 1993) became the largest opposition party.

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It is complicated to evaluate if the preparations for the presidential election in February 1993 could have any impact on the parliamentary election in October 1992, not the least because the parliamentary election was held together with the referendum over the new constitution, introducing the semi-presidential form of government. The uncertainty over the outcome of the referendum did not allow major actors to structure their actions in the parliamentary election according to the expected benefits in the presidential election. Therefore, the presidential election in 1993 could have had the higher impact on party competition in 1993-1996 and the outcome of the parliamentary election in 1996.

Indeed, the 1993 presidential election played an important role in stabilizing and structuring the Lithuanian party system. *The number of candidates* in the election was only two (the effective number of candidates¹⁸ was 1.91) and they clearly represented the two different sides in the dominant political conflict: Algirdas Brazauskas was the former general secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party while Stasys Lozoraitis was a non-partisan candidate, a Lithuanian émigré and a head of the Lithuanian government in exile from 1987 to 1991. The parties supporting the candidates also had clear positions on the dominant political conflict: Brazauskas was the chairman of the communist successor party while Lozoraitis was supported by Sajudis, the Christian Democratic Party, the Centre Union and the Liberal Union and even the Social Democratic Party. The clear-cut and polarized presidential election helped to crystallize the Lithuanian party system by further strengthening the divide into two major blocs: the former communists, represented by the Labor Democratic Party, and the anti-communists, represented by Sajudis (the Homeland Union from 1993) and the Christian Democrats. The other parties (the Social Democrats, the Centre Union and the Liberal Union) were unable to weaken the existing political conflict and remained not influential for a while.

¹⁸ For the formula of the effective number of presidential candidates see Chapter 2, section 1.

However, as proved in Chapter 2, strong *non-partisan candidates* may also increase party system fragmentation. Lozoraitis, though supported by many parties, did not participate actively in the political life of the country in 1989-1992 and had spent most of his life in the US. However, if he chose to continue his participation in the Lithuanian politics after the presidential election, it was highly likely that he would have weakened the communist/anticommunist divide or would even have established a new party. Nonetheless, his sudden death in 1994 did not enable him to do this.

The actions of Brazauskas in office have also been conducive to the institutionalization of the party system. Having strong parliamentary support until the end of 1996, Brazauskas had no incentives to declare himself as the anti-party president or to get involved into the inter-party politics. He conflicted with the existing majority in parliament only on some occasions (most notably, by using his influence on the parliamentary majority to change the prime minister in 1996) and did not try to change the dominance of the existing political conflict. Furthermore, Brazauskas was not very active in the domestic policies, and was described by some observers as a "president-observer" or an "insidious president" (Pugačiauskas 2000).

The parliamentary election in 1996 demonstrated the stabilizing impact of the constitutional framework on the party system. The election was marked by the significant increase in the effective number of electoral parties: their number increased from 4.62 in 1992 to 7.81 in 1996. The electoral volatility was also high: it reached 37.8 percent.

However, this increase may be attributed to the complete disintegration of the popular movement Sajudis and the failures of the economic policies of the government (the bank crisis in 1995 should be particularly noted), which increased the chances of new parties to acquire more votes. However, the effective number of legislative parties increased only from 2.98 in 1992 to 3.4 in 1996 (Krupavičius 2005, 42), with only five parties reaching the 5 percent threshold: the Homeland Union, the Christian Democrats, the Labor Democratic Party, the Centre Union, and the Social Democrats.

Both semi-presidential constitutional framework and electoral system had very restrictive impact on the electoral outcome. Both components of the electoral system contributed to moderate legislative fragmentation: only 69 percent of votes were represented in the PR component (Jurkynas 2005, 14) due to the 5 percent threshold while the majoritarian component of the electoral system greatly benefited the winning party Homeland Union – with 28.7 percent of vote it obtained 55.2 percent of seats. The impact of semi-presidentialism was also significant: as mentioned above, the bipolar competition in the 1993 presidential election, the inactivity of successful non-partisan presidential candidates and the president clearly identified with one of the sides in the dominant political conflict – all these factors significantly contributed to the continuation of the bipolar competition, based on the communist/anti-communist political divide.

To sum up, in 1993-1998 the semi-presidential constitutional framework was conducive to the institutionalization of the Lithuanian party system. The presidential election in 1993 strengthened the existing political communist/anti-communist division and the tendency of bipolar competition: only two presidential candidates with clear allegiances participated in the election and the non-partisan presidential candidate did not use his political capital. Furthermore, the actions of Brazauskas were constructive: he remained identified with his former party and took a rather passive role in the domestic policies, allowing the political parties to play the major role in policy formulation and implementation¹⁹. Although the increasing number of parties in the 1996 parliamentary elections demonstrated that the major conflict line was gradually been losing its importance, the institutional framework (the restrictive electoral system and the semi-presidential form of government) restrained the

¹⁹ After the former party of Brazauskas (the Labor Democratic Party) lost the parliamentary election in 1996, president appointed the leader of the Homeland Union as a prime minister and took a passive stance in domestic policies.

possibilities of new parties to get into mainstream politics. The *ex-post* conclusion can be done that the continuation of the tendencies of the Brazauskas term would have further reinforced the dominance of the bipolar competition and would have led to the moderate electoral and legislative fragmentation. However, as next subsection shows, the semi-presidential constitutional framework had very different impact on the party system.

3.2.3. Adamkus's first term: the time of change?

The comparison between Adamkus's and Brazauskas's terms demonstrates how different the impact of the same constitutional framework can be. In general, this sub-section reveals how **the pattern of party competition changed because of the presidential election in 1997-1998 and Adamkus's actions in his first term**, particularly from 1998 to 2000.

The presidential election in 1997-1998 was different in many respects from the election in 1993. *The number of presidential candidates* has significantly increased: from 2 in 1993 to 7 in 1998 (the effective number of presidential candidates has changed from 1.91 to 3.19). Furthermore, the pattern of bipolar competition has changed: four candidates were important in the election. Artūras Paulauskas, the former general prosecutor, was a non-partisan candidate, supported by the Labor Democratic Party, the Liberal Union, and Brazauskas personally. A non-partisan candidate Valdas Adamkus, a liberal former émigré, was supported by the Centre Union. Vytautas Landsbergis was the leader of the Homeland Union, the winner of the parliamentary election in 1996, and was also endorsed by the Christian Democrats, who were in the governmental coalition with the Homeland Union. Finally, Vytenis Andriukaitis was a leader of the Social Democratic Party. Besides the four major candidates, the other three candidates also acquired more than five percent of votes.

The presidential election demonstrated a similar tendency as the parliamentary election in 1996: the attempt of the two strongest parties to keep their dominance and the efforts of the smaller parties to break the power monopoly of the Labor Democratic Party and

the Homeland Union. However, differently than in 1996, the venture of the Social Democrats and the Centre Union was more successful. Although the Social Democrat candidate obtained only less than 6 percent of the vote, Valdas Adamkus was more successful: after coming second in the first round with 27.9 percent of vote, in the second round he won the elections with the support of the Homeland Union, the Christian Democrats, the Centre Union and the Social Democrats.

Although Adamkus could not win the election without the support of the Homeland Union, his victory still broke the power monopoly of the two major parties in Lithuania. Therefore, the presidential election was used by the pro-liberal Centre Union to neglect the dominating political division. The personal nature of the presidential elections significantly contributed to the success of Adamkus: it is hardly possible that smaller parties could have been so successful in parliamentary elections. However, as seen later, it was much easier for smaller and new parties to gain ground when the important function of the presidency was occupied by the person relatively unrelated to any of the both dominating political forces.

The relative fragmentation of the presidential election had a significant impact on party competition in other ways as well. First of all, it weakened the Homeland Union and the Christian Democrats, because their common candidate obtained only 15 percent of the vote. Second, the Centre Union temporarily benefited from Adamkus's victory: it became the most popular party in polls in 1998-1999. Third, the rather unsuccessful result of the Social Democrats increased their willingness to cooperate with the Labor Democratic Party, which materialized in the coalition agreement in the parliamentary election in 2000 and the merger to the Social Democratic Party in 2001 under the leadership of the former President Algirdas Brazauskas. One of the motives for the cooperation between the two parties was the wish of Andriukaitis, the leader of the original Social Democratic Party, to obtain the support of the Labor Democratic Party in the next presidential election. The strong showing of the *non-partisan candidates* (together they acquired 74.5 percent of votes in the first round) also significantly contributed to the changes in party competition. After losing the presidential election, Artūras Paulauskas refused to join the Labor Democratic Party and established his own party New Union (Social Liberals) in 1998, which came second in the parliamentary election in 2000.

The independence of Valdas Adamkus was also an important factor for his *actions in office*, which significantly influenced the changes in party competition. Having no reliable parliamentary support whatsoever and facing the strong parliamentary majoriy, Adamkus tried to implement his program in a way which significantly influenced the pattern of party competition. Several major aspects can be discerned.

First, Adamkus presented himself as an active, but strictly non-partisan president. Adamkus, differently than Brazauskas, was much more active president not only in the foreign affairs, but in domestic policies as well (Pugačiauskas 2003a, 15). In order to reduce the binds of the government on his actions, Adamkus created the parallel institutions to the government and tried to influence public officials, who formally were subordinated to the government (Pugačiauskas 2003b, 4). These actions of the president could not be easily rebuffed by the government and parliamentary majority, because the president was not associated with any political party (Adamkus distanced himself from the Centre Union after the election) and appealed to the general public (Pugačiauskas 2003a, 15-16).

Second, in order to strengthen his power, the president took the position of "semicohabitation" (Matsuzato and Gudžinskas 2006, 162-163), which basically meant the attempts to exploit the divisions within the ruling Homeland Union. As described by Matsuzato and Gudžinskas (2006), Adamkus permanently supported one faction in the ruling party against the other one in 1998-2000. These actions of Adamkus led to the two splits of the Homeland Union (Matsuzato and Gudžinskas 2006). Third, Adamkus tried to assure parliamentary support to himself in the 2000 parliamentary election by initiating the New Politics party bloc. The bloc consisted of four political parties: the Centre Union, the New Union (led by his former competitor in the presidential election Paulauskas), the Liberal Union (now led by the former Prime Minister of the Homeland Union Paksas) and the smaller Modern Christian Democratic Party.

The presidential election in 1997-1998 and the actions of Adamkus in office significantly influenced the outcome of the parliamentary election in 2000. The election brought a crushing defeat to the Homeland Union: it obtained only 8.6 percent of votes. The new Brazauskas-led Social Democratic coalition of the Labor Democratic Party and the Social Democrat Party won the plurality in the election. However, the two major parties of the New Politics bloc - the New Union and the Liberal Union - were the major winners of the election, winning 19.6 and 17.3 percent of votes in the PR component, respectively. The two parties and some smaller parties formed the short-lived government after the election, which was replaced by the more stable coalition of the Social Democratic Coalition and the New Union in 2001. Finally, the Christian Democrats and the Centre Union did not cross the electoral threshold (the failure of the Christian Democrats can be partly explained by their identification with the Homeland Union, which was obvious in the presidential election in 1997-1998, when they supported Landsbergis). In general, although the effective number of electoral parties remained similar (7.22 in 2000 and 7.81 in 1996), the effective number of legislative parties increased from 3.4 in 1996 to 4.8 in 2000 (Jurkynas 2005, 14). Electoral volatility has also increased from 37.4 percent in 1996 to 48.3 percent in 2000 (Lane 2007, 99).

Hence, the election demonstrated that the old political communist/anti-communist division had lost most of its importance. The New Politics coalition, which was presented as an alternative to this division, won the election. This would have been hardly possible without the victory of Adamkus in 1998, the success of a non-partisan presidential candidate Artūras Paulauskas in 1998, the active Adamkus's policies, and his frequent interventions into the intra-party and the inter-party elections. To sum up, in 1998-2000 the semi-presidential constitutional framework worked contrarily in comparison to Brazauskas's term: it significantly weakened the major political conflict in the party system and was a crucial factor in breaking the power monopoly of the two major competitors of the 1990s. The outcome was an increase in party system fragmentation and the success of new parties²⁰.

3.2.4. Paksas and Adamkus: the further fragmentation?

The presidential election in 2002-2003, Paksas's term, and the presidential election in 2004 have further increased party system fragmentation. All these effects are addressed below.

The presidential election in 2002-2003 was notable by the extraordinarily high *effective number of candidates*: 5.41, which is the highest number in all presidential elections held in post-communist Europe. The presidential election did not play the consolidating role anymore: all parliamentary parties (except the Homeland Union) nominated their candidates in order to present themselves (Bielinis 2003, 58). This decision could be partly influenced by the example of the Christian Democrats who supported the candidate of the other party in 1997 and lost the parliamentary election in 2000. Furthermore, the presidential election was a direct reason for the emergence of one more parliamentary party: Paksas's presidential ambitions led to the split of the Liberal Union in 2002 and the creation of the new Liberal Democratic Party with Paksas as its leader. However, the poor results in the election also led to the merger of the Centre Union and the Liberal Union, and the establishment of the Liberal Centre Union.

²⁰ Due to the lack of space, the influence of the president on party competition from the 2000 parliamentary election to the presidential election in 2002-2003 will not be addressed. Basically, Adamkus tried to keep the coalition between the New Union and the Liberal Union viable until its collapse in 2001. In 2001-2002, facing the coalition of the New Union and the Social Democrats, Adamkus took much less confrontational position than in 1998-2000.

The high number of presidential candidates may also be attributed to the decline of the communist/anti-communist division (Ramonaitė 2003, 31-32), which reduced party incentives to cooperate in the election. The mixture of the emerging rural-urban, socioeconomic divisions, the remnants of the communist/anti-communist divide, and the disagreements between the presidential candidates did not allow adjusting the positions of different candidates and reducing the fragmentation of the presidential election.

However, the high share of *non-partisan candidates* in the presidential election did not have a significant impact on the pattern of party competition. After losing the election, Adamkus did not participate in politics actively. Another successful independent presidential candidate Vytautas Šerėnas, who was a TV star, did not use the voter trust to start a political career as well.

Paksas's *term in office* had a significant impact on the pattern of party competition in Lithuania. Paksas, having a relatively insignificant support in parliament (the Liberal Democrats had less than 10 percent of seats in parliament and no viable allies), tried to take an even more active role in the domestic policies than Adamkus (Lopata and Matonis 2004, 83-94). In October 2003, when the information about the relations of one Paksas's advisor with organized crime was publicized and the so-called presidential crisis started, Paksas took the confrontational stance and refuted all prompts to resign. This put the presidency in a conflict with almost all political forces of the country: the governmental parties Social Democrats and the New Union, and the opposition parties Liberal Centre Union and the Homeland Union. The confrontation eventually ended with the dismissal of Paksas from office; however, the conflict was also harmful to the other side. The four parties had to cooperate during the impeachment of the President; this reduced the differences between them in the eyes of voters and created the perception of the elite's conspiracy against the president. Consequently, the electoral arena was open for new competitors. Furthermore, the dismissal of Paksas polarized the electorate and made sure that at least in the short run the four above mentioned parties will not be able to attract Paksas's supporters. Indeed, the support to the four parties in the polls dropped during the crisis (Lopata and Matonis 2004, 217).

The 2004 presidential election after Paksas's impeachment made this clear. The support of Paksas²¹ to the leader of the Union of Farmers Party and New Democracy Party Kazimiera Prunskienė boosted her vote share to 20.6 percent in the first round of the election and impressive 47.4 percent in the second round²². Prunskienė managed to capitalize on this support and her party for the first time managed to cross the five percent electoral threshold in the parliamentary election in 2004.

Besides Prunskienė and her party's success in the parliamentary election, *the number of presidential candidates* did not increase party system fragmentation. The unexpectedness of the election timing and the failure of most candidates in the previous election reduced the number of candidates to 5. However, all candidates were of very similar strength (the effective number of presidential candidates 4.57), which once again proved that the bipolar competition was not viable anymore and that the Lithuanian party system changed almost unrecognizably since the 1990s. The domination of two major parties changed to the more equal fragmentation of several parties.

However, the success of the *non-partisan candidate* Petras Auštrevičius (the former high rank bureaucrat) had some impact on the pattern of party competition. Endorsed by the newly established Labor Party and the Homeland Union (which also supported Adamkus), Auštrevičius joined the Liberal Centre Union just before the parliamentary election in October 2004. Auštrevičius's political capital made sure that the Liberal Centre Union would not fall behind the five percent electoral threshold, which was a high threat to the party just before the

²¹ According to the decision of the Constitutional Court, Paksas was not allowed to take any function where he would need to give an oath. The decision restricts Paksas from taking any function higher than the member of the local council.

²² It should be noted that Prunkiene was a leader of a party resulting from the merge of the two parties, which have never reached the electoral threshold in the PR component of the legislative electoral system.

election. However, he also became a leader of an inner opposition to party's leader Artūras Zuokas, which eventually led to the split of the Liberal Centre Union in 2005 and the emergence of the new Liberal Movement, led by Auštrevičius.

All factors mentioned above (the high number of presidential candidates in 2002-2003, which strengthened the tendency of party system fragmentation; the Paksas term, which weakened all parliamentary parties and created a fertile soil for new parties; the success of Prunskiene and Auštrevičius in the presidential election in 2004) led to the increase in the number of legislative parties in the 2004 parliamentary election to 6.1 from 4.8 in 2000. The effective number of electoral parties remained approximately the same: it slightly decreased from 7.22 in 2000 to 6.75 in 2004 (Jurkynas 2005, 14). Electoral volatility was the even higher than in 2000: it reached 50 percent (Lane 2007, 99) and was higher than in any election in Central and Eastern European states.

After the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004, Adamkus faced the fragmented centre-left governments of Brazauskas (until May 2006) and Kirkilas. Although the option of the intervention into the inter-party conflicts has seemed very likely, Adamkus nevertheless restrained himself from directly supporting some parties or factions in parties, differently from his first term. This might be related to the age of the president (Adamkus turned 80 in 2007); however, this might also be the general decline of the presidency's influence in the Lithuanian political system, caused by the Adamkus's inability to save his initiated New Politics coalition and, more importantly, Paksas's impeachment. The latter conclusion is also supported by the status of presidential candidates: none of the presidential candidates (with an exception of Prunskienė) was a chairman of an influential parliamentary party in the presidential election in 2004. This might be the sign that the presidency is perceived as less important institution than it was perceived in the 1990s. However, the answer to this question requires much more detailed research than available here.

To sum up, the factors related to the regime type had a significant impact on party competition in 2003-2007 (mostly the period of 2003-2004 was covered in this sub-section). The high effective number of presidential candidates in presidential elections in 2002-2003 and 2004, the moderate strength of non-partisan presidential candidates in 2004 and particularly the process of Paksas's impeachment significantly reduced the strength of the parliamentary parties, and contributed to the increased party system fragmentation on the legislative level and the success of new parties in the parliamentary election in 2004.

3.3. Semi-presidentialism: the obstacle to party system development?

The aim of the case study of Lithuanian was to explore the impact of the regime type on the pattern of party competition in Lithuania and to illustrate the findings of the statistical analysis. Three independent variables have been considered in the case study: the number of presidential candidates, the vote share of non-partisan candidates, and the actions of presidents in office (the activity in domestic policies and the interaction with major parties), which were determined by the parliamentary support the president had. The dependent variable was party system fragmentation on the legislative level.

Essentially, the case study demonstrated that the semi-presidential constitutional framework had a different impact during the different periods of time. As seen in Table 6, in the first analyzed period the semi-presidential constitutional arrangement was conducive to the stability in party competition. The low number of presidential candidates, the inactivity of the strong non-partisan candidate, and the presence of the president clearly identified with one of the two major parties strengthened the existing major political divide and did not allow new parties to reach significant influence. Though the number of electoral parties was high, it can be explained by the early stage of party system formation. Therefore, it might be argued that in case the tendencies of that period had continued, the semi-presidential constitutional
framework would have contributed to the endurance of bipolar competition and moderate fragmentation.

Time period	The number of presidential candidates	The strength of the non- partisan candidates	Presidents' identification with a political party, policy activity, and the interaction with parties	General tendencies in party competition
1992- 1997	Low.	Strong non- partisan candidate, but no participation in politics after the election.	Clear identification with one of two major parties. Low degree of activity in the domestic policies, no interventions into party politics.	Bipolar competition based on communist/anti-communist division. Other parties present in parliament, but relatively insignificant. High electoral fragmentation and relatively low legislative fragmentation.
1998- 2002	Moderately high.	Strong non- partisan candidate creating a new influential party.	No clear identification with any of parties. High degree of activity in the domestic policies and the interventions to the party politics.	The decline of the communist/anti- communist division and bipolar competition. The success of the political forces unrelated to the old division. High electoral fragmentation and moderately high legislative fragmentation.
2003- 2007	High.	Strong non- partisan candidates, but only one actively participating in politics after the election.	Clear identification with small party (Paksas) or no clear identification (Adamkus). High degree of activity in the domestic policies (Paksas). The conflict with major parties (Paksas).	No dominant political or social divisions. High electoral fragmentation and high legislative fragmentation.

Table 6: Case study: values of the independent and dependent variables in three time
periods

However, in the second analyzed period the impact of the constitutional arrangements was the reverse. The higher number of presidential candidates, the victory of the non-partisan candidate and the success of another independent candidate in joining the mainstream party politics, the activity of the president in the domestic policies and party politics allowed other parties to break the dominance of two major competitors and neglect the importance of the dominant political divide. More precisely, it was a strategy of pro-liberal centre forces. In general, this moderately increased party system fragmentation on the legislative level while electoral fragmentation remained high.

In the third period the semi-presidential constitutional arrangement was also harmful to the stability of party competition. The high number of presidential candidates, the moderate success of independent candidates, presidents identified with a small party or with no party, and, in Paksas's case, the president's high activity in the domestic policies and the deep conflict with almost all parliamentary parties allowed new parties to come to power and significantly increased the number of legislative parties. However, electoral fragmentation decreased, which might mean that only parties with viable presidential candidates are able to win seats in parliament. Hence, semi-presidentialism reduced the influence of two major parties, but also reduced the number of small parties: electoral arena became dominated by several parties of similar strength.

Roughly, these findings confirm the conclusions of the statistical analysis. Party system fragmentation was mostly influenced by the number of presidential candidates: with an increase in the number of presidential candidates the number of legislative parties also increased. However, it is also interesting to note that in the Lithuanian case the increase in the number of presidential candidates did not influence the number of electoral parties. This finding requires the further investigation. Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated in the case study that presidents with no strong support in parliament might take more active stance or intervene in party politics in order to acquire the parliamentary support. These actions may also increase party system fragmentation and instability. Finally, the case study also demonstrated the moderate impact of non-partisan presidential candidates. Although independent candidates were strong in all presidential elections in Lithuania, only two of them (Paulauskas in 1998 and Auštrevičius in 2004) actively participated in politics and increased party system fragmentation.

The most important finding of the case study is the evidence that constitutional arrangements influence party system institutionalization, but their impact is mediated by the political practice. The same constitutional framework had a very different impact on party system institutionalization in different periods. In the Lithuanian case the decline of the major political divide was a major reason influencing the number of presidential candidates, the vote share of independent candidates, and the relationship between parliament and the presidency.

Taking this into consideration, the importance of the constitutional framework should not be denied. An extensive comparison between Lithuania and Hungary could provide a good tool to explore the impact of the regime type on party competition. Unfortunately, such study is unavailable here. However, the brief remarks on this comparison are still worth mentioning.

The Hungarian and Lithuanian party systems in the early 1990s demonstrated quite a few similarities. Both systems emerged after the bureaucratic-authoritarian communist regime (Kitschelt et. al. 1999). The compromise between the former communists and their opponents ended with mixed electoral systems in both countries and strong presidency in Lithuania (notably, Hungary also had a referendum over the strong presidency). Both party systems in the early 1990s were dominated by the "triangle" of political forces. In Hungary the "corners" of the triangle were anti-communist, nationalist and populist parties the MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum), the KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party) and the FKGP (Independent Smallholders' Party), the libertarian and cosmopolitan (although with some differences) Fidesz and SZDSZ, and the former communists MSZP (Enyedi 2005, 702). In Lithuania, as mentioned above, the two "strong" corners of the "triangle" were the right wing of Sajudis (the Homeland Union since 1993) and Christian Democratis and the communist successor party, while the smaller Centre Union and the Lithuanian Liberal Union represented the liberal forces. Electoral turnovers were also very similar in both countries: the rule of the

right was changed by the return of the former communists and then again by the right-wing parties.

However, the ultimate outcome of this situation was different. In Hungary a strongly institutionalized and polarized two-bloc system emerged, while in the Lithuanian case party system fragmentation increased significantly. The impact of strong presidency might be crucial to explain this difference, because it shaped actor strategy differently. As Enyedi (2005) notes, the libertarian and cosmopolitan Hungarian parties chose to join and reinforce two other corners of the party system. SZDSZ formed a left-liberal government together with the MSZP, while Fidesz changed its liberal rhetoric and became the leader of the right wing forces. This eventually helped to institutionalize the party system, because the two-bloc system based on the deep and polarizing divisions regarding authoritarianism, religiosity, level of urbanization and anti-Communism emerged (Enyedi 2005, 717).

As presented above, in Lithuania the liberal political parties acted differently. The Centre Union and Liberal Union tried to undermine the communist/anti-communist division which assured the domination of two major political parties. The strong and directly elected presidency was a perfect weapon to reach this aim. Starting with the 1997/98 presidential election the communist/anti-communist division has been partly marginalized and the tendency of bipolar competition was undermined.

Therefore in Lithuania strong presidency allowed the "third" forces to undermine the existing major political division which provided a clear pattern of competition. The lack of such independent and directly elected political institution could be named as an important reason why in Hungary the liberal parties chose to "fulfill" the existing divisions and institutionalize them rather than trying to undermine their importance.

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CONCLUSIONS

The question asked in this study has been: "what is the impact of the form of government on party system institutionalization in post-communist states?". The hypothesis raised in the research was: everything else being equal, the more presidential post-communist democracies should have less institutionalized party systems than parliamentary democracies. The impact of the form of government on party system institutionalization has been measured by four indicators: the personalization of presidential elections, party system fragmentation on the presidential level, presidential power, and the parliamentary support to the president.

The findings provide significant evidence to the hypothesis, even if none of the subhypotheses is confirmed completely. The most extensively *the relationship between the stability in party competition and the form of government* has been addressed. The statistical analysis has demonstrated that electoral volatility in post-communist countries is not influenced by the form of government. However, as expected theoretically, the high degree of the personalization of presidential elections, the high number of presidential candidates, and the weakness of presidential parties should increase the number of electoral parties. The theoretically unexpected finding of the statistical analysis is that moderately strong presidencies reduce the number of parties while weak and very strong presidencies increase the number of parties. The tentative explanation to this finding is that parties are eager to cooperate in competing for presidency, but only in case they are crucial actors in presidential elections. In case the personalities of presidential candidates are more important than parties (the example of Russia is prominent here), parties lose the incentive to cooperate in elections.

The relationship between the number of parties and the form of government has also been explored in the case study of Lithuania, which has a semi-presidential regime with a moderately strong presidency. The qualitative case study confirmed the essential findings of the statistical analysis. In the Lithuanian case the major reason for the increase in party system fragmentation was the decline of the communist/anti-communist political division. However, the semi-presidential constitutional framework played a crucial role in weakening the major political conflict and changing the pattern of bipolar competition. The moderately successful independent candidates managed to create new and successful political organizations, the higher number of presidential candidates allowed more parties to become electorally important, and weak support to the presidents in parliament determined their active policy stances and the interventions to party politics. By contrast, in Hungary political actors could not use the direct presidential election and powerful presidency to change the existing political conflicts. Consequently, although the Hungarian and Lithuanian party systems resembled each other in the early 1990s, currently they are absolutely different: two major parties dominate the political arena in Hungary while in Lithuania fragmentation is much higher and there are no dominant parties.

Finally, the study has demonstrated that the number of parties is the most important factor of electoral volatility. Therefore, the changes in party systems are mostly caused by the regroupings of the political elites, not by the changes in voter preferences, the conclusion made by Rose and Munro (2003) as well. Hence, although electoral volatility is not influenced by the form of government directly, the more presidential systems usually create more incentives for the elites to change their political affiliations, which is a reason for volatility.

The second and the third sub-hypotheses have been addressed less extensively. In regard to *the relationship between party roots in society and the form of government*, it has been demonstrated that the increase in the personalization of presidential elections and the increase in the parliamentary support to the president should reduce the degree parties are penetrated in the society while presidential power should not influence party roots significantly. The results are easy to interpret: the more presidential elections are personalized, the more voters will relate themselves to personalities and the less they will be inclined to affiliate with party organizations. Similarly, presidents with no strong support in parliament are more likely to use their personalities to attract voters, which might undermine the efforts to create the stable party-voter relationships.

The relationship between *the legitimacy of parties and elections and the form of government* has been found to be significant as well. The increase in the personalization of presidential elections and the increase in parliamentary support to the president should reduce the legitimacy of parties while presidential power is only an intervening variable, which affects how strongly presidents in office might affect the legitimacy of parties. The interpretation of these results is similar to the interpretation in the paragraph above: the more personalized presidential elections should undermine the importance of political parties as vehicles of representation while less supported presidents are also more likely to attempt to neglect the importance of political parties (for example, by taking the anti-party or above-party stances).

To sum up, the findings of the study in general confirm the hypothesis. Certain constitutional arrangements (direct presidential election and, to a smaller extent, powerful presidencies) related to more presidential forms of government significantly impede party system institutionalization in post-communist democracies. Direct presidential election allows non-partisan politicians to acquire significant influence, which might increase party system fragmentation and reduce the strength of party roots in society and the legitimacy of parties. Furthermore, although moderately powerful presidencies might reduce party system fragmentation, very powerful presidencies significantly increase it. Presidential power is also an important factor mediating the impact of the presidents in office on the legitimacy of parties: constitutionally stronger presidents with no parliamentary support might have more negative impact on the legitimacy of parties than constitutionally weaker presidents.

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On the other hand, the study has also demonstrated that certain political practices (the number of presidential candidates, the personalization of presidential elections, and the relationship between the presidency and parliament) mediate the impact of the direct presidential election and presidential power on party system institutionalization. Therefore, *the major conclusion in the paper is that more presidential forms of government tend to impede party system institutionalization in post-communist democracies, although the political practice in these democracies play a very significant role.*

Other factors also influence party system institutionalization. Higher ethnic fractionalization increases the number of parties, reduces the strength of party social roots, and increases the legitimacy of parties. Therefore, the impact of ethnic fractionalization is mixed: although it might lead to instability in the party system, ethnic divisions increase the importance of parties as the means of representation. The better performance of economics positively affects party system institutionalization: it strengthens party social roots and legitimacy. Finally, the number of parties and the legitimacy of parties have reduced since the establishment of new constitutional arrangements.

The results provide a significant contribution to the discussion on party system institutionalization. First, the thesis is innovative because it provides empirical measurement of how the personalization of presidential elections affects the institutionalization of party systems. It has been demonstrated that democracies with highly personalized presidential elections should have less institutionalized party systems. This confirms the theoretical predictions suggested by Linz (1994, 11; 26-28) and Mainwaring (1999).

Second, the study has confirmed the existence of the well-known "presidential coattails" effect in the context of post-communist democracies. The number of presidential candidates significantly influences the number of parties: this finding is in agreement with the findings of Golder (2006), Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), Fillipov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova

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(1999) and others. However, it has been demonstrated that the proximity between presidential and legislative elections is not important in the post-communist context: this might mean that successful presidential candidates are able to maintain their political capital for a relatively long period of time.

Third, the study has explored the impact of presidential power on party system institutionalization and demonstrated that it is smaller than usually claimed (e.g. Kubicek (1994) and Fish (2000)). Presidential power might not directly influence the strength of party social roots and the legitimacy of parties, and the relationship between the number of parties and presidential power is curvilinear, not linear. These findings partly support the conclusions of Ishiyama and Kennedy (2001), who find no impact of the constitutional framework on party system institutionalization.

Fourth, the paper has also demonstrated the importance of the relationship between parliament and the presidency. Not only is this relationship important for democratic stability as claimed in the numerous studies (Linz 1994; Mainwaring 1993; Mainwaring 1999), but it also has a strong bearing on the level of party system institutionalization.

Finally and most importantly, the study has presented strong evidence that the form of government is the most significant factor (at least among those considered) of party system institutionalization in post-communist Europe. In this sense the paper generally contributes to the critiques of presidentialism (for instance, Linz 1994), that claim that presidential forms of government are less conducive to democratic stability than parliamentarism. However, it is very important to note that the paper is more in agreement with such authors as Shugart and Carey (1992) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), who more generally represent the second wave of presidential/parliamentary studies (Elgie 2005). The major claim of these authors is that not all presidential or parliamentary systems work in the same way (Elgie 2005, 112). This study has carefully considered this assumption: not only the dichotomous

(parliamentarism vs. presidentialism) or trichotomous (parliamentarism vs. semipresidentialism vs. presidentialism) operationalization of the form of government has been avoided and the more subtle operationalization of the forms of government has been used (using presidential power index), but also such indicators of political practice as the number of presidential candidates, the strength of independent candidates, and the parliamentary support to the president have been considered. As mentioned above, both constitutional framework and the resulting political practice strongly influence party system institutionalization.

Considering this important finding, the further research should concentrate on explaining why countries with similar constitutional arrangements have different political outcomes. More precisely, the factors determining the number of presidential candidates, the relationship between the presidency and parliament and, in particular, the strength of independent candidates should be addressed more extensively. Institutional arrangements, like the proximity between presidential and parliamentary elections or the electoral formula applied in presidential elections, can provide only partial explanations for differences in the above mentioned indicators.

Extensive case and comparative studies would be especially beneficial in this respect. Although the qualitative case study has been conducted in the thesis, it is only concerned with the impact of the form of government on party system fragmentation. Further case studies and the comparative research would also provide stronger explanations to some findings of the statistical analysis. Most prominently, the curvilinear relationship between the number of parties and the strength of presidency and the relationship between the legitimacy of parties and the parliamentary support to the president (with the impact of presidential power as the intervening variable) should be analyzed in more detail. Two more limitations of this study, requiring further research, should be mentioned. First, the study findings can be applied only to Eastern European post-communist democracies. The further research on the relationship between party system institutionalization and the form of government should include other third wave democracies in Southern Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South-Eastern Asia, which have very different forms of government and levels of party system institutionalization. The higher variation in the values of the variables would also provide more validity to the results.

Second, the changes in measurement would also provide more validity to the results. In respect to party system institutionalization the party social roots and party legitimacy dimensions are particularly problematic to operationalize. Party roots in society might be operationalized not only by the success of new parties as in this paper, but by the share of voters who have party preference, the share of voters who support the same party for a certain period of time, the party age etc. (Mainwaring 1999, 29-31). The legitimacy of parties may also be measured by survey data, for instance, the trust in parties, the recognition of parties as essential elements of democracy etc. (Mainwaring 1999, 35-36). In regard to the form of government, the personalization of presidential elections has been measured in this paper only by the vote share of independent candidates; this type of operationalization ignores the degree the partisan candidates are related to and dependent from their parties. As demonstrated by Samuels (2002), even when independent candidates are not strong, party competition in systems with popular presidential elections are different than in systems with no popular presidential elections. Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 2, the operationalization of the relationship between the president and parliament should be more complicated than simply taking the share of seats the presidential party has in parliament. To sum up, further research should use different ways to operationalize party system institutionalization and the form of government – including the ones mentioned above.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: The Time Period for Analyzed Countries

Country	Time period
Bulgaria	1991-2005
Croatia	1990-2003
Czech Republic	1992-2006
Estonia	1992-2007
Hungary	1989-2006
Latvia	1993-2006
Lithuania	1992-2004
Poland	1992-2005
Romania	1991-2004
Russia	1993-2003
Slovakia	1992-2006
Slovenia	1991-2004
Ukraine	1994-2006

Appendix 2: Data Sources

Electoral volatility: Lane, Jan-Erik, and Svante Ersson. 2007. Party System Instability in Europe: Persistent Differences in Volatility between West and East? *Democratization* 14 (1): 92-110.

Missing values in the Visehrad states: Tóka, Gábor, and Henjak, Andrija. 2007. Party Systems and Voting Behavior in the Visegrad Countries 15 Years after the Transition. In *Visegrad Votes: Parliamentary Elections 2005-2006*, ed. Šaradin, Pavel, and Eva Bradova. Palacky University: Olomouc.

Remaining missing elections: Adam Carr's electoral archive <u>http://psephos.adam-carr.net/</u>. The reliability of the measure has been checked by comparing the data with the volatility data provided by Sikk (2005). The correlation coefficient is 0,871 and significant at the 0,001 level.

Effective number of electoral parties : Gallagher, Michael, and Paul Mitchell. The politics of electoral systems. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Micheal Gallagher's http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Staff/Michael.Gallagher/ElSystems/index.php. website For some missing elections other sources, like the project Political Transformation and the Process Post-Communist Europe of Electoral in the University of Essex (http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/), Adam Carr's electoral archive http://psephos.adamcarr.net/ have been used.

The vote share of new parties. For operational purposes I will define a new party as a party which did not participate in parliamentary elections before. In case of the party merger or electoral alliance, the party or the electoral alliance will be regarded as new if the parties which merged have never participated in parliamentary elections before or if participated – did not get more than 4 percent of votes together. In case of the party split, the party will be regarded as new in any case. In case the party changed its name, but there is clear organizational continuity, the party will not be regarded as new. The choice of the 4 percent threshold is arbitrary; however, it is rather unlikely that parties with less than 4 percent vote would have significant influence. Moreover, the choice of this threshold does not significantly influence the results, because it has been used only in several occasions.

Data sources for the vote share of new parties and the index of effective participation: Rose, Richard and Neil Munro. 2003. *Elections and parties in new European democracies*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

The Project Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe of the University of Essex (http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/).

Adam Carr's electoral archive <u>http://psephos.adam-carr.net/</u>.

Bielasiak, Jack. 2002. The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Postcommunist States. *Comparative Politics* 34 (2): 189-210.

The vote share for non-partisan presidential candidates, effective number of presidential candidates, the proximity between legislative and presidential elections, and the parliamentary support to the president: Rose, Richard and Neil Munro. 2003. *Elections and parties in new European democracies*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

The project Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe of the University of Essex (<u>http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/</u>).

Adam Carr's electoral archive http://psephos.adam-carr.net/.

Presidential power: Siaroff, Alan. 2003. Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and presidential distinction, *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (3): 287-312.

The Siaroff index assumes nine presidential powers: the direct election of the president, the concurrence of parliamentary and presidential elections, the appointment of some key individuals, the ability of the president to chair cabinet meetings, the ability to veto legislation, the emergency or decree powers effectively valid for an unlimited time, central role in foreign policy, central role in government formation, and the ability to dissolve the assembly (Siaroff 2003, 303-305). The presidency can either have or not have the power (therefore the coding is 0 or 1). The reliability of the index has been checked using the modified Frye index (Armingeon and Careja 2004). The correlation coefficient is 0,906 and it is significant at the 0,001 level.

Electoral formula, electoral threshold, and district magnitude: Bielasiak, Jack2002. The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Post-communist States. *Comparative Politics*, 34 (2): 189-210.

Bielasiak, Jack. 2001. On the institutionalization of party regimes in emerging democracies. Working paper No. 351, University of Strathclyde.

Walsh. 2001. New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions. *World Bank Economic Review* 15 (1): 165-176.

Ethnic fractionalization: Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2002. *Fractionalization*. National Bureau of Economic Research.

The data from mostly early 1990s has been used to compute the index. However, as Alesina et. al. claim, the changes in ethnic fractionalization in the 20 or 30 years horizon should not be very significant (2002, 8).

Urbanization: 2005 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects by the Department of Social and Economic Affairs of the United Nations.

GDP growth: Database Central Europe, provided by CE Research.

Inflation: the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Unemployment: the International Organization of Labor.

		Subhypothesis 1 (stability in party competition)		Subhypothesis 2 (party roots in society)	Subhypothesi s 3 (legitimacy of parties)
	Dependent variables Independent and control variables	Pedersen's index of electoral volatility	Effective number of electoral parties	Vote share of new parties	Index of Effective Participation (IEP)
Form of	Vote share for non-partisan presidential candidates	+	+	+	-
governme	Proximity between presidential and parliamentary elections	0	0	0	0
nt	Effective number of presidential candidates		+		
	Presidential power index (Siaroff)	+	+	+	-
	Parliamentary support to the president	-	-	-	+
Electoral	ENEP	+			
system	Electoral formula ($PR = 0$, Mixed = 1)	+	+	+	+
	Dummy for 5 percent electoral threshold	-	-	-	-
	Dummy for 4 percent electoral threshold	-	-	-	-
	Ln (District Magnitude)	+	+	+	+
Social	Ethnic heterogeneity	+	+	+	-
structure	Urban-rural differences	-	-	-	+
Economic	GDP growth	-	-	-	+
factors	Lg (Inflation $+ 1, 11$)	+	+	+	-
	Unemployment _	+	+	+	-
Time	Time	-	-	-	0
	Time ²	-	-	-	0
Dummies	Dummy for Lithuania 2004 (because inflation = -1,1)		0		0

Appendix 3: Variables and Expected Relationships in the Statistical Models

+ positive relationship, - negative relationship, 0 and blank – no relationship



Appendix 4. Electoral volatility and the effective number of parties: scatterplot

Effective number of electoral parties

	1992	1995	1996	1997	2000	2000	2002	2004	2004
	Seimas*	Local	Seimas	Local	Local	Seimas	Local	Euro	Seimas
Lithuanian Democratic	44	16.9	9.5	14.9	11.1	-	-	-	-
Labor Party (LDLP)									
Lithuanian Social	6.1	4.8	6.6	9.2	6.6	31.1**	17.1	14.4	20.7***
Democratic Party									
Sąjūdis/Homeland Union	21.2	28.8	29.8	33.3	12.7	8.6	11.2	12.6	14.8
Lithuanian Christian	12.6	16.6	9.9	12.1	6.3	3.1	6.4	2.8	1.4
Democratic Party									
(LChDP)									
Peasant Party/Union of	-	7.0	1.7	5.6	13.4	4.1	8.0	7.4	6.6
Farmer Party and New									
Democracy Party									
(UPPNDP)	2.5	5.0	0.0	0.1	11.1	2.0	0.7		
Lithuanian Centre Union	2.5	5.0	8.2	9.1	11.1	2.9	8.7	-	-
			1.0		10.1	17.0			
Lithuanian Liberal Union	1.5	2.7	1.8	3.6	10.6	17.3	12.6	11.2	9.2
(LLU)/Liberal Centre									
Union New Union (Secol					17.2	10.6	75	4.0	
Liberals)	-	-	-	-	17.5	19.0	7.5	4.9	-
Liberal Domocratic Party							7.0	6.8	11.4
(LDP)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.9	0.8	11.4
Labor Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30.2	28.4

Appendix 5: Electoral support for major parties in Lithuania, % of valid votes cast in the multi-member constituency

* The name of Parliament in Lithuania ** Coalition consisted from the LDLP, the LSDP and two smaller parties. *** Coalition consisted from the LSDP and the New Union. Source: Jurkynas 2005, 13.

Appendix 6: Results of presidential elections in Lithuania, 1993-2004 (only candidates with more than 5 percent of votes included)

February 14, 1993

Candidate	Party	% of valid votes
Algirdas Brazauskas	Lithuanian Labor Democratic Party	61,06
Stasys Lozoraitis	Independent	38,94
Turnout		78,07 %

Source: Pogorelis and Krupavičius 2004.

December 21, 1997 and January 4, 1998

Candidate	Party	% of valid votes in	% of valid votes in
		the first round	the second round
Artūras Paulauskas	Independent	45,28	49,22
Valdas Adamkus	Independent	27,90	49,96
Vytautas	Homeland Union	15,92	-
Landsbergis	(Conservatives)		
Vytenis	Lithuanian Social	5,72	-
Andriukaitis	Democrat Party		
Other		5,19	-
Turnout		71,45	73,66

Source: Pogorelis and Krupavičius 2004.

December 22, 2002 and January 5, 2003

Candidate	Party	% of valid votes in	% of valid votes in	
		the first round	the second round	
Valdas Adamkus	Independent	35,53	45,29	
Rolandas Paksas	Liberal Democrat	19,66	54,71	
	Party			
Artūras Paulauskas	The New Union	8,31	-	
	(Social Liberals)			
Vytautas Šerėnas	Independent	7,75	-	
Vytenis Andriukaitis	Lithuanian Social	7,30	-	
	Democrat Party			
Kazimiera Danutė	Union of Farmer	5,04	-	
Prunskienė	Party and New			
	Democracy Party			
Other		16,41	-	
Turnout		53,92	52,65	

Source: Pogorelis and Krupavičius 2004.

Candidate	Party	% of valid votes in	% of valid votes in					
		the first round	the second round					
Valdas Adamkus	Independent	31,14	52,65					
Kazimiera Danutė	Union of Farmer	21,25	47,35					
Prunskienė	Party and New							
	Democracy Party							
Petras Auštrevičius	Independent	19,30	-					
Vilija Blinkevičiūtė	The New Union	16,45	-					
	(Social Liberals)							
Česlovas Juršėnas	Lithuanian Social	11,85	-					
	Democrat Party							
Turnout		48.40	52.46					

June 13, 2004 and June 27, 2004

Source: Official Website of Lithuanian Election Commission,

http://www3.lrs.lt/rinkimai/pgl_tipa_e.htm

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