Nonvoting in Serbia 2006 -2007: The Constitutional Referendum and the Parliamentary Election

by

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Submitted to:

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary

2007

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Abstract

The principal problem that I deal with is how explain the volatility of voter turnout in Serbia during 2006/07. I analyze the circumstances that caused the difference in voter participation between the constitutional referendum of 2006 and the parliamentary election 0f 2007. The first part of my thesis develops a theoretical approach to the problem; while the second part is devoted to the analysis of aggregate data and individual-based data. The statistical methods employed are regression analysis and the measures of association. The results of analysis identify following the groups of abstainers ethnic minorities, supporters of pro-democratic, civic parties and supporters far-right parties. The groups are divided according to the motivation of abstention into two categories: voters whose motivation can be found in the cleavage between central and subject culture and voters whose motivation can be placed in the cleavage between libertarian and authoritarian decision-making. The results underline paradoxical and destructive nature of polarized party systems.

Chapter 1: Approaching the Problem of Voter Turnout

Modern normative theory derives the authority of the government solely from the consent of the governed. The principal mechanism for translating the consent of governed into governmental authority is electoral process. Free, fair and frequent elections are *conditio sine qua non* of every democracy (Dahl 1998). However, the mere acknowledgment of concordance with these standards is a simplification of information revealed by electoral process and the result of election. Elections are explicit and unambiguous indicators of the state of a polity, and therefore analysis of elections holds an extraordinary importance in modern political science.

In this regard voter turnout has a specific explanatory power. In modern political theory abstention is viewed as negative activity which suggests the disenfranchisement of abstainers with political system (Evans 2004:151). Therefore, abstention is one of the main indicators of the problematic nature immanent to a political system. In this dissertation I will analyze phenomenon of nonvoting in Serbia and try to disentangle its paradoxical character.

1.1 The Referendum and the Parliamentary Election

The focus of analysis is on two popular electoral processes in Serbia. The first is constitutional referendum of October 28, 29 2006, while the second is parliamentary election of January 21, 2007. During the autumn of 2006 Serbian government in cooperation with the major parliamentary opposition parties made a draft of constitution which was, in its final version, put to vote in October. The adoption of the draft was not accompanied with a public debate and it was merely a product of a compromise between the largest parties in Serbia. The unique feature of this constitution was the use of 'Kosovo issue' in campaign, as well as the use of this issue in constitution itself (preamble) as a sort of protection of the territorial

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integrity of the Republic of Serbia.[1] The emphasis on this issue, as well as the very nation-building character of the constitution adoption act, was expected to mobilize voters and to boost voter participation. Furthermore, absolute majority (50% plus 1 of all registered voters) was necessary for the adoption of constitution. Nevertheless, despite the strong and united campaign, the constitution was adopted by a narrow margin. Namely, although the new constitution was accepted with 97.49% approval rate, the voter participation barely passed the threshold necessary for the adoption (see table 1.1.1).

Table 1.1.1 Results of constitutional referendum 2006

REFERENDUM VOTE	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Yes	3521724	53.04
No	97497	1.47
Invalid	25866	0.4

ELECTORATE	TOTAL VOTES CAST
6639385	3645517

Source: The Republic Electoral Commission URL: http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/engleski/propisi_frames.htm

As it was agreed in the pre-referendum negotiations, this poll was followed by the parliamentary election. The election was held on January 21, 2007. Although the campaign lasted for three months, it lacked highly polarized competition, which was characteristic for the former electoral processes in Serbia. The election produced very evenly distributed results without clear majority (see table 1.1.2). However, the most striking result was surprisingly high turnout. Namely, the voter turnout was 60.62%; in comparison with the referendum the increase was 5.71% or 388,069 votes.[2] Since in this short period political situation in Serbia did not notably change, the explanation has to be based on the different nature of these polls. In other words, the motivation of voters was significantly different.

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[1] Since after the war with NATO (March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999) the province of Kosovo and Metohia (usually called just Kosovo) is under the UN administration, and although it is officially recognized as a part of Serbia, at the moment Serbia does not have possibility to exercise its sovereignty on this territory. The possibility of province gaining independence provoked political elites in Serbia to try to defend territorial integrity of state by explicitly referring to Kosovo and Metohia as 'integral part of Serbia'. However, the Albanians on Kosovo were not able to vote on the referendum since they are not noted in voter registry.

Table 1.1.2 Results of parliamentary election 2007

PARTIES IN ORDER OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS	NUMBER OF SEATS	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES CAST
Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	81	1,153,453	28.60
Democratic Party (DS)	64	915,854	22.71
Democratic Party of Serbia, New Serbia (DSS/NS)	47	667,615	16.55
G17+	19	275,041	6.82
Socialistic Party of Serbia (SPS)	16	227,580	5.64
Liberal Democratic Party (coalition LDP-GSS-SDP-LSDV)	15	214,262	5.31
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians	3	52,510	1.30
Coalition list for Sandjak	2	33,823	0.84
Roma Union of Serbia	1	17,128	0.42
Coalition of Albanians from Presevo valley	1	16,973	0.42
Roma Party	1	14,631	0.36

ELECTORATE	TOTAL VOTES CAST	VOTER TURNOUT PERCENTAGE
6,653,851	4,033,586	60.62

Source: The Republic Electoral Commission URL: http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/engleski/propisi_frames.htm

1.2 The Design of Research

The principal question that I will try to answer is: 'How to explain the volatility of voter turnout in Serbia during 2006/07?' In other words, I will analyze the circumstances that caused the difference in voter participation between the constitutional referendum and the parliamentary election.

The importance of this research primarily lies in its contribution to the analysis of parties, party systems and voting behavior in post-conflict regions. In particular, the thesis contributes to the overall discussion on the transition and democratization of the states of the Western Balkans. The specific importance of this paper is reflected in the lack of complete and coherent study of voting behavior in Serbia and South-Eastern Europe in general

The analysis will consist of three major parts. In this opening chapter I will discuss the advantages of adopted theoretical model, namely, the theoretical framework developed by Lipset and Rokkan, and its extensions developed by Kitschelt. Afterwards, I will focus on the obtained data, the way the data were processed, and, finally, the methods that are going to be used. In the second chapter will concentrate on the historical and theoretical aspects of the matter. Firstly, I will discuss the development of Serbian electoral system and party system,

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[2] The number of eligible voters on the referendum was 6,639,385 while on the election was 6,653,851. Therefore, the difference between the numbers of eligible voters is 0.41%, which does not significantly affect

as well as patterns of voting behavior, through three phases: initial, authoritarian and transitional. Afterwards, on the basis of this analysis, I will discuss the application of Lipset-Rokkan and Kitschelt's cleavage theories on the case of Serbia. The results of this analysis will serve as the foundation of a party classification. The parties will be categorized according to the six basic cleavages, and this typology will be crucial for understanding voter alignments, and consequently, voting behavior. In the final chapter, I will firstly discuss macro-indicators of voter turnout. This analysis will additionally clarify the distinctive features of Serbian party system, but, above all, it will pinpoint the system-based and context-based incentives and disincentives of voter participation. Finally, on the basis of all aforementioned analyses, I will try to develop a full account of voter participation in Serbia at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007. I will conduct four analysis accompanied with the appropriate statistical tests. The results will isolate three groups of abstainers and locate the motivation for abstention in two cleavage structures. The scrutiny will underline the destructive nature of polarized party system and disclose the paradoxical character of voting behavior in Serbia.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

1.3.1 The Advantages of Sociological Approach to Voting Behavior

As mentioned above, the approach to the problem of nonvoting in Serbia will be predominantly based on the theory of voter alignment and party formation developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The additional extension of the theory will stem from the model of party system formation in Eastern Europe developed by Herbert Kitschelt (1992). Both of these theories belong to the corpus of sociological theories, which interpret act of voting first and foremost as an expression of identity (Tworzecki 2003: 9). The sociological approach

the research.

stresses the group basis of voting, in which the group's position in society, not values of its members, determine the vote (Harrop, Miller 1987: 157). In other words, the attitudes of voters, individual voters as such, are neglected in this approach. This point was often the focus of justified criticism and impetus for the development of alternative models of voting behavior, such as issue voting or economic voting. However, the emphasis on sociological categories increases the explanatory power of the model by connecting voting patterns with broader sociological or historical contexts. In this regard, sociological models are much more appropriate for creation of stabile and comprehensive conceptual structures, which are necessary for development of the particular studies of voting behavior.

On the other hand, sociological approaches do not necessary exclude individual-based variables. The paradigmatic example an all-encompassing approach to voting behavior is the model developed by Michigan school. Although this model significantly defers from the model adopted in this essay, namely it includes both sociological and psychological aspects of the matter, it is an example of an in-depth and comprehensive voting behavior theory. The core of the model is the so-called 'funnel of causality', which places the central phenomenon of voting act in party identification. Party identification was seen as stabile and resistant to changes, although it is occasionally altered by influential issues or candidates; however, paradoxically, these seldom modifications of voting behavior are the crucial evidence of the theory (Harrop, Miller 1987: 157). Although the findings of analysis based on this model nullify the importance of social structures (Campbell et al. 1980), there are indications that these results are the distinctive feature of American politics (Evans 2004, Oppenhuis 1995). On the other hand, the importance of Lipset-Rokkan theory is in demonstrating that the voter alignments and party systems in Western Europe are mainly consequences of sociological causes. Therefore, sociological model can serve as the basis of all-encompassing approach to voting behavior.

An additional advantageous aspect of this approach is that variables employed by this model determine causal relations. Namely, the sociological variables are necessary cause of the voting patterns, which is not the case with the other models of voting behavior (e.g. rational choice) (Harrop, Miller 1987: 157). For instance, proximity to the position of the party may be mere rationalization of choice, rather than cause. These characteristic of sociological models are the main reasons why this approach will serve as a foundation of the analysis developed in this work.

1.3.2 The Freezing Hypothesis and Theoretical Improvements

The difference between Lipset-Rokkan theory and other sociological approaches (i.e. Columbia school) is the emphasis on the analysis of macro structures that shape voter alignment. The focus of Lipset and Rokkan analysis are the four basic social cleavages, which during the course of history determined the core features of party systems across Western Europe. In other words, instead of identifying the main patterns in individual voters' social profiles and relating these to voting behavior, Lipset and Rokkan adopted an approach which relates voter alignments, and consequently voting behavior, to the historical processes which placed different social groups in opposition to each other. The historical perspective, as well as the degree of abstraction embedded in the variables implied by Lipset and Rokkan's model necessitates their primacy over other sociological variables.[3]

The main assumption based on this historical perspective is so-called freezing hypothesis. Namely, Lipset and Rokkan placed the formation of the main features of West European party systems in the early 1920s and according to their analysis these features remained the same until the 1960s, when they published their theory. Therefore, a question can be raised regarding the applicability of this theory on the 'emerging democracies' of post-communist Europe.

This application is possible due to two reasons. The first reason is that the introduction of pluralism in the post-communist states was frequently done in the framework of previously existing party systems. For instance, the two parties that succeeded in winning the largest number of seats in Serbian parliamentary elections of 2007 had taken the name, and consider themselves descendants, of major parties from the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th century. Hence, the party system tended to replicate the cleavage structures that were the foundation of West European party systems.

The second reason is based on an alternative notion of the cleavage. Namely, during the final decades of 20th century the cleavages defined by Rokkan and Lipset started to dissolve.[4] Although these changes were not c all-embracing, that is to say most of the cleavages are still the basis of party system and voter alignment, the weakening of traditional social cleavages gave impetus for the alternative theories of cleavage structures, so-called 'new politics theory' (Oppenhuis 1995: 98). These theories took various forms, many of which are not applicable to the post-communist states and are not related to Lipset and Rokkan's approach. However, a unique nature of post-communist party systems asked for the revision of the conception of cleavage structure. Building on both the new politics tendencies and Lipset-Rokkan theory, Herbert Kitschelt (1992) developed a distinctive model of East European post-communist party formation. This model defined three cleavages closely related to Lipset-Rokkan theory. Therefore, in this paper these theories will be treated as compatible. However, although, due to the comprehensive nature of the model, Lipset-Rokkan theory will be the groundwork of the approach adopted here, the explanatory power of Kitschelt's cleavages exceeds by far the power of cleavages defined by Lipset and Rokkan. Nevertheless, combined, these theories form a stabile and enduring foundation for analysis of voting behavior in post-communist East European states.

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[3] However, this does not imply that the model excludes other sociological variables.

1.4 Data and Methods

1.4.1 Design of Tests and Methods

For the purpose of analyzing nonvoting in Serbia during 2006/07 I have obtained two surveys regarding the referendum and the election, as well as aggregate data for both polls. The surveys are pre-referendum and pre-election public opinion polls conducted by CeSid, while aggregate data are the official results of polls by municipalities and census data.

As mentioned above, in the final chapter I will conduct four tests. These tests will be developed on the basis of analysis of Serbian party system and cleavage structure. In the first two tests I will use survey data, while for the other tests I will use aggregate data. The use of individual-based data in the first two tests is necessary due to lack of proper macro variables.[5] On the other hand, the analysis of these cleavages is not possible on the aggregate level. Therefore, the results based on the analysis of the individual data will be indirect inferences about the impact of macro-level cleavage structures on voter turnout. Although the third analysis can be conducted with both types of data sets, the use of aggregate data improves this analysis; therefore, the test is based on aggregate data. In contrast, the forth analysis would give better results if it is conducted on the individual level; however due to the multiple biases this approach had to be discarded. Therefore, this final test is conducted using the aggregate-based data. This has no effect on the general utility of the results obtained in this way; however, it influences the precision of analysis. The methods that I am going to use are regression analysis and correlations.

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[4] For instance, the Dutch pillar system which served as a paradigmatic example in Lipset and Rokkan's work is nonexistent in present times.
[5] The usual way of obtaining these variables is using expert opinion, and then by means of multi-level analysis estimating the impact of these variables on voting behavior.

1.4.2 Data

The biases mentioned above are basically variations of social desirability bias immanent to the individual-based data. The bias is uniformly repeated in both surveys and it is related only to the questions regarding sensitive political issues. In following lines I will give two examples of this problem. In the pre-referendum survey 55.2% of interviewees reported that they will certainly vote in referendum, while 23.2% reported that they will probably vote. On the other hand, in the pre-election survey the reported turnout in referendum is 71%. However, the real turnout was 54.91 % of the total number of registered voters. An additional example of this problem is related to the party affiliation. For instance 35.2% of interviewees do not know for whom they will vote for, while 18.2% do not want to say. Therefore, this serious bias hinders proper analysis, and the results of survey data should be understood, not as final findings, but rather as the indicators of possible solutions.

As mentioned above aggregate data set comprises the official results of the election and the referendum, and the census data by municipalities. The data set was adjusted in various respects. The set comprise 160 municipalities, but it does not contain the results of the election and the referendum in prisons (in Serbia imprisoned citizens have right to vote) and in Kosovo. The excluded results, due to the unordinary circumstances under which the act of voting is performed, do not reflect the overall trend in Serbia, and therefore they are neglected.[6] An additional reason for excluding the polling stations on Kosovo is that the census of 2002 was not carried out there. Likewise, due to the accordance with census data, the newly formed municipality Surcin is treated like it is still a part of Zemun municipality. The specific problem was related to N (total number) which varied across data. For instance, N for the referendum and the election covers the number of eligible voters. This number is volatile, between the referendum and the election it changed for approximately 15,000 votes.

However, in the 2007 parliamentary election this number was sufficient to secure only a seat for the member of a minority party (due to affirmative action hurdle); in addition, votes to seats ratio for the largest parties was about 14,000. This difficulty is resolved by using sums expressed in percentiles instead of their normal numerical value. However, a more sophisticated task was how to deal with census data, since N (which covers whole population) had to be adjusted to the number of eligible voters. In the cases where it was possible the population under 18 was deducted, and the remainder was expressed in percentiles. In the cases where it was not possible, percentiles are used as the robust estimators of the population of eligible voters.

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[6] The voters in Kosovo (who comprise almost exclusively Serbian population) are more incline to vote for far-right parties because the silent conflict with Albanian population.

Chapter 2: Cleavage Structure and Development of Party System

2.1 Elections and Electoral Systems

A cleavage structure and the responding party system ask for a number of electoral rounds to be positively identified. In the case of Serbia during the first stage of pluralism, the first and the second parliamentary elections were crucial in this regard. The first election indicated the idiosyncratic nature of the events that were about to unveil in Serbia. It also determined the basic features of the party system, and more importantly, most of the features of the cleavage structure that is going to be characteristic for Serbia even in present days. The second elections introduced proportional electoral system and revealed completely formed cleavage structure. After these elections cleavage structure stayed, more or less, the same.

However, while the cleavage structure was relatively stabile party system suffered multiple changes Although the many of parties that succeeded in mobilizing the greatest number of supporters during the parliamentary elections of 2007defined their positions in this initial period of multiparty system, most of them did not exist or they were irrelevant in that period. The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the Democratic Party (DS) and the parties of minorities were represented in these first assemblies. However, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the G17+ become relevant after 2000, while the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won seats in the 2007 election.[7] However, despite these changes cleavage structure remained the same.

In following section I will discus the development of Serbian party system through three phases: initial 1990-1996, authoritarian 1997-2000 and transitional after 2000. However, sections will follow changes in electoral system because these changes are more appropriate for isolating cleavages and understanding formation of party system. This

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[7] Appendix contains short histories of parties that succeeded in winning seats on the election of 2007.

sequence of sections is also more appropriate for the discussion on patterns of voting behavior before the referendum of 2006 and the election of 2007.

2.2.1 The First Multiparty Election

The early period after 1989 in the countries of central, east and southeast Europe can be described as the period of initial transformation of the political system. These countries had been faced with the hard assignment of creation of the basic institutions of procedural liberal democracy and the introduction of capitalistic economy within obsolete socialistic infrastructure. However, regardless of their departure positions, the countries of post-socialistic block reached different levels of development. According to Vachudova these outcomes are the products of the first multiparty elections (Vachudova 2001).

The first multiparty election in Serbia occurred while the Republic of Serbia was still within the borders of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The election followed the adoption of Serbian Constitution and the adoption of new election laws. One-party Serbian parliament introduced these changes in favor of the communist successor party, the SPS, although other parties already existed. In addition, the laws were prepared in haste, which necessitated numerous changes by means of amendments and additions immediately after the adoption of the laws (Pajvancic 1995). Also, the period between election and the date of adoption of laws was less than three months, which enabled the opposition parties to rely only on last-minute campaigns with limited results (Slavujevic 1998).

The first election of members of the parliament of the Republic of Serbia was based on the absolute majority system in the two-round vote. It took place on December 9 and 23, 1990. Serbia consisted of 250 electoral districts, and from each district one Member of Parliament was elected. In the first round a candidate had to win more than a half of the total votes cast (absolute majority of votes), while in the second round mere plurality was sufficient to win a seat. In the first round, 95 MPs were elected. However, after the second

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round relation between seats and votes became very disproportional to the advantage of the SPS. Although, two other parties, the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (DZVM) and the Democratic Reform Party of Muslims (DRSM) also had positive difference in the relation of votes and seats, this difference was insignificant. On the contrary, in the case of the SPS this difference was noteworthy. The 46.1% of votes was transformed into 77.6%of seats. According to Goati and Pajvancic proportionality index of that newly formed parliament was merely 73, while in majority systems in Western Europe the index varied about 85 (Goati and Pajvancic 1998: 141).[8] This produced the situation in which the number of necessary votes for a single seat ranged from 68,045 for the Peoples Farmer Party (NSS) to 3,432 votes for the Democratic Reform Party of Muslims (DRSM) (see table 2.1.1).

Table 2.1.1 Results of parliamentary elections 1990

PARTIES IN ORDER OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS	NUMBER OF SEATS	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF SEATS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES CAST
Socialistic Party of Serbia (SPS)	194	2,320,587	77.6	46.1
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO)	19	794,786	7.6	15.8
Independent candidates	8	456,318	3.2	9.1
Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians	8	132,762	3.2	2.6
Democratic Party (DS)	7	374,887	2.8	7.4
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	3	84,156	1.2	1.7
League of Reform forces of Yugoslavia for Vojvodina	2	74,748	0.8	1.5
Party of the alliance of Farmers of Serbia	2	52,663	0.8	1.0
People's Peasant Party (SSS)	1	68,045	0.4	1.5
Serbian Democratic Party	1	32,972	0.4	0.6
Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative	1	24,982	0.4	0.5
Democratic League of Croats in Vojvodina	1	23,630	0.4	0.5
Party for Democratic Activity	1	21,998	0.4	0.4
Party of Yugoslavs	1	21,784	0.4	0.4
Democratic Reform Party of Muslims	1	3,432	0.4	0.1

ELECTORATE	TOTAL VOTES CAST	VOTER TURNOUT PERCENTAGE
7,044,797	5,034,613	71.5

Source: Goati, Vladimir (ed.) 1995. *Challenges of Parliamentarism: The Case of Serbia in the Early Nineties*. Beograd: Institute of Social sciences: Center for political studies and Public Opinion Research.

However, the main problem in the distribution of seats was the relation of the seats and votes in the case of the main SPS's competition: the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the Democratic Party (DS), and independent candidates. While for the SPS it was enough to win 11,961 votes for a seat, candidates of groups of citizens had to win 57,039 votes, the DP 53,555 votes and the SPO 44,154 votes (Goati and Pajvancic 1998: 141).

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[8] Goati and Pajvancic use index developed by Richard Rose.

The additional issue of the election was the voter turnout (71.5%); in comparison with the most of the other republics of the SFRY, as well as other post-communist states, it was low. The voter turnout in Croatia and Macedonia was 85%, while in Slovenia it was 84 % (Goati 1999: 29). Similar voter turnout had been noticed in Romania and DR Germany, while in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia it was above 90 percent. Only in Poland and Hungary was a lower voter turnout registered. Among the other republics of the SFRY only Bosnia and Herzegovina (77%) and Montenegro (74%) had a similar participation of electorate. The main reason for such a low voter turnout in Serbia was the boycott of election by Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohia. The total population of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia is estimated at about 16.5% of the total population, and, therefore, the number of abstainers in this population was significant.[9] However, the absence of ethnic Albanians is not sufficient to explain such a low voter turnout, because even on the territory of Serbia without Kosovo and Metohia voter turnout was lower than in the other republics.

According to Goati, this can be explained in three ways (Goati 1999: 30-32). The first explanation is based on the fact that in Serbia socialism did not lose legitimacy; in other words, while in other post-socialistic states the socialistic system lost its credibility, in Serbia this was not the case – pluralism came too early. Goati sees the second reason of the low participation in the demotivation of citizens to vote under conditions in which there was no real competition between parties. The third explanation Goati sees in traditional skepticism of the citizens of Serbia when they are faced with substantial political transformations.[10] However, none one of these explanations satisfy because they do not explain why voter turnout decreased in the following elections also. In fact, the voter turnout on the first

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[9] Since the census of the 1991 was boycotted by Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia, and municipalities with Albanian majority on south of Serbia, the exact number of population in these regions is unknown.

[10] This is claim is partly refuted with election of October 5, 2000, although participation rate did not reached 5,034,613, it was vas very close 4,676,118.

parliamentary elections happened to be very high in contrast with the voter turnouts on the latter elections, especially in comparison with the most recent ones.

In addition, the outcome of the first multiparty election in Serbia was unique because, with the exception of Bulgaria and Montenegro, the SPS was the only ex-communist party that succeeded in wining the first post-socialist election. In the other Republics of the SFRY (Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia) communist lost by wining only 16-25 percent of votes. The major exception was Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) where ex-communists suffered a loss without precedent in the region – only 6 percent of voters voted for them.[11] However, the results of the former communist parties in the other countries of Central and East Europe were usually better than those in the BiH: DR Germany 16.4%, Czechoslovakia 13.5% and Hungary 8.5%. However, in comparison with these results, the unquestionably dominant role of the SPS was an extraordinary outcome of the first election. This fact had a decisive impact on Serbian party system.

2.1.2 Proportional Representation and Pseudo-Democracy

Using Duverger's (Duverger 1976: 267) and Sartori's (Sartori 1976: 196) categorizations Goati classifies the Serbian political system after the first election as a three-party polarized system (Goati 1999: 52). When it comes to Sartori's category "polarization", Serbia was definitely a polarized society – the core cleavage was based on the difference between autoritarian and anti-autoritarian model of governance.[12] However, this cleavage was not a stabile feature of party system due to the continuous disagreements within the opposition. Nevertheless, the pseudo-democratic character of the government and media manipulations gave sufficient inducement for occasional unified resistance. In this framework

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[11] The result of the first multiparty election in the BiH can be understood as a sign of further events – the votes were distributed by the national cleavages and winners were major nationalistic parties.

[12] This cleavage is much better expressed in Kitschelts terminology, but for now I am going to use these terms

the opposition conducted a successful series of protests during 1991 and 1992 causing the change of electoral system and early election.

The first election according to the PR system was held on December 20, 1992. Proportionality was based on the D'Hondt rule. Usually this rule is considered as the least proportional; Lijphart wrote that among the highest average formulas, the D'Hondt method: 'is the least proportional and systematically favors larger parties' (Lijphart 1994: 23). However, adoption of this rule improved vote to seats ratio in comparison with previous, majoritarian, election.

In contrast with the former election, the adoption of new election laws was done in cooperation with the opposition parties (with and without seats in parliament). These round tables were accompanied by the work of an expert group assigned by the federal parliament. However, although agreement over the adoption of PR system was quickly reached, a significant disagreement occurred during the discussion over the number of districts. The opposition and the federal government's experts opted for a small number of districts (namely, at the beginning they asked for the whole Serbia to be one electoral district), while the ruling party wanted a larger number of districts (Pajvancic 1995: 31). Finally, it was agreed to form 9 electoral districts (see table 2.1.2).

The other factor, related to the number of districts and proportionality, was the magnitude of districts. According to Lijphart, electoral districts are decisive factor in determining the proportionality of the outcome of elections (Lijphart, 1994: 11). He quotes James Hogan:

> …the decisive point in PR is the size (magnitude) of the constituencies: the larger the constituency, that is, the greater the number of members which it elects, the more closely will the result approximate to proportionality.

The table below shows that the magnitude of districts was fairly balanced and, theoretically, it was not supposed to affect the proportionality in a negative manner.

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Table 2.1.2 Electoral districts, parliamentary elections 1992

ELECTORAL DISTRICT	NUMBER OF VOTERS	NUMBER OF SEATS
Beograd	1,259,393	46
Zrenjanin	783,299	28
Kragujevac	806,799	29
Leskovac	725,580	25
Nis	662,624	24
Novi Sad	785,484	28
Pristina	635,396	24
Smederevo	608,716	22
Uzice	692,882	24

Source: Goati, Vladimir and Marijana Pajvancic. 1998. 'Seats and Votes: Consequences of the Electoral Laws'. Goati, Vladimir (ed.) *Elections to the Federal and Republican Parliaments of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1990-1996*. Berlin: Ed. Sigma.

An additional factor that had an effect on proportionality of electoral system was the 5% threshold. It is generally considered that the effect of the threshold is to deny the right of representation to small parties. However, this threshold has a positive effect of forcing opposition into a broad coalition – the DEPOS (Democratic Movement of Serbia).

The opposition united in the coalition was expected to win the 1992 parliamentary election. However, the results turn out to be a surprise. Not only did the DEPOS lost, but the second-best party was the extreme-right Serbian Radical Party (SRS) (see Table 2.1.3). On other hand, the SPS suffered a significant loss in electorate. Namely, although the SPS remained the strongest party in the parliament, it lost more than a million votes. This result is usually explained by the increased ethnical homogenization and the protest voting caused by the international isolation, poverty and the wars in BiH and Croatia (Goati 1999: 120-122). Nevertheless, a million votes was exactly the result the SRS obtained, which represented a noteworthy shift of voter alignments towards right.

However, the adoption of the PR system improved the proportionality of elections. The proportionality index rose from 73 to 86.1 (Goati and Pajvancic 1998: 143). For most of the parties a positive votes-to-seats ratio was registered (see Table 2.1.3). However that positive difference also meant that 899,902 (20.4%) voters voted for the parties that won no parliamentary seats. The main cause of these aberrations was the threshold However, the magnitude of districts also produced disproportional results. For instance, while the Group of

Citizens –"Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan", after election renamed in the Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ), managed to win 5 seats with only 17,352 of votes (see Table 2.1.3), other parties won no seats with 130,139 votes (Goati and Pajvancic 1998: 143).

Table 2.1.3 Results of parliamentary election 1992

PARTIES IN ORDER OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS	NUMBER OF SEATS	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF SEATS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES CAST
Socialistic Party of Serbia (SPS)	101	1,359,086	40.4	28.8
Serbian Radical Party SRS)	73	1,066,765	29.2	22.6
DEPOS - coalition	50	797,831	20.0	16.9
Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians	9	149,825	3.6	3.0
Democratic Party (DS)	6	196,347	2.4	4.2
Group of Citizens –Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan	5	17,352	2.0	0.3
Farmer's Party of Serbia (SSS)	3	128,240	1.2	2.7
Democratic Party/Reform Democrat Party of Vojvodina	2	71,865	0.8	1.5
Democratic Reform Party of Muslims	1	6,336	0.4	0.1

ELECTORATE	TOTAL VOTES CAST	VOTER TURNOUT PERCENTAGE
6,774,995	4,723,711	69.7

Source: Goati, Vladimir (ed.) 1995. *Challenges of Parliamentarism: The Case of Serbia in the Early Nineties*. Beograd: Institute of Social sciences: Center for political studies and Public Opinion Research.

The result of SSJ was possible because of the concentration of its voters in Kosovo and Metohia region, and since Albanian population did not vote - 10% of all MPs were elected by a very small number of Kosovo Serbs. The highest number of votes needed for a seat was 42,746 – the Farmer's Party of Serbia (SSS); the lowest number of votes was registered in the case of SSJ – 3,470 votes.

The following, early election did not bring major changes in electoral system. Serbia was divided in 9 electoral districts and the threshold was the same. Most of the relevant parties had a larger share of seats than of votes. The largest positive difference was in the case of the SPS – 12.5%, while for the other parties this difference was considerably smaller: DEPOS – 3.4%, the SRS 1.8% (see Table 2.1.4). For the DS this ratio was 0, while for the DSS it was negative. The highest average number of votes needed for a seat was in the case of the DSS (31,150), while the lowest was again in the favor of the SPS (12,724). At the same time 380,589 voters cast their ballot for the parties or lists without a seat.

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Table 2.1.4 Results of parliamentary election 1993

PARTIES IN ORDER OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS	NUMBER OF SEATS	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF SEATS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES CAST
Socialistic Party of Serbia (SPS)	123	1,576.287	49.2	36.7
DEPOS	45	715,564	18.0	16.6
Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	39	595,467	15.6	13.8
Democratic Party (DS)	29	497,582	11.6	11.6
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)	7	218,056	2.8	5.1
Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians	5	112,456	2.0	2.6
Democratic Activity Party /Albanian democratic party	2	29,342	0.8	0.7

ELECTORATE	TOTAL VOTES CAST	VOTER TURNOUT PERCENTAGE
7,010,389	4,300,440	61.34

Source: Goati, Vladimir (ed.) 1995. *Challenges of Parliamentarism: The Case of Serbia in the Early Nineties*. Beograd: Institute of Social sciences: Center for political studies and Public Opinion Research.

However, the elections of 1992 and 1993 raise a question why one completely unsuccessful regime succeeded in wining the plurality of the votes. First of all it should be noted that voter turnout was in permanent decline (71.5%, 69.7% and 61.34%). In contrast, during the 1960s and the 1970s voter turnout in Western Europe fluctuated from 53% of eligible voters in Switzerland to 90% in Netherlands, with 70-80% being usual turnout (Powell 1993). Although, the number of Albanians that boycotted elections was large, this fact is not sufficient to explain the low voter turnout. The other problem was the degree of support for the ultra-right SRS and the ex-communist SPS. Brankovic explored this paradox, using correlation of the so-called "misery index"[13] and changes in political affiliation in Serbia (Brankovic 1995). According to him, this atypical voting behavior is caused by the monopolization of the political interpretation of social problems. Actually, a part of voters was confused and in the state of apathy caused the economic situation, while the other part was mobilized by the state propaganda (Goati 1999: 108). Regarding the former issue, the election of 1993 disclosed the tendency of the parties to address economic concerns. The issues of living standard dominated in campaigns. The parties which insisted on these issues gain the most – the SPS and the DS. On the other hand, the nationalist issues were secondary; therefore, parties that emphasized these issues in campaigns did not have good results – SRS,

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[13] Misery index is calculated on the basis of rates of inflation and unemployment.

DSS and SSJ. However, the difference between the various approaches to the issues of economy was still not the dominant model of voter alignment.

Therefore, the voting behavior in this period is tantamount on three patterns. The first pattern is voting on the basis of ethnical difference which was the predominant form of alignment in the election of 1992. The second pattern is the mobilization of voters on the basis of the anti-authoritarian vs. pro-authoritarian model of governance, which is going to become dominant in the following phase. Finally, the third pattern is voting according to economic policies.

2.1.3 Authoritarianism and the Initial Period of Transition

The results of the local election in 1996 were the first significant defeat suffered by the SPS regime. During this period the regime became openly authoritarian.[14] The following parliamentary election was held in the atmosphere of strong polarization on the basis of pro-authoritarian vs. anti-authoritarian cleavage. The most significant issue of the election was the change of electoral laws. Namely, although election was held according to the PR system, the number of district was changed from 9 to 29. The increase in the number of electoral districts magnified the disproportionality of the electoral system. This was complemented by arranging (gerrymandering) the districts according to needs of the ruling party, so that, depending on the size of the election unit, 7-15 percents of votes were needed for a seat in the parliament (Sekelj 2000: 63). This persuaded the number of political parties to boycott the election. The election was boycotted by 12 parties and among them three were holding seats in the parliament: DS, DSS and the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS). The election was also boycotted by Albanians in Kosovo, but the boycott was not supported by other minority parties: Muslims, Albanians on southeast of Serbia and Hungarians. However, at the time the largest liberal-democratic party, the SPO, participated in elections.

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The voter turnout on this election was additionally decreased - 57.4%. Although in certain extent this voter turnout can be explained by the boycott, actually the boycott succeeded only partly. At most a third of the voters that were previously voting for the parties in boycott actually supported the boycott (Goati 1999). In reality, the government succeeded in persuading the citizens that they have an obligation to vote. Naturally, this was supported by the SPO which additionally confused citizens. In addition, situation in Kosovo and Metohia was rapidly moving towards the conflict stage and that had an additional impact on voters.

The SPO took 45 seats in the parliament, same as the DEPOS, suggesting that reputation of the DEPOS was based primarily on the reputation of the SPO. Paradoxically, boycott enabled a better representation of national minorities, which in total had 13 seats. Actually, proportionality index also rose and it was 91.3 (Goati 2003) However, beside the strong propaganda, the coalition SPS-JUL-ND suffered an electoral loss. Although, by creating the so called red-black coalition with the SRS, the SPS remained in power, the tendency of losing electorate will be continued and finally enhanced after the war with NATO.[15]

Table 2.1.5 Results of parliamentary election 1997

PARTIES IN ORDER OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS	NUMBER OF SEATS	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF SEATS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES CAST
SPS, JUL, ND	110	1,418,036	44.00	34.2
Serbian Radical Party	82	1,162,216	32.80	28.1
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO)	45	793,988	18.00	19.1
Vojvodina	4	112,589	1.60	2.72
Democratic Alternative	1	60,855	0.40	1.47
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians	4	50,960	1.60	1.23
List for Sandjak	3	49,486	1.20	1.20
Presevo Bujanovac	1	14,179	0.40	0.40

ELECTORATE	TOTAL VOTES CAST	VOTER TURNOUT PERCENTAGE
7,210,386	4,139,080	57.4

Source: Goati, Vladimir (ed.) 1995. *Challenges of Parliamentarism: The Case of Serbia in the Early Nineties*. Beograd: Institute of Social sciences: Center for political studies and Public Opinion Research.

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[14] Goati places the beginning of the authoritarian phase in 1998.

[15] However, the support of the regime was enhanced by NATO involvement. This fact is supported by the referendum of 1998 when 5,297,776 voters participated (73.05%) – however, the validity of this referendum is partly questionable.

The year 2000 was marked by the collapse of the Milosevic regime. After the federal presidential election, and following the series of protest, which reached its peak on October 5, 2000, Slobodan Milosevic publicly declared the defeat and the candidate of the opposition united in the coalition DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia), Vojislav Kostunica, became President. The new circumstances caused the early parliamentary election. The election was held according to the new law on the election of Members of Parliament, which was presented only four days before the events of the 5th of October. In the parliament law was proposed by the SRS and adopted according to the emergency procedure. The greatest change was that instead of 29 districts Serbia was transformed into one electoral district. The formula and the thresholds remained the same. The threshold presented a significant problem for the minority parties, but this problem was solved by means of a coalition. Namely, the DOS was a broad coalition that incorporated 18 parties and among them some were the parties of national minorities – the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) and the Democratic Party of Sandjak (SDP). As expected, the DOS had a landslide victory (see table 2.1.6) However, one of the largest opposition parties during Milosevic time, the SPO, did not succeed in wining the seats. Eventually, since the SPO was not a part of the DOS it was punished by the voters.[16]

Table 2.1.6 Results of parliamentary election 2000

PARTIES IN ORDER OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS	NUMBER OF SEATS	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF SEATS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES CAST
DOS	176	2,461,142	70	64.4
Socialistic Party of Serbia (SPS)	32	515,923	14.8	13.5
Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	23	324,840	9.2	8.5
Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ)	15	202,547	5.6	5.3

ELECTORATE	TOTAL VOTES CAST	VOTER TURNOUT PERCENTAGE
6,493,672	3,821,649	58.85

Goati, Vladimir. 2003. 'The Electoral System in Serbia'. Goati, Vladimir, Veselin Pavicecic, Lino Veljak and Dragica Vujadinovic (eds.) *Between Authoritarianism and Democracy*. Belgrade: CEDET. CeSID, URL: http://www.cesid.org/rezultati/sr_decembar_2000/index.jsp

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[16] In fact the SPO left the DOS earlier that year and had its own candidate on the federal presidential election.

However, in a very rapid manner the relations in coalition deteriorated. The conflict was based on the different conceptions of transition.[17] While the DS and its Prime Minister, Zoran Djinjdjic, insisted on the fast reforms and enhanced Europeanization, the DSS supported slower transformation emphasizing legalism. However, several intense episodes made cooperation among the leading parties of DOS impossible.[18] However, in spite of the conflicts, government continued its politics of rapid transformation and Europeanization until the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on March 13, 2003.

The new elections implicitly came about as the consequence of the assassination of Prime Minister. A half of a year after the event DOS fell apart and the parliamentary election were scheduled. The rules of election were not changed. However, the election reflected the disappointment of citizens with the process of transition. Having in mind the economic situation in Serbia during the SPS rule and fact that transition actually begun after 2000, the number of transitional losers was significantly bigger in comparison with other post-communist states. This explains why the SRS had the best result; they won 82 seats in the parliament (see table 2.1.7). In addition, re-legitimating of the parties of the Milosevic regime encouraged their traditional voters to vote for the SPS again. The SPS succeeded in wining 22 seats.

An additional reason for such a good result of the SRS was the permanent disagreement among the parties of liberal-democratic orientation over the content of transitional policies. The conflict was reflected in distribution of votes. None of the parties

[17] During the rule of SPS privatization was stopped, and in fact country was not transformed ate all. The period after 2000 signified the beginning of transition.
[18] Unexpectedly the greatest problem was caused by the change of the article which regulated the allocation of seats within the list. Namely, according to the law of 1992 the seats were allocated in this way: a third of the seats were allocated according to the place on the list, while the bearer of the list had the right to determine two thirds of other MPs. According to the changes of 2000, the mandates belonged to the parties, and parties had the right to choose or change the MPs. Since DSS was opposed to the policies promoted by rest of the coalition, it decided not to support the Djindjic government and to boycott sessions of the Parliament. This left the government with a thin majority of 6 seats. However, since the DOS consisted from 17 parties (without the DSS) the discipline of the MPs was serious issue. In the number of occasions the coalition could not gather

had a majority, but due to the strong opposition within the block of democratic parties, they were not able to form a coalition. Therefore a minority government supported by the SPS had to be formed. An additional negative side of this election was the representation of minorities. For the first time in the history of pluralism in Serbia minorities did not have their own representatives in the parliament.

Table 2.1.7 Results of parliamentary election 2003

PARTIES IN ORDER OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS	NUMBER OF SEATS	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF SEATS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES CAST
Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	82	1,056,256	32	27.61
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)	53	678,031	21.2	17.72
Democratic Party (DS)	37	481,249	14.8	12.58
G17+	34	438,442	13.6	11.46
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO)/ New Serbia (NS)	22	293,382	8.8	7.66
Socialistic Party of Serbia (SPS)	22	291,341	8.8	7.61

ELECTORATE	TOTAL VOTES CAST	VOTER TURNOUT PERCENTAGE
6.511.450	3.825.471	58.79

Source: The Republic Electoral Commission URL: http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/engleski/propisi_frames.htm

Nevertheless, despite the disagreements and the strong polarization of party system, the secession of Montenegro on May 21, 2006 forced the parties to gather around the project of constitution as the most urgent issue. As mentioned above, participation on the following referendum was barely sufficient for the adoption of the constitution. The approach adopted in this dissertation has the goal to explain this outcome by using cleavage theory. In this section empirical (historical) background of the cleavage structure is thoroughly discussed. In the following section I will link the empirical perspective with the theoretical models developed by Lipset, Rokkan and Kitschelt.

2.2 Cleavage Structure and Party System

According to Goati, parties in Serbia can be classified in three groups (Goati 1999): liberal - the Democratic Party (DS); nationalistic – the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS); and communistic –

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majority. Therefore, using law mentioned above the coalition decided to withdraw 36 mandates from the DOS deputies who had most often failed to attend Assembly sessions, and among them 21 from the DSS.

the SPS, the Yugoslav Left (JUL). [19] A slightly different threefold categorization was introduced by Vukomanovic (Vukomanovic 1998): nationalist – the SPO, the SRS; democrats – the DS, the DSS; and reformist – Civil Alliance of Serbia (GSS), the Social Democratic Union (SDU). These slightly diverse typologies are developed by emphasizing different axis of oppositions which can be pinpointed using the framework developed in Lipset-Rokkan theory of voter alignment.

2.2.1 The Basic Postulates of Lipset-Rokkan and Kitschelt's Cleavage Theory

In an attempt to explain formation of various European parties and party systems Lipset and Rokkan developed a longitudinal analysis that converge cross-national variations of party systems on four basic cleavages. These cleavages are the products of the two fundamental cultural and political changes in European history: the National and the Industrial Revolution.

The National Revolution has produced two lines of opposition. The first is the conflict between a single central culture and periphery cultures. Essentially this conflict is the discord between dominant nation-building culture and ethically, linguistically and religiously distinct peripheral communities. The other conflict is between the state and church. The National Revolution is understood on the grounds of major movement produced by French (*burgouise*) revolution. One of the most influential tendencies produced by this event was directed at the secularization of government which necessary jeopardized the historically established privileges of church.

The Industrial Revolution has produced additional two cleavages. The first cleavage is between the landed interest and industrial entrepreneurs. This opposition can be tantamount on the conflict between rural, agrarian interest and urban, industrial interest. The second

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[19] Goati takes 5% threshold as criterion for parties, and that is why many small but influential parties were not included.

cleavage produced by Industrial Revolution is the discord between owners and employers on one side, and tenants, laborers and workers on the other. This cleavage is relatively new. However, after Russian October revolution it becomes the dominant factor of mobilization of voters, and despite the economic and political developments of recent decades it is still the core axis of differentiation within various European party systems.

Nevertheless, although the Lipset-Rokkan model is sufficiently abstract to capture multiple differences across various party systems and reduce them to the fundamental four-cleavage structure, a question can be raised regarding the application of this theory to the post-communist European countries. As mentioned above, it can be asserted that the developments within the countries of the former Eastern block during communism produced an alternative form of cleavage structure, which does not completely reflect cleavages in West European states.

Inspired by the Lipset-Rokkan model Herbert Kitschelt developed such an approach to the development of the parties and party systems in post-communist Europe (Kitschelt 1992). Kitschelt defines three basis cleavages inherent to these recreated political systems. The first cleavage is based on dispute over the concept of citizen. Namely, the concept of citizen can be understood inclusively (cosmopolitanism) or exclusively. The inclusive definition was formulated by ignoring ethnical, racial and religious characteristics, while the second definition takes this attributes into account and, by doing so, excludes certain individuals or groups. The second cleavage is between authoritarian and libertarian decision-making. It assumes two aspects: the first is based on the difference between the narrow and broad scope of collective decision-making. The second is a cleavage developed on the basis of the difference between the hierarchical and democratic form of decision-making. These two aspects are related. The proponents of the narrow scope of decision-making are more likely to support the hierarchical model of decision making, while the proponents of the

broad scope prefer the democratic model of decision-making. The third cleavage is based on the difference between the market and the state-controlled allocation of resources. Therefore this cleavage is founded on the dispute over the regulation of market and its liberation.

A closer look at Kitschelt's theory reveals that this model is very similar to the model developed by Lipset and Rokkan. Kitschelt's first cleavage can be completely reduced on the Lipset-Rokkan cleavage between subject and dominant culture. Kitschelt's third cleavage cannot be tantamount on a specific cleavage in the Lipset-Rokkan theory, but it stems from the cleavages produced by the Industrial Revolution. However, Kitschelt's second cleavage is an important novelty.[20] Its explanatory power is especially obvious in the countries of South-Eastern Europe where the initial period of transition was deeply marked by the conflict between authoritarian and liberal tendencies.[21]

2.2.2 Application of the Theoretical Model

The cleavage is between authoritarian and libertarian decision-making was the original basis of voter alignments in Serbia. While in the other countries of Eastern block communist elites were rapidly losing legitimacy, in Serbia the legitimacy of the communist elites was unquestionable. The successor party of the League of Communist, the SPS, was able to adopt an electoral system which was the most suitable for it in the present situation (as mentioned above, it was the majoritarian, plurality system) and to achieve a landslide victory. Even during this early period authoritarian characteristics of ruling party became noticeable. The basic characteristic of the regime can be sum up in following way: charismatic leader, the ruling party identified with the state, strong influence of the party on the composition of

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[20] The crucial problem with Kitschelt's theory is that Lipset and Rokkan devised term "cleavage" in order to refer to relatively permanent differences. Kitschelt's second cleavage can be interpreted as a temporary conflict whish is supposed to be terminated by achieving certain level of democratization.

[21] Tworzecki in this regard describes the Meciar's government and government of Iliesku (Tworzecki 2003)

state-owned corporations, and control of state-owned media, especially television and radio.[22]

This mobilized opposition parties, namely DS and SPO, to create a united block of parties.

This pressure enabled the change of electoral system and early elections. However, early

election of 1992 introduced additional member on the authoritarian side of Kitschelt's second

cleavage, Serbian Radical Party. The election of 1996 added the Yugoslav Left (JUL) to the

same group. The following period, until the elections of 2000, can be predominately

described as a phase of conflicts based on this cleavage.

However, the development of party system on the basis of this cleavage was

interrupted by the outbreak of war in the former republics of the SFRY. As early as in the

formative period of parties during 1989 and 1990 the ethical character of parties was

underlined.[23] Moreover, in Serbia since 1987 the League of Communist of Serbia (LCS)

turned toward propaganda strategically aimed at the questions of national and state interest

(Slavujevic 1998).[24] The beginning of the wars enhanced these tendencies. During early 90s

all parties from 'liberal' (Goati) or 'democrats' (Vukomanovic) category incorporated some

elements of the 'national program'. For instance, under pressure from rank and file, and some

higher functionaries, during 1992, DS briefly moved towards right.[25] On the other hand,

parties as the SPO, or the SRS, were openly supportive of violent means for dealing with the

questions of national self-determination. The mobilization over national issue and the fact

that this cleavage was not coextensive with the cleavage based on difference between

authoritarian and libertarian decision-making hindered the opposition parties to form stable

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[22] A similar situation was characteristic for Croatia. The first round of the first Parliamentary elections in Serbia was at the same time the election for the President of Serbia. Slobodan Milosevic won 3,285,799 votes (65.3%) in the first round proving that his on own reputation goes far beyond the reputation of his own party (46.1% of total votes cast). In the Presidential election in Croatia of 1992 Franjo Tudjman won 1,519,100 votes while his party, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), won 1,176,437. The characteristics mentioned above Zahosek used to describe the situation in Croatia. (Zahosek 1997: 40)
[23] This was characteristic to majority of the parties of former SFRY (Goati 2004:34)
[24] The breaking point was the 8th session of the LCS (September 23-24, 1987).
[25] The DS proclaimed that the in national interest is that all Serbs live in one state. For achieving that goal the DS recommends pacific means above all the rest (Goati 2004: 41). Goati interprets the phrase "above all the rest" as the possibility of the acceptance of military solution.

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alliance. [26] However, with the increased repression of the regime, the initial national homogenization was transformed into a strong polarization. The authoritarian vs. libertarian decision-making cleavage will start gaining dominance after local election in 1996, when the regime entered its last phase. Meanwhile, cleavage based on the difference between the central and local cultures was permanent source of conflict between the parties of minorities and civic parties (DS, GSS) on one hand, and the nationalistic parties (SPS, SRS, DSS, SPO) on the other. After 2000 this cleavage (subject vs. dominant culture) remained one of the main bases of voter alignments.

The cleavage between church and state was never a dominant one. Since the denominations relatively homogeneously reflect ethnical differences, churches were usually in the service of ethnical interests. However, for a brief period during the Zoran Djindjic's government (2000-2003) a conflict occured between the secular parties and churches over policy on religious education in public schools. This issue is underlined by Lipset and Rokkan in their analysis of cleavage between church and government as a par excellence religious issue. Nevertheless, these differences were never reflected into the party system, except in above mentioned ethnical sense.

Surprisingly, the cleavages created by Industrial Revolution also never produced a major opposition in the sense implied by Lipset and Rokkan. As the product of the communist period, the cleavage between landed and industrial interest did not have the gravity observed in the states of Western Europe. In the initial years of pluralism agrarian parties succeeded in winning only a small number of seats in the parliament, and these differentiations were never transformed in the permanent characteristics of the party system (see table 2.1.1 and table 2.1.3). The only pattern that is noticeable in this regard is the tendency of rural voters to vote for right-wing parties. Nevertheless, as cross-national

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[26] For instance, the DSS left the wide anti-regime coalition DEPOS because they were too eager to fulfill

analysis showed, this pattern is quite common for other political systems also (Converse 1967: 739), and it is not based on this cleavage.

On the other hand, the cleavage between labor and employers never gain supremacy also. Although parties in their platforms followed by inertia the divisions inherent to the other European party systems, these differences never became substantial lines cleavage. In fact, the process of transition has pushed this cleavage aside, putting forth Kitschelt's third cleavage – the cleavage between the pro-liberalization parties and the parties that opted for state-controlled allocation of resources. This cleavage, along with the cleavages based on the ethnic differences (Lipset-Rokkan) and the type of decision-making (Kitschelt), was the basic factor of voter alignments. In the first period, until 2000, the SPS and the JUL were main representatives of the second notion of allocation of resources. In this regard Goati wrote that the SPS only continued politics of League of Communist of Serbia especially in the domain of state economic interventionism (Goati 2002). After 2000 the main proponent of these policies became the SRS, especially criticizing the process of privatization and the liberalization of market.

The postulation of these six cleavages (four established by Lipset and Rokkan and two established by Kitschelt) enables a robust categorization of parties according to aforementioned oppositions. This typology facilitates a possibility of explaining the past coalitions and the alliances of parties, and also enables the prediction of their future behavior, as well as the future voting behavior of citizens. Below, such a categorization is developed only for the selection of non-minority parties which participated on parliamentary elections of 2007 (see table 2.2.1). It should be kept in mind that this categorization is somewhat provisional when it comes to relatively insignificant cleavages (for instance landed interests vs. industrial entrepreneurs) otherwise it reflects empirical facts quite accurately. When it

conditions of West.

comes to the three basic cleavages (dominant culture vs. subject culture, authoritarian vs. libertarian decision making, market-controlled vs. state-controlled allocation of resources) it can be shown that every major coalition or an alternative form of alliance or cooperation between the parties followed this determinants.[27] In the next chapter I will explain impact of this cleavage structures on voter turnout during 2006/07.

Table 2.2.1 Party system and cleavage structure in Serbia

Lipset_Rokkan National Revolution		Lipset_Rokkan National Revolution		Kitschelt	
DOMINANT CULTURE	**SUBJECT CULTURE**	**GOVERNMENT**	**CHURCH(ES)**	**AUTORITARIAN DECISION-MAKING**	**LIBERTALIAN DECISION-MAKING**
SPS SRS DSS SPO NS	DS LDP G17+	DS SPS LDP G17+	SPO DSS SRS NS	SPS SRS	DS LDP G17+ SPO DSS NS
Lipset_Rokkan Industrial Revolution		Lipset_Rokkan Industrial Revolution		Kitschelt	
WORKERS	**EMPLOYERS**	**INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRENUERS**	**LANDED INTEREST**	**MARKET-CONTROLLED ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES**	**STATE-CONTROLLED ALLOCATION OF RESORCES**
SPS SRS DS	DSS LDP G17+ SPO NS	DSS LDP G17+ DS NS	SPS SRS SPO	DSS LDP G17+ SPO DS NS	SPS SRS

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[27] The only exceptions that I am aware are coalition of New Serbia, SPS and JUL 1998-2000 and support of the SPS to the minority government of Vojislav Kostunica (2003-2007).

Chapter 3: Nonvoting in Serbia: 2006/2007

3.1 Macro Explanations of Turnout

The theoretical groundwork developed by Lipset and Rokkan, which was adopted in this paper, is not sufficient to explain the whole phenomenon of voting, especially not with regard to voter turnout. As much as the development of cleavage structure into a party system is determined by particular cultural and historical context, the personal choice to vote or not to vote is determined by context in which the act of voting is taking place. These contexts first and foremost presume institutional or system settings, and are usually labeled "macro indicators of voter turnout" (Evans 2004).[28]

These institutional settings are numerous and it would be meaningless to try to cover all possible macro-indicators that could have had an impact on the voter turnout during 2006/07. [29] In this analysis I will firstly cover the macro-indicators that are usually emphasized in the analyses of voting behavior and, afterwards, I will list the factors that particularly related to the circumstances associated with the period 2006/07. The analysis will consist of three parts according to distinctions developed by Eric Oppenhuis (1995). In his analysis of European participatory culture he found that the specific country characteristics can divided in following groups: characteristics of electoral system; characteristics of party system; and specific political and social contexts (Oppenhuis 1995: 30-36).

Unfortunately, I will not be able to asses the strength of influence of these factors using multilevel analysis since the coding and weighting of these factors would be inevitably arbitrary. Therefore, at the moment I will be able only to develop a descriptive, preliminary analysis.

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[28] In this analysis I will not analyze micro factors (age, gender, income…) because of adopted theoretical framework.

3.1.1 Electoral system

According to Oppenhuis, two different kinds of characteristics of electoral system can be distinguished. The first set of characteristics hinders or promotes voting by legal or administrative features. The second set of characteristics predominantly effects the conversion of votes into seats (Oppenhuis 1995: 30).

In the first group voter registration is probably among the most frequently emphasized characteristics that may have an effect on turnout.[30] Historically the process of registration had been a major obstacle in many countries. For instance, in Britain head of the household is supposed to register all members of the household over 18 before a certain date. The record created in this way is so-called 'register of electors' which lists all eligible voters in constituency (Evans 2004:149). In the USA this procedure varies from state to state making it even more complicated to register. Obviously, this may obstruct the act of voting.

In Serbia the registration of voters is automatic, by turning 18 every person is added to the registry of eligible voters. However, although this practice does not have the impact on actual voter participation it produces fictionally lower voter turnout. According to CeSid analysis the voter registry is a juridical chimera – the real electoral body consists of 5.5 millions of voters while according to the registry right to vote on parliamentary elections had 6,653,851 citizens (Mihailovic, et. al 2005: 6).[31] Naturally, when transformed in the percentiles of registered voters, this projects the image of a lower turnout. For instance,

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[29] For instance I will not discuss factors can have an effect on voter turnout such as: absentee ballot, voting via mail, voter facilities (access to disabled, internet) and other related factors.

[30] Voter registration is not always listed among the macro-factors for instance Evans (2004) is treating it as a separate feature. Here I will follow the Oppenhuis' categorization (1995) since this factor belongs to the group of institutional settings, and it is a significant factor for voter participation.

[31]The main problem is that the registry is not up to date. Number of deceased is not accurately traced and registry contains citizens who are temporary or permanently abroad. An additional problem is migration within the state. A substantial number of citizens are not able to vote just because they moved too far from the polling stations they are register in.

official voter turnout in parliamentary election of 2007 is 60.62%, while realistic estimate would be that it reached 69.5%.[32]

The additional characteristics that could have an impact on participation are compulsory voting and Sunday voting. The effects of compulsory voting are known. Compulsory voting produces higher voter turnout (Powell 1993, Oppenhuis 1995, Evans 2004). The effects of Sunday voting (whether election is conducted during the weekend or weekdays) on participation are also positive. Elections held during weekend have a higher turnout rate due to the lack of other commitments such as work or school (Oppenhuis 1995: 30). However, in Serbia there is no compulsory voting. On the contrary, all elections are held on Sunday. Moreover, the constitutional referendum was a precedent because the voting took place over the course of two weekend days. Therefore, to sum it up, the first characteristic has a negative effect on participation, while the second has a positive effect.

The second group of characteristics is predominantly related to the various system of transforming votes into seats. The proponents of the importance of these characteristics usually focus discussion on the two most frequent systems: proportional representation (PR) and majoritarian system.[33] According to Oppenhuis systems can have two effects: they can 'encourage the feeling that one's vote will be wasted' or 'affect the richness of the 'message' ones vote can express' (Oppenhuis 1995: 30). Systems based on proportional representation 'are widely held to be more 'egalitarian' than majoritarian systems in the value they accord to the vote' (Evans 2004: 157). In this regard PR systems decrease the number of wasted votes and offer a broader variety of choice (Duverger 1986: 69-84). These are the consequences directly related to the proportionality of electoral system.

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[32] There is an additional factor included in this calculus which will be discussed in following chapter

[33] Here I am neither going to discuss the differences between other major systems (i.e. mixed systems and semi-proportional) nor the differences among the diverse majoritarian systems (simple plurality, two round systems or alternative vote).

However, if we adopt this problematic hypothesis[34] there is still the issue of various

PR systems. Namely, PR systems can be very different regarding to the degree of

proportionality. In Serbia electoral system is based on D'Hondt formula with the whole

republic being a single electoral district. While the number and size of the districts (in this

case a single district) enhances proportionality, the formula itself decreases it. For instance

Blondel ranked PR formulas in following way:

1. Single transferable vote[35]
2. Sainte-Laguë
3. D'Hondt
4. Larger remainders

On other hand Loosemore and Hanby arrived at following conclusion:

1. Larger remainders
2. Sainte-Laguë
3. D'Hondt

Lijphart, however, developed his own ranking:

1. Larger remainders
2. Single transferable vote
3. Sainte-Laguë
4. Imperiali largest remainders
5. D'Hondt
6. Imperiali highest averages (Lijphart, 1986: 170-179)

Having in mind empirical facts, namely the five parliamentary elections based on PR before

the election of 2007, it may be concluded that there is a moderate variety of choice and in this

regard a modest incentive for voters to vote. The average number of lists (at least one

coalition participated in each elections) that succeed in winning seats in parliament is 6.8

which is, in comparison with majoritarian systems of Britain and the USA, a relatively high

number of parties; however, not as much as in PR systems based on the other formulas (see

table 3.1.1).

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[34] See following section.
[35] Single transferable vote is sometimes categorized as a semi-proportional system, not among usual PRs which are divided according to the largest remainders and the highest averages types of formulas.

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Table 3.1.1 Number of lists in parliament elected under PR system

YEAR OF ELECTION	1992	1993	1997	2000	2003
NUMBER OF LISTS	8	7	8	4	6

However, when it comes to wasted votes image is much grimmer. The average number of wasted votes is 416,013, with the highest value of 663,903 and the lowest value of 227,819 (see table 3.1.2). These figures show that the substantial number of voters that participated in elections (approximately between 12% and 15%) wasted their votes. In other words, if voters do not vote for one of the major parties there is a good chance that their vote will be wasted. Naturally, this is a major disincentive for voter participation.

Table 3.1.2 Number of wasted votes

YEAR OF ELECTION	1992	1993	1997	2000	2003
NUMBER OF CAST VOTES	4,723,711	4,300,440	4,139,080	3,821,649	3,825,471
NUMBER OF VOTES TRANSLATED INTO SEATS	3,793,647	3,744,754	3,662,309	3,504,452	3,238,701
WASTED VOTES	663,903	338,862	312,464	227,819	537,015
PERCENT OF INVALID BALLOTS	5.9	4.0	3.96	2.39	1.3

Beside the formula, one of the main reasons for the large number of wasted votes is a relatively high hurdle. Since PR system is introduced in Serbia the threshold was 5% of the total votes cast on national level. Generally, thresholds varied from as low as 0.67% in Netherland to as high as 10% in Turkey, but as higher as hurdle gets the more it skews votes to seats ratio. In the past, 5% threshold presented a serious obstacle for small parties, especially for the parties of minorities. As mentioned this problem escalated on the election of 2003 when only four lists enter the parliament and among these no lists of minorities. To overcome this problem parliament adopted 0.4% positive discrimination hurdle for minority parties.

Finally, depending on the system of government and the constitutionally established division of power, elections can have different importance. The division of powers in Serbia is based on an essentially parliamentary system, and therefore parliamentary elections always had a higher turnout than presidential or local elections (see table 3.1.3).

Table 3.1.3 Participation on elections since 2000

YEAR OF ELECTION	2000	2002			2003		2004	
PARLIAMENTARY	3752170				3825471			
PRESIDENTIAL		3637062	2979254	2866320	2524522	3119789	3159194	3159194
LOCAL	4676118[36]		2553693					2553693

Therefore, one of the factors that had a positive effect on the voter turnout in the latest elections was the very status of the election and its importance.

3.1.2 Party system

Party system, and its effect on the voting behavior, is based on two factors. The first is electoral system and the second is cleavage structure. In the previous paragraphs the discussion regarding the diversity of party system was based on the presumption that the variety and the number of political parties have a positive influence on voter turnout. However, this hypothesis is not widely accepted, on the contrary, the proponents of the opposite standpoint claim that the small number of parties increases participation by making elections more decisive. PR systems, as the consequence of large number of parties and vote distribution, tend to create government coalitions. This means that, although creation of the government is constrained by the vote, it is not completely determined by the outcome of elections. In such a case elections are less decisive than in the case of winner-take-all systems were the outcome of election is straightforward (Oppenhuis 1995: 30, Evans 2004:158-159). Naturally, this assertion is in discrepancy with the claim developed in previous chapter. Therefore, on general level, no unambiguous hypothesis can be developed regarding the number of parties and voting behavior.

However, it should be emphasized that these two hypothesis (namely, that the number of parties has a positive effect on participation and the opposite hypothesis) refer to the

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different types of voters. Voters that belong to specific interest groups (e.g. minorities) and voters whose political preferences are more developed and sophisticated are more likely to vote if there is a diversity of political parties. On the contrary, the existence of a limited number of parties simplifies the message, lowers the cots of information (Downs 1957), and by doing so, promotes participation among the voters less interested in politics (Evans 2004: 159).

Furthermore, the number of parties that constitute a party system points out an additional factor that may affect voter participation. Namely, the sheer number of parties is not a relevant issue if the parties themselves are not sufficiently diverse. However, this is not a widely accepted claim. For instance, Powell (1993) uses Switzerland as an example that strong cleavages and linkage between the parties and the cleavages does not necessarily produce high voting turnout. However, Powell does not examine diversity combined with the strong polarization. Nevertheless, it is considered that the polarization of party system has a positive effect on voter turnout.

Above I developed the basic cleavage structure immanent to Serbian party system. The three cleavages were emphasized: dominant culture vs. subject culture, authoritarian vs. libertarian decision making, market-controlled vs. state-controlled allocation of resources. The categorization developed above enables a rough grouping of parties in two groups depending on the emphasized cleavage (see table 2.1.1). Based on the three emphasized cleavages there are two possible groupings and models of alliance formation (see table 3.1.4).

Table 3.1.4 Cleavage structure and models of alliance formation

GROUP 1		GROUP 2	
libertarian vs. authoritarian decision-making market-controlled vs. state-controlled allocation of resources		dominant culture vs. subject culture	
DS	SPS	SPS	DS
LDP	SRS	SRS	LDP
G17+		DSS	G17+
SPO		SPO	
DSS		NS	
NS		SPS	

[36] The elections where held on September 24, 2000 together with the presidential and parliamentary elections on federal level. The participation was due to the opposition to the authoritarian regime, which toppled after these elections.

Each cleavage can be represented on a left-right single dimension space and parties occupy various positions, from far left to far right. The most extreme ideological positions are in the group 2 (where the LDP and the SRS take the most opposed positions) however, the dominant mobilization of the voters is based on the cleavages from group 1, where the libertarian vs. authoritarian decision-making cleavage overshadows the cleavage between market-controlled and state-controlled allocation of resource. To illustrate the various positions of parties and the polarization of party system I will use the authoritarian vs. libertarian one dimension space to place the non minority parties that succeeded in winning the seats on election of 2007 (see figure 1).[37]

Figure 3.1.1 Location of parties in the libertarian-authoritarian single-dimension space

This illustration demonstrates both the strong polarization of the party system (the parties that succeeded in wining the strongest support in the election of 2007, the SRS and the DS, are on the opposite sides of the space) and the diversity of party system (parties occupied different positions with especially emphasized diversity on the left side of axis).

Related to this issue is the effect of party competition. Oppenhius wrote: "Party competition occurs when different parties compete for the same group of voters' (Oppenhius 1995: 33). The assumption is that if there is a number of parties competing over the same group of voters, then the parties will put additional effort in mobilizing their possible supporters, and this will boost participation (Niemi and Weisberg 1993). However, there is an issue that Oppenhius fail to report, but which is closely related to this one – the character of

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[37] For basis of locating parties in such a way see Vukomanovic 1998, Goati 1999, Komsic 2002, Pantic 2002, Mihailovic 2005.

campaign. As shown in discussion on cleavage structure, in Serbia there is a relatively large group of parties competing over the same group of voters. However in the period between 2000 and 2007 political debates within the group were predominantly based on the personal qualities of politicians and their biographies, reflecting rather the intense disagreement over the policy issues and means, than the competition over competence and expertise. In discussion on the elections after 2000 it was asserted that this type of discourse had a negative effect on participation. However, the campaigns of 2007 were primarily focused on political message and proficiency, which may add to the explanation why, in comparison with the parliamentary elections of 2003 approximately 280,000 additional voters participated in the process. Therefore, presumably party competition as well campaign had a positive effect on participation.

3.1.3 Political and Socioeconomic Context

The final set of factors that may affect the participation of voters is based on the number of various causes related to specific historical circumstances. These factors can range from the socioeconomic status of citizens, personality of candidates, to the unique issues of daily politics (e.g. scandals) (Evans 2004: 159). These contexts of elections can have significant influence on voter turnout. Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to list all of these factors since they are founded on distinctive features embedded in political culture, traditions and unique historical situations. I will analyze these factors through two groups. Using the first I will consider a broader political context, while using the other I will discuss general socioeconomic factors.

Under the label of political context I will underline only two factors. The first issue that has to be emphasized is the status of Serbian province Kosovo and Metohia. After the conflict of 1999 the province was under United Nations administration. While Serbia's nominal sovereignty is recognized by resolution 1244, which placed Kosovo under

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transitional UN administration, in practice Serbian governance in the province is virtually non-existent. The province is governed by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the local Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, with security provided by the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). In late 2005 UN-led political process began to determine Kosovo's future status. The process displayed the tendency of granting Kosovo independence. This gave rise to an additional mobilization over the 'dominant culture vs. subject culture' cleavage. The campaign reached its peak during the constitutional referendum which recognizes Kosovo as an 'integral part' of Serbia, and it was prolonged, although less intensely, during the campaign for parliamentary elections. Having in mind that almost all parties took this position, it is hard to assess which party benefited the most from this factor. However, it is reasonable to assume that in some fraction of population 'rely around flag' type of voting behavior has most probably occurred. Therefore, it can be assumed that this had a positive effect on participation.

The second factor is based on the impact of international institutions on attitude voters. The first and the most important factor is the process of European integration. It is assumed that if the country is legging behind the process of integration the voter turnout will decrease (Pacek, et. al 2005). This is due to high expectations regarding to potential economic and political benefits that are associated with the process of European integration. Since, on May 3, 2006 Serbia terminated the negotiations over Stabilization and Association Agreement[38] it is reasonable to assume that the voters that have a positive attitude towards EU are the ones that abstained.

The second set of factors is related to an overall matter of socioeconomic issues. Under this tag Evans introduces variables as GDP per capita, growth of GDP, literacy, size of population and density of population (Evans 2004: 160). According to Evans smaller

communities and communities with a higher population density are more likely to have high participation rate due to the social cohesion. Serbia is among moderately populated states with 106 people per km². In addition, since the size and density of population depend on type of settlement different types of behavior should be expected in accordance with these variations. Therefore, in the absence of detailed analysis, it is impossible to develop an unambiguous hypothesis regarding this problem.

On the other hand, literacy rate determines how many citizens will participate in political discourse or how likely are they to be cognitively mobilized. It is assumed that if voters are more likely to get involved in the political discourse, they are more likely to vote. The literacy rate in Serbia is 96.4% (UNESCO data). In comparison with literacy rate of North America and Western Europe (98.94) it is relatively low, but it is not far from average for Central and Eastern Europe (97.1). Therefore, this factor has a positive affect on voting turnout.

The factor of GDP growth and GDP per capita are also understood in the framework of cognitively mobilized population, so states with increasing or high GDP are expected to have a higher turnout. This hypothesis is also confirmed by Powell (1993). The result of Powell's comparative research is that voting turnout in the countries with a lower GDP per capita is lower than in the countries with a higher GDP per capita, regardless of the existence of compulsory voting and penalties for nonvoting. However, other contemporary analyses underline the ambiguous nature of the matter. According to Pacek, Pop-Eleches and Tucker the socio-economic status of voters can produce three possible outcomes: mobilization, withdrawal or no effect at all (Pacek, et. al 2005: 5). In other words, on the general, cross-national level a clear and apparent hypothesis cannot be derived. Nevertheless, if Powell's hypothesis is adopted than this factor would have a negative impact on voter participation

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[38] The Stabilization and Association Agreements are substitutes for European Agreements which were used in

since, according to IMF data, Serbian GDP is one of the lowest in the region of the Western Balkans.[39] In this regard, this factor should produce negative voter participation.

3.1.4 Overall Discussion on Macro-Factors

The final results of this analysis are equivocal. The table below shows the products of analysis in a systematic manner.

Table 3.1.5 Macro indicator of voter turnout in Serbia

ELECTORAL SYSTEM			PARTY SYSTEM			SOCIAL/POLITICAL CONTEXT		
VOTER REGITRY	+	-	DIVERSITY OF PARTY SYSTEM	+		KOSOVO	+	
SUNDAY VOTING	+		DECISIVENESS		-	EU INTEGRATIONS		-
WASTED VOTES		-	POLARIZATION	+		GNP PER CAPITA		-
TRESHOLD	+	-	PARTY COMPETITION	+		LITERACY	+	
IMPORTANCE OF ELECTIONS	+		CAMPAING	+		SIZE/DENSISTY	+	-

In sum, electoral system produces moderate incentives for voter participation. Electoral formula, as well as threshold, has a negative influence on proportionality. These characteristics of electoral system produce a modest variety of party choice and discourage voting for smaller parties. Voter registry twists the image of factual voter turnout, and affects turnout by very fact it is not accurate. However, it boosts turnout by automatic registration. In addition, Sunday voting enables larger number voters to participate in electoral processes, while hurdle for minorities facilitates incentives for the supporters of minority parties, although it produces negative effect when it comes to wasted votes. The importance of elections also had a positive effect on the case in question.

Party system offers a number of variously positioned parties; nevertheless, this also has a negative effect on the decisiveness of elections. However, polarization and party competition give raise to voter participation. In addition, the type and form of campaign is an additional factor that might have a positive impact on turnout.

EU accession of Central and East European State.
[39] According to IMF Serbian GDP for the last three years is as follows: 2005 - $6,247.723, 2006 -$6,771.437, 2007 - $7,233.544 (the sums are expressed in current international dollar).

Finally, I assumed that the present status of EU integrations and the economic situation have negative impact on the participation of voters, while the status of Kosovo enables an additional mobilization of citizens. The size of settlements and density of population are not sufficient to formulate a clear hypothesis, GDP per capita has a negative impact, while literacy positively affects the turnout.

Therefore, it can be claimed that overall (see table 3.1.5) macro indicators of voter participation expose a fairly favorable conditions for a high turnout. However, this assertion cannot be treated as the final conclusion since the discussion lacks the analysis in comparative perspective. This form of scrutiny asks for thorough quantitative analysis, which raises the question of measurement of above listed variables, as well as the problem of their scalability.

However, if we adopt the hypothesis that macro-factors have an overall positive affect on turnout, it is even of greater importance to deal with the problem of significant abstention observed in the period 2006/2007. In the next section I will try to give explanation for this fact.

3.2 Data Analysis

In this section I will develop the four analyses of voter turnout. I will control for the variables that proceed from the typology developed above (see table 2.1.1). As mentioned, since the variables that proceed from cleavage theory are partly coextensive my analysis will involve some of the individual-based variables of micro-sociological approach. These variables will enable indirect inferences on impact of particular cleavages on voter participation. However, having in mind the approach adopted in this dissertation I will control only for the variables that proceed from the theoretical framework. In other words, I will not analyze all micro-sociological variables although they are usual feature of numerous

voter behavior analyses (Lijphart 1967, Converse 1967, Evans 2004, Oppenhuis 1993). Therefore, I will not control for variables such as gender, age or marital status.

As mentioned above analysis will be based on two types of data: aggregate and individual-based. The first two analyses are based on the individual-based data, while the other two are based on aggregate data. However, before moving to the analyses it is necessary to delimit the scope of inquiry. Hence, in the following section I will deal with the concept of abstainers.

3.2.1 Abstainers

Abstainers can be divided in two basic groups; abstainers that do not participate in polls due to the political reasons, and abstainers whose reason for abstention goes beyond political motivations.[40] Political science is interested only in the second category. In this group a distinction can be made between those who are abstaining "due to their comfortable *status quo*" (Evans 2004: 148) and those who are abstaining due to the disenchantment with the system or a particular electoral process. The first group, indolent or apathetic voters, will not be the object of this paper. However, the analysis developed here is not concerned with the whole population of abstainers of the second group either. The object of this analysis is the group of voters that have abstained in the referendum but participated in the parliamentary elections. In other words, I will focus on the volatility of abstention in the period 2006/07.

The population of these abstainers is approximately 500,000, which is 7.5% of registered voters. However, this portion is in fact slightly larger. In the discussion on voter registry it was determined that the real electorate is approximately 5,500,000 voters. According to Lucic (2007) this number should be decreased by additional 500,000 since these

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[40] These are the citizens that abstain due to the various reasons, for instance: they forgot about elections, or they have to work or have some other obligation, or they are not in the country.

are the citizens who are completely apolitical and never participate in the political life of the community, and consequently never vote. Therefore, the relevant electorate comprises approximately 5,000,000 voters. In this respect, this paper is dealing with the 10% increase in voter turnout, which is a substantial growth.

This means that I am not going to analyze the group of additional 1,000,000 abstainers, which encompasses both indolent and disenfranchised voters. This group comprises the unit of permanent abstainers, not in the sense that the same individuals create this group, but rather in the sense that this is the portion of voters that did not participate in elections since 2000. However, the object of this study is temporary abstention.

In the following four sections, using the cleavage structure theory, I will try to explain the difference between voter participation on the referendum of 2006 and on the parliamentary election of 2007.

3.2.2 Workers vs. Employers

The analysis of this cleavage will be done on the basis of survey data. Firstly, I will scrutinize the relation of the abstention and occupation. The reported abstention on the election and the referendum is the highest for the category of labor (blue collar personnel which consist of unqualified and qualified workforce). In both data sets and for both electoral processes the portion of nonvoters in this group is little less than 40% of total. Other categories have relatively smaller turnout, which ranges from 7-13% but these values are predominantly determined by the size of the group with respect to the size of general population. Namely, approximately 37% is also the portion of labor in voters that did participate in these electoral processes (see table 3.2.1). Moreover, the portion of labor in voting and nonvoting is uniformly repeated in all surveys. In fact, the reported participation rate of this group in election is in line with turnout rates of the other categories. Namely, 76.4% of voters from this category reported that they will surely or probably vote, while

mean for all categories is 75.9%. The highest participation rate is reported for the category of experts where 84% said they will surely or probably vote in elections. Nevertheless, in absolute numbers the blue collar workforce constitutes the majority of voters that do not vote.

Table 3.2.1 Occupation and referendum votes

	I DID VOTE	I DID NOT VOTE	TOTAL
FARMER	12.7	10.6	12.1
LABOR	39.2	37.7	37.8
TECHNICIAN	14.2	15.2	14.5
CLERK	10.0	6.6	9.0
EXPERT	8.4	8.1	8.3
HUOSEWIFE	11.7	16.1	13.1
STUDENT	3.6	5.7	4.3

Source: CeSid pre-election survey

Examination of the statistics of overall working status shows that this group creates 71.3% of workers employed by private entrepreneurs and 41.4% of those employed in public sector. Obviously, the social background for developing opposition on the basis of the workers vs. employers cleavage exist. In this regard there is a place for the hypothesis that the portions of this category create the core of permanent abstention, where the reason for the lack of participation is the lack of representation of labor interests.

According to the typology developed above SRS and SPS are two of three parties that represent the interests of the labor. The tables below show that these two parties, which succeeded in wining approximately 1,400,000 votes in parliamentary elections of 2003 and 2007, indeed have the strongest support in the labor (see table 3.2.2).

Table 3.2.2 Occupation and party support

	NONE	G 17 +	DS	DSS	NS	SPS	SRS	SPO	LDP
FARMER	17.1	14.3	5.4	10.8	6.9	19.7	15.5	12.9	22.4
LABOR	35.5	34	29.8	32.1	44.8	41	45.8	32.2	12.2
TECHNICIAN	12.2	16.1	16.9	20.4	15.5	4.9	13.6	25.8	22.4
CLERK	8.7	7.1	16.6	13.2	6.9	9.8	6.9	0	14.3
EXPERT	5.2	16.1	13.9	12.0	6.9	8.2	5.0	12.9	10.2
HUOSEWIFE	20.4	7.1	11.1	9.0	10.3	16.4	12.9	6.5	8.2
STUDENT	4.7	5.4	6.3	3.0	8.6	0	1.3	9.7	10.2

Source: CeSid pre-referendum survey

However, the supporters of these two parties report very high participation rate. For instance at least 36.58% of supporters of SPS which are labor (15.1% of total SPS support) did vote on referendum, while according to the pre-election survey at least 55.6% of these voters (22.8% of total) reported that they will vote in the election (see table 3.2.3). Therefore, the

vote of labor explained on the basis of worker vs. employer cleavage, even if we take into account over-reporting in the surveys, is not sufficient to clarify abstention.

Table 3.2.3 Referendum, election and party support

	NONE	G 17 +	DS	DSS	NS	SPS	SRS	SPO	LDP
I WILL VOTE	38.1	58.9	60.5	72.5	61.0	74.2	68.8	71.0	28.0
I WILL PROBABLY VOTE	24.8	32.1	22.8	21.1	25.4	16.1	22.2	22.6	28.0
PROBABLY I WILL NOT VOTE	11.4	0	3.6	2.3	11.9	0	3.8	3.2	10.0
I WILL NOT VOTE	13.5	7.1	8.6	3.5	1.7	3.2	1.6	0	26.0
DOES NOT KNOW	12.3	1.8	4.5	0.6	0	6.5	3.8	3.2	8.0

Source: CeSid pre-referendum survey

The same fact is valid for white collar workforce (clerk and technician). The category clerk represents an exception in the regard that the respondents from this category report a higher turnout in referendum. However, this is associated with the fact that 32.9% of voters in this category are employed by public sector. A similarly higher turnout is notice among retired citizens. Although age has a positive impact on turnout in Serbia, exceptionally good turnout in this population is explained by the fact that both clerks and retired citizens predominantly depend on the state budget.

However, the cleavage matrix developed above does not respond to the voting behavior of these groups, whose voter alignment response better to the 'libertarian vs. authoritarian decision-making' and 'market-controlled vs. state-controlled allocation of resources' cleavages (see table 3.2.2). This fact, as well as the analysis above, demonstrates the cleavage between workers and employers is not decisive for voting behavior in Serbia.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the relation between voter participation and the cleavage between the owners and employers on one side, and tenants, laborers and workers on the other does not lead to the sufficient explanation of the nonvoting in Serbia. The analysis identified some groups of voters that have not voted, but this identity was not sufficient to determine causal relations between these factors and nonvoting.

3.2.3 Landed Interest vs. Industrial Entrepreneurs

Most of the points developed in the analysis of cleavage between workers and employers are applicable for the analysis of the cleavage between the landed interest and industrial entrepreneurs. The analysis of the occupation shows that according to pre-election survey 72.15% of farmers participated in the referendum, while 51.7% stated that they will surely participate in the election, while 25.6% said that they will probably participate. As show in table 3.2.2 the portions of farmer votes expressed as percentiles of the total vote cast for a party are relatively equally distributed across major parties. This supports hypothesis that the cleavage between landed interest and industrial entrepreneurs is of secondary importance.

An additional test may take the classical sociological approach. Instead of occupation the emphasis of analysis will be placed on place of residence. Cross-tabulation shows that 94.3% of farmers live in rural areas, while 20.2% of the whole rural residents are farmers by occupation. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that many inhabitants of rural areas own land and, therefore, in some respect share the interests of farmers. However, the measure of association between the rural and urban residence and voter turnout, as expected, shows weak relation between these two variables. The strength of association for the referendum is 0.068 while the correlation coefficient for the election is 0.061. Although significant, both associations are very weak.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the cleavage between industrial entrepreneurs and landed interest is not sufficient to explain abstention neither for the referendum nor for the election.

3.2.4 State vs. Church and Dominant vs. Subject Culture

On previous pages it was underlined that the dominant vs. subject culture is one of the most important cleavages. As mentioned above, the ethnicity and religion are highly

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associated. Below you can see the measure of association for the most numerous ethnic minorities according to the census of 2002 and their responding religions respectively (see table 3.2.4).

Table 3.2.4 Associations between religion and ethnicity

ETHICITY	RELIGION	CORRELATION COEFFICENT	SIGNIFCANCE
Serbs	Orthodox	.997	.000
Hungarians	Catholic	.912	.000
Croats	Catholic	.843	.000
Bosniaks	Islam	.886	.000
Albanians	Islam	.443	.000
Roma	Orthodox	.663	.000

These strong associations justify the use of ethnicity as a dominant variable.

The analysis of referendum will be conducted on the assumption that the minorities did not participate on this election. This hypothesis is based on two reasons for such a behavior. The first is that the emphasis on Kosovo issue in the referendum campaign and the mobilization of predominantly ethnic Serb voters discouraged the voters that belong to ethical minorities. Namely, voters on the side of 'subject culture' were not able to identify with the message put forth in campaign of all major political parties. An implicit argument for the importance of this issue in campaign is the extremely high participation observed in districts in Kosovo, where in 5 districts voter turnout was 83.86%, 96.38%, 95.99%, 82.99% and 93.49% respectively.[41]

The other reason for abstention is also related to the campaign. The united campaign of all major parties, namely their concordance over the necessity to adopt new constitution had negative impact on the participation of minorities. Namely, parties from both sides of highly polarized Serbian party system, both nationalist and civic parties, by insisting on the same point, sent an equivocal message to voters from the groups of minorities. This made the voters of ethnic minorities reluctant to participate in the referendum.

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[41] It should be kept in mind that Albanian population in Kosovo is not in voter registry; therefore, these are predominantly votes of Kosovo Serbs.

To test this hypothesis I will use regression analysis. The dependent variable is abstention rate across municipalities expressed in percentiles while the independent variables will be size of major ethnical groups expressed in absolute numbers. The results confirm the hypothesis only in two cases: Albanians[42] and Hungarians (see table 3.2.5). The results for other minority groups are either not significant or they voted on referendum - as results indicate for Croatian population.

Table 3.2.5 Ethnicity and abstention rate

	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Standardized Coefficients Beta	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for B Lower Bound	Upper Bound
(Constant)	40.879		.000	39.156	42.602
Hungarians	.002	.709	.000	.001	.002
Bosniak	.000	-.054	.396	-.001	.000
Albanians	.002	.309	.000	.001	.003
Roma	-.001	-.057	.374	-.003	.001
Croats	-.002	-.241	.008	-.004	-.001

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square
.636	.405	.385

F	Sig.
20.672	.000

Moreover, the analysis of vote against the new constitution shows that in 30 municipalities with Hungarian population ranging from 16.512 (which is the largest Hungarian settlement) to 1108 (which is the last settlement with Hungarian population above 1000 people) the strength of association between the vote against the constitution and the size of Hungarian minority is .65 and this association is significant. Having in mind that 96.6 voters that have participated in referendum voted for constitution, this kind of voting can be interpreted as protest voting.

In addition, to illustrate the fact that it is justified to threat the religion through the cleavage between dominant and subject culture I will conduct the same test using major

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[42] The Albanian population mentioned here is not the population in Kosovo. I refer to the members of this minority that are inhabitants of three municipalities (Presevo, Medvedja, Bujanovac) on south of Serbia and east of Kosovo.

minority religions. In this analysis I have added the Protestant denomination. Although it does not respond to any of the major minority groups, it additionally illustrates the behavior of minority communities. As shown below the results respond to the largest ethnic groups. The only major difference is percent of explained variance which is due to the fact that minority denominations cover a number of ethnic groups (see table 3.2.5 and table 3.2.6).

Table 3.2.6 Religion and abstention rate

	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Standardized Coefficients Beta	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for B Lower Bound	Upper Bound
(Constant)	40.524		.000	38.758	42.290
Islam	.000	.094	.000	.000	.000
Catholic	.001	.404	.396	.000	.001
Protestant	.002	.227	.000	.001	.002

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square
.514	.264	.248

F	Sig.
17.197	.000

The analysis of the election will be conducted under the assumption that the threshold for minorities served as an incentive for supporters of minority parties. In this respect, the supporters of minority parties participated in the parliamentary elections because they were able to obtain a number of seats in the parliament for their representatives. In other words, while the constitution was not tangible with the interest of ethic minorities, parliamentary election enabled them to express and defend their interests.

However, while this hypothesis can be demonstrated on the example of Hungarian minority it is not fully applicable on the Albanian minority. Namely, a number of Albanian parties called for boycott of the election, while the other participated in the process. Therefore, the participation rate for Albanian municipalities in parliamentary elections has only slightly improved (see table 3.2.7). Consequently, coalition of Albanian parties managed to win only 16,923 votes, or one seat in the parliament.

Table 3.2.7 Albanian population and abstention rate

MUNICIPALITIES WITH THE LARGEST ALBANIAN POPULATIN	POPULATION OF ALBANIANS	POPULATION OF ALBANIANSAS A PART OF TOTAL POPULATION	NONVOTING - REFERENDUM	NONVOTING – PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION
Bujanovac	18583	87.29	86.01	65.86
Presevo	14723	51.19	50.72	54.57
Medvedja	1884	23.38	49.08	54.02

On the other hand, the case of Hungarian minority is in concordance with hypothesis. Table below shows the participation rate in the referendum and the election, in comparative perspective, for 10 municipalities with the largest Hungarian population (see table 3.2.8). Consequently Hungarian parties received 65,450 votes.

Table 3.2.8 Hungarian population and abstention rate

MUNICIPALITIES WITH THE LARGEST HUNGARIAN POPULATIN	POPULATION OF HUNGARIANS	POPULATION OF HUNGARIANS AS A PART OF TOTAL POPULATION	NONVOTING - REFERENDUM	NONVOTING – PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION
Subotica	47148	40.06	66.15	40.05
Kanjiza	19019	87.41	78.02	39.54
Backa Topola	18189	60.02	65.17	41.51
Senta	16512	81.39	83.93	48.81
Becej	15928	49.98	64.54	41.8
Novi Sad	13738	5.80	51.78	38.61
Zrenjanin	12070	11.50	52.87	34.99
Ada	11627	77.22	77.87	43.93
Sombor	10530	13.54	55.23	41.01
Kikinda	7264	13.73	52.06	34.24

Also it should be noted that the voting behavior of Hungarian minority is not unique, but rather it is in concordance with the voting behavior on the north of Serbia, or more precisely the province of Vojvodina. Smaller groups of minorities in this region also demonstrated similar behavior; for instance, weak but significant associations with abstention on referendum are noticeable for Slovaks (correlation coefficient =.260, Sig. =.001) and Bunjevci (correlation coefficient =.186, Sig. =.019)

Nevertheless, participation of minorities is sufficient to explain only a part of the difference between the turnout on the referendum and on the election A robust estimation, under assumption that the fluctuation of abstention (voters randomly voting on referendum and not on election and *vice versa*) does not effect the total turnout, is that at least 80.000

voters did not participate in referendum, and did participate in the election on grounds of above mentioned reasons. This a very conservative estimation since it does not take into account minorities which are not represented by parties. However, this is not a major improvement, since the difference in voter turnout between these two polls is approximately 500,000. Moreover, even if the analysis is focused only on the regions of northern Serbia the turnout rate can not be explained solely by the participation of minorities. Therefore additional analyses are necessary if we want to completely explain the difference in turnout.

However, the previous analysis did not take into account the parties that compete on national level and belong to the corpus of civic parties. The LDP and coalition gathered around this party make the core of the parties that emphasize civic and secular, rather then nationalist and clerical values and goals. During the camping for referendum this coalition was the only one that promoted boycott of referendum. In addition, its policy regarding Kosovo is in a sharp disaccord with the agenda adopted and promoted by all major parliamentary parties.

Association between the nonvoting on referendum and voting for the LDP is .577, and the relation is significant (.000). Therefore, it can be assumed that the many supporters of the LDP did not participate on referendum. Having in mind that in parliamentary election the LDP succeeded in winning 214,262 votes, it is reasonable to assume that these voters represent a large portion of those who did not participate in referendum.

However, a closer look at the geographical dispersion of the LDP votes reveals that the fraction of LDP votes in the total of all cast votes had the highest values in the areas of northern Serbia (Vojvodina). In this region the LDP received 85.000 votes. This region had the strongest difference between the participation on referendum and participation on election. Approximately additional 240,000 participated on parliamentary election. In other words an additional group of voters has moved from abstention, and voted on parliamentary election.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the large portion of abstention on referendum can be explained by the oppositions based on dominant culture vs. subject culture cleavage. The nonvoters are identified as ethnic minorities, especially voters on the southeast and north of Serbia, and voters who support the LDP. However, these two groups are insufficient to explain the whole difference between participation in referendum and elections.

3.2.5 Libertarian vs. Authoritarian Decision-Making and Market-Controlled vs. State Controlled Allocation of Resources

The analysis of the two last cleavages will be done together. The first reason for such a scrutiny lies in the fact that the formation of the party system in Serbia, based on these cleavages, does not allow clear understanding of the real nature of the conflict over these issues. Namely, these two cleavages are coextensive and there is no strict division between two groups.

The second reason is based on the strength of oppositions. As shown above (see table 2.1.1) the conflict over libertarian and authoritarian decision-making and market-controlled vs. state-controlled allocation of resources constitute the main impetus for alliance formation. However, extremely strong polarization over the first cleavage, which is due to the recent history of Serbia, overshadows other opposition. In fact this phenomenon is even noticeable when it comes to the cleavage between dominant and subject culture, but due to the clear divisions among the opposed groups it much easier to control for variations with regard to this cleavage.

The third reason why analysis of these two cleavages will be united is related to data. A detailed analysis of these cleavages cannot be based on predetermined characteristics such as ethnicity or, in some extent, religion. The analysis has to be based on macro variables or attitudes of voters towards various issues. In both cases, a proper analysis should use individual-based data. However, in dealing with these two cleavages, where because of

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delicate nature of the subject explained above, a very subtle analysis is necessary, the problem of social desirability bias becomes overwhelming and significantly hinders scrutiny. Therefore, the united analysis of these cleavages will be based on aggregate data.

To get the overall image of voter volatility in Serbia it is useful to analyze difference in voter behavior with regard to the parliamentary elections of 2003. On previous parliamentary elections 3,825,471 voters cast their ballot. Since voter turnout on the parliamentary election of 2007 was 4033586 voter turnout increased for approximately 200,000 additional voters. According to analysis conducted by Lucic (Lucic 2007:2), the participation on 2007 election increased on 5.647 polling stations, while it decreased on 2.704. On the polling stations with increased participation additional 280,000 voters voted, while on the polling stations with decreased participation additional 80,000 voters abstained. Hence 280,000 voters stopped abstention while 80,000 started to abstain.

Since the SRS and the SPS were supported by 1,381,003 voters, which is approximately the same as in elections of 2003 (1,347,597 votes) it is obvious that the increased participation was in favor of the other block of parties (DS, DSS, LDP, G17+ and NS). The greatest number of votes in this block was won by the DS. In addition, this party received little more than 430,000 additional votes in comparison with election of 2003. Proportionally, DS had the largest gains in Vojvodina - approximately 150,000 votes. Having in mind that DS was competing on the election of 2003 in alliance with the LDP cumulative growth of these parties is approximately 235,000 votes. Having in mind that the other parties of this block lost approximately 100,000 votes, while the SRS has gained 20,000 and the SPS lost approximately 10,000 votes, the whole difference between participation in the referendum and the election in Vojvodina can be explained by votes of minority parties, the LDP and the DS. In the region of central Serbia the DS also won 175,000 extra votes, while other parties of the block, namely the DSS and the NS won 40,000 additional votes, making

the total increase for the block approximately 140,000 votes. In Belgrade the DS also gained

increased its support, namely instead of 132.000 votes the DS won 231.000. The only other

party, apart from the LDP, that has gained better results in comparison with elections of 2003

is the SRS, which increased its support from 1,056,256 to 1,153,453 votes. However,

obviously, this increase was not considerable as the growth of the DS. Nevertheless, the SRS

increased its support in Belgrade (63,000) Vojvodina (20,000) and Central Serbia (13,000).

Consequently, these two parties, the DS and the SRS, together comprise 2,069,306 votes or

51.3% of whole turnout on parliamentary elections.

Therefore, these two parties are crucial for explaining turnout difference between the

election and the referendum. As shown in my analysis of cleavage structure and party

diversity in Serbia, these two parties are among the most distant parties when it comes to

libertarian-authoritarian cleavage (see figure 1). However, both parties actively participated

in the pro-constitution campaign, and by doing so, according to Oppenhuis (1995), and Niemi

and Weisberg (1993), decreased the level of party competition. In addition, by promoting

referendum together, these parties artificially, but temporarily, decreased polarization, and

sent equivocal and ideologically unclear message to their supporters. Therefore, it is

reasonable to assume that some supporters of the DS where reluctant to participate in

referendum because the SRS took part in the referendum campaign. The same assumption is

applicable in the case of supporters of the SRS; the strong polarization of party system,

predominantly based on the cleavage between the libertarian and authoritarian decision-

making, discouraged supporters of this party from participating in referendum. Consequently,

as the polarization of party system was renewed during the camping for parliamentary

election these voters stopped abstention. Therefore, this somewhat paradoxical hypothesis

should explain the remaining part of difference between voter turnout in the referendum and

the election, which is not explained by voting behavior of ethnic and supporters of the LDP.

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To test this hypothesis I will use regression analysis on aggregate data. The dependent variable is 'Yes' (pro-constitution) vote on referendum while independent variables are non-minority parties (lists) that succeeded in winning seats. Both dependent and independent variables are expressed as the percentiles of registered voters. The decision to control for 'Yes' vote, rather than turnout rate is made in an attempt to exclude potential protest votes, and measure only the sort of participation intentionally inducted by parties - however ,it should be kept in mind that the portion of 'Yes' vote in total turnout was 96.6% and, therefore, results are not significantly different (see table 3.2.9).

Table 3.2.9 Party support and 'Yes' vote

	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Standardized Coefficients Beta	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for B	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
(Constant)	23.627		.000	16.016	31.237
DS	.600	.196	.000	.301	.899
G17+	.669	.138	.004	.217	1.121
LDP	-2.257	-.323	.000	-3.045	-1.469
SRS	.610	.267	.000	.396	.825
DSS/NS	.941	.517	.000	.753	1.129
SPS	1.517	.307	.000	.997	2.038

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square
.829	.687	.675

F	Sig.
55.660	.000

The test implies that many supporters of the DS voted 'Yes' on referendum. However, a standard deviation increase in support for the DS increases the value of 'Yes' vote only for .196 standard deviations, which is one of the lowest change in the test. In this regard the hypothesis is confirmed. On the other hand, a standard deviation increases in the SRS vote boosts the value of 'Yes' vote for .267 standard deviations. This implies that SRS was more successful than DS in mobilizing its supporters; however, the results for the SRS are still low in comparison with the values related to the DSS/NS and the SPS, which supports my hypothesis

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To give a better illustration of the participation of different party supporters on referendum I will calculate the strength of association between each party listed above and voter turnout (see table 3.2.10)

Table 3.2.10 Party support and abstention rate

	DSS/NS	G17+	DS	SRS	LDP	SPS
Correlation Coefficient	.551	.180	-.110	.130	-.577	.557
Sig.	.000	.023	.167	.102	.000	.000

As expected there is a strong correlation between increase in turnout and vote for parties such as the DSS or the SPS, as well as strong negative association between the turnout and vote for the LDP. However, association between turnout and vote for the SRS and the DS are insignificant, which just underlines the equivocal nature of the SRS's and the DS's supporters voting behavior.

These results imply that supporters of the SRS and the DS were the majority of voters that did not vote in the referendum, but did participate in the parliamentary election. According to my analysis the foundation of such a voting behavior is in the conflict between libertarian and authoritarian decision-making, and the conflict between market-controlled and state-controlled allocation of resources. My analysis could not pinpoint the more important cleavage, although recent history of Serbia gives advantage to the thesis that the dominant cleavage is between libertarian and authoritarian decision-making. However, the constellation of Serbian party system allows the possibility that both cleavages are equally important.

4.1 Final Remarks

The analysis implies that the difference between voter turnout in the referendum and in the parliamentary election can be identified with the following categories of abstainers: supporters of minority parties, supporters of LDP, supporters of SRS and supporters of DS. The explanation of abstention is placed in three central cleavages: dominant culture vs. subject culture; libertarian vs. authoritarian decision-making; and market-controlled vs. state-

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controlled allocation of resources. On the contrary, the other three cleavages, employers vs. workers, landed interest vs. entrepreneurs and church vs. state (which is identified with dominant vs. subject culture cleavage) do not contribute to the explanation of voter turnout in Serbia.

The most provoking result is related to the abstention of voters of the DS and the SRS. It exposes the self-destructive nature of strongly polarized party system both in general and especially with regard to Serbia. Namely, it shows that, although parties embraced and, in a unified and cohesive manner, promoted importance of a single issue (adoption of the new constitution), the supporters of the DS and the SRS still voted in accordance with the strongly polarized system. Having in mind that the adoption of new constitution was possible only with absolute majority it is obvious that the polarization of party system and its effect on voting behavior almost autonomously inducted a serious crisis. This, presumably short-term, self-sufficiency of the polarization is the main message that can be learned on the example of these polls. The results suggest that polarization has automatic effect that is capable of producing outcomes without or even despite the intentions of parties.

It is especially interesting that the basis of the polarization of the party system is rooted in the cleavages formed at the very beginning of multiparty system in Serbia. Although the adopted model of governance, democratic culture and historical circumstances are quite different in comparison with the initial phase of pluralism, the voter alignment is still predominantly based on the cleavage structures founded during the period of dissolution of SFRJ. This suggests that the Serbian party system still did not enter the phase of realignment and redefinition of cleavage structures. This implies that Serbian society is still in the early stage of transition and post-conflict reconciliation, rather than in the phase of enhanced stabilization. The high abstention rate additionally strengthens this conclusion.

However, it should be underlined that also there is a tendency of voting for libertarian parties, and that the voter base of authoritarian parties does not change significantly. The difference between the participation in election of 2003 and election in 2007 was in favor of pro-democratic parties, and the results of the tests imply that the largest fraction of abstainers in referendum voted for libertarian parties in parliamentary election. Therefore, it can be concluded that pro-democratic parties are becoming more successful in mobilizing their supporters, which in the long-term can produce realignment and decreased polarization.

Appendix

The Brief Report of Parties' Histories and Ideologies

The Democratic Party (DS) is founded on the basis of the revival of former Democratic Party, which was established in February of 1919 and seized to exist during 1948. During 1989 13 intellectuals decided to restore the party among them were: Zoran Djinjdjic, Vojislav Kostunica, Kosa Cavoski and Dragoljub Micunovic. It was the first new party of post-communist era. Dragoljub Micunovic was the first elected party president. The party had minor successes until the election of 1993 when it succeeds in winning 29 seats in parliament. At the party conference in January 1994 Zoran Djidjic was elected presidentet of the party. In this period other opposition parties were joined in a coalition – the DEPOS. However, after the local elections of 1996, DS joined the coalition Together, which led three-month long protests against the SPS regime. During the 1997, after dissolution of coalition Together DS boycotted parliamentary elections of 1997. After war with NATO, DS becomes the main engine of the coalition DOS. This coalition toppled down the SPS regime. The first Prime Minster of the new government was Zoran Djidjic. After his assassination the party was briefly led by Zoran Zivkovic, and finally by Boris Tadic who became President of Serbia on July 11, 2004. The ideology of party is social democracy, and the party is affiliated with Socialistic International and Party of European Socialist. The party belongs to the civil, liberal and pro-democratic bloc of parties.

The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) was formed in 1991 when the People's Radical Party and the Serbian Chetnik Movement joined into one organization. The Serbian Chetnik Movement was formed after a split in the Serbian Renewal Movement in 1990. During the 1998-2000 it formed governments with the Socialist Party of Serbia at times, while it also spent its time in opposition, with the leader, Vojislav Seselj, being in jail in 1994. The party was always very

successful in winning seats in the parliament. The lowest number of seats it gained was 23 on the parliamentary election of 2003. The party has presence in Macedonia, Montenegro and Republica Srpska. At the moment the leader of the party, Vojislav Seselj is awaiting trial at the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal in Hague. In his absence party is led by Tomislav Nikolic. The party is considered a nationalist far-right political party. Since the SRS won a plurality in the December 2003 parliamentary elections, the party added a lot of social elements to their program. The SRS is affiliated with Euronat.

The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) was founded on July 27, 1990, by Slobodan Milosevic, by merging of League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia. From 1992 it governed in coalition with other parties - initially with the Serbian Radical Party, and from 1993 with the New Democracy Party. They also participated in coalition with Yugoslav Left, a party led by Mirjana Markovic (wife of Slobodan Milosevic). After 2000 the party became a part of the opposition. In the 2003 Serbian general elections, the party won 7.6% of the popular vote and 22 out of 250 seats and supported minority government of Vojislav Kostunica. Political ideology of party can be described as social conservatism and national conservatism. At the moment leader of the party is Ivica Dacic. The party has no international affiliations.

The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) was founded when a wing of the Democratic Party (DS) that supported the DS's involvement in DEPOS ("Democratic Movement of Serbia") decided to leave the party and form a new one in the summer of 1992. However, the main point of disagreement was the national issue. Namely, the wing of DS that eventually left to form DSS thought the party needed to take a firm standpoint on the question of the position of Serbs in the former Yugoslavia. The first election DSS took part in was the December

1992 parliamentary ones. As part of DEPOS, DSS received 18 seats in the National Assembly of Serbia - a number that grew to 20 after non-party-aligned members of DEPOS decided to leave the Parliament. Next parliamentary elections in Serbia were called prematurely in late 1993. This time DSS entered alone and got seven seats. The party was also member of the coalition Together and a founding member of the DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia). Its president Vojislav Kostunica won the federal presidential election and, by doing so, brought down the SPS regime. The DSS is the largest centre-right political party in Serbia. It is a moderate nationalist party and an associate member of the European People's Party. Vojislav Kostunica is currently the Prime Minister of Serbia.

The G17+ was formed as an NGO. Its core consisted of a group of 17 experts (economists, historians, political scientists). The organization officially became a political party on December 16, 2002 after Miroljub Labus left the Democratic Party. Labus became the first president of the party. At the Serbian parliamentary election of 2003, the party won 11.5% of the popular vote which translated into 34 seats. March 2004, G17 Plus formed a minority government with Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and New Serbia (NS). The G17+ is one of the main center-right political parties in Serbia. It is a conservative party and an associated member of the European People's Party (EPP). It is also a member of International Democratic Union.

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was founded on November, 5 2005 by a fraction of the Democratic Party after their leader, former Deputy Prime Minister Cedomir Jovanovic had been expelled from the party. The number of the supporters of the DS joined the fraction of Cedomir Jovanovic. Before the parliamentary election of 2007 party has reached a coalition agreement for the next parliamentary elections with the Civic Alliance of Serbia, the League of Vojvodina Social Democrats and the Social Democratic Union. In this

parliamentary election, the Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partners won 15 seats with 5.3% of total vote. The ideology of the party is social liberalism. The ideology of party is closest to the ideology of the Civic Alliance of Serbia, which joined the LDP after this election. The emphasis of the program is put on the protection of minorities and the civic conception of civic society.

New Serbia (NS) was created in 1997 by a number of dissidents from the Serbian Renewal Movement. During the presidential election campaign of New Serbia ran as a component of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, and won eight seats in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. On the 2003 legislative election party was in coalition with the Serbian Renewal Movement. The coalition won 7.7% of the popular vote and 22 seats; nine of these were allocated to New Serbia In election of 2007 it participated in coalition with the Democratic Party of Serbia. The coalition won 47 seats. It is a moderate nationalist political party in Serbia. New Serbia has no international affiliations.

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CeSID:
http://www.cesid.org
http://www.cesid.org/rezultati/sr_dec_2003/index.jsp
http://www.cesid.org/rezultati/sr_decembar_2000/index.jsp

Republic Electoral Commission:
http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/index_e.htm
http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/engleski/propisi_frames.htm

UNESCO - literacy
http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/html/Exceltables/education/Literacy_Regional_CurrentRel.xls

International Monetary Fund
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/weorept.aspx?sy=2004&ey=2008&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=914%2C963%2C962%2C960%2C968%2C965&s=PPPPC&grp=0&a=&pr1.x=75&pr1.y=12