

Breaking-Up Hurts: Serbia's Century of Failed Relationships

PART II

**The Quest for Serbia's Imagined Phallus:
A Psychoanalytic Approach to Yugoslavia's Socialist Family, 1945-1991**

By

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to contribute a new angle to existing literature on Yugoslavia's state disintegrations, presently focusing on socialist Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1991, by proposing a psychoanalytic approach to discourses on history. In relying on a distinctly interdisciplinary framework, the project traces shifts in relations between Yugoslavia's federal republics on three parallel planes: constructed literary rhetoric, political history often echoing cultural voices, and a metaphorical analysis of power relations using tools afforded by Freudian and Lacanian theory.

The premise of this project accepts that socialist Yugoslavia mirrors a family, a configuration that allows transformations of internal relations and struggles for power. Within this matrix, Serbia is imagined in the position of an older sister, a demoted role from her metaphorical interwar motherhood, while the other Yugoslav republics comprise the familial brotherhood. The study's deliberately gendered approach takes particular care to address the axis of gender relations in the context of socialist society and the constructed psychoanalytic framework actively promotes this discussion. The narrative traces the gradual changes in republican relations in chorus with accompanying psychoanalytic interpretations of behaviors that are metaphorical attempts at resolution of repressed unconscious conflicts – Serbia's penis envy and the other Yugoslav republics quest for the imagined phallus.

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Introduction

Familial metaphors abound in historical narratives, often framing nations into specific personified roles or drawing parallels between political unions and interpersonal relationships. States are imaged as families, nations are pegged as mothers, civil war is described as a brotherly blood feud, state independence is framed as a divorce. These metaphors extend across spatial and temporal axes, and can be traced through diverse cultural products –literature, poetry, art, music, and media. This extensive use of familial metaphors inevitably stretches to political discourse and effects international relations, arguably meriting a deeper analysis and more serious consideration as a useful tool for understanding international dynamics and power relations.

Yugoslavia's history can be an especially productive case study for this endeavor, not only because the socialist state's dissolution in the early 1990s was widely labeled a "Balkan divorce," but also because Yugoslav culture constructed and appropriated many familial metaphors to speak about republican roles and behaviors. Drawing an example from pop music, for example, turbo-folk singer Lepa Brena sings on behalf of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s by imagining the state as a woman crafted from the beauties of the Yugoslav soil. The text of the song¹ frames Yugoslavia as a synthetic state composed of distinct parts by evoking two dimensions: first, the ethnic diversity of the song's cast – Lepa Brena is courted by three suitors, here chosen specifically to represent different ethnic components of Yugoslavia² – and, second, the personification of Yugoslavia's lands that account for Lepa Brena's, and metaphorically Yugoslavia's, attraction:

¹ "Jugoslovenka" was released in 1988 on the album *Hajde da se Volimo*, in conjunction with a film of the same title (a project so successful that it evolved into a trilogy of EPs released between 1988 and 1990).

² Danijel Popvic as a Serb, Vladko Kalember as a Croat, and Alen Islamovic as a Muslim.

*Oci su mi more Jadransko,
Kose su mi klasje Panonsko,
Sestra mi je dusa Slovenska,
Ja sam Jugoslovenka.*

*My eyes are the Adriatic Sea,
My hair is the Pannonian plain,
My sister is the Slavic soul,
I am a Yugoslav (woman).*

As a cultural product, it is hard not to interpret the song as an attempt to avert the waves of separatism causing ripples in Yugoslav unity in the last 1980s. The text clearly lays claim to the span of Yugoslav territory and national composition, implying that Yugoslavia is whole only by way of this vast mixture. Unfortunately, neither culture, socialism, nor a supra-national Yugoslav identity were able to keep the state together after the early 1990s, and it can be said that Lepa Brena's metaphorical Yugoslavia was tragically dismembered.

Similar implied metaphors found throughout Yugoslav culture provided the primarily inspiration for critical analysis of the personification of states and behaviors in historical rhetoric, and their use can be further mobilized to understand the spectrum of national relations and narratives. In the framework of Yugoslav history, Serbia's position is noticeably isolated and allowed considerable attention relative to the other political actors; the discourses on Serbian history will thus be of greatest importance in understanding the dynamics within Yugoslavia.³ Following the Freudian-based approach developed by Lynn Hunt of the French Revolution as a "family romance,"⁴ I propose a series of similar familial models, especially focusing on the discourses on Serbia's role within Yugoslavia, for imagining the incarnations of the three Yugoslav states and

³ Serbia's long history as an autonomous entity can partially account for the centrality of Serbia's position in Yugoslavia as well as Serbia's attributed, appropriated, and internalized central role in Yugoslav narratives. For example, certain historical moments are often evoked to lend credibility of Serbia's prevalence: the prosperous Serbian medieval kingdom, Serbian national liberation struggles against the Ottomans, and the prewar independent Serbian state.

⁴ See Lynn Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1992).

understanding the processes of unification and disintegration. My project will significantly depart from Hunt's model by expanding the initial familial juxtaposition to include the gendered axis through Serbia's imagined role as a woman and adjusting the context to suit the communist milieu. However, like Hunt's work, this project will remain deeply indebted to the tools of psychoanalysis for analyzing and understanding these imagined familial models.

In the global perspective of the project, I propose a reinterpretation of the discourses on Serbia's history through the lens of a mother, an older sister, and a wife, so that the failure of each union, and the eventual abandonment of Serbia, can be understood by deconstructing the dynamics of the three relationships with tools afforded by psychoanalysis. The overall aim of this study is to retell the last century of Serbia's history through the framework of familial relationships, tracing the events leading to the creation and collapse of the three incarnations of the Yugoslav state. In the role of a controlling mother figure, Serbia experienced the "empty nest syndrome" after significantly sacrificing for the South Slavic family in the first Yugoslavia (1918 – 1941); as an older sister in socialist Yugoslavia (1945 – 1991), she vied for attention and love from her benevolent father (Tito) while trying to resolve her own psycho-developmental complexes and live in brotherhood and unity; and as a domineering wife, Serbia was personified as a woman whose prevailing "penis envy" prompted her lover, Montenegro, to demand a divorce. The separation of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006, and later Kosovo in 2008, again depicted as "Balkan divorce," is the most recent instance of Serbia's abandonment, following a century of the state's failed relationships. The repeated disintegration of unions has affected Serbia on many levels – emotional,

psychological, and physical. While my ultimate aspiration is to understand each period of Yugoslavia, the project at hand will focus on the socialist state existing between 1945 and 1991.

The first part of this narrative has been thoroughly explored in a previous work, where Serbia was imagined as a woman, a mother, and the other South Slav nations were positioned as her children.⁵ Serbian epic poetry, particularly the Kosovo cycle and epics of Kraljevic Marko collected by Vuk Karadzic in early nineteenth century, was especially influential in shaping the prewar national consciousness and imagination of Serbia as a mother nation whose role was to unite and protect the other South Slavs from various territorial and political threats at the turn of the century. This image of Serbia was promoted across the South Slavs population, espoused by Slovenes and Croats, and most fervently reinforced by Serbs outside Serbia proper. After the formation of the first Yugoslavia, initially termed the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, a series of conflicts plagued the state and these dynamic relationships were analyzed through the psychoanalytic theories explaining mother-child relationships: initial attachment and control, offspring differentiation, and the ultimate push for separation. The collapse of the interwar state and the territorial dismemberment during World War II are illustrative of the disintegration of the parent-child model, echoing dynamics within Yugoslavia, and hinting at the transformation of roles and relationships in the reconfigured postwar state. What is more, these events are formative in prefacing the psychic conflicts of the federal structure, thus laying the groundwork for the future dynamics of the Yugoslav family.

⁵ See Jovana Babovic, "Breaking-Up Hurts: Serbia's Century of Failed Relationships," Master's Thesis at New York University (New York, May 2007).

As a continuation of a larger work, the present project constitutes the second section, the period of socialist federal Yugoslavia, again focusing on discourses of Serbia's role within the restructured postwar state. Where Serbia functioned as a mother in the interwar period, her personified role, and the imagined metaphorical family structure, must be contextualized within the socio-historical milieu and adjusted to suit the transformed organization of Yugoslavia. Considering the communist construct of society prevailing in the postwar period, Aleksa Djilas explains that "the individual was seen principally as a member of social groups such as the family, village, and nation. Individualism was identified with selfishness, and the nation itself was not perceived as the complex pluralistic entity, but as an enlarged patriarchal family."⁶ That is to say that the family model is still valid, but that the axis of power relationships has shifted away from the mother-child equation, into a different configuration.

This familial model of intra-Yugoslav relationships is also supported by the communist ideology of "brotherhood and unity" which explicitly eliminates the role of an authoritative figure (primarily imagined as cultural hegemony in the interwar period) and instates the theory of a collective balance of power between political entities as metaphorical brothers. In the words of Aleksandar Pavkovic, "the communists argued, [that the nations of postwar Yugoslavia] were not only equal but also brotherly nations living in unity. This implies that these nations were related by blood and that their relations were governed by reciprocity and mutual support, characteristic of a family."⁷

⁶ Aleksa Djilas *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919 - 1953* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 156.

⁷ Aleksandar Pavkovic, "Yugoslavism: A National Identity that Failed?," *Citizenship and Identity in Europe*, Eds. Leslie Holmes and Philomena Murray (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 152.

The prevalence of familial metaphors in historical narrative is obvious here, particularly framed as a relationship between siblings.

In this project, the role of Serbia is developed more specifically as an older sister, a restructured position of the previous mother role, thus uniquely differentiated from the other Yugoslav republics. The model is appropriate for the cultural atmosphere of the socialist society, where the status of women and men was meant to be equal and the cult of motherhood was replaced by a focus on the family.⁸ Similar repositioning was noted by Ewa Mazierska and Elzbieta Ostrowska in their study of Polish cinema; the authors found that “in the socialist realist films of the 1950s, the Polish Mother is also virtually absent and is replaced by the emancipated ‘daughter,’ a superwoman.”⁹ In the case of Serbia, this study will strive to demonstrate that the role of the older sister in the Yugoslav matrix is appropriated and internalized, just as the roles of the other republics are dually accepted and contested.

By looking to cultural products, this study specifically relies on popular literature of the postwar period to establish the primacy of sibling relationship in lieu of the fading parent-child model, noting that literature is just one possible source that must be contextualized within a greater cultural sphere of art, music, poetry, film, and media. The legitimizing premise of using culture as a mirror of political power relations is supported by Edward Said’s empire-follows-art theory.¹⁰ In order to link cultural voices invariably exerting an influence on political actions and vernacular thought, each part of the narrative will be accompanied by a literary example that was either published or well-

⁸ See Barbara Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to the Market* (London: Verso, 1993).

⁹ Ewa Mazierska and Elzbieta Ostrowska, Eds., *Women in Polish Cinema* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), 45.

¹⁰ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), 65.

read during the period. Because each of the three main chapters is shaped around three key political events, a separate novel will be used to provide context for each of these events. That is to say that literature will allow a window into the dynamics of the metaphorical Yugoslav family once the text's treatment of brotherly relations and their gradual transformations is analyzed. My narrative will attempt to weave a cohesive framework connecting literature, historical moments, and forthcoming psychoanalytic interpretations by presenting the relevant elements in unison. First offering a cultural example, I will then situate the political event into the imagined family structure, and finally mobilize selected psychoanalytic theories to interpret the metaphorical family dynamics. The ultimate intention of this narrative flow is to illustrate the presence of familial metaphors and demonstrate the value of the psychoanalytic approach.

The contribution of psychoanalytic theories is primarily drawn from Freudian and Lacanian thought rich in models of family development and gender dynamics. Although these two schools are distinct, Lacan's work heavily relies on Freudian principles and these theories can be mobilized to support and supplement one another. Expanding on Hunt's use of Freud's theories developed in *Totem and Taboo*, this project isolates several models relevant to the imagined family relations, particularly noting the underlying theories concerning gender within this matrix. Serbia's imagined position as a sister facilitates the application of Freud and Lacan's gender theories as a critical axis of power dynamics that has been surprisingly marginalized in history. As such, I propose that Serbia's role becomes imagined as the dually admired and feared phallic mother, defined by Lacan, and that her past legacy becomes the ultimate, albeit unconscious, object of desire, or the imaginary phallus. The other Yugoslav republics, conversely, can

be said to desire the imaginary phallus and to manifest their frustration via envy and jealousy. At the same time, Serbia's behaviors hint at the presence of organic repressed problems, originating from the unsettled redistribution of power after the war, causing the nation to feel metaphorically castrated in the postwar state; this imagined castration, outlined by Freud, brings about Serbia's penis envy, an unconscious conflict underlying intra-Yugoslav relations.

Relying on Freud's structure of psyche development, the present narrative is built around the process of unconscious repression, conflict reemergence, and an attempt at resolution. The familial reconfiguration following on the heels of World War II did not offer adequate closure to wartime events and did not properly consider the individual hopes of the republics during Yugoslavia's reorganization. Instead, the hasty postwar state construction simply diverted all intra-Yugoslav national questions by a superficial campaign of mutual protection and unity, and consequently repressed republican conflicts to the unconscious. These unconscious problems, as Freud claimed, are bound to resurface, and the intensifying nationalisms of the individual republics can be interpreted as the manifestation of their respective long-repressed psychic conflicts. Thereby, the disintegration of the familial ties and the brothers' desire to cultivate independent families outside the Yugoslav structure can then also be understood as a failed, or overlooked, attempt at resolution.

Several distinct periods in the timeframe of Yugoslavia's socialist era provide the structural division of this project, distinguished by critical historic moments and paralleled by psychic events. In the first place, during 1945-1963, the Partisan victory and the postwar founding of the communist state, as well as Tito's break with Stalin in 1948,

can be interpreted as factors initially unifying the brothers against a common “other.”

With the myth of national liberation and the self-management system, the regime turned a blind eye to the pending national question and thereby averted negotiations of the reshaped family structure and retarded the full process of internalization of new roles. In psychoanalytic terms, the developed psychic conflicts – Serbia’s penis envy and the brothers’ quest for the imagined phallus – were not resolved, but rather temporarily repressed by supra-national Yugoslavism.

However, in the second period, 1963-1980, because a common Yugoslav identity had not been fully accepted by the reconfigured family structure, the siblings’ unconscious conflicts resurfaced. This temporal division is significant because a 1963 constitutional saw a liberalization of cultural policies and essentially transformed Yugoslavia into a multi-cultural state with greater possibilities for construction of republican proto-states. Some of the republics took advantage of these expanded cultural freedoms to promote nationalist movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s, manifestations that were both unexpected and alarming from the Party’s perspective, but their voices were quickly suppressed by Tito’s unbiased restrictions and purges. From the mid-1960s, and especially with the 1974 Constitution, as the competition among the brothers escalated, the regime conceded to republican demands for increased autonomy with greater individual freedoms at the expense of the federal core, and the integrity of the state was essentially maintained by the presence of a benevolent father, self-identifying as *drug* Tito.

Finally, in the third section, 1980-1991, the dynamics between the republics fully devolved when Tito’s death left a power vacuum in the decentralized federal structure

and the brothers' animosities and struggles for the dominant position of power drove them apart. In this instance, 1980 marks an important shift in Yugoslavia's narrative, serving as the moment of transformation when the elimination of the father again altered intra-Yugoslav dynamics. The intensifying separatism of the republics can be understood as a complete unearthing of repressed unconscious conflicts, in Serbia interpreted as a manifestation of Freud's death drive theory at the beginning of the 1990s Balkans wars. Even in the absence of an authoritative figure and enforced repression, the brothers were inept to resolve these conflicts, and, as will become evident, the early 1990s did not provide the necessary platform for dialogue concerning the unconscious problems.

The concluding part of the greater project, an endeavor left for the future, hopes to address the role of Serbia as a wife in the union with Montenegro and the gradual disassociation of Montenegro, and later Kosovo. After the 1990s Yugoslav wars, the socialist country slowly fell apart, as one republic after another abandoned Yugoslavia and the union with Serbia. What was left of the previous state became the third Yugoslavia, rump Yugoslavia or simply a union of Serbia and Montenegro. However, this state, too, was plagued by internal psychic conflicts. Namely, Serbia's penis envy had not been fully resolved, much like Montenegro continued to search for the imagined phallus believed to be in Serbia's possession. Not surprisingly, Serbia again became unintentionally independent, or single, as result of the 2006 referendum, another attempt at psychic resolution.

The frequency of metaphorical "breakups," or Yugoslav state disintegrations in the last century, is a remarkable phenomenon, fascinating in the political sphere, as much on the level of familial metaphors. While many mainstream approaches have attempted

to offer rational explanations behind each Yugoslav union and collapse, this project hopes to contribute a new dimension to the existing discussions by introducing an interdisciplinary model for analyzing discourses on Serbia's history. In merging several distinct fields, particularly cultural rhetoric, historical discourses, and psychoanalytic tools, the aim of this study, in the least, is to provoke more creative approaches to historical methodology. The greater aspiration of this project, however, is to infuse the subjective axis into the understanding of Yugoslav history, acknowledging that rational explanations are not always complete.

Literature Review

As an interdisciplinary project, this study primarily calls on two distinct disciplines – history and psychoanalysis – yet ultimately proposes a unique methodological framework that also incorporates certain relevant theories from anthropology, sociology, nationalism studies, and gender studies. In the first place, however, the plurality of historical narratives of socialist Yugoslavia provide a significant basis for this project – both scholarship dealing with unity and collapse of the postwar state – and an academic dialogue for contextualizing this study. While major mainstream arguments must be considered, this project will primarily rely on narratives framing nationalism, culture, or the role of personalities as the fundamental culprits of socialist Yugoslavia's failure. However, at this instance, a distinct absence of the gender axis and the application of psychoanalytic tools will be noted in existing literature.

Therefore, the second crucial component of this study draws from Freud and Lacan's psychoanalytic models applicable to family relationships and sibling dynamics. Serbia's imagined female role will direct the construction of this interpretive psychoanalytic framework, where particular attention will be given to the gendered dynamics of relationships. These models introduce the essential tools for reinterpreting history and offering a fresh perspective on the understanding of Yugoslavia's postwar period. The merging of these disciplines is of particular interest, as a yet unexplored methodological approach to historical interpretation of socialist Yugoslavia that especially hopes to offer new insights to discourses of Serbia's postwar history.

A brief historical contextualization of Yugoslavia in the communist milieu follows the literature review and establishes the political framework of this project.

I. Historical Arguments

Existing academic literature proposes interpretations of both the unification and the disintegration of the three incarnations of the Yugoslav state. In the aftermath of the 1990s Balkans conflicts, there has been a proliferation of new scholarship, although not always progressive, primarily offering explanations about the circumstances that contributed to state dissolutions. In the words of Dennison Rusinow, “the Yugoslav idea left as its legacy a variety of fatefully contradictory comprehensions of Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia.”¹¹ Just as there were many conceptions about the idea of Yugoslavia(s), there are now many hypotheses about the most critical factors contributing to the breakups of the state and its structures. In isolation, these explanations are incomplete narratives of Yugoslavia’s unions and collapses, but a combined approach may ultimately achieve a more precise understanding of the state’s history.

In order to continue building on contemporary literature, it is productive to note several pitfalls of existing scholarship. Encouraging pluralism and comparative approaches, Bunce cautions that we must overcome the pressure to create a linear narrative of Yugoslav history.¹² Dejan Jovic similarly criticizes the existing literature by evoking the work of Quentin Skinner that “warns about two extremes in analyzing academic intellectual history – one linked with overestimating the context in which the text occurs, the other doing the opposite – neglecting the context by arguing that the text

¹¹ Dennison Rusinow, “The Yugoslav Idea Before Yugoslavia,” *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992*, Ed. Djokic, Dejan (London: Hurst & Co., 2003), 26.

¹² Valerie Bunce, “The Yugoslav Experience in Comparative Perspective,” *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1954-1992*, Eds. Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 354.

itself can be understood without much reference to the context.”¹³ Jovic cites four recurrent mistakes, concepts developed by Skinner, made by scholars attempting to explain the collapse of Yugoslavia: myth of coherence, myth of the ideal type, myth of prolepsis, and mythology of parochialism.¹⁴

Several comprehensive summaries of contemporary scholarship have compiled and criticized the existing approaches to Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Sabina P. Ramet’s extensive analysis of the copious literature treating the series of state collapse in *Thinking About Yugoslavia* categorizes contemporary scholars into several schools of thought: economic, demographic, programmatic choices, instrumental choices, religious cultures, elite dynamics, and deficiencies in system legitimacy.¹⁵ Ramet is particularly concerned with the scholars writing pre-1986, before strong currents of separatism began to emerge in the constitutive republics, in order to illustrate that certain events were unpredicted, unintended, and altogether unexpected to produce the results manifested in the 1990s. This approach is a conscious attempt to avoid Skinner’s myth of prolepsis.

In addition to Ramet, Dejan Jovic outlines seven main arguments that characterize the overwhelming majority of academic work treating Yugoslavia’s collapse:

¹³ See Jovic, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: A Critical Review of Explanatory Approaches,” *European Journal of Social Theory*, 4 (1), 115.

¹⁴ See Jovic, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” 115-117. Myth of coherence implies “an attempt to find coherence in one’s ideas and actions... horizontally or vertically in time.” Myth of the ideal type assumes there exists a set model for all actions and behaviors, and is vulnerable to a static view of history where scholars often “make the mistake of not looking at changes over time and of trying to situate actors within certain ideal-type categories.” Myth of prolepsis is attributed to intentionalists who believe that “the result of someone’s actions was always intentional, and that once we know the results (or even, more precisely, only then) we can fully understand the real intentions, the real meaning of the words and actions that caused such results.” Finally, the mythology of parochialism is the most significant pitfall attributed to Western political actors who often “neglect the actual context in which the actions take place,” or misinterpret the local context through the lens of their own cultural criteria.

¹⁵ Sabina P. Ramet, *Thinking About Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 3.

1. the economic argument;
2. the ‘ancient hatred’ argument;
3. the ‘nationalism’ argument;
4. the cultural argument;
5. the ‘international politics’ argument;
6. the ‘role of personality’ argument; and
7. the ‘fall of empires’ argument.¹⁶

Of these seven cited approaches, Jovic only discredits the “ethnic hatreds” argument on the basis of its integral inaccuracy of promoting wars in Yugoslavia as ethnic conflicts, a factor that can only be attributed to later, politically-induced and deliberately constructed, inter-Yugoslav relations. The other arguments, according to Jovic, are sound and contribute to the understanding of state collapse, especially when combined into a multi-factor analysis. For the purposes of this study, the nationalism, cultural, and cult of personality arguments will be particularly useful because they take into account the element of human agency that the other approaches overlook. The subjective angle underlines this project’s proposed interpretive methodology, and therefore these three argumentative currents, underlined by subjective agency, are mobilized as the foundation of its historical analysis.

Nationalism, defined as “the primacy of the national over any other interest in political activities and as a doctrine which has the creation of a homogenous nation-state at its core,”¹⁷ was becoming an increasingly prominent force in socialist Yugoslavia, especially as the Party’s decentralization efforts concurrently weakened the federal core and empowered the nationally-defined republics. The evolving national conflicts are heavily implicated with disparities between political and economic conditions of the

¹⁶ Jovic, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” 101.

¹⁷ Jovic, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” 104.

republics (and by extension, nations, nationalities, national minorities). In *Yugoslavia as a History: Twice There was a Country*, John Lampe distinguishes between state-building motives (political, economic, military) and romantic nation-state ideas (greater Serbia, greater Croatia, Yugoslavia) that fueled the collapse of the two Yugoslavias,¹⁸ citing the fragmentation of the former¹⁹ and the conflict between latter as the primary obstruction to enduring unification.

Over time, and peaking with the 1974 constitutional reforms granting even greater republican autonomy, Yugoslavia was promoted to a heightened state of federalism. In the words of Francine Friedman, “the confederalism that it imposed encouraged the republics and even the localities to shoulder much of the decision making heretofore reserved for the federal government. Therefore, regions and localities were forced to go head-to-head for the limited resources of the Yugoslav state.”²⁰ The issue of national hegemony or the privileged status of certain Yugoslav nationalities has been centrally debated topics in postwar historiography. Serbia’s dominant interwar legacy has been evoked as an answer to the other republics’ cries of discontent, as Misha Glenny explains that “many Croats believed this influence [of the Serbs in Croatia] was the bastard ideology spawned by the unholy union of two demons, Greater Serbian arrogance and Bolshevism.”²¹ On the other hand, John Fine notes a parallel voice emerging from Serbia and asserting that “policies from the mid-1960s particularly favored Croatia and Slovenia

¹⁸ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as a History: Twice There was a Country* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

¹⁹ The fragmentation of Yugoslavia’s political parties is well-documented by Ivo Banac during the interwar period [see Ivo Banac, *The National Question on Yugoslavia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984)] and Jasna Dragovic-Soso during the postwar period [see Jasna Dragovic-Soso, ‘*Saviors of the Nation: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism*’ (London: Hurst & Co., 2002)].

²⁰ Francine Friedman, “The Bosnian Muslims: The Making of a Yugoslav Nation,” *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1954-1992*, Eds. Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 276.

²¹ Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 13.

at the expense of the other four republics in the federation.”²² Despite the prevailing communist ideology of alleged equality of all nations, the relationships of the republics acquired a distinctly nationalized flavor and infused the argument of national privilege or inequality to any conflict - economic, political, cultural, social – besetting the state. Stevan Pavlowitch writes that “taking advantage of the old régime’s failure to weld together Yugoslavia’s separate identities into a single national consciousness, the communists had restored the country as a community of related nations.”²³

Complimentary to the explanations citing political, economic, and overwhelmingly nationalist reasons for Yugoslavia’s collapse, culture provides another approach to understanding the state’s disintegration. Andrew Wachtel examines the significance of cultural construction in the tradition of Edward Said’s empire-follows-art theory²⁴ in *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*. Wachtel’s major claim is that turbulence within the realm of culture, more than that within politics and economics, is the best way to grasp the conditions of Yugoslavia’s unions. That is to say that even if after World War II, the notion of Yugoslavia greatly expanded from the interwar “national oneness” idea, first to recognize multiple ethnicities, then multiple nationalities, and finally to encompass multiple cultures, a cohesive Yugoslav national consciousness was never fully constructed. Despite national, religious, and ethnic diversity present among the state’s population, Wachtel believes that a common Yugoslav culture could have been created and later internalized through literature, art, and music. Lacking this, in Wachtel’s words, “more homogenous collectives could and did easily challenge the Yugoslav idea, which

²² John V. A. Fine, “Heretical Thoughts about the Postcommunist Transition,” *Yugoslavia and Its Historians*, Eds. Norman M. Naimark and Holly Case (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 182.

²³ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Serbia: The History Behind the Name* (London: Hurst & Co. 2002), 157.

²⁴ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 65.

had lost its *raison d'être*.”²⁵ Wachtel cites noteworthy contributions of novelist Ivo Andric and sculptor Ivan Mestrovic that shows remarkable conviction and support for a supra-national Yugoslav culture.

Finally, the argument for the prevalent role of personalities primarily focuses on contextualizing Tito and Milosevic as key figures guiding the development of Yugoslavia and setting the scene for the forthcoming collapse. Tito, the leader of the World War II Partisans became the undisputed head of socialist Yugoslavia and claimed the metaphorical role as the father of the state. Scholars arguing for Tito's importance in the construction of postwar Yugoslavia, where even the state's specific variant of socialism is termed Titoism, attribute a large amount of agency to Tito's personal designs as “the only real decision-maker, the real sovereign in Yugoslavia.”²⁶ It is believed that Tito's initiatives united and balanced the state, even at times of growing decentralization; as Pavlowitch narrates, “the last decades of Tito's reign had a surreal air to it, as he continued with grand designs. His paternalism enabled him to discipline Party cadres without losing their support, and with his popularity at large he was able to take unpopular decisions.”²⁷ In the same vain, the gradual path to disintegration in the 1980s is explained as a product of the leadership power vacuum following Tito's death.²⁸

This power vacuum, according to the role of personalities argument, could only be filled by an equally dominant leader, in the late 1980s embodied by Slobodan Milosevic. Scholars believe that Milosevic's “seduction of the intellectuals” and his

²⁵ Andrew Baruch Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 10.

²⁶ Jovic, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” 112.

²⁷ Pavlowitch, *Serbia*, 181.

²⁸ See Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Tito: Yugoslavia's Great Dictator. A Reassessment* (London: Hurst & Co., 1992).

appeals to anti-Titoist dissatisfaction cultivated his base of support and legitimacy, at least among Serbs, that had previously been attributed to Tito's cult of personality.²⁹ In this case, Milosevic's seizure of power is framed as a deceptive ploy to manipulate inter-republican affairs; Lenard J. Cohen narrates how "Milosevic would begin appropriating and encouraging viewpoints that he had earlier condemned as examples of the 'darkest nationalism,' and within a year would co-opt many of the Memorandum's authors and supporters as an intellectual brain trust."³⁰ Most significantly, Milosevic is held responsible for fostering a social and political atmosphere in the post-Tito era where nationalism became the only alternative to the collapsing communist system.³¹ As Miller writes, "that movement embodied the true expression of anti-Titoism, the deepest sense of opposition to the regime – in effect, the energies of the Serbian opposition were totally focused on re-creating Serbia."³² Just as Tito is credited with the accomplishments and the ills of the postwar state, Milosevic is imagined as the central figure orchestrating the collapse of Yugoslavia and the ensuing conflicts.³³

While these three approaches to Yugoslav history – nationalism, cultural, and role of personality arguments – contribute productive additions to the study of state disintegration, they do not offer satisfactory answers in isolation. Instead, a more complete understanding of Yugoslavia's serial state collapse can be reached through a

²⁹ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, "Serbia, Montenegro, and Yugoslavia," *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992*, Ed. Dejan Djokic (London: Hurst & Co., 2003), 57-70.

³⁰ Lenard J. Cohen, "'Serpent in the Bosom:' Slobodan Milosevic and Serbian Nationalism," *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1954-1992*, Eds. Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 326.

³¹ Friedman, "The Bosnian Muslims," 284.

³² Nicholas Miller, "Reconstituting Serbia," *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1954-1992*, Eds. Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 303.

³³ Also see Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Courses and Consequences* (London: Hurst & Co., 1995).

plurality of voices and interdisciplinary approaches. New arguments should allow space for internal contradictions and paradoxes, inconsistencies that are invariably present within any history, and especially the Yugoslav one. Here, Jovic proposes a possible innovation to contemporary historiography by citing that “much of the misunderstanding of the Yugoslav conflict is the result of the underestimation of the importance of the subjective in politics. Politics is a field of human interaction and not just the reflection of some external, ‘objective,’ elements such as economic, demographic, geopolitical, etc. trends. Although political actors normally do not act entirely independently of these ‘objective factors,’ the way they perceive them and how they react to them depends on their beliefs, perceptions of interests, values, personal characteristics, etc. These subjective factors are exposed to permanent change and are thus unstable.”³⁴

It is likewise a positive sign that contemporary scholars have begun to treat each incarnation of the Yugoslav state as a unique union and to analyze each breakup with well-contextualized tools. Dejan Djokic’s edited collection of essays proposes a plurality of Yugoslavisms as the central problem plaguing the three incarnations of the state over the last century. Similarly, a number of other collected volumes give voice to a multiplicity of views, explanations, and interdisciplinary approaches to Yugoslav history.³⁵ And, finally, returning to Bunce’s words of caution, it also becomes clear that the frame of the inquiry directs the scope of understanding. As Bunce’s explains, “we would have different arguments about the end of Yugoslavia if we merely asked the

³⁴ See Jovic, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” 114-115.

³⁵ Dusan I. Bjelic and Obrad Savic, Eds., *Balkan as Metaphor* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); Melissa K. Melissa K., Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly, Eds., *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1954-1992* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); John R. Lampe and Mark Mazower, Eds., *Ideologies and National Identities* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004); Norman M. Naimark and Holly Case, Eds., *Yugoslavia and Its Historians* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

question of why the state collapsed than if we also asked what is an equally interesting and equally plausible question; that is, why did the Yugoslav state, despite its many problems, last so long? ... The result would be two very different pictures of the historical evolution of socialist Yugoslavia. One would be a kind of linear free fall, whereas the second would be a more variegated picture.”³⁶

Considering the contemporary literature on Yugoslavia’s unifications and disintegrations, as well as the criticism of these debates, the absence of the gender and the psycho-dynamic axis becomes apparent. Scholarship on the region has overlooked the gendered perspective of national relations and disregarded tools afforded by psychoanalysis.

In fact, gender has only recently been incorporated into study of history, in the aftermath of the 1960s American feminist movement. The most important achievement of this movement has been the conceptualization of gender as an analytic category,³⁷ a useful tool for deconstructing and decoding power relations where gender is positioned as one of the many axis of agency. Historian Joan W. Scott defined gender as “a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and... a primary way of signifying relationships of power.”³⁸ In Scott’s opinion, “the point of new historical investigation is to disrupt the notion of fixity, to discover the nature of the debate or repression that leads to the appearance of timeless permanence in binary gender representation.”³⁹ According to Scott, the gendered perspective on history focuses on

³⁶ Bunce, “The Yugoslav Experience in Comparative Perspective,” 351.

³⁷ Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *Gender and Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 28-50.

³⁸ Scott, “Gender,” 42.

³⁹ Scott, “Gender,” 43.

power relations and allows for pluralisms of voices and shifting identities – approaches deemed important in both Jovic's and Djokic's calls for progressive study of Yugoslavia.

A significant tool for understanding gender has been psychoanalysis, providing theoretical insight of subject identity and gender production. Historian Catherine Hall discuss the role psychoanalysis has played in the development of feminist history, particularly in deconstructing the production of gender.⁴⁰ But, in evaluating the contributions of psychoanalysis to history, Hall notes the resistance historians initially exhibited to the theoretical framework of language, discourse, and specific categories.⁴¹ While history tends to rely on empirical evidence, the psychoanalytic approach advocates theoretical ideas about the construction of identities and meaning.

It goes without saying that fundamental theories of Freud and Lacan have been extensively challenged, especially in their rigid conceptions of masculine and feminine. Both Hall and Scott are critical of certain aspects of the original paradigms of psychoanalysis, and encourage new readings of original texts in order to reinstate psychoanalysis as a valid theoretical framework. In her 1986 article, Scott urged that “we need to think in terms of the construction of subjectivity in a social and historical context”⁴² in order to keep psychoanalysis relevant for modern feminist historians. Scott is critical of both schools of psychoanalytic theory – French post-structuralism⁴³ and Anglo-American object relation⁴⁴ – and primarily cautions that a psychoanalytic reading of history is in danger of becoming exactly that which it should try to avoid: essentialist

⁴⁰ Catherine Hall, “Feminism and Feminist History,” *White, Male and Middle-Class: Exploitations in Feminism and History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 1-40.

⁴¹ Hall, “Feminism and Feminist History,” 24.

⁴² Scott, “Gender,” 39.

⁴³ Primarily theoretical, based on the work of Jacques Lacan, with a stress on language, symbolic orders, the imaginary, and gender production.

⁴⁴ Grounded in empirical work, stressing identity formation as a result of the interaction with others and cultural environments.

(when interpreted with post-structuralism) and ahistorical (via object relations).⁴⁵ Most prominently, Scott warns that psychoanalytical theory “tends to universalize the categories of male and female... [wherein] the outcome for historians is a reductive reading of evidence from the past.”⁴⁶

This is a commonly cited flaw in Freud’s work; according to Toril Moi, it was Freud’s “failure to grasp the cultural and historical specificity of his own insights”⁴⁷ that ultimately leads him to generalize about an “eternal femininity.” Yet Scott’s harsher criticism suggests that psychoanalytic theory is in fact only a “self-reproducing binary opposition – fixed always in the same way,”⁴⁸ that fails to challenge the original static problems of history. Again, Moi’s analysis of Freud and Lacan brings to light a similar error presupposing both sets of theories – the existence of “normative expectations about the psychosexual position women will take up (as a rule) and the one men will take up (as a rule).”⁴⁹ Although Scott’s evaluations are based on a wider range of psychoanalytic theory, Moi’s critique of the underpinning work is telling of recurring undercurrent reservations about the use of Freud’s and Lacan’s schools as interpretive tools.⁵⁰

Without disregarding the criticisms of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theories, this study maintains that original psychoanalysis provides useful tools for the understanding of history in concert with other distinct historians. Christopher Lane, for example, highlights the “need for a psychoanalytic approach to fantasy and identification

⁴⁵ Scott, “Gender,” 37-41.

⁴⁶ Scott, “Gender,” 39.

⁴⁷ Toril Moi (2004), “From Femininity to Finitude: Freud, Lacan, and Feminism, Again,” *Signs* 29 (3): 846.

⁴⁸ Scott, “Gender,” 40.

⁴⁹ Moi, “From Femininity to Finitude,” 855. Moi, however, claims that neither Freud nor Lacan are essentialist.

⁵⁰ Contemporary psychoanalysis has been concerned with issues of interdisciplinary integration and development of theories of relational and post-modern feminist psychoanalysis that can provide useful frameworks for reshaping the normative conceptualization of identities and power relations in historiography. See Flax and Layton for an overview of contemporary restructuring of psychoanalysis.

[that offer] radically new approaches to ideology and history, arguing that psychoanalysis has for too long been misperceived as ahistorical and politically naïve.”⁵¹ Similarly, contemporary philosopher Slavoj Žižek refutes the allegation of ahistoricism and instead engages psychoanalytic theory in his work on ethnic antagonism.⁵² The increasing integration of psychoanalysis into the study of history, as well as other social sciences, on the other hand, is helping address contemporary concerns in historiography – power relations, subject formation, and domination.⁵³ According to Gerda Lerner, “for historians, this more nuanced understanding of the various systems of oppression – gender, ethnic, race and class formation – should enable us to put power relations into the center of any analysis we make... it is not ‘difference’ that is the only problem. It is dominance justified by appeals to constructed differences that is the problem.”⁵⁴

Following these arguments upholding the utility of psychoanalysis, this study contends that certain approaches of original theories, primarily of Freud and Lacan, remain productive tools for the study history, and particularly the relations within Yugoslavia. Several contemporary scholars have offered progressive applications of psychoanalytic theory to historical work. Žižek, for example, has extended original Freudian and Lacanian concepts to modern political systems.⁵⁵ Similarly, feminist psychoanalyst Joan Copjec employs theory of postmodern psychoanalysis (specifically

⁵¹ Christopher Lane, *The Psychoanalysis of Race* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 2.

⁵² See: Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989).

⁵³ According to Catherine Hall, “historians’ efforts to reconstruct a ‘real’ past and tackle questions of determination and causation are abandoned in favour of a focus on knowledge and power – how power is discursively constructed, how politics is about the contestation over meaning” (Hall, “Feminism and Feminist History,” 24).

⁵⁴ Gerda Lerner, “Rethinking the Paradigm: Race,” *Why History Matters: Life and Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 198.

⁵⁵ Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*.

calling on Lacan) to contextualize history and modernity into an alternative reality.⁵⁶

Psychoanalysis has also been used as a tool for understanding ethnic war, where concepts such as egoisms, narcissism, denial, and mirroring have been applied to the relations of nationalities in conflict.⁵⁷ At another instance, fin-de-siècle and interwar Weimar society have been closely scrutinized by psychoanalytic theory, especially in texts by Peter Gay⁵⁸ and Carl E. Schorske.⁵⁹

The most significant guidelines for the present study, however, are modeled on Lynn Hunt's *The Family Romance of the French Revolution*. Hunt takes an unconventional approach to the historical representation of the French Revolution by proposing that family structures underline, and can therefore provide useful insights, the progress of the revolution itself. In Hunt's imagination, "the family romance was a kind of prepolitical category for organizing political experience. If kinship is the basis of most if not all organized social relations, then it is also an essential category for understanding political power. Traditionalists in European history had long pointed to the family as the first experience of power and consequently as a sure model of its working; just as the father was 'naturally' the head of the family, so too the king was naturally the head of the body politic."⁶⁰ Taking a cue from familial images manifested in cultural products – specifically focusing on plays, novels, painting, and iconography which were known for their popularity at the time – Hunt argues that the ideas advanced by writers and artists

⁵⁶ Joan Copjec, *Read My Desire: Lacan Against Historicists* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).

⁵⁷ See Vamik Volkan, "An overview of Psychological Concepts Pertinent to Interethnic and/or International Relationships," *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*, Ed. Vamik Volkan, Demetrios Julius, Joseph Montville (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 31-46; Ross Stagner, *Psychological Aspects of International Conflict* (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1967).

⁵⁸ Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).

⁵⁹ Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York: Random House Inc., 1981).

⁶⁰ Lynn Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution*, 196.

exerted a strong influence on political figures, public opinion, and thereby the course of history itself.

At this point it should be noted that Hunt's methodology is somewhat problematic because it is difficult to gage the extent of influence of cultural products on political figures and the general public and therefore. The primary source materials are chosen based on the known popularity of certain writers or artists, while this alleged popularity is used as evidence to claim that their work exerts an effect on the audience. In fact, Hunt asserts that some views, initially seen in writing or art, eventually became prominent in politics and certain public and political affairs. But, this assumption is complicated by the issue of distribution and access of culture, which was primarily available to the upper class, male populations. In the present study, I hope to use more concrete legitimization in the selection process of relevant cultural products; taking a cue from Andrew Wachtel, I will identify certain novels as popular, thus influential, based on their literary prize awards and presence in school curriculums.

Accepting the constraints of Hunt's work, the more constructive dimension of her project is located in the analysis of these cultural products and the forthcoming psychoanalytic interpretation. In these images and writing, Hunt found an abundance of familial metaphors, rich in imagery of authoritative fathers, relationships of brothers, and transformations of families. What is more, Hunt remarked a change in these themes over time: where the initial presence of a tyrannical father precedes narratives about his overthrow by a united band of brothers, it is then followed by the re-emergence of a benevolent father figure, and finally the disappearance of the father altogether in place of child-centric imagery.

By using cultural products as evidence of the primary thesis that “narratives about the family [are central] to the constitution of all forms of authority,”⁶¹ Hunt mobilizes them by way of Freud’s theories developed in *Totem and Taboo* (1913). In the model, Freud attempts to explain what happens when a group of brothers kills their father, the figure of authority. In order to minimize their post-factum feeling of guilt, the brothers create a social order where they would all be equal (heterosexuality) and instate a social law that cannot be eliminated (religion). However, this new fraternal family is unstable and the brothers dually strive to preserve a unity, while each one unconsciously hopes to achieve the father’s place of power. Noting the striking similarity between cultural narratives of the French Revolution and these theories of family relations, Hunt concludes that the psychoanalysis becomes a valid interpretive tool for reframing the Revolution as a family romance played out in the public space. In Hunt’s words, “the history of the family romance in French revolutionary politics shows that the individual was always imagined as embedded in family relationships and that these relationships were always potentially unstable.”⁶²

Hunt’s work, linking history, cultural representation, and psychoanalysis is unique in its approach and thus offers an invaluable model to the present project. In Yugoslavia, the communist revolution and the development of socialist ideology of “brotherhood and unity” in place of the alleged interwar Serbian bourgeois hegemony and the rule of King Aleksandar is mirrored in overthrow of Louis XVI and the creation of the French republic in place of an absolute monarchy. Similarly, Tito’s Partisans felt united in their struggle against fascism, much like French revolutionaries imagined themselves as brothers

⁶¹ Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution*, 8.

⁶² Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution*, 202.

fighting for a shared cause. And, finally, the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s is echoed in the breakdown of the traditional family unit in post-revolutionary France. However, due to the context of the given study, far removed from the French Revolution, this project requires some adjustment to Hunt's framework. Most significantly, the communist milieu calls for an adequate socio-historic context and the forthcoming emancipation of women⁶³ allow a considerable amount of agency to the female perspective in Yugoslavia's narrative.

In establishing the premise for "family romances" in postwar Yugoslavia, I will follow Hunt's methodological lead. I will explore familial metaphors and the representation of relationships by relying on literature popular during socialist Yugoslavia, identifying novels that were awarded prizes or which were widely assigned in school curriculums. Recognizing that literature is only one relevant source available in the spectrum of cultural products, my choice of literary material is based on a strong legacy of cultural analysis via literature,⁶⁴ the possibility of multiple interpretations, and the presence of a flourishing literary scene in socialist Yugoslavia.⁶⁵

Through literature of the postwar state, contextualized in a longer tradition of the region's cultural sphere, the prevailing metaphors grounding this project are established: Serbia can be imagined as a woman in vernacular culture, just as postwar Yugoslavia can be thought of as a family. In conceptualizing a gendered role for Serbia, the nation's political activity can be seen within the framework of certain roles normally attributed to

⁶³ Yugoslavia was a latecomer in the European women's suffrage movement, granting emancipation only in 1945.

⁶⁴ In particular, Andrew Watchel's *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation* makes a powerful argument for the importance of literature in following, and even shaping, the social and political atmosphere of both prewar and postwar Yugoslav states.

⁶⁵ On treatment of culture in the socialist period, see Carol S. Lilly, "Propaganda to Pornography" Party, Society, and Culture in Postwar Yugoslavia," *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1954-1992*, Eds. Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 139-162.

women: mothers, sisters, and wives. In a sense, this project aims to uncover the softer side of Yugoslavia, such that the state's motives, actions, and reactions to politics are read through an emotional lens of familial interactions. That is to say that once we begin to personify Serbia's history through a gendered lens, positioned as a sister among equal brothers in the socialist period, then Yugoslavia's unions similarly become imagined as a series of family feuds and love affairs. Thereafter, by following Hunt's model and applying tools of psychoanalysis to decode national narratives, we begin to grasp the logic of Serbia's behaviors and the drama of Yugoslav relationships that history alone cannot explain.

This project hopes to contribute productive new insights to the contemporary dialogue on postwar inter-Yugoslav relations by expanding the available historical scholarship, especially calling on arguments of nationalism, culture, and role of personality, through the mobilization of Freud and Lacan's psychoanalytic theories on women, siblings, and families. Not only does this approach reframe existing histories of Yugoslavia, it also stresses the dynamics of relationships, accepting that emotions often override rationality, and thereby allows space for internal contradiction and subjectivity in traditional historical narratives. Following Hunt's belief that "the most obvious material at hand for thinking politically [is] the family, not the family as some kind modal social experience, but the family as an imaginative construct of power relations,"⁶⁶ this study offers a reexamination of Serbia's socialist history as an unfolding Balkans drama.

⁶⁶ Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution*, 196.

II. Pillars of Psychoanalysis

1. Dynamics of Relationships and Families

Nations, just like individuals, rarely function as separate units, but are interconnected links that produce relationships, so that the relationships of nations are often mirrored in the relationships of people. In defining a relationship, Harold Saunders, a scholar of international affairs, lists three major characteristics that, in his view, comprise the principal features of any relationship:

- (1) Relationships may be good or bad – conflicting or cooperative, immature or mature, destructive or constructive. There are different levels, kinds, or qualities of a relationship.
- (2) Relationships are dynamic. Not only do they reflect kaleidoscopic shifts among internal or external sentiments, but also affect them. They may change in character over time. They regress or mature and contract or enlarge their capacity to accomplish what needs to be done. A good relationship may sour, and a bad relationship may improve.
- (3) An overall relationship will involve many different interactions – or relationships – among subsets of people or groups.⁶⁷

While the categorization of the most essential pillars of a relationship may vary slightly between experts, Saunders provides an outline of the elements of interpersonal relations that have already been deemed important for the understanding of international relations.

The dynamic quality of relationships is central to grasping the interaction between people, as much as between states; every relationship shapes both the present characteristic and the future development of each partner. Over the course of a relationship, it is thought that several aspects of identity undergo change:

- (1) partners in the relationship (type of person partner is)
- (2) partners in relationship to one another (type of partner for other)
- (3) social identity of the type of relationship the partners are enacting⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Harold Saunders, "A Historic Challenge to Rethink How Nations Relate," *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*, Eds. Vamik Volkan, Demetrios Julius, Joseph Montville (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 12.

The constant evolution of identity is contingent on interaction with others. In psychology, this school of thought is most often associated with Erik Erikson's stage theory of "psychosocial crisis" which suggests eight stages of development, spanning "from cradle to grave," based primarily on the social interaction with others. In the words of Jerome Kagan, "[Erikson] holds that development is a twofold process in which the psychological development of individuals (their personalities and view of themselves) proceeds hand in hand with the social relations they establish as they go through life."⁶⁹ While a union may be experienced differently by each partner, every interaction inevitably produces change. Ideally, the relationship results in positive mutual growth, but, conversely, the interaction can be traumatizing for either or both partners. In Erikson's theory, the failure to overcome the crisis, the formation of the relationship necessary at the given stage, leads to the delayed or arrested development of the individual. However, the successful establishment of the relationship allows advancement into the next stages and warrants positive growth. It is implied that a single individual achieves or learns many successive roles over the course of a lifetime, so it is possible to imagine that a woman might acquire the role of mother, sister, and wife at different, or parallel, stages of her life.

In treating relationship dynamics, it is important to highlight family relationships, defined by psychologists Carol Germain and Martin Bloom as "most intimate and

⁶⁸ Steve Duck, *The Handbook of Personal Relationships*, Second Edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 12.

⁶⁹ Jerome Kagan and Julius Segal, *Psychology: An Introduction*, Sixth Edition (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 547.

influential environment in which human development takes place.”⁷⁰ In an article in *Explaining Family Interactions*, another psychologist Alan Sillers describes the family as a place of multiple negotiations: primacy of the group goal versus the individual goal, togetherness versus separateness, integration versus differentiation, and autonomy versus interdependence.⁷¹ Ideally, these negotiations are a gateway to mutual development, where “a familialistic orientation is associated with collectivist values, such as sharing, cooperation, unity, loyalty, respect, and restraint, as well as behavioral norms pertaining to mutual assistance, family obligations, subordination of individual needs to family needs, and preservation of family honor or dignity.”⁷²

However, while the family provides a significant social, emotional, and practical context for each member’s development, the close physical proximity and shared experiences of the family provide grounds for familial conflict.⁷³ While psychologists Susan Gano-Phillips and Frank Fincham stress the inevitability of family conflict as a natural product of evolving relationship dynamics, they describe conflict resolution as the primary concern; in the article “Family Conflict, Divorce, and Children’s Adjustment,” they assert that “although conflict is inevitable in family relationships, the consequences of family conflict can vary tremendously. Conflict can be handled in a hostile, destructive manner or it can be resolved in healthy and constructive ways through compromise and cooperation.”⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Carel B. Germain and Martin Bloom, *Human Behavior in the Social Environment*, Second Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 154.

⁷¹ Alan L. Sillers, “Communication and Family Structure,” *Explaining Family Interactions*, Eds. Mary Anne Fitzpatrick and Anita L. Vangelisti (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1995), 377.

⁷² Sillers, “Communication and Family Structure,” 377.

⁷³ Susan Gano-Phillips and Frank D. Fincham, “Family Conflict, Divorce, and Children’s Adjustment,” *Explaining Family Interactions*, Eds. Mary Anne Fitzpatrick and Anita L. Vangelisti (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1995), 206-231.

⁷⁴ Gano-Phillips and Fincham, “Family Conflict, Divorce, and Children’s Adjustment,” 210.

2. Relationships of Siblings

In psychoanalytic theory, the study of sibling relationships has been largely marginalized relative to the work on psycho-sexual development of children and the parent-child relationship. This discrepancy, according to some contemporary scholars, is a consequence of the Freudian school's initial preoccupation with the Oedipus concept as a central pillar of childhood, as well as a reflection of the analysts' own unconscious desire to be an only child.⁷⁵ According to S. Rosner, "scant attention has been paid to the significance of sibling relationships, which have largely been relegated to an ancillary position as the cause of rivalry and envy."⁷⁶ It was Freud's early contention that sibling relationships are comprised only of hate, envy, and competition,⁷⁷ concepts that Anna Freud expanded in her study of cross-sibling (mixed genders) relations. In *The Ego and the Mechanism of Defense*, she analyses the experience of a sister among brothers as a case of penis envy, in terms of the inter-sibling relationships and the relation of the children to the mother that materializes in expressions of jealousy and hostility. This anger is complicated by the daughter's attachment to the mother, the primary love object of both male and female children.⁷⁸ In Freud's words, "the child grudges the unwanted intruder and rival... it feels that it has been dethroned, despoiled, prejudiced in its rights; it casts a jealous hatred upon the new baby and develops grievances against the faithless

⁷⁵ Prophecy Coles, *The Importance of Sibling Relationships in Psychoanalysis* (London: Karnac, 2003).

⁷⁶ S. Rosner, (1985), "On the Place of Siblings in Psychoanalysis," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 72 (3): 457.

⁷⁷ Freud's work on siblings is beset with the same faults as his other theories, namely a gendered biased that largely overlooked real life experience of women. That is to say that Freud, as well as most of his earlier followers, almost exclusively considered the relationship between brothers.

⁷⁸ Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanism of Defense* (London: Hogarth Press, 1936).

mother which often finds expression in a disagreeable change in its behavior.”⁷⁹ The root of this problem is the child’s immoderate demand for love which is not reconcilable with the prospect of a mother’s divided affection and attention.⁸⁰

However, the early psychoanalytic consideration of sibling relations can be added to the long list of retrospective criticisms of the Freudian school. In contrast to this primarily negative categorization of sibling relationships, Melanie Klein asserts that sibling love is the underlining factor of these relationships. Yet, a less polarized understanding of these family dynamics is offered by several contemporary scholars. Rosner credits sibling relationships with a major role in the development of the individual, especially significant to “ego development, to structural and defensive considerations, and to self and object relations.”⁸¹ In fact, where the Freudian approach implied the marginalization of siblings in individual consciousness and memory, Rosner believes that brothers and sisters are “significant objects of internalization.”⁸²

While it is important to differentiate between inter-sibling and parent-child relations, Prophecy Coles stresses the mutual interconnection of these family dynamics. She understands parental transference as a duality of rebellion and submission, and sibling transference as competition and admiration.⁸³ These two axes of relations intersect once the child’s desire for the parent’s attention comes into conflict with the equal desire to be a part of the sibling clan. Sibling love triangles can form if a parent becomes the Oedipal rival to the siblings’ “we” relationships, or if another child enters the triangle as a

⁷⁹ Sigmund Freud (1933), “Femininity,” *Psychoanalysis and Gender*, Ed. Rosalind Minsky (London: Routledge, 1996), 229.

⁸⁰ Freud, “Femininity,” 229.

⁸¹ Rosner, “On the Place of Siblings in Psychoanalysis,” 457.

⁸² Rosner, “On the Place of Siblings in Psychoanalysis,” 457.

⁸³ Coles, *The Importance of Sibling Relationships in Psychoanalysis*, 93.

competitor to the original parent-child relation.⁸⁴ In the words of psychologist Martin Leichtman, “siblings have been included among the members of the supporting cast in oedipal dramas, playing such roles as fantasized offspring, parent surrogates, additional rivals, or alternative objects.”⁸⁵

Sociologist A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, whose work has encompassed cross-cultural studies of kinship, defines three primary social relations occurring within a family: “that between a parents and child, that between children of the same parents (siblings), and that between husband and wife as parents of the same child or children.”⁸⁶ Although Radcliffe-Brown has been criticized for considering only parallel-sibling relations, thus overlooking the gender axis in his analysis,⁸⁷ his contributions are useful for understanding the primacy of inter-sibling relations in the overall family framework.⁸⁸ In fact, Mac Marshall outlines the three pillar principles of Radcliffe-Brown’s model of sibling relations:

- (1) principle of the unity of the sibling group: ‘refers not to the internal unity of the group as shown in the relations of its members to one another but to the fact that the group may constitute a unity for a person outside it and connected with it by a specific relation to one its members;’
- (2) principle of the equivalence of siblings: holds that siblings, viewed as members of a common sibling group, are in some sensed comparable and mutually substitutable for one another;

⁸⁴ Coles, *The Importance of Sibling Relationships in Psychoanalysis*, 93.

⁸⁵ Martin Leichtman (1985), “The Influence of an Older Sibling in the Separation-Individuation Process,” *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 40: 111.

⁸⁶ A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays and Addresses* (New York: The Free Press, 1952), 51.

⁸⁷ David Schneider describes Radcliffe-Brown’s argument as “solidarity of brothers (not sisters) [that] is indispensable to the maintenance of the patrilineal descent unit” (390), but then calls to attention that “siblingship and gender [are] two quite distinct systems of meaning which converge in the cross-sibling relationship” (398) that require “distinct analysis of gender and subsequent analysis of cross- and parallel-sibling relations” (398). See: David M. Schneider, “Conclusions,” *Siblings in Oceania: Studies in the Meaning of Kin Relations*, Ed Mac Marshall (London: University Press of America, 1983), 389-404.

⁸⁸ Schneider, “Conclusions,” 389.

- (3) principle of the unity of the lineage: states that, just as with a sibling group, members of a lineage constitute a unity for outsiders; co-members of a lineage are equivalent to each other in at least certain situations.⁸⁹

These principles outlining the relations between siblings will become useful in thinking about the inter-republic relations in postwar Yugoslavia's "brotherhood and unity."

While applying these models of sibling relations, it is important to note the complications incurred by gender, birth order, and relations with the parent(s) are important axis of power relations in family units. As Scheider suggests, the pluralities, as well as the transformations, of relationships must be considered.⁹⁰

3. Mobilized Principles of Psychoanalysis

The primary contentions of this study are that Serbia is imagined as a woman in cultural rhetoric, that models of familial relationships are valid metaphors for understanding international relations, and that psychoanalytic theories offer useful interpretations of history. In spite of the inevitable pluralities of roles, Serbia is consistently imagined as a woman and, therefore the concepts employed in the psychoanalysis of women are especially valid. Freud and Lacan are important in the context of this project not only because they placed a strong focus on gender dynamics, but also because they were pioneers within their respective psychoanalytic schools – Freud (1856-1939) working at the turn of the century to introduce the main pillars of the discipline, and Lacan (1901-1981) extending Freudian theories toward a more linguistic-centric and philosophical axis. Although Lacan can arguably be categorized as a

⁸⁹ Mac Marshall, Ed., *Siblings in Oceania: Studies in the Meaning of Kin Relations* (London: University Press of America, 1983), 3.

⁹⁰ Schneider, "Conclusions," 391.

revisionist Freudian, the two scholars invariably share common and complimentary theories that can be mutually supportive. Their work offers valuable, if not critical, interpretive models particularly for the study of familial structures and gender relationships. While Freud was preoccupied with child development, especially within the Oedipal triangle, he also published a vast array of work theorizing the female psyche. Lacan, on the other hand, appropriated some Freudian pillars but was more concerned with the linguistic discourse and power relations.

In light of recent interest in the applications of psychoanalysis to race, ethnicity, and post-colonial theories,⁹¹ it is important to note the diversity of contemporary engagement with Freudian and Lacanian theories. Interdisciplinary application of these original models corroborates their persistent relevance and strengthens this project's ambitious mobilization of psychoanalysis in service of Yugoslav history. At the same time, criticisms by feminist⁹² and object relations scholars⁹³ must also be addressed in an effort to properly apply the original works and to avoid some of the pitfalls that have since been attributed to both psychoanalytic schools.

Freud and Lacan's theories will be copiously used in this project, particularly models of envy/gratitude, love/hate, penis envy, the Oedipus complex, imagined phallus (also phallus mother, masquerade), and death drive. The selected principles are chosen on the grounds of their usefulness for analyzing the imagined intra-Yugoslav relations,

⁹¹ See Lane, *The Importance of Sibling Relationships in Psychoanalysis*.

⁹² Luce Irigaray, *Spectrum of the Other Woman* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Jessica Benjamin, *The Bounds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination* (New York: Virago, 1988).

⁹³ Melanie Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1984); Donald Woods Winnicott, *The Family and Individual Development* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966).

taking care to defer points of dispute between the two schools to more specialized scholars.

a. Penis Envy

A notorious complex in Freud's model of psychosexual development is penis envy, usually manifested in girls⁹⁴ once they realize they do not possess the male genitalia and its alleged power.⁹⁵ The girl faults the mother for her missing penis, identifying her as the castrator. Consequently, the girl becomes disappointed in the mother and views her as a rival in competing for the sexual love of the father. Three possible resolutions of penis envy are explained by critical scholars of Freud's work, Seymour Fisher and Roger Greenberg:

The first is simply to turn one's back on sexuality. This mode is said to characterize women who feel so inferior about their lack of a phallus that they give up phallic aspirations and thereby sexuality in general. A second is to hold on firmly to one's phallic aspirations and to persist in seeking a penis by emulating male activities. According to Freud, only the third choice, anchored in the idea of bearing the father (or father substitute) a child, can lead to normal (healthy) femininity.⁹⁶

Most importantly, Freud suggested that this syndrome evokes an inferiority complex in women's later relations to men if the crisis is not resolved. Penis envy, like the Oedipus complex, underlies antagonism with those perceived to be superior or advantaged. At first, this is usually the same-sex parent who rivals the child for the love of the opposite-sex parent, but later the antagonism can be extended to other dominant

⁹⁴ It is also seen in boys, particularly in relation to the father or other superior male figures.

⁹⁵ Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, Trans. and Ed. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1963).

⁹⁶ Fisher and Greenberg, *Freud Scientifically Reappraised* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996), 147.

figures. Freud often found that unresolved penis envy negatively influenced women's future relationships. Fisher and Greenberg note Freud's stress on the "persistent effects of disappointment about penis loss on the female's sexuality, and elaborated how 'penis envy' may enter into multiple levels of female behavior."⁹⁷ Psychologist Jovan Maric also cites this syndrome as a fundamental cause of the Serbian psyche's overwhelming envy towards the stronger (i.e., authority figure, men in relation to women).⁹⁸

Feminist criticism of penis envy is primarily concerned with the awkward imposition of the Oedipal model on women's experiences. Discrediting the Elektra complex as a makeshift adaptation of masculine narrative, feminist scholars contest penis envy as a flawed gender model of the desired object. Later work by Luce Irigaray will question the phallocentrism of both Freud and Lacan, asserting that the male narcissism of these theories positions women only as an instrument or object of patriarchy, if not completely excluding women.⁹⁹

b. Imagined Phallus

Irigaray's primary criticism of Lacanian theory is its phallocentric basis that relies on masculine imagery and thereby frames women as objects or instruments in the male narrative. The centrality of male narcissism and the preoccupation with male self-affection in Lacan's models detracts from realistic differentiation of female roles and the development of independent feminine identity. Instead, Lacan places emphasis only on

⁹⁷ Fisher and Greenberg, *Freud Scientifically Reappraised* 121.

⁹⁸ Jovan Maric, *Kakvi Smo Mi Srbi?* (Beograd: Slobodan Jovic, 1998), 45.

⁹⁹ Irigaray, *Spectrum of the Other Woman*.

the mother, and entirely overlooks the function of the daughter and the mother-daughter relationship.¹⁰⁰

Despite these feminist critiques, certain Lacanian models are useful in thinking about the power dynamics between men and women. Upon entering the symbolic order (language), the developing child experiences a crisis in the relationship with the mother and seeks a symbolic union between the self and the (m)other.¹⁰¹ The father and other siblings, who also partially possess the mother, threaten the child and Lacan proposes that desire emerges at this crisis point. In fact, the desire is a product of a lack materializing from a symbolic castration¹⁰² that ultimately provides the basis for the imagined phallus. The phallus is imaginary, therefore no one possesses it, but Lacanian theory claims that the male position is having the phallus while the female position is being the phallus.¹⁰³ In this theory, however, it is important to remember that Lacan equates women with the lack. In Minsky's words, "the actual meaning of being the phallus is therefore not power but powerlessness that is defeat by the superior power of the father and the loss of the mother as an object of Desire as well as identification."¹⁰⁴

From this principle of the imaginary phallus, Lacan develops several key pillars governing relationships. First, the phallic mother, the pre-Oedipal mother, is constructed as the castrating, powerful, seductive female figure who causes impotence in men. She is thus both an object of fear, because she is the castrator, and desire, because she is the

¹⁰⁰ See Irigaray, *Spectrum of the Other Woman*.

¹⁰¹ Jacques Lacan (1958), "The Meaning of the Phallus," *Psychoanalysis and Gender*. Ed. Rosalind Minsky, (London: Routledge, 1996), 273.

¹⁰² In Lacanian theory, gender is symbolical and the penis is represented by the phallus, and castration is caused by language and can only be resolved by language. On the other hand, Freudian theory is biological – castration is castration and the penis is simply the penis. See Rosalind Minsky, "Lacan: The Meaning of the Phallus."

¹⁰³ Lacan, "The Meaning of the Phallus," 275.

¹⁰⁴ Rosalind Minsky, "Lacan: The Meaning of the Phallus," *Psychoanalysis and Gender*, Ed. Rosalind Minsky (London: Routledge, 1996), 157.

phallus. Second, the phallus is manifested in women as a masquerade where one's own castration, lack of phallus, or penis envy is hidden by creating a desirable image of self. Minsky interprets this role of the masquerade, the expression of the woman's lack, as "what society takes to be 'natural' 'feminine' behavior as acting out of what patriarchal societies require of women: wife, mother, little girl, housewife, mother-in-law, baby doll, femme fatale, scarlet woman, iron lady, shrinking violet, blue-stockings, bitch, bimbo, single mother. Women, therefore, can represent male phantasies, but never themselves."¹⁰⁵ Finally, love is defined as giving someone what one does not possess and what the other person does not want.¹⁰⁶

c. Love/Hate, Envy/Jealousy/Gratitude

Feminist object-relations scholar Melaine Klein has extensively developed theories of love and hate, and envy/jealousy and gratitude, expanding on previous psychoanalytic foundations derived from the Freudian school. According to Rosalind Minsky, "Klein took Freud's idea of a life and death drive and converted them into instincts of love and hate."¹⁰⁷ That is to say that the child is innately and permanently in conflict between fluctuating emotions of love and hate and that "such phantasies of loving and hating form the basis of a rudimentary sense of identity consisting of impulses, defenses and relationships."¹⁰⁸ While love is associated with the life-drive, hate is a destructive urge linked with aggression, fear, and violence, and ultimately a source of anxiety.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Minsky, "Lacan: The Meaning of the Phallus," 166.

¹⁰⁶ Lacan, "The Meaning of the Phallus," 279.

¹⁰⁷ Rosalind Minsky, "Klein: Phantasy and the Mother," *Psychoanalysis and Gender*, Ed. Rosalind Minsky (London: Routledge, 1996), 82.

¹⁰⁸ Minsky, "Klein: Phantasy and the Mother," 79.

¹⁰⁹ Melanie Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1984).

In Klein's work, envy becomes crucial for understanding love and gratitude. Envy is the "expression of destructive impulses" which is defined as "the angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys something desirable – the envious impulse being to take it away or to spoil it."¹¹⁰ As such, envy is the most primitive and destructive emotion, aiming to destroy gratitude toward the object providing gratification.¹¹¹ Gratification, on the other hand, is opposed to envy but likewise directed at the "good object," or mother. If gratification is not overcome by the strong drive of envy, it facilitates the child's capacity for love in later relationships.¹¹²

Envy, however, is the more influential emotion because it is accompanied by two other related outgrowth impulses: jealousy and greed. In Klein's words, "jealousy is based on envy... [it is] mainly concerned with love which the subject feels is due and which has been taken away."¹¹³ Unlike envy, jealousy is prevalent in relationships involving at least two people and is often founded in the fear of being deprived of a love object. Citing Klein again, "there is a direct link between the envy experiences toward the mother's breast and the development of jealousy. Jealousy is based in the suspicion of and the rivalry with the father, who is accused of having taken away the mother's breast and the mother. The rivalry marks the early stages of the positive and negative Oedipus complexes."¹¹⁴ Greed, by contrast, is understood by Klein as an insatiable craving for something the subject needs and what the object can or wishes to give.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963*, 176.

¹¹¹ In Klein's theories, envy emerges as the primary envy of the mother's breast, where its later aim is to destroy gratitude toward the "good object" (mother). See: Melanie Klein (1956), "A Study of Envy and Gratitude," *Psychoanalysis and Gender*, Ed. Rosalind Minsky (London: Routledge, 1996), 236-253.

¹¹² Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963*.

¹¹³ Klein, "A Study of Envy and Gratitude," 237.

¹¹⁴ Klein, "A Study of Envy and Gratitude," 242.

¹¹⁵ Minsky, "Klein: Phantasy and the Mother," 81

d. Death Drive

In his essay “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” originally published in 1920, Freud attempts to balance his concept of the pleasure principle¹¹⁶ with the idea of the death drive. Even at the time of writing, Freud was aware of the highly controversial nature of this concept, but developed it as a counterpart to the self-preservation theory that he believed to be incomplete. In contrast to eros (love), the drive towards unity and cohesion, thanatos (death) became the basis for Freud’s concept of the drive towards destruction. In his original work, he defines the death drive as “an urge inherent in all organic life to restore an earlier state of things,” the state of no pain, and to thereby return to quiescence that precedes birth.¹¹⁷ Yet, at the same time, another aim of Freud’s death drive theory was to resolve the pattern of “compulsion-repetition,” or sadism-masochism.¹¹⁸ In Minsky’s words, “Freud’s idea of a repetition compulsion grew partly out of his recognition that certain people repeatedly become enmeshed in destructive and abusive relationships because of an unconscious compulsion to re-enact early childhood experiences which they hope might be resolved differently.”¹¹⁹ In fact, Freud believed this repetition of traumatic events was an unconscious mechanism for mastering the previously painful experiences that is materialized as “a kind of unconscious pleasure in pain” drive.¹²⁰

In his later papers, Freud linked this destructive instinct with aggression in Western civilization, where he reasoned that men’s aggression is a reaction to repression

¹¹⁶ A concept proposing that humans are governed by the continuous desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain.

¹¹⁷ Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Trans. James Stachery (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961).

¹¹⁸ Minsky, “Klein: Phantasy and the Mother,” 80.

¹¹⁹ Minsky, “Klein: Phantasy and the Mother,” 81.

¹²⁰ Minsky, “Klein: Phantasy and the Mother,” 81.

by religion and politics in society. Especially in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud defined civilization as the impossibility of human desires, and explains group aggression as the outcome of communities where men are forced to concede their pleasures.

Interestingly, Freud also believed that this “instinctual aggression [is] the greatest impediment to civilization.”¹²¹ The concept of the death drive has been widely contested, in part by feminist scholars who criticized the essentially masculine basis of the model.

Irigaray proposed a women’s death drive which, while not contesting the innate aggression of humans, redefined Freud’s concept from the female axis.¹²²

¹²¹ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961).

¹²² Margaret Whitford, “Reading Irigaray,” *Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis*, Ed. Theresa Brennan (London: Routledge, 1989), 106-126.

Yugoslavia within the Framework of Postwar Socialism

In context of existing scholarship on Yugoslavia and the academic debates surrounding the unity and collapse of the Yugoslav states, it is crucial to localize this project's period of interest, socialist Yugoslavia, into the social and political trends of the time before beginning the psychoanalytic narrative. An important distinction of the postwar period is the communist milieu that distinguished the second Yugoslavia from the preceding and proceeding states, but that, on the other hand, provided a shared context with other postwar communist states in Europe. However, the Yugoslav case is singular, and analysis of this period must include contextualization into the more standard currents of communist ideology as well as the specification of the Yugoslav derivative.

After World War II, the victorious Soviet forces extended their military dictatorship and ideological initiatives into many East European countries which both welcomed Russian liberation after the Nazi occupation and were likewise too weak to form their own governments in the aftermath of the war. Consequently, Stalinism¹²³ was a major influence imposed on the postwar design and formation of societies that had been liberated by the Soviets during the war. Although the communist model varied from state to state, Stalinist socialism was initiated in the majority of the countries in the Soviet Bloc and this ideology guided the planned industrialization and collectivization of societies as the means to building communism.¹²⁴

¹²³ Stalin identified himself as a follower of Marxism-Leninism, but he interpreted and adjusted the existing policies to suit the Soviet Union under his rule. Critics claim that Stalinism is a perversion of this core Marxist-Leninist ideology.

¹²⁴ See Svetozar Stojanovic, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: Why Communism Failed* (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1997).

In most simple terms, communism became a socio-economic model aiming to establish a society devoid of class and state divisions, instead focused on the unity of the working class and the development of efficient means of production. The revolutionary aspect of communist ideology is the elimination of the bourgeoisie ruling class and the economic problems implicated with capitalism – two important aspects providing legitimacy for the Soviet-led communist reform. By rejecting the previous state leaderships in the satellite countries and demonizing the Western economic system, Stalinism offered little alternative to Party ideology. Of course, Soviet hegemony was enforced by the Red Army and the state's powerful postwar legacy.¹²⁵

In Yugoslavia, however, Tito's Partisans were an organic communist resistance movement founded in 1941¹²⁶ and had considerable agency independent from Moscow. The major difference separating Yugoslavia's communist regime from the communism developing in the Eastern Bloc was that the Partisans had come to power by means of a popular revolution, not an external liberation or seizure of power; the regime was self-legitimizing at its core.¹²⁷ The founding myth of the communist Yugoslav state was grounded in the Partisans' united class struggle against fascism, a contribution attributed equally to all the future nations of Yugoslavia, and leading to a national liberation that ultimately became the grounding concept of brotherhood and unity.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ For further information about Stalinism, see: Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ed., *Stalinism: New Directions* (London: Routledge, 1999); and Robert Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973).

¹²⁶ The Communist Party of Yugoslavia had been founded in 1919 as the only truly non-national party based in the pro-Yugoslav tradition of socialism, but the party was banned on grounds of terrorism after an attempted assassination of King Aleksandar (Democrat Milorad Draskovic was mortally wounded in the attack) and consequently forced underground or abroad until World War II.

¹²⁷ Bunce, "The Yugoslav Experience in Comparative Perspective," 345-365.

¹²⁸ See Alex N. Dragnich, *Tito's Promised Land: Yugoslavia* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954).

Despite its virtual autonomy, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) initially nurtured close ties to the Soviet Union and Stalinist ideology. Miranda Vickers explains that “the new socialist state was defined by the 1946 constitution, based on the 1936 Soviet constitution, and intended to safeguard the rights of all nationalities from the political domination of any one ethnic group.”¹²⁹ The state embraced the Marxist notion of the nation and state, and although it accepted a configuration that was national in form (and socialist in content), it promised liberation to smaller, oppressed nations.¹³⁰ It was only after Stalin’s attempts to subjugate Tito’s authority and integrate the CPY into the Soviet sphere that Yugoslavia entirely initiated a path of political independence and claimed its version of socialism to be the true heir to Marxism-Leninism.¹³¹ In effect, after Tito’s expulsion from Cominform in 1948, the state gained yet another unifying and legitimizing rationale: the Soviet threat. As Aleksa Djilas narrates, “outside pressures brought to the fore the need for ideas and policies that would promote internal unity in Yugoslavia... both the struggle for national liberation during the Second World War and the challenges to Stalin’s hegemony over the Communist world were presented as the greatest twentieth-century achievements of the Yugoslav fighting spirit.”¹³²

After 1948, Titoism began to develop on the basis of several principles that carved out a singular position for Yugoslavia between the Soviet Bloc and the West, ultimately established the state as the leader of the nonalignment movement. Most significantly, after the Tito-Stalin split, Yugoslavia began to transition, albeit gradually,

¹²⁹ Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (London: Hurst & Co., 1998), 146.

¹³⁰ Dejan Jovic, “Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism: From Tito to Kardelj,” *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992*, Ed. Dejan Djokic (London: Hurst & Co., 2003), 157-181.

¹³¹ Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948-1953* (New York: The Viking Press, 1970).

¹³² Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 175.

into non-statist self-management and decentralization.¹³³ As James Grow writes, “drawn from a return to the Marxist classics and identification of the excessive state role in the Soviet perversion of communism, in the new Yugoslav version, the state would ‘wither away’ and the workers would take control of production and their own fates.”¹³⁴ The CPY was renamed the League of Communist of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1952, again underlining the Party’s independent path and mission as a movement of social and ideological forces committed to brotherhood (as a community of nations) and unity (of the working class). An integral component of this model was an economic orientation toward workers’ agency and decentralized market control.¹³⁵

However, just because Titoism offered an innovative approach to socialist development, it did not safeguard Yugoslavia from social and economic problems. For example, the decentralized republican management of the economy was never fully integrated and therefore did not achieve a healthy level of capital and labor movement within Yugoslavia, even after undergoing numerous reforms and adaptations.¹³⁶ Instead, the economic (mis)management of the state was unable to equalize regional economic disparities and, more prevalently, stroked the marks of dissatisfaction and competition between republics that would intensify in the 1970s and 1980s.

On of the major deterrents for socialist Yugoslavia, as will become evident, was the stagnation of the post-1950s Party ideology. Even when the Party adapted its policies

¹³³ See Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost*.

¹³⁴ James Grow, “The People’s Prince – Tito and Tito’s Yugoslavia,” *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1954-1992*, Eds. Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 38.

¹³⁵ See Lampe, *Yugoslavia as a History*.

¹³⁶ John R. Lampe, “The Two Yugoslavias as Economic Unions: Promises and Problems,” *Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992*, Ed. Dejan Djokic (London: Hurst & Co., 2003), 182-195.

to meet public demands,¹³⁷ its myths of legitimization and fundamental ideology remained unchanged and therefore gradually lost significance over time.¹³⁸ That is to say that the Partisan founding myth of the struggle against fascism was no longer potent twenty years after the Second World War, Stalin's death eliminated the realistic threat of a Soviet invasion, and self-management, as an alternative to the state, weakened the central federal structure and could ultimately no longer suppress the nationalism that the Party vehemently opposed.¹³⁹ In theory, according to Nicholas J. Miller, "self-management, for all its revolutionary character as an alternative to Marxism-Leninism, was envisioned as a transformative means to eliminate bourgeois cultural identifications like nationalisms in favor of class identifications."¹⁴⁰ Yet, problems for Yugoslavia began once the revolutionary character of self-management gave away to the state's marked antithesis.

It is apparent that Yugoslavia clearly stood apart, socially, politically, and economically, from the other communist countries in the Soviet Bloc. Structurally, however, the state shared its federal organization¹⁴¹ and the eventual development of

¹³⁷ Particularly noteworthy to this project is the relaxation of policies regarding cultural production after the 1950s. As Carol S. Lilly writes, "Even in the communist-dominated regime neither the artist nor the public were passive, but were able to influence and force modifications in cultural productions... CPY leaders ultimately had to rely on implementation of their cultural policies on individual artists, writers, and others who often consciously or unconsciously tailored the official message to suit their own personal interests and styles." Carol S. Lilly, "Propaganda to Pornography: Party, Society, and Culture in Postwar Yugoslavia," *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1954-1992*, Eds. Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 141.

¹³⁸ See Bogdan D. Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

¹³⁹ See Josef Kalvoda, *Titoism and Masters of Imposture* (New York: Vintage Press, Inc., 1958).

¹⁴⁰ Miller, "Reconstituting Serbia," 294.

¹⁴¹ The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was founded on "four equalities," as cited by Aleksa Djilas: brotherhood and unity as the founding ideology, the six constitutive republics were proclaimed as equal in rights and duties, all nations of Yugoslavia were defined as equal, and all the constitutive nations were said to have contributed equally to the national liberation struggle. Of course, these "equalities" were deeply flawed and Djilas draws attention to some of these discrepancies in his book *The Contested Country*.

proto-states and proto-nations with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. In the context of this comparison, the three states exhibit many similar features, notably the almost simultaneous collapse prompted by the post-Cold War disintegration of the international world order.¹⁴² In addition, Yugoslavia's large diaspora of Serbs outside Serbia proper, the weakened economic position of Serbia within the federal matrix, and the privileged access of Serbs in the military force were not unique factors in the Yugoslav case. Instead, Valerie Brunce cites three specific elements differentiating Yugoslavia from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and ultimately provided ground for the uniquely violent breakup of this state. In Brunce's opinion, it was the evolving confederation since the 1970s that created "an ever-weakening economic and political center, on the one hand, and, on the other, republics that over time accumulated the economic and political resources to act as nearly independent political and economic units."¹⁴³ The Yugoslav confederation can be cited, then, as the underlining condition for Brunce's two other explanations contributing to Yugoslavia's collapse: the unclear lineage of control of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), and the inter-republic conflict over the post-Yugoslav legacy.¹⁴⁴

This contextualization of Yugoslavia's narrative within the communist framework is important for understanding internal developments and interactions, as well as Yugoslavia's place within the international sphere. In fact, the singular socialist configuration of federal Yugoslavia played a significant part in shaping the state's future – affecting its domestic and foreign policy, as well as the conditions of its fateful

¹⁴² It is interesting to note that other socialist states survived the end of the Cold War intact, including Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland.

¹⁴³ Bunce, "The Yugoslav Experience in Comparative Perspective," 356.

¹⁴⁴ Bunce, "The Yugoslav Experience in Comparative Perspective," 354-358.

collapse. By distinguishing it from the strict Eastern Bloc, including the other states such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary struggling to chart an alternative communist model, and the Western capitalist world, Titoism located the state into a specific category that prevented it from following established developmental models or even finding security in a larger movement. Titoism was an uncharted path, and therefore entailed more risks than simply siding with the Eastern or the Western camps.¹⁴⁵ That said, Yugoslavia acquired a privileged position between the East and the West, for a time reaping support and benefits from both sides. The nonalignment movement pioneered by Tito in the late 1950s can be understood as Yugoslavia's version of national communism, a separate road to socialism, and possibly a new perspective in the founding structure of Marxist internationalism.¹⁴⁶ Nonalignment was an attractive alternative to many countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East because of its rejection of Soviet economic and political colonialism, but even more because it offered an alternative to membership and compromise with established power blocks. And while Yugoslavia's specific position afforded the state considerable advantages during the Cold War, the post-1989 transformation of the prevailing world order significantly displaced its role as the intermediate between the Soviet Union and the West.¹⁴⁷ In the words of Christopher Bennett, "Yugoslavia's status changed when the Soviet Union chose not to intervene to

¹⁴⁵ See Grow, "The People's Prince," 35-60.

¹⁴⁶ See Nora Beloff, *Tito's Flawed Legacy, Yugoslavia & the West: 1939-84* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1985).

¹⁴⁷ This outcome had been feared by scholars writing before 1989. See: Andrew Borowiec, *Yugoslavia After Tito* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977); Steven L. Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Gavriel D Ra'anan, *Yugoslavia After Tito: Scenarios and Implications* (Boulder: Westview, 1977).

restore communist rule in eastern Europe. Without Soviet bogey, Yugoslavia lost its claim to international importance and Yugoslavs could no longer rely on Western support to bail them out.”¹⁴⁸ As many scholars stressing the critical role of international relations and policy in the 1990s Balkans conflict would attest, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was much more detrimental to Yugoslavia than states in the Eastern Bloc.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Courses and Consequences* (London: Hurst & Co., 1995), 111.

¹⁴⁹ See Ulf Brunnbauer, Ed., *(Re)Writing History – Historiography in Southeast Europe After Socialism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004).

Chapter I: Repression (1945-1963)

In the immediate postwar period, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) espoused a cultural policy closely modeled on the Stalinist view of cultural producers as the “engineers of the human soul.” In fact, in the later 1940s, the Party was preoccupied with the legitimization of its newly-instated regime and encouraged the production and distribution of culture only to the extent that it reinforced its political and ideological designs.¹⁵⁰ As Andrew Wachtel narrates, “whereas the unitarist interwar government had lacked a definite cultural policy, allowing for a multiplicity of competing cultural models, the Communists attempted to enforce (and more or less succeeded until about 1953) a highly centralized and rigid cultural model. This culture was, however, now defined in Soviet terms and understood to stand above and outside any national questions.”¹⁵¹ The Party’s initial disregard of the national question will emerge as a fatal mistake in the years to come, not only because it silenced cultural pluralism, but also because it rejected the existence of pre-1945 conflict between South Slavs.

In the first two decades of the state’s existence, Yugoslavia struggled to legitimize its reorganized family structure after the Partisan victory, built stronger internal bonds in face of the shared external Soviet “other” after the split with Stalin in 1948, and attempted to define its self-identity based on the unique socio-economic model of self-management. Yet despite these progressive unifying trends, the initial disregard of the national question will become a recurring irritant within Yugoslavia, as communist ideology of a stateless society began to delegate more agency to the republican centers. In turn, the repression of prewar conflicts, as well unresolved dissatisfactions with the new

¹⁵⁰ Lilly, “Propaganda to Pornography,” 139-140.

¹⁵¹ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*. 146.

family reorganization, will have detrimental effects on inter-Yugoslav relations when cultural policies are liberalized and these conflicts are unearthed from the unconscious on republican platforms.

I. Building Brotherhood on the Foundations of a Partisan Victory

The Party's immediate fear was the danger of pluralism in culture that would have presented challenges to its exclusive claims on power and ideology, and threatened the successful implementation of a supra-national Yugoslav culture. When Yugoslav Communists based their 1946 founding constitution on the model of the 1936 Soviet constitution,¹⁵² they adapted "more than governing tactics from their Soviet teachers, and one thing they had come to realize was that with the proper interpretive spin most works of the past could be useful in the Socialist present."¹⁵³ That is to say that the early years of the postwar regime reclaimed interwar culture, especially literature, as a tool for self-legitimization. By reframing well-known works into the socialist cadre,¹⁵⁴ the Party's aim was to distance cultural rhetoric from interwar unitarist themes, to antagonize social principles opposing communism, and to reinforce a legitimate legacy for dominance. Yet more than the reinterpretation of prewar and interwar literature, the early years of socialist Yugoslavia also bore a new trend in literature: the partisan war novel. The genre was a unique cultural product, evidenced across republican borders in Yugoslavia,

¹⁵² Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 146.

¹⁵³ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 141.

¹⁵⁴ A notorious case is seen in the mobilization of Njegos' *The Mountain Wreath*, originally written as a call of unity of Christians against Ottoman invaders in nineteenth-century Montenegro, as an epic poem that has been reclaimed by almost every regime and almost every nation in the former Yugoslavia as a rallying cry of their cause. Wachtel writes about the Communist's aims to "redden Njegos and blacken his interwar interpreters" (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 145) in support of their conviction that "the partisans of World War II were merely updated versions of the 'freedom fighters' Njegos had described" (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 144).

intended to glorify the Partisan's war efforts and popularize the revolutionary spirit of brotherhood and unity.

Although many partisan epics became popular in Yugoslavia's first decade,¹⁵⁵ well-established Croatian writer Vladimir Nazor's *With the Partisans* (1943) is especially representative of the style. Nazor writes: "We, sons of the Serbian people, fighters of the Serbian proletarian brigade will soon continue the fight along with the other units of our national liberation army which are the personification of the armed brotherhood and brotherly unity of the peoples of Yugoslavia, a fight that will completely crush the hated occupiers, the age-old enemies of the South Slavs."¹⁵⁶ The understated motives of the narrative aims to create a feeling of a united struggle amongst all the Yugoslavs, a more glorious fight once the Serbs join the greater South Slavic brigade, against a universal evil. The unity of the brothers is seen as a prerequisite to the overthrow of the "hated occupiers" and the "age-old enemies," here implicitly Serbian hegemony and prewar unitarism, and more explicitly Nazi fascism and internal counterrevolutionaries opposing the Partisans. What is more, Nazor's narrative is inclusive of women, "not merely as love objects (although they usually play this traditional role as well), but as partisan fighters, thereby helping to back up the Communists' claim of equal rights for women."¹⁵⁷ This fraternal struggle, of both brothers and sisters, is imagined as a family affair, where the united efforts of the Yugoslav nations during World War II were only the precursor to their future relations based on this brotherhood.

¹⁵⁵ Some notable novels include Branko Copic's *Prelom* (1952), Oskar Davico's *Pesma* (1952), Mihailo Lalic's *Lelejska Gora* (1957), Ciril Kosmac's *Pomladni Dan* (1950), and Misko Kranjac *Pisarna* (1949).

¹⁵⁶ Nazor, *S Partizanima*, 102.

¹⁵⁷ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 152.

The narrative of socialist Yugoslavia during the early postwar years closely follows this model of fraternal interactions imagined in the partisan war epic. Where Hunt identifies the absolutist monarchy as the universal evil uniting Frenchmen in the Revolution, and Louis XVI as the representation of the tyrannical father, the Yugoslav Party likewise framed several “others” to serve as the contrasting negative force that must be overcome via a unified band of brothers. In the first place, the 1934 assassination of King Aleksandar, although he had been a passionate pro-Yugoslav, was imagined as the initial victory toward the overthrow of the Serbian hegemony that the postwar regime identified as the primary villain. While Aleksa Djilas explains that “between the two world wars the Serbian political, bureaucratic, and military elites, together with the monarchy, assumed a dominant, though not monolithic, role in the Yugoslav political life,”¹⁵⁸ postwar rhetoric was mobilized to create clear lines separating the good from the bad, the new from the old. In this postwar matrix, interwar Yugoslavia was unanimously demonized, and the overthrow of the Serbian king, the elimination of the Serbian bourgeoisie, and the rejection of interwar unitarism was celebrated as the united accomplishment of the new social order against the old, deceitful one.¹⁵⁹ The Communists promised to rectify the faults of the interwar state, thereby legitimizing their regime, and offered a prosperous future to all united Yugoslav brothers, thereby legitimizing their ideology. Bennett explains that in this transformed family, “no nation would be allowed to dominate the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia the way that

¹⁵⁸ Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 13.

¹⁵⁹ According to Christopher Bennett, the only novel aspect of the postwar state was the underlying idea of Yugoslavia: “All power lay with the Communist party just as in the Soviet Union. The highest authority in the land was Tito and his trusted lieutenants, Alexander Rankovic, Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj. For, despite its federal structure, Yugoslavia was if anything more unitary and centralist than it had been under King Alexander. What had changed was the concept of Yugoslavism” (Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse* 54).

Serbs had dominated the first Yugoslav incarnation. Communist Yugoslavia was hostile to all the parochial nationalisms of the peoples of Yugoslavia, while attempting to cultivate a multinational and thoroughly Yugoslav patriotism emanating from the wartime struggle for national liberation.”¹⁶⁰ The implied symmetric participation in the wartime struggle, served as the major building block of the Communist’s founding myth driving toward a reunification of the South Slavs into the Yugoslav family along a brotherly axis.¹⁶¹

An important underlying principle of sibling relationships, outlined by Radcliffe-Brown, is the perceived unity of the group – based on internal relations, but, more importantly, grounded in the external perception of their unity. In the postwar period, the CPY was quick to consolidate power and impose a centralized government,¹⁶² so that the state’s founding constitution was “a political statement endorsing the communist arrangement of brotherly people living in a single state.”¹⁶³ Thus the initial step toward the reconstruction of the Yugoslav family was the imposed unity of discourses and organizing structures that made Yugoslavia *appear* unified. Over time, these relations would begin to be internalized by the siblings, but the Party’s primary concern was the legitimization of its rule, which implicitly granted it leadership of the unified nation.¹⁶⁴

Rosner’s work on sibling relationships reinforces the idea that interactions of sibling

¹⁶⁰ Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse*, 54.

¹⁶¹ As Wachtel writes, “this brotherly struggle was always seen as having been subsumed by an essential unity that derived, in theory, from the partisans’ shared belief in communist ideals and the fact that they worked under the overall ideological umbrella of Tito’s party” (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation* 133).

¹⁶² According to Aleska Djilas, “Yugoslav Communists were faster than any other Communist party in eastern Europe in taking power and in moving from hegemony over other parties to a complete monopoly of power” (Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 150).

¹⁶³ Aleksandar Pavkovic, “Yugoslavism: A National Identity that Failed?,” 153.

¹⁶⁴ Djilas explains that communism was intended as a universal and unifying force, and that “[Communists] believed not only in the inevitable progress of classless society of freedom, equality, fraternity, and abundance, but also in the establishment of a society in which Communist ideology was accepted by everyone and not just by the avant-garde” (Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 165).

serve an important factor in identity development, and thus the Party's attention to the precise reconstruction of roles and histories plays a crucial part in the evolution of intra-Yugoslav relations.¹⁶⁵ In practice, wartime conflict between the Partisan, Cetnik, and Ustasa forces, along with any doubts about their legacy of brotherly relations, was promptly erased from official national memory¹⁶⁶ and thereby no longer recognized as a possible source of fissures within Yugoslavia. And past divergence or discord was and replaced by four pillars of equality.¹⁶⁷ On paper, the 1946 Constitution which proclaimed Yugoslavia as "a community of equal peoples that, on the basis of self-determination, including the right to secession, have expressed their will to live together in a federal state."¹⁶⁸ With this constitution, the new Yugoslavia became a family – a brotherhood – where the republics, defined as sovereign homelands of sovereign nations, were all of presupposed to be of equal stature.

This model of equality, supported by communist socio-economic ideology, offered a premise for unbiased inclusion to each republic in the Yugoslav family. However, all the members of the new socialist Yugoslav did not equally empathize with the reshaped family model. In Dejan Jovic's words, "those who wanted more changes, particularly non-Serbs, emphasized [the state's] 'new' character."¹⁶⁹ For Macedonia, for example, the new state was a refuge from Bulgarian and Serbian nationalizing aspirations

¹⁶⁵ In 1993, writing retrospectively Slavenka Drakulic explains that "thus altered and corrected, the past is in fact erased, annihilated. People live without the past, both collective and individual. This has been the prescribed way of life for the past forty-five years, when it assumed that history began in 1941 with the War and the revolution." Slavenka Drakulic, *The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of the War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 75.

¹⁶⁶ According to Jasna Dragovic-Soso, these unresolved and repressed memories will resurface in the 1980s and discredit the fraternal unity of the Yugoslavs. (Dragovic-Soso, 'Saviors of the Nation.')

¹⁶⁷ Yugoslavia was founded as a federal state consisting of six equal republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina) which were all given equal rights and equal duties. Five equal nations were recognized (Bosnian Muslims were not mentioned as a nation in 1946), deemed to have equally participated in the national liberation and given equal rights.

¹⁶⁸ As quoted in Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 167.

¹⁶⁹ Dejan Jovic, "Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism: From Tito to Kardelj," 160.

because it recognized the region as a distinct republic and named Macedonian as one of the official languages of Yugoslavia. Similarly, the Albanian population was acknowledged when Kosovo was given status as an autonomous region within Serbia, while Bosnian Muslims were partially appeased with the preserved borders of Bosnia and Hercegovina.¹⁷⁰

But, as Jovic implies, the nation least satisfied with the reconfiguration of the Yugoslav family was Serbia.¹⁷¹ Nicholas Miller explains that “from the Serbian perspective, Tito’s Yugoslavia was founded and organized on a series of unhappy ironies. Arguably the most persecuted nationality in Yugoslavia during the war, Serbs provided the core of the original Partisan units. Yet after the war, Serbia was all but dismembered.”¹⁷² Here, Miller is referring to the sectioning of two autonomous regions – Kosovo and Vojvodina – within Serbia’s republican borders. Although the regions were instated as protection for minority groups,¹⁷³ upholding the communist aim that “the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic characteristics of the nations of Yugoslavia ought to survive within the ‘new’ Yugoslav national consciousness,”¹⁷⁴ Serbia interpreted this as a punishment, rather than the expected reward, for her contributions to the liberation

¹⁷⁰ Despite certain concessions, dissatisfaction from these two groups persisted in the early postwar years. Albanians were only recognized as a minority, in 1959 renamed a nationality, and continually pushed for greater autonomous, republican rights for Kosovo. It can be said that their most radical demands were satisfied in 2008 when Kosovo declared independence from Serbia. Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, were initially recognized only as a religious group. However, the dismantling of the religious backbone, that is to say the appropriation of the Muslim identity as an important distinction of the peoples of Bosnia, created an situation in which “the Yugoslav authorities facilitated the transformation of the Bosnian Muslim community into a modern nation.” (Xavier Bougarel, “Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea,” *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992*, Ed. Dejan Djokic (London: Hurst & Co., 2003), 106.

¹⁷¹ It should be noted, however, that the Communist Party of Serbia was always supportive of Yugoslavism and remained dedicated to patriotism, anti-nationalism, and internationalism until its collapse in the early 1990s. As Djilas narrates, “the great majority of Serbian Communists were genuinely enthusiastic about Yugoslavia and totally rejected any traditional Serbian aspirations for predominance” (Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 174).

¹⁷² Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 294.

¹⁷³ Albanians in the Kosovo region and Hungarians in Vojvodina.

¹⁷⁴ Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 165.

struggle – in both World Wars. The new regime’s legitimization was based on a rejection of the organization of interwar Yugoslavia, so that “Serbia’s legacy of suffering was to some degree offset by its history of intolerance in the interwar state.”¹⁷⁵ Amidst discussions of postwar equality, Serbs in Yugoslavia claimed unequal recognition of their suffering,¹⁷⁶ unfair treatment of their prewar and interwar legacy, and deliberate division of Serbs by the republican boundaries. Much like the suppression of Serbian (and Croatia) nationalism in light of the cultivation of others (Macedonian and Albanian), the splintering of Serbian population – throughout Yugoslavia and within Serbia proper¹⁷⁷ – was interpreted as the ultimate underhanded ploy to weaken their nation.

These national grievances acquire a new dimension once they are interpreted through the lens of sibling relations. While Freud devoted his attention to the mechanisms of rivalry and envy in sibling relationships, Melanie Klein elaborates on the principle of “sibling love,” and Prophecy Coles speaks about the duality of competition and admiration that is present among siblings. In early interactions, as their relationships are still being crystallized, these emotional dichotomies are already present. That is to say that while there were clear advantaged to the union for almost every member of

¹⁷⁵ Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 293.

¹⁷⁶ By some accounts, Serbs accounted for half of *all* World War II casualties (see Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia”), but were certainly the nations which suffered the greatest number of military and civilian losses. Similarly, the postwar regime strictly eliminated discussion about the Cetnik (primarily Serb) struggle against the Ustasa and Partisan forces. Although the postwar rhetoric spoke of the unified struggle against the common enemy (fascism, Nazis), the Yugoslav resistance had been fragmented.

¹⁷⁷ The primary objection was the sectioning of the two autonomous regions within Serbia, the only republic to have recognized regions for its minorities. Serbia felt this was an unsymmetrical policy because the Serbian populations in Croatia and Bosnia (constituting majorities in certain regions) were not given autonomous status. During the first two decades of the regime, Aleksandar Rankovic played an important role in the Party’s leadership. In addition to Edvard Kardelj and Milovan Djilas, Rankovic was one of Tito’s advisors, as well as the leader of the secret police. Voicing the pro-Serbian, pro-centralism views of some Serbs, Rankovic’s place placated their grievances, especially in relation to Kosovo, until his removal in 1966. While the fall of Rankovic allowed for greater decentralization, “his removal was also motivated by the desire of the rest of the ruling class in Yugoslavia to stigmatize, finally and completely, centralism and Serbianism as one and the same ill in Yugoslavia” (Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 296).

Yugoslavia, above the subjective presumption that the South Slavs really did share enough similarities in order to constitute a cohesive nation, conflict between the brothers is evidenced from the start. Freud's contention of rivalry would provide one possible explanation, and psychologist Vamik Volkan, contextualizing this theory into politics, explains that "ethnic or national groups constantly compete with their enemy groups: the eternal question is who is bigger, smarter, more civilized... each group offers its strengths for comparison."¹⁷⁸ According to Rosner, this comparison is natural because siblings play a significant part in the identity formation of their brothers and sisters, and their roles are often internalized and used as models along, and against, which individual identities are shaped. This concept supports Freud's theory about the narcissism of small differences,¹⁷⁹ and consequently also the manifestation of envy and respect in sibling relations.

Yet, in the context of interwar intra-Yugoslav structure and the traumas of World War II, the relations of the Yugoslav republics were complicated by deeper psychic conflicts than most sibling relationships. Envy, in particular, becomes a powerful problem present at the onset of the new state's reorganization. The reactions of Serbia, even more the Serbian nation, can be understood through the principle of jealousy. Distinct from Lacanian envy, Melanie Klein defines jealousy as the most instinctive feelings of anger evoked by the impression that someone else possesses the desirable love object of which the subject has been deprived. In the context of postwar Yugoslavia,

¹⁷⁸ Volkan, Vamik. "An overview of Psychological Concepts Pertinent to Interethnic and/or International Relationships," *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*, Eds. Vamik Volkan, Demetrios Julius, Joseph Montville (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 37.

¹⁷⁹ Vamik place's Freud's concept into a national setting by explaining that "Two antagonistic groups living side by side are loath to acknowledge a total likeness in common, and so focus on – even create – minor differences. In times of peace differences are exhibited in rituals, dress, speech patterns, dances, etc., but in times of hostility these minor differences assume major and stubborn emotional importance" (Volkan, "An overview of Psychological Concepts," 38).

these feelings are most visible among the Serbs in respect to the republican borders and the creation of the autonomous regions. Although Djilas explains that “the federal structure was not meant to erect barriers between the different nations of Yugoslavia... [the republics] were in their essence all Yugoslav,”¹⁸⁰ the Serbs felt that minorities had been given greater privileges and recognition in the postwar state, while Serbia’s legacies of leadership had been reframed as a dangerous ambition for hegemony. As Klein predicts, jealousy inevitably produces a suspicion of rivalry and, in fact, actually engenders competition.

If we imagine Serbia as a woman, a sister, in the matrix of the Yugoslav brotherhood, then Freud’s principle of penis envy is even more applicable than Lacan’s jealousy. Freud suggests that penis envy is usually manifested in girls once they realize they do not possess the male genitalia and its alleged power. According to the model, the girl comes to believe that she once actually possessed male genitalia, but that she has since been castrated by the mother, who was threatened by the girl’s relationship with the father. Contextualized, this model offers an ideal understanding of Serbia’s disappointment about her demoted position in the postwar state. Not only was her sister role a far cry from the interwar Yugoslavia where she allegedly possessed the recognition and respect beset to her glorious legacy, the postwar state was also perceived to be an unacceptable distribution of power. In this sense, it can be said that Serbia felt castrated in socialist Yugoslavia, presumably because she was imagined as competition, a threat, by the Party and the other member nations.¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 164.

¹⁸¹ As will become evident, Serbia’s penis envy will be suppressed in the state’s early years, but will resurface over the course of Yugoslav family relations and severely effect Serbia’s future relations within the union.

Lacan's theory of the imagined phallus, complimentary to Freud's idea of penis envy, can also offer a productive angle for the understanding power relations within Yugoslavia, particularly the motives of the other member nations. The phallus, although imaginary, is the ultimate symbol of power in the Lacanian model. The phallus is the universal object of desire, but Lacan believed that only men can possess it while women embody it. From this theory, Serbia's prewar and interwar position fits well in the mold of the pre-Oedipal phallic mother, described as the castrating, powerful, seductive female who causes impotence in men. She is, thus, both an object of fear, because she is the castrator, and an object of desire, because she is the phallus. In socialist Yugoslavia, Serbia enters the brotherhood with this strong legacy, accounting for the Party's mixed treatment – unconsciously, Serbia is feared and hated, as much as she is respected and desired. Read through a Lacanian lens, it could be said that each of the Yugoslav republics, in fact, wished to become Serbia, or possess her (albeit, past) power. The conflict arising from these contradictory perceptions of Serbia is manifested in the metaphorical castration of the phallic mother herself, interpreted by Serbia as an undeserved punishment for her previous maternal role, but justified by the Party as necessary contribution to the “new” character of the state. Over the course of Yugoslavia's lifespan, the other republics' unconscious desire for the imagined phallus, just like Serbia's penis envy, will initially be repressed but will later reemerge and cause significant conflicts in the Yugoslavia's relationships.

II. Turned Away from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavs Appear Closer Together

Instead of resolving pressing initial conflicts, the state was consumed by the challenge of building the links of brotherhood among the South Slavs, creating a front of internal unity, and repelling external challenges to the Communist Party's ruling regime in the early postwar years. In 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform because, as Miranda Vickers explains, "Stalin was enraged at such a show of independent foreign policy-making by his client states, and even more by their lack of consultation with him."¹⁸² Although this dispute evolved into an ideological debate over the interpretations of Marxist-Leninism, or rather the power struggle between Tito and Stalin where both leaders claimed the other was betraying the core ideology while he followed the true socialist road, it had a significant affect on the state's treatment of internal national conflict and immediate consequences for Yugoslavia's cultural policies.

After 1948, the state became preoccupied with severing bonds with Stalin and cultivating a distinct Yugoslav identity. For culture, this meant liberalization. According to Carol Lilly, "despite the retention of certain restrictions and taboos, Yugoslavia's cultural scene after 1950 gradually freed itself from party dictates and reflected even more the influence of non-socialists, western, popular culture."¹⁸³ The realm of culture, and society in general, saw a decrease in centralization, but writers and artists still remained committed to fostering brotherhood and unity. This voluntary push for solidarity can be interpreted as a partial internalization of the brotherhood rhetoric and a partial reaction to the looming threat of a Soviet invasion. In literature, too, both realists

¹⁸² Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 149. Further elaborating the situation, Vickers writes: "The basic issue on the great quarrel of 1948 was simple: whether Tito and his Politburo or Stalin would be the dictator of Yugoslavia. What stood in Stalin's way was Tito's and hence the Yugoslav regime's autonomous strength, based on the uniqueness in Eastern Europe of Yugoslavia's do-it-yourself Communist Revolution" (Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 148).

¹⁸³ Lilly, "Propaganda to Pornography," 140.

and surrealists remained unified in one literary canon, despite internal disagreements, after Miroslav Krleža's 1952 speech "On Cultural Freedom" urged for greater freedom of artistic expression and aesthetic form.¹⁸⁴ From the Party's point of view, these liberalizations were meant to depoliticize culture and prevent it from becoming a form of political opposition,¹⁸⁵ but the relaxed policies also mirrored a confidence of political leaders in the unity of the Yugoslavs.

Dobrica Cosic's *Far Away is the Sun* (1950) is a fitting example of the atmosphere the Yugoslav elites were hoping to cultivate and which was indeed espoused by some authors and artists. Writing in the realist style of partisan war epics, Cosic expresses the strengthened sentiments of brotherhood in face of outside threats. The novel is, according to Wachtel, "unambiguous in its condemnation of separatist nationalist movements (both Serbian and Croatian), whose adherents were equated with the German and Italian invaders. The Communists were presented as the only force concerned with more than local problems, although national and ethnic diversity in the partisan ranks was not depicted. Rather, the national question was simply passed over and implicitly made to seem irrelevant."¹⁸⁶ The ambivalent approach to the national question can be interpreted as confidence in the integral unity of the Yugoslav or the unifying powers of Yugoslavia's new socio-economic model of self-management – the same confidence that brought about cultural liberations in the first place. But, more likely, this ambivalence was only delaying the necessary conflict resolution of national, and metaphorically psychic, conflict that was inevitably plaguing Yugoslavia's republics.

¹⁸⁴ Krleža's speech attacked the party-endorsed social realism and urged for loosened restrictions on modernism. As a result, surrealists were able to continue the legacy championed by Ujevic, Crnjanski, and other interwar modernists.

¹⁸⁵ Lilly, "Propaganda to Pornography," 157.

¹⁸⁶ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 199.

Instead of initiating dialogue addressing the nation question, Bennett explains that “according to Marxist-Leninist dogma, nationalism was a feature of bourgeois society which would disappear as soon as the proletariat won power and the inequalities which had bred nationalism in the first place were eradicated.”¹⁸⁷

The realization of self-management, as a Yugoslav model distinct from Stalinism, was the socio-economic equivalent of a pompous severance from the Soviet Union. In psychoanalytic terms, the break with Stalin can be understood as the Yugoslav’s united overthrow of another tyrannical father. The split exhibits similar mechanisms that were used in the rejection of interwar Serbian unitarism: the Soviet Union immediately became the “other” against which Yugoslavia shaped its identity, and Tito became the benevolent father, rather a friend, in place of the authoritative Stalin.¹⁸⁸

The understated outcome of the separation was another reordering of the familial order. While the brothers remained unified, possibly with strengthened bonds, the elimination of a dominant father figure greatly affected the state once it became a communist country outside the Warsaw Pact. That is to say that post-1948 redefinition of Yugoslavia is evidence of the dynamic nature of relationships, but even more of further internalization of sibling roles amongst the Yugoslavs. In concert with their friend, their trusted *drug Tito*, the republics showed a peak level of brotherhood and unity in response to the external Soviet threat, and in light of a truly unique and beneficial familial structure. Self-management, then, became the second great unifying myth of socialist Yugoslavia, and an underlying theme in literature – marking independence from the

¹⁸⁷ Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse*, 51.

¹⁸⁸ Similar rhetoric is seen in historical narratives of the national liberation struggle and the break with Stalin: “Self-management, for all its revolutionary character as an alternative to Marxism-Leninism, was envisioned as a transformative means to eliminate bourgeois cultural identifications like nationalisms in favor of class identifications” (Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 294).

Soviet sphere and toasting Yugoslavia's victorious, and united, socialist path,¹⁸⁹ but also simultaneously longer delaying the resolution of the state's psychic problems.

Initially, the distinction from the Soviets was emulated through self-management, but a reframed form of socialism, Titoism, soon evolved in Yugoslavia. Succinctly phrased by Bennett, "it is no exaggeration ... that Titoism did not exist until Stalin created it."¹⁹⁰ The principal ideological pillar became anti-statism, passionately supported by Tito's advisor Edvard Kardelj and blatantly opposing Stalin's statist stance,¹⁹¹ an ideology manifested in a gradual decentralization of the federal system and the elimination of state structure altogether. In line with communist doctrine, the regime ultimately hoped to create a classless, stateless society. According to Aleksa Djilas,¹⁹² "since the six republics of Yugoslavia had certain characteristics of states, and self-management was meant to be an antistatist way of organizing the society and economy, and to contribute to the withering away of the state, it should inevitably lead toward the weakening of sovereignty and independence of the republics."¹⁹³

However, while decentralization certainly provided Yugoslavia with a crucial distinction from Soviet-style socialism, it did not achieve its central goal of fully uniting

¹⁸⁹ Aleksa Djilas restates the importance of Tito's split with Stalin as another legitimizing factor of the postwar state: "Both the struggle for national liberation during the Second World War and the challenges to Stalin's hegemony over the Communist world were presented as the greatest twentieth-century achievements of the Yugoslav fighting spirit" (Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 175).

¹⁹⁰ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 58.

¹⁹¹ Christopher Bennett elaborates that "Titoism evolved out of attempts by Djilas and Kardelj to work out where Stalinism had gone wrong and to prove that Yugoslavia and not the Soviet Union was the legitimate heir of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy... they decided that Stalinism was gone astray in its concentration of power within the state and the expansion of bureaucracy. In Yugoslavia, by contrast, they decided that the state should wither away and that power should be devolved to the workers themselves" (Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 60).

¹⁹² Djilas' father and Tito's close advisor, Milovan Djilas, was purged in 1954 after he criticized the regime's resistance to democratization, despite internal and external encouragement. That is to say that Djilas was hinting that a full break from the Soviet Union, and a complete adherence to anti-statist ideology, would have required the Party to give up its monolithic place in society. Instead, the Party had simply changed its name in 1952 to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).

¹⁹³ Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 178.

Yugoslavs through the elimination of the national question. Instead, as decentralization began in the 1950s, Pavlowitch explains that this “devolution encouraged association of nationality with territory”¹⁹⁴ and created a new set of political actors campaigning for nationally-based interests on the republican level. On a psychoanalytical level, this mechanism was the opposite of resolution. The process weakened Yugoslavia, strengthened the individual republics demanding more autonomy and sovereignty, and paradoxically reinforced the national question that further repressed psychic conflicts within the state.

III. Self-Management's Blind Spot

The brief post-1948 interlude of Yugoslav unity was roused by the duality of external threats and the internal potentials. While self-management was still being developed as a novel Yugoslav concept, Serbia's penis envy and the other republics' desire for the imaginary phallus were momentarily inhibited by a shared belief in the possibilities of Titoism. At the same time, Yugoslavia was becoming a prominent international example of social and economic independence – praised by the Soviets, admired by other communist countries, and respected as a leader of the non-alignment movement. In turn, the CPY was confident that that Yugoslavism had already acquired a solid base of brotherly trust and further dispensed with nation-building efforts.¹⁹⁵ But, in fact, the solidarity of Yugoslavia was still only a superficial phenomenon, upheld by the mutual need for protection and an external veneer of unity. Once decentralization was

¹⁹⁴ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, “Serbia, Montenegro, and Yugoslavia,” 66.

¹⁹⁵ In the words of Andrew Wachtel, “eventually, even the highest echelons of the Communist party came to believe that a centralized culture would not work, and by 1962-63, Tito ‘abandoned the idea of Yugoslav integration... He then tried to give greater rein to the federalist tendencies inside the party and the state’” (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 173).

mobilized within the federal structure, aspirations for supra-Yugoslavism began to be substituted by detached nation-building efforts in individual republics and the revival of their unconscious drives and desires.

In terms of literature, Wachtel explains that “the essential lack of cooperation across national boundaries meant that when the project for creating Yugoslav socialist culture was basically abandoned in the 1960s, splits along national lines occurred more quickly and were more extreme than they would have been had there been a tradition of working together.”¹⁹⁶ These splits were a much feared prophesy of some adherent supporters of Yugoslavism, most notably Ivo Andric. Writing in Nazi-occupied Belgrade, Andric composed three of his most celebrated novels, all to be published in 1945: *The Bridge on the Drina*, *Bosnian Chronicle*, and *The Woman From Sarajevo*. In 1961, Andric was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature honoring *The Bridge on the Drina*, an appropriate illustration of the mood during the 1950s and early 1960s when true unity was still an ideal but an unlikely reality.

The main protagonist in Andric’s novel is the bridge connecting the two sides of the Bosnian town Visegrad, but metaphorically symbolizing a much larger scope of simultaneous links and separations between lands, nations, and people. In some respects, *The Bridge on the Drina* can be interpreted as a warning to the postwar state; by narrating the story of the stone bridge, and by extension the stories of the people living around the bridge, Andric speaks about the divisions that have already marked the people of Visegrad and which pose threats to the future Yugoslavia.¹⁹⁷ Namely, Andric is

¹⁹⁶ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 148.

¹⁹⁷ Metaphorically, Visegrad is symbolic of Bosnia as a whole, while Andric similarly imagined Bosnia to be a microcosm of the multi-national Yugoslavia. The river is an often-used geographical marker of

concerned with divisions of religious communities – Christians, Muslims, and Jews – and implicitly the national groups most closely associated with these religions. Their coexistence in Visegrad is a nod to the shared history and mutually inclusive layers of legacies of the South Slavs. But while the bridge is indeed a unifying symbol, it is also a reminder that there is enough distinction between the South Slavs that they need such a symbol, be it a bridge or a narrative, to facilitate their interconnection. Andric envisioned that a supra-national Yugoslav culture would provide this link in the postwar state, a model that was echoed by the communist ideology.

When *The Bridge on the Drina* was published, the state was beginning to build links grounded in the communist myth based on enemies of the people, or “others,” threatening the Yugoslav family as whole. As a result, the first metaphorical bridges that connected the Yugoslavs were shared fears – fascism, Serbian hegemony, Soviet domination. Andric narrates a similar scenario in the novel, where the town’s residents are completely united only after a disastrous flood, writing that “Turks, Christians and Jews mingled together. The force of the elements and the weights of the common misfortune brought all these men together and bridged, at least for this one evening, the gulf that divided one faith from the other.”¹⁹⁸ Again, the underlined message is that the people of Visegrad needed a universal tragedy before they could fully overcome their differences, because, as Wachtel notes, “each community has its own set of legends, its own customs, and its own attitude toward the bridge.”¹⁹⁹

separation. Here, the Drina symbolizes the border between east and west cultures, by extension the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires that, in fact, share a history in its borderlands.

¹⁹⁸ Ivo Andric, *The Bridge on the Drina*, Trans. Lovett F. Edwards (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1959), 77.

¹⁹⁹ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 162.

What is more, the state's singular international position allowed a second dimension to this metaphor after 1948, as Yugoslavia came to embody a bridge mediating between two worlds – the Eastern Bloc and the western Europe. Wachtel believes that “Andric’s novel can be seen as a prefiguration and even a possible inspiration for this national self-image.”²⁰⁰ However, without this bridging symbol, as Andric suggests, Yugoslavia’s unity was in jeopardy, unable to foster a true brotherhood from a mere co-existence.²⁰¹ *The Bridge on the Drina* can thus be heard as a powerful voice of the unconscious fear preceding the gradual slide toward cultural fission that followed state decentralization in the later 1950s and early 1960s.

As the Party remained ignorant about the extent of national conflict between the republics, fears of separatism were met with contradictory responses by the regime, and unsurprisingly produced mixed results. At its core, the Party remained loyal to its commitment to federalism and self-management, it also sought to maintain the notion of a synthetic, supra-national Yugoslavism. Djilas explains that “this belief in the interdependence between socialism and Yugoslavism was, however, based not only on certain utopian hopes that a socialist and, ultimately, Communist society would unite people in fraternity and freedom, but also on certain rational and positivistic ideas.”²⁰² But in spite of all the socio-economic benefits of self-management, there still remained the integral problem that Yugoslavism lacked adequate symbols of unity, or bridges, with

²⁰⁰ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 161.

²⁰¹ Andric was a bit more optimistic about Yugoslavia, as a state and as a concept. In Wachtel’s words: “In the course of the novel we come to see that each of the separate groups that inhabits Bosnia shares its historical space with other nations, and in it lies their brotherhood and their unity. It is ultimately the paradoxical existence of an overarching truth that links people and groups who think they share no common ground that becomes Andric’s central nation-building message. As opposed to his interwar predecessors, Andric does not claim that difference can be reconciled through synthesis; rather it can be overcome by stepping outside and above it, by viewing it from the position of a nonnational but sympathetic observer” (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 171).

²⁰² Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 180.

the decreasing presence of external threats. More importantly, Yugoslavia lacked proper recognition and resolution of the problems complicating its new family organization and internal relationships.

A changing mood is mirrored in institutional and cultural levels in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Constitution of 1953 was an important step in removing the Soviet legacy from Yugoslavia's structural framework and infusing the principles of self-management.²⁰³ While the constitution reinforced its ideology about the preservation of national language and culture, it withdrew certain liberties that had been allowed at the state's conception.²⁰⁴ Still resistant to the national question, the regime motioned to further suppress national aspirations by certain centralizing reforms. For example, to the dismay of Albanians and Hungarians, the powers of Serbia's autonomous regions were greatly reduced.²⁰⁵ Similarly, in last attempts to preserve a culturally united Yugoslavia, the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement rehabilitated linguistic unity as a concept of cultural unity and re-confirmed Serbian and Croatian to be a single language. These efforts, however, were to be answered with a brewing separatist response a decade later when, in 1967,

²⁰³ The 1953 Constitution was framed around principles and equality and the working people. Aleksa Djilas explains that it "defined Yugoslavia primarily as a union of producers and a community of people whose 'socialist consciousness,' based on the practice of self-management, superseded their national consciousness" (Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 178).

²⁰⁴ Not all the changes of the 1953 Constitution tightened grip on the Yugoslavs. As a way to promote Yugoslav identity, the category "Yugoslav undetermined" was allowed as a selection on state censuses. Initially, Bosnian Muslims (interestingly, Muslims in other republics had less hesitations about identifying as members about the major national group, presumably because the seeds of the Muslim identity as a national identity had only been planted in Bosnia) and children of mixed marriages primarily chose this category, but it was a progressive step in the cultivation of the Yugoslav national identity (Friedman, "The Bosnian Muslims," 276).

²⁰⁵ According to Miranda Wickers, the 1953 Constitution made important changes to the founding constitution's classification of Kosovo and Vojvodina: "The Federation no longer referred to the institution of autonomy as a federal matter, and the constitutional powers of Vojvodina and Kosovo were thus delegated to the future of the constitutional-juridical system of the People's Republic of Serbia. With the abolition of the Yugoslav government's Chamber of Nationalities the same year, the significance of the two autonomous areas was reduced even further, as they became merely no more than ordinary districts of Serbia" (Wickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 155). It is significant to note that the right to secession, as it has been granted by the first article in the 1946 Constitution, was eliminated from the new constitution.

Croatia claimed that Serbian was, in fact, “more equal” and petitioned for equality of the four standard languages in Yugoslavia (Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonia) in the “Declaration of the Name and Importance of the Croatian Standard Language.”

On a psychoanalytic level, this period can be interpreted as an unstable mélange of imposed and internalized fraternal relations, but most prominently a repression of critical psychic conflicts. According to Radcliffe-Brown, siblinghood is inevitably based on both aspects of unity – one that is external and one that is integral. Recognizing that relationships are indeed dynamic, progressive, and interdependent, as Saunders explains, then it can be expected that familial disagreements and conflict would naturally arise, especially in periods of growth and identity formation. Yet, according to Gano-Phillips and Finchman, constructive resolution should be a primary concern of family conflict, so as to prevent the accumulation of suppressed anger, resentment, and hate. The regime’s ambivalence toward the national question proved to be a stagnant solution, at best, to the incomplete negotiation between the supra-national Yugoslav identity and the development of the individual republics. That is to say that the postwar roles were not fully negotiated, the existing psychic conflicts were not fully resolved, and the relationships of the brothers were not fully stabilized.

While the national question was ignored, each republic was gradually allowed to follow a differentiated, nationally-defined path without precise federal guidance, while Yugoslav nation-building was encouraged without adequate substance (metaphorically, without enduring bridges). The individual republics, slowly growing apart, were also developing separate cultures and, in fact, beginning to define themselves in opposition to one another. In the absence of a strong federal state and threatening “others” after the

mid-1950s, each republic instinctually shaped its own national cultures against those of the other republics. Yet, because the existence of nationalism was essentially rejected by the Party's confidence in self-management, the mounting separatism in the republics were neither recognized nor addressed. Instead, the regime stubbornly disregarded the national question in the initial years of the socialist state, pushing unresolved psychic conflicts from the interwar transition and wartime traumas deeper into the unconscious.

As a post-1948 variable, the total absence of an authoritative father figure proved to be an added challenge to the brothers' struggle to reorganize the family into a meaningful unit. Tito, acting as a benevolent father, more often sought to appease the bothers rather than to strictly discipline them. Although his leadership was crucial to the development of Yugoslavia's principle pillars and his role certainly lent hierarchical structure to the family, Tito did not operate with the iron fist of King Aleksandar or Stalin. In spite of mild centralizing tendencies, especially in the realm of education and media, he attempted to create a synthetic umbrella culture that might link the South Slavs and offer them an attractive new option. Tito did not, however, account for the necessary process of transformation and adaptation to the new family structures.

Simply put, the Yugoslavs had not been given the opportunity to come to terms with past experiences and consciously accept the parameters of their new roles. The quick postwar reorganization, coupled with the need for immediate external shields, accelerated the familial reconfiguration and neglected the resolution of past conflicts. In turn Serbia nurtured an unconscious penis envy, increasingly promoting her resentment about a demoted power status. Simultaneously, the other member nations progressively cultivated aspirations for an imaginary phallus, and their desire was manifested in muted rejections

of the Yugoslav family. Repressed for the time being, however these psych conflicts would reemerge during increasing separatism in the 1970s and dramatically agitate the family relations.

Chapter II: Resurfacing (1963-1980)

In 1968, Dobrica Cosic spoke at the assembly of the Serbian League of Communists about the persecution to Serbs in Kosovo and Vojvodina. The speech mirrored Cosic's sharp turn away from Tito's regime and the idea of a united Yugoslav brotherhood previously glorified in his partisan epics. In fact, in the early 1960s, Cosic was growing disillusioned with the decentralization of the federal state, especially after the reforms of the 1963 Constitution, and warned that the unsolved national question would cause detrimental damage to Yugoslavia's internal relations. The Party, however, did not heed to Cosic's prophecies and hastily purged him on grounds of inciting nationalism. Ironically, Cosic's arguments will be revived several decades later and mobilized in the 1986 Memorandum of the Academy of Arts and Sciences as well as Milosevic's nationalist platform.

In 1968, nonetheless, Cosic's expulsion from the LCY was telling of the regime's persistent ambivalence toward the national question hovering over official Yugoslav discourses. The Party's commitment to socialist self-management and decentralization essentially rejected the existence of nationalism. That is to say that the state lacked constructive dialogue addressing the national question, while the guise of multi-culturalism was far from an adequate process of resolution. Instead, the Party's response to expressions of nationalist voices sanctioned by empowered republican centers, especially in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, was Tito's brisk suppression of each respective movement – a metaphorical repression of the preexisting psychic conflicts, Serbia's penis envy and the other republic's quest for the imaginary phallus, deeper into the unconscious. In turn, the increasing decentralization of the state, especially with the

1974 Constitution, slowly eroded federal directive and challenged supra-national Yugoslavism, essentially allowing room for the gradual reemergence of these internal psychic conflicts on the republican level. In the 1970s, Cosic's dismissed warnings will begin to echo in reality, as the long-repressed unconscious problems resurface in form of national disputes between the Yugoslavs.

I. Multi-Culturalism Becomes a Precursor to Separatism

In the early 1960s, reinforced by 1963 Constitution, the state abandoned all official attempts to create a supra-national Yugoslav identity. As Wachtel explains, "even the highest echelons of the Communist party came to believe that a centralized culture would not work, and by 1962-63, Tito abandoned the idea of Yugoslav integration."²⁰⁶ In terms of cultural policy, this meant greater liberalization of form and content. As a result of these changes, the 1960s are generally considered the golden age of Yugoslav culture, art, and literature, associated with minimal media restrictions and the "black wave" of novels and films challenging socialist reality.²⁰⁷ More importantly, because the regime embraced multi-culturalism after 1963, "the right of every people and nationality in Yugoslavia to free development and their own cultural identity,"²⁰⁸ culture became relegated to the republican level and positioned on an integral national axis.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 173.

²⁰⁷ Yugoslavia was unique in its liberalized cultural policy that allowed clear challenges to its core concepts. Miroslav Krleža's *Banners* (published in several volumes during 1964-68), for example, was a voice of opposition to the Yugoslav union. Wachtel writes that "what is significant about the novel in the context of Yugoslav culture in the early 1960s is its illustration of one man's disillusionment with the Yugoslav ideal" (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 178).

²⁰⁸ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 229.

²⁰⁹ However, that is not to say that this shift was either sudden or all-inclusive. Instead, "supranational visions of Yugoslav culture remained strong in Yugoslav society, and it would be best to characterize their interaction as a competition, one in which particularist views eventually triumphed. It was the gradual victory of cultural particularism that laid the crucial groundwork for the ultimate political collapse of Yugoslavia" (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 174).

Consequently, lacking the premise of Yugoslavism as a facilitator of inter-republican cooperation, an underlying connection, the republics came to understand cultural development as way illuminate their differences.

The collapse of the supra-national Yugoslavism was a prominent theme in literature, even before decentralization formed fissures along republican lines. In Antun Soljan's "Special Envoys" (1957), the Slovene author foreshadows the ultimate failures of Yugoslavia through a narrative of a people unable to integrate with one another. Although Soljan does not suggest that integration is unfeasible, or even undesirable, his story "presents the impossibility of the realization of the Yugoslav ideal in the tragic key befitting a man who has had, but lost, and ideal. In this he can be seen as emblematic of the culture at large."²¹⁰ Just as Andric predicted chaos without supra-national culture, the metaphorical bridge between the brothers, so Soljan's work hints at the forthcoming cultural disintegration in the 1960s and 1970s.

The slow disassociation of the republics starting from the 1960s was not simply happening on a cultural level, but rather only beginning at the cultural level. As a result of the 1963 Constitution, the Yugoslav republics gained more self-governing powers and autonomy as part of the greater communist plan to completely eliminate state structure. By divulging power to the republics and weakening the federal center, the regime expected the concept of the state to simply disappear. The plan, however, had almost opposite results. In effect, "as republican-based groups of Communists asserted their authority, they almost inevitably came to nationalism as opposed to supranationalism."²¹¹ While it cannot be said that the republics were inevitably destined to turn toward a

²¹⁰ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 182.

²¹¹ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 134.

national axis, the reforms of the 1963 Constitution were furthered by external conditions. Namely, the elimination of external threats to the federal structure,²¹² the postwar viability of small states, and the postmodern preference for particularity greatly propelled Yugoslavia toward its splintered identity.

In psychological terms, it can be said that the individual psychic problems of the republics were not addressed by Yugoslavism, but rather pushed deeper into the republics' respective unconsciousness. In the confines of the increasingly liberalized national space, lacking the restraints of supra-nationalism but also removed from intra-Yugoslav dialogue, the veiled conflicts began to emerge in individual republics. As Slavenka Drakuclic remarks, "what is absent from history, what is forbidden or repressed, often turns into a myth."²¹³ That is to say that the repressed memories and unresolved conflicts of the individual nations had manifested into exaggerated forms while they had been confined to the unconscious. In the same vain, once a slight liberalization allowed the republics to unearth portions of these inflated conflicts, they immediately demanded even greater liberties and directed blame at the federal state for the repression as the root of the conflict in the first place. Hence, the initial nationalist resonance emerging from the republics was countering the federal state – because the Party rejected the existence of nationalism, the republics' answer was nationalism itself.

Contextualized into a family dynamic, the republics' nationalist retort can be interpreted as a rebellion against their, albeit benevolent, father Tito. Recalling the

²¹² According to Arnold Suppan, "After the collapse of the Iron Curtain, Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance to Washington and Moscow. For the first time in history, no external threat forced Yugoslavia to remain whole, and none of the component nations had any need for it any longer." (Arnold Suppan, "Yugoslavism versus Serbia, Croatian, and Slovene Nationalism," *Yugoslavia and Its Historians*, Eds. Norman M. Naimark and Holly Case (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 136.)

²¹³ Slavenka Drakulic, *Café Europa: Life After Communism* (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1996), 104.

brothers' overthrow of previous figures of authority (King Aleksandar, Stalin), their resistance to Tito's regime is plausible as part of a legacy of opposition to authoritarian control. In her narrative of the French Revolution, Lynn Hunt noted a similar response by the band of brothers – the role of the father, even the benevolent one, was gradually replaced by a child-centric model and eventually followed by narratives where the brothers become fathers. In Yugoslavia's case, while Tito had struggled to be an unbiased and fair parent – trying both to appease and discipline the brothers – slight liberalizations opened the path to individual differentiation and an irreversible internal re-conceptualization of the republics' identities. From the early 1960s, the Yugoslav brothers invariably began to imagine themselves outside the context of the umbrella Yugoslavia and built confidence to petition further means of sovereignty.

II. Repressions of Nationalist Movements, and How They Backfired

The Croatian Spring of 1971 was a brave show of nationalist aspiration, ripe with youthful confidence on the part of Croatia's intellectuals.²¹⁴ Tito's protective response was an immediate repression of liberals and separatists, mass purging of members of the Croatian Communist Party,²¹⁵ and a general attempt to reaffirm LCY's authority via democratic centralism. In James Grow's words, "given Tito's twin needs to accommodate the generals and to play equitable parent with all the nationally sensitive children in his family of republics... he could have only removed the leaders in

²¹⁴ It was the intellectuals, writes, and artists who actually began creating separate cultures: "Although it was a change in the political climate that created an opening...the actual work of dismantling Yugoslav unity was carried out primarily in the cultural arena" (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 197-198).

²¹⁵ Significantly, Tito filled the positions of the purged Croatian communists with a disproportionate number of Serbs. Not surprisingly, this did receive a positive reaction in Croatia's nationalizing government.

Croatia.”²¹⁶ It can be said that Tito was so committed to his role as a fair father that he decided to undertake similar purges of intellectuals and liberals in Serbia in 1972 with the aim of showing equal treatment to each republic.²¹⁷ Instead of producing Tito’s desired response, the repressions were answered by a flowering of critical leftist cultural voices, in form of samizdat press, dissident movements, and alternative politics. Wachtel draws attention to this new rebellious culture as the central danger to Yugoslavia, explaining that “a tragic mistake [was made] by the Yugoslav government when it responded to the separatist problem by jailing political leaders but allowing separatism to flourish in the cultural sphere.”²¹⁸ So that while Tito was concerned about suppressing nationalism in its most blatant form, the regime did not account for the persuasive role of culture in cultivating national mood on the republican level. Instead, the LCY expected its liberal policies to avert the politicization of culture, as much as the rebellious impulses of the nations, but coupled with repressed nationalism, liberal culture showed to be a precarious combination for Yugoslavia in the 1970s.

Prophesy Coles identifies rebellion and admiration as the central duality in the parent-child relationship, rebellion being most often associated with the unconscious process of differentiation from the parent and the development of self-identity. In the early 1970s, the intellectual backlash answering Tito’s cultural restrictions was an important moment in the nationalization of republican cultural space. While Wachtel deems the 1963 Constitution as the benchmark of multi-culturalism, Tito’s repressions in the coming decade positioned national culture on the republican level as the perfect

²¹⁶ Grow, “The People’s Prince,” 52.

²¹⁷ As Francine Freidman argues, Serbia lost some of its best and brightest intellectuals and politicians in the 1972 purges, space left to be filled by mediocre leaders in the future (like Milosevic). (Freidman, “The Bosnian Muslims.”

²¹⁸ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 197.

platform for continued identity formation. Put succinctly, “in Croatia in the late 1960s and Serbia in the early 1980s, it would not be an exaggeration to say that nationalistic political movements rose on the back of cultural ones rather than the other way around.”²¹⁹

Examined on the level of literature, the revival of centralized control was both predicted and feared. Mesa Selimovic’s *Death and the Dervish* (1966) openly discusses themes of brotherhood, betrayal, and the role of the oppressive Party. Wachtel elaborates that the novel brought to light “the total control achieved by the use of spies, the paternalistic attitude of the authorities, and the aura of death that surrounds life itself in all its aspects all echo uncomfortably the practices of the vanguard Communist party and the realities of postwar Yugoslav life.”²²⁰ Selimovic unravels a complex web of relations in following the story of the main protagonist, the dervish Nerudin, as he tries to save his brother from being persecuted by the Partisans, with whom he had served during the war. In the course of the novel, Nerudin’s pure fraternal love is inevitably poisoned by communist politics, concluding with the tragic physical death of the brother and the dervish’s own spiritual death. The triangle of infidelity extends to several layers: while the Party had betrayed the brother, the dervish feels that he was also betrayed his brother as much as himself. Speaking about the legacy of traitors and heroes in Serbian and Croatian cultures, Aleksa Djilas elaborates that “traitors [are proclaimed] as absolutely evil, and heroes as absolutely good, and in general refused to [be] anything but permanently opposed forces of light and darkness. The phenomenon of treason became a

²¹⁹ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 184.

²²⁰ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 183.

veritable obsession of Croats and Serbs and a frequent theme of their literature.”²²¹

Contextualized in the regime’s political recentralization efforts of the late 1960s and early 1970s, themes breached in Selimovic’s novel will provide useful insights to the psychology of power relations between the federal state and the republics, metaphorically between a parent and children as well as between siblings.

In addition to the wave of repressions in Croatia and Serbia after 1971, Tito had previously answered voices of nationalism in the late 1960s in other parts of the state. Namely, in 1966, Tito purged Aleksandar Rankovic, the director of the national security police (UDB)²²² and a pro-Serbian advocate of centralism, in order to placate mounting discontent among Kosovo’s Albanian population who were being increasingly discriminated against in Serbia. Rankovic’s dismissal from the Party was celebrated as a victory for minority rights, toasted by Croats and Hungarians in Vojvodina as much as Albanians in Kosovo, and signaled a major relocation of political power to local Albanians in the region. While the Serbs felt their position in Yugoslavia eroded,²²³ the Albanians mobilized the new limited liberalizations by pushing for further anatomy in 1968 with a similar show of nationalist confidence that later became a hallmark of the Croatian Spring.²²⁴ In fact this pattern of post-liberalization nationalism, followed by political repressions and then an even greater upsurge of rebellious nationalism will

²²¹ Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 9.

²²² The UDB, much like many other federal-level government and military structures in Yugoslavia had a higher percentage of Serbs than any other national group.

²²³ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 163. Connecting the overthrow of Rankovic to a communist myth legitimization strategy, Nicholas Miller writes that “[Rankovic’s] removal was also motivated by the desire of the rest of the ruling class in Yugoslavia to stigmatize, finally and completely, centralism and Serbianism as one and the same ill in Yugoslavia” (Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 296).

²²⁴ Vickers narrates that “by removing police pressure and giving more concessions to the Albanians to secure their allegiance to Yugoslavia, the government was unwittingly encouraging the Kosovars to become more conscious of their national rights but also of their Albanian culture. The floodgates were now opened to a powerful revival of Albanian nationalism” (Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 165).

become a blueprint for the last two decades of power relations in Yugoslavia. Notably, the pattern mirrors the power dynamics within a family during the child's stages of differentiation, offering a useful metaphor for understanding the relations of the federal state's gradual concession process to the republics, and even more to the nations.

The case of Bosnian Muslims is also noteworthy in this matrix of gradual decentralization, illustrating another example of the power negotiations between center and peripheral elements. When Tito recognized Bosnian Muslims as a constitutive nation of Yugoslavia in 1968, he essentially expanded the cast of actors in the national question drama.²²⁵ Because republics were generally understood to be sovereign homelands of sovereign nations, Bosnia was implicitly connoted as the homeland of the Bosnian Muslim nation. However, this presented a problem on two levels: first, the recognition of a nation with religion as the dominant identity trait was inherently anti-Marxist,²²⁶ and second, it contested Bosnia as the homeland of the Serbian and Croatian populations also living in the republic. It can be said that in Bosnia, especially, "the heterogeneity of many regions of the country was in conflict with politically supported particularism, a volatile mixture that could produce national conflict."²²⁷ Henceforth, the dual support of national cultures and the development of republican-level structures encouraged association of

²²⁵ Tito had several motivators for granting Bosnian Muslims the status of a nation: first, just like in Macedonia, the recognition of a separate national group was expected to quell nationalistic aspirations of Serbs and Croats over the people and territory of Bosnia; second, Tito hoped that the elevated status would give Bosnian leadership greater agency for participation in Yugoslav federal affairs; thirdly, it was expected that the presence of the Bosnian Muslim group would end disputes over resource distribution in Bosnia; and finally, Tito imagined that the support of the Muslims in Bosnia would win him legitimacy with other international pan-Islamic nations and non-aligned countries.

²²⁶ Coincidentally, the creation of a Bosnian Muslim nation also contradicted Islam itself. According to Aleksa Djilas, "Islam, however, is explicitly anti-national; it asserts that Muslims should not commit themselves to any nation, since belonging to any community other than that of Islam is unworthy of a true believer... Muslim leaders opposed the creation of a Muslim nation with equal zeal [as becoming termed Serbs or Croats]. Not until the twentieth century did the transformation of Bosnian Muslims into a nation really begin" (Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 10).

²²⁷ Friedman, "The Bosnian Muslims," 279.

territory with nationality. As Bosnian Muslims (re)discovered and shaped their national discourse, gradually claiming Bosnia as their homeland, intensifying nationalism was met with partial repressions from the federal level – critical of it in the first place, but also pressured by discontent of Serbs and Croats. The accumulation of vehement energy that exploded among Bosnian Muslim in 1983²²⁸ initiated a familiar pattern of Yugoslavia's struggle against nationalism, or metaphorically the power dynamics of a child's separation from the family unit.²²⁹

Just like political oppression on the republican level that was answered by rebellious outcries, concessions to national minorities in fact stimulated their thirst for greater local power. Not only did Tito's strong support of national minorities empower them as new actors on the republican level, it also produced resentment from the Yugoslav nations who deemed this reorganization of power to be a challenge to their own rights.

In psychological terms, it can be said that Serbia, in particular, was beginning to feel increasingly betrayed by Tito in the late 1960s, especially as new political actors began to compete for powers both within the federation and within her republican borders. Considered metaphorically, the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a nation and Albanians as a nationality of Yugoslavia is parallel to an expansion of a family, the introduction of a new child. As Freud explained, "the child grudges the unwanted intruder and rival... it feels that it has been dethroned, despoiled, prejudiced in its rights;

²²⁸ Ilija Izetbegovic, Bosnia's notorious president during the 1990s conflicts, was jailed in wave of repression in 1983 on grounds of having promoted Islamic fundamentalism.

²²⁹ Aside from Macedonians, Bosnian Muslims arguably cradled the strongest attachment to the Yugoslav identity in the postwar state. Xavier Bougarel lists several factors, primarily citing that the Yugoslav federation was a sort of refuge from other nationalist aspirations and a framework where an independent identity was allowed to develop, also stressing that Bosnian Muslims credited the communist-era with socio-economic and cultural modernizations of Bosnia (Bougarel, "Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea," 107-108).

it casts a jealous hatred upon the new baby and develops grievances against the faithless mother which often finds expression in a disagreeable change in its behavior.”²³⁰ That is to say that when another child enters the love triangle as a competitor to the parent-child relations, or, worse yet, when a new child enters an already tense family environment, it is not uncommon for feelings of betrayal, jealousy, envy, and hate to surface. According to Freud, the root of this problem is the child’s immoderate demand for love, a demand not reconcilable with the prospect of a parent’s divided affection. Considering this model, it can be said that Serbia felt increasingly challenged and betrayed when her powers were challenged in Kosovo, within her republican borders, and in Bosnia, where many of her co-nationals lived.

From the Serbian perspective, a psychoanalytic approach would claim that the republic felt more and more constricted by the gaze of siblings craving her imaginary phallus. According to Minsky, the actual meaning of being the phallus is powerlessness, not power. Taken in context of a growing family, with every nation competing for the ultimate object of desire – Serbia’s imaginary phallus, or the power Serbia symbolized – it is easy to imagine how the republic came to embody the role of a martyr, and interpreted all constitutional changes as direct attacks on her territorial integrity and republican powers. When minority groups in Serbia were given more liberties, Serbia felt her own rights had been reduced. Conversely, the penis envy she had developed at the state’s founding, when her matriarchal stance had been demoted to that of a sister, began to be manifested in more overt behavior. Viewing Tito as the castrator, Serbia’s first backlash reactions were directed against the regime, decentralization, and the perceived

²³⁰ Freud, “Femininity,” 229.

betrayal of her benevolent father.²³¹ Later reactions will be displayed in more direct protests against other nations and their nationalizing aspirations, manifested in terms of jealousy and antagonism toward those perceived to be positioned as more advantaged, superior, or dominant. In this way, Serbia's unresolved penis envy will continue to have a negative influence on her relations with the other republics, crippling her from developing healthy family relationships within the framework of the Yugoslavia family.

In the early 1970s, for the time being, increased competition for power within the federal structure also enflamed the brothers' internalized envy toward Serbia and fueled their competitive rivalry over the phallus. That is to say that each brother within the family felt increasingly greedy for total self-determination imagined at the final stage of decentralization, or metaphorically the acquisition of Serbia's imaginary phallus, and openly began to voice these repressed desires.

However, despite Tito's generous appeasement of some calls for liberalizations, promotion of national culture, and increased appropriation of rights on the national level, the benevolent father remained strictly opposed to nationalism. Tito's stance is in synch with the official communist ideology, but it can also be argued that Tito truly believed in the concept of Yugoslavism and the possibility for creating a Yugoslav nation.²³² His persistent responses to outbursts of nationalist activity were expressed via measured concessions of demands or partial repressions, usually allowing the former to minority nationalisms and enforcing the latter with republican nationalisms. Unfortunately, neither method was successful because in the presence of strong envious drive, much like the one

²³¹ It might be more appropriate to imagine the LCY as the castrator because, as Wachtel writes, "central control was assured by reserving true political power in the country for the fully centralized Communist party" (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 130).

²³² See Djilas, *The Contested Country* and Djokic, *Yugoslavism*.

emerging from the repressed unconscious conflicts of the Yugoslavs, deters gratification. According to Klein, lacking complete gratification as a result of unresolved conflicts can seriously compromise the child's capacity for love in later relationships.

III. 1974 Constitutional Changes Unintentionally Erode Yugoslavism

In his final attempt to gratify the Yugoslavs' growing desires within the familiar framework, Tito conceded to the 1974 Constitution that essentially reshaped the state into a confederation and began the process of de-Titoization. George White explains how "Tito found that he could only smooth over tensions by allowing the various elements of Yugoslav society to follow ever more diverging paths of development."²³³

Contextualized into the dynamics of a parent-child relationship, the increased liberties allowed by the constitution can be seen as the final parental compromises with maturing children before their full disassociation the family unit. In Miller's words, "Tito thus granted Yugoslavs the 1974 constitution after purging those 'nationalists' who he assumed might take the republican liberties too far."²³⁴ Evidently, he was not only trying to placate stirring demands, as Miller's comment suggests that Tito believed the republics were ready for these expanded liberties and that he trusted them to develop along the intended path. Yet while the constitution was meant to lead the republics on the path towards the last phase of the decentralization process and the elimination of the state concept, it had the reverse effect of destroying supra-Yugoslavism while endowing the republics with all the trappings of proto-states. Instead of simply dissolving the family structure, the Yugoslav brothers appeared intent on destroying Yugoslavism and

²³³ George White, *Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 200), 225.

²³⁴ Miller, "Reconstituting Serbia," 302.

simultaneously transferring ultimate power and guarding the state's grand legacy for themselves. In the decade to come, and especially with the total elimination of the father figure, the unconscious motives driving this envious quest for the imaginary phallus will become manifested in a metaphorical death drive.

The arguments of Dobrica Cosic, while not publicly espoused in full until the late 1980s, began to gain more credibility in the 1970s and his novel *A Time of Death* (published in three volumes during 1972-1975) is a useful cross-section of the rhetoric of the decade. The model of the fictional father and son remains a fixture of Cosic's narrative as he positions Vukasin Katic and his son, adherents of South Slavic unity, against a group of outsiders who present the opposing view as a more realistic option. However, the utopian dream of a South Slavic unity nurtured by both the father and the son is conceptualized as only a bleak fantasy, a foolhardy attempt to overcome differences that are far too large. Cosic's perspective is an illumination of the emerging theme of separatism, rather than unity, existing between the South Slavs. In fact, in the novel's narrative of the First World War, Cosic is concerned with political debates exclusively within Serbian society.

Not only undermining supra-nationalism, the novel overtly positions the Serbian narrative as superior in relation to Yugoslavism. By extension, the novel signals a shift in the conceptualization of relationships that will also become visible in the political sphere. Telling of a metaphorical refocusing on the self, Serbia, as much as the other Yugoslav brothers, will begin to appropriate power previously reserved for the federal state in order to engage particular national aspirations at the republican level. Although greed appears to be at the root of this repositioning, defined by Klein as an insatiable craving for

something the subject needs and what the object can or wishes to give, the real driving force is better understood as the resurfacing of unresolved psychic conflicts.

The Constitution of 1974 was the last official attempt to address, although not properly resolve, the republic's unconscious problems. Most influenced by Edvard Kardelj, the constitution initiated a reorganization of power, bestowing the republics with greater jurisdiction over federal bodies than was vested in the federal state itself. The reforms proposed in 1974 marked Kardelj's victory in the constitutional debates spanning 1967-1974 and introduced his ideological concepts into the restructuring of Yugoslavia.²³⁵ Most prominently, Kardelj believed that decentralization was a precondition to self-management – the only real democracy – as well as the path to democratization. While Tito had lobbied for the preserved unity of the Part, and the Central Committee was officially endowed with reigning authority, “away from it, each party acted practically autonomously. Yugoslavia had become a nine-party system; in addition to the eight federal components, the party organization was given status equivalent to the provincial parties in the Central Committee of the LCY.”²³⁶ This remark brings to light two major reforms of the 1974 Constitution: Kosovo and Vojvodina, previously autonomous regions, were renamed provinces and granted status almost equivalent to republics, while republics were now considered “completed” nations. These changes would have a major significance for propelling the perception of Yugoslavia away from a collectivistic family model, and toward a particularist individual-centric orientation. That is to say that the regime fully recognized the presence of an inter-relational problem but its solution explicitly overlooked the nature of the conflict by

²³⁵ Succinctly put, “the future of Yugoslavia, thus, ultimately depended on who would define socialism” (Jovic, “Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism,” 175).

²³⁶ Grow, “The People's Prince,” 40-41.

allowing the republics space to avoid dialogue. What is more, by recognizing republics as nations, Kardelj's constitution essentially legitimized unconscious desires and empowered their unresolved drives.

In contrast to Tito who remained an avid believer in Yugoslavia's brotherhood and unity, Kardelj claimed that federalism and confederalism were outdated and instead advocated an extreme anti-statism that deemed any expressions of Yugoslavism anti-socialist. Although Tito officially endorsed Yugoslavia's fourth constitutional changes, the only compromises Kardelj allowed were the preserved unity of the Party and the continued alliance with the army. Pavlowitch summarizes that after the 1974 reforms, the state was left with "only Tito (who would have no successor) and the army were left to guarantee its unity."²³⁷ What is more, Pavlowitch hints at the ephemeral role of the father figure, as Tito's position was not factored in to Kardelj's redesigned power distribution in Yugoslavia.

On the contrary, 1974 also marked the beginning of the de-Titoization process lasting until the president's death in 1980, during which time Tito was reduced to little more than a symbolic icon for the similarly fading idea of Yugoslavism. The complete disappearance of the father figure is in line with Lynn Hunt's model of the evolving family drama as a mirror of the French Revolution. In the aftermath of the revolution, both in literature and in politics, Hunt found a gradual process eradicating the father figure from the national narrative – the father reappeared in literature as a benevolent figure of authority, while the French similarly experimented with monarchy even after the revolution – but a final reformation avoided the father's role altogether. As Hunt noted, the brothers themselves now aspired toward the role of the father. It is not

²³⁷ Pavlowitch, *Serbia*, 180.

surprising, then, that the Yugoslav brothers, empowered with nationally-driven prerogatives resulting from the 1974 Constitution, would begin to divulge their unconscious desires via envy, competition, and hate.

While discussing the negative emotional reactions to the 1974 changes, it is important to note that the new constitution was primarily an attempt to appease the Yugoslavs, not provoke them into conflict.²³⁸ Regardless of the constitution's generally progressive changes, none of the republics felt particularly satisfied. Nationalist Serbian rhetoric, of course, claims that Titoism became innately anti-Serbian after Rankovic's removal from the Party. From this angle, each new state reform was interpreted as a fragmentation of the Serbian nation – and the rhetoric now explicitly shifts to mobilize the potent concept of nation – within Yugoslavia, with the increased autonomy of the Serbian provinces was seen as the ultimate treason by the Yugoslav state. As Miller narrates, “the source of tension in Serbian society in the 1980s, however, would be precisely the growing belief of Serbs outside the party that Titoist methods were no longer useful. The party no longer served the Serbs.”²³⁹ Yet, neither Tito nor Kardelj were purposefully evoking dissatisfaction among the Serbs, or any of the other Yugoslav nations. Instead, the primary motive of the 1974 Constitution had been to quench the growing demands for self-determination within the federation, while officially following the path to decentralization and de-etatization – an awkward recognition of underlying conflicts. The ultimate result of the reform essentially transformed the state into a *de*

²³⁸ According to Sabina Ramet, however, there are many conflicting perceptions of the effects of the reforms: “Even the most pessimistic writers in the West tend to view the 1974 constitutional system as having merits as well as debilities, while out-and-out optimists saw it as no less than ‘the legitimization of a revolution.’” (Sabina P. Ramet, *Thinking About Yugoslavia*: (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 71.)

²³⁹ Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 303.

facto confederation,²⁴⁰ a framework hoped to guard Yugoslavia's integrity while equally satisfying demands for autonomy that, not surprisingly, did not provide the appropriate platform for conflict resolution.

One of the most prominent constitutional changes was the elevated position of Kosovo and Vojvodina to the status of autonomous provinces within Serbia, thus granting them almost equal powers as were vested in the republics. Following in the steady line of increased rights for minorities, these new privileges were intended to grant "national affirmation" to Yugoslavia's Albanian population.²⁴¹ The provinces were given representation in federal presidency, as well as their own assembly, police force, and a national bank. Most significantly, since more power was relegated to the provinces, into hands of local majority populations, this consequently opened possibilities for greater Albanian and Hungarian cultural penetration in the provinces, but also within Yugoslavia as a whole. It can be said that Bosnian Muslims were affected in a similar way; Bougarel notes that because the constitution essentially affirmed nation-states on a federal level, Bosnian Muslims had even greater opportunity to (re)discover their culture and history in a sort of "national awakening."²⁴²

For a country embracing the concept of multi-culturalism, this should have been a positive omen,²⁴³ but it evoked strong negative reactions on the part of the republics, now acting on behalf of nations. From the perspective of Serbia, as well as other republics

²⁴⁰ In short, a confederation is an umbrella collective where each state is allowed to choose its own form of government, in theory between the communist model (uni-party) and a multi-party organization. In practice, the restructuring to a confederation greatly increased the powers of the individual branches of the Communist Party, making Yugoslavia an entity consisting of several independently-acting communist states.

²⁴¹ See Djokic, "Yugoslavism: Histories, Myths, Concepts," 1-10.

²⁴² Bougarel, "Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea," 107.

²⁴³ Just as the improved economic opportunities resulting from self-management should have been toasted as a success of the transformed confederation.

with sizable minority populations,²⁴⁴ other empowered national groups proved a direct challenge to the trajectory of their individual drives. The presence of other nations and cultures was imagined as a threat to the perseverance of their own cultures. But, in fact, other empowered national groups simply roused unconscious fears and repressed conflicts. In the case of Serbia, the presence of two new actors officiated by the constitution – Kosovo and Vojvodina – created a space where her position, and alleged power, was even more hotly contested. According to Dragovic-Soso, “the raising of Kosovo and Vojvodina to the level of republics in all but name in the 1970s, while formally maintaining them as part of the republic, effectively made Serbia a Yugoslavia in miniature.”²⁴⁵ In other words, the same unconscious conflicts that plagued Serbia’s relationship with the Yugoslav brothers now also complicated the relations with the provinces.

The empowering of the autonomous provinces was an important factor in unearthing Serbia’s unconscious conflicts. Feeling metaphorically dismembered to “inner Serbia” and fearing the reduction her powers within her own borders,²⁴⁶ Serbia’s relationship Kosovo and Vojvodina was strained from the start. In perspective of the new near-synonymy of nation and republic, the republics were now imagined to be exclusively in the service of national interests, while the agency given to Kosovo and Vojvodina within Serbia’s borders seriously compromised her national republican interests. Serbia found many instances proving this injustice, more prominently the

²⁴⁴ Notably, Croatia housed a large Serbian minority. At this instance, we can also speak about the large populations of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia as (very large) minority groups. It is also important to note the contrast of the diverse population in Macedonia, as well as the almost homogeneous population of Slovenia.

²⁴⁵ Dragovic-Soso, *Saviors of the Nation*, 67.

²⁴⁶ Pavlowitch remarks how “the issue of borders began to arise as the republics came close to being sovereign states, and nation-states at that.” (Pavlowitch, *Serbia*, 182.)

provinces' political power that allowed them to veto any Serbian decision and thus hinder Serbia's autonomy. Judah explains how this was "widely regarded as the constitutional injustice done to Serbia by the 1974 constitution. That is to say, that Kosovo and Vojvodina had a say in the running of Serbia as a whole, but Serbia was unable to interfere in the internal affairs of the provinces. So, while Kosovo frequently voted against Serbia on the federal presidency, the collective body which had replaced Tito, Serbia itself was constitutionally unable to do anything about what was increasingly being considered the parlous condition of the Kosovo Serbs."²⁴⁷ Judah's comment illustrates two emerging complications: the role of national minorities and the motives of the provinces. In the first place, Serbs living in Kosovo became an important concern for Serbia, and to a lesser degree Serbian populations of Croatia and Bosnia, because they highlighted Serbia's powerlessness over her own nationals in a political environment where nation was increasingly associated with territory. Thus, this feeling of powerlessness drove Serbia's penis envy, the desire to have control over her entire nation.²⁴⁸ And, secondly, Judah makes mention of the provocative behavior of the provinces, similar to the rebellions of the republics in relation to Yugoslavia.

²⁴⁷ Judah, *The Serbs*, 52.

²⁴⁸ This concept is not new. For example, certain interpretations of the nineteenth-century language reformer Vuk Karadzic's work claimed that any land where the *stokavian* dialect was spoken marked Serbian land. In the present case, Serbia's problem of scattered populations is much more complicated due to the simultaneous nationalization of other republics. Although Serbia was concerned about the same issues post-1974 as all Yugoslav republics (national minorities, borders, integration), she felt persecuted because her own nationals were not recognized, much less given autonomous status in other republics, while Albanians and Hungarians were given sizable jurisdiction within the borders of her republic. According to Wachtel, "as the various minorities demanded and received greater recognition, autonomy, and rights, the Serbian plurality felt increasingly threatened" (Wachtel, *Breaking a Nation, Making a Nation*, 226). Serbia's growing fear and resentment, coupled with the desire to unite all Serbs into one state (Yugoslavia had, in fact, accomplished this goal, and according to some scholars, Yugoslavia was the only way to achieving this unity), will be interpreted as a megalomaniac drive toward the idea of a "greater Serbia." However, because the 1974 Constitution, vested the right to secession in nations, not republics, Serbian nationalists were able demand redrawn republican

The role of the provinces in relation to Serbia can be understood within the same context as the relationship of the South Slav brothers and Yugoslavia, taking the cue from Dragovic-Soso for considering post-1974 Serbia as a miniature Yugoslavia. Just as the republics had demanded even more liberties after they had been granted initial individual recognitions in the federal state, so Albanians and Hungarians rallied to gain greater autonomy within Serbia. The core of the problem is rooted in another imperative constitutional change: albeit ambiguous wording, the right to succession was now vested in republics of “constitutive nations.” For the autonomous provinces, clearly not entitled to the right to secede, this constitutional change seemed to highlight their continued marginalization. They demanded republican status, especially in Kosovo, with revitalized fervor and similar motives attributed to the republics’ quest for the imaginary phallus and the envious drive to destroy what the other has and one can never possess.

On a psychoanalytical level, the extreme shift to nationalized politics can be understood as the ultimate act of rebellion against the multi-national Yugoslavia, just like the provinces’ intentional objections to Serbia’s republican authority can be understood as rebellion motivated by similar unconscious drives. The regime’s last effort to acknowledge the internal state conflicts was approached by reforms intended to complete anti-statist transformation of Yugoslavia, but in fact strengthened stasis in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. As Jovic explains, “paradoxically, therefore, the Yugoslav *state* itself was based in an *anti-state* ideological conception. The paradox lies at the heart of the crisis of the Yugoslav state in post-1974 Yugoslavia.”²⁴⁹ In the absence of a supra-

borders to include all Serbs on the basis that Serbia lacked a true republic like the other nations. In Pavlowitch’s words, “the possibility of secession by republics gave Serbian nationalists a basis for the claim to redraw borders.” (Pavlowitch, “Serbia, Montenegro, and Yugoslavia,” 68).

²⁴⁹ Dejan Jovic, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” 105.

national state, the republics naturally turned to nationalism, not liberalism, as the main alternative to self-management.²⁵⁰ Metaphorically, in psychoanalytic terms, the growing association of nationalism with territory becomes an outward manifestation of unconscious conflicts that had been previously repressed. In this way, Tito's liberalizations and the gradual completion of decentralization actually opened a space for the emergence of these repressed conflicts. Not only was there a power vacuum in the place where Yugoslavia (and Tito) had previously governed, but the increased nationalization of territory provoked the unconscious conflicts of both republics and minorities.

The resurfacing of repressed conflicts of each group is illustrated on the political level in the post-1974 interactions within Yugoslavia. Most significantly, Serbia's penis envy became engorged with the empowered status of the provinces. While her initial anger and feelings of betrayal were directed at Tito and Yugoslavia, imagined as the primary castrators, she gradually cultivated an inferiority complex toward other republics and national groups perceived to be superior or more privileged, and used them as targets for the projection of her own dissatisfactions. Just as Freud had predicted, "persistent effects of disappointment about penis loss ... [enter] into multiple levels of female behavior."²⁵¹ The other republics similarly showed manifestations of their growing envy of the imaginary phallus. Following certain measures of concessions, empowered republics and national groups were even more driven to compensate for this envy, defined by Klein as "the angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys

²⁵⁰ At another instance, Jovic writes that "the weakening of the state made nationalist demands for a strong state, whether in Yugoslavia or a separate nation-state of constitutive nations, plausible." (Jovic, "Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism," 180.) It is interesting to note that self-management had been initially intended as a substitute for the state itself (thus also nationalism).

²⁵¹ Fisher and Greenberg, *Freud Scientifically Reappraised*, 121.

something desirable – the envious impulse being to take it away or to spoil it.”²⁵² Each nation aimed to obtain the imaginary phallus for themselves, in the process fatally damaging both Yugoslavia and their own inter-relations.

Most critically, Valerie Bunce believes the confederal structure evolving in Yugoslavia after 1974 was the major culprit in the state’s collapse. Indeed, the increased liberties of individual entities promoted separatism and largely fueled competition. The Yugoslav republics found themselves in a complex paradox – between membership in the sibling clan and the competing desire for parental love. After 1974, these two options appeared mutually exclusive, as resurfaced unconscious conflicts perturbed the intra-Yugoslav relationships. In the opinion of Francine Freidman, “the confederalism that it imposed encouraged the republics and even the localities to shoulder much of the decision making heretofore reserved for the federal government. Therefore, regions and localities were forced to go head-to-head for the limited resources of the Yugoslav state.”²⁵³

It is needless to mention that the absence of a father figure further destabilized the Yugoslav entity. In this case, Dejan Jovic believes that the “disintegration of Yugoslavia was in the first place a consequence of ‘revolutionary political changes’ introduced by Kardelj and his protégés among the younger generation of the Yugoslav political elite.”²⁵⁴ If the elimination of Tito’s position is viewed as the final revolution of the band of brothers, as Hunt would interpret the overthrow of the last figure of authority, then the next stage would call for a reorganized social and political system to compensate for the fatherless power vacuum while satisfying the demands of the brotherhood. However, as

²⁵² Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works*, 176.

²⁵³ Freidman, “The Bosnian Muslims,” 276.

²⁵⁴ Jovic, “Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism,” 180.

Freud warned and Hunt illustrated, the brothers were not interested in creating society based on brotherhood and unity, but rather becoming fathers themselves.

Chapter III: Resolution? (1980-1991)

Tito's death in 1980 completed a transformation of Yugoslavia that had already been underway since the mid-1970s: the last figure of authority had finally been removed and the Yugoslav brothers were at liberty to pursue their individual agendas. In the case of Yugoslavia, the end of Tito's era also signified the end of brotherhood and unity. Tito was, in fact, the final fraternal link between the republics, the last legitimizing force holding the federation together. As Wachtel explains, "Yugoslavia went from being a country with a poorly articulated but vitally important supranational policy to an ungovernable group of squabbling republics in less than 30 years. Federal policies encouraged, indeed almost guaranteed, a revival of nationalism both in the political and the cultural sphere. By leaning toward 'brotherhood' and away from 'unity,' the governing Communist party encouraged citizens of Yugoslavia to see themselves first and foremost as members of a specific national group."²⁵⁵ National rhetoric will come to replace supra-Yugoslavism, as much as it will seek to debase Yugoslav myths of origin and the question the existence of the federal state itself.

The 1980s were ripe with competing national dialogues, emerging from the repressed unconscious and increasingly conceptualizing their own national aims as mutually exclusive of the other republican objectives, and especially inhibited by the concept of Yugoslavia. This atmosphere will provide fertile ground for the reception of the 1986 "Memorandum" as a critical call to Serbian nationalism, as well as the ascend of Milosevic rallying around the same nationalist thrust. A similar dialogue will emerge in other republics, metaphorically as the unearthing of conflicts that had been repressed in Tito's Yugoslavia. While the resurfacing of unresolved problems does not inevitably lead

²⁵⁵ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 226.

to the scale of conflict seen at the 1990s breakup of Yugoslavia, their resolution certainly becomes more difficult after a long period of repression. Freud's concept of the death drive will be a useful tool for understanding Serbia's relations in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, while other psychoanalytic tools will be called upon to determine how unconscious national problems were influenced by the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia.

I. In Tito's Absence, Serbia Voices Discontent via the "Memorandum"

In the years after Tito's death, the stance notoriously taken by Dobrica Cosic in the late 1960s began to be voiced by other writers and appropriated in vernacular discourse. In *A Time of Death*, Cosic essentially implied that the creation of Yugoslavia after the First World War, in place of an autonomous Serbian state, had been a fatal mistake. In the political realm, individual nations were gaining more autonomy at the expense of the weakening Yugoslavia, and this shift can be said to follow the cultural fissure of national rhetoric. On the heels of Cosic's work, Danko Popovic's *A Book About Milutin* (1985) speaks exclusively from the Serbian perspective, idealizing the peasant mentality as innately Serbian and demonizing the intellectual classes as way of implicitly rejecting familial Yugoslavia. The novel was widely read in Serbia, and breached nationalist themes that will become popular in the years to come.

Popovic primarily spoke about Serbia's sacrifice for collective interests of the South Slavs, while criticizing the ungratefulness, and even treachery, of the South Slavic brothers. Popovic writes, "I hear, our brothers, but my brother already dies for some 'our

brother.’”²⁵⁶ In the same vain of self-victimization, Popovic mobilizes the overwhelming dissatisfaction with Titoism in Serbia after 1974 and frames communism as a “stab in the back” of the Serbian nation. Dismissing Yugoslavia, brotherhood, and socialist ideology, Popovic goes as far as to blame the path followed by Serbia’s prewar leaders and to essentially reject all forms of paternal authority. As a show of desperate anger, Popovic writes: “Pasic and Prince Aleksandar, Colonel Garasanin and Mladen should hear this. It’s they who built this country – I don’t want to hear about this, I want to forget!”²⁵⁷ Here, the novel voices the mounting resentment toward past leadership and the overall feelings of betrayal prevalent in Serbian national rhetoric, not dissimilar from Selimovic’s previous variation. In light of increasing separatism, this sort of discourse limited inter-republican dialogue and consequently magnified the expression of unconscious conflicts even more when the nations felt the regime and other Yugoslavs were not receptive to their plight.

In the mid-1980s, the primary plight concerning nationalists in Serbia was the condition of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, and more broadly the growing fear of Serbs that they were becoming second-class citizens in Yugoslavia’s nationalizing republics. The Serbian Communist Party, strongly espousing its anti-nationalist stance did not respond to these grievances, at least to the degree that the nationalists demanded,²⁵⁸ and the regime’s overall oblivion to the growing national tensions only fueled the

²⁵⁶ Danko Popovic, *Knjiga o Milutanu* (Beograd: NIRO, 1986), 7.

²⁵⁷ Popovic, *Knjiga o Milutanu*, 79.

²⁵⁸ Immediately after 1974, the Serbian League of Communists voiced its concerns regarding the extent of privileges granted to the provinces by Yugoslavia’s fourth constitution. The Party supported revisions of some reforms, but only within the bounds of a Titoist framework and ideology. Miller believes that the Party simply took this stance as an attempt to guard its legitimacy. The extreme Serbian nationalists, on the other hand, called for the re-integration of Serbia and the reunification of Serbs into a single state. “The solution was ‘the establishment of a complete national and cultural integrity of the Serbian nation, regardless of which republic or province it is in, as its historical and democratic right’” (Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 307).

dissatisfaction of Serbia. According to Miller, “given the long-term Titoist commitment to seeing Kosovo develop in the hands of Albanians, the Serbian League of Communists came to be viewed as a virtual traitor to the Serbian nation.”²⁵⁹ Mirroring the rhetoric of Popovic’s novel, Serbia was beginning to feel betrayed by the Party, Tito, and her Slavic brothers and vulnerably sought a platform to express the resentment bubbling up from the unconscious. The Party went as far as persecuting Kosovo Albanians’ 1981 protests for republican status as “counter-revolutionary” and “anti-communist,” but Serbian nationalist demands were not satisfied with communist self-management solutions and consequently turned on the regime itself.

While the Party failed to address Serbia’s grievances, these national concerns, metaphorically the repressed unconscious conflicts, were heard, but more often publicized and exploited, by intellectuals.²⁶⁰ In 1986, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences produced the “Memorandum,” originally intended as an internal text aimed at Serbian leadership. The document’s first part was essentially an assessment of the Yugoslav crisis, dealing with economic pitfalls, the negative effects of decentralization, corruption, investment, and other problems the Academy proposed might be remedied by democratic socialism.²⁶¹ In the second part of the “Memorandum,” however, the text takes a much more radical tone to speak about the oppression of Serbs, especially in

²⁵⁹ Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 305.

²⁶⁰ According to Jasna Dragovic-Soso, Serbian intellectuals had transferred the focus of their political activism in the 1980s, from concerns about freedom of expression to the “Kosovo Question.” In effect, intellectuals transformed from liberals and universalists, into nationalists. In Dragovic-Soso’s words, “Kosovo represented a cause which allowed them to transcend their existing defiance of freedom of speech, Kosovo as the ‘Serbian Jerusalem,’ a holy land of inestimable importance to national identity – adopt the role of guardians of both universal and national values” (Dragovic-Soso, *Saviors of the Nation*, 115).

²⁶¹ Dragovic-Soso, *Saviors of the Nation*, 178-179.

Kosovo and Croatia, as a deliberate conspiracy of Slovenes²⁶² and Croats, or Tito and Kardelj.²⁶³ According to Lenard Cohen, “the Memorandum characterized the entire Titoist approach to the ‘national question’ as an elaborate deceit and failure that had seriously harmed Serbia, and also had stimulated interethnic and inter-regional conflict throughout the country.”²⁶⁴ The “Memorandum” echoed many themes of Cosic’s earlier platforms about the regime’s deliberate aim of weakening the Serbian nation via decentralization and recognition of autonomous provinces.²⁶⁵ But, instead of advocating major government restructuring or ideological changes, the text benignly proposed only reforms of the 1974 Constitution as a solution to all outlined problems.

While the “Memorandum” was not intended as a provocation of separatism,²⁶⁶ its unauthorized publication caused a nationalist snowball effect across Yugoslavia, and especially in Serbia.²⁶⁷ The Serbian Communist Party responded weakly to the claims made in the text, rejecting criticism and nationalistic overtones, thereby contesting its

²⁶² While Serbia and Slovenia had been close allies politically and culturally in Yugoslavia, supposedly on grounds that they did not share contested territories or populations, Slovenia did not support Serbia’s opposition to the autonomy of Kosovo.

²⁶³ By some accounts, “the importance of the Memorandum as a nationalist text was rather in the extremist language it uses to depict the situation of the Serbs and in the conspiracy theory it relies on to explain it” (Dragovic-Soso, *Saviors of the Nation*, 181).

²⁶⁴ Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, 322. Similarly, Nicholas Miller characterizes the reception of the text: “If the general point of the Memorandum was that Titoism mistreated Serbs, then the way Titoism did this was equally crucial. The answer was simple: ‘first of all, it is the Serbian nation and its state that are being discussed.’ ‘After four decades in the new Yugoslavia, she alone doesn’t have her own state’” (306-307).

²⁶⁵ Similarly, Cosic’s 1977 speech “Literature and History Today” was another major influence for shaping the 1980s nationalist platform. Miller writes that “Cosic’s vehicle was a speech on the relationship of the novel to history – specifically, the ability of the novel and the novelist to characterize the history of a people where historians fail. However, the true theme of the presentation is to be found in the history he claims has inadequately been served by historians” (Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 304).

²⁶⁶ On the contrary, the text’s authors as well as intellectuals from all the other republics saw decentralization as the main reason behind the Yugoslav crisis in 1980s. While not advocating a major re-centralization, they vaguely proposed a Balkan Federation model for the region that would “allow the [Serbian] nation to be unified into one state, without denying the same right to other nations intermingled with it on the same territory” (Dragovic-Soso, *Saviors of the Nation*, 156).

²⁶⁷ Slovenian intellectuals answered the Serbian Academy’s text with their own “Contributions for a Slovene National Programme,” published in January 1987 in *Nova Revija*. While the text was not a blueprint for action, it was intended to raise awareness in regards to the treatment of the Slovene language, unbalanced economic burdens, the functioning of the army, and other issues concerning Slovenia’s perceived inequality in Yugoslavia.

own legitimacy as an advocate of the Serbian nation. Instead, nationalists allied with intellectuals became the voice of opposition and worked together to unearth Serbia's long-repressed conflicts, unfortunately in an isolated atmosphere, breeding fear and chaos, instead of a dialogue for resolution.

Interestingly, while opposition to communism in most other East European countries had seen campaigns toward civil society based on individual liberties, the nationalists who came to oppose the LCY, especially in Serbia, increasingly encouraged a regression to ethnic societies and nationalism. Several reasons can explain the growing dissatisfaction with post-Tito communism in Yugoslavia: an economic crisis resulting from structural problems and mismanagement, the reappearance of national problems and conflicts with minorities, and political crisis resulting from fading legitimacy of LCY.²⁶⁸

At the same time, the Serbian opposition was becoming more concerned with the national question, an issue the Party had not been ready or willing to address. According to Cohen, “throughout the last decade of Tito's life, Serbian leaders had avoided taking any innovative steps with regard to the issue of politicized ethnicity,”²⁶⁹ despite the fact that nationalism had been a byproduct of decentralized state structure. Furthermore, Serbia felt particularly targeted by Titoist policies in Kosovo, experiencing them as a sort of sanctioned Albanization, and act of betrayal by the father and the regime. Increasingly, the nationalist opposition lobbied enough support and assumed the voice of the Serbian people – in opposition to the LCY, and in opposition to the other nationalizing threats.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ Cohen, *'Serpent in the Bosom,'* 318.

²⁶⁹ Cohen, *'Serpent in the Bosom,'* 319.

²⁷⁰ After Tito's death, Serbian nationalist demands for the “return,” that is the return under Serbian republican jurisdiction, of Kosovo and Vojvodina became more prominent. As Miller writes, the “movement embodied the true expression of anti-Titoism, the deepest sense of opposition to the regime – in effect, the energies of the Serbian opposition were totally focused on re-creating Serbia” (Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 303).

Yet the largest paradox of the Serbian opposition movement in the late 1980s will come after the collapse of the LCY, when this nationalism becomes mobilized by Milosevic and other like-minded leaders, consequently positioning the opposition into the service of the new regime.²⁷¹ Put succinctly by Freidman, when “the main post-Tito protector, the LCY, collapsed... nationalism replaced communism as a legitimizing ideology in Yugoslavia.”²⁷²

In the immediate period after the publication of the “Memorandum,” the opposition movement can be interpreted as the vocalization of Serbia’s long-repressed penis envy. Since the republic had been gaining momentum as the voice of the entire Serbian nation, the unearthed conflict became both magnified and complicated. In fact, Serbia initially felt betrayed by Tito and the regime, and this is evident by the opposition’s vapid use of pre-partisan mythology, anti-Titoist rhetoric, and counter-revolutionary ideology.²⁷³ However, as the other Yugoslavs also became nationally mobilized and empowered, a problem Serbia had initially attributed to the LCY, they posed a threat to the already vulnerable Serbian nation within the Yugoslav family. In effect, Serbia’s unresolved conflicts were now manifested in an atmosphere of fear and disappointment, where she quickly began to sense competition and rivalry with the other Yugoslavs over governing powers that she herself did not possess.

²⁷¹ Some of the intellectuals driving the nationalist movement in Serbia were allied with the Praxis Group, a collective of philosophers espousing a humanistic opposition to Titoist Marxism-Leninism. Their opposition had been Marxist in nature, and democratically declined. Yet, in spite of this, they were able to transition to a nationalist rhetoric because their conception of democracy had not been based on individual liberties but rather on ideas of collective societies and rights, and so they could theoretically move from one homogenizing collective ideology (class-based Marxism) to another (cultural-based nationalism).

²⁷² Freidman, “The Bosnian Muslims,” 284.

²⁷³ In Miller’s words, “The regime, for Serbs, meant the power that has punished Serbs when they should have been rewarded; meant the power that had divided Serbs even more, and more importantly, divided Serbian lands” (Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 310).

The case of Serbia is particularly interesting because the nation felt ever more victimized by all direct relations – the father, the brothers, and the family. The imaginary phallus that the other Yugoslavs hoped to find in Serbia was also an object of desire for Serbia herself. Yet because Serbia felt that she had once possessed this phallus, but had since been castrated, her unconscious conflict became expressed in a jealousy toward those who seem to have stripped her of her privilege. In Freud's work, jealousy is based in the suspicion and rivalry with the father, who is accused of having taken away the mother's breast and the mother's attention, but later emulations of Freudian jealousy are directed at siblings as rivals for parental love. In Serbia's case, the fear and hate developing toward the other Yugoslav nations fuel her unconscious phallic aspirations and ultimately manifest in a death drive. The persisting problem, of course, is that the original conflicts were never resolved through direct confrontation, and Serbia, as well as the other Yugoslavs, was now driven by impulses of these repressed unconscious conflicts.

II. Milosevic Mobilizes Serbia's Repressed Unconscious

The sentiments resulting from Serbia's resurfacing, albeit still unresolved, penis envy came to be voiced and directed by Serbian culture, especially literature. Now distinctly nationalized, the mood was a far cry from the partisan war epics about the brotherly struggle. Although brothers and families remained consistently present actors, they were underlined by much different themes. In Vuk Draskovic's *The Knife* (1983), several casts of interconnected plots slowly unravel the histories of two main protagonists, boys who had been raised by adopted parents. Ironically, as their true identities are recovered, the boys find that they are by birth the things they learned to hate

most – the boy raised in a Muslim home finds out that he is in fact Serbian and that his family had been murdered by his very adoptive parents, while the other boy discovers a similar scenario in the context of Ustasa-Muslim relations. What is significant about Draskovic's novel is that he also proposes an unearthing process through which the ultimate truths may be reached. In addition, by using references to Serbian epic poetry, for example evoking the last names Osmanovic and Yugovic, and clearly positioning himself as an agent of Serbia's victimization, Draskovic colors the narrative with generational nationalist sentiment. While it can be said that *The Knife* echoes some of Andric's warnings about the difficulty of co-existence in the absence of a bridging symbol, Draskovic implies that the "very kinship, seen metaphorically as the proximity of the two sides of a knife blade, is what makes possible great connection and empathy *and* the most horrifying and violent enmity."²⁷⁴ However, by Draskovic's account, Serbia is a victim of Yugoslavia's double-edged knife, and an unavenged victim at that.

Serbia's unresolved penis envy, manifested through jealousy, hate, and anger, and increasingly targeting the other Yugoslav nations as the source of discontent, was capitalized by Serbia's burgeoning leader Slobodan Milosevic. As Dragovic-Soso explains, "by early 1988, Serbia was in a pre-revolutionary situation. In the eyes of the population, Yugoslavia's founding myths, its singular variant of socialism, and its Partisan slogan of 'brotherhood and unity' had lost their legitimacy."²⁷⁵ That is to say Milosevic cleverly sought the opportunity to fill this power vacuum and seize the nation's support, in the process redefining his own ideological trajectory. While he had been an active member of the Party, particularly promoted by friend and colleague Ivan

²⁷⁴ Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 209.

²⁷⁵ Dragovic-Soso, *Savors of the Nation*, 206.

Stambulic, Milosevic was quick to shed both his beliefs and his friendships. In the late 1980s, Milosevic employed the “darkest nationalism”²⁷⁶ that he had previously condemned, and played on Serbia’s dissatisfaction with Titoism and the Party’s regime in order to legitimize the transformation of the ruling elite.

After 1987, Milosevic was able to consolidate a powerful base of previous Party devotees and non-party opposition members by merging nationalist ideas with revolutionary themes afforded by communism.²⁷⁷ His overwhelming success can be attributed to the intellectuals’ intrinsic fragmentation, as the anti-communist nationalists, liberal democrats, and other intellectuals opposed to Milosevic were not able to overcome personal and political divisions in order to stage a significant opposition.²⁷⁸ Instead, his supporters, emerging from a sort of “nationalistic pseudo-opposition” lent substance to Milosevic’s aggressive campaign, first under the guise of protecting the rights of Serbs in Kosovo,²⁷⁹ and later pledging a defense of the entire victimized Serbian nation.

Milosevic’s campaign claimed to voice the deepest grievances of the Serbian nation. Beginning with his strategy of politicizing nationalism in Kosovo, Milosevic linked the present-day accusations against Albanian hegemony with myths historic

²⁷⁶ Cohen elaborates how “Milosevic would begin appropriating and encouraging viewpoints that he had earlier condemned as examples of the ‘darkest nationalism,’ and within a year would coopt many of the Memorandum’s authors and supporters as an intellectual brain trust” (Cohen, *‘Serpent in the Bosom,’* 326).

²⁷⁷ His appeal to intellectuals, what many academics describe as a seduction of the intelligentsia, is explained by Lenard Cohen: “For many intellectuals, Milosevic represented the first Serbian politician since Aleksandar Rankovic who was willing to remain ideologically committed to socialism, but still take a strong stand on behalf of Serbian national interests” (Cohen, *‘Serpent in the Bosom,’* 315). But, more than that, Milosevic also courted the intellectuals with liberalized cultural policies, hoping to use their credibility in the public sphere to lend legitimacy to his own leadership position. In Pavlowitch’s words, “He defended the interests of Serbia, allowed an unprecedented degree of liberalization of Serbia’s cultural scene, and most of the one-time critical intelligentsia out democracy on hold. Milosevic’s seduction of the intellectuals was one of his many ways of legitimizing his authority.” (Pavlowitch, “Serbia, Montenegro, and Yugoslavia,” 68)

²⁷⁸ See Dragovic-Soso, *‘Saviors of the Nation,’* and Cohen *‘Serpent in the Bosom.’*

²⁷⁹ In 1989, Kosovo’s autonomy was suspended, as Milosevic rallied against discrimination of Serbs in the region.

injustices stemming from the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans.²⁸⁰ In his approach, Milosevic appeared to be giving voice to centuries of oppression, not simply addressing the wrongs of the communist period, or revising the 1974 Constitution as the “Memorandum” had initially implied. Emulating Popovic’s cries against several generations of Serbia’s leaders, Milosevic, too, appeared to be evoking historical myths in service of political agendas. The main platform of his campaign called for a recentralization of Serbia, and then a recentralization of power in the federation – both political goals presented as a path to a reunited Serbian nation under one rule. Distinctly aiming to mobilize the fear and animosity brewing in Serbia, Milosevic deliberately magnified the victimization of Serbs, the demonization of other Yugoslavs, and polarized their relations onto a scale where coexistence became almost impossible.²⁸¹

Where a different method might have better handled the resurfacing of unconscious conflicts, Milosevic exaggerated their scope and triggered Serbia’s capacity for developing a death drive. In fact, it cannot be said that Milosevic even attempted to remedy the persisting national question or to resolve the repressed conflicts. Instead, as a nationalist leader, he simply facilitated the surfacing of unconscious problems without restrain, and even encouraged their manifestation as a way to harness emotional responses to serve his aims. Following in Popovic and Draskovic’s steps, Milosevic was compelled to uncover other repressed problems, digging deeper into Serbia’s unconscious and reframing history in order to contextualize the present grievances into a narrative of

²⁸⁰ As Nicholas Miller writes, “by linking the fate of a disunited Serbia in 1389 with that of the allegedly disunited Serbia of 1989, Milosevic bridged the subtle revisionism of the Serbia party with the overt nationalism of the Memorandum authors” (Miller, “Reconstituting Serbia,” 309).

²⁸¹ In views of some academics, Milosevic’s mobilization of nationalism was simply a method of seizing power. In Cohen’s words, “unlike most Balkan politicians in the 1990s for whom power was a means to achieve nationalist goals, for Milosevic nationalism was simply the paramount instrument to achieve and solidify political power” (Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, 335).

repetitive injustice and injury committed against the Serbian nation. Milosevic's rhetoric liberated the unconscious conflicts, but in the meantime also provoked greater symptoms attributed to penis envy – one that is better understood through Freud's death drive.

The death drive, developed as a counterpart to the drive to self-preservation, is defined by Freud as “an urge inherent in all organic life to restore an earlier state of things,” the state of no pain, and to thereby return to quiescence that precedes birth.²⁸² Yet, at the same time, another aim of Freud's death drive theory was to resolve the pattern of “compulsion-repetition,” or sadism-masochism.” In other words, it can be understood as Freud's attempt to analyze the motives of subjects who repeatedly become enmeshed in destructive and abusive relationships because of an unconscious compulsion to re-enact early childhood experiences they hope might be resolved differently at each instance. In examining Serbia in the late 1980s, the emergence of the death drive becomes apparent, as a drive towards destruction rather than the eros-driven force towards unity and cohesion. The mobilization of Serbia's penis envy toward this more aggressive expression of repressed conflict can largely be attributed to Milosevic's poor management of unresolved problems, where he steered national memory into an imagined repetition of traumatic events. While the death drive implies a desire to eventually master the previously painful experiences, it is a paradoxical mechanism because the only pleasure the subject is able to experience is materialized as “a kind of unconscious pleasure in pain.”²⁸³ Thus there is no resolution to the death drive, apart from self-destruction.

²⁸² Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

²⁸³ Minsky, “Klein: Phantasy and the Mother,” 81.

III. Collapse as a Manifestation of Unresolved Conflicts

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Serbian rhetoric was drowning in talk of reunification and resolution, but political actions were motioning to anything but self-preservation. The first casualty of Serbia's mobilized death drive was Yugoslavia, a state whose cultures had long ceased an internal dialogue and whose structure finally dissolved in 1991.²⁸⁴ As author Dubravka Ugresic writes, "with the collapse of multinational Yugoslavia began the process of confiscating the Yugoslav collective memory and its replacement by the construct of national memory. The war simply speeded up the process and radicalized the measures."²⁸⁵ Milorad Pavic's *The Dictionary of the Khazars* (1984), highly esteemed post-modern novel speaks of this polarization of national memory, in a much more eloquent form than the slew of texts shaping separatist national memories, fictional and allegedly non-fictional, that will following in the aftermath of the war.²⁸⁶ Instead, Pavic presents three parallel narratives organized in encyclopedic entries and divided into dictionaries of three people.²⁸⁷ Although names, locations, and symbols reappear in each dictionary, the narratives appropriate different meanings to them and consequently the reader cannot achieve a complete, or true, understanding of the entire novel. It is Pavic's implicit message that these dictionaries are incompatible, that

²⁸⁴ In short, Yugoslav republics began to declare independence and secede from the state, starting with Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. Civil war ensues.

²⁸⁵ Dubravka Ugresic, *The Culture of Lies*, Trans. Celia Hawkesworth (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University, 1998), 228.

²⁸⁶ The novel was widely read, translated, and awarded (including the prestigious NIN prize in Serbia). Speaking about the influence the novel's anti-Yugoslav stance would have had on the public, Wachtel believes that "there is no doubt that Pavic's *Dictionary* could have been and in some cases was read by Yugoslavs both as a specific warning against Serbian assimilation into Yugoslavia and as an attack on the very basis of on which the country was constructed" (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 218).

²⁸⁷ Identified only by color in Pavic's novel, the three dictionaries are implicitly representing the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish tradition.

synthesis is a utopian quest that does not lead to knowledge but rather destruction²⁸⁸ – a parallel the reader quickly applies to Yugoslavia. When further analyzed, it becomes apparent that Pavic metaphorically negates the basis of Yugoslav coexistence by relying on ancient histories, much like his literary predecessors, in attempting to prove a future union of these people and their narratives is impossible, if not dangerous.²⁸⁹

It was this same approach to national history that attracted Milosevic, and that ultimately mobilized Serbia's death drive. In the other Yugoslav republics, a similar nationalist discourse will also take root, but not to the extent that it was mobilized in Serbia. In psychological terms, the South Slavic brothers experienced a complete unearthing of their repressed conflicts, expressing a growing rivalry and antagonism in relation to one another and especially Serbia.

Toward the last decade of Yugoslavia's lifetime, the republics had come to internalize their relationships and consequently their behaviors continued to mirror that of a brotherhood despite the state's gradual dissolution.²⁹⁰ That is to say that in the absence of a father figure, the Yugoslav nations began to develop their individual identities in opposition to the identities of their brothers, with the unconscious aim of growing into the father's position. Their competition was directed by unconscious impulses, and driven by envy, anger, and antagonism. A psychological approach to enemy formation cites that

²⁸⁸ At the opening of the novel, the reader is challenged to solve the mystery of the Khazars' origins, but is warned that all previous attempts at achieving a metanarrative have ended in disaster. The brave reader, undeterred by these prophecies, is still unable to decipher the puzzle of the Khazars' three dictionaries, proving Pavic's underlined message that differences cannot be bridged by truth.

²⁸⁹ As Wachtel explains, "in the context of Yugoslavia, such a radically relativized vision of historical truth was quite obviously problematic, for it implied that no agreement or mutual understanding could be reached among peoples who begin from different starting points" (Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, 213).

²⁹⁰ For example, Brian Hall illustrates this internalization was applied to understanding the Yugoslav union, narrating that "to the Serbs... it meant a fraternal relationship, this is, big brother Serbia and little brother Croatia – a sentimental impulse." (Brian Hall, *The Impossible Country: A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia* (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 6-7.)

“groups from which we most passionately distinguished ourselves are those with which we are most inseparably bound.”²⁹¹ And, in fact, the Yugoslavs had easily evolved from being brothers to being enemies. The sibling rivalry that would have been normal in a competition for parental affection was intensified by the gravity of each member’s unresolved conflicts about the initial creation of the Yugoslav family. Psychologist Vamik Volkan explains that “when a territory – or even prestige – is lost to an enemy, and a group has difficulty forming a remembrance formation, the group can still be trying to recoup ancient losses,”²⁹² so that unconscious resentment may build up and become exaggerated if the group is not allowed to reconcile with the past.

This was exactly the tactic used by nationalist leaders for creating a platform of separatism – first by antagonizing the brothers’ relationships by mobilizing their unresolved conflicts, and then claiming that they, the nationalist leaders, would offer resolution but only in a separate state for their own nation. Much of the Yugoslav’s reactions were propelled by the expressions of Serbia’s death drive, and by threats it would have posed to their territories and population. Serbia, in fact, had been transformed and Milosevic’s leadership made her almost intolerable. Bennet writes that “for all the rhetoric about sovereignty and statehood, the independence declarations were essentially symbolic. Slovenia and Croatia were not seceding from Yugoslavia, but from Milosevic’s vision of Yugoslavia.”²⁹³ So where a relationship is defined as “a dialogue, and as such implicates both the differentiation and fusion of relationship parties,”²⁹⁴ it can be said that

²⁹¹ Howard Stein, “The Indispensable Enemy and American-Soviet Relations.” *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*. Ed. Vamik Volkan, Demetrios Julius, Joseph Montville (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 73.

²⁹² Volkan, “An overview of Psychological Concepts,” 43.

²⁹³ Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse*, 13.

²⁹⁴ Duck, *The Handbook of Personal Relationships*, 340.

the Yugoslav family seized to be a functioning relationship at the close of the 1980s and recoiled into individualistic narratives that were neither heard nor addressed by the other members.²⁹⁵

At the start of the 1990s Balkans conflicts, it can be said that Serbia was suffering from a dangerous death drive, while the other Yugoslav brothers still cradled their envy of the imaginary phallus. By declaring independence from Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and later even Bosnia attempted to reign in the power of the imaginary phallus by becoming ultimate authorities over their own states and nations. This case is similar to Hunt's model of the revolutionary transformation in France that ultimately reshaped traditional forms of family, dissolving the collective community in place of independent individuals. Likewise, a clear evolution of roles and relations can be noted in the narrative of Yugoslavia's socialist family, implicitly suggesting that each brother expected to become a father.

While nationalist leaders certainly appealed to the brothers in this respect, proper conflict resolution was not breached in any nation. On the contrary, productive psychotherapy should have uncovered the origins of the repressions and brought them to the forefront of consciousness in order to allow the ego to confront them; resolution cannot be completed until the root of the repressions is eliminated from the psyche. It can be said that the Yugoslav wars did not achieve a full resolution, but instead intensified the

²⁹⁵ In her narrative, Slavenka Drakulic also mobilizes these metaphors: "Brothers started to kill one another, and unity fell apart, as if Yugoslavia were only a part of a communist fairy tale. Perhaps it was. Nationalism as we are witnessing it now in the former USSR, former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia is a legacy of that fairy tale. And it is so far for at least three reasons: the communist state never allowed development of a civil society; it oppressed ethnic, national and religious beliefs, permitting only class identification; and in the end, communist leaders manipulated these beliefs, playing one nationality against the another to keep themselves in power for as long as they could. Even if the price was war" (Drakulic, *The Balkan Express*, 50)

resurfacing conflicts to the extent that they produced unfortunate local and international results.

Newly formed states took the place of the Yugoslav family. The nations that had seceded from Yugoslavia now attempted to reform their own family structures around national leadership. In the process of transferring authority to the individual brothers, the nations were challenged to restructure legitimizing laws and social order that had collapsed in the absence of the father. Freud speculates that the evolving society, notably religion and politics, continues to repress man and ultimately leads to his future discontent.

Serbia, on the other hand, struggled to overcome her penis envy and the manifested death drive, but found herself in a vicious cycle of anger, hate, resentment, and betrayal. Even more, Serbia's emotions were being driven by a powerfully constructed narrative of the past that seemed to magnify every aspect of her unconscious conflicts. In order to resolve her penis envy, Serbia's repressed problem dating from the founding of the socialist Yugoslav family, Freud proposed three possibilities: to give up phallic aspirations, to persist in seeking a penis by emulating male activities, or to bear the father (or father substitute) a child. According to Freud, this last solution is the only path to normal (healthy) femininity. While encumbered in psychoanalytic theory, Freud's solution can be applied a valid metaphor for Serbia's future relations: in the union with Montenegro, in rump Yugoslavia after the wars, Serbia reshapes her role to become a domineering wife who tends to mother Montenegro rather than participate in equal partnership. However, this relationship, again, will echo the same postwar sentiments of anger and betrayal in its internal dynamics.

Conclusion

Although Ivo Andric espoused strong supra-Yugoslav beliefs, he has equally weary of the dangerous unconscious drives of the South Slavs. In the short story “A Letter from 1920” (1956), Andric describes a Bosnian town where three religions (Christian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Islam) cannot come into synchrony, not even to mark the noon hour at the same moment. Andric extends this metaphor to highlight the dynamics of Yugoslav history, particularly to warn against the underlying hate that might surge from the unconscious. He writes: “Most of you are accustomed to channeling the full power of your hatred towards what is nearest you. Your sacred loves are regularly far away, beyond three hundred rivers and mountains; the objects of your disgust and hate are there besides you, in your town and often on the other side of your courtyard wall.”²⁹⁶

While Andric was right about the presence of unresolved psychic problems, they are not fatefully expressed through hate, and this hate is not inevitably manifested against one’s closest kin. Just like the Yugoslav family was not inevitable to collapse, brothers are not destined to antagonize one another and resign from the family structure. Instead, relationships are dynamic and shaped by many factors. Freudian theory asserts that unconscious drives account for an important part of behavior, especially when unresolved problems resurface to consciousness. Repressed conflicts are, thus, the most dangerous of these drives, and require proper resolution in order to stabilize future development. Once politics invades the private, however, many relationship dynamics become tainted by political motives and pulled into the service of political aspirations. In the case of Yugoslavia, and especially Serbia, national leaders were not concerned with resolving the

²⁹⁶ Ivo Andric, “A Letter from 1920,” *The Damned Yard and Other Stories*, Ed. and Trans. Cecilia Hawkesworth (Belgrade: Dereta, 1992), 18.

repressed unconscious problems, but simply in provoking their emotional responses and capitalizing on their thrust.

This project's psychoanalytic consideration of discourses on Serbia's history hopes to contribute to the literature on Yugoslavia's socialist period, vaguely following in Hunt's model of the French Revolution. The study calls on support of three separate fields – literature, history, and psychoanalysis – in order to develop a framework that both mobilizes contemporary scholarship and offers a new understanding of Yugoslavia's disintegrations. By examining cultural products, a marked trend of familial models emerges, allowing a metaphorically gendered understating of Serbia's role as a woman in each of the three incarnations of Yugoslavia. Contextualized within socialist dialogue, Serbia can be imagined as a sister, on an equal plane in the metaphorical Yugoslav brotherhood. Forthcoming interpretation, then, engage valuable tools afforded by psychoanalysis, particularly employing Freud and Lacan's theories dealing with the female psyche.

Building upon existing historical arguments, especially the nationalism, cultural, and role of personality currents in scholarship, this project's interdisciplinary approach is distinct in its consideration of gender and the mobilization of the psycho-dynamic axis. In fact, both the gender dimension and tools afforded by psychoanalysis have been greatly overlooked by historians as valuable interpretive tools, and these elements are, not surprisingly, absent from Yugoslavia's historical narratives. In light of abundant discourses on Serbia, this study's aim is to introduce a more subjective perspective to the conceptualization of Serbia's central role in each Yugoslav union and collapse. By imagining Serbia as a woman, in this instance a sister, the underlying premise of the

study is that each Yugoslav state can also be framed as a family that was inevitably colored by internal dynamics, but also emotions. However, acknowledging that emotions are not always rational, this approach to socialist Yugoslavia's narrative strives to offer a broader understanding of intra-Yugoslav relationships that cannot be easily explained by mainstream arguments. The interdisciplinary approach, particularly relying on the psychoanalytic lens, hopes to deconstruct traditional limitations of historical discourses and propose a more inclusive model for understanding the disintegration of the socialist state.

Serbia's last relationship in the framework of Yugoslavia, unfortunately, also collapsed after Montenegro's 2006 referendum, often termed a "Balkan divorce," and was closely followed by Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence. These disintegrations can similarly be analyzed by a psychoanalytic approach to political rhetoric, taking into consideration a reformed family structure hypothetically in shape of a marriage, and these interpretations might offer further insights for Serbia's future. Metaphorical family romances imagined in the cultural sphere become productive tools of analysis of political discourse, both for understanding the driving force of familial transformations as well as their consequence. Further applications of this psychoanalytic approach to history might provide constructive conceptualization for the ex-Yugoslav states' pending membership into the European Union, another political family structure. In Serbia's case, it can be said that the state will finally have to resolve all pending unconscious conflicts before joining the European Union, this time as a single woman.

In a more global perspective, this interpretive matrix might be productively applied to other case studies. In fact, after the fall of communism, the collapse of

Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union were similarly branded as “divorces” in vernacular political rhetoric. And while diverse accounts attempted to develop rational explanations driving these major transitions in societal order, they are similarly wrought with inadequacies that disregard the possibility irrational, emotional factors. If properly contextualized, the interdisciplinary model developed for the Yugoslav case might offer a productive framework for understanding these proximal cases of disintegration of other postwar socialist European societies.

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