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**DRIVING WITHOUT MIRRORS - U.S. FOREIGN  
POLICY IN POST-9/11 CENTRAL ASIA:  
EXPLANATIONS FROM THE INSIDE**

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**JEFFREY D. LE**

SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR TAMAS MESZERICS

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## ABSTRACT

This work aims to explain why, despite the fact that Central Asia (CA) is an important region in global security in the post-9/11 world, is it that CA is still not a top-tier regional priority, despite pressing political and geo-strategic elements?

I evaluate the post-9/11 bureaucratic and policy shift of Central Asia from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) to the Bureau of South Asian Affairs (SA) through two lenses: bureaucratic politics and power; and misperceptions and the use of analogical explanation. I use Nelson Michaud's (2002) power model to operationalize the events that took place that created a failed attempt for a CA bureaucratic and policy shift towards SA in 1992 in comparison to the successful effort to shift CA in 2006.

I compile evidence through personal and telephone interviews with career diplomats, civil servants and political appointees from the State Department, the Department of Defense (DoD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Congress, and the National Security Council (NSC). In addition, I use official government statements and briefings, newspaper commentary and academic literature to substantiate my claims.

I conclude that the Central Asian bureaucratic and policy shift to South Asia, due to disuniting bureaucratic policy perspectives as well as psychological misperceptions, such as overestimation, wishful thinking, and cognitive dissonance, and historical analogue reasoning, both rhetorical and strong analogies related to the Tajikistan Civil War, Afghanistan, and Central Asia's pre-Russian historical linkages to South Asia actually undermined Central Asia's intended high-level priority in U.S. foreign policy and created unintended consequences. Finally, I present recommendations on how to better reflect Central Asia's importance bureaucratically and argue that regional integration is not necessarily the strongest strategy.

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*-JDL, June 1, 2007*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AF	– Bureau of African Affairs
AE	– Khong’s Analogical Explanation Framework
A/S	– Assistant Secretary of State
CA	– Central Asia or Office of Central Asian Affairs
CENTCOM	– U.S. Department of Defense, Central Command
CIA	– Central Intelligence Agency
DoD	– Department of Defense
D/S	– Deputy Secretary of State
EAP	– Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
E & E	– U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau of Europe and Eurasia
EU	– European Union
EUR	– Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
EUR/SOV	– Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Soviet Affairs
JCS	– Joint Chiefs of Staff
M	– Undersecretary of State for Management
NEA	– Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
NIS	– New Independent States
NSC	– National Security Council
NATO	– North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	– Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OECD	– Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
P or PA	– Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
S or SS	– Secretary of State
SA	– South Asia or the Bureau of South Asian Affairs
SCA	– Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
WHA	– Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
UN	– United Nations
U/S	– Undersecretary of State
USAID	– U.S. Agency for International Development

## **CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION: POST-9/11 CENTRAL ASIA – IN THE BLIND SPOT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY**

As the world's lone superpower, the United States has the globe's most expansive foreign policy. Literature on U.S. foreign policy is exceptionally rife. From popular culture magazines, to academic journals, much is written on what is important to the United States abroad. However, little has been written on U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia, still considered a major blind spot in America's global agenda. Due to little direct exposure to the region historically, culturally, and geographically, along with the hyper-emphasis on Moscow during the Soviet era, the region was lumped into a perceived monolithic USSR.

The United States and its foreign policy quickly found itself in the need for drastic reexamination when its Cold War rival shattered into 15 separate republics, including the 5 Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. For these new states, this was the first taste of modern statehood and independence from a foreign entity. Despite the obscurity to even some Sovietologists, there has been some noteworthy literature written on the U.S. foreign policy in the region both before and the after 9/11 discussing a number of important geostrategic topics, such as securing energy, balancing a neo-imperial Russia and increasingly influential China; promoting gender equality, democracy and human rights; and combating rising HIV/AIDS infection, poverty, global drug trafficking, environmental degradation, Islamic extremism and the Global War on Terror.

In general terms however, looking at foreign policy resultants is not enough. To execute foreign policy objectives and decisions, bureaucratic structures in the U.S. Government must effectively work on promoting U.S. interests regionally and thematically. However, how are these regions created and compiled? Specifically, I will look at the case of Central Asia and the following puzzle in U.S. foreign policy: Despite the fact that Central Asia is an important region in global security in the post-9/11 world, why is it that Central Asia is still not a top-

tier regional priority, despite the similar pressing political and geo-strategic elements with the Middle East and South Asia?

While the U.S. foreign policy literature on Central Asia does highlight many important topics in regional and international relations, the current academic debates on the region and American involvement fail to discuss the internal American perspective and workings on Central Asia. To date, there has been no scholarly work on the organization and regional prioritization of the U.S. Government and its resultant policies towards Central Asia. In addition, the bureaucratic politics literature, popularized by Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision* in 1971, has been debated to extensive length about the work's relative shortcomings and explanatory holes in both its ability to predict and its difficulty to operationalize into a coherent and effective paradigm. Also, in the post-1971 literature, case studies have overemphasized the crisis situations while overlooking explanatory routine choices in bureaucracies.

As such, this work will, in part, also attempt to contribute to what is missing in the bureaucratic politics literature. Furthermore, as bureaucratic politics alone may not explain the entire phenomenon to decision-making, this paper also aims to explain reasons for this shift not only in traditional bureaucratic terms but also in the area of political psychology and cognitive processes, a part of the foreign policy decision-making literature that has a strong hold over current debates. Overall, the region is understudied and this work ambitiously hopes to shed light on this strategic corner of U.S. foreign policy and to add to the general foreign policy decision-making literature.

In this paper, I evaluate the post-9/11 bureaucratic and policy shift of Central Asia from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) to the Bureau of South Asian Affairs (SA) through two lenses: bureaucratic politics and power; and misperceptions and the use of analogical explanation. First, I take an in depth look at the bureaucratic politics model. From

the literature review, I discuss the seminal works and its criticism through other academic works. Then, I analyze the story through a bureaucratic politics cut and use Nelson Michaud's (2002) power model to operationalize the events that took place that created a failed attempt for a Central Asia bureaucratic and policy shift towards South Asia in 1992 in comparison to the successful effort to shift Central Asia in 2006.

Through applying the model to the shifts, I also discuss the background of policy practitioners' formal and informal reasoning as well as evaluate intended consequences. This lens looks closely at the State Department's regional designation process from 1992 to present. Through this, I summarize the story and detail the pulling and hauling between the key governmental agencies regarding the region's representation in the U.S. Government's bureaucratic framework, thereby indicating that the Bush Administration's policy shift created an institutional change. I compile compelling evidence through personal and telephone interviews with career diplomats, civil servants and political appointees from the State Department (State), the Department of Defense (DoD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Congress, and the White House's National Security Council (NSC)<sup>1</sup>. In addition, I use official State Department statements and briefings, newspaper commentary and academic literature to substantiate my claims.

In addition, as bureaucratic impetus does not explain the story alone, I then look at the Central Asian example in the lens of analogy and misperception. After a literature review, I hypothesize that misperceptions, such as overestimation, wishful thinking, and cognitive dissonance was present for decision-makers, using interviews to display evidence. In addition, I hypothesize that the historical applications of analogies also contributed to policy changes. Through interviews discussing the Tajikistan Civil War, Afghanistan and pre-

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<sup>1</sup> Interviews were conducted under strict conditions of anonymity and unrecorded. The author stands by fieldwork conducted in the United States and over telephone discussions from February 2007 through May 2007.

Russian historical linkages between Central and South Asia, these analogies played roles in persuasion and policy outcomes.

Finally, I conclude that besides the misfortune of being sandwiched in between the Middle East, Russia and China, without the crisis label, the Central Asian bureaucratic and policy shift to South Asia due to disuniting bureaucratic policy perspectives as well as psychological misperceptions, such as overestimation, wishful thinking, and cognitive dissonance, and historical analogue reasoning, both rhetorical and strong analogies related to the Tajikistan Civil War, Afghanistan, and Central Asia's pre-Russian historical linkages to South Asia actually undermined Central Asia's intended high-level priority in U.S. foreign policy and created unintended consequences. Finally, I present recommendations on how to better reflect Central Asia's importance bureaucratically and argue that regional integration is not necessarily the strongest strategy. While the reorganization and its consequences are still early to predict, there is already evidence that its bureaucratic movement has allowed policy losses to outweigh its intended policy gains. To culminate, I argue that Central Asia should ideally be placed in its own bureau with the Caucuses to promote maximum exposure to avoid the shadows of other regions and offer career incentive to diplomats and civil servants serve as regional experts.

## CHAPTER 2 - CUT I: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND POWER

### 2.1 Introduction

After an inspection of the outputs of U.S. foreign policy objectives and aims in Central Asia, another angle is needed to explain decision-making related to reintegration aims between Central and South Asia. One perspective is through the lens of bureaucratic politics, an inward look at how bureaucracies and players shape policy. In this chapter, I provide a literature review highlighting major works. Second, I use theories that will be applied to the case of U.S. efforts for Central and South Asian integration. Using interviews, I will argue that bureaucratic politics did play a major role in policy explanations, and both unintended and intended consequences. Third, I will apply Michaud's model of power to the case. Finally, I summarize the findings.

### 2.2 Literature Review and Theories: *Sweeping the Bureaucratic Politics Road*

To have a literature review on bureaucratic politics, one must start with Graham T. Allison's (1971) *Essence of Decision* and its consequent second edition with Philip D. Zelikow (1999). Allison formalizes three decision-making paradigms, two of which – the organizational processes (Model II) and governmental politics (Model III) lens – combine into the bureaucratic politics model of decision-making. First, one must look at the organizational processes aspect. In contrast to the rational actor paradigm (Model I), routines and standard operating procedures are used to constrain governmental behavior (Simon 1966 [1945]). Model II explains organizations and members of organizations, not those of a particular individual. Model II does 'not operate at the moment of decision; rather, it explains deviations which organizational routines constrain the formulation of options, and it explains deviations from perfect instrumentality after decisions are made by revealing how routines affect implementation' (Welch 1992: 117).

From this, tendencies can be made on how organizations tend to act and make decisions. First, formal organizations are 'groups of individual members assembled in regular

ways, and established structures and procedures dividing and specializing labor, to perform a mission or achieve an objective' (Meyer and Rowan 1991: 41). Second, organizations create capabilities for individuals to complete tasks that would otherwise be impossible. Third, organizational culture matters and shapes the behavior of individuals within the organization through informal as well as formal norms.

The other half of the bureaucratic politics model, Model III, is 'a central, competitive game' where the 'name of the game is politics: bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government' (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 255). As leaders are not one-dimensional, these players handle multiple issues, both on the personal and organizational level. What typifies the model is that a government's final decision is 'not a single, rational choice but [decided] by the pulling and hauling that is politics' (Allison & Zelikow 1999: 255). In groups, when officials take decisions, there is no way of knowing what the given outcome will be, even when knowledge is available on the leader's initial preferences (Allison & Zelikow 1999: 258).

From these groups, players in positions matter, especially in the national security context, as positions define what players can and have to do. There are four types of position: Chiefs (the president, cabinet members); Staffers (immediate staff of a chief); Indians (political appointees and permanent government officials within each of the departments and agencies); and Ad Hoc Players (actors in the wider government game such as the press, interest groups, etc.) (Allison & Zelikow: 297). In terms of what players will represent and contribute, priorities, goals, and stakes matter in shaping where a player will stand on an issue. Throughout the game, action-channels, a regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue, are filled by players to act in accordance to the formal and informal rules of the game. From this, the action is a result of the political game.

### **2.3 Explaining and Applying Michaud's Model**

Michaud's model of power aims to identify power relationships for a pair of actors throughout a decision-making process. As power structures influence decisions (Rosati 1983; Kaarbo 1998), Dahl's (1957) concept of dominance is applied where 'Actor A dominates Actor B when A's opinion prevails over B's in the final policy formulation' (Dahl 1957: 201). This dominance is determined by looking at both actors' stances at the beginning at the end of a specific episode and comparing them to see whether the opinion of one prevailed over the other. In conjunction with this premise, dominance can be established in occasions of pulling and hauling games when the winner dominates over the loser. Pulling and hauling games is defined as 'when two actors of the same level of authority contest each other or when an actor of an inferior level does so with a superior' (Michaud 2002: 278). When outcomes, actors, relationships, and innings are identified, a graph can be drawn to determine the direction of a power flow to influence the outcome<sup>2</sup>.

### **2.4 Bureaucratic Regional Organization before 9/11: Africa, the Former Soviet Union, and South Asia**

In the U.S. context, bureaucratic regional reorganizations are rare but not unheard of. In October 1949, State commissioned an Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs on Oct 3, 1949, after the Hoover Commission recommended that certain offices be upgraded to bureau level after Congressional approval (State Office of the Historian). Relations with African nations became the responsibility of a new Bureau of African Affairs on Aug 20, 1958 under the Eisenhower Administration, citing the end of colonialism and the birth of numerous states in the global community. As colonial decline also impacted the Middle East region, it was decided among the State, Defense, and White House foreign policy experts, that the African states in the Sahara Desert system would be placed with West Asian and South Asian states for cultural, religious and historical purposes

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<sup>2</sup> A listing of the various diagrams and key signs for graphs derived from Michaud (2002), pp. 279, are found in the appendix.

(Retired Former Ambassador to Africa, Telephone Interview, May 20, 2007), thus creating the Near East and South Asian Affairs Bureau in 1974.

Years later, another big reorganization occurred. Prior to its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had been classified as a European state under the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs (EURCA) since its inception in June 1949. According to the first EURCA Assistant Secretary of State (A/S) George W. Perkins, this European designation was made on the grounds that the USSR was ‘much more European than Asian’ (U.S. State Department 2007a) despite the fact that the USSR was geographically on both the European and Asiatic continents.

After the 1991 disintegration, the Soviet Union dissolved into 15 successor states and the first initial question was where to place these newly independent countries, all of which were unique culturally, unified historically under the Communist banner and spanned over expansive distances. The first attempt to restructure U.S. foreign policy and its regional distribution came shortly after the passage of the Freedom Support Act (FSA), a bill pushed and passed by Congress in October 1992. FSA formally marked the importance of maintaining influence in the former Soviet Union through aid. In lieu of the new changes, a debate within State’s EURCA Bureau emerged. At the time, EURCA covered one of the most diverse and most expansive diplomatic portfolios: 45 countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Some members of the defunct Office of Soviet Affairs (EUR/SOV) had advocated to A/S Niles, a career EUR Foreign Service Officer (FSO), to split EUR away from the Caucuses and Central Asia for the following reasons. First, budgetary and staffing constraints loomed heavily over the morale of management. Additional funding Congress was to allocate for new missions in the New Independent States was significantly shorter than its needed target. Also, EUR personal costs were projected to be even higher. Staffing diplomatic

missions and training in Turkic and Caucasian languages compounded the bureaucratic frustration within EUR. Second, many policymakers at Foggy Bottom felt that the EUR Bureau would be too cumbersome with the addition of many more countries coming into the fold.

Third, bureaucratic infighting had emerged. Divisions had formed between its Sovietologists and its Western European regional experts. Due to the previous emphasis on the Soviet Union, Western European colleagues felt ‘shafted’ by the lack of support with its diplomatic partners in London, Brussels and Paris. Now that the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Western European experts wanted to move the former Soviet Union out of EUR as much as possible. Fourth, the few members of the former EUR/SOV who did have knowledge of the Caucasus and Central Asia did feel that these 8 countries did share a common pre-Soviet history with one another and not with Central and Eastern Europe. The question was where to place them – alone or with another existing bureau?

A possible solution came to the forefront with the newly established South Asian Affairs Bureau (SA). In August 1992, SA was separated from the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau (NEA), a move mainly supported by Congress through Section 122 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which also authorized the Assistant Secretarial appointment. However, the current A/S NEA Djerejian, a career FSO, would serve as A/S for both NEA and SA concurrently for over a year while the transition was made for both regional bureaus. While NEA and SA were still in flux, discussions were held between A/S NEA and SA Djerejian, A/S Niles, and Acting Director of Policy Planning Samuel A. Ross in September 1992. Separate discussions were also held with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (U/S P) Kanter in October 1992 and, eventually, Deputy and, later, Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in November 1992. As both were career diplomats, they understood and perceived bureaucratic influence as the number of countries

under their jurisdiction. While Niles was keen to end the difficulties within his bureau by jettisoning countries, the idea of prestige and influence loss was not acceptable. Additionally, he and much of the EUR Front Office felt that their Soviet experts could still add a different dimension to staffing these new diplomatic missions due to their cultural and linguistic knowledge, a point that Djerejian and the SA Front Office could not refute. For Djerejian, it was also a priority to obtain the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Increasing the number of countries from 8 to 16 would drastically give the new bureau critical mass and weight behind its movements within the Department; however, largely due to the strain and difficulties in managing both bureaus, Djerejian could not muster the support to persuade U/S P Kanter and Secretary of State (S) Eagleburger and a decision was made in December 1992. By the beginning of 1993, the Caucasus and Central Asia remained in EUR and SA maintained its eight countries, the smallest of State's regional bureaus.

After the debate ended within State ended, the NSC, DoD, the CIA also kept the bureaucratic status quo. The former Soviet states maintained their place with EURCA but the Clinton Administration put further efforts to also have the former Soviet Union under an Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States (NIS). What best represents the Clinton Administration's outlook on the NIS is with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's claim that Eurasia was 'a valuable trade and transport corridor along the old Silk Road between Europe [and] Asia' (Feigenbaum 2007). Maintaining the link and adding higher diplomatic representation was a happy medium for both policymakers and bureaucrats.

### ***2.5. Applying Michaud's Model I: The 1992-3 Attempted Central Asia Shift<sup>3</sup>***

The 1992-3 attempted bureaucratic and policy shift of Central Asia (and the Caucasus) from EUR to the newly separated SA yields lessons on bureaucratic politics and the impact of power relations. Using interviews from anonymous and unnamed retired Foreign Service officers and civil servants in the State Department close and knowledgeable to the policy

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<sup>3</sup> See appendix one to view Michaud's key set, Michaud (2002), pp. 279.

formulation process in EUR, SA, and NEA, ten episodes were grouped in two periods. The “internal jettison debate process” begins when A/S Niles was confronted by EUR colleagues to push the Caucuses and Central Asia out of EUR in a time of bureaucratic infighting and financial uncertainty in February 1992 until July 1992 when A/S Niles agrees to support the bureaucratic status quo in EUR. The “negotiating and lobbying process” extends from when State’s senior management discussed the issue with A/S Niles in August 1992 until Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger’s decision to decline the bureaucratic move in December 1992.

### **2.5.1 The Internal Jettison Debate Process**

Prologue: The Soviet Union falls and 15 new states emerge in the global community.

First Episode: A/S Niles (AN) is confronted by EUR colleagues who aim to push the Caucuses and Central Asia out of EUR (Jettison Officials: JO) in February 1992. JOs feel that the Bush Administration has not focused enough on its Western European partners and ‘that the Eurasian states should be categorized with Asian bureaus, not European ones’ (State Civil Servant, Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2006). With this pressure, JO had unilateral power over AN.

**1) JO -----→-----AN**

First Inter-Episode: FSOs in EUR/SOV bid for postings for Summer 1992.

Second Episode: Supporters of maintaining the status quo (SO) discuss the issue openly with A/S Niles (AN) in May 1992 to counteract the internal pressures set previously by JO (Retired State Civil Servant, Personal Interview, Rockville, MD, April 16, 2007). As such SO had unilateral power over AN.

**2) SO-----→-----AN**

Third Episode: A/S Niles (AN) agrees to maintain and support the status quo in July 1992. While the pressure did affect Niles initially, his intention to keep the original bureaucratic set-up the way it was currently was due, in part, to preventing a potential loss of prestige and

budgetary influence within State (Retired State Civil Servant, Personal Interview, Rockville, MD, April 16, 2007). For both situations of officials (JO & SO), AN has unilateral power.

**3a) AN-----→-----JO**

**3b) AN-----→-----SO**

Second Inter-Episode: New FSOs rotate into EUR as the most of the previous EUR/SOV FSOs rotate out of Main State abroad for EUR or rotate to a different regional bureau through Summer 1992.

### **2.5.2 The Negotiating and Lobbying Process**

Fourth Episode: A/S Niles (AN) is summoned by Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger (SS) to discuss EUR's stance on Eurasia in August 1992. AN confirmed that EUR will pool its resources to maintain Eurasia and SS agreed to the logic of EUR's position. SS maintained that he will reserve judgment for a later date. Under this premise, power is mutual with no losses for either side.

**4) SS----- = -----AN**

Third Inter-Episode: The Bureau of South Asian Affairs is formally established on August 24, 1992.

Fifth Episode: Discussions are held between A/S NEA and SA Djerejian (AD) and A/S Niles (AN) in September 1992. In an attempt to broker a deal and both coming from a career diplomatic point of view, they both agreed to pressure Acting Director Ross (PP) in October 1992 to force the leadership to be pro-active and to make a decision (Retired State Civil Servant, Personal Interview, Rockville, MD, April 16, 2007).

**5) AD----- = -----AN**

Sixth Episode: Discussions are held between A/S NEA and SA Djerejian (AD), A/S Niles (AN), and Acting Director of Policy Planning Samuel A. Ross (PP) in October 1992. Both

AD and AN catch PP off-guard with insistence for a decision from the senior leadership. With both bureaus pressuring PP, power is both unilateral for AD and AN towards PP.

**6a) PP-----←-----AD**

**6b) PP-----←-----AN**

Seventh Episode: Discussions are held between A/S NEA and SA Djerejian (AD) and A/S Niles (AN) again in early October 1992. In feeling more pressure from fiscal cuts, AN pushes for AD to drop their bureaucratic ambitions to gain the Central Asian diplomatic portfolio. With the wear and tear from running two bureaus in actuality, AD is under the unilateral power of AN.

**7) AD-----←-----AN**

Eighth Episode: U/S P Kanter (PK) meets with A/S NEA and SA Djerejian (AD) and A/S Niles (AN) to formally recommend a decision for Eagleburger (SS) regarding the bureaucratic jurisdiction of the Office of Central Asian Affairs in November 1992. AN persuades PK and wants to promote the maintenance of the status quo (Retired State Civil Servant, Personal Interview, Rockville, MD, April 16, 2007). Conversely, PK unilaterally has power over AD since PK has sided with AN.

**8a) PK-----←-----AN**

**8b) PK-----→-----AD**

Ninth Episode: U/S P Kanter (PK) meets with S Eagleburger (SS) to formally recommend that the Office of Central Asian Affairs maintain its bureaucratic jurisdiction in EUR. Initially, Eagleburger was leaning towards a change, but was persuaded to agree with PK (Retired State Civil Servant, Personal Interview, Rockville, MD, April 16, 2007).

**9) SS-----←-----PK**

Tenth Episode: Eagleburger (SS) announces to EUR (AN) and NEA-SA (AD) that the Office of Central Asian Affairs will maintain its bureaucratic jurisdiction in EUR in late December 1992. Again, unilateral power was found from AN, and in the reverse for AD.

**10a) SS-----←-----AN**

**10b) SS-----→-----AD**

Epilogue: Shortly after this bureaucratic process, President Clinton takes office in late January 1993 and pushes the former Soviet Union portfolio's responsibility to an Ambassador-at-Large for New Independent States.

### 2.5.3 An Evaluation of the 1992-3 Experience


Looking at the paired combinations, it becomes clear that AN's success came from its ability to stay active and to be successful in arguments not just localized in one's bureau but also to persuade with key decision-makers at the top. AN was able to also have the most interactions in the process with six different actors, compared to AD winning just one pairing. The table on power relations below illustrates how some actors to dominate others, regardless of where they stand in the hierarchy chart. Also looking at this case, it is clear that bureaucratic inertia for change which comes as bottom-up must have active sympathizers at the top in order to produce a favorable outcome.

**Table 1: Power Relations Analyzed – State Department Episodes, 1992-3**

<b>Actor AA</b>	<b>Actor BB</b>	<b>In Episode</b>
JO	AN	1, (9 + 10a)
SO	AN	2
AN	JO SO PP AD PK SS	3a 3b 6a 7 8a, (9) (9), 10a
SS	AN AD	4 10b
AD	PP	6b
PK	AD	8b

\*Bracket indicated nuanced relationships

**Figure 1: Power Relationships Analyzed – Collective Model, 1992-3 Experience**



## 2.6 Shifting and Non-Shifting: 1999 to 2006

In January 1999, EURCA was reorganized. The Office of Canadian Affairs was placed with the Bureau of Latin American Affairs and combined into the new Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. At this point, the former Soviet Union was still classified as European; however, in August 2001, State redefined its Bureau of European Affairs (EUR). EUR now had two major regional areas of responsibility. The first was Europe, which covered traditional Western Europe and Eastern Europe, with the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia placed in this grouping. The second area of responsibility was Eurasia, which was classified as the Caucasian States (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) and the Central Asian republics, which were Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan. As such, EUR now stood for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (State 2007a).

The administrative delineation occurred due to two major factors. The first was financial considerations. Historically, EUR received much more funding than its other bureau counterparts because of higher costs of maintenance and other overhead. An internal divide allowed for the European wing to receive a higher share of the funding on those very same grounds without clearly indicating a decline in funding for Eurasia (State Civil Servant Telephone Correspondence, April 7, 2007). Relevant actors and offices such as the U/S for Management, U/S for Political Affairs, the A/S for EUR, and the Director of the Policy Planning Unit would cite the support for the budgetary differences largely on the grounds that the American Embassies in Eurasia were already built and established. (Civil Servant Telephone Correspondence April 7, 2007).

Second, senior bureaucrats attempted to create niches and experts from within its bureau. As EUR is one of the largest bureaus in terms of diplomatic postings and personnel, as well as in its country portfolio variance, EUR had encouraged its FSOs and civil servants to broaden their regional scope but still maintain its base within the bureau as a whole. Informally and formally, civil servants and FSOs were encouraged to be regional experts in at least two bureaus or in two sub-regions.

State was not the only department to reevaluate its outlook with Eurasia. In 1999, DoD made a dramatic shift and moved the Central Asian Republics from to Central Command (CENTCOM), the most influential command of military operations. The NSC, representing the bridge for the White House to dialogue with the CIA, State, and DoD, put a high amount of effort in 1999 to the former Soviet Union, in large part due to the uncertain transfer of power from President Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. An unpredictable Russia meant that the United States needed to increase its focus on the ‘cultural neighborhood’ (Telephone

Interview, DoD Official, April 10, 2007). For example, the NSC pushed department heads, bureau chiefs and policy planning units to augment pre-existing security language programs to include Eurasian languages. As such, State, DoD and the CIA designated education and language programs to encourage young scholars to further their research interests with Turkic-based linguistics.

Going against the trend of bureaucratic shifting, USAID maintained their Europe and Asia link by keeping Central Asia in the same Europe and Eurasia (E & E) bureau. There are three reasons to why no reorganization occurred: 1) because the numbers of countries are smaller in E & E, there was not a bureaucratic need to decrease the target country portfolio; 2) USAID experts typically do not enter and exit different region bureaus; in fact, they are encouraged to focus on one region in contrast to State officials; and 3) the funding process in USAID is arguably the most important aspect of USAID work. To disrupt the funding mechanism would create severe bureaucratic headaches and policy hiccups. These highlighted reasons display how different bureaucratic culture and objectives have affected internal departmental structures.

## ***2.7 Bureaucratic Reorganization after 9/11***

Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, the U.S. and coalition partners militarily intervened into Afghanistan. For strategic and military purposes, the Central Asian (CA) states became an essential partner to the Global War on Terror. They largely cooperated with America and hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. After 9/11, 'U.S. policy emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking' (Nichol 2005: 15). The Bush Administration's policy aimed to integrate these states into the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and to discourage the growth of

xenophobic, fundamentalist, and anti-Western orientations that could threaten peace and regional stability (Nichol 2005: 12).

## **2.8 Applying Michaud's Model II: The 2005-2006 Bureaucratic and Policy Shift of Central Asia to South Asia**

As a bureaucratic response to meet these challenges of the post-9/11 world, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's (SS) appointment was an important catalyst for change within the State Department: its bureaucratic structure and its policy aims. Michaud's power model can be applied to the 2005-2006 process as well. Using interviews from anonymous and unnamed retired Foreign Service officers and civil servants in the State Department close and knowledgeable to the policy formulation process in Main State, nine episodes were grouped into two periods.

The "team shaping process" begins when Secretary Rice (SS) meets with Powell's senior management from February 2005 until U/S Political Affairs Burns' (UB) failed attempt to push for a bureaucratic restructuring of the regional bureaus in August 2005, unheard because of the leaderships' fixed interest in filling senior-level offices to end transition period. The "transformational diplomacy process" extends from Rice (SS) calling a meeting with her inner-circle (SF) in September 2005 to Spokesman Boucher's (RB) acceptance to serve as A/S South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA).

### **2.8.1 Michaud's Model II: Actions and Channels**

Prologue: After serving as National Security Adviser, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice begins her term at Main State on January 26, 2005, taking over for Colin Powell.

#### **2.8.1.1 The Team Shaping Process**

First Episode: Secretary Rice (SS) meets with Powell's senior management occupying U/S and A/S positions and receives resignations throughout May 2005. U/S for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky (UD) and A/S for South Asian Affairs (SA) Christina B. Rocca (AS) stay on for Rice.

**1) SS----->-----MS**

First Inter-Episode: Deputy Secretary Zoellick (DS), Counselor Philip Zelikow (CZ), Director of Policy and Planning Stephen Krasner (PP) joined State in February 2005. U/S for Political Affairs R. Nicolas Burns (UB), State's top career diplomat is promoted in March 2005. A/S EUR career FSO Daniel Fried (AE) heads EUR in May 2005.

Second Episode: Rice (SS) pushes her top career FSO, U/S for Political Affairs Burns (UB) to make recommendations for internal reform State in June 2005. Burns agrees to hold sessions with different members of the regional bureaus and to submit a report to Rice by the end of Summer 2005.

## 2) SS-----→-----UB

Third Episode: Burns (UB) informs Rice (SS) in August 2005 of the findings he has collected. The conclusion is that bureaucratic restructuring of the regional bureaus would be important to the quality of diplomacy, not simply on policy ground alone, but also because of internal efficiency. This largely goes unheard by Rice and her office, strictly because State's top hierarchy was focused on filling important vacancies rather than their mandated work (State Civil Servant, Telephone Interview, Washington, D.C., April 17, 2007).

## 3) UB-----| |-----SS

Second Inter-Episode: U/S for Arms Control Robert Joseph (UJ) joins in July, replacing John Bolton and U/S for Economic, Business and Agriculture (EBA) Josette Shiner (US) becomes a part of Rice's circle in August 2005, ending the lack of capacity in the building.

### 2.8.1.2 Transformational Diplomacy Process

Fourth Episode: Rice (SS) calls a meeting in September 2005 with her inner-circle: her Deputy, U/S's, the Counselor and Policy Planning, vis-à-vis the seventh floor of Main State (SF) to make changes to internal bureaucratic structures and policy-wise in American foreign affairs (State GS-15 Civil Servant, Personal Interview, April 19, 2007). The seventh floor leadership, with so many picked carefully, was less likely to provoke or be provoked because

of their loyalty towards the Administration. None of her inner circle would break the tradition.

**4) SS-----→-----SF**

Fifth Episode: Burns (UB) proposes to expand the Bureau of South Asian Affairs with the Office of Central Asian Affairs for bureaucratic and policy reasons in October 2005 to Rice (SS), Zoellick (DS), and A/S Fried (AE) and A/S Rocca (AS). Many of the Sovietologists in the inner-circle support this initiative [D/S Zoellick (DS), U/S EBA Shiner (US), U/S Global Affairs Dobriansky (UD), and U/S Arms Control Robert Joseph (UJ)] (State GS-15 Civil Servant, Personal Interview, April 19, 2007). At this point, Burns is now the point person on a bureaucratic and ideational change. In fact, Burns' success displays how one person can have power, for this moment, over both bureaucratic superiors and small players at the same time.

**5a) UB-----→----- SS**

**5b) UB-----→----- DS**

**5c) UB-----→----- AE**

**5d) UB-----→----- AS**

Sixth Episode: A/S Fried (AE) and A/S Rocca (AS) discuss the prospects of a bureaucratic switch of the Central Asian diplomatic portfolio in November 2005 with little resistance on the possible move from EUR and SA (State GS-15 Civil Servant, Personal Interview, April 19, 2007). Both AE and AS have been in government for an extension amount of time and, as such, worked out a successful negotiation that all would witness and accept. Mutual power is the closest aspect to display in episode six.

**6) AE----- = -----AS**

Seventh Episode: Burns (UB) agrees with Fried (AE) and Rocca (AS) in December 2005 that the Central Asian diplomatic portfolio should be moved to SA to create a South and Central

Asian Affairs Bureau (State GS-15 Civil Servant, Personal Interview, April 19, 2007). Collectively, UB was able to soothe both AE and AS at the same time. As such, power is relative and mutual.

**7a) UB----- = -----AE**

**7b) UB----- = -----AS**

Eighth Episode: Rice (SS) instructs her inner circle (SF) to promote her concept of transformational diplomacy in early January 2006 (State GS-15 Civil Servant, Personal Interview, April 19, 2007). This order created the start of policy changes; thereby, this justifies a bureaucratic shift of Central Asia to South Asia to promote partnership for the region and the world, with implicit support in return from her senior management.

**8) SS-----→-----SF**

Third Inter-Episode: The doctrine of transformational diplomacy is assembled and pushed through U.S. foreign policy within State.

Ninth Episode: Rice (SS) and Burns (UB) asks Spokesman Richard Boucher (RB) to serve as A/S for South and Central Asian Affairs in January 2006. Boucher accepted the task to head of a new bureau, as it signaled a much-needed change in the 20<sup>th</sup> century ((State GS-15 Civil Servant, Personal Interview, April 19, 2007). Since Boucher was not certain to accept, the assurance of the bureau's future importance was highlighted. As such, SS and UB were more powerful.

**9a) SS-----→-----RB**

**9b) UB-----→-----RB**

Epilogue: Ambassador Boucher is confirmed to serve as A/S for South and Central Asian Affairs and Congress agrees to the bureaucratic reorganization.

### 2.8.2 An Analysis of the 1992-3 Process


Going to the table, it is clear that this process was much more different than its 1992 counterpart. Unlike the 1992-3 policy process, this round was top-bottom and was pushed by Rice and Burns, where as the other was a bottom-up strategy for institutional change.

**Table 2: Power Relations Analyzed – State Department Episodes, 2005-6\***

Actor AA	Actor BB	In Episode
SS	MS	1
	UB	2, (3)
	SF	4, 8
	RB	9a
UB	SS	2, 5a
	DS	5b
	AE	5c, 6, 7a
	AS	5d, 7a
AE	RB	5a, (5b, 5c, 5d)
	UB	6
	AS	3b
	PP	6a

\*Bracket indicated nuanced relationships

**Figure 2: Power Relationships Analyzed – Collective Model, 2005-2006**




### 2.8.2.1 Criticisms of the Michaud Power Model

It is difficult to rely on any decision-making process analysis model to predict with absolute certainty the outcome of a policy, since there are many human factors intervening during the process (Michaud 2002: 295). In fact, the approach is far from perfect. For example, values and ideas are assumed to be equal when they may or may not have the same influence. Also, as the model relies heavily on Dahl's definition of power, how that would

affect a study to have its core assumptions disappear. Finally, historical and personal perspective is not taking into account. When analyzing the competed picture model, making the direct relations became confusing. During the team building phase, it became a different model when many of these individuals were actually Sovietologists. Also, many of these leaders were once opposing Central Asia's move to South Asia in 1992. As such, many of these senior managers were part of EUR/SOV and have learned from this experience.

This segues way into my biggest criticism: In any bureaucratic politics or power model, the model does not display support. In fact, power is also fueled past hierarchy but from cognitive aspects: ideas, values, power, historical lessons, and implicit support. The model displays direct power action exchanges, but not what unites a group in power. In the revised figure below, I expand on Michaud's model and add support (S+) to the power model.

**Figure 3: Power Relationships Analyzed – 2005-2006 Collective Model with S+**



Through this change, links go beyond bureaucratic structures, but there also needs to be a cognitive explanation to decision-making. If it were the case that all decisions were the same, there would be no nuances in relationships and all choices would be the same.

## 2.9 A Formal Decision

After analyzing the policy process, the endgame leads to the creation of new bureaucratic reorganization and policy formulation. After months of discussions, SA assumed

official responsibility at State for the CA diplomatic portfolios on February 9, 2006. As a result, the bureau was transformed into the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA). For the first time in U.S. foreign policy history, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, the Maldives, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Bhutan were formally linked with CA. Within the new SCA, offices were split into desks for Afghanistan; CA Affairs; India, Nepal and Sri Lanka; Pakistan and Bangladesh; Regional Affairs (Maldives and Bhutan); and Public Diplomacy. State's Office of the Spokesman cited the following change:

'[the shift was] part of the Secretary's [Condoleezza Rice's] focus on transformational diplomacy and [was] intended to channel the Department of State's resources to address most effectively the transnational threats and challenges of the 21st century. In addition to balancing the workload between the regional bureaus, the restructuring [was] designed to foster increased cooperation among the countries of Central Asia and South Asia as they work towards our shared goals of security, prosperity, stability, and freedom. This move also aims to build on the Central Asian states' natural partnership with Afghanistan in advancing that country's democracy and stability.' (State Office of the Spokesman 2006)

On February 16, 2006, during his confirmation hearing with the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee the future A/S for SCA, Richard Boucher remarked the following:

'[The creation of SCA made] good sense, because South and Central Asia belong together. In addition to deep cultural and historic ties, major 21st Century realities such as the war on terror, outlets for energy supplies, economic cooperation and democratic opportunities tie these regions together. We will continue to emphasize the involvement of Central Asian nations with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Their links with NATO, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and with individual European nations must remain an important part of their future. We also anticipate the nations of Central Asia will strengthen their ties to the people of South Asia. Central Asia's natural partnership with Afghanistan and the tremendous potential for cross-border trade and commerce are links we should foster and support. We believe that strengthening these ties and helping to build new ones in energy, infrastructure, transportation and other areas will increase the stability of the entire region' (Boucher 2006a)

## **2.10 The Bureaucratic Shift: Unintended Consequences**

Officially, the bureaucratic shift to create SCA was for two reasons. First, the workload of the bureaus was perceived as lopsided. As EUR was overwhelmed with numerous countries and international organizations, handing five states to SA was due to its 'smaller' coverage of seven countries. Second, cooperation in similar security matters, economic ties, and democratization issues between the CA and SA was centered with

Afghanistan seen as the bridge between both regions. As such, integration and additional cooperation is at the heart of the decision.

Both these factors have their flaws and unintended consequences. Regarding bureau workload, senior decision-makers failed to acknowledge that SA was already overloaded with handling the Afghanistan campaign, as well as unstable conflicts in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. Looking at the decision strictly in terms of numbers and not in intensity was an error. Also, while A/S Boucher was ‘looking forward to working with ‘...[staff] joining [SCA] from the European Bureau’ (Boucher 2006a), staff from EUR did not have the expertise on SA issues and SA experts did not work with CA before the shift. Additionally, CA would now not be close with Administration political appointees, which were prominent in EUR. Political appointees represent a closer link to the White House (Wilson 1989; Hilsman 1993; Hersman 2000; Halperin & Clapp 2006). With less connection to the Executive, policy priorities effectiveness, at least past the rhetoric, regarding CA is a major concern for the immediate short-term and the long-term.

There are also other unforeseen results of the shift. CA, despite being overshadowed by other EUR partners, was still in a prestigious and influential regional bureau. However, moving to SA created yet three other concerns. First, as CA was no longer a part of EUR, CA’s direct link with international organizations, such as NATO, the OSCE, the UN, and the EU was a major blow. The cooperation to coordinate support on Central Asia issues with influential Western allies was all discussed in Brussels, Vienna, and Geneva. Second, while CA would now be competing with less diplomatic portfolios, the already perceived obscurity of the region could be viewed as being in the blind spot of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Third, the financial support for CA is at question. Previously, EUR internally placed CA as a second-tier sub-region. Now, SCA officially could do the same, justifying that SA countries

are a higher priority. Very central to these arguments and perspective is that CA merged with SA and not vice versa, implicitly placing CA as a junior partner in the bureau.

### ***2.11 A Policy Shift and a Regional Priority Boost: A Great Central Asia or a Greater Middle East?***

In many ways, the bureaucratic change did create a policy perspective shift. Instead of focusing on the historical Europe and Asian link, CA was now being paired with SA. Instead of going through Moscow, CA affairs would now ‘concentrate on Kabul as the pivotal bridge’ (Boucher 2006b). According to Bhadrakumar, the U.S. has implemented a ‘Great Central Asia’ policy attempting to counterbalance the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and is using New Delhi as a key partner in energy and transport cooperation, but also to check Moscow’s and Beijing’s traditional influence in CA (Bhadrakumar 2006). Starr (2005) also believes that the U.S. needs a Greater Central Asia Partnership for Cooperation and Development that will harmonize U.S.-CA policy. While the CA states do have some differing issues, a truly coherent CA policy is needed to replace the mainly bilateral deals conducted between the U.S. and CA governments.

In terms of priorities, it is clear that CA was increasingly important to the Bush administration, as reflected in the reorganization (Wright 2005). However, does the U.S. Government have a clear classification and identity for CA? While State has placed CA with SA, some government circles want CA to be a part of a ‘Greater Middle East’. For example, DoD’s CENTCOM transferred CA and Afghanistan as part of its Greater Middle East agenda (Davis and Sweeney 2004). EUR even purports a Broader Middle East and North Africa policy to bring Eurasia closer to the Middle East (State September 2006). The distinction is not just a war of words and rhetoric, but rather a conflict of differing policy architecture. Clearly, bureaucratic consensus is needed before a clear and overarching policy can be produced to be effective for the CA region.

## **2.12 Conclusion**

Bureaucratic politics, despite its difficulties with internal logic, its lack of flexibility, and its problems to operationalize, it offers important insights in decision-making. Especially in the context of the U.S. decision to reorganize Central Asia to South Asia, bureaucratic politics and its nuances shed light to its political resultants through the hauling and pulling processes. Michaud's model, while not perfect, does make exceptional gains in explaining and viewing the causal routes during the decision-making process, not in a crisis but in its routines and standard operating procedures.

Through the two Central Asian reorganization drives out of EUR, one can see that a bottom-up or top-down approach when looking at decision-making possibly creates a huge difference for a policy outcome. As the model is not perfect, I contribute the idea that support should be added through the model to display power and influence in another point of view. Finally, while bureaucratic politics has explained much of what happened during the U.S.-Central Asian policy context, cognitive misperceptions and the analogical explanations can yield yet more understanding to this context to how the United States prioritizes the world.

## CHAPTER 3 - CUT II: THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES ANGLE

### 3.1 Introduction

The analysis in prior sections makes it clear that the bureaucratic politics angle does not have a monopoly on analyzing foreign policy decision-making. Different disciplines are needed to reevaluate and to repaint explanatory and predictive aspects of the field. As such, the field of foreign policy decision-making has been dominated in recent years by the political psychological perspective. Its popularity in the study of leaders and their cognitive abilities has set off a storm of alternate ways to predict foreign policy decision-making failures and successes.

In this chapter, I look at the literature's seminal works on cognitive and information-processing tasks related specifically towards perceptions and misperceptions related to overestimation, wishful thinking, cognitive dissonance, shared images and the use of analogy. From these two brands of political psychology, I theorize that the policy and bureaucratic shift towards Central Asia can be further explained also due to policymakers under the influence of various misperceptions and also using strong analogies. Finally, I apply these theories towards the elite interviews conducted with U.S. government officials and experts, Central Asian Embassy representatives, and non-governmental organization advocates.

### 3.2 Perceptions and Misperceptions

Attempts to find testable theories within the realm of the psychological aspects of foreign policy decision-making could not be discussed without an in-depth summary of Robert Jervis' *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand. Using Jervis' typologies, I will hypothesize that overestimating one's importance as an influence and wishful thinking were present behind the Central Asia shift to South Asia.

### 3.2.1 Overestimation of One's Importance as an Influence

Actors can exaggerate the degree to which they play a central role in others' policies but the content of the resulting perception varies with the effect of the other's behavior.

Indicators of overestimation of one's importance as an influence are the following.

(1) When the other behaves in accord with the actor's desires, s/he will overestimate the degree to which his/her policies are responsible for the outcome. (2) When the situation is fluid, there is a less pronounced tendency for the actor to overestimate his potential influence. (3) When the other's behavior is undesired, the actor is likely to see it as derived from internal sources rather than as being a response to his/her own actions (Jervis, 1976: 343).

With these tests, overestimation of one's importance as an influence can be applied to the U.S.-Central Asia case through the content and discourse of conducted interviews.

### 3.2.2 Wishful Thinking

In a loose way connected to overestimation, wishful thinking is created through policymakers' desires and fears. While difficult to measure in international relations, wishfulness often has a strong tendency for people to see what they expect to be present as opposed to reality. Essentially, actors may choose what they want to see. Indicators of wishful thinking may come in the form of large signs of rationalizations, correlations between desires and perceptions, over-optimism from policymakers, perceptions of danger, and the avoidance of perception of extreme probabilities (Jervis 1976: 367-78). As effectively measuring rationalizations and the correlations between desires and perceptions is difficult, (1) over-optimism, and (2) perceptions of danger and (3) avoidance of extreme probabilities can be tested through interviews and generated discourse.

### 3.2.3 Cognitive Dissonance

According to Jervis, a dissonant relation occurs when 'two elements alone, the obverse of one element would follow from the other' (Jervis 1976: 382). In lay terms, cognitive dissonance happens in decision-making when the decision one makes is actually the worst possible choice. For example, 'the information that a Ford is a better car than a Chevrolet is dissonant with the knowledge that I have bought a Chevy' (Jervis 1976: 382). For purposes of analytical tests, I will assert that the presence of cognitive dissonance occurs when a

decision is taken contrary to what information asserts as the ‘best option’. In this respect, the central theme behind dissonance and decision-making is self-reassurance for a decision-maker that s/he made the best possible use of all the information available, to believe resources were not spent foolishly, and to see that subsequent actions were quality (Jervis 1976). To see that decisions were correct may involve increasing the value they place on what was achieved and devaluing what was sacrificed (Jervis 1976: 406).

### **3.2.4 The Application of History, Cognitive Images and Analogies**

Overestimation of one’s influence and wishful thinking are not the only aspects of misperception that can be applied to the U.S.-Central Asia case. This section will look at how the application of history yields cognitive images and analogies that policymakers use in foreign policy decision-making.

#### **3.2.4.1 Jervis’ View**

According to Jervis, decision-makers have used history as a tool of learning. Through this lens, policymakers learn directly and indirectly from history’s major events, such as revolutions and the most recent war (Jervis 1976: 262). In this context, this can be taken beyond the individual level. Organizations can also be effected by the application of history.

In many instances, the application of history has been misapplied, thereby leading to failed policy outcomes. First, there is often ‘little reason why those events that provide analogies should be the best guides to the future’ (Jervis 1976: 281). Second, because outcomes are learned without careful attention to details of causation, ‘lessons tend to be superficial and overgeneralized’ (Jervis 1976: 282). Third, decision-makers do not examine a variety of analogies before selecting the one that they believe sheds the most light on the current situation.

#### **3.2.4.2 Building on Jervis: Neustadt & May’s Analytical View**

Neustadt and May (1986) are among the first to look at the use of historical analogies in foreign policy decision-making. They contend that historical analogies and shared images

can be applied in a way that yields a successful outcome. Their analytical view is premised that policymakers use analogies to analyze or make sense of their foreign policy dilemmas. Representing success, using the examples of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and social security reform of 1983, Neustadt and May link historical analogy usage to both short-term crises and longer-term non-crises situations. With the Cuban Missile Crisis context, Neustadt and May cite that this success story became a reality chiefly because President Kennedy and his Executive Committee (ExComm) applied history in non-standard ways and due to the long-term perspective taken during a crisis situation (Neustadt & May 1986: 4)

In cases of which '[Neustadt and May] know, debate in serious decision situations starts at least nine times out of ten with the question: What do we *do*? Background and content get skipped, but not in this case study' (Neustadt & May 1986: 6). If the positive outcome was due even in part to those choices by Kennedy and his ExComm, then 'unusual uses of history perhaps deserve part of the credit' (Neustadt & May 1986: 8).

According to the authors, three caveats need to be taken into consideration when using historical analogies to guide decision-making. First, items which are known, unclear and presumed must have to do with the action-issue at hand, the second is that they must be so identified from the standpoint of the person or persons who have to act (Neustadt & May 1986: 34). This point clearly dabbles into the bureaucratic politics perspective in that if you are the decision-maker, the list is yours. If you are an aide or analyst, the items are your inferences about some other person or persons.

The basic premise to sorting and separating the known from the unclear and both from the presumed is to establish as quickly and economically as possible the circumstances that cause a particular decision-maker to feel at a particular time that s/he must do what s/he is hired to do. Once the relevant information is placed in the three columns of known, unclear, and presumed, two more steps are needed. One is the quick inspection of analogies that

figure or may figure in the decision-maker's mind. The second is review of the history of the issue, tracing how the specific concerns arose. With this inspection of analogies, possible historical images must be placed in categories: likenesses and differences. Neustadt and May contend that this process 'defends better against the danger [of misapplying analogies] than testing out analogies before putting them on the table' (Neustadt & May 1986: 47).

For Neustadt and May, the difference between success and failure is partly probabilistic in that many analogies could be used to partly compare one situation to another. That said, their 'mini-methods' are still do not offer a sincere ability to test an analogy. Sometimes, decision-makers select the correct analogy. Sometimes, the wrong analogy is chosen. In fact, even if the 'right' analogy is used, decisions and its resultants can still be incorrect or considered a failure.

#### 3.2.4.3 Khong's Analogical Explanation Framework

Yuen Foong Khong (1992) builds on Neustadt and May's work and also weighs in on the use of historical analogies and its implications to foreign policy decision-making. According to Khong, the term historical analogy signified an inference that if two or more events separated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in another (Khong 1992: 11). Analogical reasoning may be represented thus:  $AX:BX::AY:BY$ . In words, event A resembles event B in having characteristic X; A also has characteristic Y; therefore it is inferred that B also has characteristic Y (Khong 1992: 15).

To add to the previous analytical works on psychology imagery, Khong adds on to previous systematic advice and provides a general framework. The AE (the Analogical Explanation) framework suggests:

' that analogies are cognitive devices that 'help' policymakers perform six diagnostic tasks central to political decision-making. Analogies (1) help define the nature of the situation confronting the policymaker, (2) help assess the stakes, and (3) provide prescriptions. They help evaluate alternative options by (4) predicting their chances of success, (5) evaluating their moral rightness, and (6) warning about dangers associated with the options (Khong 1992: 22).

This AE framework is Khong's attempt to explain their observed pattern of poor use of analogies.

Analogies ‘help’ evaluate the implied solution or other alternatives by ‘predicting’ their likelihood of success, ‘assessing’ their moral rightness, and ‘warning’ of dangers associated with them. These six steps make up a framework that identifies with some precision what policymakers are likely to use analogies for and how analogies might affect their policy choices. Of a policymaker’s use of historical analogy X when faced with situation Y, the AE framework suggests that we ask the following questions:

‘(1) How will X define situation Y? (2) What might X say about the stakes in situation Y? (3) Does X provide an implicit prescription about what to do concerning Y? In addition, what does X say about (4) the chances of success, (5) the morality, and (6) the risks of its implied prescription or other alternatives put forward to deal with Y’ (Khong 1992: 38)?

These series of questions, based on the hypothesis that ‘analogies are capable of performing multiple, interdependent diagnostic tasks, lends a certain order and clarity to the phenomenon of analogical reasoning that is absent or only implicit in the analytical view (Khong 1992: 42).

Historical analogies as knowledge structures play an important role in information processing and comprehension. In addition, to highlight the idea that analogical reasoning often involves going beyond the information given and using the default values of the analogy invoked to fill in for missing information. ‘Poor use is defined primarily by process, that is, by the tendency of policymakers to pick the first analogies that come to mind, by their failure to search for and to seriously consider other parallels, by their neglect of potentially important differences between situations being compared, and finally, by their tendency to use analogies as substitutes for proof’ (Khong 1992: 38). Poor use, therefore, implies a pattern of partial or inaccurate assessments of unfolding foreign situations, as well as dubious estimates of the costs of alternative policies. On average and over time, one would expect poor use to be associated with suboptimal policy outcomes.

Critics of the analogical explanations doubt whether it is necessary to resort to cognition for explanations since constraints imposed by the international community might suffice. While their objections have some legitimacy, there is evidence and cases where

policymakers use historical analogies as a shortcut when confronted with foreign policy issues leading to policy decisions. One would have to concede that ‘systematic constraints’ and the world order would force decision-makers to make choices that fit with the global system (Larson 1985: 15). However, cognitive imagery and the use of analogies have explanatory and casual value. They further shed light on the overall mosaic of foreign policy decision-making.

More often than not, decision-makers invoke inappropriate analogues that only fail to illuminate the new situation but also mislead by emphasizing superficial and irrelevant parallels. Inasmuch as such analogies influence decisions, they are deemed to be at least partially responsible for costly or failed policies. But these choices appear systematic. On average, policymakers of diverse historical depth across administrations seem to use analogies poorly. In this sense, investigating the process of analogical reasoning itself is crucial. From this, AE attempts to specify precisely what analogies do and applying it to explain a set of important decisions; also, to provide an explanation for the finding that policymakers often use analogies badly. Therefore, I will use Khong’s AE framework as a test for bureaucratic and policy decision to reclassify Central Asia with South Asia.

### ***3.3 Empirical Evidence: Psychological Factors and Interviews***

As stated in the previous chapter, there were numerous bureaucratic and policy factors to why a shift occurred in moving Central Asia to South Asia. This section will focus on the policy factors and the internal shift occurred not only because of bureaucratic politics but also because of cognitive misperceptions and the use of historical and comparative analogies. First, I will test whether overestimation and wishful thinking were present. Second, I will look at what analogies were presented and whether these analogies were rhetorical in nature or an actual cognitive rationale for decision-makers. Finally, from the evidence acquired through elite interviews, it can be concluded that overestimation, wishful thinking, cognitive

dissonance and three analogies were used. Afghanistan, the Tajik Civil War, and historical pre-Russian Central Asia links to South Asia were all used not only for rhetorical purposes but also because they, indeed, were direct cognitive comparisons, albeit comparisons depended on the experiences of the individual.

### **3.3.1 Official and Unofficial Policy**

As stated in the previous chapter, the United States decided to make shifts in their policies and practices towards Central Asia first within the U.S. governmental structures and then reorganizing foreign policy to connect Central Asia to South Asia. In this process, there were both official and unofficial reasons for the decision. The first official point was Secretary Rice's push for transformational diplomacy, meaning that the United States should engage more actively towards traditional trouble spots in the world. Second, official documents and senior level policymakers reflected the natural partnership Central Asia had with South Asia, especially with Afghanistan. Third, government officials pointed out that Central Asia's previous classification with the EUR was only because of recent history with the Soviet Union and was, in actuality, artificial. Finally, the U.S. policymakers wanted to create unified regional integration through the means of energy and trade, citing the historical trading routes between the two land masses.

These official reasons are important to understanding rationale to the decision; however, there were also unofficial reasons. First, transformational diplomacy meant also changing the degree of importance to EUR (State GS-13 Civil Servant, Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2007). Policy architects felt that EUR was, at times, overemphasized and that the reason for 'declining American influence in other parts of the world was because policies were still stuck in the past' (State GS-13 Civil Servant, Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2007). Also, for many bureaucrats interested in U.S.-

Central Asia relations, they felt that the United States was losing influence also due to external actors. A ‘resurgent imperialistic Russia coupled with an ever more perceived powerhouse in China meant that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was a dangerous threat to American interests in both Central and South Asia’ (State GS-13 Civil Servant, Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2007). From these official and unofficial rationales, it became clear that the shift in policy meant both to increase the reflected importance of Central Asia and to attempt to drive Central Asia away from Moscow and Beijing, supplanting links for Central Asian leaders to look towards South Asia for regional and economic cooperation. But was the overall decision to push both a bureaucratic and policy change related to Central Asia conducted with misperceptions?

### **3.3.2 Applying Misperceptions: Overestimation of One’s Importance as an Influence**

Actors can exaggerate the degree to which they play a central role in others’ policies. Using Jervis’ indicators of overestimation of one’s importance as an influence are the following, I will cite revealing data and pertinent information that falls in line with the presence of overestimation. I will be using three angles of classifying interviews. The first will be based strictly on agency lines. The second will be rested on agency lines and whether the government agent is a career employee or a non-career or political appointee. Third, the last perspective will be drawn from the agency and whether the agent has direct experience with Central Asian issues and the region or not. These different angles reveal different empirical findings for this work, directly reflecting what appears to be overall misperception.

First, when the other behaves in accord with the actor’s desires, s/he will overestimate the degree to which his/her policies are responsible for the outcome. Over a year has passed since the bureaucratic and policy shift and since actual policy outcomes and projects are still in process, what is currently available is limited. In many of the interviews, examples of overestimations would be the following.

According to a State Department GS-14 civil servant with direct exposure to Central

Asian affairs:

'I don't know why the United States hasn't engaged Central Asia earlier. After the fall of the Soviet Union, **we should have really gone in and made sure we could control the 'Stans**. Russia was weak and China was still focused on other parts of the globe. Because we missed out chance in Central Asia in the 90s, now China and Russia are much more influential again. Now it's important to display our military might and economic weight, especially as the Global War on Terror is becoming more dominating of the democracy and human rights agenda. As the United States, we are the lone superpower and must act in the region in order to maintain stability in the region' (Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2007, bold emphasis added).

Another example comes from a CIA political appointee with direct experience in the region:

'I've been around the block in Central Asia and we're dropping the ball. But it's good that the Administration is really attempting to link the region towards South Asia, allies which we have a lot of control over. If we can continue pushing them together, then we can influence them more so, especially with New Delhi and Islamabad there to back us' (Personal Interview, Rosslyn, VA, April 15, 2007).

The example responses above are much more typical than atypical. The tone is usually very firm and very confident that the United States can shape Central Asia's interests, even towards a unilateral point of view.

The second aspect to test is regarding undesired effects. According to Jervis, when the other's behavior is undesired, the actor is likely to see it as derived from internal sources rather than as being a response to his/her own actions. There are some clear examples here, especially with regards to the perceived slowness in working with Central Asian states on regional cooperation.

According to a NSC political appointee with non-direct experience in the region:

'It's so frustrating to work with Central Asia that I don't work on the portfolio. But my colleagues who work on it directly have all mentioned the difficulty in pushing Central Asia away from Moscow and towards India. It must be [the Central Asian leaderships'] fear that drives them back to Mother Russia. I think our policies would work if they just stopped being so blind that we're doing them a favor' (Personal Interview, Fairfax, VA, April 17, 2007).

Yet another example comes from a Congressional career staffer dealing directly on Central

Asian affairs:

'Does it really matter where Central Asia is in the State Department organizational chart? Probably not. But what is clear is that no matter what we do, the Central Asians don't engage. So whether we put them with Europe or with South Asia, what's for sure is that our policies will fail because it takes two to dance' (Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2007).

In an attempt to locate whether overestimation was present through heightened confidence in U.S. influence and/or placing blame for undesired consequences on Central Asian actors

themselves, 39 of 66 U.S. government interviewees (59%) mentioned that further cooperation between Central Asia and South Asia was due mainly because of U.S. efforts to bring Central-South Asia regional cooperation to the forefront. With the exception of Congress, every other agency's members gave responses with signs of overestimating the U.S. importance in shaping Central Asia over 50% of the time.

**Table 3: Indication of Overestimation of One's Important as an Influence – U.S. Government Interviewees by Agency**

Agency	Response with Signs of Overestimation (N = 66)		
	YES	NO	Total
<b>State</b>	22 (56%)	17 (44%)	<b>39 (59%)</b>
<b>USAID</b>	2 (67%)	1 (33%)	<b>3 (5%)</b>
<b>DoD</b>	5 (83%)	1 (17%)	<b>6 (9%)</b>
<b>NSC</b>	4 (67%)	2 (33%)	<b>6 (9%)</b>
<b>CIA</b>	3 (100%)	0 (0%)	<b>3 (5%)</b>
<b>Congress</b>	3 (33%)	6 (67%)	<b>9 (14%)</b>
	<b>39 (59%)</b>	<b>27 (41%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

From the career and non-career angle, there is a division between how career diplomats and civil servants responded with signs of overestimation versus their non-career and political counterparts. 21 of 40 (53%) displayed signs of overestimation where as non-career personnel had a count of 18 of 26 (69%). Within each agency, only State and DoD had career employees more likely to not show signs of overestimation. From the non-career side, USAID and Congress were the only agencies that were more likely not to show signs of overestimation. Congress is especially interesting in that it was the only grouping that had more interviewees as a percentage identity as a non-career advisor.

**Table 4: Indication of Overestimation of One's Important as an Influence – U.S. Government Interviewees by Agency and Career/Non-Career Distinction**

Interviewees by Agency and Overestimation Signs Examination							
Agency	Response with Signs of Overestimation				Career Total	Non-Career Total	Cumulative Total
	Career (N = 40)		Non-Career (N = 26)				
	YES	NO	YES	NO			
State	12 (44%)	15 (56%)	10 (83%)	2 (17%)	27 (68%)	12 (46%)	39
USAID	2 (100%)	0	0	1 (100%)	2 (5%)	1 (4%)	3

<b>DoD</b>	1 (33%)	2 (67%)	3 (100%)	0	3 (8%)	3 (12%)	<b>6</b>
<b>NSC</b>	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	2 (100%)	0	4 (10%)	2 (8%)	<b>6</b>
<b>CIA</b>	2 (100%)	0	1 (100%)	0	2 (5%)	1 (4%)	<b>3</b>
<b>Congress</b>	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	2 (29%)	5 (71%)	2 (5%)	7 (27%)	<b>9</b>
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>21 (53%)</b>	<b>19 (47%)</b>	<b>18 (69%)</b>	<b>8 (31%)</b>	<b>40 (61%)</b>	<b>26 (39%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

The third angle comes from whether or not the governmental representative had direct or non-direct exposure to Central Asia. For simplification, I will define direct exposure as working on Central Asian issues or have had opportunities to travel to the region on official business. Non-direct exposure will be defined as not working on issues related to the region and without experience in the region.

**Table 5: Indication of Overestimation of One's Important as an Influence – U.S. Government Interviewees by Agency and Direct or Non-Direct Experience in Central Asia**

<b>Agency</b>	<b>Response with Signs of Overestimation</b>						<b>Cumulative Total</b>
	<b>Direct (N = 41)</b>		<b>Non-Direct (N = 25)</b>		<b>Direct Total</b>	<b>Non-Direct Total</b>	
	YES	NO	YES	NO			
<b>State</b>	16	10	6	7	26	13	<b>39</b>
<b>USAID</b>	2	0	0	1	2	1	<b>3</b>
<b>DoD</b>	3	1	2	0	4	2	<b>6</b>
<b>NSC</b>	3	0	1	2	3	3	<b>6</b>
<b>CIA</b>	3	0	0	0	3	0	<b>3</b>
<b>Congress</b>	2	1	1	5	3	6	<b>9</b>
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>29 (71%)</b>	<b>12 (29%)</b>	<b>10 (40%)</b>	<b>15 (60%)</b>	<b>41 (62%)</b>	<b>25 (38%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

In this lens, what is interesting is that 29 of 41 (71%) of personnel who would directly exposed to the region and/or to its issues are more likely to display signs of overestimation than its non-direct counterparts [10 of 15 (40%)]. As such, it appears that expertise and a closer relationship to the region tend to yield higher possibilities for overestimation of one's influence. This is perhaps due to individuals being more emotionally and personally attached to the region, thereby being more likely to misperceive the situation. Also, a person who has

direct experience will tend to have more information on the region and may pick and choose evidence that s/he sees fit.

After viewing the aspect of overestimation of one's influence in the U.S.-Central Asia case, it is clear that there is a large abundance of overconfidence and high amounts of faith placed in America's ability to shape the events and activities in the region. In addition, policymakers who are frustrated with U.S.-Central Asia relations also place fault with their Central Asia counterparts rather than blame possibility ineffective policies. In this respect, there is a present misperception.

### **3.3.3 Applying Misperceptions: Wishful Thinking**

The next test of misperception will look at the presence of wishful thinking. According to Jervis, (1) over-optimism, and (2) perceptions of danger and (3) avoidance of extreme probabilities can be tested through interviews and its consequent discourse. For the sake of parsimony, if any of these aspects are found, then it will result in an affirmative find. Conversely, if none of these aspects are found in an interview, then it will be scored as a negative.

#### **3.3.3.1 Over-Optimism**

According to Jervis, to see whether decision-makers are not only optimistic, but over-optimistic, a comparison must be made to compare policymakers' views with scholars (Jervis 1976: 368). As well, many of the cases in which over-optimism occurs have the element that beliefs and perceptions correspond with desires, thus creating a 'more general explanation of the influence of the expectations generated by the actor's beliefs about the world and images of the other states' (Jervis 1976: 369). As such, two tests will be made. First, interviews collected from non-governmental experts on Central Asia and Central Asian diplomats will give an external account to how favorable or likely the U.S. Government's bureaucratic shift of Central Asia to South Asia will be effective in the short, medium, and long term. Their opinions will then be compared with the interviews with the U.S. Government officials. If

there is a disparity between the external experts' beliefs and internal governmental attitudes, then over-optimism is most likely present.

### 3.3.3.2 Perceptions of Danger

Another key component of wishful thinking is the perceptions of danger. Jervis highlights that policymakers may either react to evidence in two ways – highly vigilant and highly defensive. If a policymaker is vigilant, information will be sought and evidence will directly determine a course of action; however, if a policymaker avoids or does not seek substantial amounts of evidence, then a policymaker could be seen as self-defensive towards potentially contrary information. While a policy and bureaucratic move for Central Asia to be lumped with South Asia may appear to lack danger, decisions without eliciting or listening to relevant reservations can be a danger, especially if intended positive consequences of policy do not occur and residual unintended negative consequences do occur. Gaining opinions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Central Asian diplomats will test whether the Administration's response had vigilant or defensive reactions to their beliefs.

### 3.3.3.3 Avoidance of Perceptions of Extreme Probabilities

Jervis accounts that 'if the advances of an outcome are great and the probability of success is slight, decision-makers will tend to overestimate this possibility...resting on the idea that people [tend to be] conservative and unable to extract the information [with] all the certainty that is in it' (Jervis 1976: 378). As such, decision-makers will underestimate the probability of extremely likely events and overestimate the likelihood of very unlikely ones. Thus, this means that once decision-makers consider the possible occurrence of danger or the possible success of a policy, they are not likely to assign it a terribly low or a terribly high probability, especially with high payoffs associated. Potentially, outcomes a policymaker would highly desire could distort the probabilities and that can influence policy (Jervis 1976: 379). In an effort to measure avoidance of perceptions of extreme probabilities, a comparison

can be made between optimism of external experts and players and governmental bureaucrats' assessment of U.S. chances for policy success.

### **3.3.4 Testing the Odds: Opinions of Non-Governmental Stakeholders, Think Tank Experts, and Central Asian Diplomats**

To solicit opinions of the new bureaucratic and policy shift, interviews were conducted with program officers from 10 major NGOs, which conduct projects and advocacy related to the region, and Central Asian policy experts from 3 major think tanks. As well, to have a direct response to how the Central Asian states view the shift themselves, diplomatic personnel at 4 Central Asian embassies in Washington, D.C. were interviewed. These interviews would give indicators to how realistically effective the U.S. shift in policy.

#### **3.3.4.1 Non-Governmental Stakeholders**

Major NGOs have a huge stake in U.S. policy towards Central Asia. First, NGOs are directly affected by the quality of diplomatic relations between the United States and its Central Asian partners. If the Central Asian governments are not favorable towards Western groups and Western governments, NGOs cannot operate safely or effectively. For example, Freedom House was forced to shut down its operation in Tashkent. Now operating Uzbekistan projects based in Almaty, they are 'unable to positively and directly push anti-torture initiatives' (Personal Interview with Washington-based NGO Senior Program Officer, April 13, 2007). Also, the 'diplomatic cover greatly helps their contacts and success with more influential leaders to implement acts of change, especially when the United States is applying heavy pressure' (Personal Interview, NGO Senior Management Officer, April 14, 2007). However, 'America is not the most powerful actor in the region and sometimes American pushiness is not enough to support NGO efforts on the ground' (Telephone Interview, NGO Special Eurasia Liaison, May 12, 2007).

Second, NGOs rely on U.S. support for programs financially. As such, governmental funding plays a major role in the scale of projects towards the region. These projects tend to

exact high costs and range from democratization, human rights advocacy, political party development, and combating environmental degradation. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the bureaucratic shift was a result of a policy shift. As such, at the core of changes within and outside government were the changes in funding and allocations. Of the ten representatives interviewed from ten different NGOs, all of them complained about a sharp decline in funding. In fact, according to a Freedom House report on the Bush Administration's FY08 budget allocation, there was a nine percent cut of civil society funding across the board, thus making allocations toward Central Asia projects decline significantly (Freedom House, 2007).

When it comes to the actual policy itself, 8 of the 10 advocates expressed their doubts to the merit of the policy. According to one Special Assistant to the President for Eurasia Programs:

'This bureaucratic move by the Administration isn't really the best for them and it's certainly not the best for us. To get the dough, we had to mirror the government's regional formulations so now we have Pakistan folks working on Tajikistan projects. It's overwhelming for our people and our resources. So if our projects are taking a hit from the changes, I doubt that the U.S. policy will be as fluid' (Telephone Interview, May 1, 2007).

Yet another cynical advocate handling the former Soviet Union portfolio stated that:

'It seems the U.S. ran out of ideas on how to deal with the region. So they're trying something else. I can't fault them, but I doubt regional integration will happen just because the Americans want them to' (Telephone Interview, May 5, 2007).

While the majority of NGO personnel interviewed were pessimistic, there were some views of hope for successful policy in the medium and long-term. According to a former governmental aide and current financial officer for a large NGO:

'I think the short term will not yield successful gains for United States, but in the medium and long term might have prospects for further American influence and these steps the Administration pushed forward could well develop the inertia towards South and Central Asia regional integration' (Telephone Interview, April 29, 2007).

#### 3.3.4.2 Central Asian Officials

Interviews were conducted with embassy officials in Washington, D.C. For the past year, Central Asian governments have reacted to the U.S. push for South and Central Asian regional integration. In interviews with these officials off-the-record, a clear pattern of skepticism emerged.

According to a senior official at the Kazakhstan Embassy in Washington, D.C.:

‘What makes Washington actually think that we’re going to focus on India instead of Russia? Just because they decide it’s a good idea doesn’t mean it’s good for us. It’s foolish to think this way’ (Personal Interview, April 15, 2007).

Likewise, a Tajikistan representative also displayed similar viewpoints:

‘While we would like to do business to get more energy and more financial investment, never will our government look south above north and east. The fact is that Russia and China are already investing in our country’ (Personal Interview, April 15, 2007).

A Kyrgyz senior official echoed these sentiments and also added another dimension of unintended consequences:

‘At first, I was a little surprised. We’re not European anymore? I thought that democratization was an important part of U.S. foreign policy. Being compared to Pakistan and Afghanistan does not push us to further our human rights effort, to be honest’ (Personal Interview, April 16, 2007).

Strikingly, the other embassy officials also mentioned this comparison issue. As such, it appears that the Administration, by linking Central Asia away from Europe and with South Asia has created a greater focus on hard regional security issues, while sacrificing the democracy and human rights agenda. A senior bureaucrat in State’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor bureau also confirmed that they were losing policy discussions attention from the Secretary (Telephone Interview, May 10, 2007).

#### 3.3.4.3 External Players’ Assessment

Looking at both the statements from external players and from Central Asian representatives themselves, it becomes clearer that they were, indeed, pessimistic that the U.S. shift would create successful policy outcomes. In addition, the odds appear to reflect low chances for immediate policy success and doubtful benefits for the future. The next section will look at a comprehensive listing to see whether wishful thinking was present with internal agents.

#### 3.3.5 The Presence of Wishful Thinking in Government

Throughout interviews, there was a general trend towards wishful thinking. Many bureaucrats seemed convinced that the regional re-focus was in the right direction. One GS-13 State bureaucrat working directly on Central Asian affairs displaying over-optimism states that:

'I'm very confident that our Central Asian counterparts will respond well to our efforts to connect South and Central Asia together. Only through the role of United States can we have South Asia act as a counterweight against Russia and China's increasing influence' (Telephone Interview, April 28, 2007).

The other aspects of wishful thinking, namely perceptions of danger and the avoidance of extreme probabilities can also be found in interviews.

For example, according to one NSC political appointee with direct experience in Central Asia:

'We've taken the time to look at our information and changes can happen quickly, especially in the energy sector. Regardless of what some NGOs and academics are saying, it's still very likely that we can be successful in creating an improvement from the current status quo' (Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2007).

Looking at the data collected from 66 government agents, it is clear that a significant number exhibits signs of wishful thinking. On total 49 of 66 (74%) of government interviewees exhibited over-optimism, perceptions of defensiveness towards danger, and/or avoided perceptions of extreme probabilities. Across agencies, the interviews from Congress were the only grouping that had more staffers not exhibit signs of wishful thinking than have its psychological aspects. This may be explained in that staffers and political appointees may have more independence from the agenda of the Executive and, as such, are more likely to resist an idea, such as shifting Central Asia to South Asia, which originated from policymakers close to the President and distant from Congress.

**Table 6: Indication of Wishful Thinking – U.S. Government Interviewees by Agency**

<b>Agency</b>	<b>Response with Signs of Wishful Thinking (N = 66)</b>		
	<b>YES</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>State</b>	32 (82%)	7 (17%)	<b>39 (59%)</b>
<b>USAID</b>	2 (67%)	1 (33%)	<b>3 (5%)</b>
<b>DoD</b>	5 (83%)	1 (17%)	<b>6 (9%)</b>
<b>NSC</b>	4 (67%)	2 (33%)	<b>6 (9%)</b>
<b>CIA</b>	3 (100%)	0 (0%)	<b>3 (5%)</b>
<b>Congress</b>	3 (33%)	6 (67%)	<b>9 (14%)</b>
	<b>49 (74%)</b>	<b>17 (26%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

From the aspect of career and non-career personnel, 32 of 40 (80%) career diplomats and civil servants had signs of wishful thinking. Likewise in high percentages, 17 of 25 (66%) non-career political appointees also maintained signs of wishful thinking. As such, it appears that the distinction in careers does not indicate major differences in whether employees were wishful or not.

**Table 7: Indication of Wishful Thinking – U.S. Government Interviewees by Career Type**

Agency	Response with Signs of Wishful Thinking						Cumulative Total
	Career (N = 40)		Non-Career (N = 26)		Career Total	Non-Career Total	
	YES	NO	YES	NO			
<b>State</b>	24	3	8	4	27	12	<b>39</b>
<b>USAID</b>	2	0	0	1	2	1	<b>3</b>
<b>DoD</b>	2	1	3	0	3	3	<b>6</b>
<b>NSC</b>	2	2	2	0	4	2	<b>6</b>
<b>CIA</b>	2	0	1	0	2	1	<b>3</b>
<b>Congress</b>	0	2	3	4	2	7	<b>9</b>
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>32 (80%)</b>	<b>8 (20%)</b>	<b>17 (66%)</b>	<b>9 (34%)</b>	<b>40 (61%)</b>	<b>26 (39%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

From the aspect of whether the government official had direct or non-direct experience with Central Asia, there is very significant data. Of 41 interviewees with direct political experience in Central Asia, 37 (90%) exhibited signs of wishful thinking compared to 12 of 25 (48%) interviewees without direct political experience in the region. The large difference between direct and non-direct experience in terms of wishful thinking may be attributed to level of information and varying and sometimes conflicting expert opinion on policy issues. To sum up, it appears that the degree to which a government representative is exposed to the region significantly influences whether they display signs of wishful thinking.

**Table 8: Indication of Wishful Thinking – U.S. Government Interviewees by Experience**

Agency	Response with Signs of Wishful Thinking						Cumulative Total
	Direct (N = 41)		Non-Direct (N = 25)		Direct Total	Non-Direct Total	
	YES	NO	YES	NO			
<b>State</b>	23	3	10	3	26	13	<b>39</b>
<b>USAID</b>	2	0	0	1	2	1	<b>3</b>
<b>DoD</b>	4	0	0	2	4	2	<b>6</b>
<b>NSC</b>	3	0	1	2	3	3	<b>6</b>
<b>CIA</b>	3	0	0	0	3	0	<b>3</b>
<b>Congress</b>	2	1	1	5	3	6	<b>9</b>
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>37 (90%)</b>	<b>4 (10%)</b>	<b>12 (48%)</b>	<b>13 (52%)</b>	<b>41 (62%)</b>	<b>25 (38%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

### 3.3.6 Cognitive Dissonance

The final psychological trait of misperception that will be tested is the presence of cognitive dissonance. For purposes of analytical tests, I will assert that the presence of cognitive dissonance occurs when a decision is taken contrary to what information asserts as the 'best option'. As the effects of the shift are still in process, I will measure whether cognitive dissonance has occurred. As cognitive dissonance is difficult to measure, I will see whether interviewees do, indeed, perceive Central Asia as more important in the world compared to other regions in its new regional formulation with South Asia than its previous distinction with Europe and Eurasia. I then had government officials rank the regions of the world in terms of importance based on the State Department regional designations both with Central Asia with EUR or Central Asia with South Asia.

From this, the data is then compared with the previous formulation and the current formulation. If Central Asia has fallen in its comparative importance in the new bureaucratic structuring, then signs of cognitive dissonance occurred. Conversely, if Central Asia has increased in its perceived regional priorities in relation to other geographic areas, then signs of cognitive dissonance were not present. These premises can be applied as the United States initially moved Central Asia in an effort to signal its growing importance as a regional priority in the world.

#### 3.3.6.1 Empirical Data: Ranking the Globe

Ranking the globe is not an easy task; however, the U.S. Government does this every day through its expansive policies and sprawling bureaucratic apparatus. Foreign policy practitioners have a regional framework that they use to divide the world. From these geographic divisions, the United States attempt to group countries together based on proximity and common history and culture. As such, many of its global interests are directly tied to its ease in labeling a part of the world. Currently, the State Department splits the world into six categories: Sub-Saharan Africa (AF), Western Hemisphere (WHA), Europe and

Eurasia (EUR), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Near East (NEA), and South and Central Asia (SCA). As highlighted in previous chapters, Central Asia was once part of the EUR bureau but was merged into a South and Central Asia Affairs bureau (SCA) in an effort to promote more attention, resources and importance for Central Asia. This action especially displays the heightened focus on traditional ‘hard’ security issues, such as drug trafficking and military issues, rather than traditional ‘soft’ security issues, like democracy and human rights. To attempt to measure perceived importance before and after the reorganization, when interviewing government agents, it was requested that they rank, in order of importance, the regional bureaus<sup>4</sup>.

Ranking importance interviewees were first asked to rank the regions based on the pre-shift classifications (AF, EAP, EUR-CA, EAP, NEA, SA, and WHA). Bureaucrats would then list the bureaus based on their importance one through six<sup>5</sup>. To attempt to evaluate any perceived change in importance with the new classifications (AF, EAP, EUR, EAP, SCA, and WHA), bureaucrats were then asked to list the new typology based on importance one through six. For purposes of simplifying data aggregation, both their listings were assigned points values. If a region was ranked first, it received 6 points. If a region was ranked second, it received 5 points. If a region was ranked last, it received 1 point.

### 3.3.6.2 Interviews: Pre-Shift Central Asia in the World

When asked to rank the regions in the world, interviewees were first asked to rank the world with the previous distinctions (AF, EAP, EUR-CA, EAP, NEA, SA, and WHA). 45 interviewees ranked the globe.

**Table 9: Pre-Shift Classifications and Regional Ranking in the World – U.S. Agencies and Perceptions**

	<b>Pre-Shift Regional Bureaus with Rankings*</b>					
Agency (N = 45)	AF	EAP	EUR (CA)	NEA	SA	WHA
State (N= 30)	1.3 (6)	3.9 (4)	4.1 (3)	5.9 (1)	5.0 (2)	2.4 (5)

<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that the word ‘importance’ was left for interpretation of the interviewee.

<sup>5</sup> Not all interviewees ranked the regions as requested. Many highlighted the fact that it was too difficult to rank regions and that the distinction should be based on a country-to-country basis.

<b>USAID (N = 3)</b>	1.3 (5)	3.7 (3)	3.3 (4)	5.7 (1)	5.3 (2)	1.5 (5)
<b>DoD (N = 4)</b>	1.2 (6)	4.0 (3)	3.2 (4)	5.6 (1)	5.4 (2)	1.8 (5)
<b>NSC (N = 5)</b>	1.0 (6)	3.5 (3)	3.5 (3)	6.0 (1)	5.0 (2)	2.0 (5)
<b>CIA (N = 0)<sup>6</sup></b>	--	--	--	--	--	--
<b>Congress (N = 5)</b>	1.2 (6)	4.1 (4)	5.2 (2)	5.8 (1)	5.2 (2)	1.8 (5)

\*Rankings by Numerical Score is Accompanied by Overall Ranking in Parentheses

Looking at the data by agency, NEA dominates the top spot, followed by SA. EUR and EAP consistently fit between third and fourth with WHA in fifth and AF last. Analyzing data by agency may not be helpful in this section as USAID, DoD, NSC, and Congress combined only equal 17 samples, just over half the State sample. A combined sample of 45 would display a clearer picture.

**Table 10: Pre-Shift Classifications and Regional Ranking in the World – U.S. Agencies and Perceptions**

<b>Pre-Shift Regional Bureaus with Rankings (N = 45)</b>		
Bureau	Numerical Score	Rank
NEA	5.8	1
SA	5.2	2
EUR (CA)	4.1	3
EAP	4.1	3
WHA	2.2	5
AF	1.3	6

From the condensed view, NEA and SA occupy the top and WHA and AF fill in the bottom. It can be inferred that NEA and SA maintain top-tier importance and that WHA and AF are considered low-tier priorities. Consistently, EUR (CA) and EAP have the most variation in where the region should stand in the middle and appears to not have a consensus view.

According to one State career EUR regional expert:

<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that none of the CIA affiliates interviews were willing to use these methods to rank the globe.

'Finding a home for EUR in terms of importance is always tough. Of course, these are your traditional allies, home to NATO, the EU, but in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, can it help in the security context? I am skeptical (Personal Interview, April 19, 2007)'.

A second cut distinguishing the opinions of career and non-career government representatives in small ways. Again, NEA and SA are firm as a top-tier region and WHA and AF are clearly of low importance. And EAP and EUR (CA) flip flop in between importance between the career and non-career personnel.

**Table 11: Pre-Shift Classifications and Regional Ranking in the World – Career and Non-Career Government Representatives**

<b>Pre-Shift Regional Bureaus with Rankings (N = 45)</b>				
Bureau	Numerical Score – Career (N = 25)	Rank – Career	Numerical Score – Non-Career (N = 20)	Rank – Non-Career
NEA	5.9	1	5.7	1
SA	5.1	2	5.2	2
EAP	4.2	4	4.3	3
EUR (CA)	4.3	3	4.1	4
WHA	2.2	5	2.1	5
AF	1.2	6	1.2	6

A political appointee placed mainly at EAP in State mentioned that:

'EAP has to be on the rise, especially in this Administration. We've tried to do so much in China, Korea, Indonesia and so on. And it's no surprise that we've tried to focus more on Asia than Europe as a priority' (Telephone Interview, May 8, 2007).

When looking at the data between officials with direct or non-direct experience in Central Asia, the data makes a larger distinction between EUR and EAP. Personnel with direct experience tended to place EUR in front of EAP and personnel with non-direct experience tended to place EAP in front of EUR.

**Table 12: Pre-Shift Classifications and Regional Ranking in the World – Direct and Non-Direct Central Asia Experience**

<b>Pre-Shift Regional Bureaus with Rankings (N = 45)</b>				
Bureau	Numerical Score – Direct (N = 27)	Rank – Direct	Numerical Score – Non-Direct (N = 18)	Rank – Non-Direct
NEA	5.7	1	5.8	1
SA	5.3	2	5.2	2
EUR (CA)	4.5	3	4.1	4

EAP	4.2	4	4.6	3
WHA	2.1	5	2.0	5
AF	1.4	6	1.2	6

### 3.3.6.3 Interviews: Post-Shift of Central Asia in the World

In this section, interviews conducted were also asked interviewees to rank the world in post-shift terms as well. As such, officials would rank the globe based on the new classifications (AF, EUR, EAP, NEA, SCA, and WHA). In these terms, data was first collected without distinctions and collected together.

**Table 13: Pre-Shift and Post-Shift Classifications and Regional Ranking in the World Compared–Collective Perceptions**

Pre-Shift Regional Bureaus with Rankings (N = 45)			Post-Shift Regional Bureaus with Rankings (N = 45)		
Bureau	Numerical Score	Rank	Bureau	Numerical Score	Rank
NEA	5.8	1	NEA	5.8	1
SA	5.2	2	EAP	5.0	2
EUR (CA)	4.1	3	EUR	4.1	3
EAP	4.1	3	SCA	4.0	4
WHA	2.2	5	WHA	2.2	5
AF	1.3	6	AF	1.3	6

The clearest difference is the post-shift did have a cognitive effective on officials. With the change of regional distinctions, NEA, WHA and AF remained the same; however, EAP saw a 0.9 boost, the largest change in numbers. With this change in value, EAP ranks second among others compared to being tied for third with EUR (CA). Now with Central Asia part of SCA, Central Asia as a region dropped to fourth instead of third. Interestingly, one would expect that SA would be boosted with the adding of five extra countries to its portfolio in terms of prestige and importance. But it appears that Central Asia has acted as a weight to knock SA from second to fourth, the biggest drop. EUR, now without Central Asia, was thought to take a decrease in importance with the loss of a strategic place in the world. However, this was also incorrect as EUR maintained a score of 4.1 and its place in third.

What is interesting about the results of this shift is that the policy and bureaucratic reorganization was intended to (1) raise the importance of Central Asia in the U.S. foreign policy, (2) decrease the emphasis on EUR, and (3) maintain the importance of South Asia as a top-tier regional priority. When looking at the data, none of these intended aims were achieved. Central Asia, now not part of EUR, fell to fourth. EUR maintained the same importance without Central Asia and South Asia, now paired with Central Asia, fell out of importance and got weighted down to fourth together. As such, SA and CA did not benefit from a policy shift that was intended to benefit these two portfolios, at least in terms of internal perception.

In fact, the biggest winner of the policy was not SA or CA, but was EAP, which enjoys a much higher status due to the changes. In this context, it can be shown that while all the information was intended to highlight Central Asia's invigorated importance in the post-9/11 world, government officials actually perceive the region as less important with the changes, just one year after its implementation. Clearly, a sense of cognitive dissonance occurred in that its intended aims failed to happen and unintended results did.

### **3.3.7 Conclusion: Aspects of Overestimation, Wishful Thinking and Cognitive Dissonance Present**

The psychological aspects of misperception that Jervis presents still maintains its relevance not only in crisis situations, but also in 'more routine' decision-making such as the rationale to shift Central Asia to South Asia. While Jervis does not actively solidify methodological guidelines to measure misperception, from the interviews conducted, there appears to be patterns of overestimation, wishful thinking and cognitive dissonance, all of which occurring to a majority or even a supermajority of policy practitioners both closely and not closely affiliated to the region, as well as large numbers of government servants who are

both career and non-career personnel. Next, I will look at yet another cognitive aspect to decision-making: the use of historical analogies.

### **3.4 Historical Analogies: Application to South and Central Asia?**

Yuen Foong Khong's (1992) Analogical Explanation framework builds beyond misperceptions set forth by Jervis. As stated before, the AE (the Analogical Explanation) framework suggests:

‘...that analogies are cognitive devices that ‘help’ policymakers perform six diagnostic tasks central to political decision-making. Analogies (1) help define the nature of the situation confronting the policymaker, (2) help assess the stakes, and (3) provide prescriptions. They help evaluate alternative options by (4) predicting their chances of success, (5) evaluating their moral rightness, and (6) warning about dangers associated with the options (Khong 1992: 22)’.

These six steps make up a framework that identifies with some precision what policymakers are likely to use analogies for and how analogies might affect their policy choices. Of a policymaker's use of historical analogy X when faced with situation Y, the AE framework suggests that we ask the following questions:

‘(1) How will X define situation Y? (2) What might X say about the stakes in situation Y? (3) Does X provide an implicit prescription about what to do concerning Y? In addition, what does X say about (4) the chances of success, (5) the morality, and (6) the risks of its implied prescription or other alternatives put forward to deal with Y?’ (Khong 1992: 38)

Finally, I will also look to see what sort of analogies these were in terms of usage.

Were they strictly rhetorical and used for purposes of persuading other decision-makers or were they also used because there was a real cognitive link for the analogy user? Through Khong's AE framework, I will test the bureaucratic and policy decision to reclassify Central Asia with South Asia on whether cognitive historical images were used effectively in decision-making.

#### **3.4.1 Analogies Used**

Before going into detail of the type or quality of analogy, one must first look to see whether analogies were present. After looking through data from interviews, it became clear that three analogies were used. Some policymakers cited inaction towards a potential new civil war in Central Asia. As such, the Tajikistan Civil War was cited in the context of avoiding internal warring. Second, when discussing the topic of economic and regional

integration, the pre-Russian historic links between Central and South Asia, while not mentioned in the context of a specific event, was consistently mentioned to rationalize the need to renew historical linkages between the two regions. Finally, when discussing the geo-strategic importance of the region, the analogy of post-9/11 Afghanistan was used for its historical and cultural comparisons. Each of these analogies provides a different angle and perspective that shapes how the U.S. policy shift towards Central Asia is perceived. As well, each analogy will be tested to Khong's AE framework and how deep the analogy is will be evaluated. Finally, whether the analogy was used in a poor manner will be put to the test.

#### 3.4.1.1 The 1992 Tajikistan Civil War

Shortly after independence, disenfranchised groups made up of democrats, liberals and Islamists waged a resistance against the Government of Tajikistan. Pro-Government militias and opposition clashed with at least 100,000 casualties. The war ceased after military intervention from Russia and Uzbekistan to support the Government and the war formally ended in 1997.

Unlike the other analogies later discussed, the Tajikistan Civil War did not appear in official documentation and statements as rationale for a policy change; however, this analogy has been used by mainly personnel with direct experience in the region. Many identified themselves as Sovietologists but became an important run-up to the heightened attention to radical Islam, as rebels and other opposition leaders identified with the Islamist Resistance Party, a sect with extremist views on a pure Islamic state. When it was reported that Islamists were being backed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, yet another radical Islamic group, and the Taliban from northern Afghanistan, policymakers became aware of the potential destabilization and domino effect of Central Asia falling to radical Islamic movements.

According to a self-identified GS-14 career Sovietologist from State:

'Moving Central Asia is important because the issue of radical Islam is a major hurdle for the United States, especially in the post-9/11 context. If we had been more proactive in Central Asia before, we might have learned from what extreme views of Islam can do to regional and

global security. We probably could have prevented what happened in Tajikistan' (Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., April 15, 2007).

Looking at 66 interviews conducted with U.S. government representatives and their agencies,

43 of 66 (65%) of interviews invoked the analogy of the Tajikistan Civil War.

**Table 14: Use of Tajikistan Civil War Analogy – U.S. Governmental Agency**

Agency	Use of Tajikistan Civil War Analogy (N = 66)		
	YES	NO	Cumulative Total
State	30	9	39
USAID	2	1	3
DoD	2	4	6
NSC	2	4	6
CIA	2	1	3
Congress	5	4	9
Overall Total	43 (65%)	23 (35%)	66

Looking at the career and non-career, there does not appear to be a correlation of whether a career or non-career government official will invoke the use of the Tajikistan Civil War analogy. 26 of 40 (65%) career officials used the analogy, while 17 of 25 (66%) non-career officials used the analogy.

**Table 15: Use of Tajikistan Civil War Analogy – Career and Non-Career**

Agency	Use of Analogy – Tajikistan Civil War						Cumulative Total
	Career (N = 40)		Non-Career (N = 26)		Career Total	Non-Career Total	
	YES	NO	YES	NO			
State	20	7	10	2	27	12	39
USAID	1	1	0	1	2	1	3
DoD	1	2	2	1	3	3	6
NSC	1	3	1	1	4	2	6
CIA	1	1	1	0	2	1	3
Congress	2	0	3	4	2	7	9
Overall Total	26 (65%)	14 (35%)	17 (66%)	9 (34%)	40 (61%)	26 (39%)	66 (100%)

From the direct and non-direct regional experience perspective, there is a relation between one's direct experience and their likelihood to use the Tajikistan Civil War. 35 of 41 (85%) directly experienced officials used the analogy compared to just 8 of 17 (32%) using the same analogy. One can infer that this particular analogy was used more effectively to policymakers who are invested in the region or have worked in the region in the past.

**Table 16: Use of Tajikistan Civil War Analogy – Direct and Non-Direct Experience in Central Asia**

	Use of Analogy – Tajikistan Civil War						
Agency	Direct (N = 41)		Non-Direct (N = 25)		Direct Total	Non-Direct Total	Cumulative Total
	YES	NO	YES	NO			
State	24	2	6	7	26	13	39
USAID	2	0	0	1	2	1	3
DoD	2	2	0	2	4	2	6
NSC	2	1	0	3	3	3	6
CIA	2	1	0	0	3	0	3
Congress	3	0	2	4	3	6	9
Overall Total	35 (85%)	6 (15%)	8 (32%)	17 (68%)	41 (62%)	25 (38%)	66 (100%)

#### 3.4.1.2 Applying AE

To apply Khong's AE framework, one must apply his rubric and ask how the questions fit the analogy and its effect on the current situation. In this case, the current situation is the U.S. policy reorganization of Central Asia to South Asia.

First, the nature of the situation confronting the policymaker must be defined. How will the Tajikistan Civil War define the U.S. policy reorganization? This analogy appears to be defined as an important preventative measure since 'the Tajikistan Civil War could have been prevented with more U.S. vigilance in the region' (Telephone Interview, Civil Servant, DoD, Washington, D.C., April 18, 2007). As such, the policy appears to frame the situation as a must-act situation.

Second, the analogy helps assess the stakes. What might the Tajikistan Civil War say about the stakes in the U.S. reorganization? As the Civil War itself represents a regional security failure, the stakes are high that the entire region could fall to conflict. According to one close Bush Administration political at DoD, 'stability in Central Asia is a top priority at near-unlimited costs' (Telephone Interview, Arlington, VA, April 14, 2007).

Third, the analogy provides prescriptions. Does the Tajikistan Civil War provide an implicit prescription about what to do concerning the U.S. reorganization? Many 'external advocates of the region made it clear that the United States could not afford to let another civil

war happen' (NSC Political Appointee, Washington, D.C., April 15, 2007). While not a direct prescription to the solution, 'any sort of status quo shift was appreciated' (Former U.S. EUR Deputy Chief of Mission in Eurasia, Telephone Interview, May 1, 2007).

Fourth, in terms of options, what does the Tajikistan Civil War say about the chances of success, the morality, and the risks of its implied prescription or other alternatives put forward to deal with prospects for the United States to promote regional integration? In terms of chances for success, according to the previous section, U.S. policymakers were very confident of achieving success in promoting inter-regional cooperation between Central and South Asia.

In addition, it was also clear that the Americans 'feel a sense of duty to take more active steps in the region to not only counter radical Islam but to play as a counterweight to Moscow and Beijing' (CIA career official, Alexandria, VA, April 15, 2007). To many policymakers interviewed, it appeared that their efforts 'was a worthwhile try with little to lose in a region that [the United States] has so little sway' (USAID career official, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2007). As such, there appears to be not much of a risk to attempt to push for Central and South Asian trade and dialogue. However, as discussed in previous sections, Central Asian representatives felt that the new formulation meant they were no longer considered European, thus lowering expectations on the human rights dimension when being linked directly to Afghanistan and Nepal.

### **3.4.2 Afghanistan**

Afghanistan represents a number of images to U.S. policymakers, regional experts, and even the general public. Afghanistan represents to many epitomized policy failure. After the Soviet invasion in 1978 and subsequent withdrawal in 1992, Afghanistan was left in anarchy and warlordism until the Taliban took control of the country. American foreign policy had been 'distant and negligible in kinder words' (Program Officer, NGO, Telephone

Interview, May 10, 2007). Then America experienced 9/11 and Afghanistan became the highest priority in regional security. Through this, the Global War on Terror and the United States intervened militarily into Afghanistan, thus changing the geo-strategic aims of the United States in Central and South Asia.

The contrast of U.S. foreign policy before and after 9/11 is night and day. Previously, the ‘hands off won the policy debates in the past, but the United States is now kicking themselves for not handling it before’ (State Political Appointee, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2007). In essence, Afghanistan represents the ultimate policy failure: ignoring a clear and present danger and paying for it with the worst attack on American soil in U.S. history since Pearl Harbor.

As so much attention is placed on Afghanistan in the Global War on Terror, its geo-strategic neighbors are even more important, especially after the successful negotiations of obtaining basing rights in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (via NATO), and Uzbekistan. With the heightened momentum of U.S. interests in Central and South Asia, reorganization was seen as essential to give the much-needed importance to both regions and to consolidate experts.

In looking at whether policymakers found the use of Afghanistan as an important analogy, the interview data was collected to see whether Afghanistan was used as an analogy. In previous chapters, it was highlighted that Afghanistan was seen as the bridge between Central and South Asia. Only through a successful and stable Afghanistan can the regional integration process be most effective to promote safe links for business, energy and cultural exchanges. Likewise, according to a senior official in the NSC:

‘Only can a successful and stable Central and South Asia can Afghanistan be a success. A destabilization in Dushanbe, Tashkent, and Islamabad does not bode well for the future of the country. We wouldn’t want Central Asia or the other parts of South Asia to be another Afghanistan. It would be even more difficult, costly, and we would never be able to have any semblance of stability and order in the region, let alone strong democratic institutions and

respect for human rights and the rule of law' (Personal Interview, Ballston, VA, April 20, 2007).

Looking at the interviews by agency as a whole, the analogy is clearly used frequently. Of 66 interviews, 61 (92%) use the analogy compared to the 5 (8%) who did not use Afghanistan as an analogy. It could be asserted that Afghanistan is a 'catch-all phrase that everyone uses to describe top threats to regional and global security' (Congressional Staffer, Washington, D.C., April 18, 2007). DoD, NSC, CIA all posted analogical explanations related to Afghanistan.

Table: Use Afghanistan Analogy: U.S. Agency Overview

Agency	Use of Afghanistan Analogy (N = 66)		
	YES	NO	Cumulative Total
State	37	2	39
USAID	2	1	3
DoD	6	0	6
NSC	6	0	6
CIA	3	0	3
Congress	7	2	9
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>61 (92%)</b>	<b>5 (8%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

Looking from the career and non-career lens, there does not appear to be a significant deviation between the use of analogy for career or non-career personnel.

Table 17: Use of Afghanistan Analogy – Career and Non-Career

Agency	Use of Analogy – Afghanistan						Cumulative Total
	Career (N = 40)		Non-Career (N = 26)		Career Total	Non-Career Total	
	YES	NO	YES	NO			
<b>State</b>	26	1	11	1	27	12	<b>39</b>
<b>USAID</b>	1	1	1	0	2	1	<b>3</b>
<b>DoD</b>	3	0	3	0	3	3	<b>6</b>
<b>NSC</b>	4	0	2	0	4	2	<b>6</b>
<b>CIA</b>	2	0	1	0	2	1	<b>3</b>
<b>Congress</b>	1	1	6	1	2	7	<b>9</b>
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>37 (93%)</b>	<b>3 (7%)</b>	<b>24 (92%)</b>	<b>2 (8%)</b>	<b>40 (61%)</b>	<b>26 (39%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

From the direct and non-direct regional experience perspective, the Afghanistan analogy is used frequently; however, in 41 decision-makers directly working in Central Asian issues,

only 1 (2%) did not use the analogy whereas 40 (98%) of analogies did use the analogy. This analogical tool was used far more than for non-direct employees, despite the fact that 21 (84%) there appears to be a relation between one's direct experience and their likelihood to use the Afghanistan analogy.

**Table 18: Use of Afghanistan Analogy – Direct and Non-Direct Experience in Central Asia**

	Use of Analogy – Afghanistan						
Agency	Direct (N = 41)		Non-Direct (N = 25)		Direct Total	Non-Direct Total	Cumulative Total
	YES	NO	YES	NO			
State	26	0	11	2	26	13	39
USAID	2	0	0	1	2	1	3
DoD	4	0	2	0	4	2	6
NSC	3	0	3	0	3	3	6
CIA	3	0	0	0	3	0	3
Congress	2	1	5	1	3	6	9
Overall Total	40 (98%)	1 (2%)	21 (84%)	4 (16%)	41 (62%)	25 (38%)	66 (100%)

#### 3.4.2.1 Applying AE to Afghanistan

To apply Khong's AE framework, one must apply his rubric and ask how the questions fit the analogy and its effect on the current situation. In this case, the current situation is the U.S. policy reorganization of Central Asia to South Asia.

First, the nature of the situation confronting the policymaker must be defined. How will the Afghanistan analogy define the U.S. policy reorganization? This analogy is cognitively linked to the 'doomsday scenario of failed U.S. foreign policy' (Senior Advisor, NGO, Telephone Interview, March 10, 2007) where the United States purposely neglected the country and the region and is now the on the forefront of many of the global security problems that the Administration is placing its resources to fight. Essential, the policy for regional integration from this analogy represents the idea that everything and anything must be done to prevent a new 9/11 from happening.

Second, the analogy helps assess the stakes. What might the Afghanistan analogy say about the stakes in the U.S. reorganization? As the Afghanistan represents the doomsday

scenario, the stakes are the highest possible. According to one close Bush Administration political at DoD, 'the world has already seen one 9/11 and we don't need to see another coming from South or Central Asia' (Telephone Interview, Arlington, VA, April 14, 2007).

Third, the analogy provides prescriptions. Does the Afghanistan analogy provide an implicit prescription about what to do concerning the U.S. reorganization of South and Central Asia? If the situation is perceived as a doomsday scenario that could negatively impact the region and the world, the only prescription that is implicit is to engage in the region actively and 'to encourage the Central Asian and South Asian partners to see that they can mutual benefit from furthering their relationships' (State FP-1, Telephone Interview, April 28, 2007). Action can be summed up in terms of obtaining influence as the key to shaping inter-regional stability.

In Afghanistan before 9/11, the Americans had little to no direct influence in Central Asia, with Russia and China dominating the geo-strategic region. In South Asia prior to 9/11, 'some American influence was found in New Delhi, but the rest of the region was fairly disconnected from Washington's bidding' (Research Assistant, Telephone Interview, March 29, 2007). In the post-9/11 frame, it became 'essential that America get South Asia on board the Global War on Terror, so Central Asia was obviously another component to a successful campaign in Afghanistan' (NSC, Telephone Interview, April 27, 2007). To sum up, policymakers who invoked the analogy of Afghanistan perceive the reorganization as check to prevent actively engage Central Asia with more pro-American partners so that the region does not destabilize and become another Afghanistan.

Fourth, in terms of options, what does the Afghanistan analogy say about the chances of success, the morality, and the risks of its implied prescription or other alternatives put forward to deal with prospects for the United States to promote regional integration? In terms of chances for success, some U.S. policymakers viewed success as 'not a total meltdown of

the entire region' (State FP-2, Telephone Interview, March 30, 2007). In yet another strategic sense, traditional balance of power could measure the chances of success as 'the United States needed a creative way to get Central Asian leaders to look towards South Asia for energy instead of Moscow' (State FP-2, Telephone Interview, March 30, 2007).

With regards to perceived morality, some bureaucrats saw preventing future Afghanistans and supporting Kabul as killing two birds with one stone. According to one NSC official, the policy to connect the regions is 'both preventive to stop potential failed states and to give the Government of Afghanistan support. The Government of Afghanistan 'knows that we're trying to get her neighbors to cooperate much more' (Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., April 15, 2007). In official statements, this is present as well. According to State's Office of the Spokesman:

'[the shift was] part of the Secretary's [Condoleezza Rice's] focus on transformational diplomacy and [was] intended to channel the Department of State's resources to address most effectively the transnational threats and challenges of the 21st century. In addition to balancing the workload between the regional bureaus, the restructuring [was] designed to foster increased cooperation among the countries of Central Asia and South Asia as they work towards our shared goals of security, prosperity, stability, and freedom. **This move also aims to build on the Central Asian states' natural partnership with Afghanistan in advancing that country's democracy and stability**' (State Office of the Spokesman 2006, Bold Emphasis Added).

In essence, the moral imperative comes from the desire to minimize possible external problems and to improve the current status quo in Kabul.

As for perceived risks, the Afghanistan analogy gives policymakers fuel to make clear that 'doing nothing would result in sure disaster' (Congressional Advisor, Washington, D.C., April 13, 2007). In these circumstances, the hopes of success are outweighed by the desire to prevent future policy failures in the region. Through an Afghanistan analogy, the idea is that a rethink for strategies with Central Asia and South Asia will not only help the current Afghanistan situation but also prevent future problems within these strategic regions.

### 3.4.3 Central Asia's Pre-Russian Historical Links with South Asia

Besides the Tajikistan Civil War analogy, another analogy present was Central Asia's pre-Russian historical links with South Asia. Prior to Russian domination of the Central Asian region, Central Asian nomads traveled through present-day Afghanistan to other parts of South Asia for trading purposes and shared cultural affinities. While not a distinct event, this time period represented a major image that was implemented in the decision-making process.

In official documents and statements, this historical rationale was often used. For example, as used previously, Richard Boucher echoed the following:

'[The creation of SCA made] good sense, because **South and Central Asia belong together. In addition to deep cultural and historic ties**, major 21st Century realities such as the war on terror, outlets for energy supplies, economic cooperation and democratic opportunities tie these regions together (Boucher 2006a, February 16, 2006, bold emphasis added).'

Likewise the analogy appeared in the interviews conducted. Looking at the interviews by agency, 31 of 66 (47%) interviewees cited the analogy compared to 35 of 66 (53%) who did not. It was the only analogy that was not used by a majority of State Department officials.

**Table 19: Use of Pre-Russian History Analogy: U.S. Agency Overview**

Agency	Use of Pre-Russian Analogy (N = 66)		
	YES	NO	Cumulative Total
State	17	22	<b>39</b>
USAID	2	1	<b>3</b>
DoD	2	4	<b>6</b>
NSC	4	2	<b>6</b>
CIA	1	2	<b>3</b>
Congress	5	4	<b>9</b>
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>31 (47%)</b>	<b>35 (53%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

Looking at the career and non-career angle, there appears to be no major difference between the career users of the analogy [18 of 22 (45%)] and non-career users of the analogy [12 of 26 (46%)]. The data does reveal that 7 of 12 State non-career personnel used the analogy compared to just 10 of 27.

**Table 20: Use of Pre-Russian History Analogy – Career and Non-Career**

Agency	Use of Analogy – Pre-Russian History Analogy						Cumulative Total
	Career (N = 40)		Non-Career (N = 26)		Career Total	Non-Career Total	
	YES	NO	YES	NO			
<b>State</b>	10	17	7	5	27	12	<b>39</b>
<b>USAID</b>	2	0	0	1	2	1	<b>3</b>
<b>DoD</b>	1	2	1	2	3	3	<b>6</b>
<b>NSC</b>	2	2	1	1	4	2	<b>6</b>
<b>CIA</b>	1	1	0	1	2	1	<b>3</b>
<b>Congress</b>	2	0	3	4	2	7	<b>9</b>
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>18</b> <b>(45%)</b>	<b>22</b> <b>(55%)</b>	<b>12</b> <b>(46%)</b>	<b>14</b> <b>(54%)</b>	<b>40</b> <b>(61%)</b>	<b>26</b> <b>(39%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

When the data is cut from the direct and non-direct experience angle, it appears that 17 of 41 (41%) invoke the analogy compared to 14 of 25 (56%). One would have previously assumed that the use of pre-Russian history of the region would be more heavily used by policy practitioners who have had more experience in Central Asia. However, perhaps this reflects the weakness of the analogy. According to one Congressional aide with direct experience in the region:

‘You see that some officials of the government are using a funny twist of history. They mention Central and South Asian linkages based on history and culture. This may be true, but they might have forgotten about years of Russian domination in between’ (Telephone Interview, May 9, 2007).’

**Table 21: Use of Pre-Russian History Analogy – Direct and Non-Direct Experience in Central Asia**

Agency	Use of Pre-Russian Historical Analogy						Cumulative Total
	Direct (N = 41)		Non-Direct (N = 25)		Direct Total	Non-Direct Total	
	YES	NO	YES	NO			
<b>State</b>	12	14	5	8	26	13	<b>39</b>
<b>USAID</b>	1	1	1	0	2	1	<b>3</b>
<b>DoD</b>	1	3	1	1	4	2	<b>6</b>
<b>NSC</b>	1	2	3	0	3	3	<b>6</b>
<b>CIA</b>	1	2	0	0	3	0	<b>3</b>
<b>Congress</b>	1	2	4	2	3	6	<b>9</b>
<b>Overall Total</b>	<b>17</b> <b>(41%)</b>	<b>24</b> <b>(59%)</b>	<b>14</b> <b>(56%)</b>	<b>11</b> <b>(44%)</b>	<b>41</b> <b>(62%)</b>	<b>25</b> <b>(38%)</b>	<b>66 (100%)</b>

With this in mind, it appears that this analogy may be used with some skepticism and puts the strength of this analogy into question. Whereas the Tajikistan Civil War and

Afghanistan analogies are strong and persuasive on different levels, the pre-Russian historical analogy may be viewed as a weak analogy based mainly for the purposes of rhetoric. This point of view would explain its usage in official statements. However, almost half of the interviewees use the analogy so it does carry some psychological reasoning, especially for officials without direct experience in Central Asia.

#### 3.4.3.1 Using AE for the Pre-Russian Historical Analogy

To apply Khong's AE framework, one must apply his rubric and ask how the questions fit the analogy and its effect on the current situation. In this case, the current situation is the U.S. policy reorganization of Central Asia to South Asia.

First, the nature of the situation confronting the policymaker must be defined. How will the pre-Russian historical analogy define the U.S. policy reorganization? As there is no specific event, rather a time period, there is strong image. The definition appears to be vague in its usage.

Second, the analogy helps assess the stakes. What might the pre-Russian historical analogy say about the stakes in the U.S. reorganization? If one uses this analogy, it justifies the need to bring these two regions together due to their similarities. As an example, Secretary Rice in a January 5, 2006 interview:

'One of the things that we did in the State Department was to move the Central Asian republics out of the European bureau, which **really was an artifact of their having been states of the Soviet Union**. It represents what we're trying to do, which is to think of this region as one that will need to be integrated, and that will be a very important goal for us' (Crawley 2006, Bold Emphasis Added).

Similarities in this context represent integration and a move away from the Soviet Union's legacy. The stakes in this situation are represented by the desire for control away from Moscow and thereby achieving integration for the regions.

Third, the analogy provides prescriptions. Does the pre-Russian historical analogy provide an implicit prescription about what to do concerning the U.S. reorganization? In this case, the analogy provides a direct prescription to bring these peoples together for purposes of

integration. In interviews conducted, the use of pre-Russian history is framed in a way that displays how prosperity was achieved prior to Russian aggression in the region, implicitly explaining that ‘the region was better off before the Russians came’ (USAID Officer, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2007).

Fourth, in terms of options, what does the pre-Russian historical analogy say about the chances of success, the morality, and the risks of its implied prescription or other alternatives put forward to deal with prospects for the United States to promote regional integration? In terms of chances for success, the usage of this history already implies that by using the prescribed remedy in integrating Central and South Asia based on trade and transportation grounds, success will be achieved since history would appear to tell policymakers that Russian intervention led to the decline of the region. With regards to morality, using this history does not imply a certain level of morality per se, but rather a need to reintegrate the region. With risks, as highlighted previously, it appeared that decision-makers’ efforts ‘[were] a worthwhile try with little to lose in a region that [the United States] has so little sway’ (USAID career official, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2007).

As such, there appears to be not much of a risk to attempt to push for Central and South Asian trade and dialogue. However, a large misperception is apparent when policymakers use this history. While the history does have validity and truth, it somehow attempts to gloss over the bigger truth that Russian influence over the region for over 200 years does make a difference and that Central and South Asian integration must be now taken into this context. Recent history matters just as much, if not more.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

This chapter highlighted the other alternative explanations of the rationale and reasoning towards U.S. policy and bureaucratic shifting of Central Asia to South Asia. Through misperceptions such as overestimation, wishful thinking and cognitive dissonance, it

is clear that decision-making was under the influence of psychological explanations in the decision to make changes in U.S. foreign policy in the two regions. In addition, the usage of analogies played a crucial role in creating and supporting the U.S. integration policy. The Tajikistan Civil War, Afghanistan, and the pre-Russian historical analogy each aided in different ways. The Tajikistan Civil War persuaded stakeholders within the government but was not used to persuade externally. Afghanistan, representing the doomsday scenario, was used both for rhetoric and as a cognitive weight. Finally, the pre-Russian historical analogy was implemented to attempt to best find a prescription for integration but was not as persuasive or as heavy a cognitive influence for decision-makers.

## CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

Central Asia (CA), in the post-9/11 world, has become a much higher priority for the United States. But with such similar national security threats with the Middle East and SA, why is it not placed at the top? In this work, I have worked to display these reasons for this puzzle in two lenses: the first being from the bureaucratic politics and power angle and the second coming from the psychological misperceptions and cognitive historical images perspective. Going beyond the notion that CA had the ‘tragic misfortune of being sandwiched in between the Middle East, Russia and China, without the much-needed crisis label’ (DoD Official, Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., April 13, 2007), the Central Asian bureaucratic and policy shift to SA, due to disuniting bureaucratic policy perspectives as well as psychological misperceptions, such as overestimation, wishful thinking, and cognitive dissonance, and historical analogue reasoning, both rhetorical and strong analogies related to the Tajikistan Civil War, Afghanistan, and CA’s pre-Russian historical linkages to South Asia actually undermined CA’s intended high-level priority in U.S. foreign policy and created unintended consequences.

### ***4.1 Policy Recommendations***

The U.S. Government made important steps to reorganize CA in an effort to reflect the growing importance of CA in foreign policy and regional preferences. However, the various competing bureaucratic units, varying classifications, and differing approaches highlight the difficulty in formulating CA as a credible high regional priority for the United States. What is reflected is CA’s position as a major blind spot of U.S. foreign policy. A part of the globe where the United States had no past significant political, economic, and cultural influence, CA is also geo-strategically sandwiched between Russia, China, and the Middle East. While CA is on the forefront of the Global War on Terror, CA still does not receive the necessary

attention to promote strategies to actually interconnect CA and SA together to weave something that would build long-term foundations of security for this vital subcontinent.

Additional bureaucratic measures must be implemented in order to successfully bring CA as a top-tier priority. First, management should earmark a minimum funding level for CA within SCA in the initial years in order to give CA an opportunity to not be financially overshadowed by SA. Second, personnel and structures within the SCA bureau must be boosted. To maintain crucial links to the international organizations and multinational bodies in Europe, an office must be created to link CA to these groups through the auspices of EUR and the Bureau of International Organizations. A high-level politically-appointed envoy must be assigned from the White House to implement the regional integration initiative and to assist in building partnerships within the region. Finally, the Policy and Planning Unit should meet with the relevant regional heads to formulate a consistent policy CA in the multi-regional context.

But another way to look at the matter is through a different integration process all together. Secretary Rice argues that integration is the key to promoting CA and the goals of the United States. She is correct to say that being in EUR was based on the Soviet legacy; however, integrating actually benefits SA much more than CA. The collective SCA receives a larger budget and more prestige, but CA is still overshadowed and sandwiched, this time between New Delhi, Kabul and Islamabad. With this in mind, I believe that CA should be integrated with the Caucuses and ideally placed in a separate bureau. While risking possible isolation within Political Affairs and having a small diplomatic portfolio, the move would outweigh these concerns and promote maximum exposure out of the shadows of any other region and offer career incentive to diplomats and civil servants serve as regional experts. A Eurasia and Caucuses bureau would be able to have its own public affairs unit and focus

could be made much more on the volatile region, especially in light of the post-Soviet colored revolutions of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, personnel could gain regional exposure for career advancement by using State's emphasis to focus on two global portfolios, thereby giving CA much needed expertise that would replace the current Sovietologists' perspective that dominates the bureau.

In the past, the region has been characterized by so much instability. The government has made positive steps to consolidate attention to the most crucial global and regional security risks. This moment in this region is an 'arc of opportunity' (Wright 2006). But if no further bureaucratic force, creative ideas, and political will are given to CA, the whole region and continent could fall back into an arc of crisis.

## APPENDIX A: MICHAUD'S POWER RELATIONSHIPS GUIDE

TABLE 1  
Power Relationships

*A. No relationship*

1. Absence of power      A ————— B

*B. One tier decisions*

2. Unilateral power from A      A —————>————— B
3. Unilateral power from B      A —————<————— B
4. Mutual power      A —————=————— B
5. Null power      A —————||————— B

*C. Two tier decisions*

6. Bilateral power      A —————X————— B
7. Superior power from A      A —————Σ————— B
8. Superior power from B      A —————∑————— B
9. Unidirectional power from A      A —————▷|————— B
10. Unidirectional power from B      A —————|◁————— B
11. Equivalent power      A —————□————— B

*D. Three tier decisions*

12. Mutual power      A —————X————— B
13. Non-compatible power      A —————X————— B
14. Prevalent power from A      A —————◁|————— B
15. Prevalent power from B      A —————|▷————— B

*E. Four tier decisions*

16. Integral power      A —————X————— B

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