

NEW MEMBER STATES' PREFERENCES FOR FURTHER EU ENLARGEMENT

PRIORITIES AND POSITIONS IN BULGARIA, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY AND POLAND

By
Miriam Stackpole Dahl

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Annabelle Littoz-Monnet

Budapest, Hungary
2008

Word count:
17 172

ABSTRACT

Why are new EU member states generally among the strongest supporters of further EU enlargement? Although future enlargements might divert financial transfers away from them, the recent EU members advocate a continuous enlargement process with fair conditions for all potential candidates. Addressing the puzzle why new members support accession of countries in which they have few national material interests, this thesis analyzes preferences for further enlargement in four new member states - Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. To be best able to understand what factors determine the preferences, a combined theoretical approach is applied. Whereas liberal intergovernmentalism focusing on material interests is particularly useful to understand the priorities for immediate neighbors, constructivist accounts focusing on the role of norms and identity allows for an explanation of new members' support for enlargement to non-neighboring potential candidates. This thesis shows that the new members analyzed support and prioritize enlargement to their immediate neighbors, as that will increase their national security and economic opportunities. However, that is not the whole picture. They also support enlargement to non-neighbors where direct individual material gains are limited. This puzzle is solved by understanding enlargement preferences as partly formed in a socialization process where new members adhere to an EU identity based on promotion of democracy, human rights and welfare for the Union as a whole and genuinely follow these norms and values when determining their positions on further enlargement.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Professor Annabelle Littoz-Monnet for her continuous encouragement and valuable input during the process from developing the idea to finishing this thesis. Special thanks go to my academic writing instructor, Robin Bellers, for his useful comments that have helped to improve my work and to Professor Péter Balázs for his insights and kind help with arranging interviews in all my case countries. I am also grateful to all the officials and experts in Budapest, Prague, Sofia and Warsaw, who took time to meet and share their views and knowledge with me. My friends and family deserve acknowledgement for their constant support and patience throughout the academic year. Finally, I want to thank Robert Hódosi for always being there supporting me and making me laugh.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Abstract</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>Table of Contents</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>1</i>
Chapter 1 – Theoretical Framework: From Rationalism to Constructivism	9
1.1 Explaining Positions and Priorities	9
1.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism.....	12
1.3 Constructivism	14
1.3.1 ‘Rhetorical Action’	16
1.3.2 From Kinship-based Duty Towards a Moral Responsibility.....	17
Chapter 2 – Accession of Immediate Neighbors: The Quest for Security and Stability	19
2.1 Positive Public Opinion.....	19
2.2 Preferences and Prioritization of Direct Neighbors.....	20
2.3 Material Gains and the Determination of Priorities	24
2.3.1 Securing a Stable Neighborhood.....	24
2.3.2 Getting New Partners	27
2.3.3 Extending Economic Opportunities?.....	28
Conclusion.....	29
Chapter 3 – Enlargement to Non-Neighbors and Turkey: The Role of Norms and Identity	31
3.1 Preferences for Non-Neighbors	31
3.2 Positions on Turkey’s membership	32
3.3 Limitations to a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Explanation.....	33
3.3.1 Stability and Security for Europe	34
3.3.2 Friends or Rivals?	34
3.3.3 Calculating Economic Gains and Costs.....	35
3.4 Strategic Use of Norm-based Arguments	36
3.5 Socialization and ‘Appropriate’ Behavior	38
3.5.1 Cultural and Historical Ties - a Feeling of We’ness.....	39
3.5.2 Moral Duty of being a New Member	42
Conclusion.....	44
Chapter 4 – New Members’ Preferences: A Piece of A Larger Picture	46
4.1 The Liberal Intergovernmentalist Explanation	46
4.1.1 EU Budgetary Transfers at Risk.....	47
4.2 The Constructivist Explanations	49
4.2 The Stakes Determine the Logic.....	50
Conclusion	53
Appendix 1: Interviews	57
Appendix 2: Public Opinion	59
Bibliography	60

INTRODUCTION

Enlargement is regarded as one of the most successful foreign policy instruments of the European Union. The prospect of membership, and later inclusion to the Union, helped to stabilize and democratize both Southern and Eastern European countries,¹ and continues to be an incentive for further reforms in countries that aspire to become members. Now the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)² are among the strongest supporters of further enlargement of the EU.³ Based on this observation, the aim of this thesis is to explain which factors determine the enlargement preferences of new members.

Although the Eastern enlargement was completed with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, enlargement is still high on the agenda and will be in the years to come. The EU is currently undertaking membership negotiations with Croatia and Turkey. Macedonia has received candidate status, and the EU has unambiguously signaled that the rest of the Western Balkans⁴ has a future within the EU when they fulfill the membership criteria.⁵ Furthermore, countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, currently covered by the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), have voiced their EU aspirations and received some support, particularly among the new EU members. The climate for further enlargement today, though, is not that favorable. The real and perceived effects of the 2004 enlargement coupled with domestic economic and social factors have created a certain ‘enlargement fatigue’ within the EU, and hence a reluctance concerning both the geographical scope and the speed of future enlargements. Although Croatia most likely will become a member within the coming years,

¹ Karen Smith “Enlargement and European Order”. In *International Relations and the European Union*, ed. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press 2005), 271

² The new members are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus that joined the EU in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria that joined in 2007. Cyprus and Malta are not considered in this study due to their different geographical and historical position.

³ Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, ed, *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States*, Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006

⁴ The ‘Western Balkans’ is a term used by the EU when referring to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo under resolution 1244.

⁵ Thessaloniki European Council conclusion (2003):

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/76201.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2008)

yet no other Western Balkan country is anywhere close to membership. In addition, Turkey's accession remains controversial in the EU due to its Muslim religion, human rights practice, size and relative economic backwardness. Simultaneously, in new member states, people see the benefits of their own accession, and their governments strongly promote further enlargement. The governments argue that the enlargement process should continue and that the door to the Union should be kept open - not only for those countries that are currently undertaking accession negotiations or are regarded as potential candidates, but also for European countries on the Eastern borders of the Union.

Despite the fact that new, relatively poor members run the risk of losing EU funding from the agricultural and regional policy if further candidates accede to the Union, they support the continuation of the enlargement process. Seen from a rationalist perspective, the accession of immediately bordering neighbors is likely to outweigh the cost of losing funds, either by increased opportunities for trade and secure investments or by enhancing the security of these states at the EU border by 'exporting' stability and prosperity to their neighbors. However, we can observe the puzzling situation that official support for enlargement in new member states is not limited to their immediate neighbors. In light of this puzzle – that new member states persistently communicate support for further enlargement despite few tangible direct national advantages of the accession of certain countries – this thesis aims at addressing several questions. Why do new member states favor enlargement? Why do they prioritize some countries over others? And, most importantly, what determines these countries' preferences?

By looking at the official positions regarding further enlargement of the EU, and the priorities towards different potential accession countries⁶, the purpose of this thesis is to explain the underlying rationale for the support for further enlargement in new member states.

⁶ "Potential accession countries" is here used to describe both candidate countries (Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia), potential candidates (the rest of the Western Balkans) and other European countries that might be regarded as candidates in the future (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia etc)

My analysis draws on a combination of two theoretical approaches, which allow me to distinguish the different logics at stake when explaining different aspects – priorities and official positions - of the new members’ preferences. First, a rational institutionalist account⁷, based on the main theoretical assumption proposed by Moravcsik in his liberal intergovernmentalist (LI)⁸ approach is used to understand the priorities for immediate bordering neighbors. According to this view, national economic, security and geopolitical interests are the most important factors determining enlargement preferences.⁹ As these gains increase with geographic proximity, we can hypothesize that new member states prioritize the accession of their closest neighbors. Second, I draw on assumptions from constructivist approaches to assess the main puzzle of why new member states in their official positions are in favor of further enlargement to all potential accession countries, also non-neighbors. According to constructivism, actor’s interests and identities are formed through participation and socialization into the international community,¹⁰ in this case the EU. In this process actors ‘learn’ norms for ‘appropriate’ behavior – either by adapting to the community norms to enhance the legitimacy of their preferences by, what Schimmelfennig calls, “an instrumental use of norm-based arguments”¹¹, or, as Sjusen argues, by following norms simply because they are considered right¹² in light of the identity to which they belong. From the constructivist approaches, it can be hypothesized that new member states support for

⁷ Liberal intergovernmentalism is a modified version of rational institutionalism, Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, In *European Integration Theory* ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 78

⁸ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁹ Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova “National interests, state power and EU enlargement”, *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 17, No.1 (2003)

¹⁰ Thomas Christiansen et. al, *The Social Construction of Europe*, (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 2

¹¹ Frank Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Action In A Community Environment: The Decision to Enlarge the European Union to the East”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol 36, No 156, (2003), 159-160

¹² Helene Sjusen, ed. *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in search of identity*, (New York: Routledge, 2006),

enlargement to non-neighbors is shaped by their own recent accession to the EU and based on socialization into the EU's collective identity.¹³

Scholars studying enlargement have in recent years explained the EU enlargement policies, member states' and applicants' policies and the decision to enlarge based on both rational and constructivist theoretical approaches. Moravcsik and Vachudova¹⁴ are the central rationalist contributors, whereas Schimmelfennig introduces a combined approach of rationalist and constructivist assumptions.¹⁵ The bulk of authors, however, understand enlargement as influenced by different aspects of norms and identities.¹⁶ Despite this vast interest in understanding earlier EU enlargement rounds, few attempts have been made to explicitly explain and theorize on the still ongoing enlargements process focusing on the role of new members. Studies have been conducted on the EU decision to open negotiations with Turkey,¹⁷ Croatia's policy towards the EU and its drive for accession,¹⁸ and support and opposition to Ukraine's membership perspective¹⁹ all drawing on constructivist assumptions, but they rather focus on the EU enlargement policy or of potential accession countries, not on new members' preferences. The topic, though, is not overlooked in empirical research projects. In publications by Kazmierkiewicz and Král, preferences for further enlargement in

¹³ A further elaboration of the hypotheses to be tested in this thesis is provided in Chapter 1.

¹⁴ Moravcsik and Vachudova, „National interests

¹⁵ Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 1, (2001)

¹⁶ Ulrich Sedelmeier, *Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement: The uneven policy impact of EU identity*. (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier ed, *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches* (London/New York: Routledge. 2005), Helene Sjursen, "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.40, No.3, (2002); Sonia Piedrafita and Jose Torreblanca, "The Three Logics of EU Enlargement: Interests, Identities and Arguments", *Politique Européenne*, no. 15, (2005), Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener, "Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol.6, No.5, (1999) , Sjursen *Questioning*,

¹⁷ Neill Nugent, "The EU's Response to Turkey's Membership Application: Not Just Weighing of Costs and Benefits" *Journal of European Integration*, Vol 29, No 4.(2007)

¹⁸ Nives Misic-Lisjak "Croatia and the European Union: A social constructivist perspective" in *Policy Studies*, Vol 27, No 2, (2006)

¹⁹ Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, "The EU and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment?", *European Security*, Vol. 15, No. 2, (2006)

Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Latvia are explained.²⁰ Despite being highly valuable contributions, these empirical studies are not placed within the larger theoretical framework. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to make a theoretically informed analysis of new members' preferences.

To be able to get a more generalizable understanding of the preferences of new members, I will analyze the enlargement positions and priorities in four new member states – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - that geographically roughly represent all new members. This choice is made because geographical location has been one of the strongest explanatory factors for enlargement preferences in the past.²¹ Furthermore, the choice is also based on the 'Carpathian mountains line', identified by Raik and Grmadzki, that divide the new members into two groups depending on their own geographical location and how this influences their policy priorities. The 'northern' group of Poland and the Baltic states focusing on their Eastern neighborhood, and the four Visegrad countries, Romania and Bulgaria have two 'neighborhoods', but focus on the Western Balkans rather than Eastern Europe.²² These two groups also have a different perception of the 'Russian threat', the 'northern' states being more suspicious.²³ Consequently, the selection of cases is based on the fact that Poland has similar positions as the Baltic states, that the Czech Republic is the only country with no 'external' borders, that Hungary, more or less like Slovakia and Slovenia, borders countries both with a clear membership perspective and more distant one. Finally, Bulgaria borders Turkey, and has, like Romania, closer economic ties with Turkey.

²⁰ David Kral, ed. *Romania, Bulgaria, who next? Perspectives on further enlargement as seen from the new member states and EU hopefuls* EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, 2007; Kazmierkiewicz, *EU Accession Prospects*

²¹ Schimmelfennig, "The Community, 49

²² Kristi Raik and Grzegorz Grmadzki "Between activeness and influence: The contribution of new member states to the EU policies towards the Eastern neighbours", Tallinn: *Open Estonia Foundation*, September 2006. <http://www.oef.org.ee/repository/Document/Contribution%20of%20new%20member%20states%20towards%20Eastern%20neighbours.pdf>. (Accessed May 16, 2008), 25

²³ David Král, *Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The role of the New EU Member States and Candidate Countries*, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, 2005, 11. http://www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/Enlarging_EU_foreign_security_policy.pdf (Accessed, May 31, 2008)

Considering the empirical methodology, this thesis focuses on the positions of political elites in new member states and the official enlargement preferences as the current governments and political administrations communicate it, primarily since their own accession. In order to identify the enlargement preferences and priorities, I will undertake a qualitative analysis of primary source material in the form of available foreign policy documents, speeches, and statements. Moreover, the thesis is based on in-depth interviews with more than 20 independent experts, officials and policy makers in the relevant political institutions.²⁴ The interviews were semi-structured in order to understand the underlying dimensions of the enlargement preferences. Secondary empirical accounts of enlargement preferences conducted by scholars or referred in the media are also utilized. For assessing priorities, I divide possible accession countries into three groups based partly on geography and partly on their prospect of further EU integration. The first group is the six Western Balkan countries that all have received a membership ‘promise’ from the EU. The second potential accession country is Turkey who is currently in accession negotiations with the EU. The third group is Ukraine and possibly Moldova, Georgia and other Eastern European countries that are today without a clear membership prospect, but have partly expressed EU aspirations.

This thesis finds that the new member states analyzed are most strongly in favor of the accession of their immediate neighbors and it thus goes a long way in confirming the liberal intergovernmentalist hypothesis. However, LI cannot sufficiently explain why new members officially quite strongly support enlargement to all potential accession countries even if it will not give substantial direct economic and security gains for the member states. These preferences for enlargement in ‘general’ are reasoned in the interests of the EU as a whole, solidarity and moral responsibility not to deny others what benefited them and being consistent with earlier promises made by the EU. Empirical evidence suggests that members

²⁴ See Appendix 1 for a full list of conducted interviews

do not only use such normative arguments instrumentally to further their own interest of upholding the accession process for the inclusion of ‘their’ candidates,²⁵ but such arguments are also used when few individual material interests are present. Hence, drawing on constructivist assumption, I argue that enlargement preferences cannot be understood without considering the genuine role of norms and identities in shaping the positions.

Due to geographical and historical conditions, preferences for enlargement in new member states are somewhat differently explained than the preferences of the ‘old’ members²⁶ both today and in earlier enlargement rounds. An analysis of the enlargement preferences of new members therefore not only contributes to getting a better understanding of the logics underpinning enlargement policies in the EU member states today, but also to the understanding of the new member states’ ‘behavior’ within the EU and the possible influence of their own EU accession. Moreover, this thesis includes a brief comparison between the findings here and main explanations of the preferences of in ‘old’ member states from the literature on the Eastern enlargement. By placing the justification behind the preferences in the new member states in a wider theoretical framework assessing enlargement policies, I link my findings to larger debates in the study of EU enlargement.

The present thesis consists of three main parts. The first part develops the combined theoretical framework used to understand enlargement preferences on the basis of liberal intergovernmentalism and two constructivist approaches²⁷ The second part, chapter two and three, provide the analysis of enlargement preferences and priorities in the four case countries based on the theoretical framework. Chapter two assesses the preferences for immediate neighbors and in chapter three preferences for non-bordering potential candidates including Turkey is analyzed. In the third part, I point to the main similarities and differences in the determination of preferences between the existing literature on EU15’s enlargement

²⁵ Schimmelfenning, “Strategic Action

²⁶ ‘Old’ members is the EU15

²⁷ Schimmelfennig, “The Community; Sjursen, “Why expand

preferences and the findings in this thesis. The thesis concludes that new member states' enlargement preferences cannot sufficiently be explained by looking at individual material interest alone, as it is evident that their preferences are shaped by their own recent accession and socialization into following the norms and values of the EU.

CHAPTER 1 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FROM RATIONALISM TO CONSTRUCTIVISM

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a combined theoretical framework that enables a more complete understanding of what determines the different aspects of preferences for enlargement in new member states. The two main theoretical approaches that are most frequently applied when scholars explain past EU enlargements is a rationalist institutionalist approach, most commonly Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), and different strands of constructivist theoretical approaches.²⁸ These two theoretical camps are based on different ontologies. Whereas the former sees material interests as exogenously given and assumes that actors behave rationally to maximize these interests,²⁹ the latter sees preferences and identity as endogenous constructed through social interaction.³⁰ Furthermore, the two approaches assume different logics of actions; the rationalist 'logic of consequentiality', where actions are driven by expectations about consequences and how to reach self-interests and the constructivist 'logic of appropriateness' where actors look to identity, norms and rules to define what is expected and the "right thing to do" in a given situation.³¹

1.1 Explaining Positions and Priorities

Based on the theoretical landscape outlined above, the question is whether national interests or norm-based identities are the most central factor in determining member states' preferences for further EU enlargement. When looking at enlargement preferences of new

²⁸ Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Theorizing EU enlargement: Research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research", *Journal of European Public Policy* Vol. 9, No 4, 508

²⁹ Schimmelfennig, "The Community, 58

³⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics" *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 1, (1992) 398

³¹ James March and Johan Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. (New York: Free Press, 1989), 160

members, material economic and security interests seem to be important determinants of states' priorities at the same time as governments refer to norms to justify their positions. On the basis of these empirical observations, this thesis applies a combined theoretical framework drawing on both rational and constructivist theoretical assumptions.³² When explaining the enlargement preferences in new members, it is analytically useful to distinguish between official positions concerning enlargement as such, thus also towards non-neighbors, and priorities, most often towards direct neighbors. By identifying these two aspects, I improve my ability comprehensively to explain the preferences in new member states by focusing systematically on different theoretically based logics to explain these two aspects of the new member states' preferences. This combined framework can be justified if it "increase[s] our ability to explain the empirical world".³³

First, central assumptions from Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) approach are applied to explain the prioritization of direct neighbors in the case studies' enlargement preferences. As LI mainly is concerned with economic and geopolitical interests of individual member states, it cannot satisfactorily explain support for enlargement when these interests are limited, as is often the case with more distant potential accession countries. Therefore, I draw, secondly, on assumptions from constructivist approaches to assess the puzzle of why new member states' official positions are supportive of further enlargement even when there are few immediate gains.

According to constructivists, norms constitute actors' identity, which in turn influence preferences and action.³⁴ Hence, the role of norms is important. However, norms not only constitute actors identity, they may also be used instrumentally. Thus, I start by assessing whether the support for further enlargement is a result of members' strategically use of norm-

³² Rationalism and constructivism are meta-theories. Approaches based on these camps are utilized here.

³³ Joseph Jupille et. al "Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union", *Comparative Political Studies*, XXXVI, 2003, 20

³⁴ Mark Pollack, "International Relations Theory and European Integration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 39 No. 2, (2001), 232

based arguments to further their own national interests³⁵. I continue by analyzing whether member states can be regarded as socialized into the EU identity and values³⁶, and look to the norms that define EU identity and rather act according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ when their preferences are determined. Building on the logic of appropriateness, Sjursen has developed an approach that makes a distinction between “rule-following as a result of...a particular identity *and* rule-following based on...assessment of morally valid arguments”.³⁷ According to this view, member states’ enlargement preferences are either shaped by a ‘kinship-based duty’,³⁸ or a general solidarity towards all countries aspiring to become EU members following universal principles of democracy and human rights.

Most scholars studying EU enlargement do not completely deny either material or ideational factors in their explanations.³⁹ O’Brennan argues that ideational arguments and normative reasoning drove the enlargement process, but still emphasizes that geopolitical and economic motivations cannot be disregarded in explanations of the EU enlargement process.⁴⁰ Schimmelfennig most famously developed a combined approach of rationalist and constructivist accounts where LI explains enlargement preference and a constructivist analysis of normative effects of the community environment to understand the final decision to enlarge.⁴¹ Others, such as the authors behind the logics of consequentiality and appropriateness, March and Olsen, argue that the two logics are not mutually exclusive, and consequently, any political behavior or action “cannot be explained exclusively” in terms of

³⁵ Schimmelfennig, “The Community,

³⁶ The EU liberal identity is, according to Schimmelfennig (Ibid.) based on the norms and values enshrined in the Copenhagen membership criteria, including liberal democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and a market based economy.

³⁷ Sjursen, “Why expand, 495

³⁸ Kinship is understood as a close sympathy for states considered to have a similar cultural or historical identity

³⁹ Moravcsik and Vachudova, “National interests, Sjursen,” *Questioning*

⁴⁰ John O’Brennan, *The eastern enlargement of the European Union*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 171

⁴¹ Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 180

the one or the other logic.⁴² This further legitimizes the choice of the combined approach based on two theoretical approaches that assume different logics of action. Furthermore, March and Olsen propose four interpretations of the relationship between the two logics, out of which one is elaborated here as a suggested explanation of how liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivist approaches relate to each other in this thesis. “A clear logic dominates an unclear logic”⁴³, hence, when stakes are real and actual and preferences clear, a rational logic of consequentiality is more likely to dominate. When there are fewer direct and vital interests at stake, but the identity and its inherent norms clearly defined, the logic of appropriateness is more likely to prevail.⁴⁴

After having established the basis for the combined theoretical framework, the chapter proceeds with a brief introduction to the main theoretical assumptions underpinning the approaches used to explain new member states’ enlargement preferences. Hypotheses will be drawn at the end of the sections of each relevant approach.

1.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Andrew Moravcsik has developed one of the most central rationalist explanations of member states preferences for enlargement in line with his liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) theory on EU integration.⁴⁵ In this theory, Moravcsik presents a threefold explanation of EU integration; the first - a liberal theory of national preference formation⁴⁶ - is applied here as only preferences are studied. According to liberal intergovernmentalism, national economic and

⁴² James March and Johan Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, (1998), 952

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ This argument also builds on Jupille et al. in their suggestions on how constructivism and rationalism can “work together”. See Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic change”, *European University Institute: EUI Working Papers*, RSC No. 56, (2000) for a similar interpretation.

⁴⁵ Moravcsik, “The Choice,

⁴⁶ Ibid. 3-4

geopolitical interests are the most important factors determining enlargement preferences.⁴⁷ A complete economic analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, however the main tenets of LI concerning economic gains based on geographic proximity as well as perceived costs due to socioeconomic structure are examined. According to LI, states will consider the cost and benefits of enlargement, and those states whose benefits are larger than their costs will logically favor enlargement. Divergent preferences are explained by the uneven distribution of costs and benefits.

First, international interdependence, including opportunities for trade, investments and dominant national economic interests, determines the preferences of member states.⁴⁸ This interdependence increases with geographic proximity to non-members, as states at the periphery of the EU are more sensitive to instability in the neighborhood. The smaller distance also creates larger opportunities for economic gains due to lower transport and communication costs.⁴⁹ Hence, according to LI, countries that are close to potential accession countries are more in favor of enlargement as they can reap benefits from increased trade and investment opportunities as well as enhanced national security. Accession of countries belonging to the same geographical region might also increase the member states' international influence by tipping the center of gravity of the Union in its direction.⁵⁰ From this approach, the first relevant hypothesis for this thesis is that states will prioritize the EU accession of their direct neighbors.

Second, the cost of enlargement is also unevenly distributed among members dependent on socio-economic structure. Poorer, less developed, agricultural countries will bear the highest cost as they face competition for transfers from agricultural and regional policy as well as trade competition in sectors they share with potential accession countries.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Moravcsik and Vachudova, "National interests,

⁴⁸ Moravcsik, *The Choice*, 26

⁴⁹ Schimmelfennig, "The Community, 50

⁵⁰ Ibid. 52

⁵¹ Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO*, 180

According to LI, relatively poorer member states should be less enthusiastic about further enlargement.

1.3 Constructivism

EU enlargement has been widely analyzed from constructivist perspectives. The difficulty for rational theoretical approaches to explain the decision to enlarge to the Central and Eastern European countries only based on material preferences and bargaining power has inspired the lion's share of constructivist studies on enlargement.⁵² However, in a book edited by Sijursen, enlargement preferences in Spain, Denmark, France and Germany are analyzed largely from a constructivist perspective.⁵³

Constructivism is fundamentally based on two assumptions; 1) structures in the international environment are not only material but also have a socially constructed, ideational dimension; 2) the social environment provides the actors with an understanding of their identities and preferences.⁵⁴ Based on the definition of norms as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity”,⁵⁵ constructivists argue that social norms direct actors' behavior. In the EU context, actors' preferences are shaped by participation in the international community.⁵⁶ During the integration process, states are socialized into the collective values of the community, which mean that they switch to follow norms and rules

⁵² Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “The study of EU enlargement: Theoretical approaches and empirical findings” in *European Union Studies* ed. Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 113; Lykke Friis, “The End of the Beginning of Eastern Enlargement: Luxembourg Summit and Agenda-Setting”, *European Integration Online Papers* 2(7), 1998, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-007.htm> (Accessed June 2, 2008), Fierke and Wiener; Sijursen, “Why expand,

⁵³ Sonia Piedrafita, “In spite of the costs? Moral constraints on Spain's enlargement policy”; Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sijursen “The importance of solidarity: Denmark as a promoter of enlargement”; Helene Sijursen and Børge Romsloe “Protecting the idea of Europe: France and enlargement”; Marcin Zaborowski, “More than simply expanding markets: Germany and EU enlargement”; all in Sijursen, *Questioning*

⁵⁴ Jupille et al, 14; O'Brennan, 154

⁵⁵ Peter Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996), 5

⁵⁶ Christiansen et. al, 2

that the EU considers appropriate.⁵⁷ This includes adhering to the “community culture”, where governments consider the interests of the overall system, not just individual interests.⁵⁸

Weiler further explains;

‘The idea of community seeks to dictate a different type of intercourse among the actors belonging to it, a type of self-limitation in their self-perception, a re-defined self-interest, and hence redefined policy goals. To the interest of the state must be added the interest of the community.’⁵⁹

Enlargement preferences are, according to constructivists, formed by ideational factors such as the shared collective identity between member states and future members, and the norms it prescribes.⁶⁰ Despite the difficulty arguing existence of a unified European identity, constructivists claim that:

“[the] EU integration process has facilitated the construction of a...collective identity...built [on] commitments...to principles of collective decision-making and contractual obligations, and embedded in perceptual shared values, and a commitment to diffuse these values internationally”⁶¹

Two aspects of such an EU identity are, according to Sedelmeier, “particularly salient”⁶² for enlargement. The first is the “pan-European vocation [that] implies an obligation to remain open to new members”⁶³. This point is based on the European Economic Community treaty signed in 1957, that states the will of the members “to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the people of Europe”, and article 49 of the Treaty on European Union saying that any European state that shares the principles on which the EU is founded, may apply for membership.⁶⁴ The second is the liberal democratic identity of the EU based on adherence to democracy, human rights, rule of law and protection of minorities institutionalized in the

⁵⁷ Jeffrey Checkel, International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework, in *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 3, 2005, 804

⁵⁸ Friis

⁵⁹ Weiler, Joseph, “The Transformation of Europe”, *The Yale Law Journal*, 100, 1991, 2480 Quoted in Friis

⁶⁰ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Theorizing EU”, 513

⁶¹ O’Brennan, 157

⁶² Sedelmeier, *Constructing*, 21

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Copenhagen membership criteria.⁶⁵ Moreover, Sedelmeier argues that the previous enlargement in itself reinforced the “role specific identity of the EU” as a promoter of human rights and democracy.⁶⁶ From these understandings of EU identity, enlargement preferences are built on legitimacy and appropriateness.⁶⁷ Thus, it would be normatively inconsistent to refuse membership to a country if it is considered European, share the same collective identity and adhere to the same values.

1.3.1 ‘Rhetorical Action’

Behaving in line with the community values can also mean adopting a role rather than internalizing an identity. Consequently, states still pursue national interests and act according to a logic of consequentiality, by using what Schimmelfennig calls “rhetorical action” or a strategic use of norm based arguments. This view assumes that weakly socialized actors do belong to and share the norms and values of the community, but it is not necessary that the collective identity shape their preferences.⁶⁸ Thus, actors use normative arguments consistent with this community values instrumentally to reach their “individual specific policy preferences.”⁶⁹ Actors comply with the norms not because they act ‘appropriately’, but in order to avoid public “shaming” of illegitimate behavior. Following this view, by evoking community norms and values, member states can add legitimacy to their material interests.⁷⁰ According to this approach, the second relevant hypothesis to be examined is that member states justify their self-centered preferences with normative arguments to increase the legitimacy of their positions.

⁶⁵ Schimmelfennig, “The Community, 59

⁶⁶ Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Collective identity” in *Contemporary European Foreign Policy* Walter Carlsnaes et.al (New York: Sage Publishers, 2004), 128

⁶⁷ Schimmelfennig, “The Community..., 58

⁶⁸ Ibid. 62

⁶⁹ Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Action...,157

⁷⁰ Ibid. 160

1.3.2 From Kinship-based Duty Towards a Moral Responsibility

In opposition to Schimmelfennig, Sijursen argues that norms are not only used instrumentally, but constitute the identity and therefore preferences of the member states.⁷¹ Consequently, norms do not only constrain behavior because of the cost of non-compliance, they are followed according to which norms are considered ‘right’, ‘just’ and legitimate, based on the identity they adhere to, and thus this approach has “much in common”⁷² with the logic of appropriateness. To explain this norm-following, Sijursen introduces the concept of ‘communicative rationality’ that contends, “actors are rational in the sense that they are able to justify and explain their actions with reference to intersubjectively valid norms...that cannot be reasonably rejected in a rational debate”.⁷³ Moreover, Sijursen points out that there is a need to distinguish between two types of normative arguments. The first are ‘value-based’ arguments, which refer to values of a cultural European identity, a sense of we-ness and non-material solidarity towards those that belong to a common past. The second are ‘right-based’ and refer to universal norms of justice and rights, based on the EU norms of democracy and human rights not restricted to a cultural community.⁷⁴ This distinction is important, as it better enables us to explain the prioritization towards different potential accession countries.⁷⁵

According to Sijursen, the eastern enlargement was largely a result of ‘kinship-based duty’.⁷⁶ This argument is, among others, based on the fact that CEE-applicant countries with whom existing member states shared a “community-based identity”⁷⁷ were prioritized over Turkey in the enlargement process. From this approach, the third relevant hypothesis to be

⁷¹ Sijursen, “Why expand, 492

⁷² Ibid. 494

⁷³ Sijursen, *Questioning*, 7

⁷⁴ Helene Sijursen, “Enlargement in perspective: The EU’s quest for identity”, *Oslo: ARENA working paper*, No 5, 2008, 3, <http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2008/> (Accessed May 16, 2008)

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Sijursen, *Questioning*, 10

⁷⁷ Sijursen, “Why Expand, 508

examined is that EU members will prioritize enlargement to those countries towards whom they feel a special kinship-based duty.⁷⁸

Sjursen's approach also allows us to conceptualize the moral dimension of enlargement preferences that goes beyond support to countries with whom states share some sense of 'we'ness'. Enlargement support, communicated with references to universal values of democracy and human rights, can be understood as the morally valid position of new members. As O'Brennan argues, in the context of Eastern enlargement, the then newer members such as Ireland and Spain "conceptualized their preferences through the lenses of their own specific experiences"⁷⁹. Since their own democracies had been reinforced by the EU accession prospect and they had argued their 'right' to membership by referring to the EU norms and values, it was difficult to deny others the same based on self-interests.⁸⁰ In the same way, the current new member states have "subscribed to norms and principles that they may in turn be expected to respect also when this is not in their own interest".⁸¹ Based on this, it is finally possible to hypothesize that new member states' preferences are shaped by their own accession and socialization into the EU, which forms their conception of their current social role and prescribes what is as legitimate and a justified position for new members to take on enlargement.

The following parts of the thesis will analyze the new member states' preferences for further enlargement based on the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter.

⁷⁸ Sjursen, "Why Expand 495

⁷⁹ O'Brennan, 167

⁸⁰ Ibid. 170

⁸¹ Sjursen, *Questioning*, 215

CHAPTER 2 – ACCESSION OF IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS: THE QUEST FOR SECURITY AND STABILITY

The new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe are generally stronger supporters of further enlargement than the ‘old’ member states.⁸² This is visible both in public support for further enlargement and official and practical support by governments and political elites. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the preferences for further enlargement in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland with focus on the prioritization of their immediate neighbors. As the Czech Republic does not have borders with non-EU countries, the main analysis of Czech preferences will be provided in the next chapter. First, I shortly present results from public opinion surveys regarding future enlargements. Second, I introduce the preferences for enlargement in general in my case countries showing that direct neighbors are their main priority. Finally, I analyze these preferences by using the rational liberal intergovernmentalist theoretical approach outlined in the first part of the combined theoretical framework.

2.1 Positive Public Opinion

Preferences and priorities for enlargement communicated by the current government, political administrations and political elites in the new member states is the focus in the present thesis. However, political preferences are not formed in a vacuum – governments and politicians want to be reelected. Thus, public opinion is a relevant and clearly measurable indicator of a country’s enlargement preferences as also the population may identify national interests and identity when determining their positions. The public enlargement preferences presented in the European Commission’s Eurobarometer surveys show relatively stronger

⁸² Kazmierkiewicz, *EU Accession*, 14, Eurobarometer surveys 2005, 2006, 2007

support for enlargement among the populations of new member states in comparison with the ‘old’ members. Whereas 43 percent in EU15 are in favor of further enlargement, 68 percent are in favor in the twelve new member states. Among my case countries, and overall in the EU, the highest support can be found in Poland where 76 percent of the population is in favor of further enlargement. In the Czech Republic and Hungary the support is 64 percent and in Bulgaria 58 percent.⁸³ Croatia enjoys the highest support in the populations of my case countries, followed by Ukraine (not on the EU enlargement agenda), Macedonia and Serbia. The support for Turkey among my case countries is between 30 (Czech Republic) and 45 (Bulgaria) percent, however still higher than the 26 percent support in EU15.⁸⁴

2.2 Preferences and Prioritization of Direct Neighbors

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland all officially support further enlargement of the EU. The enlargement positions of the main government alternatives in these countries are largely stable although the focus as well as the rationale behind the support might differ somewhat. Nevertheless, as the positions since the new members’ accession seems relatively constant⁸⁵, analysis of divergent positions within the countries will not be considered here. In line with their official support, it is important for these four countries that the enlargement process continues and that the ‘enlargement fatigue’, especially in old member states, does not halt the ongoing and future enlargement process. This means that they primarily favor the accession of the countries that are undertaking negotiations, or are regarded as potential candidates, as soon as these countries fulfill the criteria. According to one Czech senior foreign ministry official, the candidate countries should be admitted as soon

⁸³ Eurobarometer 67, June 2007, 188-189

⁸⁴ Eurobarometer 66, December 2006 Annex 66. See Appendix 2 for further details.

⁸⁵ Confirmed in interviews with experts in my case countries. The Czech Christian democrats are perhaps the most divergent political grouping as it quite openly expresses reservation towards Turkey’s accession

as they are ready and not be delayed because the EU is not ‘prepared’.⁸⁶ These countries’ governments are also against that current and future candidates should face stricter conditions than they did when they entered the EU. Officially, they all support the candidates to achieve nothing less than full membership.⁸⁷

Official support in my case countries is not limited to the Western Balkans, foremost among them Croatia, and Turkey who are already on the EU enlargement agenda. Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria also favor an extended enlargement agenda to include countries in Eastern Europe that today do not have a membership perspective and are covered by the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP). Although clearly in favor of further enlargement, these countries’ support is not unconditional. They emphasize the necessity for the candidates and potential candidates to undertake the sufficient reforms and to fulfill all the accession criteria, to share the European values and for the EU to be institutionally ready to take them in as members. However, despite official positions on the accession of potential candidates, enlargement is not a topic that figures high in the domestic political environment in these countries. As Kazmierkiewicz argues, except Poland, the other new members have a “self-perception of being small”⁸⁸ and with little influence – a notion that contributes to the determination of their positions on enlargement. Thus, in many situations their preferences fundamentally reflect that of the Commission.⁸⁹

Enlargement is regarded as one of the priorities of Poland’s foreign policy.⁹⁰ Even though Poland’s obvious priority is the further integration of their Eastern neighbors, their official support is also, although less proactive, given both for the Western Balkans and

⁸⁶ Interview by author with senior official in the Czech Foreign Ministry, Prague, April 29, 2008

⁸⁷ Confirmed in several interviews in all the case countries

⁸⁸ Kazmierkiewicz, *EU Accession*, 36

⁸⁹ Ibid. 37

⁹⁰ Lech Kaczynski, Polish President, interviewed in True, January 2007, <http://www.president.pl/x.node?id=7543036>. (Accessed May 13, 2008)

Turkey.⁹¹ The low salience of Southeastern Europe is visible in statements such as the most recent foreign policy speech by foreign minister Sikorski. The minister emphasized the strengthening of the Eastern policy of the union as ‘Poland’s specialization’ and it that it is time for Ukraine to get a European perspective. Candidates that are undergoing negotiations were just mentioned very briefly in that Poland supports “the integration of the Balkans”. In this central speech, Turkey was not mentioned at all.⁹² In another recent speech that unambiguously shows the Polish priorities, the president, Lech Kaczynski, mentioned primarily the strong support for Ukraine, Georgia and even Azerbaijan when talking about potential EU candidates, however the speech also mentioned that “Poland also supports the development of the EU... in the direction of the Balkans.”⁹³

The Czech EU presidency in the first half of 2009 has progress in the enlargement process especially with the Western Balkans, but also with Turkey, as one of the three main foreign policy priorities.⁹⁴ Moreover, in official Czech statements we can read that “[w]e want the door into the Union to be open for everybody who fulfills the relevant...criteria”.⁹⁵ But, as the Czech Republic only borders EU members, the issue of enlargement to neighbors is obviously less salient.⁹⁶ In Hungary, however, enlargement is one of the EU policy areas where the country has been most vocal.⁹⁷ It is regarded in Hungary’s interest that the EU “preserves its openness and provides for a genuine European perspective for those European

⁹¹ Sikorski, Radosław, Polish Foreign Minister, Address, Warsaw, January 25 2008. <http://www.mfa.gov.pl/files/WYSTAPIENIA/pakistanENG.pdf> (Accessed May 13, 2008).

⁹² Sikorski, Radosław, Foreign Policy Exposé by Poland’s Foreign Minister before the Sejm, Warsaw, May 7, 2008. www.msz.gov.pl/files/ExposeMinistraSikorskiegoEN.doc (Accessed May 8, 2008)

⁹³ Kaczynski, Lech, Polish President, Address, January 16, 2008. <http://www.msz.gov.pl/Materials.and.Documents.2081.html?PHPSESSID=1a41a4d5d2ca22e55703dec8df75cdea> (Accessed May 13, 2008).

⁹⁴ Czech Republic, Priorities for the Czech Republic’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2009, October 2007, 17. A www.euroskop.cz/58065/121285/clanek/czech-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-european-union (Accessed May 30, 2008)

⁹⁵ Topolánek, Mirek, speech by the Czech prime minister Brno, May 25, 2007. <http://www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=23196> (Accessed, May 30, 2008)

⁹⁶ Kral, David, “Czech Republic” in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States* ed. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, (Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006) 50

⁹⁷ Agnes Batory, “Hungary” in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States* ed. Kazmierkiewicz, Piotr (Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006), 102

countries that share the same values”.⁹⁸ Despite the official support for all candidate countries, it is apparent that the not every country is equally prioritized. In Hungary’s External Relations Strategy from 2008 it is clearly stated that “[i]t is in Hungary’s strategic interests to see countries of *the region* meet the political and economic criteria of accession and become members of the EU...”.⁹⁹ The countries that are mentioned are Croatia and Serbia, as well as a reference to the interests of greater stabilization of the Western Balkans in general. The Hungarian position is that Croatia should be admitted “as soon as possible”,¹⁰⁰ and not have to wait for other candidates to get ready.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, Hungary recognizes that Ukraine is far from membership, but is in favor of a future membership perspective for the country.¹⁰²

In official documents on Bulgaria’s foreign policy, support for a continuous integration process both to the Western Balkan countries and Turkey is mentioned as key priorities of the country as an EU member.¹⁰³ The primary concern is for the direct neighbors Macedonia and Serbia. Turkey is also a bordering country, but according to Bulgarian analysts, the official position on Turkey is more cautious, ambiguous and less outspoken than the support for the Western Balkans.¹⁰⁴ Considering this, it is logical that although Turkey is a direct neighbor, Bulgaria’s preferences for Turkey will be closer elaborated in the chapter on all the case countries’ preferences for Turkey. Bulgaria officially supports Croatia’s EU

⁹⁸ Hungarian Foreign Ministry, European Policy Guidelines of the Hungarian Government.. Budapest, August, 2007. http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/967AA2CB-9B6B-4E80-872E-DEC71B21EE1E/0/EU_Pol_Essence_final_070803.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2008)

⁹⁹ Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Hungary’s External Relations Strategy, 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/3E8FA370-15B3-4919-AC14-41A02CB54BA3/0/080319_kulapcs_strat_en.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2008), my emphasis

¹⁰⁰ Gyurcsany, Ferenc, speech by the Hungarian Prime Minister, March 7, 2006.

http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/37EB85AF-7C80-4F6D-B5CC-6AE9A5B3B60D/0/070307kulpol_en2.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2008)

¹⁰¹ Peter Györkös, Hungarian ambassador to Croatia, “Specificities and Perspectives of the Wester-Balkan Enlargement”, EU Enlargement and Global Implications of the Balkan Problem, Conference, Central European University, Budapest, February 22, 2008

¹⁰² Somogyi, Ferenc Statement by the former Hungarian Foreign Minister, May 5, 2006, www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/actualities/ministers_speeches/050506_committee_ei.htm (Accessed May 31, 2008)

¹⁰³ Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, Bulgaria as a Member of the EU, priorities, http://www.mfa.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8682&Itemid=451 (Accessed May 13, 2008)

¹⁰⁴ Interviews by author with Antoinette Primatarova, Programme Director, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, Bulgaria, By phone, April 24, 2008

accession¹⁰⁵, but in practice, Croatia is not a priority. Nonetheless, enlargement is not high on the political agenda as Bulgaria still has challenges with their own EU membership¹⁰⁶, such as possible withdrawal of EU funds due to corruption allegations.

Officially, all four countries support further enlargement to all candidates. However, it is clear that the accession of their neighbors is the priority. In the next section, I argue that these preferences largely can be explain by a rationalist logic.

2.3 Material Gains and the Determination of Priorities

Enlarging the EU to their immediate neighbors is the main concern for Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria who all shares a border with potential accession countries. Regarding direct neighbors they are more willing to speak up about their interests at the EU level and actively support their accession and/or closer integration with the EU. The prioritization relate closely to the countries' geographical proximity to potential accession countries and thus corresponds well with the LI assumptions that being at the EU border increases the interdependence between the new EU member states and directly bordering countries, and thus also the security and economic gains.¹⁰⁷ In the following sections I argue that three main reasons based on LI goes a long way in explaining the determination of enlargement preferences for direct neighbors in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.

2.3.1 Securing a Stable Neighborhood

Enlargement to immediate bordering neighbors is primarily seen as a way of promoting and “locking in” further reforms and stabilization of the neighborhood. This can

¹⁰⁵ Koldanova, Evgenia, statement by Deputy Minister, Bulgaria Foreign Ministry Website. www.mfa.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8832&Itemid=217 (Accessed May 31, 2008)

¹⁰⁶ Interview by author with Juliana Nikolova, Director European Institute, Sofia, Bulgaria, By phone, April 21, 2008

¹⁰⁷ Schimmelfennig, “The Community, 50

generally be in the interest of the EU as a whole, but it is even more rational for the neighbors whose own national security can be threatened by their neighbors' instability. Moreover, by enlarging the EU to their neighbors, these countries will no longer be at the border of the EU.

Among the countries currently on the EU enlargement agenda, none are in the geographic vicinity to Poland, however, when positive stances on enlargement is mention in essence it means the Eastern neighbors.¹⁰⁸ As Poland shares a fairly long border with Ukraine, its stability is of crucial importance for Poland's national security. Consequently, the main rationale for the overall enlargement preferences in Poland is the vital interests of having Ukraine, but also other Eastern neighbors, in the European Union. Geopolitically, Ukraine's EU integration is seen as a way to ease the threat of Russian influence over Poland's neighbor.¹⁰⁹ As stated by a senior official in the foreign ministry; "the influence of Russia over Ukraine would not be that advantageous for Poland" referring to Ukraine as a buffer country to ensure a 'free' Poland.¹¹⁰ Or as Zbigniew Brzeziński once said; "Russia with Ukraine is an empire; Russia will not be one without Ukraine"¹¹¹ Hence, it is in Poland's interests that Ukraine, and also Belarus, are free, democratic, with a market economy and aligned with the West.

The Polish focus on the eastern neighborhood stems from a long tradition of Polish support for closer connections between European organizations and its neighbors, Ukraine and Belarus, as their closer connection is perceived also as an incentive for both economic and political reforms in the countries.¹¹² On the background of close historical and cultural ties, this support originated even long before Poland's accession to the EU, and Poland has

¹⁰⁸ Interview by author with Eugeniusz Smolar, President, Center for International Relations, Warsaw, May 6, 2008

¹⁰⁹ Kazmierkiewicz, *EU Accession*, 119

¹¹⁰ Interview by author with senior official in the Polish Foreign Ministry, Warsaw, May 6, 2008

¹¹¹ Quoted in Aleksander Smolar "Poland's Eastern Policy and Membership in the European Union" in The EU's "Eastern Dimension" – An Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland's Policy? Ed. Pawel Kowal, Centre For International Relations, Warsaw, 2002

http://www.ipp.md/files/Calendar/2003/Atelier7/4_Pawel%20Kowal_03_10_2004.pdf (Accessed, May 30, 2008)

¹¹² Kazmierkiewicz, *EU Accession*, 119

been a staunch supporter of a more pronounced Eastern dimension of the ENP, e.g. when publishing a non-paper on an Eastern dimension in 2003.¹¹³ The Polish support for Ukraine in particular became even more visible when the Polish president was one of the mediators in the 2004 Ukrainian Orange Revolution.¹¹⁴

Considering that Hungary literally ‘heard’ the war in former Yugoslavia, the security and stability of the neighborhood is of utmost importance.¹¹⁵ Hungary borders three potential accession countries - Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine - and has ethnic minorities there.¹¹⁶ Consequently, these three countries are in the forefront of Hungary’s enlargement priorities – primarily Croatia, Ukraine to a lesser extent. For security reasons the chief concern is to have a stable Serbia with a European orientation at its border,¹¹⁷ hence, Hungary is clearly in favor of Serbia’s accession to the EU. Moreover, it is also of central importance for Hungary that the significant Hungarian minority in Serbia in the future will be in the EU. Serbian EU membership is seen as a way to ensure sufficient minority protection of Hungarians in the north of Serbia¹¹⁸, and to achieve the “reunification of the Hungarian cultural nation”¹¹⁹ - a goal that has been and still is a driving force for Hungarian foreign policy in general and for the support for enlargement to its neighbors in particular.¹²⁰ Proactive actions taken towards Serbia’s EU accession includes when Hungary in late 2006 pushed for restarting the talks on the stabilization and association agreement – the first step towards becoming a candidate - with Serbia when they were stopped due to the failure of arresting war crimes suspects Mladic

¹¹³ Polish Government, “Non-Paper with Polish Proposals Concerning Policy Towards New Eastern Neighbors after EU Enlargement” <http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Non-paper,with,Polish,proposals,concerning,policy,towards,the,new,Eastern,neighbours,after,EU,enlargement,2041.htm> (Accessed May 16, 2008)

¹¹⁴ Ibid. 121

¹¹⁵ Interview by author with Hungarian senior Foreign Ministry official, Budapest, April 16, 2008

¹¹⁶ According to information provided by the website of The government office for Hungarian minorities abroad, there are 293 299 Hungarians living in in Serbia (2002), 156 600 in Ukraine (2001) and 16 595 in Croatia (2002). http://www.hhrf.org/htmh/en/?menuid=08&news020_id=1201 (May 29, 2008)

¹¹⁷ Interview, senior official, Hungarian Foreign Ministry

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ The Hungarian European Policy Guidelines

¹²⁰ Eamonn Butler, “Hungary and the European Union: The political implications of societal security promotion”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 7, 2007, 1130

and Karadzic.¹²¹ Hungary's concern about the situation for Hungarians currently living outside the EU can also be regarded as a reason for Hungary's official support of Ukraine's EU aspirations.¹²²

Bulgaria views EU membership as the best way to ensure stability and regional security¹²³, hence the EU accession of Bulgaria's immediate neighbors, Macedonia and Serbia is their primary interest. Moreover, like Poland and Hungary, Bulgaria also utilizes its EU membership to achieve important national interests. This is in conformity with the rational logic of LI emphasizing that states participate in international organizations as a way of more efficiently pursuing national interests.¹²⁴ One clear example is how Bulgaria in recent years has emphasized that its support for Macedonia and Turkey's EU accession is not unconditional, but depends on the fulfillment of good neighborly relations.¹²⁵ In this way Bulgaria brings bilateral issues to the enlargement negotiating table and it can be argued that the support for neighbors' EU accession is used to gain leverage and concessions from them.

2.3.2 Getting New Partners

Geopolitical interests also affects enlargement preferences, as future enlargements might further move the centre of gravity more eastward and towards countries/regions where the new member states have more contacts and ties. The prospect of enhanced influence within the EU as a result of this can also be one reason especially for Poland's support for Ukraine. The support for the accession of new members from Eastern Europe is mentioned in interviews as an unofficial rationale to get "more alliance partners" in the Union.¹²⁶

¹²¹ "Leaders will consider 'integration capacity', but remain unwilling to close the door", in *The Irish Times*, December 15, 2006, <http://www.eapn.ie/notices/1248> (Accessed June 3, 2008)

¹²² Batory, 113

¹²³ Website of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry

¹²⁴ Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) 143

¹²⁵ Interview, Primatarova

¹²⁶ Interviews by author with a Polish state official, Warsaw, May 5, 2008 ; senior official, Czech Foreign Ministry; Boyko Todorov, Program Director, Centre for Study of Democracy, Sofia, Bulgaria, April 18, 2008

2.3.3 Extending Economic Opportunities?

Close geographic proximity also enhances possible economic gains through increased trade and investments as costs for transportation and communication are reduced.¹²⁷ Potential economic profit is a determinant for support for enlargement to direct neighbors, and this is closely related to the security argument, as a stable neighbourhood provides safer protection of investments and a more favourable environment for increased trade. Ukraine is Poland's second largest export destination among non-EU countries¹²⁸, and as Ukraine is a large market, its further integration with the EU gives economic potentials for Poland.¹²⁹ Croatia is a relatively important export market for Hungarian goods and for this landlocked country the Croatian coast is the closest passage to the sea.¹³⁰ Hungary is also an important investor in Croatia.¹³¹ However, Hungarian support for Croatia is not primarily seen in economic terms, but more as 'natural' in light of thousand years of relatively peaceful coexistence of the two countries the period of the Hungarian kingdom.¹³² The strong support for Croatia was evident at the EU level when the Hungarian prime minister criticized the EU for failing to open negotiations with Croatia in March 2005 because of not arresting the war-crimes suspect Ante Gotovina.¹³³ Hungary was also vocal in separating Croatia's accession negotiations from that of Turkey,¹³⁴ and today there is a strong Hungarian lobby for trying to close the negotiations in 2008. Economic relations are also an additional factor influencing Hungary's support for Serbia's EU integration.

¹²⁷ Moravcsik, *The Choice*, 26

¹²⁸ World Trade Organization statistics, <http://stat.wto.org>

¹²⁹ Interview, Polish senior foreign ministry official

¹³⁰ Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Bilateral relations with Croatia.

http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/bilateral_affairs/bilateral_affairs.aspx?d=Economic%20relations&c=53&z=Europe (Accessed, May 31, 2008)

¹³¹ Interview by author with Péter Györkös, Hungary's ambassador to Croatia. By phone, April 18, 2008

¹³² Mentioned by most interviews in Hungary. See Appendix 1

¹³³ "No agreement in EU on Croatia talks", *EU Observer*. March, 10, 2005, http://euobserver.com/index.phtml?sid=9&search_string_top=&subscribe_email=Enter+your+email&list=news-twice-daily@list.euobserver.com&accept_charge=Accept+charge&aid=18636&cost_shown=1 (Accessed May 8, 2008)

¹³⁴ "Croatia-Hungary relations "continually good and friendly" – president. Excerpt from report in English by Croatian news agency HINA, May 3, 2007. Available at Lexis Nexis

Finally, as the Balkans physically cuts Bulgaria off from the rest of the EU, the security of the region is important also for Bulgaria's economic development. This is based on the experience of the 1990s when Bulgaria's economy suffered during the embargo and wars in Yugoslavia as their main transport route to the EU goes through Serbia. Furthermore, Serbia and Macedonia are among Bulgaria's most important non-EU trading partners and Bulgaria also has the biggest share of its foreign investments in its three non-EU neighboring countries.¹³⁵

However, despite the fact that the accession of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria's neighbors could have some positive economic benefits, all the case countries are conducting the vast majority of their trade with other EU member states.¹³⁶ Although the economic argument has some importance, it seems unable to alone account for the preferences.

Conclusion

As the analysis above shows, the enlargement policy of the new member states in question emphasizing the priority for their immediate neighbors seems highly influenced by their geographical proximity to the potential accession countries and the interdependence this creates. This goes a long way to confirm the liberal intergovernmentalist hypothesis. Of the three above-mentioned rational explanations, the importance of ensuring stability and security in their neighbourhood is stronger emphasized than both the geopolitical and the economic aspects, as the economic gains are not expected to be that great. Furthermore, the less priority given to countries where the expected security and economic gains are smaller, seems also to be in line with the liberal intergovernmental explanation of state preferences focusing mainly on national interest. Yet, despite the comparatively less support for non-neighbors, consistent

¹³⁵ Bulgarian export partners, 2006: EU 60,7, Western Balkans 13,9 %, Turkey, 11,9% (Bulgarian National Bank), Outward FDI (2008): Serbia 19,5%, Macedonia 9,1%, Turkey 9,7% (Bulgarian Statistical Institute)

¹³⁶ World Trade Organization, <http://stat.wto.org>

official support from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic towards enlargement also to countries that would not give them any immediate national gains is still observed. Therefore, there is a need to look into other factors focusing more on the role of norms and non-materialistic to explanation the preferences for non-neighbors.

CHAPTER 3 – ENLARGEMENT TO NON-NEIGHBORS AND TURKEY: THE ROLE OF NORMS AND IDENTITY

Although new members focus principally on their immediate neighbors' EU accession, in official statements they also offer strong support for enlargement in general. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze my case countries' support for enlargement to non-bordering potential accession countries. Because of Turkey's strategic geographic location, size, religion and relatively low economic development it is regarded as a special case when it comes to enlargement. Hence, preferences for Turkey will be present in a separate section. Even though Bulgaria borders Turkey, its support for Turkey is also considered here. First, I present the preferences for non-neighbors and for Turkey. Second, I show the limitations to the liberal intergovernmental explanations of positions on non-neighbors, and finally I apply the constructivist theoretical approaches outlined in the second part of my combined framework to explain what determines the preferences.

3.1 Preferences for Non-Neighbors

The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria all officially favor a Union that has open doors for all potential future members that fulfill the necessary criteria. But as the direct national security and economic gains decrease when potential future members are not immediate neighboring countries, the rationale for the support for non-neighbors is somewhat different than for direct neighbors– and the support is less proactive. One exception to this pattern is the Czech Republic surrounded only by EU member states, but still a strong supporter of further enlargement. For the Czech Republic, the main priorities are the accession of Croatia, Serbia and the rest of the Western Balkans. As Prime Minister Topolánek said; “We are in favor of further enlargement of the EU, in particular by countries

of the West Balkan”.¹³⁷ One practical example of this support is that during discussions leading to the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia in April 2008, Czech diplomats in Belgrade were among the EU representatives that were most active in pushing for Serbia’s closer EU integration - more active than diplomats from neighboring Hungary.¹³⁸ Moreover, the Czech Republic favors Ukrainian and Georgian EU membership if they fulfill the necessary criteria and share EU values,¹³⁹ but as these countries are not on the EU enlargement agenda, they are not a priority. Poland is loosely interested in the integration of the whole Balkan region, without making any particular Balkan country its priority. Rather, Poland seems to follow the opinion of the Commission and support the country that is closest to accession – namely Croatia. Hungary and Bulgaria also support the integration of non-bordering Western Balkan countries, but their accession is not presented as a priority. Finally, Bulgaria favors that Ukraine moves closer to the EU and therefore, is supportive of an ENP that does not exclude a future membership perspective.¹⁴⁰

3.2 Positions on Turkey’s membership

The EU integration process of Turkey has been and still is highly controversial within the EU. The arguments at the center of this controversy are the fear that the accession of Turkey will create difficulties for the functioning of the EU under the current institutional set up and in certain policy areas, and the fact that Turkey is viewed by many as so ‘different’ that its accession would put in danger the nature of the whole EU project.¹⁴¹ However, it is in old member states such as France, Germany and Austria, where one hears the greatest

¹³⁷ Mirek Topolánek Speech by the Czech Prime Minister, "The Czech Republic – Member of the EU", Sweden. Date not provided. <http://www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=22649> (Accessed, May 30, 2008)

¹³⁸ Interview with European Union diplomat posted in Belgrade, Belgrade May 10, 2008

¹³⁹ Mirek Topolánek, Speech by the Czech Prime Minister, "The Czech Republic as the Presidency country in a changing Europe" Greece, April 11, 2008, <http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/default.asp?ParentIDO=854&ido=22016&amb=12&idj=2> (Accessed, June 1, 2008)

¹⁴⁰ Interview by author with Bulgarian foreign ministry expert, by email, May 2008

¹⁴¹ Nugent, 481

reservations about Turkey's accession. In new member states, where enlargement in general is favored by most of the political elites, the Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech governments officially support Turkey's accession to the EU, stressing their support for full membership.¹⁴² Nevertheless, the support for Turkey is not a priority in any of the four countries. Except Bulgaria, the three other countries have more interests in the accession of Ukraine than Turkey. The position on Turkey in Poland is neither to oppose further enlargement and thus not to Turkey, nor to play a leading role in supporting Turkey's accession.¹⁴³ For Bulgaria – a direct neighbor of Turkey – the situation is somewhat different as good relations with Turkey and regional stability are of central national importance. Therefore, analysts point out that all Bulgarian governments officially will support Turkey's EU accession,¹⁴⁴ even if the accession of the Western Balkans is higher prioritized.¹⁴⁵ As one analyst noted; Bulgaria will be no motor for the accession of Turkey, but no brake either.¹⁴⁶

3.3 Limitations to a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Explanation

According to liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), states will favor enlargement to countries where their perceived material gains are higher than their costs. Although, the lower salience of the non-neighboring countries among the enlargement priorities of my four case countries correspond with the assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism, this theoretical approach cannot sufficiently explain why these new member states still support further enlargement, even if to a lesser degree, to include all potential accession countries. I emphasize three main reasons.

¹⁴² Interviews by author with Foreign Ministry officials in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and from Sofia, April, May 2008, See Appendix 1

¹⁴³ Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, "Poland" in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States* ed. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, (Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006), 118,

¹⁴⁴ All interviews with Bulgarian experts, see Appendix 2

¹⁴⁵ Interview, Nikolova

¹⁴⁶ Interview, Primatarova

3.3.1 Stability and Security for Europe

A primer motive for the support for EU integration of non-neighbors is that the inclusion of the Western Balkans, Turkey and also Ukraine, is expected to enhance the stability in the region and the overall security of the EU, and hence strengthen national security for all members.¹⁴⁷ One aspect of this is that Turkey's accession is seen as important because the Muslim country is an significant NATO ally for the new member states,¹⁴⁸ and also a source for diversification of energy supply.¹⁴⁹ However, in my case countries the integration of non-neighbors is typically regarded not as a particular national interest, but rather as an interest of the EU as a whole. Consequently, LI, that focuses on the utility maximizing of member states' own interests, can not satisfactorily explain why 'far away' countries, such as Poland, support the accession of Southeastern Europe, as non-enlargement to this region would have few direct effects on Poland's security. The same is the case with the Czech and Hungarian support for Turkey.

3.3.2 Friends or Rivals?

The accession of the Western Balkans and Ukraine is perceived by new member states' governments as a way to increase the number of alliance partners within the Union, as it might shift the EU centre of gravity further east and southeast.¹⁵⁰ However, not all non-bordering potential accession countries will further increase the position of the new members. With the accession of the Balkans, the Union's focus might 'tip' more to the south, which is not in the interests of Poland. Moreover, Turkey's accession could threaten Czech and Hungarian influence in the Balkans. Finally, with the inclusion of Turkey, the EU might

¹⁴⁷ Interview, senior official Czech Foreign Ministry; senior official, Polish Foreign Ministry; Bulgarian Foreign Ministry website

¹⁴⁸ Kazmierkiewicz, *EU Accession*, 36

¹⁴⁹ Kaczynski, Speech, 2007; interview senior official, Czech Foreign Ministry

¹⁵⁰ See footnote 126

become more a Union of ‘concentric circles’¹⁵¹ with different degrees of integration based on distance from the centre. This could result in a situation where Bulgaria and Hungary might be in an ‘outer circle’ not being able to participate in ‘core Europe’, which is viewed as against their interests.¹⁵²

3.3.3 Calculating Economic Gains and Costs

Potential economic gains, in terms of trade and better protection and opportunities for investments, are also a frequently mentioned reason for support for enlargement also to non-neighbors. With EU-driven democratic and economic reforms the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland anticipate some increased economic benefits for their companies in the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Turkey.¹⁵³ Although the accession of non-neighbors might increase trade and investments opportunities, economic gains are not mentioned as the primary motive behind the support for the inclusion of the Western Balkans¹⁵⁴ as these markets are relatively small and my case countries’ trade mainly is with existing EU members.¹⁵⁵ Support for non-neighbors in the Western Balkans is rather justified with references to for security of the Union or because of historical relations.

Turkey and Ukraine, however, are viewed as more interesting potential markets. For Bulgaria Turkey is the fourth largest trading partner¹⁵⁶ and a medium investor, thus economic ties are also an important rationale for support. However, in spite of the greater economic

¹⁵¹ See Kerstin Junge “Differentiated European Integration” in *European Union Politics* ed Michelle Cini, (New York:Oxford University Press, 2007), 398

¹⁵² Interviews by author with Hungarian MEP, György Schöpflin, Budapest, April 30, 2008; Primatarova

¹⁵³ Lech Kazinsky Interview with True, January 2007, Interviews by author with Radek Pech, Director of the Department of EU General Affairs, Czech Foreign Ministry, Prague, April 28, 2008; senior Hungarian foreign ministry official

¹⁵⁴ Interviews, Pech; senior official, Polish Foreign Ministry; expert from the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, Interview by author with Péter Balázs, Director, Center for EU Enlargement Studies, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, Budapest, April 30, 2008

¹⁵⁵ World Trade Organization statistics, <http://stat.wto.org>

¹⁵⁶ Linden, Ronald H, “Balkan Geometry: Turkish Accessoin and the International Relations of Southeast Europe,” *Orbis*, Volume 51, Issue 2, (2007), 346

potential in Turkey than in the Western Balkans, the integration of the Western Balkan neighbors, is higher on the Bulgarian agenda.¹⁵⁷ This prioritization can be explained by the precedence of security in the Balkans over economic opportunities in Turkey, and that the enlargement to the Western Balkans is less controversial in the EU.¹⁵⁸ However, this prioritization is insufficiently accounted for by LI focusing on material interest. Moreover, apart from Bulgaria's economic relations with Turkey and Poland's with Ukraine, the other case countries' trade relations with Turkey and Ukraine are relatively small.¹⁵⁹

Yet, the most central point that shows the limitation to a LI explanation of the position towards non-neighbors, is that these four new members, which today are great beneficiaries of transfers from the EU common agricultural and regional policy,¹⁶⁰ with accession of new and poorer countries, risk that financial transfers from the EU will diminish. Considering these potential economic costs and simultaneous support for non-neighbors, there is a need to look for other explanations for the preferences.

3.4 Strategic Use of Norm-based Arguments

The main interest of Poland is to keep the enlargement process going, so Ukraine and other Eastern neighbors can accede to the Union in the future. To be in line with their own rhetoric, it is natural that they also support enlargement to the countries currently on the agenda.¹⁶¹ A statement by the Polish president, Lech Kaczynski, confirms this view; "Poland

¹⁵⁷ Interview, expert Bulgarian Foreign Ministry

¹⁵⁸ Interview, Nikolova

¹⁵⁹ Hungarian import and export from/to Ukraine and Turkey are less or around 1% (Hungarian Central Statistical office, 2006). For Czech Republic export and import with the two countries are 1% or lower, (Czech Statistical Yearbook 2007)

¹⁶⁰ Poland is per capita the 6th recipient of the Common Agricultural Policy, Hungary the 7th. New members are also among the greatest beneficiaries of EU structural and cohesion funds. See [www.farmsubsidy.org, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm)

¹⁶¹ Interview by author with Grzegorz Gromadzki, Director International Cooperation, Stefan Batory Foundation. Warsaw May 5, 2008

cares about...enlargement of the EU and Croatia can count on Poland's support"¹⁶². Moreover, the relatively less complicated accession of the Western Balkans compared to bigger countries like Turkey or Ukraine, is seen as a way out of the current scepticism towards enlargement in other EU member states.¹⁶³ As there are few direct national interests for Poland in the accession of the Western Balkans and Turkey, the justification for Poland's support to further enlargement towards these countries is based on arguments referring to "keeping commitments",¹⁶⁴ "solidarity" and EU wide interests. This rhetoric can be interpreted as a strategic use of norm-based arguments, or 'rhetorical action', where Poland backs up its selfish interests by referring to the community norms,¹⁶⁵ both to legitimize their general enlargement support and to invoke community values that could benefit Ukraine's accession. Interviews confirm that one rationale behind Poland's support for the Western Balkans and Turkey is that it will increase the chances for Ukraine.¹⁶⁶ Thus, it seems plausible to conclude that, although references are frequently made to norm-based arguments in Poland's enlargement preferences, the norms seem to be used rather instrumentally and consequently, rationalist logics seem to prevail in their enlargement preferences.

In the Czech Republic a "hidden agenda" is also detectable, particularly in the support for enlargement by the current government, led by the conservative, Eurosceptic, Civic Democratic Party (ODS). For this party, which is against further political integration in the EU, the inclusion of as many new members as possible (widening) is supported as it is perceived to make further political integration (deepening) more difficult.¹⁶⁷ This ideological interest deviates from the LI explanation, but can nevertheless be understood as a self-

¹⁶² "Poland for Croatia joining EU "as soon as possible", president says", in HINA news agency, Zagreb, January 18, 2008. Found through Lexis Nexis

¹⁶³ Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, "EU enlargement to the Western Balkans from the Polish Perspective" in *Romania, Bulgaria, who next? Perspectives on further enlargement as seen from the new member states and EU hopefuls* ed David Kral, (Praha: EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, 2007) 56

¹⁶⁴ Confidential Foreign Ministry document "Poland's position towards the EU enlargement", 2007

¹⁶⁵ Schimmelfennig, "The Community", 63

¹⁶⁶ Interview, senior official, Polish Foreign Ministry

¹⁶⁷ Interview by author with advisor for the Czech Government. Prague, April 29, 2008.

centered national interest promoted through the strategic use of norm-based arguments. However, these concerns were not the rationale behind the enlargement support of the previous government led by the Social Democratic Party¹⁶⁸, hence alone it fails fully to explain Czech preferences.

3.5 Socialization and ‘Appropriate’ Behavior

As opposed to some authors who argue that new member states tend to pursue national interests and pay little attention to the broader EU perspective,¹⁶⁹ I find that there are several examples of how my case countries seem to be promoting EU interests. When new members explain their enlargement preferences for non-neighbors, reference is often made to the interests of the EU as a whole, rather than to the maximization of their own economic or security interests. This is not only evident when countries such as Poland promote further enlargement to increase the chances of Ukraine’s accession, but also when limited direct material interests of the member states are present. ‘EU-interests’ include the promotion of democracy, peace and stability¹⁷⁰ – values that are part of the liberal collective EU identity.¹⁷¹ The emphasis on the interest for the EU as a whole are particularly evident in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland’s support for the accession of Turkey, where their direct national interests are modest.

According to constructivist reasoning, the norms and values of the community into which a state is socialized can determine the behavior of that state as it acts in line with a

¹⁶⁸ Kral, ”Czech,

¹⁶⁹ Raik and Grmadzki, 34

¹⁷⁰ Interviews, Pech; senior Hungarian foreign ministry official; Speech by former Polish Foreign Minister, Anna Fotyga, Government information on Polish foreign, policy in 2007, Warsaw, May 11, 2007, <http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:6A8EzsPVpm0J:www.msz.gov.pl/Ministers,Annual,Address,2007,10134.html+anna+fotyga+to+loose+the+most+enlargement+solidarity&hl=no&ct=clnk&cd=6&gl=no> (Accessed June,2, 2008)

¹⁷¹ Schimmelfenning, ”The Community 58

‘logic of appropriateness’ and what is expected of them in a particular situation.¹⁷² In relation to the external action of the EU, the norms on which the EU identity is based are about “inclusion into the community of like-minded actors”.¹⁷³ Thus, the support for enlargement to promote democracy and the general interest of the EU as a whole can be seen as a sign that the new member states are successfully socialized into the EU identity and community culture, and thus have adopted the EU norms and values as their own interests. Consequently, they are not only concerned about their direct material interests, but see themselves as part of a larger community whose interests for peace, stability and security, *and* identity are to be promoted.

3.5.1 Cultural and Historical Ties - a Feeling of We’ness

Norms and values seem partly to guide the formation of the official enlargement positions of new member states. But, as pointed out by Sijursen, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ does not tell us what kind of normative arguments are used as justification for enlargement preferences.¹⁷⁴ Hence, I will look into whether member states refer to values that constitute a shared European identity, common history, and hence a feeling of duty and solidarity - or what Sijursen calls “kinship-based duty”¹⁷⁵ - as opposed to a general understanding of what is morally justified based on universal values. This distinction enables a better understanding of prioritization of countries.¹⁷⁶ Three kinship-based points that are important for my study will be mentioned. First, the EU has made a ‘promise’ of a ‘European future’ for the Western Balkans. This fact somewhat influences non-bordering new members’ position towards these Balkan countries - as their accession is not as controversial as Turkey’s or Ukraine’s, however the geographical location and historical relations of the Western Balkans adds to the understanding of why these countries are prioritized over Turkey. This is not only the case in

¹⁷² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999)

¹⁷³ Hansen, 116

¹⁷⁴ Sijursen, “Why expand, 494

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. 502

Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, but also in neighboring Bulgaria. “Culture and history play a certain role in the...position of the government...[and] cultural differences of Turkey compared to the majority of states in Europe is always a factor”¹⁷⁷. The ambivalent preferences of Bulgaria towards Turkey is based on problematic historical relations with Turkey from more than 400 years of Ottoman occupation and the presence of a significant Turkish minority and a powerful (unofficial) Turkish party, Movement for Rights and Freedoms, in Bulgarian politics.¹⁷⁸ Culturally, linguistically and religiously, there are few contacts between Bulgaria and Turkey,¹⁷⁹ and despite conflicts with Macedonia, Bulgaria’s historical relations with Western Balkan neighbors are less problematic than with Turkey,¹⁸⁰ and culturally and linguistically they are also closer. This may be a kinship explanation for why Bulgaria prioritizes the accession of its Western Balkan neighbors over Turkey even though the country has more prospects for economic gains with Turkey in the EU

Interviews in Poland and Hungary also emphasized that the accession of the Western Balkans is a “natural inclusion to Europe”¹⁸¹ and that the Western Balkans is “an island” in Europe that should be in the EU.¹⁸² Hence, it seems that new member states see the inclusion of the Western Balkan countries as a continuation of the ‘reunification of Europe’ that was central in the Eastern enlargement.

Second, former Yugoslavia, and particularly Croatia and Serbia, are considered almost as neighboring countries for the Czech Republic, due to closer historical and cultural ties, and partly because of this, these countries are also a priority for the Czech Republic when it comes to enlargement. As one Czech foreign ministry official said: The Czech Republic feels “bound to Croatia...[and] the rest of former Yugoslavia”.¹⁸³ These ‘feelings’ are based on the fact that

¹⁷⁷ Interview, expert, Bulgarian Foreign Ministry

¹⁷⁸ More than 10 percent of the population is Turkish. Linden, 345

¹⁷⁹ Interview, Todorov

¹⁸⁰ Interview, Nikolova

¹⁸¹ Interview, Smolar

¹⁸² Interview, Györkös

¹⁸³ Interview, Pech,

the Western Balkans is a traditional field of activity for Czech diplomacy; historical and cultural links to the Southern Slavs are much stronger than to the Eastern Slavs as they were part of the same state, and finally, Croatia is the most visited tourist destination for Czechs and thus popular support is high.¹⁸⁴ These ‘interests’ are not material, nor concrete, but rather cultural, emotional and historical ties, that one can argue seems to prescribe it as a kinship-based duty for the Czech Republic to support these countries’ EU accession. Finally, as the Czech Republic already has a lack of labor and needs foreign workers, the integration of countries that are similar in language, culture and history is seen as a good way to recruit labor that can easily be integrated into the Czech society.¹⁸⁵ The same is mentioned as a rationale behind support for Ukraine’s closer EU approximation. This factor can be seen as a rational argument, but it is nonetheless based on historical and cultural closeness.

Third, historical, cultural and emotional ties are also an additional factor that explain Hungary’s strong support towards Croatia and Serbia, and also Ukraine – all neighboring countries. The interest for their accession is not only material, but the emphasis on the Hungarian minority in Serbia and Ukraine can also be considered as a cultural and ideational kinship duty towards people belonging to the same ‘nation’. Additionally, in explanations of the preferences for Croatia, frequent reference is made to the shared history, and cultural ties.¹⁸⁶ This further confirms the importance of non-material ideational theoretical explanations for getting a full understanding of EU enlargement preferences.

The kinship-based duty argument seems an important explanatory factor for the difference in support for potential accession countries. However, the emphasis on cultural closeness does not explain why all the countries officially support the accession of Turkey, a country that cannot easily be considered as a part of the traditional European space.

¹⁸⁴ Kral, “Czech, 53

¹⁸⁵ Interview, senior official, Czech Foreign Ministry

¹⁸⁶ See footnote 132

3.5.2 Moral Duty of being a New Member

Accepting that new member states to a certain extent are socialized into following a ‘logic of appropriateness’, I contend that it is partly the experience from the new member states’ recent accession that has influenced their conception of their current social role in the EU, and what is ‘appropriate’ and legitimate action when it comes to enlargement. During the 1990s, when they claimed the ‘right’ to membership, new member states referred to the norms and values of the Union.¹⁸⁷ By appealing to the rules for membership¹⁸⁸ and taking the “pan-European... commitment of the EU at face value”,¹⁸⁹ they argued that these norms prescribed the Union to admit them to avoid being inconsistent with the ideational foundations of the Union itself. Consequently, *now* it would be inconsistent and illegitimate for them to oppose enlargement to others based on the same conditions and identity, even if it is not in their immediate national interests. This particular situation seems to have created a distinctive moral duty or responsibility for continuing the enlargement process that includes, but goes beyond general solidarity towards ‘kin’.

It is evident that the justification of the preferences in new member states for enlargement to non-neighbors is partly based on such moral arguments, it would not be fair and legitimate to interpret the Treaty that states that all European states respect the values of the EU can apply for membership differently from when they joined the EU.¹⁹⁰ According to the logic of appropriateness, states that share the values of an international community are entitled to join¹⁹¹ an argument that also is frequently found in new member states enlargement preferences,¹⁹² often related to the obligation to meet the existing commitments towards states

¹⁸⁷ Sijursen, *Questioning*, 215

¹⁸⁸ Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union states that “any European state which respects the principles specified in Article 6 (1) of the Treaty (“liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law”) may apply to become a member of the EU”

¹⁸⁹ Schimmelfennig, “The Community”, 68

¹⁹⁰ Pointed out in several interviews in Prague, Budapest and Warsaw

¹⁹¹ Schimmelfennig, “The Community”, 59

¹⁹² E.g. Speech, Topolaneck, April 2008; Hungarian Foreign Policy Guidelines

on the enlargement agenda.¹⁹³ The official line is that the rules and values are universal – values that Turkey shares in NATO,¹⁹⁴ and that the same criteria should apply to all candidates.¹⁹⁵ Reference to rules and commitments are used to justify support for Turkey's accession, but focus on values may, on the other hand, be a way to exclude the country if it does not fulfill these criteria.

The moral duty appears particularly linked to the cost of further enlargement and the perceived reduced budget transfers that these new members might experience with the accession of poorer countries. To use the loss of funds as an official argument against enlargement to countries that would not give the members immediate trade and security gains, is at the moment considered “unfair” and “not morally acceptable”.¹⁹⁶ As said in a speech by the former Polish foreign minister, Anna Fotyga:

Poland support[s] enlargement. That may seem paradoxical, because we are the country that... would stand to lose the most...regardless of that, guided by the principle of solidarity..., [Poland] supports... further enlargement of the European Union through the accession of the whole Balkans, Ukraine, Turkey...¹⁹⁷

However, experts expect that when the issue of Turkey's accession comes closer and the costs for individual countries, in terms of loss of funds from the EU becomes clearer, opposition to Turkey's membership might increase.¹⁹⁸

Moreover, among the new member states, we can observe references to the moral responsibility connected to their own accession both in official documents, statements and in interviews.¹⁹⁹ As said by a Czech official: “We were allowed to join recently and should not

¹⁹³ Confidential Polish government document; Report on the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic 2006, 36, <http://74.125.39.104/search?q=cache:f421tOMR4bUJ:www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp%3Fido%3D21105%26idj%3D2%26amb%3D1%26trid%3D1%26prsl%3D%26poccl%3D5+Report+on+the+Foreign+Policy+of+the+Czech+Republic+2006&hl=hu&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=hu&client=firefox-a> (Accessed, June 2, 2008)

¹⁹⁴ Interview, Pech

¹⁹⁵ Interview, Györköcs

¹⁹⁶ Interviews with senior Foreign ministry officials in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest

¹⁹⁷ Speech, Fotyga

¹⁹⁸ Interviews, Gromadzki; Jiri Schneider, Program Director, Prague Security Studies Institute, Prague, the Czech Republic. Interview by author, Prague, April 28, 2008

¹⁹⁹ In Bulgaria the moral duty is less referred to. This can be explained by the fact that all candidates or potential candidates are in their close neighborhood and security and economic reasons prevail.

prevent others... This is a moral feeling that is important in our enlargement logic.²⁰⁰ In the Hungarian European Policy Guidelines it is stated that “[e]nlargement... is a question of moral and political responsibility based on the openness of the Union and the fulfillment of the accession criteria.”²⁰¹ A senior Hungarian foreign ministry official confirms the importance of this responsibility for a new member like Hungary, and underlines that officially the loss of funds would not influence Hungary’s position on enlargement. However, he added that the moral responsibility is a ‘headache’ when it comes to the accession of countries, such as Turkey, which might mean an economic loss for Hungary.²⁰²

Conclusion

As shown in this chapter, new member states’ official support for further enlargements to non-neighbors including Turkey, cannot sufficiently be explained by a rational liberal intergovernmentalist logic focusing on individual economic and security gains. Although Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland prioritize their immediate neighbors, they also officially support non-neighbors. This stance is justified with references to non-material normative and value-based arguments, as well as to the utility of the EU as a whole. In the light of this, it seems plausible to argue that the new members are socialized into the EU collective identity and follow a logic of appropriateness - not only considering individual material benefits, but also what is the legitimate and “right” position to take when it comes to enlargement. Their normative argumentation cannot be considered only as a strategic use of norms to achieve mundane national interests as support is also given without strong direct or indirect material gains. Hence, the hypothesis that norms are mainly used strategically is not confirmed. Moreover, the prioritization of ‘kin’ towards which the new member states have a

²⁰⁰ Interview, senior official Czech Foreign Ministry

²⁰¹ Hungary European Foreign Policy Guidelines

²⁰² Interview, senior official Hungarian Foreign Ministry

special historical, cultural or ‘mental’ connection, sheds additional light on the factors that determines the preferences, not only towards non-neighbors, but also towards direct bordering countries. Thus, this chapter goes a long way in confirming that social values and norms connected to the EU identity plays a part in forming the member states’ enlargement preferences. Finally, I conclude that new member states are affected by their recent accession to the Union and that this experience prescribes them with an additional moral responsibility beyond shared cultural identity that guides what their ‘appropriate’ position to take on enlargement should be.

CHAPTER 4 – NEW MEMBERS’ PREFERENCES: A PIECE OF A LARGER PICTURE

Considering new EU members history and geographic location in relation to potential accession countries, I have in this thesis established that the preferences in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are determined not only by material interests, but are also influenced by norms, values and identity. Moravcsik’s rational liberal intergovernmentalism goes a long way in explaining the priorities for direct neighbors, whereas Sjusen’s constructivist approach sheds light on the official positive positions on enlargement even in cases where the security and economic interests are limited. The aim of this chapter is to place my findings in perspective by pointing to similarities and differences with explanations of member states’ preferences in the Eastern enlargement by the above-mentioned theoretical approaches. Although the comparison is only a brief one, it relates the findings here to the larger study of EU enlargements.

4.1 The Liberal Intergovernmentalist Explanation

In the case of Eastern enlargement, Schimmelfennig argues that enlargement preferences in ‘old’ member states largely corresponded with geographic location. Bordering countries were ‘drivers’ and countries further away were more reluctant.²⁰³ Geographic location is also one important factor for the preferences in new member states as, being at the EU border increases the potential of being affected by instability in the neighborhood and strengthens the potential for economic gains. However, whereas Schimmelfennig argues that economic interdependence and high share of trade with the Central European neighbors was the most important explanation for enlargement support in Germany, Austria etc.²⁰⁴ this thesis shows that the prospect of securing a stable neighborhood is more significant in determining

²⁰³ Schimmelfennig, "The Community, 49-50

²⁰⁴ Schimmelfennig, "The Community, 53

the preferences in new member states bordering potential accession countries. This can both be explained by the more limited economic relations with non-neighbors and hence less potential for gains, and because some of the now bordering countries can be regarded as more unstable and having less consensus on their EU/Western orientation than the CEEs in the 1990s.

The shift of gravity in the EU moving eastwards is mentioned as an explanation for German support for, and for French reluctance to, enlargement.²⁰⁵ This line of reasoning is also evident in new member states whose interests are to ‘move’ the EU more to the east and southeast. Moreover, in the same way as the UK conservatives, the Czech conservative (and Eurosceptic) party, ODS, partly bases its pro-enlargement preference on the understanding that ‘widening’ will make ‘deepening’ more difficult.²⁰⁶ Finally, the LI explanation of the reluctance towards enlargement in relatively poorer countries such as Spain, but also bordering countries such as Greece and Italy, based partly on fear of losing EU budgetary transfers²⁰⁷ does not mirror the preferences of new, and also relatively poor, members.

4.1.1 EU Budgetary Transfers at Risk

One of the main differences with explanations of ‘old’ members’ preferences in earlier enlargement rounds, is that fear of potential loss of EU transfers does not seem to determine new members’ official positions. I propose four explanations based on the conducted research. First, as these new member states border or are in closer proximity to potential new members, the perceived security, stability and economic opportunity gains outweigh the costs of losing transfers. Secondly, the benefits of later accession of their neighbors to the Union, might

²⁰⁵ Grabbe, Heather and Kirsty Hughes, *Enlarging the EU Eastwards*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, 5

²⁰⁶ Kral, “Czech, 51

²⁰⁷ Schimmelfenning, “The Community, 52

outweigh the cost of earlier enlargements. Third, current enlargement preferences are based on the fact that funds are already allocated until the next financial perspective starts in 2014 and that these members still are net recipients in the EU budget. These arguments are in line with the liberal intergovernmental explanation focusing on cost/benefit calculations. However, LI cannot account for the fact that loss of funds does not seem to figure high even when the potential accession countries are not perceived to give great individual security or economic gains.

Hence, the final explanation that is evident in enlargement justifications in these new members²⁰⁸ is that the loss of transfers is less important than the general commitment and moral responsibility to continue the enlargement process to those who have received a ‘promise’, share common values and fulfill the necessary criteria. Constructivist accounts best explain this final position. This support my argument that new member states have been socialized into following the norms and values of the EU identity, and additionally that their own recent accession to the Union prescribes them with a stronger solidarity and moral duty when it comes to positions on further enlargement – even if it means loss of transfers. This analysis is based on the current positions on enlargement in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. However, it is pointed out in interviews in all the case countries, that when future enlargements come closer and the individual costs for their own country becomes clearer, positions on further enlargement might change somewhat –analysts predict at least a fierce debate on conditions for future entries, side payments and transitional agreements on funding.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ See footnote 196

²⁰⁹ Interviews, Smolar; Pech

4.2 The Constructivist Explanations

In opposition to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, Sjusren²¹⁰ does not explain enlargement preferences in member states based solely on material interests. Sjusren, Riddervold,²¹¹ Zaborowski²¹² and Piedrafita²¹³ do not find sufficient support for the claim that norms were used strategically, and Sjusren rather argues that norms had ‘genuine resonance in the...national communities’²¹⁴ and stipulated solidarity and norm-based rule-following. Hence, Danish support is explained by solidarity,²¹⁵ German with emphasis on reconciliation as a larger European interest,²¹⁶ and Spanish with moral constraints based on their own recent accession.²¹⁷ I argue in this thesis that preferences in new member states cannot alone be explained by material factors. Hence, the explanations here do, to a certain extent, fit with Sjusren and others’ analysis of the Eastern enlargement. The Czech Republic priorities focusing on the Western Balkan countries, is better explained by kinship-based duty than by material gains. This kinship argument also adds understanding to the Hungarian support for the accession of neighboring states, where historical ties and national minority are of central importance for their support. Moreover, the accession of clearly European states, such as the Western Balkans, are prioritized over the accession of Turkey – also in line with Sjusren’s kinship argument.²¹⁸

However, whereas Sjusren argues that enlargement preferences are mainly explained by kinship based duty and not reference to more universal values, the new member states official support for the accession of Turkey is not about kinship, but rather about universal values and morally valid positions. Hence, my analysis suggests that new members are not so

²¹⁰ Sjusren, *Questioning*

²¹¹ Riddervold and Sjusren

²¹² Zaborowski

²¹³ Piedrafita, "In spite of

²¹⁴ Sjusren, *Questioning*, 205

²¹⁵ See footnote 211

²¹⁶ See footnote 212

²¹⁷ See footnote 213

²¹⁸ Sjusren, "Why expand

concerned about Turkey's different cultural background – at least officially. Interviews confirm that different religion and culture do not affect official preferences.²¹⁹ Moreover, the fact that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary do not have a considerable Turkish or other Muslim minority, and that Poland and the Czech Republic do not have any major historical problems with Turkey, contributes to their positive stance on Turkey's accession.²²⁰

The analysis here shows that LI fails to account convincingly for priorities towards non-neighboring countries where material interests are limited, thus the official positions are better explained by constructivism and hence in line with Sjursen's²²¹ explanations of earlier enlargements. Consequently, to understand fully the two aspects of preferences in new member states– priorities and official positions – it is insufficient to look only at material interests. Whereas LI explain quite well the factors that determine the priorities for immediate neighbors, constructivists' assumptions are needed to understand the factors that determine the positions concerning non-neighbors. Hence, in the case of new member states and preferences for enlargement I see the two theoretical approaches complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Building on March and Olsen's suggestion of how the logic of consequentiality, underpinning LI, and the logic of appropriateness, underpinning constructivism, relate to each other,²²² I finally offer a potential explanation of how the opposing theoretical approaches might relate to each other in the real world.

4.2 The Stakes Determine the Logic

According to March and Olsen, “a clear logic dominates an unclear logic”²²³, hence, when stakes are real and actual and preferences clear, a rational logic of consequentiality is more likely to dominate. When there are fewer direct and vital interests at stake, but the

²¹⁹ Interviews Pech; Györkös, senior official Polish Foreign Ministry

²²⁰ Interviews in Poland and Czech Republic

²²¹ See footnotes 211, 212, 213

²²² March and Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics, 952

²²³ Ibid.

identity and its inherent norms are clearly defined, constructivist logic of appropriateness is more likely to prevail.²²⁴ As the EU accession of Ukraine is of vital interest for Poland's national security, the rationalist logic of consequentiality and assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism coupled with the rational usage of norm-based arguments to further these interests, prevail. The same is true for Bulgaria, whose national security and economic prosperity is dependent on a stable neighborhood, which, arguably, can be achieved with the EU integration of Western Balkans and Turkey. In Bulgaria, due to geographic proximity to all potential candidates, most of the preferences can be explained by liberal intergovernmentalism. Still, the constructivist kinship-based duty sheds light on possible reasons why Bulgaria more actively supports the accession of its Western Balkan neighbors than Turkey.

The moral duty and the overall constructivist logic of appropriateness seems to be strongest at work when less vital national interests are at stake in the overall enlargement process. For the Czech Republic, which does not have an external border with non-EU countries, enlargement, as a way to increase security and stability, is less important,²²⁵ as is the case for Hungary, since the accession of Turkey is not so directly crucial for the country's national security. Moreover, since Hungary's priority region, the Western Balkans, has been given a clear membership prospect and the number one priority, Croatia, is not too far from accession, there is not the same incentive as in Poland to support the further continuation of the enlargement process. Hence, the national interests are not so vital, but one can argue that the EU's identity and role of diffusing its values to the neighborhood is clearly defined and also that these countries confirmation of their European identity is important.²²⁶ This is in line

²²⁴ March and Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics, 952

²²⁵ Kral, "Czech, 50

²²⁶ As Jonavicius argues, democracy promotion - a part of the enlargement rationale - in new member states is seen as an important way to "anchor their European identity", Laurynas Jonavicius "The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States" FRIDE, Working Paper 55, March 2008,2, <http://www.fride.org/publication/393/the-democracy-promotion-policies-of-central-and-eastern-european-states> (Accessed May 12, 2008)

with my argument that the logic of appropriateness is at work in these new member states' enlargement preferences.

CONCLUSION

“The EU should not be a closed club... We were admitted recently and should not prevent others from the same...This is a feeling of fairness, offered to everyone”.²²⁷ In interviews with officials and experts from new member states, I frequently came across such arguments when enlargement preferences were justified. New member states are aware of the potential and sometimes self-evident material gains that further enlargement might bring – both economically, but mostly by increased national security and regional stability. Yet, this is not the whole story. Normative arguments referring to EU accession prospects as a democratic reform-incentive, as a promise that must be kept, and solidarity with those still waiting in line, are mentioned together with material interests. Some interests are also presented as ‘national’, but when one scrutinizes motivations in greater depth; it is possible to see that ‘interests’ are determined more by kinship, historical ties and feelings of we-ness than direct and concrete material gains. Sometimes these normative arguments might be used to gain legitimacy for more mundane national interests. But, also when the material interests are limited a feeling of moral responsibility and kinship-based duty can be observed.

As theoretically informed studies of new EU members’ enlargement preferences are yet to be elaborated, the purpose of this thesis was to get a better understanding of what determines new member states’ preferences. To answer that question, positions and priorities in the four new member states Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were analyzed. As country specific circumstances always plays a part in determining the preferences, I can only draw conclusions from the four case countries and their recent and current positions. However, considering the selection of case studies based on geographical location and historical relations seeking to cover different positions among all new members, and the conditions in which preferences are determined by certain factors more than others, an

²²⁷ Interview, senior official, Czech Foreign Ministry

attempt at generalizing my findings to other new member states is possible. In view of this, there are grounds to believe that e.g. the Baltic states, that have a similar perception of the threat from Russia as Poland,²²⁸ and are also far away from the Western Balkans, would prioritize Eastern Europe. But, also support the accession of all potential members justified with normative references to enlargement as an incentives for political reforms, commitment to existing criteria and EU wide interests. The fact that e.g. Estonia supports enlargement based on such arguments²²⁹ despite not bordering any countries expected even potentially to join the EU in the future, seems to be in line with the argument in this thesis. Following the same logic, Slovenia who prioritizes the integration of the neighboring Western Balkans for security and economic reasons²³⁰, is less focused on e.g. Turkey, but still support its accession referring to EU wide interests of security for the Union as a whole and general commitments to remain open.²³¹

When looking at the preferences for further enlargement in my four case countries, three points stand out as most significant. Firstly, in official positions the four member states support further enlargement to all countries on the enlargement agenda. Although more cautious, they also support the “European perspective” of Ukraine and, potentially, other Eastern European countries today not on considered by the EU for accession. Secondly, the accession of direct bordering neighbors or potential accession countries with whom the member states share close historical, cultural or ‘mental’ ties are their priority in the enlargement process. Thirdly, support for the less controversial, smaller and clearly European Western Balkan countries is stronger than the support for more controversial and large Turkey.

²²⁸ Kral, “Enalaring EU foreign, 11

²²⁹ See references to such arguments in the Estonian Governments EU policy for 2007-2013. http://www.vm.ee/eng/euro/kat_486 (Accessed, June 3, 2008)

²³⁰ EU-CONSENT, “EU-25/27 Watch”, Issue no 6, March 2008, 101 <http://www.eu-consent.net/content.asp?contentid=522> (Accessed May 13, 2008)

²³¹ Veronika Bajt “Slovenia” in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States* ed. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006

This is evident both when Western Balkans and Turkey are bordering the member states, and when neither is a bordering country.

Examining these results, the liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) hypothesis - member states prioritize the accession of their closest neighbors due to economic and security interests – is to a certain extent confirmed. However, when countries share ‘ historical and cultural ties’, but no direct border with potential future EU members, LI cannot explain why the countries examined here prioritize these countries’ EU accession. Preferences based on such justifications are rather in line with Sjusen’s kinship-based duty hypothesis that priority is given to countries with a shared “community based identity.”²³²

In explaining the puzzling situation that new members enlargement preferences not are limited to their immediate neighbors, I argue, that preferences for non-neighbors must be understood as based on the new members’ socialization into EU collective identity, and recent accession to the Union that has created a moral obligation not to deny others the opportunities for reforms, peace, stability and the economic prospect that has benefited them. This again influences and constrains what legitimate positions they can take when it comes to enlargement. Hence, normative arguments seem not as a rule used strategically, but rather shape actors’ identity. Although the norm-conform behavior in these four member states is strongest towards the countries that are clearly in the European space and share the same collective and cultural identity, their solidarity is not limited to support for kin. The four countries also support Turkey, even though Turkey’s accession will have few direct positive, maybe even negative, effects on their countries – neighboring Bulgaria is of course an exception as both security and economic issues in relations with Turkey are more salient there. Nevertheless, this suggests that new members follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that is based on universal values of democracy and human rights and what is just.

²³² Sjusen, “Why expand, 508

The overall conclusion to be drawn from this is that LI is the strongest in explaining the priorities for immediate bordering neighbors when vital national interests are salient; however, constructivist approaches are needed to get a full picture of the preferences for non-neighbors when the adherence to the EU norms and identity seems largely to determine the positions. Hence, the combined theoretical framework applying one theoretically based logic to explain each of the two aspects of preferences - priorities for neighbors and general positions – enables the most comprehensive understanding of enlargement preferences in new member states.

My findings build on and largely correspond with the existing theoretically based literature explaining earlier enlargement rounds.²³³ However, analyses of new member states particularly have to consider the implications of their own recent accession both in terms of degree of socialization into the Union, its norms and values and the moral duty it seems to prescribe. Therefore, I argue, the analyses of new members have to, at least partly, draw on constructivist assumptions. Moreover, insights such as that risks of losing EU funds does not (yet) appear to determine the enlargement positions of new member states, contribute to the understanding that enlargement is about something more than just material gains for new members.

To conclude, the new members analyzed here support and prioritize enlargement to their immediate neighbors as that will increase their security and economic opportunities. But, they also support enlargement to potential accession countries where material gains are limited. This puzzle is solved by understanding enlargement preferences partly as formed in a socialization process where new states adhere to an EU collective identity and genuinely follow the norms and values that constitute it.

²³³ Mainly Moravcsik and Vachuduvu, "National Interests; Schimmelfennig "The Community "Strategic Action, *The EU, NATO* ; Sjursen "Why Expand; *Questioning*

APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEWS

List of all interviews conducted in Budapest, Prague, Warsaw and by phone/e-mail with Sofia

Bulgaria

Minchev, Ognyan, Senior Research Fellow and Head of the European Council of Foreign Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by author by phone, May 7, 2008

Nikolova, Juliana, Director European Institute, Sofia, Bulgaria, Interview by author by phone, April 21, 2008

Primatarova, Antoinette, Former Ambassador to the EU, Programme Director, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by author by phone, April 24, 2008

Todorov, Boyko, Program Director, Centre for Study of Democracy, Sofia, Bulgaria. Interview by phone by author, April 18, 2008

Expert from the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview by e-mail, May 2008
Confidential interview

The Czech Republic

Kral, David, Chairman of Europeum Institute for European Policy, Prague, the Czech Republic. Interview by author in Prague, April 29, 2008

Kratochvil, Petr, Deputy Director, Institute for International Relations, Prague, the Czech Republic. Interview by author, Prague, April 29, 2008

Pech, Radek, Director of the Department of EU General Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czech Republic, Interview by author in Prague, April 28, 2008

Rouček, Libor, Member of the European Parliament for the Czech Social Democratic Party, Czech Republic. Interview by phone by author, May 20, 2008

Schneider, Jiri, Program Director, Prague Security Studies Institute, Prague, the Czech Republic. Interview by author, Prague, April 28, 2008

Tulmets, Elsa, Researcher, Institute for International Relations, Prague, the Czech Republic. Interview by author, Prague, April 28, 2008

Czech Government advisor, Interview by author in Prague, April 29, 2008. Confidential interview

Senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. Interview by author, Prague, April 29, 2008. Confidential interview

Czech official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. Interview by author, Prague, April 28, 2008. Confidential interview

Hungary

Balázs, Péter, Director, Center for EU Enlargement Studies, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. Interview by author in Budapest, April 30, 2008

Györkös, Péter, Hungary's ambassador to Croatia. Interview by author by phone, April 18, 2008

Pogatsa, Zoltan, Researcher, Hungarian Academy of Science, Interview by author, Budapest, May 12, 2008

Schöpflin, György, Member of the European Parliament for Hungary, Fidez-Hungarian Civic Union. Interview by author, Budapest, April 30, 2008

Senior official, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview by author in Budapest, April 16, 2008. Confidential interview

Poland

Gromadzki, Grzegorz, Director International Cooperation, Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, Poland. Interview by authors, Warsaw May 5, 2008

Kazmierkiewicz, Piotr, Researcher, The Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw, Poland. Interview by author in Warsaw, May 5, 2008

Smolar, Eugeniusz, President, Center for International Relations, Warsaw, Poland. Interview by author in Warsaw, May 6, 2008

Senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland. Interview by author in Warsaw, May 6, 2008. Confidential interview

Official, The Office of the Committee for European Integration, Warsaw, Poland. Interview by author in Warsaw, May 5, 2008. Confidential interview

Serbia

European Union diplomat posted in Belgrade, Interview by author, Belgrade May 10, 2008
Confidential interview

APPENDIX 2: PUBLIC OPINION

Support for further enlargement of the European Union

Public opinion in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland

Support for the accession of specific countries when they fulfill the criteria

	Croatia	Ukraine	Macedonia	Serbia	Turkey
Bulgaria	70 %	67 %	70 %	69 %	45 % ²³⁴
Czech Republic	80 %	47 %	49 %	45 %	30 %
Hungary	74 %	46 %	43 %	37 %	39 %
Poland	75 %	69 %	61 %	58 %	40 %
Average of the above 4 countries	75 %	57 %	56 %	52 %	38 %
Average EU15	46 %	37 %	37 %	34 %	26 %

(Source: Eurobarometer 66, December 2006, Annex 66)

²³⁴ In a recent survey (April 2008) on Bulgarians preferences for the accession of Turkey to the EU conducted by Open Society Institute, Sofia, 34 % of the respondents said that Turkey's accession would be rather favorable for Bulgaria, whereas 32% said Turkey's accession would be rather unfavorable for Bulgaria. In comparison 50 % think that the accession of Macedonia and Serbia will be favorable for their country.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bajt, Veronika "Slovenia" in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States* ed. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006
- Batory, Agnes, "Hungary" in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States* ed. Kazmierkiewicz, Piotr, Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006
- Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, Bulgaria as a Member of the EU, priorities, http://www.mfa.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8682&Itemid=451 (Accessed May 13, 2008)
- Bulgarian National Bank, <http://www.bnb.bg/bnb/home.nsf/fsWebIndex?OpenFrameset> (Accessed June 1, 2008)
- Bulgarian National Statistics Institute, http://www.nsi.bg/Index_e.htm (Accessed June 1, 2008)
- Butler, Eamonn, "Hungary and the European Union: The political implications of societal security promotion", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 7, 2007
- Börzel, Tanja A, and Thomas Risse "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic change", *European University Institute: EUI Working Papers*, RSC No. 2000/56, 2000
- Czech Republic, Priorities for the Czech Republic's Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2009, October 2007, 17. A
www.euroskop.cz/58065/121285/clanek/czech-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-european-union (Accessed May 30, 2008)
- Czech Republic, Report on the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic 2006, 36,
<http://74.125.39.104/search?q=cache:f421tOMR4bUJ:www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp%3Fido%3D21105%26idj%3D2%26amb%3D1%26trid%3D1%26prsl%3D%26pocc1%3D5+Report+on+the+Foreign+Policy+of+the+Czech+Republic+2006&hl=hu&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=hu&client=firefox-a> (Accessed, June 2, 2008)
- Czech Statistical Yearbook 2007,
<http://74.125.39.104/search?q=cache:V82CoB2Cn8MJ:www.czso.cz/csu/2007edicniplan.nsf/engp/10n1-07+Czech+Statistical+Yearbook+2007&hl=hu&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=hu&client=firefox-a> (Accessed June 1, 2008)
- Checkel, Jeffrey, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework", in *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 3, 2005
- Christiansen, Thomas, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Antje Wiener, *The Social Construction of Europe*, London: Sage Publications, 2001

- “Croatia-Hungary relations "continually good and friendly" – president. Excerpt from report in English by Croatian news agency HINA, May 3, 2007. Found through Lexis Nexis
- Estonian Government, The Estonian Government’s EU policy for 2007-2013.
http://www.vm.ee/eng/euro/kat_486 (Accessed, June 3, 2008)
- EU-CONSENT, “EU-25/27 Watch”, Issue no 6, March 2008, <http://www.eu-consent.net/content.asp?contentid=522> (Accessed May 13, 2008)
- European Commission, Regional Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm (Accessed June 3, 2008)
- Fierke, Karin and Antje Wiener, “Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.6, no.5, 1999
- Friis, Lykke, “The End of the Beginning of Eastern Enlargement: Luxembourg Summit and Agenda-Setting”, *European Integration Online Papers* 2(7), 1998
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-007.htm> (Accessed June 2, 2008)
- Fotyga, Anna, Speech by the former Polish Foreign Minister, Government information on Polish foreign policy in 2007, Warsaw, May 11, 2007,
<http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:6A8EzsPVpm0J:www.msz.gov.pl/Ministers,Annual,Address,2007,10134.html+anna+fotyga+to+loose+the+most+enlargement+solidarity&hl=no&ct=clnk&cd=6&gl=no> (Accessed June, 2, 2008)
- Grabbe, Heather and Kirsty Hughes, *Enlarging the EU Eastwards*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998
- Gyurcsany, Ferenc, speech by the Hungarian Prime Minister, March 7, 2006.
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/37EB85AF-7C80-4F6D-B5CC-6AE9A5B3B60D/0/070307kulpol_en2.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2008)
- Györkös, Peter, Hungarian ambassador to Croatia, “Specificities and Perspectives of the Western-Balkan Enlargement”, EU Enlargement and Global Implications of the Balkan Problem, Conference, Central European University, Budapest, February 22, 2008
- Hansen, Flemming Splidsboel, “The EU and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment?”, *European Security*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2006
- Hungarian Central Statistical Office,
http://portal.ksh.hu/portal/page?_pageid=38,119919&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (Accessed June 1, 2008)
- Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Bilateral relations with Croatia.
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/bilateral_affairs/bilateral_affairs.aspx?d=Economic%20relations&c=53&z=Europe (Accessed, May 31, 2008)
- Hungarian Foreign Ministry, European Policy Guidelines of the Hungarian Government.. Budapest, August, 2007. http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/967AA2CB-9B6B-4E80-872E-DEC71B21EE1E/0/EU_Pol_Essence_final_070803.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2008)

- Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Hungary's External Relations Strategy, 2008,
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/3E8FA370-15B3-4919-AC14-41A02CB54BA3/0/080319_kulkapcs_strat_en.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2008)
- Hungarian Government office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad,
http://www.hhrf.org/htmh/en/?menuid=08&news020_id=1201 (May 29, 2008)
- Jonavicius, Laurynas "The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States" FRIDE, Working Paper 55, March 2008,2,
<http://www.fride.org/publication/393/the-democracy-promotion-policies-of-central-and-eastern-european-states> (Accessed May 12, 2008)
- Junge, Kerstin, "Differentiated European Integration" in *European Union Politics* ed Michelle Cini, New York:Oxford University Press, 2007
- Jupille, Joseph, James A.Caparoso and Jeffrey Checkel "Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union", *Comparative Political Studies*, XXXVI, 2003
- Kaczynski, Lech, Polish President, interviewed in True, January 2007,
<http://www.president.pl/x.node?id=7543036>.(Accessed May 13, 2008)
- Kaczynski, Lech, Polish President, Address, January 16, 2008.
<http://www.msz.gov.pl/Materials.and.Documents,2081.html?PHPSESSID=1a41a4d5d2ca22e55703dec8df75cdea> (Accessed May 13, 2008).
- Katzenstein, Peter, ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Colombia University Press, 1996
- Kazmierkiewicz, Piotr ed. *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States*, Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006
- Kazmierkiewicz, Piotr: "Poland" in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States* ed. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006
- Kazmierkiewicz, Piotr: "EU enlargement to the Western Balkans from the Polish Perspective" in *Romania, Bulgaria, who next? Perspectives on further enlargement as seen from the new member states and EU hopefuls* ed David Kral, Praha: EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, 2007
- Koldanova, Evgenia, statement by Deputy Minister, Bulgaria Foreign Ministry Website.
www.mfa.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8832&Itemid=217
 (Accessed May 31, 2008)
- Kral, David, *Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The role of the New EU Member States and Candidate Countries*, *EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy*, 2005, 11.
http://www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/Enlarging_EU_foreign_security_policy.pdf
 (Accessed, May 31, 2008)

- Kral, David, "Czech Republic" in *EU Accession Prospects for Turkey and Ukraine: Debates in New Member States* ed. Piotr Kazmierkiewicz, Warsaw: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006
- Kral, David, ed. *Romania, Bulgaria, who next? Perspectives on further enlargement as seen from the new member states and EU hopefuls* EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, 2007
- "Leaders will consider 'integration capacity', but remain unwilling to close the door", in *The Irish Times*, December 15, 2006, Available through Lexis Nexis
- Linden, Ronald H, "Balkan Geometry: Turkish Accessoin and the International Relations of Southeast Europe," *Orbis*, Volume 51, Issue 2, (2007)
- March, James, and Johan Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press, 1989
- March, James, and Johan Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders", *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998
- Moravcsik, Andrew, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998,
- Moravcsik, Andrew and Milada Anna Vacudova "National interests, state power and EU enlargement", *East European Politics and Societies* , Vol. 17, No. 1, 2003
- Nives, Mistic-Lisjak, "Croatia and the Euroepan Union: A social constructivist perspective" in *Policy Studies*, vol 27, no 2, 2006
- "No agreement in EU on Croatia talks", EU Observer. March, 10, 2005, http://euobserver.com/index.phtml?sid=9&search_string_top=&subscribe_email=Enter+your+email&list=news-twice-daily@list.euobserver.com&accept_charge=Accept+charge&aid=18636&cost_shown=1 (Accessed May 8, 2008)
- Nugent, Neill "The EU's Response to Turkey's Membership Application: Not Just Weighing of Costs and Benefits" *Journal of European Integration*, Vol 29, No 4. 2007
- O'Brennan, John, *The eastern enlargement of the European Union*, New York: Routledge, 2006
- Piedrafita, Sonia and Jose Torreblanca, "The Three Logics of EU Enlargement: Interests, Identities and Arguments", *Politique Européenne*, no. 15, 2005
- Piedrafita, Sonia, "In spite of the costs? Moral constraints on Spain's enlargement policy" in *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in search of identity*, Sjursen, Helene ed. New York: Routledge, 2006
- "Poland for Croatia joining EU "as soon as possible", president says", in HINA news agency, Zagreb, January 18, 2008. Found through Lexis Nexis

- Polish Foreign Ministry, Confidential Foreign Ministry document “Poland’s position towards the EU enlargement”, 2007
- Polish Government, “Non-Paper with Polish Proposals Concerning Policy Towards New Eastern Neighbors after EU Enlargement” <http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Non-paper,with,Polish,proposals,concerning,policy,towards,the,new,Eastern,neighbours,after,EU,enlargement,2041.html> (Accessed May 16, 2008)
- Pollack, Mark, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 39 No. 2, 2001
- Riddervold Marianne and Helene Sjursen ”The importance of solidarity: Denmark as a promoter of enlargement” in *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in search of identity*, Sjursen, Helene ed. New York: Routledge, 2006
- Raik, Kristi and Grzegorz Grmadzki “Between activeness and influence: The contribution of new member states to the EU policies towards the Eastern neighbours”, Tallinn: *Open Estonia Foundation*, September 2006.
<http://www.oef.org.ee/repository/Document/Contribution%20of%20new%20member%20states%20towards%20Eastern%20neighbours.pdf> (Accessed, May 15, 2008)
- Rosamond, Ben, *Theories of European Integration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000
- Schimmelfennig, Frank, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rethorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2001
- Schimmelfennig, Frank: *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003
- Schimmelfennig, Frank, ”Strategic Action In A Community Environment: The Decision to Enlarge the European Union to the East”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol 36, No 156, 2003
- Schimmelfennig, Frank, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, In *European Integration Theory* ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004
- Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Theorizing EU enlargement: Research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research”, *Journal of European Public Policy*” vol. 9, no 4, 2002
- Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier ed, *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches* London/New York: Routledge, 2005
- Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “ The study of EU enlargement: Theoretical approaches and empirical findings” in Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne(eds) *European Union Studies*, Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006
- Sedelmeier, Ulrich, ”Collective identity” in *Contemporary European Foreign Policy* ed. Walter Carlsnaes et.al. London/Thousand Oaks/New York: Sage Publishers, 2004

- Sedelmeier, Ulrich. *Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement: The uneven policy impact of EU identity*. Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2005
- Sikorski, Radosław, Polish Foreign Minister, Address, Warsaw, January 25 2008.
<http://www.mfa.gov.pl/files/WYSTAPIENIA/pakistanENG.pdf> (Accessed May 13, 2008).
- Sikorski, Radosław, Foreign Policy Exposé by Poland's Foreign Minister On Poland's Foreign Policy for, Warsaw, May 7, 2008.
www.msz.gov.pl/files/ExposeMinistraSikorskiegoEN.doc
- Sjursen, Helene, "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.40, no.3, 2002
- Sjursen, Helene ed. *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in search of identity*, New York: Routledge, 2006
- Sjursen, Helene and Børge Romsloe "Protectin the idea of Europe: France and enlargement" in *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in search of identity*, Sjursen, Helene ed. New York: Routledge, 2006
- Sjursen, Helene, "Enlargement in perspective: The EU's quest for identity", *Oslo: ARENA working paper*, No 5, 2008. <http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2008/> (Accessed May 16, 2008)
- Somogyi, Ferenc Statement by the former Hungarian Foreign Minister, May 5, 2006,
www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/actualities/ministers_speeches/050506_committee_ei.htm (Accessed May 31, 2008)
- Smith, Karen "Enlargement and European Order" in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press 2005
- Smolar, Aleksander "Poland's Eastern Policy and Membership in the European Union" in The EU's "Eastern Dimension" – An Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland's Policy? Ed. Pawel Kowal, *Centre For International Relations*, Warsaw, 2002
http://www.ipp.md/files/Calendar/2003/Atelier7/4_Pawel%20Kowal_03_10_2004.pdf (Accessed, May 30, 2008)
- Thessaloniki European Council conclusion (2003): Available at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/76201.pdf (Accessed June 2, 2008)
- Topolaneck, Mirek, Speech by Czech Prime minister, "The Czech Republic as the Presidency country in a changing Europe" Greece, April 11, 2008,
<http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/default.asp?ParentIDO=854&ido=22016&amb=12&idj=2> (Accessed, June 1, 2008)
- Topolaneck, Mirek, speech by the Czech prime minister Brno, May 25, 2007.
<http://www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=23196> (Accessed, May 30, 2008)

Topolánek, Mirek, speech by the Czech Prime minister "The Czech Republic – Member of the EU", Sweden. Date not provided. <http://www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=22649> (Accessed, May 30, 2008)

Zaborowski, Marcin "More than simply expanding markets: Germany and EU enlargement in *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in search of identity*, Sjursen, Helene ed. New York: Routledge, 2006

Weiler, Joseph, "The Transformation of Europe", *The Yale Law Journal*, 100, 1991, Quoted in Friis, Lykke, "The End of the Beginning of Eastern Enlargement: Luxembourg Summit and Agenda-Setting", *European Integration Online Papers* 2(7), 1998 <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-007.htm> (Accessed June 2, 2008)

Wendt Alexander, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics" *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1992

Wendt Alexander, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

"Who gets what from the Common Agricultural Policy" www.farmsubsidy.org (Accessed June 3, 2008)

World Trade Organization statistics, <http://stat.wto.org>