A NEW GREY ZONE:
INTELLECTUALS, THINK TANKS, AND POLITICS IN POST-COMMUNIST SLOVAKIA

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Abstract

The thesis analyses the sphere of think tanks and its intellectuals in Slovakia in 1998-2006 adopting a Bourdieuan genetic structuralist approach. Adapting Medvetz's theory of the US 'proto-field' of think tanks, it theorizes this sphere as a new distinct relatively autonomous sphere of intellectual production located on the intersection of the academy, politics, journalism, business, and 'the transnational field of democracy and human rights' as analyzed by Guilhot. The sources of data are organizational documents, publications, CVs, semi-structured interviews, and media production. The sphere is found strongly tied to the academy and 'transnational field' resulting from their role in its founding. Tracing the social histories of the think tankers, the thesis argues that the prevalence of agenda congruent with neoliberalism among the main Slovak think tanks results from intellectuals' struggle with communist nomenclatura. In this struggle a segment of intellectuals adopted a worldview congruent with the neoliberal program abandoning the traditional teleological pretensions of region's intelligentsia and adopted a more Western-type role. This worldview and a derived program led some of these intellectuals to enter the politics during the post-communist transition and later also to found the think tank sphere. Though bringing a more technological role, the transformation to think tankers did not entail professionalization. The proto-field is found to be similar to the 'grey zone' as it allows its' intellectuals to remain relatively autonomous and cultivate their cultural capital. This 'new grey zone' differs from the original one mainly in deriving its relative autonomy from engaging with multiple relatively autonomous sources of power. Importantly, it allows the intellectuals to be a significant presence in politics despite their post-transitional retreat from positions of political power.

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List of Abbreviations

ASA	Analýzy, Stratégie, Alternatívy	(Analyses, Strategies, Alternatives)
ANO	Aliancia Nového Občana	(Alliance of the New Citizen)
CEE		Central and Eastern Europe
CEP	Centrum pre Európsku Politiku	(Center for European Politics)
CPHR	Centrum Pre Hospodársky Rozvoj	(Center for Economic Development)
DS	Demokratická Strana	(Democratic Party)
DU	Demokratická Únia	(Democratic Union)
EU		European Union
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	(Friedrich Ebert Foundation)
FH		Freedom House
GMF		German Marshal Fund of the United States
MESA 10	M.E.S.A.10 – Centrum pre ekonomické a sociálne analýzy	M.E.S.A. 10 – Center for economic and social analyses
NGO		Non-Governmental Organization
IVO	Inštitút pre Verejné Otázky	(Institute for Public Affairs)
INEKO	Inštitút pre Ekonomické a Sociálne Reformy	(Institute for Economic and Social Reforms)
INESS		Institute for Economic and Social Studies
IRI		International Republican Institute
ISOS	Inštitút pre Solidárnu Spoločnosť	(Institute for Solidary Society)
KAS	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	(Konrad Adenauer Foundation)
KI	Konzervatívny Inštitút M.R. Štefánika	(M. R. Stefanik Conservative Institute)
KDH	Kresťanskodemokratické Hnutie	(Christian Democratic Movement)
KSS	Komunistická Strana Slovenska	(Communist Party of Slovakia)
HZDS	Hnutie Za Demokratické Slovensko	(Movement for Democratic Slovakia)
MNI	Maďarská Nezavislá Iniciatíva	(Hungarian Independent Initiative)
NATO		North-Atlantic Treaty Organization
NED		National Endowment for Democracy
NMS	Nadácia Milana Šimečku	(Milan Šimečka Foundation)
nSPACE		Social Policy Analysis Centre
ODU	Občiansko-Demokratická Únia	(Civic Democratic Union)
OKS	Občianska Konzervatívna Strana	(Civic Conservative Party)
OSI		Open Society Institute
OSF		Open Society Foundation
PAS	Podnikateľská Aliancia Slovenska	The Business Alliance of Slovakia - a Permanent Conference of the Center for Economic Development on Business Environment Improvement
PR		Public Relations
RC SFPA		Research Center of Slovak Foreign Policy Association
SAV	Slovenská Akadémia Vied	(Slovak Academy of Science)
SDK	Slovenská Demokratická Koalícia	(Slovak Democratic Coalition)
SDKU	Slovenská Demokratická a Kresťanská Únia	(Slovak Democratic and Christian Union)

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SDKU-DS	Slovenská Demokratická a Kresťanská Únia - Demokratická Strana	(Slovak Democratic and Christian Union - Democratic Party)
SDA	Sociálnodemokratická Alternatíva	(Social Democratic Alternative)
SDL	Strana Demokratickej Ľavice	(Party of the Democratic Left)
SFPA		Slovak Foreign Policy Association
SGI		Strategic Governance Institute
SMK	Strana Maďarskej Koalície	(Party of the Hungarian Coalition)
SNS	Slovenská Národná Strana	(Slovak National Party)
TIS		Transparency International Slovakia
UNDP		United Nations Development Program
USAID		United States Agency for International Development
V4		Visegrád Four Group
VPN	Verejnosť Proti Násiliu	(Public Against Violence)
WB		World Bank
ZRS	Združenie Robotníkov Slovenska	(Association of Workers of Slovakia)

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INTRODUCTION

The transformation of CEE countries from state socialism to democracy and market economy changed also the role of knowledge and its bearers and producers. In the newly emerging political, social and economic order, intellectuals had to find and occupy new social positions, seeking to utilize their knowledge and gain influence and power. In the transition some intellectuals played a crucial role in politics; however soon after the revolutionary turmoil was over, they – voluntarily or involuntarily – either left the positions of political power, or transformed into professional politicians. The literature agrees that the intellectuals are no longer a significant presence in politics.[1]

Certainly no longer directly present in the politics, some intellectuals however occupy a specific new social position; they became think tankers, and through this position that endows them with power and influence they nevertheless are a significant presence in politics. Though this is widely affirmed, the existing accounts fail to provide satisfactory explanations of how this new social position of intellectuals endows them with power and influence and why they have occupied this newly emerged social space. I will argue that in Slovakia this new social position of intellectuals is a distinct sphere of intellectual production and endows them with power and influence because of its strategic location on the intersection of five distinct spheres of social power – politics, business, academy, media, and the transnational democracy and human rights focused networks – and that they occupied it as a result of the interaction of their dispositions formed in the conflict with the nomenclatura under the state socialism and the structural conditions after the downfall of the communism.

My analysis of Slovakia contributes to the debate by theoretically grasping this position of intellectuals and reasons why they occupied it, building on the existing stream of literature on CEE intellectuals and introducing novel elements into it. Adopting the Bourdieuan genetic structuralist approach I develop a theory of intellectuals and think tanks in

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CEE. Building on Karabel's (1996) theory of intelligentsia I understand the intellectuals as bearers and producers of the cultural capital, and thus members of the intelligentsia, who dominate the sub-spheres of cultural production and so belong to society's elites. Building on Eyal's (2003) theory of postcommunist new class with its Bourdieuan notion of class I read the intellectuals as a segment of new class.

Utilizing Medvetz's (2006) Bourdieuan theory of US sphere of think tanks and its 'hybrid intellectuals,' I develop a theory of CEE think tanks by accustoming it to regional specifics, with essential contribution of Guilhot's (2005) theory of the 'transnational field of democracy and human rights.' I theorize the newly emergent social space occupied by intellectuals in think tanks as 'the proto-field of think tanks,' which is a distinct relatively autonomous sphere of intellectual production located at the intersection of its five paternal fields – politics, academy, journalism, business, and the transnational field of democracy and human rights – to which it is materially and symbolically tied. The intellectuals of this proto-field – the policy experts – are 'hybrid intellectuals,' as their intrinsic and structural properties reflect the proto-field's intersectional location, which, due to its strategic position between the main, relatively autonomous sources of social power, endows them with power and influence.

Slovakia's development can also tell us more about the CEE intellectuals, as it was not dissimilar from that of the other CEE countries and some of its particular aspects common to all CEE countries were even more accented. Despite the previous doubts raised by the authoritarian tendencies of the second generation of post-1989 Slovak political elite, the literature now affirms the success of Slovakia's democratization, and credits the intellectuals active in transition for being highly conducive to it.[2] Similarly, the 'civil society structures,' also led by intellectuals, receive credit for contributing to the democratization in the second half of the 1990s and to the reform policies of the period of 1998 – 2006. Prominent among

[1] See e.g. Bozóki's (2003) comprehensive overview of the literature on elites in post-communist CEE.

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these structures were think tanks led by intellectuals, often those formerly associated with the democratic forces of the first phase of the transition. Shortly after the intellectuals in Slovakia lost political power, they occupied a new social position with significant influence in the political life.

Applying a Bourdieuan approach my analysis of the proto-field of think tanks and policy expertise in Slovakia in 1998 – 2006 constitutes a nested double objectivist and subjectivist reading. Consequently, I identify the proto-field's organizational and individual agents in their mutual relations, and its ties to its paternal fields, focusing on their material and symbolic dimensions and the sources of their dynamics. I assess them on field, organizational and individual level; through the institutional structures, flows of resources, circulation of personnel and proto-field's intellectuals' trajectories, habituses, multiple-agent status and hybridity. Dissecting how the proto-field allows its intellectuals to reproduce and utilize their capitals and gain influence and power, I give special attention to their presence in politics, involving not only the field of parliamentary and party politics, but also top-level administration and public service, as these are in Slovakia structurally subordinated to the field of politics.

I connect my findings and their implications to the theoretical debate on CEE intelligentsia, intellectuals, and new class. First, I explain the 'neoliberal' agenda of the dominant segment of think tankers more complexly than the existing literature by excavating dominant think tankers' social history embedded in broader contexts of Slovak and CEE intelligentsia. I demonstrate how the development of Slovak think tank intellectuals fits into the framework of CEE intelligentsia's transformation from the pretenders for a teleological role to the bearers of the 'neoliberal' program that creates a more technological role for them.

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[2] To the role of intellectuals in Slovak post-communist transition see works by Szomolányi (1993, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2004) or Pešek and Szomolányi 2000.

Next I discuss how the location of Slovak think tank intellectuals in the period under scrutiny parallels the 'grey zone' (Šiklová 1990) in state socialist regimes, as both are positioned on the intersection of main competing sources of power and allow them to remain relatively autonomous intellectuals and cultivate their cultural capital. I discuss how the 'grey zone' and the new position differ, as in a democratic society with a market economy there are multiple relatively autonomous sources of power, and not only two with one dominant like in a state socialist society.

Based on Bourdieuan field and genetic analysis, my research utilizes primary and secondary analysis of organizational documents and publications, media production, semi-structured interviews, and analytical literature. The documents involve a set of official CVs and short biographies of 91 think tankers and affiliated intellectuals. The set entails members of eighteen organizations active in the think tank sphere, with focus on the top- and medium-level think tankers and the most active think tanks and is attached as Appendix 1. The sources of biographical or other information about the intellectuals under scrutiny are the CVs if not indicated otherwise. Other documents are think tanks annual reports, other printed publications, and web pages. The media production involves articles on or by the intellectuals under scrutiny, and the interviews with them, in Slovak and Czech language printed and on-line media based in Slovakia and Czech republic. The interviews with five intellectuals involve three top-level think tankers of different Slovak think tanks, and two experts affiliated or collaborating with think tanks. Areas of questions focus (where possible) on their educational and career backgrounds and trajectories; their views on the other think tanks and policy expertise in Slovakia; the activities and strategies of their think tanks; their relations with politics, media, academy, business, and the transnational field of democracy and human rights.

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CHAPTER 1: THEORY OF INTELLECTUALS AND THINK TANKS

1.1 Theories of Intellectuals and Politics

1.1.1 The Context of the Sociology of Intellectuals

Within the social-scientific literature on intellectuals several specific subsets can be identified. In their recent systematic overview of the field Kurzman and Owens (2002) distinguish three traditions with roots traceable to the founding of the field in the 1920s. These traditions differentiate in their understanding of intellectuals (1) as a 'class-in-themselves,' (2) as 'class-bound,' and (3) as 'class-less.'[3] It cannot be stated that this literature (all its three traditions) offers any sufficiently satisfiable general theory (in terms of its cross-case applicability, and analytical clarity and strength) of intellectuals and politics. (Brym 1987; Karabel 1996)

In the theoretical literature on intellectuals their relations to the sphere of politics are a prominent area of interest. Although this literature constitutes a diverse and colorful spectrum, it can be seen as polarized at least along one dimension: the degree of normativity vs. empirical-analytical character. (see Karabel 1996) The normative pole is constituted by a tradition of literature present in the discussion on intellectuals from its very beginnings and remains vigorous and dynamic even in the present. This tradition is defined by a focus on the values and/or interests, often characteristically considered as universal, that the intellectuals should represent. The empirical-analytical pole is characterized by focus on empirical analysis of factors that shape and determine the relations of intellectuals and the sphere of politics.

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[3] For other similar categorizations of the theories of intellectuals see e.g. Brym (1980; and 1987), Gagnon (1987), or Szelenyi and Martin (1988).

1.1.2 The New Class Theories of CEE Intellectuals and Politics

In the region of CEE the analysis of intellectuals and their relations with the sphere of politics (or, more generally, power) has to take into account several factors defining the regional specificity. The specific path of modernization, the historical role of intelligentsia and the communist regimes that ruled for several decades after the Second World War are the most important ones.

In the analysis of CEE intellectuals and their relations with the sphere of politics (or power) the theories of the 'new class' played a prominent role since the end of the 1950s.[4] The existence of communist regimes in the region and the changes of social structure it brought rendered the existing theories of intellectuals and politics based largely on the experience of Western societies somewhat inadequate. The new class theories have focused on and reflected these changes.

Through their now more than century-long development the new class theories produced such a variety of accounts on the new class that even to find a comprehensive definition of new class that unites them is almost impossible. What unites them is the view that in the developed societies – whether being 'post-industrial', socialist, 'post-capitalist,' or 'post-Fordist' – there is a 'new class' among the dominant segments of the society owing its position to the knowledge it possesses. The engineers, managers, humanistic intellectuals, technocrats or bureaucrats, (i.e. the highly educated) compose the new class. (Szelenyi and Martin 1988)

The new class theories can be understood as belonging to the 'class-bound' approaches (as by Kurzman and Owens 2002) or as a separate category (as e.g. by Gagnon 1987). Their roots can be traced to the anarchist theories of the intellectual class in the Marxist project and to the Marxist critique of Soviet bureaucracy, which both critically

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assessed the role of the highly educated in the state-socialist projects and societies. (Szelenyi and Martin 1988; Kurzman and Owens 2002) Among the most important and influential theoretical works that developed new class theorizing in its 'third wave' are the knowledge-class theories from the 1960s and 1970s by Gouldner (1979) and by Bell (1976). (Szelenyi and Martin 1988) These were also partially a reaction to the radical changes of the social structure and the role of education in developed societies, and were not relying solely on Marxist theoretical grounds.[5]

In the field of studies of the CEE region 'Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power' by Konrad and Szelenyi (1979) is probably the most important one and elaborates a specific version of new class theory. Konrad and Szelenyi (1979) developed Djilas's (1957) theory of new class radically reevaluating it and focusing on the prospects of a radical transformation of the state-socialist societies that would establish intellectuals as the dominant class succeeding in this position the communist nomenclatura. Their analysis and predictions proved to be somewhat flawed as intellectuals did not came to power under the state-socialism or in its gradual reconstruction and rather suffered a 'counter-offensive' of the nomenclatura and were forced into the position of a non-dominant group or of a dominated fraction of the dominant group. (Konrad and Szelenyi 1991) Yet, during the downfall of communism in the CEE a new window of opportunity for intellectuals to gain and retain political power opened.

In the CEE region intellectuals were among the most important actors of democratization, in some countries even previously forming a counter-elite in the period of liberalization in 1980s. This reflects quite a rich body of literature on the role of intellectuals

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[4] See Szelenyi's and Martin's (1988) account on the new class theories, Kurzman's and Owens's (2002) comprehensive overview of the literature from the field of the sociology of intellectuals, and Bozóki's (2003) comprehensive overview of the literature on elites in post-communist CEE.

[5] Bell (1976) analyzed prospects for a convergence of socialist and capitalist societies to a post-industrial society with new elites basing their dominant position on their mastery of knowledge and skills. Bell rejected the idea that this new highly educated elite would be a class bound by certain common interests and suggested that instead it will be bound by certain ethos. Gouldner (1979) identified a new 'universal class,' albeit a 'flawed' one, composed of critical intellectuals and technical intelligentsia who posses 'human capital' (or 'cultural capital') and are bound by a 'culture of critical discourse.'

in the post-communist transition processes in CEE. Its set that belongs to the above-mentioned empirical-analytical pole focuses on the sources and outcomes of intellectuals' engagement in the transition. Frequently utilizing new class theories and elements of Bourdieu`s social theory, these studies share a focus on the positions and strategies of intellectuals in post-communist transition and on the factors that shaped those. [6]

Eyal's work 'The Origins of Postcommunist Elites: From Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia' (2003) belongs to this subset of literature and constitutes its theoretically most advanced and complex development to date. Eyal's main focus is on the role of elite configuration in Czechoslovakia after the 1992 parliamentary elections as the main factor that led to the breakup of Czechoslovakia. He construes the theoretical framework using new class theories, Bourdieu's social theory and Foucault's theory of 'power/knowledge' (see e.g. Foucualt 1979 or 1982) as the main sources and overcomes the most salient problems of the new class theorizing. I utilize Eyal's (2003) theorizing, which represents a valuable source and current most developed account on which further work in the sub-field can fruitfully build, and elaborate several of its elements in my analysis.

1.2 Bourdieuan Genetic Structuralism

The basis of the theoretical framework in this project is provided by Bourdieuan genetic structuralism,[7] which contains a universal model "that can be deployed in the analysis of the transformations of the inner structures of the social space and most importantly the relation of social, symbolic and physical world" (Petrusek 2000, 130), and analytically grasps simultaneously the structure and agency in their complexity and interactions. Emphasizing the fundamental interconnectedness of knowledge production and politics it underscores the

[6] See Bozóki's (2003) comprehensive overview of the literature on elites in post-communist CEE. Most important are works by Szelényi (1995) and by Eyal and Szelenyi and Townsley (1997; 1998). See also the volume 'Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe' edited by Bozóki (1999).

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analysis of the knowledge producers – among which intellectuals belong – in the analysis of modern societies and politics. (Wacquant 2002) Currently it is the most fruitful and promising approach in the research centered on intellectuals.[8] A vital stream within the literature utilizes it, of which a significant part focuses on the intellectuals in CEE. This creates the perspectives to productively utilize these works and join the scholarly debate.

1.3 Intelligentsia – Intellectuals – New Class

The social scientific literature on intellectuals is often characterized by a lack of conceptual clarity in regards to the very central concepts, including 'intellectuals' and 'intelligentsia.' Research on intellectuals faces two concept-related challenges. First, various actors try to define the very concept of 'intellectuals' in a variety of divergent and contradicting ways, frequently with strong normative undertones. (Karabel 1996) This is related to the fact that all the definitions of intellectuals are in fact self-definitions (Bauman 1987) and it is indeed a "central property of the intellectual field… …that it is the site of struggles over who does and who does not belong to it."(Bourdieu in Kurzman and Owens 2002, 80) Thus my research requires adoption of a definition of intellectuals based on their position within social structure rather than on the normative views about their role.

Second, various concepts of intellectuals and intelligentsia were developed for the context of societies different from CEE societies[9] and their utilization in the research centered on post-communist CEE brings the pitfalls of conceptual stretching. To address these challenges and adopt adequate concepts of 'intelligentsia' and 'intellectuals' an account on the specificity of the CEE is useful. Building on the Bourdieuan notion that it is necessary to

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[7] For the fundaments of Bourdieuan genetic structuralism see e.g. Bourdieu's works (1983; 1990; 1991; 1998a; 2000) and work by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992). Bourdieuan structuralism is also labeled as 'constructivist structuralism' (Petrusek 2000).
[8] See the overview of the field by Kurzman and Owens (2002). For Bourdieuan approach in the analysis of CEE intellectuals see also Bozóki's (2003) systematic overview of the field of elite-centered research on CEE.
[9] See Kurzman's and Owens's (2002) overview of the field.

define them knowing their genesis and positions within the social structures, this account should briefly elaborate also the social history of the concepts under scrutiny.

1.3.1 The Sphere of Cultural Production and Cultural Capital

In every society a part of its activities is based on operating with symbols and information. In some societies a relatively autonomous sphere of cultural production gradually formed in which these activities and the means and resources necessary for their exercise concentrated. In some societies the development of this sphere was marked by its significant broadening, autonomization and internal differentiation and connected with the increase of both the relative share and the absolute number of the members of societies active in it. (Aron 1962 [1955])

Consequently, this sphere has become a field. Each field is a 'relatively autonomous social microcosm' characterized by specific forms and combinations of values, rules, regularities, institutions and resources effective, in which the agents struggle within a delineated area to achieve specific aims under the authority of specific rules. These rules and their enforcement are not necessarily explicit and perceived. The field is an objective set of relations between agents irreducible to agents' direct intentions and interactions. The regularities and predictability of the field exist even if the external structures do not mechanically limit the actions: the source of field's organization is habitus. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)

Habitus is a set of durable and transposable conative and cognitive dispositions acquired during socialization. It allows collective actions and complex forms of social action without the presence of an organizing agent. The long and dialectical process allows different fields to produce agents with habituses that allow them to function within a given field and

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thus also the field to function; thus each field is tied with a specific habitus(es). (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Wacquant 2005)

In the field of cultural production is based the production, accumulation and reproduction of a specific resource fundamentally tied with this field – the cultural capital. This resource rests "in the specific ability to operate with information, prominently with those that are the content of the symbols," which "can be cumulated and saved for future use, i.e. converted to a capital, from which interests flow without diminishing it." (Možný 1991, 31) Its incorporated form are the skills of operating with symbols and information, its objectified form are cultural goods, and its institutionalized form are institutions in the sphere of cultural production. (Bourdieu 1983)

The processes of modernization were linked with an intense development, growth, and structural transformations of the sphere of cultural production. The cultural capital has become one of the most important sources of power and main principles of differentiation in modern societies. It can not only increase its holders' chances to affect the events, including the behavior of others, (Lipset 1991) but in modern societies the functioning of their various spheres requires the existence of specialized knowledge. Moreover, it plays an essential role in legitimization.

In modern societies no power can effectively and in other than short-term horizon exist without legitimization. This requires the power to produce socially binding visions of social world and the principles of division of this world, which is the symbolic power, based on the possession of the symbolic capital.[10] These visions are simultaneously the means of domination and the means of knowledge; the cultural capital is employed in their elaboration.

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[10] The symbolic capital is accumulated credit, honor, or prestige. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) Symbolic capital can be understood also as the effects of all other kinds and forms of capital, which are not perceived as a capital, but are attributed as characteristics to their bearers. Symbolic capital can be grasped also as distinction, as the difference inscribed into the social structures when perceived through the categories accustomed to this structure. (Bourdieu 1991)

(Petrusek 2000; Bourdieu 1991) Thus, the cultural capital functions in the legitimization of power in society, but it can serve also for its de-legitimization. (Lipset 1991)

One of the crucial elements of the exercise of symbolic power is the public discourse sphere formed in the processes of modernization. It exists through specific institutions and mechanisms of the sphere of cultural production (media etc.) and cultural capital is essential for its functioning, which entrenches its status of one of the main principles of differentiation in modern societies.

1.3.2 The Intelligentsia

Different paths of modernization were connected to different developments of spheres of cultural production and its actors in the societies of the West and CEE. In the societies of the West modernization brought the mutual differentiation and relative autonomization of the spheres of economy, politics and cultural production. The economic field formed with the development of capitalist market economies has become dominant in respect to most of the various sub-spheres of cultural production. A significant part of the educated members of societies underwent the process of the integration to the sphere of economy – they became *professionals*. (Szelenyi 1982) This transformation meant also a change of the character of their cultural capital – its teleological component was lessened and its technical component was accentuated.[11]

In the societies of CEE similar phenomena did not occur in given period. Instead of professionals another specific group based in the sphere of cultural production arose and was labeled as the *intelligentsia*.[12] The specificity of the intelligentsia is connected to the

[11] The different character of the technological and teleological aspect of the cultural capital can be understood as corresponding to Weber's (1998) distinction between formal/instrumental rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) (technological aspect) and substantive rationality (*Wertrationalität*) (teleological aspect). See also Karabel's (1996) own discussion.

[12] The term 'intelligentsia' originates from Russian or Polish context. There in its original sense it denoted a group of educated population that distinguishes itself from the rest of its society by its education and which has formed a collective consciousness about its identity and is engaged in the support of certain projects with a

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specificity of modernization in these societies. The economic modernization lagged in comparison with the West and did not bring professionalization.[13] Together with the lagging social and political modernization this allowed the intelligentsia to become the main bearer of modernization projects. These projects were different from the Western variants of modernization; most importantly they did not involve in their priorities the development of capitalist market economy and reserved a privileged position for the educated segments of societies. (Szelenyi 1982; Karabel 1996)

During the 20th century the societies of CEE underwent radical transformations of their social structures. State socialism had a prominent role. The characteristics and positions of educated segments of society were also radically changed, yet the term 'intelligentsia' was continually used to denote their significant part. In the state-socialist societies a birth of a new category of educated people – the 'working intelligentsia' – was proclaimed. Yet this 'working intelligentsia' in the intentions of this project did not have the privilege to be the exclusive bearer of the modernization project. (Karabel 1996; Kemp-Welch and Jennings 1997; Szelenyi 1982)

Two issues affect the choice of the definition of the 'intelligentsia' for the purposes of the analysis of Slovak society. First, as in other societies in the CEE, Slovak society did not follow the Western-type path of modernization. (Szűcs 2001) Second, as discussed above, the term 'intelligentsia' is used in various diverging ways. Thus, it is useful to adopt for the purposes of the analysis of Slovak case a more robust and inclusive version of the concept of 'intelligentsia' than the one developed for the societies of the CEE in the 19th century. I define

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strong political dimension. The term 'intelligentsia' was also already adopted during the 19th century in the public discourses of Western societies. It was used to denote a wider set of the members of society, which are connected with the sphere of cultural production and from this position derive their high position in the social structure and due to this they have, or claim, non-negligible influence and power in society. Gradually this term became established also in the sphere of social science. (Karabel 1996; Kemp-Welch and Jennings 1997; Szelenyi 1982)

[13] Thus the teleological component of their cultural capital is much stronger in comparison with the cultural capital of the professionals.

'intelligentsia' as those members of society "who create, distribute, and apply *culture*, that is, the symbolic world of man, including art, science, and religion."[14] (Lipset 1981, 333)

This set can be divided into two main levels and one peripheral part on the basis of the importance of their cultural capital for their social position.[15] The higher their position the higher is their level within the intelligentsia and the higher are the amounts of cultural capital they posses. The first level of intelligentsia is composed of the dominant actors in the sphere of cultural production[16], of the core of the creators/producers of the culture, such as "scholars, artists, philosophers, authors, some editors, and some journalists." (Lipset 1981, 333) The second level is composed of the distributors of culture such as "performers in the various arts, most teachers, most reporters" and peripheral third group is composed of "those who apply culture as part of their jobs - professionals like physicians and lawyers." (Lipset 1981, 333) Additionally to this division of intelligentsia into three horizontal levels, Karabel (1996) further divides intelligentsia into three vertical segments. This division is based on the relative importance of the technological aspect and the teleological aspect in the cultural capital of the intelligentsia of the given vertical segment.

Table 1: Karabel's (1996) division of intelligentsia

Level \ Dominant aspect of capital	*Technologic aspect*	*Both aspects*	*Teleological aspect*
(1) Production of culture	A1	B1	C1
(2) Distribution of culture	A2	B2	C2
(3) Application of culture	A3	B3	C3

Based on Karabel (1996).

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[14] Lipset (1981) originally uses the label 'intellectuals' for these segments of society, but I follow Karabel (1996) and adopt the underlying concept, yet I use a different term –'intelligentsia.'

[15] Here I adapt Lipset's (1981) classical tripartite division; it is important to note that Lipset (1981) does not use the term 'cultural capital.'

[16] Indeed in some 'less developed' societies the dominant actors of the culture belong also to the second level of intelligentsia. (Lipset 1991) However this is not the case of the society under scrutiny in this research.

When combined these two divisions divide the intelligentsia (analytically, although not practically) into nine segments. (Table 1) Karabel (1996) on this basis distinguishes the 'technical intelligentsia' (A1, A2, A3), the 'political intelligentsia' (B1, B2, B3) and 'cultural intelligentsia' (C1, C2, C3). The label of 'political intelligentsia' chosen by Karabel (1996) due to the political importance of the knowledge produced by it can imply a direct political engagement of the members of this segment into the political life, but such an engagement is not automatic. Thus, I label this segment of intelligentsia as the 'social-scientific intelligentsia.'

The usefulness of Karabel's (1996) distinction of the three vertically divided segments of the intelligentsia stems from the different importance of these aspects of cultural capital for the power structures of the society. The cultural capital with a dominant technological component constitutes 'technical expertise,' which is possessed by the intelligentsia of natural science, technology (narrowly understood), and the more technically oriented part of the social-scientific intelligentsia. This type of cultural capital is contextually bound[17] and it is essential for the functioning of many spheres of modern societies. The cultural capital with a dominant teleological aspect is much less contextually bound and constitutes the 'interpretative resources' and allows its possessors to use symbolic power. In large part it is possessed by the social-scientific intelligentsia and cultural intelligentsia, yet non-negligible interpretative resources are also under the control of political actors. (Karabel 1996)

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1.3.3 The Intellectuals

If some (sub-)type of capital is a relevant principle of differentiation in a given society, then the agents who posses such amounts of this capital that they can control its field hold also some positions in the field of power of this society. The field of power is a meta-field in which

[17] The notion of contextual boundedness points to the applicability of a capital in various fields. The less is the given type of capital contextually bound, the wider field of application it has. (Karabel 1996)

these agents struggle for 'setting the exchange rates' between various capitals and for the control over the institutions that can modify these rates. (Bourdieu 1998)

Thus, intellectuals[18] can be defined as individuals that possess relatively high amounts of cultural capital, which is relatively contextually unbound, in societies where this capital belongs to the relevant principles of differentiation. Their cultural capital and positioning within the sphere of culture and field of power allow them to intervene in other spheres of social life. Crucially, in public discourses they can attempt to exercise symbolic power and thus influence also spheres of social life other than their original sphere. This concept of intellectuals is applicable for all modern societies, as the cultural capital is a relevant principle of differentiation in all of them.

By defining the intellectuals as a part of the intelligentsia and adopting Eyal's (2003) theory of new class I understand intellectuals as a segment of the new class. Eyal's (2003) theory overcomes the 'false dilemmas' that mark the theories of new class, especially when they are applied in the analysis of post-communist societies. The first dilemma concerns the class character of the new class. Critics, especially from Marxist positions, emphasize that the new class cannot be characterized as a class. The most developed form of this argument points out that the educated stratum occupies a 'contradictory class location' and thus has contradictory and fluid interests.[19] Eyal (2003) overcomes this by adopting Bourdieu's theory of social space and social groups and classes. [20] The class is then understood as a group of

[18] A brief genealogy of the term 'intellectuals' is in place. The term 'intellectuals' appears in the public discourse at the end of the 19th century. Its use can be observed already in the 18th century, yet only in isolated areas and with a much lower frequency than later. In the end of the 19th century the term 'intellectuals' gradually substituted the term 'intelligentsia' in the West. For the first time it became frequent and widely used in connection with the Dreyfus affair. (see e.g. Kemp-Welch and Jennings 1997) In the beginning of the 20th century the term 'intellectuals' was used to denote a diverse set of actors (scientists, artists, journalists, etc.) from various spheres which perceived as their moral obligation and collective right to intervene in the political processes. (Bauman 1987)

[19] For this critique besides Eyal's (2003) discussion of it see also its summarization by E.O. Wright (1979).

[20] According to Bourdieu (1991) social classes are constituted by agents socialized within similar socio-structural conditions and thus have similar habituses and are inclined to similar perceptions, cognitions, and actions if they are in similar conditions. The classes are only 'classes on paper,' as they have necessarily only a theoretical existence and allow explaining and predicting the features and practices of the classified agents. As sets of agents close in the social space they are 'probabilistic classes.' Similarly as in the geographical space, even this space of

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agents that are located in positions of the social space that are close enough to create a possibility to create and adopt a class identity for them. These processes take place in the 'classificatory struggles' in which such class identities, classifications, and boundaries are made, challenged and unmade. Then the educated constitute a 'class on paper' due to the proximity of their positions within the social space which is determined by their capital assets – of them the cultural capital being the most important one – and by their trajectories within the social space. These factors also allow us to identify their group or class interests and their genesis. This concept of class allows us also to identify the relations and boundaries of intellectuals and other social groups.

The second of the dilemmas attached to new class theories is concerned with the character of the dominant or dominated status of the new class. As Eyal (2003) points out, this problem is associated with understanding – under the term power – only specific forms of power, mostly repressive (or more generally 'negative') and economical ones. His solution is twofold. First, analysis shows that such kinds of power were not typical for new class groups even when they were very close to the dominant position. Deployment of Bourdieu's social theory can solve this problem. The new class is then constituted by those, who posses significant assets (both relatively and absolutely large) of cultural capital. These assets locate them in the field of power and are the precise source of their power. Eyal's (2003) new class thus falls into the intelligentsia as I define it and intellectuals as I define them fall into Eyal's new class. Second, Eyal (2003) introduces Foucault's concept of peculiar features of a specific form of power that is exercised by the new class in discursive practices: the 'power/knowledge' and 'subjection'.[21] The specific form of power of new class is 'positive'

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social relations requires the agents to pay for the movements by labor, effort and time. Mutual distances of agents within the social space determine the probability of the successful formation of an organization or group. The closer the actors are the higher is the probability and vice versa. The closeness of agents together with the similarity of their habituses are then factors which determine the probability of the organization or group to persist.

[21] For 'power/knowledge' and 'subjection' see Foucault's works (1979; 1982).

(i.e. productive, constitutive and enabling) and diffused through the whole social space rather than negative and concentrated around one center.

The position of intellectuals within the social structure affects their relations to the sphere of politics. The new proliferation of the division of labor that occurred in CEE and affects strongly also the intelligentsia – and intellectuals in particular – reflects to a large degree the Western pattern of professionalization. Consequently, the intellectuals in post-communist CEE are in a similar position as intellectuals in Western societies – they are the "dominated fraction of the dominant class." (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 192) Crucial are the structural relations of three spheres in which three different segments of dominant class are based: the sphere of economy, the sphere of cultural production, and the sphere of politics. Reflecting this, the field of power is occupied by the dominant actors of these spheres – economic elites, political elites and cultural (intellectual) elites mutually dependent because of the resources each of them controls. (Karabel 1996)

1.4 Think Tanks and Intellectuals

1.4.1 Theorizing Think Tanks

In contemporary public, political and scientific debates the term 'think-tank' is a constant presence. This is linked to the increased number, visibility and perhaps also influence of specific institutions concerned with policy research and influencing in political life, which take specific forms of organization distinguishing them from the related spheres of politics, media, business and academy. The concept of 'think tank' is a socially contested one and as Stone and Garnett (1998) point out, the diversity of the institutions labeling themselves or being labeled as think tanks furthers the intricacy of this concept.

The relatively small, yet growing body of literature on think tanks (rooted mainly in the field of public policy studies) offers various accounts on the definitions, functions, and typologies think tanks. Attempts to decide whether think tanks should be defined as

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governmental or non-governmental institutions, as profit or non-profit oriented, as public or private, as conducting independent research or only disseminating it, beset the debate. (Medvetz 2006; Stone and Garnett 1998; McGann and Weaver 2000)

Emphasizing the need for conceptual robustness McGann and Weaver (2000, 4) recommend to depart from a broad definition of think tanks as "institutions that provide public policy research analysis and advice" and precise the definition context-sensitively. Building on this strategy I adopt within the Bourdieuan framework a theory of think tanks attentive both to the structures in which they are located and to the agents active within them, which simultaneously underscores the dimension of knowledge production. In the pursuit of this strategy a brief account on the genesis of think tanks is suitable.

The institutions conducting research on public policy emerged in the late 19th century in the USA and for a large part of the 20th century remained a distinctively US phenomenon. (McGann 1992) As such, they bear a legacy of the context in which they originated and take this legacy even when transposed to different contexts. Moreover, their proliferation in the US took place in four distinct waves, each connected with a "major domestic or international upheaval that sparked the creation of a new generation of public policy research institutes" bringing new elements to the sphere and transforming it, each wave thus creating a specific legacy of its own. (McGann 1992, 733)

The first wave occurred on the beginning of the 20th century as the existing scientific expertise was expanding to the sphere of economic and political problems. Private capital helped to set up relatively autonomous institutions, which sought to utilize the expertise of scholars and managers to solve the social and economic hardships through policies and programs development, before tax funded agencies pursuing similar ends were set up. (McGann 1992) World War I, and the new status of US as a global power, influenced the first wave. The drive for a more active role of the USA in the international politics and the idea

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that the specific qualities of US economic system destined it to alter the existing unsatisfying patterns of international behavior merged with the movement for the application of "social science and scientific management." (McGann 1992, 734) The blueprint of the think tank – the 'Brookings model' – in which the established scholars from social sciences, commonly assuming the aura of 'disinterested experts,' analyze public policy issues in an empirical, scientific, objective and value-free fashion was formed. (McGann 1992)

The second wave (dating from 1930 to 1959) was crucially shaped by World War II and driven by concern with US foreign and defense policies. Also, the concern with the re-conversion of the economy and the political order to peacetime conditions led business circles to support conservative institutes aiming to inhibit the expansion of the etatist forces. The 'military-intellectual complex' and the 'defense intellectuals' were embodying this milieu.[22] (McGann 1992) It is in this period when the policy research institutes started to be labeled as 'think tanks' and the term also became used anachronistically for the institutes from the previous periods. (Medvetz 2006)

The third wave (dating from 1960 to 1975) was shaped by the social and political turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s. At the time defense contracts were disappearing and simultaneously the institutes focused on urban and social policy issues were expanding. The availability of governmental funding for this type of research was crucial. New institutes were set up and many existing ones adopted this agenda extending their focus. Also government-established agencies were expanding. (McGann 1992)

In the fourth wave (dating form 1976 to 1990) McGann (1992) identifies six trends that altered the landscape of the sphere of public policy research institutes. These were the proliferation of the institutes, their shift towards the center of federal power in Washington D.C., their growing specialization and increasing politicization, the increase and

[22] The Rand Corporation founded in 1948 set the standards for this period, focusing on the defense and foreign policy research applying the 'research and development techniques' (R and D). (McGann 1992)

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professionalization of legislative's and executive's staff and the increased role and influence of media in the policy process. (McGann 1992) In connection with these trends one radical transformation took place: abandoning the original conception of technical expertise, the institutes allied with political forces and took up an openly ideological production. This trend was pioneered by the (neo)conservative think-tanks[23] and adopted also by the institutes of other ideological backgrounds. (McGann 1992) Roots of this transformation can be traced to the collapse of the 'liberal consensus,' the emergence of an 'international conservative movement' (McGann and Weaver 2000) and the emergence of human rights networks in the 1970s and 1980s. (Guilhot 2005)

In the phase started by the fourth wave Medvetz (2006) identified five historical shifts. First, the think tanks and policy experts became increasingly relationally oriented. The competition for funding and media attention increased, they became positioning towards each other in effort to secure these resources and an increase of the number and importance of rivalries and collaborations resulted. Second, distinctive forms of intellectual production emerged, specific and increasingly rigidly standardized genres reflecting the needs to catch the attention of media, political and business audiences and thus adopting the elements of the intellectual production characteristic for these spheres. Third, knowledge about think tanks became increasingly codified, in scholarly research as in the media production and business. Fourth, distinct mechanism relatively independent from other spheres assuring the reproduction of the think-tank sphere emerged. This involved the institutionalization of means of training and socialization of personnel relatively independent of the academic sphere. Fifth, distinct new forms of "lifestyle and habitus" of the individuals working in the sphere emerged as "a new mode of social and professional being." (Medvetz 2006, 17)

These five shifts represent the formation of a distinct 'field-like' social microcosm, a 'proto-field' of policy expertise. (Medvetz 2006) This social microcosm can be analytically

[23] The Heritage Foundation (founded in 1973) is an exemplary case. (McGann 1992)

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represented as a "space anchored and delimited by the four institutional poles of politics, academics, business, and journalism," thus capturing the dual character of its existence. (Medvetz 2006, 9) The think tanks on the one hand compose a relatively autonomous social microcosm with its own rules of practice and structures and autonomous of the will and intentions of the individual agents which at the same time remains bound to the four established 'parental' fields among which it is located. These bounds to the fields of academics, business, journalism and politics are simultaneously material as these fields provide material, financial and personal resources and symbolic, as they provide also 'imaginary models' from which the experts in the field build their self-understanding, which thus becomes hybrid. (Medvetz 2006) Summing up his account on US think tanks, Medvetz (2006, 2) points out that the contemporary

> American think-tanks occupy an emergent "proto-field," a constitutively hybrid, structurally intermediate system of relations that traverses, links, and overlaps the divergent worlds of politics, academics, business, and journalism. In this peculiar arena of intellectual production, policy specialists vie for control over both (a) the means of producing politically relevant knowledge, and (b) the proper definition of the "expert." The space of think tanks is notable for its growing boundedness and autonomy from academic production, its dependence on the outside institutions, and its internal differentiation with respect to the forms of power held by policy experts.

I adopt Medvetz's (2006) theory of the proto-field of think tanks. However, its application in the analysis of the sphere of think tanks in the context of the post-communist CEE requires taking into account several regional specifics.

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1.4.2 Think Tanks and Intellectuals in CEE

In Slovakia as in the whole CEE the emergence of think tanks can be seen as a part of a larger wave of proliferation of think tanks into various regions of the world that begun in 1980s continuing the forth wave and being strongly influenced by it. The countries that started the political and economic transformation towards democracy and market economy

experienced emergence of think tanks with Western donors assisting it both with funding and know how. As McGann and Weaver (2000, 12) point out, in the CEE think tanks that emerged after the end of the Cold War "were created to provide intellectual and political muscle for the transition taking place" in this region. These think tanks also took from their Western partners' know how blueprints of organization and functioning, resulting in many similarities between them and their Western counterparts. These blueprints were transposed to an environment in many ways different from the US situation.

The literature standardly identifies several areas of difference between CEE and US, most prominently CEE think tanks operate in different legal, political and economic conditions. (see Stone and Garnett 1998; McGann and Weaver 2000) However, with one exception all of these differences do not alter the character of the sphere of think tanks in terms of the spheres to which it is tied. Thus, although in CEE think tanks have somewhat differently structured ties with politics, business, academy and media the sphere in which they operate fits Medvetz's (2006) theory of the proto-field of think tanks. The one factor that makes the environment and the character of the sphere considerably different is precisely the essential role of Western donors in founding and funding CEE policy research institutes, as not only what can be described as their success, but also the most important challenges they face are closely tied to it. (Kimball 2000)

To grasp this role of Western donors I utilize Guilhot's (2005) analysis of the transnational 'field of democracy and human rights' as the crucial Western donors (NED and Ford Foundation to name just few) are located within this field.[24] Guilhot (2005) defines this field as sphere of a social network institutionalized in an international structure of NGOs, transnational and governmental agencies centered on the production and proliferation of the knowledge how to build and preserve institutions of democratic regime, human rights,

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democratic governance and market economy. I grasp the influence of these Western donors as a fifth paternal field – the transnational 'field of democracy and human rights' – of the Slovak proto-field of think tanks in addition to the four paternal fields defined by Medvetz (2006).

This fifth paternal field has a different status than the other four. Its importance and influence are changing over time. In the beginning the CEE think tanks were fundamentally tied to it. The democracy, market economy and civil society building were then the fundaments of the agenda of Western donors, who were giving as a part of its pursuit general institutional support for CEE think tanks. As the democracy and free market were implemented in CEE, the focus of Western donors shifted to other regions and the support that remained in the region became more project-oriented. (Kimball 2000) As a consequence think tanks (and intellectuals within them) face the fact that the withdrawal of the Western donors leaves them in a situation where they are similarly as US think tanks located between four fields of politics, business, academy, and journalism. Yet these four fields and their mutual relations and the relations to the proto-field of think tanks are somewhat different than in the US case.

In addition I use two further modifications of Medvetz's (2006) theory in order to adopt it for the purposes of the analysis of Slovakia. As the proto-field of think tanks is an objective set of relations between agents irreducible to agents' direct intentions and interactions, I add to my analysis also individual – i.e. non-organizational – agents active within the field taking part in its internal struggles and engaging in its specific form of intellectual production, that is in policy and politics expertise.

Two aspects of this strategy of mine require further explanation. First, I include the notion of political expertise to the intellectual production, as in Slovakia the think tanks were at least for a certain period engaged in a specifically political expertise, producing even

[24] For the most important donors see e.g. the discussion of Western donors' role in establishing the think tanks in CEE by Mungiu Pippidi (1999) and the status of these donors within the transnational field of democracy and

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knowledge close to the political-consultancy type. Second, I include individual agents to my analysis of the relevant agents of the Slovak proto-field of think tanks, because Slovak marketplace of political expertise is relatively small (both in terms of resources and competitors). Thus some individual intellectuals-analysts can effectively engage and compete in it (or at least in a longer than short term horizon attempt to do so) without being fully integrated into a specific think tank or other similar organizational platform. Due to this theoretical modification of mine the proto-field of think tanks becomes more a proto-field of political expertise, however in my analysis of Slovakia further I also apply the term 'proto-field of think tanks' when denoting this transposed and extended notion of the concept.

To sum up I utilize Medvetz's (2006) theory of think tanks, yet I modify it in three main ways. (1) I add a fifth paternal field – the 'field of democracy and human rights'. (2) I add the notion of political expertise to the notion of policy expertise proper as one of the essential elements of the specific intellectual production of the field. (3) I add the individual (non-organizational) agents to the analysis of the field. I further elaborate these aspects of my theoretical modifications in my analysis, focusing on whether they can be justified in the light of the empirical data.

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human rights analyzed by Guilhot (2005).

CHAPTER 2: THE THINK TANK SPHERE IN SLOVAKIA 1998 – 2006

In this chapter I focus on the new social positions of intellectuals in the proto-field of think tanks and policy expertise in Slovakia in the period from 1998 to 2006.[25] After a brief characterization of the broader political context and the role of think tanks in it, I identify the proto-field's main think tanks and other organizational and individual agents. Next I analyze the proto-field's relations to its paternal fields of politics, academy, business, journalism, and the transnational field of democracy and human rights. Due to my adoption and modifications of Medvetz's (2006) theory, throughout the analysis I emphasize the different structural characteristics of the US and Slovak proto-field. Analyzing the relations of the proto-field to each of its paternal fields I focus on their material and symbolic dimensions and the sources of their dynamics on field, organizational and individual level. I assess them through the institutional structures, flows of resources, circulation of personnel and proto-field's intellectuals' trajectories, habituses, multiple-agent status and hybridity. Emphasizing the analytical value of a Bourdiean perspective, Medvetz (2006, 3-4) points out that

> [t]he notion of think tanks as occupying a hybrid, field-like space destabilizes the category "intellectual" by underscoring its socially contested nature. Think tanks thereby challenge the common assumption that intellectuals are a negligible presence in American politics. Instead, their proliferation points to the existence of a highly developed, differentiated, and dynamic – but heteronomous – space of intellectual production.

Following Medvetz (2006), I similarly argue that in Slovakia intellectuals were not a negligible presence in politics, thus analyzing how the proto-field allows its intellectuals to reproduce and utilize their capitals and gain influence and power. I give special attention to their presence in politics, involving not only the field of parliamentary and party politics, but also top-level administration and public service, as these are in Slovakia structurally subordinated to the field of politics.

[25] Hereafter I also refer to the proto-field of think tanks and policy expertise in Slovakia as a 'proto-field.'

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2.1 Political Context 1998 – 2006

Slovakia's situation from 1998 to 2006 was different form the other V4 countries, which were in 1998 already further on the paths of democratization and European and international integration. This lagging of Slovakia was largely due to the rule of the second generation of the post-communist elite. HZDS under leader Vladimír Mečiar was its dominant element and from 1992 till 1998 the main political force in Slovakia. In government for almost the whole period (only with a brief intermission of interim government in 1994), it raised doubts not only about the state of Slovakia's transformation to democracy and market economy, but also about the prospects and the very direction of Slovakia. Especially after the early elections of 1994 the ruling coalition of HZDS, SNS and ZRS manifested authoritarian tendencies.

After the parliamentary elections of 1998 SDK, SDL, SMK, and SOP – the political forces that opposed the previous coalition – gained over a three-fifths majority in the parliament and formed a governing coalition with Mikuláš Dzurinda as the Prime Minister. This diverse coalition, which involved several parties from post-communist left to liberal-conservative right, had as its priorities to finish Slovakia's transformation to liberal democracy and to rejuvenate the processes of Slovakia's international and European integration catching up with other V4 countries in their efforts to enter the EU and NATO. Despite the coalition's unity being disrupted by diverging views on the economic and social reforms, and tensions and splits among its members, it endured for the whole term and succeeded in its main priorities. Slovakia started to catch up with the other V4 countries in consolidating democracy and European and international integration.

In the parliamentary elections of September 2002 four center-right parties – SDKU, KDH, ANO, and SMK – won a narrow majority in the parliament and formed a coalition with Mikuláš Dzurinda being the Prime Minister. The coalition's programmatic goals continued

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the aims of the previous coalition and its ideological and programmatic proximity allowed for agreement also on a broader and ambitious spectrum of economic and social reforms.[26] Through the course of four years many conflicts within the coalition occurred, resulting in the loss of parliamentary majority, and later break up of the coalition and early parliamentary elections in 2006. Despite these problems Slovakia successfully entered into the EU and NATO in 2004. Despite the wide controversies over government's economic and social reform policies, the implementation of some of them was successful in terms of the intended aims.[27]

During Dzurinda's two terms as Prime Minister the think tanks rose in Slovakia to an unprecedented prominence. Reaching high levels of media visibility, influence in public discourse and influence on policy making, think tanks were engaged in the reform and integration policies leading some scholars, observers and engaged actors even to claim that this development was unparalleled in any other V4 country. (Schneider 2003)

2.2 The Agents of the Proto-Field of Think Tanks

As the literature finds it difficult to agree upon a more than a very general definition of a think tank, it is an even more intricate question how to assess the strength, dominance or success of a think tank (i.e. its relevance). The most visible aspect of a think tank's relevance is its influence over policies. Grasping its channels is a complex and intricate task due to their diversity – besides the more-or-less direct participation in the formally institutionalized policy process, there is a variety of 'less direct' ways: shaping the public, political and scholarly debates, getting the attention of decision makers and other involved top-level actors, or mobilizing public support. (Stone and Garnett 1998) In addition, the analysis of influence is

[26] These reforms included most importantly tax system reform, reform of the pension system and health-care reform. (Gyárfášová 2004)
[27] It is largely agreed that the core of the reform policies was successful; most importantly the economic growth has accelerated as a result. (Gyárfášová 2004; Mesežnikov 2004)

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further complicated by the policy diffusion, which remains one of the main challenges faced by political scientists (see Braun and Gilardini 2006). Analytically two main dimensions of think tank's influence can be distinguished: the influence in public debates and the more or less direct participation in the formalized policy process.

Besides these two dimensions of influence, there are multiple dimensions of think tank's relevance. The resources that allow think tanks to become relevant actors in the policy process are diverse as they involve expertise, material and financial resources, social capital,[28] or reputation to name just the most important ones. Moreover, not only is the possession of resources important, but also the autonomy in manipulating with them. This necessitates the extension of the analytical focus when evaluating think tank's relevance. Adopting this multidimensional approach to relevance, I utilize both primary data and existing literature to identify the main agents of the sphere and add to my analysis also other agents – both organizational and individual – with lesser relevance. Drawing a more complex picture of the sphere provides also space for the analysis of the relevance of think tanks and experts of different ideological orientations and its causes.

2.2.1 The Main Think Tanks

Depending on the criteria chosen – the definition of think tank and the indicators of its relevance – as well as the specific period under scrutiny, there are variations in the broader set of relevant think tanks identified in the literature. Despite these variations, the literature agrees upon a core set of most relevant think tanks in Slovakia. These are IVO, MESA 10, F.A. Hayek foundation, INEKO group, KI and RC SFPA.[29] INEKO group is an umbrella

[28] Social capital is membership in social networks, the ability to gain and retain this membership and the resources, which the membership enables to acquire and posses. (Bourdieu 1983) As Možný (1991, 31) put it, it comes from "the ability to create complex webs of social networks, to understand how these networks are constructed and to use this ability for own benefit, prominently through moving oneself and one's own allies to strategically advantageous positions;" this ability can be cumulated.

[29] For the accounts on main think tanks in Slovakia see Schneider's (2003) work on think tanks in V4 countries and the account on Slovak think tanks by Horváth et al. (2004). Both these sources discuss the existing accounts

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organization that integrates four relatively autonomous think tanks: INEKO, SGI, TIS, and CPHR and serves as a 'think tank incubator.' (Schneider 2003) CPHR was the first one of them and de facto the platform on which INEKO group was build. In the period 1998-2006 they were steadily the most active, influential, resource-endowed, and reputed ones.

The five main think tanks can be found in the Table 2 and Table 3. The sources of data on think tanks in Table 2 – IVO, MESA 10, RC SFPA, and F.A. Hayek Foundation – are think tanks' annual and cumulative reports (MESA 10 1999; 2000; 2003; 2005; 2007; IVO 1999; 2004), on-line documents by think tanks (RC SFPA 2006a; 2006b) and accounts by Horvát et al. (2004), NIRA (2002), Schneider (2003), Leška (1999), and Šípoš and Dubéci (2007a). The sources of data on think tanks in Table 3 – INEKO, CPHR, SGI, TIS, and KI – are cumulative and annual reports of think tanks (INEKO 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; CPHR 1998; 2000; SGI 2003; TIS 2003; 2006; KI 2006; 2007) and accounts by Horváth et al. (2004), Šípoš and Dubéci (2007a), NIRA (2002), and Schneider (2003).

The think tanks are characterized along several dimensions: declared goals, the actual scope of their activities (i.e. their main focus), ideological orientation or proximity and main sources of funding. The ideological orientation and proximity is assessed here not in the terms declared by the think tanks, but in terms of the congruence of the value and programmatic orientations of the organizations to the actors of Slovak political field. In the ideological orientations and proximities of think tanks under scrutiny, besides my own analysis, I utilize also Šípoš's and Dubéci's (2007a) account. The tables also provide additional information about specific relevant particularities of the think tanks concerned with the features that distinguish them from the others and are discussed later in the analysis.

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on think tanks in Slovakia and provide their own multidimensional characterizations of the main think tanks. In the main set of think tanks identified they differ as Schneider (2003) excludes SFPA (RC SFPA) form the list of think tanks and adds also nSPACE. Horváth et al. (2004) add nSPACE and CEP.

Table 2: The Main Think Tanks in Slovakia 1998-2006 Part 1

Think tank	IVO - Institute for Public Affairs	MESA 10 - Center for Economic & Social Analyses	F.A. Hayek foundation	RC SFPA - SFPA Research Center
Est.	1997	1992	1991	1995
Declared Goals	To promote and contribute to the strengthening of the values of the open society - freedom, market economy, democracy, ethnic tolerance.	Promotion of free market economy, limited role of the state, inviolability of private property, separation of economic and political power and associated values and principles.	Promotion of ideas of Austrian school economics and economic liberalism.	Independent research on foreign policy and international relations of Slovakia.
Focus	Broad: policy research from many sectors, political and sociological analyses.	Forming and advocating policies concerned with economic and social reform, European integration, reform and decentralization of public administration, and regional development.	Forming and advocating pension system reform, tax system reform, liberalization of energy sector, education system reform. Proliferation of advocated ideas.	Research on foreign policy, European and international integration.
Ideological Orientation / Proximity	Center-right	Right	Right	Center-right
Main Sources of Funding	OSF, Ford Foundation, GMF, NED, IRI, Western embassies, Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe	OSF, FH, British Know-How Fund, KAS	Prevalently private/ business.	FH, OSF, GMF, KAS, Foreign embassies, public sector.
Other features	Arguably the most successful think tank. Scholarly character, intense research and publishing.	Satellite consulting agency ‘MESA 10 Consulting Group.’	Satellite consulting agency ‘Hayek Consulting.’	Part of SFPA. Personal continuity with the former research center of foreign affairs ministry.

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Table 3: The Main Think Tanks in Slovakia 1998-2006 Part 2

Think tank	INEKO group				
	CPHR - Center for Economic Development	TIS - Transparency International Slovakia	SGI - Strategic Governance Institute	INEKO - Institute for Economic and Social Reforms	KI - Conservative institute
Est.	1993	1998	2001	1999	1999
Declared Goals	Support of economic process transparency, entrepreneurship, and democracy and quality of life in Slovakia.	Transparency promotion, fight against corruption.	Search for solutions for transparent and effective allocation of public resources and public services.	Development and promotion of solutions for long-term economic growth.	Promotion of conservative views and values.
Focus	Wide spectrum of research and knowledge dissemination activities, primary focus on economy.	Transparency of public sector promotion, focus on central and local government.	Policy research and knowledge dissemination with focus on public finances, e-government, public administration and education system.	Economic analyses and knowledge dissemination. Focus on national level, long-term and macro- perspective.	Ideas proliferation. Conferences and seminars. Focus on economic, fiscal, and foreign policies, societal development, political system, national security.
Ideological Orientation / Proximity	Center-right	Center-right	Center-right	Center-right	Right (conservative)
Main Sources of Funding	OSF, FH, UNDP, PHARE	USAID, Local Government Institute, FES, European Commission	UNDP, Ekopolis Foundation, WB, OSF, OSI, Western embassies	Ford Foundation, OSI, OSF, GMF, UNDP, Freedom House, foreign embassies	KAS, Hans Seidel Stiftung, Ekopolis Foundation, private donors.
Other features	Satellite organization PAS (fifth member of INEKO group).	Transparency International branch.		Think tank 'incubator.' / umbrella organization.	Leadership overlap with OKS party.

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2.2.2 Other Agents of the Proto-Field

Besides the core set of the most relevant think tanks outlined above, there are three further sets of organizational agents present in the proto-field. The first set is composed of think tanks of lesser relevance, which is due to their narrow and specific focus. For instance the HPI – Health Policy Institute – focuses on the health sector policies and reforms. Other examples are nSPACE (focused on social policy) or Forum Institute (focused on minority related issues).[30]

The second set is composed of institutions fashioned as think tanks in their organizational form and intentions, which nevertheless do not become full-fledged think tanks. They differ from the first set in their broader focus, but for variety of reasons do not become full-fledged think tanks as they fail to continuously produce policy expertise. The lack of know-how, expertise, staffing, finances and other resources are usually the causes. In some cases the reasons might include the intention of creators to use the think tank form for some different purposes. These purposes are usually linked with different forms of non-profit organizations such as advocacy tanks. In some cases there is arguably the intention to derive from the think tank form some symbolic capital as it can provide the image of expertise and neutrality and also funding. The instances of the think tanks of the second set are ASA and ISOS.[31]

There is one important caveat to be added to the discussion of the second set, namely there might be also strategy of redefining the socially accepted scope of policy-relevant expertise present through the use of the think tank image to legitimize some marginal views or

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[30] For HPI, nSPACE and Forum Institute see also accounts by Horváth et al. (2004) and Šípoš and Dubéci (2007a). For Forum Institute's history and activities see also Tóth's (2006) recapitulation of the ten years of its existence and Forum Institute's (Forum Institute 2004) self-characterizing document. For nSPACE see also Schneider's (2003) account.

[31] ISOS is virtually not active for several years since its founding. ASA was founded in 2004 and focuses on policy research and knowledge dissemination in lines with its creed of 'social justice' and 'solidarity.'(see ASA 2007)

views with non-expertise status. Thus the social contestations of concepts taking place complicate the delineation of second set's boundaries.

The third set is composed of organizations which are not proper think tanks in their organizational form and their primary activities, yet in some of their activities they de facto function like think tanks. NGOs and foundations like CEP, Pontis foundation, or NMS also do policy research and/or its dissemination, typically as a part of their focal activities.[32]

Among the relevant agents in the proto-field are besides the organizational agents also several individual intellectuals-experts. Though sometimes they can be members of a think tank or other similar organizational platform, or collaborate with it, they remain relevant agents as individuals and not exclusively through their think tank positions or links, typically holding also positions in the academy, media, or non-think tank NGOs.[33]

2.3 Relations of the Proto-Field with its Parental Fields

2.3.1 Relations with the Academy

In Slovakia the proto-field markedly differs from the US in its relations with the academy and the main reasons lie in academy's character. Slovak academy – and particularly the social sciences – is marked by the standard problems of post-communist academies: lack of financing and material resources, insufficient or unqualified staffing, and lack of credit to name just the most salient ones.[34] Many of these problems are legacies of communism. In the case of social sciences one factor is particularly strongly present behind these problems: in

[32] For example Pontis foundation focuses on civil society empowerment, corporate philanthropy promotion, civil society development in transforming and non-democratic countries, and promotion of human rights and democratization agenda in Slovak and European foreign policies, and conducts also policy research and its dissemination. (see Horváth et al. 2004) For CEP, which is focused on European integration and related issues see account by Horváth et al. (2004). For NMS's wide spectrum of activities see the annual reports of NMS (e.g. NMS 2004; and 2005).

[33] Also the think tankers recognize this situation. The ability of individual experts to become relevant agents of the proto-field was also admitted by one of the interviewed think tank leaders (Jurzyca 2007), who also named Eduard Chmelár as an instance. E. Chmelár, though a member of ISOS (a think tank with virtually no activity) also holds positions within the university, NGOs and is active as a journalist.

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communist regimes social sciences were under regime's tight ideological and power-concerns driven control, hindered and isolated from the international scientific life, limited in the scope of scientific activity. This left the social scientific academy in post-communist countries severely damaged and hardly able to adapt to the international scientific life. In Slovakia this was felt particularly strong, as was even in the 1970s and 1980s the Czechoslovak communist regime one of the most rigid in the region.

Moreover, during the period of 'normalization' the combination of co-optation and repression strategies of nomenclatura towards social scientists created a culture of passivity, conformity and provinciality prevailing in a significant part of the social scientific community, which nevertheless enjoyed a relatively comfortable existence as a reward. (Medzihorský 2006) Additionally, as in many other communist countries, the academy became an attractive sphere for individuals who would in system with market economy and/or liberal democracy pursue different forms of existence.

Although not all the academic community shared the culture of passivity, conformity and provinciality, this culture persisted and reproduced even during the 1990s as a part of the academy allied with the second generation of post-communist political elites and was effectively co-opted by them. Once again in exchange for loyalty to the ruling elite or its legitimization, they secured a relatively comfortable existence and avoided the adaptation to the internationally shared standards of scientific work.[35] Thus, despite the opportunities and efforts to change this state after the breakdown of communism and the marked differences between parts of the academy, these legacies remain present and affect also academy's relations with the proto-field.

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[34] See Johnson's (1996) discussion of the state of the post-communist academies and its impacts on the emergent think tank sphere.

[35] For the emergence of this relationship see e.g. Eyal (2003) for his account on how the alliance between the nationalist historians and the second generation of post-communist political elite was formed.

As two relatively separate spheres of intellectual production the proto-field and academy are typically tied by the relations of competition and cooperation in the production of knowledge. In Slovakia, on the organizational level these relations are particularly marked by the fact that the academic institutions are mostly funded from public sources and the think tanks by Western or business donors. This reduces the incentives to compete for funding and contributes to the prevalence of the cooperation between the spheres over the competition. There are collaborations on research and publishing projects between think tanks and academic institutions. In these the latter contribute prevalently with the cultural and sometimes symbolic capital (arguably they hold certain prestige, particularly the aura of scientific neutrality) and the former with funding, prestige, visibility, publishing and dissemination platforms and also cultural capital.

On the level of individual intellectuals, the state of social-scientific academy has serious effects as the wages, the prestige, and the working conditions of academics are often perceived as unsatisfying especially when they are compared to the Western situation. What results is that a strictly academic career in Slovak academy is not an attractive option for social scientists, and they are oriented to search other or complementary research opportunities and sources of income and prestige. This makes them prone to become 'double agents' – to hold several positions or be active simultaneously in the academy and in the proto-field is a common feature of think tank intellectuals in Slovakia.[36]

The dual agents utilize and combine the opportunities of both spheres often with cross-fertilizing effects. On the one hand think tanks can enable research not always possible in the academy due to its lack of resources and funds-distributing mechanisms often marked by bureaucratic rigidity and under the control or influence of various agents including the

[36] The analyzed CVs indicate that about one third of the think tankers were at some point active also in the academy as full- or part-time faculty members, researchers or university lecturers.

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political ones.[37] In addition think tanks' capacities to get media and popular attention allow them to reach wider domestic and international, scholarly and non-scholarly audiences than the academy.[38] On the other hand the academy offers access to cultural capital (prominently its institutionalized forms: degrees and positions[39]) and specific symbolic capital. The educational segment of the academy also offers one particularly attractive option to intellectuals: to teach. Some think tankers take teaching positions even on a volunteer basis, and the reason is not only the attached prestige or a mere diversification of one's assets: it is a unique opportunity to disseminate one's ideas and influence future generations of the educated segments of the society.[40] There is typically a certain sense of mission present behind this drive.

2.3.2 Relations with Business

In the US the ties of think tanks to business have been vital since the birth of the think tank sphere as the assistance of private capital was essential in establishing the first policy research institutes and despite the relative diversification of the sources of funding it still remains important. In CEE the situation is different, and obtaining funding from domestic business agents remains one of the biggest challenges think tanks face, particularly due to the lack and only slow development of a culture of philanthropy similar to the Western one. This

[37] The influence of various political, bureaucratic and academic agents over the fund distribution in the academy might not be as high as the perceptions and behavior of academics would suggest, but it is important to bear in mind that these are connected to the above discussed persisting academic culture of passivity and conformity. The persistent influence of this culture results for example in the relative lack of expressed criticism and clear stances towards governmental policies in some institutions of Slovak academy. One of the interviewed think tank leaders and an economist (Jurzyca 2007) indeed used this argumentation to explain lack of academic economists' criticism towards governmental policies. Here it is important to remind that in the period under scrutiny the persistence of this culture was highly varying across the academic institutions.

[38] IVO's publishing activity and its reception illustrate this; its 'Global Reports on Slovakia' constitutes an excellent example of highly influential and widely received think tank publication with strong academic dimension. For the extent, reputation and reception of IVO's publications see also accounts by Horváth et al. (2004), Leška (1999; 2006), and Haughton (2006).

[39] So far the think tanks in Slovakia do not have the degree granting entitlements like e.g. the Brookings Institution.

[40] The interviewed think tankers also stated (Jurzyca 2007; Mesežnikov 2007) that this motivation is present behind their academic activities.

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becomes even more salient as the support coming from the Western donors – who played in CEE an analogous role to that of private capital in West in the birth of the proto-field – is diminishing and changing from institutional to project-based support.

This holds true for Slovakia in the period under scrutiny: think tanks derive only a minor fraction of their budgets from business donors, and though the share is gradually increasing it cannot substitute for the diminishing funds form Western donors. In the period under scrutiny the material links of the proto-field with business were relatively weak as only few think tanks obtained significant parts of their funding from business donors.[41] In addition to the undeveloped culture of philanthropy, there are further hindrance to their relations with business, as many think tanks are cautious towards aligning themselves with business interests and also have other available strategies to fundraise then obtain donations from business.

One of the strategies think tanks in CEE pursue is the creation of a satellite profit-oriented consultancy agency. (Schneider 2003) In Slovakia some think tanks have pursued this strategy, [42] yet there are some hindrances to it. Business consulting consumes time and energy preferably deployable in think tank's activities. Moreover, even when it is possible it can be seen as problematic, as less fulfilling, scientific, attractive and stimulating than think tank activities. Then, even if it is considered as an option necessitated by the lack of funding, it is presented as a 'necessary evil.'[43]

[41] Šípoš and Dubéci (2007b) point out that despite the increasing tendency the funding from business actors constituted only about 20% of main think tanks' budgets in 2004 and 2005, with the only exception being HPI where these funds constitute around 80% of the budget. Also the F.A. Hayek Foundation states that business donors fund it in significant part. See also the account by Horváth et al. (2004) and Table 2 above.

[42] Of the main Slovak think tanks only two did so in the period under scrutiny MESA 10 (MESA 10 Consulting Group) and F.A.Hayek foundation (Hayek Consulting). See Table 2 above.

[43] A good instance of this was provided by one interviewed think tank leader and economist (Jurzyca 2007). He stated that their think tank has considered this option and decided that even if they opt for it under the pressure of circumstances, it will be strictly limited and the main reason will be to offer additional sources of income to think tank staff. Moreover, in case the consulting agency will be established and the opportunities to gain funding from donors will arise again, the think tank will inhibit the commercial consulting activities. Interestingly, this is also the case when the organization (CPHR respective INEKO) has long-term institutional ties with business institutionalized in PAS (The Business Alliance of Slovakia, founded in 2001). PAS serves as an organizational platform through which experts and businessmen join forces to influence policies. PAS shapes its mission as a representative of the interests of the whole business sector, and not particular interests of its members. Yet, by no means are the think tankers the junior partner in this partnership; quite the opposite and precisely due to their

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Similarly are proto-field's material and symbolic ties reflected on the individual level. Only few individual think tank affiliated intellectuals are simultaneously openly active in business and in the think tanks. Prevalently among economists there is some circulation of personnel between the spheres.[44] Some think tankers are individually involved in business consulting, however it is difficult to assess its character and degree. Evidence suggests that even if it does not take place, some intellectuals consider it as a viable individual strategy.[45]

Summarizing, between economists and other think tankers there is a difference in the relations to business as they are stronger materially and symbolically tied to it. They are more oriented to be dual agents or circulate between spheres. However, even in the case of economists this potential is not automatically opted for, with more academic or scholarly habituses making them unwilling to do so unless necessitated by financial concerns. The economists among the think tankers sometimes similarly as other think tankers emphasize the differences between their activities and business. This indicates the incompatibility of their habituses with the rules and demands of the business field.

2.3.3 Relations with Journalism

Media attention is one of the primary means to achieve relevance in an established think tank sphere. The think tanks have incentives to get the media attention; similarly media have incentives to provide them space and utilize their expertise in media production to fill the

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expertise. (Jurzyca 2007) For the think tankers this partnership where they proliferate their ideas among the businessmen is much more attractive than one, in which they have to assume a more technical role, such as in business consulting. Although they are economists, they see their activities dissimilar to bussiness.

[44] In the official CVs business activities are only rarely mentioned (about then one fifth of the CVs indicate involvement in business in any part of their career, half of them were economists). This might indicate lack of engagement in business, yet it is possible that business activities are omitted out of the official CVs as they are not seen as relevant. The CVs reflect mostly circulation from business to think tank sphere, and not vice versa as the people that left the sphere sometimes do not provide publicly their CVs (which might be connected to positions in the private sector).

[45] Mainly some think tankers' official CVs indicate that they possess the licenses to offer such services (this is common e.g. among KI staff).

space, diversify it and provide 'expert' views.[46] Yet as the think tank sector expanded the competition is now prevalently on the side of supply. Due to their dynamics the media-think tank relations function effectively as a segment of the market of expertise for media.

In Slovakia it took several years to develop this market and the ties between media and think tank sphere. Although the first think tanks emerged shortly after the downfall of the communist regime,[47] these were then mostly oriented on elites (political, business, academic or civil society) and did not feature in the media as frequently as later. Until 1997-1998, journalists contacted politicians in order to obtain policy commentary and analysis; only then did they change and start to approach experts. (Jurzyca 2007; Mesežnikov 2007)

Though especially in the case of political analysts the interests arose due to the political situation,[48] think tanks had to learn how to get the media attention and be proactive in the market.[49] The proactive measures of the successful competitors involve a full-fledged PR strategy deploying measures as promotion of own reputation, press releases and conferences, webpages (Horváth et al. 2004) and partnerships with media.[50] Crucial for success are the think tank's credibility and its ability to provide expertise on relevant issues in media-suitable formats. (Robl in Horváth et al. 2004; Jurzyca 2007)

Other factors besides the pro-activity affect the success on the market (Horváth et al. 2004) and their role is manifest in the structure of the market. The think tankers are not the

[46] For the relations between media and NGOs and the role of think tanks in it in Slovakia see the account by Horváth et al. (2004).
[47] See Table 2 and Table 3.
[48] According to one head of the think tank and a political scientist (Mesežnikov 2007), the uncertainty accompanying the parliamentary elections of 1998, which were expected to be decisive about the prospects of Slovakia's democratization, rapidly increased demand on the side of media audiences and journalists for political expertise.
[49] As the head of CPHR stated in CPHR's cumulative report for 1994–1997 (Jurzyca in CPHR 1998), on a workshop on media policy of NGOs in 1995, when CPHR had already 2 years of fruitful existence behind, he was stunned by the amount of media citations some NGOs can achieve. Only by hiring a PR specialist and approaching journalists they managed to reach several tens of monthly media citation by the end of 1997.
[50] On the organizational level there exist several formally institutionalized long-term partnerships between think tanks and media outlets, but are not standard. E.g. KI which had formal partnership with liberal-conservative oriented weekly (*Domino Fórum*) and then with a conservative oriented weekly (*.týždeň*) and IVO has partnerships with one of the main Slovak dailies SME and a private news-oriented TV channel TA3. See also Chmelár's (2005) discussion and Šípoš's and Dubéci's (2006; 2007a) discussions of media-think tank relations.

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only ones to supply the expertise to the media. As it can be seen in Table 4 and Table 5, diverse types of agents provide economic expertise (Table 5) and other type of expertise (Table 4) to media.

As can be seen in the Table 5, in the area of economic expertise the economists located in the private sector (above all banking) are dominant. The academic experts are also significantly present as three economists from SAV gather together 416 media citations. Among the think thanks the F. A. Hayek foundation is the most successful as their two economists occupy the second and tenth rank and assemble 422 media citations. The only other think tank with its experts in the top 25 is INEKO as two its economists occupy fifteenth and seventeenth place and aggregate 170 media citations.

The success of bank economists in the competition results from the fact that the business field equips them with tools (such as PR skills) to succeed and interestingly it shows that their transparent linkages to business interests are not such a hindrance to appear as 'disinterested experts.'[51] Additional explanation is that the expertise-endowed economists are indeed driven into the banking sector due to the status it offers. On the other hand academic economists are hindered in the competition by the remaining elements of the academic culture of passivity and conformity, as they try to avoid to make strong comments on economic policies in order not to alienate political actors that control the funding of their academic institutions.[52]

In the segment of non-economic expertise (social science, political, public policy, law) think tank experts are among its dominant providers, yet the academy, private sector (in two out of four cases these are survey agencies) and non-think tank NGOs are also significantly

[51] Though this is not that unproblematic, there are voices that contest the 'disinterested expert' status of the bank economists commenting on policies in the media both from the side of their competitors on the market with expertise for media and by the political actors that create these policies. Nevertheless these voices did not affect the appearance and presentation of these experts in media so far. For a brief account on the character of the debate see also the discussion by Šípoš and Dubéci (2006).

[52] This was even explicitly reflected by one think tank economist (Jurycza 2007) as a comparative advantage of think tank economists on the market with expertise for media.

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present on the market. According to the numbers of scholarly citations several groups of experts can be distinguished. Some of the most cited think tankers (first, fourth, eleventh, fourteenth) have numbers of scholarly citations comparable to the most cited academic experts (second, twenty-forth, ninth). However, other think tankers (e.g. tenth) have low numbers of scholarly citations. Significant is the presence of academic experts with very low scholarly citations (sixth, twenty-second). Non-think tank NGO experts and private sector experts have very low numbers of scholarly citations.

Table 4: Šípoš's and Dubéci's (2006) ranking of media citations of non-economic experts in Slovakia for the period from 1 September 2002 to 4 December 2006

Ranking	*Name*	*Media citations +*	*Scholarly citations **	*Expertise*	*Primary institutional affiliation*
1	Mesežnikov, Grigorij	612	80	Political science	IVO
2	Kusý, Miroslav	559	46	Political science	University
3	Haulík, Pavel	469	7	Sociology	Survey agency (belongs to a radio station)
4	Samson, Ivo	395	66	International relations	SFPA
5	Wienk, Zuzana	277	3	- (NGO activist)	NGO
6	Procházka, Radoslav	276	3	Law	University
7	Sičáková-Beblavá, Emília	237	31	Economy/ Public policy	TIS
8	Vašečka, Michal	231	29	Sociology	CVEK, IVO, University
9	Kusá, Zuzana	199	71	Sociology	SAV
10	Nechala, Pavel	187	3	Law	TIS
11	Gyárfášová, Oľga	174	33	Sociology	IVO
12	Abrahám, Samuel	164	19	Political science	NGO, University (private sector)
13	Pirošík, Vladimír	157	1	Law	TIS
14	Bútora, Martin	152	74	Sociology	IVO
15	Duleba, Alexander	150	18	International relations	SFPA
16	Baránek, Ján	138	0	Sociology	Polis agency (private sector)
17	Lukáč, Juraj	133	0	- (environmentalist)	NGO
18	Kamenec, Tomáš	132	1	Law	Private sector
19	Trubíniová, Ľubica	121	1	- (environmentalist)	NGO
20	Kunder, Peter	116	2	- (NGO activist)	NGO
21	Salner, Andrej	114	4	Public policy	SGI
22	Tóth, Rastislav	110	1	Political science	University
23	Huba, Mikuláš	103	16	Environmental science	SAV
24	Malová, Darina	101	73	Political science	University
25	Valko, Ernest	101	10	Law	Private sector

Source: Šípoš and Dubéci (2006)

* This does not equal academic citations as they are conventionally measured.

\+ * For the methodology see Šípoš and Dubéci (2006).

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Table 5: Šípoš's and Dubéci's (2006) ranking of media citations of economic experts in Slovakia for the period 1 September 2002 to 4 December 2006

Ranking	*Name*	*Media citations +*	*Primary institutional affiliation*
1	Tóth, Ján	425	Bank
2	Karász, Pavel	275	SAV
3	Chren, Martin	265	F.A.Hayek Foundation
4	Kotian, Juraj	243	Bank
5	Šmál, Miroslav	241	Bank, since mid-2006 Ministry of Finance
6	Blaščák, Mário	234	Private sector (includes bank)
7	Pätoprstý, Viliam	231	Bank
8	Gábriš, Marek	218	Bank
9	Ondriska, Pavol	161	Bank
10	Švejna, Ivan	157	F.A.Hayek Foundation
11	Drahovský, Ľubomír	134	Private sector
12	Prega, Robert	118	Bank
13	Barto, Martin	95	National bank, previously private bank
14	Čechovičová, Silvia	91	Bank
15	Jurzyca, Eugen	89	INEKO
16	Macho, Elizej	82	Bank
17	Goliaš, Peter	81	INEKO
18	Páleník, Viliam	78	SAV
19	Staněk, Peter	63	SAV
20	Štefanides, Zdenko	56	Bank
21	Zlacký, Vladimír	54	Ministry of Finance, previously private bank
22	Ódor, Ľudovít	53	National bank, previously Slovak Rating Agency
23	Fehérová, Mária	52	Bank
24	Marcinčin, Anton	46	World Bank
24	Kovalčík, Ján	46	Private sector

Source: Šípoš and Dubéci 2006
+ For the methodology see Šípoš and Dubéci (2006).

Summing up, two quite distinct groups are present on the market with one primarily media oriented and including private sector, NGO and also some academic experts and the second both scholarly and media oriented consisting of both academic and think tank experts. This indicates that not only for think tankers, but generally for all intellectuals, this market offers an opportunity to enhance their capital assets and some academics prefer it, or are more successful in it than in properly academic strategies.

Bourdieu (1998b) points out that this orientation stems form the structural role of the media: no scientific, political, or artistic discourse can enter the public debate without the media and thus an intellectual can through medialization effectively improve her position within her particular sub-field of cultural production. Accustoming to the demands of the journalistic field transforms the intellectual into a double agent (a 'Trojan horse of

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journalism'), through which the autonomy of the particular sub-field of cultural production is circumscribed as the medial success becomes a criterion of success in it and thus and a heteronomy is brought about.

These double agents affect the field of cultural production in two ways: they bring about new forms of cultural production into the space between academic esotericism and journalistic exotericism and impose new principles of valuation of cultural products, which derive the value of a cultural product on the market. Serious consequences are brought about, as these principles are incompatible with principles that enable certain kinds of cultural production. As the journalistic field is increasingly dominated by television, which itself is a 'Trojan horse' of the field of business, through this mediating mechanism business becomes structurally dominant to the sub-fields of cultural production. (Bourdieu 1998b)

Think tankers are indeed somewhat more resistant to the temptation to become Trojan horses of journalism then academics, as due to their position they also have other means to improve their position, including scholarly ones. To put it blatantly, in the academy with all its problems it is much more tempting to become a media-intellectual figure and subjugate oneself to the demands of the media field.

Šípoš and Dubéci (2006) point to the segmentation of the market with expertise for media along the dimension of the areas of expertise. The supply of expertise in some areas is narrow and the few experts easily dominate their particular sub-markets (such as e.g. expertise public administration reform). Some experts are prominently tied to certain media, which induces another dimension to market's segmentation. Two kinds of networks play a role here in expert's success: the networks of experts and journalists and journalists' own networks. (Šípoš and Dubéci 2006) These factors allow the expert that reaches a certain status of visibility, reputation and integration into the networks of the journalistic field to maintain her dominant position on the market easier.

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Despite the diversity of agents providing expertise to the media, the interviewed think tank leaders do not consider agents from business or the academy as competitors for media attention. (Jurzyca 2007; Mesežnikov 2007) Even views divergent with theirs are welcome, with one caveat: "until they have something relevant to say." (Jurzyca 2007) In other words, until these voices remain in lines with think tankers' conception of expertise, which reflects their position and trajectory.

Despite the change of the situation since the half of the 1990s, some think tankers still identify political agents as main and particularly dangerous contenders in the market of policy expertise for media precisely because they break experts' conception of expertise.[53] It is more relevant to them whether the voice speaks the language of expertise (and thus deploys expertise similar to theirs) than who the speaker is as the socially accepted definition of the proper scope of expertise is contested.

Supporting the evidence about the segmentation of the market the interviewed think tank leaders (Jurzyca 2007; Mesežnikov 2007) state that there is in fact no competition for media attention between the think tanks, even along organizational, ideological or areas-of-expertise lines. However these interviewees lead very successful think tanks and are proximate in ideological orientations and networks, and these views of theirs do not share some differently oriented experts and commentators, who claim that there is competition along the lines of ideological orientations.[54]

On the individual level there is some circulation of personnel between the spheres, but it remains rather rare. More common was a move from journalism to think tanks when the think tank sphere was emerging, and in the opposite direction think tankers move to the media

[53] A particularly sharply pronounced version of this view was delivered by one think tank leader (Jurzyca 2007): when asked to name the main competitor in the struggle for media attention, did not name other policy experts, but politicians.
[54] See the discussions by Šípoš and Dubéci (2006), Šípoš (2007a), Chmelár (2005), and Ďurina (2005).

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only on top-level positions.[55] Despite their frequent journalistic production think tankers rarely become full-time journalists. The journalistic activities are treated as an enhancement of properly expert activities with only an instrumental role in disseminating one's expert views and ideas at the cost of accustoming to the demands of journalism.[56] A significant hindrance to become a full-time journalist is that the journalistic sphere does not offer enough autonomy and opportunities to deploy and cultivate cultural capital. To sum up, for intellectuals capable to succeed in both spheres the think tanks are perceived as a better option in career and status prospects and also more compatible with their habituses.

2.3.4 Relations with the Transnational Field of Democracy and Human Rights

The assistance of Western partners belonging to the transnational field of democracy and human rights was instrumental in founding the proto-field of think tanks in Slovakia (as in all CEE). The ties between this transnational field and the proto-field established in that period started to transform as the democracy and market economy looked secured in Slovakia, but remained strong. The diminishing institutional support from Western donors and the remaining considerably lower on project basis available funding necessitated new think tanks' strategies. One of them is to compete for funds from Western donors extending own activities to the areas where the funding is still available.

Through their activities in the transformation of Slovakia towards democracy and market economy, many organizational and individual agents of the proto-field have been established as holders of expertise on democratization and social and economic

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[55] Though the think tankers frequently publish commentaries in mainstream printed media, only about one tenth of the CVs indicates involvement in journalism simultaneously with think tank activities. Departure from the think tank sphere to become a journalist is rare. Regarding the move to top-level positions in media there are also only few cases. The best known one is the general director of IVO in 1997-2002 (Richard Rybníček), who left IVO to become first the head of a private TV station, then of the public broadcasting service TV, and subsequently the head of another private TV station.

[56] This view was presented e.g. by one interviewed think tanker (Jurzyca 2007), who even stated that he would not mind to write occasional expert commentaries for a tabloid as he did in the 1990s being at the time already an established think tank expert in order to disseminate his ideas.

transformation. As this transformation of Slovakia now seems finished, and the focus of the agents of the transnational field of democracy and human rights moves towards countries that lag or stumble in these processes, these Slovak agents can search for new markets for their expertise. Especially in the case of the post-communist and even the few remaining communist countries their expertise is very marketable, as they posses not only general expertise for democratization and social and economic transformation, but the specific knowledge about the transformation from communism.

Moreover, as Slovakia's path to democracy was marked by a period of rule of an elite with authoritarian tendencies, they can draw on their experience and knowledge in dealing with post-communist authoritarian political elites. Additionally, Slovakia's reputation as a pioneer in reform policies in several sectors (e.g. public healthcare system or welfare system) and their experience with them can be used as a comparative advantage in the emerging and opening markets for policy expertise. In addition to the expertise and credibility these agents are tied to the social networks within the transnational field of democracy and human rights and the know how to operate within this field.[57]

This strategy of searching for new markets for expertise means transforming oneself from being prominently an agent of the local proto-field of think tanks to an agent of the transnational field of democracy and human rights. This shift takes place both on the level of organizational agents and on the level of individual intellectuals. Individual experts have several possibilities open to them in the pursuit of this strategy. They can join existing transnational institutions that are the dominant agents of the transnational field of democracy

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[57] All the relevant think tanks maintain relations with the transnational field; through these their members are also individually socialized into the field. Some organizational agents are (emerged as or became) a branch of agents of the transnational field of democracy and human rights. Through them experts can be easier integrated into this transnational field. Pontis foundation (created from the Slovak branch of the Foundation for a Civil Society) and TIS (Transparency International branch) are particularly illustrative instances of this kind of organization (see Guilhot's (2005) discussion of the agents of the transnational field and particularly of the Transparency International). Top-level think tankers can also be personally members or affiliates of the organizations of the transnational field of democracy and human rights (e.g. G. Mesežnikov is member of OSF's board, and M. Bútora was member of OSF's board and Trust for Civil Society's board).

and human rights, expand the activities of their think tanks, or even join think tanks in transforming countries. Some of them opt for this strategy becoming even stronger integrated into the transnational field of democracy and human rights.

Organizational agents that opt for this strategy strengthen their integration in the institutionalized networks of the transnational field and often also create and maintain new networks to help them market the expertise on foreign markets.[58] This strategy is reflected also in their strategic plans and standardly involves several kinds of dissemination of knowledge to local agents in the transforming countries. Educating and advising governments, administration, NGOs, political agents or local elites from these countries are the most common forms.[59]

2.3.5 Relations with Politics

The think tanks in CEE were created with the focus on the transformation processes that the region's countries were undertaking, which makes them different from their Western counterparts, particularly in their relations to politics. CEE think tanks stepped into a situation where the political field was fluid an the rules of the game were still disputed and unsettled, and sought to actively contribute to the establishing of democracy, subjugating to this goal their relations with political actors.

The relations of Slovakia's think tanks with politics were quite unusual even in the regional context. (Schneider 2003) They started in a situation when the Slovak political field was polarized between the authoritarian-leaning second generation of the post-1989 political

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[58] An instance of the strengthening integration in the institutionalized networks of the transnational field is the Network of Democracy Research Institutes founded in 1999 of which IVO is a member. Another instances are the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative founded in 1997 of which MESA 10 is a member and OSI Related Policy Centers Networks of which IVO and INEKO are members. An example of new international network created by think tanks in CEE region is the Networks of Visegrad Think Tanks; noteworthily initiated by Slovak think tanks IVO and RC SFPA. (cf. Horváth et al. 2004; Schneider 2003)

[59] For example one think tank (MESA 10, 2007) outlined in its program priorities for the years 2006-2010 a shift from the formation and advocacy of reform policies in Slovakia to the defense of already implemented reforms

elite and a diverse pro-liberal democratic camp of political agents from the left, center and right. This polarization was transposed in the proto-field and the dominant think tanks were – along with as a significant part of the NGO sector and media – allied with the anti-authoritarian democratic coalition before the elections of 1998. This affinity was based on the shared goals of democratization and international and European integration of Slovakia. (Horváth et al. 2004) In the next period there were vivid connections between the dominant think tanks and political actors, especially from the center-right part of the spectrum, both those in government and others.

Despite the programmatic and ideological proximity, on the organizational level formal partnerships of think tanks and political parties were rare, with ASA's partnership with Smer-SD being the most remarkable exception and symptomatically taking place on the left part of the political spectrum.[60] The 'political party think tank' model (McGann and Weaver 2000) was neither common nor successful.[61]

It might appear striking that the think tankers close in their ideological orientations to the center-right part of the political field did not develop party think tanks, but several factors prevented such development. It can be argued that the independence increases think tank's credibility of disinterestedness. However, this factor was only secondary, since the think tanks were often perceived as allies of these parties in public debates, and for their Western donors

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and to the dissemination of the expertise in the countries that are yet to undergo such reforms. They indeed already follow this strategy in their activities (e.g. providing expertise on local government reform in Ukraine).

[60] Though ASA states to be independent, its leadership is composed of top-level members of Smer-SD (Zala, Číž, Faič) and a significant part of the staff is also members of Smer-SD or its affiliated youth organization and it has Smer-SD among its main partners.(see ASA 2007) Precisely the latter is exceptional even in the context of other Slovak think tanks whose leadership overlaps with a political party. Another similar case is KI and its leadership's overlap with that of the OKS (conservative party). Though KI lists OKS along with several other political organizations among its partners, the status is different. There is a difference between KI and ASA is in the status of their partner party: while OKS is a marginal and non-parliamentary party and KI is among the main think tanks, ASA does not belong to main think tanks and Smer-SD is among the parties with highest electoral support. KI is generally more autonomous, as it has also other sources of funding and partners and is far from becoming a satellite of the party.

[61] McGann and Weaver (2000) distinguish two sets of think tanks: (1) 'academic and contract research think tanks' and (2) 'advocacy tanks' and 'political party think tanks.' The think tanks of the former set are close to the academy, recruit their personnel from it and follow its patterns of work. The think tanks of the latter set are close to politics, circulate their personnel between the spheres and follow its patterns of work.

arguably an eventual open political alignment was not an unbearable hindrance in supporting them.[62]

The most prominent factor is a complex of orientations common among these intellectuals. They prioritize independence, including political independence, and see the structures, dynamics, struggles and divisive lines of political field as not corresponding to their positions, pursuits and interests. Often they regard everyday politics as cognitively and morally inferior, lack trust to political elites and treat them as contenders for influence in public debates and policy process. Particularly, the demand cast by the political field upon its agents to respond to the demands of the public/electorate is seen as harmful.[63] The elitist mentality of the 'Chicago boys,' who prepare and implement reforms undisturbed by the uneducated public, marks some of the think tankers who formed the reform policies implemented by the center-right political forces. In the end, due to their orientations, the party think tank model did not offer them anything more attractive than the model they opted for.

On the left of the spectrum the situation was different. Importantly, in Slovakia similarly as in other CEE countries the failure of communism discredited the socialist (and leftist in general) thinking among the elites.[64] However, this discrediting was not that strong among some segments of the intellectuals and also other factors are behind the absence and weakness of left-oriented think tanks in Slovakia. First, the intellectuals close to the left generally preferred different strategies than becoming think tankers: from a direct involvement in politics, through more grassroots NGOs, to a more secure existence within the

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[62] Several interviewed think tankers and experts supported the views that the donors were focused primarily on the expertise and credibility of their Slovak partners. (Šípoš 2007b; Jurzyca 2007; Szomolányi 2007; Mesežnikov 2007) The political alignment of think tanks was, at least for some of the donors, only a marginal concern.

[63] This was particularly strongly emphasized by one of the think tank leaders active in the sphere since its founding. (Jurzyca 2007)

[64] As Kimball (2000) points out, the relative weakness of the leftist-oriented think tanks in post-communist countries cannot be attributed exclusively to the ideology or selectivity of the Western support, as it is sometimes argued. (See e.g. Chmelár 2005) As one of the interviewed think tankers (Šípoš 2007b) noted, there were funds available also for non-right oriented think tanks, and some even for left-oriented think tanks.

academy.[65] In addition even if there was a will to create a left-oriented think tank and funding available, though arguably lower than for differently oriented think tanks, they lacked the know-how and credibility needed to establish these think tanks. (Ďurina 2005; cf. Šípoš 2007b)

These factors were particularly salient until 2002. Since then, also the character of the Slovak political left played a role. After the elections of 2002 the reformed successor communist party (SDL) and its more liberal splinter party (SDA) failed to enter the parliament and the only parliamentary leftist parties were the orthodox communist party (KSS) and the populist and nationalist 'social democracy' (Smer-SD). Witnessing their political counterparts fall into political irrelevance, the leftist oriented intellectuals were left only with potential allies that many of them did not seen as close.[66]

Though later there were some attempts to launch think tanks, besides the disputable degree of success of ASA, they remained completely unsuccessful. The lack of success of think tanks on the left part of the spectrum can be explained by their comparative disadvantages. Apart from the above discussed factors of the lack of will and ability to obtain funding, their personnel also lacks the relevant expertise and they fail to produce relevant research. Consequently, they fail to successfully compete in the market for expertise in the media.[67]

Despite the scarcity of the formal partnerships, think tanks' ties with politics are maintained through informal social networks. Several interconnected factors shape them. The

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[65] Chmelár (in Ďurina 2005), himself being considered as one of the most prominent left-oriented intellectual, points out that the think tank form with its elitist aspect is contradicting the basic orientations of most of leftist intellectuals. The view that Slovak leftist intellectuals tend to pursue different strategies (both individual and organizational) was supported also by two of the interviewed think tankers. (Jurzyca 2007; Mesežnikov 2007)

[66] One of the prominent left-oriented intellectuals and policy experts of the younger generation Ivan Štefunko (in Čorná 2006) notes this, and also adds that from the side of the Smer-SD's leadership the left-oriented intellectuals are not seen as particularly close allies. He also discusses the fact that it was even the case of some younger left-oriented intellectuals close to the SDA and SDL, who had some political experience.

[67] This is emphasized by Ďurina (2005) For instance virtually no publication activity occurred. The lack of success on the market of expertise for media was explained by one interviewed think tanker (Jurzyca 2007) as due to their inability to provide any added expert value to the views presented by the left parties.

center-right political elites developed a pro-active strategy towards the think tankers, which stems from their active attempts to create favorable relations with what they perceive to be the opinion-making segments of the cultural elites, and from their intention to utilize policy experts' expertise.[68] Moreover, some think tankers and politicians come from common career and social backgrounds and share membership in networks.[69] Finally, the circulation of personnel between the spheres and the dual agents create, strengthen, or take place due to the informal social networks. The circulation of personnel and existence of dual agents involve besides the politics proper also the administration and public service, because in Slovakia these are structurally subordinated to the political agents as their top levels are controlled by political mechanisms.

On the level of politics proper the circulation of personnel between the spheres and the dual political and think tank agents can be best understood in the broader context of dual intellectual and political agents as they are affected by the same dynamics. This is apparent in the cases of direct involvement of intellectuals in top-level politics. Two prominent public figures, both member of the cultural elite, ran for president: one in 1999, and the other, a think tanker, in 2004. Both cases displayed several similarities. The president has largely a symbolic role with some significant competencies in foreign policy, is elected directly and it is possible to candidate without a party or parliamentary support. [70] These factors make it easier for intellectuals to run for president, as they can avoid the everyday politics and see the role of president as above it and more abstract. The campaigns of both candidates indeed

[68] Particularly SDKU-DS has developed a pro-active strategy towards the opinion-making cultural elites.
[69] This view is also frequented in the public debate (see e.g. Chmelár 2005; or Ďurina 2005) and supported by interviews with several experts (Mesežnikov 2007; Szomolányi 2007) This is for example the case of MESA 10 or KI and it can be said also about some members of IVO.
[70] Since the presidential elections of 1999 Slovak president is elected directly in two-round system, in which the second round is a run-off between the two most successful candidates. The candidates can be nominated by the group of 15 MPs or by a petition of 15000 eligible voters. The latter option opens the possibility to run without parliamentary support and thus avoid a direct alignment with political parties. Neither of the two candidating intellectuals managed to get to the run-off, Magda Vášaryová ran in 1999 and finished third in the first round obtaining 6.6% of the votes and Martin Bútora ran in 2004 and finished fifth obtaining 6.5% of the votes. (see Tóth 1999; and Školkay 2005)

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emphasized this aspect. Both fashioned themselves in the campaign as civic or civil society candidates, both emphasized their expertise and experience as ambassadors. (see Tóth 1999; and Školkay 2005)

On the governmental level there were several important cases of a direct engagement of intellectuals in politics. During the period 2002-2006 there were two further prominent cases of intellectuals in governmental (ministerial) positions, both engaged previously in think tanks and one of them being a think tanker.[71] Both were nominated as non-partisan experts and for the purpose of implementing their expertise in sector reforms found it increasingly difficult to maintain both the position of intellectuals and not to get involved in everyday party politics, while remaining effective in their ministerial functions. While one resisted the demands of politics and gradually left it, the other gradually became involved in party politics.[72]

A dual-agent *par excellance* is Ivan Mikloš, who, despite having a rather impressive political career, managed to not adapt fully to the demands of the political field and retain positions in think tank sphere and academy.[73] As one observer (indeed a think tanker involved at one point in public service) remarked, "since the beginning of his political career Ivan Mikloš has mostly pretended he hasn't got any." (Beblavý 1999) However the other discussed cases indicate that being simultaneously an intellectual (a public intellectual as the former, or academic and think tank intellectual as the latter) and politician is not feasible in longer than a short term and Mikloš's case is an exception.

[71] These are Rudolf Chmel, a renowned literary scientist and a former ambassador (minister of culture in the period 2002-2006), and Iveta Radičová (minister of social affairs 2005-2006). Radičová, a sociologist and university professor, has also a think tank background (nSPACE).

[72] Running as non-partisan on a party list, she obtained the most preferential votes of all party's candidates. After the elections she became a party member and soon after the vice-chairman of the party. (see e.g. SITA 2006)

[73] Ivan Mikloš is an economist and during the communist regime he was a university faculty member. After the downfall of communism he became an advisor to a government member and was involved in administration (high-ranking staff position at the office of government) till 1991 and later in government. He was a founding member of one of the first and most successful think tanks (MESA 10). Simultaneously he became involved in top-level party politics becoming a deputy chairman of ODU in 1992, then in 1993–2000 member of DS (at one

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Among dual agents a much less direct engagement in politics constitutes advising, which appears in two different spheres: on the one hand governmental, administrative and public service, on the other at the party level. In the former the official advisory positions are more attractive to think tankers as they are less 'politicized' than in the latter and bring certain non-negligible prestige. Party advising in the development of policy proposals and programs can be fostered by the ideological proximity and personal ties, but experts – especially economists – fashioning their expertise as technical and value-free are prone to cross or ignore the ideological lines.[74] To what extent other factors – such as social networks – allow this transgression of ideological boundaries remains to be analyzed.

On all levels the circulation of intellectuals between think tanks and politics, administration or public service has a two-way dynamic. The move from think tanks is typically driven by two main factors: the will of intellectuals to engage more directly in realization of their ideas and programs in policies and the willingness of political actors to gain expertise to their staff, particularly on certain positions as ambassadors or high level bureaucrats. Although these positions require political support, nevertheless they allow their holders to remain relatively remote and independent from the everyday politics. The move from politics, administration or public service to think tank sphere is usually opted for as a return to a safe-haven after the advocated programs did not succeed (most importantly their political bearers lost in elections or were forced into opposition).[75]

A typical drive behind the attempts to become a dual agent is intention to use both positions as complementary means of asserting their ideas and programs. These might turn tempting enough to overcome eventual disregard for politics and the risk of the loss of the

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point even its chairman) and member of SDKU-DS since 2001 (currently he is its vice-chairman) and member of the government in 1998–2006.

[74] For example one of the interviewed think tank economists admitted that he participated both on the formulation of programs of a center and also of a center-right party, dismissing the meaning of 'left' and 'right' as suitable to characterize his expertise. (Jurzyca 2007)

status of the independent intellectual or disinterested expert. Nevertheless, as the cases of intellectuals' involvement in politics form the period under scrutiny show, the dual intellectual and political agents are affected by a dynamics brought by the conflicting demands cast by both fields on their agents and thus find themselves in almost constant conflicts between their roles. To put it blatantly, sitting on these two chairs is not an easy task – as many intellectuals in CEE learned during the transition – and this holds true even for think tankers.

2.4 Conclusion

In Slovakia in the period of 1998-2006 a new space occupied by a segment of intellectuals has formed: the proto-field of think tanks and policy expertise. This new distinct sphere of intellectual production made them a significant presence in politics, prominently through the active engagement in the shaping of Slovakia's transformation. Located at the intersection of its paternal fields, the proto-field offered the intellectuals new specific opportunities to utilize their own capital assets and endowed them with resources, power and influence. Simultaneously it changed the character of these intellectuals; they became 'hybrid intellectuals.'(Medvetz 2006)

The hybridity of these intellectuals reflects the strength of the ties with the proto-field's paternal fields. In Slovakia the strongest material and symbolic ties were with the academy and the transnational field of democracy and human rights, weaker with politics and even weaker with media and business. Though the conditions changed and so did the strengths of proto-field's ties to its paternal fields, this pattern persisted.

The strength of the ties to the transnational field was due to its provided crucial assistance in funding and know-how. Reflecting this, the dominant Slovak think tankers were above all experts on democratization and reforms, producing and proliferating the knowledge

[75] As Johnson (1996) and Krastev (2000) in accordance point out, this is typical for CEE think tanks. In Slovakia this is for example the case of MESA 10 or SGI: as the CVs indicate, several of their members returned from

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how to build and preserve institutions of democratic regime, human rights, democratic governance and market economy. (Guilhot 2005)

The strength of the ties to the academy is because the people coming from academic backgrounds were instrumental in establishing the think tank sector and became its dominant agents. Because their habituses were being formed in the academy they brought and imposed the academic patterns of cognition and conation into the proto-field. Due to their origin these think tankers are adjacent to the academic networks and maintained and cultivated them in their new position. Consequently, the dominant think tankers remain academically oriented.

The ties with politics were hindered by the habituses of intellectuals, as the opportunities offered to them by aligning themselves more with the transnational field and the academy were attractive enough not to attempt to overcome the incompatibilities of their habituses with the demands of the fields of business and journalism. The dynamic was similar in the case of politics, but it still offers strong incentives to intellectuals to attempt for dual agent status; most prominently the opportunity to pursue one's program. However, it is particularly difficult to maintain the dual political and intellectual agent status for think tankers, similarly to other intellectuals; the demands of both fields are putting them into almost constant conflicts. To pursue one's program it is much easier to circulate between the think tank sphere and administration or public service.

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politics, administration and public service. Szomolányi (2007) also noted this process.

CHAPTER 3: FROM NEW CLASS TO NEW GREY ZONE

3.1 Hegemony of Neoliberalism?

The questions of the ideological homogeneity of the dominant Slovak think tanks and experts, and its sources and outcomes on policies and public and political debates became highly disputed ones. Journalists, commentators, politicians and scholars often question whether the dominant think tanks and policy experts pursue one particular agenda, and whose interests they represent in doing so. Some of the participants in the debate even go as far as speaking about the dominance of neoliberalism.[76]

Though frequently far-fetched, driven by political interests, and bracketing together the media-featuring private-sector economic experts with academics and think tankers, these claims have some ground. As I showed in the previous chapter, the dominant agents of the proto-field were close in their ideological orientations to the right of the center part of the Slovak political field; on the contrary, the think tanks that are labeled as leftist were rare, irrelevant and marginal. The social proximity of the dominant agents of the proto-field further strengthens the appearance of their homogeneity and due to their perceived share on the pro-market reform policies of second Dzurinda's government, this is complex phenomenon is often framed as the above-mentioned dominance of neoliberalism.

Abstracting from the intricate question of the definition of the socially contested concept of neoliberalism, it is evident that the dominant segment of the proto-field shared a certain vision of the social world. Its core conceptions of the role of economy, state and politics in society, and the derived program are congruent with neoliberalism, or 'right-wing liberalism.' Following Cerny (2004) I understand neoliberalism as a contested concept. Consequently, I adopt a robust definition of neoliberalism understanding it as a worldview

[76] For example Chmelár (2005) presents such a view. See also Ďurina's (2005) response to him and Šípoš's (2007a) and Šípoš's and Dubéci's (2007a) discussions of the frequency of right-oriented experts in media.

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that builds on classical liberalism, emphasizes individual rights, and embraces strongly anti-etatist and pro-market views on society and economy.[77] In Slovak context this label encapsulates a wider spectrum of orientations from liberal-conservative through civic-liberal to libertarian leaning. It is important to note that the intellectuals under scrutiny do not typically use the label neoliberal to characterize their orientations.

I discussed the underlying causes of the dominance of the right-oriented think tanks and experts effective in the period, yet to complete the picture it remains to be answered where they originate. As I discussed above, it is sometimes argued that the main factor behind the prevalence of rightist orientations among the think tankers is that the blueprints that the CEE think tanks adopted from Western donors included not only fundamental organizational forms and practices, but also agendas. This again does not explain the emergence of these intellectuals. Though the transnational field of democracy and human rights mediated and disseminated know how, the process was more complex: the adoption of the agendas it involved by CEE agents was possible because they were compatible with their orientations, agendas, and interests.

Krastev (2000) reflecting also his own experience with the Bulgarian Center for Liberal Strategies argues that the think tanks in post-communist CEE allowed the liberal intellectuals unsuccessful in asserting their liberal agenda as politicians to institutionalize and further pursue it. This explanation seems to work for Slovakia: before they became the dominant think tankers, they were involved in politics.[78] But though it is true that these intellectuals belonged to the liberal politicians, most of them never became successfully habituated agents of the political field. Regardless of whether they left the politics voluntarily

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[77] Hereafter I refer to these conceptions of the role of economy, state, and politics in society, and the derived program as neoliberal, or simply liberal (particularly when discussing Krastev's (2000) views); in the case of program I use interchangeably also the term 'agenda.'

[78] This is generally not challenged. To mention just the best-known cases: M. Bútora, I Mikloš, P. Zajac, and F. Šebej were first in VPN's leadership and some also later in other parties (ODU, DS). Also other future think tankers were involved in VPN's activities or MNI's activities in the first months of the transition. This personal continuity is widely recognized by the interviewed experts. (Szomolányi 2007; Petőcz 2007; Mesežnikov 2007)

or involuntarily, the root causes were the incompatibility of their habituses and of the role they fashioned for themselves in their pursued vision of social world with the political field.

It is apparent that deeper causes took effect. To understand why the agents under scrutiny adopted a vision of social world congruent with neoliberalism it is necessary to excavate their social history, which cannot be understood without the context of the development of the Slovak and CEE intelligentsia.

3.2 The Origin of Slovak Neoliberal Intellectuals

In CEE the intelligentsia emerged as the main bearer of modernization projects. Differing from the Western variant of modernization, they refused the capitalist model with its dominance of the field of the economy, and reserved the intelligentsia a privileged role: the intelligentsia resisting the Western pattern of professionalization fashioned itself as a teleological agent. (Szelenyi 1982; Karabel 1996) With the arrival of the state-socialism in the CEE significant part of the intelligentsia in the region identified with the modernization appeal of this project: after all, it was one of the offsprings of the teleological intelligentsia's modernization projects.

In the amalgam of the elements of the pre-modern and modern societies created by the state-socialism all the distinct spheres of social life were stripped of their relative autonomy and structurally dominated by the nomenclatura. (Možný 1991) Its creation involved serious repression against the CEE elites, including the educated and the birth of a new 'working' intelligentsia was proclaimed. Under the state-socialism two principles of social differentiation were effective: the nomenclatural political capital and the cultural capital, the former being dominant. (Konrad and Szelenyi 1991; Medzihorský 2006) Consequently, the intelligentsia, far from becoming the dominant social segment in the new order, had in the field of power a strong counterpart in the nomenclatura.

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Already in the 1950s with the brink of de-Stalinization the intelligentsia started to form a distinctive new project, which became later known as the 'new class' project. It contested the dominance of the nomenclatura, but was far from abandoning intelligentsia's traditional teleological pretension. (see e.g. Konrad and Szelenyi 1991) This project, based on the vision of a society governed by the elites of intelligentsia as the teleological redistributors, sprinkled in various forms during the 1960s thought the CEE, paralleling similar drive for more power of the newly emerging educated segments in the West. (see e.g. Eyal 2003)

Before the 1960s ended, the ethos of hope and expectations of the convergence of all developed societies to this 'post-industrial' model of organization was fatally shattered. Slovakia had a role in this, as it was a part of Czechoslovakia, where in the 1968 the educated formed an alliance with the reformist segment of the nomenclatura in an attempt to implement the reform of state-socialism along the lines of the new class project. (see Karabel 1995; Medzihorský 2006) The results are well known: Warsaw pact's military intervention and following more than two decades of occupation backing one of the most rigid regimes in the region.

In the other CEE countries the hopes of the intelligentsia for the reform of state-socialism lived somewhat longer, but soon a large-scale counteroffensive of the nomenclatura against the intellectuals shattered them. Left without the hopes for the reform of state-socialism, many intellectuals broke their paths not only with the new class project, but also with the project of the teleological intelligentsia as such. Segments of critical humanistic intellectuals and technocratic experts became bearers of new programs, which entailed more technological role for them. (Konrad and Szelenyi 1991)

Though similarly as in other CEE countries, in Slovakia in 1989 intellectuals emerged as leaders of the transformation of Slovakia to liberal democracy the story of Slovak intelligentsia differs since the 1960s not only from the other CEE countries, but also from the

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Czech, with which it shared the common state. Far from demanding democratization as their Czech counterparts, the main reform demand of Slovak intellectuals in 1968 was the federalization of Czechoslovakia. (Rychlík 1998) Being aware of that, during the normalization nomenclatura applied a different strategy against Slovak intellectuals than against the Czech ones. Instead of large-scale purges with long-term consequences, the repression was milder and remaining in the sphere of cultural production, most of the victims were only removed from public visibility. (Marušiak 2000; Škaloud 2001) Moreover, wide co-optation secured the intelligentsia a comfortable existence in exchange for loyalty or passivity. Thus, instead of changing their strategy, which in the given context necessitated also the reshaping the vision of the role of themselves as the bearers and producers of the cultural capital, as they Czech counterparts did, they pursued the cultivation of political and social capital. (Eyal 2003)

Slovakia also experienced during the normalization another wave of state-socialist style modernization policies. Large-scale investments brought also the expansion of the educated segment of the society. Once again the new members of intelligentsia were recruited from rural backgrounds and brought with themselves the pre-modern strategies based on social capital's cultivation. (Marušiak 2000; Medzihorský 2006) The regime produced a new 'socialist intelligentsia,' and did its best to secure its loyalty. (Rychlík 1998) Consequently, the state-socialist project remained attractive to significant part of Slovak intelligentsia, including the intellectual elites, and nourishing their hopes for its reform they did not abandon the new class project. The culture of the provincial anti-Western nationalism cultivated in the façade federal normalization Slovak Socialist Republic was accepted by the cultural elites. (Marušiak 2000; Rychlík 1998) It was after all a continuation of the teleological intelligentsia project. (Eyal 2003)

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As late as the second half of the 1980s, when the communist regimes were entering a serious crisis and the segments of CEE intelligentsia started to search for new solutions, the dominant discourse of Slovak social-scientific intellectuals was 'prognostics.' This reincarnation of the 1960s' new class project, taking upon yet again the rallying call of the 'scientific-technological revolution.' Shortly, Slovak intellectuals did not abandon the teleological project of the CEE intelligentsia. (Eyal 2003)

However, as the communist regimes in CEE stripped off their only support – after they lost any legitimity – the power of the Soviet Union started to collapse, the intellectuals were leading the changes. Czechoslovak communist regime imploded in November 1989 under the pressure of a mobilized public, and in the Czech part two groups of intellectuals stood in the forefront of the regime change: dissident critical intellectuals and former 'internally exiled technocrats.'(Eyal 2003) Though both previously engaged in the movement of 1960s, this time they did not attempt to transform the state-socialist regime as in the 1960s, but instead aimed directly at the restoration of the liberal democracy and market economy. Surprisingly, a simultaneous movement occurred autonomously in Slovakia: several groups of intellectuals mobilized, and formed VPN. Here the future dominant think tankers entered the political stage in VPN, MNI, through other platforms, or informally associated with them.

Their emergence in the ranks of political elite is surprising in the context of the development and it has also surprised these intellectuals themselves. (see Antalová 1998) Though the literature is satisfied when discussing the party-system with labeling them as "by neoliberalism (self)indoctrinated intelligentsia," (Učeň 2000, 116) that quickly left the political stage, or analyzing the break-up of Czechoslovakia briefly mentions them as the pro-federal segment of Slovak new class (Eyal 2003), to understand their role it is necessary to trace how they adopted the neoliberal agenda.

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The answer is in their social position during the normalization regime and in the dynamics of the intellectual field. Though located in the generally content Slovak society and intelligentsia and working in the sphere of cultural production dominated by the co-opted segments of the intelligentsia, these intellectuals did not adopt the prevalent strategy based on the cultivation of the political and social capital. Instead they sought to cultivate their cultural capital, internalizing the rules of their spheres of cultural production as they existed in the democratic societies. (Medzihorský 2006)

This was caused by a specific configuration of factors. Coming from the families of pre-communist intelligentsia persecuted by the regime, urban backgrounds, and ethnic and religious minorities, were endowed by habituses and capital assets that in the given conditions led them towards the pursuit of the cultural capital and not the political or social capital. (Medzihorský 2006) Though a small minority within the Slovak intelligentsia, their development paralleled, albeit in somewhat different context, the development of Czech 'internally exiled' technocrats – they were the Slovak 'grey zone.'[79]

Similarly they, though participating in the discourse of 'prognostics' which was hegemonic in the Slovak intellectual field in the second half of the 1980s, already adopted a new worldview and program, in which their role as the bearers of the cultural capital was not that of the teleological redistributors. Formed in a conflict with the Slovak state-socialist system where all the spheres of social life were amalgamated and structurally dominated by the nomenclatural field, and where the interconnected social and political capitals were the dominant principles of differentiation, they opted for its opposite: for a society with relatively autonomous distinct spheres of social life; for a society with the market economy and liberal democracy. This program, however rudimentary at this phase, contained all the crucial ideas

[79] Many of these intellectuals indeed used this label when describing their own position during the 1980s. (cf. Antalová 1998)

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of the further transformation policies pursued by them in politics, and later by the dominant think tank sector.

This returns us to the question of the 'Western import of neoliberalism' to CEE. As my discussion of the development shows, neoliberal programs' CEE intellectual bearers adopted its fundaments already before the breakdown of communism. The intellectual development of several of present dominant Slovak think tankers shows that similarly as their CEE counterparts, they, through the scarce, but available literature and interaction with their Czech and foreign counterparts formed a vision of the social world and program congruent with neoliberalism. (see Antalová 1998; Jurzyca 2007) This process was, similarly as in the case of their counterparts in some communist countries further intensified by their access to the intellectuals legacies of the pre-communist past, and sometimes even by the relative deprivation they felt when they compared their status to that of their Western counterparts. (Coser 1996; see also Medzihorský 2006)

It can be argued, that this view just shifts the 'import of neoliberalism' further to the past and changes its channels: now instead of the transnational field of the democracy and human rights the intellectual field provided its proliferation. But, as Bockman and Eyal (2002) point out, this interpretation omits the origin of neoliberalism: it has 'transnational roots' and was marked by the essential contribution of CEE intellectuals in its formation. Bockman and Eyal (2002) utilizing Latour's (1987) concepts of 'actor-network' and 'translation' argue that through two autonomous networks that connected the Western economists with their counterparts in the communist countries, the stream of thinking that became later known as neoliberalism in its economic and political incarnations was formed. The essential contribution of scientists form communist countries was veiled by their Western counterparts in the pursuit of their interests, framing it as 'empirical data' and thus hiding its theoretical elements. The Slovak economists, that later become the bearers of the liberal agenda indeed

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were attached to these networks, though mainly indirectly through their CEE counterparts. (Jurycza 2007) They also co-mediated the intellectual influence of these networks to other social scientists that were already adopting a liberal agenda under the influence of above discussed factors. (see Szomolányi 2007)

Equipped with this program, when the opportunity arose these Slovak intellectuals immediately stepped in and pursued their program in the first generation of the post-1989 governing elite. Now the last part of the mosaic is missing: how they transformed from politicians to think tankers. Krastev's (2000) insightful and straightforward argument points to the autonomous role of the same factor that led the intellectuals to become politicians in their transformation to think tankers. Yet, it can be elaborated more complexly.

The liberal intellectuals in the first generation of the post-communist political elite in CEE were, as Wasilewski (2001) put it, an elite of 'mission and vision.' The reason why they became politicians, frequently even despite their disregard for politics, was that it allowed them to pursue their program of the transformation of the society. Following their mission and vision and consequently failing or unwilling to accustom to the demands of the political field, they left the positions of political power. Importantly, they failed to respond to the demands of the population, which stopped to support the course of transformation set by these intellectuals after its revolutionary euphoria had disappeared and it started to experience the costs of transition. (Krastev 2000)

This is true for Slovakia. Precisely the response of the second generation of the post-1989 Slovak political elite to the grievances of public, which started to feel the costs of the transition, effectively drove the intellectuals out of power. The costs of transition stemmed precisely form the fact that the political and social capital – upon which a significant part of the Slovak population including a large part of the intellectuals relied – were devalued through the transformation policies. After the second free elections in 1992, the bearers of the

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political and social capital assumed dominance in the field of politics. (Eyal 2003) Consequently, the retreat of the intellectuals from the positions of political power was even faster and more pronounced than in the other CEE countries.

The liberal intellectuals had to find themselves a new social space. Still being the people of mission and vision, driven by their unfinished program soon first of them pioneered the think tank form. The pioneers were originally not directly politically involved – they were prevalently economists and involved in implementation of transformation policies in administration.[80] Subsequently they were joined also by other social scientists. Both segments of intellectuals were in a series of conflicts with the second generation of post-1989 political elite and its intellectual allies driven out of their positions not only in politics proper, but also in the administration and public service.

The move to the emergent think tank sphere was for these social scientists marked by a strong continuity: even at the height of VPN's power they refused the direct engagement in politics, and served instead as its 'brain trust' forming its strategy, program and policies through various intellectual forums. Indeed even this fastened the liberal intellectuals' descent from power: as intellectuals interested more in the critical discourse and engaged in endless discussion, simultaneously reluctant to engage in day-to-day politics, they allowed the 'pragmatic wing' of VPN led by Vladimír Mečiar to take over the exercise of actual political power. Taking advantage of his position, Mečiar split from VPN and formed HZDS, which soon rose to power driving the remaining intellectuals out of it. [81] Though some of the VPN intellectuals after realizing the counter-productivity of this strategy attempted to become professional politicians, yet others tried to rejuvenate the revolutionary democratic ethos in

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[80] Most importantly economists involved in administration or government had an instrumental role in establishing the first think tanks (CPHR, MESA 10). (Jurzyca 2007) Also F.A.Hayek foundation was established by two economists coming from the academy. One of them previously worked in the national bank after 1989.
[81] For the internal structure and dynamics of VPN and the role of the intellectuals in it see the volumes edited by Pešek and Szomolányi (2000) and by Antalová (1998).

various NGOs, and the rest turned to the academy and private sector, gradually many of them were absorbed by the emerging think tank sector.

At the point they started to create Slovak think tank proto-field, its founders already shared a certain set of goals, congruent with the agenda of the agents of the transnational field. Thus it was possible for these Slovak intellectuals to build and maintain the ties to the transnational field and utilize its support. To sum up, the social history of the agents of the proto-field not only explains the prevalence of neoliberalism among the dominant Slovak think tanks, but also helps to understand why their role in the transformation politics was even more accented than in the case of the other V4 countries.

3.3 The New Grey Zone

On the advent of the downfall of the communism Czech sociologist Šiklová (1990) wrote that in the new order the crucial role will be played by a particular social segment, by people who were nor nomenclatura or its allies, neither dissidents or open opponents of the regime, but somewhere in the space between these two poles. They were the 'grey zone:' a segment of intelligentsia that did not oppose to regime, but avoided to collaborate with it, thus benefiting from the proximity to power and simultaneously remaining 'clean.' Critical towards the regime, though only in closed circles (see Szomolányi 1998), still it maintained the language of the culture of critical discourse that defines the new class.[82]

The grey zone existed within a social space where there were two main principles of differentiation, two sources of power: the cultural and the nomenclatural political capital, the latter being dominant. They as intelligentsia were the bearers of the former, and avoiding as much as possible to reproduce nomenclatural capital's dominance, they located themselves at

[82] For the culture of critical discourse that belongs to the new class see Gouldner's (1979) and Konrad's and Szelenyi's (1991) accounts.

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the intersection of the two conflicting fields and sought for opportunities to cultivate and utilize their cultural capital in this 'internal exile.'(Eyal 2003)

The events proved Šiklová's analysis to be right: though the dissident intellectuals rose to prominence and political power in the few months after the implosion of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, soon people from the grey zone succeeded them in the position. In the emerging new order the domination of the nomenclatural capital was shattered, and thus the space occupied by the original grey zone vanished. With democracy and market economy in the new social space a multitude of power sources emerged, distinct and relatively autonomous from each other, none of them being completely dominant. Business, media, politics, and the academy are prominent among those field, each the domestic field of a specific source of power, of a specific capital.

In this new order segments of the new class had to find and occupy new positions. Some of them transformed and adapted to politics or business, yet others did not, unwilling or unable to do so. Some of the intellectuals that led the changes during the transition occupied a new social space, which is the emergent proto-field of think tanks. Their social history, through which some of them went also through the 'grey zone,' points to the similarities between the 'grey zone' and this new space. Similarly, they are located at the intersection of fields, each with its own principles, which often conflict. But unlike the old grey zone, finding balance between two powers and remaining non-aligned, the 'new grey zone' is located at the intersection of several sources of power, an thus can align more freely with them when useful, playing them against each other at times. Its inhabitants are in a sense multiple agents of various fields. The status of multiple agents is specific: serving several conflicting 'masters' simultaneously, they no longer serve any of them, but themselves. (Guilhot 2005)

The old grey zone meant a break with the project of teleological intelligentsia and a shift towards a more Western role of knowledge bearers and producers. But does the new grey

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zone mean that yet another segment of CEE intelligentsia became professionalized with the market economy established in the region? For now, the answer should be no, or not yet. Though definitely not being pretenders for a teleological role, the think tank intellectuals remain relatively autonomous; most importantly, unlike as in the case of professionals, their sphere is not structurally dominated by the economic field. The dominant agents of the think tank sphere were still relatively weakly tied to business in 2006, but with the diminishing support of the Western donors and new, more business-oriented agents arriving in the sphere, they will have to readapt to this new situation. Whether they will retain their status, or undergo yet another transformation, remains one of the most interesting questions for the political sociology of CEE intellectuals.

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CONCLUSION

The transformation of CEE countries from state socialism to democracy and market economy changed the role of knowledge and its bearers and producers, thus necessitating for the intellectuals to find and occupy new social positions in the emerging political, social and economic order. Seeking to utilize their knowledge and gain influence and power, segments of intellectuals tried various positions in the context of the new proliferating division of labor. The crucial question was whether they would follow the Western pattern of professionalization, attempt to assume a more teleological role in lines with the traditions of region's intelligentsia, or develop a new strategy.

In the post-communist transition some intellectuals played a crucial role in politics; however with the democratic political field introduced they had to – voluntarily or involuntarily – leave the positions of political power, or transform into professional politicians. Conflicting demands of the intellectual field and its intellectual habitus, of which they were the bearers, proved not compatible enough with the demands of the political field. It seemed that the intellectuals are no longer a significant presence in politics.

The development in Slovakia followed this pattern: a group of liberal intellectuals played a central role in the transition. After their post-transitory retreat from positions of political power these intellectuals started to create and occupy a new social space: they have become think tankers. This thesis analyzed this new social space in Slovakia in 1998-2006 and its agents and their social history from a Bourdieuan genetic structuralist perspective. The characteristics of this new social space and of the agents that occupy it were identified and several of their crucial features explained linking the findings to the broader context of theorizing of CEE intellectuals.

In Slovakia in the period under scrutiny the strategic location of the think tank sphere on the intersection of distinct five independent spheres of social power – politics, business,

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media, academy, and the transnational field of democratization and human rights – allowed the intellectuals to cultivate their cultural capital aligning themselves with these multiple independent sources of power and still remain independent.

However, the material and symbolic ties to all paternal fields were not equally strong. From the beginning the ties with the transnational field of democracy and human rights and with the academy were stronger, as the former provided essential funding and know how in establishing the think tanks and from the later the think tankers were recruited. Despite the diminishing support of the transnational field as the liberal democracy and market economy were consolidated in Slovakia, the ties with it still remain strong, but take up different forms. With the changing market for their expertise in Slovakia, the think tanks and think tankers follow the shifting focus of the transnational field to different regions that are yet to continue their transformation, in order to market their expertise there. Similarly, the ties with the academy remain strong: frequently as dual think tank and academic agents the intellectuals use their dual position to cross-fertilize their capital assets.

On the other hand, despite the strong incentives to became dual political and think tank agents, especially the option to pursue one's program also through this, the dual intellectual and political agents are subject to conflicting demands cast by both fields on their agents, and thus find themselves in almost constant conflicts between their roles. As many intellectuals in CEE learned during the transition, sitting on these two chairs is not an easy task; and this holds true even for the think tankers. Journalism and business provided them only options comparatively less attractive than the other three proto-field's paternal fields and the ties were weaker. The emergence of stronger ties with politics, business, and media was, even when other factors favored their emergence, prevented by think tank intellectuals' orientations, which typically entailed the drive for autonomy and intellectual integrity, and a sense of mission attached to their agendas.

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Thus, the dominant think tankers, as hybrid intellectuals, were, and largely remain above all academic-oriented and experts on democratization and reforms, producing and proliferating the knowledge how to build and preserve institutions of democratic regime, human rights, democratic governance, and market economy. Becoming at times multiple agents of various fields and serving several conflicting 'masters' simultaneously, they no longer had to serve any of them, but themselves. (Guilhot 2005) This yielded them significant power and influence, including in the sphere of politics: they managed to shape the reform policies of the two Dzurinda's governments between 1998 and 2006, which were particularly bold especially after 2002, according to their neoliberal program.

The dominance of think tankers that share the neoliberal agenda cannot be explained only by pointing to the alleged agenda-based selectivity of Western donors' support, the discreditation of leftist thinking, and the orientations and capital assets of left-leaning intellectuals. Another crucial factor was the with neoliberalism congruent orientation of some intellectuals that later became think tankers, which preceded not only their shift into the think tank sphere, but also their previous engagement in politics. This orientation stemmed from their conflict with the nomenclatura under the state-socialism.

This conflict was much less intense in Slovakia than in the other V4 countries and a large segment of intelligentsia remained passive and loyal to the regime due to regime's strategy combining intense co-optation and selective repression, and never broke with the project of the teleological intelligentsia. Even at the end of the 1980s the dominant Slovak social scientific intellectuals tried to rejuvenate the new class project of the Czechoslovak reform intellectuals from the 1960s. Moreover, the majority of Slovak intelligentsia cultivated its social and political capital instead of the cultural capital.

Despite this a minor fraction of intellectuals – prevalently economists and social scientists – occupied the 'grey zone' between the nomenclatura and dissident critical

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intellectuals. Due to their backgrounds they were driven more towards the strategy of cultivation of cultural capital. Through the mediating role of the international scientific life they broke with the project of the teleological intelligentsia and with the attempts to reform state-socialism and pursued the deposition of the dominance of the nomenclatural capital. They adopted a rudimentary project of social change, which already by the second half of the 1980s was congruent with the fundamental principles of neoliberalism and entailed a more technological role for them. The pursuit of this program drove them into politics as the communist regime imploded, and was also one of the causes that drove them out of politics.

Driven by the attempts to pursue their unfinished programs they sought for a new position of power and influence on politics, which would simultaneously allow them to remain autonomous and cultivate their cultural capital. The sphere that allowed them to do so was the emergent think tank sphere; they were instrumental in establishing it in Slovakia and became its dominant agents, thus fostering the prevalence of the neoliberal program within it.

Through their careers a significant part of the think tankers belonged to the grey zone. The space they occupied in 1998-2006 was similarly located on the intersection of conflicting fields. Differing from the old one, this 'new grey zone' is located on the intersection of multiple relatively autonomous social fields. Although the old grey zone meant a shift towards a more Western role of the bearers and producers of knowledge, not even the 'new grey zone' entails a complete professionalization, as the think tank intellectuals remain relatively autonomous and the economic field does not structurally dominate their sphere. The ties of the dominant agents of the think tank sphere with business were still relatively weak in 2006. Yet with the diminishing support of the Western donors and new, more business-oriented agents arriving in the sphere, they will have to readapt to this new situation. Whether they will retain their status, or undergo yet another transformation, remains one of the most interesting questions for the political sociology of CEE intellectuals.

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Appendix 1: CVs and Biographies Set

No	Surname	First Name	Affiliation	Sources
1	Andrassy	Ľubomír	ASA	URL: <http://www.andrassy.sk/andrassy2.html> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
2	Beblavý	Miroslav	SGI	URL: <http://www.governance.sk/assets/files/CV%20BEBLAVY%20SGI%20website.doc> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
3	Benč	Vladimír	RC SFPA	URL: <http://www.sfpa.sk/sk/onas/RC_SFPA/pracovnici/files/clenovia/Benc.rtf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
4	Bilčík	Vladimír	RC SFPA	URL: <http://www.sfpa.sk/sk/onas/RC_SFPA/pracovnici/files/clenovia/Bilcik.rtf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
5	Brezáni	Peter	RC SFPA	URL: <http://www.sfpa.sk/sk/onas/RC_SFPA/pracovnici/files/clenovia/Brezani.rtf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
6	Bútora	Martin	IVO	URL: <http://www.ivo.sk/buxus/generate_page.php?page_id=166> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
7	Bútorová	Zora	IVO	URL: <http://www.ivo.sk/buxus/generate_page.php?page_id=273> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
8	Červeňáková	Jana	MESA 10	(MESA 10 2007, 19). Email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May 2007
9	Chmel	Rudolf	OSF and others	URL: <http://www.coe.int/t/e/com/files/events/2003-02-culture/CV_delegations.asp> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
10	Chmelár	Eduard	ISOS	URL: <http://www.osobnosti.sk/index.php?os=zivotopis&ID=1836>Last accessed on 29 May 2007.
11	Chren	Martin	F.A. Hayek foundation	URL: <http://web.archive.org/web/20050504032216/http://www.hayek.sk/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=66> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
12	Číž	Miroslav	ASA	URL: <http://www.strana-smer.sk/index.php?id=&clanok=miroslav_ciz> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
13	Dostál	Ondrej	KI	URL: <http://www.konzervativizmus.sk/upload/doc/CV_Dostal_2005.doc> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
14	Duleba	Alexander	RC SFPA	URL: <http://www.sfpa.sk/sk/onas/RC_SFPA/pracovnici/files/clenovia/Duleba.rtf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
15	Ďurana	Richard	INESS	URL: <http://www.iness.sk/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=4> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
16	Ďurana	Radovan	INESS	URL: <http://www.iness.sk/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=4> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
17	Fedor	Gál	NMS	URL: <http://www.fedorgal.cz/> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
18	Faič	Vladimír	ASA	URL: <http://www.strana-smer.sk/index.php?id=&clanok=vladimir_faic> last accessed on 29 May 2007. URL: <http://www.nrsr.sk/exeIT.NRSR.Web.SSLP/Posl.aspx?PoslanecID=36&Lang=en> last accessed on 29 May 2007.

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19	Filadelfiová	Jarmila	IVO	URL: <http://www.ivo.sk/buxus/generate_page.php?page_id=276> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
20	Frišová	Simona	HPI, MESA10	URL: <http://www.hpi.sk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=200&Itemid=34> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
21	Gajzdica	Michal	HPI, MESA10	URL: <http://www.hpi.sk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=200&Itemid=34> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
22	Gonda	Peter	KI	URL: <http://www.konzervativizmus.sk/upload/pdf/CV_Gonda_08_2006.pdf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
23	Gyárfášová	Oľga	IVO	URL: <http://www.ivo.sk/buxus/generate_page.php?page_id=169> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
23	Horváth	Juraj	ASA	URL: <http://www.nrsr.sk/exeIT.NRSR.Web.SSLP/Posl.aspx?PoslanecID=661> last accessed on 29 May 2007. URL: <http://www.osobnosti.sk/index.php?os=zivotopis&ID=59085> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
24	Humajová	Zuzana	KI	URL: <http://www.konzervativizmus.sk/upload/pdf/CV_Humajova.pdf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
25	Hunčík	Péter	Fórum Inštitút	Čorná, Tina. 2005. Psychiater Péter Hunčík: Nemusíme sa milovať, aby sme sa vážili. [Psychiatrist Péter Hunčík: We do not have to love each other if we are to respect each other] *TV OKO*. 4 August 2005
26	Jakoby	Marek	MESA 10	(MESA 10 2007, 20). Author's email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May 2007
27	Ježovica	Milan	MESA 10	(MESA 10 2007, 20). Author's email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May 2007
28	Juris	Andrej	CPHR	URL: <http://www.antimon.gov.sk/article.aspx?c=361&a=1968> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
29	Jurzyca	Eugen	CPHR	Author's email comunication with E. Juryzca on 10 May 2007.
30	Karpiš	Juraj	INESS	URL: <http://www.iness.sk/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=4> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
31	Kadlečíková	Jana	IVO	URL: <http://www.cvek.sk/index.php?a=static&id=people> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
32	Kazda	Radovan	KI	URL: <http://www.konzervativizmus.sk/upload/doc/CV_Kazda_2005.rtf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
33	Kelley	Eva	nSPACE	URL: <http://www.nspace.sk/ktojekto.html> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
34	Kling	Jaroslav	MESA 10	(MESA 10 2007, 19). Email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May 2007.
35	Kolesík	Andrej	ASA	URL: <http://www.mladi.sk/docs/CV_A_Kolesik.pdf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
36	Kollár	Miroslav	IVO	URL: <http://www.ivo.sk/buxus/generate_page.php?page_id=170> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
37	Košťál	Ctibor	SGI	URL: <http://www.governance.sk/index.php?id=430> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
38	Kostolná	Andrea	SGI	URL: <http://www.governance.sk/index.php?id=429> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
39	Králiková	Renáta	SGI	URL:

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				<http://www.governance.sk/assets/files/CV_Kralikova_SGI_website_ENG(1).doc> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
40	Gallová Kriglerová	Elena	IVO	URL: <http://www.cvek.sk/index.php?a=static&id=people> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
41	Krivý	Vladimír	IVO	URL: <www.sav.sk/uploads/01311100vk_www_s.doc> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
42	Kubáňová	Martina	SGI, INEKO	URL: <http://www.governance.sk/assets/files/CV__Martina_Kubanova_2006(2).doc> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
43	Kuhn	Ivan	TIS	URL: <http://www.konzervativizmus.sk/upload/pdf/CV_Kuhn_sk.pdf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
44	Kusý	Miroslav		URL: <http://www.osobnosti.sk/index.php?os=zivotopis&ID=1655> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
45	Kysel	Miroslav	RC SFPA	URL: <http://www.sfpa.sk/sk/onas/RC_SFPA/pracovnici/files/clenovia/Kysel.rtf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
46	Liberčan	Adam	CEP	URL: <http://www.cpep.sk/index.php?id=136&no_cache=1&L=0> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
47	Maďarová	Henrieta	HPI	URL: <http://www.hpi.sk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=200&Itemid=34> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
48	Majchrák	Jozef	IVO	(IVO 2004, 16)
49	Marcinčin	Anton	MESA 10, CPHR, SFPA	URL: <http://www.ineko.sk/euroreform/menu4_marcincin.htm> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
50	Marušinec	Ján	MESA 10	(MESA 10 2007, 21). Author's email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May 2007
51	Mederly	Peter	SGI	URL: <http://www.leaders.sk/index.php?id=792> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
52	Mesežnikov	Grigorij	IVO	URL: <http://www.ivo.sk/buxus/generate_page.php?page_id=165> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
53	Mikloš	Ivan	MESA 10	(MESA 10 2007, 21). Email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May 2007
54	Mitošinka	Marek	F.A. Hayek foundation	URL: <http://www.jenewein.sk/bottom/sk_consultants_bios.php> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
55	Morvay	Karol	HPI, MESA10	(MESA 10 2007, 22). Author's email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May 2007
56	Najšlová	Lucia	RC SFPA	URL: <http://www.sfpa.sk/sk/onas/RC_SFPA/pracovnici/files/clenovia/Najslova.rtf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
57	Nechala	Pavel	TIS	URL: <http://www.advocate.sk/team.php> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
58	Nižňanský	Viktor	MESA 10	(MESA 10 2007, 21). Author's email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May 2007
59	Oravec	Ján	F.A. Hayek foundation	URL: <http://www.ineko.sk/euroreform/menu4_oravec.htm> last accessed on 29 May 2007. URL: <http://web.archive.org/web/20050504192809/www.hayek.sk/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=68> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
60	Pažitný	Peter	HPI, MESA10	(MESA 10 2007, 22-23). Author's email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May

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				2007
61	Petőcz	Kálmán	Fórum Inštitút	URL: <http://www.hhrf.org/mkp/mkplib/pet_hu.htm> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
62	Pilát	Jaroslav	MESA 10	(MESA 10 2007, 23). Author's email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May 2007 last accessed on 29 May 2007.
63	Pilková	Anna	CPHR	URL: <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&ct=res&cd=1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tpl.ukf.sk%2Frvs%2Frvs9%2FMPSVaR-Pilkova.doc&ei=UX1cRrviDo-MmAPj85GtBg&usg=AfrqEze6dEyV7OHLtyJnoJS7BdKDwqiUkA&sig2=BanppGXu0CacS0KnnEaZCw> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
64	Pošvanc	Matúš	F.A. Hayek foundation	URL: <http://www.hayek.sk/content/view/151/26/> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
65	Procházka	Radoslav		URL: <http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:K-nZS97EP48J:www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/prochazka/cv.doc+Radoslav+Proch%C3%A1zka&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&client=firefox-a> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
66	Radičová	Iveta	nSPACE	URL: <http://www.nspace.sk/ktojekto.html> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
67	Reptová	Oľga	MESA 10	(MESA 10 2007, 24). Author's email communication with R. Valentovič on 29 May 2007
68	Rybníček	Richard	IVO	URL: <http://www.febio.tv/en/who_is_who.php?nid=3> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
69	Samson	Ivo	RC SFPA	URL: <http://www.sfpa.sk/sk/onas/RC_SFPA/pracovnici/files/clenovia/Samson.rtf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
70	Šebej	František	IVO, KI	URL: <http://www.oks.sk/tvare_sebej.htm> last accessed on 29 May 2007. URL: <http://www.osobnosti.sk/index.php?os=zivotopis&ID=3283> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
71	Sekulová	Martina	IVO	URL: <http://www.ivo.sk/buxus/generate_page.php?page_id=278> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
72	Sičáková – Beblavá	Emília	CPHR, TIS	URL: <http://www.fses.uniba.sk/ustavy/ppm/tikiwiki/tiki-index.php?page=EmiliaBeblava&bl> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
73	Šípoš	Gabriel	INEKO	URL: <http://spwoprojekte.blogspot.com/> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
74	Sládek	Kamil	CEP	URL: <http://www.cpep.sk/index.php?id=59&no_cache=1&L=0> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
75	Sloboda	Dušan	KI	URL: <http://www.konzervativizmus.sk/upload/pdf/Dusan_Sloboda_CV_sk_2006.pdf> last accessed on 29 May. URL: <2007.http://www.konzervativizmus.sk/upload/pdf/zoznam_media_2006.pdf> last accessed on 29 May 2007.
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77	Šastný	Marek	IVO	(IVO 2004, 17)
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