

THE TANZIMAT AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES: IMPACT OF THE EARLY TANZIMAT REFORMS IN THE OTTOMAN PERIPHERY

By
Laura De Vizcaya

Submitted to
Central European University
History Department

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Selim Deringil
Second Reader: Professor Alexei Miller

Budapest, Hungary
2008

STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT

Copyright in the text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies by any process, either in full or part, may be made only in accordance with the instructions given by the Author and lodged in the Central European Library. Details may be obtained from the librarian. This page must form a part of any such copies made. Further copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without the written permission of the Author.

ABSTRACT

The topic of this thesis falls into the analysis of imperial responses to the challenges of modernization, and is related to the examination of Ottoman legacy in the development of interethnic conflicts in the regions that once formed part of the Ottoman domains. It shows that to understand the development of interethnic conflicts in the Balkan territories it is necessary to consider the imperial legacy as a basis. Therefore, it locates the topic in a broader context which suggests the analysis of the changes that impacted the cohesive measures of Ottoman society. This thesis deals mainly with the Ottoman Empire's response to the challenges of modernization in the early nineteenth century. Therefore, it focuses on the reforms in the military and treasury institutions which were intended to establish centralizing measures to retake control of the imperial subjects; but, that as a secondary effect weakened the military and treasury institutions modifying the bonds that had kept Ottoman society together over their plural distinctions. I claim that the administrative and social changes that the Ottoman state adopted in 1839 and 1856 weakened the treasury and military institutions modifying the terms between the ruling and subject classes in the Empire. Therefore, the changes adopted with the promulgation of the Gülhane Rescript (1839) and the Hatt-i Hamayun (1856) altered the dynamic that sustained the coexistence of multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups in the Ottoman periphery, opening the possibility for the consolidation of projects of self-determination and emancipation.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
I. Historiographical and theoretical considerations.....	8
1.1 Tanzimat Reforms and Balkan Upheavals in Contemporary Historiography	8
1.2 Theoretical Framework	17
II. Imperial Pillars: Non-Muslim Communities Before the Reforms.....	25
2.1 Ottoman Social Organization.....	26
2.2 Institutional dynamic in Ottoman Society	32
III. Contextualizing the Tanzimat Era in the Ottoman Empire	38
3.1 Political context leading to the reforms.....	41
3.2 Proclamation of the reforms	44
IV. The Tanzimat and the local communities	51
4.1 Transformations in the Ottoman institutions	52
4.2 Reform's impact on the local communities: the Vidin uprising (1850).....	59
Conclusion	65
Bibliography.....	71

Introduction

The Balkan upheavals of the second half of the nineteenth century are considered the beginning of an era of nationalism and conflict in Europe,¹ which resulted from early twentieth century movements of liberation on the part of the different nationalities that were under Ottoman control. It is argued that one of the main reasons for the outbreak of upheavals in the Balkan Peninsula responds to the fact that leaders of the different groups began taking political and social matters in their own hands.² To consider this statement valid, it is necessary to bear in mind that since the conquest of Constantinople the Ottoman Empire established a system to organize and level the national and ethnic groups within its domains. However, in the course of time alterations to this system proved that the Balkan Ottoman domains, despite being united by strong mechanisms of integration, constituted a region founded on focal points of potential instability.

Therefore, to understand the development of interethnic conflicts in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire, considering the imperial legacy as a basis, it is necessary to locate the topic in a broader perspective, which will allow the analysis of the context that surrounded the changes that impacted the cohesive measures of Ottoman society. In this sense, the topic of this thesis falls into the analysis of imperial responses to the challenges of modernization, and is related to the examination of Ottoman legacy in the development of interethnic conflicts in the regions that once formed part of the Ottoman domains. In this thesis I deal mainly with the Empire's response to the challenges of modernity in the early nineteenth century. Therefore, I focus on the reforms that modified the bonds that had kept Ottoman society together

¹ See: Richard Hall, *Balkan Wars 1912-1913 Prelude to the First World War*, (London: Routledge, 2000).

² This statement has been put forward by George F. Kennan, in the introduction of the work: *The Other Balkan Wars: a 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1993).

over their plural distinctions, and that led to the development of projects of emancipation which set the ground for the outbreak of uprisings in the Balkan imperial territories.

Recent works that address the history of the Balkan communities recognize that during the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire events were determined by continued decline, the emergence of a burgeoning nationalism and the increasing intervention of the European powers.³ Others as well, contend that in the second half of the nineteenth century the imperial structures were confronted with rivalries that European powers displayed over Ottoman territories; the deterioration of the institutions as a result of military defeats and territorial losses; and the loss of social, ethnic and religious cohesion.⁴ These approaches are accurate, but it must not be overlooked that the Ottoman Empire also had to cope with the influence of the western concept of nationalism that reached the imperial subjects, especially, the non-Muslim communities. Published works on the origins of the Balkan Wars in the early twentieth century mentioned the decline of the Ottoman Empire as the background on which the Balkan states saw an opportunity to fulfill their national ambitions. These attempts do not reject the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the outbreak of nationalist struggles on the part of the non-Muslim communities. Nevertheless, they fail to establish a link between the Tanzimat reforms, and their impact on the situation of the Balkan communities in the empire.

The Ottoman factor in Balkan history provides the basis for several inquiries. First, the interest to find out to what extent the transformations that took place in the Ottoman

³ See: L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, (New York: Hold, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), p. 225

⁴ See: Wayne S. Vucinich, "The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule" in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Dec., 1962), P. 600

Empire in 1839 and 1856 pave the way for strengthening the national struggles that resulted in the outbreak of upheavals in the Balkan area. To provide an answer to the main research question, this thesis will suggest answers to the following queries: Which internal and external factors led to the reforms in 1839 and 1856? Which imperial structures were mostly affected by the transformations? How did these reforms affect the core-peripheral relationship within the Empire?

Hence, the aim of this thesis is to analyze the impact of early Tanzimat transformations focusing on the early stages of the Tanzimat era, namely the proclamation of the Gülhane Rescript in 1839 and of the Hatt-i Hamayun in 1856. This will show that the reform in the imperial structures, which constituted the Empire's first attempt to preserve power in the face of national and international crises, modified the status of the peripheral communities contributing to the outbreak of Balkan upheavals that shaped the history of the Peninsula in the early twentieth century. I want to demonstrate that the outbreak of rebellions in the early twentieth century is related to the transformation process that linked the Tanzimat reforms, the challenging nineteenth century world politics and the consolidation of emancipation ambitions in the peripheral communities of the Ottoman Empire. That is why I draw special attention to the political backgrounds in which the domestic military crisis and the discomfort on the part of the non-Muslim communities developed. And on how these were affected by the changes in the Ottoman traditional structures of power that had maintained the imperial heterogeneous character.

The outbreak of Balkan upheavals is linked to the Tanzimat period to the extent that the administrative and social changes that the Ottoman state adopted in 1839 and 1856

weakened the imperial main institutions of power, namely the treasury in charge of securing wealth for the maintenance of the state, and the military in charge of securing the sultan's power. This situation modified the terms of the relationship between the Ottoman ruling and subject classes, and it opened the door for the consolidation of projects of self-determination and emancipation. This is why the analysis of the outbreak of rebellions in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire must consider the weakening of Ottoman imperial structures as a secondary effect of the Tanzimat reforms, and the forthcoming redefinition of the relationship between the Muslim core and the non-Muslim peripheries in the Empire within the modernizing project's framework.

For many centuries the Ottoman Empire existed as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire whose identity was sustained by the differences between its religious and ethnic components. In contrast to Western empires, the Ottoman did not consider religious conversion as a state policy; it did not pursue the conversion of its subjects, rather the manipulation of their plural character. Furthermore, towards the end of the eighteenth and the first years of the nineteenth century, the imperial logic was to maintain religious and ethnic differences among subjects under a temporal integration. However, facing the challenges of the political and military crisis that took place in the early nineteenth century, Ottoman reformers focused on transforming the policies that attained the relationships within the imperial margins into a cohesive Ottoman modernity. This process of modernization aimed mainly at retaking control of the periphery and at re-establishing the position of the sultan as ultimate authority. However, as a secondary effect, it allowed the consolidation of emancipation ambitions which found expression mostly in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire.

In the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876) “... the Ottoman state sought to redefine itself as more than an Islamic dynasty, as a modern, bureaucratic, and tolerant state – a partner of the West rather than its adversary.”⁵ During this period one of the Empire’s main aims was to integrate all provinces and subjects into an official nationalism that sought to assert much stricter political and administrative control over the periphery of the empire. This policy’s aims were to provide an inclusive image of the ruling dynasty, and “...to cohere different ethnic groups, different religious communities, different regions, and above all, different stages of progress within a unified Ottoman modernity.”⁶ However, the policy’s subaltern outcome resulted in stressing the ethnic components and in generating national tension.

To achieve the aim of this thesis, in the theoretical chapter I consider Alexei Miller’s approach to the history of Empires and Alexander Motyl’s theory of empires. I also address Caglar Keyder’s model of patrimonial crisis to address the effects of the changes on Ottoman institutional mechanisms in the Balkan periphery. Finally, I use Andreas Kappeler’s approach to understand the core-peripheral relationship in the Ottoman Empire. Then, I describe the conditions and regulations that bound the peripheral non-Muslim subjects to the Ottoman centre. I examine the backgrounds that led to the enactment of the Gülhane Rescript in 1839 and the Hatt-i Hamayun in 1856, their most important policies, and their consequences in the status of the non-Muslim communities of the Empire. This allows me to show that the confrontations between the communities in the Balkan Peninsula happened because the early stages of the Tanzimat period (1839 and 1856) emphasized the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim

⁵ Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism” in *American Historical Review*, (June 2002), p. 770

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 779

subjects giving the non-Muslim communities the possibility to define nationalist projects to achieve ambitions of self-determination.

The main body of this thesis is divided into four sections. The first presents historiographical approaches to the origin of the Balkan Wars and the Tanzimat period from the twentieth and early twentieth first century, to identify and define the main approaches that are useful to address the reform process in the Ottoman Empire. This chapter also addresses the theoretical landmarks to analyze how the Ottoman Empire responded to the challenges presented by the nineteenth century tendencies of modernization. This provides tools for a better understanding of the outbreak of the Balkan upheavals as the starting points of a series of events that led the multi-ethnic populations that were part of the Ottoman Empire's periphery into conflict.

The second chapter: *Imperial Pillars: the Ottoman Empire Before the Reform*, is a contextualization of the topic within the framework of the institutional organization of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, in it I describe the way in which the Ottoman government built up cohesion among its subjects to provide the context for the further evaluation of the impact of the reforms and the relevance of the confrontation between the reforms and the non-Muslim communities' nationalist ambitions. The aim of this chapter is to provide the background in which to describe the traditional and organizational structures of the Imperial government before the nineteenth century crisis took place. In this sense, I explore the Imperial military and administrative organization, and I examine the role of the non-Muslim communities in the military institution, as well as its relevance within the imperial administrative structure.

The third chapter *Contextualizing the Tanzimat Era in the Ottoman Empire* deals with the first Tanzimat reform documents, the Gülhane Rescript (1839) and the Hatt-i Hamayun (1856). This chapter presents the political contexts that motivated the promulgation of the Gülhane Rescript in 1839, and the Hatt-i Hamayun in 1856. It attempts to show the links between the domestic dynamic of the empire and its response to the need of reform facing the changes that were disrupting the imperial cohesion. In this chapter I address the reforms as decisions that confronted the need to reestablish the loyalty of the citizens and the need to promise modernized reforms, to restrain national disruption and foreign intervention.

The fourth chapter: *The Tanzimat and the Local Communities* points out the transformations that took place in the most significant institutional pillars of the Ottoman Empire, namely the military institution and the imperial treasury. The chapter's aim is to analyze how the conditions of the non-Muslim communities changed from the moment before and after the reform documents were proclaimed and set in practice. This chapter makes reference to the Vidin uprising (1850) to provide elements to draw conclusions on the effects of the reforms on the core-peripheral dynamic in the Ottoman Empire, therefore, of their impact on the nationalist and autonomy expectations of the peripheral communities.

Chapter 1

Historiographical and theoretical considerations

1.1 Tanzimat Reforms and Balkan Upheavals in Contemporary Historiography

Before analyzing the impact of early Tanzimat transformations on the development of the Balkan upheavals I want to examine twentieth and early twentieth first century historiographical approaches to the origin of the Balkan uprisings and the Tanzimat period. This is to identify the main approaches that will be useful to address the reform process that initiated in the early nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire, and that led to the emergence of upheavals in the Empire's Balkan territories.

Since the late twentieth century researches have been made to find the root of the conflicts that framed the contemporary history of the Balkan Peninsula, and to explain the emergence of the nationalist and emancipation ambitions in the area. In this sense, authors like George Kennan (1993), Richard Hall (2000) and Andre Gerolymatos (2002) have addressed the origins of the Balkan Wars from different perspectives, and in many occasions they make reference to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the area. However, already in 1958 this issue had been fully addressed by L.S. Stavrianos in his book *The Balkans since 1453*.

In the book *The Other Balkan Wars: a 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect*, George Kennan inquires into the origin of the First and Second Balkan Wars, the relationships between nationalities, international policy and international law. On his part, Richard Hall in his work *Balkan Wars 1912-1913 Prelude to the First World War* provides one of the most relevant historiographical approaches to the origins and developments of the Balkan Wars. The author's main thesis is that the Balkan

War's outbreak was the result of the intervention of the Great Powers, and that they constitute the main antecedent of the First World War. However, his approach is not as rich as to provide a consistent platform to link the Ottoman influence and the beginning of the Balkan confrontations.

Andre Gerolymatos in his book *The Balkan Wars Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond* approaches the influence of the Ottoman Empire in the historical discourse of the Balkan Peninsula, he makes especial emphasis on the relationship between the Ottoman authority and the emergence of local centers of power in the peripheral areas. Finally, L.S. Stavrianos, whose book *The Balkans since 1453* constitutes a main reference source to address the topic of this thesis, states that an analysis of nineteenth century politics in the Balkan Peninsula should consider the relationships between the following factors: "... the continued decline of the Ottoman Empire, the awakening of the subject nationalities, and the expanding interests and increasing rivalries of the various great powers."⁷

I recognize that the previous contributions are valid to approach the outbreak of the Balkan War from a western and European perspective, which does not deny the Ottoman past, but unfortunately does not go in detail into the relationship of the reform policies and the response of the non-Muslim communities to these changes. Any of these sources establish a link between the early Tanzimat period and its outcomes as direct causes for the outbreak of the conflicts in the Balkan Peninsula in the early twentieth century. Therefore, the existence of this link is what I want to prove in the forthcoming pages.

⁷ Stavrianos, *Op. Cit.*, p. 215

To find the connections between the Tanzimat period (1839-1856) and the outbreak of the First Balkan War I will consult contemporary sources that focus on the Tanzimat reforms, their political and social backgrounds, their relation with the influence of world politics on the international and domestic areas of the empire and its consequences on the situation of the Balkan subjects. This will allow me to describe how the military and administrative policies adopted after the promulgation of the Gülhane Rescript and the Hatt-i Hamayun in 1839 and 1856 respectively, affected the status of the Balkan non-Muslim communities.

Definitions, motivations and outcomes of the Tanzimat period have been addressed before. However, to construct the framework that is needed to address the topic of this thesis, I will shed light on the historiographical works of Roderic Davison, Stanford Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, Butrus Abu Manneh and Caroline Finkel. All these authors appraise the Tanzimat era from different perspectives, they provide definitions of the Tanzimat period, and between them there exist some common features that are useful to draw a historiographical platform from which to establish links between the reform in the Ottoman Empire and its impact on the Balkan non-Muslim communities.

In his article *Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century*, Roderic H. Davison proposed a reevaluation of the Tanzimat period, specifically the concept of equality and the reactions it arose in the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. When the principle of equality between Christians and Muslims was proclaimed, it became a central issue in the Ottoman discourse for survival.⁸ This principle, clearly imported from western traditions, raised opposition on the part of the

⁸ Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century" in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 59, No. 4. (Jul., 1954), p. 846

Muslim subjects and Muslim members of the ruling class as it undermined their positions of power and their privileges in the Ottoman state's affairs. Nevertheless, it also brought discomfort to the non-Muslim communities who were not satisfied with the restrictions and duties that the new policies obliged them to comply with. In the words of the author "[i]t soon became obvious that the Christians would rather continue to pay than serve, despite the step towards equality which [the reforms] might mean."⁹

Later, in 1975 Stanford J. Shaw addressed matters of economic reform and the response of the non-Muslim communities to the changes on taxation practices during the Tanzimat. He effectively stated that the Tanzimat implied an institutional change, but also a change in administrative practices.¹⁰ The author also described the Tanzimat's financial goals, which aimed first to reorganize the tax burden; second, to supplant indirect with direct tax collection, situation that provided opportunities of social mobility and empowerment of local notables; and third, the standardization of taxing practices disregarding religious or ethnic differences.¹¹ This source provides the elements to address the changes that were undertaken to modify the terms of the taxation system. It allows setting parameters to describe the changes that took place in the financial matters of the Ottoman administration, and in the situation of the non-Muslim peripheral communities.

In the late twentieth century the historian Butrus Abu-Manneh analyzed the motivations and ideologies behind the Tanzimat Era, namely the Gülhane Rescript of 1839, and the bureaucracy's reactions to the reforms. The author describes the objectives of the

⁹ Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century", p. 859.

¹⁰ See: Stanford J. Shaw, "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Oct., 1975).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 421

Tanzimat period and addresses the position of members of the Ottoman ruling class, i.e. Nedim Pasha, who found the adoption of measures of modernization counterproductive.¹² Therefore, the transformations adopted in the early Tanzimat in the administrative and military institutions weakened key institutions of power. As a side effect, they fostered the decentralization of the state and the need to consider local leaders as key allies to keep an effervescent periphery that ambioned greater autonomy. This decentralization or empowerment of local elites provided the conditions for the increment of ambitions for local autonomy in the Balkan periphery.

Abu Manneh's most remarkable approach comprises the relationship between the Tanzimat reforms and the attempts on the part of the Ottoman state to retake control of the subjects by re-stressing the Islamic faith in the behavior and doctrines of the Ottoman government. In his article *The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript* the author denies the idea that the drafting of the Gülhane Rescript was influenced by western political systems or ideas of equality, liberty or fraternity. On the contrary, he effectively states that the document was motivated and supported by the ideas of Orthodox Islam.¹³ This approach establishes the Tanzimat's independence from western ideological influence in favor of the assertion that the period of reform was motivated by Islamic ideas that bind justice, wealth and loyalty to the state.

¹² Grand Vizier Nedim Pasha was inclined for the centralization of the Ottoman state, and for strengthening the absolute power of the sultan. He stated that "...when the sultans managed the affairs of the state themselves, Muslim power grew, the Janissary corps and the *ulema* [as key institutions of the Ottoman power] were kept under control, and the interests of the state were kept apart from the private interests of its ministers." However, his main criticism to the Tanzimat was that it embodied a tendency "... to apply European practices to the Ottoman sultanate [which] were imitating things European and by so doing were destroying six hundred years of Ottoman practice." Therefore, despite suggesting the counterproductive effects of the changes that took place, Nadim's position clarifies that the Tanzimat goal of centralization and the redefinition of absolute power of the Ottoman government were necessary for the survival of the empire. See: Butrus Abu Manneh, "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: the Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasa" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug., 1990), pp. 262-263.

¹³ See: Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript" in *Die Welt des Islams*, New Ser., Vol. 34, Issue 2. (Nov., 1994), pp.173-203.

Finally, Caroline Finkel's account of Ottoman history from the rise to the fall of the Empire constitutes a main reference source to approach the topic of this thesis. Her book *Osman's Dream: the story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923* provides points of reference to define the Tanzimat period, the motivations that fostered it and most importantly the political background in which it developed.¹⁴ Finkel's approach stresses that Mahmud II's reforms, which set the platform for the reforms that changed the complete sphere of Ottoman life, were the response to a period of external humiliation and internal unrest which could only be addressed by transforming all aspects of society, not only the military institutions of the state.¹⁵ I agree with the author and I find relevant to bear in mind that this transformation, which emphasized the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, also entailed the redefinition of the terms of the relationship between the imperial core and its periphery contributing to the development self-determination ambitions that the Empire proved unable to confront.

The Tanzimat period in the Ottoman Empire (1839-1876) is defined as the period of reorganization and westernization, which addresses the reform that took place in the Ottoman Empire from 1839 up to the implementation of the Ottoman Constitution in 1876. It was "... a period of sustained legislation and reform that modernized Ottoman state and society, contributed to the further centralization of administration, and brought increased state participation in Ottoman society between 1839 and 1876."¹⁶ It is also

¹⁴ Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: the story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923*, (London: John Murray, 2005), pp. 413-487

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 440

¹⁶ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II: Reform, Revolution and Republic; The Rise of Modern Turkey*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 55

referred to as an era of ‘reordering’ that resulted from the bureaucratic and legal reforms that began during the reign of sultan Mahmut II.¹⁷

One of the most remarkable and complete approaches to the study of nineteenth century history of the Ottoman Empire is attributed to the American scholar Roderic H. Davison who extensively approached the Tanzimat period from different perspectives. One of his main proposals is that an evaluation of the Tanzimat period should consider each of the reform stages as independent lines of investigation.¹⁸ Thus, he deals with the inclusion of the concept of equality before the law in the Ottoman administrative and political arenas. Davison proposes three distinctive directions to analyze the Imperial reforms. First, he urges to reconsider the degree and nature of Ottoman slowdown in front of Western civilizations; second, to reckon the impediments that the Empire had to confront facing European diplomatic pressures; and third, to keep in mind the situation of multinational empires in the age of clamoring nationalisms.¹⁹

The first direction suggests a deeper approach of the Ottoman Empire in comparison to European civilizations on the light of an analysis of stages of development in pre-modern and modern societies. However, due to the scope and focus of this thesis, this analysis has to be set aside. The second direction appears to stress the relevance of foreign pressure as propeller of the structural changes that took place in the Ottoman Empire. The third, brings up the links between multinational empires and the emergence of compelling nationalisms.

¹⁷ See: Finkel, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁸ See: Davison, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century”

¹⁹ See: *Ibid.* p. 849.

I agree with the author when he mentions that "... the reform question [has to be] examined as a domestic problem, on which the diplomatic pressure was but one of many influences."²⁰ Therefore, the analysis of the motivations that led to the enactment of the documents will prove that the reform can be defined as an internal issue, in which the diplomatic pressure played only a secondary role. Even though diplomatic pressures from the western powers on the Ottoman Empire were significant elements to determine the enactment and production of the reform documents, they did not have an exclusive character. On the contrary, the pressure exerted on the Porte's internal politics became significant towards the second part of the period 1839-1856, when the imbalance created as a result of the first transformations opened the gate for the consolidation of the nationalist ideas and the intervention of foreign powers to "protect" the non-Muslim communities.

The political, social and cultural motivations that led to the enactment of the Gülhane Rescript and the Hatt-i Hamayun are topics that open debate among scholars in so far as the need to know the reasons behind the weakening and disruption of the Ottoman structure and institutions grows. To analyze the motivations behind the reform documents there are two approaches that deserve especial attention, those of Stanford Shaw and Butrus Abu Manneh, who from opposing perspectives contextualize the emergence of the Tanzimat period, specifically of the drafting of the Gülhane Rescript. Shaw argues that the drafting of the Gülhane Rescript was mainly influenced by western political systems, and by ideas of equality, liberty and fraternity²¹. In turn, Abu Manneh states that "... at the start of the Tanzimat period many members of the Ottoman elite –

²⁰ Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, (New York: Gordian Press, 1973, c1963), p. 9.

²¹ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II*, pp. 55-171.

the sultan, and officials affiliated to the Palace as well as *ulema* and bureaucrats – were motivated by the ideals of Sunni-orthodox Islam, and that the Gülhane Rescript had its roots in Muslim thought and political concepts.”²² Abu Manneh acknowledges that western political ideas may have influenced the Tanzimat only in its later period. However, he recalls that the drafting of the Gülhane lies mostly on a Sunni-orthodox outlook which relied on an agreement between the bureaucracy and sultan Abdülmecid I by which both institutions recognized the need to readdress the principles of Islam to bring justice, therefore prosperity and stability to the Ottoman state.

To support the statement that Islam was behind the motifs of the Gülhane Rescript, the author mentions the influence of the Naqshbandi-Khalidi, a branch of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order. The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order spread from India to the Ottoman lands of western Asia and Istanbul in the early nineteenth century as an urban religious movement, which took root among the upper and educated classes of Ottoman society, and attempted to strengthen the orthodox faith of the Muslims by encouraging its followers to influence rulers to secure the strict implementation of the *sharia* and to bring justice to the state²³. In this sense, it is argued that “...orthodox Islamic ideals formed the foundation of [sultan Abdülmecid’s] convictions and socio-political outlook...”²⁴, who grown in an Orthodox Islamic environment, was exposed to the Naqshbandi-Khalidi.²⁵

In the work *The Other Balkan Wars: a 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect* when the origin of the Balkan Wars is approached, it is established that towards the end

²² See: Abu-Manneh, “The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript”, p. 201

²³ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century” in *Die Welt des Islams*, New Ser., Bd. 22, Nr. 1/4. (1982), p. 1

²⁴ Abu-Manneh, , “The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript”, p. 186

²⁵ Finkel, *Op. Cit.* p. 449

of the nineteenth century there was a sentiment of national expansion among the non-Muslim communities, and that “[t]hroughout this period ... the people turned voluntarily to the leaders, even in the settlement of their private affairs, instead of going before the Ottoman officials and judges...”²⁶ This statement may suggest that the transformation on the Ottoman methods of control and on the structure of the administrative institutions rephrased the terms of the subject’s relationship to the Ottoman state and its local leaders as political authorities. This suggestion opens the possibility of further analysis to show that the presence of local elites in the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat reforms was crucial for securing the loyalty of the peripheral communities and for implementing the mechanisms and processes that sustained the center’s civilizational mission within the modernizing project. Suffice is to say that the empowerment of local elites in the Imperial institutions, mostly the administrative branch, was not a goal of the Tanzimat period. On the contrary, it was a secondary effect that the Ottoman Porte did not consider until it was too late to reverse the tendencies towards emancipation and self-determination ambitions.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

In order to analyze the impact of early Tanzimat transformations for the development of Balkan upheavals in the early twentieth century, I will consider Alexei Miller’s statement which establishes that an approach to the history of empires must focus on the patterns of imperial response and adaptation to the challenges of modernity.²⁷ This statement refers to the study of the Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman Empire as contiguous political entities. However, in this thesis an analysis of how the Ottoman Empire responded to the challenges presented by the nineteenth century tendencies of

²⁶ Kennan, *Op. Cit.* p. 33

²⁷ Alexei Miller. *The Value and the Limits of a Comparative Approach to the History of Contiguous Empires.*

modernization will allow a better understanding of the outbreak of Balkan upheavals in the second half of the nineteenth century as the starting point of a series of events that led the multi-ethnic populations that were part of the Ottoman Empire's periphery into conflict.

I will start from Alexander Motyl's definition of empire, which recognizes empires as "... structurally centralized political systems within which core elites dominate peripheral societies [serving] as intermediaries for their significant interactions, and [channeling] resources and information flows from the periphery to the core and back to the periphery."²⁸ Based on this definition, it is possible to establish that the Ottoman Empire was formed by culturally distinctive core and periphery populations, which were related by an institutional structure in charge of managing political, economic and cultural affairs. Therefore, the distinctive feature of the Ottoman peripheral populations consists of the existence of cultural characteristics between core and peripheral population that established patterns of dissimilation.²⁹

I propose that the Tanzimat period in its early stage (1839-1856) modified the terms of the relationship between the Muslim majority of the imperial core and the Empire's multi-religious and multi-ethnic periphery, contributing to the emergence of upheavals in the Balkan periphery of the Empire. Therefore, to better understand how these situations are related I address Alexander Motyl's theoretical landmarks to understand the core-peripheral dynamic of empires, and its relevance for the Ottoman Empire. Then

²⁸ Alexander J. Motyl, "Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective" in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2. (Jan., 1999), p. 128

²⁹ See: Alexander J. Motyl, "Thinking About Empire" in *After empire: multiethnic societies and nation-building : the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* / edited by Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1997), p. 20

I use Andreas Kappeler's approach to the strategies adopted by Empires to handle the relationship between imperial cores and peripheral elites.

In his article, *Thinking About Empire*, Alexander Motyl establishes that Empires are formed of a centralized core made up of multidimensional, territorially concentrated and mutually reinforcing institutions that control peripheries, which he defines as the core's territorially bounded administrative outposts. To achieve the purpose of control, imperial cores handle matters related to foreign policy, currency and control of borders. More importantly, and what matters for the topic of this thesis, they handle the periphery's finances, and appointment of governors, and they are not "...accountable to the periphery, which in turn, has no legal basis for influencing the appointment of core officials and the choice of core policies."³⁰ On the basis of this distinction between the functions of the core and the status of the periphery I shed light on the military and the imperial treasury as key institutions of the Ottoman government, and on the effects of their transformations on the peripheral non-Muslim communities in the Balkan area.

I understand the core-periphery relationship in the Ottoman Empire on the basis of what Motyl establishes as the three defining characteristics of an empire. First, the fact that empires are formed of defined core and peripheral elites and populations. Second, that the core, in charge of the imperial state, consists mainly of the ruling elite, and the periphery is represented by the state's administrative outposts and the peripheral elites. And third, that there exists a relationships between the core and the periphery. Within this relation the imperial elite coordinates, supervises and protects the peripheral

³⁰ Motyl, "Thinking About Empire", p. 21

societies which interact between each other through institutions.³¹ For the purpose of this thesis the Ottoman core is understood as the ruling class formed mainly of Muslim officials, members of the *ulema* and military officials who were recruited from the non-Muslim peripheries, converted through the *devshirme* system, and who governed over the subject class or *reaya*, which was formed of the tax paying subjects who were the providers of resources and wealth for the maintenance of the state and the sultan's authority.³² Hence, in this study the periphery is understood as the *reaya* that lived in the imperial administrative outposts of the Balkan Peninsula. The relationship previously described, together with the power of the sultan, was sustained by the guarantee of justice, the rule of Islamic law and the existence of efficient administrative mechanisms. This correlation between the *reaya*, as provider of loyalty and manpower for the maintenance of the Ottoman state, and the ruling class, will be better understood through the definition of the Circle of Equity, which will be fully addressed and analyzed in the following chapter.

Going back to Motyl's defining characteristics, it is relevant to bear in mind that when these three come together the empire is said to exist, but in the absence of any, the empire, in the words of the author, is likely to collapse. In this thesis I do not attempt to discuss the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, however, on the basis of this approach I will focus on the modification of the third characteristic as the element that opened the door for the disruption of the structural scheme that had kept the multi-ethnic society

³¹ Motyl, "Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspectives" p. 128

³² In this sentence I refer to the description provided by Halil Inalcik, Lewis V. Thomas and Norman Itzkowitz of the organization of Ottoman society, which complements Stanford J. Shaw's definition of Ottoman social structure. See: Joel Shinder, "Early Ottoman Administration in the Wilderness: Some Limits on Comparison" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4. (Nov., 1978), pp. 497-517.

together upon religious differentiations paving the way for the consolidation of national discourses of emancipation and self-determination.

To approach the Tanzimat period as the starting point of the process that ended with the outbreak of upheavals in the Balkans, I draw attention to Caglar Keyder's models defined to understand the Ottoman Empire's collapse. Keyder proposed the emergence of national separatism due to the empire's confrontation with capitalism, and the model of patrimonial crisis³³, which establishes that a classical empire, mainly agrarian³⁴, "... is basically ... governed by a strong centre that uses non-hereditary tax-collecting administrators to control peripheral areas."³⁵ This model is useful to address the effects that changes on the Ottoman institutionalized mechanisms of control had on the Ottoman Balkan periphery, and to establish a link between the Tanzimat reforms and the outbreak of upheavals in the Ottoman Balkan periphery. The model allows me to sustain that the empowerment of local notables as a secondary effect of the Tanzimat attempts at centralization, and the loss of incomes because of the inability to keep the periphery under control, took root in the Ottoman context as a consequence of the transformations that the Ottoman state exerted on its key institutions, namely the military and the imperial treasury.

On the other hand, to understand the relationship between the imperial core and the peripheral elites in the context of the reform period in the Ottoman Empire I shed light on Andreas Kappeler's approach which is based on the assumption that local elites are

³³ See: Caglar Keyder, "The Ottoman Empire" in *After empire : multiethnic societies and nation-building : the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* / edited by Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 30-44.

³⁴ To read more about the difficulties that the Ottoman state faced during the Tanzimat because of the treatment of the agrarian issues one can consult Halil Inalcik's *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 1st ed. 1943, 2nd ed. Istanbul: Eren, 1992. (Course notes and translation by Professor Selim Deringil).

³⁵ Keyder, *Op. Cit.*, p. 30.

useful for the imperial core as suppliers of resources, army, and bureaucracy, and as crucial elements to consolidate mechanisms of control over peripheral populations. Kappeler suggests three strategies that the imperial core elites may adopt to deal with peripheral elites. First, the centre may adopt a strategy of cooperation in which local elites could be either allowed to keep their rights, privileges and religion as they are recruited into the imperial elite, or they could be under a strict control that will take away power from them while granting limited privileges. The second strategy consists of guaranteeing the privileges and liberties of the provincial nobility so that they could keep their traditional institutions, power structures and certain political autonomy on their territory. The third strategy is based on the assumption that because of their disloyalty, peripheral elites may be forbidden to keep their political institutions and autonomy despite the fact that they could be a social and culturally dominant group.³⁶

According to Kappeler, the inclination towards one strategy or another depends on three elements. First, the need to include an elite considered equal to the ruling elite; second, the degree of the elite's loyalty to the emperor; and third, on the military, strategic, geopolitical and foreign political assumptions concerning neighbour empires whose share of same ethnic or religious characteristics with the elites in the periphery of the own empire could threaten the imperial core. The first element does not apply for the Ottoman case. However, the second and third are present if we take into consideration that the Imperial center, especially during the Tanzimat, counted on the loyalty of the local elites who acted as intermediaries to keep control of the non-Muslim subjects in the periphery. Moreover, the Imperial fear of foreign intervention on behalf of the non-

³⁶ Andreas Kappeler. *Imperial Core and Elites of the Peripheries in the Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman Empires*. (Conference paper.)

Muslim communities increased the strategic importance of keeping the loyalty of the communities' elites towards the Sultan as utmost authority.

In the case of the Ottoman Empire because of the Empire's dependence on the subject's human and financial contributions the strategy of cooperation was implemented since the classical age until before the adoption of the reforms. In the early stages of the Ottoman Empire the loyalty of non-Muslims was secured by allowing them to keep their rights, privileges and religion as long as they carried out their taxation duties for the Imperial Treasury and the military institution. The role non-Muslims played in these two mechanisms of control allowed them to have certain autonomy and the possibility to be included into the imperial elite. In regard to the second strategy proposed by Kappeler the Ottoman center guaranteed some privileges and liberties of the provincial nobility to safeguard the strategic geopolitical role of the non-Muslim communities in the Balkan area. And when facing threats of foreign intervention this led the empire to increase its efforts towards strengthening the control of the situation in the periphery and towards granting certain political autonomy to secure the peripheral loyalty needed for the survival of the Empire.

Finally, Kappeler's remark on how empires handle the effects of modernization and the consequences of this issue on the status of its plural communities and its nationalist projects is also relevant to address the topic of this thesis. Kappeler states that in front of the challenges of modernization (urbanization, alphabetization, industrialization and social mobilization), and especially of the threats of nationalism and the politicization of religious and ethnic differences, an Empire's main interest is to maintain the traditional social and political order. This is true in the Ottoman case if we bear in mind that the

Tanzimat's main goal was to reassert the control of the Ottoman state and to reestablish the mechanisms of absolute and central power on the position of the Sultan.

Furthermore, Kappeler argues that in the attempt to adapt their traditional structures with reforms, empires witness the emergence of contradictions which are manifested in the relations of the imperial center and the old imperial elites, and in the uprising of national elites in the peripheral areas. By bringing this approach to the context of the structural reform in the Tanzimat period, I sustain that one of the most significant weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire in the period of transition was that the changes in the mechanisms to reestablish relationships between the Ottoman state and the non-Muslim periphery rather than encouraging the betterment of the imperial dynamic, as a side effect, opened the door for the definition of emancipation projects. This was because first, many of the reforms that were proclaimed affected the positions of power that some local leaders had previously attained. This enabled the growth of ambitions of power, of independence, and negatively of local confrontations. Second, once the mechanisms to control the army and to guarantee the functioning of the administrative institutions were modified, the strength of the institutional body of the Empire was seriously permeated paving the way for the non-Muslim communities in the Balkan area to envision the consolidation of their emancipation projects.

Chapter 2

Imperial Pillars: Non-Muslim Communities Before the Reforms

For centuries, the Ottoman state focused on maintaining an imperial logic in which subjects from divergent religious and ethnic backgrounds were compelled to live side by side. In this dynamic Muslim and non-Muslim communities were obliged to fulfil different duties in a state that emphasized religious belief over ethnic differentiations and which established diverse criteria for each of the communities under its rule. However, this situation changed overtime especially in the nineteenth century when domestic and foreign conditions forced the Porte to rephrase the terms of the relationships that had kept the imperial subjects under control. The outcomes of the redefinition of the terms of the core-peripheral relationship between the Ottoman centre and its subjects, mostly due to the changes in Ottoman legislation and the reforms of the Tanzimat era, developed into confrontations that stressed the change from religious to ethnic differentiations which grew bigger and evolved into projects of emancipation and nation-formation.

The conflicts, which emerged as a secondary effect of the nineteenth century reforms in the Ottoman periphery, raise the need to understand the organizational structure of Ottoman society and the way in which the Ottoman state was able to build cohesion among its multi-ethnic subjects. Therefore, this chapter attempts to examine the institutional organization that framed Ottoman society in the Empire's early period, in order to construct the landmarks from which to analyze the status of the non-Muslim subjects of the Balkan Peninsula. This will allow us to understand the differentiations established between non-Muslims subjects and their Muslim counterparts, their

relationship to the Ottoman state, and the order that for centuries kept both groups together. This chapter also aims to distinguish the institutional mechanisms that existed within the social organization in the classical age of the Ottoman Empire in order to draw conclusions about the status of the non-Muslim communities in the imperial realm. This will allow me reveal first, that the power of the Ottoman Empire was supported by the guarantee of justice, the rule of Islamic law and the existence of efficient administrative mechanisms. Then, that the Ottoman state counted on institutionalized mechanisms of control to secure the cohesion of its multi-ethnic and multi-religious subjects, and to guarantee financial resources and human assets to sustain the imperial power. Therefore, the description of how the Empire built cohesion among its multi-ethnic and multi-religious subjects before the enactment of reforms in the nineteenth century, will allow me to further address the impact of the Tanzimat reforms for the outbreak of upheavals in the Ottoman periphery.

2.1 Ottoman Social Organization

The Ottoman Empire succeeded in keeping a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population together because despite the religious features that differentiated its society, the Ottoman government developed institutionalized mechanisms that enabled the strengthening of the subjects' loyalty to the sultan, and of their allegiance to the imperial rules. Therefore, through the institutionalization of mechanisms of control such as the army's recruitment methods and the policies for tax collection, all imperial subjects, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, were obliged to contribute to the maintenance of the state by the completion of fiscal obligations which were key for the maintenance of justice, wealth, security, and imperial stability.

It is necessary to approach the military and administrative organization of the Ottoman state in the Empire's classical age because it was in this period and within these administrative bodies, when mechanisms of control were first institutionalized and different rules were defined and applied to distinguish the role of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. Particular emphasis has to be made on the stipulations related to the Balkan non-Muslim communities within the Imperial Treasury, which was in charge of securing the Empire's wealth; and the military institution, mainly the standing army. Both institutions constitute key bodies of the Ottoman Empire's political and social organization; the first because of its relation to the provision of wealth and financial resources for sustaining not only the ruler, but also the state; and the second, as the provider of loyal manpower to secure the imperial might in front of internal and external threats.

Ottoman society was made up of Muslim and non-Muslim (*dhimmi*) subjects who lived together under the jurisdiction of Islamic (*Seriat*) and customary (*kanun*) laws.³⁷ Within the imperial legal dynamic, non-Muslims were granted certain judicial autonomy as long as their legal issues "...did not cross religious boundaries, involve capital crimes or threaten public order and security."³⁸ Under this measure, they could be treated under the scope of laws elaborated by their specific religious leaders. Nevertheless, non-

³⁷ In the early twentieth century the historian Albert Howe Lybyer in his work: *The government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966), which provides a detailed framework to understand the composition of Ottoman society in the sixteenth century, and the duties that its members were compelled to fulfil. According to his description the Ottoman Empire was said to be formed of two institutional bodies: the Ruling Institution and the Moslem Institution. The first, made up of the personal slaves of the sultan who were mainly conscripted Christians was in charge of military and administrative issues. And the second, made up of freeborn Muslims was responsible for the Islamic faith. However, this two-fold division overlooks the heterogeneous composition of Ottoman society.

³⁸ Najwa Al-Qattan, "Dhimmi in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Aug., 1999), p. 429

Muslims frequently attended Muslim courts to treat issues related to marriage, divorce, child custody or inheritance.³⁹

The relevance of Islamic tradition in the organization of the Ottoman state was stressed by the historian Paul Wittek.⁴⁰ According to the author, the *devshirme* system emerged to satisfy the *ghazi* ideal of forced conversion, while at the same time it represented a restriction on the *ulema*'s ambitions.⁴¹ In this sense, the conflict between the *ghazis*, as defenders of Islam in front of the infidels, and the *ulema*, as the religious institution in charge of safeguarding the Orthodox Islamic tradition, led to the development of mechanisms to control the possibility of social mobility on the basis of religious differences, but also to secure the status of both Muslim and non-Muslims over the discrepancies between religious representatives. The *devshirme* system, which began as the exercise of the sultan's right to collect a portion of the prisoners captured in warfare, later developed into a practice that institutionalized the fact that religion was part of the process by which the individual's status and position could be changed. Through the *devshirme* Christian children were recruited, mostly from the Balkan area, and were converted to Islam and trained to occupy positions in the Ottoman administration and the palace, or to serve in the regular infantry as members of the janissary corps.⁴² Exemptions in the recruitment were given to subjects who served the sultan as cultivators of his personal lands, mine workers or guards of important road crossings.⁴³

³⁹ See: Najwa Al-Qattan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 429-444

⁴⁰ The author was Emeritus Professor of Turkish at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and is one of the earliest historians to focus on the early period of Ottoman history. His work is centred on the emergence of the Ottoman Empire and its relations to the *ghazi* tradition. See: Paul Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*, (London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1965).

⁴¹ Shinder, *Op. Cit.*, p. 497

⁴² M.L. Bush, *Servitude in Modern Times*, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000), p. 168

⁴³ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. I: Empire of the Gazis; Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 114

The system was a tool used to keep loyalties in the new conquered areas. It was also meant to build networks of support that would sustain the areas as part of the empire, guaranteeing the subjugations of the new communities.⁴⁴ Therefore, to a great extent, this mechanism forced the loyalty of non-Muslims while at the same time it also represented a possibility of social mobility which over time fostered the emergence of a class whose power grew stronger when the Ottoman government adopted mechanisms of indirect rule aimed at controlling its peripheral areas, and consequently became the main threat to the sultan's power.

Conflicts between local notables and the traditional Muslim authorities made the sultan more dependent on the *devshirme* class than on the favour of Turkish tribal families. This threatened his position as ultimate authority. Hence, the sultan became more compelled to give credit to the *devshirme* class and to support the strengthening of its mechanisms than to cede to the military reforms suggested by Turkish officials to regain the positions of power that had been attained through the *devshirme*.⁴⁵ It is clear that the *devshirme* system, which provided the human resources for the army, played a key role in increasing the inclusion of non-Muslims in state affairs and in influencing the sultan's authority, especially his power and his position as ultimate ruler.

The distinction of Ottoman society as being organized in two large groups: an Ottoman ruling class (*askeri*) and an Ottoman subject class (*reaya*), can also be addressed through the acknowledgement of the relationship between the imperial key institutions and the dynamic with which the Ottoman Empire established relationships and control of its plural population based on the distinction of an Ottoman subject class governed by

⁴⁴ See: Paul Wittek, "Devshirme and Sharia" in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. 17, No. 2, (1955), pp. 271-278.

⁴⁵ Shinder, *Op. Cit.*, p. 498

a clearly defined ruling class,⁴⁶ whose members were mostly Muslims. It was made up of four institutions: the palace, the scribal, the military and the learned institution. This class constituted the main support of the Sultan, and governed a majority of non-Muslim subject communities. The subject class (*reaya*), made up of the peasantry, merchants and artisans, in exchange for care and protection produced wealth, which "... the Ruling Class was to exploit and defend."⁴⁷

According to Muslim Law, the *reaya* was organized on the basis of occupation, residence and religion. Muslims and non-Muslim members of the *reaya* were obliged to pay the same taxes. However, non-Muslims, unlike Muslims, were "... subjected to the head tax (*cizye*) imposed in return for their protection by the Sultan, retention of their traditional laws and customs within the autonomous *millets*, and exemption from military service."⁴⁸ The *cizye* also referred to as 'poll tax' applied to all adult male members of the non-Muslim communities who according to their wealth and possessions had to pay determined amounts to the state. The un-fulfilment of this duty constituted a major cause for warfare.

The *reaya* was also divided into communities according to religious creeds forming the *millet* system. Hence, on the basis of religion, there were four *millets* in the Ottoman Empire: the Muslim, the Orthodox, the Jewish and the Armenian.⁴⁹ In this system, subjects dealt with the ruling class only through the leaders of the *millets*, who were

⁴⁶ See: Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: the classical age, 1300-1600*, (London: Phoenix, 1994, c1973). This distinction is also present in Norman Itzkowitz article *Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities*, in *Studia Islamica*, No. 16. (1962), pp. 73-94, in which the author provides elements that complete Inalcik's approach.

⁴⁷ Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. I*, p. 150.

⁴⁸ Shaw, "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System", p. 421.

⁴⁹ The Armenian *millet* was recognized in 1461 by Sultan Mehmet II, it comprised all subjects not included in the Orthodox or Jewish *millets*, that is: Gypsies, Asirians, Monophysites of Syria and Egypt, Bogomils of Bosnia and Maronites, the only Roman Catholic community in the empire. See: Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. I*, p. 152-153.

appointed by the sultan and were responsible for the behaviour of the community and the payment of taxes and other obligations.⁵⁰ This system was the basic framework in which the relationship between the imperial government and the *dhimmi* population was organized.⁵¹ This description of Ottoman social organization has been widely accepted and used in Ottoman literature. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the concept of the *millet* system is considered the result of a combination of myths that took form as part of the nineteenth century Orientalist interpretation of Ottoman social organization.⁵²

In any case, the division of the *reaya* aimed at guaranteeing power in the Ottoman state. This power was based on the provision of justice, on the maintenance and provision of wealth, but most importantly on the effective control of the peripheral domains which increased with every conquest, and therefore demanded the definition and enforcement of methods of control. When Ottomans gained control of a new territory they first sought to establish control over the acquired lands. Then, this control was strengthened by the elimination of local dynasties and the establishment of direct control through the *timar* system.⁵³ This dynamic evidences the relevance of Ottoman institutions for social control. It is also aimed to assimilate non-Muslim groups which became part of Ottoman society and to an extent ambioned the possibility to acquire a different social status under Ottoman control.

⁵⁰ Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. I, p. 151

⁵¹ Najwa Al-Qattan, *Op. Cit.* p. 431

⁵² Within an Orientalist framework the term *millet* was misunderstood. Based on the analysis of Ottoman documents Braude demonstrated that in the early stages of Ottoman history the term *millet* was not used to refer to the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. On the contrary, it referred to the community of Muslims in front of non-Muslims. Until the nineteenth century the term became part of the discourse and interpretation of Ottoman social organization. Since that time it has been used to address the organization of Ottoman society and as a parameter to classify non-Muslim Ottoman subjects. See: Benjamin Braude, "Foundation Myths of the *Millet* System" in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman empire : the functioning of a plural society* / edited by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, (New York: Holmes & Meier, c1982), pp. 69-88

⁵³ See: Halil Inalcik, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest" in *Studia Islamica*, No. 2 (1954), p. 103-129

The aforementioned pattern of conquest was present throughout Ottoman history and it implied the inclusion of the new acquired subjects, without ethnic or religious distinction, into the backbone of Ottoman social stability: the Circle of Equity, which proposed that:

... a state requires a sovereign authority to enforce rational and Holy Law; to have authority a sovereign must exercise power; to have power and control one needs a large army; to have an army one needs wealth; to have wealth from taxes one needs a prosperous people; to have a prosperous subject population one must have just laws justly enforced; to have laws enforced one needs a state; to have a state one needs a sovereign authority.⁵⁴

Therefore, the survival of the sultan's authority was conditioned by the existence of power which depended on controlling its subjects by means of a strong army whose position was sustained on wealth, which relied on the revenues from the tax paying *reaya* and the exercise of just laws.

2.2 Institutional dynamic in Ottoman Society

Taking the Circle of Equity as a basis to recognize the relevance of the adequate functioning of the imperial finances and of the importance of the military as key institutions for the maintenance of order, it is possible to address the main features of both institutional bodies. In this sense, the Imperial Treasury as the main provider of wealth depended greatly on the *reaya*, which included all the tax paying subjects of the empire, who in exchange for protection contributed to the state by paying taxes. The tax system followed a pattern very similar to the Ottoman legal system; it was divided between those taxes authorized by the Islamic law and the taxes that were authorized by the sultan's decrees. Their collection relied in the hands of members of the ruling class.

⁵⁴ Shinder, *Op. Cit.*, p. 499

The most important taxes related to Islamic law were: the *tithe*, which constituted one tenth of agricultural production; the *cizye*, known as the head tax, which was collected from non-Muslims; *zekat* (alms) that was charged on Muslims as a requirement of their faith; the municipal tax which was collected from artisans and merchants as part of the licensing and regulating process; the sheep tax, which included customary taxes added to all other animals; and the mine tax, which enabled the state to collect one-fifth of the yield of private owned mines.⁵⁵ The taxes approved by decree included the household tax (*avariz*) which obliged the inhabitants of the peripheries to cover the expenses of soldiers and functionaries and those generated by natural disasters; a tax paid by every Muslim and Christian subject in western Anatolia and Thrace in return for their right to cultivate their agricultural land; the pasturage tax, which was collected from Christian cultivators and bridegroom taxes, fines to recover stray cattle, market taxes, customs duties on trade and fees for using public scales.⁵⁶

Ottoman territorial possessions were divided in units called *mukata'a*. The revenues obtained from these units could be destined to the treasury or to its owner. The owners whose revenues went entirely to the imperial treasury were compensated by a salary in cases where the government could supervise the performance of the holders, such as customs duties. The opposite of this scheme "...was the *timar*, whose holder kept all the revenues in the holding in return for performing some other service for the sultan."⁵⁷ The sultan, as owner of the sources of revenue, could transfer its property to individuals "... in return for the performance of military or administrative duties other than those involved in collecting their taxes."⁵⁸ In this way, the loyalty of the ruling class was also

⁵⁵ Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. I, p. 120

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 121

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

secured by strengthening their power in front of the subject communities and the inhabitants of the peripheral areas of the empire.

For a multi-ethnic empire whose agrarian society was governed by a centralized bureaucracy and controlled by an absolute ruler, the army constituted a significant branch of power whose adequate functioning was decisive to the maintenance of order and power. The military was "... an imperial device, [that enabled] the regime to function with an overall efficiency."⁵⁹ It was intended to guarantee the power of the sultan and the loyalty of the imperial subjects to the ruler as ultimate authority of the state. It was divided into the land army and the navy. The transformations in the land forces of the Ottoman army had the greatest impact on the stability of the Empire. In its early period the land army was made up of prisoners and mercenaries, either Muslim or non-Muslim, who could be part of the Janissary corps, the artillery or the cavalry. Overtime this body became mostly composed of Christian youths recruited through the *devshirme* system, converted to Islam and made part of the imperial administration, the palace offices, or the ordinary troops in the Janissary corps.

The Janissary corps "...were not the largest group in the army, but because of their organization, training, and discipline, as well as their expert use of [arms] they formed the most important fighting force in the empire..."⁶⁰ The levy of youths from the Balkan Christian subjects guaranteed a trustable source of human resources⁶¹ in charge of keeping order throughout the Empire. However, in the course of time, the Sultan became dependant on the Janissary support. Caroline Finkel effectively states that "[i]n theory these corps were the servants of the sultan but in reality he was the prisoner of

⁵⁹ Bush, *Op. Cit.*, p. 170

⁶⁰ Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. I, p. 123

⁶¹ Finkel, *Op. Cit.*, p.28

their whims, and without their support he could not exercise his sovereignty.”⁶² This is true mostly towards the end of the eighteenth century when the Ottoman government was obliged to change the rules of military conscription and in parallel adopted mechanisms of indirect rule to keep control of the non-Muslim peripheral areas.

After examining the organization of Ottoman society it is possible to affirm that according to law Muslim and non-Muslims communities in the Ottoman Empire were clearly differentiated, as well as their defined spheres of influence and areas of development. The Ottoman subject class constituted a broad conglomerate of different national groups that within the empire were divided according to their belief more than to their ethnic or national characteristics. Mazower expressed this situation as follows: “The question of whether they were Serbs, Bulgarians or Greeks meant little for Christian peasant boys in the Ottoman system...”⁶³ Therefore, in Ottoman domains, on the basis of religious beliefs, subjects were appointed tasks that implied obligations to the state either by means of military service or by their contributions to the treasury. By these mechanisms non-Muslims were given opportunities for social mobility through conversion or by being appointed as leaders of their communities, therefore, as intermediaries between the periphery and the imperial centre.

As we have seen in this chapter, the guarantee of justice, the rule of Islamic law and the existence of efficient administrative mechanisms supported the power of the Ottoman Empire in its domains. Therefore, in order to keep the imperial subjects together above their religious differences the Ottoman state constructed an order based on the institutionalization of methods of control that guaranteed on the one hand financial

⁶² Finkel, *Op. Cit.*, p. 153

⁶³ Mark Mazower, *The Balkans. A Short History*. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000), p. 40

resources and, on the other, human assets to sustain imperial power. Moreover, the acknowledgement of loyalty was one of the key elements through which the Ottoman state guaranteed balance between rulers and subjects. However, despite the fact that both classes converged in their obliged loyalty to the sultan there existed a tacit differentiation between them, which could be expressed as “... a functional division between those who performed services for the state and therefore received remuneration, as opposed to those who paid taxes; [without] reference to religion in this distinction.”⁶⁴ Ottoman communities were organized in a way that differences between the ruling class and the *reaya*, were clearly specified, one group as ruler and holder of the power to influence political decisions and to enforce the obedience of the second group, who was in charge of working and providing the resources of wealth.

Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that the reliance on different methods of control, which needed to be transformed or improved as Ottoman territories expanded and the plurality of the subjects increased, constituted another element that was used to maintain balance within the Ottoman state and society. In this sense, as the domains of the empire increased and with them the heterogeneous character of the empire, the military and the imperial treasury gained more importance as key institutions through which control and loyalty of the non-Muslims was secured and exercised.

Once I have described the imperial institutions as the landmarks that provided loyalty, justice, military and financial compromises to secure imperial cohesion, in the forthcoming chapter I will analyze the political conjunctures that in the domestic and external contexts motivated the enactment of the Gülhane Rescript (1839) and the Hatt-i

⁶⁴ Metin Kunt, “Transformation of Zimmi into Askeri” in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman empire : the functioning of a plural society* / edited by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, (New York, Holmes & Meier, c1982), p. 58

Hamayun (1856). In this framework I will examine the most significant changes that took place in the military and the Imperial Treasury, namely the changes in the military recruitment methods, the abolition of military branch, and the changes in the system of taxation. This approach to specific transformations within the Tanzimat reforms will be the platform to reveal the links between the Empire's internal dynamic, its response to the need of reform as a survival tactic, the process of institutional change, and the instability that came as an outcome of these changes opening the door for the outbreak of upheavals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Chapter 3

Contextualizing the Tanzimat Era in the Ottoman Empire

In the previous chapter I described the organization of Ottoman society and the status of the non-Muslim communities before the reform period. I argued that within the institutional organization that framed Ottoman society the existence of institutionalized mechanisms of control was crucial to secure cohesion between the plural subject communities, and the subjects' loyalty to the sultan as ultimate authority. It also became clear that loyalty was important not only as a means to safeguard the stability of the empire, but also to guarantee the provision of resources for the maintenance of justice and wealth in favour of the imperial power. Also in the previous chapter I analyzed the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of their compromises to the administrative and military institutions of the Ottoman state. This showed that the role of the non-Muslim members of the tax-paying class was crucial to maintain the appropriate functioning of Ottoman society, which relied on the existence of a strong army sustained by the provision of wealth and the exercise of just laws. That is why the changes in the framework of the reform that altered the status of the non-Muslim Balkan subjects also transformed the Imperial dynamic and paved the way for the increment of ethnic differentiations and national tension.

To go further on the analysis of the reforms, which modified the bonds that held Ottoman society together over their plural distinctions, and that led to the development of projects of emancipation, I will now shed light on the early stages of the Tanzimat era: first, the promulgation of the Gülhane Rescript (1839), and second, the Hatt-i Hamayun (1856). This will allow me to reveal the link between the Empire's internal context in the early nineteenth century, the Ottoman response to the need of reform, and

the institutional changes that transformed the conditions of the non-Muslim subjects of the Balkan Peninsula.

On the basis of the aforementioned and to contribute to the analysis of the impact of early Tanzimat transformations on the development of Balkan upheavals, this chapter specifically attempts to address the motives that led to the proclamation of the Gülhane Rescript in 1839 and the Hatt-i Hamayun in 1856 and show that they were responses to the need for internal institutional re-orderings. The documents represent the initial and middle stages of the process of modernization shaped to encounter nineteenth century political and social challenges. Their promulgation took place in the scope of internal political contexts, whose particular characteristics determined the direction of the reforms they entailed. Therefore, the analysis of the imperial response to the military crisis and of its outcomes for the Ottoman society must establish a link between the Tanzimat reforms and the internal and external elements that propelled them in 1839 and 1856 respectively.

In this sense, in its initial paragraph the Gülhane Rescript (1839) established that the non-observance of the Islamic laws, which resulted from the military and territorial crisis of the eighteenth century, jeopardized the empire's stability. The former crises resulted in increasing weakness, and therefore, arouse the need to retake control of the Ottoman domains and to reinforce the supremacy of Islamic law.⁶⁵ In turn, the Hatt-i Hamayun (1856) started from the assumption that the guarantees promised by the

⁶⁵ "In the last one hundred and fifty years a succession of accidents and diverse causes have arisen which have brought about a disregard for the sacred code of laws and the regulations flowing wherefrom, and the former strength and prosperity have changed into weakness and poverty; an empire in fact loses all its stability so soon as it ceases to observe its laws." See: "Tanzimat Fermani-The Rescript of Gülhane-Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu, 3 November 1839" in *Documents I: Ottoman Reform Documents and the 1876 Constitution and its Amendments of 1908*. Translation of the original document provided by: Bilkent University, Turkey. <http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~genckaya/documents1.html>

Gülhane Rescript of 1839 were already ‘confirmed and consolidated’. However, there existed the need to establish further mechanisms for their set in practice and adequate functioning. It has been established that the document constituted a response to the need to address the threat of unrest as a consequence of the growing inconformity of the *reaya* to the promulgation of the changes in the system of taxation. Nevertheless, taking into consideration that the reform does not make reference to the threat of foreign intervention,⁶⁶ the reference to the influence of foreign interests in the drafting of the Edict remains an interpretation.⁶⁷ It can be concluded that in the attempt at re-establishing the central authority, both documents in their respective spheres, helped the Ottoman government to consolidate the jurisdiction of the Ottoman state and its legal system.⁶⁸ And that both constituted steps that redefined the relationship between the Imperial core and the Balkan periphery of the Ottoman Empire whose change allowed the emergence of national tension.

In this chapter I will outline the political juncture that surrounded the promulgation of the Gülhane Rescript and the Hatt-i Hamayun. In the forthcoming pages I will show that the promulgation of these two documents led to transformations in the financial and military mechanisms of control that the Ottoman state had established to keep cohesion among its multi-ethnic subjects. These changes caused significant setbacks that affected the status of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects and the institutional structure that sustained

⁶⁶ “The guarantees promised on our part by the Hatt-i Hümayun of Gülhane, and in conformity with the Tanzimat, to all the subjects of my Empire, without distinction of classes or of religion, for the security of their persons and property and the preservation of their honour, are today confirmed and consolidated, and efficacious measures shall be taken in order that they may have their full and entire effect.” See: “Islahat Fermanı Rescript of Reform 18 February 1856” in *Documents 1: Ottoman Reform Documents and the 1876 Constitution and its Amendments of 1908*. Translation of the original document provided by: Bilkent University, Turkey. <http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~genckaya/documents1.html>

⁶⁷ This interpretation has mainly been put forward by Stanford J. Shaw in his work *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II*.

⁶⁸ See: Donald Quataert, “The nineteenth century” in *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 65

the power of the Ottoman Empire. This contextualization will allow me to set the framework to better understand the motivations that led to their promulgation, and from which to analyze the effects of the Tanzimat on the conditions of the Empire's peripheral communities.

3.1 Political context leading to the reforms

Since the late eighteenth century the Ottoman administrative and political system became very corrupted, especially when the sultans, confined to the conveniences and luxury of the palace, ceased to attend to the affairs of the state in person. This situation endangered the core-peripheral relationship between the Ottoman rulers, as core, and the non-Muslim subjects of the Balkan peripheral territories. Consequently, the union that had kept the loyalty of the sultanate and the Muslim communities was widened, and the zeal of the community cooled.⁶⁹ Equally important was the fact that the Janissaries, key elements of the imperial power base, apart from being an instrument used by high officials to threaten the authority of the sultan, became uncontrollable, and facing evident European superiority in the battlefield gradually worthless in war and a menace to the state because of their threat of rebellion.⁷⁰

Since the reign of Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839) reform turned out to be "... a combination of the rooting out of abuses, repression of rival authority in the empire, and westernization."⁷¹ When Mahmut II took power he realized that successful reforms must encompass the entire scope of Ottoman institutions and society. Hence, he was determined to put an end to the arbitrary acts of the local governors, and to restore the rule of the Muslim and state laws. As a response, the Sultan was committed to re-

⁶⁹ Abu-Manneh "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasa", p. 262

⁷⁰ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, p. 16

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25

establish a power base independent of the noblemen that had brought him to power. However, during his reign the power of the ruling class remained in the hands of the leaders of the old institutions. In this situation, the Sultan opted to appoint officials to key positions of power "...creating sufficient power of his own to undermine [the leader's] overall strength and establish[ing] his own supporters in positions of importance."⁷² In the framework of reform, the strength of the army was a decisive factor to save the integrity of the empire. However, the Janissary corps had developed a seriously corrupt behaviour. Therefore, one of the first orders of reform was related to this military body. The order focused on the prohibition to sell positions, on the restoration of the system of promotion of seniority and on the re-establishment of disciplined training of all members of the corps.⁷³ Undermined in their potential power the Janissaries reacted with revolt, while internal opposition and threats of external destabilization were growing.

Gradually, the sultan's domination of the political processes grew. However, this dynamic was interrupted when the effects of the Serbian uprising (1804), which had introduced unsettling elements into the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula, combined with Muhammad Ali's modernization in Egypt. Muhammad Ali, Ottoman viceroy in Egypt since 1805, was also determined to keep control of the province by means of reforms. He created an entirely new army, and a modern administrative system. He replaced the partially autonomous tax farmers with salaried officials under direct control of the state, he secured farm management by appointing members of his own family forming an aristocracy loyal to the dynasty, he approved the creation of secular schools to train men for the new bureaucracy, and he issued law codes to build up the power of the

⁷² Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. II, p. 8

⁷³ *Ibid.* p. 4

bureaucracy. Mahmut was influenced and threatened by the success of the Egyptian governor. However, internal political difficulties and the urgent need to act against foreign enemies and provincial notables limited Mahmut's possibilities to react.⁷⁴ Following the defeat of the First Serbian uprising, Milos Obrenovic, prince of Serbia and leader of the Second Serbian uprising, started "... a slow evolution towards complete autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty..."⁷⁵ Apart from the events in Egypt and Serbia, the Greek claims of independence, which involved all the European powers, also affected the sultan's attempts of control and reform.

The same decree that on June 16, 1826 abolished the Janissary corps, also created the new army that was to replace it in the military hierarchy: the Trained Soldiers of Muhammad (*Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiye*). Later attempts were made on the part of the sultan to parallel the *Mansure* to new Western-style cavalry corps. Reforms were made so that each ethnic group had to fill vacancies in its own ranks having villages providing certain number of horses and men according to their size and wealth in exchange for tax exemptions.⁷⁶ However, further transformations in the army and the irregular corps were hindered by the lack of trained officers.

Mahmut's program for creating a large, modern, European-style army stressed the need for a more efficient bureaucracy, mobilization of resources, and most importantly, a reform on education towards more western style teaching methods to raise suitable army officials and bureaucrats. Mahmut established a new system of military technical education to train Muslim Ottomans as officers. In the end, the reform of the military institution increased the channels of communication with Europe, and unleashed a chain

⁷⁴ Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. II, p. 12

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24

reaction for the creation of other institutions like military engineering and medical schools. However, the threat of foreign intervention sustained by the existence of religious differentiations as suitable opportunities for the European powers to encourage agitation among the non-Muslim communities, narrowed Mahmut's frame for negotiation and action, making it even more difficult to continue the efforts to re-establish centralization.

Nevertheless, Mahmut's reforms brought an imbalance in the economic and financial situation of the Empire. During his reign, only the foundations for the reforms that followed were established. The lack of well-trained and trustworthy personnel to face the military confrontations, the fact that the reform policies lacked a secure social basis, and the difficulties to get rid off the patrimonial system in the government, constituted the main causes for Mahmut's failure to maintain control to consolidate centralizing reforms. The fact that the jurisdiction of old and new institutions was not clearly defined came to be a major problem added to the Empire's internal crisis.

3.2 Proclamation of the reforms

Towards the last years of Mahmut's reign reforms were done slowly because they raised internal opposition, and gave opportunity for foreign intervention. Moreover, Mahmut's reforms were based on the desire to emulate European traditions, which widened the gap between what was needed to re-establish control and stability in the empire, and the lines drawn by the Muslim tradition which suggests that rule of the *sharia* constitutes a prerequisite for justice, therefore of wealth and stability. Thereby, facing this situation and Muhammad Ali's threat to the integrity of the Empire, the Gülhane Rescript of 1839 was proclaimed later at the beginning of Abdulmecid's reign, as a weapon whose attempt was to reconcile the Ottoman subjects with the rule of Muslim law. Besides

acknowledging the relationship between the Empire's prosperity and the adherence to Islamic precepts the document proclaimed the creation of new and westernized institutions to face the Empire's challenges, while it also preserved and cautiously reformed traditional institutions of state.⁷⁷

All the world knows that in the first days of the Ottoman monarchy, the glorious precepts of the Kuran and the laws of the empire were always honoured. The empire in consequence increased in strength and greatness, and all its subjects, without exception, had risen in the highest degree to ease and prosperity... Full of confidence, therefore, in the help of the Most High, and certain of the support of our Prophet, we deem it right to seek by new institutions to give to the provinces composing the Ottoman Empire the benefit of a good administration.⁷⁸

The Rescript's main purpose was to strengthen the integrity of the Empire. Therefore, its main promises were versed around guaranteeing security of life, honour and property of all Muslim and non-Muslim *reaya*, creating an orderly system to make sure that Imperial subjects remain loyal to the Empire and their actions directed to securing the wealth of the state. In this sense, the Rescript proposed to regulate the burden of taxes to guarantee the state's revenues to cover the army's expenses.⁷⁹

The Rescript's major argument, which establishes the need to guarantee the *reaya's* security, is based on the dynamic defined by the Circle of Equity, previously addressed in the second chapter of this thesis, in which it is established that justice brings security, security causes prosperity and prosperity is the prerequisite for loyalty:

If there is an absence of security as to one's fortune, everyone remains insensible to the voice of the Prince and the country; no one interests himself in the progress of public good, absorbed as he is in his own troubles. If, on the contrary, the citizen keeps possession in all confidence of all his goods, then, full of ardour in his affairs, which he

⁷⁷ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, p. 39.

⁷⁸ "Tanzimat Fermanı - The Rescript of Gülhane-Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu, 3 November 1839" *Op. Cit.*

⁷⁹ "As to the regular and fixed assessment of the taxes, it is very important that it be regulated; for the state which is forced to incur many expenses for the defence of its territory cannot obtain the money necessary for its armies and other services except by means of contributions levied on its subjects." See: *Ibidem*.

seeks to enlarge in order to increase his comforts, he feels daily growing and bubbling in his heart not only his love for the Prince and country, but also his devotion to his native land.⁸⁰

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the Rescript attended the need to strengthen the application of the *sharia* facing the political unrest that was evidencing the Empire's weakness.⁸¹ Thus, the document was drafted as an urgent response to the instability that became evident to the imperial statesmen as a result of the Egyptian threat to the Empire's integrity in 1839 and 1840, and as a means to reinforce the centralization of the Empire.

As part of the imperial attempt to preserve the integrity of the Empire, the principle of equality was included in the Gülhane Rescript in 1839. This proclamation was far from being well received because institutional bodies like the *ulema* and the Supreme Council, which recognized the need to provide security to the subjects, were not ready for equality and secularization. On the other hand, "[a]mong the Turkish population an initial reaction which was favourable to the promises of security of life and property, of tax reform and of conscription reform was followed by an opposite reaction directed primarily against the doctrine of equality..."⁸² arguing that this principle disrupted the principle of tolerance contained in Islamic law. Facing this critical situation, the intervention of the powers in the Porte's affairs acquired a more significant role when the threat of Russian expansion became more evident. Since Russia's participation in

⁸⁰ See: "Tanzimat Fermani - The Rescript of Gülhane-Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu, 3 November 1839" *Op. Cit.*

⁸¹ It should be taken into consideration that some debates suggest that the motivations behind the Gülhane Rescript were influenced by the connections between Abdülmecid's Grand Vizier, Mustafa Resid Pasa, and western political systems. In this respect the historian Harry Hearder contends that Reshid Pasa drew up the Gülhane Rescript by emulating what had been established in the western Declarations of the Rights of Man, more specifically the principles of equality, right to individual life, liberty and property. See: Harry Hearder. *Europe in the nineteenth century, 1830-1880*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c1966). However, the historian Butrus Abu-Manneh more effectively concludes that the Rescript was based on the Imperial need to reestablish the rule of the *sharia* to centralize the imperial power and to secure the survival of the Empire. See: Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript"

⁸² Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, p. 43

the Serbian and Greek crisis in the nineteenth century it was clear that the Tsar was determined to get benefits from the Ottoman crisis. Therefore, when religious differences became a focal point in the discussions within the Ottoman government and with the Western powers, Russia's position as leader of the Orthodox faith gave her the means to claim a natural right to defend the Orthodox communities of the Empire, and a reason to legitimize her ambitions of intervention in favour of territorial expansion.

The Russian and Ottoman Empires confronted each other in the Crimean War (1853-1856)⁸³. However, before the Crimean War was settled, sultan Abdülmecid proclaimed the Hatt-i Hamayun, also referred to as Imperial Edict, in February 1856. This document put particular emphasis on the equality of all the Muslim, Christian and Jewish subjects of the Empire, and it referred to the different ways in which the rights and privileges of non-Muslims should be guaranteed.⁸⁴

All the privileges and spiritual immunities granted by my ancestors, and at subsequent dates, to all Christian communities or other non-Muslim persuasions established in my empire under my protection, shall be confirmed and maintained. Every Christian or other non-Muslim community shall be bound, within a fixed period, and with the concurrence of a Commission composed of members of its own body, to proceed, with my high approbation and under the inspection of my Sublime Porte, to examine into its actual immunities and privileges, and to discuss and submit to my Sublime Porte the reforms required by the progress of civilization and of the age.⁸⁵

The declaration of equality gained the Ottoman Empire recognition as part of the Concert of Europe, however, without full equality with the European powers. With the promise of equality, "...the state aimed to win back or retain the loyalty of its Balkan

⁸³ The Crimean War was fought, in 1853-1856, between Russia and an alliance of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, France and Sardinia. The conflict began with a dispute between Russia and France over the control of the Palestinian holy places, which involved Russian discomfort over the privileges granted to Latin churches and the Ottoman negative to satisfy Russian demands. The Ottoman declaration of war followed the Russian occupation of Moldavia and Walachia in 1853. Later Britain, France and Sardinia joined the war. Finally, in 1856 peace negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Paris, which put an end to the war ending the dominant rule of Russia in south-eastern Europe.

⁸⁴ See: Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, p. 3

⁸⁵ See: "Islahat Fermani Rescript of Reform 18 February 1856" *Op. Cit.*

Christian subjects who were being courted by Russia and the Habsburgs and/or separatist movements.”⁸⁶ With this declaration, Sultan Abdülmecid gained some ground to focus on the internal reconstruction for the survival of the Empire.

Stating that the treatment of the non-Muslim communities or the efforts made to satisfy their desires were the only motives of the reform launched by the proclamation of the Hatt-i Hamayun means overlooking the real aim of the transformation that followed the enactment of the Imperial Edict. The changes that took place in the empire after the proclamation comprised areas of military strength, which first needed a stable economic basis, improvement of the educational and administration of justice systems and the reorganization of public administration. After the Edict, the Porte was left alone to focus on its internal matters. Besides, Tanzimat statesmen had to crush national rebellion and to reorganize internal institutions proclaiming reforms in a context ordered by European powers. Therefore, the Ottoman government faced the need to evolve into a more flexible body, so reforms in provincial administration and in the structure of the non-Muslim communities became the main issue to be addressed in parallel to the development of a secular concept of citizenship that left aside religious differences, but stressed allegiance and loyalty to the Imperial government as such.

Although it is fair to say that the Hatt-i Hamayun of 1856 was greatly influenced by the international agenda and the outcomes of the Crimean War, it would be an error to indicate that the making of this document was a response only to the need to balance the interference of the powers on behalf of the religious communities. Considering the unstable internal situation, which worried the Ottoman centre, more than the

⁸⁶ Quataert, *Op. Cit.* p. 67

international pressures, it is clear that the Ottoman government drafted the Hatt-i Hamayun in response to the tensions that were driving the imperial communities away from the loyalty to the imperial core. When the decisions regarding equality and the betterment of the conditions of the minorities were established in the Hatt-i Hamayun, the threat of nationalist disruptions became more latent and the Porte became more preoccupied about losing control of its subjects, mainly the loyalty of the Muslim population. This preoccupation rested, but not deleted, importance to the interference of the Western powers who were looking not for the survival of the Empire, but to stop Russian encroachment in the area.

In Abdülmecid's reign government factions agreed that submission to the Muslim and to the state law were necessary to halt the decline of the state. "The Palace, the old and young bureaucrats ... and the senior *ulema* – were united in their resolve to end the rule of arbitrary and despotic government and to restore the supremacy of [the Muslim and state law] as the best guarantee for a just and virtuous government according to the ideals of orthodox Islam."⁸⁷ Furthermore, the sultan also prompted the objectives of the reforms to be directed to attend the Ottoman public, as opposed to the reforms made during Mahmut's reign which, as mentioned before, were drawn up by top officials in the government and lacked the support of a social base.

It is possible to conclude, that the definition of the Gülhane Rescript and the Hatt-i Hamayun represent different stages of the modernizing mission aimed at rebuilding the social bonds whose purpose was to allow the Ottoman Empire survive with its heterogeneous character. While each of the documents responded to specific political

⁸⁷ Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript", p. 193-194

situations, both shared the aim of regaining control of the imperial internal dynamic. It is undeniable that the breakdowns that the Ottoman government faced in the nineteenth century had consequences over the instruments of sovereignty and the traditional institutions. Therefore, the enactments of both documents constituted responses to the need to recover control of the army, and to rebuild the bonds that had held the empire together. However, this response transformed the traditional mechanisms that had kept Ottoman plural society under control.

Having examined the political junctures that led to the proclamation of the Gulhane Rescript and the Hatt-i Hamayun, in the following chapter I will analyze the most significant changes in the military and treasury institutions. I will also address the response of the non-Muslim subjects to the Tanzimat transformations to draw conclusions on how the conditions of the non-Muslims communities changed from the moment before and after the reform documents were set in practice. This will allow me show the effects of the reforms on the core-peripheral dynamic in the Ottoman Empire, therefore, their impact on the nationalist and autonomy expectations of the non-Muslim Balkan communities.

Chapter 4

The Tanzimat and the local communities

In the previous chapter I contextualized the political junctures that surrounded the enactment of the Gülhane Rescript and the Hatt-i Hamayun in 1839 and 1856. The analysis of these backgrounds provided the landmark for a better understanding of the reform's motivations and consequences on the social and political conditions of Ottoman society in the nineteenth century. It is clear now that the military and territorial turmoil that the Ottoman Empire faced in the first half of the nineteenth century obliged the Ottoman centre to launch the process of modernization that in the course of time, and contrary to its major aim, loosened the institutional mechanisms that had kept Ottoman subjects under control, leading to the outbreak of upheavals in the Empire's periphery.

As described in the second chapter, before the beginning of the period of reform, the Ottoman state had already established institutionalized mechanisms of control, such as the army's recruitment methods and administrative taxation practices that defined the subjects' obligations towards the state in exchange for the promise of protection and of the possibility to acquire a better social position. However, the reforms in the imperial treasury and the military institution affected the functioning of the imperial social dynamic. The changes altered the status of Muslims and non-Muslim communities, they affected the established institutionalized mechanisms that had kept the imperial society under control, and they opened the door for the emergence of ambitions of emancipation and nation-formation.

Therefore, to draw conclusions on how the Tanzimat transformations changed the status of the non-Muslim subjects influencing the development of Balkan upheavals, in this last chapter I will first highlight the most significant changes in the military and treasury institutions, specifically the changes in the system of taxation, and the transformation in the army's recruitment methods. This will allow the analysis of how the conditions of the non-Muslim communities changed from the moment before and after the reform documents were proclaimed and set in practice. Then, using the Vidin (1850) uprising as a case study, I will address the outcomes that resulted from the transformations, namely the responses to the application of the principle of equality before the law in the military stipulations, the reactions to the changes in taxation practices, and to the transformations in the provincial administration.

4.1 Transformations in the Ottoman institutions

The Ottoman failure to observe the civil and Islamic laws allowed the period of crisis that welcomed the reign of sultan Abdülmecid in 1839. In the beginning of his reign, the military institution was still in a period of adjustment, which despite Mahmut's reforms had not been able to secure new sources of manpower and the adequate functioning of the institution. On the other hand, the imperial treasury's activities relied mainly on the tax farming system.⁸⁸ However, over time, the tax farming system allowed local governors to have stronger positions of authority, and in consequence, to abuse their positions of power.

Facing the empowerment of local notables and the consequences of malpractices in the established mechanisms of control, Abdülmecid recognized that to secure the existence

⁸⁸ This system of tax collection was adopted when the government tried to close the gap between state revenue and state expenditure. Through this system "... an individual or partnership paid the state in advance a sum equivalent to the tax revenue from a given source, then made the actual collection themselves (with an extra element of profit built in)..." See: Finkel, *Op. Cit.*, p. 177

and exercise of just laws necessary to provide wealth to sustain the army and the Sultan's power, he needed to improve the administration⁸⁹ to bring the empire back to the path of modernization without setting aside the role of Islamic and civil laws. In this context, Abdülmecid's ministers pointed out three principles to guide the sultan's efforts: the extension of guarantees of life and property, honour and dignity to Muslim and non-Muslim subjects; the fixation of taxes according to the wealth and the possibilities of each subject; and the definition of military service according to the size of each province.⁹⁰ The *ferman*, in which the sultan notified the adoption of the Gülhane, stated that the main aim of the reform was "...to eliminate the general distress caused by malpractices in taxation and to alleviate the tax burden of the populace."⁹¹

As the main concern of the Ottoman state around 1839 was the status of the imperial finances, then, the reformers' main tasks were to encourage the subjects' loyalty to the state, and also to secure sources of revenue by replacing old methods of taxation and abolishing irregular practices on tax collection. Thereby, administrative transformations aimed at achieving a significant increment in state revenues through a more centralized revenue system⁹² that replaced old and irregular methods of taxation and defined new sources of income. Overall, reforms included the elimination of tax farming, of confiscation, the guaranteeing of property rights to individuals, the institution of a public and open court system and the reduction of the service in the army. On the other hand, a major innovation brought by the Gülhane Rescript to the Ottoman political and

⁸⁹ "...we deem it right to seek by new institutions to give to the provinces composing the Ottoman Empire the benefit of a good administration." See: "Tanzimat Fermanı-The Rescript of Gülhane-Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu, 3 November 1839" *Op. Cit.*

⁹⁰ Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman wars 1700-1870: an Empire Besieged*, (Harlow, England: Longman Pearson, 2007), p. 403.

⁹¹ Halil, Inalcik, *Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects*, (Lisse: The Peter de Ridder Press, 1976), p. 22.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

social dynamic was the principle of equality, which established that all new regulations were to be applied to all Ottoman subjects disregarding religious differences:

These imperial concessions shall extend to all our subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be; they shall enjoy them without exception. We therefore grant perfect security to the inhabitants of our empire in their lives, their honour, and their fortunes, as they are secured to them by the sacred text of the law.⁹³

It was expected that through this principle non-Muslim subjects would feel included rather than segregated or oppressed, and, therefore, would abandon their independence ambitions. However, this principle remained a promise and when it combined with old traditions of corruption and administrative misuses, rebellions broke out.

The transformations proposed by the Gülhane Rescript continued the reforms in the military institution that had already begun in the reign of Sultan Selim III, and that by the 1830s were extended to administrative and public institutions.⁹⁴ The reform text recognized the duty of all inhabitants to provide soldiers for the military institution, but most importantly, that the establishment of "...laws to regulate the contingent to be furnished by each locality according to the necessity of the time..."⁹⁵ had become a necessity, as well as the reduction of the military service because driving men away from the agricultural and commercial activities caused severe drawbacks to revenues. It also mentioned that military mobilization had to be regulated to distribute the burden equitably.⁹⁶ In this respect, while the tax farming system was abolished and replaced by having each citizen provide revenues in proportion to his wealth, the term of military

⁹³ "Tanzimat Fermani - The Rescript of Gülhane-Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu, 3 November 1839" *Op. Cit.*

⁹⁴ Halil Inalcik, "Political Modernization in Turkey" in *From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History*, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1995), p. 141

⁹⁵ "Tanzimat Fermani - The Rescript of Gülhane-Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu, 3 November 1839" *Op. Cit.*

⁹⁶ Carter V. Findley, "The Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: The Beginnings of Bureaucratic Reform under Selim III and Mahmud II" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4. (Oct., 1972), p. 447

service was reduced and the institution became a possibility for social mobility that opened its lines to non-Muslim citizens.

For the stability of the Empire the adequate functioning of the treasury and military institutions always came together, this is why taxation and conscription laws were revised to guarantee the provision of justice to enable the existence of wealth, to control the army and to secure the Sultan's power:

As to the regular and fixed assessment of the taxes, it is very important that it be regulated; for the state which is forced to incur many expenses for the defence of its territory cannot obtain the money necessary for its armies and other services except by means of contributions levied on its subjects.⁹⁷

In this respect, the Gülhane Rescript established the creation of a new system of law to regulate taxation and the uses to which the money would be destined. It was established that "...each member of Ottoman society should be taxed for a quota of a fixed tax according to his fortune and means, and that it should be impossible that anything more could be exacted from him."⁹⁸ In the same way special laws were proclaimed to organize and limit the expenses of the land and naval forces. This new system implied the reorganization of the old administrative system and, in consequence, the abolition of the traditional system of taxation.

Together with the abolition of tax farming, the government authorized the establishment of administrative councils, whose members were elected by the people and who were in charge of security issues. This measure gave the population a major voice in local administration, but most importantly a possibility for social mobility. The burden of

⁹⁷ "Tanzimat Fermani - The Rescript of Gülhane-Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu, 3 November 1839" *Op. Cit.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

financial matters was given to officials, who were appointed directly by the centre. In the attempts at introducing a western system of administration, the public service in the provinces was given to salaried civil servants appointed by the central government. These new appointments succeeded in abolishing tax immunities and exemptions, and they were intended to secure fair practices in revenue collection. Consequently, *ayans*, *ulema* and other influential groups, were affected because they no longer benefited from irregular taxation practices. Nevertheless, the shortage of well-trained officials forced the Sultan to count, once more, on local notables for the collection of revenues, and to allow the establishment of secular education, which over the years facilitated the influence of western notions of nationality and citizenship.

With the establishment of local administrative councils the non-Muslim population thought that abuses and bad practices would come to an end, mainly the making of profit on the part of the collectors, unpaid labour and issues related to the poll-tax. However, peripheral non-Muslim populations were still obliged to fulfil forced labour and to pay taxes that had supposedly been abolished. Even after the proclamation to abandon unpaid labour, notables in many parts of the Balkan Ottoman domains treated the *reaya* as personal slaves, forcing them to work on the fields or as providers of personal services without any payment.⁹⁹ For instance, the *cizye* or poll-tax became subject of abuses and misuses. This tax continued to be collected mainly from non-Muslim subjects, so the *reaya* argued that it was contrary to the principle of equality proclaimed in the *Gülhane*. The abolition of the tax would have meant depriving the state of a considerable amount of revenues. Hence, to prevent the state from losing significant incomes, the principle of equality was applied to bring the status of the

⁹⁹ Inalcik, *Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects*, p. 11

Muslim population closer to that of non-Muslims causing unrest for the non-Muslims, who would rather have had the tax disappear, and on the Muslims who were now obliged to pay it.

In the Hatt-i Hamayun, Abdülmecid promised to continue the reinforcement of the transformations in the military and financial institutions; he guaranteed improvements in infrastructure, but most importantly the freedom of religious observance.

As all forms of religion are and shall be freely professed in my dominions, no subject of my Empire shall be hindered in the exercise of the religion that he professes, nor shall be in any way annoyed on this account. No one shall be compelled to change their religion.¹⁰⁰

With this stipulation the sultan enforced the possibilities for members of all creeds to enter the new civil and military schools, or to seek state employment¹⁰¹, and he also paved the way for options of social mobility which affected the exclusivity of Muslims to participate in the affairs of the state.

... the subjects of my Empire, without distinction of nationality, shall be admissible to public employments, and qualified to fill them according to their capacity and merit, and conformably with rules to be generally applied. All the subjects of my Empire, without distinction, shall be received into the Civil and Military Schools of the Government if they otherwise satisfy the conditions as to age and examination which are specified in the organic regulations of the said schools.¹⁰²

However, this measure rather than increasing the loyalty of the local leaders towards the Ottoman centre, as was expected, allowed more room for independent ambitions and strengthened the bonds of the leaders to their ethnic communities. Therefore, rather than

¹⁰⁰ See: "Islahat Fermani Rescript of Reform 18 February 1856" *Op. Cit.*

¹⁰¹ Finkel, *Op. Cit.* p. 458

¹⁰² See: "Islahat Fermani Rescript of Reform 18 February 1856" *Op. Cit.*

becoming closer to the Ottoman state, local leaders and peripheral subjects became more freely identified as members of a particular ethnic group.

In the Hatt-i Hamayun, the principle of equality was extended to military stipulations. In this period, with the shortening in the provision of manpower after the losses of the Crimean War, it became necessary to restructure the methods of conscription. As a result, non-Muslims were given the opportunity to be included in the fighting forces.

...Christian subjects and those of other non-Muslim sects, as it has been already decided, shall, as well as Muslims, be subject to the obligations of the Law of Recruitment... A complete law shall be published, with as little delay as possible, respecting the admission into and service in the army of Christian and other non-Muslim subjects.¹⁰³

However, after the war neither Muslims nor non-Muslims agreed to being forced to serve in the army. Hence, it was authorized that individuals would be permitted to send a substitute in their place: “The principle of obtaining substitutes, or of purchasing exemption, shall be admitted.”¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, the poll tax continued to be levied but under a different status: as an exemption tax which relieved non-Muslims from military service.

Transformations on military stipulations loosened the rigid structure of the military as the most significant institutional pillar of the Empire. This was possible because changes in the methods of conscription opened the door for non-Muslims to occupy positions in the state’s administration, and at the same time it restrained the guarantee of securing the presence of functionaries loyal to the authority of the Sultan. However, the abolition of tax farming was equally important as a radical measure adopted in the early

¹⁰³ See: “Islahat Fermani Rescript of Reform 18 February 1856” *Op. Cit.*.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

Tanzimat. This can be said, because with the disappearance of this practice local notables and officials realized that their irregular practices had been cut off, besides, as a consequence of taxation on the basis of financial position, *ayans* and notables were forced to pay more taxes. Thus, besides losing a greater percentage of their personal revenues and wealth, they were deprived of the benefits they got from forced labour and other customary practices. In this context, opposition on the part of local notables developed, their loyalty was broken, and their efforts were destined to restrain the course of the Imperial reforms. This situation, which strengthened the power and influence of non-Muslim local leaders, eventually led to the consolidation of mobilizations that ended in upheavals throughout the empire.

4.2 Reform's impact on the local communities: the Vidin uprising (1850)

Transformations in taxation, provincial administration and the military institution caused major setbacks in the status of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, and in the institutional structure that sustained the Empire. First, due to the principle of equality non-Muslims were given an opportunity for social mobility. With this, the state lost the loyalty of first class subjects and faced the introduction of westernized and secularized views to the Ottoman administration that reduced the strength of mechanisms of control based on religious distinctions.

Second, responses to the principle of equality reflected increased inconformity on the part of the imperial subjects. Applying the principle in a way that the changes encouraged transformations to the status of non-Muslims would have meant the loss of significant military and financial revenues for the state. This is the reason why the principle was applied in a way that Muslims' compromises were brought closer to the obligations of non-Muslims, not the other way around. Therefore, Muslim subjects'

inconformity arose when their status was defined in more equal terms to that of non-Muslim, and when due to its application the power of Muslim elites was reduced. Non-Muslims reacted because the principle remained a promise and it was not applied in the exercise of new practices of taxation and administrative regulations.

Third, the loss of privileges because of the changes in provincial administration caused unrest and dissatisfaction on the part of local notables and members of the *ulema*. The abolition of tax farming, the appointment of officials and the creation of administrative councils, considerably reduced the benefits that local notables and *ulema* gained from the exercise of irregular practices. However, these appointments also evidenced serious weaknesses in the Ottoman reformation plans when the lack of well-trained functionaries restrained the development of a bureaucracy loyal to the centre. The shortage of qualified functionaries forced the centre to rely once more on local leaders to secure administrative reforms. In some cases, this repositioning of local leaders allowed not only the return to practices of corruption and financial abuses, but also the growing inconformity of the tax-paying *reaya*, who were again forced to pay obligations that had, in theory, being abolished. In many cases these local officials who were again given power became the leaders of the nationalist movements that set the ground for the national upheavals.

This situation is clearly visible in Vidin, where the government of villages was entrusted to local Muslim notables, who were engaged in irregular practices that secured their own wealth in detriment to the *reaya* who where obliged to pay taxes to the local authorities in addition to the taxes for the central government. After the abolition of forced labour was proclaimed in the Gülhane Rescript, the *reaya* "... refused to render

any of the services demanded by the [notables] as compensation for their land rent payments.”¹⁰⁵ Tension grew especially when the Council of Vidin, whose authority on local matters was recognized in the reforms, protested to Istanbul’s reiteration on the abolition of unpaid labour. The council replied “... by saying that every citizen was the free owner and absolute master of his lands and properties, and no one was entitled to use land that belonged to somebody else except with just compensation.”¹⁰⁶ Istanbul left the matter to be arranged between the two parties involved and local notables managed to handle the new regulations to their own benefit.

In consequence, the strengthening of local elites provided the conditions for the empowerment of leaders who initiated campaigns in favour of Ottoman reforms to hinder the power of Muslim notables.

...Christian leaders in [the Balkan periphery] were determined to extend the meaning of the reforms to give their endeavour the character of a nationalistic movement in close ranks with peasantry, the rising urban bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia, since the elimination of the Muslim landlord[s] would have been beneficial to all three of these groups.¹⁰⁷

These actions, instead of reconsolidating loyalty to the Ottoman state, encouraged the definition of ethnic distinctions that served as platforms for the development of national projects of emancipation. Overtime the growing inconformity of the *reaya*, whose ethnic consciousness grew, was manifested in rebellions that jeopardized the core’s influence and power on the periphery.

The rebellion in Vidin in 1850 shows how the early Tanzimat reforms awakened social reactions. In the region, the proclamation of the adoption of the principle of equal

¹⁰⁵ Inalcik, *Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects*, p. 32

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 33

taxation (taxes measured according to the individual's wealth), the abolition of the tax system and the ending of forced labour was presented to both Muslim and non-Muslim notables. However, after the proclamation of the taxation reforms the worsening of the relationship between the non-Muslim peasants and the Muslim landholders, as well as the problems derived from the abuses in the system of taxation became the main causes for uprisings.¹⁰⁸ According to the official declaration presented to the population:

... no exemption was to be given from [taxes] either to Muslim subjects of the area or to those otherwise privileged; taxes from the [*reaya*] were to be collected by the *knezes* (chiefs) of their villages; no extra dues were to be collected in the future; government officials were not to collect any remunerations for themselves from the peasant population, whether in cash or in sustenance; furthermore, the [farm magistrates] were to be removed from the villages; only the rural policemen...were to remain, and they were to cover their personal expenses from their own pay.¹⁰⁹

Peasants were clearly satisfied with this declaration, as they thought it meant the ending of abuses and of the heavy tax burden they bore. However, unrest arose when the *reaya's* condition did not improve, and abuses from Muslim notables continued. The *reaya's* "...open resistance clearly demonstrated that [they] were determined to stand against any further government abuses, particularly in tax matters, and had decided to seek their rights by all available means."¹¹⁰ In the end, the fact that these uprisings could extend to the rest of the Empire threatened the stability of the Ottoman state.

In sum, the reforms that were set in practice in the military and treasury institutions after the proclamation of the Gülhane Rescript and the Hatt-i Hamayun brought structural changes that altered the order of society and intensified social differentiations allowing the politicization of ethnic differences. Within these structural transformations

¹⁰⁸ Inalcik, *Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects*, pp. 30-31

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 29

“...the individual’s social position began to coincide [more] with its membership in the [ethnic] community”¹¹¹ rather than with its religious faith. Therefore, “[t]he social, ethnic, and religious cohesion of the Ottoman society [was transformed], and the social balance was upset”¹¹² when the changes of the early Tanzimat set the conditions for the consolidation of ideas of group identity which were based on ethnic elements. These same ideas framed the political demands of the peripheral communities when the transformations in the structures of power allowed their expression and consolidation.

It is possible to conclude that reforms in the military and financial institutions caused significant changes in the dynamic of what made the Ottoman society work: the Circle of Equity. After reforms in the military and fiscal stipulations were set in practice, this mechanism, whose adequate functioning had sustained the Empire, became dysfunctional.¹¹³ In the framework of the relationship between a sovereign authority, whose power is based on the existence of a strong army that depends on the wealth provided by the collection of revenues from a prosperous *reaya*, whose prosperity depends on the exercise of just laws, it is clear that the functioning of the military and treasury institutions are linked. The strength of the first one relies on the success of the second and vice versa. In the same way the weakness of the military institution is also a reflex of the inadequate functioning of the provision of revenues. Therefore, all parts involved in the dynamic of the circle are related. Thus, the weakening of the military, as a result of the disappearance of loyalty bonds due to the inclusion of non-Muslims in its lines, and the weakening of the imperial treasury due to the restitution of local leaders

¹¹¹ Kemal Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: from Social Estates to Classes, from Millets to Nation*,. Research Monograph no. 39, (Princeton, N.J.: Center for International Studies, 1973), p. 113

¹¹² Vucinich, *Op. Cit.*, p. 601

¹¹³ Barbara Jelavitch, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, Vol. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. x.

who once more abused their positions of power and used their privileges to secure benefits for themselves or for their ethnic groups, caused the disruption of the platform of Imperial stability.

In any case, the main topic behind the resistance movements in the peripheral territories of the Ottoman Empire was the application of the new principles in the taxation and military systems.¹¹⁴ For centuries the Balkan territories in the Ottoman periphery remained a large bastion inhabited by many communities differentiated by religion more than by ethnicity. For decades, problems related to areas of influence or the gaining of benefits in state compromises had been kept under the scope and control of Ottoman institutions. However, due to the institutional changes in the Ottoman state, the differences grew and together with the ambitions of the religious communities became politicized. The politicization of nationality and ethnicity, together with secularized and westernized concepts of citizenship and state, gave opportunity for external European intervention on behalf of the different communities in the area, and placed the issue of equality on the political agenda. Therefore, it can be established that the early Tanzimat reforms impacted Ottoman social structures in the status and authority of Muslim leaders in the peripheral administrative outposts, and of local non-Muslim leaders who became aware of their role within the Empire for the completion of the reform project. This awareness led also to the awakening of national consciousness which found expression in the series of reactions that as a result of the reforms took place throughout the Ottoman Empire.

¹¹⁴ Inalcik, *Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects*, p. 33

Conclusion

In the thesis I studied the reforms that were adopted in the military and treasury institutions of the Ottoman Empire in 1839 and 1856 to analyze the impact of early Tanzimat transformations on the development of Balkan upheavals. This study aimed at understanding how these changes modified the institutional bonds that for centuries sustained the Ottoman as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. My claim is that the changes in the military and treasury institutions adopted with the promulgations of the Gülhane Rescript of 1839 and the Hatti-Hamayun of 1856 altered the dynamic that sustained the coexistence of multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups because they weakened the mechanisms of control of the Empire's military, and treasury institutions.

In this work, I focused on the imposition of reforms in the military and administrative institutions, arguing that they redefined the relationship between the ruling class and the *reaya* providing the conditions for the non-Muslim communities to strengthen the debate over nationalist sentiments. After analyzing historiographical approaches to the definitions and objectives of the Tanzimat, and the reform documents of 1839 and 1856, it can be established that the period implied a transformation of practices, which entailed reforms in the status of Muslim and non-Muslims before the state and the law, and of reforms in financial, judicial and political matters. In its early period the Tanzimat attempted to re-establish the treasury and army instruments of control to face challenging domestic political contexts. Among other changes, the reforms adopted provided opportunities for social mobility as they opened the door for the development of a new bureaucracy less loyal to the sultan than before; and they modified the position of non-Muslim subjects in the Ottoman state. In time this turned out to be the immediate antecedent of the consolidation of the nationalist sentiments that strengthened as a result

of the weakening of the imperial structures and institutions of power because it contributed to alter the structures that held the Empire together. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the early stages of the Tanzimat period (1839 and 1856) emphasized the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, giving the non-Muslim communities the possibility to define nationalist projects to achieve ambitions of self-determination. These reforms were drafted to retake control of the imperial subjects and to recover the position of the sultan as ultimate authority. However, as a secondary effect they opened the door for the empowerment of local leaders, which later became the leaders of the peripheral non-Muslim communities' national movements.

From the examination of the institutional organization that framed Ottoman society it is possible to conclude that within the Ottoman social dynamic, the existence of methods of control related to guaranteeing loyalty of the imperial subjects and their allegiance to the imperial rules was essential to maintain the balance between the mainly Muslim core and the non-Muslim peripheral communities. And that the institutionalization of mechanisms of control was a key instrument for the Ottoman centre, useful not only to restrain the imperial subjects, but to build bonds to secure social cohesion and loyalty to the sultan as ultimate authority.

However, the differentiations in the policies and requirements that Muslim and non-Muslims had to attend fomented the growth of the ethnic disparities after the enactment of the reforms in the nineteenth century. This happened especially when the non-fulfilment of the promises of social mobility and of the ending of abuses on the part of local leaders nourished the development of emancipation ambitions that transformed the imperial social dynamic, threatening the Empire's survival. The multi-ethnic and multi-

religious character of the Ottoman society was maintained through mechanisms of political and social administration, which despite all efforts was not able to confront the crisis that affected the structural pillars of the Empire. In consequence, the Ottoman state made transformations that had an impact on the relationship between the Sultans as embodiment of authority and ultimate rule, the ruling class as sustain of that authority, and the subject population as social basis in which to exert the sultan's power.

The relationship between the sultan, as ultimate authority, and the subject class, as the main provider of resources, was based on a mutual agreement by which the Ottoman centre guaranteed protection and certain autonomy as long as the subjects fulfilled fiscal obligations to sustain the Empire's finances and military power. This relationship worked within the framework of the Circle of Equity¹¹⁵, which helps understand that the stability of the Empire was based on a tributary compromise between rulers and subjects on the basis of religious differentiations over ethnic distinctions. Equally important for this relationship was the institutionalization of mechanisms of control, which allowed differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in a system that permitted the centre to control an administrative network to govern the periphery. However, after the reforms, institutional changes not only accentuated, but also politicized the social differentiations that had always been present between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects in the Ottoman Empire. This occurred also because the restitution of local non-Muslim leaders to fulfil the tasks of the new administration reinstalled the political power of peripheral notables, granting them possibilities to acquire a better economic position, and to recognize that they were key tools for the Empire to keep cohesion and loyalty of the peripheral

¹¹⁵ In this thesis see: Chapter 1 Section: 1.2; Chapter 2 Section 2.1

subjects. This strengthened the platform from which they could demand a more equitable role in the Empire's political and economic issues.

According to the Circle of Equity, the basis of the political organization and of the administrative practices in the Ottoman Empire was the production of wealth to sustain the ruler, the state and the maintenance of justice. In this dynamic, tax payments and military conscription regulations constituted the departure principles of the relationship between the sultan's power, and the guarantee of justice and wealth. Muslim and non-Muslim communities were indeed united by their loyalty to the sultan; however, they played different roles within the imperial administrative and military institutions. For instance, before the proclamation of freedom of religion, which opened the possibility for non-Muslims to enter civil service and to occupy high rank governmental positions, differences were clearly established. In that framework, non-Muslim localities in the imperial periphery were under the rule and authority of a Muslim majority that from the centre established mechanisms to keep them under control and surveillance. Therefore, it is argued that communities in the Ottoman Empire before being ethnically differentiated, they were more identified with their religious differences.¹¹⁶ These differences allowed the later ethnic segmentation that benefited Muslims in detriment to non-Muslims. This demonstrates that for the imperial government until the second half of the nineteenth century distinctions on the basis of ethnicity were not as important as distinctions on the basis of religion.

The guarantee of justice, the rule of Islamic law and the existence of efficient administrative mechanisms were the support of the power of the Ottoman Empire in its

¹¹⁶ Fatma Muge Gocek, "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Society" in *Poetics Today*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Cultural Processes in Muslim and Arab Societies: Modern Period I, (Autumn, 1993), p. 514

domains. Therefore, to keep the imperial subjects together above their religious differences, the Ottoman state constructed an order based on the institutionalization of methods of control that guaranteed on the one hand financial resources and, on the other, human assets to sustain imperial power. However, the structural and institutional reforms that were set in practice after the proclamation of the Gülhane Rescript and the Hatt-i Hamayun transformed the relations between the Ottoman rulers and the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. The changes in the military and treasury institutions, which aimed to guarantee the survival of the empire, had a direct impact in the relations between the ruling class and the *reaya*. This impact had repercussions on the relationship between the elites of the Ottoman centre and the elites of the peripheral communities, whose role changed from intermediaries to leaders of the nationalist movements that saw in the changing imperial conditions the framework to consolidate their emancipation projects.

During the Tanzimat, modernization supplanted religious subordination and sought to discipline the plural peripheries. In the same way, it propelled the adoption of new policies regarding military conscription, organization of the army, reorganization of the finance system, tax collection, and the promise of legal equality for the subjects. Therefore, the opportunities of social mobility, which opened after reforms in the traditional institutions of power, changed the organization of Ottoman society. With the application of the principle of equality ethnic distinctions became more important than religious differentiations, which became no longer useful to define socio-economic status and political influence. The opening of military and administrative lines to non-Muslims allowed differentiations on the basis of ethnicity. This contributed to the rupture of loyalty bonds within the ruling class, and in many cases, it permitted the

restitution and empowerment of local leaders, which brought back abuses to administrative practices.

The analysis of the political situation at the beginning of the nineteenth century showed that the weakening of the army and administrative irregularities created a vacuum of power that permitted the accentuation of the differences that existed between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects; and between both groups as periphery in relation to the Ottoman government as imperial core. Those differences, apart from destabilizing the Empire's institutional organization, provided the reasons with which Western Powers were able to legitimize their intervention in favour of their own political ambitions.

In the end, despite the efforts, the process of modernization separated the dynastic from the ethnic components and generated national tension. This occurred because, as shown in this thesis, reforms weakened the military and administrative institutions breaking up loyalty bonds and cohesive agreements between the Ottoman plural societies. In the long run, this fomented nationalist sentiments, which were inflamed by the fact that the heterogeneous imperial society was no longer united by a common Ottoman identity, but rather divided by the possibility of achieving political and territorial emancipation.

Finally, the impact of the Tanzimat reforms in the local communities in the Balkan periphery of the Ottoman Empire is only one of the aspects that need to be addressed to analyze the growth of tension between the different groups. To have a clearer picture one must take into consideration national and international political junctures, the influence of westernized notions for nation-building processes, the growing awareness of ethnic distinctions, and the always present geopolitical interests of the foreign powers in the Balkan Peninsula. This issues open gaps for further analyses.

Bibliography

Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century" in *Die Welt des Islams*, New Ser., Bd. 22, Nr. 1/4. (1982), p. 1-36.

Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasa" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Aug., 1990), pp. 257-274.

Abu-Manneh, Butrus. "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript" in *Die Welt des Islams*, New Ser., Vol. 34, Issue 2. (Nov., 1994) pp. 173-203.

Adanir, Fikret and Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottomans and the Balkans: a discussion of historiography*. Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2002.

Aksan, Virginia H. *Ottoman wars 1700-1870 : an Empire Besieged*. Harlow, England: Longman/Pearson, 2007.

Al-Qattan, Najwa. "Dhimmi in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Aug., 1999) pp. 429-444

Davison, Roderic H. "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century" in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 59, No. 4. (Jul., 1954), p. 844-864

Davison, Roderic H. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*. New York, Gordian Press, 1973, c1963.

Deringil, Selim. "Conversion and Citizenship; avoiding the 'Imperial Headache'." (Course reading and notes)

Findley, Carter V. "The Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: The Beginnings of Bureaucratic Reform under Selim III and Mahmud II" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4. (Oct., 1972), pp. 388-416.

Finkel, Caroline. *Osman's Dream: the story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923*. London: John Murray, 2005.

Gerolymatos, Andre. *The Balkan Wars Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Greene, Molly. *Minorities in the Ottoman Empire*. Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005.

Hall, Richard. *Balkan Wars 1912-1913 Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Header, Harry. *Europe in the nineteenth century, 1830-1880*. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c1966.

Howe Lybyer, Albert. *The government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent*. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966.

Inalcik, Halil. "Ottoman Methods of Conquest" in *Studia Islamica*, No. 2 (1954), p. 103-129.

Inalcik, Halil. *The Ottoman Empire: the classical age, 1300-1600*. London: Phoenix, 1994, c1973.

Inalcik, Halil. *Application of the Tanzimat and its social effects*. Lisse, The Peter de Ridder Press, 1976.

Inalcik, Halil. *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: essays on economy and society*. Bloomington, Indiana University Turkish Studies, c1993.

Inalcik, Halil. "Political Modernization in Turkey" in *From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History*. Istanbul: Isis Press, 1995.

Inalcik, Halil. *From empire to republic: essays on Ottoman and Turkish social history*. Istanbul, Isis Press, 1995.

Inalcik, Halil. *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 1st ed. 1943, 2nd ed. Istanbul: Eren, 1992. (Course notes and translation by Professor Selim Deringil).

Inalcik, Halil. *Essays in Ottoman history*. Beyoğlu, İstanbul, Eren, 1998.

Itzkowitz Norman. *Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities*, in *Studia Islamica*, No. 16. (1962), pp. 73-94.

Jelavitch, Barbara. *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. Vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Kafadar, Cemal. *Between two worlds: the construction of the Ottoman state*. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1995.

Kappeler, Andreas. *Imperial Core and Elites of the Peripheries in the Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman Empires*. (Conference paper.)

Karpat, Kemal. *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: from Social Estates to Classes, from Millets to Nation*. Research Monograph no. 39, Princeton, N.J.: Centre for International Studies, 1973.

Kennan, George F. *The Other Balkan Wars: a 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1993.

Keyder, Caglar. "The Ottoman Empire" in *After empire: multiethnic societies and nation-building : the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires /* edited by Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 30-44

Kunt, Metin. "Transformation of Zimmi into Askeri" in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman empire : the functioning of a plural society* / edited by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis. New York, Holmes & Meier, c1982.

M.L. Bush, *Servitude in Modern Times*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

Mazower, Mark. *The Balkans. A Short History*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000.

Meriage, Lawrence P. "The First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813) and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Eastern Question" in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3. (Sep., 1978), pp. 421-439.

Miller, Alexei. *The Value and the Limits of a Comparative Approach to the History of Contiguous Empires*.

Motyl, Alexander. "Thinking About Empire" in *After empire: multiethnic societies and nation-building: the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* / edited by Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1997.

Motyl, Alexander. "Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective" in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2. (Jan., 1999), pp. 127-145

Muge Gocek, Fatma. "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Society" in *Poetics Today*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Cultural Processes in Muslim and Arab Societies: Modern Period I, (Autumn, 1993), pp. 507-538.

Murphey, Rhoads. "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice during the Late Seventeenth Century" in *Poetics Today*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Cultural Processes in Muslim and Arab Societies: Medieval and Early Modern Periods, (Summer, 1993), pp. 419-443.

Nezir Akmese, Handan. *The birth of modern Turkey: the Ottoman military and the march to World War I*. New York: I.B. Tauris, New York, 2005.

Quataert, Donald. "The nineteenth century" in *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 54-73.

Reid, James J. *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: prelude to collapse 1839-1878*. Stuttgart, F. Steiner, 2000.

Sencer, Emre. "Balkan Nationalism in the Ottoman Parliament, 1909" *East European Quarterly* XXXVIII no 1 March 2004.

Shaw, Stanford J. "The Aims and Achievements of Ottoman Rule in the Balkans" in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 21, No. 4, (Dec., 1962), pp. 617-622.

Shaw, Stanford J. "The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-I Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III" in *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 37, No. 3, (Sep., 1965), pp. 291-306.

Shaw, Stanford J. "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Oct., 1975), p. 421

Shaw, Stanford J. "The Population of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, (May, 1979), pp. 265-277.

Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. I: Empire of the Gazis; Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II: Reform, Revolution and Republic; The Rise of Modern Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Shinder, Joel. "Early Ottoman Administration in the Wilderness: Some Limits on Comparison" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4. (Nov., 1978), pp. 497-517.

Sonyel, Salahi R. *Minorities and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire*. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1993.

Stavrianos, L.S. *The Balkans since 1453*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Company, 1958.

Vucinich, Wayne S. "The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule" in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 21, No. 4, (Dec., 1962), pp. 597-616.

Wittek, Paul. "Devshirme and Sharia" in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. 17, No. 2, (1955), pp. 271-278.

Wittek, Paul. *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*. London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1965.

Zürcher, Erik J. *Turkey a Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1994.