DECLARATION

I hereby declare that no parts of the thesis have been submitted to no other institution different from CEU towards a degree. To my knowledge nor does the thesis contains unreferenced material or ideas from other authors.

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EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS IN INTRASTATE ETHNIC CONFLICTS: UNILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL ACTIONS

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Executive summary

The dissertation presents an analysis of successes and failures of foreign interventions in intrastate ethnic wars. The main novelty of the dissertation is in considering successes of third party actions not by durable peace established in a target country but by actual fulfillment of intervention goals and aims. The main working hypothesis of the dissertation is that multilateral interventions are more likely to achieve success in the pursuit of their goals than unilateral actions.

For this purpose the dissertation distinguishes between unilateral and multilateral interventions and studies them in two different directions. First, the large-N regression analysis of 107 cases of foreign interventions in ethnic conflicts studies the effect of the main independent variable – composition of the interveners – on their ability to achieve the goals of their interventions. Second, small-N in-depth studies of the interventions in Chad, Georgia, Somalia and Rwanda, as selected on the basis of quantitative analysis, help find additional aspects salient to third party successes.

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Table of contents

List of tables

The history of humankind is marked by constant struggle for existence, or conflicts. A conflict situation, which can be viewed as a need for transformation from one state of affairs to another notwithstanding the nature of the conflict actors, should not be necessarily considered *a priori* a negative phenomenon. Conflicts have always been one of the principal driving forces for human evolution, contributing to development of peoples' thoughts, their ideas on reality, and their perceptions of the contemporary world.

Intra-state conflicts and the means of resolution have been a topic of scholarly interest for quite a considerable time. Some scholars concentrate on the courses of conflicts and define conditions for the victory exclusively concentrating on domestic players[1] and the endogenous nature of belligerents.[2] Others theorize about the third party roles in overcoming intra-national security dilemmas.[3] Academicians are concerned with the study of the effects of composition of third party interventions in the matter of conflict resolution,[4] successes or failures of negotiations,[5] the rules of the resolution process and the roles of post-conflict institutions in conflict management.[6] Scholars study the ways in which civil wars ended,[7] and factors, both domestic and international, associated with civil wars.[8]

The last decade of the 20th century and end of the Cold War, which shaped the relations within the international system of states for almost half a century, was marked by acceleration of ethnic clashes within state territories. In the words of Alexander George, the post-Cold War period "has created a new geopolitical environment and has spawned many new types of internal

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[1] Mack, A, (1975). Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict, *World Politics*, 27(2), 175-200.

[2] Areguin-Toft, I. (2001). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, *International Security,* 26(1), 93-128.

[3] Snyder, J. and Jarvis, R. (1999). Civil War and the Security Dilemma. In B. Walter and J. Snyder (eds.), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (pp. 17-37). New York: Columbia University Press.

[4] Regan, P.M. (1996). Conditions of Successful Third-party Interventions in Intrastate Conflicts, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(2), 336-359.

[5] Walter, B.F. (1997). The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement, *International Organization*, 51(3), 335-364.

[6] Hartzell, C.A. (1999). Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(1), 3-22.

[7] Licklider, R. (1995). The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wards, 1945-1993, *The American Political Science Review*, 89(3), 681-690.

[8] Henderson, E.A. and Singer D.J. (2000). Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92, *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3), 275-299.

conflicts. Such internal conflicts within states… vastly outnumbered the more conventional types of war between states".[9]

The end of the Cold War together with the positive processes of overall democratization of the world brought forth proliferation of severe and zero-sum civil wars. At this point, the ideological identity of conflicting groups was replaced or layered with religious and/or ethnic ones. Ethnicity and nationalism became key distinguishing features of groups representing country populations.

Important insights to the problem of successful resolution are contained in the character of participants of the process itself. In essence, conflicts may end as a result of actions of the belligerents alone, or with participation of a third party. Although the conflicting parties themselves can, in principle, reach solutions to the disputes, outside influence may play a crucial role in shaping the course of events from the viewpoint of aggravating or mitigating domestic problems and contracting or extending the duration of conflict actions. Actors in conflicts do not engage in conflicting actions in a complete vacuum: any process significant enough to change one particular setting would inevitably have a "butterfly effect" on its surroundings.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 The Puzzle

The choice of the topic of this dissertation was based on an important empirical puzzle of the current literature on conflict resolution and intervention. Often outside efforts directed to ending conflicts become counterproductive. Interventions may either not end the conflict at all or provide temporal termination of hostilities, which are susceptible to resumption in a short time-span. Similarly, a ceasefire achieved through intervention may merely grant additional time to the belligerents during which they can marshal their forces for resumption of hostilities in future.

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[9] George A. (2000). Strategies for Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Scholarship for Policymaking, *Political Science and Politics*, 33(1), 15.

The problem is the incorrect usage of the proxy for success of third party interventions: longevity of peace cannot be taken as a measure of considered success when peace was not its major objective.

At the same time, there is a moral issue behind this reasoning. It is a universal truism that peace is better than war, which leads to tremendous human suffering. However, if we assume that "success" of third party actions measured through long-lasting peace occurring after interventions, is good per se, and their "failure", measured by resumption of hostilities after a certain time period is bad per se, then the natural question would be how this peace, or a good state of affairs, was established in first place, and for whom was this state of affairs good? What if in order to reach long-lasting peace one side had to completely eliminate the other one, and received assistance from a third party in this endeavor?

Hence the way to solve this puzzle of measurement is to not assume that success equals peace, but, rather, to measure success of third party actions via *actual fulfillment of their intervention goals*.

A number of scholars have used de facto peace as a criterion for judgment about success of third party actions. For Patrick M. Regan, "success" of conflict resolution is an actual cease-fire agreement between the sides[10] lasting for the period of at least six months. Another measure of settlement stability is given by Licklider and Caroline Hartzell, who equate successful intervention with de facto peace for at least five years.[11]

This approach of using durable peace as the main proxy of the dependent variable of success is wide-spread in current conflict resolution scholarship. However, when the matter concerns the real agendas of interveners and what they indeed wanted to achieve when intervening, this approach is inadequate. We may have conflicts where a third party directed its support to an ethnic group (with or without some sort of kinship links), which had eventually lost

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[10] Regan, P.M. (1998). Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts, *The Journal of Politics*, 60(3), 754-779.
[11] Hartzell, C.A. (1999). Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(1), 14 and Licklider, R. (1995). The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wards, 1945-1993, *The American Political Science Review*, 89(3), 682.

the war to another group, thus bringing a conflict to its logical end from the realist point of view and restoration of peace in a target country. At the same time, we have conflicts where interveners were not concerned with resolution of conflicts at all, but rather wanted to exercise influence over the target country; they may have even been interested in further prolongation of hostilities.

Thus, consideration of duration of peace as the main dependent variable gives us a distorted understanding of the phenomenon of intervention. Years of ceasefire as an indicator of settlement may, of course, be considered a proxy for success of intervention in cases where conflict settlement was indeed the aim of interveners. The wide array goals and aspirations of third parties, the actors that are intervening, the roles they play on international and regional arenas, interactions they have with other actors, composition of interveners themselves and nature of the conflicting parties make attempts to measure conflict resolution by a single constant parameter undesirable.

In order to solve this empirical and theoretical difficulty, I go beyond the standard definition of success and consider outside actions successful *if the interveners managed to reach their intervention agendas and goals.*

This "intervention puzzle" can be unveiled by consideration of the effects of the composition of the intervention forces on the resolution process, where the likelihood of interventions' success directly depends on who the third parties are. Intervention can be *unilateral*, i.e. undertaken by the leadership and being composed of one foreign state; or *multilateral*, undertaken by the leadership and being composed of more than one foreign state. Since the focus of the dissertation is on both the participants on the intra-national ethnic conflicts and their outcomes, the general aim is to find out whether or not the composition of the third parties plays a crucial role in the success of the intervention, and, if yes, under what conditions these interventions result in success.

1.2 The Question

My inquiry into the field of outside interventions is divided into two interconnected questions. To start with, it is important to define the linkage between the interveners and conflicts outcomes. Hence, the first sub-task of the dissertation is to answer the following question: *Do the outcomes of third party interventions in intrastate ethnic violence depend on the composition of third party intervention?*

At the same time, it is important to mention that the third party actions may not be the sole determinant of conflict outcomes: conflicts differ much in their geographic locations, compositions of the belligerents, domestic power games, and interests of neighboring countries. Country-specific and intervention-specific variables influence the outcomes of third party actions. Therefore, after answering the first question I concentrate on identifying the factors that have a demonstrable intervening effect on the success of the intervention.

The second sub-task of the research is, therefore, to answer the question of *what are the conditions for successful conflict resolution apart from third-party interventions.* This way I am able to define causal factors, which, together with the outside interventions, either contribute to successful completion of interventions tasks or present obstacles to the realization of their goals.

1.3 Working hypothesis

The main problem of viewing third party actions from the perspective of peaceful conflict resolution is the diversity of aims and goals. We cannot attribute the role of a mediator of peace agreement or an arbiter and an outside guarantors of peaceful settlements, as Walter argues,[12] to a third party whose objectives are not to safeguard peace but, rather, to help one ethnic group win over another with no further commitment for long-lasting peace. However, commitment remains the theoretical basis for success of third party actions, but in this sense it is not the commitment to bring and keep peace to a target country.

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[12] Walter, B.F. (1997). The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement, *International Organization*, 51(3), 335-364.

13

The commitment of interveners that will be explored in my research is divided into two parts: *the commitment to the self* (in this case I mean the commitment of a third party to carry on its actions, to act decisively, the will with which it wants reach the goals it had defined), and *the commitment to the other* (to punish or reward the belligerents with the purpose of making them obey its actions).

Of course, the third parties' commitment and the trust the third parties have from the warring sides may (and, in many cases will) include their wish to keep peace, but this is in no way the only goal the interveners may pursue. The question of intervention success, as viewed by the "new institutionalism" literature, would be based on a number of factors, or independent variables, out of which my variable of interest is third party composition. Composition of external interventions may play an important, if indecisive, role in the success of intervention and the degree of their commitments.

I start this research by developing the working hypothesis of success of third party actions based on their composition features. I transfer Regans' and Licklider's hypothesis of success of third party actions in conflict resolution to the issue of success of third parties in reaching their intervention objectives and claim that *ceteris paribus, multilateral interventions are more likely to be successful in reaching their agendas as goals in violent ethnic conflicts than unilateral interventions.*

My hypothesis is based on a number of assumptions about third party interventions, which will guide the research and serve as a starting point for development of a credible commitment theory of intervention success based on composition of the interveners. The underlying difference in the variation of success of external interventions lies in the very nature of composition of third parties (unilateral versus multilateral) and the ways they are perceived by belligerents.

First, irrespective of the recipients of external support – be they the target or the challenger, according to Carment and Harvey, conflict "settlements… require the stamp of

institutional legitimacy upon which long-term measures depend".[13] In order to be sustainable, both secession and integration of the challenger require legal frameworks, which would institutionalize the conflict outcomes. In this case, multilateral intervention provides the *institutionalized legitimacy* of more than one party to the outcomes of conflict.

The second assumption underlying the intervention hypothesis is its *impartiality* of action, which goes against Walter's "biasness" as a predictor of success. Functional impartiality minimizes the incentives for defecting from the ceasefire by the belligerents, and increases their level of their credibility in the eyes of the conflicting parties. The warring sides clearly know that, if they disarm or demobilize, the intervener will not impose a victory on either side. Of course, the participating states may have their own interests and stakes in the outcome of the intervention. However, in multilateral coalitions, the self-interests of member-states are "neutralized" by the presence of other states: functional impartiality of intervention balances the interests of the different states of which it is composed.

On the contrary, when states intervene unilaterally, the guarantees they offer to conflict participants in relation to outcomes are shaped in accordance with their interests and stance toward the different groups, which negatively influences the level of credibility of the third-party guarantors.

The third assumption supporting the hypothesis is the *shared operational bias* of the multilateral intervention. In ethnic wars, when sometimes the best possible outcome for one side is the worst possible outcome for the other, in the words of Carment and Rowlands, "[m]utually preferable settlements are unattainable because large, well-armed groups are aware that they can make greater gains by holding out and support provided to one side will be opposed by the

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[13] Carment, D. and Harvey, F. (2001). *Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence*: *An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence*, Westport, Connecticut, London: Preager Studies on Ethnic and National Identities in Politics, Praeger, 129.

other".[14] From this point of view, what distinguishes multilateral interventions is their common biased in actions bias in actions.

The fourth assumption is that there is a *higher degree of transparency* of multilateral interventions in comparison with the unilateral ones. Once an intervener becomes a major player in an intra-national conflict, it can easily hide from the international public what is taking place on the ground and influence public opinion through using different tools, access of mass media being one.[15] Hence, its actions are more clandestine and may include undercover operations, supplies of arms and unregulated economic support.

When such an intervention is conducted by more than one state, and, ideally, according to Regan, under "the leadership of international command… [it] entails the active placement of personnel on the ground [which] are not involved in supplies/re-supplies of arms".[16] Furthermore, multilateral "troops are not engaged in partisan combat but play a neutral role in preventing an outbreak or spread of fighting".[17] Transparency of actions and intentions builds up the credibility of the interveners and makes the threat of use of force and promises of rewards more effective. Transparency of actions contributes to decrease of uncertainty of the belligerents in the moves that the intervener may undertake, leading to decrease of fear and, subsequently, mitigation of domestic security dilemma.

In sum, at this stage my working hypothesis is that multilateral interventions are more likely to succeed in fulfillment of their goals: they offer higher degree of commitment both to the members of coalitions (to themselves) and the belligerents (to others); their actions are based on institutionalized framework; their actions are more transparent and impartial than those of solitary interveners; and share joint bias in operations.

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[14] Carment, D. and Rowlands, D. (1998). Three's Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention In Intrastate Conflict, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(5), 580.
[15] Actions of Russia in the Abkhazian and Ossetian conflicts have been clandestine not only for the Georgian population but also for its domestic constituents.
[16] Regan, P.M. (2002). *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers – Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*. University of Michigan Press, 102.
[17] Ibid.

In order to define factors contributing to the success of third party actions, I first consider the traditional approach to the study of ethnic conflicts that view intervention success in terms of the interveners' ability to bring peace to a target country. I will do this by studying the factors contributing to conflict resolution from two levels of conflicts: *endogenous* (the nature and interaction between the sub-systemic units of the action-system; causes of conflict and how the hostilities actually ended; duration and casualties of hostilities) and *exogenous* (the influence of other actors and/or its sub-systemic units on the course of conflicts).

Both these approaches have the aim of studying the effects of various independent variables on durability of peaceful settlements. I will then concentrate on combination of the two levels from the viewpoint of the interveners and see what strategies help them achieve their goals.

1.4 Endogenous level of conflict resolution

At first glance, on the endogenous level it seems that due to the nature of belligerents and relationships between them, peace in identity conflicts might be harder to maintain than the conflicts involving ideological grounds for separation of sub-systemic units. Scholars of conflict management have diverse opinions on this issue: the analyses done by Roy Licklider[18] and Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis[19] revealed that ethnic and religious identity wars had higher likelihood of resumption than other conflicts. However, these conclusions were not supported by the research of Dubey[20] and Caroline Hartzel et al., who found no significant difference between the nature of participants of conflicts and successful mediation.[21]

The rate of casualties was found to play an important role in successful conflict resolution, according to Dubey and Doyle and Sambanis: the bloodier the conflict the higher the likelihood of its resumption. In simple terms, this means that the more people are killed on both sides the more the belligerents want to avenge the death of their kin, which leads to prolongation of conflicts. At the same time, when it comes to the majority/minority conflict, a higher death toll means a comparative advantage for the majority, which can absorb higher losses on the battlefield.

The studies of Collier and Hoeffler,[22] Elbadawi and Sambanis,[23] Dubey,[24] Michael Ross,[25] and Doyle and Sambanis[26] argue that domestic capacities are important in sustaining war-related activities of the belligerents. Dependence on natural resources, or "lootables" (oil, gas, minerals, gold, diamonds, as well as other income-related variables, such as sea access and transit roads) were also strong predictors for lasting peace settlements. There is a general agreement in the literature that if the belligerents possess substantial resources for military activities, the conflicts will last longer and will be more difficult to solve.

As to whether conflicts are most effectively settled through a negotiated settlement or a decisive military victory,, Harrison Wagner concluded that lasting peace is more likely to be achieved in case of military victory of the stronger side, which is usually the majority. If operational and functional capabilities of the weaker side, or the minority, are destroyed, the latter would not be able to launch the next offensive.[27] According to Wagner's theory, military victory of one side means that "an opposition will have great difficulty in starting a civil war…. A negotiated settlement to a civil war is likely to result in veto groups that will not surrender power to social change whose impact on them is uncertain; but a military victory will destroy the

[22] Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2000). Greed and Grievance in Civil War, *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2355.*
[23] Elbadawi, I. and Sambanis N. (2001). How Much War Will We See? Estimating the Incidence of Civil War in 161 Countries. *World Bank Research Working Paper.*
[24] Dubey A. (2002). Op.cit.
[25] Ross, M. (2006). Mineral Wealth and Equitable Development, *Equity and Development*, World Bank Development Report, Background Papers.
[26] Doyle, M.W. and Sambanis, N. (2000). Op.cit. PP. 779-802.
[27] Licklider, R. (1995). Op.cit. P. 685.

power of such groups, making renewed conflict more difficult and allowing the government to act as it pleases".[28]

Thus, the fact of a decisive military victory assures the winner that the loser will not resume hostilities due to annihilation of the military power of the latter. Under such conditions the duration of peace can be quite high: even if the loser tries to restore its fighting potential, the winner is likely to do the same, so it would be still more optimal for the winner to maintain its military advantage over the former gained as a result of the achieved victory.

A ceasefire is also possible under stalemate where, as Barbara Walter noted, "neither combatant is able to make noteworthy advances on the battlefield due to the strength of the opposing side, and neither side believes that the situation will improve in the near future".[29] However, from the point of view of sustainable resolution and mutual assuredness of the warring parties in durability of ceasefire alone, this may be considered worse-case scenario: while the parties may have exhausted their military capacities as a result of the conflict, as Walter stated, they are still aware of each other's potential, which, in principle, can be used at any time. In fact, stalemates may offer a needed respite to the belligerents during which they can marshal their resources for renewed hostilities.

The third option for ending conflicts is negotiated settlements, which may be more conducive to lasting peace. This can be achieved by the belligerents themselves by agreeing to commit themselves to maintain the peace. Quantitative analysis of Doyle and Sambanis indicated that the agreements signed by the belligerents show "…the parties' will to end the violence phase of their conflict…[T]reaties enable international involvement in the forms of loans, foreign aid, transfers of goods and services, and the deployment of peace operations".[30]

When agreements are reached by the conflicting parties, the outcome of the resolution is based on cooperative efforts of the parties exclusively, which, according to David Bloomfield,

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[28] Ibid.
[29] Walter, B.F. (1997). Op.cit. P. 347.
[30] Doyle, M.W. and Sambanis, N. (2000). Op.cit. PP. 779-802.

"…solve the conflict… by jointly finding their own integrative solution, thereby becoming their own guarantors of the agreement".[31] This need for cooperation between the belligerents in the process of conflict termination is also stressed by Caroline Hartzell, who claims that "…to qualify as a negotiated settlement the antagonists themselves had to participate in the bargaining process and agree to any concessions, compromises, or substantive agreements".[32]

1.5 Exogenous level of conflict resolution

On the exogenous level we have the participation of outside actors and their implications on durability of settlements. Current scholarship mostly focuses on viewing actual and lasting peace as a proxy for third party success in ethnic civil wars. These scholars are interested in identifying the factors that contribute to durability of peace reached as a result of third party interventions. One scholar of conflict intervention, Virginia Page Fortna, found a number of variables that affect de-facto peaceful settlements.

According to her, the resolution of identity conflicts may be harder to maintain than in ideological confrontations, thus supporting Kaufman's argument on the difficulty of solution of ethnic wars, as ethnic identities represent "harder" and "the hardest" cases of identities respectfully since they include such characteristics, as "language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one can change".[33]

Her statistic analysis of conflicts in the period between 1944 and 1997 found a substantive degree of stability (almost 70%) of peaceful settlements after deployment of international peacekeepers. With intervention success measured as the risk of peace failing in a particular time period, she argued that "[t]raditional [UN] peacekeeping missions and observer missions have been the most successful, reducing the risk of war by about 86% and 81%,

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[31] Bloomfield, D. (1995). Towards Complementarity in Conflict Management: Resolution and Settlement in Northern Ireland, *Journal of Peace Research*, 32(2), 152.
[32] Hartzell, C.A. (1999). Op.cit. P. 13.
[33] Kaufman, C. (1997). Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil War. In Brown, M. et al. (eds.) *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, (p. 270). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

respectively".[34] In general, according to her, interventions followed by peacekeeper missions reduced the risk of resumption of conflicts by more than a half. Fortna concludes her analysis of sustainability of de-facto peace with the statement that non-UN missions have a larger effect on the duration of peace than UN involvement.

The outcome of conflicts is also important for the duration of peace. Fortna demonstrates consistency with Wagners' argument that there is a higher degree of stability in post-conflict settings after a decisive victory of one side. The victory would help third parties save their resources and would decrease the chances for renewed hostilities organized by the losing side. Economic development of target countries was found to play an important role in the matter of conflict resolution: Fortna argues that peace is easier to keep in economically developed countries. Finally, the peace is more likely to last in longer and less deadly wars.

Doyle & Sambanis, in general, support Fortna's observations concerning the longevity of peace. For them, identity wars and higher degree of casualties negatively influence international peacekeeping efforts to stop violence. Apart from them, multiple domestic players and dependence of belligerents on natural resources make interventions less effective. However, contrary to Fortna and Wagner, Doyle & Sambanis note the significance of negotiated agreements to durability of peace.

An important part of their analysis relates to multilateral interventions, especially those conducted under the UN aegis. In general, Doyle & Sambanis claim that "international enforcement can help solve commitment and cooperation problems by imposing order or by directly implementing peace agreements or raising the costs of defection from them".[35] As for UN interventions, they noted that although it "…signals international interest in ending the conflict and offers needed assistance to the parties",[36] such actions should be backed by major international actors, both operationally and functionally.

[34] Fortna, V.P. (2004). Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War, *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(283).
[35] Doyle, M.W. and Sambanis, N. (2000). Op.cit. P. 781.
[36] Ibid., 785.

21

In concluding their analysis, Doyle & Sambanis state that diplomatic efforts and mediation of multinational institutions is insufficient for preventing violent conflict: the more vigorous actions embodied in multidimensional peace-keeping operations have higher probability of success. From the point of view of both de-facto and de-jure peace, Doyle & Sambanis stated that multidimensional involvement would "contribute both to reduced violence…and…institutional and political reform, elections, and democratization".[37]

According to Diehl et al., there are a number of plausible aspects of UN involvement in settling intra-national conflicts: in contrast to unilateral action, which "tends to favor one side or the other in the conflict", the UN is neutral, which means that it fosters "a solution that meets the interests of the disputants as well as the international community". Thus, by its multilateral character, UN intervention ensures consideration of interests of major actors in the international arena. In addition, UN offices provide a "better guarantee than unilateral…action that the interests [e.g. major powers or other states in the same geographic area] will be respected".[38]

De-facto peace as the dependent variable of third party interventions was also used in Regan's analysis of resolution of intra-national conflicts. Specifically in relation to the composition of intervention force, Regan noted that there is a higher probability of success for multilateral interventions than unilateral actions, due to the neutrality of the former. Neutrality of intervention associated with the concepts of goals, compositions and activities of intervening forces leads the warring sides to accept external involvement.

For Regan cost-and-benefit analysis is central to both the decision to intervene and its subsequent efficiency. On the one hand, decision-makers of the intervener make their calculations of interventions, and if the benefits are higher than the costs, they decide to intervene. At the same time, interventions also alter cost calculations of the belligerents by "either making the actual cost of fighting prohibitively high or by making the benefits of not

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[37] Ibid., 791.
[38] Diehl, P.F., Reifschneider, J. and Hensel, P.R. (1996). UN Intervention and Recurrent Conflict, *International Organization*, 50(4), 687-688.

fighting actually attractive. The successful intervention will result then from a cost-benefit calculation by the antagonists that leads to not fighting providing the highest expected outcome".[39]

We should also note that apart from perceived benefits, intervention may also have a negative side, quite frequently connected with high costs of participation. According to Carment & Rowlands, the costs of external involvement are differentiated by the following two types: the costs undertaken by interveners themselves and the costs associated with the solutions imposed by third parties: "All strategies involve risk to the intervener. Doing nothing may precipitate undesirable outcomes. Forceful intervention may lead to further escalation and unnecessary costs for the intervener".[40] Besides, inadequate intervention (for instance, low-intervention in high-risk environment) may turn out to be even more costly for the intervener and, eventually, for the belligerents.

With regard to the downsides of multilateral interventions, from a purely operational prospective it is time-consuming to form a coalition of "likeminded states", which would represent the interests of all the conflicting parties. Even if such unity can be forged,[41] it is still not an easy task to come to an agreement as to how to act jointly: states-members of international coalitions face domestic opposition to their participation in an intervention, thus producing Putnam's "Janus-faced" model of "two-level games".[42]

The more state actors are involved, the more the chances of free-riding or escaping from responsibility: when both successes and failures will be shared among the members of intervention coalition, the cases of voluntary and involuntary defections[43] are quite frequent. Also, the state-participants of multilateral initiatives would have their domestic interest actors and veto-groups, which may be in opposition to the ruling regime of their own governments and

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[39] Regan, P.M. (2002). Op.cit. P. 73.
[40] Carment, D. and Rowlands, D. (1998). Op.cit. P. 576.
[41] Some possible examples could be the UN, European Union, NATO, OAU and CIS.
[42] Putnam, R.D. (1998). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Game, *International Organization*, 42(3), 427-460.
[43] Ibid.

oppose international involvement of their country from considerations of domestic power balance.

Thus, Diehl et al. have quite strong reservations concerning the role of UN in conflict resolution: first, capacities of UN and its political will as an organization are limited and employed "only after [disputes] have passed some high threshold of severity". Second, UN "tends to be quick to leave": due to limited resources, it has limited objectives, and, once hostilities are over, the UN presence ends. A final objection to UN involvement is that it offers artificial solutions: while conflicts may end in a number of ways, including decisive victory of one side, UN "actions may halt that process and lead to an impasse that only delays, rather than prevents the renewal of hostilities".[44]

Other critics of UN as a "weak conflict manager" include Carment and Hill, according to whom unilateral and biased interventions are more operationally successful than UN interventions. Their analysis concludes that, being indirectly affected by intra-national conflicts,[45] "regional organizations perform favorably in stopping the violence when compared with both individual states and the UN".[46]

1.6 Security dilemma and credible commitment theory

On the whole, there is no unified approach either to the role of the composition of intervention forces that influence the durability of peace or how the nature of the interveners affects the end-state of conflicts. While for some scholars neutrality of interveners contributes to their success in the matter of resolving conflicts, for others individual interests of third parties make them more decisive in their actions, which brings them better results.

When combined with Johan Galtung's conflict resolution theory, impartial third party presence contributes to building peace through its institutional functionalism and sanctions:

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[44] Diehl, P.F., Reifschneider, J. and Hensel, P.R. (1996). Op.cit. P. 688.
[45] For example, due to flow of refugees, political instability, close economic ties with a country with internal conflict
[46] Carment, D. and Harvey, F. (2001). Op.cit. P. 129.

"[t]he more functional an institution [of conflict resolution], and the more functions it satisfies and the better, the more easily will it be institutionalized".[47] An essential element of such institutionalization is enforceability of the sanctions: the more the belligerents fear the sanctions (in this case externally imposed), the more they will trust that the opponents would have exactly same fears and expectations from the punitive force of the sanctions.

Another element, which was not directly mentioned by Galtung, but which follows from his argument, and is especially applicable in intra-national ethnic wars, is the factor of *trust* of belligerents to the institutional set-up that ends hostilities. Trust, which by definition of Edward Lawler et al, means "an expectation that another will cooperate in a mixed-motive situation",[48] essentially signifies the belief that a party would not be abused or treated unfairly by the institution and by others, and that the others would neither cheat the institution, nor, as a consequence, this group.

Through trusting the institutional arrangements for conflict resolution, the belligerents will eventually trust each other's fears and expectations. Finally, trust builds up *credibility* of the resolution framework. Conflicting parties would more likely accept specific arrangements under the institutional settings which they trust for their credible threats and punishment.

Fear and trust to the third party actions are an inherent part of the *credible commitment theory* of third party interventions, which originates in "agent-principal" theories of economics. In the banking sector, for example, central banks commit themselves through banking supervision mechanisms to guarantee that in cases of insolvency of commercial banks, according to Maximilian Hall, the depositors "receive adequate compensation and the system is insulated from the damage wrought by the ensuing contagion".[49] This way central banks act as third parties in the relationships between the depositors, as principals, and the commercial banks, as

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[47] Galtung, J. (1965). Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm, *Journal of Peace Research*, 2(4), 372.
[48] Lawler, E.J., Ford, R., Large, M.D. (1999). Unilateral Initiatives as a Conflict Resolution Strategy, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62(3), 242.
[49] Hall, M.J.H. (1989). *Handbook of Banking Regulation and Supervision*, New York and London: Woodhead Faulkner, 75.

agents, protecting the interests of the former and, in a broader sense, the stability of the banking system as a whole.

Similarly, insurance markets are founded on the commitment of insurance agencies that they will honor the insurance claims made by their clients. Such markets also rely on the commitment of clients that they will not cheat the insurance companies. The central concept of the credible commitment is trust, i.e. in the words of Anderson et al, "a belief that the counterpart will behave "equitably" (in a manner that is "fair" or which respects the interests of the trusting party)".[50]

The credible commitment theory of ethnic conflict was developed by James D. Fearon in relation to escalation of ethnic tensions between majority and minority and was subsequently applied by Barbara Walter to the external guarantors in civil wars. In multi-ethnic states, where, according to Kaufman, there are "ethnically defined grievances, negative stereotypes, demographic threats, histories of ethnic domination, emotion-laden ethnic symbols, reciprocal fears of group extinction, de facto political anarchy, and the political space and military means to act",[51] ethnic groups need strong guarantees from state institutions against abuses of their interests.

State authorities have to act as guarantors of peace in the relations between two or more ethnic groups. Under the conditions of sub-state anarchy when state institutions are either absent or not acting properly, conditions are ripe for an ethnic security dilemma – a situation in which each party's efforts to increase its own security reduces others' security and, consequently, its own. This may ultimately lead to interethnic violence.

An intrastate security dilemma arises, according to Fearon, "when two groups find themselves without a third party that can credibly guarantee agreements between them… [and]

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[50] Anderson, E., Ross, W.T. Jr., and Weitz, B. (1996). Commitment and Its Consequences, *American Agency System of Selling Insurance*, INSEAD working paper, 96/42/MKT, 7.
[51] Kaufman, C. (1996). Op.cit. P. 175.

ethnic majorities are unable to commit themselves not to exploit ethnic minorities".[52] History, usually precipitated with negative episodes of ethnic interactions, is revived, fables and myths of former glory are put in new contexts, and other groups are depicted as evil. Without close interactions on state level and guarantees given by the state, groups gradually begin to distrust each other's intentions in future interethnic interactions.

This uncertainty contributes to mutual fears of predatory intentions. Under such circumstances, minorities usually fear that they would be tyrannized by the majorities, which are usually stronger and which enjoy overwhelming presence in state apparatus, including law-enforcement agencies and the military. Minorities fear that majorities may use their advantage to oppress the former by gaining their wealth and, eventually, their territory. At the same time, majorities fear that the minorities might find suitable moments, or "windows of opportunity", when the former cannot effectively control the situation, and resort to nationalistic expressions leading them to break away from their former state.

Thus, without their interests and rights effectively safeguarded by state authorities, according to Fearon, a minority living in an anarchic state may at some point be faced with the dilemma whether to fight for a better life or continue living as before – in the same state. Majorities, at the same time, have their own myths and history and may also fear that minorities will rise against their rule. Much depends on how credibly the majority commits itself not to suppress the minority and offer its share of the country's benefits, and how credibly the minority commits to stay within the state.

The majority may, of course, use the overwhelming advantage in human capital, resources, technical factors, and, more importantly, military strength, to crush the minority completely in order to avoid any future upheavals. Such a scenario would confirm Wagner's expectation that military victory yields a higher probability of peace because it offers credible guarantees to at least one side of the conflict. However, the majority may have fears that its

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[52] Fearon, J.D. (1998). Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict. In: D.A. Lake and D. Rotchild, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict* (p. 108). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

comparative advantage is not enough to guarantee quick and bloodless (for its subjects) victory over the minority, or it may be aware of negative international reverberation its actions may cause in case of "ethnic cleansing" of the minorities.

In this case, the majority may consider it more effective to resort to peaceful means of regulating the conflict situation by offering institutionalized guarantees to minorities, which may include a wide array of commitment arrangements safeguarding, or at least appeasing, the minority and preventing conflict. If the minority remains dissatisfied with its condition after the first round of "commitment negotiations", it may decide to confront the majority. However, as Fearon noted, it "would be more difficult for the minority to secede after the majority has consolidated its control of the new state and begun to build-up the police, army and security apparatus".[53]

What Fearon omits to mention, but which is an important aspect in effective conflict resolution, is that even if concessions made by the belligerents have high degree of credibility through costly signaling, such steps may still be devoid of trust due to the power distribution between the ethnic groups, the ways in which the concessions are made, and the nature and status of interethnic relationships.

This process was discussed by Lawler et al from the point of view of power distribution and nature of concession-making. They found, inter alia, that the balance of power matters greatly in success of the initiatives made by a conflicting party with the purpose of stopping the confrontation. According to them, the highest level of efficiency can be achieved when the power of belligerents is relatively equal, which may be the case in inter-national relations: "[u]nder equal power, each party perceives the other as relatively strong and fears retaliation if it uses its power capability. Thus the parties expect cooperation from one another that is structurally based trust".[54] Equal powers develop a similar mentality and respect for each other:

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[53] Ibid.
[54] Lawler, E.J., Ford, R., and Large, M.D. (1999). Op.cit. P. 243.

neither of the parties in such settings fears that it would lose in case of starting or resuming war, which increases the chances for lasting peace.

On the contrary, when the power distribution is unequal, which is quite frequently the case in intra-national relationship between the minority and majority, Lawler's theory states that "…the higher-power party perceives the lower-power party as weaker, the lower-power party is likely to regard the higher-power party with suspicion".[55] Peaceful initiatives, even made with good intentions, in fact, decrease mutual trust: the majorities would not trust that the readiness of the minorities to stop a confrontation and accept their concessions and would view them as buying time for a renewed conflict. Similarly, the minorities would not trust the majorities either, because concessions are irrational to make from a position of power.

Thus, even though both parties make concessions that depict their true intentions, which should build mutual trust, due to inequality in distribution of power capabilities, or due to the fact that one side to the conflict is the majority and the other is the minority, these concessions are not credible commitments of peaceful intent. At the same time, in ethnic conflicts, as Kaufman correctly noted, once atrocities have reached "the point when cross-ethnic political appeals are unlikely to be made…, [and] victory can be assured only by physical control over the territory in dispute",[56] it is difficult for the belligerents to offer mutually credible guarantees not only for the short-term non-resumption of war, but also long-lasting peace.

1.7 Credible commitment of third parties

What follows from this argument is that the credible commitment problem exists by definition between the minority and majority in a state of regime transition, and its level, or severity, is in direct connection with the status of the minority/majority relations. A key feature of Fearon's commitment problem theory is its focus on domestic variables, assuming that the

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[55] Ibid..
[56] Kaufman, C. (1997). Op.cit. P. 266.

commitment problem can be solved by belligerents themselves without the participation of external actors. Although he suggests that "the commitment problem can be eliminated if there is some powerful third party willing and able to commit to intervene if the minority does not respect political commitments to the minority", he is doubtful that this will be possible: "due to the costs and character of ethnic wars, international organizations will rarely be able to make such commitments credible".[57]

The role of an external guarantor in mitigating interethnic security dilemmas and ending ethnic civil wars from the viewpoint of credible commitment theory is discussed at length by Barbara Walter. According to her, the "[t]hird-party… can change the level of fear and insecurity that accompanies treaty implementation and thus facilitate settlement,…can guarantee that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept".[58] In essence, third party involvement alters cost calculations of the conflicting parties for the continuation of war and conveys the message to the belligerents that "the payoffs from cheating on a civil war agreement no longer exceed the payoffs from faithfully executing its terms. Once cheating becomes difficult and costly, promises to cooperate gain credibility and cooperation becomes likely".[59]

In order to be credible, according to Walter, the commitment of an outside intervener should satisfy three conditions: the third party must be a biased intervener with its own stakes in solving the conflict; it "must be willing to use force if necessary, and its military capabilities must be sufficient to punish whichever side violates the treaty;… [and] an intervener state should be able to signal resolve".[60]

The problem with Walter's approach to external guarantors of domestic peace is that she focuses only on the phenomenon of intervention per se and does not make distinction between types of interveners. Since the dissertation aims at defining conditions that favor sustainability of

[57]Fearon, J.D. (1998). Op.cit. P. 123.

[58] Walter, B.F. (1997). Op.cit. P. 340.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

peace settlements of intra-national ethnic conflicts through institutionalization of conflict resolution outcomes under third party intervention, it is necessary to have complex view of the role of outside actors, which includes not only the types, but also the composition, of the participants of interventions.

Under the conditions of substate security dilemma, outside interveners can serve two roles: the first being a *mediator* with no vested interest in particular outcome of conflict. In the words of Galtung, such interventions may "direct… antagonists towards the mutual acceptance of some point in the compatibility region. The task is not to decide on that point, only to indicate it, and serve as debate regulator so as to make the contestants better aware of the structure of the goal-space." [61] The guarantee of success of the intervention is given by the impartiality of the third party: that it will not impose any sort of solution that might be detrimental to the interests of one side and beneficial to the other. The third party may facilitate the negotiation process by offering "good offices",[62] funding meetings, and providing other relevant technical support.

The other role of a third party is of an *arbiter*, a principal decision-maker and guardian of a negotiated agreement, even if neither party agrees with its decision. Here a third party not only offers solution to the conflicting parties but also enforces it through creation of necessary conditions for its acceptance and commits itself to distribute future wealth, and, sometimes, appoints the winner. This can be done either with or without self-interests of the third party, which, according to Bloomfield, "…can quite legitimately employ its own resources to bribe or threaten the disputing parties into agreement".[63]

An important aspect of interventions mentioned by Galtung is that, although the parties may or may not submit to arbitration voluntarily, "in either case they may agree to the solution only if they accept or have to agree".[64] The guarantee of success of intervention is the commitment of a third party: even if one side is dissatisfied by the outcome of conflict imposed

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[61] Galtung, J. (1965). Op.cit. P. 360.
[62] An example of usage of good offices of UN can be the Geneva Process between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides.
[63] Bloomfield, D. (1995). Op.cit. PP. 152-153.
[64] Galtung, J. (1965). Op.cit. P. 360.

by the interveners, third parties can, according to Snyder and Jarvis, still "…establish a hegemon by helping one side to win or by imposing direct rule by outsiders."[65]

Here a third party resolves the problem of domestic anarchy by providing external security to the belligerents and credibly committing itself to punish any "defector" of the ceasefire. By supplying correct information about actions of the conflicting parties, controlling arms, safeguarding agreements, and offering credible "carrots and sticks" to ethnic groups, outside interveners can greatly reduce mutual fears and uncertainties, which are the basis of security dilemmas.

The problems with the current literature on third party intervention are twofold. On the empirical level, studies investigating the causes of intervention success are fatally flawed by the fallibility of their measures. Even if we observe peace following an intervention, we cannot conclude that the intervention was successful if it did not have peace as its aim. The fact that different studies of intervention success yield different conclusions shows that the approach to measuring effects of third party interventions should be revised.

At the same time, there are problems with isolating the independent effects of different variables on the end-results of interventions. There are many factors that cannot be controlled for due to immense differences among conflicts. A conflict may last longer because of the effect of dependence of the groups on "lootable" resources that allow them to carry on military activities, as well as initial high level of hostilities that keep the memories of human suffering vital and prevent people from finding ways of reconciliation.

On the theoretical level, theories of ethnic conflict that rely on the security dilemma or credible commitment do not tell us anything about the effects of the composition of third parties on these dynamics.[66] These theories neglect not only the peculiarities of the countries that

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[65] Snyder, J. and Jarvis, R. (1999). Civil War and the Security Dilemma. In B. Walter and J. Snyder (eds.), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention.* (p. 27.). New York: Columbia University Press.
[66] Although Walter's work on interveners as external providers of stability goes beyond Fearon's negating of the third party's role in providing external commitment, she still does not differentiate on the basis of composition of external actors.

contain the conflicts, but also the effects that different types of interventions have on these struggles. The work of these scholars suffers from a homogenizing approach.

1.8 Research design

The goals of this thesis are threefold: first, by applying a durability approach to intervention success, I build on approaches that take the goals of the interveners seriously in assessing their success. Second, I aim at finding out whether the factor of composition of third parties – unilateral or multilateral – plays a role in intervention success. And, finally, I re-conceptualize the existing theoretical approach to credible commitment of third parties by bringing in the binary nature of their composition and developing a theory of third party success.

I divide my research into three parts: first, I run a large-N statistical regression analysis of success of third party interventions in intrastate ethnic violence. By doing the regression, I establish a correlation between the types of third party interventions (unilateral and multilateral as my independent variable) and success of their actions (my dependent variable).

Next, I conduct in-depth case studies from different regions involving different participants, including the belligerents and interveners. I select the cases from the results of the large-N analysis. Since the purpose of the case studies is to identify conditions that facilitate the success of third party interventions, I select these cases on the basis of variations of extreme values of independent and dependent variables. Applying the Method of Structured and Focused Comparison developed by Alexander George[67] to case studies, the research will identify causal factors that, together with the facts of third party presence, assist interveners in establishing the credible commitment necessary to achieving intervention success.

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[67] George, A. (1979). Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison. In Paul G. Lauren (Ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy* (pp. 43-68). New York: Free Press, 1979).

Finally, upon completing the case studies, I use the results to tease out the theoretical implications of third party interventions and to construct a credible commitment model that can be used to good effect by external interveners in resolving violent conflict.

CHAPTER 2: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SUCCESS OF INTERVENTIONS

2.1 The dataset

On the basis of the hypothesis which argues for the success of multilateral interventions, I have two goals that I aim to achieve through quantitative analysis of cases of intervention. First, I identify the impact of multilateral versus unilateral composition of the interventions on the success of their intervention agendas. Second, I study additional factors that either contribute to success of interventions or impede fulfillment of intervention agendas. In essence, by conducting quantitative research I will test the degree of efficiency of multilateral versus unilateral interventions vis-à-vis their actual outcomes, identifying causal factors that determine their success or failure in reaching their target agendas.

In selecting the cases, I consulted a number of existing databases on intrastate armed conflict. It is important to mention that all of them contained durability of peace as the dependent variable. Therefore, I had to recode this variable to capture whether the interveners reached their objectives. On the basis of several qualitative case studies, I have created my own intervention dataset that uses fulfillment of intervention objectives as the dependent variable.

Since I do not focus on the conflicts per se and the question of successful resolution, I abandon the time-restricted criterion of the available datasets, which measured success of interventions by the number of years that passed after the end of hostilities. With the purpose of finding intervention agendas of third parties and how these agendas correspond to the actual outcomes of the interventions, I have consulted the following independent sources on intrastate ethnic violence:

- The "Correlates of War 3" dataset includes 35 ethnic conflicts from 1946 to 1997. The number of cases is quite small due to restrictive approach to the definition of ethnic conflict employed by COW, particularly the threshold of 1000 casualties per year and a five-year period from the moment of secession of hostilities. (available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/)

- Patrick Regan at Binghamton University had created another dataset – "Intervention Data", which uses less stringent criteria for conflicts – at least 600 casualties, and a six-month period from the end of warfare. (see http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~pregan/replicationdata.html for the replication data).

- Database of the Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS) research project of the International Social Science Council (administered through the Center for International Studies and the Department of International Relations at the University of Southern California) for some of conflicts (information on 20 cases of conflicts is available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/html_pages/conflictdatabase.htm)

- Uppsala University Conflict Data Program includes a number of datasets among which the most important for the purposes of my research were the dataset on Armed Conflict (developed together with the PRIO), which includes conflicts from 1946 to 2006; Conflict Termination Dataset – from 1946-2005 (these and other datasets are deposited at project's website: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm)

- Case-studies produced by the "Beyond Intractability Project Version II" (an online "encyclopedia" with almost 400 topics explaining the dynamics which determine the course of conflict; available at http://www.beyondintractability.org/)

- Essays and surveys of the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (an NGO promoting effective conflict prevention and peace-building strategies, available at http://www.conflict-prevention.net/).

- "Conflict Histories" data and "CrisisWatch" searchable database of the International Crisis Group (the conflict narratives can be found at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2530&l=1)

- The data on UN interventions has been taken from the official US web-site (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp)

- A number of other online country-related information, including histories and dynamics of conflicts (Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress at www.country-data.com; www.nationsencyclopedia.com; www.fpif.org/selfdetermination/index.html; www.globalissues.org)

2.2 Definitions

The unit of analysis for the dissertation is not a conflict or country per se, but an intervention in intra-national ethnic war. For the purpose of this research, I view this identity as a set of constituent qualities of the sub-systemic units engaged in a conflict within one action-system, such as ethnicity, language, culture, and religion.

To be more precise, I view an intra-national ethnic war between identity groups as *a sustained military conflict between geographically contiguous ethnic groups, one being the central government (the target), and the other(s) – the challenger(s), with at least 1 000 battle-death per year, the outcome of which is either reshaped administrative-political territorial arrangement of the country or altered power balance between these ethnic groups.* My definition is based on Roy Licklider's description of intra-national conflict[68] and includes considerations of the aspirations of conflicting parties vis-à-vis the actual end of conflicts.

Due to the quite diverse and, sometimes, vague nature of participation of one state in the internal affairs of another, it is necessary to define the phenomenon of intervention. Notwithstanding the considerable amount of literature on intervention embracing quite diverse spheres and areas, there is no general and universally agreed definition of intervention. There is literature on military interventions; propaganda interventions; economic interventions; diplomatic interventions; ideological interventions; mixed interventions; unilateral and multilateral interventions.

Perhaps the broadest definition of intervention is offered by James N. Rosenau: actions of external force that involve "modifications of the behavior of persons and groups in the target nation that would not have occurred if the intervening nation had not engaged in interventionary activities".[69] If we take the definition of intervention as actions of an external actor to alter the domestic affairs of a state, then inaction, or absence of external influence, can still be considered as an intervention.

By this logic, absence of actions from outside *also* influences the domestic settings of states that would have been different had this influence occurred. Since linguistically the word "intervention" means "occurring between two events", nearly each and every instance of external participation of a state in the affairs of another state can be considered an intervention. If

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[68] Licklider, R. (1995). The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wards, 1945-1993, *The American Political Science Review*, 89(3), 682.
[69] Rosenau, J.N. (1969). Intervention as a Scientific Concept, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13(2), 159.

everything is intervention, then the term loses its meaning. Therefore, a parsimonious definition of external intervention should be adopted.

With the purpose of defining intervention narrowly and precisely, I will merge Licklider's and Regan's definitions of intervention[70] in my dissertation and present a third party intervention as a *convention-breaking military and/or economic interference in the domestic affairs of a foreign country aimed at altering the internal balance of power by targeting the authority structures and capacities of the government, the challenger or providing no support to the belligerents*. This definition allows me to include the interventions with different approaches to use of force.

As a criterion for selection of cases of intervention, I employ a standard research approach of the existing literature on conflict resolution and review the cases of external intervention in intrastate ethnic conflicts that happened after the end of the World War II, i.e. after 1945 till 2003.

The current dataset includes 51 cases of conflicts which, altogether, make up to 107 interventions in the period from 1948 till 2003. Apart from de facto resolved conflicts, there are also 8 ongoing conflicts with various degrees of hostilities (Burma vs. Karens, 1948-present; Philippines vs. MIM & MNLF, 1970-present; Mauritania (Western Sahara Independence Movement), 1975-present; Morocco (Western Sahara Independence Movement), 1975-present; Sri Lanka vs. Tamil Insurgency, 1982-present; Somalia, 1991-present; DRC vs. Ituri, 1999-present; Sudan (Darfur), 2003-present), which were also included in data.

2.3 Independent and dependent variables

Current research on interventions in ethnic conflicts rests upon the assumption that the ultimate goal of interventions is to end violence and bring peace to a country with conflict

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[70] For the definitions of intervention see Licklider, R. (1995). Op.cit. PP. 681-690 and Regan, P.M. (2002). *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers – Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*. University of Michigan Press, 2002.

(Licklider, 1995; Regan 2000, 1996; Walter, 1997; Hartzel 1999). In other words, the literature views success of interventions in terms of actual termination of hostilities and durability of peace, which is its main dependent variable.

However, as empirical evidence shows, interventions have their own rationales, agendas, goals and aims of actions, which are not always directed towards stopping violence and making peace in a country with conflict. For example, out of its geopolitical reasoning and own vital national interests, a third party may support a belligerent group aiming to weaken the government of the target state, which means that interventions may actually extend, and not contain, conflicts. At the same time, the end of hostilities may not correspond with the actual agenda of the intervener.

Taking de facto peace as the key proxy for success of interventions contains a wide of the mark approach, which means that while the interventions themselves may not have aimed at reaching peace, a conflict had actually stopped.

With the purpose of isolating the factors that yield successful interventions and measuring the success of interventions, I examine the actual outcome of each case of intervention cross-checked against their intervention agendas and the aims of the interveners themselves and the belligerent groups they support. This is the *dependent variable* and analytical focus of the dissertation.

Short- or long-term effects of intervention have crucial impact on the study of interventions. Since my dependent variable is fulfillment of intervention objectives, I will consider them as successful once an intervener had reached its goals and exits the scene. For example, a neutral third party may intervene to end hostilities in a conflict-affected state, and if the peace was indeed achieved, this can be considered a successful intervention.[71] Similarly, if a party intervened with the purpose of helping a minority group in its fight against the majority one, and that group eventually gained some political concessions (a certain degree of autonomy

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[71] For instance, humanitarian and peace-keeping intervention of UN in Somalia in 1992-1993.

or even independence) from the target government, this can also be considered a successful intervention.[72]

If, on the contrary, a long-lasting peace is established and state's integrity had been preserved by the defeat of a minority group being supported by an outside actor, this means a failure of an intervention's goals.[73] An important thing to bear in mind is that while de facto peace can be achieved in either of these cases, it may also happen independently from the facts of interventions, due to other causal factors.[74]

Thus, it is necessary to define the ceteris paribus impact of composition of intervention force/interveners, which is the *independent variable* of the dissertation. The actions of multiple interveners can be considered multilateral if they have been undertaken either under joint command of an international/regional organization, or when multiple actors jointly pursue a common goal in the same point in time, and take actions in the same direction – targeting the same belligerent parties or intervening in a neutral fashion. On the other hand, the independent actions of interveners with different aims, pursuing diverse agendas and/or supporting different belligerent groups are considered unilateral interventions.

Since I hypothesize that the multilateral composition interventions are more likely to achieve their goals than unilateral ones, the independent variable will not differentiate between various types of multiple actors, such as interventions undertaken by more than one state, or the interventions under the aegis of a multinational or regional organization. At the statistic stage of the research I am planning to see the pure compositional effect of the binary nature of interveners on the ability to reach their goals. The substantive issues of actor differences in multilateral coalitions will be later discussed in case studies.

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[72] Independence of Bangladesh achieved as a result of the Indian intervention in Pakistan in 1971.
[73] Failure of Afghanistan to support the Baluchi secessionist rebellion in 1973-1977 in Pakistan.
[74] Actual peace in Abkhazia and Ossetia and de-facto nature of their states may not be considered a success of the Russian interventions supporting the secessionist regimes with the ultimate aim of their independence or incorporation into its territory.

2.4 Control variables

At the same time, it is necessary to mention that, apart from the composition variable of interventions, there are other factors, either belonging to the domestic arrangements or systemic matters, that have intervening effects over the overall success of intervention agendas. Without holding these effects constant, we cannot establish the true relationships between the type of intervention and the success of the intervention.

Some of these variables have been identified and studied in existing research on conflict resolution (Regan 1996, Carment & Rowlands 1998; Doyle & Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004), where the scholars focused on duration of peace as their main dependent variable. Such control variables include the target of third party support, strategies of interveners and power factors in interventions. I included them in my research to see whether these variables are still significant for the third-party success when the dependent variable is whether the aim of the intervention was fulfilled.

These variables deal primarily with domestic factors. However, the international political climate and interactions among the states on the systemic level will inevitably influence the domestic situation in target countries, which may have an intervening effect on the degree of success of interventions. Therefore, I have added the variable of proximity of conflicts to the end of the Cold War to see whether the end of the US-USSR confrontation in the international system had an influence on the outcomes of sub-systemic ethnic wars.

Control variable 1: The recipient of third party support – the target, the challenger or none – may be an important factor in influencing the success of interventions. Operationally, a third party has three choices: support the target, support the challenger or be neutral. Current literature on interventions in civil wars (Regan 1996, Doyle & Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004) holds that the neutral nature of the intervening force may have positive effects on the de facto peace and its duration. When no warring parties receive outside support it denotes neutrality of

interveners in relation to the belligerents, even though third parties may actually be interested in a certain conflict outcome out of their own best interests.

It was also noted by previous research that when represented by a coalition of states, multilateral interventions may enjoy a higher degree of neutrality: their shared operational bias and the presence of more than one state in an intervention force contributes to perceptions of neutrality in the eyes of the belligerents. As a result of probit analysis, I test the relevance of direction of third party support on the probability of intervention success and whether neutrality of the third party increases the chances for its success.

Control variable 2: Type of interventions – military, economic or mixed – may also matter to the outcomes. Military, economic or mixed interventions can bring different results to the conflict settings. According to Regan's study, the combination of military aid with financial backing increases the chances that interveners will reach sustainable peace in civil wars.[75] In other words, when military victory is "backed up" by economic support to the winner,[76] this boosts its capabilities and contributes to their achieving victory over the side that has no substantial military and economic support.

Interventions should also be tailored to the context of each conflict: for example, long-fought conflicts that causes significant destruction may require more emphasis on economic and political development, while in shorter conflicts military interventions alone may suffice. Such joint strategies would mean that interveners are ready to commit themselves not only to a relatively short-term militarily presence, but also to much longer economic assistance, which itself increases the trust of the belligerents who receive external support.

Control variable 3: The relative power of the members of an intervention may significantly affect the chances for their success. This variable has been taken from Regan's and Fortna's works on third-party interventions (Regan 1996, Fortna 2004). They assume that the

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[75] Regan, P.M. (2002). Op.cit.
[76] For instance, economic and military actions of African countries, Sweden and Ireland under the aegis of the UN aimed at restoring order in Zaire in 1960-1965 and preventing the country from breaking apart.

presence of a superpower both in absolute (UN, global superpowers, such as US, USSR) and relative terms (regional superpowers: Belgium in its African interventions) alone or together with other countries is positively related to fulfillment of the intervention's aims.

Although it would be quite logical to assume that a stronger state would be more successful in military operations and provision of economic support to any of the conflict parties, the power variable will contribute to the understanding of success of interventions and help determine whether the power alone is a sufficient precondition for success of third parties. Probit analysis will be used to determine the effect of presence and absence of superpower factor in both unilateral and multilateral interventions separately: whether a powerful actor gives the multilateral interventions a greater probability for success than when there is a relative parity among the coalition members and whether a single superpower is more likely to fulfill its goals then a non-superpower intervener.

Control Variable 4: The closeness of the intervention to the end of the *Cold War* (+/- 5 years from the moment of dissolution of the Soviet Union, i.e. from 1986 to 1995 may also play an important role in the matter of their efficiency (for instance, for Regan, proximity of conflict to the Cold War increased the likelihood of foreign interventions[77]).

At this point, I assume that the end of the bipolar world and absence of ideological rivalry between the US and USSR, which enjoyed a certain degree of cooperation during the Cold War, is negatively related to the success of interventions. At the same time, during the Cold War many ethnic confrontations were also fought on ideological grounds, where both belligerents and states used their ideological affiliations and ideological considerations to apply for outside assistance and to intervene.[78]

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[77] Regan, P.M. (1998). Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts, *The Journal of Politics*, 60(3), 754-779.
[78] Some instances of ideological interventions in ethnic conflicts: USSR and Cuban support of Ethiopian Government during the Ogaden conflict in 1977-78; Belgian intervention in Zaire during the Katanga conflict (1960-1965) against pro-Patrice Lumumba forces. For more examples see Jenne, E.K., Saideman, S.M. and Will Lowe W. (2007). Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization. *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(5), 539-558.

During this era, conflicts at the domestic level were elevated to the international stage and became so-called pawns of superpower rivalry (also known as "proxy wars"). At the same time, the proliferation of non-state actors led to an increase of low- and medium-intensity conflicts that could no longer be contained by their former "patrons", which can also explain the lower success rate of all interventions at this time.

Table 1: Intervention Dataset

Conflict	Dates	Intervener	Type	Support	Composition	Success
Burma vs. Karens	1948-present					
		China	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
Zaire vs. Katanga	1960-1965					
		Belguim	Military	Military	Unilateral	No
		UN	Mixed	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Algeria	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Egypt	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Belgium	Mixed	Government	Unilateral	Yes
Ethiopea, Ogaden I	1960-1964					
		Somalia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
Iraq, Kurdish rebellion I	1961-1966					
		Syria	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
Eritrean War	1962-1991					
		Cuba	Military	Opposition	Multilateral	No
		USSR	Military	Opposition	Multilateral	No
		US	Mixed	Government	Multilateral	No
		Cuba	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		USSR	Mixed	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Sudan	Military	Opposition	Multilateral	No
Cyprus	1963-1964					
		UK	Military	Neutral	Unilateral	No
		Greece	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
		Turkey	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		UN	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
Chad Civil War I	1966-1971					
		France	Military	Government	Unilateral	Yes
		Lybia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
Iraq, Kurdish rebellion II	1968-1970					
		Iran	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	Yes
Oman, Dhofar Rebellion	1970-1975					
		UK	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Iran	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Jordan	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes

44

Conflict	Dates	Intervener	Type	Support	Composition	Success
		YPR Yemen	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
PLO-Jordan War	1970-1971					
		Syria	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
South Africa, African Nationalist Struggle	1970-1994					
		UN	Economic	Opposition	Multilateral	Yes
		US	Economic	Opposition	Multilateral	Yes
		UK	Economic	Opposition	Multilateral	Yes
		USSR	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	Yes
Pakistan vs. Bengalis	1971					
		India	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	Yes
Uganda, Obotes Overthrow	1971-1972					
		Tanzania	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
Burundi vs. Hutu	1972					
		Zaire	Military	Government	Unilateral	Yes
Philippines vs MNLF	1972-present					
		US	Military	Government	Unilateral	Yes
Rhodesia	1971-1979					
		Cuba	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	Yes
		South Africa	Mixed	Government	Unilateral	No
		UN	Economic	Opposition	Multilateral	Yes
Pakistan vs. Baluchi Rebels	1973-1977					
		Afghanistan	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Iran	Mixed	Government	Unilateral	Yes
Cyprus	1974					
		Turkey	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Greece	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
		UN	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
Iraq, Kurdish rebellion III	1974-1975					
		Iran	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
Mauritania, Western Sahara Independence Movement	1975-present					
		France	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
		Morocco	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
		Algeria	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Saudi Arabia	Economic	Government	Unilateral	No
Morocco, Western Sahara Independence Movement	1975-present					
		Mauritania	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
		Algeria	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Lybia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
Ethiopea, Ogaden II	1977-1978					
		Somalia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Cuba	Military	Government	Unilateral	Yes

45

Conflict	Dates	Intervener	Type	Support	Composition	Success
		USSR	Military	Government	Unilateral	Yes
Zaire, Shaba Crisis I (FLNC)	1977					
		Angola	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Morocco	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Belgium	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		France	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		USA	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Egypt	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
Zaire, Shaba Crisis II (FLNC)	1978-1979					
		Zambia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Morocco	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Belgium	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		France	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		USA	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Senegal	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Togo	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Gabon	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Ivory Coast	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
Chad Civil War II	1978-1982					
		Lybia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	Yes
		France	Mixed	Government	Unilateral	No
		Congo	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	No
		Zaire	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	No
		OAU	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	No
		Lybia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	Yes
Iran, Kurdish rebellion	1978-1979					
		Iraq	Military	Government	Unilateral	Yes
Uganda I	1980-1986					
		US	Mixed	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		ROK Korea	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
Somalia	1982-1991					
		Ethiopea	Mixed	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		US	Mixed	Government	Unilateral	Yes
		US	Mixed	Opposition	Unilateral	No
Sri Lanka vs. Tamil	1982-present					
		India	Mixed	Government	Unilateral	No
		Norway	Economic	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		UK	Economic	Opposition	Unilateral	No
Chad Civil War III	1983-1987					
		France	Mixed	Government	Unilateral	Yes
		Lybia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Zaire	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
Iraq, Kurdish rebellion	1985-2003					
		Iran	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		US	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	Yes
		UN	Mixed	Opposition	Multilateral	Yes
Liberia I	1989-1990					

46

Conflict	Dates	Intervener	Type	Support	Composition	Success
		ECOMOG	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
Chad Civil War IV	1989-2003					
		France	Military	Government	Unilateral	Yes
Rwanda vs. Tutsi I	1990-1993					
		France	Military	Government	Unilateral	Yes
		UN	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
Rwanda vs. Tutsi II	1994-1996					
		UN	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
		France	Military	Neutral	Unilateral	Yes
Niger	1990-1995					
		Liberia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
Mali	1990-1995					
		Liberia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		UN	Economic	Government	Multilateral	Yes
Georgia vs. Abkhaz	1991-1993					
		Russia	Mixed	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		CIS	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	No
Georgia vs. South Ossetia	1991-1992					
		Russia	Mixed	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		CIS	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	No
Azerbaijan vs. Nagorno-Karabakh	1991-1994					
		Armenia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Turkey	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
Somali	1991-present					
		US	Mixed	Neutral	Unilateral	No
		UN	Mixed	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
		UN	Mixed	Neutral	Multilateral	No
Croatia vs. Serbs	1991-1993					
		UN	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
		Yugoslavia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
Bosnia/Herzogovina vs. Serbs	1992-1994					
		Yugoslavia	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		UN	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
		NATO	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
Moldova vs. Transdniestria	1990-1994					
		Russia	Mixed	Opposition	Unilateral	No
Liberia II	Liberia II					
		ECOMOG	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		UN	Mixed	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
Indonesia vs. East Timor	1999-2002					
		UN	Mixed	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
DRC	1998-2002					
		Rwanda	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Burundi	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Uganda	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No

47

Conflict	Dates	Intervener	Type	Support	Composition	Success
		Zimbabwe	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Angola	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Namibia	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Chad	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Lybia	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		Sudan	Military	Government	Multilateral	Yes
		UN	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
DRC-Ituri	1999-present					
		Uganda	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		Rwanda	Military	Opposition	Unilateral	No
		France	Military	Neutral	Unilateral	No
		UN	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
Kosovo	1998-2002					
		Serbia	Military	Government	Unilateral	No
		NATO	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
		UN	Mixed	Neutral	Multilateral	Yes
Sudan II (SPLA)	1983-2003					
		US	Economic	Neutral	Unilateral	Yes
Sudan III (Darfur)						
		OAU	Military	Neutral	Multilateral	No

2.5 Probit analysis of interventions

The transformed dataset includes the following categories: *Conflict* (name of the conflict and/or conflicting parties); *Date* (dates of the beginning and end of conflict). The independent variable is *Composition* (composition of the intervening force: "0" for unilateral and "1" for multilateral interveners). My key assumption here is that since I view success of interventions as the fulfillment of the interveners' agendas, success and failure can take only binary values, i.e. either yes or no, and cannot be expressed in relative terms (i.e. there cannot be "slightly more successful" or "slightly less successful" interventions). Thus, the independent variable *Success* also represents a categorical, or a "dummy" variable with "1" as success of intervention and "0" as failure.

Control variables include *Type* (operational characteristics of interventions: "0" for military interventions; "1" for economic support or sanctions against the belligerents; and "2" – mixed interventions, including military and economic components); *Support* (direction of intervention actions: "0" when the third party supports the challenger(s); "1" when the

beneficiary of intervention is the target government; and "2" when third party supports neither side and is operationally neutral); *Power* (both in multilateral and unilateral interventions; relative capabilities of actors and third parties: "0" when one of the interveners is a major power relative to the target government; and "1" when one of the interveners is a superpower in absolute and relative terms); and *CW* (proximity of the conflict to the end of the Cold War: "0" for the conflicts started before 1985 or after 1995; and "1" for the conflicts started within a ten-year period from 1985 to 1995).

For the purposes of determining the impact of intervention type on the probability of success of the intervention, I use a large-N probit analysis using the "R 2.2.0" software package (http://www.r-project.org). Because the dependent variable is a binary response (success=1, failure=0), using an OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) model would be inappropriate. Instead, I employ the probit transformation to estimate the probability of attaining an outcome *a=1* (success). In general, the probability *Y(a)* of a specific intervention outcome *a* (where *a* = {success, failure}) is a continuous variable that can take any value between "1" or "0."

In my model, a value close to "0" means that *a=1* (intervention success) is very unlikely, and a value close to "1" means that *a=1* (success) is very likely.[79] Thus, the probability of success of interventions {$a=1$} can be expressed as a function of the set of factor variables of interest, $\mathbf{X}=\{X^1,...,X^p\}$: $P\{a=1/\mathbf{X}\}=f(\mathbf{X})$. The probit model can also estimate the difference in the probability of success when moving from unilateral to multilateral types, while holding the value of the intervening variables constant at their means or typical values.

Finally, the optimal model of intervention success has been achieved through the *forward-backward stepwise search method*,[80] which starts with the unconstrained model (including the full set **X** of independent variables), and then tests whether any of these control variables are insignificant and can be removed from the model. The first control variable to be

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[79] Pampel, F.C. (2000). *Logistic Regression: A Primer*, Sage Publications 2000; Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 2.
[80] Field, A. (2000). *Discovering statistics using SPSS for Windows: advanced techniques for the beginner*. London: Sage Publications, 169.

removed will have the least impact on the overall model. As a result of this analysis, only the "important" variables have been kept in the model, in other words, those variables that have higher values than others.

2.5.1 Multilateral versus Unilateral Interventions

The essence of the large-N analysis is to estimate the independent impact of the study variable as well as the intervening variables on the dependent variable. In order to find out whether my initial working hypothesis is correct I start with a general model, including all the variables that I predict have effects on the outcome. This will help me to "purify" the model by eliminating variables with uncertain influence on the dependent variable. In the end, I select the simplest model that represents the "best-fit" for explaining the success of interventions into ethnic conflicts.

To start with, I conduct probit analysis to assess the "pure" impact of independent variable on the dependent variable. The predicted probability of success, given a specific values of the independent variables, is calculated by computing the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution at the predicted value of the latent variable, $P(Y(x)=1|x=\mathbf{X}) = \Phi$ (*intercept* + ax_1 + bx_2 + ... + zx_p), where $x_{1...p}$ are the independent variables, and $a...z$ are their corresponding coefficients in the underlying linear model.

The multilateral character of interventions appeared to play a very significant role in their overall success. Although all multilateral interventions in the dataset account for only 1/3 of the total number of cases of interventions (107), the rate of success of these interventions is, in fact, quite high: the data show that these interventions have been successful in 27 cases, or almost 84%. Unilateral actions enjoy a much lower rate of success: only ¼ of the total number of unilateral interveners (19 out of 75 cases) managed to reach their goal.

The probit analysis revealed quite a significant probability of success of multilateral interventions. It established that, if taken separately, multilateral interventions increase the odds

50

of success (Pr (success = 1) Type =T) = Φ (intercept + T · 1,6740) with "0" for unilateral and "1" for multilateral interventions) by approximately 60% as compared to unilateral foreign actions:

Table 2: Probit analysis

Unilateral interventions: Φ (-0.6640 + 0) = Φ (-0.6640) = 25.33%
Multilateral interventions: Φ (-0.6640 + 1.6740) = Φ (+1.01) = 84.37%

The probability of intervention success increases greatly when moving from unilateral to multilateral interventions, which means that multilateral interventions are more successful in pursuing their tasks than unilateral ones. The advantages of multilateral interventions can be explained by a number of factors, which are related to the higher degree of commitment in pursuing their initial intervention goals.

First, whenever multilateral interveners act, they do so either on under the aegis of an international organization or without such an entity. In the latter case such interventions are multinational, which means that they are organized by more than one state to carry out joint tasks. In either case we are talking about an institutional approach to interventions, which, on one hand, set frameworks for actions at the outset, and, on the other, provide fewer incentives for "logrolling" and acting unilaterally.

When interventions are organized on behalf of an international or regional organization or are mandated by such an entity, there are certain rules, norms, moral standards and best practices that the members of these institutions have to obey. In cases where the interveners are acting together without the backing of an international organization, there are also rules and standards. However, in such cases these are set by bilateral and/or multilateral agreements and memoranda, which delineate aims, operational scenarios and who-is-doing-what strategies. In the third and final case, interveners act on their own, unilaterally, and the rules of engagement are set at the discretion of the solitary intervener.

51

Why is the institutional approach to interventions important to their success? Because rules and frameworks create a perception of legitimacy by both the interveners and the belligerents. Through intervention mandates, which are the embodiment of institutionalized rules, domestic warring groups see what the interveners *can do* and what they *cannot*. This develops a perception of trust to the intervention that is even less welcome. The greater the number of rules guiding such interventions, the lower the odds of free-riding and predatory behavior by any member of coalition.

Such "*multi-party legitimacy*" is a fundamental difference between unilateral and multilateral interventions that contributes to the success of the latter by internationalizing the conflict outcomes.

This means that when intervening, the third party coalition through its mandate commits itself to legitimize any outcome of the conflict. When interventions are undertaken by multinational organizations, such commitment denotes agreement by the international community to legally recognize either secession (a new independent state, like Eritrea or East Timor), reintegration (a pre-war status quo in Liberia in 1989-1990) or concessions from the target state (a power-sharing arrangements, as in Mali in 1990-1995), which is shared by the members of the coalition, thus decreasing susceptibility of defection of any of its members in favor of one side of the conflict. In contrast, if an intervention is undertaken by one party, its commitment, and, as a consequence, legitimacy depends on the actions of that party alone.

Out of the total 33 multilateral interventions conducted from the period of 1948 until 2003, the majority, or 79% (26 instances of interventions) have been undertaken under the aegis of multinational organizations (UN, NATO, ECOWAS). Out of them, only 5 failed to achieve their goals, and the remaining 21, or over 80% have been overall successful in reaching their targeted goals.

The success of multilateral interventions as opposed to unilateral ones can also be explained by the higher degree of *transparency* of their actions. Rules and standards set up in the

intervention mandates of multilateral interventions make the leaders of the members of the coalition accountable for their actions not only to their domestic constituencies and, in some cases, veto players, but also to the leaders and publics of the other countries that participate in the interventions. It is usually easier to hide one's actions from your own people than from international scrutiny.

Not only are the activities of multilateral interventions more transparent, but all the resources and technical means they use are subject to international scrutiny. Whether the intervention is undertaken under the aegis of an international or regional organization or by a mere coalition of states without organizational support, every instance of intervention is subject to economic and political scrutiny by other members of the intervention. Apart from this, the prescribed modus of actions is under continual review of the coalition members. This is because, for example, human rights violations (if any) of one member-state tarnish the image of all members.

Unlike multilateral interventions, unilateral actions, even by highly democratic states, do not have the same degree of transparency. Of course, there can be a domestic review process that in many instances involves domestic veto players that would disapprove actions of their country abroad from political reasons.

The higher degree of success of multilateral interveners can also be explained by another assumption made at the beginning of the research that supports the hypothesis – *functional impartiality*; this follows directly from the notion of institutionalized interventions. There are several explanations why multilateral interventions tend to be more functionally impartial and thus more acceptable to the combatant parties.

First, there is "melting-pot" logic behind the whole nature of multilateral interventions: whatever are the preferences of the participant countries, they are sometimes directly opposed by the preferences of others. This is not to say that interveners do not have their own interests when entering the third party coalitions. These interests may range from the wish to be a significant

actor on international arena[81] and securing their peacemakers image to assisting one of the parties of the conflict – due to kinship ties, political preferences or purely mercantilist aspirations. In a coalition, however, these interests and preferences are "melted" into a joint interest and aspiration of the multilateral intervening force, where the bias (if any), becomes impersonalized and shared by all.

Second, functional impartiality is a factor that directly contributes to the build-up of trust to the third parties by the belligerents. Here, trust does not necessarily mean that the warring groups will trust the third parties that they would assist them. Rather, trust in this case means that the belligerents would not be punished discriminatively. Even if a warring group considers a member of the multilateral coalition inherently biased, it can appeal to organization in question (if this is the form of third party intervention) to exclude this country from the list of participants.[82]

Finally, by existence of institutionalized norms and standards of multilateral interventions (which would be known to the target country), the conflict parties would trust that the other participants of the intervention force would not allow them to be punished by any biased coalition member.

The issue of functional impartiality is directly linked with the third factor supporting the hypothesis on success of multilateral interventions – *shared operational bias*. The problem of all interventions – be they multilateral or unilateral – is that the options or the way the goals of interventions are implemented must be accepted by the warring parties. Interventions conducted by coalitions of states may not necessarily be neutral in their operations, since they cannot satisfy aspirations of all parties, which usually have diametrically opposing interests.[83] Even if the

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[81] Consider, for instance, largely disputed participation of countries of the former Soviet Union, for instances, Georgia, in the US intervention in Iraq.

[82] This is what, actually, Georgia tries to accomplish in relation to exclusion of Russia and ending its sole participation in the CIS peacekeeping forces: Georgia appeals (however, unsuccessfully) to the international community either to bring in other CIS states (for instance, Ukraine) or to completely replace CIS peacekeepers with those of other international organizations (UN and/or NATO).

[83] The case of East Timor is an example of such operational bias: 11 500 troops of the INTERFET and UNTAET safeguarded independence of East Timor from Indonesia.

interveners are neutral and impartial, their actions, undertaken with the purpose of implementation of their mandates, might be perceived as biased if the interveners are not helping them to win their war aims.

Given the collective nature of the intervention, however, even if a group believes that it is the victim of discrimination, it must see that the decision to act was taken not by one state alone, but by the whole group of states. In this way, the bias of multilateral third parties is *internationalized* and represents the joint actions of the international community. In addition, when interventions are undertaken under the aegis of a multinational organization, the bias is *institutionalized* through its mandates and conventions, which increases the credibility of the interveners' commitment in the eyes of the belligerents.

2.5.2. Intervening Factors for Intervention Success

Due to an array of other factors of a domestic and exogenous nature that affect intervention outcomes, the composition of the intervention force cannot entirely account for intervention success. Apart from revealing a higher probability of success of multilateral versus unilateral actions of interveners, I also included control variables in the probit analysis that have an intervening effect on the overall success of the third parties' abilities to reach their target agendas. I introduce these factor variables into the system after evaluating the effect of the main independent variable on the dependent one. Introduction of these variables had diverse effects on the efficiency of all types of interventions. The probit analysis of the combined model including all the variables is presented below:

The general combined model includes all the initial independent variables: Type (unilateral or multilateral); Power (superpower or not); CW (proximity to the end of the Cold War); Support (direction of third party support to the target, challenger or neutral); and Nature (military or economic alone or interventions having combination of these components).

Table 3: Combined Probit Model of Third Party Interventions

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.0114	-0.5309	-0.2715	0.5371	2.0145

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)	
(Intercept)	-1.1195	0.2677	-4.181	2.9e-05	***
Factor(Composition)1	1.6185	0.5182	3.124	0.001787	**
Factor(Power)1	1.6373	0.4382	3.736	0.000187	***
Factor(CW)1	-0.6774	0.3777	-1.794	0.072852	.
Factor(Support)1	0.5978	0.3562	1.678	0.093279	.
factor(Support)2	-0.7478	0.5680	-1.317	0.187945	
factor(Type)1	-0.0928	0.6965	-0.133	0.894001	
factor(Type)2	-0.5220	0.4259	-1.226	0.220307	

*Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1*

The combined model shows high significance of three variables – Composition, Power and CW. The remaining factor variables – Support and Type, turned out to have low significance for the model. These insignificant variables have been eliminated by the stepwise search method due to their negligible impact on success of intervention. The significance of these variables can be explained in the following way.

2.5.2.1 Neutrality of interventions

The finding that intervention neutrality is unrelated to intervention success contradict the arguments of a number of scholars who believe neutrality to be a positive factor in reaching peace. For instance, Diehl et al largely attributed the success of the UN interventions to their neutrality, which fosters "a solution that meets the interests of the disputants as well as the international community".[84] Neutrality is thus thought to engender trust on the part of the parties

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[84] Diehl, P.F., Reifschneider, J. and Hensel, P.R. (1996). UN Intervention and Recurrent Conflict, *International Organization*, 50(4), 687-688

in conflict that the interveners are committed to the general goals of peacekeeping rather than self-aggrandizement.

Similarly, Regan stressed the greater likelihood of success of multilateral than unilateral interventions due to the neutrality of the former. Neutrality of intervention helps to get the warring sides to accept external involvement: according to Regan, operationally, such troops "are not engaged in partisan combat but play a neutral role in preventing an outbreak or spread of fighting".[85] Success of a neutral multinational intervention is also noted by Doyle & Sambanis, who claim that "international enforcement can help solve commitment and coordination problems by imposing order or by directly implementing peace agreements or raising the costs of defection from them".[86]

When the success of intervention is measured not by the presence or absence of de facto peace in a target country and its durability, but by success of third party agendas, none of the three characteristics of direction of third party support turned out to play a significant role. The number of neutral interventions in my dataset is quite low: 19 cases out of 107 total interventions, or only 18%. Out of these 19 interventions, slightly more than one half managed to reach their goals (11 cases, or 57%). The probit analysis shows that for third parties to reach their intervention goals, it does not matter whether the interveners direct their support to the target state, the minority or neither.

This is especially true in the case of neutral unilateral interventions – a solitary intervener is rarely neutral but rather pursues its own vital national interests in the conflict; it therefore faces difficulty in persuading the belligerents of its neutrality. A multilateral force, however, is by its very nature more neutral; however, its neutrality may not yield a mutually acceptable outcome for all the belligerent sides.

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[85] Regan, P.M. (2002). Op.cit. P. 102.
[86] Doyle, M.W. and Sambanis, N. (2000). International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis, *American Political Science Review*, 94(4), 781.

A good example of neutral interventions that were not successful is the conflict in Somalia: all three instances of interventions – US, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II – were directed towards ending the deadly conflict and bringing peace to the people of the target country. However, two of them failed (UN and UNOSOM II), and the only neutral intervention that managed to reach its objectives was UNOSOM I, which was directed towards alleviation of human suffering and was, in fact, a purely humanitarian intervention. The unilateral actions of US and the multilateral actions of UNOSOM II were aimed at restoring the central government and had a large peace-building component, which, taking into account significant diversity of interests of the belligerent groups, absence of centralized authority and the difficult political climate in the country, failed to reach their initial intervention agendas, and currently Somalia remains a failed state, with four de facto unrecognized entities.

At the same time, the complexities of interethnic interactions, apart from purely numeric characteristics of the roles of factor variables, show that in some instances, it does matter whom the third parties support. In fact, when forceful external imposition of the options by the interveners is the only or preferred option to achieve intervention goals, the domestic power balance is an intervening variable that has to be taken into account in the logistic regression. Support to minorities or majorities, challenger or target government all involve operation of third parties in the context of domestic power imbalance. By supporting weaker groups, interveners improve their domestic power standing by joining their own resources and thus equalizing the situation with the stronger ones. This may lead to an extended conflict and increased chances for the challengers to sustain military operations against the target government.

If, however, the interveners help the stronger side, they spend fewer resources that they would have had they supported the weaker side. They may also achieve their own goals more easily by supporting the side that already enjoys military advantage over its rival. Finally, such support of a third party will contribute to ending the conflict quicker by decreasing the expected utility of the weaker group out of acting against the government, being usually stronger.

The probit analysis shows that for all interventions to be successful in their tasks, it does not matter whom they should support. However, due to nature of the independent variable – unilateral and multilateral composition of interventions – I argue that the interaction between intervention type and direction of support *does* matter for intervention success. In order to assess the effects of this interaction, in-depth case studies are needed to see whether the nature of the recipient of third party support is relevant to successful pursuit of intervention agendas by different types of interveners.

2.5.2.2 Intervention strategies

The logistical regression analysis shows that the combination of military and economic strategies (a total of 20 mixed interventions, or 19%) is not a significant predictor of intervention success. This finding goes contrary to the existing literature on conflict resolution, which views durable peace as the dependent variable for success of interventions. Mixed strategies, which, according to Regan, would have a higher probability of success than pure strategies, can be efficient in successful resolution of civil wars, including ethnic, religious and ideological.[87] However, they are insignificant in the matter of resolving ethnic conflicts alone.

Such diverse outcomes can be explained by a number of factors. First, diversification of the type of aid provided by the third parties to the belligerents would be an important factor in considering the success of interventions from the point of view of durable of peace. The reason why mixed strategies played a significant role in peace according to other studies is because they are, indeed, required for long-term settlement of conflicts. Five years is quite a long period of time for the target country to restore its normal functioning and provision of state services, with or without interveners.

Economic assistance helps people in many ways: recover the losses of property and other assets, sustain minimum living standards, create work places, pay people salaries and, in general,

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[87] Regan, P.M. (2002). Op.cit.

revive human dignities. It helps overcome the feeling of being underdeveloped, being neglected and discriminated, which may lead to conflicts in the first place, where "they" (other ethnic groups) are blamed in "our" economic troubles.

For these types of actions where effects of interventions are measured by the number of peaceful years, the more economic aid follows military support at first instance, the easier it will be for a country to recover from conflict. In simpler terms, military aid helps in bringing peace, while economic aid helps to keep this peace. That is why previous research showed a high significance of mixed intervention strategies for interventions for long-lasting peace.

Second, the military and economic components are not always easy to distinguish when judging about success of interventions from the point of view of their initial goals. For instance, training troops of a belligerent group can be considered both military aid and improvement of economic standing of that group (like Indian support for Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka), since the recipient party could spend the money allocated for its military needs on other purposes.

Finally, due to the nature of the dependent variable of the hypothesis, i.e. immediate observation of the success of interventions, the long-term effects of mixed actions are difficult to determine: while the impact of military side of interventions is usually easier and straight-forward to observe, it takes time for economic interventions to have a significant impact on the success of interventions, as was the case with the UN and Belgian interventions in the conflict in Zaire (Katanga, 1960-1965).

2.5.3 The optimal model

The probit analysis of the remaining variables – Type, Power and CW – is presented below:

Table 4: Optimal Probit Model of Third Party Interventions

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)	
(Intercept)	-0.9526	0.2186	-4.359	1.31e-05	***
factor(Composition)1	1.1524	0.3595	3.205	0.001350	**
factor(Power)1	1.3728	0.3644	3.768	0.000165	***
factor(CW)1	-0.7180	0.3513	-2.044	0.040951	*

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

The reduced model includes the main independent variable *Composition* and control variables *Power* and *CW*. Although including these control variables decreased slightly the coefficient of the independent variable *Composition*, the influence of these variables over the predicted probability of success of interventions in general tends to confirm overall prediction that multilateral interventions are more successful than unilateral ones. However, it is interesting to note that these intervening variables have different impacts on the probability of success depending on their composition.

Table 5: Probabilities of Intervention Success with a Power Factor

	Unilateral	**Multilateral**
Superpower	48.62%	87.70%
No superpower	14.55%	55.57%

This table shows that, in general, the presence of a superpower in all types of intervention has a positive effect on their success. Availability of superior military – either in international or regional terms – to destroy the capacities of the belligerents increases the chances for success both for multilateral and unilateral interventions. However, it is more important for unilateral interventions than multilateral ones: the success of unilateral actions almost doubles (from 25.33% to 48.62%) if an intervening state is a superpower versus a state with relative power parity with a target country, whereas it has only a 3%-effect in multilateral interventions (from 84.37% to 87.70%).

At the same time, the absence of a superpower in interventions decreases their overall success quite significantly: in unilateral interventions it accounts for 10% of decrease of predicted probability of their success (from initial 25.33% to 14.55%), whereas in multilateral interventions without a superpower in a coalition the decrease equals almost 29% (from initial

84.37% to 55.57%). The model above shows that the least successful were unilateral interventions undertaken by a country with relative power party vis-à-vis a target state, and the highest rate of success is enjoyed by multilateral coalition containing a superpower.

Consistent with Regan's and Fortna's research, the relative power of third party also plays quite a significant role in their overall success of interventions notwithstanding their type. A powerful intervener will not only present a credible threat of defeat to the side it is opposing, but can also be a trust-worthy guarantor of peace and/or victory of any party to the conflict. Once such a powerful actor enters the scene, further developments in the conflict largely depend on the interests of an intervener and the policy it decides to implement in the conflict.

Two factors account for overall success of a "superpower" on the success of interventions. First, from a pure operational perspective, superpowers enjoy military superiority, allowing them to perform their intervention tasks better and quicker than countries that have relative parity with the target state. Second, and especially in multilateral interventions, superpowers have quite high stakes when intervening: apart from military victories, there is an issue of superpower prestige in the world arena. Also, in the case of multilateral interventions, the other participants of the coalition may have "psychological" assurances that if a superpower decides to act, it will use all its resources to achieve success because its reputation as a world power is at stake.

Table 6: Probabilities of Intervention Success with a Power and Cold War Factors

Cold War Period			5 years before and after the End of Cold War		
	Unilateral	Multilateral		Unilateral	Multilateral
Superpower	66.28%	94.21%	**Superpower**	38.29%	80.36%
No superpower	17.04%	57.92%	**No superpower**	4.74%	30.21%

The final variable, CW is also an important predictor of intervention success. It also confirms the efficiency of multiple third parties. Out of all the types of interventions, the most

efficient are joint actions with a superpower presence in a multilateral coalition undertaken during the bi-polar period: 94.21% compared to initial 84% (a 10% increase in efficiency). In addition, the Cold War period also positively affected the remaining types of interventions: unilateral with and without superpower presence and multilateral interventions without a superpower.

It is interesting to note that the value of the Cold War factor in all unilateral interventions is relatively equal: the rate of success of unilateral parity interventions undertaken during the Cold War as opposed to at the end of the war almost doubles (from 4.74% to 17.04%). The situation is the same with unilateral superpower interventions, which see quite a significant increase in success – 28% (from 38.29% to 66.28%).

This was also true for the multilateral interventions: when undertaken during the Cold War, regardless of presence of a superpower within its ranks, they were all more successful if compared with similar interventions 5 years before and after the end of the bipolar rivalry. Likelihood of success of all multilateral interventions increased during the Cold War: by 27.71% (from 30.21% to 57.92%) without a superpower and by 13.85% (from 80.36% to 94.21%) with a superpower.

While multilateral interventions are still more successful than unilateral actions, the probability of success of intervention was higher for all types during the period of bi-polar world than after the end of US-USSR confrontation. This phenomenon can be explained first, by viewing interactions of the systemic and sub-systemic levels, and, second, by the nature of intra-state ethnic relationships.

During the bi-polar world, interactions between superpowers were characterized not only by their ideological rivalry, but also by a form of "contained cooperation", where each of them feared mutual destruction in the event of a major conflict, which would inevitably lead to a nuclear war. This phenomenon was first noted by Benjamin Miller, who noted that during the Cold War ideologically dissimilar superpowers cooperated in international security arena and

63

jointly managed regional conflicts.[88] The world was divided into the two areas of influence for the two hegemons, which, while refraining from direct collision, tested their muscles on other countries.

Systemic rivalry of the two superpowers was transferred onto the domestic level and took the form of civil wars in their satellite countries. Each of the superpowers supported a rival side while avoiding direct confrontations between each other. During the era of nuclear arms race, the MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction – had a very positive effect of peacekeeping, where both the US and USSR refrained from direct military actions against each other out of fear of total world collapse in case of nuclear war.

This idea is also supported by a famous Russian Cold War historian A.D. Bogaturov, who claimed that during "1960s confrontational stability was characterized by activization of a dialogue between the USSR and the USA, détente of their position on the issue of arms control and international situation in Europe on the background of high level of conflict in regional sub-systems…"[89] However, in the beginning of 1990s, transformation of the world system from bipolar to multipolar, which led to the systemic anarchy and appearance of independent states possessing nuclear arsenals, made cooperation at the systemic level more difficult: Russia was preoccupied with its domestic problems (economic decline, political instability and territorial conflicts), while the US had to cope with a new major source of violence – terrorism.

At the same time, from a domestic prospective, relationships between ethnic groups that had been subordinated to the superpower contest, led to tensions without central control. This was the case of emergence of ethnic conflicts, for example, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, where, as described by Susan Woodward in her pathbreaking work on the conflict in former Yugoslav – the "Balkan tragedy: chaos and dissolution after the Cold War",[90] primordial hatreds, which had been stifled by common adherence to a communist rule, regained significance

[88] Miller, B. (1992). Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management. *World Politics*, 45(1), 1-46.
[89] Bogaturov, A.D. (ed.). (2006). *The System History of International Relations*. М.: Культурная революция, 278-279.
[90] Woodward, S. (1995). *Balkan tragedy: chaos and dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

after dissolution of the Soviet Union. Apart from this, collapse of the Communist bloc led to a deep financial crisis, breakdown of all elements of domestic order, political disintegration and rising nationalism.

In general, third parties intervening after the end of Cold War had an overall low rate of success: both unilateral and multilateral interventions represented either by a superpower or having a power equilibrium with the belligerents in a target country have tended to be less successful.

2.6 Conclusions

Overall, the probit model correctly predicted the success of 31 multilateral interventions out of 41 (75.61%) and the failure of 51 unilateral interventions out of 66 cases (77.27%). Thus, the total validity rate of the model is 76.64% (it correctly predicted 82 cases out of 107).

The probit model has revealed a number of relationships that require theoretical explanation. First and foremost, it has confirmed the main hypothesis of the dissertation about the greater success of multilateral interventions as opposed to unilateral ones: interventions undertaken by coalition of states were more successful in reaching their goals then were the actions of single states. Also, the degree of power wielded by the third party had a significant effect on the interveners' ability to reach their agendas: the presence of a superpower in multilateral as well as unilateral interventions confers substantial advantage to the interveners. At the same time, apart from substantially decreasing the probability of success of unilateral actions, the absence of a superpower also negatively affects multilateral interventions, which means that in order to be successful, a coalition of states should endeavor to recruit a superpower.

Finally, rivalry and cooperation between the world superpowers before and after the end of the Cold War is positively related to success of all interventions, while the period of transition was associated with a low rate of success. The interventions were more successful during the

ideological confrontation between the US and USSR and after the end of effects of dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The novel results of the probit analysis have revealed a divergence between my findings and former works on interventions. The model showed that multilateral interventions were more successful than unilateral interventions notwithstanding their nature and support they provided: whether military, economic or both, multilateral coalitions are usually more efficient in pursuing their interventions agendas. More importantly, this analysis reveals that interveners were equally successful no matter whom they supported: the target government or the challenger. Finally, neutrality did not contribute to overall intervention success: in ethnic wars, a neutral intervention does not increase the chances of success for interveners.

Altogether, this model implies that interventions have the highest probability of success in an international climate of cooperation between the world superpowers, when undertaken by a coalition of states, when including a country with absolute and relative power superiority vis-à-vis the target government, and when conducted under the aegis of an international/regional organization,. The least successful were interventions of a single state with rough power parity with the belligerents that were undertaken around the time of the end of the Cold War.

With the purpose of defining causal factors that contribute to or impede the success of interventions, I conducted in-depth case studies, which were selected from the list of cases used for the quantitative study. The first two interventions to be studied are cases that were correctly predicted by the probit analysis and that confirm my hypothesis, namely, a unilateral unsuccessful intervention and multilateral successful interventions. The remaining two cases have been selected from the list of incorrectly predicted cases, namely, a unilateral successful and multilateral unsuccessful intervention. This will allow me to confirm my hypothesis about successes of multilateral interventions and further refine it with addition of the factors, which contribute to their successes. Incorrectly predicted cases will contribute to falsifiability of my

theoretical approach and would give the account of the instances in which the theory of third party commitment would not work.

On the basis of my case selection criteria – variations of the high and low level of independent and dependent variables respectfully – I selected the following cases: the conflict in Rwanda (successful unilateral and successful multilateral interventions); Georgia-Abkhazia (unsuccessful unilateral and unsuccessful multilateral interventions); Chad (successful and unsuccessful unilateral interventions); and, finally, Somalia (successful and unsuccessful multilateral interventions). Such case selection would also allow for controlling large number of in-country factors and keeping them constant.

These cases of intervention have many things in common. The most remarkable commonality between them is the characteristics of target countries, timeframes of interventions and the nature of the interveners themselves. Notwithstanding the geographic, historical and cultural differences between the African and European countries that I have researched, all my cases bear equal characteristics of more or less "failed states", without or with extremely week central government and no or very low administrative resources to successfully and credibly exercise their influence over their national territories. By the time of interventions Rwanda, Chad, Somalia and equally Georgia were all experiencing larger-scale civil war, in some cases instigated or supported by the third parties themselves. Weak economies, identity differences (culture, religion, ethnicity, and geography) also contributed to state failure in these cases.

The historical backgrounds were also similar: all the cases had a colonial history. The conflicts within the territories of the cases all happened shortly after the countries gained their independence from their colonial "patrons" and were experiencing a dangerous mix of upheaval of national pride, historical stigmatization and a devastated economy.

From the point of view of the timing of interventions, the conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, and Georgia all happened after the dissolution of the bipolar system and during the decade of

67

systemic chaos, when the old rivalry was gone without building up new patterns of relations between the two superpowers. The outlier case in this respect is Chad, where the interventions of third parties started long before the end of Cold War. However, even in this case the final resolution of the conflict – when Libya was made to return the Aouzou Strip to Chad by the decision of the International Court of Justice in 1994 – coincided with the end of the Soviet Union.

These conflicts were also similar in the nature of the third parties. In nearly all these conflicts (except for the US intervention in Somalia) the interveners had historical ties with the target countries.

The interventions also took place around the time of the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, this was due to a wish and will of the former big players of the bipolar international arena to re-establish their influence over target countries and target regions and to strengthen their "say" in the international arena (US as a member of UNITAF and later UNOSOM in Somalia, and France with its two interventions in Rwanda). This was also a time when comparatively small players (e.g., the Libyan intervention in Chad) used the window of opportunity presented by the systemic transition to build-up their military potential and exert their influence on their neighbors without being punished by the stronger players.

As noted above, the end of the Cold War witnessed decreased cooperation between the US and the USSR and the reluctance of Russia to intervene abroad due to its preoccupation with its own domestic problems.

The composition of interventions varied among the cases from unilateral interventions (France and Libya in Chad, Russia in Georgia) to unilateral intervention with the mandate of a multinational agency (France in Rwanda) to a coalition of multilateral forces (US in Somalia) to multilateral force in name only (Russia in CIS peacekeeper troops) to multiple third parties acting together with a common goal defined and framed by the international organizations of which they were part (UNAMIR, UNOSOM).

All the conflicts I studied also experienced a range of interventions, which varied in type and/or degree of success, which allowed me to use the comparative method to tease out the effects of intervention type, my independent variable, on fulfillment of the interveners' goals, my dependent variable.

The conflict in Somalia experienced both successful and unsuccessful multilateral interventions by the UN, which allowed me to control for the character of interventions as well as the features of the conflict itself in assessing why the same intervener might succeed in reaching its goals at one time, while failing at another. The conflict in Chad, which experienced only unilateral interventions (Libya and France), was also remarkable for the range of success achieved by a single actor at different points in time (Libya). The Rwandan war was characterized by differences in the composition of intervention forces (the UN and France); however, all these interventions managed to fulfill their objectives and mandates. Finally, the conflict in Georgia experienced multiple interventions by the same actor (Russia) in both unilateral and multilateral form, which also helped me control the identity of the intervener.

CHAPTER 3: CHAD (1966-1987)

The conflict in Chad stands apart from other ethnic conflicts both on the territory of the African continent and elsewhere in many respects. Although not as intense and violent as the Rwandan case, the Chadian civil war has been known as one of the most protracted civil wars in the post-Cold War era. Nearly two generations of Chadians were born and lived their lives under constant threat of numerous rebellions tearing apart the country. The conflict in Chad is also notable for a number of interventions it had experienced after its independence, as well as the diversity of intervention outcomes.

3.1 Conflict Background

As is the case for the majority of northern-central African countries, Chad had been a French Colonial possession, a status that determined nearly every political development in the country. Although deprived of valuable resources, Chad was well situated along the major trans-Saharan cross-roads, which led to development of trade, crafts and trafficking of slaves. Ethnic, environmental and religious fragmentation is a distinctive feature of the Chadian society – the country is separated into the Northern, Central and Southern Chad – with about 200 ethnic groups[91] speaking over 100 different languages.[92]

3.1.1 Colonial period

France, as a colonial power, arrived in the region at the end of the 19th century. As a result of a steady spread of the French influence, by 1916 Chad joined three French colonies to the south--Ubangi-Chari, Moyen-Congo, and Gabon within the French Equatorial Africa. In

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[91] Chapelle, J. (1980). *Le Peuple Tchadien*. Paris: Hartman, 1980; reprint in *World Almanac* (1993). New York: Press Publication Company, 741.
[92] Morrison, D.G., Mitchell R.C. and Paden, J.N. (1989). *Understanding Black Africa: Data and Analysis of Social Change and Nation-Building*. New York: Paragon House and Irvington, 412.

1920, Chad gained a status as a separate colony with its own legislature, which was established in 1946.

From the very beginning of their governance, the French favored southerners over northerners and settled populations over nomads. This was solely because of suitable climatic conditions and different levels of economic development. Such diverse attitudes divided the country into two parts: the industrially advanced South (called by the French "Tchade Utile"), and underdeveloped North ("Tchade Inutile"). In this way, the French got Chad to pay for their presence – they wanted to utilize the colony to cover their own administrative costs without the spending coming from Paris. France also wanted to limit non-Francophone Saxon and Muslim influence on the African continent.

However, what was worse than simple economic exploitation was France's social and political segmentation of the Chadian society. These divides were at the heart of all subsequent internal conflicts. As Mario J. Azevedo and Emmanuel U. Nnadozie claimed, "[T]he French administration reinforced polarization between North and South through the constant use of contrasting terminology: *chrétien* (Christian) versus *musulman* (Muslim); *sudiste* (southerner) versus *nordiste* (northerner)…"[93] and so on.

Such segregation created further social separation between the Southerners, who were thus more developed better-educated and better-off than their fellow-Northerners, and who, after independence, occupied the best administrative positions. This state of affairs continued after independence, with the Southerners enjoying dominance over the rest of the country, which was the root of all further conflicts.

3.1.2 Post-independence

After the end of WW II, Chad was a designated overseas French territory, and its population citizens of France. This was the time when first political parties in Chad entered the

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[93] Azevedo, M. and Nnadozie, E.U. (1998). *Chad: A Nation In Search Of Its Future*. Westview Press, 38.

scene, out of which the major ones were the Chadian Progressive Party (PPT), representing southern interests the French socialists, and the Chadian Democratic Union (UDT), which was an influential local branch of De Gaulle's Rassemblement du Peuple Francaise, which represented French commercial concerns together with traditional communal interests.

From the beginning of de-colonization, UDT dominated the political scene. However, by 1953 the PPT was gaining momentum and began to represent a force capable of competing with the UDT. By independence in August 1960, the PPT and the South dominated Chadian politics. The post-independence process was painful for the Chadian society: an essentially traditional and import-oriented economy with an insignificant industrial sector, a cotton-dominated agriculture, and rather inadequate infrastructure were aggravated by turbulence arising from local politics, fragmentation of the population into separate, and sometimes conflicting, groups along ethnic, religious and regional lines, leading to economic regionalization.

On August 11, 1960, Françoise Tombalbaye of PPT became the first president of Chad. He was faced with the daunting task of consolidating the society that had been both naturally and artificially fragmented into ethnic, clan and religious groups. In the beginning, Tombalbaye employed French advisers in many government posts and allowed France to control most of the nation's financial operations. On the basis of the intergovernmental agreement signed with Chad, France continued to remain a "statutory" patron of Chad. Not only did the Chadians, according to Thompson and Adloff, "continue… to look upon France as their natural protector and source of aid,"[94] but France viewed Chad as essential to its security. This relationship was reflected in the agreements with this and all subsequent Chadian governments, allowing France to intervene to salvage Chadian regimes from internal and external threats.

Soon, however, Tombalbaye's style of "one-man-one-group" rule antagonized the rest of the population and led to powerful opposition from the other groups. He was a Sara from the South and allocated the majority of the administrative positions to his kin and to Southerners in

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[94] Thompson, V. and Adloff, R. (1981). *Conflict in Chad*, Research Series – Institute of International Studies, #45, University of California, Berkley, 12.

general, who were better educated in the colonial institutions than their Northern compatriots, thus leading to natural grievances from the latter. Soon, Northern religious leaders and warlords, each with an ethnic-based following or cadre of supporters, began to openly oppose Tombalbaye's regime.

To many in northern and central Chad, the southerners were simply another set of foreigners, almost as external and arrogant as the departing French. Anti-Tombalbaye politicians increasingly used traditional loyalties and enmities to condemn their opposition and solidify popular support for their positions. On his part, Tombalbaye hastened the onset of civil conflict by squandering his legitimacy through repressive tactics and regional favoritism. According to Thompson and Adloff, Tombalbaye was also inconsistent in relation to his opponents: his "policy was to eliminate all opponents by mass arrests, following which he would gradually amnesty certain prisoners, and then either take them into his cabinet, or name them to embassies abroad."[95]

3.1.3 Emergence of opposition

Dissatisfaction steadily grew, alleged or real coups were uncovered, and Tombalbaye's government increased its oppression of all the layers of population, including detentions from among his own Sara group. One of the very first rebel groups in the Northern parts of Chad was Front de Libération du Tchad (FLT) created in 1966 by Muslim intellectuals and nationalists from Chad. FLT was later transformed into the Union National Tchadienne (UDT), and, finally, the Front de Libération National Tchadien (FROLINAT).

Although FROLINAT united people who were dissatisfied with Tombalbaye, it had lack of common political will and vision and only vague plans for future governance. Another problem was the absence of a specific and concrete political platform: its goals and objectives were too broad, too ambiguous and too ambitious. Also, as Nolutshungu notes, FROLINAT

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[95] Ibid., 39.

"…had always been highly regionalized in its command structure, and its regional wings were of different ethnic composition."[96] It suffered from ethnic fragmentation of its members, aggravated by diversities, personal loyalties and uneven access of various groups to the top political leadership, leading to their differential treatment.

From the very beginning, FROLINAT was split into three military groups with separate agendas. The First Liberation Army, led by Abba Siddick and composed of ethnic Arabs, was created in 1969, and in 1976 became the Volcan Army. The most influential was the Second Liberation Army, or the Northern Armed Forces (FAN), led by Goukouni Oueddi (the son of a *derdei*, Chadian spiritual leader, who was in exile from Tombalbaye in Libya, and who had strong Libyan support) and Hissène Habré, which was in internal rivalry with the First Liberation Army. The Third Liberation army was primarily active in the west-central Kanem, and did not represent more or less strong force.

A very interesting point in the nature of FROLINAT, which, in fact, framed all the subsequent conflict scenarios was that FROLINAT, while originating in the Muslim Toubou region of BET and including in its ranks predominantly Muslims, *never* actually wanted to secede from the rest of Chad. On the contrary, it was strongly centralizing and advocated a unified country.

This wish to keep the country intact was from quite rational: according to Nolutshungu, "[There was] little for FROLINAT to gain from pulling out of the Republic the least prosperous and economically least promising North, and certainly not when it had a realistic chance of taking the whole country."[97] At the same time, the less developed Northern region, if it seceded, would have fallen victim to Libyan interests, which since the very arrival of Quadaffi to power, wanted to annex Northern Chad to create a unified state. This was quite well known to the FROLINAT leaders, who, instead of controlling the *whole* country, understood that they would

[96] Nolutshungu, S.C. (1996). *Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad.* University Press of Virginia, 97.
[97] Ibid., 61.

find themselves, in the best scenarios, as at best be the regional heads of these territories in case of unification with Libya.

3.2 Unilateral interventions

From the very beginning, the actions of FROLINAT were quite significant in the North: it captured the BET and the Wadai Prefecture. The army of southerners stationed there with no support from the domestic public in the North were feeling like aliens, antagonizing the local population, which supported FROLINAT, who fought on its own territory and claiming to protect the interests of its fellow-Muslim Northerners. Unable to cope with the increasing dissatisfaction in the North, and also knowing the paternalistic attitude of the French, Tombalbaye invited France to intervene to stop the advances of the FROLINAT.

3.2.1 Unilateral intervention: France I (1968), success

The first military intervention of France in Chad in 1968 had the primary aim of saving the Chadian postcolonial government. As a by-product of the intervention, the French tried to foster administrative reforms directed at democratization of the society through minimization of the chances of successful revolts in the future. Neither Tombalbaye nor the French had the ultimate goal to completely crush the FROLINAT revolt: the former feared mass retaliation from the Northern provinces, and the French were not prepared to get engaged in a costly and lengthy war.

Apart from providing a tentative remedy to the Chadian problems, the French had their own intervention goals, some of which, in fact, had nothing to do with Chad. The reason of the French intervention was deeply rooted, as P. Chaigneau noted, in their "need for… global presence and influence, [with] Africa having a major role to play in such a scheme."[98] France

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[98] Chaigneau, P. (1984) *La Politique militaire de la France en Afrique*", Paris 1984, 18-19.

wanted to reinstate its role as a regional superpower in Africa, which was seen as a natural extension of the French sphere of interest. Also, the French remembered the supportive role the Chadian government played in the Second World War under its governor Félix Eboué and were grateful for its support of de Gaulle's Free France at that time. Moreover, France wished to redeem itself from the stigma of German occupation during the war and revive the potency of the country in the eyes of its own citizens.

Also, the first French intervention coincided with the difficult period for the NATO, when one of its key pillars – France – decided to leave its Integrated Military Command in 1966. Three major factors figured strongly in French foreign policy at that time: France had to possess an independent nuclear arsenal – *force de frappe*, emphasizing its *grandeur* in the world political arena and fulfilling its special mission of spreading democracy worldwide. Thus, a short-term successful international operation of France, especially outside of statutory borders of Europe, would restore its superpower status and would show the NATO allies that France was capable of acting independently.

Upon the request of the Chadian government, France promptly responded by sending an expeditionary force. The aim of the intervention, according to Nolutshungu, was "to make possible the reinstallation of the Chadian administration in the BET"[99] – a mission limited geographically and operationally. The intervention occurred in two phases: the first phase began in August 1968 and lasted for three months. This time, the French sent only an expeditionary force, which, by the end of intervention, amounted to 2000 French marines. After a series of military clashes with the rebels, the French succeeded in retaking government outposts in the North, which had been held under siege by the FROLINAT since March of that year.

The second phase of the intervention began the following April, and was considerably larger in terms of personnel and scale of operation. It involved French troops, who engaged in open combat with the rebels on the territory under their control. The intervention was officially

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[99] Nolutshungu, S.C. (1996). Op.cit. P. 71.

ended in June 1971, however around 1200 French military personnel still remained in Chad to train the national army, which was about twice as big as the French contingent – 2700 infantry and air force.[100]

The French also succeeded in suppressing the revolt in the central and eastern parts of the country, curbing the threat from the BET, in general, and Tibesti, in particular. Through participation in the battles with the governmental forces, the French raised their morale and fulfilled their short-term limited objective of preventing FROLINAT from proceeding southwards and re-capturing most of the FROLINAT-held regions. FROLINAT's early gains in the North had been reversed, and the French, according to Nolutshungu, "progressively weakened FROLINAT's influence in this region and permanently deprived the Center-East of its leading role in the rebellion."[101]

As a result of intervention, the FROLINAT rebellion was seriously disorganized. The split within its political structure that was evident from the very beginning grew even larger. Internal divisions in the movement made it feeble and more susceptible to outside influences. A large part of further success role Libya in assisting FROLINAT was, paradoxically, due to the French force that battled the northerners. Having difficulty in consolidating its forces for the successful military operations against the French army, FROLINAT turned its attention to its Muslim neighbor – Libya.

After the intervention was over, the French insisted upon conducting administrative reforms directed to decentralization of authority and a shift to provincial officials and traditional leaders. The reason for such post-intervention involvement of the French is clear: they knew that the rebellion was far from being over, and feared further aggravation of the situation in northern Chad, which might lead to a re-intervention. The French needed Chad to have a democratic government with power-sharing mechanisms, increase the quality of administration and improve

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[100] Ibid., 69.
[101] Ibid., 63.

relations between Northern and Southern parts of Chad to satisfy the diverse viewpoints of population in order to prevent future discontent and renewal of rebellion.

Chad was quick to follow the French recommendations: central authorities started negotiations with the local chiefs, tax collection practices were improved, and political prisoners were released. However, the reforms turned out to be quite on the surface, and failed to address fundamental problems of the Chadian society – regionalization, poor economy, and political instability. Nothing had been done to improve domestic political climate and one-party dominance: Tombalbaye effectively remained the sole ruler of Chad.

By 1975 it became clear that Tombalbaye had not only lost the support of his fellow-southerners, but also of the armed forces, which were severely criticized because of their poor performance. The army was feeling a sense of pride due to successful operations against FROLINAT with the support of the French and wanted to play an active role in the political life of the country. On his part, Tombalbaye also feared being overthrown. This led to repressions in army ranks and frequent reshufflings of the top officers.

In March 1975 several senior military officers were arrested on suspicion of organizing yet another coup. This is the final blow to the army, and on April 13, 1975 junior military officers, led by Lieutenant Ali Dimtoloum, chief of staff, and General Milrew Odinar killed Tombalbaye during a mutiny. General Felix Malloum, a former government critic who had been imprisoned by Tombalbaye, and himself a southerner with strong kinship ties to the north, became the president.

Malloum formed the Supreme Military Council (CSM), which marked the beginning of the subsequent shift from the Southern to Northern dominance of the country. This government, as Nolutshungu notes, became increasingly "militar [istic]…, with only a few civilians occupying fairly minor ministerial positions."[102] The CSM became largely Muslim and contained more representatives from northern and eastern Chad. The new priority of his

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[102] Ibid., 94.

government became the independence of Chad from outside influence, especially from the French, since they supported the "dictator" Tombalbaye.

Soon the problems with the Malloum's government emerged, paradoxically because of the overthrow of Tombalbaye. Chadians were not so much pro-Malloum, not being a prominent opposition leader who enjoyed mass public support, as were they anti-Tombalbaye. For them, anybody but him would be fine. However, neither reformers nor skilled administrators, the new military leaders were unable to keep the authority, legitimacy, and popularity that they had from the first days of CSM. Gradually Malloum's governance resembled that of his predecessor: he seized control of all branches of government and banned almost all political activity – suspended the National Union of Chadian Workers and prohibited strikes.

Opposition to Malloum gathered around FROLINAT, which was successful in establishing alternative administrations in outlying areas to compete with N'Djamena. In the meantime, the rebel movement itself split, as a result of the rivalry between Goukouni and Habré. Goukouni, being generally receptive to Libyan interests, did not want FROLINAT to fight on two fronts – both N'Djamena and Tripoli. For him top priority was defeating the central government, and then possibly ousting Libya from Aouzou. In contrast, Habré claimed himself a true patriot of Chad and objected to Goukouni's wish to cooperate with Libya, whom he considered an occupier, in its struggle against the CSM.

Another significant factor in the disagreement within FAN leadership was the case of Habré's kidnapping of two French and one German citizens and the subsequent murder of the French security forces officer who came to negotiate a ransom. While Goukouni wanted to let them free out of fear of negative reaction from the Europeans, Habré insisted on keeping them as long as possible to re-negotiate ransom. Finally, the French managed to release the hostages after direct talks with Habré, which outraged Malloum. He ordered the majority of the French combat forces go home as "revenge" for their alleged "connections" with the enemy rebels. However,

the unstable situation in the Chadian army led him to retain several hundred French soldiers, and he renegotiated a series of military accords to ensure emergency aid.

Urged on by African heads of states and the French advisers, Malloum attempted to bring Habré and Goukouni into the government, but they soon clashed with each other, and, later, with Malloum himself. While Habré's troops engaged government forces in the North, Goukouni defeated the government army and threatened N'Djamena. To shore up his position, Malloum offered a formal alliance to Habré, which was embodied in the Fundamental Charter, forming the coalition government in August 1978. Malloum became president and Habré prime minister of the new government.

3.2.2 Unilateral intervention: France II (April-May 1978), success

From the point of view of military capacities, the governmental coalition was weak, which was caused by issues particular to its composition. As Nolutshungu notes, FAN was not the strongest wing of FROLINAT, and CSM's "deal with only one, and by no means the most representative, element in FROLINAT – one, moreover that was isolated from the mainstream – was a provocation to the movement rather than an encouragement to negotiate."[103] The remaining two armies of FROLINAT were much more influential and powerful than FAN, with FAP enjoying strong Libyan support. Jointly, FAT and FAN could, in principle, defeat FAP, provided they acted in close cooperation and pursued the same goals and agendas.

The entry of Habré into government, however, did not mean cessation of hostilities by FROLINAT. Goukouni, who was feeling marginalized by the new governmental coalition was now against Malloum and Habré alike. Composed now of three armies, with a new name - People's Armed Forces (FAP), his new opposition had as its objective to overthrow the coalition regime of the governmental FAT (Chadian Armed Forces)/FAN. By that time, nearly half of the

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[103] Ibid., 102.

country's territory was under rebel control. FAP continued to advance toward the capital, and in April 1978 it seized Salal and moved within range of 100 miles of N'Djamena.

The situation was dangerous not only for Malloum, who was faced with losing power completely, but also for the French. They were afraid that the growing strength of FAP, as a Muslim force with the backing of Libya, might challenge the view that Africa was under French political, economic, linguistic, religious and cultural influence. They were highly suspicious of the links between FAP and Libya and that the latter might exploit a situation in which the central government was weak and the opposition was growing stronger every day for its own benefit. Also, the French were afraid that the advances of FAP would jeopardize their secure access to the uranium resources of Niger, which were vital for France's nuclear *force de frappe*.

The second French intervention, which lasted two months – April-May 1978 – in support of the government, was a small-scale short-term rapid airlift of 1700 troops with battle aircrafts. The French created a buffer zone around the capital and heavily bombarded the rebel troops. These actions showed to the opposition that the government – even composed of former enemies – enjoyed strong French support and that the French were committed to retain the regime in power.

As was the case in their first intervention, the French had not wanted to become deeply engaged within the Chadian politics, nor to become the external guarantors of peace and reconciliation. They confined their presence to N'Djamena and used their limited resources to achieve limited ends. The French intervention dissuaded the opposition FAP from further attacks on the government forces and the capital of Chad and pushed them back northwards; Ati. Malloum's and Habré regime was saved for a while.

The actions of the French against FAP revealed an important modus that appeared in all remaining French interventions in Chad: its path-dependency and conformity with the recipient of their aid. A decade after their first operation in 1968 France directed their actions in support of the country's government, even though it now included the player it had fought against. For

France, it was not important who actually was in power in Chad: it continued assisting the central government.

At first, the Malloum/Habré union seemed to follow the same path. Both of them opposed the Libyan intervention in Chad. They together opposed the federal form of government that would aggravate existing ethnic divisions. They wanted to create a secular state, where Arabic would be given same status as French. Finally, they were both for a state-controlled economy. Notwithstanding the victory that the FAT/FAN managed to achieve over FAP with the support of the French troops, the split of their coalition was evident from the very beginning of their rapprochement.

The problems within the coalition government became apparent when Habré, among other things, started to demand that more governmental positions be given to the northerners, and the usage of the Arabic language instead of French in radio broadcasting. He also refused to surrender the FAN forces loyal to him, and used them as personal guards, which led to the situation with "de-jure two armies in…[a] city of barely quarter of a million souls, one belonging to the president and the other to the prime minister, both armed by France."[104] The conflict increased further when an exchange of anti-Malloum and anti-Habré pamphlets led to clashes between college students supporting rival factions. The final push towards war between Malloum and Habré was the seizure of passports of three of Habré's ministers at the airport, which triggered escalating provocations.

The major fighting, known as the First Battle for N'Djamena, occurred on February 12, 1979. The French contingent remained neutral and had not taken a major part in the conflict. Such behavior can be explained by the fact that the two rivals were once in the central government, and the winner of this confrontation would become the next president of the country. France was prepared to support the government of whichever party prevailed. Thus, France decided to abstain from supporting any factions and wait for the winner.

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[104] Ibid., 106.

At the same time the French were tacitly favoring Habré, notwithstanding his kidnapping of the French civilians and assassination of the French officer. There was only one occasion when the French pilots, contracted by FAT, attacked FAN, but Habré managed to thwart their air raids by threatening retaliation against French civilians. This was, one of the most decisive factors in the battle between FAN and FAP. As Azevedo and Nnadozie claim, "Had the French not forced the Chadian government to stop air raids against enemy positions in February 1979, Malloum's troops would have prevailed on the ground."[105] Thus, although the French remained formally neutral, protecting "…the central bank, the airport (where its base was), the urban telephone system (there were scarcely any telephones in African quarters), and the Israeli-built international hotel…,"[106] their operational inaction ultimately led to the collapse of Malloum's CSM.

Demoralized from the abandonment of their French supporters, FAT retreated from the capital. This was followed by mutual retaliations between the retreating southerners and advancing northerners. During the battle N'Djamena, about 1 000 people were killed and more than 80 000 fled the capital. In ten days, Goukouni's FAP seized the opportunity presented by the chaos and entered the capital. By March 1979 the struggle led to de facto partition of Chad: FROLINAT controlled the north, the capital was Goukouni's, and Malloum controlled the five southern prefectures.

3.2.3 Further war

Clashes between Muslims and Christian southerners marked a shift of conflict from the North into the South and led to numerous reconciliation efforts by foreign governments. Four peace conferences with the mediation of neighboring states, primarily, Niger, had beenwere held from March to August 1979. However, their effectiveness was limited, since, according to

[105] Azevedo, M. and Nnadozie, E.U. (1998). Op.cit. P. 53.
[106] Nolutshungu, S.C. (1996). Op.cit. P. 114.

Thompson and Adloff, the belligerent "…leaders… wanted more power than they could acquire through a coalition administration and…believed that they had the strength to seize it."[107]

Although a peace-keeping force was envisaged by all these conferences, and some (800 Nigerians, for instance) have indeed been dispatched, according to Nolutshungu, "they were neither an effective substitute for a police force nor able to disarm the contending factions. They were… too few to dissuade a determined aggressor nor to decide the outcome of any battle between the indigenous armed political groups – and even less able to impose Nigeria's choice of leader of the Chadians."[108] Under such circumstances, the Nigerian peacekeepers could not offer credible third party guarantees of peace in return for their observance of a peace agreement.

The most important of these conferences was the final one, held in Lagos in August 1979, which managed to include all parties and political and military movements in Chad. Apart from stressing the need for demilitarization, the release of prisoners, amnesty, neutrality in radio broadcasting, and introduction of a peacekeeping force, the participants decided to form the Government of National Unity of Chad (GUNT), which would reconcile the belligerent forces. Distribution of cabinet posts was balanced between south, north, center, and east. The OAU peacekeeping mission, composed of Congo, Benin and Guinea, was supposed to replace the French, but failed to reach full scale deployment. As a power-sharing tool, GUNT tried to incorporate all leaders: Goukouni was the country's president, Kamougue (a southerner and the leader of the Third Liberation army) – vice president, and Habré – minister of defense.

From the very start, GUNT had problems similar to those of CSM. Its leaders mistrusted each other, and it failed to achieve a sense of coherence. Politically, apart from Habré, all the leading roles had been given to pro-Libyan people, thus antagonizing one of the main figures of anti-Libyan opposition. On a personal level, the rift between Goukouni and Habré during the early years of FROLINAT continued. The new government was as inefficient as all its power-sharing coalition: as Thompson and Adloff noted, "…none of the key provisions of… [Lagos]

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[107] Thompson, V. and Adloff, R. (1981). Op.cit. P. 91.
[108] Nolutshungu, S.C. (1996). Op.cit. P. 124.

had been carried out, the cabinet had met only once, the southern prisoners had not been liberated, and none of the African peace-keeping forces had yet arrived in Chad."[109] After installation of the GUNT, Goukouni and Habré maintained separate spheres of influence and occupied separate parts of N'Djamena.

This confrontation between the two leaders led to another civil war that started in March 1980 and lasted for nine months without much change in the positions of the combatants. In December 1980, the Second Battle for N'Djamena took place. In addition to FAP and FAN, Kamougue's Southern Third Liberation Army also reached the suburbs of N'Djamena, but was pushed back with heavy losses. Almost all the civilian population of N'Djamena had left the city. Even when 600 Congolese soldiers finally arrived, together with the present French troops, they were completely inefficient in bringing peace to the country due to the multiplicity of actors. According to Thompson and Adloff, "the troops of five armies patrolled the streets…"[110]. Fearing that he might lose the war, Goukouni called for Libya to intervene.

3.2.4 Unilateral Intervention: Libya I (November 1981), success

Relations between Chad and Libya resembled one between amiable yet antagonistic neighbors. The strained nature of their alliance was born of centuries of ethnic, religious, and commercial interactions. The countries shared the same colonial past – Chad being a colony of France and Libya – of Italy, and the rivalry between the colonial powers framed the relations between their former colonies. After Libya became independent in 1969, its new head Quadaffi reclaimed the Aouzou Strip, a 100,000-square-kilometer portion of northern Chad, once given by France to Italy.

A number of factors translated into long-time Libyan interests in Chad, which actually coincided considerably with the interests of France. The quest for dominance over Chad was for

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[109] Thompson, V. and Adloff, R. (1981). Op.cit. P. 97.
[110] Ibid.

Libya a mix of rational calculus and historical path-dependence. On the one hand, there was a reported cache of minerals in the Aouzou Strip, including uranium that might have been utilized by the Libyan economy. At the same time, Libya wanted to liberate itself from its colonial past by itself becoming a colonial power. Following this reasoning, Nolutshungu claims that, just like France, Libya was interested in establishing "[a]t most, a pro-Libyan government, similar in ideology and willing to accept the fit accompli of Libyan incorporation of the Aouzou Strip would be desirable; better still, it should unite with Libya and be led by men in whom Quadaffi had confidence."[111]

Alongside such interests stood the desire of Libya to reduce the European presence in Africa and project Islamic influence into the Sahel through Chad and Sudan. Thus, by weakening Chad's ties with the West and reducing African dependence on the Western nation-state system, Quadaffi hoped to fulfill his dream of a unified Muslim Africa. Since the Chadian post-colonial government, highly dependent on France both economically and militarily, was not consistent with this picture, Quadaffi established alliances with several opposition leaders, including Goukouni, Siddick, Acyl Ahmat (a Chadian of Arab descent and head of the Democratic Revolutionary Council - CDR), and Kamougué who would foster his interests, and, in case of victory and accession to government, would build-up Chadian policies in accordance with Libyan wishes.

Goukouni's GUNT and Libya signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation on June 15, 1980. Under the treaty, the Chadian government had the right to call upon Libya should Chad's independence, territorial integrity, or internal security be jeopardized. Using this agreement as a pretext, Libyan troops entered Chad in November 1980 at the invitation of Goukouni and claimed to support GUNT, which was, according to the Lagos Agreement, the legitimate government of the country, now being itself confronted by the opposition. Altogether, around

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[111] Nolutshungu, S.C. (1996). Op.cit. P. 147.

7000 – 9000 Libyan troops with tanks and self-propelled artillery, including 4500 to 5000 from the Islamic Legion, were stationed in the Northern and Central Chad.

Operationally, Libyan troops succeeded in suppressing FAN and bringing GUNT to power. Starting from Northern Chad, the united front of the GUNT and the Libya-backed Islamic Legion gained control of N'Djamena on 15 December 1980. The results of the Libyan intervention were devastating for FAN, which lost nearly all major battles. In one month, FAN was defeated, and Habré was forced to flee to Sudan and reorganize his forces in Abeche. As a concession for their support, in January 1981 Libya made Goukouni sign an agreement allowing for the merger of the two countries. This was soon, however, disavowed by GUNT after pressure from France and a number of African states who were unreceptive to such Libyan "extension".

Apart from gaining quite tangible benefits for itself, the Libyan intervention helped to normalize the internal situation in Chad. According to Nolutshungu, Libya's "…presence helped to restrain clashes among GUNT factions, facilitated the withdrawal of forces from [sic] the capital and their redeployment elsewhere, and the disarmament of civilians. The Libyan troops were deployed where [sic] they were most needed, and…held back the advantage of Habré's rapidly constituted forces…" Also, "The [Libyan] troops had brought money, thus giving a stimulus to economic life…"[112]

An interesting point here is that the French made no efforts whatsoever to support Habré and to fight the Libyans. Most probably they did not want to escalate the conflict into an inter-state war. However, seeing these developments, the French increased their contingent in the Central African Republic, which should have acted as a show of force to the Libyans. In response, Libya threatened to impose an embargo on oil. This was followed by clear signaling from France that it would act if Libya made any move against Chad. Eventually, under pressure from the OAU and upon the request of Goukouni, who feared he might lose the country to Libyans, Quadaffi withdrew his forces from N'Djamena in November 1981.

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[112] Ibid., 155.

Several reasons can explain Libya's withdrawal, economic reasons being most plausible. Libya simply could not sustain the cost of a widening intervention. Its advances southward were quite quick and did not envisage the need for a large-scale permanent occupation. Also, Libya enjoyed limited popular support in Chad, except for the Northern part, which was dominated by Muslims Chadians and Arabs. Libya was even more alien to the Sara than were their Muslim neighbors.

With all this, Quadaffi wanted to retain an image of a neutral and impartial peacemaker to conceal his aspiration for dominance over the Northern Chad: he repeatedly mentioned that his "troops were in Chad at the request of the GUNT and its president, and that they would withdraw immediately if the Chadian president demands so."[113] Finally, being in Chad for a long time and assuming responsibility for domestic security, and, as a consequence, control over the country's international policy, was running the risk of collisions with the not so pro-Libyan Chadian neighbors, among which were Sudan, Egypt and Nigeria.

After Libya had retreated, OAU Inter-African Force (IAF), consisting of 2 000 Nigerians, 2 000 Zairians, and 800 Senegalese, out of the total of seven African governments that had pledged their contributions, entered Chad. Because of the vague mandate of the peacekeeping force and the determination of all three countries to avoid combat, the IAF made no effort to block Habré's military comeback after the departure of the Libyans. The most decisive factor in abstaining from fighting against Habré was the wish of the IAF countries to prevent Libya from spreading its influence in the Northern Africa.

It took Habré almost a year to regain control of the North. In response, GUNT again tried to seek support from Libya, but did not have much success, due to an internal split within its political and military ranks. Also, Quadaffi, understanding that the military advantage was on FAN's side and that he might sustain heavy losses if he openly confronted Habré, decided to refrain from helping Goukouni militarily. Facing little resistance from the GUNT or the OAU

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[113] Ibid., 156.

Inter-African Force, Habré's FAN moved toward the capital. As a result, in June 7, 1982 FAN captured N'Djamena and proclaimed Habré head of state.

3.2.4 Unilateral interventions: France III (1983), and Libya II, III, IV, and V (1983-1987), success-failure

After his defeat Goukouni, however, retained aspirations to come back to power. Numbering from 3000 to 4000 his troops included the remnants of FAP, former governmental FAT, CDR, the First Liberation Army, the Volcan Army, and the Western Armed Forces. The new force was christened the National Liberation Army (ANL) and had a total strength of 12 000 troops. Habre also regrouped his forces and the new FANT had an estimate of 10 000 force. At first, Goukouni managed to make progress on battlefield and captured Faya Largeau in June 1983 after a decisive bombing by the Libyan air forces. Moving further south, ANL occupied Kalait, Oum Chalouba, and, finally, Abéché.

Reverse of Libya's attitude toward involvement in Char was caused by the events following the defeat of Goukouni in June 1982. Libya began to fear that Habré might endanger Libya's possession of the Aouzou Strip. Thus, it decided to secure its positions by aiding Goukouni. Habré was also seeking help from the outside, without much success. Finally, he took command of the FANT forces himself, and first liberated Abéché four days after the city's fall, then Faya Largeau, and finally retook the northern posts.

Habré's counter-attack in the north led to a confrontation between FANT and Libyan contingents, including heavy armored vehicles and air force, totaling 4 000-5 000 troops, which soon expelled FANT from Faya Largeau. The Libyan force had overwhelming superiority in military power, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, battle aircrafts, self-propelled artillery, and multiple rocket launchers.

Seeing that Chad might fall victim to Libyan dominance, which France was very much eager to prevent, Paris finally decided to intervene. Thus, the conflict in Chad moved from a

standard three-player intervention, with two belligerent sides and a third party, to four players, where each of the belligerents had a corresponding "patron-state".

This "externalization" of the internal conflict in Chad, however, did not grow escalate into an open conflict between France and Libya, since their respective interventions, according to Nolutshungu, "…had some of the characteristics of a cooperative game. Each kept to its side of the line of demarcation, France unwilling to retake the North for Habré and Libya unwilling to press its military advantage to help the GUNT move toward the capital…"[114] Both countries were afraid of taking the Chadian domestic war to the level of international conflict and therefore limited themselves to a mere show-of-force, abstaining from any direct confrontation.

With the aim of pushing Libya from Faya-Largeau and minimizing its role in Chadian domestic politics in particular, and in the African continent in general, in August 1983 France started the *Operation Manta* (Stingray) with the airlift of 180 military advisers and equipment, followed by 3 500 troops, including its air force, the Foreign Legion, and airborne personnel. The French used the same tactics as before, occupying N'Djamena and the routes leading to it, thus securing the capital, where the government was based, from Libyan air strikes. France also tried to separate the belligerents via establishing a no-fly zone on the 16th parallel to the North, which was supposed to limit Libyan bombings.

By 1983 the country was divided into two parts: BET belonged to ANL, and the rest of Chad was under FANT. Libya was increasing its presence in the region by building new, modern radar stations in Chad and bringing in new troops. The country was not only on the verge of collapse, but the conflict threatened to lead to interstate war between France and Libya. Seeing this, in September 1984 the two states decided to deescalate the conflict and pledged to withdraw Chad (for France) and the contested Aouzou Strip (for Libya). The withdrawal, however, was made only by the French, who left Chad by November, in accordance with their agreement, while Libya defected and continued to remain in the BET with 3 000 troops.

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[114] Ibid., 189.

France prevented Libya from further advances southward and from threatening N'Djamena. The French intervention - Operation Manta - had a real credible threat of punishment to ANL. At the same time, Libya did not want to engage in open conflict with France. Also, the establishment of a 16th parallel no-fly zone helped FANT strengthen its positions in the regions immediately adjoining the demarcation line. Finally, although Libyans remained in BET after France retreated, acting mainly as a show-of-force, Operation Manta prevented Libya from furthering its presence and occupying the territories beyond BET.

France's presence also led to a rapid increase in numbers and morale of the FANT with opposite developments on the other side, including defection and dissention in ANL. At this point, FANT included around 15 000 personnel from the former *codos* rebellion in the south.[115] Seeing this, Libya decided to increase its presence in Chad, and the combined ANL-Libyan forces totaled 10 000 soldiers in Tibesti and Fada.

The strengthening of Libya's position through a new airbase and radar stations galvanized the French to return with *Operation Epervier* (Sparrowhawk) with 2 500 personnel including a detachment of top-level Jaguar and Mirage aircrafts. The "Epervier" could not be called an intervention in a military sense, since it participated in few military activities, instead using "swaggering" tactics to dissuade Libyans from attacking N'Djamena and Abéché. The only French forces in BET, where the real military operations were taking place, was a group of 150 engineers engaged in de-mining.

The build-up of the FANT and the French contingent coincided with a split within GUNT. Acyl, head of pro-Libyan CDR composed exclusively from Arabs, was receiving separate assistance from Libya, which antagonized other factions of ANL. This break-up was partially due to the increasing support that the Arabs in the ANL were receiving from Libya. This led to resentment of Goukouni's forces, especially, FAP, to Libyan presence in the north and their unwillingness to continue offensive against FANT. These developments escalated into

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[115] The rebellion was insignificant for my research since it had neither serious consequence for future developments in Chad, nor did it have any third party interventions.

an open military confrontation between FAP and CDR, which, with the Libyan support, forced Goukouni's men, who constituted around 2/3 of the whole ANL reserves, to retreat to mountains.

Goukouni finally decided to side with FANT. Such reverse of fortune was very much favored by Habré, who signed an agreement with the FAP units, while Goukouni himself being under house arrest in Tripoli. When it became known that Goukouni was prepared to make peace with his arch-rival Habré, his house in Tripoli was surrounded, and he was shot and wounded. At first, FAP organized attacks against CDR, but was pushed by the Libyans to the Tibesti mountains where they had still been under Libyan attacks. In December 1986 Libyan armored columns attacked the FAP settlements in Tibesti, using napalm and poison gas, and forced them to retreat.

At the same time, with the economic help of France and equipped well for a desert war with light Toyotas pick-ups carrying arms, FANT attacked CDR and Libyans in Fada. Libyans, together with the Islamic Legion's heavy armored tanks were not suited for such warfare, with high maneuvering Toyotas firing antitank missiles and recoilless rifles at them from a close range. With their last two tank barriers Libyans were defeated leaving around 700 dead and 150 war prisoners. In this operation Libya lost about $ 1 billion worth of military equipment.[116]

This, however, did not stop Quadaffi from another attempt to regain control over BET. His offensive resumed in February 1987 with a total of 11000 troops. The counterstrike was also unsuccessful: FANT not only defeated the two tank squadrons, but managed to capture their base in the north, with the death toll reaching 1200 and 450 prisoners. This was a severe blow to Libya. Without a pretext of intervention upon request from the government and without any support from its former Chadian allies, Libya found itself deeply "bogged down" in Chad as an occupant of its territory. Libyans were isolated in an unfamiliar terrain, and with no effective radar systems and airbase for air strikes to support its land units could inflict no harm on mobile FANT units. This decreased the already-low morale of the Libyans.

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[116] Azevedo, M. and Nnadozie, E.U. (1998). Op.cit. P. 59.

Eventually, suffering heavy losses in personnel and military equipment and failing to reach its goal of securing the North for CDR and spreading its influence in the BET, Libya retreated. Following this, FANT launched a successful attack on the town of Aouzou urging Libyans to leave their base. Libya retaliated by bombing the northern cities occupied by FANT. Habré asked for French intervention, but in vain. Although France wanted to keep its involvement in Chad, it still did not want to intervene in Aouzou, which was a territory of vital Libyan interests. The French Ministry of Defense declared that there would be no French soldier or aircraft intervening on behalf of the Chadian government to liberate northern Chad from Libyan occupation, and that the 1000 French troops and aircrafts stationed in N'Djamena would be used exclusively for the purpose of defense of the capital.

Thus, FANT was left alone, and, as a result, was driven out of Aouzou by air strikes followed by ground troops copying Chad's own desert warfare tactics with the usage of light vehicles. Habré responded with a surprise attack on the Libyan airbase, killing 1000, capturing 300 and a considerable number of Libyan fighter aircrafts and choppers. The French, however, tacitly assisted Habré by establishing an air defense system to prevent any further Libyan military actions southward of the 16th Parallel; they also bombed the Libyan radar installation at Qadi-Doum.

Finally, seeing the fruitlessness of further military confrontation, both Habré and Quadaffi decided to suspend fighting. Chadian and Libyan foreign ministers met in August 1988, and the two governments agreed to conduct further talks with OAU mediation. Chad suspended its attempts to regain the Aouzou Strip, and Libya stopped bombing the southern regions of the country. The two states subsequently signed an agreement that ended their rivalry, while the Aouzou Strip continued to remain for a period within Libyan hands.[117]

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[117] The dispute over the Aouzou Strip between Chad and Libya was taken to the International Court of Justice in 1990 for a binding ruling. According to the ICJ decision, made on 3 February 1994, the Aouzou would remain within Chad. The Strip was formally transferred from Libya to Chad on 30 May 1994 (see the ICJ judgement at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=424&code=dt&p1=3&p2=3&case=83&k=cd&p3=5, last accessed on 21.04.08).

From 1989 onward, in his nearly seven years in power, Habré pursued a mix of national reconciliation policy with punishment of leaders of factions who openly and actively opposed his regime. In domestic politics, he advocated national integrity and a unitary state. However, faced with internal threats to his regime, he used repression against his political opponents. On the international level, Habré expressed strong preference for French rather than Libyan patronage. France continued to maintain a sizable military and security presence in Chad as well as strong economic and financial support.

Ethnic rivalry, however, continued. Collisions between different ethnic groups, especially between the representatives of Hadjerai, Zaghawa and Gorane in the central government, led to the defection of Idriss Deby, a Zaghawa and one of Habré's leading generals, to Darfur, Sudan in April 1989. In December 1990, with no opposition from the French stationed in Chad, Deby successfully occupied N'Djamena and ousted Habré (a Gorane) to Senegal. Three months later, Deby, and his Patriotic Salvation Movement (PSM), became the new president of Chad.

3.3 Analysis of Interventions

The conflict in Chad is characterized not only by a multiplicity of belligerent parties, their colliding interests and agendas, but also by numerous intervention attempts by third parties, mixed in character and aims, which enhanced the ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional tensions within the Chadian population. Since I am assessing the causes of successes and failures of unilateral interventions in these cases, I mainly focus on the actions of France and Libya. Moreover, instead of viewing these as separate interventions, I treat the French actions together as one intervention and Libya's actions as the second intervention in the Chadian conflict.

This reasoning is mainly born out of consideration of the third party goals and intervention agendas, which were largely path-dependent in that they engaged in similar methods of intervention. Moreover, these interventions were always directed to one the same side of the conflict: in all instances France supported the government, while Libya provided aid on behalf of

the opposition. Therefore, the successive interventions by France and Libya are best treated as two long, more-or-less continuous interventions.

3.3.2 Success of the French Interventions

Ever since the independence of Chad, France has played an important role in Chadian politics, supporting subsequent governments in all spheres – military, economic, administrative.[118] The presence of France was always noticeable: their troops had either physically been in Chad for a limited time or were stationed in other neighboring countries. France was the most important supplier of economic aid through development assistance, loans and other grants. Although no longer a consumer of Chad's agricultural goods, as was the case during colonial times, France still accounted for a substantial part of the country's budget.

In the 1980s with the change of Giscard d'Estaing's government to Mitterrand's, France acquired a nominally anti-colonialist stance, which, in general, was against large-scale interventions in Africa. This largely framed future French involvement in the region: limited operations supporting government factions without getting much involved in domestic political settings. Another reason for French involvement in Africa, and Chad in particular, was its desire to limit the influence of pro-Soviet and Muslim Libya on the territory it considered its own backyard and an extension of its European geopolitical environment.

Important insights into France's continuous support and presence in Chad is given by Noluchungu, who claims that, "In France, the fate of Chad was always linked to the security of French influence over the rest of his former colonies in tropical Africa. The kind of domino theory seemed to apply: if one were lost… others might be lost (or abandoned); if France were unable to protect one dependent state, its guarantees to others might become less credible… France's global status as well as its African economic interests and prestige would be

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[118] According to some sources, the value of French military assistance to Chadian government from 1983 to 1987 was around $ 175 million. During the first half of 1987 alone, all aid, including *Operation Epervier*, amounted to nearly $100 million (for more information on France's military and economic role in Chad see http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/tdtoc.html, last accessed on 10.05.08).

undermined."[119] Thus, France considered Chad as an inherent component of its security and wanted to keep the situation stable.

Another consideration for France was the advance of Libya, which might have brought not only overwhelming "Islamization" of the country, , but also "Arabization" of the Chadian population and a slow decrease in the usage of the French language, which would be substituted by Arabic, presaging the demise of the French cultural aura (which, in fact, happened during the first years of Habré's rule). As a result, France stood to lose the traditional linkages between the French and their African ex-colonies. Besides, the developments in Chad and Libyan build-up threatened access of France to uranium resources of neighboring Niger, which were vital for France's force de frappe.

Given France's *limited intervention aims*, it was largely successful in pursuing its objectives in Chad. An important factor that framed modus operandi of France in Chad is that it wanted to retain influence over the African country at minimal cost (probably with involvement of other African countries). This could best be accomplished through usage of political means (for instance, to mobilize African countries against increasing Libyan aspirations for pan-African domination), rather than a purely military presence.

A pattern that characterized French interventions was the direction of French support; France always *supported the governments*, without however paying much attention to who the government was.[120] This stance stemmed from a general "paternalistic" attitude that committed France to supporting its Francophone African states. Also, since France preferred to keep security in Francophone Africa and protect its economic and political interests in the state, it was much easier to keep security in the country by supporting the government which, in most cases, was stronger than the opposition. This yielded a familiar pattern of protecting whomever was in power. During their first intervention, they protected Tombalbaye against FROLINAT,

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[119] Nolutshungu, S.C. (1996). Op.cit. P. 11.
[120] For instance, as it was during Operations Manta and Epervier, France supported Habré, whom they did not particularly like due to his past anti-France rhetoric and hostile acts.

and then it supported Malloum, who overthrew Tombalbaye, against FROLINAT in general and FAP, in particular. It also provided a backing for Habré against Libya, which was notorious for kidnapping and killing of French citizens.

France continued to support the government in the face of blatantly non-democratic practices. For instance, according to Nolutshungu, in case of Tombalbaye, "…Paris… found itself in the classic dilemma of intervention – whether to back…[him] or to let him fall, with all the uncertainty that might entail. There was no obvious candidate for his replacement, and the Chadian army, bloodied in the revolt, could not yet be trusted to provide alternative leadership."[121] With all this in mind, France concluded that the benefits from a successful intervention would considerably outweigh the costs of supporting the non-democratic government.

In this case, as well as in subsequent attempts to save the ruling regime, France did not want to install an external authority and put in place its "own" person, like Gabriel Lissette during the colonial times and immediately after independence. Neither did France want to serve as a substitute for the acting government in fulfilling its administrative tasks, which would remind both Chad and France of their colonial past.

Another significant factor in French success in Chad was its *limited character of intervention*, which was reflected by its limited agenda, scope, coverage, and resources. France never intervened with the goal of total annihilation of the opposition. Neither had it undertaken the role of peace-enforcer or peacekeeper, under which it would provide external security guarantees for the parties. France never actually led any formal peace talks or negotiations, or had any agreement with FROLINAT with the purpose of ending the conflict, except for the release of the kidnapped French citizens.

Furthermore, the French never aimed to replace the Chadian government in any way. France never wished to be connected with the security of the Chadian state in a way that would

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[121] Nolutshungu, S.C. (1996). Op.cit. P. 72.

require a large-scale presence in the country. Such operational posture stemmed from France's general stance towards African countries: it was not going to be involved in major external actions in Africa; it preferred to have stability in the region, but not through massive military intervention.

Limited intervention agendas lead to limited operational scope: on a very few occasions the French directly collided with the opposition, but this was always the domestic Chadian player – usually a faction of FROLINAT or GUNT. It never had any face-to-face military confrontation with the other intervener – Libya – which protected France (and Libya) from an inter-state conflict. Mainly, France's actions against Libya's incursions to the South were conducted from the air, which limited both French fatalities.

Another factor that affected French intervention was limited geographical operational coverage: unlike Libya, which was largely scattered over the northern Chadian terrain, the French, when present, always maintained a close pattern of deployment. French troop were mainly stationed in N'Djamena and protected the inbound routes. These tactics allowed them to keep good communication lines, high mobility of troops, high concentration in the case of combat and minimal casualties. The French, unlike the Libyans, were never forced to operate in an unknown and hostile environment against the wishes of the population; in only a few cases, did it go beyond the southern and central parts of Chad and its capital.

France never maintained a large-scale presence in Chad, except for during the actual interventions During non-combat phases, French personnel were limited to a couple of hundred military training officers and service personnel of the N'Djamena Airport. Being stationed in other African countries meant that France had to considerably cut its operational costs and save money for troop maintenance in order to rapidly intervene when necessary.

Another quite significant factor of success of the French intervention, which follows the minimalist approach to intervention, was both their attitude towards the side they supported and

operational characteristics of intervention. While intervening, France always *remained an external player*, avoiding deep involvement in domestic matter.

France aimed at distancing itself from the belligerents and their internal rivalry, assuming no responsibility for long-term external security to the country. France was protecting both the independence of the party it supported – the government – and its own independence. French detachments were operating on their own, now including within their ranks local Chadian soldiers. They did not mix with the Chadian army, and always represented a separate entity. Thus they created a sense of credibly autonomy for the Chadians, who were believed they were acting on their own. Such an attitude facilitated high morale within the Chadian ranks and a feeling of self-sufficiency.

At the same time, although there was always a French presence in Chad, they were never all the time stationed in Chad, and their interventions had a repeated, concurrent, but not continuous and prolonged fashion. For instance, after the Operation Manta, the French donated to FANT considerable military equipment and a 100-person strong army training unit, which was incomparable better than the capacities it had used during the operation itself. This helped them to cut expenses of having a serious military and political presence in the country, allowing for high mobility inside and outside the target country over the long-term.

A very important aspect of success of these interventions were their *institutionalization* both in the eyes of local Chadians as well as the international community, which was given in corresponding legal acts. The legislative basis for interventions of France in Chad was the multilateral military assistance agreement between France and the members of *Afrique Equatoriale Francaise* – AEF (French Equatorial Africa: Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, and Congo). In accordance with the terms of the agreement, and specifically in reference to Chad, France was granted the right to use the military base close to N'Djamena, rights for

overflight and automatic transit of goods and personnel. In return, France was obliged not only to protect against external threats but also to provide domestic security, law and order.[122]

Chadian government could thus automatically request direct French intervention to protect its government in case of major civil unrest, insurgency or coups.

This institutional approach to intervention from the viewpoint of Chadian domestic politics was significant in maintaining public support for the French interveners. In fact, the French were never considered by the general public as interveners but as protectors of security and keepers of stability of the country.

On the other hand, on the basis of bilateral agreement between Chad and France, apart from economic support the latter was to provide military technical assistance to the Chadian army, including training and coaching of the Chadian officers. This would have tied France to long-lasting commitment and provision of permanent aid to the government, which could have been a serious burden. That is why a special clause was included in the general and bilateral agreements with Chad that France would intervene to salvage Chadian regimes from internal and external threats whenever *it* considers necessary.

3.3.3 Success and failure of the Libyan Interventions

The second third party intervener in this case was Libya, which was always concerned with the direct fulfillment of its vital national interests in Chad. Libya attempted to influence developments in Chad from the beginning of the 20th century, when it was itself ruled by Ottomans. However, it was during the colonial period that a decisive event laid the basis for future confrontation with Chad: in 1935, under pressure from Fascist Germany, France was forced to change its administrative borders in Chad in favor of its colonial next-door neighbor – Mussolini's Italy, who held what is now independent Libya.

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[122] This clause was invoked by Malloum when he asked for the French assistance to put down the FROLINAT rebellion.

As a result of these negotiations, the Libya-Chad boundary was relocated about 100 kilometers southward across the Aouzou Strip. After the independence of Chad, Libyans attempted to retain the Aouzou by stationing their troops in the strip. Unlike a standard intervention, which usually begins at a certain point in time marking a certain problem to be solved and ends with fulfillment or failure to achieve its goal, the Libyan actions resembled more an occupation and annexation. The Libyan forces stationed in North and Center of the country were *Libyanizing* the local population through introduction of Libyan ID cards, Libyan currency, educating young people in Libya for study, establishing local People's Committees, and flying Libyan flags on governmental buildings.

Since the independence of Chad, Libya in most cases *supported the opposition* (from the North) against the government (usually Southern), which, in return for their support, secured Libyan interests in the northern part of the country. Only on one occasion did Libya succeed in fulfilling its intervention agenda when it acted together with the opposition: this was the case of late 1980 Libyan intervention, when its troops actually brought GUNT to power. This success was due to two factors.

From an operational point of view, Libyan troops succeeded in helping GUNT to stifle FAN and for almost a year pushed Habré's supporters out of N'Djamena. This happened due to the fact that Libyans, together with GUNT troops, were considerably *operationally stronger* than Habré's FANT, possessed superior military equipment and, in general, outnumbered FANT, which was left in the capital without support of the French troops.

However, the most important consideration here is that GUNT – the Government of National Unity – while being in opposition, was still a legitimate government of the country. This was the crucial determinant of success for the Libyan intervention – *institutionalization of their actions*. On the basis of an official agreement with Goukouni, Libya supported the coalition government in exile, a legal entity installed as a result of the Lagos II conference. Apart from

securing public support in Chad, this allowed Quadaffi to represent himself as a peacemaker and distract international attention from his real interests in Chad.

If the Libyans had enjoyed popular support in the territories to the North, including their fellow-Arabs and other African Muslims, the appreciation of their presence in Chad was decreasing with their movement southward. The South had always rejected the domination of the northerners, especially when this domination was installed and supported by an outside force. However, in this case, when Libyans were supporting the legitimate government of the country, Tripoli's actions looked legitimate, helping to achieve a certain level of popular support.

The institutionalization was needed both for the internal Chadian politics, and the international arena. The institutionalized intervention increased the confidence of both Libyans and Chadians that they were supporting the right cause and the right government. Quadaffi went even further and claimed that, since Goukouni (as the head of the government of Chad) had asked Libya to intervene, he might also ask them to leave. In this view, Libya, as a responsible member of the international community, would respect this request and leave. This may also have been a face-saving act since, following the request of Goukouni, Libya did in fact leave.

The legitimacy of GUNT, nurtured and endorsed by four reconciliation conferences, might have been an additional explanation for why France did not support Habré in 1980-1981. Although minister of defense, for them Habré was still an opposition rebel, who was acting against the legitimate government, whom France supported. A logical question to ask would then be why did France not support GUNT, as a legally placed government, as it did Habre's government?

The answer may be that GUNT enjoyed the backing of Libya, with which France had a competitive relationship in the region. France could in no way act in cooperation with a country, which, if not an enemy, was certainly not a friendly state, the influence of which threatened France's interests in Chad. Thus, a rational explanation, taking into account the general line of the French support, would be that in this case inaction was action, and the French were in any

102

case willing to support a legitimate government in place in Chad, no matter who was in office. Once this government was in place, France could easily exercise its influence over it. Also, there were still lingering negative feelings towards Habré after the kidnapping incident, which prevented them from supporting him at this stage.

Operational reasons for the failure of Libyan interventions were largely due to their tactical inferiority and inability to effectively enforce their will against the opposing side. The reasons for Libya's continuous defeats after Habré's return to power stem from the nature of the intervention and the identity of the party to which it directed its support. Operationally, Habré's troops enjoyed considerable *tactical superiority*. Although FAN received no sizable assistance from the French, who mainly played the role of a buffer force, his troops were fighting a war, which, according to David Ottaway, was the result of "the most successful collaboration between a Western army and a Third World army in modern times."[123]

After its initial defeat at N'Djamena, FAN forces became both operationally more suited to the desert warfare and tactically flexible. The Libyan army, on the other hand, "…favored conventional Soviet-style operations in which infantry are backed up by armor, making them vulnerable to that FAN's hit-and-run tactics".[124] As for its single victory against Habré in 1988, when FAN was driven by Libyans out of previously occupied Aouzou, this was done by mimicking FAN usage of highly maneuverable light vehicles and short-range self-propelled missiles.

Unlike the French, who always viewed themselves as an external player, Libya eventually became an *internal actor* on the Chadian domestic political scene: not merely an intervener with its own agenda, but an occupant of the territory covered by the intervention. Unlike the French, who entered Chad only when there was a need for military action, the Libyans from the very beginning of their involvement were looking forward to a long-term prospects of territorial annexation.

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[123] Ottaway, D. (1987, September 17). The US May Send Chad Some Stingers. *Washington Post*, p. A36.
[124] *Africa Confidential* 28(8). (1987, April 15), p. 2.

On the one hand, this was can be explained by Libya's going out of the original area it occupied and expanding its intervention agenda, which turned out to be fatal. While stationed in Aouzou, its troops could easily coordinate its actions, provide continuous supplies of military equipment and ammunition from Libya proper, and economically sustain their presence. They could also instate their own administration (which they did in practice), and conduct heavy expansion of the Libyan culture, Arabic language and traditions. Also, limited territorial coverage allowed Libyans to effectively survey the land installations and back-up their infantry actions by aircraft fire.

Once, however, Libya decided to engage southward, it proved difficult to effectively sustain a presence of its troops on larger territories and unknown terrain. Airlift of cargo from Libya proper became increasingly difficult with the Libyan southward advances. Air surveillance was limited due to the absence of radar installations to the south, and their troops received no support from the air. Libya also had to operate in a territory with other ethnic groups, which, apart from decreasing the morale of its soldiers, led to greater popular resistance.

An important factor in Libya's failures that that Libya had not limited itself to operational presence but undertook the steps directed towards provision of responsibility for external security and external governance for the northern territories. As a result of being in Aouzou strip for a long time, Libya got deeply immersed in domestic Chadian politics. This involvement intensified even as Quadaffi tried to rein in Libya's commitments in Chad.

Libya could not remain upon another state's sovereign territory indefinitely. A decision had to be made: either legalize its status in northern Chad via complete unification of Libya with the Northern part of the country, retreat, or remain in the region for an unspecified time. Libya, who did not have large support in the international community, and which had poor relations with the US, was unable to effectively annex the Chadian territory. Thus, it decided to remain in Chad, undertaking an increasing number of state functions and responsibilities that it was unable to perform.

104

4.4 Conclusions

The conflict in Chad and its concurrent intervention represents a case with variation in dependent variable – success of intervention, while the independent variables – composition of intervention force – remained the same: each intervention was unilateral. With a number of factors held constant – political environment, geography, conflict period, – I identify factors that had an important intervening effect on the course of interventions and, consequently, on their overall success.

The interventions of France and Libya were characterized by path-dependency of their actions: they always supported the same side, with the first providing aid to the government, which was generally the stronger of the two, and the latter – the opposition, being usually weaker. In both cases, the interventions were successful when they were backed up by institutional arrangements safeguarded by formal legal agreements. Even when Libya supported GUNT in opposition to Habré's ruling regime, it was still a government in exile, on behalf of which Libya made a commitment to intervene.

The direction of third party support had an important effect on the subsequent developments: the government-supporting intervener enjoyed a higher degree of legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Hence, the intervener was considered by the population an upholder of law and order, helping the intervener achieve its goals. In contrast, the intervener that supported the opposition had the backing of that party and its supporters alone, which by definition was quite limited.

Another decisive factor in the success of interventions was a limited intervention agenda. Both France and Libya were effective when they had narrower intervention goals: the first not wanting to engage in long-lasting conflict with the opposition (whoever that was) and succeeding in having a say in the Chadian affairs, and the latter effectively keeping its presence in a small area of the Aouzou Strip, making it a stronghold of Libyan influence.

105

Operationally, the internalization of intervention made it became increasingly difficult for Libya to sustain its army on a large territory away from its home base, especially when it was a large army composed of infantry, armored vehicles, artillery and air power. This required not only high degree of coordination between highly dispersed units, but also a huge economic commitment to maintain such presence. It turned out to be a daunting task for Libya to go southwards and attempting to provide for the local administration of the territories it was covering, mainly due to its limited economic resources, and the diversity of population it encountered to the south.

In sum, the French presence remained largely external to the situation in Chad, allowing France to retain its limited agenda. In contrast, Libya's decision to extend its presence by going out of the area, both literally and figuratively – extending its territorial coverage and includes additional components of intervention – worked against Libya's ability to achieve its intervention goals.

CHAPTER 4: GEORGIA (1992-1994)

The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is a typical post-Soviet case of ethno-political conflict, which has not been finished yet. Nationalist forces, nurtured by a Soviet system that created self-identified quasi nation-states, were unleashed into long-lasting identity wars. Initially started as communal collision between Georgians, who represented the ethnic majority on the territory of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, and ethnic Abkhaz, being the minority, the conflict later developed into a full-scale war. Apart from the main conflicting sides – the Abkhaz and the Georgians, the war involved other participants, mainly non-state actors – mercenaries and volunteers from northern Caucasus part of Russia, and, allegedly, irregulars from the Russian military.

For the purpose of the present research I consider two cases of intervention: a unilateral intervention, where the main actor was Russia, which does not necessarily mean overt involvement in the conflict, and a multilateral intervention, which was also conducted by Russia under the aegis of CIS peacekeeping forces. Since in this case I am dealing with unilateral and multilateral interventions that were unsuccessful in reaching their aims, I will not consider in detail the role of other actors involved in the conflict resolution process (the UN mission in Georgia and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe).

4.1 Conflict Background

To understand the causes of interventions as well as their consequences, it is necessary to view it from the prism of historical relations between the Abkhaz and the Georgians. At the heart of ethnic rivalry has been Abkhaz land, which had a number of accompanying attachments: language, culture, religion, and, last but not the least, political loyalties. Georgian sources identify the indigenous population of Abkhazia as belonging to the Iberian-Caucasian family of

peoples, the principal member of which is Georgians, thus denying the Abkhaz their identity. Contrary to this, the Abkhaz claim to be autochthonous in the region with no ties whatsoever to the Georgians.

Historically, Abkhazia constituted a separate principality within Georgia when the kingdom was divided between Iran and Turkey. The modern history of the people starts with the Great Caucasian Wars between Russia and Turkey (1830-64), in which the Abkhaz supported their kin Muslims in Turkey, while Georgia sided with Christian Russians. Following the Russian victory, Abkhazia came under direct Russian rule, and, after two unsuccessful revolts of 1878, a considerable proportion of the Abkhaz were expelled to Turkey, where they formed a sizable Diaspora. This event, known in the Abkhaz history as *Mokhadjirstvo*, became a notorious black spot in the history of the Abkhaz.

In 1918 Abkhazia legally became a part of Georgia with an autonomous status. The situation with the ethnic minorities was far from perfect in Menshevik Georgia, which led the Abkhaz to seek shelter in Russia. Ethnic minorities faced oppression, which lasted until 1921, when the communist Red Army eliminated the Democratic Republic of Georgia. In March of the same year, the Abkhazian Bolsheviks declared independence and proclaimed establishment of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia – a union-level republic directly subordinated to Moscow with no formal links to the newly created Georgian SSR.

Only in 1931 was the Abkhaz SSR renamed the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Georgian SSR, meeting the fate of other quasi-autonomous formations on the territory of the Soviet Union (such as Crimea, the Don, Terek, Stavropol, and Odessa). This was the first time when formal vertical hierarchical relations were established between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. During the times of Stalin, when prominent Abkhaz, as well as Georgians, were repressed, a policy of mass resettlement of Georgians from Georgia proper to Abkhazia was undertaken in an attempt to further alter the demographic structure of Abkhazia.

Disagreements between the Abkhaz and Georgians concerning the "who-is-who" conundrum were not resolved with the further strengthening of communist rule. The whole process can be characterized as the struggle of the Abkhaz nation between their forced assimilation by the Georgians and willful assimilation by the Russians, one of the signs of which was imposition of the usage of Cyrillic script. The nature of this disagreement was indeed vital: the nationalist Georgians claimed that the Abkhaz were *newcomers* to the region and had nothing to do with the ancient population of Abkhazia, who were a Kartvelian tribe.[125] This argument was over the very existence of the Abkhaz nation; while the Abkhaz claimed their uniqueness, the Georgians asserted that they had no distinct national identity.

Interesting insights to the interethnic situation between the Georgians and the Abkhaz are given by Susan Goldberg, according to whom the Georgians believe that "the Abkhazian identity is entirely a product of the Soviet corruption of history, and was artificially reinforced to destabilize and weaken the Caucasus."[126] Hence, the zero-sum nature of the forthcoming conflict: while Georgians were concerned with the territorial integrity of their nation-state, the Abkhaz were fighting for their very existence as a nation.

4.1.1 Abkhazian autonomy as security dilemma

The system of autonomies and republics established by early leaders of the Soviet Union, "…actively institutionalized the existence of multiple nations and nationalities as constitutive elements of state and its citizenry … [through] sponsoring, codifying, institutionalizing … [and]

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[125] Traditionally, the Georgian nation consists of different tribes – the Karts, Svans, Chans, Megrels, Guruls, Khevsur, and others, who have been living on the territory of present Georgia for centuries. Two of them have their own spoken language, which is distinct from the others (the Svans and Magrelians). This is also the case with Abkhaz, whose spoken language is quite distinct from the Georgian, and which uses Russian Cyrillic as its written base.
[126] Goldberg, S. (1994). *Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 102.

inventing nationhood and nationality on sub-state level, while at the same time doing nothing to institutionalize them on the level of the state as a whole".[127]

The ethnic autonomies present from the very moment of creation of the Soviet Union were, according to Suny, an important condition for future unrest: "[n]ational self-determination to the point of separatism had been enshrined in a constitutional guarantee of a right of secession from the union, a time bomb that lay dormant though the years of Stalinism, only to explode with the Gorbachev reforms".[128] In essence, a formal right of secession of Soviet Republics, envisaged in Article 72 of the Soviet Union Constitution, though without any real mechanism for secession, was also applied to ethnic autonomies.

On the whole, the situation in Abkhazia was quite beneficial for the Abkhaz. As a small nation, they enjoyed a number of advantages, among which included immunity from serving in the Soviet Army, easy access to Soviet-level higher education, good positions in the civil administration, and so on. According to Ozhiganov, "…Abkhazia occupied a privileged position during the Soviet period not only within Georgia, but within the Soviet Union as a whole. Abkhazia had a relatively higher rate of growth in per capita income, a disproportionate share of the state budget, and a larger than average number of publications in the Abkhazian language…"[129] Special attention was given to development of the Abkhazian language and culture and their educational facilities, which, in fact, became the future *casus beli*.

More importantly, the Soviet system created a legal framework for Abkhaz separation within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Having this de jure administrative separation, at least, nominally, Abkhazia had been governed, first, by their republican authorities in the capital of Tbilisi, and, second, by the central authorities in Moscow. Their own autonomous structures in Sukhumi were simply mimicking the decisions coming from the top. Such a double

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[127] Brubaker, R. (1994). Nationhood and National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutional Account. *Theory and Society*, 23(1), 52

[128] Suny, R.G. (1993). *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union.* Stanford University Press, 128.

[129] Ozhiganov, E. (1997). The Republic of Georgia: Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Arbatov, A., Chayes, A., Chayes, A.H. and Olson, L. (eds.), *Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives* (pp. 351-352). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

administrative hierarchy belittled the importance and power of republican organs vis-à-vis their autonomous ones, who increasingly turned to the Soviet center in Moscow. When Soviet Union collapsed, the problems were directly delegated to Russia.

Under the Soviet Union, the status of autonomous republic merely denoted administrative separation from their titular nations. However, after the Soviet collapse, a minority's autonomous status implied possible independence. Autonomies, which, according to Svante Cornell, "…impl[y] introduction of ethnoterritoriality - territorial control linked to ethnicity",[130] in post-Soviet Union meant "separation"; that is, the institutionalized feeling of "otherness".

A number of scholars noted the important nature of autonomies for future developments in multi-ethnic states. In these countries, as noted by Brubaker, former "… institutional incarnation… [of autonomies] laid the foundations not only for their statehood but also their self-understanding as specifically national states".[131] For the Abkhaz, by definition, their autonomy introduced, what Liah Greenfeld calls the feelings of "a unique, sovereign people",[132] and contributed to creation of their "sovereign-like" mentality. The Abkhaz began to claim that they had been a separate and independent state in the past, and, accordingly, have the grounds to claim independence in the future. For them, in the words of Miroslav Hroch, reminiscence of "…independence or statehood … [played] an important role in stimulating national historical consciousness and ethnic solidarity,"[133] which later led them to an open conflict with the titular nation.

Their identification as Abkhaz led the minority to express openly their wishes for leaving Georgia and entering Russia. Nearly every decade - in 1947, 1957, 1967, 1978-1980, and in 1988-1992 – they submitted petitions to join the Russian federation as a Soviet Socialist Republic, requests that were consistently rejected by Moscow. The official position of Russia was neither to accept the Abkhaz petitions nor reject them completely. On the one hand, the

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[130] Cornell, S. (2002). Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective. *World Politics*, 54(2), 246.
[131] Brubaker, R. (1994). Op.cit. P. 65.
[132] Greenfeld, L. (1992). *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 8.
[133] Hroch, M. (1993). From National Movement to the Fully Formed Nation. *New Left Review,* 198, 9.

situation was, indeed, tempting for the Russians to step in and control the territory directly from Moscow. However, the Russian government understood well that granting republican status to Abkhazia could lead to similar requests by minorities in Russia proper.

4.1.2 Start of conflict

The national consciousness of Georgians became politically salient in the late 1980s, when a mass media campaign was launched on the theme of "the rebirth of the Georgian nation", which asserted the priority of the Georgian people over the other nationalities living in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. This ethnic chauvinism continued under the administration of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a former dissident and a self-proclaimed leader. Right from the very beginning of his appearance on the Georgian political scene, the voices of nationalism and "otherness" began to slowly but surely appear in the political rhetoric of Gamsakhurdia.

The most common slogans at the time were "Chosen nation", "Newcomers", "Kremlin's agents", "Traitor of the nation", "End discrimination against Georgians in Georgia!", "Go home, Russian invaders!" and "Abolish the Abkhazian Republic!" At that time, the interethnic security dilemma was evident. According to Zdravomislov, "Imperial components of the Georgian politics towards Abkhazia stimulated the Abkhaz nationalism, which gave an impetus to the Georgian nationalism."[134]

Interestingly enough, the Georgian nationalism had an indiscriminate nature, even during Soviet times. Ronald Suny claims that "Georgia became a protected area of privilege for Georgians. The received the bulk of the rewards of the society, the leading positions in the state and the largest subsidies for cultural projects while Armenians, Abkhaz, Ossetians, Adjarians,

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[134] Zdravomislov A.G., (1997). *Mezhnatsionalnye konflikty v postsovetskom prostranstve*. (International Conflicts in Post-Soviet Space) Moskva: Aspekt Press, 21.

Kurds, Jews and others were at a considerable disadvantage in the competition for the budgetary pie."[135]

Minorities upon Georgian territory were worried that Georgian nationalism would incite aggressive actions against the minority groups. On their part, the Georgians tended to blame Russia for all their ills. The mere fact of existence of the Abkhazian autonomy gave Georgian authorities sufficient grounds to view these ethnic minorities as threatening their right to self-determination as nations. A classic security dilemma had developed, where, , according to Cornell, the Georgians "…viewed the Abkhaz and Ossetians merely as a tool and instrument of Russian in its attempts to destabilize Georgia and prevent its accidence to independence…Georgian nationalists never recognized the demands or claims from the Abkhaz and Ossetians as legitimate: they were seen as artificially created by Russia, with no domestic roots of their own…Georgians saw minorities as 'immigrants' or 'guests on Georgian territory'…"[136]

A typical example of this negative stance to ethnic minorities was a famous interview given by Gamsakhurdia to a Russian newspaper describing the situation in Ossetia: "We wanted to persuade the Ossetians to give in. They took flight, which is quite logical since they are criminals. The Ossetians are an uncultured, wild people – clever people can handle them easily."[137] By that time, it was clear that the country was slowly sliding into civil war.

In a republic that numbered nearly half a million people, the Abkhaz numbered only 93 000 in 1989, which was about 1.8% of the whole population of Georgian, and 18% of the total population of Abkhazia. The first real step towards escalation to open conflicts with the Abkhaz and Ossetians was the introduction by Georgian authorities of the State Program of the Georgian Language in August 1989[138] that proclaimed the Georgian language as the only official media of

[135] Suny, R.G. (1989), *The Making of the Georgian Nation*. London: I.B. Tauris, 290.
[136] Cornell, S.E. (2001). *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Press, 163
[137] Gamsakhurdia, Z. (1990, December 2). We Have Chatted Too Long With the Separatists: A Conversation with the Chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet. *Moscow News*, p. 11.
[138] Newspaper *Comunisti*, (1989, 25 August), 196.

communication in the country leading to negative reactions from Georgia's minorities. Later, a Presidential decree dated August 20, 1990 proclaimed Georgian as the only medium of official communication in the country. Tensions began to roil in the autonomous republics soon after these laws were passed. Meanwhile, nationalist movement of Abkhaz *Aidgilara*, which advocated complete separation from Georgia and becoming independent subjects within the Soviet Union, enjoyed a large public following. Same was the situation in Ossetia with their nationalist movement *Adamon Nihaz* (Public Front).

The first overt conflict between the Abkhaz and Georgians occurred with the establishment of the branch of the Georgian State University in the capital of Abkhazia, Sokhumi, to conduct teaching in the Georgia language. This was considered by the Abkhaz as a threat to their identity. According to the security dilemma scenario, each subsequent move of one group to increase its own security would provoke a harsher reaction by the other group(s), increasing the likelihood of preemptive war.

The Language Laws were followed by the Elections Law of Georgia, which banned the parties coming from the Georgian regions to participate in the Republican Supreme Soviet. The most important legal document out of these was adoption of the "Act of Restitution of Independence of Georgia" on April 9, 1991 by the government of Georgia, which proclaimed the territory of Georgia as "indivisible". Abkhazia promptly declared the acts of the Georgian state on the language and elections "null and void" on its territory,[139] and on 25 August 1990, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia adopted the resolution "On Legal Guarantees of Protection of the Independence of Abkhazia" and the declaration of "State Sovereignty".[140] These declarations

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[139] Decree issued by the Supreme Council of the Abkhaz ASSR on Legal Guarantees of Protection of the Statehood of Abkhazia, 25 August 1990, in newspaper *Sovetskaia Abkhazia*. (1990, 28 August), 164.
[140] Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic, 25 August 1990, in *Sovetskaia Abkhazia*, (1990, 28 August), 164.

were revoked the next day by the Supreme Council of Georgia, which in turn proclaimed them "null and void."[141]

With some political maneuvering, the Abkhaz began strengthening their ties with Russia and their ethnic kin living over the Russian border – the North Caucasian nations. In November 1991, they hosted the Third Session of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, at which they signed the Treaty for a Confederative Union of the Mountain People of the Caucasus. This was a perfect window of opportunity for the Abkhaz to push for independence from Georgia, since Georgia was currently preoccupied with internal civil war against its nationalistic and chauvinistic president. Another option for Abkhazia was a wide federation inside Georgia. Negotiations on this issue were conducted on August 13 1992 in Sukhumi between the Abkhaz and Georgian officials. The next day began the war, which continued until September 30, 1993.

4.2 Unilateral intervention: Russia (1992-1999), failure

The war in Abkhazia started on August 14, 1992, when the troops of the State Council of Georgia entered the territory of Abkhazia. Formally, Georgian forces entered with two aims: to protect railroad cargo from looting and to set free the government officials kidnapped in the Western Georgia by the supporters of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia (among those kidnapped was Akaki Kavsadze, Vice-Prime Minister).[142] The Abkhaz soon labeled this an intervention of the Georgians upon their territory. For their part, the Georgians considered Abkhazia as falling within their jurisdiction, meaning that their government had the right to send troops wherever it wanted.

Soon the Georgian forces occupied Sukhumi. However, with assistance in a form of mercenaries from Northern Caucasus, Cossacks from the southern provinces of Russia, the

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[141] Decree issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Georgian SSR on the Decision Taken by the Supreme Council of the Abkhaz ASSR on 25 August 1990, 26 August 1990, in *Bulletin of the Supreme Council of the Georgian SSR*. (1990), 1, 15-16.
[142] At the end of 1991 Gamsakhurdia was ousted in a military coup by a group of Georgians dissatisfied with his nationalist and totalitarian rule. By some accounts, this coup was ideologically supported by Eduard Shevardnadze, former Chair of the Georgian Community Party and former foreign minister of USSR.

Baltic States, and military and support from the Russian military bases in Gudauta and Ochamchira, the Abkhaz managed to retake Sukhumi in September 1993. Russia, at least tacitly, supported the moves of Abkhazia towards independence – by not closing its borders, they allowed groups of *boyeviks*, goods and arms to move in and out. The Abkhaz troops were also armed from the Russian military bases in Gudauta and Ochamchira.

On 25 September 1992, Russia's Supreme Soviet denounced Georgia's resort to violence and adopted a resolution suspending the delivery of Russian arms and equipment to Georgia. This was followed by a real economic disaster for Georgia, including a severe energy crisis, which lasted for several years. Georgians began to view Russia as a firm supporter of the Abkhaz cause, which created strong anti-Russian sentiment. Finally, Georgia accused Russia of interference in its domestic affairs. Despite Russian denials of involvement in the civil war, 46 Russian soldiers of various ranks had been killed in Georgia in 1992.[143] However, no regiment from the regular Russian army had officially participated in the war on either side; it is likely that the Russian soldiers who did fight were mercenaries and irregulars who wanted to make money by serving the Abkhaz.

The war led to the deaths of 20 000[144] people from both sides and more than 250 000 Georgian IDPs. As a result of the ceasefire signed in 27 July 1993, Abkhazia remained quasi-independent. Eventually, to avoid large-scale confrontation with Russia, Eduard Shevardnaze, who replaced Gamsakhurdia, had no choice but to bring Georgia into the Commonwealth of Independent States. Under the ceasefire agreement, the CIS peacekeeper troops, formed exclusively by the Russian military, arrived to Abkhazia and became guarantors of de facto peace. Currently Abkhazia has the status of a self-proclaimed and unrecognized republic.

There is a considerable controversy over the specific Russian role in Georgian politics and its intervention in the conflict. On the one hand, there is no clear-cut evidence of direct

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[143] Brecher, M. and Wilkenfeld, J. (2000). *A Study of Crisis Data Project*. University of Michigan Press, 2000.
[144] As reported by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (available at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm; last accessed: 19.04.08).

participation of the Russian regular troops in the military activities on either side. That is why the empirics in this case is based on the work of scholars who studied the Abkhazia conflict, rather than documentary evidence.

However, one thing is clear: Russia did not close its border with Georgia, which allowed the irregulars from northern Caucasus to freely pass in and out Abkhazia, and to offer vital support to the Abkhaz. Russia allowed the Abkhaz to take arms and ammunition from its bases in Gudauta and Ochamchira, thus supporting their secessionist claims. It also provided economic support from its nearby Krasnodar region. It is a commonly known that the Abkhaz were outnumbered, less well-armed and less well-trained fighters, then the Georgians, who had had their first military "test" in Ossetia and later in Tbilisi against Gamsakhurdia and the rebels in Mingrelia.

There is, obviously, a predictable divergence between Russian and Georgian sources about the Russian role. Western and Georgian authors directly ascribe their loss in the war to the Russian factor. Thus, Goldberg notes that "Georgia's unforeseen defeat was almost entirely due to the reinforcement from Russia which fought on the side of the rebels…[The] forces from the former Soviet army base at Sukhumi were aiding the Abkhaz…The disintegration of the Red Army had left hundreds of thousands of servicemen without employment and housing; signing on an as a mercenary provided a convenient alternative…"[145]

Herzig also supports the idea of the Russian hand behind the Abkhazian victory: he claims that "[t]he Abkhaz also benefited from Russian military support channeled through the Russian bases in Abkhazia at Gudauta and Bombora, though the scale of that support and the level at which it was authorized remain disputed."[146] For his part, Horowitz notes the long-lasting effect of the separatist movement in Abkhazia as a function of the support of Moscow: "The Soviet Center encouraged and supported South Ossetian and Abkhaz resistance, as a way of discouraging Georgian separatism. This also provided a green light to local Soviet

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[145] Goldberg, S. (1994). Op.cit. P. 109.
[146] Hertzig, E. (1999). *The New Caucasus : Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia*. London: Pinter Publishers, 77.

Commanders sympathetic to the Ossetian and Abkhaz causes."[147] He goes on to assert that "[l]ocally based Russian troops provided crucial aid, while hard-liners in the Russian parliament and military threatened to intervene on a large scale. This placated Caucasian mountain peoples within the Russian Federation that were ethnically related to the Abkhaz…"[148]

A student of the Caucasus, Cornell also notes Russia's pro-Abkhaz stance in the conflict. He claims that after quick victory Georgian troops "…were pushed back, with the assistance of the Russian units to the Abkhaz side, in particular, air force units bombing Georgian positions."[149] For him the fact that the Abkhaz possessed "T-72 tanks, Grad rocket launchers, and other heavy equipment… that over 100,000 landmines were pulled out during the war is another factor indicating Russian military support for Abkhazia, as there were simply no such amounts of armory in the region…"[150]

The fact remains that Confederation of Mountainous Peoples and its military groupings and soldiers, which fought on the side of Abkhaz against the Georgians, were officially citizens of Russia, and were under their country's jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the claim that the Russians provided support to the both sides of the conflict, they were in due course accused of conspiracy by both of them. While the Georgians blamed Russia for supplying weapons to the Abkhaz, thus undermining their territorial integrity, the Abkhaz, for their part, could not trust the Russians completely, since they believed that Russia was not overly concerned with their fate, but rather its own presence in the region.

Another side of the role of the Russians in the conflict is presented by Russian scholars. As an example, Pryakhin condemned anti-Russian Georgian attitudes during the conflict and believing that Russia had "stifl[ed] Georgia for centuries, which had finally chosen

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[147] Horowitz, S. (2004). Identities Unbound: Escalating Ethnic Conflict in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. In Lobell, S.E. and Mauceri, P. (eds.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (p. 63). Palgrave Macmillan.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Cornell, S.E. (2001). Op.cit. P. 171.
[150] Ibid.

Abkhazia…as a "working tool" for bringing back breakaway and free Georgians."[151] He considers Russian interest in the Caucasus region as a sine qua non of its foreign policy, and its involvement justified by the simple fact that the conflict bordered Russia.

For his part, Zdravomislov noted non-homogeneity of the Russian domestic politics, itself undergoing drastic transformation from communism to democracy. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, especially in early years of its statehood, it was increasingly difficult for the center to control its peripheries, which was especially true for the army. The army, which once represented a strong force capable of ruling nearly half of the world, was left not only unattended, but out of control as a result of the collapse of the USSR.

With respect to Georgia, as Zdravomislov claims, Russian generals and Russian politicians – mainly ex-communists – developed aspirations of world domination. They wanted to avenge "democrat-Shevardnadze, who took an active part in dissolution of the Soviet Union" and who wanted to use the Abkhaz card for the sake of territorial interests of the "unified and indivisible Mother-Russia within the borders of 1917."[152]

Besides, scholars claim that military assistance was also rendered to the Georgians. For instance, Edmund Herzig argued that as a result of Moscow's complete lack of control over the military forces, "Russia also equipped the Georgian forces. Local Russian units and their commanders, as well as generals in Moscow, made ad hoc decisions based on personal preferences and local loyalties, with scant regard for official policy."[153]

Here an important thing to consider is that Transcaucasia was traditionally a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and NATO, which bordered the region from the side of Turkey. After the collapse of the USSR, the Trancaucasian Military District, with its headquarters in Tbilisi, had left vast amounts of arms - armored units and a variety of artillery and missile systems – in

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[151] Pryaxin, V. F. (2002). *Regionalnie Konflikti na Post-Sovetskom Prostranstve. Abkhazia, Yujnaya Ossetiya, Nagorni Karabakh, Pridnestrov'e, Tajikistan* (Regional Conflicts on the Post-Soviet Space. Abkahzia, South Ossetia, Mountainous Karabakh, Transdniestia, Tajikistan), Moscow: Publishing House GNOM and D, p.134.

[152] Zdravomislov A.G., (1997). Op.cit. P. 63.
[153] Hertzig, E. (1999). Op.cit. P. 156.

the region. The main problem was the fact that the troops from the former Transcaucasus Military District lacked a clearly defined legal status, creating danger for Russian personnel stationed in what had become a conflict zone. It thus became increasingly easy for both sides to obtain weapons.

Hence the only source of weapons for the Georgians was Russian military bases. The plans of Shevardnadze to conquer Abkhazia, as Ozhiganov claims, were also well knows to Boris Yelcin, then President of Russia. The two men were instrumental in achieving a transition from communism, and shared similar values and aspirations. The official position of Yeltsin's Russia was to support the territorial integrity of Georgia and not to jeopardize the peace near its borders. While this was Russia's official position, various Russian politicians and rogue army generals launched small-scale private wars, making money on both sides.

The principal problem with Russia's role in the conflict was its inconsistency in policy and actions vis-à-vis Georgia. Officially, Russia supported the inviolability of Georgia's borders and territorial integrity of the country. At the same time, Russia participated as a mediator in the negotiation talks within the "Geneva Process", where the so-called "Group of Friends of the Secretary-General" (Russia, Germany, UK, France, and US) meet regularly to bring the conflict to its end. There Russia stresses it neutral nature and assures the negotiating parties of its best intentions to solve the conflict.

Domestically, however, Russian opinion was divided between the anti-Georgian military and political hard-liners, who argued for the inclusion of Abkhazia into Russia, and the democratic forces, who upheld the idea of Abkhazia being part of Georgia, fearing negative political spill-over into their own autonomous republics. From one side, the Abkhaz received arms and assurances of support from communist and nationalist factions of the Russian establishment. From the other the Georgians received weaponry from the Russian bases in Georgia proper: there was simply nowhere else from which they can obtain arms in the region in such a short period of time.

4.3 Conflict aftermath

The war ended in late September 1993 with Abkhazia's de facto secession from Georgia. As a result of the war, 200,000 people were forced to leave their own places of residence and moved to various regions in Georgia. Hundreds of thousands of houses were destroyed; most damage was sustained by the Eastern part of Abkhazia yielding thousands of IDPs. This created additional problems for the government of Georgia and the Abkhazian leadership; additional refugees fled to Russia and other countries.

The post-conflict history is characterized by numerous peace agreements, some of which were almost immediately broken, others provided only temporary remedies to the situation, and neither of which managed to resolve the conflict in the direction of co-existence or separation.

The first attempt to find a solution was made right after the beginning of the conflict in Sochi in July 1992 with the Russian mediation. The Sochi agreement provided for the withdrawal of the Georgian troops from Abkhazia, demilitarization of both sides, and the return of a 'legal government' to Abkhazia. Russia stepped in as an external guarantor of the agreement. The Georgian side observed the agreement and withdrew their heavy weaponry from Sukhumi to the port of Poti, in the Western Georgia. The Abkhaz weapons, on the other hand, were stored near the front and kept handy in case of resumption of the hostilities. The agreement was soon breached, and the war resumed.

The war was officially over on September 3, 1992 when the leaders of the conflicting parties, together with Boris Yeltsin, signed a cease-fire agreement in Moscow. Here again, Russia officially supported the territorial integrity of Georgia, the inviolability of their frontiers, and protection of the interests and rights of national minorities living on their territories. Once again, Yeltsin proposed that Russia would act as a third party to guarantee the peace agreement. There were then a series of fruitless discussions and meetings in Moscow between Shevardnadze and Vladislav Ardzinba, the Abkhaz leader, although nothing actually worked until the warfare

121

ended in 1993, when, finally, the parties reached a temporal armistice and began a real negotiation process. The Russian Duma (Parliament), dominated by Communists, adopted an extremely negative approach to Georgia and passed several resolutions condemning the activities of legal authorities in Abkhazia.

Negotiations to end the conflict were conducted also on a bilateral level between Georgia and Russia. On February 3, 1994, the sides signed the "Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Peaceful Coexistence between the Russian Federation and the Georgian Republic". On April 15, 1994, Georgia, as a new member of the CIS, signed a "Resolution of the Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability of the Borders of Nations Belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States", in order to safeguard its own borders.

The conflict eventually became internationalized. UN became involved in the conflict with a parallel conflict resolution process. In November 1993, after the end of the Georgian-Abkhazian war, the negotiating process for a peaceful resolution to the conflict began in Geneva under the auspices of the UN, with the collaboration of Russia and participation of OSCE. The first two rounds of talks took place in Geneva (28 Nov-1 Dec 1993, 11-13 Jan 1994).

The outcome of the Geneva stage of the settlement process was the Memorandum of Understanding and the Communiqué on the 2nd round of negotiations. According to these documents, the two sides pledged to refrain from using force against each other. Georgians and the Abkhaz expressed their mutual wish to use the Russian military contingent in the role of peacekeeping forces in the zone of conflict. As for the refugees, the first to the Gali Region) refugees and displaced persons.[154]

As a result of UN resolution attempts, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established on 24 August 1993 by Security Council resolution 858 mainly to monitor the situation and report to the UN on the belligerents' compliance with the peace

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[154] This process has not yet started, even after 15 years since the end of the conflict. The return of the refugees is still a cornerstone of the disagreement between the Abkhaz and the Georgians, the former insisting on political recognition of their

agreement.[155] The OSCE also participated in the conflict resolution process; OSCE's involvement increased since Georgia became a member of the Council of Europe (the first among the Caucasian countries) in 1992. None of these actions, however, managed to solve the essential cause of the conflict: the incompatibility of the views of the belligerents on their political statuses.

4.4 Multilateral intervention: CIS Peacekeepers (1994-to present), failure

The multilateral intervention of CIS peacekeeping forces was based on the Moscow Agreement of May 1994. Apart from stressing the urgent need for ceasefire and removal of the heavy equipment from the conflict zone, the agreement created a delimited area of 12 km on either side of the Inguri river (a border between Abkhazia and Georgia proper) for separation of the belligerents. The parties also agreed to dissolve and remove all informal military groupings upon the request of Georgia who complained about mercenaries from Russia. Such an agreement of the parties was due to the fact that the war was already a heavy burden for both the Georgians and the Abkhaz and, all that time, presence of the CIS peacekeepers was considered by them as a guarantee for status quo.

The crucial aspect of the Agreement was the provision for deployment of CIS peacekeepers and military observers in the conflict region. The Georgian side agreed to withdraw their troops from the Kodori gorge (the only part of Abkhazia still under the control of the Georgian government) and accept their replacement by CIS and UN peacekeepers.

In May 1994 the Georgians and the Abkhaz appealed to the CIS countries to act as intermediaries and third parties in the resolution of the conflict. The answer, much sponsored by Russia, came almost immediately. Acknowledging the territorial integrity of Georgia (which, in this case meant acknowledging that Abkhazia is also a part of Georgia) and support for

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[155] The UNOMIG Official webpage (available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig/mandate.html, last accessed on 20.04.08).

protection of the rights of the multinational population of Abkhazia, CIS Presidents decided to deploy "in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict the Collective Peacekeeping Forces, which would be composed out of the military contingents of the interested CIS member-states, and the number of which will be 1.5-3 thousand units, together with the military observers...."[156]

The CIS intervention had the aim of separation of belligerents and providing a real buffer zone between them. This was within their initial mandate that had the goal of stopping the conflict. The minor goal of the peacekeeping operation was to conduct monitoring over the fulfillment of the ceasefire agreements reached by the parties. Larger issues included humanitarian assistance, among which were de-mining actions. More specific operational tasks included disarmament of the illegal paramilitaries from both sides, supervision on the fulfillment of the International Humanitarian Law and preventing fighting between the sides.

The first peacekeeping operation was scheduled to end in May 1995. At this stage the peacekeepers were somewhat successful in fulfilling this part of their mandate and reaching their limited operational objective: separating the belligerents and acting as a buffer between the Georgians and the Abkhaz.

For their part, the Abkhaz were quite successful in keeping control over the land that, according to them, was theirs. They secured the capital, possessed overwhelming military advantage over the majority of the land (apart from the Kodori Gorge, which was traditionally populated by the Svans, who are mountainous Georgians). Any additional territorial acquisition by the Georgians would mean increased casualties for their people and recruiting additional mercenaries from the Northern Caucasus and Russia proper, which would reignite the warfare. Thus, the Abkhaz decided to rest on their gains and seek peaceful legal separation from Georgia. They did not fear any retaliation on the part of the peacekeepers, knowing that majority of them, having been stationed for years in Abkhazia, would have natural sympathies towards the local people.

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[156] Decision of the Council of the CIS Heads of States on usage of Collective Forces to maintain peace in the conflict zone of Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. 22 August 1994.

The situation was the same for the Georgians: the CIS peacekeepers were a good face-saving tool for the Shevardnadze government, which had actually lost the war in Abkhazia. The country with a population of more than 4 million could not effectively use its majority advantage to secure a territory with a population of some 90 000 people. Therefore, Russian peacekeepers served as an excuse for the government to explain away the loss of their land.

The Abkhaz, on the other hand, played on the aspirations of nationalist and communist forces in the Russian political establishment by joining forces with opportunistic Russian elites to launch appeals to join the Russian Federation. Each such appeal was duly rejected by the Russian Parliament. Russia, for its part, was stressing its neutral position, abstaining from direct participation in the conflict and advocated political settlement of the conflict and respecting the territorial integrity of Georgia. What was even worse was the policy of some Russian politicians who viewed the region as an extension of their Krasnodar region and indiscriminately conferred Russian citizenship upon the Abkhaz, thus creating a foothold in the country.

That same month, the Head of CIS amended the mandate of the peacekeepers to include the most important task that remains unresolved until now. This was the return of more than 200 000 refugees in Abkhazia, beginning with the Gali region, which borders Georgia proper. This was the vital issue for the Georgian government; with Georgian refugees returned to their prewar homes, the balance of power would shift back to its pre-conflict stage, i.e. almost entirely to the benefit of the Georgian majority.

The return of refugees would have allowed the Georgian forces to gain an initial foothold in the conflict zone, and would provide a sizable influx of human power to the Georgian military – the refugees would defend their interests. In case of a peaceful course of action – such as, for example, a referendum on the political status of the region – the increased Georgian population in the region would serve as an indispensable asset for bringing back Abkhazia into the Georgian realm.

These activities remain the core of the peacekeepers' mandate and a lightning rod of criticism by the Georgian government. The Georgian parliament is continuously making proposals either to stop legal power of the peacekeepers or not to prolong their mandate any longer after its current expiration date or to enlarge their contingent with forces from other countries or to replace them with other peacekeeping forces (in the best scenario, this might be a pro-Georgian NATO or at least nominally "neutral" UN blue helmets). The reason for this is continuous perception within the Georgian establishment of Russia being strong lobby of the Abkhaz. Also, the CIS peacekeepers are accused by the Georgians of supplying arms and training the Abkhaz military.

These proposals continue to be vehemently rejected both by Abkhazia, which has justifiable fears of resumption of hostilities, in such case facing win-lose dilemma, and by Russia, which also cares about peace at its borders and has a legal right to protect the rights of its citizens. The situation is further aggravated by the passage of years, and the new generation of the ex-Abkhazian settlers had been almost completely integrated within the Georgian society or elsewhere where they are refugees. With no historical memory, nor emotional linkages to the land, the refugees had been forced to build new lives outside Abkhazia, and their (re)integration seems quite problematic, if not impossible.

Even though the CIS peacekeepers had managed to separate the belligerents and stop fighting between the sides with more or less frequent worsening of the situation, the most important part of their mandate – facilitation of peaceful return to refugees and peace-building efforts – failed to be duly executed. Although there had not been any significant military activities in the region since the deployment of the peacekeepers (barring the unsuccessful assault of the Abkhaz forces in 1998 in the Gali region), the peacekeepers continued to serve merely as a buffer between the conflicting sides.

In sum, the leadership of the multinational intervention force, which was only nominally multinational, but de facto unilateral, undertook the task it was either unable to achieve or

126

unwilling to do so. The CIS forces failed to reach their main goal and establish favorable political climate free from coercion and one-sided domination. At the same time, they failed to successfully enforce their mandate and tasks, which it had envisaged. Until now the refugees remain outside of Abkhazia, and with the recent political developments – recognition of Kosovo being considered by Russia as a precedent for de facto statehood in the case of Abkhazia – the solution of the conflict was never as remote as it is today.

4.5 Analysis of the interventions

The conflict in Georgia is still far from being settled. The Abkhaz continue their struggle for inclusion into the Russian Federation and the Georgians insist on standing their ground and accuse Russia of interference and attempted annexation. The recent orders of the Russian present Vladimir Putin to the Russian government "to protect the rights, freedoms and legal interests of the Russian citizens living in Abkhazia…including organization of cooperation in trade-economic, social, scientific-technical, informational, cultural and educational spheres"[157] and to perform consular services for the Abkhaz assure Georgia of Russia's hostile stance as an only member of the CIS peacekeeping forces.

These actions of the country that claims to be neutral and impartial in fulfillment of its peacekeeping duties has pushed Georgia even further towards Western political institutions (mainly, NATO), from which the country leadership seeks assistance in resolving the current situation. Seeing evident and fruitlessness of its actions to retrieve Abkhazia with the help of the Russians, Georgian increasingly aims at usage of other means, such as solving the conflict through replacing the CIS peacekeepers with those of UN and NATO.

Statements by Georgian officials that they would like to join NATO, just like the situation with the language laws at the beginning of the conflict, are perceived in accordance

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[157] Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia # 501-16-04-2008 (available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/FD56A80A7198CD7CC325742D003F807C, last accessed on 20.04.08).

with a standard security dilemma by the Abkhaz and the Russians alike. The Abkhaz fear that Georgia might resort to a forceful solution of the conflict and once again invade their territory, while the Russians oppose having NATO directly bordering their land, especially in light of the recent initiatives to establish NATO missile protection systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.

4.5.1 Unilateral intervention - failure

Russia, as a state directly bordering the conflict zone, was vitally interested in any developments in this region, and interfered from the very beginning of the conflict with the role of a neutral mediator. However, knowing its prior attitude towards the whole interethnic interplay, and its role in the conflict, Russian mediation attempts were met from the very beginning with hostility by Georgia, although they were embraced by the Abkhaz side, who felt that Russia was supporting them. This situation can be explained as a severe perceptional commitment problem on the part of Russia vis-à-vis the Georgian side. The causes of the commitment problem are rooted in the modern history of the relations between the two nations.

Some in Russian political circles supported Abkhazia with the purpose of putting pressure on Georgia to remain within the zone of geopolitical interests of Russia. In the case of Georgia, such pressure could have been accomplished through external political actions and spreading instability in the country. While not having any ethnic ties with the Abkhaz, Russia became, in the words of Erin Jenne, their "surrogate lobby state"[158] – an external patron not by ethnic links but, rather, by political and economic interests.

From economic considerations, Russia needed the Black Sea coast for marine cargo and passenger transportation. Russian energy transit of from the Caspian Sea to Europe and beyond is somewhat limited by its few sea ports, a majority of which, located to the North of the country,

[158] Jenne, E.K. (1990). A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Didn't Bite in 1990 Yugoslavia, *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(4), 748.

are out of operation several months a year due to climatic conditions (Murmansk, Sakhalin, Nakhodka, Vladivostok, Archangelsk and St. Petersburg). Out of the Black Sea ports, only one – Novorossiysk – remains in Russia, others are either in Ukraine (Odessa and Illichevsk) or Georgia (Batumi, Poti and Sokhumi in Abkhazia). Apart from Sokhumi, the majority of the remaining Abkhazian cities have access to the Black Sea and could be used as ports. At the same time, with the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its traditional sea resorts, which was a major source of income in the Union's budget.

Russia failed to satisfy the aspirations of the Abkhaz for either their own statehood or an entity within Russia. The real problem, however, was that Abkhaz and Ossetians, on the one hand, and Georgians, on the other, received completely different and diametrically opposed commitments from Russia. The official position of Russia has historically been to support the territorial integrity of Georgia. This was during the Soviet Union, when Moscow repeatedly denounced Abkhazian petitions for separate status and never agreed to have Abkhazia with its 90 000 population as a Union Republic with equal status to, for example, Ukraine with its 60 million people. If the Abkhazian separatists received any encouragement from the communist leaders in Moscow, this was on the personal level and was never elevated to official state policy.

One possible explanation for Russia's position between the two belligerents may be not so much attention to and willingness to preserve the territorial integrity of Georgia, but wanting to prevent the setting of a precedent for its own administrative autonomous oblasts, districts, regions and republics. "Upgrading" the Abkhazian status to a Soviet Socialist Republic could have created a precedent for further segmentation of the Russia. With Abkhaz, it was clear that Russia would not give equal status to the land, as it had with larger units of the country, for instance Tatarstan. Giving increased territorial and political rights to an entity populated by less than a hundred thousand would mean, in the eyes of the Russians, setting a precedent for disaggregating their own country into lesser units with higher status.

In its attempt to get involved in the conflict, Russia suffered from double failure: the aim of bringing end to the conflict – not only de facto peace but a political settlement – was not reached. The single cause of this failure was an *unclear intervention strategy and aims*. Russia wanted to establish its presence in the conflict zone, have a say in the domestic affairs of the country, keeping its role as (at least) a regional power, but with no specific agenda and no actual steps towards resolution of the conflict. Russia failed both to effectively submit Georgia to its will and to include Abkhazia because of the lack of pure political will.

A number of causes can explain such political and operational failure. To study them it is first necessary to see what were the real (and hidden) intervention agendas. As a maximum, Russia wanted to keep Abkhazia within its tight control and within its territory. Russia wanted to use Abkhazian resources, especially, access to the Black Sea, for its cargo transportation. Finally, Russia needed to have strong sea border to protect its southern regions.

The main problem of effectively imposing its will was that Russia itself was undergoing immense transformation, which resulted in a struggle between new democratic forces and old totalitarian elements, which were mainly in the army. The conflict coincided with the time when reactionist forces occupied the Russian White House and the future of the democracy in the country was seriously jeopardized.[159]

Under such circumstances, controlling separate military regiments, the heads of which could quite successfully launch their own mini-wars, was quite difficult. Russia, which had a difficult time of keeping control over its political establishment, failed to act decisively and preferred no-war-no-peace to an actual solution of the conflict.

Additional problem was that the Abkhaz and the Georgians alike received diverse signaling from Russia about its intentions. While acknowledging participation of some non-state actors and irregulars from the territory of the Russian Northern Caucasus in the conflict, according to Pryaxin, "…the official position of Russia did not allow for any deviations from the

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[159] Revanchists, like former military general Alexander Rutskoi with aspirations of recapturing Russia's former communist glory, tried to control of the military and organize a coup against democratic forces in Russia.

principal line of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of the friendly Georgian state. Russian representatives at all stages of … the conflict undertook strong commitments for [its] peaceful resolution with safeguarding the principle of territorial integrity of Georgia and protection of the rights of national minorities within one state together with the Georgians."[160]

Another instance, in fact quite anecdotal, happened in 2005, when a group of pro-Abkhazian members of the Parliament of Russia, mainly from Communist and LDPR Parties, applied to its legal committee with an appeal to annex Abkhazia. The letter was transferred to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which rejected it as unconstitutional and against the principles of the international law. According to the Court, the only condition for transfer of Abkhazia to Russia would have been an official request of Georgia to Russia to accept Abkhazia. Such an official stance was not only a repudiation of Abkhazia's separatist aims, but those of other conflict zones bordering Russia.[161]

At the same time, the Abkhaz were constantly receiving indications of the Russia's will to protect its fellow-citizens. It could not be denied that strong pro-Abkhazian feelings were shared by a considerable part of the Russian establishment. Nationalist parties continue to visit Abkhazia and an economic embargo is not respected, Russian citizenships are indiscriminately given to every Abkhaz who wants one, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still holds meetings with the Abkhazian leadership and openly lobbies for their interests and participation at various international events. Yet Russia denounces its role as a third party to the conflict arguing that its presence is justified solely by its will to keep peace at its borders.

Indecisiveness and unclear intervention strategies led to another operational failure – *low level of engagement* of Russia in the conflict. In fact, this was an intervention for the sake of intervention: Russia had not used its regular military regiments under one command and control. The intervention tools were limited to economic support in the form of transfer of weapons, ammunition and allowing the flow of goods across its border, and irregular military support in

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[160] Pryaxin, V. F. (2002). Op.cit. P. 138.
[161] Ibid.

the forms of Russian soldiers fighting on the Abkhaz side and free movement of mercenaries from its southern regions to Abkhazia.

No large-scale military force was used to effectively subdue Georgia. Low intervention commitment and absence of clear political meant that few resources were used. Russian regular troops had almost no participation in the conflict, and the availability of Russian weapon within the Abkhaz ranks was explained as a result of looting of their military bases

Another cause of Russia's failed mediation in the conflict was its *internationalization* within the conflict environment. Russian bases had long been stationed in Abkhazia, and Russia's presence was everywhere – starting with the mercenaries and ending with the main currency and economic support. The problem was that Russia became so involved in the conflict that it undertook many uneasy commitments to the Abkhaz,[162] that it was extremely difficult for it to fulfill. Russia continues to issue messages of support to the Abkhaz, meeting its high representatives quite frequently; it advocates for equal status for the Georgians and the Abkhaz at international negotiations; and attempts to protect its citizens – the Abkhaz – living on the conflict territories at all costs.

Moreover, the permanent presence of the Russian troops in Abkhazia and discussions of the fate of the region became a part of domestic politics. Russian politicians, including mayor of Moscow Yuri Lujkov, Vladimir Jirinovski (leader of liberal-democrats), representatives from communist and nationalist parties, delegations from various Russian ministries, and representatives from the district administration of bordering regions (primarily Krasnodar) continue strong ties with the Abkhaz establishment.

The issue here is the deep Russian involvement in the conflict, which causes negative public and international attention. Georgia continues to view Russia not merely as a third party in conflict resolution, but a participant in the conflict, accusing it of supporting the Abkhazian

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[162] A vivid illustration of Russian support of the Abkhaz are the efforts of the Russian politicians to equate the solution of the Kosovo conundrum with that of unrecognized republics – mainly Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniestria, stating that Kosovars' independence would serve as an international precedent for legal solution of similar ethnic enclaves.

regime both economically and politically. Even if Russia wanted to exit, it would be an extremely difficult to do, for it has tied its hands with its commitment to protect its own citizens, which comprises an overwhelming majority of the current Abkhazian population.

The most important factor of operational failure of mediation was Russia's *support to the opposition*, which by all accounts was much weaker than the Georgian government. With its presence in Abkhazia, Russia balanced the capacities of the belligerents in such a way as to continue the conflict as long as possible. Such equalization of powers, from a moral perspective, protects the minority from punitive actions of the majority. However, from the longer-term prospective, it extended the conflict by bringing in additional forces of a third party and imposing such a situation where neither of the sides is able to reach a decisive victory.

In case of such ethno-territorial conflict as the Abkhazian one, successful support to the minority would mean establishing a new geopolitical environment for the target country, where the minority would receive either concessions from the central government, or secede from it and create its own state or join another state. On the other hand, successful support to the majority government would likely mean a more moderate solution of incorporating the minority into the existing state, with or without possible power-sharing agreements with the minority.

From a purely operational perspective, the latter option is easier to achieve through intervention by a third party. An external player would boost the capacities of the majority government and help it achieve victory over the minority more effectively and quickly. With the Abkhazian conflict, Russia chose not to support the Georgian state, but rather Abkhazia.

4.5.2 Multilateral interventions: failure

With the intervention of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of The Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia tried to institutionalize its involvement in the Abkhazian conflict. Contrary to its name – "collective" – the only intervening force in Abkhazia was represented by

Russia alone. Contrary to the notion of *multinationality*, the intervention was completely unilateral, providing guarantees for sustainable peace based entirely on one player.

The main problem with the intervention was, thus, *lack of impartiality* of terms and conditions of peace agreements. On the one hand, the CIS was heavily influenced by Russia, which still remains the main architect and player on the former Soviet Union space. This was also evident in all the decision of the Head of CIS states, who abstained from sending their troops, thus acknowledging the right of Russia to deal directly with the situation close to its borders.

For instance, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan promised to send only observers, while Belarus and Armenia signed the agreement with the proviso that they will consider their participation in the course of future negotiations with the conflicting parties. The Agreement was not signed by Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. None of the CIS state actually participated in the peacekeeping force, leaving Russia the only decision-maker.

This fact, together with the alleged Russian participation on the side of the Abkhaz in the conflict, meant that the Georgian side failed to see this organization as an effective mediator.

At first, it may seem that the CIS participation in conflict resolution would be quite fruitful for all parties, and that Russia, as the main actor on the ex-Soviet political stage, would be acceptable to both of the belligerents as a mediator able to keep peace, and, in future, to restore a political settlement acceptable for all. For the Abkhaz, "official" Russian involvement would gave an official blessing to their action, since they received official support from the Russian Federation in the form of its governmental military forces stationed there, instead of unidentifiable non-state actors.

For Georgians, too, position of Russia was acceptable, as it was officially supporting Georgia's territorial integrity, which meant the end of further abuse and a possibility for retaining their land. The former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze in one of his speeches stated that Russia's influence on Georgia was so important that "…if Boris Yeltsin were to ask

me to retire, I would go tomorrow because if a person constitutes an obstacle to his country, that person should go."[163]

However, as the time went by, the Georgians became strengthened in their belief that there were two "Russias" involved in the conflict: the one that officially supported peaceful settlement of the conflict and argued for keeping the territorial integrity of Georgian in accordance with the international legal standards and a second that accused Georgia of peace process violations, sent its regional and federal delegations to officially meet the Abkhaz representatives, and at all international meetings lobbied for the Abkhazian interests.[164]

The indications of Russian bias toward Abkhaz were numerous, take the most famous ones – indiscriminate issuing of Russian citizenships to the population of Abkhazia and in all occasions "implying" the need for protection by all means its counterparts on the territories of other state; and trying to create an international legal precedent out of the anticipated Kosovo independence that would apply to other breakaway regions of Georgia and Moldova.

Such duality of actions greatly undermined trust of Georgia to the neutrality both of Russia's interventions and its peacekeeping mission. On a number of occasions, Georgians have accused the PKF of failing to fulfill its mandate, since the return of the approximately 200 000 Georgians displaced from Abkhazia has not been achieved. They see Russia, particularly the Russian military, as having actively supported the Abkhaz during hostilities, and therefore as unfit to act as an impartial peacekeeper. The Georgian side also complains that, with passage of time, current status quo strengthens the Abkhaz territorial gains and makes the refugees psychologically accustomed to permanent exile.

This reasoning gets to the heart of the problem with the CIS forces and its mandate – *composition of intervention* – i.e. a unilateral nature of allegedly multinational action. Unlike the UN, which has "good offices" of a political, economic, administrative nature, the CIS could offer

[163] News Agency "POSTFACTUM", November 9, 1994.
[164] Examples of official and unofficial backing of the Abkhaz by Russia are too numerous to mention. The latest one, in April 2007, was at the last round of the UN talks of Abkhazia, when the US denied issuing entry visa for Sergey Shamba, the Abkhaz Minister of Foreign Affairs. Russia immediately accused Georgia of blocking the negotiation process and presenting a one-sided view of the conflict.

only peacekeeping activities. Enlargement of the mandate to peace-building became for them an absolute and an unsolvable quandary. The CIS failed to effectively assure the Georgians of its neutrality and impartiality, because for the Georgians the peacekeeping forces contained the military of the country that was blamed for their loss in the war.

The fact that Russia was the only real participant in these peacekeeping forces, and repeatedly blocked any other country's participation in it (be it the UN peacekeepers or, for instance, Ukraine, a CIS member, which is famous for its ties with Georgia and the West) sent a clear message to the Georgians. First, Russia was not committed to preserving Georgian state borders, and second, CIS peacekeepers were there simply as window dressing for an intervention based on naked Russian interests.

The composition of the peacekeeping force, together with Russia's historical interests in the region, is related to one of the biggest obstacles to the success of the peacekeeping actions - their *internalization*. Russia, as the sole significant member of the multinational operations in the Abkhazi conflict, transferred to the intervention its aspirations of a former unilateral actor which was vitally interested in a specific outcome that would suit its own best interests. Such internalization of actions with the former unilateral player greatly undermined the impartiality of the multilateral intervention. For Georgians it became increasingly clear that the options, solutions and actions offered by the peacekeepers were framed in accordance with previous intervention agenda of Russia.

At the same time, the long history of involvement of Russia in the relations between Georgia and Abkhazia also contributed to failure of Russian actions within the multinational mandate. An officially claimed role of the Russian government as impartial mediators was undermined by their constant support for one of the warring party thus making any attempts to resolve the conflict unsuccessful.

The CIS peacekeepers not only failed to fulfill their mandate, but failed even to articulate a mandate per se. Although de facto peace had been kept, the return of the refugees as imbedded

in the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping forces was not implemented. The CIS, acting as a "buffer zone" failed to fulfill the main aim of their presence: peace-building with assistance to return of the refugees and facilitation of peaceful reconstruction processes. However, as soon as peace-building and national reconstruction components were added, the CIS mission was not effective. The issue here was not that this particular task was difficult per se, but that there was not enough will and commitment on the part of Russia, as the one and only figure of the "multinational" intervention to fulfill it. CIS peacekeepers were used by Russia as a tool of Russia influence on the situation in Abkhazia, and not to improve the situation and gradually manage the conflict.

4.6 Conclusions

The conflict in Abkhazia continues to be at the center of international attention not because of its current level of violence, which is practically absent, nor because of the refugee crisis. The conflict promises to be the next separatist conflict to reemerge after Kosovo independence, which may (or may not) have created an international precedent.

The two interventions conducted during the course of the conflict were in fact one continuous intervention by a single third party, where the first was clandestine, unofficial and irregular, and the second open, publicized, more or less official, multinational in form but unilateral in practice. Neither of these interventions managed to reach their goals: the first one was indecisive, clumsy, irresolute and largely a function of the messy transition of a powerful neighboring state, which wanted to have a say in the politics of the target state, which it considered to be firmly in its own sphere of interest. The second intervention – seemingly vague and pointless – might have been considered successful had it not expanded its mandate to peace-building.

The cause of these two failures was vague intervention agendas, the "fake" nature of the multinational force preformed by one actor, consideration of the problem from the prism of

137

domestic politics and internalization of interventions, which created a credible commitment problem. Russia had entrapped itself in the cobweb of building unfulfilled commitment to the Abkhaz either to have them as a part of Russia, or to internationally acknowledge their independent status. Likewise, as a CIS peacekeeper, Russia failed to assure Georgia of the neutrality and impartiality of its actions, assist in the unification of Abkhazia with Georgia and facilitate return of the refugees.

CHAPTER 5: SOMALIA (1991-1994)

The conflict in Somalia stands apart from similar post-Cold War identity conflicts due to the specificities deeply rooted in the history of the country. It is a mixture of tensions based on ethnicity, communal strife and self-determination: a clan-led power struggle framed by a common wish for a unified country.

The conflict had two interventions conducted by the same entity – the United Nations – the first of which being successful and the second - unsuccessful. While the first UN intervention was solely aimed at ceasefire monitoring and reconciliation, the second went far beyond traditional premises of UN peacekeeping and was aimed at state reconstruction. The task of evaluating the success of the interventions is, thus, made easier by the fact that the identity of the intervener is the same in both cases. This allows me to control a whole number of factors peculiar to the character of the third party (for instance, their method of internal decision making, the power of interveners vis-à-vis the target state, and other geopolitical considerations).

Since I am comparing the effectiveness of fulfillment of the aims of the interventions, I again focus not on their ability to stop the violence and bring peace to a target country, but by the stated aims of the interveners themselves. In the case of the UN interventions in Somalia, such indicators are given by the UN Security Council's resolutions and the relevant mandates of the UN agencies.

5.1 Conflict Background

Historically, the Somalis represent quite a homogenous group: on the ethnic level they come from Eastern Cushites or Hamites tribes, called "Berbers" by ancient Arabs. Their main religion is Islam, and all Somalis consider themselves to be descendants of the mythical Samaal, after whom the country was named. Subsequently, with the arrival of two (also mythical)

warlords Sheikh Daarood and Sheikh Isahaaq, the two principal clans were created – the Daarood and the Isahaaq.

In general, all the Somalis, in the words of Laitin and Samatar, have "…a sense of common national identity…", possess common territory, "…common language universally spoken and understood…a way of life, that is predominantly pastoral, a shared poetic corpus; a common political culture; a profound Islamic heritage; and a deeply held belief that nearly all Somalis descend from the same source…"[165] The notion of division, difference, and specific and conflicting identities is virtually absent in Somalis' mentality. However, the Somali society is still highly stratified, and its fragmentation is of a peculiar nature: this is not a division along ethnic lines per se, nor is it a separation of people on the basis of their culture, language, religion or unique occupations. Here, the clan and sub-identities are what count.

A typical Somali citizen "…gives political allegiance first to his/her immediate family, then to his immediate lineage, then to the clan of his lineage, then to a clan-family that embraces several clans, including his own, and ultimately to the nation that itself consists of a confederacy of clan-families"[166] This clan division serves as a crucial factor in understanding the origins and nature of power struggle in the country, which helped determine the effectiveness of conflict mediation. Clan-based ideology and mentality is also what lay behind the present conflict in Somali, and it is a key to its solution.

5.1.1 Colonial period and post-independence

Somalia has long been a focus of interest of foreign countries, and not only its immediate neighbors. The country is situated at the commercial and cultural crossroads between the West and the East along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, facing the Arabian Peninsula. It was exactly this strategic location, and not natural resources or any other land-based wealth that

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[165] Laitin, D.D. and Samatar, S.S. (1987). *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 21.
[166] Ibid., 30-31.

attracted foreign interventions. Somalia thus saw waves of occupation by Britain, France, Italy, Egypt, and Ethiopia over the decades. Before 1960, when the two Somalilands – the British and the Italian – were unified under the name of the Republic of Somalia, there were five mini-Somalilands: the North-Central part controlled by the British; the French East and Southeast territories – modern Djibouti; the Southern Italian Somaliland; the Ogaadeen in the west controlled by Ethiopia; and the Northern Frontier District, or NFD, in the Southwest, which was a part of Kenya.

The path to independence in Somalia started, as in many ex-colonial nations, with an increased sense of national consciousness and, in such a divided country, a collective? quest for unification of all Somali people. However, even movements for political independence were still clan-based, where party membership was almost exclusively based on clan membership. This *political clanization* was also one of the determinants of future politization of clan-based rivalries. The first and only non-clan-based political movement to appear with the permission of the Italian colonial administration was the Somali Youth Club, which was created by young educated Somalis in 1943. In four years, the Club was transformed into the Somali Youth League (SYL) and had the aim of unifying all Somali territories and opposing clan-based rule.

In contrast to non-clan based SYL, another major southern party – the Hisbia Digil Mirifle (HDM) – represented two clans of Digil and Mirifle and enjoyed financial support from the Italians to balance SYL. Other parties were also clan-associated, like the northern Somali National League (SNL, representing the Isaaq clan-family), the northern United Somali Party (USP, representing Dir clan-family with Gadabursi and Issa sub-clans and Daarood clan-family with its Dulbahante and Warsangali sub-clans), and the National United Front (NUF, with the support of the SNL and the SYL).

With the unification of the British and Italian Somalilands on July 1, 1960, the country reappeared on the African map with the name Republic of Somalia. However, immediately after independence, problems of joining the two entities emerged that, according to Paolo Contini,

previously had "…different judicial systems; different currencies, different organizations and conditions for service for the army, the police and civil servants…The governmental institutions, both at the central and local level, were differently organized and had different powers; the systems and rates of taxation and customs were different, and so were the educational systems"[167]. The south was much better developed under the Italian administration than the British north, which presupposed possession of key administrative posts in nearly all the governmental branches by better-educated representatives of the southern clans, leading to administrative hegemony. As a result, the northern clans felt themselves marginalized in the new state.

The other side of post-independence Somali life, apart from clan-based considerations of domestic politics, was unification of *all* the territories populated the Somalis under a single nation-state.[168] Traditionally, the most sensitive geographic area for the Somali nationalism has been the Ogaadeen district of Ethiopia, mainly populated by ethnic Somalis. Ogaadeen has long been a central issue of confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia. For the short period, it was "united" with Somalia proper under the Italian administration, but after the WW II was returned to Ethiopia upon request of the latter.

5.1.2 Siyaad Barre's regime

On the domestic level, the power struggle continued. In the 1967 presidential elections, former Prime Minister Shermaarke (Daarood) was elected president of the country with strong support of the SYL. Other factions, divided along clan lines, began accusing government of political fraud, nepotism, protectionism, and corruption. Tensions grew, and in October 1969 Shermaarke was assassinated by a soldier. The military seized power and Major-General Siyaad Barre became the Head of Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC).

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[167] Contini, P. (1969). *The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration*. London: Frank Cass, 11.
[168] The Somali flag features a five-point star, where each of the points represents Somali territories: British Somaliland, French Somaliland (Djibouti), Italian Somaliland, Ethiopian Somaliland (Ogaaden) and Kenian Somaliland (NFD).

142

Initially, Barre took a democratic stance in his governance – abolishing clan-based parties and aiming at ending tribalism and clan-based political decision-making. However, he himself was not free from his clan baggage. As a typical Somali, he paid particular tribute to his own clan (Mareehaan), his mother's clan (Ogaadeen), and his son-in-law's clan (Dulbahante), channeling political power to these clans. The "MOD" (an acronym of Barre's clans) quickly became the synonym for the political power epicenter in Somalia.

The wish to settle domestic problems through "internationalization" resulted in further fragmentation of the Somali society along clan lines. The 1977-1978 war with Ethiopia, in which Somalia lost to its rival with the support of the Soviets and Cuba,[169] was a crucial factor in understanding the fall of Barre's regime and the subsequent civil war. The defeat in Ogaadeen was not only a defeat for Somalia, but, most importantly, rendered an irresistible blow to Barre's clans as principal actors in the war. It was not the country that had lost, but Barre's clans.

The clan-based confrontations during the last years of Barre's rule were the primary cause of the conflict that followed. The domestic situation deteriorated soon after the war, which undermined the faith of Somalis in a unified country. All the other clans blamed Barre's clan for Somalia's defeat in Ogaadeen. This was followed by harsh reaction on the part of the ruling clans against the dissatisfied ones. The defeat in Ogaadeen led to the creation of the first political clan-based movements in opposition to Barre's regime, which were instrumental in further conflict in Somalia.

After the unsuccessful coup d'etat organized by the Majeerteen officers in 1978, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) was organized. Also, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed by Isaaq in London in 1981 with the same agenda – to overthrow Barre. The Hawiye clan created its own political movement - the United Somali Congress (USC), which

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[169] Soviet Union was previously a strong supporter of Barre, who had developed so-called "scientific socialism" to win Soviet assistance. However, when Barre moved away from this political line toward economic nationalism?, he lost all Soviet support. Worse than that, the Soviets switched sides, and during the Ogaadeen war supported the Ethiopians.

closely cooperated with the SNM in the north. Probably the most dissatisfied with the war was the Ogaadeen clan, related to Barre, which blamed him for Somalia's defeat and for "selling" the country's interests in negotiating a subsequent peace treaty.

In 1985 they formed the Somali Patriotic Movement (SMP). The country was politically divided along clan lines: SPM in the south, the USC in the center, and the SNM in the northwest. Other lesser political organizations included the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM, Rahanwayn clan) and the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA, Gadabursi clan). And yet these clans were not fighting against themselves; they had a common enemy – Barre and his "defeatist" politics – and were temporarily united in the interest of changing the regime.

The trigger that led to the final collapse was the supressed demonstration on July 6, 1990 when sixty-five people were killed by the government. This action by the governmental led to the emergence of an anti-Barre "Manifesto", the organizers of which were later put in prison and sentenced to death. However, this never happened, since the demonstrators forced Barre to release the accused. Demonstrations spread all over Somalia, and Barre was forced to flee the country on January 27, 1991.

5.1.3 Start of conflict

The government's inability to achieve internal unity between clans became clear soon after the creation of the provisional government. The rift in this case was not even along clan-family lines, but rather within a single clan. The warlords were pursuing the policy of all against all without a clear political agenda and with vague political representation. The resulting anarchy was not only on the central, but also regional, levels,[170] where clan loyalties were clashing as well.

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[170] The only part of Somalia that was not touched by wide-scale atrocities were the northern territories, which roughly coincided with the former British Somaliland. There, the ruling party SNM proclaimed an independent Republic of Somaliland in May 1991. This de-facto state, although having a resemblance of a normally operating country, is still not recognized by the international community. Another self-administered part of the country is

The clashes started when USC (Hawiye) movement formed a government against the interests of the other clan-families. Although this new government tried to incorporate within its ranks representatives from the main clan-families (president Ali Mahdi Mahammad was a Hawiye and Prime Minister Umar Arteh Ghalib an Isaaq), other clan-families and their corresponding sub-clans considered themselves to be marginalized in this power-struggle. Some of them, such as the SSDF and the SMP, temporarily aligned themselves against the USC.

The conflict started in September 1991. The worst fight occurred between the members of the same clan-family – Hawiye, which was instrumental to the overthrow of Barre's regime. Former General Mahammad Faarah Aideed (from Habar Gidir sub-clan of the Hawiye clan-family) declared his opposition to the rule of President Ali Mahdi Mahammad (from Abgal sub-clan of the same clan-family) and created his own faction of USC.[171] The real issue behind the inter-clan confrontation was the fact that the leaders of Abgaal sub-clan were considered by other clans to have been outsiders in the fight against Barre or, as Helen Chapin Metz calls them, "upstarts trying to usurp control of the opposition movement,"[172] and now being "undeservedly" in power.

The situation reached a deadlock when Aideed formed his own provisional government opposed to Mohammad in the southern part of Mogadishu. Thus, the battlefield – a single city – was divided into two parts. Troops loyal to Mahammad, controlled the north of Mogadishu, while the south remained in the hands of Aideed. Neither of the groups was able to win the war or even to effectively control the territory it held.

By the end of March 1992, according to some estimates, 250 000 people had been killed. Additionally, 500 000 became refugees in Ethiopia--300,000 in Kenya, 65,000 in Yemen, 15,000

Puntland, located in the north-east part of Somalia, which, however, does not have aspirations for independent statehood, but rather regional self-administration. Finally, SPM is building its own state under the name of Jubaland.
[171] The Abgaal and Habar Gidir factions of the USC were quite distinct even before the conflict, when in November 1990 Aidid, on behalf of his group, signed an agreement with the SNM and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) to unify military operations against Barre.
[172] Metz, H.C. (1992, May). Somalia: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress (available at: http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/sotoc.html, last accessed on 15.05.08).

in Djibouti, and about 100,000 in Europe.[173] Around 300 000 people died and 1.5-2 million people became internally displaced as a result of the famine in 1992.[174] The anarchy resulting from the fighting was overwhelming in Mogadishu and its suburbs, where there were no clear lines of battle.

5.2 Multilateral Interventions: UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II, (1992, 1993), success and failure

The situation in Somalia, both from the point of view of internal humanitarian crisis and regional stability, drew international attention right from the onset of the conflict. Humanitarian relief workers had long been active in the country. However, efficiency of their work, which was limited mainly to food distribution, was much undermined by different armed groups controlling distribution channels and extracting rents from the humanitarian agencies.

A crucial determinant of success in the first intervention in Somalia was that the conflict gradually became the focus of domestic political discourse within the intervening countries, especially the US, which was a key decision-maker in the UN. Patrick Gilkes describes how the issue of Somalia became a cornerstone of domestic politics in the US: "Candidate Bill Clinton seized on the issue as evidence of President Bush's failures in foreign policy… The decision [to intervene] came too late to influence the US election results, but it suggested that Bush believed that the US can and should intervene at will."[175] Such "domestication" of the international conflict put additional pressure on the main UN decision-making body – the Security Council – from the viewpoint of accelerating decision-making in relation to operational mandates of interventions.

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[173] Ibid.
[174] van Beurden, J. (2000). Somalia: From Permanent Conflict to More Peacefulness? Searching the Peace in Africa, European Center for Conflict Prevention (available at www.conflict-prevention.net, last accessed on 15.05.08).
[175] Gilkes, P. (1993). From Peace-Keeping to Peace Enforcement: The Somalia Precedent. *Middle East Reporter*, Despots and Democrats Political Change in Arabia, 185, 22.

5.2.1 UNOSOM I

Two interventions in Somalia were conducted through the UN: UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II. Whereas the first (successful) intervention had the principal aim of providing humanitarian assistance and monitoring the ceasefire, the second (unsuccessful) one had the more difficult aim of preserving and building the peace.

From the beginning of the crisis, the UN closely monitored the situation in Somalia. When the death toll reached the point where it could no longer be ignored by the international community, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 733 in January 1992 and appointed Mohammed Sahnoun as resident coordinator to oversee humanitarian activities and negotiate a ceasefire with the belligerents. This was done mainly under pressure from the US administration, which wanted to take an active role in the post-Soviet world politics.

The same resolution established a "general and complete embargo" on weaponry and military equipment to all the conflicting sides.[176] Sahnoun's task was to organize the peace process in an extremely difficult setting with no central authority and constantly changing political and military conditions. Special attention was to be paid to the role of elders as a key conflict resolution mechanism in Somalia.

In less than six months, Sahnoun managed to reach good working relations with the both sides of the conflict and the local population, especially the elders. He followed an incremental approach to conflict resolution and advocated increased involvement of the local communities in bringing the belligerents to negotiating table. It was due to his intervention that the first agreement was reached between Aideed and Ali Mahdi, which was signed on March 3, 1992. The "Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire" also included the acceptance of a United

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[176] Text of the UN Resolution 733
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/010/92/IMG/NR001092.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed on 14/04/08).

Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance and the initial deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire.

The real problem, however, was a deeply rooted antagonism on a personal level between Aideed and Mahammad, who viewed any action within the context of their rivalry. For Aideed, according to John Drysdale, "Mahdi's agreement to the deployment of UN military observers…and indicated UN support for Mahdi's unilateral appeal for the deployment of foreign troops in Mogadishu…[meant] formal UN backing for Mahdi as interim president, real or imagined, [and] was enough to ensure that Aideed's further cooperation with the UN would require exceptional diplomatic skills."[177] Aideed considered himself alone responsible for the victory over Siyaad Barre, and he was not going to yield this image either to Ali Mahdi or the UN.

Initially, the agreement was largely respected. However, it did not alter the basis of confrontation between Aideed and Ali Mahdi, since neither of them was ready for political compromise. As a result, Mogadishu remained divided into several parts, each of which supported a different warlord. At the same time, Sahnoun was negotiating an agreement with quasi-independent Somaliland and bringing together the belligerents in Mogadishu to reach a reconciliation with Ethiopia in order to avoid further complications in the Ogaadeen region.

However, the process was impeded by the internal rift within the UN: while Sahnoun advocated gradual and careful actions based on local considerations, UN Secretary General, the US and several other member-states argued for immediate and forceful intervention to alleviate human suffering. However, food, as before, was used as a weapon between the troops loyal to Aideed and Mohammad, who frequently looted the aid supplies and interfered in the operations of international relief agencies on the grounds that they were providing assistance to their enemies.

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[177] Drysdale, J. (1997). Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia: The Root Cause of the Shift from UN Peacekeeping to Peacemaking and Its Consequences. In Clarke, W. and Herbst, J (eds.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. Westview Press, 120.

The worsening of the humanitarian situation and UN-internal bureaucracy led to the dismissal of Sahnoun and authorization of a military intervention. Established in April 1992 by Resolution 751, UNOSOM I was initially composed of 50 ceasefire monitors, whose task was "to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs".[178]

On 12 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, after considerable delays and difficulties, agreement had been reached with the principal leaders of the conflicting parties in Mogadishu to deploy 500 United Nations security personnel in the capital as part of UNOSOM. Pakistan had agreed to contribute a unit for this purpose. The first group of military observers arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992. Furthermore, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in Resolution 775 recommended the deployment of four additional United Nations security units with 750 personnel to protect the "humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia".[179]

By that time, as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations notes, the UN manpower in Somalia amounted to 4 219 personnel, including the unit of 500 authorized for Mogadishu and 719 for logistical support.[180] UNOSOM I was supported by the two belligerent camps: Letters of Agreement had been signed by both Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aideed; the letters stipulated the mechanisms for monitoring the ceasefire and distribution of humanitarian assistance.

However, UN resources were far too limited to control the whole country, and the only state interested in intervening on humanitarian grounds was the US. The US National Security

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[178]Text of the UN Resolution 751
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/10/IMG/NR001110.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed on 14/04/08).
[179] Text of the UN Resolution 775,
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/010/92/IMG/NR001092.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed on 14/04/08).
[180] Information of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom1backgr2.html, last accessed on 14/04/08).

Council authorized a humanitarian intervention the same month. Together with the UN monitors, 400 American soldiers were deployed to Kenya during *Operation Provide Relief*, airlifting aid to remote areas in Somalia. The problem was that in a country with no central authority to facilitate aid distribution by providing primary security, this humanitarian assistance was subject to constant looting and pillaging of supplies. The ceasefire agreement had also been violated a number of times by its signatories.

In view of mass casualties and displacement, a non-functioning central government, and frequent albeit low-scale attacks on UN personnel, Boutros Ghali decided to reframe the UN strategy in Somalia. The Security Council allowed the use of force under Resolution 794, which authorized the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". The UN was determined "to restore peace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations."[181] Chapter VII of the UN Charter was invoked, in accordance to which the military forces of the Member-States were to act under "the unified command and control". The Resolution called on member-states to provide military forces or cash or in-kind contributions to the UN operations.

On the basis of Resolution 794, the United Task Force (UNITAF) was established under US field commander, Marine Lt. General Robert Johnston. The main reason behind US involvement in Somalia was that it saw clear institutional advantages for itself in the post-Cold War world and wished to expand its prestige and influence beyond its traditional spheres of interests in Europe and Asia. However, even in his wish to be remembered as a peacemaker, President Bush wanted to avoid large-scale military operations that would inevitably lead to human losses. He wanted to keep the US mission within a limited scope and specific objectives

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[181] Text of the UN Resolution 794
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed on 14/04/08).

that could be "met in the near term and as soon as they are, the coalition force will depart, transferring its function to the UN force,"[182] one renowned US diplomat noted.

Although a considerable US military force had been committed to the effort (the total strength of UNITAF was 37 000, out of which 28 000 were Americans), UNITAF also included troops from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.[183]

The goal of UNITAF was to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. US Special Envoy Robert Oakley specifically stressed the neutrality and supposed operational low-intensity of the UNITAF, while sending a message of minimal UN commitment to the belligerents, "We are not an occupying power. We have no power to arrest. There is nothing in the Security Council resolution about war crimes."[184] Once security was in place, the control of the military operations would revert to the UN, in accordance with the wishes of President Bush. At the same time, all political and humanitarian aspects of conflict resolution in Somalia were to remain within UNOSOM.

This separation of responsibilities also had a geographical component: while UNOSOM I remained mainly in Mogadishu, UNITAF's task was to secure major population centers, including the capital, to ensure proper and efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNITAF was engaged in food distribution in the centers in each of the major areas and aimed at stopping the looting. The importance of this aim was to eliminate food extortion as a main strategy of the belligerents in stymieing the work of the humanitarian agencies.

However, in essence, it was the US who was in charge with the commanding issues of the UN intervention force. This fact from the very beginning jeopardized the UN neutrality and put the organization is a very awkward position in relation to the belligerents who could not

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[182] Bolton, J. (1994). Wrong Turn in Somalia, *Foreign Affairs*, 73(1), 40.
[183] These multinational forces amounted to 10 000 military personnel, with the total number of intervention force of 37 000
[184] Perlez, J. (1992, December 29). Witnesses Report a Somali Massacre before U.S. Arrival. *New York Times*, p. A1.

distinguish between who is doing what and considered the UNOSOM as another party in the domestic confrontation.

The actions of the international community were accepted as a necessary evil by both Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The first tensions between the UN and Aideed began with a seemingly trivial dispute: soon after their deployment, the Pakistanis reached an agreement with the Hawadle sub-clan (a supporter of Aideed's clan but in practice more pro-Mahdi) who were using the Mogadishu airport as a means of extorting money from airlines and passengers. It was agreed that the Pakistanis would be allowed to control and guard the airport. However, this was broadcast by the BBC service as a major agreement between the UN and the Hawadle. Aideed, who knew nothing about it, was outraged: he considered this rapprochement as a betrayal by the UN and the Hawadle alike and wanted to punish them both.

The initial antagonism of the UN in the eyes of Aideed continued. Here, an important factor was the personal perceptions of Aideed: according to O'Neill and Rees, he viewed Boutros-Ghali "as having a hidden agenda, that of seeking to make Somalia a UN trusteeship and of wishing to restore Barre."[185] Although this was far-fetched, he accused the UN of continuing to support Ali Mahdi both politically and militarily.

On the other hand, and unlike the UN, the United States enjoyed greater acceptance by Aideed because of its humanitarian agenda and because, as John Drisdale noted, he believed that the US, with no prior colonial ties to Somalia, "would not change the political balance of power to his detriment."[186] This amiable relationship was also based on a previous alliance during the Barre regime, when Aideed and his top leadership—then in opposition—had good working relations with the Americans; for instance, his treasurer and advisor was a liaison for the US oil company Conoco and a close acquaintance of UN Ambassador Oakley.

[185] O'Neill, J.T. and Rees, N. (2005). *United National Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Routlegde, 114.
[186] Drysdale, J. (1997). Op.cit. P. 129.

Within the framework of UNITAF and in accordance with Resolution 794, the US in December 1992 launched *Operation Restore Hope* with the aim of assisting and protecting the humanitarian activities of the UN and other international relief agencies. This goal was divided into two stages – disarmament of the population by the UNITAF military personnel and further steps directed towards political reconciliation (creating first level local government – municipalities and restoring communal services). At the same time, considerable efforts were made in the direction of official conflict management by the UN, its Secretary General, and US officials.

In general, although limited in operational capabilities and scope of action, UNOSOM I was an effective multinational intervention. From the very beginning, the neutrality of the UN mission guarded against perceptions that the forces would intervene in the conflict between Aideed and Ali Mahdi – its mandate was confined to monitoring of the ceasefire agreement, provision of humanitarian assistance, delivery of food and medical supplies, and mediation through reconciliation conferences.

Until the UNITAF stayed out of domestic power rivalry and abstained from engagement in active military actions against the belligerents, it was perceived as neutral and not supporting any side. In the first UN mission – UNOSOM I - the presence and operations of UNITAF, meanwhile, had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the improvement of effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. As a result of the UN presence, the warring groups were effectively separated from each other, and there were no subsequent large-scale clashes between them.

Also, Sahnoun's actions created favorable conditions for peace by facilitating cooperation among elders and local communities who represented historically developed media of resolutions of conflicts in the Somali society. The groups were increasingly drawn into the negotiations. Involvement of civil society and traditionally developed social structures of the Somali communities, viewed by Sahnoun as a cornerstone of the relief operations and serving as

153

an incremental mechanism for conflict resolution, was a promising beginning for improvement of the political situation.

Even when this approach had been neglected by the UN, and emphasis placed on negotiations with key belligerents, the presence and leadership of the US in the multinational coalition, which was not going to use active force against the warring sides, seemed to be a good start for an eventual solution. However, what happened soon after US involvement was a complete reversal of the situation, which led to ultimate failure of the intervention and withdrawal of coalition forces.

5.2.2 UNOSOM II

Mediation efforts of the international community, started by Sahnoun, were continued by the UN and, particularly, the US high representatives. Altogether, there were 17 national- and 20 local-level reconciliation conferences held in Somalia with the aim of bringing together the representatives of as many conflicting parties as possible. The most representative and, probably, the most valuable national reconciliation conferences during the conflict were held in Addis Ababa (January 3, 1993 and 15 March, 1993), at which a peace agreement was signed by Aideed and Ali Mahdi.

The first package included a general agreement on cease-fire and disarmament and was signed by 14 Somali military factions, although it excluded traditional leaders of Somali society – elders, businessmen and intellectuals. This was done because of the request of Aideed to include only those groups that had been instrumental in overthrowing Barre. This meant that Aideed achieved control of the negotiation process, and it seemed to many Somalis as if the UN was putting warlords in the political center of the country.

The second Addis Ababa conference tried to correct for the mistakes of the first one by including an extensive list of participants. It was at that conference that key divergence in views appeared between the key belligerents: while Aideed pushed for a federalist notion of the

154

country with significant powers for regional clan-based warlords like himself, Ali Mahdi, as a statutory government figure, advocated a strong central government. Eventually, the agreement established a Transitional National Council (TNC) for a period of 2 years and included formation of central and regional administrative units. It also called for complete disarmament. Interestingly enough, SNM refrained from signing the Agreement and remained an independent observer.

For the UN, which was advocating a rapid solution to the conflict through political means, these conferences were considered a clear sign of slow but steady improvement of the political and security situation, and a general will of the conflicting parties to cooperate. The UN decided that the country was ready for a transformation of its operations from peace-keeping to peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. Therefore, on the basis of the UN Security Council Recommendation, it was decided to expand the mandates of UNOSOM I and UNITAF into the field of political reconciliation.

The day before the signing of the agreement, the UN adopted Resolution 814 in March 1993, which extended the mandate of the UN operations in Somalia, and, what was more important, included enforcement measures in accordance with the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The civil war in Somalia, which was now viewed by the UN Security Council as a clear threat to peace and security in the region, mandated that the UN mission undertake large-scale disarmament with the ultimate goal of national reconciliation.

In particular, the resolution authorized UN to "to assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administrations in the entire country."[187] Thus, the peace-keeping of UNOSOM I and UNITAF was enlarged, expanded and "enriched" by peace-building actions of UNOSOM II.

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[187] Text of the UN Resolution 814
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/226/18/IMG/N9322618.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed on 14/04/08).

The UNOSOM II mandate was overly ambitious: in a war-torn country with a proliferation of different clan-groups engaged in constant conflict, its personnel was tasked with the continuation of the UNITAF's mandate of restoring peace, law and order and general stability in a country where peace was still very much confined to its capital. In addition to this, UNOSOM II was to provide assistance for the economic, social and political development of the Somali society, revive national security institutions and facilitate reconstruction of administrative functions of the state in keeping with the principles of free society and democracy in a country that throughout its history had been ruled by clans.

To lead UNOSOM II, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali appointed Jonathan T. Howe as a head of the civilian component and Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir of Turkey as military commander of UNOSOM II. The military ranks of the UNOSOM II included 28 000 personnel with approximately 3 000 civilian administrative officers. UNOSOM II became the first UN operation to be mandated not only to the use force to bring peace in a country, but, more importantly, to undertake external security guarantees to the warring parties, to reconcile all the belligerent groups, and (re)create a fully functional country.

The UNOSOM II personnel was thus to be involved in nearly all post-conflict reconstruction activities, including repatriation and resettlement of refugees and IDPs, training of civilian officers and local police, removing anti-personnel mines, provision of public services reconstitution of the media and economic rehabilitation of the country.

The scope and essence of its tasks became the fatal flaw of UNOSOM II. The UN wanted to carry out post-conflict reconstruction in an active conflict environment. Encouraged by the accomplishments of UNOSOM I, and the slow but promising pace of peace-building in a country that had long been torn apart by a multitude of political and clan-based military forces, the UN accelerated its pace of actions.

The problem was that even if a fragile peace had been achieved, the conflict was far from being de jure settled. Somalia, which was divided by military groups with their own agendas and

156

aims, was not ready for the power-sharing political solution as offered by the UN. It had no effectively operating government, neither in the center nor in the periphery. There was no organized civil service, nor any effective army and police force that would obey the orders of a central government.

Furthermore, the country was fragmented into numerous belligerent groups, possessing enough human resources and military equipment not only to fight with each other, but also oppose any UN actions that would jeopardize their interests. Not only the local population but also the UN personnel itself and that of international humanitarian agencies were under threat by "loose cannon" groups that could not be identified. Besides which, the limited operational coverage of the UN forces--which were mainly confined to the capital - made such a solution difficult to impose.

Political and military fragmentation of the Somali society represented uncontrollable and cascading problems for the UN from the point of view of information-sharing; the communication pipeline between the UN and these groups was difficult to control. Moreover, the UN soon became hostage to parochial interests, as the representatives of various factions used their ties to the international body to pursue their own agendas. In a country with so many political figures and participants, who were using the UN for their own benefit, "…[P]eacebuilding soon degenerated into a cynical cottage industry dominated by entrepreneurial Somali politicians.

Factional leaders were quick to appreciate, and exploit, the fact that UNOSOM [II] needed Somali national reconciliation far more than they did."[188] Under such conditions, it was sometimes difficult for the UN to know who was against whom. Political fragmentation of the local context substantially complicated UN peace-building efforts. Due to the multiplicity of actors, actions of the international community involved in the intervention had to be performed

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[188] Menkhaus, K. (1997). International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia. In Clarke, W. and Herbst, J (eds.), *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention.* Westview Press, 46.

with a sense of awareness of the domestic situation and, even more so, with increased sensitivity to the main players. This was difficult to achieve in practice.

The UN's efforts to revive the governmental structures and agencies of Somalia, which had been artificially imposed on the Somalis for a number of decades by Barre, "…worked at cross purposes with its reconciliation efforts, often fueling conflict instead of reducing it…Different clans were often able to coexist in relative peace in a single location. However, if asked to form a local government structure with a fixed number of seats, they often fell into heated disputes, sometimes ending in casualties, and dramatically worsening local security."[189] Somalia had gotten rid of Barre's oppressive administrative structures and a return to them, even in a democratic form as proposed by the UN, was unacceptable to the warlords and their supporters in general public, and even to those who were not engaged in warfare but accused the UN for extending the conflict.

Naturally, these forces were against re-imposition of public administration by the UN "via locally-selected district councils [which] directly threatened the interests of a number of militia leaders and their clans, who controlled valuable riverine and urban estate through conquest, and who viewed UNOSOM's program as a move to disenfranchise them. A confrontation was inevitable."[190] What was even worse was that these forces considered UN actions in all instances, if not helping them, then a priori hostile and supporting other belligerents.

This was the cause of the first harsh blow to UN prestige and authority, when, due to incorrect and faulty communication between the UN HQ and several factions of the Somali militia, on June 5, 1993 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were ambushed and killed as they were doing their reconnaissance duties at the SNA arms depot near the radio station controlled by Aideed's forces.

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[189] Ibid., 59.
[190] The World Bank. (2005). *Conflict In Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics*, 11-12 (available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf, last accessed on 20.04.08).

The blame quickly fell upon Aideed, who soon became the target of the US and the UN alike. The UN promptly issued Resolution 837 urging the arrest and trial of all those responsible for the brutal assault upon UN troops. UNOSOM II launched large-scale operation to find and capture Aideed. However, it not only failed in this task, but it further antagonized the Somali population.

On July 12, in response to the incident with the Pakistani peace-keepers, UNOSOM II destroyed the building that was reportedly occupied by Aideed's Habar Gedir clan, killing about 50 Somali clan leaders but failing to capture Aideed. This move further enraged the Somali public, who viewed the Americans as a rogue force acting with its own agenda. However, the turning point of the intervention was on October 4, 1993. In what became known as the Battle for Mogadishu, an attack was launched on the Olympic Hotel, an alleged hide-out for Aideed. During the attack more than three hundred Somalis were killed and about eight hundred wounded.[191] The US also suffered casualties: 18 soldiers were killed and 79 more injured in combat; scenes of mutilation of their bodies were broadcast all over the world.

These events were a serious blow to US/UN prestige, and in two days, President Clinton ordered a halt to all US actions against Aideed except those in self-defense. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley was appointed a special envoy to Somalia to arrange a peace settlement and subsequent withdrawal of the US troops by March 1994. The events of October 1993, however, played as a critical role in subsequent military developments in Somalia: for Aideed, it was clear that such defiance would further antagonize the Americans, and he decided to temporary cease military actions and seek respite. On 9 October his USC declared a unilateral cessation of military activities against UNOSOM II. On 24 March 1994 Aideed and Mahdi signed an UN-brokered peace agreement, which later met the same fate as all the previous agreements.

[191] Atkinson, R. (1994, January 30). The Raid That Went Wrong: How an Elite U.S. Force Failed in Somalia. *Washington Post*, p. A1.

After the departure of US forces, the remaining UN forces kept a low profile until they were finely removed in 1995. Within a year from the US departure, UNOSOM II, which continued a nominal presence in the country, ceased to exist, with one of the highest rate of mission fatalities.[192]

5.3 Analysis of the interventions

In Somalia, the international community was faced with a difficult task from the very beginning: restore peace and order and re-create a fully-functioning state. The remedy presented by the UN on the one hand was quite simple: to come, negotiate with the belligerents, establish peace (at least, temporarily), and assist the leaders of military groups in rebuilding their country.

However, the conundrum of this approach was the solution it offered: a centralized state in a chronically decentralized society. This point was noted by Lederach and Storks, who stated that "Centralization in governance had been a root cause of Somalia's breakdown…The rebellion that developed in Somali society was a revolt against this centralization."[193] With all the paradoxes of Somalia – general political wish for unity of the Somalis, have same roots and want to maintain the territorial integrity of their country – the counterproductive forces that made all Somalis politically different was the fundamental problem with the UN mission: imposition of a unitary state Issa-Salwe claimed that "The Somalis had never been subjected to institutionalised government except under that of the authority of elders, and felt uneasy with the interruption of their traditional way of life..."[194] This implies failure for any form of governance different from Somalia's traditional structures – elders, intra- and inter-clan public administration.

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[192] With civilian fatalities of 3 persons, total military casualties of UNOSOM I and II amounted to 155 battle deaths. (source: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/StatsByMissionAppointmentType%203.pdf).
[193] Lederach, J.P. and Stork, J. (1993). The Intervention in Somalia: What Should Have Happened: An Interview with John Paul Lederach. *Middle East Report*, 181, Radical Movements: Migrants, Workers and Refugees, 39.
[194] Issa-Salwe, A.M. (1994). *The Collapse of the Somali State*. (monograph, published by the Author in association with HAAN Associated). London, 30.

5.3.1 Multilateral Intervention (UNOSOM I) – success

A comparative assessment of two interventions by a single actor is valuable from the point of view of keeping constant the variables inherent to the third party. Although organized under the auspices of the same organization – the UN – the two interventions were quite distinct in their nature, character, operational objectives, and modus operandi. The task is, thus, to compare these two interventions to determine why the first was more successful that the second..

The first intervention – UNOSOM I, which marked the start of UN involvement – had a *limited operational mandate, was low-profile,* and had a *geographically limited* monitoring and peace-keeping mission. The aim of the mission was the "…imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved."[195] Thus, the mandate of the UNOSOM I, as initially defined by the Security Council, was to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, to provide protection and security for own UN in fulfillment of mission, and to escort and protect humanitarian supplies in distribution centers.

Apart from the limited scope of the mission, another key determinant of success of the UN involvement was its limited geographic coverage: the UN forces were confined almost exclusively to the capital of Mogadishu. This aspect was, of course, negative from the viewpoint of establishing and preserving peace beyond the capital and in Somalia proper and gaining control over the territory. However, neither the resources not the tasks of the UNOSOM I allowed it to go beyond what was defined in its mandate.

In comparison with UNOSOM II, the first UN intervention was also limited in its operational capacity. UNOSOM I had a total of 28 000 personnel plus 2 800 international and local staff, which was reduced to around 15 000 by the time of its withdrawal. In contrast, UNOSOM I had only 50 military observers and 900 security personnel out of an authorized

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[195] Diehl, P.F. (1993). *International Peacekeeping*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 13.

161

3 500. Apart from limitation in tasks, the UNOSOM I enjoyed wide acceptance of the warring parties who knew that its low numbers meant it could not present any significant threat to their actions.

Although they accused the UN of supporting each others' rivals, in reality, they were not afraid of UN punishment. With its limited resources at hand, the UN could not effectively impose peace or punish the defectors. Thus, the very features that signaled its lack of bias and made the UN a credible and trustworthy mediator also meant that it could not enforce any peacekeeping agreement that was reached.

Thus, UNOSOM I was a *neutral* peace-keeping and monitoring mission which that not supposed to impose peace of any sort to the belligerents, restore law and order, or act, in Walter's terms, as an "external guarantor" of peace agreements. Its mission and operational mandate were limited to a modest range of functions. It was this modesty of aims that facilitated successful conflict mediation in the case of the first intervention.

Sahnoun, favoring a bottom-up approach without large-scale military engagement, was successful in establishing dialogue and good working relations with the local chieftains, elders and community leaders, women's associations, tradesmen, professionals and intellectuals.[196] The incremental and cautious process of building peace through talks, negotiations and reconciliation had scored substantial success under the first intervention. This, however, did not mean that the conflict was over, nor was it the case that the two main rivals Aideed and Ali Mahdi had handed in their weapons and returned to normal civilian life. It merely meant that both of the key belligerents had accepted the UN presence as a neutral intermediary, or were at least not hostile to it.

Thus, in fulfilling its duties, the UN initially enjoyed the consent of the warring parties, who knew about the statutory neutrality of the UN and believed that its presence would not

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[196] Lederach, J.P. and Stork, J. (1993). Op.cit. P. 39.

jeopardize their own interests. During the negotiation process, Sahnoun favored nobody in particular and aimed at inclusion of all the parties – both military and societal actors.

At the same time, this aspect of the UN mission has been considered a drawback of the mission by some scholars, one of which claimed that "The overall flaw of UNOSOM I was the UN's failure to address the fundamental problem, namely collapse of state authority. The UN had behaved towards the factions as it would with sovereign governments."[197] Such strategy of inclusion of the warlords in the negotiations processes, if employed, would have led to marginalizing the actual conflict sides. Forming a sovereign government at the outset would also have forced the UN to negotiate with an amorphous and nominal government and societal actors who had no actual power on the ground. Ignoring the key players in the mediation process would have been a mistake,, leading in the best case scenario to meaningless peace agreements.

The final factor that contributed to success of the mission was its timing. UNOSOM I was deployed *after the actual cessation of* hostilities. It did not participate in the enforcement of peace and was not engaged in open combat with any of the belligerents. The Addis Ababa Agreement signed by Aideed and Ali Mahdi was the starting point for UNOSOM I, which directed its efforts not to enforcement of the agreement, but to monitoring its observance and providing humanitarian assistance to the population.

Although the agreement provided for no actual peace-building mechanism, it was a clear window of opportunity for the UN. There were not active military activities in Somalia, and this fact set the parameters of the UN's further involvement: not to intervene with the purpose of stopping fire, but to act as a neutral and impartial force, which would separate belligerents and contribute to the peace process. Absence of warfare provided a secure environment for the UN operations and the low casualties encouraged the member-states to remain in the coalition,[198] which contributed to the successful fulfillment of its mandate.

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[197] O'Neill, J.T. and Rees, N. (2005). Op.cit. P. 112.
[198] By the time of transition from UNOSOM I to UNOSOM II the casualties of the former amounted to 6 deaths (see the UNOSOM I web at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom1facts.html, last accessed on 15.04.08).

163

5.3.2 Multilateral Intervention (UNOSOM II) – failure

Sahnoun's incremental approach toward building trust among the key stakeholders of the Somali nation was not favored, however, by the UN headquarters. The Security Council, under pressure from the US administration, wanted to score a success in Somalia, leading the UN into another stage: active involvement in peace-building. Thus, the UN, in the words of O'Neil and Rees, "…sought neither to assume fully the reins of power nor to propose what form any new Somali authority should take."[199] The intervention happened for a number of reasons, which were peculiar to the situation in Somalia and would have easily complicated the operations of any intervener.

Extension of the UN mandate with the state-building and post-conflict settlement activities coincided with *active conflict* developments in the country. Neither side was a clear winner or loser, and each of them posed equal threats to security. The volatile political environment of Somalia led the UN to use its power, especially after the deaths of its Pakistani peacekeepers. Two factors were counterproductive to the success of the UN involvement during its second intervention. On the one hand, there were problems with its mandate which, in addition to peace-enforcement, also included a peace-building component. The UN was trying to restore the government in a country where the war had not yet ended. This was a crucial factor why the UN's efforts failed.

State-reconstruction require the involvement of the public, which would serve as a cornerstone of the society to be rebuilt. The focus of peace-building is usually on the representatives of all layers of the society, which have representation in the new government, power-sharing in all administrative and legal aspects, as well as reconstruction of their

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[199] O'Neill, J.T. and Rees, N. (2005). Op.cit. P. 124.

identities.[200] This was the primary area of engagement of UNOSOM I, which was involved in facilitating negotiations between traditional social components of the Somali society. However, when these developments were forcefully accelerated in the direction of state reconstruction, as they were under UNOSOM II, the UN suffered a severe blow.

Enforcement of peace requires substantial resources, both military and economic, to be used to make the belligerents comply with the will of the external power. One problem with UNOSOM II was that it suffered from insufficiency of material-technical base to project its will in an active conflict environment. Except for the US troops, the majority of the remaining peace-keepers were underequipped. Even though this was a multilateral coalition, according to O'Neill and Rees, "UNOSOM II was composed of contingents from states all too many of which either had not the equipment required or were unwilling to provide it."[201] Different military contributions of the member-states made it difficult to for the coalition to operate in combat conditions.[202]

Another important cause of intervention failure was its inefficient breach of impartiality. Supporting and/or acting against one clan-faction would automatically mean acting against and/or supporting other clans. From this point of view, the situation puts the intervener in a *biased position*. Thus, according to Gilkes, UNOSOM II's "…action against Aideed becomes support for the Darod clan, the main Hawiye rival for control of Mogadishu."[203] Without doubt, with the launching of large-scale hunt for Aideed, the UN became a major player in the internal Somali game. The African Rights Report even claims that for the local Somalis, the UN became somewhat inseparable from the rest of the belligerents; it became, in a way, a third force, and "Somalis regard[ed] UNOSOM as another faction and Admiral Howe as another warlord"[204].

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[200] These and other solutions to ethnically divided societies is discussed by Lijphart, A. (2004). Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, *Journal of Democracy*, 15(2), 96-109.
[201] O'Neill, J.T. and Rees, N. (2005). Op.cit. P. 132.
[202] For instance, the heaviest vehicle with the Pakistanis was M42 A2 tank, model 1957. These tanks were totally obsolete and unreliable, especially in the harsh desert conditions in Somalia.
[203] Gilkes, P. (1993). Op.cit. P. 23.
[204] African Rights Report. (1993). *Somalia. Human Rights Abuses by the UN Forces*. London, 33-34.

The UN, had thus become not an intervener aiming to facilitate cessation of the conflict, but literally a third party participant in the conflict.

Under such conditions of active conflict, even the matters specific to internal UN mismanagement that had nothing to do with the belligerents per se took on a veneer of sinister intent in the eyes of Somalis.[205] The failure of the UN to properly investigate this case and impose additional sanctions against a key side of the conflict indicated to many Somalis that the UN tacitly backed Ali Mahdi.[206]

An excellent illustration of a violation of the UN principle of impartiality and its overall peace-building failure is given by Ken Menkhaus. According to him, "UNOSOM [II] found its role as a facilitator-mediator in Somali national reconciliation incompatible with its mandated role of peace enforcer. For peace enforcement, the UN had to be impartial – that is, it had to enforce certain rules of the game on all parties concerned…As long as the peace-enforcement operation imposes the same penalties on everyone for security infractions, it maintains its impartiality. But having once embarked on enforcement measures against a serious violation (Aideed's attack on UNOSOM forces in June 1993), the UN cannot simultaneously play the role of a neutral mediator in national reconciliation."[207] It became a conflict participant in its own right.

Thus, the UN failed to effective impose their will at the expense of neutrality and impartiality for the sake of imposing sustainable peace. In this sense, neutrality and impartiality could not easily coexist due to the fact that it should have been effectively imposed on a society that was structured through kinship connections. The problem, according to Menhaus, was that "…efforts to arrest or marginalize warlords failed to account for the deep-rooted notion of collective responsibility in Somali political culture and were doomed to fail. Actions taken against a clan's militia leader were seen by Somalis not as justice done to an errant individual,

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[205] For instance, the failure of the UN to investigate the crash of the Russian plane with the UN's World Food Program in July 1992, which was reportedly delivering arms to Ali Mahdi against the UN SC Resolution 733, antagonized Aideed.
[206] O'Neill, J.T. and Rees, N. (2005). Op.cit. P. 111.
[207] Menkhaus, K. (1997). Op.cit. P. 59.

but as a hostile action against the entire clan."[208] Thus, any act to alter the battlefield calculus was not neutral by definition, and the only way the UN could score a success in such a conundrum was to vigorously enforce a peaceful solution, which it failed to do.

Another very significant internal problem for the UN was its *over-reliance on a single coalition member* – in this case, the US – and its inability to act in case of its departure. From the very beginning, the issue of intervention in Somalia became part and parcel of US domestic politics. Too much reliance had been put on US participation in the coalition, first in UNITAF and later as a UN-endorsed military operation. The US had its own rationale for intervention – strengthening its role in changing global political settings after the end of the Cold War, and its own vision of success and failure of operations that may not coincide with those of the coalition as a whole.

Bringing the Somali conflict into the fora of US domestic party rivalry had a mirror-reflection not only on its operation in Somalia, but on further effectiveness of the whole intervention. The problems were, on the one hand, politicizing the issue of intervention and making it a part of the internal US politics. Second, the mediation was strongly affected by changes in the US administration (from Republicans to Democrats), which involves stressing negative points of the former presidential administration

From his side, President Bush was feeling an urge to resurrect his image on the foreign front after the fiasco of the first Gulf War for the benefit of his presidential campaign. After having lost the presidential elections to Bill Clinton, George Bush, according to Chopra et al, was "no longer constrained by domestic considerations" and wanted to do "a last good thing."[209] The same situation held for President Clinton, who criticized Bush for the failures of his foreign policy and wanted to do things differently (i.e., better).

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[208] Ibid., 56.
[209] Chopra, J., Eknes, A. and Nordboe, T. (1995). *Fighting for Hope in Somalia*. Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 38.

After the end of the Cold War, the US was eager to reinstate its superpower status and build a peacemaker image, and the new president and his administration, making both the overall goals and operational objectives too ambitious, and, therefore, too vulnerable and susceptible to failure. For example, Madeline Albright, then US permanent representative in the UN, declared that "With this resolution [814], we will embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country."[210] This was an overly ambitious start of the first Clinton administration, which wanted to score early visible victories in foreign policy and distance itself from the failures of the Bush administration, especially in Somalia.

When the US departed from the scene, UNOSOM II was unable to carry out the same peace-enforcement with the resources it was left with. This led to overall reconsideration of the intervention mandate, its strategic objectives in the field, and, as a result, to its final withdrawal.

5.4 Conclusions

There were two main sets of problems with the UN involvement in the Somali conflict. The first was external to the UN itself and may present a problem for any third party. This was the nature of the conflict in Somalia: a multi-dimensional and a multi-participant conflict. There was no single credible force that the UN could back with its peace-enforcement and reconstruction efforts,

In the words of Menkhaus, "…in the absence of either a Somali state authority or clearly recognizable social and political leadership, reconciliation efforts were chronically weakened by disputes over legitimate and effective authority. Who had the right to represent whom in Somali peace talks?"[211] This was a real issue for any neutral external actor. The task was complicated further by constant and concurrent fights between the belligerents. This was a conundrum, the

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[210] Bolton, J. (1994). Op.cit. P. 62.
[211] Menkhaus, K. (1997). Op.cit. P. 57.

168

solution of which was outside UN competence, and remained an issue throughout the actual intervention.

The second set of problems concerned the participation of the UN as a multilateral force in the intervention. Apart from all the drawbacks it had with the coordination of the intervention coalition and difficulties of a purely operational character, the major quandary of the UN was the solution it was going to offer to the conflict participants. This solution not only needed to be designed, but also imposed on all the belligerents, which turned out to be quite problematic. The UN had to develop a solution that was outside of the conventional structures of Somali governance. The idea of a centralized country with its own governance rules was foreign to the mentality of a typical Somali, who almost exclusively paid allegiance to his sub-clan and clans.

Another important negative aspect of the UN involvement in Somalia was its rush to build a unitary state in a country still engaged in active conflict. As long as the UN abstained from direct involvement that would have resulted in limiting political and military options available to the Somalia military factions, it enjoyed security for its personnel and was largely successful in monitoring the activities of the warring parties.

However, once the UN decided to impose peace, on the one hand, and simultaneously build a state, political instability, domestic anarchy, the absence of legitimate authority, a multiplicity of actors, domestic power arrangements and the peculiarities of a clan-based society, the inability to enforce decision of any sort made it difficult, and, finally, impossible to fulfill its objectives as embedded in its mandate.

Finally, the UN multinational intervention in form became a unilateral in essence: while there were other nations presented in the intervention coalition, the real power factor of the interveners was the UNITAF, which was merged into the UNOSOM I and later the UNOSOM II and was responsible for all the operational decision-making. The US, as a lead actor, was vulnerable to blows it received as a result of its intervention activities, which were inevitable.

Too much pressure and too higher stakes were put for the US/UN success, and a failure in one operation caused retreat of forces and subsequent failure of the whole mission.

CHAPTER 6: RWANDA (1990-1996)

The conflict in Rwanda resulted in nearly one million deaths of its resident population and almost two million refugees and internally displaced persons. While its causes were deeply rooted in internal tensions within the Rwandan society, the outburst of the conflict and its course was largely influenced by outside factors, such as changing geopolitical environment in the region and international arena, historical linkages between the Francophone Africa and its former French patrons, and the inability of the international community to effectively stop wide-scale ethnic cleansing.

The lack of willingness of the international community to intervene with the purpose of ending genocide, and aid in disaster relief, has been a crucial factor in the ongoing conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Perhaps the only powerful state that retained its interests in the region was France, which wanted if not to contain the conflicts, to reinstate its influence in the region and become a regional hegemon.

There have been four foreign interventions in the conflict, with the two parties (France and UN) intervening twice within six years period. Although the conflict ended in 1996 with estimates of casualties ranging between 10 and 50 000 Hutus and half a million to 850 000 Tutsis,[212] I claim that the third parties were successful in reaching their initial intervention goals. To identify the reasons for success of the interveners' actions, it is necessary to view not only characteristics of operational environment during each intervention, but also the local context in which the conflict was embedded.

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[212] These figures have been taken from various sources, including "UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) on Rwands"; Prunier, G. (1995). *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 1959-1994*. London: Hurst&Co.; Human Rights Watch and Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, (1999). *Live None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. London and New York,: Human Rights Watch, and Paris, Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, 1-15; Sellstom, T. and Wohlgemuth, L. (1997). *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from Rwanda Experience*. Study 1, Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors, Uppsala, Sweden: The Nordic Africa Institute, 1.

6.1 Conflict Background

Before the beginning of the conflict, the population split in Rwanda had a clear cut division between majority Hutus (85%) and minority Tutsis (14%) with the remaining 1% of the Twa people.[213] Rwanda was a case of a minority rule, where a considerable number of the country's administrative posts were occupied by the minority Tutsis. An explanation for this, which had a tragic influence on the fate of the entire population, can be found in the colonial history of Rwanda.

6.1.1 Artificial "Ethnicization"

The antagonism between Hutus and Tutsis, based on "shamelessly twisted ethnic argument for the sake of class privileges",[214] as Johan Pottier puts it, was nothing more than a man-made creature of the European colonial powers, which wanted to implant their nation-state model in Rwanda. First the Germans and later the Belgians needed a domestic group to rely on and to serve as their counterparts in local affairs. The Belgians had chosen the Tutsis, who, in their view, more resembled the Europeans in accordance with the "Hamitic Hypothesis".[215] According to this theory, described by Edith R. Sanders, the Tutsis were viewed as a "Caucasoid" race, the lost tribe of Ham,[216] who had migrated to the rest of Africa from Ethiopia and brought "civilization" to the whole continent.

When Belgians drew the ethnic map of Rwanda, they had used quite rough procedures of ethnic specification, which were based on household wealth and other physical parameters

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[213] Klinghoffer, A.J. (1998). *The International Dimensions of Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: New York University Press, 9.

[214] Pottier, J. (2002). *Re-Imaging Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century*. London: Cambridge University Press, 9.

[215] Interestingly enough, this racist theory was later on employed by the Hutus with the purpose of alienation of Tutsis and depicting them as "foreigners". The most notorious expression of the Hamitic hypothesis was in the famous speech by Léon Mugesera on November 22, 1992 when he said the Tutsis "belong in Ethiopia and we are going to find them a shortcut to get them there by throwing them into the Nyabarongo River [a source of the Nile.]". (quoted in Melvern, L. (2000). *A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*. London: Zed Books, 47.

[216] Sanders, E.R. (1969). The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective, *Journal of African History*, 10(4), 521-522.

(phenotype and genotype).[217] Such an artificial Barthian "poly-ethnic stratification",[218] in case of Rwanda differentiated people into groups of Tutsis and Hutus in accordance with the number of cows each family had: those with ten or more cows were Tutsis together with all their descendants in the male line and those with less were correspondingly named Hutus.[219] This brought along quite a unique ethno-cultural setting.

Although, in the words of Mahmood Mamdani, there was a "purity of social identification…: everyone…identifies as either Hutu or Tutsi [with] no hybrids, none is *Hutsi*",[220] people could quite easily move from one ethnic group to the other due to frequent intermarriages and, sometimes, unofficial arrangements. In reality, however, in the words of Dominique Franche, the whole population of Rwanda represented a "political community deprived of any other characteristics",[221] and people speaking "the same language,… [living] on same hills, and… more or less the same culture".[222]

Nevertheless, the civil war in Rwanda should still be considered an ethnic case due to the distinct pattern of violence directed towards a specific group of the Rwandan residents on the basis of their ethnic identities. This difference between Tutsis and Hutus become deeply incorporated in the Rwandan society.

6.1.2 Start of the conflict

After the end of the colonial period, Rwanda was governed by the minority Tutsis, who were in a more privileged position than Hutus with a higher level of education, greater accesses

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[217] The *phenotype* parameter distinguished Tutsis from Hutus in accordance with their height, while *genotype* one referred to diverse characteristics of lactose digestion by these groups. Noted in Franche, D. (1996, 24 November). There's Only One Ethnic Group in Rwanda: Rwandan. *Le Monde Diplomatique / Guardian Weekly*, p. 14 and Hiernaux, J. (1974). *The People of Africa*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 60.

[218] Barth, F. (ed.). (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Culture Difference*. Bergen/Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 9-38.

[219] Shoumatoff, A. (1992, 13 December). Rwanda's Aristocratic Guerrillas. *New York Times Magazine*, 44.

[220] Mamdani, M. (2001). *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton University Press, 53.

[221] Franche, D. (1996, 24 November). There's Only One Ethnic Group in Rwanda: Rwandan. *Le Monde Diplomatique / Guardian Weekly*, p. 14.

[222] Mamdani, M. (2001). Op.cit. P. 53.

to urban jobs, better economic standings and predominance in the government services. De-colonization process in Africa had a number of consequences for Rwanda, taking into account its unique domestic settings and its relationship with the former colonizers.

The first conflict between Hutus and Tutsis began at the end of 1959, after false rumors were broadcast to the effect that one of the *Parmehutu*[223] leaders had been killed by Tutsi extremists.[224] As a result of this "Social Revolution"[225]-- inspired and orchestrated by a Belgian colonel, Guy Logiest, which led to installation of the new government under Kayibanda[226]-- around 20,000 Tutsi were killed in Rwanda and a total of 150 000 fled to nearby Uganda, Burundi, Congo, and Tanzania.[227] Ethnic clashes and pogroms of Tutsis have been launched nearly every year since with frequent counter-attacks from Tutsi refugees living in neighboring countries.

Grégoire Kayibanda became president of the country with the decisive support of the majority Parmehutu party (78%). After Rwanda's independence on July 1, 1962, a one-party rule based on Hutu nationalism was installed in addition to a hierarchical administrative system, where the president, in the words of Prunier, applied the "…same style of leadership [as former King], …[with] his deliberate remoteness, authoritarianism and secretiveness…".[228] The same one-person tyranny was continued by General Juvénal Habyarimana, who removed Kayibanda from the office in a bloodless coup of 1973, and created his own party, the *Mouvement Républicain National pour le Développement* (MRND).

Habyarimana continued the same modus operandi as his predecessor of suppressing the Tutsi minority: he, as Richard H. Robbins noted, "ran a tight ship,' even requiring all Rwandans

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[223] *Parmehutu* - Party for the Emancipation of the Hutu People was opposed by the "monarchist" and Tutsi-led *UNAR* – National Rwandese Union.
[224] Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. P. 48.
[225] For detailed accounts of the event, see Mamdani, M. (2001). Op.cit. P. 103-132.
[226] Gourevitch, P. (2000). *We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families*. Picador: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 59-61.
[227] African Rights Report. (1994). *Rwanda: Who is Killing, Who is Dying, What is to be Done*. London, p. 7l; Melady, T.P. (1974). *Burundi: The Tragic Years*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 47; and Segal, A. (1964). Rwanda: The Underlying Causes, *Africa Report*, 9(4), 6.
[228] Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. P. 48.

174

to participate in collective labor on Saturday".[229] The new president banned Tutsis from nearly all spheres of civil life, including education, government offices, army and church, however, without much physical suppression. Popular dissatisfaction with the ruling regime grew not only among Rwanda's Tutsis and moderate Hutus, but also in the neighboring countries among the Tutsi refugees, but mainly in Uganda,[230] where in 1979 they formed the *Rwandan Patriotic Front* (RPF), which became the main opposing force to Habyarimana's government.

6.2 Unilateral intervention: France (1990), success

On October 1, 1990, a group of 4 000 RPF rebels invaded Rwanda from their base in Uganda. The rebels, primarily Tutsis, accused the government for failure to conduct democratic reforms and discriminating against Tutsis in public administration, education, health, the economy--in essence, all spheres of life. While Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni was well aware of what was going on within the borders of his country, as well as the rapid build-up of Tutsi forces from Congo, he denied all allegations of supporting the rebels, declared the closure of state borders with Rwanda and promised to put in prison anyone who crossed border to go back to Uganda.

Unable to stop the assault of the RPF, Habyarimana sought French support. A number of reasons account for the willingness of France to intervene on behalf of the Rwandan government. First, its *colonial heritage* of controlling a large portion of the African continent presupposed future ties between French and its former colonies. As Prunier puts it, France has always considered Africa "le pré carré" (our own backyard) and viewed itself as "a large hen followed by a docile brood of little black chicks" [231] that needed always to be taken care of. France had always been committed to supporting countries with common historical ties. This attitude was

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[229] Robbins R.H. (1999, 2002). *Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism.* Allyn and Bacon, 271.
[230] Ugandan-based Tutsi refugees played a key role in Yoweri Museveni's seizing the presidency there in 1986, and many were subsequently rewarded with important posts in his administration.
[231] Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. P. 103.

175

galvanized by the *lingua franca* of the continent – the French, which played a decisive role in keeping France and its former colonies together under the common "threat" – the Anglo-Saxon influence.

Second, *geopolitics* played an important role in *modus vivendi* of the French presence in Africa. Both Klinghoffer and Prunier point to the role played by the historic universal struggle of the French against Anglo-Saxon influence everywhere in the world, starting from the 100-years war with the Britain, Napoleon's times, occupation of Canada by the "les Ricains",[232] WWII aftermath and the de Gaulle's *grandeur*, and, last but not the least, the spread of the influence of the "les Angliches": the Fashoda syndrome[233] has been the primary driving force for the specific French attention to Africa.[234] Thus, English-speaking Uganda, with the large Tutsi population, and, particularly, President Museveni was considered the forefront of this Anglo-Saxonization, on top of which many Tutsi RPF leaders had received military training in Britain and the US (for example, Paul Kagame spent couple of months in Ft. Leavenworth before the initial defeat of the RPF).

Another quite significant variable in explaining the commitment of the French to assist the government of Rwanda in the crisis, was French history, especially their Revolution of 1789 and similarities with Rwanda's "Social Revolution" of 1959. The parallels had been drawn between the suppressed *classe ouvrière* and revolt of the French Jacobins and Hutus against *aristocrate despotisme* of Royalists and Tutsis, respectively.[235] Thus, according to Prunier, "…in Rwanda the French army was in the position of those revolutionary soldiers of 1792 who fought Prussians and 'émigrés' [here: the refugee Tutsis in Uganda, i.e. the RPF] alike"[236] This led to institutionalization of a *morally*-felt obligation: the French felt obliged to help the Hutu government of Habyarimana based on their legacy of popular liberation.

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[232] Here: the "Yankees"
[233] In 1898 the clash between the forces of Captain Marchand of France and the army of Lord Kitchener of Britain near a small Sudanese village of Fashoda nearly led to a European War (see: Bates, B. (1984). *Encounter in the Nile: The Fashoda Incident on 1898*. London: Oxford University Press.
[234] Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. PP. 102-112 and Klinghoffer, A.J. (1998). Op.cit. P. 14.
[235] Lemarchand, R. (1970). *Rwanda and Burundi*. New York: Preager.
[236] Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. P. 112.

Finally, there has been a strong *personal* aspect to the French intervention: right on the day of intervention, Habyarimana called President of France François Mitterrand and received promises of support, which materialized less than three days after the first attack of RPF. Mitterand's son, Jean-Christophe, who was supervising African affairs at the government office in the Presidential palace, was also a close friend of President Habyarimana. According to Kakwenzire & Kamukama, he even owned a plantation in Rwanda and was personally involved in the arms trade.[237]

Such personal links between the governments of the two countries were instrumental in both the rapid deployment of French forces to Rwanda, and the government's commitment to protect mutual interests of the two leaders. President Habyarimana knew that the French would support his regime and keep the spirit of Francophone Africa alive in the struggle against Anglo-Saxon influence. He played this card very effectively: in less than a day after his appeal to the French leadership, the support was received.

In three days after the first attack of the RPF, 150 French soldiers were dispatched from the Central African Republic. Belgium and Congo also helped in the intervention, but quickly withdrew due to domestic political pressure on the former and the inefficiency of the latter. With the purpose of drawing increased support from the French, and drawing them into direct combat with the RPF, Habyarimana further dramatized the situation by organizing a fake attack by Tutsis on Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, which brought him support from the French ambassador.

Soon the French military contingent was increased to 600 soldiers, who played a decisive role in buffering the RPF attack. The French, according to Prunier, "took care of the airport guards and logistics … looked after the government helicopters and when necessary flew them, organized artillery positioning and ammunition supply, and ensured radio communications".[238] They also supervised military security and counterinsurgency operations of the Rwanda army,

[237] Kakwenzire, J. and Kamukama, D. The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990 – 1994. In Howard, A. and Astri S. (eds.), *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (p. 83). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
[238] Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. PP. 110-111.

and maintained roadblocks. The immediate result of this French intervention was that by November 1990 the RPF operation had been stalled and it was forced to retreat to the mountainous part of Uganda.

Right from the very beginning of the RPF invasion, Habyarimana tried to represent it as an effort to bring the Tutsi ethnic group back into power. This galvanized the Hutu population around the government, followed by large-scale suppression of the Tutsis and liberal-minded Hutus. Arrests of Tutsi businessmen, teachers, and priests on the grounds of alleged cooperation with the RPF became the new modus operandi of Habyarimana's regime. To increase the efficiency of suppression of the opposition, president established well-trained and armed "death squads" – the so called *Interahamwe* ("Those Who Attack Together") and the *Impuzamugambi* ("Those With a Single Purpose"), which were indoctrinated with racial hatred toward Tutsi.[239] These were the groups that conducted most of the killing of Tutsis that was to follow.

Although small-scale attacks on the Rwanda territory never actually ceased, the immediate outcome of the French intervention, in general terms, corresponded with its initial goals and agenda. The French did not want to be deeply involved with the domestic Rwandan problematique and to undertake the role of an external guarantor of peace. This would have required much economic effort from the French and would have increased international publicity of their intervention. Also, they did not want to get engaged in large-scale operations against the RPF because this would have internationalized the domestic conflict. In this case, Uganda would have gotten involved, as the French would have had to chase the RPF into that country to ensure their complete defeat. Such deep involvement would have involved more actors, and would have made the French efforts more complicated, long-lasting, costly, and, therefore, unlikely to succeed.

Therefore, the French maintained a limited goal for their intervention: stop the RPF assault and save the Habyarimana regime. This goal was achieved: the Hutu government forces

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[239] Robbins R.H. (1999, 2002). Op.cit. PP. 271-272.

with the support of the French achieved a victory over the Tutsi rebels, which stopped their insurgencies for three years.

An important thing to mention about the French intervention was the moral side of it. Suppression of the Tutsi population of the country, even more so, their complete eradication, as well as the creation of racist paramilitary groups as a result of this victory, has never been the objective of the French. On the contrary, they pressed Habyarimana to create favorable political conditions for domestic stabilization and allow all citizens' participation in the political life of Rwanda.

As a result of the French intervention, political and diplomatic talks with Habyarimana and pressure from the international community, the Rwandan president introduced reforms that were meant to be democratic and remedy ethnic tensions in the country; however, these reforms remained superficial and quite ineffective. In the middle of 1991, he adopted a new Constitution, which allowed for multi-party political system, created the office of Prime Minister, limited the term of presidency to a maximum of two consecutive terms of five years, and separated the legislative, judicial and executive governmental branches. International support quickly followed: the World Bank issued a loan of 80 mil. USD to "help solve chronic economic problems and calm heated political conditions brought on by the RPF invasion". For its part, France provided 13.6 mil. USD to Rwanda in the form of a grant for purchasing its essential imports.[240]

6.3 Multilateral and Unilateral Interventions: UN, France, UN (1993-1994), success

The process of negotiations between the Rwanda government and the RPF lasted nearly nine months from January to August 1993 and ended with the Arusha Agreement. The agreement that was meant to stop confrontation between Tutsis and Hutus, became, in fact, the

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[240] "Rwanda Chronology" (available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cis/cews/database/Rwanda/index.html (last accessed on 12.04.08).

starting point for renewed tensions in Rwanda, and the main legal basis for further interventions. A number of African states, concerned with the security situation in the region, tried to get directly involved in this process – Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Tanzania formed the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG), but it turned out to be completely unsuccessful due to limited operational capacities, financial resources and personnel.

Due to the unstable political situation in Rwanda and the split between moderate Hutus supporting further continuation of the negotiation process, on the one hand, and extremist racist militants, on the other, implementation of the Arusha Agreement was repeatedly blocked at home by the Hutus who wanted to have a larger part in the new Transitional Government, including all its relevant spheres, especially the military. There were also the French lobbies of Habyarimana, who, in the words of the French Minister of Cooperation Marcel Debarge, advocated the creation of "a common front"[241] with Habyarimana against the Tutsis.

Notwithstanding accelerating tensions, the Arusha Agreement was signed by the belligerents on August 4, 1993. The agreement package comprised four main aspects, agreed at various times: a cease-fire (July 1992); a power-sharing arrangement (October 1992 and January 1993); the return of refugees (June 1993) and the reform and integration of the armed forces (August 1993). At first glance, things were beginning to show slow improvements, since the Agreement was the first step towards real reconciliation and power-sharing. However, the peace-settlement process was halted by two unrelated events that had very grave consequences for the resumption of the conflict in Rwanda.

The first was the murder of Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu President of Burundi, on October 1993 by extremist Tutsis and opposition Hutus, causing internal conflict in the country, which led to the combined deaths of 50 000 people and the exodus of approximately 300 000 Hutus to Rwanda.[242] At the same time, around 150 000 Tutsis became internally displaced. Such

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[241] Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. P. 178 and *Le Monde* (1993, February 11), p. 27.
[242] Commission Internationale d'Etiquête sur les Violations des Droit de l'Homme au Burundi depuis le 21 Octobre 1993, *Rapport final*, Brussels, July 1994.

acts of violence and their aftermath greatly exacerbated internal Rwandan anti-Tutsi sentiment and fueled hatred against them.

The second unfortunate turn was assassination of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994, when he was returning from a meeting with President Museveni. Together with him on the French Falcon plane was the newly elected president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, a Hutu. While a number of theories have been spun as to who exactly was behind this act,[243] most probably this was done by Hutu elites opposing the progress of Arusha and fearing Habyarimana was a defector from the Hutu cause. The death of Habyarimana led to what is known as the Rwandan Genocide.

6.3.1 UNAMIR

On 22 February 1993, Rwanda and Uganda applied to the UN to deploy military observers along their 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, especially the transit of military supplies. With the purpose of safeguard the terms of Arusha Agreement, by Resolution 84 the UN established an Observer Mission in Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) with its headquarters in Kabale, a city in western Uganda, which, at its first stage included 81 military observers.[244].

In nearly one month, the mission was renamed UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda) and had a mandate of "contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional Government".[245] The main duties of UNAMIR were ensuring the security of Kigali, monitoring the Arusha Agreement through notifying the UN of non-compliance with the agreement, and facilitating the

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[243] Prunier brings up a number of considerations of who is to be blamed for killing Habyarimana: the PRF, the French, the Hutu extremists, the hired hands (see Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. PP. 213-229).
[244] Countries that provided military observers were: Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Hungary, Netherlands, Senegal, Slovak Republic and Zimbabwe.
[245] UN Security Council Resolution 872 (available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/540/63/PDF/N9354063.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed on 19.05.08).

repatriation of refugees and IDPs. The Mission also coordinated humanitarian assistance with other UN agencies. The UNAMIR force totaled 2 539 military personnel from Bangladesh, Ghana, and Belgium, including observers from UNOMUR and NMOG.

Two months after deployment of UNAMIR, then UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali noted its success when he called the Mission "a factor of stability in the area and that it was playing a useful role as a confidence-building mechanism".[246] However, the UN deployment lacked the capacity to forcefully impose an effective cease-fire.[247] This actually went beyond their mandate, which included monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the agreement--not peace-enforcement and peace-making per se. Such modus operandi of the UN, in the words of Prunier, meant that they "were completely useless because their mandate prevented them from interfering."[248]

The essential part of the UNAMIR activities, according to Klinghoffer, was "the implementation of the Arusha agreements, including the installation of a Transitional Government".[249] The parties participating in the Arusha process, indeed revealed high level of collaboration: notwithstanding their sometimes conflicting positions, such as composition of military forces, both the government and the RPF representatives "showed good will and cooperation with each other and with the United Nations".[250]

Two factors worsened implementation of the results of the negotiations, endangered the implementation of the Arusha agreements and, eventually, the success of UNAMIR. The first was the existence of a strong anti-Arusha and anti-Tutsi domestic lobby in Rwanda: the ruling Hutu government was quite fragmented, with moderates supporting the peace settlement, and the "hawks" eager to exterminate the Hutus. Such gaps in elite preferences were reflected in the

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[246] UNAMIR official website (available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirFT.htm, last accessed on 20.04.08).
[247] Kuperman, A.J. (2001). *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention. Genocide in Rwanda*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 40.
[248] Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. P. 261.
[249] Klinghoffer, A.J. (1998). Op.cit. P. 47.
[250] UNAMIR official website (available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirFT.htm, last accessed on 20.04.08).

negotiation process as well as its implementation: the major reason why the Transitional Government and Transitional National Assembly had not been installed was differences in opinions within the existing government regarding its composition – how many places would be given to Tutsis. Such obstacles in the negotiation process slowed down the pace of UNAMIR.

The second factor that undermined the success of UNAMIR was the assassination of Habyarimana, after which the groups of violent *Interahamwe* launched wide-scale ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi population and moderate Hutu leaders. Among the Hutus who had not supported violent nationalist stance of the masses, was Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who had been assassinated together with 10 Belgium blue helmets. This event forced the Belgian government to reconsider its role in the multinational intervention. Ultimately, under strong domestic pressure, Belgium left the UN force.

Following the Belgian retreat and fearful that its forces might become the target of interethnic violence, the UN Security Council decided to further reduce UNAMIR forces by up to 270 troops.[251] The remaining troops would act as "an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire; assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and monitor developments in Rwanda".[252]

At the same time, no backing was forthcoming from the major international players to increase the UN force and amend the mandate so as to prevent further killings of the civilian population: the biggest possible contributors, both financially and militarily, had their own problems: Russia was too preoccupied with fighting its ongoing war in Chechnya, and US, according to Klinghoffer, was "reluctant to put peacekeepers in jeopardy in a military conflict with no ceasefire",[253] after their painful experience in Somalia.

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[251] U.N. Security Council Resolution 912 (available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/190/85/PDF/N9419085.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed on 20.04.08).
[252] UNAMIR official website (available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirFT.htm, last accessed on 20.04.08).
[253] Klinghoffer, A.J. (1998). Op.cit. P. 51.

Given the indications coming from UNAMIR monitoring on frequent clashes in Kigali, controlled by government forces and the RPF, as well as on alleged preparations for further massacres of civilians, Ghali still managed to pass UN Resolution 918 on May 17, 1994, which included two crucial points: it enlarged the UN force by up to 5 500 and, most importantly, included protection of civilians in its mandate.[254] It again, however, had no peace-making component, although UN troops had the right of opening fire in self-defense.

Although the key task of UNAMIR was the implementation of the Arusha provisions, which was impossible to accomplish given the diametrically opposing interests of the RPF and the interim government, with much diplomatic efforts, by SC Resolution 925 the UN managed to establish and deploy UNAMIR II, which was composed of forces from Zimbabwe, Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal, Zambia, Malawi, Nigeria, Congo and Mali. However, due to purely technical problems, such as funding, transport, equipment, the deployment failed. It was now time for the French to intervene.

6.3.2 The French Intervention – "Operation Turquoise"

Establishment of the UN mission in Rwanda coincided with major advances of the RPF, which by mid-April 1994 had managed to gain control of Kigali. At this time, there was a quite evident change within the ranks of the RPF: although the "Uganda nucleus" holding key posts within the rebellion remained, the RPF was now recruiting much less selectively from the new arrivals, who were fleeing from Hutu Power persecutions; this subsequently decreased the discipline in the army. Secondly, it now included Tutsis who had fled from neighboring Burundi out of fears of persecution after the failed coup organized by Tutsi paratroopers in October 1993. These Tutsis nursed bitter sentiments against the Burundi Hutu in particular, and all Hutus in general, including those in Rwanda.

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[254] U.N. Security Council Resolution 918 (available at:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/218/36/PDF/N9421836.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed on 20.04.08).

Both of these developments had negative consequences for the population of the territories occupied by RPF: the Hutu population did not welcome "liberation" by the RPF. The RPF included not only those who viewed the war as political and non-ethnic, but also large numbers of "new" Tutsis, who were outraged with the Hutus and wanted to take revenge against those who had brutalized their kin. Under such circumstances, there was a vital need to separate the two groups: the Tutsis, on the one hand, and the remaining Hutu Power politicians and their Interahamwe operatives together with the ordinary Hutu population, which might have fallen victim to the advancing RPF.

Such a "buffer zone" needed to be organized quickly and effectively to save the lives of the people, and the country to organize it was France. After its initial involvement in Rwanda in October-November 1990, France had not actively participated in conflict resolution in Rwanda. The duality of French interests was obvious: on the one hand, it was vitally interested in maintaining a presence in the country with the aim of re-establishing its patronage over Francophone Africa.

From operational perspective, France was not going to launch large-scale operations within Rwanda. The non-functional Transition Government was completely useless in keeping the *Interahamwe* from mass killings of Tutsis, even if they had wanted to. The situation was indeed tense: the RPF was gaining momentum and, even without any outside support, was capturing region after region. In such a situation, France could create a "safe haven" for the retreating FAR (Rwandan National Army) soldiers and the Hutu Power people. Such actions would have been welcomed by French-speaking Africa.

On the other hand, the possible defeat of France or even casualties from combat carried the risk that the French would lose their influence in the region and damage their image both inside France and in Rwanda as the "defender" of the Francophone Africa. The French government feared negative developments in case of military defeat by the RPF and had no wish to restore the Hutu Power as they had done back in November 1990.

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France thus needed a cautious, inexpensive (both economically and operationally) face-saving show of force, which would transfer the entire responsibility in case of failure to another actor, in this case the UN. According to Klinghoffer, France was interested in a short-term humanitarian intervention to counter the negative international and domestic publicity they had received after the earlier fiasco with Habyarimana.[255] Prime Minister Balladur even depicted French intervention as "a moral act aimed at stopping genocide", and claimed that there were "no French strategic interests…involved".[256] Essentially, France wanted to protect itself from accusations that it was not stepping up to the plate to protect its former colonial possessions from sectarian bloodshed.

In June French President Mitterand officially requested a mandate for intervention for the French troops from the UN SC, which was granted by UN Resolution 929 under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The French mission was to be humanitarian in nature; the French would guarantee security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk, and, more specifically, abstain from direct peace-making and refrain from actions directed at separating belligerents.[257] The UN also had its own fears that their mandated intervention could be defeated in case of open military actions. The French were allowed to remain in Rwanda for a maximum of two months until the final deployment of UNAMIR II. This intervention was different from previous French actions: in essence, it was a unilateral intervention backed by the international community.

Operationally, "Operation Turquoise" was huge: for a total of 2 500 Senegalese and French troops there were about 100 armored vehicles, a battery of marine mortars, 10 helicopters, and 12 fighter-bomber aircrafts. This was a show of force both to the Hutu *Interahamwe*, who warmly welcomed the armada, and the RPF soldiers, who were on the ascendant. However, the RPF was unwilling to get involved in open warfare with the French: from the point of view of military operations, it was significantly outmanned by the French. At

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[255] Klinghoffer, A.J. (1998). Op.cit. P. 82.
[256] Ibid., 84.
[257] Although it was to refrain from a military clash, many high-ranking French officers were strongly opposed to the RPF's advances. (the last sentence doesn't make sense to me.) See Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. P. 294.

the same time, the RPF was eager to establish a positive international image not as a "Tutsi avenger", but as a true "democratizer" of Rwanda and a human rights protector.

Even with their strict humanitarian mission, the French sometimes openly supported former *Interahamwe* and the genocide perpetrators. They created "safe heavens" for the ex-government soldiers and civilians who had fled in the face of RPF advances and even assisted them to leave the country.[258] All this did not go without notice by the RPF, who, in their turn, could do nothing but accept the limited, two-month long French presence. Retaliation, however, was quick: the RPF launched a new offensive on the day of adoption of the Resolution 929, and less than two weeks later seized Kigali.

6.3.3 UNAMIR II

The genocide finally ended after the RPF had defeated the governmental troops and *Interahamwe* and taken control of the country. On July 18, 1994, the RPF was in Gisenyi, the governmental residence, and declared a unilateral ceasefire, thus ending the civil war. However, the atrocities continued, although not in the form of mass killings of Hutus. Fearing retaliation on the part of the RPF, which had been depicted by the Hutu elites as a hostile Tutsi force, thousands of Hutus fled Rwanda, forming refugee camps in neighboring countries. Congo was the main destination of the refugees, and had become, according to Robbins, "a country in exile for the Hutu extremists who fled with them, using their control over the fleeing army to maintain control of the Hutus in the refugee camps."[259]

After having separated the warring parties, the French troops began their withdrawal on July 29. In two days they were replaced by UNAMIR II, which was "to ensure stability and security in the north-western and south-western regions of Rwanda; to stabilize and monitor the

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[258] A number of scholars have indicated a positive attitude on the part of the French military not to *Interahamwe* and government forces per se, but the Hutu civilians and all the French-speaking population in general. See: Omar, R. and de Waal, A. (1995). *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*. London: African Rights, 1145-1146 and Destexhe, A. (1995). *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. New York: New York University Press, 54.

[259] Robbins R.H. (1999, 2002). *Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism*. Allyn and Bacon, 273.

situation in all regions of Rwanda to encourage the return of the displaced population; to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda; and to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda".[260]

UNAMIR II was involved in training the Rwandan policemen through their training unit CIVPOL. CIVPOL was also monitoring the activities of local police and gendarmerie and those of the civil authorities with regard to human rights violations; and protecting the workers of the International Tribunal, as mandated by UN Resolution 955 on 8 November 8, 1994 in Arusha, Tanzania. Another important side of UNAMIR II was the program of state-building; within this framework, it began operating a radio station in three languages calling for national reconciliation.

UNAMIR II was also active in the neighboring countries, mainly in Congo, protecting the refugee camps there and preventing an influx of Hutu rebels from these camps[261] and other areas. To make this effort more effective, the UN extended the Rwandan arms embargo to the neighboring countries. Furthermore, to strengthen protection of Rwanda from Hutu attacks from neighboring countries, the UN suspended the arms embargo against Rwanda but retained it for other countries, thus, reducing "the likelihood that the refugees would return home as part of a military operation".[262]

One of the examples of successful work by UNAMIR II was the case of the Kibeho refugee camp in the Gikongoro region. Seven out of eight camps had been closed down by the Rwandese Government out of fears that they would harbor former *Interahamwe* elements, thereby posing a security threat to the new regime. At Kibeho there were about 80 000 IDPs who escaped the camp and spent five days in the hills without food, adequate space and proper sanitation. Under such conditions, UNAMIR immediately ensured transportation of IDPs,

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[260] UNAMIR Official webpage (available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko_co_mission/unamirFT.htm, last accessed on 20.04.08).
[261] This was actually the first peacekeeping mission in a country operated by its own troops: Congolese peacekeepers were equipped, trained and paid by the UN.
[262] Klinghoffer, A.J. (1998). Op.cit. P. 69.

organized casualty collection posts and provided emergency medical assistance. It also evacuated sick and injured people to nearby medical facilities in the city of Butare.[263]

Another example of successful humanitarian assistance within the frameworks of the UNAMIR was the UN World Food Program, which distributed food to a total of 420 000 beneficiaries. Other programs of assistance included the rehabilitation of hospitals and health centers by UNHCR, health training programs undertaken by World Health Organization and the United Nations Population Fund, water supply projects undertaken by UNICEF, and assistance by UNICEF to some 2,000 unaccompanied minors.[264]

The UN also established the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR), which was composed of 113 staff in 11 field offices. Its mandate was to serve the purpose of confidence-building towards final national reconciliation. HRFOR carried out investigations of genocide and other grave human rights violations; it created comprehensive human rights field offices with the aim of monitoring the current human rights situation; finally, it started promotional human rights activities, such as rebuilding of the Rwandese administration of justice to human rights education. Another important mission of HRFOR within the general aim of national reconciliation was protection of human rights during the implementation of the process of repatriation and resettlement of former refugees and IDPs. HRFOR also monitored the situation of state prisons and assisted in restructuring the justice system at national and local levels.

After six months of its deployment, the capacities of UNAMIR reached its peak with 5 740 peacekeepers and military observers. At this point, the UN began gradually downsizing its presence, shifting its activities from peacekeeping to confidence-building, which would include "monitoring throughout the country with military/police observers, as a complement to human rights monitors; helping in the distribution of humanitarian assistance; facilitating the return and

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[263] Background of the UN operations in Rwanda (see the UN Mission webpage at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirFT.htm, last accessed on 15.05.08).
[264] Ibid.

reintegration of refugees; providing assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and de-mining; and stationing a limited reserve of formed troops in certain provinces to assist in the performance of the above tasks".[265] These tasks have been performed by 2 330 troops. Eventually, their numbers had been decreased by to 1 800 troops.

The downsizing and subsequent retreat of UNAMIR happened for two reasons, the first being the overall internal stabilization of Rwanda. After the end of the genocide, the RPF quickly started building a coalition government. The majority of the executive government posts have been allocated to Hutus, but the real power remained with RPF due to one simple reason: in a country torn by half a decade of genocide with all the attendant consequences (no infrastructure, an economy in shambles, an absence of community services), the RPF was the only authority with vehicles, weapons, fuel, and portable telephones.

Gradually, Rwanda was starting to resemble a normally functioning country, and, with the move to suspend its arms embargo against it, the UN decided that the country should rely on its own military capabilities. Thus, although there were severe cuts in the UNAMIR personnel, its mandate shifted from peacekeeping to national reconciliation.

The second reason was chronic financial problems within the organization and proliferation of local conflicts elsewhere in the world. If financial constraints mattered even in the active military phase, now, with the actual end of conflict, these constraints gained even greater force.

At the same time, the government of Rwanda was itself willing to be relieved of the UN presence. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the new Rwandan leadership had opposed the initial downsizing of UN forces in April 1994, which had led to increased hostilities by *Interahamwe* militia against the Tutsis. Now that the conflict was over the Rwandan government had not needed the UN which, according to them, did nothing to stop the genocide.

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[265] Ibid.

The government of Rwanda also rejected charges of human rights violations made by UN and international human rights organizations against their personnel.[266] They also protested against the distribution of humanitarian aid by the UN to Hutu refugees, whom they considered to be genocide perpetrators, instead of using it for in-country development.

Most of all, the government's ire toward the UN was due to its authorization of the French intervention, which, in the eyes of RPF, had protected the Hutus and contributed to their escape from the country's new government. The actions of the French had not passed without notice by the RPF. RPF military leader and subsequent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, when referring to the UN in general, and French peacekeepers in particular, mused that "[t]hey have been basking in the sunshine, burning fuel, doing nothing and receiving the credit for creating this peace environment. We do not accept that. We're happy they're gone".[267] The UN presence ended on April 19, 1996. Upon withdrawal of UN troops, the new government agreed to establish the UN Office in Rwanda for coordination of humanitarian assistance, monitoring of human rights abuses and further peace-building actions.

6.4 Analysis of the interventions

The starting point of departure in answering the question whether the unilateral and multinational interventions in Rwanda were successful is establishing a proxy of intervention success. In the dissertation, I measure success of interventions in conflicts by whether the outcomes of the interventions correspond to the interveners' initial agendas, namely, whether the third parties reached their principal goals in the intervention; the inherent flexibility of this definition means that it can be applied to all types of interventions.

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[266] A number of sources have reported on the retaliation of the RPF against alleged Hutu *Interahamwe* and the Hutu population in general. Among them was the report of Robert Gersony from AID, which estimated that the number of Hutus killed after RPF gained control over the country was 30 000 (see Smith, S. (1996, February 27). Rwanda: enquete sur la terreur tutsie. *Liberation*, 4594, p. 5). Additional 3 000 Hutus were killed in Butare district, cited by Mujawamariya, M. (1995). Report of a Visit to Rwanda, September 1-22, 1994. *Issue*, XXIII(2), 33-34.

[267] Interview with Paul Kagame in *Newsweek,* International edition, vol. CXXVII, no. 12 (April 1, 1996): 54

6.4.1 Unilateral intervention: success (France)

During their first intervention in 1990, the presence of first 150 and later 600 French troops was quite low as to reach victory in open combat activities against the RPF. The maximum number of French soldiers was still only 15% as big as the 4 000-strong Tutsi force of the RPF. The French troops had never actually participated in one-on-one combat with the RPF, but provided other important support to the Rwandan army. They trained high-level FAR cadre, provided for the physical protection of President Habyarimana, and supplied technical equipment and know-how to the FAR. Leaving everything else aside, they increased the morale of the FAR soldiers and assured them of their success.

Keeping in mind overwhelming advantage of Hutus in numbers, the Habyarimana's regime could have won the war at the first stage even without French operational support. Nevertheless, with limited operational inputs, the French greatly facilitated the initial rapid victory of the government forces over the Tutsi rebels, who were credibly threatened by the presence of highly-trained and equipped French personnel.

The credibility of French support was further strengthened by the fact that France was clearly a *superpower*, at least by African standards. In comparison to the belligerents, it possessed the most up-to-date military know-how; its troops were much better trained and equipped; and had strategic warfare logic that was absent in the ranks of newly formed Tutsi opposition. It was also able to marshal resources and deploy its military personnel much more quickly than an international organization, the resources of which depend largely on the consent of multiple states.

The presence of French officers among the FAR not only raised their military morale, but also gave a subliminal message that, in case of a possible defeat by the RPF, the French, taking into account their strength and their will to uphold the country's prestige in the international arena, would not hesitate to engage militarily against the rebels.

The success of the intervention (i.e., its positive outcomes cross-referenced against the initial agendas of interveners and who they aimed to help), was largely due to the decisiveness of the outside actors in supporting a particular group and the special meaning of their presence. Hence, we are dealing with the phenomenon of *double commitment*: the commitment by the intervener to help its domestic allies as well as destroy and punish defectors, and the commitment by its allies to accept this outside support and act in accordance with the help provided, as well as to stop fighting.

In the case of the Hutus, it was the defeat of the Tutsi rebellion by the government forces with the support of the French, which succeeded largely due to the commitment of the latter to support the former. Even though the French had not directly participated in the warfare, their mere presence boosted the morale of the FAR, which fought more effectively.

Second, the timing of the French intervention was quite significant for its success: *intervening right from the very beginning of warfare*. The rapid deployment of the French troops to the conflict scene resulted in stopping the advance of the opposition that was not well organized and therefore quite ineffective. The RPF advances had not possessed all the necessary military means to effectively crush the Hutu Power regime, and the assistance of the French to the FAR from the very beginning of the conflict had an important effect on the course of further clashes.

The early intervention by the French contributed to intervention success from another point of view. As a matter of military tactics, when an advancing group captures certain territory, it tries to use it as a stronghold for further attacks. The group will use all the resources – food, cattle, fuel, etc. – on the territory to sustain further military activities. The group will also try to recruit additional people, usually having kinship connections or simply sympathizing with them, to join their ranks from the territory it controls. In the case of the French intervention, the RPF was not given the chance to capture any sizable territory, thus weakening its fighting capacities.

The early intervention of French troops also helped to prevent large-scale warfare and save the lives of many people. This promoted the success of the intervention even without direct French participation in the military activities against the RPF. Here, I would like to stress that in assessing French success, I based my judgment on the immediate results of their intervention – the conflict was stopped, the RPF was beaten back, and the government remained in power – this saved the lives of many people who might have been killed on both sides from prolonged warfare.

Finally, success of the French intervention was largely due to the fact that the interveners *supported the government*, which, at that time, was in a much stronger position than the opposing forces of the RPF. The Hutus represented the majority of the Rwandan population, and the government was mainly composed of Hutus and enjoyed considerable military advantage over the RPF. The question of why Habyarimana invited the French still remains open. Perhaps, out of two reasons: despite his military advantage, he was afraid that the advancing Tutsis might be joined by their in-country supporters, which would increase the capacities of the opposition.

Another reason might have been the geopolitical considerations of possible involvement of Burundi and Uganda into the conflict, which would have internationalized the conflict. By inviting the French forces to intervene, Habyarimana sent a clear message to his neighbors to abstain from any further involvement in the conflict and from supporting Tutsi rebels.

6.4.2 Multilateral interventions: success

Success of multilateral interventions in Rwanda, conducted by the United Nations, like any other actions on the international organization level, should be judged in accordance with its corresponding mandate.

The first multilateral intervention, UNAMIR I, had no mandate to directly interfere in the active warfare either by helping one side of the conflict or acting as a buffer force that separated them. The main bases for UN actions are its conventions--in this case, the Genocide Convention

194

of 1948, which clearly describes the human rights abuses that qualify as genocide that therefore mandate intervention. With reference to Rwanda, the UN avoided usage of the term *genocide* for as long as possible and only after evident mass killings resorted to using this term.

If this were a genocide, then the UN should have acted with the purpose of stopping it as it constituted a violation of the relevant convention. This would have meant not only proclaiming the conflict a genocide, but doing everything possible to stop it. If this was the case, then the open agenda and mandate of UN intervention should have included putting an end to mass murders, backed up by the decisive usage of force against the perpetrators. In the case of Rwanda, the UN abstained from calling it genocide, and, even when its Secretary General finally used this term, it still refrained from interfering directly.

The main point here is that the UN, as any international organization, is not an independent entity. It is comprised of member-states who are driven by a situational logic: they act on their own discretion, geopolitical reasoning and vital national interests. The more powerful a state is on the world stage, the more leverage it has over the decisions of the Security Council, which is its main decision-making body. This leverage is quite often framed by financial as well as in-kind contributions to joint operations. In case of interventions this participation could be physically presence of a country in the international coalition or sponsoring the coalition's actions.

The main financial contributor to the UN has been the US. The genocide in Rwanda corresponded with the end of the US presence in Somalia. Faced with the failures of its intervention there, the US was extremely hesitant, first, to call the events in Rwanda a genocide, and second, to act correspondingly. In this connection, Gourevitch gave a clear account of the US role in such interventions: "[T]here are obligations which arise in connection with the use of the term…[I]f it was a genocide, the Convention of 1948 required the contracting parties to act. Washington did not want to act. So Washington pretended that it wasn't a genocide".[268] The

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[268] Gourevitch, P. (2000). Op.cit. P. 153.

situation was the same with the international community in general, which preferred not to call this a genocide and hence not to intervene to stop the killing. Thus, neither the will nor the resources were present for the UN to act in accordance with the Convention in order to halt the bloodshed in Rwanda.

The second important point is that the UN, as any international organization, remains very much concerned with its prestige in the international arena. With regards to its actions, and, specifically its military capacity, UN prestige means two things: fulfillment of its mandated goals and doing this with the minimum human casualties. In other words, in order to be successful, the UN must be realistic, if not minimalistic, in establishing the goals of its missions.

The most important factor in the success of the UN intervention was its *neutrality and impartiality* in that it is not interested in punishing or rewarding any side of the conflict but is only involved in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance. Of course, the UN did not stop the conflict: for this, considerable resources would have been required, which the UN did not have or was unwilling to use. However, the neutral nature of the intervention facilitated its acceptance by both parties.

UN neutrality in its institutional arrangements also facilitated the success of the French "Operation Turquoise". While not quite welcoming the French presence in their country, the RPF had to accept them as "a necessary evil", as a part of the overall UN operation. They, of course, thought that the French were helping the Hutu Power and *Interahamwe* people to escape. However, since the French intervention was mandated by the UN – a neutral and impartial international organization, the Tutsis trusted that the French would not go beyond their mandated actions and fight against them as they had done during their first intervention back in 1990..

Another variable that promoted the success of UN actions was its *minimalist approach*. Initially, UNAMIR was limited to monitoring the fulfillment of the Arusha Agreement. Subsequently, although ordered not to intervene directly in warfare, the UN peacekeepers were

yet allowed to open fire if attacked. Intervening after the end of hostilities protected the UN from suffering losses due to combat.

Obviously, with its limited financial and human resources, it could not stop the conflict in Rwanda or even intervene effectively with the purpose of separating the troops. A clear indication of the fact that the goal of UNAMIR I was *not* putting the end to hostilities, according to Gourevitch, but monitoring of the actual situation on the ground is a cable sent by its head Romeo Dallaire on April 21, 1994, which read that with "just with five thousand well-equipped soldiers and a free hand to fight Hutu Power he could bring the genocide to a rapid end. No military analyst…has ever questioned his judgment, and a great many have confirmed it".[269] Yet the same day the personnel of the UNAMIR I faced nearly a 90% cut; instead of 5 000, Dallaire was left with only 270 troops.

Such behavior of the UN, how inhuman or unethical may seem at first glance, clearly indicates that even though the UN, its Secretary General its Security Council as a representative body of decision-making states, might have been concerned with ending killings in Rwanda from moral and humanitarian point of view, it had *not* defined the actions directed at stopping genocide within its legal framework. Second, it had actually *acted* within its limited mandate of mere monitoring of the situation. Had the Security Council approved extension of the scope of the UNAMIR I mandate, ordering it to directly act against the *Hutu Power* and end genocide of the Tutsis, and had failed in this endeavor, then we can say that UNAMIR was a failed intervention.

This did not happen, and the UN contingent was cut even further, its scope limited and clear instructions had been given to Dallaire to abstain from involvement in warfare against the *Interahamwe* and Hutu militia. Thus, the UNAMIR I cannot be accused of failing to bring peace to the war in genocide-torn Rwanda simply because this was *not* its goal. Such reasoning was also confirmed by General Dallaire, who, when speaking on the Canadian television, admitted

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[269] Ibid. P. 153.

with bitterness, "The real question is: What does the international community really want the UN to do? ... The UN simply wasn't given the tools...We did not want to take on the Rwandan armed forces and the *interahamwe*".[270]

Another operational factor that directly contributed to the success of the multilateral intervention was the timing of operations. However, in this case of multilateral third parties, it is the *late intervention* that matters in achieving success, unlike the successful French unilateral intervention, which acted from the beginning of the conflict. This discrepancy can be explained in a number of ways.

After the institutionalized end of hostilities, which was the Arusha Agreement, the UN had not participated in the fight against any of the conflicting parties. Its tasks were limited to monitoring of the situation and fulfillment of the ceasefire agreement. The UNAMIR I was not supposed to get engaged in enforcing peace, it just provided what Carment and Harvey called, "...the stamp of institutional legitimacy"[271] to the agreement. This was a signal to the belligerents that their actions are being monitored.

Conducting an intervention in such a period meant that its troops would not have to be directly involved in military activities, and but could concentrate on peace-building, rather than on peace-enforcement and peace-keeping. Intervening after the actual end of hostilities had saved the UN from additional casualties and kept the decision-making spirit unanimous within the Security Council, taking into account the negative attitude of Belgium to the peace-keeping operations after the assassination of ten of its soldiers.

The second French intervention – now with the UN mandate - was conducted on the behalf of international community, although not unanimously supported by the Security Council. "Operation Turquoise" was carried out with the UN mandate and it had organizational back-up of the international organization, Although the RPF had long held grievances against the French

[270] Ibid., 170.
[271] Carment, D. and Harvey, F. (2001). *Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence*: *An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence*, Westport, Connecticut, London: Preager Studies on Ethnic and National Identities in Politics, Praeger 129.

coming from their early defeat in 1990 and subsequent lobbying on behalf of Habyarimana government and *Hutu Power*, the RPF never directly challenged the French presence.

Like the first unilateral intervention, the successful involvement of the French was due to the *early intervention* timing. France intervened when the RPF was just gaining strength, capturing city after city. There was a direct threat of another mass killing taking place, and, in this case, it would have been much harder to stop the conflict. Intervening early, the French saved the lives of many thousands of people and sent a clear message to the Tutsis to abstain from direct clashes.

This was achieved by increasing *operational superiority* of the French troops in comparison with the RPF rebels. Military and technological advantage was also a variable in success of the second French intervention - "Operation Turquoise" was largely due to the fact that it had quite a significant advantage against the RPF. The French troops acted as a buffer between the advancing former and the Hutu groups within the country, which had been indoctrinated by their elites. No one could precisely estimate the degree of their success, i.e. whether it was less or more successful.

However, using counterfactual logic, we can suppose that, if not the French and the UNAMIR, the situation would have been far more serious: taking into consideration the changes within the RPF ranks, negative memories of people-genocide victims and fleeing from Burundi. Thus, for example, the French troops secured about 1.2 million people, who, according to Prunier, "would start moving again at any time if they feared that their temporary situation was about to change".[272]

An open military fight with the French, especially in the situation in Rwanda, would have had an overall negative impact on a third party presence both from the viewpoint of domestic veto groups that would question the costs of their country's actions, and the international community, which would also raise questions as to the necessity of direct confrontation. The

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[272] Prunier, G. (1995). Op.cit. P. 299.

RPF had a good relationship with the UN, although the leadership of the former quite often accused the UN of not taking sides in the conflict and not interfering on behalf of innocent people who were being slaughtered by Hutu Power.

Although the advancing army condemned the French backing of the Interahamwe, claiming that the killings of Tutsis continued on the French-controlled territory, they never did so openly and defiantly. The RPF wanted to create the image of a neutral liberator, which had more of a political, rather than ethnic agenda: some of the key figures in the RPF were Hutus,[273] a part of its troops were also moderate Hutus, who had fled from persecutions in Rwanda, and it was the task of RPF to tell the international community that it had a balanced and fair approach to the solution of conflict, which did not mean extermination of *all* Hutus, but rather the removal of those who were directly involved in genocide.

A large degree of success of the French intervention was due to the fact that it was now a UN-mandated and authorized mission, which meant that there would be some moral and ethical aspects to the intervention and not just serving its own interests. This allowed for an *institutionalized intervention*, which meant that if the French had acted hostile as they did before, i.e. engaged in large-scale military operations openly taking sides and backing their fellow-Francophone Hutus, there would have been a quick end to that. Taking into account the already widespread negative international publicity and usage of the term "genocide", the UN mandate would have been revoked and the French would have been considered hostile interveners.

The institutionalization of the intervention process under the aegis of the UN also showed to the Tutsis that, in case of conflict with the French soldiers, they would have to deal with the UN. Seeing the rapid advances of the RPF, the UN needed to prevent another genocide from happening, this time the one against the Hutus. For this it needed to quickly deploy forces on the ground, taking into account the lengthy decision-making process in the Security Council. France was the one member-country that willingly agreed to serve as a protector and peacekeeper to

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[273] In fact, the first president to become after the RPF victory was Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu.

clear its tarnished image from the 1990 intervention. At the same time, the UN knew how the RPF viewed the French involvement into the conflict and blamed them from not stopping the genocide. Therefore, the UN gave the French its mandate for operation, thus institutionalizing the process.

6.5 Conclusions

In considering successes and failures of interventions in Rwanda an important methodological part of the comparative analysis should be mentioned: the independence of individual observations. Although the French had intervened twice, the success of the first intervention had no influence on the course of the second. If anything, the earlier intervention should have undermined the success of the subsequent intervention, as the French had supported Hutu Power during the first intervention. This meant that the RPF government of the second intervention was not well-disposed to the French presence in the country. Their hostility, however, did not appear to have negatively affected the effectiveness of the second intervention; in both the first and the second cases, the French succeeded in reaching their intervention agendas.

The conflict in Rwanda represents a perfect example of inconsistency of the existing scholarship in relation to defining the success of interventions.[274] The end of conflict and absence of hostilities, i.e. *de facto peace*, used as a proxy for successful third party interventions by existing literature, is, in fact, not applicable in the Rwandan case: although neither of the outside actors involved in the conflict had a strong vested interest in ending the genocide, they succeeded in fulfilling their intervention tasks.

The end result of the French unilateral intervention in 1990 was a temporary defeat of the RPF (for the period of the presence of the French troops and after their departure) and

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[274] For example, the French intervention in 1990 was included among "unsuccessful" third party actions in Regan's dataset, while COW 3 database does not even include outside interventions in the Rwandan conflict.

continuation of president Habyarimana's rule as president of Rwanda for another four years. This success of this unilateral intervention was largely due to the strong individual commitment of France to the party it supported. Operationally, the ability of France as a regional hegemon to credibly threaten a belligerent group together with choosing the right moment for intervention-- when the RPF was comparatively weaker its opponent--also contributed to the success of the French intervention.

The multilateral UN and UN-mandated interventions in Rwanda also succeeded but for different reasons. UNAMIR I was quite effective in monitoring the implementation of the Arusha Treaty and getting the message of its violations to the parties of the peace agreement and the UN. "Operation Turquoise" succeeded in acting as a buffer zone between the advancing RPF and the remaining Hutu Power forces and prepared the grounds for further deployment of the UNAMIR II, which, for its part, was successful in providing post-conflict settlement remedies.

Operationally, these actions were institutionalized and conducted under the aegis of a multinational organization. The interventions had been undertaken by the UN and with its blessing. Under such settings, a unilateral intervention, even by itself having low degree of trust, as it was with the French, is changed. The individual commitment of the French as a regional superpower to the Rwandese as a nation and the Hutus as an ethnic group was, first, neutralized by the international organization of which it was a part, and, second, limited by the UN mandated framework.

The multilateral interventions succeeded also due to their minimalist actions allowing their deployment only after the physical end of hostilities and precluding them from direct participation in combat. Although neither of the outside actors had ended the genocide per se, they still succeeded in fulfilling their tasks, and, in the case of the multilateral interventions, in words of Gourevitch, their "first commitment was not to protect people, but to protect their

202

mandates".[275] Strict implementation of their mandates permitted the interveners to remain neutral.

The case of Rwanda suggests that, to be successful, unilateral interventions have to consist of small-scale rapid-deployment operations at the beginning of a conflict and should aim to assist the government of a target country. For the multilateral interventions to be successful, they need to have a mandate limited to non-combat missions, which should be strictly adhered to, and should include a (regional) superpower within their ranks for immediate deployment.

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[275] Gourevitch, P. (2000). Op.cit. P. 289.

CHAPTER 7: SUCCESS OF INTERVENTIONS

The aim of my thesis was to study the effect of composition of third parties on the propensity of their success. Previous research conducted by different authors also focused on the causes of successes and failures of interventions, but viewed proxies for success as de facto and de jure end of conflicts, making durability of peace their central dependent variable. I took a different path and, instead, studied the degree to which initial goals of interveners themselves were fulfilled as a result of the interventions. Thus, my task was to define the factors making some interveners more successful in pursuing their agendas, missions, mandates and tasks they faced, than others.

The conclusions from the study of intervention successes and failures will be divided in two parts. First, I will delineate the factors that contribute to successes and failures of unilateral and multilateral interventions, respectively. I will then summarize the findings from my research in relation to the composition of interveners and define the variables that helped single actors reach their goals, and the variables that prevented them from being successful. The same will be done for the multilateral interventions. Finally, I will proceed to generalize criteria for success for both cases and will answer the initial question of my research – what makes some conflict interventions more successful than others.

7.1 Unilateral interventions

The variables that determine the success versus failure of unilateral interventions are rooted in the final outcome of third party's actions: to bring benefit to two actors of the conflict – the participant(s) and the intervener itself. It would be naiive to assume that third parties engage in costly interventions for the sake of saving the lives of the people fighting there. Apart from the

204

considerable domestic and international political risks of intervention, an intervener is confronted by considerable economic expenses and the need to have sufficient means to conduct military actions (which are also calculated in economic terms).

Unlike the multilateral interveners who act in a coalition, single states can make decisions unilaterally, hence they can intervene in a more timely manner. Their operational and tactical decision-making does not have to pass through elaborate and slow process of joint approval (which is the case with the UN Security Council's deliberations) nor must they submit to as much international scrutiny during the actual intervention. Also, single actors enjoy more liberty in their actions and do not have to pass through the operational standardization processes, and can use any means available to accomplish their intervention aims.

The factors that contributed to the success of unilateral interventions in the cases studied were their support to the government (usually a majority group); operational superiority against their rivals, the specific timing of the intervention (intervening from the beginning of the conflict when casualties on all the sides are low); limited intervention agendas; institutionalization of interventions, and operational presence of a third party as an external player to the conflict.

7.1.1 Support to the government

In most cases, the target country's government is the strongest political actor in the conflict. Governments possess more political, military and punitive means to influence the conflict setting than does any other group. When there is a conflict in ethnic societies, the ethnic majority usually appears to be the stronger side as compared to other ethnic groups. It has more popular support and enjoys a comparative advantage in the areas of military and technical resources for combat activities that aim to affect the outcomes of battles with the minority group. The military capacity of the ethnic majority outweighs those of the minority, which helps them conduct warfare more efficiently.

General claims that the majority or central government enjoys a military advantage have been challenged by Ivan Arreguin-Toft, who argued that the minority, being weaker, can actually win the war against a stronger majority if the former engages in asymmetric warfare and launches guerilla resistance of attrition.[276] In fact, this means that while the differences in the capacities of the warring parties remain the same – the stronger remains stronger after months of warfare – this form of warfare equalizes the chances of winning for the belligerents, and may even put the minority in the better position vis-à-vis the majority.

When the stronger side receives third-party help, this increases its capacities to sustain longer warfare and, in fact, makes the warfare shorter by bringing the victory to the stronger side earlier than it otherwise would without the third-party support. Outside aid boosts the capacities of the stronger side, which makes its actions more efficient, casualties lower and victory more decisive. The unilateral intervener, which brings in its own capacities and does not have to go through the lengthy process of international approval, acts solely at its own discretion, allowing it to quickly deploy forces to be used in the combat. Whether economic, military or both, assistance directed at the stronger side helps it to retain its military advantage and contributes to increasing the morale of the solders of the side they support.

Conversely, by putting its interests, capacities, human, military and technical resources to work aiding the weaker (usually minority) side, the third party thus equalizes the two sides, helping the weaker side to sustain its resistance against the stronger side. Under such conditions the war is protracted by the forces of the minority having been increased by the third party, which leads to increased losses on both sides, including economic and military devastation and untold human casualties.

When there is an intervener supporting the stronger side, caeteris paribus, the earlier the war is ended by the stronger side the more chances there are that the human lives and military and economic capacities of both the stronger and the weaker sides are saved. Without such third

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[276] Areguin-Toft, I. (2001). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, *International Security,* 26(1), 93-128.

party intrusion or its support to the weaker side, extended warfare is likely to be the result. After the victory, however, third party should also ensure that human rights of the opposition representatives are not violated through power-sharing mechanisms to be enforced upon the winner (as it was the case with the French interventions in Chad).

Consistent with this argument, the interventions studied in the present research revealed a consistent pattern of success whenever the third parties supported the stronger side. For instance, the Libyans managed to reach their intervention goals when they were acting on the side of the GUNT, which was operationally stronger than its opposition. However, when they switched sides and provided assistance to the FROLINAT, being operationally inferior to GUNT, they could not fulfill their aims: to effectively annex Aouzou strip. The situation was similar with the French intervention in Chad: they never supported the opposition and always acted on the side of the stronger force in the country, which was the acting government (even if this government was formerly in opposition).

The French in Rwanda also managed to succeed in enforcing a buffer zone between the belligerents not because they supported any side of the conflict, but because they had not acted *against* the stronger side, which, at that particular time, was the RPF. The advancing forces of Tutsis were strongly committed to avenge the Hutus, or, at least, force them out of the country, and neither side wanted to engage militarily with the French peacekeepers. However, the RPF represented the stronger side to the conflict domestically and might have inflicted damage on the French that could not have been neglected. This would have reflected negatively on both France and the UN, in general, and prevented the French from engaging in direct military confrontations against the Tutsis had this been necessary. This strategy gave France the ability to protect the Hutus from the advancing Tutsis, which was the initial goal of their intervention.

Quite close to the question of intervention failure in this respect was the role of Russia in Abkhazia. The Russian troops offered passive support to the Abkhaz rebels, whose aim, in the best case scenario, was to be an independent state, or to join the Russian Federation as a part of

its Krasnodar region. The absence of documented evidence of direct involvement of the Russian military regiments in the conflict with the Georgian authorities is in direct connection with the answer on the question why the Russians could not reach their goal: there was no clear-cut goal per se.

The Russian Federation itself was undergoing dramatic political changes from the Soviet times – either to keep the Soviet-style Empire or move to a democratic system.[277] If the population was divided on this question, so was the military. The problem was that Russia was quite indecisive as to what it wanted in Abkhazia. Clearly, it wanted to use the resistance for its own benefit; it wanted to have a say in a region where it had many vital national interests: the Black Sea transport corridor, seaside resorts, and protection of its southern borders.

However, instead of calming the tensions and contributing to a quick solution of the conflict for the long-lasting economic benefit of all sides, Russia provided support to the weaker side of the conflict – to the Abkhaz – who were a clear minority even in their own republic. Thus, Russia created a domestic balance of power equalizing the forces of the opposing sides: the Georgians could neither reincorporate Abkhazia into its territory, nor could the Abkhaz freely develop as an independent state. Support to the weaker side prolonged the conflict until now (almost 17 years), put Russia in an uneasy international position (Georgia uses each and every opportunity to depict Russia as a part of the conflict rather than an unbiased mediator and peacekeeper), kept ongoing provocations in the region that are also negative for the Russian peacekeeping forces, and largely impeded the economic development of Abkhazia.

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[277] Interesting insights concerning Russian failures in peacekeeping operations were given by Andrei Kozirev, the former foreign minister of Russia: "…we [Russia] also have drawbacks from lack of experience and out of former Soviet customs. Even more so, we have to act…under the condition of rapid transformation of the Soviet Army into the Russian one, and diplomacy learns new unknown methods of work in new directions." Cited in Mayorov, M.B. (2007). *Peacekeepers: from the mediation experience of the Russian diplomacy*. M.: Moskva: Mejdunarodnie Otnosheniya, 64.

7.1.2 Operational superiority

Unlike multilateral interveners, who pursue a common goal of the actors of which they are composed, unilateral interveners have more freedom in their activities and, while intervening, usually aim at fulfilling their own goals. For the unilateral actor, thus, the success of intervention directly depends on its capacity to overwhelm the strength of the rival factions and influence the calculus of war so as to produce their preferred outcome.

For the party they support, third party military involvement means fewer costs that must be borne by that party, thus saving the lives of the many. For the party they act against, third party involvement means vastly greater losses that can be wrought by their externally-leveraged enemy. Notwithstanding the level of engagement – a unilateral intervener may or may not get involved in a direct confrontation with one of the belligerent forces on behalf of another – it should be ready to possess the strength capable of intervening militarily on behalf of the party it supports.

Since unilateral interventions are about action, there is another operational factor that plays a significant role in the future outcomes of interventions. The fact that a group is supported by an actor much stronger that its rival, apart from bringing quite tangible benefits to that particular group (for instance, by reducing their battle casualties),), is positively related to overall performance of that group. The soldiers of the group that receives the support, see the prevailing dominance of their third party patron, become more victory-oriented. The presence of a mighty intervener increases their own morale and assures them of a forthcoming victory.

In the cases I have studied during the present research, the successes of unilateral actors directly depended on their capacity to act quickly and their possession of sufficient military strength to alter the battle calculus on the ground. One of the key distinguishing features of the unilateral intervention was the greater perceived likelihood that they would become involved in combat operations against the enemies of the groups they supported. In all the instances of success, the unilateral interveners displayed their military superiority, either in numbers or in

209

technical characteristics of the weaponry they were using. Seeing this, the opposing side either directly submitted to the intervener or refrained from acting against the overwhelming military support the rival faction received from outside.

For instance, during the French intervention in Rwanda in 1990, when the French received a direct request of the then-President of the country, Habyarimana, to intervene, French forces played an instrumental role in stymieing the early assault of the Rwandan Patriotic Front forces (RPF). During this intervention, 600 French soldiers were involved in open combat with the Tutsis and, using their military and personnel capacities (high-tech equipment, helicopters, and computer surveillance), managed to rebuff the Tutsis and keep the Hutus and their president in power for another year.

Other good examples of the importance of intervener's operational superiority in the success of intervention were the numerous interventions by the French and Libyans in Chad. To mention just a few: the French intervention of 2 000 marines against FROLINAT in support of country's president, Tombalbaye, in the very beginning of the conflict; their actions in spring 1978 when they intervened on the side of another president, Malloum, and scattered Habré's FROLINAT troops; the successful Libyan intervention against the Chadian political factions they fought (in 1980 almost 14 000 Libyan and the Islamic region's army brought the Government of National Unity to power, beating the FAN army).

To signal their operational superiority and thereby induce the opposing side to back down, third parties also resort to a show of force, which sometimes proves to be quite sufficient for their success. A good case of such "swaggering" was the French "Operation Turquoise" in Rwanda at the end of the conflict. The French military machine, consisting of 2500 paratroopers, 100 heavy armored vehicles, dozens of helicopters and fighter-bomber aircrafts were all too much for the lightly armed RPF to confront. The aim of the French was to create a buffer zone between the incensed Tutsis, who were the core of the RPF forces, and their former persecutors, the Hutus, whom the French had supported from the very birth of the independent Rwandan

state. The RPF, seeing the prevailing superiority of the French military machine, which had a UN mandate for the intervention, abstained from military engagement, which allowed the Hutus to escape to refugee camps, thus making the French intervention successful.[278]

"Swaggering" was also used by the French interveners in Chad. Calculating that the mere presence of more advanced opponents would be sufficient for the rival faction to roll back their forces, the French used this tactic every now and again. Their actions both signaled to the belligerents the imminence of a credible punishment in case of acting against the French, and served as a credible sign of protection to the side the French supported.

This was the case of two operations, *Manta* and *Epervier,* in Chad. The former started with an airlift of almost 4 000 French Foreign Legion troops and creating such a military climate in the country--especially around the capital of N'Djamena--that the advancing Libyan troops were dissuaded from getting engaged with the French, whose military strength and operational superiority was undoubted. The *Epervier* was less numerous and involved only half of the previous French contingent to prevent the Libyans from controlling the country, over which the French had their own vital interests.

In contrast, the ambivalence of the Russian interventions in the conflict in Abkhazia, which were not backed up by a credible threat of force, was another variable that contributed to the failure of Russia's ability to achieve its stated intervention aims. Unclear goals led to weak operational involvement in the conflict. Russia signaled its ambivalent intentions by refraining from direct military engagement with the Georgian troops, supporting the Abkhaz with only ammunition and military equipment, ad hoc training of the Abkhaz rebels, flying military aircrafts (which were not that numerous), and keeping the Abkhaz section of the Russian-Georgian border open for the inflow of the mercenaries.

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[278] There was another reason, of course, why the RPF headquarters instructed their soldiers not to get engaged with the French: the Tutsis leadership wanted to maintain the group's reputation as victims of the conflict and to prove to the whole world that they were liberators and human rights protectors. Notwithstanding this fact, however, there were numerous and systematic examples of Hutus being tortured and mutilated by the Tutsis, as I discussed in my Rwanda chapter.

7.1.3 Early Intervention

What follows from the reasoning of the prevailing importance operational superiority plays in the success of unilateral intervention, is the timing of the usage of military and technological means of intervention. The key point about efficiency of interventions is to consider whether it is more effective to enter the scene when the conflicts have just started or to intervene after the conflicts have reached a certain point in their development.

Enlarging and extending Regan's conclusions about the higher probability for success of interveners who conducted their actions after the end of military hostilities and after the actual ceasefire agreement,[279] my findings show that in order to be effective, military superiority should be exercised right from the very beginning of the conflict, and not after hostilities have been going on for some time or even after they have de facto ended. There is considerable evidence in support of my statement, which is consistent with the notion that unilateral interventions should be about action and multilateral interventions about negotiations.

Unilateral interveners should act *quickly* and not let the troops of the opposing faction gain momentum in warfare against the group that they support. Any prolongation of the conflict would not only bring additional damage to all the sides: when the conflict is going on for some time and a third party is not intervening from the very beginning, chances are good that the party the intervener supports might lose to its rival. This is the case notwithstanding the nature of the conflict (whether the majority government itself attacks the minority or the target government is being attacked by the opposition) and the nature of the intervener (whether the third party is supporting the majority or a minority group).

In the first case, the government's assault on the rebels, supported by a third party, would gain additional force and military strength to crush minority strongholds if this help is provided from the very beginning of the conflict. From a purely cost-benefit point of view, this would spare more lives for the majority and would allow it to put down the rebellion more quickly.

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[279] Regan, P.M. (1998). Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts, *The Journal of Politics*, 60(3), 754-779.

With timely external aid, the majority could win its battles more efficiently, while preventing the minority group from fleeing the country so as to repeat its assault from abroad. Under such conditions of sudden and decisive attack, the minority that would otherwise resist the government's troops for a longer time would not have enough time to garner support or economic help from another third party to sustain the conflict against the target government.

In situations where a third party supports the minority group, the effective presence of an intervener would not allow the majority to score a quick victory. The majority would not have the opportunity to stop the rebellion right from the beginning. Also, resistance of the minority would allow it to better use the resources on the territories it holds. Apart from sparing human lives on both sides (not only the minority's, which it supports, but also the majority's, which would resort to negotiations seeing third party support to its rival), a third party would thus create a new balance of power in the target country. This would both allow for the opposition's physical survival, creating the conditions under which negotiations between all sides would be more cost-effective than to continue the fight.

Quick interventions thus play a positive role in the overall success of unilateral interventions. If the opposition itself attacks a government that has external support, an early intervention would prevent the opposition from consolidating control over the territories it manages to capture. The rebels would not be able to exploit the natural and man-made resources of the land they possess during their assault (for instance, to use oil revenues to purchase military equipment and food for soldiers and to recruit more manpower) to regain their strength and further prolong the conflict. Third party assistance from the start of the confrontation would allow the government to better and more effectively block all the chances of the opposition to take territories and use them to sustain the conflict.

This principle also applies to situations in which the opposition attacking the government is itself being supported by a third party. Here, the assumption behind the effectiveness of quick intervention is that an attacker is usually in a worse position than the defender. According to Van

213

Evera's argument in the "Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War", when defending their strongholds, the defensive side is in a better position from a strategic point of view. It can organize its troops in such a way as to save their lives and inflict more damage on the attacker.[280] The argument is reversed for the attacker: in its effort to occupy the positions of the enemy, the offensive side is in a much more vulnerable position from a strategic viewpoint; its soldiers are more exposed to fire from the defending side.

When the opposition is attacking the target government and is supported by a third party, its vulnerable position, as an attacker, is mitigated by outside help. With third party aid, the attacker can occupy the territories of the government much faster, thus decreasing human casualties and making the end of the warfare closer.

The cases I have studied where the unilateral intervention was successful all revealed a connection between early intervention and the overall success of outside actions. In Chad and Rwanda, the French and Libyan troops were more successful when intervening in the conflict right from the very beginning. For instance, the French peacekeeping operations in Rwanda against the two assaults of the RPF – first in support of Tombalbaye and the second to prevent mass ethnic cleansing of Hutus by advancing Tutsis – all were conducted from the beginning of the warfare and all reached their goals.

The first one rebuffed the RPF attack and kept Tombalbaye in power and the second prevented Tutsis from killing their earlier persecutors. The same held for Libya and its interventions: Libya always tried to support the opposition in the Chad conflict; it was successful when it did so from the very beginning of the warfare, when the government troops proved unable to crush FROLINAT's numerous attacks in 1983-1987.

An outlier in this respect is Russian actions in Abkhazia. Although Russia had been present in the region even during Soviet times, before the conflict began, and became involved in the conflict from the very beginning, the Russian intervention failed to reach its goals. This

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[280] van Evera, S. (1984). The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War, *International Security*, 9(1), 58-107.

happened not because it intervened from the beginning of the conflict and lost, but because there was no actual military intervention per se: Russian troops were simply present, but refrained from participating in the warfare. Nevertheless, their mere presence and the support the Abkhaz gained from Russia were instrumental in their military defeat over the Georgians.

After more than a decade from the beginning of the conflict, Russia is still unclear about its foreign policy in relation to Abkhazia and de facto independent states in general. Recent developments in the European political field – the independence of Kosovo and its widening recognition as an independent state – has, according to Russia, a clear precedent for the solution of the ethnic conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Republics. Apart from its wish to maintain its superpower image on the international arena, this paradoxically means that Russia has no policy of its own related to this issue. It means that whatever decision is made on the highest levels (UN Security Council, European Union), Russia would choose its policy according to its interests in any given case. Finally, it means the dependence of Russian foreign policy on the international system (to acknowledge secessionist regimes in Georgia as a response to Kosovo independence), its vagueness and indecisiveness.

7.1.4 Externalization of intervention

Another variable crucial to the overall success of third party actions is the actual and perceptual geographic location of the intervener vis-à-vis the target country. Here I refer to the position of the intervener both inside the target country (i.e. its *internalization*) and outside the target country (i.e. its *externalization*). Pros and cons of being based inside or outside the country actually depend on the composition of intervention force, i.e. on its unilateral/multilateral character, and are considered from three angles: local (where the intervener is stationed), commitment (responsibility) and agenda (what intervention tries to archive).

Taking into account the broad differences in goals between the unilateral (action) and multilateral (presence) interventions, internalization of the unilateral intervention would lead to

its increased success as opposed to externalization. In order to be effective and reach its goals, a single actor should not only be actively involved in the country throughout the course of the civil war and from the very beginning, but should also abstain from a *permanent* presence in the country of its actions.[281] The reverse is true for multilateral interventions.

The rationale is this: lasting presence of troops capable of inflicting sizable damage on any of the parties to the conflict is connected with considerable expenditures of the third party. Keeping a considerable presence of soldiers, battle and other relevant equipment in the country would be costly any state. Months of occupation inside the target country would not only require high expenses for having human capital and technical means, but also require additional supporting airlifts from the country of the intervener.

Limiting its presence in the target country would also decrease the war expenditures of the intervener country, which will be constrained by domestic veto players in any case. Since, according to Carment and Rowlands, "[t]he decision by a third party to escalate imposes costs on both militias, as well as on the third party"[282], the expected utility of third party presence from the costs-benefit analysis would increase every month, taking into account the considerable expenses that would arise.

Apart from economic rationale of being out of the country, there is also a human factor attached to externalization of interventions. The more time a third party spends inside the country, the more it is susceptible to losses in human capital. Battlefield casualties may happen not only as a result of engagement with the opposing side, but also from what von Clausewitz calls "friction", or "fog of war"[283]: pure chance. All such cases would seize upon by domestic opponents of the intervention as justification for pulling out. The longer an intervener stays in the target country, the greater the possibility of interactions with the enemy, leading to a higher

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[281] An exit strategy for an intervener is discussed in details in Edelstein, D.M. (2004). Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail, *International Security*, 29(1), 49-91.

[282] Carment, D. and Rowlands, D. (1998). Three's Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention In Intrastate Conflict, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(5), 575.

[283] von Clausewitz, C. (1873). *On War*. The complete translation by Colonel J.J. Graham published by N. Trübner, London, 1873 (available at http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/ONWARTOC2.HTML, last accessed on 18.05.08).

number of battle deaths, and the greater the propensity for unexpected and unaccounted "frictions".

In addition to these problems, an extended intervention would also lead to dissatisfaction in the country of the intervener. The facts of human losses and high expenses in terms of troops and equipment, even mishaps caused by chance, will be reflected negatively on the internal political arena. Domestic "veto players",[284] who Robert Putnam mentions as a strong force playing on international arena, are usually very much concerned with the fate of the troops sent abroad by their political opponents.

Every accident would be magnified for the consumption of the domestic audience, and political rivals would use all possible events (for instance, even the accidental loss of life of soldiers or faulty or broken equipment) to achieve their goal of troop withdrawal).[285] This would challenge the "political durability" of the government of the intervening country and might even lead to abandonment of the intervention itself, leaving intervention goals unfulfilled and the overall intervention unsuccessful.

Another factor contributing to the success of externalized foreign actions is the limitation of intervention agenda. When acting on a temporary basis, the intervener restricts its expenses to the limited goals it plans to achieve. An important thing to consider here is that the goals of the intervention may involve quite separate tasks with separate goals, scope, participants, economic expenditures, and, paradoxically, different recipients of third party aid.

The underlying principle behind having externalized interventions is that maintaining a permanent presence in the target country leads one's goals and intervention agendas to become "foggy". With the passage of time, a third party may gradually lose the sense of what its initial goals were and how these goals are reflected in the current operations of the intervention force.. Similarly, an intervention may start with quite limited agendas (for instance, to stop a rebellion

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[284] Putnam, R.D. (1998). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Game, *International Organization*, 42(3), 427-460.
[285] A typical case of problems with internalization include the general dissatisfaction of the American public with the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where any mistake of the US military leading to the deaths of their soldiers is a liability for the party in office.

or provide cover for the retreating military of the side it supports), be quite successful in fulfilling this agenda, and then gradually grow into a larger presence that includes other objectives in addition to previously defined ones.

This by itself does not mean that the extension of intervention agendas will inevitably lead to the failure of the intervention. It would only be harmful for the intervention if increasing its presence is not followed by an increase of support – political, military, and economic – necessary to achieve its expanded goals. An intervener who stays longer in a target country would necessarily find itself under pressure to enlarge its intervention actions either by continuous requests from the side it supports or simply by the situation itself, requiring additional sources of funding for interventions, clearance of all domestic actors, and restructuring of interventions. Eventually the intervener would be faced with a situation where it would be better and more cost-efficient for it to leave rather that stay much longer. All these are the pitfalls of internalization of intervention.

Quite different is the situation where the intervention had from the very start limited goals, the means to achieve these goals, and no impulse or pressure to extend these goals. By fulfilling limited intervention agendas, an intervener would signal to the recipient of its support that it is not going to play the role of an internal actor, and that all the responsibility of further political developments is directly within the competence of that side.

The third component of success of externalized interventions is positive perceptual characteristics of the intervener. When acting in a target country, notwithstanding what side it supports – the majority government or the opposition – a third party would be considered by the conflicting sides in some way or the other an actor in the domestic arena. This leads to increased commitment by the third party to justify expectations of the side it supports by political, economic and military actions.

The responsibility to the side it support, willingly or not, is evident in the mere presence of a third party. This leads to perceptions of both the recipients of the aid and its opponent that

218

the third party will not only act as a military power against another side but would also have a say, role and eventually a key position in domestic politics.

The intervener is, thus, perceived by the country population as another component of their national political scenery, another player in the game of politics, which is to be taken into account in the battlefield calculus. In order to receive and keep public support for its actions, a third party would undertake additional responsibilities vis-à-vis the side it supports, which may go beyond its initial mandates and goals. The responsibility, which is attached to an internalized intervention, can lock an intervener into a commitment to undertake governmental functions in a intervention that was only planned to have a military component. Such an extended commitment would be quite difficult to fulfill for an intervention that started as purely military. Even if a third party might not want such a high stakes presence, the longer an intervener stays in a target country the more its interactions with all the sides – both the government and the opponent – and the higher commitment it has.

The unilateral interventions in my study revealed a quite consistent pattern in being successful when they were based outside of the target country and supported the parties to the conflict on a *veni-vidi-vici* basis. The French interventions in Chad and Rwanda were all conducted from outside, and the interveners were stationed in the target country as long as the limited intervention agendas lasted.

In Rwanda, for instance, in October 1990 the first French intervention focused exclusively on buffering the RPF attack. With only 600 soldiers the French had not followed the defeated Tutsis outside of Rwanda to prevent them from coming back. They had not intervened in Uganda with the purpose of prevention of the Tutsis comeback against Hutus. They certainly did not have in mind keeping the governing regime of Hutus and preserving Habyarimana's regime. After the French managed to make the Tutsis abandon their initial plan to change the government in their country, they retreated. They did not stay in Rwanda to prevent the Tutsis from any further attacks although there were credible signs that the RPF would come back.

The temporary nature of another French intervention - *Operation Turquoise* – also contributed to their success in June 1994. The goal of the intervention also was limited: still being superior to the incoming RPF, the French created a buffer zone between them and fleeing Hutus. The French humanitarian operation (as they called themselves) created "safe havens" for the Hutus, prevented the large-scale return of ethnic cleansing by Tutsis and let many of the Hutus leave the country thus saving their lives.

The French had no intention whatsoever to save the inhumane regime of *Interahamwe* and to keep their people in power. All they wanted was to save fellow-Francophone Hutus from the Anglophone Tutsis. A sign of success of limited intervention was that after two-month long French action the RPF, having previously accepted the presence of the French whom they blamed for much of the Hutu atrocities, continued their attacks and finally captured the capital of Kigali without much in the way of human casualties, which was the aim of *Operation Turquoise*. The intervention also reached its own goal of improving the peacemaker's image of France, after its reputation had been damaged from their support to the Hutu regime.

These shuttle interventions also brought results in other settings. In Chad, for instance, all the French interventions were conducted from outside of the country and lasted for quite short time. The situation was similar in Rwanda. Invited in 1968 by the country's president, Tombalbaye, the French did not stay longer than fulfillment of the goals required: to reinstate their presence in the region, to confirm that even after the end of the colonial period they were the key player in Africa, to show that even without NATO (where the French had left the Integrated Command Structure in 1966) they still had their *grandeur* in place, and, finally, to rebuff the first serious attacks of FROLINAT and to prevent them from capturing the Northern areas of the country.

The French, after leaving the country, insisted on conducting administrative reforms with the purpose to improve the domestic political climate in the country and to include members of

the opposition into the governance. French only permitted themselves to giving advice without backing it with actions. They had not undertaken the larger and extended agenda of imposing power-sharing and engaging in state-building in the country. In a certain way, the French did not want to have the role of an outside guarantor of peace, which they believed was not cost-effective.

The second French intervention, now in support of another president – Malloum – also lasted no longer than two months. The French bombarded the rebel troops, prevented them from taking the northern stronghold city of Ati, saved the Malloum's regime and retreated. The third intervention – *Operation Manta* – in 1983 prevented another intervener, Libya, from taking the capital of N'Djamena. Libya was afraid to engage in an open confrontation with the French and soon retreated. Finally, *Operation Epervier*, conducted in 1986, was a mere show-of-force and again signaled to Libya to keep out of Chad.

Intervention of the other external actor, Libya, in Chad was also successful whenever they abstained from permanent presence in the country and kept a low operational and military profile. When on the basis of the friendship agreement with the ruling Chadian party GUNT Libya sent in its forces, they had the task of preventing the former government and current opposition forces FAN from taking N'Djamena. Eventually, the Libyans managed to help GUNT in its fight against FAN. However, when Libya signed the agreement for a merger with Chad, and brought in more troops, soon it found out that could not sustain such an enlarged objective – to annex the strip of land in Chad under conditions of domestic insecurity and economic problems.

The externalization of the third party actions played a decisive role in failure of the Russian unilateral intervention in Abkhazia. The Russian forces were always present in Abkhazia as a part of the Soviet Army and were located in different places of the Republic to protect the Black Sea borders of the Soviet Union. The time-span between the dissolution of the

221

USSR and the conflict in Abkhazia was quite small, and the troops remaining in Abkhazia represented the military forces of the Russian Federation.

The presence of the troops had also an intangible value for the participants: the Abkhaz, being always pro-Russian, perceived the Russians as supporting them, and the Georgians, being aware of these settings between the Russian and the Abkhaz, perceived the Russians as by default hostile. This perceptual security dilemma led to the situation where Russia was considered by all the parties as biased. Both the Abkhaz and the Georgians thought Russia was pro-Abkhaz. Interestingly enough, Russia itself contributed to this perception when it began giving out its citizenship and issuing the Russian passports to anyone who wished to have it in Abkhazia. Currently the majority of the population of Abkhazia is Russian citizens, and Russia, from a perceptional internal player became an actual internal player, which was negatively related to the overall success of the CIS peacekeepers where the only participant was Russia itself.

7.1.5 Institutionalization of intervention

The final variable directly related to the success of foreign interventions in intrastate ethnic conflict is *institutionalized presence* of a third part on the territory of the target country. This means that an intervention is acquiring additional importance and value both to the side they support and the side they act against. The fact of intervention existence and success is additionally strengthened by a legal form attached to its presence. Institutionalized interventions and their corresponding legitimacy can be considered on the basis of existence of legal documents justifying facts of intervention and presence and future actions of a third party.

Coming out of the assumption that we are dealing with only open and documented presence of a third party in a target country and cannot account for all the clandestine actions of third parties, I view legalizing the presence of the intervener on the basis of any special documents usually drafted between the two governments – the intervener's and the target

222

countries'. A signed agreement with the side it supports brings to the intervener a number of tangible benefits for its presence in a target country on three levels: the third party domestic settings (the process of endorsing and further support to interventions), the international system (the process of not acting against and, in the best possible scenario, approval of intervention by other countries) and the target country's own domestic setting (the process of accepting and preparing the grounds for an intervention).

First, from the point of view of the target country, when the intervention is institutionalized, it is much easier to achieve legal clearance from a domestic legislator for the activities of the country abroad. This includes not only giving a green light to sending soldiers and technical equipment to the target country, but also approving considerable economic expenses for keeping them there. Interventions usually put a considerable strain on the intervening countries' budgets, which eventually is translated to additional tax burdens for taxpayers and which can raise uneasy questions locally by domestic veto-players about cost-efficiency of the intervention to its proponents. When the intervention is institutionalized, this helps leaders to justify external political obligations in the domestic context, and the process of approval of interventions and budgetary allocations becomes easier, faster and more efficient in comparison with non-institutionalized interventions.

Second, from the point of view of other countries, institutionalized intervention brings increased political support for the intervener's actions on international arena. The countries of the region, as well as other political "stakeholders" may have their own interest in the fate of the conflict – to end it as soon as possible, to end it with a specific winner whom they might support, or even to continue it forever.

This would raise concerns with regard to third party intervention actions abroad, and all its actions would be subject to additional outside scrutiny, including alleged human rights abuses and civilian causalities that would be politicized and used for the benefit of other actors. However, in case of an agreement with the target country setting a framework for third party

action, when faced with international opposition, the country leadership would always be able to refer to this document and to the assent of the country's government with whom they entered into the agreement as legitimizing their intervention according to international legal standards and practices, common to all states.

Third, from the point of view of the target country, institutionalized intervention brings quite a number of benefits to the third party. On the one hand, depending on the nature of the agreement with a third party, a host government can structure and regulate its relations with the outside force: its nature, composition, participant military units, structure, composition, etc. Among other things, the framework of institutionalized intervention will clearly specify the exit strategy for the intervener: when and, most importantly, for how long the intervention will last.

Also, the institutionalized intervention would bring high popular support to the government seeking outside assistance: it will be less concerned with the negative feelings (if any) of its citizens towards the interveners. Finally, such a document will serve as a good "face-saving" device for the country's government as it can depict the presence of another state's forces within their territory as a legal act of one country's help to another.

Interventions of the French and Libya in Chad and Rwanda were all successful whenever they were based on signed agreements with the host countries for the presence of their troops on their territories. For instance, on the basis of a general agreement with the AEF countries, France was obliged to support the Francophone countries not only economically but also provide military assistance in times of internal and external conflicts. Apart from this, on the basis of bilateral agreement with the Chadian government, in case of threats to their statehood, both domestically and from the outside, France had to intervene and uphold law and order. For this France was given the right to place and move troops freely. On the basis of this agreement, France had to provide military assistance, training, and equipment to the Chadian army.

The French interventions in Rwanda had a UN mandate for their operations, which also provided an institutionalized and legalized framework for the intervention. However, in this case

224

the consent for outside actions was granted not by a host government, which was practically absent, but by the international community of states. This mandate also institutionalized the intervention: including its structure, its composition, location, and, most importantly, the timing – when to come and when to leave.

Similar to the French, Libyans also were successful in reaching their goals when their actions were backed up by a legal agreement with the host state. Since GUNT was considered the government of Chad, it was easy for Libya to justify its presence in the country as legitimate. This brought strong support from the government troops and popular support from the territories they occupied. When justifying interventions and attaching a humanitarian and liberalization touch to it, Quadaffi always referred to the treaty with GUNT and claimed that Libya would leave as soon as asked by the Chadian government, which it did.

Of course, from the point of view of legal documents, the opposition's interests can be included in the process of conflict resolution and become a signatory of the agreements. Here much depends on how effectively another state demonstrates the legitimacy of the agreement concluded with the non-recognized entity. This means that signing the agreement with a non-state actor – a break-away region – would require a "stamp of international legitimacy". Hence, the more states support the actions of a third party based on such agreements, the more institutionalized third party actions will be.

This process is currently underway in relation to the Russia's intervention in Abkhazia and Ossetia. Russia tries to support de facto states through institutionalizing relations with them as a response to massive international recognition of Kosovo. However, Russia's actions have met increasing opposition not only from the Georgian government, but also from other states who support the territorial integrity of Georgia.

7.2 Multilateral interventions

The main difference between single and multiple actors, although it sounds much as a truism, is their composition. Existence of more than one player has both positive and negative consequences for the interveners' successes. On the one hand, the more participants of the coalition there are, the more legitimate (at least, from the point of view of the member countries) their action would be. Moreover, such interventions have a common goal uniting several actors, who may take engage in actions that go beyond their narrow self-interests. In any case, all the results achieved would be shared.

The factors that contributed to the success of the actions of multilateral interveners in the cases studied had to do with the overall character of their actions – neutrality and impartiality in their activities; operational superiority against their rivals, specific timing of the intervention (intervening not from the beginning of the conflict as was the case with the unilateral interventions, but entering the scene after de facto end of hostilities); their operational presence in a target country as an external player to the conflict; institutionalized legitimacy of the interventions, and compositional parity of the interveners'-members of the multinational coalition.

7.2.1 Impartiality of actions

Based on the nature of multilateral interventions, i.e. its composition, which includes more than one country-member in an intervention coalition, their actions are directed towards goals that are justifiable from the point of view of governments of which the coalition consists. In this sense impartiality of actions means not favoring any party in distribution of the rewards and punishment.

Being impartial would help interveners reach their goals more effectively since none of them would be dependent on any of the warring parties. Impartiality means transparency in actions, and the more transparent the goals of intervention are for all the participants of the

226

conflict, the more impartial they will be and the likelihood for success will increase. Not favoring any side in particular will give "a green light" that would serve the purpose of intervention: interveners would have operational access would otherwise be blocked by one or the other side that opposed the intervention.

The reasoning behind the role impartiality plays in overall success of multilateral intervention is based on a number of assumptions. The first assumption in the coalition-building process is that states willingly become members of international intervention force – it is their own decision to act on international arena, which they undertake in accordance with their domestic legislative processes.

Second, there is little doubt that the country-members of the coalition would have their own rational reasons for intervening in a target country apart from a humanitarian perspective. As Hans Morgenthau noted, "…some states have found it advantageous to intervene in the affairs of other states on behalf of their own interests and against the latter's will".[286] Among other things (like pure economic benefit for a coalition member), such country interests could include support to a particular ethnic group-actor of the domestic conflict.

Third, interethnic conflict, at least from its very beginning, until possible ceasefire and negotiations represents a zero-sum game, where the victory of one side is considered a loss for others. Actions of interveners are viewed by the warring parties similar to the actions of the belligerents themselves. This would include a whole array of third party actions, starting from pure usage of military force against one group or its demilitarization that would be seen as supporting its opponents, and ending with the distribution of humanitarian aid to representatives of an ethnic group, which would be viewed similarly.

Fourth, although countries tend to choose like-minded states as members of their coalition, whose values are similar and viewpoints on international political and legal issues

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[286] Morgenthau, H. (1967). To Intervene or Not To Intervene. *Foreign Affairs*, 425.

coincide,[287] the counties would still have their own national or international interests to pursue. A multilateral intervention, thus, becomes a "melting pot" for interests of its components, producing a joint outcome of intra-coalition negotiations and a unified goal to be pursued by all the coalition members. In this way, the bias in action of one member is balanced by the bias of another, which eventually becomes the *bias of all*. Hence, the actions of intervention forces acting in a target country acquire a joint and shared bias: whenever the intervention is acting, this is done in agreement with their members.

Finally, whenever there is a bias in actions, there should be enough political will and military force to effectively implement this bias. Knowing that any move that would not favor one side to the conflict would be considered an act against it, third parties must reveal a strong commitment to impose their decisions in such a way as to discourage the parties from any further resistance and to make them obey their decisions.

As is the case with unilateral interventions, multilateral actions' bias can be considered on institutional and operational levels. On the institutional level, we have interventions organized both within the frameworks of an international organization or without such institutional arrangements. Either way a certain document – a mandate – defines such aspects of intervention as its mission scope, geographical coverage, human and technical means to be used during the interventions, and, quite importantly, intervention timing – entry into and exit from a target country. The mandate is the key document to consider in case of multilateral organization's bias or impartiality.

An important problem is to distinguish between a *real bias* (when the actions are conducted with direct aim and against a certain group) and a *perceptional bias* (even though there is no special preference on the part of the intervener toward one group and against another. One or more side may feel it has received fewer benefits – "carrots" – or to have been hurt more

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[287] For instance, a commonly accepted principle of democratic governance and protection of human rights, which was a "curtain", in which the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq was "wrapped".

– more "sticks" – than other groups from the intervention; these actors are likely to perceive that the interveners are biased.

Every action of third parties against a certain group would always be considered by that group as hostile, and, out of a zero-sum nature of the confrontation with other groups, will be viewed as supporting others. The real question is how to make third parties impose their will in such a way and without prejudice, so as to be accepted by all the participants notwithstanding the consequences their actions would bring.

Here, the institutional nature of multilateral initiatives, i.e. their organizational settings – is an important variable determining the success or acceptability of the interveners' decisions by the belligerents in contrast to unilateral interventions. The unilateral actor brings its own interests and aspirations and favors a particular outcome from its own perspective. Contrary to that, multilateral nature of intervention, in the words of Diehl et al, "would allow it to forge a solution that meets the interests of the disputants as well as the international community."[288] An important aspect of multilateral intervention is that it would bring to the intervention interests of not one single party, but "…the interests and views of other actors (e.g., major powers or other states in the same geographic area)…", [289] thus minimizing single party impact on conflict resolution.

From the viewpoint of bias, impartiality of actions of multiple third parties becomes an important determinant in their overall success. The cases I have studied help illuminate the effects of having third party interventions that are considered impartial.

The UN interventions in Rwanda and Somalia were successful when they were not directed against any of the warring parties. UNAMIR and UNOSOM I had in their mandate peacekeeping without direct military interaction with the belligerents. Neither UNAMIR I nor UNAMIR II was allowed to fight either against the Hutu *Interahamwe* or RPF.

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[288] Diehl, P.F., Reifschneider, J. and Hensel, P.R. (1996). UN Intervention and Recurrent Conflict, *International Organization*, 50(4), 687-688.
[289] Ibid.

The mandate of UNAMIR tasks the interveners: "to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations."[290] Such actions from the very beginning excluded any actions that would have either real or perceptional bias towards any particular group.

UNAMIR had quite limited operational objectives – to monitor the Arusha agreement, the register the facts of its breach and communicate them to the UN headquarters and the belligerents themselves. The UN blue helmets were not given the task to protect Hutus and Tutsis from each other. Nor were they to facilitate peace-building efforts and to restore administration to a conflict-torn country. Such actions, requiring expensive economic and military resources were not within the UNAMIR's operational mandate, making success of overall the mission contingent upon the fulfillment of a limited scope, which had not envisaged open combat against any of the side that would inevitably lead to increased human losses.

Similarly, the mandate of UNOSOM I contained no interference in domestic warfare. It was "to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia; and to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs".[291] This meant that the UN soldiers were not only not allowed to impose any decision upon the belligerents which might harmed one side disproportionately, but the UN itself was engaged only in neutral monitoring and reporting on the situation.

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[290] Mandate of the UNAMIR (available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko_co_mission/unamirM.htm, last accessed on 23.04.08).
[291] Mandate of the UNOSOM I (available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko_co_mission/unosom1mandate.html, last accessed on 23.04.08).

Such "peaceful" interventions with limited goals and resources led the belligerents to believe that if the UN was not favoring their side, it was also certainly not acting against them. This created trust of non-punishment in the UN in the eyes of the conflicting sides and allowed Mohammed Sahnoun to start negotiating efforts with Aideed and Ali Mahdi.

Contrary to this, when direct military collision becomes a part of the agenda of interveners, any action, even those aimed at assisting the most destitute members of the population, would by itself be viewed as hostile and biased by the group that was being harmed disproportionately as a result of multilateral actions or which has received lesser benefits. "Supporting them" becomes "acting against us". By definition, the imposition of peace would mean stopping the actions which are threatening peace and security, i.e. acting against the interests of a party that is undertaking such action, which is not neutral.

According to the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, the word "impartiality" means "not supporting any of the sides involved in an argument"[292] – i.e. preferring no particular and specific beneficiary of the actions. This definition applies to mediation or arbitration, in that, according to Jacob Bercovitch, a mediator, as an outsider "is not directly involved as a disputant"[293], the decision is achieved on the basis of consensus between the parties and none of the sides feels discriminated against. Or during the negotiation process, when a third party takes, according to David Bloomfeld, a "facilitative role to help the conflicting parties redraw their relationship cooperatively around a mutual problem in order to generate a self-sustaining, integrative resolution",[294] all the parties must be interested in reaching the agreement.

The problem with impartiality is that the belligerents might incorrectly perceive the actions of a third party, who would not be able distinguish between real and perceptional bias. As in a security dilemma situation, the intentions of third parties would be considered to be

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[292] Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, (available at http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=39269&dict=CALD, last accessed on 23.04.08).
[293] Bercovitch, J. (1991). International Mediation, *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1), Special Issue of International Mediation, p. 3.
[294] Bloomfield, D. (1995). Towards Complementarity in Conflict Management: Resolution and Settlement in Northern Ireland, *Journal of Peace Research*, 32(2), 153.

opposing "us" and favoring "them" at the same time. The lesson for third party interveners is either to abstain from usage of force to maintain the image of one's impartiality in place, or to use such force "wholeheartedly", which would crush the other side.

UNOSOM II failed to do so. With its expanded mandate, enlarged scope and means of action, the UN officers were authorized to use "enforcement measures [and], to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance."[295] As soon the interveners (in this case we are talking about the US) launched large-scale attacks on Aideed and devastated the civilian population, their dwellings and hospital yet failed to reach their target – to capture Aideed – this instantly created the perception that *all* the interveners were participants in the conflict: "Somalis regard[ed] UNOSOM as another faction and Admiral Howe [commander of the US troops] as another warlord"[296]

The situation was further aggravated by the fact that this positioned the UN not only as a player having its own agenda, but as a pro-Mahdi player acting against his rival and thus supporting him by definition. Any actions against Aideed were considered by Ali Mahdi as supporting his faction, and vice versa. Even when the actions involved an outsider group that was a bit player in the Somali conflict (which was the case with the Mogadishu airport event), this were considered by all others as discriminating against themselves.

UNOSOM II also failed due to the lack of both operational will and enough power to conduct the actions envisaged by its mandate and effectively impose peace through demobilization of all the belligerents and, in some instances, even targeting their physical presence in the country. Thus, impartiality was ineffectively breached, and the cause of the conflict – at least, one side of it, Aideed, – or, using Galtung's terms, when "an action-system…

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[295] Mandate of UNOSOM II (available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2mandate.html, last accessed on 23.04.08).
[296] African Rights Report. (1993). *Somalia. Human Rights Abuses by the UN Forces*. London, 33-34.

must no longer have two or more incompatible goal-states"[297] - was not eliminated as an end of the conflict.

The real problem here was, paradoxically, the multilateral nature of the intervention. Even if the coalition represented a combined mutual approach to problem-solving by its members, each member--apart from its direct agenda and goals of its presence in a target country – would have its own national interests in the conflict, views on its place in the international arena, domestic veto players, and organizational culture of warfare.

From these points of view, military coordination, usage of force and, more importantly, remaining in the coalition is highly subjective and a matter of each country's will. Any loss of lives of its citizen-soldiers would have drastic political reverberation at home, which might jeopardize the country's presence in the multilateral coalition (as it was the case with the Belgian component of UNAMIR in Rwanda following the deaths of 10 of its soldiers).

It was a similar case with the CIS intervention in Abkhazia. Even though historically there were no sign of Russian support to the Abkhazian quest for independence, and all the moves of the Abkhaz politicians to exit Georgia and enter Russia during the Soviet Union were put to an end by the Russian political establishment, Georgians perceived CIS as biased towards Abkhazia. This was because they viewed Russia, as the only country in the purportedly multilateral peacekeeping force, as non-impartial actor. Russia, according to the Georgians, which formerly supported Abkhaz, now, as a orchestrator, guarantor and the only keeper of peace agreement in CIS intervention, could not have due credibility as a disinterested mediator.

A negative view of the history of Russia in the region and the Russian's role in the Abkhazian conflict created strong perceptions of bias in eyes of the Georgians. The credibility of Russia as an impartial peacekeeper was further shaken by the fact that the majority of Abkhazians have Russian citizenship and, notwithstanding strong and concurrent Georgian

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[297] Galtung, J. (1965). Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm, *Journal of Peace Research*, 2(4), 351.

protests, are participating in all political actions revealing their citizenship duties, including presidential elections in Russia.[298]

The fact that a country – formerly a unilateral intervener – now participated in the multilateral intervention, and, even more so, was the only actor and sole representative of the intervention "coalition," contributed to perceptions of bias of its actions and is another factor that impeded the third party from fulfilling its goals.

Quite interesting in this respect is the argument of Mark Mullenbach, who claimed that "once a major power has militarily intervened in support of or against the government of the target state, it is likely to oppose the subsequent formation of a peacekeeping mission in the target state by any other third-party actor. The primary goal of the major power in these situations would be to assist one of the parties to the dispute in militarily defeating the other party, and a third-party peacekeeping mission would arguably hinder the achievement of that goal." [299]

What follows from his argument is that Russia, as a major power, should have either opposed any further foreign interventions in Georgia, or become such a part of it that it would retain total control of the intervention, which it actually did. Even more so, the strong wish of Russia to remain the only force in the region strengthened the perceptions of Georgians that any changes in the composition of the CIS peacekeeping operations would undermine Russia's control over external intervention in Abkhazia and increase their bias.

7.2.2 Institutionalization of interventions

The success of any intervention can be evaluated by its ability to impose on the conflicting parties such an option or set of options – to continue conflict or to stop conflict – that would be accepted by everybody who is involved in the conflict. This hypothesis applies to both

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[298] The newsline of the Black Sea Press news agency, 28.02.08 (available at http://www.newsgeorgia.ru/geo1/20080228/42164297.html, last accessed on 23.04.08).

[299] Mullenbach, M.J. (2005). Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49, 537.

unilateral and multilateral interventions and is a common factor in nearly all successful scenarios. The interveners may support one side of the conflict, pursue their own objectives, conduct monitoring or provide humanitarian support to the population. In order to be successful, their actions should be either willingly accepted or at least not opposed by the conflicting parties. The key component of successful interventions is their institutionalization: the ability not only to impose the decision on the combatants but also, more importantly, to make it acceptable to the warring parties.

Intervention may have greater legitimacy when it has the consent of the target government. It can also happen as a result of ceasefire agreements that envisage outside forces-guarantors of peace and security. In either case, legal documents (just like in the case of the French concurrent interventions in Chad) help legalize and thus legitimize the interventions.

However, an institutional framework for starting an intervention is an insufficient guarantee for the eventual success of third party actions. The mere fact that the third parties have been invited by the target government does not mean that the intervention will be legitimate in the eyes of all the conflicting parties. Even more so, what is legitimate and good for one side of the conflict may be illegitimate and bad for the others.

The varying success of external interventions depends largely on their ability to pursue their objectives, which in turn lies in the nature of the third parties and the ways they are perceived by belligerents. Here we are talking about mediation, the acceptance of which depends on the legitimacy of their propositions – who makes the peace proposals and how are these options negotiated. The unilateral/multilateral dichotomy is an important determinant of legitimacy of interventions and their acceptance.

Irrespective of the recipient of support – be it the target or the challenger or none – the solution to conflicts – either peaceful settlements, or victory of one party over the other, or even unlimited stalemate – according to Carment and Harvey, "…require the stamp of institutional

legitimacy upon which long-term measures depend"[300] In order to be successful, outcomes of interventions in cases of interethnic violence require legal frameworks, which would institutionalize the conflict outcomes. In this case, multilateral intervention provides the institutional legitimacy of more than one party to the outcomes of conflict.

Such *multi-party legitimacy* is a fundamental difference between unilateral and multilateral interventions that contributes to the success of the latter in the matter of de jure internationalization of the conflict outcomes. This factor was stressed by Charles G. Fenwick at the very birth of the United Nations, who pointed out that "[w]hat would be arbitrary for the individual state would in the case of the whole body of states be no more than the exercise of the higher right of the community to maintain law and order and to see to the observance by separate states of their obligations as members of the community".[301] This means that the more actors are included in the intervention coalition, or, using Fenwick's terms, the wider the community is, the more legitimate the mediation by multilateral interveners.

Following Fenwick's argument, such interventions undertaken under the aegis of a multinational organization (for example, UN, NATO, OSCE, OAU), and not merely by groups of states with no organizational backing, enjoy *internationalized arbitrariness* in dealing with conflicts. When intervening, the third party coalition, through its mandate, commits itself to institutionalize specific outcomes of conflicts. Or, as Hartzell concludes, third parties safeguard "negotiated settlements that are the extensively institutionalized – that is, that provide institutional guarantees for each of the security threats antagonists face as they move toward a situation of centralized power – are the most likely to prove stabile"[302]

In case of multilateral interventions, such commitment denotes the agreement of the international community to legally recognize either secession (a new independent state, like

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[300] Carment, D. and Harvey, F. (2001). *Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence*: *An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence*, Westport, Connecticut, London: Preager Studies on Ethnic and National Identities in Politics, Praeger, 129.

[301] Fenwick, C.G. (1945). Intervention: Individual and Collective. *The American Journal of International Law*, 39(4), 663.

[302] Hartzell, C.A. (1999). Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(1), 4.

Kosovo) or reintegration. If intervention is undertaken by one party, its commitment, and, as a consequence, legitimacy depends on that party alone. A good example of such successful multinational interventions can be peace keeping operations of UN, which, according to Erin Jenne, represent the interests of all nation-states and none in particular, and, thus, "[are] not invested in the outcome of the conflict".[303]

Having the peacekeeping mandate from the international organization which does not allow it to participate in open conflict with the belligerents, such interventions have the aim of supporting the populations, decreasing their suffering, helping overcome obstacles of conflict, and treating all sides of the conflict impartially. This idea is also supported by Diehl et al, who noted that "…the results of UN intervention will carry greater legitimacy than any of the alternatives. That the world community supports an action may exert pressure on protagonists to halt hostilities and not renew warfare at some point in the future…".[304]

An important component of success of interventions from the point of view of legitimacy of their actions is not only the ability to unanimously "bless" a specific outcome and to put a seal of approval on the conflict settlement, but, more importantly, to effectively impose a solution upon the belligerents. The greater the strength of imposition, the more these settlements are viewed as legitimate by the warring parties, and the fewer incentives they have to oppose the settlement. Put simply, the more decisive the actions of multilateral interventions , and the more the decisions of international community are backed by overwhelming force, the more legitimate these solutions would be viewed by the belligerents.

Another way in which legitimacy contributes to the overall success of multilateral interventions is through transparency of collective actions. Even if a member of multinational coalition would like to support one of the conflicting parties, it cannot do so (at least, openly and in larger scale) due to presence of other states with their own interests, which may substantially

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[303] Jenne, E.K. (2003). Sri Lanka: a Fragmented State. In R.I. Rotberg (Ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (234). Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press.
[304] Diehl P. et. al. (1996). Op.cit. PP. 687-688.

differ. Thus, individual interests of the coalition members, which might bring along operational bias, are neutralized, and the belligerents trust the actions of international community seeing there is no defection from the general intervention mandate.

There would, of course, be doubts about the justifiability of the actions of the international community and how their actions reflect what is needed on the ground. However, in comparison to multilateral intervention, unilateral action, according to Fenwick, "is likely to given even less justice than community action, quite apart from the fact that it may readily lead to lawlessness".[305] This argument is much in the line with Mullenbach's consideration of efficiency of multilateral interventions that include a major actor – which is often a former unilateral intervener – which would either oppose the presence of other states in the target country whose interests are seen as contrary to their own or, to keep the situation under its control, organize multilateral intervention itself, where it would be the sole decision-maker and imposer of its own will.

This was exactly the role that the Russian Federation plays in CIS peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and in the Joint Control Commission in Ossetia. Even though the presence and actions of the CIS peacekeepers are heavily institutionalized by numerous decisions of the Head of CIS states, the legitimacy of the CIS intervention has been eroded from the very beginning of the intervention. This happened because the multilateral intervention was actually a continuation of the unilateral one, which was considered to be biased by one of the belligerents.

When Russia became part of the CIS peacekeeping force, its unilateral bias was transferred to the multilateral institutionalized framework, which violated the whole notion of transparency of interventions. Under such circumstances, instead of accepting the options offered by multilateral intervention as impartial and, thus, credible (take the proposition of the Russian side to abolish economic blockade of Abkhazia and to start economic revival of the region),[306]

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[305] Fenwick, C.G. (1945). Op.cit. P. 659.
[306] News line of the RIA Novosti news agency, 07.03.08 (available at http://www.rian.ru/politics/20080307/100910127.html, last accessed on 23.04.08).

the side which accuses participation of a state-participant of multilateral intervention as a formerly unitary biased actor would also reject any move of multilateral intervention as illegitimate.

On the other hand, if not readily accepted, to be successful, the options and mechanisms of solutions should be imposed effectively by multinational interveners. This is also lacking in the cases of Abkhazia and Ossetia. Russia limits itself to making announcements and decrees that have no binding force even for their local political decision-makers: all the documents issued by the Russian Duma with regard to the breakaway regions are in the forms of recommendations and suggestions to the Russian government, which, as discussed above, follows the lead of other major powers (USA and EU): the Russian policy is structured on a quid-pro-quo basis, where any political move is contingent upon the move of the West.[307]

This case is consistent with a quite significant consequence of the argument about "majority rule" creation of new nation-states in Europe and the consequences this process might have for other unrecognized de facto states. The case of Kosovo is a vivid example of how secessionism creates legal precedents. Nearly every week, European countries and other states acknowledge the independence of Kosovo. This means that the more countries consider Kosovo as an independent state, the greater the legitimacy of Kosovo as a state (at least, based on perceptions – specific legal procedures are required to make it an official member of community of states, be it EU, NATO or UN).

Indeed, Russia has tried to argue that the Kosovo case sets an international precedent, hence it should be applied everywhere where ethnic minorities oppose majority rule. However, Russia is the sole participant of CIS peacekeeping forces in Georgia, and these statements decrease even this low level of legitimacy of their intervention. Even if Russia does acknowledge

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[307] Thus, Russia says that it would acknowledge the Abkhazian and Ossetian independence *as a result* of the West acknowledging Kosovo's.

Abkhazia and Ossetia as independent, according to some analysts, it would remain the only country[308] upon which the legitimacy of decision would depend.

A formal invitation to intervene has been a contributing factor to the success of other multilateral interventions as well. Both UNAMIR and UNOSOM I were asked to enter the conflict scene by the respective governments of Rwanda and Somalia. They were allowed by their mandate to conduct the activities that were approved by the states that invited them, thus avoiding actions that were not welcome by the government and legitimizing the ones that the government considered to be acceptable or at least not harmful to their interests. This included monitoring the fulfillment of peace agreements, providing assistance to the refugee and conflict-affected regions, and fostering reconciliation processes. Such actions were greeted by the leaders of conflicting factions, since they would restrict the UN's interference into their internal rivalry.

As long as these interventions provided acceptable solutions for all sides, they have been successful in pursuing their initial objectives, which were agreed upon by the representatives of the conflicting parties. However, there are situations that require changes of the views on how the matters should be run, and which require quick responses and the transformation of the strategic approach of interveners.

In such cases, the third parties should not only be quick in adapting to new circumstances, but also effective in offering and, if needed, imposing other solutions upon the belligerents. Institutionalization of third party actions will depend very much on how strongly the solutions are offered and/or imposed. If there is little will or strength to pursue imposition of new solutions, i.e. to overcome the opposition of the warring parties, then the force with which these solutions were put forward would have been considered illegitimate. Put simply, the legitimacy of actions increases with the increased force to back them up.

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[308] The newsline of the Black Sea Press news agency, 21.03.08 (available at http://www.newsgeorgia.ru/exclusive/20080321/42190495.html, last accessed on 23.04.08). This list would also include countries that might benefit from the Kosovo "precedent", as Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh situation, as well as states that tow the Russian political line, such as Belarus.

This was true in the extension of the mandate of UNOSOM II, when, under the circumstances of worsening of violence and, especially, the death of the Pakistani peacekeepers, the UN Security Council allowed its soldiers to use force in pursuit of their goals – disarmament of warring groups, imposing peace and reconstructing a state. Clearly, these milestones soon came into open conflict with the conflicting groups, since neither Aideed nor Ali Mahdi had agreed upon clearly punitive actions of the UN aimed at their destruction.

Notwithstanding the fact that this went against the aims of the belligerents in Somalia, the UN decided to enforce peace and security in the country by targeting the parties that were involved in confrontation. Peace enforcement started with Aideed, whose troops were allegedly participating in attacks on UN soldiers. Both the previous monitoring and current disarmament actions were conducted by the same actors – countries which were participating in the multilateral coalition. However, now the tasks were different, and if previous UN options were accepted by the belligerents, now the UN failed to enforce their acceptability and fulfill the objectives of its new mandate.

7.2.3 Late Intervention

As with unilateral interventions, the timing of multilateral actions is also an important determinant in fulfilling intervention tasks. However, a crucial thing for the multilateral intervention is to intervene late in the conflict, when there are no more combat activities, the level of casualties is low or absent and when there is already a ceasefire agreement between the belligerents.

The fewer casualties the coalition suffers, the longer the coalition members are willing to remain in the coalition. This means that the members are willing to stay together to carry out common tasks, which would strengthen the intervention actions. Key factors supporting the late intervention variable are the multilateral composition of the interveners and the inter-coalition settings.

Due to the usual lengthy process of coalition building, multilateral interventions usually take place only after a conflict has already reached a certain level of casualties and human atrocities. Multilateral coalitions, if conducted by international organizations, are tied up by internal rules and institutional procedures, which would extend intervention deliberations. This is especially true for a decision-making process within large organizational settings, like the UN and its Security Council, which is further slowed down by the actions of veto states.

At the same time, intervening during the heat of hostilities is connected to a high risk of casualties on the part of the interveners. The participation of a country in an intervention coalition, apart from vital national interests, economic rationales and country's geopolitical role, is a way to project intervener's image on international arena – as a peacemaker and a strong punitive force. Intervention is usually chosen after careful deliberations of coalition members at home where any damage to one's own soldiers will be magnified by the mass media and the political forces that opposed the participation of their country in the intervention.

In addition to the high level of casualties, intervening from the very beginning usually requires using one's domestic economic resources. Multilateral interventions tend to be more "clumsy" both in pre-intervention decision-making process and in deployment. The more players are represented in the third party coalitions, the more veto players there are and the more "two-level games"[309] their representatives have to play.

While the problem of allotting a certain share of domestic resources for intervention purposes is vital to third party interventions, it usually takes some time for a country to build up these resources. In cases of multilateral interventions, the length of this process is multiplied by the number of countries-members in a third party coalition.

When, however, the multilateral actor intervenes after the end of hostilities, it has higher chances to build a coalition for the intervention due to that fact that the resources needed for intervention will be much lower than when the intervention comes at the beginning or middle of

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[309] Putnam, R.D. (1998). Op.cit. PP. 427–460.

hostilities. Furthermore, countries would be much more willing to join the coalition and bring in their own inputs – manpower, equipment, airlift, supplies – when they see the limited inputs that would not be endangered. This would facilitate the coalition-building process and would be a facilitating factor for their ultimate success.

For the multilateral coalitions, late intervention has its rationales for another as well. After a period of significant hostilities, the parties that could not have achieved decisive victory over their rivals would be more inclined to use a third party to conclude the agreement and stop the war. This could happen partly due to domestic pressures from people fear the death of their kin. Also, the belligerents might need some respite from warfare and consequently would be more willing to accept an outsider's help: as Doyle and Sambanis put it, "the parties grow tired of fighting, and any prewar uncertainty about the probability of military victory or the parties' relative resolve is removed. Longer wars offer a chance for the parties to learn by reflecting on the benefits of peace and by controlling war-related hostility."[310] Put simply, the sides might be more willing to accept a third party intervention as a face-saving exercise while concluding talks with their enemies or while regrouping for a renewed offensive.

Therefore, the belligerents would be more willing to accept the party that they trust will guarantee the implementation of a mutually acceptable solution or a party that does not interfere much in their domestic affairs. Multilateral interventions act as a "melting pot" of self-interests of single actors and represents a non-personified and institutionalized mediator into which the belligerents can place their trust. From this point of view, this is a better situation than a unilateral actor whom the warring parties would equally mistrust or that one side trusts but the other does not.

The relevance of late interventions for multilateral coalitions is a matter of considerable interest to both policy-makers and scholars. Diehl et al., who examined third party actions statistically, is pessimistic about their success, but claim that multilateral operations intervening

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[310] Doyle, M.W. and Sambanis, N. (2000). International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis, *American Political Science Review*, 94(4), 785.

after the end of hostilities "tend to freeze the status quo and inhibit change as well as remove some of the pressure on the disputants to make concessions and settle the dispute."[311] For her part, Virginia Fortna, who researches on the durability of UN-imposed solutions to conflict, concludes that the goal of multilateral interventions - "…peace [-] will generally be easier to maintain, all else equal, after wars that end with a decisive victory than after those that end in an informal truce. Peace will also be easier to keep after long wars…"[312] Ralph Regan also concluded that the probability of a successful intervention decreases with the increase of the number of casualties, which is usually connected with protracted conflict.[313]

The cases I have studied all indicate that multilateral interventions are more successful when conducted after the de facto end of the hostilities. In Rwanda, the UN intervened after the Arusha Agreement was signed by the government of the country, representing the Hutus, and the Tutsi RPF rebels. The UN mandate was limited to monitoring the fulfillment of the agreement by the parties and coordination of humanitarian activities. The UN had not intervened during the heat of ethnic cleansing of Tutsis by Hutus, and, therefore, was not involved in active peace-enforcement that is associated with high casualties for interveners. Hence, the UN casualties in this case were very limited due to no active warfare and only included collaterals to the conflict (the Belgians blue helmets, who had not participated in the fights, were lightly-armed and had not shown any resistance to the *Interahamwe* who had captured them).

The Somalia conflict was different with respect to UN involvement. Established in April 1992 to monitor the ceasefire agreement between Aideed and Ali Mahdi, UNOSOM I's task was also to monitor fulfillment of the terms of the agreement and to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need. The UN was quite successful in these activities, which were performed by light

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[311] Diehl P.F. et. al. (1996). Op.cit. P. 687.

[312] Fortna, V.P. (2004). Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War, *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(283), 287.

[313] For data on interventions see Regan, P.M. (2002). Op.cit. Although a high number of casualties may not be the exclusive domain of long-lasting conflicts--the one in Rwanda took the lives of more than a million people in less than three months--it is still strongly associated with the length of conflicts.

or non-armed UN security personnel, whose tasks had more to do with negotiation and talks rather than direct participation in the war against any of the defector from the agreement.

However, due to the worsening of the situation, the UN, together with the UNITAF mission, created as an operational branch of the UN, enlarged its activities and extended its mandate to "preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate action… maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions… [and] seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements…".[314] This brought the UN into direct conflict with one of the warring parties – Aideed – which led to increased human casualties of the coalition members (the first being the ambushed Pakistani peacekeepers as well as the US soldiers who had attempted to localize and capture Aideed). This led to a drastic change in the coalition's ability to fulfill its tasks when the US abandoned it.

The experiences of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Abkhazia stand as exceptions to these rules. In this conflict, the intervention variable of "timing" was insignificant from the point of view of success. There, the multilateral intervention was an extension of the unilateral intervention of Russia, which was present from the very beginning of the conflict. Although established after the actual cessation of hostilities and the signing of the corresponding agreement in 1993, Russia actually represented the only country in the nominal multilateral intervention, which had previously participated as a unilateral actor in this particular warfare.

7.2.4 Compositional parity

Another factor associated with a higher likelihood of success is when multilateral interventions are composed of equal partner-states and there is no superpower/regional power present in the intervention coalition. At first, this may sound counterintuitive: the presence of a strong partner in a multilateral coalition would seem to boost the joint capacities of the

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[314] Mandate of the UNOSOM I, the UN website (available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko_co_mission/unosom2mandate.html, last accessed on 23.04.08).

interveners and make the actions more decisive. However, when going into the depth of the matter, this factor is associated with failures of interventions. Since multilateral interventions represent joint actions of more than one state, it would be important to know how their internal power games play a role in their overall success. Here, again, I consider durability of intervention coalition to be a factor contributing to its success.

By durability of the coalition I mean the third party coalition's ability to stay together and to jointly perform tasks and pursue joint goals. Hence, the more durable the union of states intervening in domestic affairs of another state, the more likely it is to achieve success in pursuing its goals.

Technically speaking, multilateral interventions can be of two types: one where there is a *compositional parity*, where there are more or less equal international actor-states gathered in a coalition (for the purpose of the analysis, I consider military and economic capacities together), and *compositional disparity*, where the coalition represents a conglomerate of states with different levels of economic development and military capacity. In considering the role that this plays in intervention success, I claim that the more homogeneous the coalition (i.e., the greater parity there is between the coalition members) the more it is likely to achieve success in its actions. Let us consider these two factors separately.

Compositional parity brings a number of positive characteristics to the intervention. First, taking into account the impartiality factor of multilateral interventions, the stronger actor plays a more decisive role in the third party coalition. It has more economic resources to allocate for the purposes of the intervention, it has more personnel available for the intervention's activities, and it has more equipment to use during the intervention. Thus, the more inputs the country brings in, the more it has a "say" in the coalition, and the greater its role in the coalition. Due to its increased inputs, the actor that has higher decision-making power in the coalition and prevailing advantage in economic and military factors over its partners, would take a lead role in interventions.

246

This lack of parity would also create a decision-making imbalance, where the final verdict on the coalition's decisions would be made by the lead actor. This means that the bias in actions of that particular state would prevail over the biases of others, and the "melting pot" which I mentioned when considering the importance of impartiality for the multilateral intervention would not produce a joint outcome of the intra-coalition negotiations. On the contrary, the outcome of the multilateral intervention would be unilateral in essence, since it would reflect the views and aspirations of the lead actor much more than it would the others.

Thus, instead of balancing individual biases of coalition partners and producing a *joint bias of all*, the multilateral intervention would have a *skewed bias of one* reflecting the interests of the lead actor. This would bring a unilateral substance to a multilateral form of intervention since the actions of multilateral coalition would no longer be impartial. The coalition, thus, would aim for a certain outcome of the conflict that reflects the preferences of the lead actor, who may favor one belligerent group over the other.

In cases where multilateral interventions are conducted under the aegis of international organizations, such as UN or NATO, the goals of the interveners are designed to be reached on behalf of the organization per se. Credibility of equal rewards and punishment, which is at stake during interventions, is achieved by the name that the organization bears for the belligerents as well as for the coalition members themselves. From this prospective, the presence of a powerful actor jeopardizes the whole idea of *multilateralism* and signals to the warring parties that the intervention is not multilateral after all. Eventually, the presence of a single strong actor decreases the level of credibility of the organization in the eyes of the conflicting parties, who view such interventions as biased by definition.

Second, the presence of a single lead actor in the coalition would mean *overdependence* of the coalition on that particular country. Since the durability of the coalition, among other things, is measured by the ability to withhold pressure (both from inside the coalition as well as from outside), and if the lead actor for some reason leaves the coalition, this would mean an end

247

to the intervention itself. Other members of the coalition that depended on that actor's disproportionate participation will no longer be able to fulfill the intervention's agenda.

When multilateral international organizations are intervening, the ability of the interveners' coalition to fulfill their mandate is crucial not only to durability of the intervention as such, but also to the prestige, reliability and credibility of the organization itself. A major threat to the fulfillment of the mandate of the intervention is posed by the exit of the lead actor on which many things depend: operational sustainability of interventions, the credibility of threats of punitive actions due to the presence of a strong and potent lead actor; the overall prestige of the organization, and, most importantly, the ability to quickly alter the usage of resources (both human and technical) depending on changes and alterations in the intervention mandate.

Returning to the statistical analysis intervention success, we can see that presence of a superpower is positively related to overall high probability of intervention success: 48.62% for the unilateral and 87.70% for multilateral interventions. However, the presence of an intervening strong state is more significant for the success of unilateral interventions, which I discussed earlier in their "Operational superiority" section. As for the multilateral interventions, presence of a superpower (both in absolute and relative terms) – a compositional imparity – account for only 3% effect, increasing intervention efficiency from 84.37% to 87.70%, which itself is quite insignificant.

With regard to specific cases of interventions I have examined, the importance of compositional parity in successes of multilateral interventions is quite evident. Very significant from this respect is the UN intervention in Somalia, which reflects how overdependence upon a single actor in an intervention coalition is counterproductive to its success. From the beginning, UNOSOM depended very much on the US presence in UNITAF. At that time, however, the activities of the UNOSOM I were limited to monitoring the implementation of peace agreement, and the blue helmets were not mandated to enforce peace among the belligerents.

The whole body of UNITAF, as an operational wing of the UN intervention was composed of 24 nations, among which were such highly developed states as Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. Out of the 37 000 total personnel of UNITAF, the US contribution was 25 000 soldiers, or 70% of the total number.[315]

The UNITAF handed over its tasks to the UNOSOM II in March 1993, and the US, which had dominated the UNITAF, thus became the major player in UNOSOM assuming not only the lead role, but also providing for the majority of the intervention's resources. There was a clear gap between the inputs the US and those of the other member countries, which were very undermanned and underequipped. While keeping all its staff and resources to itself, the US, nevertheless, became the leading actor in the intervention, assuming the major share of the overall UNOSOM II responsibility, which was installing and keeping the peace.

Having its own vision, goals and agenda for the intervention, the USA created a set of tasks and actions for the multilateral intervention that turned out to be impossible to achieve. The incident of October 3-4, 1993 marked the beginning of the end of US involvement in Somalia. Failure to capture Aideed, the death of its 18 soldiers and the destruction of military machinery were not only a negative human factor that was magnified at home. It was a severe blow to the Clinton administration's ambitious goals to act as the guarantor of global stability and to assert its predominant role in the international arena. It forced the US to abandon its plans to restore peace in a war-torn country.

It took less than 2 days after "Black Hawk Down" for the US to announce the change of its foreign policy in relation to participation in peacekeeping operations and the decision to end its presence in Somalia and withdraw from multilateral coalition by the end of March 1994. As soon as the decision for American retreat was made, the remaining states were not able to continue the operations of the multilateral intervention as before. Without the American

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[315]Information on the UNOSOM II composition is taken from the Wikipedia encyclopedia (available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Task_Force#Composition_of_UNITAF, last accessed on 23.04.08).

contribution to the coalition, both in financial and military terms, UNOSOM II failed to fulfill its large-scale, multi-dimensional mandate of peace enforcement and conflict settlement.

In less than 3 months after the incident, knowing that it would no longer be able to carry on the peace-enforcement that had been planned taking into account the USA presence, the UNOSOM II amended its mandate, excluding the usage of "coercive methods" and limiting itself to the previously defined tasks of UNOSOM I: assistance to the warring parties of the Addis Abba peace agreement, providing humanitarian assistance to those in need, and protection of its own personnel and those of other international or foreign organizations.[316] In fact, it had returned to the tasks that UNOSOM I had succeeded in fulfilling. However, now the previous credibility of the UN was gone and Somali trust toward the negotiations had been breached. A slow process of retreat was started, and in March 1995, a year after the US was out of Somalia, UNOSOM II stopped its operations.

The case of the Rwandan intervention also supports the notion of increased likelihood for success for multilateral interventions that are not dominated by a superpower. UNAMIR had the total of 5,442 military staff, international observers, police officers, and local civilians. The countries representing the UN were: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.

Although having quite insignificant contribution from such states as Argentina (1 observer), Austria (15 observers), Poland (2 observers) and even such a potent state as the Russian Federation (15 observers), contributions from participating states were spread in such a way that made the mission dependent on all the participants jointly and none in particular, For instance, Canada had 376 troops, Ethiopia – 805 observers, Ghana – 829 troops, India – 326 troops, Malawi – 170 troops, Mali – 200 troops, Nigeria – 338 troops, Zambia – 455 troops.[317]

[316] Mandate of the UNOSOM II, the UN website (available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2mandate.html, last accessed on 23.04.08).
[317] Information on the UNAMIR from the UN website (available at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm, last accessed on 24.04.08).

Even when Belgium had departed from the scene, this did not jeopardize the overall observer mission of the UN. Even when the Belgians exited the coalition after the tragic events with their soldiers, this decreased only around 30% of the total capacities of the UNAMIR. This did not undermine the success of the intervention because, unlike in Somalia, it had limited tasks and had not participated in enforcing peace.

7.3 Conclusions

States alone and their coalitions intervene in the matters of other states for various reasons. Some want to use the conflict opportunity to pursue their own goals and objective, others try to spread their influence over the conflict territories. Some states may be interested in extending the conflicts, while others may still want to help stop bloodshed and assist countries in their post-conflict recovery. Countries may have their own rationale while intervening or may be genuinely interested in acting as neutral and impartial arbiters and to undertake genuine peacekeeping responsibility.

Notwithstanding the multiplicity of rationales for state interventions and their case-specific differences, the decision of a state to intervene either in internal affairs of another state is usually related to two issues: positive cost-and-benefit calculation of the intervener to enter the conflict and its felt moral obligations vis-à-vis one of the belligerents. In both cases, outside actors are assessing the conflict situation in a target country from the point of view of the likelihood of success of their actions and, on this basis, make decisions to intervene or to abstain.

In the first case, states calculate the expected utility from intervention and the possible losses they could suffer. If the state thinks it stands to benefit more that it stands to lose, it decides to intervene. This, however, does not mean that the state conducting rational situation assessment intervenes for purely self-interested reasons. These interests may also include the interests of other actors in their cost-and-benefit analysis: that of the target countries and warring ethnic groups (what benefits/costs intervention would bring), neighboring states and also

251

international organizations (what good the intervention would bring in the world political climate). The important point here is that, while taking all pros and cons into account, states still decide to intervene out of their own interests.

With regard to the second set of motives, states also assess the situation. However, in this case, the assessment is not about weighing hypothetical benefits or costs. States evaluate the situation in accordance with the norms, rules, morality and ideational settings they are themselves governed by. Here, states intervene if they view a particular situation in the target country as violating the principles on the basis of which their own domestic society or the institutional arrangements of which they are a part operate.

Here, they might intervene even if their cost-benefit calculus turned out to be negative. They would intervene because the situation in a target country is unacceptable. Similarly, states might abstain from intervention in domestic affairs of other countries if they believe that the situation is within the realm of moral and ideational acceptability.

Interventions that I studied in the present thesis had the following factors that contributed to their success:

Table 7: Success factors of intervention

Intervention	Success	Failure
Multilateral	Impartial and neutral Late Intervention Institutionalization of interventions Compositional parity among coalition members	Bias Early intervention Direct involvement in conflict One-state prevalence A former unilateral actor in coalition
Unilateral	Support to the government Operational superiority Early Intervention Externalization of intervention Institutionalization of interventions	Support to the opposition Internalization of intervention Late interventions

To sum up my findings: for the multilateral intervention to be successful, it should be impartial and neutral so as to gain acceptance from all the parties involved in the conflict, be

252

conducted late in the course of the conflict in order to avoid direct conflict with the belligerents; its presence in the target country should be permanent and visible to the population; the legitimacy of its actions should be clearly stipulated in its international mandate; and, finally, the success of the intervention should not depend overly on the actions of any of its members.

In multilateral interventions, commitment of the belligerents is transferred to a coalition of states and no state in particular, where this commitment is shared by the members of the coalition, thus decreasing the possibility of clandestine support of any of its member to any conflicting side. Multilateral interventions, thus, become more impartial in their actions – the belligerents should be reassured that if they violate moral principles, norms and rules of the institution (here I talk about various conventions, charters, statutes, etc.), they would be punished.

In the case of the UN, its actions directed to restoring peace and stopping security threats are embedded in three articles of its Charter: article 51 (collective self-defense), and article 52 (peacekeeping) and article 53 (enforcement by regional organizations), where the decision-making body is the UN Security Council, which determines "…the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken… to maintain or restore international peace and security."[318] This normative field of action sets the standards for enforcement, which do not depend on the nature of the violator, are neutral and impartial from the viewpoint of collective action, and render third party actions legitimate in the context of international law.

Compositional parity among the members of multilateral intervention also helps to overcome the problems of neutrality and impartiality of the members of multilateral coalition and contributes to their acceptability by target communities. Even though decision-making in a multilateral coalition depends upon multiple states and their willingness to act (the Security Council in case of the UN), states-members of multinational coalitions still have their own interests in the intervention will be guided by situational commitment vis-à-vis their views on particular outcomes of conflicts.

Since the coalition members are bringing along their own interests to the coalition, the stronger they are (a "superpower" variable), the more likely they are to influence the organizational decision-making process and to put bias in their activities. Such players will bring their affective ties to the coalition: they are there because of the particular situational settings (own vital interests, neighbors, ethnic kinship, etc.) However, compositional party among the intervening states strengthens impartiality of the coalition: when the participants of multilateral

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318 Article 39, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/, last accessed on 24.04.08).

coalitions are equal players, the interests of any single state are "neutralized". The functional impartiality of the intervention balances out the interests of the states of which it is composed.

On the contrary, lobbying of a strong coalition member would erode the notion of impartiality and jeopardize the main principles, norms and standards by which the organizations undertaking interventions have been created and operate, making it situation-oriented. This would further undermine the main characteristic of a successful intervention – credible trust.

Unlike multilateral interveners, in order to be successful, unilateral actors should be effectively biased in their actions, using their operational superiority for fulfilling their agendas. Successful unilateral interventions provide support to the government of the target country, which in most cases is the stronger of the two sides of the conflict, thus minimizing the costs of the interveners themselves. Support to the government would increase the chances for success for the interveners and make their actions more legitimate on the domestic and also international level.

They should also intervene early in the conflict to prevent the opposing side from winning. Early interventions are more successful because they would indicate to the warring parties the strong commitment of the outside actor to win by all means, even if casualties are expected. Unlike multilateral interveners who usually wait to be invited by the target state or wait until the conflict has reached a certain level of atrocities, unilateral actions may be early hitting, when the casualties are not high and their inputs are more efficient because the opponents have not yet gained momentum in their attacks.

A very important factor for success of unilateral interventions is their distancing from the belligerents and pursuing their own agendas without getting too much involved in domestic matters that might become a long-term engagement. Non-permanent presence of foreign troops on the territory of the target state would tie their actions to a specific situation rather than a specific actor. It will not only allow interveners to use their resources efficiently, but also them to undertake actions where they believe they are more likely to succeed, while refraining from those where they are likely to fail.

Finally, solitary actors should base their actions on institutionalized frameworks (agreements) that would allow for their official involvement and, like the mandate of multilateral interventions, delineate their further involvement in the conflict. Although the agreements for outside support may include a description of cases requiring foreign aid and limiting them, for instance, to internal and/or external threats to domestic security and stability, they would set additional constraints on the interveners, and require increased human and economic resources, thus, increasing the costs.

A way out of this problem is to do to clearly define in the institutional frameworks which situations requires the presence of interveners, and, second, to make the interventions fully dependent on the will of the interveners themselves – to intervene upon their sole discretion. This would allow them to conduct their own assessment of risks and values and not tie their actions to the developments of the situation in the target state.

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