THE IMPACT OF NEW MEMBER STATES ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE OF POLAND

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Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of new EU member states and especially Poland on EU foreign policy-making within the process of post-enlargement Europeanization. By looking at the changes in the content, directions and governance of the EU foreign policy after the last rounds of enlargement, the present thesis will assess the impact of the new member states and notably Poland on the formulation of EU external policies. The study will analyze whether there have been changes in the EU foreign policy as response to Polish interests and actions within the machinery of EU foreign policy-making.

The urge for this research is rooted in the need of studying the effect of the last rounds of enlargement on the EU. Past enlargements have re-shaped the EU foreign policy\(^1\). The accession of Britain in 1973 resulted in the need of designing EC\(^2\) policies towards former British colonies; the Nordic Countries created the need for a special policy towards the Baltic Basin, while the accession of Greece and Spain had, as result an increase in EC’s financial and political attention towards Latin America and the Mediterranean\(^3\). Torreblanca argues, that the ‘policy [and interest] transfer from the new members had been accompanied by a ‘problem transfer’ towards the EC\(^4\), thus compelling the EU to design policies, allocate resources and take action in both functional and geographic areas which had been of little concern and interest for the ‘old’ members.

The new members managed to communicate and impact the foreign policy of the EU by transferring their foreign policy goals to the European level. Conversely, the national foreign

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\(^{1}\) Antonio Missiroli: “Central European Between EU and NATO” in *Survival*, 46(4), 2004, page 125
\(^{2}\) EC is used instead of EU for the events happening before the Treaty of the European Union, which formalized the existence of the EU
\(^{4}\) Torreblanca, ibid
policies have been affected by the political cooperation in foreign policy matters which happens in the EU.

With the rounds of the ‘historical’ enlargements in 2004 and 2007 the EU included ten new Central and Eastern European members. Together with the new member states, the EU imported a set of new political, economic and security concerns, interests and attitudes, which will require changes in EU foreign policy. For that, the enlargement poses important challenges to the EU and especially in the loosely-integrated field of foreign policy-making. The last rounds of enlargement have been largely regarded as ‘dangerous’ to the existing patterns of coordinated foreign policy-making in the EU, as it was expected to alter both the constellation of interests and identities, which formed the basis of ‘common’ foreign policy-making in the EU, and the geographical directions of pre-enlargement EU foreign policy.

Despite of the substantial Europeanization of their foreign policies during the accession period, a sharp foreign policy ‘misfit’ between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ EU Member States still persists. The new members pose a greater adaptation problem than previous enlargements, because of their dissimilarity to the ‘old’ EU. The foreign policies of the new members are shaped on distinct interests and identities, security threats and problematic neighborhoods and volatile security complexes, which entail complicated relations with Russia, and therefore, justifies their pro-Atlanticism. Another aspect of the ‘Eastern’ members’ policies is determined by their close historic and economic ties with the Eastern neighbourhood, which orders their foreign relations priorities towards the Eastern Europe.

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5 Karolina Pomorska: The Deadlock that never happened: the impact of enlargement on the Common Foreign and Security Policy working Groups in the Council” in European Political Economy Review, no. 6 (March 2007), 13 and Heather Grabbe: “How Enlargement Will Change the EU’s Political Dynamics and Its Foreign Policies” in Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Spring 2004, 63

This ‘misfit’ triggered fears for the loss of coherence and for stalemate in the EU foreign policy-making process. Thus, the ‘new members’ strive towards changes both in policy (the modification of existing policies) and changes of policy (adopting new policies). Particularly, the ‘new’ members push for policies which disturb the cozy EU-Russia relations, the further integration of ESDP and the pre-enlargement EU policy on the neighborhood.

The thesis will analyze the changes to the EU foreign policy brought by the new EU member states, but will focus, however, on the case of Poland. The importance of Poland lies in its political weight in the EU. Poland is the biggest and most powerful new member state, being the smallest of the big EU countries. Poland displays both potential and desire for leadership and aspirations towards reshaping the foreign policy of the European Union in functional, geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions. Poland also has designed a number of concrete projects in order to advance its interests via the EU foreign policy. Thus Poland is the most able and active of the member states of the new intake, which makes the study of its impact on the EU foreign policy particularly important. The thesis, thus, aims at providing an answer to a number of questions. First, has the Polish foreign policy had an impact on the foreign policy of the EU? Did Poland’s proposals and actions trigger a change in policy and/or a change of policy?

I hypothesize that Poland does influence both a change of and a change in EU foreign policy. That change is pushed by the need of Poland to become effective participant in the formulation and implementation of the EU’s foreign policy in order to maximize its security, power, political and economic gains. Therefore, Poland has become a policy-maker. Due to an unprecedented misfit between the different interests and identities, and thanks to its relative power in the EU, Poland seeks not only to adapt to the EU Acquis Politique, but also to shape it

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8 Alan Mayhew: “Will Enlargement Radically Change the EU?”, in Adelina Baleanu, Alice Andronache, Adriana Lungu et al: Romania and the EU Enlargement: Debates, 21
according to its own needs and interests. However, the thesis will argue that the changes are rather an outcome of bargaining over the Polish proposals than a transposition of Polish preferences and interests into the EU-level foreign policy and, thus contain a large dose of European preferences.

I will study how Poland has altered the framework and the institutional and normative context within which EU foreign policy is made, and the policy-making process, the instruments it uses to achieve policy objectives, and the outputs that emerge from the policy process.

The examination of EU foreign policy formation requires the use of tools and mechanisms of Europeanization. To achieve the goals of the present research I will use a theoretical framework which combines an explanation of Poland’s actions in international relations with its behavior within the EU foreign policy-making structures. I will explain how Poland’s interests, preferences and identity which drive its foreign policy reflect in the politics of EU foreign policy-making.

The Europeanization theory explains the means and mechanism available to the new Member States and Poland in particular for promoting their foreign policy goals and interests through the EU foreign policy. Europeanization focuses on the emergence and creation of EU-wide of institutions, regimes and norms, which, in effect, shape the policies and bind the member states to EU-appropriate behavior. Europeanization provides a useful mechanism of interaction between the Member States and the EU: one of upload, thus a communication of states’ preferences, policy practices and identities to the EU level (negotiating the shape and content of EU Foreign policies and institutions) and download, the internalization of [common] EU norms.

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institutions and practices at both formal and behavioral level in the conduct of domestic and foreign policies.

The Europeanization approach allows analyzing the instruments used by Poland to ‘upload’ its preferences to the EU level, in order to shape the EU foreign policy.

The present thesis aims at contributing to the existing literature on the integration processes in the EU foreign policy and on the Europeanization of national foreign policies of the ‘new’ EU member states. The literature on the role of the national governments in EU foreign policy-making (Sotendorp, Tonra, Torreblanca, Hilt, Manners and Whiteman) deals predominantly with the ‘old’ EU members and previous enlargements, thus leaving the important impact of the ‘new’ Members out.

The Europeanization literature is mostly focused on the 1st pillar issues and the impact of the Community institutions on domestic politics and policies (Börzel, Risse, Radaelli, Caporaso and Cowles). The literature on Europeanization of the EU foreign policy is scarce (White, Tonra, Torreblanca, Pomorska). Most of these sources analyze the impact of the EU foreign policy on the national policies, that is how the participation in the EU foreign policy making has lead to the adaptation of national foreign policies of the newcomers with the policies of the ‘old’ EU member states. A minority of CFSP-related literature takes the national

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11 Ibid.
12 Ben Soetendorp: *Foreign Policy in the European Union*
13 Ben Tonra: *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001)
17 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse: “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe” in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds.): *The Politics of Europeanization*
18 Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds.): *The Politics of Europeanization*
19 M. Cowles, J. Caporaso and C. Radaelli (eds.): *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*
20 Tonra, ibid
21 Torreblanca, op. cit.
foreign policy of Member States as the independent variable and the EU foreign policy as the independent variable.

The present study will take the latter position in examining the impact of a national foreign policy, that of Poland, on the EU foreign policy. I will analyze Poland’s and the new member states’ impact on the transformation of the EU foreign policy in its three-pillar dimension. I will look at the political discourse and proposals of Poland and how these proposals are evolving towards becoming parts of the EU foreign policy. I will draw both on the tools, the process and the outcome of the actions of the two states towards their EU policies.

Apart from the theoretical literature, the present thesis draws on discourse and document analyses, of both of Polish and EU origin, and a series of interviews with EU and Polish officials.

The thesis is structured into three parts. The first part of the paper focuses on a theoretical explanation on Europeanization and describes the interaction between the national foreign policies of ‘new’ Member States, including Poland and the EU foreign policy.

In the second chapter will provide an analysis of the independent variable in the research – the national foreign policy of Poland. The question answered through this chapter is ‘what is being uploaded’ to the EU foreign policy level? In this chapter I will analyze both the rational and normative content of the foreign policies of Poland, which is important for determining the extent of the ‘misfit’ between the foreign policy of Poland and the EU foreign policy.

The third chapter is focused on the dependent variable: the EU policies and how they were shaped according to the input of Poland. The chapter is focusing on two major foreign policy areas, in which Poland was active: the ‘Eastern Dimension’ and its impact on EU foreign policies in a three-pillar perspective. The second focus area is the Transatlantic dimension.
Chapter 1- Europeanization and the New Member States’ Foreign Policies: a Theoretical Perspective

The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical framework, which allows assessing the impact of the national foreign policy over the EU foreign policy. First, I will present the Europeanization theory. Then, I will draw on the application of the Europeanization framework to the EU foreign policy. In the latter part of the chapter, I will explain the mechanisms of influence of the national foreign policies of the ‘new’ Member States on EU foreign policy.

1.1. The Europeanization Approach

Europeanization studies the influence of EU membership on the politics and policies of the member states. It also deals with the impact of national policy identities, preferences and interests on institution building and policy-making on the EU structures, assessing how Member States project their preferences and policies to the EU level within the construction of European structures.

Radaelli defines Europeanization as:

“… a process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles… and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU policy and politics and incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.”

23 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse: “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe”, 57
25 Claudio Radaelli: “The Europeanization of Public Policy” in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds.): The Politics of Europeanization, 29
According to this approach, the EU members first create the institutions and practices, which, at their turn, affect their own policy-making. This definition points at the importance of analyzing the process of creation of common EU institutions, norms and policies by the Member States, aside from considering solely top-down influences of the EU.

The logic of Europeanization, as defined by Börzel and Risse relies on the structural and normative ‘misfit’, between the national- and EU-level structures, policies, norms and identities. According to them, “if the [EU norms, rules and collective understandings] are compatible with those [embodied at the domestic level], there is no need for transformation.”\(^{26}\) When EU level policies differ from the national policy goals, laws and policy instruments to achieve those goals, the EU institutions exert pressures on the Member States and require compliance.\(^{27}\) The EU standards are regularly embodied in the Acquis, and are guarded by the ECJ, which sanctions non-compliance.

Low ‘misfit’ leads to compliance. High ‘misfit’ raises the domestic cost of compliance and impinges states to seek to ‘upload’ their preferences and norms to reduce the costs.\(^{28}\) In the integrated pillars, the ‘uploading’ opportunities are fewer, because of the high degree of institutionalization. The area of the misfit also affects the willingness of the states to Europeanize. In sensitive and important policy areas, which are deeply embedded in the national identity, Europeanization has a lower impact and takes longer to accomplish.\(^{29}\) High adaptation pressure results, in this case, in the propensity of the state to challenge the EU norm, rather than comply. The EU foreign policy, because of its lower degree of integration and institutionalization poses a theoretical and empirical puzzle from the point of view of Europeanization.

\(^{26}\) Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, op. cit., 61
\(^{27}\) Ibid
\(^{28}\) Börzel and Risse, ibid
\(^{29}\) Checkel, quoted in Börzel and Risse, op. cit., 63 s
1.2. Europeanization and EU Foreign Policy

The EU foreign policy is a problematic area for Europeanization, as conceived in the aforementioned definitions. EU foreign policy is under-institutionalized, the binding legal and institutional mechanisms to which the Member States have to adapt are nearly-absent and there is a lack of effective sanctioning mechanisms.\(^{30}\)

The intergovernmental nature of the EU foreign policy makes the EU impact on the member states weak. Thus, the “top-down” approach has less relevance in areas of EU foreign policy than in 1\(^{st}\) pillar policy areas. Conversely, the Member States are more empowered compared to the EU in foreign policy issues. Thus, the construction of common EU norms, values and institutions in foreign policy areas are mostly characterized by the “bottom-up” process, by which the states ‘upload’ or ‘transfer’\(^{31}\) their policy preferences and norms to the EU level and form coordinated EU approaches, institutions, values and policies in the field of foreign policy.

Form this perspective, the ‘success’ of a state in the Europeanization process of its foreign policy is defined by how much of the national policy, that is norms, institutional practices, preferences, are embedded into the EU level and how much of the national policy goals are being implemented through the EU foreign policies using common EU resources.

Also, because of the ‘misfit’ between the national and EU-level foreign policies would imply that the states should defend the intrusion of ‘inappropriate’ and costly elements of other EU members’ foreign policies in their national foreign polices, that is, the states should seek to

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resist engaging and spending their own resources on the pursuit of other states’ goals, if they contradict their own interests and norms.

**1.3. New Member States and the Europeanization of EU Foreign Policy**

There are two main logics of change relevant to the Europeanization of national foreign policies of the ‘new’ EU member states. Börzel and Risse mention the “logic of appropriateness” and “the logic of consequentialism”.

**1.3.1. A Constructivist Interpretation**

According to the “logic of appropriateness” actors voluntarily ‘import’ identities and norms attached to a particular community by participating in collective meanings. Actors match their behavior to the perceived obligations inherent to their new roles and identities. Thus, the ‘new members’ align to the established rules, norms and practices of the EU member states, follow the foreign policy lines of the EU members and incorporate the foreign policy priorities of the EU.

The Europeanization of national foreign policy started, for the ‘new’ Member States since their integration period, when they had to internalize the foreign policy principles, norms and action courses of the EU. The ‘new’ Members adopted the *Aquis Politique*, by which they

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32 Karen Smith: op. cit., 16
33 Olsen, quoted in Adrian Hyde-Price: “Interests, Institutions and Identities in the Study of European Foreign Policy” in Ben Tonra, Thomas Christiansen: *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, (Menchester University Press, 2004), 113
34 Geoffrey Edwards: “The New Member States and the Making of EU Foreign Policy” in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11, 2006, 144
aligned to common declarations, statements and positions of the EU Member States\textsuperscript{35} thus proving their ‘fit’ to the EU identity. This process was an asymmetric “top-down” Europeanization. The voluntary character of this conformity was facilitated by the CEECs’ desire to overcome the “complex of otherness”\textsuperscript{36}, the desire of European recognition.

The accession of the ‘new’ Member States to the EU changed the process of Europeanization. It ceased to be “top-down”, as the ‘new’ Member States have become legitimate policy-makers, which gave them the role, opportunity to shape the EU foreign policy by affecting EU identity and, therefore the interests and norms.

Tilikainen argues that in order to be ‘common’, the EU identity should be defined by (1) a collective dimension (by which the identity of the EU gives every Member State a share in the common EU foreign policy project) and (2) the historical dimension (by which the EU identity is “legitimated by the historical experiences of all\textsuperscript{37} Member States”).\textsuperscript{38} The EU identity, lacks, however, a collective meaning and value set with which every of its members can identify with\textsuperscript{39}. There is a differentiation between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member states’ role conceptions, perceptions of amity and enmity and, with that, different definitions of the “general kind of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their foreign policies”.\textsuperscript{40} The EU foreign policy identity was, thus, constructed by the ‘old’ Member States, which differs from the conception of EU foreign policy of the ‘new’ Members.

\textsuperscript{37} My emphasis
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid
\textsuperscript{40} Adrian Hyde-Price: “Interests, Institutions and Identities in the Study of European Foreign Policy” in Ben Tonra, Thomas Christiansen: Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy, (Manchester University Press, 2004), 109
First, in the collective dimension – the EU foreign policy, its priorities, geographic directions, functional areas and ‘ways of doing things’ have been determined before the accession of the ‘new’ Members. This generated a wide ‘misfit’, which the ‘new’ states had to change.

Second, the identity ‘misfit’ between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ EU states stems from their different historical experiences, which generates policy incoherence across the EU.

In order to level down the ‘misfits’, the new EU members have to alter the EU identity and norms and give a greater feeling of ‘appropriateness’ to their foreign policies. The ‘upload’ tools available to the ‘new’ Members within the cooperative socialization process of EU foreign policy-making institutions are persuasion.

Another instrument is persuasion. Johnston defines it as “changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about causality and identity in the absence of overtly material coercion”\(^{41}\). Sedelmeier implies that subjects are open to being persuaded by the better argument, while interests hold secondary importance. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger hold that subjects “…try to agree on why certain behaviors should be chosen over the other. Insofar as the reasons are convincing internally, the subjects are motivated to behave according to the mutually constructed interpretations”\(^{42}\). The success of persuasion depends on the authority and the expertise of the persuader\(^{43}\). The ‘new’ Member States have often claimed their greater legitimacy on dealing with Russia and the Eastern Neighbors, as they have more expertise and have been more closely socialized with the Eastern states.

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Sedelmeier draws attention on “argumentative communication” i.e. the use of argumentative rhetoric with reference to ‘common’ norms and values in order to induce ‘appropriate’ behavior for other actors. States refer to norms and identity and warn that “the EU’s identity is a stake, suggest particular policy options for ‘appropriate behavior’, or unravel discrepancies between behavior and collectively-professed norms”\(^{44}\) Thus, EU Member Governments use shaming or identity-building arguments to induce ‘acceptable’ behavior by other actors. Specifically, the actors are shamed or warned about their breaches of the ‘solidarity’, ‘cooperation’ or human rights principles in order to act or abstain from acts that would spoil the cooperative atmosphere in the EU.

The frequent use of discursive instruments by the ‘new’ Member States denotes the need for Europeanization of the EU foreign policy to the extent where it would derive from the identity and historical experience of all EU Members. Thus, they are building their arguments and discourses using already existing EU values in foreign policy-making, such as ‘solidarity’ and ‘cooperation’.

### 1.3.2. The Rationalist Explanation

The second approach is the “logic of consequentialism”, which regards the states as rational, self-interested and goal-oriented actors who \textit{are concerned with own gains and losses}\(^{45}\). State actions are determined by strategic calculations of the actors and by the actors’ utility functions\(^{46}\). The EU is viewed instrumentally, as an opportunity structure\(^{47}\) which has utility as long as and in those areas where it enables states to further and maximize their interests.

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\(^{45}\) Andreas Hasenclever; Peter Mayer; Volker Rittberger: \textit{Theories of International Regimes}, (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997), 26

\(^{46}\) Ibid

\(^{47}\) Ibid
From the rationalist point of view, the ‘misfits’ between the EU and the Member’s preferences, policies, structures and identities create adaptational pressure and inflict adaptation costs. The states seek to ‘upload’ their preferences in order to alter the ‘misfit’ to their own advantage and, thus, offset the costs of adaptation. Plus, ‘uploading’ has also a strategic role. A state ‘transfers’ its policy goals to the EU level, so that the national policy goals be pursued more effectively, by using EU resources, institutional capacities, legitimacy and global outreach. This is especially important for small and medium-sized countries with limited resources and leverage for the conduct of their foreign policies.

From the rationalist standpoint, the adherence of the ‘new’ Member states to the Acquis Politique was driven by the self-interest of the CEECs to accede to the EU. The benefit of accession outweighed the political costs related to the states’ acting along EU policy lines. Rationalists discard the identity-related arguments, according to which adherence to EU values was conditioned by the ‘logic of appropriateness’. For them, the EU norms have instrumental value, as long as they provide access to the EU’s institutional and material resources.

However, the status of EU Member provides the opportunity to switch from policy-taker to policy-maker. Rationalist arguments are reinforced by the turn in Europeanization after the accession of the new Member States to the EU. The ability to influence the EU’s structures and norms allowed the ‘new’ Member States to voice for the reform of the EU foreign policy.

EU Membership, thus, provided the ‘new’ Member states with opportunities and tools for ‘uploading’ their policy preferences to the EU level. However, because of the horizontal character of Europeanization in the field of foreign relations, and the low utility of coercive

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47 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse: op. cit., 63
48 Heather Grabbe: “How Enlargement Will Change the EU’s Political Dynamics and Its Foreign Policies” in Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Spring 2004, page 63
mechanisms, states have to use strategic communicative and entrepreneurial tactics to influence EU foreign policy-making.

The second tool available to the states is, therefore, strategic persuasion, or rhetorical action, by which policy advocates employ “ideas and beliefs as calculated means and hooks”\(^49\) and “identity-based arguments purely instrumentally”\(^50\) in order to constrain “those actors whose material interests is not served”\(^51\) by the particular policy option. Values, norms and identities thus acquire instrumental value, as they can be used by particular states to induce norm-conforming behavior for the other states.

Johnston mentions that the success of such actions depends on the ability of the proponent to justify and legitimate his needs by referring to the EU ‘collective identity’. Opponents are entrapped, but not because of normative reasons, but “by their declared commitment to [EU norms and identity and fear]…about the damage to their reputation as community members if they were to act against norms that characterize its identity”\(^52\). Thus, actors which are able to frame their policy options as EU interest, related to EU identity are most likely to succeed in ‘uploading’ their preferences to the EU level.

Pomorska identifies a third tool, which is strategic socialization, when national officials representing their governments in Brussels use socialization as part of their strategy. Thus, officials engage in official and unofficial meetings (in the corridor, or during lunch\(^53\)) and discuss facts, ideas and policy options before taking them into high-level meetings. As an officer

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\(^49\) Ben Tonra, op. cit., 31

\(^50\) Schimmelfennig, quoted in Ulrich Sedelmeier: “EU Enlargement, Identity and the Analysis of European Foreign Policy: Identity Formation Through Policy Practice” in, European University Institute Working Papers, RSC No. 2003/13, (Florence: European University Institute, 2003),

\(^51\) Ibid

\(^52\) Ibid

\(^53\) Ana E. Juncos and Karolina Pomorska: “Learning the ropes and embracing the rules: CFSP institutions as arenas for learning and strategic socialisation”, draft paper, Conference on EU Foreign Policy ‘Challenges and Options for the Future’ in Brussels, 17 November 2005, 7
of the Polish Representation at the EU mentions, it is most often during these meetings that “things get agreed on”\textsuperscript{54}

After accession, the ‘new’ Members have a variety of tools to achieve change. All of the tools require the Member States to take initiative in both designing and advocating for the desired policy directions of EU foreign policy. However, their success depends largely on whether the changes attempted by them are consented by the ‘old’ Member States.

Poland’s efforts in re-shaping the EU foreign policy are, therefore, dependent on whether the ‘misfit’ between its own interests and identity and the EU ones can generate a high propensity for reshaping the EU foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{54} Interview with an official in the Council Secretariat, Brussels, April 2007
Chapter 2 – Polish Foreign Policy – a European Foreign Policy?

This chapter will provide an overview of the constituent elements of Polish foreign policy in order to set the stage for the study of its interrelation to EU foreign policy. First, I will analyze the sources of Polish foreign policy: its identity and interests and then determine how they form Poland’s preferences. Further, I will analyze Poland’s attitudes towards the EU foreign policy and Poland’s perception of the ‘misfit’ between its own and the EU foreign policy.

2.1. The Sources of Poland’s Foreign Policy: Identity, Interests and Opportunities

States acquire identities during their historical socialization. Identities, “role-specific understandings about self”, are relational, i.e. resulted from an interactive delimitation between ‘self’ and ‘others’. The experience in encounters between collectivities form values, attitudes and perceptions of ‘enmity’ and ‘amity’ towards other states. Identity is, thus, rooted in the memory, understanding and experience of self-defined people. Identities, values and worldviews determine the political culture and ideology of a society and, thus, shape the foreign policy of states by providing the context for the formulation and development of national interest.

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55 Karen Smith: op. cit., 16
57 Ben Tonra, op. cit., 32
58 Sanford, George, ’Overcoming the burden of history in Polish foreign policy’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19:3, 178
59 Tonra, op. cit., 31
The Polish national identity is largely determined by Poland’s historical experience. Poland has been erased from the world map four times during history. At all times, Poland fell prey to its powerful neighbors, mainly Germany and Russia. As result, Poland had only 120 years of independence in the last 200 years and has suffered horrors, such as the World War 2 massacres and communist oppression.

Thus, Poland’s socialization in international relations happened within power politics systems. As Johnston argues, socialization in Realpolitik ideology leads to Realpolitik behavior. Thus, Poland’s history has produced a resistant, skeptical and rationalist political culture throughout most of the population and political elites. Security and independence have become the central interest of Poland.

As Wood notes: “in IR terms Poland has a ‘realist’ orientation, in EU terms ‘intergovernmental’”. Poland’s fundamental national interest is, therefore to protect its physical, political and cultural identity from all kinds of encroachments. As realists, Polish statesmen think of the world according to the worst case scenario and approach neighbors and alliances prudently. Thus, Poland has always been skeptical towards its neighbors and partners in international cooperation frameworks.

Polish foreign policy cannot be described just from the realist point of view. By participating in collective meanings, actor’s interests and preferences change. NATO and EU

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60 During the three partitions in 1772, 1793 and 1795 and during the German-Soviet invasion in 1941 source: Sanford, George, ‘Overcoming the burden of history in Polish foreign policy’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19:3, 186
61 Ibid
62 Alastar Johnson, op. cit., 507
64 Ben Tonra, op. cit., 28
66 Karen Smith, op. cit., 16
membership, which attenuated the fears of another *comeback to Realpolitik* and loosened the geopolitical situation in Central Europe, allowed Poland to concentrate on the opportunities, such as becoming a regional leader and maximizing the advantages provided by its new roles.

The main dimensions of Polish foreign policy correspond to the interests, historical and perceived roles of Poland in Europe and in the region.

### 2.2. The Directions and Content of Polish Foreign Policy

Polish foreign policy has been dominated by a number of central topics: Russia, United States and NATO, the Eastern Neighborhood and the European Union.

#### 2.2.1. Russia

Russia has occupied an important place in Polish history and has been one of the core elements of its foreign policy. The historical lessons learned by Poland conditioned it to design prudent policies with Russia. Poland’s policy on Russia, crafted by Foreign Minister Skubiszewski and followed by subsequent governments ever since, was centered on the assurance of Polish independence, which implies a policy of balancing Russia regionally.

The dissolution of the USSR has changed the geopolitical landscape in Central Europe. Thus, for the first time in history, Poland and Russia did not have a common border (except for Kaliningrad). This alleviated some tensions and allowed Poland to build a more civilized relationship with Russia. At start Poland assured Russia that “it would not join any alliances

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67 George Sanford: *Poland: the Conquest of History*, (Harwood Academic Publishing: Amsterdam, 1999), 81
68 George Sanford, 'Overcoming the burden of history in Polish foreign policy', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19:3, 182
69 George Sanford: *Poland: the Conquest of History*, (Harwood Academic Publishing: Amsterdam, 1999), 81
which could create base of aggression on Russia.” This allowed Poland to bargain for the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1993. However realist thinking was still dominant and, in a month, Poland declared its willingness to accede to NATO.

In order to alleviate the Russian ‘threat’, Poland changed its approach on Russia. It presupposed strengthening Russia’s democracy and engaging Russia as close as possible with the Western structures, so as to strengthen the spirit of trust and minimize possibilities of conflict. Aside assurances that Poland’s NATO accession is not a threat, Poland sought to promote the NATO-Russia cooperation. Poland even invited Russian troops for military exercises on Polish territory.

Following the Russian crisis in 1998, Poland became alerted by the democratic ‘nose-dive’ of Russia, which threatened the ‘democratic peace’ in Central Europe. Russia’s political and economic encroachments on Ukraine and the Baltic States posed a direct threat to Poland. However, because of its NATO membership, a threat of open conflict is minimal. What Foreign Minister Geremek feared most was a geo-economic encroachment on Poland and its neighbors. NATO cannot absolve Poland of such threats. Besides, Poland started fearing abandonment from the part of the US, which needs Russia as ally in the ‘war on terror’, and from the energy-dependent EU, where the biggest powers are favoring an accommodating policy on Russia.

Therefore, Poland’s main goal is to use the EU as a mechanism to alleviate the ‘Russian’ threat. However, despite of the advantages of EU Membership, the current constellation of

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71 George Sanford: *Poland: the Conquest of History*, (Harwood Academic Publishing: Amsterdam, 1999), 96
72 Wojciech Kostecki, op. cit., 212-214
75 Ibid
interests over the ‘Russia-first’ policy within the EU make this task extremely difficult. Therefore, a Poland-promoted “Russia Policy” is indispensable for Polish Security.

### 2.2.2. The Eastern Neighbors

The Eastern neighbors, Ukraine, Belarus and, to some extent, Moldova have a special importance for Poland. Ukraine stands out from the other Eastern neighbors of Poland. Its importance is primarily geopolitical. As Brzezinski noted: “Russia with Ukraine is an Empire; Russia will not be one without Ukraine”\(^76\). Therefore, the independence of Ukraine is a \textit{de sine qua non} condition for the main policy goal of Poland and a crucial guarantee vis-à-vis Russia’s imperial ambitions in Central and Eastern Europe\(^77\).

In Poland’s view, the only efficient way to keep Ukraine outside Russia’s influence is to support Ukraine’s democracy and market-oriented development, but, most importantly, provide Ukraine alternatives other than CIS integration. Poland was the first to recognize the independence of Ukraine\(^78\). Also, Poland supported Ukraine’s acceptance into the Council of Europe and Central European Initiative. Consequently, Poland pleaded for Ukraine’s integration into NATO and advocated for a European Perspective for Ukraine. These measures are intended to ease Russia clout on Ukraine and augment Polish independence.

Poland enjoys a high profile in the Ukrainian society and political groups, as being the most important ally of the United States in Central Europe and a politically strong member of the

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\(^76\) Zbigniew Brzezinski, quoted in Aleksandr Smolar: “Poland’s Eastern Policy and Membership in the European Union” in Pawel Kowal: \textit{The EU’s “Eastern Dimension” – An Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland’s Policy?}, (Warsaw: Centre for International Relations, 2002), 11

\(^77\) Michal Natorski and Anna Herranz: “The Impact of German-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian Special Relations on European Foreign Policy: Energy Supplies and Visas in the EU Neighborhood”, \textit{Paper presented for the conference “Reflecting on a wider Europe and beyond: norms, rights and interests”}, organized by the Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA), 4th Convention, University of Tartu, Estonia, 25 – 27 June 2006, 6

\(^78\) George Sanford: \textit{Poland: the Conquest of History}, (Harwood Academic Publishing: Amsterdam, 1999), 101
EU. The Ukrainian political leadership views Poland as their most important “window to Europe” and NATO\textsuperscript{79} Poland has included Ukrainian troops into its missions in Kosovo and Iraq, thus, taking active measures for the integration of Ukraine into the Western political and security structures\textsuperscript{80}.

Ukraine is important for Poland because the odds of success for Polish foreign policy are much higher than in other CIS neighbors. Since the ‘Orange revolution’, Ukraine is the pivot of the Polish ‘Eastern Dimension’, which is the central policy proposal of Poland in the EU.

Belarus is a more problematic case. Despite of the good relations in the start of the 1990s, the election of President Lukashenka marked a sore period in Polish-Belarusian relations. Unlike Ukraine, the leadership of Belarus does not seek a European perspective and has a low human rights record. Besides, the Belarusian leadership foments actions against the Polish minority, thus intending to curb Polish influence in the country. Belarus is a problematic spot in the Eastern Strategy of Poland, as it leaves a gap in Polish security and regional projects.

Moldova interests Poland because of its complicated geopolitical situation, its independence being undermined by the continuous presence of Russian troops in its breakaway region of Transnistria. Although Moldova has not figured in the top of Poland’s foreign policy agenda, Polish involvement is comparatively high in comparison to the other EU Member States. Thus, for Poland, Moldova is more of a strategic opportunity than security necessity.

Aside from being pivotal for Poland’s security, the Eastern neighborhood represents an important opportunity structure for Poland. Eastern neighborhood is the only area of EU foreign

\textsuperscript{79} Michal Natorski and Anna Herranz, ibid
\textsuperscript{80} Stephen Wood: “A New ‘Partner in Leadership’? Poland in contemporary international affairs” in National Europe Centre Paper No: 114, 2003, 6
policy where Poland enjoys comparative advantage in terms of expertise, presence and local political support.\footnote{Interview by the author with an official of the Council of European Union, Brussels, April 25, 2007}

Other strategic opportunities arise from the potential economic value of the neighborhood. Ukraine and Belarus are important transit routes for oil pipelines and transport linking the EU with the Russian market. Due to the close historical and cultural ties, Polish companies have a competitive advantage in these regions.\footnote{Interview with a Polish official in Poland’s Representation to the EU} Despite of the economic downfalls, these countries are potential beneficiaries of EU enlargement in the future. With the potential development of free trade areas, these countries can become important markets and business sites for EU and, specifically, Polish companies\footnote{Interview by the author with an EU Commission official, April 25, 2007, Brussels}.

The eastern neighborhood has a strategic and geopolitical importance for Poland and provides opportunities for Polish foreign policy. Because of its past involvement and expertise, Poland has a comparative advantage in shaping the EU policy on these countries, which makes it a priority for Poland within the EU.

2.2.3. The United States and NATO

Due to its historical “lessons”, Poland views NATO and the United States as the only credible security guarantee in the face of its security threats. During its history, Poland had forged regional and wider alliances, most notably with France and Great Britain. However, these were not effective in the face of the German and Soviet invasions in 1941. As the former Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz noted:

“...My nation experienced several instances of betrayal by our disloyal neighbours and allies and paid the highest price for it. Therefore we...
understand better than anyone else how priceless and crucial true loyalty and
alliance are.\textsuperscript{84}

Polish fears seem justified by the conciliatory politics of the ‘old’ Europe towards Russia, which keeps the so-called “Rapallo myth”\textsuperscript{85} alive. Thus, the United States is Poland’s sole credible guarantee that that it would not suffer from EU’s log-rolling with Russia at Poland’s expense\textsuperscript{86}.

Thus, from 1993, despite of its assurances to Russia that it would not join NATO, the Polish government applied for NATO membership\textsuperscript{87}. Poland’s foreign policy sought to develop a special relationship with the United States. Since joining the Alliance, Poland became a pivot in NATO’s Northern Wing, which is responsible for the Baltic Sea, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus\textsuperscript{88}. Poland participated in US-led campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, assisted the United States in involving its neighbors (Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Latvian troops under Polish command)\textsuperscript{89}. Poland’s close relationship with the US paid off well. For the relatively small contribution of 247 troops, Poland received a considerable role in the administration of Iraq and Polish companies got privileges in the form of lucrative reconstruction contracts\textsuperscript{90}.

NATO membership has solved the Polish security dilemma towards Germany and Russia. Nevertheless, it has strained its political relations with France and Germany, which have

\textsuperscript{84} Stephen Wood: “A New ‘Partner in Leadership’? Poland in contemporary international affairs” in National Europe Centre Paper No: 114, 2003, 3
\textsuperscript{85} Aleksandr Smolar: “Poland’s Eastern Policy and Membership in the European Union” in Pawel Kowal: The EU’s “Eastern Dimension” – An Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland’s Policy?, (Warsaw: Centre for International Relations, 2002), 11
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid
\textsuperscript{87} Wojciech Kostecki: “Poland” in Hans Mouritzen (ed.): Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europe’s Baltic Rim, (Ashgate: Aldershot, UK; Brookfield, VT, USA: 1998), 211
\textsuperscript{89} Wood, op. cit., 6
labeled Poland as the American ‘Trojan Horse’ and ‘Trojan Donkey’. The ‘transatlantic rift’ created by Poland’s relations with the US put Poland under allegations of thwarting integration in ESDP.

Nevertheless, Poland’s close relations with the US gives it leverage in designing the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and in influencing the Russia-EU dialogue. The transatlantic rift is, thus a mere proof that integration in security and defense matters does not satisfy all EU members’ interests.

### 2.2.4. Poland and the European Union

Membership in the EU has been regarded, aside NATO membership as a ‘historical solution’ for Poland’s historical and economic challenges. Poland signed its Europe agreement in 1991 and had to adopt the *Acquis*, interiorize European values and align to the EU policies in order to achieve membership. In 1994 Poland started a ‘Structural Dialogue’ with the EU on foreign policy issues, by which Poland committed to bring its institutions and foreign policy actions in accordance to the EU practice. During the process of integration, Poland aligned to the EU demarches and positions. However, the decisions to follow the line of EU foreign policy were determined by Poland’s desire to construct the image of “Good European”, so as to gain acceptance for EU accession. Poland’s compliance with the EU foreign policy norms was a rational response to the strict EU pre-accession conditionality. Although aware of the ‘misfits’, the ultimate benefit of joining the EU made the Polish government to take softer positions.

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91 Nicholas Walton, ibid
93 George Sanford: op. cit., 86
Poland’s position, has however, accession. Poland became empowered to influence the EU foreign policy and change the practices and norms of the EU foreign policy making, so as to adapt it to its own interests. Poland’s main interests and preferences towards the EU can be grouped into two fields. First, are the interests relating to the relations of Poland with the third countries: the United States, Russia and the Eastern neighbors, which Poland is striving to promote through the EU means. Second are the interests and preferences of Poland towards the EU foreign policy instruments and structures, such as the EU foreign aid, economic and military instruments within the ENP and CFSP.

Despite Poland’s decade-long alignment to the EU foreign policy statements, as Polish Foreign Minister Czimoszewicz said: “Poland’s membership in the EU will not alter our fundamental priorities”\(^{(94)}\) In a different statement, he asserted: “We are entering the Union under the Polish flag!”\(^{(95)}\) which denotes the rationalist stance the Polish government has taken towards EU foreign policy.

Poland’s interests in the EU pertain to preserving its strategic relations with the United States as the sole security guarantor of Poland’s independence by keeping the United States present in Europe, which entails reluctance towards integration in the ESDP; the promotion of the Eastern Neighborhood, the area where Poland has both vital security and economic interests and where Poland has comparative advantage as opposed to its EU partner states; acquiring new roles in international relations, mainly strengthening Poland’s profile towards Russia and widen the foreign policy agenda to the areas where Poland has been formerly absent due to its relatively meager due to its traditional regional orientation and rather limited resources.


The main foreign policy goals for Poland in the EU are therefore to assure that Polish interests are not sidelined and the EU foreign policy machinery is permissive to the Polish proposals. These goals require, therefore, consolidating Poland’s position within the EU foreign policy-making institutions and gaining the support of the other Member States to support Polish policy proposals.
Chapter 3 – The Europeanization of Polish Foreign Policy

The purpose of this chapter is to account for the Europeanization of Poland’s foreign policy and analyze how and to what extent Poland has affected the EU foreign policy by ‘uploading’ its preferences onto the EU-level of foreign policy-making.

The chapter uses the theoretical mechanism outlined in the first chapter and starts from displaying the ‘misfit’ between the two levels of foreign policy. Then, I will analyze the tools use by Poland to further its foreign policy instruments by explaining Poland behavior in the process of creation of EU foreign policy-making institutions. In the end, I will locate the input of Poland within the current EU foreign policy areas.

3.1. The Misfit Between Poland’s and EU Foreign Policies

Poland has important priorities for EU foreign, such as the Eastern Dimension, the transatlantic partnership and the EU-Russia relations, all with vital security implications. As it has been pointed, Poland’s preference towards Eastern Europe requires an active EU role in the stabilization of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Poland’s view is that this stabilization can only be achieved by a closer integration of these countries into the EU, the recognition of their potential of being granted EU membership and providing the four freedoms, but also enhancing EU’s financial contribution to help the stabilization and democratization processes in the Eastern Neighborhood96.

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Poland’s preference towards the transatlantic partnership bases on its close relations to the United States and the need to maintain US presence in Europe, so as to assure Poland’s security. Because of its preference to preserve the NATO-ESDP link, Poland has been accused of stalling integration within the ESDP. However, Poland views ESDP as a tool for enhancing its role in Eastern Europe and specifically in those areas, where NATO cannot take a role, such as the ‘frozen conflicts’ Therefore, Poland’s preference is in developing the civilian tools of ESDP. However, Poland is supporting the development of EU military capabilities, as it views them important for possible peacekeeping operations in Eastern Europe, where Poland can have a strong role.

Therefore, Poland is interested in NATO for security reasons, while the ESDP is seen as an opportunity of enhancing Poland’s influence in Eastern Europe.

These views have little resonance with both the previous EU policies and with the interests of the majority of ‘old’ EU members For instance, the ‘eastern policy’ of Poland hampers the EU-Russia relations, which regards the EU’s eastern neighborhood as its exclusive sphere of influence. The ‘old’ EU members have a dominant interest in maintaining good relations with Russia, which is conditioned by the EU’s increasing energy dependence on Russian gas. Besides, Russia has a much bigger importance and represents less of a threat for the ‘old’ EU than for Poland.

A more generous policy towards the Eastern neighborhood also endangers the existing EU’s policies for the Mediterranean which makes the Southern EU members stark opponents of Polish interests.

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97 Interview with a senior Council official, Brussels, April 2007
The transatlantic partnership causes a different rift within the EU, as it challenges the French and German-supported integration in the European Security and Defense Policy.

Thus, there is a fundamental ‘misfit’ between Poland’s interests and actual EU foreign policy, which was forged by the ‘old’ EU member states before Poland’s accession. Poland’s projects in the EU require a significant re-definition of EU’s interests, roles and norms of foreign policy decision-making in the Union. The lack of understanding between the interest factions within the EU can endanger the whole EU projects. It is clear that the divergences can be hardly reconciled, as they involve solid material underpinnings and vital interests for all parties involved.

In the same time, the EU member states need a coherent EU foreign policy, without which none could pursue its interests effectively. Poland does not possess the required economic and political potential to conduct its policies on Russia and the Eastern neighborhood effectively: in the case of Ukraine to support, but in the case of Belarus - to a pro-West evolution. This task, which is of key importance to Poland can be best achieved through the use of the EU’s means and potential\(^\text{100}\).

Therefore, Poland’s success depends on both its political influence in the EU decision-making structures, which would assure its interests are not being ignored.

**3.2. Strategies of Europeanization in Poland’s Foreign Policy**

Poland’s strategies for Europeanization (‘uploading’) are varied, including institution-engineering, alliance strategies, rhetorical action and policy entrepreneurship.

\(^{100}\) Andrzej Harasimowicz, Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski: “European Union’s Policy Towards Russia and Ukraine – The Tasks for Polish Foreign Policy”, in *Studies & Analyses*, Vol. II, no. 3 (2003), 5
3.2.1. Institution-Engineering

Poland’s participation in shaping the EU foreign policy making started during its participation in the ICG on the EU Constitutional Treaty. Poland’s actions during the constitutive negotiations have been directed towards creating a favorable institutional and political format, which would best promote Poland’s preferences in EU foreign policy-making. The importance of the Constitutional Treaty lies in its implications for the decision-making procedures in the Council and in the provisions on the EU Foreign Minister and the EU External Action Service.

Poland’s position reflected its interests in maintaining and acquiring maximum benefits from the future mode of action of the EU foreign policy-making. Its main goal during the deliberations was to support the intergovernmental character of the CFSP.

Specifically, Poland’s influence in the EU is due to the number of qualified votes it was assigned by the Nice Treaty, which awarded Poland 27 votes as opposed to Germany’s 29, although Germany has more than double the population of Poland and a much stronger economy. The Nice system generally favors the smaller and medium-size countries vis-à-vis the big states by shortening the gap between them. An indirect effect for Poland is that the Nice system also favors its allies, which are small states.

During the Inter-Governmental Conference, the issue of qualified majority voting was the most important issue on the agenda. Consequently, Poland supported the Nice status quo. The Polish position during the ICG was best expressed by Jan Rokita, a leader of Poland’s opposition, by the phrase: ‘Nice or death!’.

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102 Interview with an official of the Council of the EU, April 2007, Brussels
Poland opposed communitarization in the field of CFSP and defended the veto rights.\textsuperscript{104} The Polish delegates accepted the institution of EU Foreign Minister. However, they resisted the title of European Foreign Minister for the official which was in charge of CFSP. He pleaded that the title remains as High Representative.\textsuperscript{105}

The most important area of debate within the CFSP with great implications for Poland was the enhancement of the decision-making format by creating a ‘European nucleus’ of strong states, or “big three countries” (Germany, France and the UK). Poland sided with the other mid-ranked, but strong Member States (Italy and Spain) which were excluded from the ‘nucleus’.\textsuperscript{106} As Petrelli and Vallianatou mention, the Polish president Kwasniewski, claimed to be skeptical towards the idea of a “European nucleus”, but would have joined one if possible.\textsuperscript{107} This points at Poland’s interest of avoiding marginalization within the EU CFSP structures.

Poland rejected the application of QMV for the CFSP, thus defending its opportunity to veto issues related to the EU Foreign Policy. Nevertheless, Poland supported the application of the QMV in third pillar affairs, especially in matters related to the Schengen agreement.\textsuperscript{108} The latter position was conditioned by Poland’s fears that the EU states might initiate a special transit agreement with Russia for the inhabitants of Kaliningrad and Poland needed to have at least some control on that issue.\textsuperscript{109}

Poland participated actively in the deliberations on ESDP Poland also rejected communitarization in this area. Poland was one of the most problematic countries, its delegates stating that “the negotiation of such important issues for their future were not possible to be

\textsuperscript{104} Interview with an official of the Council of the EU, April 2007, Brussels


\textsuperscript{106} Interview with an official of the Council of the EU, April 2007, Brussels

\textsuperscript{107} M. Petrelli and A. Vallianatou, op. cit, 10

\textsuperscript{108} Institut für Europäische Politik: ibid

\textsuperscript{109} Interview with an official of the Polish Mission to the EU, Brussels, April 2007
limited to such a tight time frame.\textsuperscript{110} However, the delegates of Poland insisted on the inclusion of an article stipulating the ESDP relation to NATO.\textsuperscript{111}

Poland also resisted the idea of ‘structured cooperation’ in matters of ESDP. With a defense budget of 3.9 billion US Dollars (often compared to that of Belgium),\textsuperscript{112} Poland feared that the concept can be used by the big Member States as a tool for its marginalization.

Although Poland was not yet a Member State at the ICG on the EU Constitution, one can discern the principles of Poland’s preferences within the EU: that of taking advantage of the position of a strong state and its relative power towards the big Members. Poland has defended its pro-American interests, based on its long-term strategic interest and rejected the emancipation of the ESDP from NATO.

Poland’s main interest in EU foreign policy is to avoid marginalization and ‘hijacking’ of its foreign policy by the big states of the EU. That is why Poland supported the persistence of the QMV mechanisms without change, so as to strengthen the influence of its small allies in the EU.

\textbf{3.2.2. Alliance Strategies}

Poland scant economic resources and ‘dependency’ on the bigger EU Members make Poland a middle-rank EU State. That, but together with the tendency of emerging ‘directoires’\textsuperscript{113} of big powers, Poland’s chances of being marginalized from the EU decision-making increase. The fears are justified by the later actions of the ‘big three’ (France, Germany and the UK), who have proven “an increasing tendency act independently outside the CFSP, or on behalf of their

\textsuperscript{110} M. Petrelli and A. Vallianatou, op. cit, 11
\textsuperscript{111} Interview with an official of the Polish Mission to the EU
\textsuperscript{112} Simon Duke: “The Enlarged EU and the CFSP”, Report 5/04, Center for International Relations (Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych), page 8
\textsuperscript{113} Geoffrey Edwards: “The New Member States and the Making of EU Foreign Policy” in \textit{European Foreign Affairs Review}, 11, 2006, 152
like in Tehran in 2003; or when France and Germany tried to forge an EU transit visa agreement for the Russians in Kaliningrad without the concourse of Poland and Lithuania. To enhance its standing in the EU, Poland has conducted alliance-building in order to both boost its role in the EU and to counter-balance other ‘nuclei’.

### 3.2.2.1. “New Member States” Alliances

In order to counter-balance the propensity of the ‘big three’ in ‘hijacking’ the EU foreign policy, Poland sought to collaborate with the ‘new’ Member States. For that, Poland sought to enhance collaboration within the ‘Visegrad four’ (V4).

The Visegrad Group was enacted in 1991 including Poland, Hungary and Czekoslovakia (later Czech Republic and Slovakia) and is a framework of cooperation in the fields of intelligence, science and trade. The group was later complemented by the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). The project has been rather weak. The states in the region had a “scornful attitude to the potential regional leadership of Poland”, which, due to its relative weakness towards the other V4 members and towards the competing alternatives (such as Germany and the EU in general), has not managed to become a leader in the Visegrad Group.

Membership in the EU has, however, changed the situation into Poland’s advantage. In order to avoid side-lining and marginalization in the EU, the Visegrad states committed to develop a Central European Identity, based on the common ‘new’ European identity Visegrad and ‘common interests’. As Edwards notes: “when the group can agree, it is lending additional

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114 Simon Duke, ibid
115 Ibid
weight to Poland’s voice.”\textsuperscript{119} Because of its privileged relations to the US, Poland has regained leadership potential within the V4. The V4 cooperation has concentrated on common EU issues, and cohesive strategies and positions towards the CFSP/ESDP matters and in the development of policies for the Western Balkans and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)\textsuperscript{120}.

Another important cooperation framework is the Vilnius 10, including the new EU Central and Eastern European Members who joined NATO and the EU, united around the aim of getting US support for acceding into NATO. The US-sponsored alliance emerged during the Iraq split in 2003. The group is built around the goals of supporting the labor division between the EU and NATO\textsuperscript{121} and support for ESDP in principle, but with no acceptance for the weakening of NATO as result of the development of ESDP\textsuperscript{122}. The Vilnius 10 is accused of being an intrusive project of the United States, aimed at hindering the integration processes in the EU’s ESDP.

Former President Kwasniewski proposed combining the V4 with the V10 into a single regional structure states with the aim to “strengthen the voice and influence of the Central and Eastern European States”\textsuperscript{123}. Kwasniewski also mentioned that the organization should envisage the inclusion of the countries with similar security concerns and challenges, but which have not joined in Prague (meaning Ukraine).

Thus, Poland has taken a leadership role in concentrating the efforts of the smaller EU Members within the EU. These groups act cohesively, because of their shared problems and identities. Poland’s exquisite relationship with the United States adds to its authority vis-à-vis the new Member States and with that, gives it a higher power in the EU. The ‘new’ EU Members

\textsuperscript{119} Edwards, op. cit., 153
\textsuperscript{120} Edwards, op. cit., 154
\textsuperscript{121} Barbora Gabelova: “Europe Old and New: Neighbors, Friends or Allies” in Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Spring 2004, 59
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid
\textsuperscript{123} Barbora Gabelova: “Europe Old and New: Neighbors, Friends or Allies” in Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Spring 2004, 58
alliances have a significant impact on the future of the transatlantic relations, and on the speed of integration in the ESDP\textsuperscript{124} and on the course of EU foreign policy.

### 3.2.2.2. The Alliances with the ‘Big’ EU Members

The ‘Weimar Triangle’ is in Poland’s ‘top of the list’ priorities in the EU. It dates back from 1991, and comprises France, Germany and Poland. Its aims were to intensify cooperation and integration between the three bigger powers in Europe. Poland’s interest in this cooperation format was to position itself as the ‘France of the East’\textsuperscript{125}. Poland asserted its position towards the Weimar Triangle as to a ‘framework of dialogue between three equal partners’\textsuperscript{126}.

The character of cooperation has changed as Poland approached EU accession. Especially after Poland’s support of the United States’ Iraq War, France and Germany became interested in Europeanizing Poland and influence its foreign policy actions which contradicted the stance of France and Germany. By that, the French and German governments were giving Poland a sign of their interest in creating a ‘directoire’ uniting the strong states of Europe, where the national positions of the strong states would be ‘pre-cooked’ and coordinated before taking them to the political fora.

Besides, the Weimar triangle provided a forum for socialization, where the future ‘partners’ on EU foreign policy learned about the preferences on important issues such as the EU policy on the Eastern Neighborhood and Russia\textsuperscript{127}.

\textsuperscript{124} Gabelova, op. cit., 48
\textsuperscript{125} Interview with a senior official from the Council of the EU, Brussels, April 25, 2007
The political importance of the Weimar Triangle was, however limited and volatile. Poland’s support of the US War in Iraq and the subsequent scandal spurred by the Polish preference to purchase US F-16 fighters over the European-manufactured Gripen and Mirage fighters made the ‘big three’ cautious towards Poland. Hence, the ‘big three’ chose to include Spain, rather than Poland into separate talks when conducting consultations with Russia on EU-Russia relations. The actions of both parties are rooted in their divergent security interests, which can hardly be reconciled. These mutually disturbing actions have overshadowed the ‘Weimar Triangle’. The developments in the ‘Weimar Triangle’ made Poland re-orient towards the small states.

The Weimar Triangle had, however, an important implication, as it gave Poland a ‘strong EU Member’ identity, which increased Poland’s understating of the EU foreign policy-making.

3.2.3. Policy Entrepreneurship

In order to further its interests within the EU, Poland has promoted several policy projects, such as the Eastern Dimension and the Visa Policies.

3.2.3.1. The ‘Eastern Dimension’

Poland’s interest in the ‘Eastern Neighborhood’ was not shared by the ‘old’ Members, which regard this area as problematic and dangerous for the EU-Russia relations. Besides, as the neighboring countries do not have a clear European perspective, are rather distant

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128 Barbora Gabelova: “Europe Old and New: Neighbors, Friends or Allies” in Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Spring 2004, 59
129 Edwards., ibid
130 Interview by the author with an official of the Polish Mission to the EU, Brussels, May 26, 2007
geographically from the ‘old’ EU Members, and already covered by the TACIS programme, there was little sense of urgency in changing the general EU policy lines towards the East.

The anticipation of Polish accession made the EU elaborate the European Neighborhood Policy, a compromise variant aimed to clam Spain over the threats that an eventual ‘Eastern Policy’ and, thus equate the Eastern Direction to the Southern Direction\(^1\)\(^{31}\).

However, this policy was marginalizing Poland. As response, Poland prepared a “Non-Paper with Polish Proposals Concerning Policy towards New Eastern Neighbours after EU Enlargement”. The paper is advocating a more assertive EU policy towards Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia, but also for the Caucasus and Central Asia. The main objective is “abolishing the existing division lines through assistance and closer co-operation with the adjacent countries that should be based on the common values and interests.”\(^1\)\(^{32}\)

Through the non-Paper, Poland is demanding a differentiation between the MEDA countries and the Eastern European Neighbors and is requiring the recognition of ‘the European choice’ of Ukraine “which is so important for stability and security in the eastern part of the continent\(^1\)\(^{33}\).

The non-Paper underscores the need to provide a long-term European perspective for the countries concerned, if the “countries wish so and if they are capable of meeting membership criteria, should have an option of accession to the European Union\(^1\)\(^{34}\)”\. Poland’s proposal requires the granting of Free Trade Agreements and the upgrading of the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreements to Association Agreements\(^1\)\(^{35}\). To that, the non-Paper adds people-to-people contacts and facilitated travel agreements for Eastern Europeans.

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\(^{131}\) Interview with a senior official from the Council of the EU, Brussels, April 25, 2007


\(^{133}\) Ibid

\(^{134}\) Ibid

\(^{135}\) Ibid
The aim of the Eastern dimension policy of Poland was to provide the Eastern countries with a development alternative to the CIS and to keep them in the ‘EU orbit’. Moreover, the non-paper equalizes Ukraine to Russia because of its importance and pleads for equal treatment for these two countries.

The policy proposal delimitated in the non-Paper did not succeed because of its too radical character. At that time, Poland was an observer within the EU and “did not know the Brussels game”. As a senior official of the Council mentioned, the Polish proposal failed because it endangered the European Neighborhood Policy, the main philosophy of which was both engaging the Eastern neighbors, and avoiding the marginalization of Spain’s and Finland’s projects on the Mediterranean and the Northern Dimension. Thus, the Eastern Dimension was perceived as a national project of Poland, serving mainly Polish interests, while the ENP was a European project, serving the ‘common’ interests.

### 3.2.3.2. The Visa Policy

Starting with the Constitutional convention, Poland was demanded the establishment of a special policy on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in order to alleviate the consequences of Poland’s entering into the Schengen system.

Poland committed to implement the JHA Acquis by the time of its accession “without any transition periods or derogations”. Since 1998 Poland had to harmonize its visa policy with the

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137 Interview with a senior official from the Council of the EU, Brussels, April 25, 2007

138 Interview with a senior official in the Council of the EU, April, 2007

common visa policy of the EU, including the introduction of visa requirements for the citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Moldova\(^{140}\).

The implementation of the *Acquis* posed a set of problems for Poland, relating directly to the foreign policy of Poland. As opposed to the EU, which regards the visa policy as a security policy directed to curb illegal immigration, Poland regards visa policy as a foreign policy tool\(^{141}\). Specifically, the free movement of people is a cornerstone of Polish foreign policy towards the Eastern countries and notably of Poland’s strategy to support their European orientation. Natorski and Herranz describe the Polish position on the visa regime for the neighbors as based on the following principles: “…the maximum possible delay in the introduction of visas; maximum openness of the border; and visa system that would reduce possible constraints in the movement of people.”\(^{142}\)

Poland delayed the implementation of its Schengen obligations and instituted an asymmetric visa regime with Ukraine and Moldova, by which visas are free of charge and granted according to a facilitated procedure. Besides, Poland assured maximum consular presence\(^{143}\). As result, the consequences of the ‘paper curtain’ have been attenuated. As and EU diplomat says that Poland managed to establish a visa regime without major damage to the free flow of people, why the Schengen visa does not seem to be able to curb illegal migration\(^{144}\).

As an official of the Polish mission to the EU noted, the main aim of the visa regime is to provide the neighbors an alternative to the economic ties and people-to-people contacts

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\(^{140}\) Michal Natorski and Anna Herranz: “The Impact of German-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian Special Relations on European Foreign Policy: Energy Supplies and Visas in the EU Neighborhood”. *Paper presented for the conference “Reflecting on a wider Europe and beyond: norms, rights and interests”, organized by the Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA), University of Tartu, Estonia, June 2006*, 12


\(^{142}\) Natorski and Anna Herranz, ibid


\(^{144}\) Interview with a senior official in the Council, Brussels, April 25, 2007
available for them in the CIS and should be an instrument of Europeanization, rather than a security policy. Poland also defends that the visa regimes for the Eastern Europeans should be equally beneficial as the agreements between EU and Russia, or even more open.

Poland offered to be a mediator in the visa negotiations between the EU and the Eastern European countries and presented a draft based on its experience. The proposal included a facilitated visa regime, free of charge visas and a readmission agreement to balance the risks.

Thus, the effort of Poland to influence the EU foreign policy is a policy transfer based on best practices. Poland tried to ‘sell’ its policy to the EU based not on bargaining, but rather on persuasion. The proposal was approved for further consideration. Thus, the effort of Poland was, partly successful. However, Poland’s goal will be determined on whether the EU Member States would agree to incorporate this visa model into the Schengen Acquis.

3.2.4. Rhetorical Action

As defined by Schimmelfennig, rhetorical action is an appeal to the collective norms in order to induce norm-conforming behavior. However, Schimmelfennig notes that the reasons behind rhetorical action are material interests of the actors. Actors usually use identity-based arguments and shaming in order to convince their partners into choosing particular courses of action even against their interest, or even if the action does not conform to the utility functions of actors.

145 Interview in Brussels, April 26, 2007
146 Michal Natorski and Anna Herranz, op. cit., 13
147 ibid
148 Interview with an official in the Polish Mission to the EU, April 26, 2007
149 Ulrich Sedelmeier: op. cit., 21
Poland has used this tactic in several occasions. A notable case of rhetorical action was the Polish support for the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine, when Poland got actively involved in supporting candidate Viktor Yushenko.

The stakes of Poland were high, as the victory of the pro-Russian candidate, Yanukovich could have negative security implications for Poland. Yanukovich built his campaign on the promise of a ‘startegic partnership’ with Russia and integration into the Euro-Asian Economic Space. Russia provided support to Yanukovich, and Poland realized the need to counterbalance the Russian actions.

First, Poland got involved when President Kwasniewski offered mediation support to the two candidates. Later, he financed a visit of the former Polish President Lech Valesa to Kiev. However, they were refused an official role in the mediation.

The electoral battle was conducted on a ‘Europe vs. CIS’ publicity. Polish President Kwasniewski realized the importance of sending a ‘European message’ to the Ukrainian voters. Thus, Kwasniewski urged the High Representative for CFSP and other prominent politicians of the EU countries to get involved. However, he was not able to get the support of the stronger EU states, as, anxious about the relations with Russia, they preferred a ‘wait and see tactic’. Poland’s President justified his appeal by the principle of ‘support and promotion of democracy’ – a central tenet of CFSP.

In order to give this action a more ‘EU’ as opposed to ‘Polish’ character, the Lithuanian President Adamskas joined CFSP High Representative Solana and Kwasniewski on their visit to Kiev, when they mediated the dispute and stood up in front of the pro-EU candidate’s supporters.

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152 Interview with a senior official in the Council of the EU, April, 2007
153 ibid
This gave Yushenko a definite advantage, as he was able to position himself as an EU-supported candidate.

This action was successful, as it is an example of how a political preference of Poland was transferred to the EU level and had a clear political output – the victory of the pro-EU candidate. Thus, Poland was able to use the EU channels for the promotion of Poland’s national interests.

Another case of Poland’s rhetorical action was in relation to the Baltic Pipeline and the ‘meat ban’, imposed by Russia in November 2005. Poland became concerned of a bilateral deal between Russia and Germany to build a new gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea, by-passing Ukraine and Poland. The Polish government called upon the principle of solidarity by arguing gas transport deals should be agreed upon in the EU framework, as they affect the security and economy of all Member States. However, Poland failed to gain support. For that, Poland warned it would ban the Russia-EU comprehensive agreement after the PCA has expired.

Two months later, Russia banned Polish meat exports on an allegation of Polish exporters counterfeiting origin documents. The Polish government undertook a joint Polish-Russian inspection to the meat factories. Russia has not, however, renounced to the ban, thus fuelling Poland’s concerns that the ban was an economic war.

The Polish government first called on the EU for assistance in dealing with Russia, basing the arguments on the ‘solidarity’ principle. Poland denounced Russia’s attempts to deal with this issue bilaterally, stating that this is a problem for the whole EU. Moreover, Poland emphasized

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156 Ibid

157 Ibid

158 Ibid
the value of solidarity within the EU with the threat of vetoing both political and energy agreements with Russia.

Poland managed to get the support of the EU. During the last EU-Russia Summit in Samara, Germany stood in Poland’s defense by giving the ‘meat ban problem’ an EU dimension. In their justification for supporting Poland, German Chancellor Merkel and the Commission President specified that the EU works according to the ‘solidarity’ principle. Merkel also made clear that Poland’s problem is automatically an EU problem and the EU would speak in one voice.

These two cases are show how Poland managed to make both an ‘interest transfer’ and a ‘problem transfer’ from its national foreign policy level to the EU level.

3.2.5. Strategic Socialization

Poland’s influence over the foreign policy-making process of the EU has not been limited to actions within the high political fora of the EU, such as the COREPER and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The lower groups of the EU foreign policy-making are of crucial importance. As Pomorska argues, the decisions in the COREPER or the PSC are taken in line with the consensus reached in the Council Working Groups and with the input of expert groups in the Council Secretariat.

The interaction of national and Council officials within those groups has a largely informal character. Many decisions are the result of the informal socialization, such as opinion sharing.

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159 Slawek Szefs, ibid
160 Ibid
161 Karolina Pomorska: ‘The Deadlock that never happened: the impact of enlargement on the Common Foreign and Security Policy working Groups in the Council’ in *European Political Economy Review*, no. 6 (March 2007), 3
162 Ibid
over lunch or in the corridors. Being aware that consensus in the upper institutional bodies can be achieved with difficulty (because of the rigid positions over national interests), the consensus is usually reached within the lower groups. Because of the consensus-oriented mindset, officials tend to empathize with their partners. Plus, due to the lesser politicization and of the informality, the officials are more prone to use arguments, rather than national positions.

However, as mentioned before, the consensus-building propensity can be exploited by national officials by persuasion with strong arguments, or by pointing at their domestic constraints, which do not allow them to alter their national position, thus encouraging their counterparts to see consensus as equal to their national position.

Polish officials have played a very important role in the lower and less politicized levels of EU foreign policy-making, such as the expert groups. First, they managed to impose themselves as the primary source of expertise on Eastern Europe and as experts on the general issues of transition, security sector reform, democratization and human rights.

Poland has influenced the policy-making process of the EU by bringing up and prioritizing its national interests on the day-to-day agenda of the working groups. For instance, the issue of Ukraine, ‘meat bans’, have become very frequent within the groups’ discussions, thus increasing the knowledge and familiarity of the ‘older’ Members’ delegates on issues pertaining to the ‘eastern dimension’.

164 Pomorska, op. cit., 12
165 Interview with a Council official, Brussels, April 2007
166 Interview with a Council Official, Brussels, April 24, 2007
167 Pomorska, ibid
168 Interview with a senior Council official, Brussels, April 24, 2007
Also the Polish officials tend to act as ‘bridges’ between the officials of the Eastern Neighbors and the ‘older’ Members’ officials. Poland developed ties between the sectoral ministry officials in Ukraine and the EU working group officers.

EU Membership has empowered Poland to use a variety of tools for furthering its interests. The examples above prove that Poland can and does create changes in both the structure and conduct of EU foreign policy making. In order to analyze further the impact of Poland on the EU foreign policy, I analyze how Poland’s preferences and interests are reflected in the areas of EU foreign policy.

3.3. How Much Poland is in the EU Foreign Policy?

This part of the paper examines the result of Poland’s actions within the EU foreign policy process on the EU foreign policy. I will analyze the effect of Poland’s Europeanization strategies on the sectors of EU foreign policy.

3.3.1. The External Dimension of the 1st Pillar

3.3.1.1. The ‘Eastern Dimension’ of the European Neighborhood Policy

As it has already been shown, the ‘Eastern dimension’ proposal of Poland was ‘put on a shelf’. The Member States reiterated their adherence to the ENP. However, the Polish recommendations were soon reflected in another foreign policy proposal, brought in by the German presidency in 2007.

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First, the German foreign policy proposal makes a difference between the *European Neighbors* and the *Neighbors of Europe*. For the Eastern Europeans, the German presidency proposed a ‘ENP-Plus’, which is a ‘partnership for modernization’, presupposing a number of binding sectoral agreements, by which the Eastern European and Caucasian partners would adopt the *Aquis* in the areas of their interest. The states which have completely adopted the *Acquis* provisions in certain areas would be given observer status in the EU institutions responsible for those specific areas.

The “ENP-Plus” partnerships differ from Poland’s proposal in several aspects. The ENP Plus does not offer Associated Member Status, nor does it offer a full Free Trade Agreement (but rather in several sectors which are in Germany’s interests: energy, transportation and infrastructure). In this case, the agreements could be unattractive, as the neighbors are interested in agreements which respond to their interests equally. Equally, the German proposal lacks the clauses on *finalité politique* for Ukraine, which Poland views crucial for EU’s policy on Ukraine.

The role of Poland in this policy direction is not salient. Besides being largely attributed to the pro-Eastern interest of Angela Merkel, the German *Ostpolitik* was, as a Council official said, inspired, partly, by the 2003 Polish proposal and by the interest of the German leadership to ease the ‘new’-‘old’ Members division, thus, a result of the socialization of the new and old Member States. Besides, the policy provides Germany with a good opportunity to engage the ‘new’ members, and especially Poland into its projects. This case is an example of

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171 Alexander Duleba, op. cit., 16
172 ibid
173 ibid
174 Interview with an official of the Polish Mission to the EU, Brussels, April 2007
175 Interview with a senior Council official, Brussels, April 2007
Europeanization, when Poland’s preferences were ‘uploaded’, transformed and then re-transmitted back to Poland.

The impact of Poland on the foreign ‘economic’ policy of the EU can also be inferred from the evolution of the ENP in the last two years. Ukraine and Moldova have been performing meagerly on their action plans. Nevertheless, both Moldova and Ukraine have been awarded trade facilitations (Moldova - the ‘GSP+’, while Ukraine – market economy status and the prospect of a Free Trade Area)\(^{176}\). These happened after the two countries agreed to host the EUBAM and were, subsequently punished by Russia through trade sanctions.

These denote the strategic and political, as opposed an expected technical, character of EU foreign economic policies towards these two countries and is in line with Poland’s stance: that the relations towards the Eastern neighbors should be based on political, rather than on economic grounds. Besides, the opening of the EU markets for the Moldovan wine, strained by Russia’s political embargo, was advocated by Poland and the Baltic States\(^ {177}\).

Tracing Poland’s direct impact on the EU’s foreign economic policies towards the Eastern neighborhood is a difficult task, because of the great number of the intervening variables, as it is, after all an EC field. However, it is possible to see the change in EU’s policies towards Ukraine and Moldova. Before Poland’s proposal and actions, EU’s policies towards these two countries were technical in character and mostly consisted of aid and conditionality. After Poland’s proposals, the EU policies on Ukraine and Moldova became more strategic and economic tools have been since used for attaining foreign policy objectives.


\(^{177}\) Interview with an official of the Polish Mission in Brussels, April, 2007
3.3.1.2. Russia

The impact of Poland on EU-Russia economic relations has been more salient. Poland challenged the ‘Russia first’ approach employed by the EU. In the first pillar, the most important effect of Poland relates to the energy policy and to the ‘meat ban’ dispute.

Poland has advocated for a comprehensive EU-Russia agreement that would be binding for both sides. The reason was to set a set of norms which would restrict both Russia and the ‘big three’ striking deals ‘over Poland’s head’. This agreement would also force the EU to act as a unitary actor vis-à-vis Russia, when Poland’s interests are at stake.

Poland’s strategy was to veto both the Russian energy deal and the post-PCA agreement. The strategy was successful, as it made the EU appreciate Poland’s solidarity, which could only be obtained if the EU itself were supportive of Poland.

Poland’s stark position on Russia thus resulted in an enhancement of the EU as a foreign actor. During the Summit in Samara in May 2007, the EU ‘sang from the same song sheet’. Poland’s impact on EU foreign policy is, in this case, notable and multifaceted. First, it produced a change in the way EU foreign policy was made, by enhancing the solidarity. Second, it altered the EU-Russia relations.

3.3.2. Poland’s Impact on the CFSP/ESDP

3.3.2.1. Poland and the Content of CFSP

Poland’s input into the CFSP has been considerable. First, Poland, as the other ‘new’ Member States, changed the EU identity. Even before Poland has become an EU member, it ‘uploaded’ its interests, threats and international role perception into the EU foreign policy. First,
Poland brought Eastern Europe to attention. The first step, as a senior EU Council said was that Poland included the ‘frozen conflicts’ in the European Security Strategy. Poland’s second proposal, of including Russia as a threat to the EU was rejected.

Poland affected both the policy, but also the politics behind the CFSP/ESDP. Poland’s main contribution in terms of regional directions was bringing Ukraine to the center-stage of the EU foreign policy. As result, the EU has become an active actor in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. This resulted in the need to create a number of new CFSP and ESDP policy instruments, such as the EU Special Representative for Moldova (EUSR), the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM).

The EU got involved into the Ukrainian elections and signed ENP Action Plans with the Eastern European countries. By that, the EU has also become a ‘domestic’ actor in the region, as it entered the public discourse as a agent of domestic change.

All these lead to a shift in EU’s geopolitical role. By entering Eastern Europe, the EU stepped into Russia’s zone of interest, which also meant the EU had to reassess its relations with Russia. Russia has undertaken integration projects in the region, such as the CIS and the Single Economic Space, which are endangered by the more attractive EU.

Whereas the EU is interested in stability, Russia views its policy in the region as in promoting “controlled instability”. It foment and then manages [frozen] conflicts. Russian involvement frustrates their resolution. Judging from the Russia’s goals in the regions, the aim of

\[179\] Interview with a senior Council official, Brussels, April 2007
\[180\] Ibid
\[181\] Alexander Duleba: op. cit., 7
\[182\] Interfax, “Vstrecya Presidenta Putina s Poslami Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [President Putin Meeting with Ambassadors of Russian Federation], 12 July 2004, on http://www.interfax.com/com/?item=Rus&pg=0&id=5739470&req
\[185\] Ibid
its policies is in thwarting their integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, as it would endanger its geopolitical position and the prominence of Russian economic interests.

In the 2003 Non-Paper, Poland indicated the resolution of the frozen conflicts a priority in the EU relations with Russia and Ukraine. Poland is the ‘promoter’ of the resolution of the secessionist conflict in Moldova. As result of Poland’s insistence, the EU refused to recognize any exclusive spheres of interest in Europe. Moreover, Poland has been constantly promoting the possibility of ESDP police, or peacekeeping missions to Transnistria, on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. Thus, the enlargement, but specifically, the energetic foreign policy of Poland and its ‘allies’ has complemented the EU-Russia relations with an area of geopolitical rivalry.

Thus, Poland has ‘uploaded’ its historical security threats into the EU foreign and security policy. EU Membership allowed the EU to act more assertively in its foreign policy. Specifically, Poland has enhanced its role of supporter of Ukraine’s independence and has risen its profile as security exporter in the region. Simultaneously, Poland’s EU Membership empowered it vis-à-vis Russia.

Poland’s foreign and security policy had, thus a strong impact on the content of EU foreign policy, by which the EU acquired new roles and developed new CFSP instruments. As in the case of EUBAM, presence in the new regions leads to a process of learning-by-doing, which unfolds the EU opportunities of enhancing its CFSP/ESDP tools and institutions. Moreover, by learning, the EU Members acquire new information on the situation in these areas, where it had previously little interest, which leads to the reassessment of threats and interests. This, in turn, leads to the further integration of the CFSP.

186 Non-paper with Polish Proposals, ibid
187 Interview in the Council, April, 2007
188 Ibid
189 Interview with a Senior Council official, April, 2007
3.3.2.2. Poland’s Impact on ESDP

ESDP is the area where Poland has been rather salient. At first Poland subdued its preferences for ESDP to its participation in NATO, which was justified by its historical threats. Moreover, Poland was skeptical towards ESDP, as it perceived ESDP as a competing alternative to NATO[190]. This position has reflected in Poland’s actions towards ESDP. First, Poland tried to stall integration in EU defense during the deliberations[191]. Later, Poland became the leader of the anti-ESDP Vilnius 10 group. Finally, Poland chose to buy F-16s instead of Gripen fighters[192], which undermined the EU Defense Procurement policies. By that, Poland has become one of the ‘breakers’[193] of ESDP and its impact on ESDP was counterproductive to integration.

Nevertheless, ESDP gained value for Poland. The rising profile of the EU in the Eastern Europe, required the EU to develop military and civilian tools. Because of US’s unwillingness to act in the region, so as not to spoil its relations with Russia, whom it need for the ‘war on terror’, the EU has become Poland’s most ‘usable’ framework for providing military and civilian tools to respond to Poland’s threats and promote its interests in the region. For example, Poland has pushed for peacekeeping and police missions in Moldova, but NATO was not the appropriate framework[194]. Thus, Poland’s views have changed. NATO was perceived as the main security provider, while the ESDP was a new opportunity structure. However, Poland continued to support the EU-NATO ‘division of labor’.

ESDP has become one of Poland’s priorities. The Polish government decided to contribute to the operation Concordia in Macedonia in 2003[195]. Poland has also provided important...

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[191] M. Petrelli and A. Vallianatou, op. cit, 11
[192] Barbora Gabelova:op. cit., 59
[193] Schimmelfennig
[194] Interview with a Council official, April 2007, Brussels
contributions for military and civilian operations such as Althea, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, also EUFOR in Congo, EJUSTR LEX in Iraq, EUBAM (on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, where Poland has by far the most numerous presence -15 officers\textsuperscript{196}), and the EU-coordinated action in Lebanon in 2006\textsuperscript{197}. Poland offered to become a ‘framework nation’ for a Rapid Reaction Force battle group commonly with Slovakia, Germany, and the Baltic states\textsuperscript{198}.

Poland has been one of the most important contributors to these missions. The participation in ESDP missions was intended to promote Poland’s image of capable EU Member, so as to minimize the chances of being sidelined out of the EU defense ‘cores’. However, Poland’s priority is still NATO, while in the EU Poland mostly favors civilian and rapid reaction forces, so as to not create competition to NATO\textsuperscript{199}.

Poland also became active in EU defense procurement. To balance the F-16 purchase, Poland pledged 10 million Euros for a joint EU Defense Project, the total budget of which was 54 Million EUR\textsuperscript{200}, thus proving its commitment to the development of ESDP.

Despite of the activeness, Poland is still a pro-Atlanticist EU Member. The main impact of Poland on ESDP, thus, is the split between the ‘Atlanticist’ and ‘Europeanist’ members. Poland has been promoting a separate Central European Identity in the ESDP by combining the Vilnius 10 with the Visegrad states\textsuperscript{201}. However, as Pomorska mentions, these tendencies can be the result of Poland ‘selling’ its role of a strong EU state, so as to get more control over the ESDP policy-making process.

\textsuperscript{196} EUBAM Website: \url{http://www.eubam.org/index.php?action=show&sid=9ti2zgl1eb4i1su5cozdw7a2664sziey&id=213}, accessed: June 3, 2007
\textsuperscript{197} Pomorska, ibid
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid
\textsuperscript{199} Rafał Trzaskowski and Olaf Osika: op cit, 2
\textsuperscript{200} Pomorska, ibid
\textsuperscript{201} Barbora Gabelova, op. cit, 58
Overall, Poland has disturbed the integration efforts from the pre-enlargement process, making them more ‘patchy’\textsuperscript{202}. As an EU official defends, there is a clear competition between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Member States. The older states have a preference in acting in their former colonies, while the new Member States advocate for Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

### 3.3.3. Poland’s Impact on the Third Pillar

The adoption of the *Schengen Acquis* was one of Poland’s greatest challenges for Europeanization. On one hand, the lifting of the border controls with the EU countries would benefit Poland’s population, on the other hand, the border on the East would result in a ‘paper curtain’, which would cut its Eastern neighbors from Europe and slip them into Russia’s control, which is a threat for Poland.

Poland has brought the visa issue for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova onto the top agenda of the EU. Poland attempts to influence the EU visa policy consisted of persuasion and policy entrepreneurship. Poland had to persuade the EU states that, contrary to the Schengen Acquis, where visas are tools of security, visas should be used as instruments of foreign policy and tools of Europeanization of their neighbors. Poland mediated the visa negotiations between the EU and Ukraine and also between EU and Moldova\textsuperscript{203}.

The Polish diplomats made the case that visas represent a serious impediment to cross-border trade, tourism and people-to-people contacts. Another argument was that the EU visa regime with Russia is much more beneficial, which induces the population of Ukraine and Moldova to acquire Russian citizenship, which can later be used by Russia to question the

\textsuperscript{202} Term adopted from Edwards:

\textsuperscript{203} Interview with an official from Poland’s mission to the EU, Brussels, 2007
independence of the Eastern neighbors. The situation for Moldova was presented as more serious. The visa regime inclines the inhabitants of the breakaway Transnistrian region to acquire Russian passports, which serve then as reason for Russia delaying its troops from the country. Thus, a more relaxed visa regime would help the conflict resolution efforts of the EU.

Poland proposed a gradual cancellation of the visa regime with a parallel introduction of readmission agreements to offset the costs of the visa-free regime. First, however, they pleaded for the cancellation of visa fees. The Polish delegation has presented the example of their own consular policy vis-à-vis these countries, by which Poland managed to preserve security and in the main time, introduce a visa regime.

The visa policies were discussed in April 2007 between the EU and the two neighboring states. The Member States agreed to issue free multiple-entry visas based on the Polish model. The Polish visa policy model will be replicated by other new Member States: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, the old Member States are skeptical towards these changes and the installation of the visa regime towards the neighbors will be awaiting ratification.

The case of the visa policy has shown that, in its effort to influence the EU foreign policy-making, Poland has become constructive and has transcended its image of ‘Trojan Horse’. Poland’s impact on the external extensions of the third pillar policies shows that Poland’s impact on EU foreign policy-making is considerable.

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204 Interview with an official of the Council of the EU, Brussels, April 2007
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Interview with an official of the Polish Mission to the EU, Brussels, 2007
208 Interview with an official of the Council of the EU, Brussels, April 2007
209 Ibid.
Conclusion

The purpose of the thesis was to analyze the impact of Poland, as a new Member State on the foreign policy of the EU. The purpose of the research was based on an empirically-motivated assumption that enlargement leads to changes in the foreign policy of the EU. I hypothesize that Poland does influence the EU foreign policy though inducing changes in the governance format and in the normative and material content of EU foreign policy. That change is pushed by the need of Poland to become effective participant in the formulation and implementation of the EU’s foreign policy in order to maximize its security, power, political and economic gains.

The thesis is structured into three parts. In the first part of the thesis, I introduce the theoretical framework. The thesis was based on the Europeanization model, by which the process of EU foreign policy-making was analyzed from the lenses of rationalist and constructivist interpretations. The Europeanization approach studies the creation on the European level of institutional superstructures and norms, which, further shape the policies and bind the member states to EU-appropriate behavior.

Europeanization presupposes a dual process of interaction: upload, by which states transfer preferences, policy practices and identities to the EU level and download, by which the states internalize norms and practices for the conduct of domestic and foreign policies.

The ‘misfit’ between the EU-level norms and practices and the national style of foreign policy-making is the central variable explaining the propensity of states to influence the EU foreign policy.

I argue that the ‘misfit’ between Poland’s foreign policy beliefs and interests and the EU foreign policy is the main determinant of Poland’s behavior in the EU foreign policy system.

In the second part of the paper, I analyze the formation of Poland’s national interests and identity and the main factors that determine the content of Polish foreign policy. I found that
Poland’s interests are shaped by the country’s history. The precarious geopolitical situation determines the rationalist character of Polish foreign policy and determines the main patterns of relations with Russia, the United States, with its neighbors and the EU. Thus, Poland’s inherent cautiousness towards Russia determines the state’s rapprochement with the United States.

The rationalist foreign policy thinking also reflects in Poland’s behavior within the EU foreign policy-making system. Thus, Poland’s main goal within the EU is to avoid marginalization and maximize its interests.

In the latter part of the thesis, I analyze the tools and strategies that Poland employs to level down the ‘misfit’ between its own foreign policy and the EU foreign policy.

Poland has influenced the EU foreign policy in its three pillar dimension. The variation of its influence is explained through the variation in the availability of instruments of influence.

Thus, I found that Poland’s influence is most obvious in the CFSP/ESDP pillar, where Poland has relative power compared to the other member states. Poland has used both its voting weight in the Council and a system of alliances with both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Member States in order to shape a favorable political setting allowing the maximization of its interests. I found that Poland’s participation in the deliberations on the Constitutional Treaty and its system of alliances with the ‘new’ Member States were crucial for the promotion of its national interests.

Conversely, Poland has been able to influence less the foreign policy of the EU in the first and third pillar, due to its lack of economic power and little availability of foreign policy tools.
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