CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY

A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE FORMATION AND SUCCESS OF ETHNIC PARTIES IN POST-COMMUNIST STATES

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Abstract

This aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the causes leading to the political mobilization of ethnic minorities and the success of ethnic parties in post-Communist states. The paper bridges a significant gap in the existing literature, which usually focuses on simple explanations for the existence of ethnic parties. I use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to capture complex causal patterns explaining the formation and success of ethnic parties, analyzing the combined effect of social, economic and political variables. The results of the analysis reveal that the political mobilization of ethnic minorities and the success of their ethnic parties are explained by elements often underemphasized in the existing theories. Also, the success of ethnic parties often depends on electoral tactics and ability of ethnic political leaders to use the electoral context in their advantage and to mobilize the members of the minority. The paper leads to a better understanding of the complex dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in post-Communist states.

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INTRODUCTION – A NEW APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF ETHNIC MINORITIES AND ETHNIC PARTIES

After the fall of Communism in the late 1980's and early 1990's, many studies approached, from both a normative and an empiric perspective, the issues of nationalism and ethnicity in Central and Eastern Europe and throughout the entire post-Communist space. The issue of ethnic parties has usually been tackled in relation to one other aspect of the broader picture, such as the outbreak of ethnic conflicts or the representation of minorities. The aim of this research is two-folded. First, it aims to bridge the various approaches in the literature in a binding theoretical framework for the study of ethnic parties and ethnic minorities, with a specific focus on post-Communist states. Second, it moves forward from the classical approaches, which focus only a particular category of causes or explanations for the existence of ethnic parties and for their activity; this studies aims to take into consideration economic, social, political and institutional variables and identify their interaction in determining the formation and the success of ethnic parties.

I contribute to the literature by conducting the first large-scale study on the post-Communist states, which have different features than Western or African states and on which a large part of the existing literature on ethnic minorities is written. Also, the two stage approach sheds light on both the formation and the success of ethnic parties.

The puzzle that represents my starting point in this research is why in some post-Communist states ethnic minorities become politically mobilized and their political movements are successful and why in others this does not take place. In order to solve this puzzle, I will answer two main research questions: What are the institutional, political and socio-economic factors that lead to the political mobilization of significant ethnic minorities in post-Communist states? Under what circumstances do ethnically based political movements become significant institutionalized political actors? The main reason I chose to conduct this research is the particularities of post-Communist states in terms of ethnic minorities and ethnic parties. Unlike many cases in Western Europe, no minority in post-Communist states has been formed through immigration in the 20th century, although in a few years one might also deal with this aspect. Rather than that, the minorities in the post-Communist space exist due to the complex ethnic landscape, in which numerous nations and ethnic groups inter-mingled throughout history, often leading to conflicts over land or supremacy in a region. Due to the often changing of borders, some groups changed their status from being part of the titular nation to becoming a minority subject to assimilation politics. Another important reason for conducting this large-scale study is the re-emergence of ethnic identities and ethnic rivalries after the fall Communism, which turns this particular group of states into consistent source of research in the field of ethnic parties.

The fall of Communist regimes in the late 1980's and early 1990's represents a turning point in the history of over 20 states, from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to former USSR Republics and Mongolia. While some of these states became "success stories" of rapid transition to democracy and capitalism, others remained in the hands of old elites or fell victim of civil war or new dictatorships. Beyond dictatorial regimes and planned economies, Communism, as an ideology enforced on individuals and societies by the dictatorial regimes, became the dominant component of national identities. During the Communist era, old ethnic rivalries, which marked the history of CEE and Central Asia in particular, became secondary identity elements. Every nation was now under the Communist umbrella and what united them meant much more than what divided them in the past, despite the nationalistic tendencies of certain Communist regimes, such as the Hungarian or the Romanian ones. Besides this rather propagandistic reason, any ethnic confrontation between two states belonging to the Communist world would not have been allowed by the USSR. Beyond all the acknowledged bad parts of Communism, this has been one of the few of its positive aspects.

One of the biggest challenges that post-Communist states had to face right after the fall of dictatorships has been the accommodation of minorities and of their re-emerging identities. With the exception of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (after the break from Slovakia), almost all CEE states have been confronted with inter-ethnic issues. Violent clashes broke out between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania, Bulgarians and Turks in Bulgaria, Hungarians and Slovaks in Southern Slovakia, while in the Baltic states, especially in Estonia and Latvia, restrictive legislation towards Russians has been introduced. The complex ethnic puzzle in Yugoslavia was disbanded after an inter-ethnic war, while Moldova was also confronted with violent separatism in Transnistria.

Despite obvious ethnic disputes in many post-Communist states, violence was rather an exception than a rule. Many of those disputes have been brought inside the political arena, through the formation of ethnic political movements along ethnic cleavages or with purely representative purposes. However, this did not happen in all post-Communist states where minorities are present. In others, however, ethnic movements became a constant presence in parliaments and even in governments. This research aims to look at how ethnic minorities mobilize, form political movements and become relevant political actors.

This study is organized in the following way. In the first chapter I give a broad overview of the theoretical framework on which the study is based. I cover theoretical considerations on a wade range of relevant topics, including ethnic and national identity, minority rights, ethnic conflict, political parties, electoral systems, and types of representation. Based on this theoretical framework, I identify the independent variables and derive the hypotheses. In the second chapter, I present the methodology of the research, including case selection, research design, indicators and criteria for the operationalization of

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the dependent and independent variables, and the method I use for the analysis of the data – Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). In the third chapter I perform the two-staged data analysis, in order to identify the causal conditions and combinations of causal conditions which lead to the occurrence of the outcomes – political mobilization of ethnic minorities and, respectively, the success of the ethnic parties. I also interpret the results of the analysis by permanently referring to the cases. In the final chapter I draw the conclusions of the study and I present some guidelines for further research.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The existing literature in the field of ethnicity and nationalism includes numerous studies on ethnic minorities, ethnic parties or mobilization of minorities. However, a large comparative study on the mobilization of ethnic minorities or the success of ethnic parties, with a specific focus on post-Communist states, has not yet been conducted. Hence, there is no coherent theory on these topics, which might be tested by a subsequent study. This is a significant gap in the existing literature. However, post-Communist states, while being different among themselves in many respects, share many differences from Western European states. All of them have been until recently ruled by dictatorial regimes and have experienced major societal changes, based on ideological reasons. In the beginning of the 1990's, all of them went through deep transformations and faced many challenges, one of them being the re-accommodation of ethnic identities. This process resulted in different outcomes in inter-ethnic relations and compelling explanations are yet to be found.

Nevertheless, many authors approach particular aspect with relevance for post-Communist states. In this section, I make a review of the existing literature, approaching some of the most relevant issues in the study of inter-ethnic relations. I also give my working definitions for the main concepts used throughout the study. Based on this, I will identify and operationalize the dependent and the independent variables in the following chapter.

1.1 Ethnicity, ethnic groups, ethnic minorities

The usual definitions given to ethnicity refer to the common features defining a group of people, whether they refer to religion, language, culture, mythology, physical resemblance, or combinations of the above. Closely tied to ethnicity is the concept of nation, defined by Kymlicka as "a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture."¹ Ethnic minorities are sometimes also referred to as "subnations."² There are two main approaches to the formation of nations – primordialism and constructivism. The first presumes that a nation is an organic entity and membership in it is genetically determined, while the latter presumes that nations are fluid structures that change over time.³ I view ethnicity according to this second approach. There is also a third approach – instrumentalism – derived from constructivism, according to which ethnic identities are shaped by political entrepreneurs and used as tools to fulfill their own political goals.

An ethnic group is, according to Weber, a group that has a shared collective identity, built on the features of ethnicity.⁴ Kymlicka, on the other hand, sees this as a more appropriate definition for (ethnic) national minorities, usually associated with the existence of a kinnation, while ethnic groups do not have this sense of common identity, being formed usually of immigrants or their descendants.⁵ However, Kymlicka's definition does not accurately capture the phenomenon of re-emerging identities in second or third generation immigrant communities, a good example in this respect being the Turkish community in Germany. Gurr defines ethnic groups as "people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on a belief in common descent and on shared experiences and cultural traits."⁶ Also, he views ethnic identities as "enduring social constructions that matter to people who share them."⁷ Thus, Gurr also shares a constructivist approach to ethnicity and emphasizes, as Weber, the importance of shared beliefs. Moreover, Gurr sees ethnicity as a developmental

¹ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 11.

² Charles Ragin, *The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies.* (Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1989), 133.

³ Kanchan Chandra, "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability." *Perspective on Politics*, Vol. 3, Issue 2 (2005): 235-252.

⁴ Max Weber, *Economy and Society*. Edited by Guenther Rothand Claus Wittich. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1978).

⁵ Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 30.

⁶ Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 5.

⁷ Idem.

process. He also introduces the term "ethnonationalist groups," which are politically mobilized groups, seeking to improve their social status. Schermerhorn regards ethnic groups from two perspectives: size and power,⁸ while Chandra focuses on membership, defining ethnic identity as "nominal membership in an ascriptive category, including race, language, caste, or religion.⁹ Offe defines the ethnic minority as "a group that, due to its «constitutive characteristics» and «shared identity», will always remain a minority, although its members used their «individual rights to a maximum extent» and which is also treated in an unjust manner by the majority."¹⁰ Therefore, we are dealing with a structural identity of the minority, based on features acquired at birth and that cannot be changed, with the exception of forced assimilation.¹¹

In my working definition of an ethnic minority, I capture the essence of the previously mentioned definitions, maintaining the constructivist approach. I include both national minorities and minority ethnic groups formed as a result of immigration under the single category of "ethnic minority," defined as a group which has a shared collective ethnic identity and is numerically inferior to the dominant group in the society (be it a majority or not). Based on this, I define the political mobilization of an ethnic minority as the process through which an ethnic minority pursues collective goals through the political actions of its own ethnic parties.¹² Mobilization can also be discussed in relation to ethnic conflict. Thus, ethnic minorities mobilize, but do not seek to fulfill their goals through political means, but through violent, non-conventional, ones. Also, a combination of political and non-political

⁸ John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, *Ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 17.

⁹ Chandra, "Ethnic Parties...,", 236.

¹⁰ Claus Offe, "Ethno-Nationalized States of Eastern Europe: Is There a Constitutional Alternative?", *Studies in East Europe Thought*, No. 54 (1998), 126.

¹¹ This is what distinguishes collective rights, and minority rights in particular, and social rights. We are not dealing with a structural identity when it comes to social rights, because there rights are given to individuals only temporarily, each individual being a potential right bearer of a social right during his lifetime. For instance, the right to healthcare. No one enjoys this right permanently, but only when s/he is ill.

¹² This definition is inline with Olzak's definition of ethnic mobilization. See Susan Olzak, "Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization." *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 9 (1983), 355.

mobilization is possible. In this research I am interested only in political mobilization, associated with the formation of ethnic parties.

As I will further elaborate in the next subsection, I use the term ethnic party in the definition of political mobilization in order to make a clear distinction between political movements which act as parties and aim at having an institutionalized position within the party system and organizations which are only interested in local level positions or in collecting the "fruits" of affirmative action regulations, if they exist.

1.1.1 Minority rights – collective vs. individual

In theory, minority rights are regarded as part of the fourth generation of fundamental rights – the group specific rights. Offe¹³ believes that these rights emerged due to the increasing number of "sources and symptoms of heterogeneity" within a society. The main three sources are based on interests, ideology and identity. Ethnic heterogeneity emerges especially due to the identity cleavage within a society, although elements of the previous two cannot be neglected. Lipset and Rokkan's theory on social cleavages considers the "ethnic-cultural" cleavage to be a component of the generically named "center-periphery" cleavage.¹⁴ Kymlicka identifies two sources of ethnic heterogeneity: a larger state incorporates a previously self-governing territory and culture, and immigration.¹⁵ The first cause precedes modernity, being a feature of a world dominated by empires and large multi-national states existing before World War Two,¹⁶ while the second one is a more modern one, being favored by the increasing globalization and modernization occurring towards the end of the 20th century.

¹³ Offe, "Ethno-Nationalized States...," 119.

¹⁴ Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, ed. Lipset and Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1-64.

¹⁵ Will Kymlicka, "Individual and Community Rights", in *Group Rights*, ed. Judith Baker (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 17-33.

¹⁶ Of course, the last empire to fall was the USSR, in the end of the 1980's. However, the most intense instability of borders throughout the world was noticeable before the two World Wars.

This heterogeneity led to an identity-based conflict between two main streams of thought: one asking for collective rights for minorities, needed to preserve its distinctive identity, and another one rejecting collective rights and arguing either in favor of granting the same rights as that of the citizens belonging to the majority – the rights tied to the citizenship of a particular state (as it is the case in France) – either in favor of denying citizenship for the persons belonging to a particular minority, thus excluding an entire group from the political community, because it was perceived as a threat to the identity of the majority (as it was the case of the Russians in Latvia at the beginning of the 1990's).

In post-Communist states, nations were defined primarily in primordial terms and this view was imposed by the constitutions, as Dimitrijevic points out.¹⁷ Thus, the supreme laws "nailed" the supremacy of the titular nation over the territory, while minorities were either not mentioned at all or specifically excluded, as in Latvia or Estonia. In other cases, ethnic minorities were recognized only as part of the titular nation. If the minorities, either as a group, either by targeting its members, are specifically excluded from the equal exercise if civil rights, trough the constitution or through other official regulations, then we are dealing with systematic discrimination based on ethnic criteria. This is the understanding of discrimination that I will use in this research. The literature provides more complex definitions, such as that of Craig.¹⁸

1.2 The territorial-administrative dimension

Territorial concentration has an important impact on the behavior of ethnic minorities. Territorially concentrated minorities are usually the traditional inhabitants of a particular territory and their identity is organically tied to it. The members of the minority, as well as the nation to which belongs, claim primordial feelings and try to justify their "ownership" over

¹⁷ Nenad Dimitrijevic, "Ethno-Nationalized States of Eastern Europe: Is There a Constitutional Alternative?" *Studies in East Europe Thought*, No. 54 (2002).

¹⁸ Ronald L. Craig, *Systemic Discrimination in Employment and the Promotion of Ethnic Equality*. (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2005).

the territory, as Geertz underlines.¹⁹ A brief look over the ethnic conflicts across the world will let us see that they are almost all (if not all) involving territorially concentrated ethnic minorities, trying to obtain either autonomy or to secede from the home-state.²⁰ Also, it can be noticed that the level of mobilization of dispersed minorities is quite low, the best known example in this respect being the Roma community.

For ethnic minorities, the claim for rights is a natural one. As Offe's definition shows, ethnic minorities emphasize a "structural disadvantage" in the society; due to their different identity, its members will always remain in a minority. Therefore, as Dimitrijevic underlines, minority rights are needed in order to guarantee equality between the minority and the majority and to ensure the preservation of the identity of the minority.²¹ Minority rights can take different shapes, but the widest used concept is that of autonomy. Cultural autonomy is seen as a minimal type of autonomy, ensuring the usage of the minority's language, the free exercise of its religion, the right to education or to administer its own cultural affairs. This is what Friedrich calls "corporate federalism," which allows self-government for minorities, but defined in a non-territorial way.²²

While for territorially dispersed minorities it is rather difficult to claim more than cultural autonomy, territorially concentration brings with itself territory-related claims as well. In this case, ethnic minorities can request territorial autonomy and a status of selfgovernment or the federalization of the country and the grouping of the minority in a particular region. Smith shows that federalism can be linked with two opposing outcomes either the creation of a dual identity, based on ethno-regional sub-identities (as in Switzerland), either the reinforcement of ethnic divisions and the outbreak of conflicts (as in

¹⁹ Clifford Geertz, Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. (New York: Free Press, 1963).

 ²⁰ Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff. *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).
²¹ Dimitrijevic, "Ethno-Nationalized States...," 261.

²² Arend Lijphart, Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), 183.

Yugoslavia).²³ Liphart considers federalism a tool to transform social heterogeneity into regional homogeneity, if the boundaries of the regions "approximate" the ethnic boundaries.²⁴ Liphart considers this as a positive step towards the accommodation of minorities, part of his model of consociational democracy,²⁵ resonating with Mill's idea that democracy is possible only in ethnically homogeneous societies.²⁶ Federalism can also be used to restrict minority rights if the ethnic group is divided in different administrative units. Federalism, associated with territorial autonomy, other forms of self-government or limited statuses of autonomy, are all institutional arrangements aimed, or at least favorable, to the preservation of minority identity. While the absence of such arrangements is not necessarily signs of discrimination, the state may also take measures with the particular aim of baring the access of minorities in the decision-making process. I will refer more to this issue in the subsection on electoral politics.

1.3 Ethnic parties

In order to define an ethnic party, a brief overview of the main approaches in defining a political party is needed. In the literature there are two main views. Sartori gives a minimal definition of a political party – "any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office."²⁷ Although he broadened his definition by including in the extension of the concept also parties from authoritarian regimes, where pluralism is not allowed and elections are not free, Sartori restricts the concept only to those groups which participate in elections. In order to counterbalance this view, Janda gave a broad definition of a political party - "an organization that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government

²³ Gurr and Harff, *Ethnic Conflict*...

 ²⁴ Lijphart, *Democracies*, 180.
²⁵ Arend Lijphart. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1977).

²⁶ John Stuart Mill. Considerations on Theoretical Government. (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1991 edition).

Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 63.

positions."²⁸ Thus, Janda includes in the extension of the concept those groupings which seek to gain power through other means than elections. Through this definition, he captures an essential feature of a party, in line with the approach of this research – that is the desire to gain public functions, whereas Sartori considers that just putting forward candidates in elections is necessary for an organization to be called a party.

The literature also offers definitions of an ethnic party. The most widely used is that of Horowitz. According to him, a party becomes ethnic if "it derives its overwhelming support from an identifiable ethnic group and serves the interests of that group."²⁹ This definition identifies the two basic elements needed for a party to be considered an "ethnic" one: identification by the public of a party with an ethnic group (usually a minority) and an official recognition from the party of this identification. Horowitz's definition accurately captures the "ethnic" dimension of the concept, but falls just short of capturing the "party" dimension. In order to have a role of a relevant actor within the party system, an ethnic party needs to go beyond the statute of a single-issue party and also tackle other relevant political issues, such as taxation or education, even if the accent still falls on the interests of the ethnic group. Chandra focuses on exclusion in her definition, defining an ethnic party as a party that "appeals to voters as the champion of interests of one ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and makes such an appeal central to its mobilizing strategy."³⁰

Baring in mind the elements included in the definitions previously mentioned my working definition for an ethnic party is: an organization that runs in elections at a national

²⁸ Kenneth Janda, *Political Parties: A Cross National Survey*. (The Free Press: New York, 1980), 5.

²⁹ Donald Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. (University of California Press, 2000), 291. This definition has its own shortcomings. "Overwhelming" is a vague term, while the expression "serves the interests of that group" is too idealistic.

³⁰ Chandra, "Ethnic Parties...", 236.

³¹ Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), li.

level, whose political program acknowledges the identification with an ethnic minority, but goes beyond the simple goal of representing its interests.

The reason I chose to use the word "organization," and not party, in the definition is that in several CEE states, political movements representing ethnic minorities are not parties, from a legal point of view. More precise, they do not exist on the basis of the laws that regulate the existence of political parties; however, they stand in elections with candidates and behave as a regular party in or outside the parliament or in the government. Here are two examples in this respect. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) is a civic organization, representing the Hungarian minority.³² The Movement for Freedom and Rights (MRF) in Bulgaria is also formed not as a political party,³³ but on civic basis. Both of them stand in elections with their own party lists, form groups in parliament and name representatives in local and governmental structures, when they have the possibility and wish to do so. Defining parties according to national legislation would be misleading, because similar movements would be parties in some countries, but not in others, and this would lead to conceptual stretching. Nevertheless, I use the term "ethnic party" throughout this research, because I only take into consideration those organizations which act as parties.

Several authors, such as Bugajski³⁴ or Gunther and Diamond,³⁵ include regionalist parties in the same category with ethnic parties. However, the overlap between the two groups is not perfect. Ethnic parties representing ethnically concentrated minorities usually advocate regional interests as well, but these are related mainly with the interests of the ethnic minority. There are regionalist parties without an ethnic background, such as the Moravians in the Czech Republic, even though they claim a particular regional identity. Third, there are ethnic

³² Other minorities in Romania – Ukrainians, Italians, Macedonians, etc – have similar types of organizations.

 $^{^{33}}$ Article 11, paragraph 4, of the Bulgarian constitution forbids the formation of ethnic parties: "There shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial, or religious lines, nor parties which seek the violent usurpation of state power."

³⁴ Janusz Bugajski, *Political Parties of Eastern Europe. A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era.* (Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).

³⁵ Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, "Species of Political Parties", *Party Politics*, vol, 9, no. 2 (2003), 167-199.

parties without any regionalist connotation. This is the case of parties representing geographically dispersed ethnic minorities. In this research I take into account only ethnic parties. If an ethnic party also has a regional agenda, it is also included. Parties only with a regionalist agenda, but no ethnic background are not included.

1.3.1 Ethnic parties and ethnic conflict

Past conflicts between nations are significant elements of collective identities. Usually associated with territorial disputes, memories of past conflicts shape present inter-ethnic relations, as identities of neighboring peoples, mixed in a majority-minority puzzle, are constructed in an adversarial manner. The existing literature usually treats ethnic conflict post-factum, trying to identify causes for its emergence and, based on them, to make predictions about other potential conflicts. Thus, ethnic conflict is treated as a dependent variable and political mobilization, among others, as an independent variable. In other words, hypotheses involving a relation between ethnic mobilization and the outbreak of conflict have often been tested, with studies reaching contradictory conclusions – either finding that ethnic political mobilization causes, or at least favors, the outbreak of conflicts, either that ethnic parties prevent conflicts. In this research, however, I move away from this classical approach. Rather than considering ethnic conflict as the final outcome of a process, I see it as a transitory stage in the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations. Thus, I include past ethnic conflicts as an independent variable for current political mobilization of ethnic minorities. Due to the fact that such an approach is new in the literature, it is hard to find a theoretical expectation on whether past conflicts should favor mobilization or prevent it, by themselves or in association with other causes.

Despite the fact that I do not use the traditional approach, the existing literature offers relevant consideration for this research. Several authors view the existence of ethnic minorities and ethnic parties as a threat to democratic stability,³⁶ but the most radical view is that of Rabushka and Shepsle, who believe that the emergence of even one single ethnic party "infects" the entire party system.³⁷ They argue that the emergence of an ethnic party polarizes the party system and favors the emergence of nationalist parties, representing the dominant group, which might lead to a polarization of the entire society. Horowitz also believes that the existence of ethnic parties favors the emergence of conflicts. Chandra, on the other hand, believes that "ethnic parties sustain democracy," with the condition that institutions favor the politicization of ethnic issues across multiple dimensions, bringing India as an example.³⁸ Alonso and Ruiz establish two conditions needed for ethnic parties to have a moderating effect on ethnic issues: a relatively strong parliament in relation with the executive and the wish of minorities to influence decision-making.³⁹

1.3.2 Ethnic parties, representation and electoral politics

Horowitz, as Reilly,⁴⁰ argues that the solution to accommodate ethnic parties in democratic politics is to have a preferential electoral system, which provides incentives for candidates of ethnic parties to seek for electoral support across ethnic cleavages.⁴¹ Riker believes that the best electoral system for the accommodation of ethnic minorities and for the prevention of a polarization in the society along an ethnic cleavage is a simple plurality ("first past the post") electoral system, which is conducive to a two "catch all" party system (according to Duverger's law⁴²). He argues that the two main parties, in order to maximize their electoral gains, need to appeal to the margins of the society, where minorities (including

³⁶ J.S. Mill, Robert Dahl, Arend Liphart, Donald Horowitz. See Chandra, *Ethnic Parties...*, 248 (endnote 1).

³⁷ Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in plural societies: A theory in democratic instability.* (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1972).

³⁸ Chandra, "Ethnic Parties..."

³⁹ Sonia Alonso and Ruben Ruiz, "Political Representation and Ethnic Conflict in New Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 46, Issue 2 (2005), 237-267.

⁴⁰ Ben Reilly, *Democracy in divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁴¹ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. (Berkley, University of California Press, 1985). See also Donald L. Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1991).

⁴² Maurice Duverger, "Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System", in *Party Politics and Pressure Groups*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), 23-32.

ethnic ones) are found.⁴³ Horowitz, Reilly and Riker all speak about the so-called "substantive representation" of minorities, measured through the legislation or other regulations passed in their interests by parties which are not ethnic, but seek the electoral support of the groups.

Lijphart, on the other hand, emphasizes four institutional elements that accommodate ethnic cleavages in a divided society and favor the politicization of any potential disputes: the formation of grand coalitions, mutual veto, the principle of proportionality (including a PR electoral system), and segmental autonomy.⁴⁴ By focusing on proportionality in the entire political system, Lijphart advocates the "descriptive representation," measured through the percentage of representatives belonging to minorities in the legislative or in public functions. The two types of representation measured are not mutually exclusive. Ideally, minorities can benefit of both substantive and descriptive representation, but might also lack both.

Whatever the electoral system advocated, all actors emphasize the influence that a split inside the minority might have on the representation of the group, but also on the chances for an ethnic conflict. Horowitz and Reilly believe that a preferential system encourages a political split, which leads to the formation of several parties of the same minority, unable to gain all the votes of the group. This further leads to the formation of transethnic coalitions among the moderate parties of competing groups, thus diminishing the risks of conflict. In case of a proportional electoral system, a split in the group might endanger the representation of the minority, which might find itself unable to pass the electoral threshold through either of the two or more parties competing for the votes of the same ethnic minority.

In the case of a territorially concentrated minority, the electoral system employed is particularly important. For an ethnic party representing a territorially concentrated minority, winning the elections (in terms of the highest number of votes) is not difficult. However, additional factors should be taken into consideration. In case of a PR system, the electoral

⁴³ William H. Riker, "Electoral Systems and Constitutional Restraints," in *Choosing an Electoral System*, ed. Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (New Yorc: Praeger, 1984), 103-110.

⁴⁴ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*...

threshold is important. Hypothetically, if a minority has a percentage of 7% and is concentrated, resulting in an electoral score close to the same percentage, setting an electoral threshold of 8% might be a deliberate attempt to bar the access of the minority in the legislative. Another element that needs to be taken into consideration is the political unity of the minority, already mentioned above. Considering the same minority of 7% and a threshold of 5% - which is employed by most states that use PR system – a split within the minority might be fatal, as one of the parties might pick up 3% of the votes and the other 4%, thus living the minority without representation. The issue of the threshold also applies to territorially dispersed minorities. In case of a plurality/majority system, in single-member districts where the minority forms the majority of the population, it is not difficult for a candidate of the group to win the seat. However, the issue of the split again becomes problematic, if the ratio in the population of the district is 60% for the minority and 40% for the dominant (or another) ethnic group, especially in the case of the simple plurality, where the candidate with the highest number of votes wins, regardless of the fact that s/he has majority or not.

The authorities can place additional barriers to the representation of ethnic minorities, included in the electoral laws. The drawing of district boundaries can be a way to deliberately reduce the level of representation. For instance, the territory inhabited majoritarily by the minority can be split into two different districts, so that it remains a minority in any district, thus preventing them from winning the seat in a single-member district. Gerrymandering can take numerous and complex forms. Another, more direct, option is to restrict the right to vote of persons belonging to minorities. The best example in this respect is the measures taken by the Latvian government with respect to the citizenship of the Russian minority in the beginning of the 1990's.

1.4 Ethnicity and economical issues

Ethnicity has been approached by several authors from an economical perspective. Ethnic identities have been seen in close relation with the creation of social classes. Gellner believes that modern societies preserve ethnicity through social stratification,⁴⁵ while Hechter speaks about a "cultural division of labor."⁴⁶ He argues that industrialization pushes ethnic minorities (or "subnations," as he calls them) in inferior social positions. This leads to a class mobilization, which coincides, under these conditions, with ethnic mobilization. As most post-Communist states dealt with a process of economic transition and with a re-arrangement of social strata, after the flattening Communist ideology, a lower economic and social status for ethnic minorities might constitute a cause of political mobilization.

1.5 The triadic nexus – the importance of the kin-state

An important tool in analyzing inter-ethnic relations is Brubaker's triadic nexus,⁴⁷ which captures the importance of kin-states in the mobilization of an ethnic minority. The triadic nexus is formed of the home-state, the ethnic minority and the kin-state of the minority. The essence of this tool is the interdependency existing between the three actors; if one of them acts, the others will react. The intervention of a kin-state to help its co-nationals abroad is considered an incentive for the political mobilization of the minority. Besides official declarations of support, the most effective way for the government of a kin-state to help its co-nationals is by funding. Funding is much easier to be absorbed if there is a strong organization, with a solid infrastructure. Also, the kin-state and the ethnic party of the minority might effectively act as partners to determine the government of the homeland to improve its policies regarding the minority.

⁴⁵ Ernst Gellner, *Thought and Change*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

⁴⁶ Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).

⁴⁷ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Another example of kin-state intervention is the attempt of the Hungarian government to pass a law, in 2001, through which all Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary, who sign a declaration and recognize their Hungarian identity, are entitled to special rights of employment in Hungary and even to a financial aid. Several similar provisions have been passed by other states in the region, such as Romania, Ukraine, Macedonia or Slovenia, either through law or as articles in the constitution. The home-states of the targeted ethnic minorities usually perceived such regulations as a menace.

1.6 Derived variables and hypotheses

Based on the existing theoretical framework, I can now derive hypotheses in order to answer the research questions referring to the political mobilization of ethnic minorities and the success of ethnic parties. For the first dependent variable, I identified the following independent variables: past conflictual relations between the dominant group and the ethnic minority (A^{48}), formal discrimination (B), informal discrimination (C), territorial concentration (D), existence of strong anti-minority parties in the society (E), and he support of the kin-stat (F). I generate several alternative hypotheses:

Past conflictual relations between the dominant group and the ethnic minority, combined with the existence of strong anti-minority parties in the society, leads to the political mobilization of ethnic minorities.

Formal discrimination or informal discrimination, as well as the presence of at least one of them, leads to the political mobilization of ethnic minorities.

The support of the kin state leads to the political mobilization of ethnic minorities.

Territorial concentration of the ethnic minority leads to the political mobilization of the ethnic minority.

⁴⁸ All the variables are noted with single letters, which eases and is actually required by the software-based analysis in QCA.

For the second part of the research, I identify the following independent variables: territorial concentration (D), existence of anti-minority parties standing in elections (G), political unity of the minority (H), membership in a coalition (I), and the existence of a PR electoral system (J). I derive the following alternative hypotheses:

Membership in a coalition leads to the success of ethnic parties.

Territorial concentration, combined with the absence of a PR electoral system, leads to the success of ethnic parties.

The political unity of the minority leads to the success of ethnic parties.

The existence of anti-minority parties standing in the election, combined with the territorial concentration of the minority, leads to the success of ethnic parties.

These hypotheses, rather than establishing clear links between the independent and the dependent variables, should be rather regarded as speculations on possible causal links between the causal conditions and the outcomes. Considering the method I use for data analysis – Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) – the primary role of the theoretical and conceptual framework is to emphasize what might be the potential causes of the outcomes under scrutiny and not the derivation of hypotheses. Once an encompassing model is created, QCA allows for the identification of both complex and simple causal patterns, the findings being interpretable without too much reference to the initial hypotheses. Nevertheless, the derivation of hypotheses is still a relevant process, since it makes a link between the theory and the data, but their role in the overall research is not as significant as in studies relying on statistical or other types of methods.

I deal in more detail with the features of QCA in the next chapter, in which I present the methodological framework of the research, I operationalize the variables and specify the indicators I use for assigning scores.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

After giving an overview of the theoretical and conceptual framework of the research, I will a detailed overview of the research design. I start by explaining the case selection criteria and how the unit of analysis changes in the two stages of the research. I move on to operationalize all the variables included in the study. Finally, I present the method that I use for data analysis – Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) – touching upon its main features and I explain why I use this method, in the same time making comparisons between QCA and statistical methods.

2.1 Case selection

My initial analysis focuses on all 28 states that have made up the USSR or have been under the influence Communist dictatorships supported or imposed by Moscow, until the end of the 1980's or the beginning of the 1990's. Therefore, the initial bulk of states included in the analysis are the following 28:⁴⁹ Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro,⁵⁰ Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Considering the research question and the hypotheses, there are a few conditions that a state needs to fulfill in order to be relevant for analysis.

2.1.1 The threshold of significance

The first condition is for a state to have significant minorities on its territory. In the absence of at least one important minority, it is pointless to discuss the mobilization of ethnic minorities in a state. I consider a minority to be significant if the number of people belonging

⁴⁹ A 29th former Communist country is the German Democratic Republic, but I eliminate it from the analysis due to the rapid reunification with West Germany.

⁵⁰ Although they are currently two separate states, I will treat them as a single case, because throughout their entire transition period they co-existed within the same federal state.

to it represent at least 5% of the number of people belonging to the dominant⁵¹ group (which might be a majority – over 50% of the population – or not). The reason I chose to have a threshold of significance for a minority dependent on the number of people belonging to the predominant group and not on the entire population is that the latter option could have been more or less arbitrary and would not have captured the entire complexity of the minority-majority network of relations. Without claiming that my version fully does so or that it lacks a dose of arbitrary, it is more accurate from a very important perspective. Let's take the following examples. In a state with a predominant group comprising 90% of the population, a minority of 3% is less important in terms of social and political significance than if the dominant group represents 60%. Obviously, the size of the minority or the ratio between the minority, but this can be considered a precondition, without which an ethnic minority might find it difficult to claim anything. Moreover, this type of measurement also takes into account the size of the predominant group, which is also an important factor, often overlooked by those who study minorities.

This indicator might have the risk of producing many "significant" minorities, in a state where the largest group is less than 50% of the population (and my threshold of significance for a minority would be around 2.5% from the total population). However, in the post-Communist space, only Bosnia-Herzegovina is in this situation, with the dominant group measuring only 48%. Despite the risks provided by this measurement, I do not obtain more than three significant minorities for a state.

Based on the threshold of significance that I explained, there are nine states which do not have significant minorities on their territories: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Czech

⁵¹ The reason I chose to use "dominant" instead of majoritarian group because there are states in which there is no majoritarian group. There is only one state in my sample in this situation – Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Russia and Slovenia. I will no longer take into consideration these states.

2.1.2 Political pluralism

The second criterion that a state needs to fulfill in order to be taken into consideration for analysis is political pluralism. Since the first dependent variable is political mobilization of ethnic minorities, measured through the presence or absence of ethnic parties, it would be pointless to discuss about this in states where political parties are banned, with the exception of the ones (or the ones) which support an authoritarian ruler. Political pluralism is not a guarantee for the formation of ethnic parties, but its absence is sufficient to prevent it. Based on this criterion, one other state can be eliminated. This is Turkmenistan, where only the Democratic Party is allowed to exist.

2.1.3 Stability and absence of foreign intervention

The third criterion comprises of several conditions. In order to be taken into consideration in the analysis, a state must be capable to rule itself without foreign intervention. Internal conflicts in post-communist states have triggered the intervention of foreign armies, such as the ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia (Kosovo) and Moldova (Transnistria). However, in some cases army intervention was followed by the installment of an international leadership, usually assisting local authorities in governing the countries. The two cases in the post-communist space where this happened are Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro. In the former, the Dayton peace agreement, ending the civil war, set up the Office for High Representative, which has a veto-power over the decisions of the government.⁵² Similarly, the NATO intervention in Kosovo was followed by a UN Protectorate, which also shortens to a great extent the powers of the government in Belgrade

⁵² "The High Representative is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement." General Framework Agreement for Peace, (GFAP), Annex 10, Civilian Implementation, Article V, Final Authority to Interpret, [http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=366], last accessed on 12 May 2007.

over Kosovo's internal affairs. Both international authorities have as their main goal to ensure that inter-ethnic tensions do not spill over into new civil wars. Therefore, the entire dynamics of the inter-ethnic relations in these two states is influenced by external factors, while this research focuses on internal causes of the political mobilization of minorities and of the success of ethnic parties, the only "external" variable included being the involvement of the kin-state.

In opposition to these examples, the intervention of the Russian 14th Army in Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova, was not followed by a Russian rule over the region. The Moldovan government does not have a great deal of authority of Transnistria, but this is due to the autonomous statute of the region, provided by the Moldovan government, and to the separatist leadership of Igor Smirnov, its self-proclaimed president.

Another condition, which makes especially the case of Serbia-Montenegro a problematic one, is the absence of state divisions after the fall of Communism. Yugoslavia broke into pieces soon after the fall of Communism. Its formal successor, which later became Serbia-Montenegro, further divided in 2006. Because of this, the minorities that might be taken into consideration would change across time, raising several issues of operationalizations and measurement for this case.

Based on this third criterion, I rule out Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro (or the former Yugoslavia). The only state from former Yugoslavia remaining in the sample is Croatia. Also, Slovenia fits this third criterion, but has no significant minority on its territory, according to the threshold of significance.

2.1.4 Inclusion in MAR reports

The last criterion for selecting the minorities is closely related to the source of data that I use for the first part of the research. Since I gather the information necessary for coding the first dependent variable and the first set of independent variables from the reports of the "Minorities at Risk" project (MAR),⁵³ I rule out all those minorities which are not taken into consideration in the project, even though according to my previous criteria they count as relevant minorities. MAR uses different criteria for selecting the minorities under study; however, their reports largely cover the information I need. Choosing to include minorities that are not covered by MAR means that I should look for information from other sources for a limited number of cases, without any guarantee that the information would be reliable or that it covers the whole time period that I study. I come back to the MAR reports in a following subsection. Based on this last criterion, I eliminate the following minorities: the Azeris and the Armenians in Georgia, the Ukrainians in Kazakhstan, the Belarussians in Latvia, and the Turks in Macedonia. I also eliminate the Russians and the Ukrainians in Moldova, because MAR considers these two minorities, together with the Bulgarians, as one single group.

2.2 First part of the research

2.2.1 19 significant minorities in 15 countries

For the remaining 15 states, the significant minorities can be found, for each state, in the following table. In total there are 19 significant minorities in all the states.

Country	Dominant group (proportion in the total population)	Significantminorities(proportion in the totalpopulation;proportionrelativetotheproportionofthedominantgroup)
Belarus	Belarussians (81.2%)	Russians (11.4%; 14.03%)
Bulgaria	Bulgarians (83.9%)	Turks (9.4%; 11.2%)
		Roma (4.7%; 5.6%)
Croatia	Croats (89.6%)	Serbs (4.5%; 5.02%)
Estonia	Estonians (67.9%)	Russians (25.6%; 37.7%)
Kazakhstan	Kazakhs (53.4%)	Russians (30%; 56.17%)

Table 1:	: Significant	minorities in	post-Communist states
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⁵³ Minorities at Risk Project (2005) College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/], last accessed on 31 May 2007.

 $^{^{54}}$ The formula I use to determine the proportion of a minority related to the dominant group is: (proportion of minority in the total population*100)/proportion of the dominant group in the total population. The result needs to be bigger than 5%.

	Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyz (64.9%)	Uzbeks (13.8%; 21.26%)
			Russians (12.5%; 19.26%)
	Latvia	Latvians (57.7%)	Russians (29.6%; 51.29%)
	Lithuania	Lithuanians (83.4%)	Polish (6.7%; 8.03%)
			Russians (6.3%; 7.55%)
	Macedonia	Macedonians (64.2%)	Albanians (25.2%;
			39.25%)
	Moldova	Moldovans/Romanians (78.2%)	Gagauz (4.4%; 5.62%)
	Romania	Romanians (89.5%)	Hungarians (6.6%;
			7.37%)
	Slovakia	Slovaks (85.8%)	Hungarians (9.7%;
			11.3%)
	Tajikistan	Tajiks (79.9%)	Uzbeks (15.3%; 19.14%)
	Ukraine	Ukrainians (77.8%)	Russians (17.3%;
			22.3%) ⁵⁵
Uzbekistan Uzbeks (80%)		Uzbeks (80%)	Russians (5.5%; 6.87%)
			Tajiks (5%; 6.25%)

Source: Compiled based on data from the CIA World Fact Book

Thus, the 19 minorities are the cases under study in the first stage of the research. In the next subsection, I operationalize the dependent variable and the independent variables⁵⁶ for this stage. Following this step, I will explain how the unit of analysis changes in the second part of the research.

2.2.2 Dependent variable – political mobilization

The dependent variable for the first stage of the research is *political mobilization* (P) of ethnic minorities. As with all the other variables in the research, I construct this variable as a dichotomous one, thus assigning scores of 0 and 1 for it. As I mentioned in the theoretical and conceptual framework, I define the political mobilization of an ethnic minority as the formation of one or several ethnic parties of the minority, in order to achieve collective goals through their political actions. Thus, I assign a score of 1 if there is at least one ethnic party which represented the minority for at least five years after the fall of Communism. I chose this threshold because this represents around 1/3 of the time period under study and it reflects a

⁵⁵ In Ukraine, the Region of Crimea enjoys constitutional autonomy and Russians form about 64% of the population of this region. MAR treats the Russians in this region as a separate group from the Russians in the rest of the country and so will I throughout this study.

⁵⁶ In QCA terminology, the dependent variable is called "outcome" and the independent variables are "causal conditions." I will use this terminology during the data analysis, but for now I will stick to the "classical" names, for reasons of clarity.

minimal potential of political mobilization on behalf of the minority. Also, through this threshold I aim to limit, if not to eliminate, the possibility of a having the effect (mobilization) before the occurrence of the causes. In this way I avoid situations in which there might be an ethnic party for the first two years of the period, let's say, after which it disappears due to one or more of the possible causes reflected in the independent variables.

Alternatively, I assign a score of 0 if there is no kind of organization of the minority or if there is one or several organizations which function as a civic movement without political involvement or are interested in public functions only at local levels. I also assign a score of 0 if this association puts forward candidates in national elections only to take advantage of affirmative action measures which might exist in the electoral legislation of a state.⁵⁷

2.2.3 First set of independent variables

For the first part of my research, I take into account six independent variables, as suggested by the theoretical background of the research. These variables are: existence of past conflictual relations between the minority and the dominant group, formal discrimination of the minority (based on official state regulations) after the fall of Communism, informal discrimination of the minority (a lower socio-economic status), territorial concentration of the minority, existence of strong anti-minority parties, and support for the minority coming from the kin-state.⁵⁸ I will now explain the criteria I use for the operationalization of each of these variables.

I assign a score of 1 for *the existence of past conflictual relations between the minority and the dominant group* (A) if in any time before the fall of Communism there have been violent clashes between the two nations – the one which qualifies now as the dominant group

⁵⁷ I do not take into consideration the situation when members of an ethnic minority run on the lists of non-ethnic parties, even if they claim to serve the interests of their particular ethnic group.

⁵⁸ Initially, I took into account one more independent variable – political and institutional arrangements favorable to the minority, measured through territorial or cultural self-governing statuses for the minority. However, I dropped this variable because only on case – the Gagauz in Moldova – benefited from such arrangements.

in a given state and the one to which the minority belongs – or between the dominant nation and the minority itself. All the conflicts appearing in this study have broken out because of territorial disputes over land which both groups claim to be their own.⁵⁹ I assign a score of 0 if the there has been no report of conflict between the two groups before the fall of Communism or if there have been disputes which did not turn violent and were approached through political means. Also, I assign a score of 0 even if there are reports of one group trying to assimilate the other one, but without using violence or causing a violent resistance. I leave from the premise that the process of assimilation was not as tough on the minority if there are no reports of a violent resistance and therefore does not constitute a significant element of the constructed identity of the minority, or at least not as significant as past violent conflicts or violent repressions. I also assign a score of 0 if there are no reports of past conflict or of the absence of past conflict.

For the variable *formal discrimination of the minority after the fall of Communism (B)*, I assign a score of 1 if the governments in power after the fall of Communism drafted laws which prevent the members of the minorities from having equal civil rights as the members of the dominant group or if there are reports of the government (or other state authorities) oppressing the political or civic organizations of the ethnic minority, in order to prevent them from claiming more rights. I assign a score of 0 if there are no reports of such legislation being passed by the post-Communist governments or of any official oppression against the existence of organized claims for tights coming from the minority. There is one ambiguous situation, for which I also assign a score of 0. There are cases, for instance in the former USSR Republics, when the government closes state-financed schools which function in the language of a minority (Russian for instance). Also, MAR cites as discrimination the refusal of the state authorities to grant the status of official language to the language of the minority.

⁵⁹ I would also assign a score of 1 if these disputes would not involve territorial disputes, but it is not the case for this research.

but only in some states and not so in others. The debate on the rights of minorities is extremely complex and it is very difficult to reach common ground I establishing universal standards. While the existence of state-financed schools in the language of the minority can obviously pass for a minority right (the same with officializing its language), its absence cannot be considered discrimination. There are also situations when MAR cites as discrimination coming from the authorities the fact that the members of the minority are in the lower strata of the society or that they are socially discriminated. I cover this issue through the next variable.

Thus, I assign a score of 1 for the variable *informal discrimination of the minority (a lower socio-economic status) (C)* if there are reports that the members of the minority, as a group, are facing disadvantages in getting hired, if they are paid less than the members of the dominant group, if they are marginalized as a group, if they are not allowed to use their language due to prejudice against the group, if they are poorer or have a worse state of health. I assign a score of 0 if there are reports that none of the above mentioned things are or have been present after the fall of Communism or if there are no reports at all (positive or negative) about this issue.

For the variable *territorial concentration* (*D*), I assign a score of 1 if the minority is concentrated in one or two regions in the country, that is if at least 50% of the group can be found in a geographically contiguous area, whether they constitute the majority in that region or not. I assign a score of 0 if there are no reports about territorial concentration or if there are reports that the minority is dispersed in the country. I also assign a score of 0 if there are are also dispersed throughout the country. I focus on regional-territorial concentration because an ethnic minority with this feature might articulate its interest easier and its demands for rights

might be stronger when they are associated with a territory in which they have traditionally lived.

For the variable *existence of strong anti-minority parties* (E), I assign a score of 1 if a declared anti-minority party has entered parliament in more than 60% of the elections that took place since the fall of Communism or if two or more anti-minority parties have entered parliament, taken together, in more than 60% of the elections, even if by themselves they do not pass this threshold. A party can only temporarily have an anti-minority discourse, case in which I count it as such only in the respective period of time and not for the entire post-Communist period. I chose this threshold of 60% to emphasize the adjective "strong" in the name of the variable. Temporary extremist parties might emerge or other parties can temporarily adopt anti-minority speeches for political purposes. However, they might not count as relevant political and social actors, capable of inducing an anti-minority feeling in the society. If no anti-minority party or group of parties enters parliament in more than 60% of the post-Communist elections or if there are no reports of such parties, I assign a score of 0 for this variable.

The sixth and last variable in the first set of independent variables is *support for the minority coming from the kin-state* (F). I assign a score of 1 for this variable if there are reports of the kin-state's support – financial, "ideological" – for the ethnic minority or for its organizations, or if the kin-state actively supported the group in front of international bodies in order to help them improve their situation in their home-state. I assign a score of 0 if there are no reports of such involvement of the kin-state in favor of the ethnic minority or if there are explicit reports that the authorities of the kin-state refuse to support the organizations of the minority or that they did not take any action in their support.
2.3 Second part of the research

2.3.1 Changing the unit of analysis

After identifying the variables or combinations of variables which determine the political mobilization of ethnic minorities, as well its absence, I move on to the second stage of the research. In this part, I aim to identify the causes of the success of ethnic parties, as well as the causes of the absence of success. Since I focus only on those minorities which are politically mobilized and are represented by at least one ethnic party, I leave out from the analysis those minorities which are not politically mobilized, meaning those which received a score of 0 on the previous dependent variable, because after the fall of Communism they have not been represented by at least one ethnic party for at least five years.

Therefore, I start with 11 significant, politically mobilized, minorities for this second part of this research: the Turks in Bulgaria, the Roma in Bulgaria, the Serbs in Croatia, the Russians in Estonia, the Russians in Latvia, the Polish in Lithuania, the Russians in Lithuania, the Albanians in Macedonia, the Hungarians in Romania, the Hungarians in Slovakia, and the Russians in Ukraine. Out of these, I eliminate the Serbs in Croatia, due to the affirmative actions implemented by the Croatian authorities. Serbs have three seats granted through law in the Croatian parliament and all Serbian parties compete among each other only for these three seats, thus restricting their chances of getting more seats. Therefore, it is pointless to speak about the success of Serbian parties in Croatia in a given election, measured through the presence or the absence of legislative representation. Therefore, I remain with 10 minorities for the second stage of the research.

For each of this minority, I look at the election in which they were represented by at least one ethnic party. Therefore, there are six observations for Turks in Bulgaria, two for Roma in Bulgaria, four for Russians in Estonia, five for Russians in Latvia, four for Poles in Lithuania, two for Russians in Lithuania, four for Albanians in Macedonia, five for Hungarians in Romania, four for Hungarians in Slovakia, and two for Russians in Ukraine. All together, there are 38 cases for the second part of the research. The unit of analysis is a minority in an election in which it is represented by at least one ethnic party.

Minority	Ethnic party	Election year
		(observations)
Turks in Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and	1990, 1991, 1994, 1997,
	Freedoms	2001, 2005
	National Movement for	2001
	Rights and Freedoms	
Roma in Bulgaria	Euro-Roma	2001
	Civil Union "Roma"	2005
Russians in Estonia	Estonian United People's	1995, 1999, 2003, 2007
	Party (the Constitution	
	Party from 2006)	
	Russian Party of Estonia	1995, 1999, 2003, 2007
Russians in Latvia	Party of Russian Citizens in	1993, 1995
	Latvia	
	Latvian Socialist Party	1995, 2002, 2006
	The National Harmony	1993, 1995, 1998, 2002,
	Party	2006
	Equal Rights	2002, 2006
Poles in Lithuania	Polish Union (Lithuanian	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Russians in Lithuania	Union of Russians	1996, 2000
Albanians in Macedonia	Party for Democratic	1994, 1998, 2002, 2006
	Prosperity	
	Democratic Party of	1998, 2002, 2006
	Albanians	
Hungarians in Romania	Democratic Alliance of	1990, 1992, 1996, 2000,
	Hungarians in Romania	2004
Hungarians in Slovakia	Hungarian Civic Party	1998, 2002, 2006
	Coexistence	1994, 1998, 2002, 2006
	Hungarian Christian	1994, 1998, 2002, 2006
	Democratic Movement	
Russians in Ukraine	The Russian-Ukrainian	2002, 2006
	Union	

Table 2: Units of analysis for the second part of the research

I now move on to operationalize the second dependent variable and the independent

variables for this second stage of the analysis.

2.3.2 Second dependent variable

The second dependent variable in this research is *success of ethnic parties* (S). The indicator for this variable is the presence in parliament of at least one ethnic party for a minority in an election in which the minority is represented by at least one ethnic party. Of

course, it can be argued that the success of a party is something measurable in degree. A party that wins the elections with 35%, for instance, is more successful than a party which barely passes the electoral threshold. Similarly, a party that is government can be regarded as more successful than an opposition party. However, all these perspectives are relative. A party that holds 7%, but forms a coalition with a party with 45% in order to have majority might fulfill many more goals using its "coalition potential" or its "blackmail potential," in Sartori's words,⁶⁰ than an opposition party of 30%, which takes no part in the decision making process. In order to avoid any methodological problems that might arise from these interpretable measures of success, I prefer to stick to a minimal indicator, based on the simple premise that a party which makes it in parliament is definitely more successful than a party which does not manage to do so.

Another thing that needs to be clarified is the difference between parties which enter in parliament with one seat and with a very low percentage and those which enter parliament with a high number of votes. I will take into account all of them as successful parties and I will show that even those who manage to win just one seat have been able to take advantage of favorable institutional provisions or had good electoral strategies. I will deal with these elements through the independent variables.

The case of Serbs in Croatia is problematic with respect to this variable. Although special seats for minorities are assigned in several states, the only minority included in this research, which takes advantage of it, is the Serbs in Croatia. Three seats are assigned by the state for this minority. However, although this may sound as a pro-minority provision, it limits the possibility of Serb parties to compete for votes; they can fight only for these three seats. Therefore, I will not take into consideration as successful the Serbian parties, because this minority would be represented in the parliament in any case, regardless of the values of

⁶⁰ Sartori, Parties and Party Systems....

the independent variables. On the other hand, I cannot include affirmative action as a separate independent variable, because the Serbs in Croatia would be the only one for which this variable makes sense.

Thus, I assign a score of 1 for the second dependent variable if at least one ethnic party of the minority obtains at least one seat in parliament. I also assign a score of 1 if two or more parties of the minority make it into parliament, competing by themselves or in a coalition with other parties. Alternatively, I give 0 when no ethnic party of a minority gains at least one seat in parliament. In case of bicameral legislatives, I take into account only the elections for the lower chamber.

2.3.3 The second set of independent variables

For the second stage of the research I identified, based on the theoretical framework, the following six independent variables: territorial concentration of the minority, existence of anti-minority parties participating in the election, political unity of the minority, membership in a coalition, and a list PR electoral system. I will now operationalize these variables.

The variable *territorial concentration* (D) is exactly the same as the one in the first stage of the research. Despite the fact that some minorities faced periods of migration in the post-Communist period, the degree of concentration (or dispersion) of any group did not change considerably during this time. Therefore, the operationalization of this variable is the same as explained previously and the values it takes remain the same for each case across all elections under study.

There is another variable similar to one in the first set of independent variables, but it is not identical. While for the first stage of the research I was taking into consideration the existence of strong anti-minority parties across the entire period, I now focus on *the existence of anti-minority parties standing in an election* (*G*). Therefore, I assign a score of 1 if there is at least one anti-minority party which puts forward candidates in a given election and gains at

least 3% of the popular vote, and a score of 0 if there is no such party. Note that I eliminate the word "strong" from the title of this new variable, in comparison to the previous variable, because I no longer take into consideration only those parties which make it in parliament in at least 60% of the post-Communist elections. However, I included the 3% threshold in order to eliminate very small parties, with insignificant results, unlikely to have a significant influence on the election results and the electoral dynamics.

For the variable *political unity of the minority* (H), I assign a score of 1 if there is only one single party representing an ethnic minority participating in a given election or if there is a coalition of all the parties representing the same minority. I give a score of 0 if there are at least two parties representing the minority, which are not in a coalition, or if there are two or more ethnic parties forming a coalition, but at least one party representing the same minority that competes on its own or as part of a different coalition.

The next variable is related to the previous one and there is a slight overlap between the two. *Membership in a coalition (I)* refers to participation of an ethnic party in a coalition for a given election, but also captures the non-ethnic coalitions, while the previous variable referred mainly to ethnic coalitions. Thus, I assign a score of 1 if at least one party representing the minority enters a coalition, either with other ethnic parties of the same minority or of other minorities, or with non-ethnic parties. I give 0 if all the parties representing the minority in a given election run by themselves.

The last independent variable in the second set refers to *the existence of a PR electoral system* (*J*). Thus, I assign a score of 1 if the electoral system used for a given election is a list PR system, regardless of the threshold (whose relevance is captured in the previous variable)

or the redistributing formula used.⁶¹ I give 0 if any other system then list PR is used, such as plurality/majority systems, mixed systems, preferential systems, etc.

2.4 The Method - QCA

The choice of the appropriate method for a study is based primarily on the theoretical demands and on the research design, no particular method being superior in itself to other ones. The numbers of cases, the number of relevant variables, the type of the data, the theoretical knowledge on the relationship between the variables work together in determining the choice for the appropriate method. This observation comes to contradict the beliefs of many quantitativists (usually statisticians) or qualitativists (usually comparativists), which, due to their personal biases, believe that only one particular category of methods is appropriate for a study, regardless of the above mentioned elements.

For this study, I chose to use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a method introduced by Charles Ragin in 1987, in *The Comparative Method*, and developed since then by Ragin and other authors.⁶² QCA is based on Boolean algebra and set theory, and relies on dichotomous variables, logical operations between variables (causal conditions and outcomes in QCA terminology), logical operators (AND, OR, and NON), and truth tables.⁶³ I will now briefly explain why I chose to use QCA over statistical methods.

QCA allows a case-oriented approach in the research and requires good case knowledge in order to explain the link between the theory, the cases (the reality on the ground) and findings of the analysis. Statistical methods, on the other hand, focus on the variables, paying much less attention to the cases. This research deals with a particular type of cases – minorities in post-Communist states – that require a good understanding of inter-

⁶¹ For a broad overview of the different types of electoral systems, including the different types of PR, see Andre Blais, Louis Massicotte and Antoine Yoshinaka, *Establishing the Rules of the Game* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

⁶² One example is Lasse Cronqvist, who developed a new extension of QCA, called "Multi-Variate Qualitative Comparative Analysis" (mvQCA).

⁶³ For a comprehensive presentation of QCA based on crisp sets, see Ragin, *The Comparative Method*.

ethnic relation in each state taken into consideration. The results of QCA analysis are not conditioned by limitations to the number of cases; while rules of thumb in statistical methods require hundreds of cases for meaningful results, QCA can deal with both a low and a high number of cases. This research deals with small-medium N's; in the first stage, with 19 cases, and, in the second stage, with 38 cases. Neither would be suitable for the use of statistical methods (such as linear or logistic regressions). QCA deals with several issues⁶⁴ which are not captured by statistical methods, such as sufficiency, necessity,⁶⁵ equifinality, or conjunctural causality.⁶⁶ Sufficiency, necessity and equifinality are almost entirely overlooked by statistical methods, while conjunctural effect of variables is captured by interaction effects and multicolinearity; these are undesired elements in a statistical analysis and one or several variables are usually discarded in order to eliminate these effects, thus loosing important information in the interpretation of the results. Another important issue overlooked by statistical analysis, but noticeable in QCA analysis, is causal asymmetry.⁶⁷ Given the relatively high number of variables (which is not a particularity of QCA in comparison to statistical methods) in this research and the medium-low number cases, the use of QCA allow for the study of causal complexity and a thorough analysis of the empiric evidence.

⁶⁴ Bernard Grofman and Carsten Q. Schneider, "It might look like a regression equation ... but it's not! An intuitive approach to the presentation of QCA and FS/QCA results." Available at

[[]http://www.compasss.org/WPShort.htm], last accessed 31 May 2007. See also Carsten Q. Schneider, "Causal complexity and the change of political regimes: a QCA analysis of Howard and Roessler's (2006) study on 'liberalizing electoral outcomes'".

⁶⁵ A causal condition is necessary, but not sufficient, for the occurrence of the outcome if it is always present as a condition, but is always combined with the presence or the absence of other conditions, never leading to the outcome on its own. A causal condition is sufficient, but not necessary, if it always, by itself leads to the occurrence of the outcome, but there are also other causal conditions leading to the outcome, independent from each other. A causal condition is neither necessary, nor sufficient, if it appears in some combinations leading to the outcome, but not in all. Finally, a causal condition is both necessary and sufficient if it and only it leads to the outcome. See Schneider, "Causal complexity and the change of political regimes..."

⁶⁶ Equifinality means that there are at least two different conditions (or at least two different combinations of conditions) leading to the same outcome. In other words, there are at least two sufficient, but not necessary, causes or causal combinations leading to the outcome. Conjunctural causality means that a condition is the cause for the occurrence of an outcome only in combination with the presence or the absence of at least one other cause; unless this combination occurs, its effect, when treated singularly, is not noticeable.

⁶⁷ Causal asymmetry means that a condition or a combination of conditions explains the occurrence of the outcome, but does not explain the absence of the outcome. Causal asymmetry, equifinality and conjectural causality are all explained in Ragin in *The Comparative Method*.

Nevertheless, the use of QCA comes with inherent disadvantages and potential problems to deal with. The use of (required) dichotomous variables, synonym with the use of a scale from 0 to 1, can lead (and often does so) to lose of information and to problems of operationalization; setting the boundary between 0 (absence of something – a condition, a concept, a phenomenon) and 1 (presence) can be a tricky issue, which later influences the findings and the interpretation of the results. While more developed versions of QCA (mvQCA and fsQCA) allow the use of non-dichotomous variables, this is not the case with "classical" QCA, based on crisp sets, which I use in this study.

Another potential problem is limited diversity, which means the existence of possible logical combinations between the variables, but which do not have an empirical correspondent. This is dealt with mainly through the use of simplifying assumptions, which will be explained in more detail during the data analysis. Limited diversity is more "limited" as the number of causal conditions increases, and together with it the possible logical combinations (there are 2^k possible combinations, where k is the number of causal conditions). However, a higher number of variables usually eliminates (or at least reduces) the problem of contradictions, caused by identical combinations leading to the occurrence of the outcome in some cases and its absence in others. Therefore, finding a middle ground between comprising all the relevant variables and reducing limited diversity is not an easy task.

Some clarifications on the notations in QCA are needed. The method requires the labeling of each variable with one single letter. For instance, if A is a variable, in our case existence of pat conflicts between the ethnic minority and the dominant group, then whenever A appears in an expression it means the presence of the variable (better said of the causal condition), while whenever a appears it means the absence of the causal condition and is read as "NON A." QCA uses logical operators – AND, OR and NON. AND is represented in an expression by the sign "*" (e.g. "A*B") or by simply putting the two letters labeling the

variables next to each other (e.g. "AB"). OR is represented by the sign "+" (e.g. "A+B"). NON, as mentioned previously, is represented by using the low case letter. A proposition in QCA makes a link between causal combination or a reunion of causal combinations and an outcome. If AB is a cause of P, the solution formula would be "AB \rightarrow P" where " \rightarrow " indicates a logical relationship, but does not imply causality *per se*. A causal link between the term(s) on the two sides of " \rightarrow " is established based on theory and by empiric evidence that the observed relationship is actually taking place and that the term(s) on the left side of the proposition are actually cause(s) for the outcome, and the relationship is not just a coincidence.⁶⁸

Based on these explanations, I will not write the hypothesized relationships between the causal conditions and the outcomes in two propositions, one for each dependent variable, by using the single letter labels for variables and logical operators:

$AE + B + C + D + F \rightarrow P$

This is read in the following way: Past conflictual relations between the dominant group and the ethnic minority, combined with the existence of strong anti-minority parties in the society, OR formal discrimination OR informal discrimination, OR territorial concentration OR the support of the kin-state leads to the political mobilization of ethnic minorities.

$$Dj + DG + I + H \rightarrow S$$

This is read in the following way: *Territorial concentration, combined with the absence of a PR electoral system, OR the existence of anti-minority parties standing in the election, combined with the territorial concentration of the minority, OR membership of an ethnic party in a coalition OR the political unity of the minority, leads to the success of ethnic parties.*

⁶⁸ Grofman and Schneider, "It looks like a regression equation..."

In the next chapter I move on to the data analysis. Through the use of QCA I identify more complex and simpler causal patterns for each outcome under study (and for its absence) and I interpret the findings by permanently making connections with the empiric cases.

CHAPTER 3: DATA ANALYSIS

I now proceed with the analysis of the data, using the QCA methodology and the Tosmana and fsQCA software. There are several steps that I take. The first step to be taken is a necessity analysis. Using fsQCA, I test whether the presence and the absence of each causal condition is necessary for the occurrence of the outcome (and for its absence subsequently). For each value of a variable I obtain two scores between 0 and 1 (which can also be interpreted as percentages). The first is a consistency score, showing in how many combinations a particular variable is necessary for the outcome to occur. I consider a cause to be necessary only if this score is high, over 0.9.

Then, based on the data matrixes put together, I design the truth table reflecting all possible combinations of the variables. The truth table contains 2^k rows, where k is the number of variables. The truth table includes all the combinations with empiric correspondents, as well as those combinations which do not appear in reality, thus providing a complete picture of the limited diversity which the researcher must confront almost whenever a QCA study is conducted, especially in those with a high number of independent variables. After the truth table was constructed, one can notice that there is a consistency score corresponding to each row an empty column with the label "outcome." A consistency of 1 means that all cases falling in the respective row display the outcome only the desired outcome (its presence or its absence), a consistency of 0 never explains the desired outcome, while values in between 0 and 1 mean that the cases corresponding to the respective rows sometimes display the outcome and other times they do not. For instance, a consistency of 0.33 means that a row in the table, reflecting a single combination of variables, explains contains 1/3 of cases displaying the outcome. The "outcome" column is filled with 0 or 1 for each row based on the consistency score. In this research, I will assign a score of 1 for the outcome only for rows with a consistency of 1, all the other rows for which there are

corresponding empiric cases receive 0. The rows which display logically possible combinations, but have no empiric correspondents, will be dealt with through the use of simplifying assumptions, as I will explain later in the analysis.

All the rows with a consistency between 0 and 1 are listed as contradictions, meaning that that particular configuration of causal conditions leads to both the presence and the absence of the outcome. One of the ways of solving these contradictions can be solved by introducing a threshold for consistency. The researcher can decide, for instance, that if a particular configuration of the independent variable explains the outcome in 3/4 of the empiric instances, than the value of the outcome is 1 (true). If a combination of causes explains the outcome at least once, regardless of the number of instances it does not explain it, than the researcher can decide that the dependent variable receives a value of 1, but then we discuss not about the "occurrence" of the outcome, but of the "possibility of occurrence" of the outcome. At the other end, a conservative solution is to give the outcome a value of 1 only if the combination of causes always, with no exception, leads to its presence. As mentioned above, this is the solution I choose throughout this study.

For each value of a variable I obtain two scores between 0 and 1 (which can also be interpreted as percentages). The first is a consistency score, showing in how many combinations a particular variable is necessary for the outcome to occur. I consider a cause to be necessary only if this score is high, over 0.9.

After these preliminary steps, I move on to identify the combinations of causes which explain the outcome and draw the conclusions on whether the initial hypotheses are verified and identify other relevant findings of the analysis. First, I deal with the first stage of the research, in order to identify the explanations for the political mobilization of ethnic minorities, measured through the formation of at least one ethnic party for one minority for at least five years. Then, I will seek to explain the success of ethnic parties, measured through the entrance in parliament of at least one ethnic party in the national elections they participate

in.

3.1 First stage – what are the causes of the mobilization of ethnic minorities?

The cases included in the analysis in the first stage of the research and the corresponding outcome for each of them are included in the table below.

Tuble 51 Gubes und corresponding outcomes i	ior the mist part of the rescaren
Ethnic minority	Politically mobilized
Turks in Bulgaria, Roma in Bulgaria, Serbs in	Yes (1)
Croatia, Russians in Estonia, Russians in	
Latvia, Poles in Lithuania, Russians in	
Lithuania, Albanians in Macedonia,	
Hungarians in Romania, Hungarians in	
Slovakia, Russians in Ukraine	
Russians in Belarus, Russians in Kazakhstan,	No (0)
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, Russians in	
Kyrgyzstan, Gagauz in Moldova, Uzbeks in	
Tajikistan, Russians in Uzbekistan, Tajiks in	
Uzbekistan	

Table 3: Cases and corresponding outcomes for the first part of the research

Out of the 19 cases, in 11 the outcome occurs, while in the rest of 8 it does not. Below

is the truth table used in the analysis, containing $2^6=64$ lines (where 6 is the number of causal

conditions), only those with corresponding cases being shown. The rows which do not have

empiric correspondents reflect the limited diversity; there are no cases corresponding to them.

Row		0	Causal co	Outcome	Corresponding			
#					-			cases
	Past	Formal	Informal	Territ.	Strong	Kin-	Political	
	conflicts	discr.	discr.	Conc.	anti-	state	mobilization	
					min.	support	of ethnic	
					parties		minorities	
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Serbs in Croatia
2	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	Hungarians in
								Romania
3	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	Russians in
								Estonia
4	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	Russians in
								Latvia
5	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	Roma in
								Bulgaria
6	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	Hungarians in

Table 4: Truth table I – 6 conditions, political mobilization of ethnic minorities and corresponding cases

								Slovakia
7	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	Turks in
								Bulgaria
8	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	Albanians in
								Macedonia
9	1	0	0	1	0	1	С	Uzbeks in
								Kyrgyzstan,
								Polish in
								Lithuania
10	0	0	0	0	0	1	C	Russians in
								Belarus,
								Russians in
								Lithuania
11	0	1	0	1	0	0	C	Uzbeks in
								Tajikistan,
								Russians in
								Ukraine, Tajiks
								in Uzbekistan
12	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Gagauz in
								Moldova
13	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	Russians in
								Kazakhstan
14	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	Gagauz in
								Moldova
15	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Russians in
								Kazakhstan
•••	1	1			1	1		
64							?	-

Source: Truth table compiled by fsQCA software.

Note: "0" means the absence of the causal condition, "1" means its presence.

There is no variable necessary for the occurrence of the outcome. I accept an outcome of 1 only for those rows with a consistency of 1, and the consistencies of the causal conditions range from 0.21 for *A* to 0.81 for *F*. *E* has a coverage of 1, meaning that whenever it appears in a combination, the outcome will occur.⁶⁹

There are eight rows explaining the outcome, covering eight cases. There are six combinations explaining the outcome, given in the following solution formula:

 $aBDeF + aCDeF + bcDEF + aBCdef + aBCdEF + ABCDEF \rightarrow P$

Note that this solution formula is obtained without making any simplifying assumptions about the possible outcome of logical combinations which do not have an

⁶⁹ The results of the necessity analysis can be found in appendix 13.

empiric correspondent. In the absence of simplifying assumptions and without selecting prime implicants, this is the most complex solution explaining the occurrence of the outcome. The cases corresponding to each combination are listed in table below.

Expression	Raw	Unique	Consistency	Corresponding
	coverage	coverage		cases displaying
				the outcome
aBDeF +	0.181818	0.090909	1.000000	Russians in Estonia,
				Albanians in
				Macedonia
aCDeF +	0.181818	0.090909	1.000000	Russians in Estonia,
				Turks in Bulgaria
bcDEF +	0.181818	0.181818	1.000000	Hungarians in
				Romania,
				Hungarians in
				Slovakia
aBCdef +	0.090909	0.090909	1.000000	Roma in Bulgaria
aBCdEF +	0.090909	0.090909	1.000000	Russians in Latvia
ABCDEF	0.090909	0.090909	1.000000	Serbs in Croatia

Table 4: Primitive (complex) causal expressions associated with political mobilization of ethnic minorities and corresponding cases

Solution coverage	0.727273
Solution consistency	1.000000

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

The first three combinations in the solution formula have a raw coverage of 0.18, meaning that each of them covers two cases out of the 11 in which the outcome occurs. The other three each cover one case, having a raw coverage of 0.9, while three other cases are dropped because they are involved in contradictions. Thus, the total coverage of this proposition is 0.72. Each of the six primitive combinations has a consistency of 1, meaning that each of them is a sufficient, but not necessary, conjectural cause for the political mobilization of the minority, and therefore the consistence of the entire proposition is also 1.

A look at this table provides some interesting initial conclusions. Russians in Estonia and Albanians in Macedonia follow the same analytic pattern (*aBDeF*), despite the differences in the way each of the minorities was treated by its home-state government. While in Estonia, Russians have been marginalized in the society and excluded from citizenship in

the early years of transition, the discrimination faced by Albanians in Macedonia primarily referred to language rights and education.⁷⁰ One might say that Russians in Estonia had a much more difficult situation than Albanian in Macedonia. Yet, the former group did not, at any point, give up on political means to reach their goals, while Albanians started a violent insurgency against the Macedonian government in the beginning of this decade. This could serve as evidence for a study which treats ethnic conflict as a dependent variable and political mobilization as an independent one, to show that political mobilization does not seem to be an explanation for neither the outbreak of ethnic conflict, or for its prevention.

Hungarians in both Romania and Slovakia follow the same path (bcDEF), mainly due to the endogenous features of the minority in both states – territorial concentration (D) and support of kin-state (F). These, together with a strong sense of identity and of belonging to one common nation, led to the mobilization of the minority from the first days of post-Communist political pluralism, in both Romania and the former Czechoslovakia. Despite the presence of very strong and vocal anti-Hungarian parties even in governing coalitions, the Hungarians did not fall victim to discrimination, mainly of the support coming from Hungary, especial in international bodies which forced Romanian and Slovak government to implement better legislation for minorities.

The combination corresponding to the Roma in Bulgaria does not seem to reflect, however, a causal explanation for the mobilization of this minority. The Roma have been represented so far only by minor parties, which are rather constructions of wealthy and influential elites than expressions of bottom-up mobilization. This combination also does not have a theoretical support, as it states that discriminated, poor and divided ethnic group, without financial resource neither from internal associations nor from a kin-state (which does not exist in this case) or without a significant support from external actors, is politically

⁷⁰ All the information referring to empiric cases used in this chapter relies mainly on MAR reports.

mobilized in order to resolve its problems. The explanation for the existence of these minor Roma parties seems to be, as mentioned above, the political involvement of wealthy individuals from within the minority. Euroroma, which ran in a coalition with the Turkish party in the 1997 Bulgarian elections, was set up by a wealthy ethnic Bulgarian, Tzevelin Kantchev, which grew up in a Roma family, a very controversial figure, who was also temporary jailed, for assault and kidnapping.⁷¹

The initial solution formula can be simplified further in several ways. Some terms of this proposition can be factored out. For instance:

 $aDeF(B+C) + BC(adef+adEF+ADEF) + bcDEF \rightarrow P$

The cases corresponding to each of the terms in the proposition above are listed in table below:

 Table 5: Primitive (complex) causal expressions associated with the occurrence of political mobilization, obtained through factoring, and corresponding cases

Expression	Corresponding cases displaying the							
	outcome							
aDeF(B+C) +	Russians in Estonia, Albanians in							
	Macedonia, Turks in Bulgaria							
BC(adef+adEF+ADEF) +	Roma in Bulgaria, Russians in Latvia,							
	Serbs in Croatia							
bcDEF	Hungarians in Romania, Hungarians in							
	Slovakia							

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

In this way, particular causal conditions can be emphasized. In the proposition above, the combinations of formal and informal discrimination are emphasized. Either type of discrimination, together with a particular combination of the other variables – no past conflicts (*a*), territorial concentration (*D*), absence of anti-minority parties (*e*) and support from kin-state (*F*) – explains the political mobilization of three minorities: Russians in Estonia, Albanians in Macedonia and Turks in Bulgaria. Formal and informal discrimination

⁷¹ The fact that there is another condition explaining the outcome in a particular case is not a problem, as long as it is easily identifiable and it is just a peculiarity of a case. It would not make sense to include this as a variable and to treat it as a possible causal condition, because it would be present in only one case and not in the others.

together (*BC*), in combination with different configurations of the remaining variables, explain three other cases, out of the eight in which the outcome is present: Roma in Bulgaria, Russians in Latvia and Serbs in Croatia. The third term of the proposition, as written above, emphasizes the absence of both formal and informal discrimination (*bc*), in combination with the presence of three other variables – territorial concentration, anti-minority parties and support from kin-state – in explaining the political mobilization of Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia.

This initial combination of causes can be interpreted also in a more simple way, by allowing the computer to make simplifying assumptions, through assigning scores of 0 and 1 for the outcomes of the rows with no empiric correspondents and performing a new stage of minimizations. The terms obtained as a result of this analysis are called "prime implicants," which are reduced combinations of conditions that imply subsets of combinations. For instance, AC would be a prime implicant for both AbCe and ABCF. Ragin calls the identification of prime implicants as "second-phase" minimization.

The most parsimonious solution formula, based on prime implicants obtained after computing the simplifying assumptions, ⁷² is the following:

 $E + BC + BF + CF \rightarrow P^{73}$

Table	6: T	he simples	t causal	expressions	associated	with	the	political	mobilization	of	ethnic
minorities and	corre	sponding c	ases								

Expression	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency	Corresponding cases displaying the outcome
<i>E</i> +	0.363636	0.181818	1.000000	Hungarians in Romania, Hungarians in Slovakia, Russians

 $^{^{72}}$ There are four solution formulas, each one containing the required prime implicants E and BF and combining the other possible prime implicants – Bd, CD, CF and BC – out of which I already chose CF and BC. The list of the 42 simplifying assumptions, as revealed by Tosmana, can be found in appendix 14.

⁷³ I dropped two prime implicants – Bd and CD. The first one contradicts the theoretical considerations presented earlier in the paper, according to which territorial concentration should be a condition of political mobilization, rather than dispersion. The second one corresponds to primitive expressions which are also covered by BF and CF. I would rather keep CF as a prime implicant than CD, because together with BF, it shows the significance of the kin-state support for ethnic minorities, an issue which the noticeable exception of Brubaker and a few other authors, is largely neglected in the study of inter-ethnic relations.

				in Latvia, Serbs in
				Croatia
BC +	0.363636	0.090909	1.000000	Roma in Bulgaria,
				Russians in Latvia,
				Russians in Estonia,
				Serbs in Croatia
BF +	0.363636	0.090909	1.000000	Russians in Estonia,
				Albanians in
				Macedonia, Russians
				in Latvia, Serbs in
				Croatia
CF	0.363636	0.090909	1.000000	Russians in Estonia,
				Turks in Bulgaria,
				Russians in Latvia,
				Serbs in Croatia

Solution coverage	0.727273
Solution consistency	1.000000

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

Each prime implicant has a raw coverage of 0.36, meaning that each covers 4/11 cases in which the outcome occurs, including the three dropped because of contradictory combinations, and, as the primitive expressions, all have low unique coverage scores – 0.18 for E and 0.09 for *BC*, *BF* and *CF*.

I will now discuss each of these expressions in more detail. *E* covers four cases in which the outcome occurs – Hungarians in Romania, Hungarians in Slovakia, and Serbs in Croatia and Russians in Latvia. A closer look reveals that, in all of these cases, anti-minority parties and ethnic parties emerged almost simultaneously, in the first years of the transition, once political pluralism was reintroduced in post-Communist states. Although anti-minority feelings existed in these states before the fall of Communism, especially in Croatia and Latvia, the anti-minority parties constantly tried to mobilize the society against the ethnic groups, warning of the dangers their action posed to the integrity of the state. This even resulted in violence, as in March 1990 in Romania and especially as in Croatia, where the war between Croats and Serbs went on throughout the 1990's. While the action of anti-minority parties had a mobilizing effect at least for some parts of the dominant group, it also helped the

mobilization of the targeted ethnic minorities, which needed a strong political actor to protect their interests. Thus, anti-minority parties and ethnic parties mutually justified each other's existence.

Another prime implicant in the solution formula above combines formal and informal discrimination (BC). This combination alone covers four cases – Russians in Estonia, Roma in Bulgaria, Serbs in Croatia and Russians in Latvia. Latvia and Estonia are famous in the post-Communist space for their very harsh anti-minority legislation, passed in the first years of the transition. In both states, large parts of the Russian minorities have been excluded from citizenship, either based on linguistic reasons (requiring a very good command of the dominant language) or on descendance (excluding those whose families were not settled in the home state before World War Two). This led to many social and economic problems for the Russians, who were unable to access well-paid jobs, to buy land or other goods, to access public health-care services or to enjoy basic civil rights. This was particularly problematic considering the fact that Russians in both Estonia and Latvia leave primarily in urban areas. However, this is also a cause which might explain the rapid political mobilization of this minority in both states. The Roma in Bulgaria can be found overwhelmingly in the lower strata of the society, as is the case with Roma communities in any state. Although this minority fulfils the criteria of political mobilization, the two ethnic parties it formed and which participated in the 1997 and 2001 elections were rather movements of the Roma elites, which did not manage to mobilize the Roma community, whose situation has not improved significantly in the past years. The Serbs in Croatia have faced a massive process of emigration during the war, but also after it ended, due to the ongoing attacks against members of its community. Under the leadership of Franjo Tudiman, Croat authorities did nothing to prevent or to stop these attacks, while judicial procedures concerning the war were overwhelmingly unfavorable to Serbs. The Serbian ethnic parties adopted different strategies. In the first years after the fall of Communism, they tried to collaborate with Tudjman, who agreed to include several measures of positive discrimination in the legislation, such as three guaranteed seats in the legislative. After Tudjman's death, the situation of the Serbs improved considerably. However, although Serbian members of the Croat legislative collaborate with the government, they are unable to compete for an electoral market larger than the three assigned seats, which are rather a restriction to these parties.

The case of Albanians in Macedonia is explained by only one prime implicant, combining the presence of formal discrimination and the support of the kin-state (*BF*). Two Albanian parties formed in Macedonia almost immediately after it declared independence from Yugoslavia. Despite good previous relations, the Macedonian authorities have been reluctant in granting too many rights to the Albanian minority, especially when it came to education at the university level or allowing Albanians to enter the state apparatus or the police force. However, the Albanian minority benefited from the support of Albania, which spoke publicly in support of the minority in international institutions. Also, Albania had a strong nationalistic rhetoric after the fall of Communism, targeting both the predominant Albanian region in Macedonia and Kosovo.

The support of the kin-state (F) also appears in combination with informal discrimination (C), to explain the case of Turks in Bulgaria. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms formed in the first days after the fall of Communism, by former political detainee Ahmed Dogan, who still leads the party today. The Turks underwent a forced process of assimilation during Communism, which led to a low position in the society and a bad economical status. On this premise, Dogan rapidly found electoral support among the Turks concentrated in two close regions of Bulgaria and benefited from the support of the Turkish government in mobilizing the members of the minority. As in the case of other kin-states, Turkey was an out-spoken critic on the international scene of the way Bulgaria handled the

issue of the Turkish minority. However, Turkey was not as active as Hungary, for instance, due to the unsettled Kurdish problem on its own territory.

Based on the previous solution formulas, for any combination displaying the presence of both formal and informal discrimination, the outcome will be the formation of ethnic parties. In fact, with the exception of E, all the other prime implicants contain either B or C, including the two dropped earlier. Formal discrimination (B) in association with either the support of kin-state (F) or territorial dispersion (d) leads to the political mobilization of the minority. Also, informal discrimination (C), in combination with either the support of the kinstate (F) or territorial concentration (D), leads to the formation of ethnic parties. Another important observation regarding the previous proposition is that the variable referring to past conflictual relations between the minority and the dominant group (A or a) does not appear in any prime implicant. Also, the support of the kin-state (F) leads to political mobilization, in combination with either type of discrimination.

Some words should be said about the initial hypotheses, based on theoretical expectations. QCA is not primarily about testing hypotheses, but aims to identify patterns of interaction between causal conditions. At a first look, the results of the QCA analysis seem to differ from the hypotheses. Nevertheless, the cases corresponding to the solution formulas, either the most complex one or the simplest one, also fit the proposition containing all the alternative hypotheses. From this perspective, one can conclude that the initial hypotheses are verified. However, rather than regarding this as the main finding, one should focus more on the interpretation of the QCA results and on what combinations and interactions between the causal conditions are revealed by the analysis.

I now analyze the cases which do not display the outcome. Out of the 8 cases not displaying the outcome, there are 4 corresponding each to one particular row and for others involved in contradictions. I also accept only consistencies of 1 (in this case the consistency

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refers to the absence of the outcome, not to its presence), therefore there are only 4 cases included in the analysis – Russians in Kazakhstan, Russians in Kyrgyzstan, Russians in Uzbekistan, and Gagauz in Moldova. At the necessity analysis, the absence of strong antiminority parties appears as a necessary cause, with a consistency of 1. This means that in all the combinations which display the absence of political mobilization of ethnic minority, this variable takes a value of 0, thus it is absent.⁷⁴

The analysis of the obtained truth table, without any simplifying assumptions, reveals the following proposition:

$$bcDef + abcDe + abCdef \rightarrow p$$

Table 7: Primitive	e (complex)	causal	expressions	associated	with	the	absence	$\boldsymbol{o}\boldsymbol{f}$	the	political
mobilization, and correspon	nding cases									

Expression	Raw	Unique	Consistency	Corresponding	
	coverage	coverage		cases	
bcDef +	0.250000	0.125000	1.000000	Russians	in
				Kazakhstan,	Gagauz
				in Moldova	
abcDe +	0.250000	0.125000	1.000000	Russians	in
				Kyrgyzstan,	Gagauz
				in Moldova	
abCdef +	0.125000	0.125000	1.00000	Russians	in
				Uzbekistan	

Solution coverage	0.500000
Solution consistency	1.000000

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

The complex solution formula explaining the absence of political mobilization can be simplified by factoring out e, thus emphasizing this variable, with its negative value, as a necessary one for all combinations:

 $be(cDf + acD + aCdf) \rightarrow p$

By looking at the proposition above, it is obvious that e is the only prime implicant, as it covers all the other combinations. Thus, in all the combinations which do not lead to

⁷⁴ The results of the necessity analysis for the non-occurrence of political mobilization can be found in appendix 15.

mobilization of ethnic minorities, regardless of what other variables intervene, we can notice the absence of formal discrimination (b) and of strong anti-minority parties (e). In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan the situation of the Russian minorities is similar. While there are reports of Russians being "taunted" by local authorities, especially in Uzbekistan, according to MAR, the strong influence of Russia in the Central Asian region makes it impossible for any significant anti-Russian party to be successful on a nationalistic campaign. Also, the Russians are not perceived as a potential threat, because, in each of these three states, the large relocations of people taking place during the Communist era led to a break in the connections between Russians in former USSR republics and Russia as a "homeland." Consequently, the existence of an ethnic party is not justified for the Russian minorities, despite claims for more political and cultural rights formulated by cultural associations. Russia itself does not encourage a stronger mobilization of Russian minorities, since the potential of instability in neighboring countries would not serve its interests, hence the absence of support of the kin-state (f) in all the combinations referring to the Russians. The fourth case is represented by the Gagauz in Moldova. This minority benefits from a status of territorial autonomy and self ruling within Moldova. Parties representing the Gagauz exist, but they only compete for the local autonomous legislative or local administrations.

The more parsimonious solution, after the inclusion of simplifying assumptions,⁷⁵ leads to a two terms proposition:

 $bf + abcDe \rightarrow s$

	Table 8: The	simplest	causal	expressions	associated	with the	absence	of political	mobilization	of
ethnic m	inorities and	correspor	nding c	ases				-		

Expression	Raw coverage	Unique	Consistency	Correspondi	ing
		coverage		cases	
bf +	0.375000	0.250000	1.000000	Russians	in
				Uzbekistan,	
				Russians	in
				Kazakhstan,	
				Gagauz	in

⁷⁵ The list of simplifying assumptions, shown by Tosmana, can be found in appendix 16.

				Moldova	
abcDe	0.250000	0.125000	1.000000	Russians	in
				Kyrgyzstan,	
				Gagauz	in
				Moldova	

Solution coverage	0.500000
Solution consistency	1.000000

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

Out of the 19 cases included in the analysis, seven are involved in contradictions, meaning that the same logical combinations lead to both the presence and absence of the outcome. These proposition containing the contradictory combinations and the corresponding cases are listed below.

 $abcdeF + AbcDeF + aBcDef \rightarrow C$

Table 9: Contradictory expressions and corresponding cases for the first part of the research			
ExpressionCorresponding cases (truth value of			
	outcome variable)		
abcdeF +	Russians in Lithuania (1), Russians in		
	Belarus (0)		
AbcDeF +	Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan (0), Polish in		
	Lithuania (1)		
aBcDef	Uzbeks in Tajikistan (0), Russians in		
	Ukraine (1), Tajiks in Uzbekistan (0)		

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

The existence of these contradictions shows that the present model needs to be respecified through the inclusion of additional causal conditions. Those included in the research cannot explain the occurrence or the non-occurrence of the outcome in these seven cases, therefore it is something else which must contribute to the outcome, but is not captured by the current model. For instance, in the case of Russians in Belarus, the element which probably explains why Russians do not form an ethnic party is the leadership of Alexander Lukashenka. His strong pro-Russian policies ensured a privileged status for the Russian minority. The Russians and the Poles in Lithuania went on to form ethnic parties and compete regularly in elections due to a non-PR component in the Lithuanian electoral system, which allows them to easily gain a small number of seats. This variable is captured in the second

stage of the research. In the three Central Asian states – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan – the absence of political mobilization of the minorities (other than Russians) can be explained by the authoritarian tendencies of the rulers, which do not allow any kind of potential source of contestation or instability to arise. For the Russians in Ukraine it is fairly easy to mobilize politically, considering the considerable size of the Russians in the population (over 17%) and the strong sense of identity of this minority. Nevertheless, it seems that non-Russian parties, such as Viktor Yanukovych's Party of the Regions, are more successful in mobilizing the Russians than the Russian ethnic parties.

3.2 Second part of the analysis – what causes the success of ethnic parties?

I now move on to the second part of the analysis, in which I attempt to identify the causes that lead to the success of ethnic parties. The unit of analysis for this part of the research is one ethnic minority in one election in which is represented by at least one ethnic party. So for a minority there can be several units of analysis, corresponding to the number of elections in which it is represented by at least one ethnic party. For instance, for the Hungarians in Romania there are five units of analysis, corresponding to the elections in 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004. Also, for the Roma in Bulgaria I have only two units of analysis: 2001 and 2005. All the units of analysis and the corresponding outcome for each of them are listed in the table below.

Ethnic minority and year of election	Successful ethnic party
Turks in Bulgaria 1990, Turks in Bulgaria	Yes (1)
1991, Turks in Bulgaria 1994, Turks in	
Bulgaria 1997, Turks in Bulgaria 2001, Turks	
in Bulgaria 2005, Roma in Bulgaria 2005,	
Russians in Estonia 1995, Russians in Estonia	
1999, Russians in Latvia 1993, Russians in	
Latvia 1995, Russians in Latvia 1998,	
Russians in Latvia 2002, Russians in Latvia	
2006, Poles in Lithuania 1992, Poles in	
Lithuania 1996, Poles in Lithuania 2000,	
Poles in Lithuania 2004, Russians in	

 Table 10: Cases and values of the outcome in the second part of the research

Lithuania 2000, Albanians in Macedonia	
1994, Albanians in Macedonia 1998,	
Albanians in Macedonia 2002, Albanians in	
Macedonia 2006, Hungarians in Romania	
1990, Hungarians in Romania 1992,	
Hungarians in Romania 1996, Hungarians in	
Romania 2000, Hungarians in Romania 2004,	
Hungarians in Slovakia 1994, Hungarians in	
Slovakia 1998, Hungarians in Slovakia 2002,	
Hungarians in Slovakia 2006	
Roma in Bulgaria 2001, Russians in Estonia	No (0)
2003, Russians in Estonia 2007, Russians in	
Lithuania 1996, Russians in Ukraine 2002,	
Russians in Ukraine 2006	

In total there are 38 units of analysis, in 32 the outcome is present, in 6 it is not. Below

is the truth table compiled with the help of fsQCA based on the existing data matrix. It has

 $2^5 = 32$ lines.

Table 11: Truth table II – 5 causal condition	s, success of ethnic parties and	corresponding cases
---	----------------------------------	---------------------

Row		Ca	ausal cond	litions		Outcome	Corresponding
#		I	T	Γ	1		cases
	Territ.	Anti-	Political	Membership	PR	Success	
	conc.	min.	unity	in a	system	of ethnic	
		parties		coalition		parties	
		in					
		elections					
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	Turks in
							Bulgaria 1991,
							Turks in
							Bulgaria 2005,
							Hungarians in
							Romania 1990,
							Hungarians in
							Romania 1992,
							Hungarians in
							Romania 1996,
							Hungarians in
							Romania 2000,
							Hungarians in
							Romania 2004
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	Russians in
							Estonia 1995,
							Hungarians in
							Slovakia 1994,
							Hungarians in
							Slovakia 1998,
							Hungarians in

							Slovakia 2002,
							Hungarians in
							Slovakia 2006
3	1	0	0	0	1	1	Russians in
							Estonia 1999,
							Russians in
							Estonia 2003,
							Russians in
							Estonia 2007,
							Albanians in
							Macedonia
							2002
4	0	1	1	1	1	1	Roma in
							Bulgaria 2005,
							Russians in
							Latvia 1998,
							Russians in
							Latvia 2002
5	1	0	1	0	0	1	Poles in
							Lithuania 2000.
							Poles in
							Lithuania 2004,
							Albanians in
							Macedonia
							1994
6	1	1	1	0	0	1	Turks in
							Bulgaria 1990,
							Poles in
							Lithuania 1992,
							Poles in
							Lithuania 1996
7	0	1	0	0	1	1	Russians in
							Latvia 1993,
							Russians in
							Latvia 1995
8	1	0	0	1	1	1	Turks in
							Bulgaria 2001,
							Albanians in
							Macedonia
							2006
9	1	0	1	1	1	1	Turks in
							Bulgaria 1997,
							Russians in
							Ukraine 2006
10	0	0	1	1	0	1	Russians in
							Lithuania 2000
11	0	0	1	1	1	1	Roma in
							Bulgaria 2001
12	0	1	0	1	1	С	Russians in
	-		-			-	Latvia 2006
L		1		1			

13	0	1	1	0	0	C	Russians in
							Lithuania 1996
14	1	0	0	0	0	0	Albanians in
							Macedonia 1998
15	1	0	1	0	1	0	Turks in Bulgaria 1994
16	1	0	1	1	0	0	Russians in Ukraine 2002
•••							
32						?	-

Source: Truth table compiled by fsQCA.

The model that I test includes five independent variables – territorial concentration (D), existence of anti-minority parties standing in the election (G), political unity of the minority (H), membership in a coalition, and the existence of a PR electoral system (J). According to the necessity analysis, none of these variables (either present or absent) is necessary for the outcome to occur. None of the causes is necessary for the occurrence of the outcome.76

The most complex solution formula obtained for explaining the occurrence of the outcome, containing only primitive expressions, and without making any simplifying assumptions, is the following:

 $DHi + Dgij + dGhJ + GHIJ + dgHIj + DghIJ \rightarrow S$

corresponding cases				
Expression	Raw	Unique	Consistency	Corresponding cases
	coverage	coverage		
DHi	0.437500	0.343750	1.000000	Turks in Bulgaria 1990, Turks in Bulgaria 1991, Turks in Bulgaria 1994, Turks in Bulgaria 2005, Poles in Lithuania 1992, Poles in Lithuania 1996, Poles in Lithuania 2000, Poles in Lithuania 2004
				Lithuania 2004,

Table 12: Prin	nitive (complex) ca	ausal expressions	s associated with	h the success o	of ethnic p	parties, and
responding cases						

⁷⁶ The results of the necessity analysis for the occurrence of the outcome in the second part of the research can be found in appendix 17.

				Albaniana in
				Albamans III Magadamia 1004
				Macedonia 1994,
				Hungarians in
				Romania 1990,
				Hungarians in
				Romania 1992,
				Hungarians in
				Romania 1996,
				Hungarians in
				Romania 2000,
				Hungarians in
				Romania 2004
Dgij	0.125000	0.031250	1.000000	Poles in Lithuania
				2000, Poles in
				Lithuania 2004,
				Albanians in
				Macedonia 1994,
				Albanians in
				Macedonia 1998
dGhJ	0.093750	0.093750	1.000000	Russians in Latvia
				1993, Russians in
				Latvia 1995, Russians
				in Latvia 2006
GHIJ	0.250000	0.250000	1.000000	Roma in Bulgaria
				2005, Russians in
				Estonia 1995,
				Russians in Latvia
				1998, Russians in
				Latvia 2002.
				Hungarians in
				Slovakia 1994.
				Hungarians in
				Slovakia 1998.
				Hungarians in
				Slovakia 2002
				Hungarians in
				Slovakia 2006
doHIi	0.031250	0.031250	1 000000	Russians in Lithuania
ugiiij	0.031230	0.031230	1.000000	2000
DghIJ	0.062500	0.062500	1.00000	Turks in Bulgaria
				2001, Albanians in
				Macedonia 2006

Solution coverage	0.906250
Solution consistency	1.000000

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

Each of these combinations has a consistency score of 1, meaning that each of them is

sufficient for the outcome to occur. Also, the consistency of the entire proposition is also 1.

However, the fact that we deal with equifinality means that none of them is a necessary causal combination and that none of these expressions will have coverage of 1. The coverage score of this proposition is 0.906. There is not a complete overlap between these conditions and the outcome, because three cases out of the 32 in which the outcome occurs are involved in contradictory combinations and have been dropped from this analysis.

The analysis of this primitive solution formula shows that one single combination – DHi – explains 14 out of the 32 cases in which the outcome occurs, having a raw coverage score of 0.43, and uniquely covering 11 out 32 cases, having a unique coverage score of 0.34. Thus, territorial concentration (D), political unity within the minority (H) and absence of membership in a coalition with other parties explains the success of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) in all the elections in Romania following the fall of Communism, the success of the Polish party (under different names) in Lithuania in all four post-Communist elections, as well as the success of the Turkish based Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgaria in 4/5 of the elections. One Macedonian election (1994) falls in this category. The cases of Hungarians in Romania and Turks in Bulgaria are similar - territorially concentrated, numerous enough to pass the electoral threshold, with a stable and disciplined electorate. A relatively insignificant split in 2001 causes that particular election year to be excluded from this category. Thus, it is no surprise that the success of Hungarians in Romania and Turks in Bulgaria are explained by the same combination. A rather peculiar case in this category is that of the Poles in Lithuania. Usually, this party gains only a few seats (so far never more than five) in each election in the region where they are concentrated, thanks to the single-member districts component in the electoral system.

Another eight cases are explained by a combination of four causal conditions – the presence of anti-minority parties in the elections (*G*), political unity of the ethnic group (*H*), membership in a coalition (*I*), and the existence of a PR electoral system (*J*) – having a raw

coverage score of 0.25 and the same unique coverage. This combination explains the success of the Hungarian Coalition in Slovakia in all four elections following the break-up of Czechoslovakia. For these four elections, the re-unification of all Hungarian parties in Slovakia ensured that this common movement will pass the electoral threshold established in the Slovak electoral legislation based on PR. The Roma in Bulgaria are a peculiar case, because they are acknowledged to have a successful ethnic party in 2005 based only on the one seat that it got after joining a large coalition led by the Socialists. Without membership in this coalition, the Roma party would not have made it in the legislative. The Russians in Estonia managed to gain representation in parliament only in 1995, when the two major ethnic parties joined to form a coalition.

Four other combinations cover 10 other cases, with one combination covering only one case – the Russians in the 2000 Lithuanian election. Note that all cases corresponding to Lithuania, either Russians or Poles, appear in combinations in which the PR electoral system is absent. The parties of these minorities would have never gained seats in the legislative without the single-member district component in the electoral system. The electoral system emerges as a very important variable in determining the success of ethnic parties. Although both Russians (6.3%) and Poles (6.7%) in Lithuania are numerous enough to pass the electoral threshold in case a party would manage to mobilize all the members of the minority, the Polish party and the Russian Union usually get around 2% of the votes each, does not passing the PR electoral threshold, because many members of these minorities vote for leftist and post-Communist parties in Lithuania. However, descriptive representation of the minorities is possible because of the plurality/majority component in the electoral system.

The solution formula can be simplified through the use of simplifying assumptions:⁷⁷

 $^{^{77}}$ The expression dgHIj is explained by two implicants – dgj and dIj. What explains the success of the Russians party in the 2000 elections is the membership in a coalition headed by the successor party of the former Communists, thus the prime implicant which I choose for this expression is dIj. The list of the 12 simplifying assumptions, shown by Tosmana, are listed in appendix 18.

 $DHi + hI + GJ + Dij + dIj \rightarrow S$

Table	13:	The	simplest	causal	expressions	associated	with	the	success	of	ethnic	parties	and
corresponding	case	S											

Expression	Raw	Unique	Consistency	Corresponding cases
	coverage	coverage		
DHi	0.437500	0.031250	1.000000	Turks in Bulgaria
				1990, Turks in
				Bulgaria 1991, Turks
				in Bulgaria 1994,
				Turks in Bulgaria
				2005, Poles in
				Lithuania 1992, Poles
				in Lithuania 1996,
				Poles in Lithuania
				2000, Poles in
				Lithuania 2004,
				Albanians in
				Macedonia 1994.
				Hungarians in
				Romania 1990,
				Hungarians in
				Romania 1992,
				Hungarians in
				Romania 1996,
				Hungarians in
				Romania 2000,
				Hungarians in
				Romania 2004
hI	0.093750	0.062500	1.000000	Turks in Bulgaria
				2001, Russians in
				Estonia 1999,
				Russians in Latvia
				1993, Russians in
				Latvia 1995, Russians
				in Latvia 2006,
				Albanians in
				Macedonia 2002,
				Albanians in
				Macedonia 2006
GJ	0.562500	0.312500	1.000000	Turks in Bulgaria
				1991, Turks in
				Bulgaria 2005, Roma
				in Bulgaria 2005,
				Russians in Estonia
				1999, Russians in
				Latvia 1993, Russians
				in Latvia 1995,
				Russians in Latvia
				1998. Russians in

				Latvia	2002,
				Hungarians	in
				Romania	1990,
				Hungarians	in
				Romania	1992,
				Hungarians	in
				Romania	1996,
				Hungarians	in
				Romania	2000,
				Hungarians	in
				Romania	2004,
				Hungarians	in
				Slovakia	1994,
				Hungarians	in
				Slovakia	1998,
				Hungarians	in
				Slovakia	2002,
				Hungarians	in
				Slovakia 2006	
Dij	0.218750	0.031250	1.000000	Turks in B	ulgaria
				1990, Poles	in
				Lithuania 1992	, Poles
				in Lithuania	1996,
				Poles in Lit	huania
				2000, Poles	$\frac{10}{2004}$
					2004,
				Albamans	1004
				Alboniona	1994, in
				Macedonia 199	8
dIj	0.031250	0.031250	1.000000	Russians in Lit	thuania
				2000	

Solution coverage	0.906250
Solution consistency	1.000000

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

As for the solution formula containing only primitive expressions, the combination of territorial concentration (D), political unity of the ethnic minority (H) and non-membership in a coalition (i) explains 14 out of 32 cases in which the outcome occurs, having the same raw coverage of 0.43, but a unique coverage of only 0.03, exclusively covering only 1 case. The combination between the existence of anti-minority parties (G) and a PR electoral system (J) explains the occurrence of the outcome in 18 cases, having a raw coverage of 0.56. 5/7 cases

in which Russians in Latvia and Estonia had successful parties in election are all explained by this combination, the two states showing again a very similar pattern in the inter-ethnic relations between the dominant group and the Russian minorities. The combination of a political split in the minority (h) and membership in a coalition (I) explains the success of the Turkish party in the 2001 Bulgarian election and of the Albanians in the 2006 Macedonian elections. The Poles in Lithuania in the 2000 and 2004 elections are explained by the same combination – territorial concentration (D), non-membership in a coalition (i) and a nonproportional electoral system (j) – as the success of Albanians in the 1994 and 1998 Macedonian elections. In both states, the two minorities are territorially concentrated, the attitude of the dominant group towards the ethnic minority is fairly good and no anti-minority parties stood in the elections, the ethnic parties ran on their own and the electoral system was a mixed one. Nevertheless, the Party for Democratic Prosperity representing the Albanians in 1994 and the same party plus the Democratic Party of Albanians in 1998 would have passed the electoral threshold for the PR component anyway, while the Lithuanian Polish party gained seats in the legislative based only on the non-PR component.

I now analyze the non-occurrence of the outcome. There is no causal condition sufficient for the outcome s.⁷⁸ There are three rows which yield sufficient causal combinations, each of the having one empiric correspondent. The proposition containing these combinations and the corresponding cases are listed below.

 $dGHij + DgHIj + dgHIJ \rightarrow s$

Т	Table 14: Prir	nitive (comple	ex) causal	expressions	associated	with	the a	absence	of success	of	ethnic
parties, a	nd correspon	ding cases									

Expression	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency	Corresponding cases not displaying the outcome
dGHij +	0.166667	0.166667	1.000000	Russians in Lithuania 1996
DgHIj +	0.166667	0.166667	1.000000	Russians in Ukraine

⁷⁸ The results of the necessity analysis for the non-occurrence of the outcome in the second part of the analysis can be found in appendix 19.

				2002		
dgHIJ	0.166667	0.166667	1.000000	Roma 2001	in	Bulgaria

Solution coverage	0.500000
Solution consistency	1.000000

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

Each combination has a raw and a unique coverage of 0.167, explaining 1/6 cases in which the outcome does not occur, without a case being explained by more than one combination. 3/6 cases are involved in contradictions, therefore the total coverage of the proposition is 0.5, with the total consistency 1, meaning that each of the terms contained is sufficient for the explained outcome (absence of success of ethnic parties). In case of the Russian party in Lithuania, the difference between the 1996 elections and those in 2000, when they gained minor representation is the legislative, seems to be made by membership in a coalition. In 1996, this ethnic party ran on its own and did not gain any seats, while in 2000 it joined a coalition with the major Socialist party and gained representation as part of this coalition. The Russian party in Ukraine was part of the "Nathalia Vitrenko Electoral Bloc" in 2002, together with another small party, gaining together only 3.55% of the votes. The reason it failed to pass the electoral threshold is likely to be that the Russians in Ukraine vote largely for non-ethnic parties, but which rely heavily on support from Eastern Ukraine, advocating stronger ties with Russia, such as the Party of the Regions, led by the current prime-minister Viktor Yanukovych. The case of the Roma in Bulgaria in the 2001 elections is rather peculiar. Euroroma was part of a coalition together with the Turkish MRF and another small party and the coalition gained 21 seats in the legislatives; however, not even one seat was given to Euroroma. This is probably due to internal agreements (or disagreements) within the coalition; had Euroroma received at least one set, they would have been considered a successful ethnic party.
A more parsimonious solution is obtained through the use of simplifying assumptions.⁷⁹ The following solution formula is obtained:

 $dij + DIj + dgJ \rightarrow s$

Table 15: The simplest causal expressions associated with the absence of success of ethnic parties, and corresponding cases

Expression	Raw	Unique	Consistency	Corresponding	
	coverage	coverage		cases	
dij +	0.166667	0.166667	1.000000	Russians in	
				Lithuania 1996	
DIj +	0.166667	0.166667	1.000000	Russians in	
				Ukraine 2002	
dgJ	0.166667	0.166667	1.000000	Roma in	
				Bulgaria 2001	

Solution coverage	0.500000
Solution consistency	1.000000

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

There are six cases, out of the total of 38, involved in contradictions, in the second part of the research. The proposition containing the two combinations and the corresponding cases are listed below.

 $DgHIJ + DghiJ \rightarrow C$

Expression	Corresponding cases involved in
	contradictions (value of the outcome)
DgHIJ +	Turks in Bulgaria 1997 (1), Russians in
	Ukraine 2006 (0)
DghiJ	Russians in Estonia 1999 (1), Russians in
	Estonia 2003 (0), Russians in Estonia 2007
	(0), Albanians in Macedonia 2002 (1)

Table 16. Contradictory overragions and cor d nant of th ding oo h

Source: Table compiled using output results generated by fsQCA and Tosmana.

The first two cases - Turks in Bulgaria 1997 and Russians in Ukraine 2006 - display the same combination of causal conditions; yet, the Turkish MRF made in the Bulgarian Parliament in 1997, while the Russian party in Ukraine did not. Both parties ran in coalitions in the respective elections. The Turkish party was the driving force in the "Alliance for National Salvation," which gained 9.44% of the votes, relying mainly on the disciplined

 $[\]overline{}^{79}$ The list of simplifying assumptions, as revealed by Tosmana, can be found in appendix 20.

Turkish electorate. Meanwhile, The Russian party in Ukraine was in a coalition with another small party, failing to pass the electoral threshold. The element which most likely makes the difference between the two cases is the discipline of the electorate. While the Turks in Bulgaria constantly vote for the MRF, which is the only party representing them and ensuring them parliamentary representation, while the Russians in Ukraine, as already mentioned above, vote largely for non-ethnic parties.

Four other cases correspond to the second contradictory combination (*DghiJ*), three of them corresponding to Russians in Estonia and the fourth one to the Albanians in Macedonia. The Russians obtained parliamentary representation in 1999, but under the exact conditions, no Russian party entered the legislative in the following two elections. A possible explanation may be that the Russian electorate grew unconfident with the ethnic parties and opted to vote for left-wing socialist parties, which also advocate stronger ties with Russia. However, a merge of the two main Russian parties would ensure that the resulting party would enter the legislative. The Albanians in Macedonia have always obtained representation in the legislative, in the four elections under study, under four different combinations, benefiting from a large proportion of the population, which allowed them to overcome the political splits.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The aim of this research is to bridge the gap between the theoretical approaches to ethnicity and ethnic parties with the on-ground realities in post-Communist states and to explain why in some post-Communist states ethnic minorities mobilize and form political parties, while in others they do not. The existing theories identify possible causes of ethnic mobilization, but rarely take into consideration combinations between presence and absence of different causes in the occurrence of the outcomes under study. The data analysis chapter reveals complex conjunctural causes for the formation and success of ethnic parties, which the existing theory, as presented in the theoretical chapter, fails to capture. From this perspective, the current research substantially contributes to the literature, by providing a broader picture of how social, economic and political causes work together to explain relevant issues with respect to ethnic parties and ethnic minorities.

The first part of the research provides several compelling findings. First, the solution formula obtained after the use of simplifying assumptions shows that past ethnic conflicts, as a significant element of ethnic and national identities, does not seem to have any influence on the formation of ethnic parties, by itself or in combination with other causal conditions. In other words, ethnic parties do not form (or ethnic minorities do not mobilize politically) because of past conflicts with the dominant group. Thus, the numerous studies focusing on the relation between ethnic conflicts and the mobilization of ethnic minorities seem to over emphasize the importance of the former; while ethnic conflicts are most likely significant elements in shaping inter-ethnic relations, their importance in relation to the existence of ethnic parties seems to be quite low.

Second, the importance of discrimination is emphasized in the analysis. I distinguished in this research between formal discrimination and informal discrimination, for

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methodological and empiric reasons. Nevertheless, discrimination can be seen as an encompassing concept in the light of my findings and it seems to contribute greatly to the formation of ethnic parties. Adding to its importance, the absence of discrimination seems to be decisive in explaining why some ethnic minorities in post-Communist state do not politically mobilize.

Third, the kin-state seems to have a greater significance in explaining why ethnic minorities mobilize than the existing theory lets us see. Apart from Brubaker, no major study emphasizes the importance of kin-states, while this study reveals their support for their co-nationals as an important element, at least in combination with discrimination, in explaining why ethnic minorities mobilize, but also why they do not.

Finally, anti-minority parties are significant political actors whose existence explains the formation of ethnic parties. Unlike the previously mentioned causes, the existence of strong anti-minority parties explains by itself the formation of ethnic parties in some cases, appears in combination in others, while their absence is a necessary cause for the absence of mobilization.

For the second part of the research, for which the outcome under study has been the success of ethnic parties, with an emphasis on the ethnic minority represented by the parties and not on the parties themselves, the analysis does not provide clear indications on the importance of one or another condition, but rather captures complex combinations. Causal conditions are sometimes present and other times absent and it is difficult to make any assessment on the importance of one of them over the other. Then again, the purpose of QCA and of this study is to capture complex causal patterns, overlooked in previous studies. The context as a whole, captured in the causal combinations, is relevant in determining the success of ethnic parties. Ethnic parties need to adapt in order to gain representation. A really small party can join a broader coalition led by stronger parties and gain seats on a common list, as

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was the case of the Roma in Bulgaria in 2005 or of the Russians in Lithuania in 2000. In other cases, a small party, either in a coalition or by itself, can gain seats benefiting from a singlemember district component in the electoral system, especially if the minority it represents is territorially concentrated, as is the case the Poles in Lithuania. A political split can ruin the chances for representation of the minority; while one single party of the minority might be able to pass the threshold in case of PR systems, the existence of several smaller parties representing the same minority, which run separately, might lead to a split within the minority electorate, leaving all the parties unable to pass the threshold. This is what explains the success of the Hungarian parties in Romania and Slovakia or of the Turkish party in Bulgaria in all the post-Communist elections, while Russians in Estonia, for instance, experience problems in obtaining representation because of the political split inside the minority.

The electoral strategy of ethnic parties becomes very important in determining their success and, implicitly, the level of representation of ethnic minorities. As reflected by the independent variables for the second part of the research, the potential causes leading to the success or the failure of ethnic parties are political and institutional; the features of the minority are less important. This shows that ethnic parties and their leaders also need to be good political actors and turn in their favor the electoral contexts in order to gain seats in the legislative. Having a clear electoral target, represented by the minority, is not enough, as it is shown by the case of Russians in Ukrainian. The Russian parties are rather insignificant, despite the large Russian community, which prefers to vote for other parties that appeal better to its needs rather its own ethnic parties.

The current research can be considered a starting point for further research from several perspectives. The inferences drawn based on my findings are largely applicable to the entire post-Communist space, despite the fact some minorities have not been included due to methodological considerations. The same type of research can and should be conducted on minorities in Western Europe and even in Africa, while carefully controlling for the particularities of each region, in comparison to post-Communist states. Also, further potential causal conditions can be identified and can be included in the model, such as the type of leadership of the country, the level of support for the elites of the ethnic minorities within the group or the level of institutionalization of the ethnic party within the national party system.

Despite the fact that further development is possible and new or different causal explanations might be found for the formation and success of ethnic parties, the study I conducted reveals compelling and often overlooked causal patterns, which contribute to a better understanding of the existence of ethnic parties in post-Communist states. Also, the findings of this study, adding to the already existing theoretical background, help us understand better the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations, which have often been a source of instability and conflicts in this part of the world throughout history.

APPENDICES⁸⁰

Appendix	1:	Ethnic	Parties	in	Post-C	'ommunist	states
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Minority	Ethnic party	Period of existence
Russians in Belarus	"Absent any kind of official	
	discrimination, the Russian	
	group's demands and	
	grievances do not seem to	
	be clearly articulated at this	
	point."	
Turks in Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and	1990 - today
	Freedoms	
Roma in Bulgaria	Euro-Roma	1998 - today
Serbs in Croatia	Serb Democratic Party	1997- today
Russians in Estonia	Estonian United People's	1994 – today
	Party	
	Russian Party of Estonia	1994 - today
	Russian Unity Party	1994 - today
Russians in Kazakhstan	-	
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan	-	
Russians in Kyrgyzstan	-	
Russians in Latvia	The Harmony Party	1993 (?) - today
Polish in Lithuania	Union of Lithuanian Poles	1994 - today
Russians in Lithuania	Union of Russians	1995 - today
Albanians in Macedonia	Party for Democratic	1990 - today
	Prosperity	
Gagauz in Moldova	Several parties exist but are	
	active only in the	
	autonomous region.	
Hungarians in Romania	Democratic Alliance of	1990 - today
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Slovakia	The Hungarian Coalition	1998 – today (re-uniting
	Party	parties existing from 1992)
Uzbeks in Tajikistan	-	
Russians in Ukraine	The Russian-Ukrainian	2002 (?) - today
	Union	
Russians in Uzbekistan	-	
Tajiks in Uzbekistan	-	

⁸⁰ Appendices 2-5 and 7 are compiled based on the MAR reports. Appendices 1, 6 and 8-12 are compiled based on data collected from Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe..., Sergiu Gherghina, The relationship between the strength of parliament and party development in post-communist countries. (Iasi: Editura Lumen, 2007), and [http://www.cses.org], [http://www.electionworld.org], [http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/election.htm] - the database was relocated [www.wikipedia.org] for all the countries included in my at research, and [http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/], all last accessed on 31 May 2007.

Russians in Belarus	-
Turks in Bulgaria	-
Roma in Bulgaria	-
Serbs in Croatia	"The Serbs recalled the extreme repression faced by their relatives at the hands of the pro-Axis Croatian Ustase during World War II. []After clandestinely supporting the Croatian Ustase for a number of years, the Axis countries installed Ustase leaders as the rulers of the Independent State of Croatia. The Croatian government of anti-Serb leaders engaged in a campaign of persecution, expulsion, and execution of all Serbs living in the territory it controlled. After the Croatian regime was defeated by Tito's Partisans, several hundred thousand Croats suffered reprisals handed out by Serbs and Croatian opponents."
Russians in Estonia	-
Russians in Kazakhstan	"Following the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861, many Russian and Ukrainian peasants moved to Kazakhstan and were granted Kazakh lands. Resentment against immigration led to local disaffection with Russian rule, and in 1916 a major rebellion against Russian control was brutally repressed, with some 150,000 people killed "
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan	"An ethnic clash has erupted in Osh (in 1989), an industrial center and second largest city of Kyrgyzstan, near the border of Uzbekistan, between ethnic Uzbeks and indigenous Kyrgyz. According to official reports, over 300 people were killed in the pogrom."
Russians in Kyrgyzstan	-
Russians in Latvia	-
Polish in Lithuania Russians in Lithuania	"In April 1919, Polish forces entered and established control over the Vilnius region of Lithuania, claiming it as historically Polish territory. In response, the Lithuanian government used the help of the Soviet Russian government in evicting the Poles from the Vilnius region. In October, Lithuanians and Soviets signed the Treaty of Suwalki, designating the Vilnius region as Lithuanian; however, the Poles immediately marched back into Vilnius and maintained control until 1939."
Albanians in Macedonia	1795, following the final partition of Poland. During the 19th century, Lithuanians experienced severe Russification, instituted by the 1885 decrees of Czar Alexander III. The local nobility had estates confiscated and distributed to the peasants, and the Lithuanian language was repressed."

Appendix 2: Past conflictual relations between minority and dominant group

	of coexistence, for the most part peaceful."
Gagauz in Moldova	"Commentators generally agree that the absence of
	historic conflict, or discrimination between Moldovans
	and Gagauz played a key role in facilitating the
	agreement between the two groups."
Hungarians in Romania	"During World War II Transylvania was reoccupied by
	fascist Hungary, but was later again recovered by
	Romania after the latter withdrew from the Axis and
	joined the Allies once it was clear that Hitler was losing
	the war."
Hungarians in Slovakia	"[T]he present-day ethnic Hungarians are what remains
	of the Hungarians who politically and culturally
	dominated Slovakia for about 1000 years (most recently
	in the form of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) until 1918,
	when Czechoslovakia was created. Many Slovak
	nationalists resent the long history of political
	subordination to Hungary and view the remaining
	Hungarian minority in Slovakia not merely as a minority
	but as the dispossessed former masters. The negative
	image of the Hungarian minority and fears of their
	irredentism had been intensified by the group's persistent
	refusal to integrate itself into the new host state \as well
	as by the revisionist efforts of neighboring Hungary
	which had never fully reconciled itself to the harsh dictate
	of the 1920 Trianon Treaty."
Uzbeks in Tajikistan	-
Russians in Ukraine	-
Russians in Uzbekistan	-
Tajiks in Uzbekistan	-

Minority	MAR Report
Russians in Belarus	"Russians living in Belarus do not face any significant
	discrimination or disadvantage, and the minority policies
	adopted by the government are inclusive"
Turks in Bulgaria	"The cultural rights of Turks are generally well respected,
	including broadcasting print media and schooling in
	Turkish."
Roma in Bulgaria	"In terms of government repression, there have been
	consistent reports of Roma being arbitrarily arrested and of
	Roma being beaten by police while in custody"
Serbs in Croatia	"[A]fter four years of stalemate and diversions caused by
	the war in neighboring Bosnia, the Croatian Army managed
	to quickly recapture Serb-occupied Western Slavonia in
	May 1995 and the much larger Krajina region in August
	1995. Croatian reprisais against Serbs were reportedly
	wheespread as more than 100,000 Croatian Serbs field or
	Serb controlled areas of Bosnia and Serbia [14.5 of 1000]
	Serbs of Croatia were still encountering continuing human
	rights violations both by Croat authorities and the Croat
	populace. Harassment and physical attacks against Croatian
	Serbs continued, and Serbs were killed and taken into
	custody for acts related to the conflicts in 1995. []While
	the new government has begun implementing changes to
	improve the position of Serbs, overall political
	discrimination remains large-scale."
Russians in Estonia	"The group's current disadvantages are directly linked to
	the post-independence legislation adopted by the Estonian
	government. Specifically, the widely criticized Estonian
	citizenship law requires evidence of pre-World War II
	historical roots in Estonia to be considered a citizen of
	Estonia. Those that do not fulfill this requirement must pass
	a language exam and demonstrate sufficient knowledge of
	Estonian history."
Russians in Kazakhstan	"Kazakhstan has solved most of its problems with its ethnic
	Russian minority, including the vexing issue of dual
	citizenship, and discrimination levels remain relatively
Linhala in Kamanatan	10W. "Despite these southeriteries developments Alexandid
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan	Despite these authoritarian developments, Akayev did make made afforts to maintain inter athria stability within
	the country Accordingly he festered a dialogue between
	the three largest ethnic groups: the Kyrgyz Pussians and
	Uzbeks in an attempt to prevent resentments and
	misunderstandings from erunting into violent clashes."
Russians in Kyrgyzstan	-
Russians in Latvia	"The group's [Russians] current disadvantages are directly
	linked to the post-independence legislation adopted by the
	Latvian government."

Appendix 3: Formal discrimination against the minority after Communism

Polish in Lithuania	"Compared to other Lithuanians, Poles living in Lithuania do not face any significant discrimination or disadvantage."
Russians in Lithuania	"Compared to other Lithuanians Russians living in
Russians in Linnama	Lithuania do not face any significant discrimination or
	disadventage "
	disadvantage.
Albanians in Macedonia	"However, the Albanians are underrepresented in the state
	apparatus, in the military and the police. There are
	restrictions in regard to the education in Albanian, and
	social prejudice to the practice of Islam. Amnesty argues
	that in general the police is using torture in its
	investigations, and several Albanian suspects have died
	while in custody over the last several years. The cultural
	demands of the Albanians in Macedonia have been focused
	on the right of education in their mother tongue at the
	university level. They founded the Albanian University of
	Totovo in 1005, but this institution has been considered
	illegel by the accomment "
	inegal by the government.
Gagauz in Moldova	Gagauz do not seem to have experienced any serious
	disadvantages vis-à-vis the dominant population."
Hungarians in Romania	"The relationship between the Hungarians and Romanians
	seems to have improved consistently over the past years.
	The government has met many of the cultural demands of
	the ethnic group"
Hungarians in Slovakia	"They are well-represented in the central government and
	face no current political discrimination."
Uzbeks in Tajikistan	"Ethnic Uzbeks face widespread societal discrimination in
	Tajikistan as well as some formal governmental
	restrictions. The Uzbek language is marginalized; Uzbeks
	are underrepresented within the political system; and
	President Rahmonov'ss government has actively sought to
	keen ethnic Uzbek leaders such as Colonel Mahmud
	Khudoberdiev out of political life "
Dussions in Illeroino	"Ilkrainian independence left athric Dussians formerly a
Russians in Oktaine	okrainian independence leit etiline Russians, formerty a
	privileged minority, stranded. Okrainian pointical entes
	began a program of state-building, which included
	expanding the use of Ukrainian in education, the media and
	government. Various policies sought to counteract
	centuries of russification. As a result, Russian-language
	schools have been closed, and Russian language usage in
	the media and for governmental purposes has been
	discouraged. Electoral laws also disadvantage primarily
	Russian political parties."
Russians in Uzbekistan	-
Tajiks in Uzbekistan	"In the course of the past decade, ethnic Tajiks have
	undergone a rapid political and organizational regression."

Minority	MAR Report
Russians in Belarus	-
Turks in Bulgaria	"Economically, the Turks are disadvantaged relative to the Bulgarians in terms of income, presence in professions and presence in the commercial sector and the overall level of discrimination is seen one of social exclusion but with neutral state policies."
Roma in Bulgaria	"Traces of this status of inferiority are to be found still among the perceptions of the current majority population. The Roma live in very poor sanitary conditions, sometimes without running water and electricity. Because they form a large percentage of the unemployed (in some areas nearly 90%), they lack health care benefits and suffer from chronic diseases. Economically they are at a disadvantage in that they are poorly qualified (many of them are illiterate) and cannot easily find suitable jobs"
Serbs in Croatia	"They [Serbs] are also discriminated against economically via current social practice, and public policies aimed at rectifying this situation are almost wholly ineffective. There are very few Serbs in the civil service and the police force, and this is due to social discrimination in hiring practices. These hiring practices have affected the group's economic well-being by limiting where they can get jobs."
Russians in Estonia	"Language restrictions also adversely affect group's educational and occupational opportunities."
Azeris in Georgia	
Armenians in Georgia	
Russians in Kazakhstan	-
Ukrainians in Kazakhstan	
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan	"Uzbeks also face discrimination in jobs for the civil service as well as other practices that restrict their ability to organize politically and have fair judicial hearings to the same degree as ethnic Kyrgyz."
Russians in Kyrgyzstan	"There is also widespread societal discrimination against the use of Russian in school and in the media."
Russians in Latvia	"The law also imposed economic hardships on the minority, banning them from purchasing property and having social guarantees equal to those of citizens."
Belarussians in Latvia	
Polish in Lithuania	"Compared to other Lithuanians, Poles living in Lithuania do not face any significant discrimination or disadvantage."
Russians in Lithuania	"Compared to other Lithuanians, Russians living in Lithuania do not face any significant discrimination or disadvantage."
Albanians in Macedonia	-
Turks in Macedonia	
Ukrainians in Moldova	
Russians in Moldova	

Appendix 4: A lower socio-economic status – informal discrimination

Gagauz in Moldova	"Nor were Gagauz significantly economically
	disadvantaged compared to Moldovans."
Hungarians in Romania	"[T]here are no indications of systematic economic
	discrimination against them."
Hungarians in Slovakia	"[E]thnic Hungarians also do not currently face economic
	discrimination."
Uzbeks in Tajikistan	"Ethnic Uzbeks face widespread societal discrimination in
	Tajikistan as well as some formal governmental
	restrictions. The Uzbek language is marginalized."
Russians in Ukraine	-
Russians in Uzbekistan	"Nevertheless, economic discrimination remains nominal,
	and only societal discrimination plays a serious role against
	the Russians in a number of categories."
Tajiks in Uzbekistan	-

Minority	MAR Report
Russians in Belarus	"Geographically dispersed throughout the country Russians
	of Belarus represent an advantaged minority."
Turks in Bulgaria	"Most Turks live in two main areas where they represent
	the majority of the inhabitants, one in the northeast of the
	country (Silistra - Varna), the other in the southeastern
	corner (Haskovo – Kurdzali)"
Roma in Bulgaria	"The Roma population is spread out evenly across the
	territory of Bulgaria, without any one region of high
	density."
Serbs in Croatia	"Since the war, the Serbs have been concentrated in the
	Slavonia and Krajina regions of Croatia."
Russians in Estonia	"The Russian minority in Estonia resides primarily in two
	areas of the country — the capital city Talinn and the
	border cities of Narva and Sillamae."
Russians in Kazakhstan	"Russians are territorially concentrated."
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan	"They are concentrated in the southern regions of
	Kyrgyzstan, [] in the Osh, Batken and Dzhalal-Abad
	regions."
Russians in Kyrgyzstan	-
Russians in Latvia	"Although not regionally concentrated, Latvian Russians
	reside primarily in large urban areas."
Polish in Lithuania	"Geographically concentrated in the Vilnius and Soleczniki
	districts"
Russians in Lithuania	"Russians in Lithuania are geographically dispersed"
Albanians in Macedonia	"Albanians live concentrated in the northwestern part of the
	country, in a region that borders Albania and Kosovo, two
	areas inhabited by other Albanians. []The northwestern
	region of Macedonia, centered on the city of Tetovo, is the
	place where most Albanians live and where they make up
Cases in Maldana	the majority of the population."
Gagauz in Moldova	The Gagauz live in a relatively small area of southern
Una sociona in Domonio	Moldova
Hungarians in Komama	Hungarians are primarily concentrated in the northwestern
Hungerians in Slovelsie	"Virtuelly ell ethnic Hungerians or Megyers live in
Huligai lans in Slovakia	virtually all etimic Hungarians, of Magyars, live in geographically contiguous gross of southern Slovakia"
Uzbalza in Tajilzistan	"Ethnia Uzbaka are concentrated in Leninghad oblast, north
Ozbeks III Tajikistali	of the capital Dushanha, in the eastern Ferghana Valley
	Additional Uzbek populations live in Hissar (west of
	Dushanhe) and in the Kurgan-Typhe region There is also a
	substantial Uzbek community in Khatlon province a rural
	region in the southwest which is among the country's
	poorest." All these regions are along the Uzbek-Tajik
	border. ⁸¹
Russians in Ukraine	"in the eastern regions where they are geographically

Appendix 5: Territorial concentration

⁸¹ See [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/casia_ethnic_93.jpg], accessed on 13 May 2007.

	concentrated in relatively large numbers."		
Russians in Uzbekistan	-		
Tajiks in Uzbekistan	"[T]hey [the Tajiks] were a large and regionally concentrated group which populated Samarkand and Bukhara, both Tajik historical cities situated in eastern Uzbekistan adjacent to Tajikistan."		

Minority	Anti minority porty	Davied of existence
Ninority Decesions in Deleman	Anti-minority party	Period of existence
Russians in Belarus	-	1000 1002 (
Turks in Bulgaria	The Bulgarian Socialist	1990-1992 (gave up on anti-
	Party	minority discourse after
		1992)
	Attaka	2005 - today
Roma in Bulgaria	Attaka	2005 - today
Serbs in Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights ⁸³	1993 - today
Russians in Estonia	Estonian Independence	1992 -1995 (then merger
	Party	with moderate Pro Patria
		party)
Russians in Kazakhstan	-	
Ukrainians in Kazakhstan		
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan	-	
Russians in Kyrgyzstan	-	
Russians in Latvia	Alliance for Fatherland and	1990 – 2000 (then gave up
	Freedom	on nationalistic discourse) ⁸⁴
Belarussians in Latvia		
Polish in Lithuania	Lithuanian Nationalist Party	1992 (?) – today (Never
		gained seats under PR
		component)
Russians in Lithuania	Lithuanian Nationalist Party	1992 (?) – today (Never
		gained seats under PR
		component)
Albanians in Macedonia	-	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Turks in Macedonia		
Ukrainians in Moldova		
Russians in Moldova		
Gagauz in Moldova	-	
Hungarians in Romania	Greater Romania Party	1991 - today
	National Salvation Front	1990 - 2000
	(FSN, PDSR)	
Hungarians in Slovakia	Movement for a Democratic	1993 - today
	Slovakia	
Uzbeks in Tajikistan	-	
Russians in Ukraine	-	
Russians in Uzbekistan	-	
Tajiks in Uzbekistan	-	

Appendix 6: Existence of strong anti-minority parties in the society

⁸² BSP

⁸³ "It is a right-wing party with an ethnocentric platform. The "Rights" in the party's name refer to the idea of Croatian national and ethnic rights that the party has vowed to protect since its founding in the 19th century." See [http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/hr%7Dhsp.html]. ⁸⁴ LNNK

Minority	MAR Report		
Russians in Belarus	"The group [Russians] has also benefited from ideological		
	support from the Russian Federation."		
Turks in Bulgaria	"The support that Turkey offers to the ethnic Turks living		
	in Bulgaria encourages politically negotiated solutions."		
Roma in Bulgaria	-		
Serbs in Croatia	"[T]he Yugoslav Army and Serb militia groups in Croatia		
	set out to seize control of Serb-inhabited territory inside		
	Croatia and unite the territory with Serbia as a defense		
	against potential repression."		
Russians in Estonia	"Russians in Estonia have also received outside ideological		
	and humanitarian assistance from the Russian Federation."		
Russians in Kazakhstan	"[T]he government of the Russian Federation has urged		
	nonviolence, has shown no willingness to support		
	extremists, and did little to intervene (other than request		
	extradition of Russian citizens) when ethnic Russians were		
	arrested and accused of planning a violent overthrow of the		
	government in late 1999."		
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan	-		
Russians in Kyrgyzstan	"Dependence on Russian protection may have served to		
	dampen ethnic Russian protest, which has consistently been		
	low. Despite a waning role in the region, Moscow's military		
	and economic leverage (with Russian troops still remaining		
	in the area) are likely to act as a brake against any overt		
	policy of discrimination toward the remaining ethnic		
	Russians in the area."		
Russians in Latvia	"Similar to other Baltic states, Russians in Latvia have		
	received outside ideological and humanitarian assistance		
	from the Russian Federation."		
Polish in Lithuania	"Poland continues to be the main outside ideological		
	sponsor advocating on behalf of the group. Official		
	relations between the Polish and Lithuanian governments		
	remain cordial, however."		
Russians in Lithuania	"Russian Federation continues to be the main outside		
	ideological sponsor advocating on behalf of the group."		
Albanians in Macedonia	"Albania has spoken in the name of the Albanians in		
	Macedonia in international forums and defended their		
	demands."		
Gagauz in Moldova	"The Turkish government persistently encouraged the		
	Gagauz to accept autonomy within Moldova and provided		
	economic aid for the development of the region."		
Hungarians in Romania	"Support came for the Union not only from among local		
	people, but also from the government in Budapest. [] The		
	link with Hungary was and continues to be very strong,		
	both at the official level (help from the government in the		
	torm of financial and logistical measures) and at the level		
	of the society, with many cultural and other types of		
	associations crossing across the border."		

Appendix 7: Support from kin-state

Hungarians in Slovakia	"The group has received ideological support from the
	Hungarian government"
Uzbeks in Tajikistan	-
Russians in Ukraine	-
Russians in Uzbekistan	-
Tajiks in Uzbekistan	"The regime in neighboring Tajikistan has shown no
	willingness to support irredentist policies of Tajiks in
	Uzbekistan, which further undermines Tajiks' ability to
	oppose the state violently."

Minority and election year	Anti-minority party (votes - percentage)
Turks in Bulgaria 1990	Bulgarian Socialist Party (47.15%)
Turks in Bulgaria 1991	Bulgarian Socialist Party (in coalition – 33.14%) ⁸⁵
Turks in Bulgaria 1994	None
Turks in Bulgaria 1997	None
Turks in Bulgaria 2001	None
Turks in Bulgaria 2005	National Union Attack (8.9%)
Roma in Bulgaria 2001	None
Roma in Bulgaria 2005	National Union Attack (8.9%)
Russians in Estonia 1995	Fatherland - Pro Patria Union ⁸⁶ (7.86%)
Russians in Estonia 1999	None
Russians in Estonia 2003	None
Russians in Estonia 2007	None
Russians in Latvia 1993	Latvian National Independence Movement (13.4)
	For Fatherland and Freedom (5.4%)
Russians in Latvia 1995	Latvian National Independence Movement (6.3%)
	For Fatherland and Freedom (11.9%)
Russians in Latvia 1998	For Fatherland and Freedom (14.7%)
Russians in Latvia 2002	For Fatherland and Freedom (5.4%)
Russians in Latvia 2006	For Fatherland and Freedom (6.94%)
Poles in Lithuania 1992	Union "Young Lithuania" (3.55%)
Poles in Lithuania 1996	Union "Young Lithuania" (4.01%)
Poles in Lithuania 2000	None
Poles in Lithuania 2004	None
Russians in Lithuania 1996	Union "Young Lithuania" (4.01%)
Russians in Lithuania 2000	None
Albanians in Macedonia 1994	None
Albanians in Macedonia 1998	None
Albanians in Macedonia 2002	None
Albanians in Macedonia 2006	None

Appendix 8: Anti-minority standing in elections

 ⁸⁵ Gave up on anti-Turkish speech after 1991 elections and formed an alliance with the MRF in 1992.
⁸⁶ Dropped anti-Russian discourse after 1996.

Hungarians in Romania 1990	National Salvation Front (66.31%)	
Hungarians in Romania 1992	Democratic National Salvation Front (27.72%)	
-	Party for Romanian National Unity (7.72%)	
	Greater Romania Party (3.89%)	
Hungarians in Romania 1996	Party for Romanian National Unity (4.46%)	
	Greater Romania Party (4.36%)	
Hungarians in Romania 2000	Greater Romania Party (19.48%)	
Hungarians in Romania 2004	Greater Romania Party (13%)	
Hungarians in Slovakia 1994	Movement for Democratic Slovakia (in coalition –	
	34.97%)	
	Slovak National Party (5.4%)	
Hungarians in Slovakia 1998	Movement for Democratic Slovakia (27%)	
	Slovak National Party (9.07%)	
Hungarians in Slovakia 2002	Movement for Democratic Slovakia (19.5%)	
	Slovak National Party (3.3%)	
Hungarians in Slovakia 2006	Movement for Democratic Slovakia (in coalition –	
	8.79%)	
	Slovak National Party (11.73%)	
Russians in Ukraine 2002	None	
Russians in Ukraine 2006	None	

Appendix 9: Political unity of the minority

Minority and election year	Ethnic parties	Ethnic coalition
Turks in Bulgaria 1990	Movement for Rights and	-
	Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1991	Movement for Rights and	-
	Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1994	Movement for Rights and	-
	Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1997	Movement for Rights and	-
	Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 2001	National Movement for	No
	Rights and Freedoms	
	Movement for Rights and	
	Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 2005	Movement for Rights and	-
	Freedoms	
Roma in Bulgaria 2001	Euro-Roma	-
Roma in Bulgaria 2005	Civil Union "Roma"	-
Russians in Estonia 1995	Estonian United People's	Yes
	Party	
	Russian Party of Estonia	
Russians in Estonia 1999	Estonian United People's	No
	Party	
	Russian Party of Estonia	
Russians in Estonia 2003	Estonian United People's	No
	Party	
	Russian Party of Estonia	N T
Russians in Estonia 2007	The Constitution Party	NO
	(former Estonian United	
	People's Party)	
Duraciona in Latria 1002	Russian Party of Estonia	No
Russians in Latvia 1993	Party of Russian Citizens	INO
	In Latvia	
	Dorty	
	Faily Equal Dights	
Pussions in Latvia 1005	Dorty of Pussion Citizons	No
Russialis III Latvia 1995	in Latvia	INU
	The National Harmony	
	Party	
	I atvian Socialist Party	
Russians in Latvia 1998	The National Harmony	
	Party	
Russians in Latvia 2002	The National Harmony	Yes
	Party	
	Equal Rights	
	Latvian Socialist Party	
Russians in Latvia 2006	The National Harmony	No

	Party	
	Equal Rights	
	Latvian Socialist Party	
Poles in Lithuania 1992	Polish Union (Lithuanian	-
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Poles in Lithuania 1996	Polish Union (Lithuanian	-
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Poles in Lithuania 2000	Polish Union (Lithuanian	-
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Poles in Lithuania 2004	Polish Union (Lithuanian	-
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Russians in Lithuania 1996	Union of Russians	-
Russians in Lithuania 2000	Union of Russians	-
Albanians in Macedonia 1994	Party for Democratic	-
	Prosperity	
Albanians in Macedonia 1998	Party for Democratic	No
	Prosperity	
	Democratic Party of	
	Albanians	
Albanians in Macedonia 2002	Party for Democratic	No
	Prosperity	
	Democratic Party of	
	Albanians	
	Democratic Union for	
	Integration	
Albanians in Macedonia 2006	Party for Democratic	No
	Prosperity	
	Democratic Party of	
	Albanians	
	Democratic Union for	
	Integration	
Hungarians in Romania 1990	Democratic Alliance of	-
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Romania 1992	Democratic Alliance of	-
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Romania 1996	Democratic Alliance of	-
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Romania 2000	Democratic Alliance of	-
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Romania 2004	Democratic Alliance of	-
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Slovakia 1994	Coexistence	Yes
	Hungarian Christian	
	Democratic Movement	
Hungarians in Slovakia 1998	Hungarian Civic Party	Yes
	Coexistence	

	Hungarian Christian	
	Democratic Movement	
Hungarians in Slovakia 2002	Hungarian Civic Party	Yes
	Coexistence	
	Hungarian Christian	
	Democratic Movement	
Hungarians in Slovakia 2006	Hungarian Civic Party	Yes
	Coexistence	
	Hungarian Christian	
	Democratic Movement	
Russians in Ukraine 2002	The Russian-Ukrainian	-
	Union	
Russians in Ukraine 2006	The Russian-Ukrainian	-
	Union	

Appendix 10: Membership in a coalition

Minority and election year	Ethnic parties	In coalition
Turks in Bulgaria 1990	Movement for Rights	No
_	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1991	Movement for Rights	No
	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1994	Movement for Rights	No
	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1997	Movement for Rights	Yes, in Alliance of
	and Freedoms	National Salvation
Turks in Bulgaria 2001	National Movement for	Yes, with UDF, BAPU
	Rights and Freedoms	and BSDP
	Movement for Rights	Yes, with Liberal Union
	and Freedoms	and Euro-Roma
Turks in Bulgaria 2005	Movement for Rights	No
	and Freedoms	
Roma in Bulgaria 2001	Euro-Roma	Yes, with Liberal Union
		and MRF
Roma in Bulgaria 2005	Civil Union "Roma"	Yes, in a large coalition
		led by the Bulgarian
		Socialist Party
Russians in Estonia 1995	Estonian United People's	Yes, both Russian
	Party	parties formed a
	Russian Party of Estonia	coalition
Russians in Estonia 1999	Estonian United People's	No
	Party	
	Russian Party of Estonia	No
Russians in Estonia 2003	Estonian United People's	No
	Party	N T
	Russian Party of Estonia	No
Russians in Estonia 2007	The Constitution Party	No
	(former Estonian United	
	People's Party)	N T
	Russian Party of Estonia	NO
Russians in Latvia 1993	Party of Russian Citizens	NO
	in Latvia	NT
	The National Harmony	NO
	Party	NI -
	Equal Rights	INO N
Russians in Latvia 1995	Party of Russian Citizens	INO
	In Latvia	NT -
	I ne National Harmony	INO
	Party	NI -
Dussians in Latria 1009	Latvian Socialist Party	
Kussians in Latvia 1998	I ne National Harmony	r es, all three ethnic
		parties formed a
	Equal Rights	coalition
	Latvian Socialist Party	

Russians in Latvia 2002	The National Harmony	Yes, all three ethnic
	Party	parties formed a
	Equal Rights	coalition
	Latvian Socialist Party	
Russians in Latvia 2006	The National Harmony	Yes, in coalition with
	Party (Harmony Center)	Latvian Socialist Party
	Equal Rights	No
	Latvian Socialist Party	Yes, in coalition with
		Harmony Center
Poles in Lithuania 1992	Polish Union (Lithuanian	No
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Poles in Lithuania 1996	Polish Union (Lithuanian	No
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Poles in Lithuania 2000	Polish Union (Lithuanian	No
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Poles in Lithuania 2004	Polish Union (Lithuanian	No
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Russians in Lithuania 1996	Union of Russians	No
Russians in Lithuania 2000	Union of Russians	Yes, in a coalition led by
		the Social-Democrats
Albanians in Macedonia 1994	Party for Democratic	No
	Prosperity	
Albanians in Macedonia 1998	Party for Democratic	No
	Prosperity	
	Democratic Party of	No
	Albanians	
Albanians in Macedonia 2002	Party for Democratic	No
	Prosperity	
	Democratic Party of	No
	Albanians	
	Democratic Union for	No
	Integration	
Albanians in Macedonia 2006	Party for Democratic	Yes, in a coalition with
	Prosperity	Democratic Union for
		Integration and
		Democratic League of
		Bosniaks
	Democratic Party of	No
	Albanians	
	Democratic Union for	Yes, in a coalition with
	Integration	Party for Democratic
		Prosperity and
		Democratic League of
		Bosniaks
Hungarians in Romania 1990	Democratic Alliance of	No
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Romania 1992	Democratic Alliance of	No
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Romania 1996	Democratic Alliance of	No

	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Romania 2000	Democratic Alliance of	No
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Romania 2004	Democratic Alliance of	No
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Slovakia 1994	Coexistence	Yes, the two ethnic parties formed a
	Hungarian Christian	coalition
	Democratic Movement	
Hungarians in Slovakia 1998	Hungarian Civic Party	Yes, all three ethnic
	Coexistence	coalition
	Hungarian Christian	
	Democratic Movement	
Hungarians in Slovakia 2002	Hungarian Civic Party	Yes, all three ethnic
	Coexistence	coalition
	Hungarian Christian	
	Democratic Movement	
Hungarians in Slovakia 2006	Hungarian Civic Party	Yes, all three ethnic
	Coexistence	coalition
	Hungarian Christian	
	Democratic Movement	
Russians in Ukraine 2002	The Russian-Ukrainian	Yes, part of Ruses Bloc
	Union	coalition
Russians in Ukraine 2006	The Russian-Ukrainian	Yes, in a coalition with
	Union	the Progressive Socialist
		Party of Ukraine

Appendix 11: PR electoral system

Minority and election year	Ethnic parties	In coalition
Turks in Bulgaria 1990	Movement for Rights	No
_	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1991	Movement for Rights	No
	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1994	Movement for Rights	No
	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1997	Movement for Rights	Yes, in Alliance of
	and Freedoms	National Salvation
Turks in Bulgaria 2001	National Movement for	Yes, with UDF, BAPU
	Rights and Freedoms	and BSDP
	Movement for Rights	Yes, with Liberal Union
	and Freedoms	and Euro-Roma
Turks in Bulgaria 2005	Movement for Rights	No
	and Freedoms	
Roma in Bulgaria 2001	Euro-Roma	Yes, with Liberal Union
		and MRF
Roma in Bulgaria 2005	Civil Union "Roma"	Yes, in a large coalition
		led by the Bulgarian
		Socialist Party
Russians in Estonia 1995	Estonian United People's	Yes, both Russian
	Party	parties formed a
	Russian Party of Estonia	coalition
Russians in Estonia 1999	Estonian United People's	No
	Party	ЪТ
	Russian Party of Estonia	NO
Russians in Estonia 2003	Estonian United People's	NO
	Party Dension Denter of Estenic	N -
	Russian Party of Estonia	NO
Russians in Estonia 2007	The Constitution Party	NO
	(former Estonian United	
	People's Party) Dussian Danty of Estania	No
Ducciona in Latvia 1002	Russian Party of Estonia	
Russians in Latvia 1995	in Latvia	INO
	The National Harmony	No
	Party	INU
	r arty Equal Dights	No
Pussians in Latvia 1005	Darty of Pussion Citizans	No
Russians in Latvia 1995	in Latvia	INU
	The National Harmony	No
	Party	
	I atvian Socialist Party	No
Russians in Latvia 1008	The National Harmony	Yes all three ethnic
ixussians in Latvia 1770	Party	narties formed a
	Equal Rights	coalition
	Latvian Socialist Party	
	Latvian Socialist Latty	

Russians in Latvia 2002	The National Harmony	Yes, all three ethnic
	Party	parties formed a
	Equal Rights	coalition
	Latvian Socialist Party	
Russians in Latvia 2006	The National Harmony	Yes, in coalition with
	Party (Harmony Center)	Latvian Socialist Party
	Equal Rights	No
	Latvian Socialist Party	Yes, in coalition with
		Harmony Center
Poles in Lithuania 1992	Polish Union (Lithuanian	No
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Poles in Lithuania 1996	Polish Union (Lithuanian	No
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Poles in Lithuania 2000	Polish Union (Lithuanian	No
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Poles in Lithuania 2004	Polish Union (Lithuanian	No
	Poles' Electoral Action)	
Russians in Lithuania 1996	Union of Russians	No
Russians in Lithuania 2000	Union of Russians	Yes, in a coalition led by
		the Social-Democrats
Albanians in Macedonia 1994	Party for Democratic	No
	Prosperity	
Albanians in Macedonia 1998	Party for Democratic	No
	Prosperity	
	Democratic Party of	No
	Albanians	
Albanians in Macedonia 2002	Party for Democratic	No
	Prosperity	
	Democratic Party of	No
	Albanians	
	Democratic Union for	No
	Integration	
Albanians in Macedonia 2006	Party for Democratic	Yes, in a coalition with
	Prosperity	Democratic Union for
		Integration and
		Democratic League of
		Bosniaks
	Democratic Party of	No
	Albanians	
	Democratic Union for	Yes, in a coalition with
	Integration	Party for Democratic
		Prosperity and
		Democratic League of
		Bosniaks
Hungarians in Romania 1990	Democratic Alliance of	No
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Romania 1992	Democratic Alliance of	No
	Hungarians in Romania	
Hungarians in Romania 1996	Democratic Alliance of	No

	Hungarians in Romania		
Hungarians in Romania 2000	Democratic Alliance of No		
	Hungarians in Romania		
Hungarians in Romania 2004	Democratic Alliance of No		
	Hungarians in Romania		
Hungarians in Slovakia 1994	Coexistence	Yes, the two ethnic parties formed a	
	Hungarian Christian	coalition	
	Democratic Movement		
Hungarians in Slovakia 1998	Hungarian Civic Party	Yes, all three ethnic parties formed a coalition	
	Coexistence		
	Hungarian Christian		
	Democratic Movement		
Hungarians in Slovakia 2002	Hungarian Civic Party	Yes, all three ethnic	
	Coexistence	coalition	
	Hungarian Christian		
	Democratic Movement		
Hungarians in Slovakia 2006	Hungarian Civic Party	Yes, all three ethnic	
	Coexistence	coalition	
	Hungarian Christian		
	Democratic Movement		
Russians in Ukraine 2002	The Russian-Ukrainian	Yes, part of Ruses Bloc	
	Union	coalition	
Russians in Ukraine 2006	The Russian-Ukrainian	Yes, in a coalition with	
	Union	the Progressive Socialist	
		Party of Ukraine	

Minority and election year	Ethnic parties in	Number of seats
	elections	gained
Turks in Bulgaria 1990	Movement for Right	s23
	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1991	Movement for Right	s24
	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1994	Movement for Right	s15
	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 1997	Movement for Right	s13
	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 2001	National Movement fo	r0
	Rights and Freedoms	
	Movement for Right	s21
	and Freedoms	
Turks in Bulgaria 2005	Movement for Right	s34
	and Freedoms	
Roma in Bulgaria 2001	Euro-Roma	0
Roma in Bulgaria 2005	Civil Union "Roma"	1
Russians in Estonia 1995	Estonian United People'	sRan in a coalition and
	Party	together got 6 seats
	Russian Party of Estonia	,
Russians in Estonia 1999	Estonian United People'	s6
	Party	-
	Russian Party of Estonia	. 0
Russians in Estonia 2003	Estonian United People's0	
	Party	0
	Russian Party of Estonia	. 0
Russians in Estonia 2007	The Constitution Part	y0
	(Iormer Estoman Omte	u
	Puggion Dorty of Estonia	0
Pussions in Latvia 1003	Russian Faity of Estonia	. 0
Russialis III Latvia 1995	in Latvia	50
	The National Harmon	v15
	Party	y 15
	Faual Rights	7
Russians in Latvia 1995	Party of Russian Citizen	<u>,</u> s0
itussiuns in Latvia 1995	in Latvia	50
	The National Harmon	v6
	Party	
	Latvian Socialist Party	6
Russians in Latvia 1998	The National Harmon	vRan together in a
	Party	coalition and gained 16
	Equal Rights	seats.
	Latvian Socialist Partv	1
Russians in Latvia 2002	The National Harmon	yRan together in a
	Party	coalition and gained 25

Appendix 12: Success of ethnic parties

	Equal Rights	seats.	
	Latvian Socialist Party		
Russians in Latvia 2006	The National Harmony	Ran together in a	
	Party	coalition and gained 17	
	Latvian Socialist Party	seats.	
	Equal Rights	Ran in a coalition which	
		got 6 seats.	
Poles in Lithuania 1992	Polish Union (Lithuanian	4	
	Poles' Electoral Action)		
Poles in Lithuania 1996	Polish Union (Lithuanian	1	
	Poles' Electoral Action)		
Poles in Lithuania 2000	Polish Union (Lithuanian	2	
	Poles' Electoral Action)		
Poles in Lithuania 2004	Polish Union (Lithuanian	2	
	Poles' Electoral Action)		
Russians in Lithuania 1996	Union of Russians	0	
Russians in Lithuania 2000	Union of Russians	3	
Albanians in Macedonia 1994	Party for Democratic Prosperity	11	
Albanians in Macedonia 1998	Party for Democratic	14	
	Prosperity		
	Democratic Party of	11	
	Albanians		
Albanians in Macedonia 2002	Party for Democratic	2	
	Prosperity		
	Democratic Party of	7	
	Albanians		
	Union for Democratic	16	
	Integration		
Albanians in Macedonia 2006	Party for Democratic	3	
	Prosperity		
	Democratic Party of	11	
	Albanians		
	Union for Democratic	14	
	Integration		
Hungarians in Romania 1990	Democratic Alliance of	29	
	Hungarians in Romania		
Hungarians in Romania 1992	Democratic Alliance of	27	
	Hungarians in Romania		
Hungarians in Romania 1996	Democratic Alliance of	25	
	Hungarians in Romania	27	
Hungarians in Romania 2000	Democratic Alliance of	27	
Hungarians in Romania		22	
Hungarians in Romania 2004	Democratic Alliance of	22	
Hungarians in Romania			
Hungarians in Slovakia 1994	Coexistence	Kan together in a coalition which got 17	
	Hungarian Christian	seats.	
	Democratic Movement		

Hungarians in Slovakia 1998	Hungarian Civic Party	Ran together in a
	Coexistence	coalition which got 15 seats.
	Hungarian Christiar	
	Democratic Movement	
Hungarians in Slovakia 2002	Hungarian Civic Party	Ran together in a
	Coexistence	coalition which got 20 seats.
	Hungarian Christiar	
	Democratic Movement	
Hungarians in Slovakia 2006	Hungarian Civic Party	Ran together in a
	Coexistence	coalition which got 20 seats.
	Hungarian Christiar	
	Democratic Movement	
Russians in Ukraine 2002	The Russian-Ukrainiar	0
	Union	
Russians in Ukraine 2006	The Russian-Ukrainiar	0
	Union	

Appendix 13: Results of the necessity analysis for the occurrence of the outcome in the first part of the research

Outcome variable: P

Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage	
А	0.272727	0.600000	
a	0.727273	0.571429	
В	0.545455	0.750000	
b	0.454545	0.454545	
С	0.454545	0.833333	
С	0.545455	0.461538	
D	0.727273	0.571429	
d	0.272727	0.600000	
Е	0.363636	1.000000	
e	0.636364	0.466667	
F	0.818182	0.750000	
f	0.181818	0.285714	

Source: Table compiled based on output results in fsQCA.

Appendix 14: Simplifying assumption for outcome P



⁸⁷ Tosmana uses a different notation for outputs of QCA analysis. A{0} means *a* and A{1} means *A*, according to the notation used in this study.

Appendix 15: Results of the necessity analysis for the non-occurrence of the outcome on the first part of the research

Outcome variable: p

Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
А	0.250000	0.400000
a	0.750000	0.428571
В	0.250000	0.250000
b	0.750000	0.545455
С	0.125000	0.166667
с	0.875000	0.538462
D	0.750000	0.428571
d	0.250000	0.400000
Е	0.000000	0.000000
е	1.000000	0.533333
F	0.375000	0.250000
f	0.625000	0.714286

Source: Table compiled based on output results in fsQCA.

Appendix 16: Simplifying assumption for outcome p

 $\begin{array}{l} A\{0\}B\{0\}C\{0\}D\{0\}E\{0\}F\{0\} + A\{0\}B\{0\}C\{0\}D\{0\}E\{1\}F\{0\} + \\ A\{0\}B\{0\}C\{0\}D\{1\}E\{1\}F\{0\} + A\{0\}B\{0\}C\{1\}D\{0\}E\{1\}F\{0\} + \\ A\{0\}B\{0\}C\{1\}D\{1\}E\{0\}F\{0\} + A\{0\}B\{0\}C\{1\}D\{1\}E\{1\}F\{0\} + \\ A\{1\}B\{0\}C\{0\}D\{0\}E\{0\}F\{0\} + A\{1\}B\{0\}C\{0\}D\{0\}E\{1\}F\{0\} + \\ A\{1\}B\{0\}C\{0\}D\{1\}E\{1\}F\{0\} + A\{1\}B\{0\}C\{1\}D\{0\}E\{0\}F\{0\} + \\ A\{1\}B\{0\}C\{1\}D\{0\}E\{1\}F\{0\} + A\{1\}B\{0\}C\{1\}D\{1\}E\{0\}F\{0\} + \\ A\{1\}B\{0\}C\{1\}D\{1\}E\{1\}F\{0\} \rightarrow p \\ \\ Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 13 \end{array}$
Appendix 17: Necessity analysis for the occurrence of the outcome in the second part of the research

Outcome variable: S

Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
D	0.781250	0.862069
d	0.218750	0.777778
G	0.656250	0.954545
g	0.343750	0.687500
Н	0.750000	0.857143
h	0.250000	0.800000
Ι	0.406250	0.812500
i	0.593750	0.863636
J	0.750000	0.857143
1	0.250000	0.800000

Source: Table compiled based on output results in fsQCA.

Appendix 18: Simplifying assumption for outcome S

 $\begin{array}{l} D\{0\}G\{0\}H\{0\}I\{0\}J\{0\} + D\{0\}G\{0\}H\{0\}I\{1\}J\{0\} + D\{0\}G\{0\}H\{0\}I\{1\}J\{1\} + D\{0\}G\{1\}H\{0\}I\{0\}J\{0\} + D\{0\}G\{1\}H\{0\}I\{1\}I\{0\}J\{1\} + D\{0\}G\{1\}H\{1\}I\{1\}J\{0\} + D\{1\}G\{0\}H\{0\}I\{1\}J\{0\} + D\{1\}G\{1\}H\{0\}I\{0\}J\{1\} + D\{1\}G\{1\}H\{0\}I\{1\}J\{1\} \rightarrow S \\ \text{Number of Simplifying Assumptions: } 12 \end{array}$

Appendix 19: Necessity analysis for the non-occurrence of the outcome in the second part of the research

Outcome variable: s

Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
D	0.666667	0.137931
d	0.333333	0.222222
G	0.166667	0.312500
50	0.833333	0.312500
Н	0.666667	0.142857
h	0.333333	0.200000
Ι	0.500000	0.187500
1	0.500000	0.136364
J	0.666667	0.142857
1	0.333333	0.200000

Source: Table compiled based on output results in fsQCA.

Appendix 20: Simplifying assumption for outcome s

 $\begin{array}{l} D\{0\}G\{0\}H\{0\}I\{0\}J\{0\} + D\{0\}G\{0\}H\{0\}I\{0\}J\{1\} + D\{0\}G\{0\}H\{0\}I\{1\}J\{1\} + D\{0\}G\{0\}H\{1\}I\{0\}J\{0\} + D\{0\}G\{0\}H\{1\}I\{0\}J\{0\} + D\{0\}G\{0\}H\{0\}I\{1\}J\{0\} + D\{1\}G\{1\}H\{0\}I\{1\}J\{0\} + D\{1\}G\{1\}H\{1\}I\{1\}J\{0\} \rightarrow s \\ \text{Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 9} \end{array}$

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