

Beyond Nation-State?

Framing National Identities of Bosnia and Herzegovina into One State

By

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INTRODUCTION

We understand each other well; just we must not talk about the politics.

(Former football coach on relations between Serbs and Albanians in northern Kosovska Mitrovica)

This is what results from an ideological concept that reduces human individuality and social life to where they belong and what they represent, when, having used up all the other 'avant-garde' forms, we return to the national as our only refuge, and in that national category recognize only its political content.

(Ivan Lovrenović)

Looking at the Bosnia and Herzegovina¹ from the European political perspective, it is an extraordinary complex country, with political and social processes that cannot be easily described, having three salient national identities. The problem that persists in BiH is how to frame its national identities into one state. In Europe, ideal model for building a state has been a nation-state, defined as a state that should have one nation encompassing territory where this nation lives (Tägil 1995: 20), therefore, France has French and Germany has Germans, but BiH cannot be framed in the same manner. This absence of one nation seems to be perceived as one of the reasons for the numerous political crises going on in BiH. Actually, the problem of post-war BiH is by many seen in 'ethnicization' of the society, the perception that usually leads to the discourse on 'beyond ethnicity' (see for example Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings 2006: 20), implying that ethnicity *per se* is something negative and should be abolished, eliminated, overcome. This discourse can be traced also in the rhetoric of international officials in BiH. In this thesis I argue that the problem is not in the existence of ethnicity but

¹ Hereafter BiH.

in the ‘politicization’ of the ethnicity, moreover, in the disagreement between the main political parties on how to organize the state, an issue that had impact on the war itself.²

Discussion in this thesis therefore addresses an issue of framing BiH as a state where there are developed three national ideologies. Here I focus on the problem of the accepting the same unit of identity in the state-building process among dominant political parties, and at the same time I take a look at a role of the ‘ethnic’ factor in international intervention in BiH, which was at several occasions criticized for misunderstanding of the realities on the ground. For instance, Mahmutćehajić claims, taking rather radical stance, that the international community’s solving of the conflict in BiH during the war reflected Croat and Serb ‘ethnonational’ ideologies that deny “complete Bosnian-Herzegovinian historical, political and cultural content” (1998: 45).³ However, usually these criticisms do not get far from mere accusations, without developing the concrete argument for such allegations. On the other hand, Kasapović for example writes that international actors in BiH seem to organize political and social relations in BiH according to their own interpretation (Kasapović 2005: 188). According to Kasapović, lack of this kind of strategy seems to lead to the “irresponsible experimenting with constitutional reforms that can cause extremely serious political crises in the country” (ibid: 190).⁴ Moreover, Kasapović is of the opinion that loyalty to the common

² Events in other Yugoslav republics in the beginning of 1990s affected also happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Visions of future organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina by three national parties were conflicting: Muslim and Croatian politicians were in favor of sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Serbian leaders were for staying under the framework of Yugoslavia (Donia and Fine 1994: 229).

³ It is clear that international community is not homogenous entity, however, this term best describes external political actors involved in interventions.

⁴ The most dramatic reactions till now have been to the suggestion of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to change the election procedure of members into House of Peoples, an institution ensuring the equality of all constitutional nations. Election procedure was that Croat members were elected by Croat representatives in cantonal parliaments, and Bosniak members by Bosniak representatives. However, the proposed reform should introduce the elections where all members of House of the Peoples would be elected by all representatives of cantonal parliaments. This would mean that Croats because of their small number in the parliament would hardly influence the election of Bosniak members, but on the other hand, Bosniak majority could decisively determine results of elections of Croat members into this institution. Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) reacted to this suggestion with organizing Croatian National Congress (sabor) in October 2000 that gathered all Croatian parties; they adopted Declaration on Sovereignty of Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and demanded abolishment of suggested reform. They then organized referendum on which

country is conditioned with assuring “the full development of national identities,” and that Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats can be Bosnian patriots only if “Bosnian state does not put under the question their national identities and latently suspect them as potential destroyers of the state” (Kasapović 2005: 165). Here she argues against the thinking among Bosniak political and academic elite and as well among international actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina that ethnic and religious differences during the several centuries had not had influence on society and also not on the state, and if there were some divisions they had been overcome in the time of multicultural Yugoslavia. Kasapović also sees that this kind of thinking has had influence also on the politics of international organizations in BiH after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and argues that they have showed “disturbing non-understanding of the society and state that have been entrusted to them for governance” (Kasapović 2005: 8). Sumantra Bose, positioning his argument in the same direction as Kasapović, articulates the role of the international community as “the flagbearer of a vision of liberal internationalism in a place destroyed by competing particularistic nationalisms” (Bose 2002: 6). He takes the same stance as Woodward, arguing that international community is the key actor in the dysfunctional and disunited post-Dayton BiH, furthermore, he sees that the main confrontation seems to become not between the three constitutional nations, but between all three national groups and the international actors (Bose 2002: 6-7).⁵ All the same, literature usually does not go in the detail of scrutinizing of how international actors understand the ‘multiethnic’ reality in BiH.

Croatian People should declare whether they are in favor of creating of their own national entity inside Federation of BiH; 70 percents of votes were for establishing new entity. In March 2001 Congress had on the basis of referendum results declared “Croatian Self-Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and announcing that this way Croats are constituting a third entity in BiH and this way stepping out of the Federation. High Representative withdrew HDZ president from the post of member of Presidency of BiH and suspended several other political officials of HDZ in federal institutions. The crisis ended with international organization’s stepping away from the suggested reform and with HDZ’s calling off the proclaimed new entity (Kasapović 2005: 189-90).

⁵ Bose assesses as accurate the general international perception of competing nationalists in BiH that in fact use fighting for the interests of their national group in order to gain ground for their racketeering activities. But he sees many areas of international involvement in BiH as problematic; one of it is unchanged situation within the area such as return of refugees and displaced persons. Nevertheless, he sees, similarly as Kasapović, High

The issue I am interested in this thesis, which could be called as ‘absence’ of one nation, is closely connected with the problem which one faces while discussing the politics in BiH: difficulties with naming what seems to be the issue in relation between main political actors in BiH, and having problem with naming the main political actors with the most suitable terms. In case of BiH, there are variety of terms at display to use in English language: ‘constitutional people’, as it is used in the Dayton Constitution and referring to the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs; they can be referred to also as ‘ethnic groups’, but also they can be called nations, it depends on what one wishes to express with this terminology. This terminology is very confusing, and it gets worse when referring to the politics in BiH: there can be ‘ethnic politics’ but at the same time parties that are involved in this politics can be called ‘national parties’ or ‘nationalist parties’, with their ‘national interests’ that exist in ‘a multiethnic-state’ (see for example Donais 2005). Moreover, the confusion in the terminology is closely connected with the conceptual confusion when it comes to the state-building projects in the post-conflict countries after the end of Cold-War, BiH being one of such examples.

What is more, here seems to be an issue of relation between concept of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nation’. First of all, concept of ‘ethnicity’ is contested, however, as Wilmsen writes, even though deconstruction of ethnicity shows that it is artificially constructed, this does not mean it should be “dismissed as illegitimate” (Wilmsen 1996: 3). Also Connor argues that nationalists have been able to mobilize nations on the basis of appealing to the common kinship of nations, that is, on the basis of shared blood. Moreover, Connor criticizes scholars that deny kinship as basis when defining nation, saying that it is not “what is” but “*what*

Representative’s direct involved into shaping media, education and judicial issues highly questionable. As he writes, the basic assumption of international actors is that “international community is there to do good for the people of the Bosnia, whose lives and future are being held to ransom by venal and sectarian leadership” (Bose 2002: 6-7). International officials express great dissatisfaction with massive voting on the basis of national lines; for instance a Council of Europe spokesman after 2000 elections expressed disappointment with the elections outcome saying that people in Bosnia-Herzegovina would live better and to be financially supported by West but do not “vote for the parties that could make it happen” (Cvijanovic cited by Bose 2002: 9). On the basis of such actions, Bose argues that international actors with their premises, assumptions, strategies, and objectives “fail to take sufficient account of the extraordinary complexity” in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (Bose 2002: 9).

people perceive as is which influences attitudes and behavior” (Connor 1994: 197). Another important aspect concerning ethnicity is, according to Wilmsen, that it has “no singular construction”, but there has to be at least two to be defined one against other. Also, what appears to be very intriguing is the fact that dominant group is never defined as an ethnicity, for example, there is no notion of English ethnicity in United States (Wilmsen 1996: 4-5). If we take a look at the etymology of term ‘ethnic’, its origins can be traced back to the Greek word ‘ethnos,’ whereas the origin of this expression derives from Latin expression ‘nation’, both meaning people, and the difference between them is in the use of these two expressions (Tägil 1995: 12). With term ‘nation’ it is usually referred (by historians) to a group of people when they have established or they strive to establish “their own state on the basis of a common culture” (ibid). Thus, discourse on ethnic groups implies that this group has not yet achieved its goal, since it is not nation yet; or as Fowkes says, “an ethnic group is a potential nation” (Fowkes 2002: ix). Actually, this ‘evolution’ is nicely portrayed with Anthony Smith’s ‘evolutionary model’, as I call it. Smith has on the basis of seven characteristics of nation (cultural differentiae, territorial mobility, size, external relation with similar groups, in-group sentiment citizenship rights, and economic integration) developed classification of the political complexity of groups (from the politically least complex groups to the politically most complex groups): ‘tribes’ (and kinship), ‘ethnies’, and ‘nations’ (Smith 1971: 186, 189). This model shows therefore that ethnic group is a nation in the making. Therefore, to say that in BiH exist ethnic groups and not nations carries the implication that BiH consisting of only ethnic groups, thus, the process of nation-building not yet being finished. What is more, this terminology seems embodied in the languages of the countries from former Yugoslavia, since there can exist ‘narod’ – ethnic group, ‘nacija’ - nation, ‘nacionalnost’ – minority, but it also can refer to an ethnic group; here I will leave out explanation of the terminological historical background. Moreover, whereas in the countries of former Yugoslavia, there exists a clear

distinction between concepts of a nation and a state, in English-language literature these two concepts are often used interchangeably, thus concept of nation can describe the people and the state, even though there exists a distinction between them, nation standing for group, and state for a political unit that is territorially defined (see Tägil 1995: 12-3).⁶ However, this terminology automatically excludes existence of more than one nation in one state.

Methodology in this thesis includes analysis of the group identity unit in the political programs of currently five dominant parties in BiH; three are parties representing interests of one of the three ‘constitutional peoples’, Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD),⁷ Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH), and two that are considered to be ‘multi-ethnic’ parties and more moderate,⁸ Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH).⁹ In addition to this I analyze the rhetoric of the High Representative, which is the leading international authority in BiH, and also the most exposed international officials, what makes the discourse analysis much easier.¹⁰ I use interviews and speeches, which were given during the period from 1999 to 2008 by Wolfgang Petritsch, Paddy Ashdown, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, and the most recent Miroslav Lajčák, and are available on the OHR website but as well in the books they

⁶ In this thesis I use terminology from Dayton Agreement, ‘peoples’ (narod), however, I use term ethnic group for the purposes of discussion. Furthermore, when analyzing programs I use same terms as used by political parties: therefore, beside terms peoples also ‘national’ (nacionalno) and ‘multiethnic’. What is more, for the sake of clarity, consistency and again for the purpose of discussion, I use expressions ‘ethnic politics’ and ‘ethnic parties’ when referring to the political parties that represent interests of the ‘constitutional ethnic groups’ (as one aspect how it could be called) in BiH, along with the expressions used by authors I cite (for example term ‘nationalist’).

⁷ SNSD is a coalition between Party of Independent Social Democrats and Democrat Socialist Party.

⁸ In Bosnian ethnic politics classification of parties as “moderate” and “nationalist” which, as Donais describes, are rather relative in Bosnian politics, because the division line between parties that belong to the either of the blocs is not really so clear. For example ‘civic’ SDP has become more nationalist in the recent years, and all parties in Republika Srpska could be considered as more or less nationalist, including Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) that is considered as moderate by the international organizations (Donais 2005: 175-6).

⁹ According to the election results in 2006 (www.izbori.ba) these parties got the biggest number of votes.

¹⁰ High Representative is appointed every two years by Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, and has a role to monitor implementation of civilian aspects of Dayton Agreement in BiH. Moreover, his/hers responsibilities have been enlarged with Bonn Conference that was held in December 1997 with giving him/her rights to dismiss uncooperative public officials and impose legislation if BiH’s legislative bodies fail in this process.

published.¹¹ Reason, I chose only this period and not the whole period of post-war intervention, therefore starting in 1996, is due to the fact that during the years immediately after the war the primary aim of intervention was peace stabilization and physical reconstruction; civilian aspects of the intervention could start only when this first phase of reconstruction was over.

In following chapters I first address the issue how ethnic principle guided the international intervention in stopping conflict in BiH, then, I analyze the power-sharing arrangement that was applied in BiH with Dayton Agreement. This is followed by outline of ethnic politics and the analysis of the role of the identity units in the political programs of five main political parties in BiH. Next chapter is the discourse analysis of international actors working on the post-war rebuilding of the state where I seek to identify their notion of nation and ethnicity and how do they connect it to the BiH (political) realities; moreover, I frame this discourse in the broader context of ‘state-building’ or so-called ‘nation-building’ project, conducted by international actors in post-conflict states. As a conclusion I discuss the adequacy of federal structure in multinational environment, and include the debate on ‘civic option’ that is by some perceived as remedy to ‘ethnic’ problems, where I include as well discussion on Bosnian identity among intellectuals in BiH.

¹¹ I analyzed 386 interviews during the period from 17 September 1999 to 27 March 2008, and 334 speeches during the period 8 September 1999 to 9 May 2008, all found on www.ohr.int website.

1. ETHNICITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO 'ETHNIC' CONFLICT IN BiH

1.1 'ETHNIC' PRINCIPLE IN THE PEACE PLANS

During the war in BiH, and also before its escalation, there have been many attempts of European Community to solve the conflict with acceptance of 'ethnicity' as the main principle in reorganizing of the territory.¹² During 30 to 31 March 1992, six days before international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by European Community, there has been sixth round of negotiations on Bosnia and Herzegovina in Brussels. Representatives of all three national parties proposed corrections to the Declaration of Principles of New Constitutional Order of BiH or so called Cutilhero Plan, adopted few weeks earlier. According to this plan, BiH would have three constituent units based on the ethnic principle (Marković 1996: 35).¹³

After war broke out on 6 April 1992 there was a second phase of international mediation in BiH. In August 1992 European Community presidency and United Nations jointly organized conference in London, where they invited regional leaders and international foreign ministers.¹⁴ Among asserting principles such as releasing of the civilians, closing of the detention camps and protection of the minority rights, it also included non-recognition of the territorial gains that were achieved by force. Their two co-chairmans, Cyrus Vance and Lord

¹² Here republican borders of BiH were not taken into consideration to be changed. In 1992 only former Yugoslav republics could be internationally recognized, even though there were many more requests for independence, among them was also request for recognition of newly proclaimed Serb Republic in BiH (see Lucarelli 1995: 23).

¹³ However, few days later before three units had been delineated, Alija Izetbegović, head of the Bosnian collective presidency, renounced the agreement; later it was rejected also by Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban (Tindemans et. al. 1996: 48).

¹⁴ London conference established International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia that was a successor to the previous European community Conference on Yugoslavia (see Tindemans et al. 1996).

Owen, had task to negotiate the settlement according to the principles agreed in London. They came up with a plan, known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, that envisioned BIH as decentralized state with ten provinces, where Sarajevo would have special status, and there would be loose central government. After long negotiations it was rejected by the Serb leaders (Tindemans et al. 1996: 48-9). Creation of these provinces was based on the ethnic lines, even though there was an attempt to hide this in order for Muslim representatives to accept it. However, it was accepted only by the Croat leaders since with it they would get more territory than they actually controlled; Muslim leadership rejected it because of its ethnic division, while Serb leaders rejected it since they would get less territory than they already gained (Cohen quoted from Popovski 1995: 201).

Two plans that followed (the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan and the Contact Group Plan) “accepted de facto partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina into national territories” (Tindemans et al. 1996: 49).¹⁵ Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, for instance, endorsed a proposal of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat leaders to make BIH a “Union of Three Republics,” giving 53 percent of territory to Serb side, 17 percent to the Croat side and 30 percent to the Bosnian government (Tindemans et al. 1996: 52). With all these plans, assertion of London conference not to recognize territorial gains that are accomplished with violence was violated.¹⁶

In March 1994, one-year-long conflict between Croat and Muslim forces ended with their entering into the federation that was engineered by the US government under Clinton administration; with this, the implicit acknowledgment was made that ethnicity is the main

¹⁵ Actually, in all plans ethnicity was organizing principle, so that “succession of plans for Bosnia reflected stages of ethnic partition” (Tindemans et al.: 1996: 47).

¹⁶ According to Mahmutćehajić, at International conference for former Yugoslavia on 4 October 1992 there were five possibilities how to organize BiH, (1) as centralized state, (2) centralized federal state having essential functions divided into four to ten areas, (3) loose federal state of three geographically unconnected ethnic communities, (4) loose confederation of three republics formed on ethnic lines, having considerable sovereignty, (5) Muslim state, where Croats will be part of Croatia and Serbs will be part of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1998: 45). One of the reasons why partition of BiH was considered also in international community’s talks on its organization, is suggested in ethnonational understanding of states or better to say recognizing the formation of such states. Partition of Yugoslavia into territories that were based on ethnonational ideologies (nation-states) made existence of BiH that was not an ethno-national unit questionable (see Mahmutćehajić 1998: 49-50).

criteria (Puhovski quoted from Popovski 1995: 201). This federation joined territories governed by the Bosnian government and the areas of Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna that was proclaimed already at the beginning of the war (Bieber 2005: 62-3).

Dayton Peace Agreement that finally ended the war in the December of 1995 was the eighth plan in a row (Woodward 1999: 73-74).¹⁷ With this agreement Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two entities, the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁸ The Republic of Srpska was accorded to the Serb side and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Bosniak and Croat leaders.

1.2 INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN POST-WAR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Arend Lijphart, leading scholar in consociationalism, sees power-sharing as the best solution to ethnic conflict, since it grants political influence and autonomy to the ethnic groups in the same state. As he writes, this solution is characterized by, first of all, participation of representatives of all significant groups in the state government; secondly, high level of group autonomy, where all decisions are made jointly by different groups; thirdly, proportionality as the basics for political representation; and fourthly, minority veto as crucial means of protecting vital interests of minorities (Lijphart 1990: 494-5). In the case of territorial concentration of groups, Lijphart writes that autonomy could be institutionalized through federalism, however, if groups are intermixed, only non-territorial autonomy could be

¹⁷ One of the reasons that Dayton Agreement was different from other plans was readiness of United States to contribute ground troops to an international force that would implement it (Woodward 1999: 73-74).

¹⁸ Blommaert and Verschuere criticize Western powers that they had been thinking only about partition as a solution to war in BiH, "a measure built on the acceptance of homogeneous premises and therefore bound to fail in the long run in a thoroughly mixed area" (1996: 120).

granted, or combination of territorial and non-territorial autonomy (Lijphart 1990: 494).¹⁹

Nevertheless, the argument for granting territorial autonomy to ethnic groups is being pushed forward by many scholars beside Lijphart, for instance by Hurst Hannum, Hanz-Joachim Heintze or Ruth Lapidot, seeing it as an effective means for solving ethnic conflicts.

At the time when Graham wrote the article “Mapping the federal condition,” war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been still going on. Graham in it says consociationalism has been considered “as possible model for managing conflict in deeply divided societies” in countries like Ireland, Ukraine and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995: 15). The reason behind why consociationalism in this situation is perceived as welcome model is belief that “ethnic depoliticisation can be achieved through actions of their incorporated elites, despite possible dissension at the mass level” (Graham 1995: 15). Moreover, here federation is perceived “to meet the conditions for consociationalism where a fragmented society combined with a decentralized federal arrangement ensures the autonomy of the various segments” (Graham 1995: 15).

Today’s BiH could be characterized as a loose multinational federation (Bieber 2005: 61).²⁰

Other characteristic of BiH is that it is an asymmetric federation (ibid). One reason for this is that one of its units consists of ten cantons (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), where two nations, Croats and Bosniaks are considered to be predominant, and the other one is

¹⁹ It is interesting to note that also in the case of power-sharing Lijphart suggests that partition or secession could be seen as the last resort when power-sharing solution fails. He actually sees this as having “a very important moderating influence,” since in his opinion “the best way for a government to prevent secession is pledge not to resist it.” Here he mentions as successful example of this kind of moderation in the case of Quebec (Lijphart 1990: 494).

²⁰ Ambrosio in 1996 wrote that without Bosniak-Croat Federation, BiH would be most probably divided in three “ethnically-homogenous ” entities. What is more, according to Ambrosio, Dayton Agreement has set this federation as a half reconstructed BiH. Moreover, “the Federation may prove to be precedent -setting set of institutions which will have further application in other ethnically torn states. /.../ Thus, the process of state building in Bosnia has important implications for many ethnically segmented states.” (Ambrosio 1996: 226). Also Miro Lazović from Forum of Parliamentarians 1991-1996 states that at the Washington Agreement negotiations it was initially thought (referring here to his conversation with Charles Redman) that territory controlled by Serb forces would later on join Federation of BiH, and whole BiH would become Federation of BiH; but later on this did not happened (2007: 195).

centralized republic envisaged for one nation, the Serbs (Republic of Srpska) (ibid).²¹ In addition to this, the main difference between these two entities is an uneven division of the territory on the basis of the ethnicity; it can be said that in Republic of Srpska, Serbs enjoy territorial autonomy, while Croats and Bosniaks enjoy autonomy through cantons where neither of these two groups is solely predominant, therefore none of the cantons represents one nation solely as in the Republic of Srpska (Bieber 2005: 61).

What is more, Dayton Agreement sets the framework for various power-sharing arrangements which are based on the ethnic criteria: 1) ethnic representation in parliament; 2) rotating presidency; 3) legislative that requires support based on ethnic lines; 4) veto on “vital interests” of ethnic groups; and 5) proportional representation in electoral process (O’Halloran 2005: 106). Thus, the division of the governmental institutions (see O’Halloran 2005; Bieber 2005) is based on the ethnic criteria, together with the entity criteria, which precisely envisions from which entity representatives of the ethnic groups must come from.

Concerning legislative at the state level, parliamentary assembly consists from the House of People (upper chamber), having 15 members, and the House of Representatives (lower chamber) with 42 members. Delegates to the state upper chamber are being nominated by the upper chambers on the entity levels, while members of the lower chamber are elected in the entities. Dayton constitution envisions 28 members from the Federation to be elected into the House of the Representatives, and 14 from the Republic of Srpska; here the number of the representatives is evenly shared by the three ethnic groups. Also in the House of Peoples, members consist from five Bosniaks and five Croats from the Federation and five Serbs from the Republic of Srpska.

State executive power consists from the rotating presidency and Council of Ministers. Members of presidency are elected from each of main ethnic groups for four-year mandate,

²¹ Second reason is the existence of special district (Brčko), having the same jurisdictions as other two entities, but at the same time belonging also to the both entities (Bieber 2005: 61).

and hold a title President of Presidency for eight months. They are elected with a direct vote. The Council of Ministers is chaired by the prime minister that is nominated by the presidency, and before taking his position he must be approved by the House of the Representatives. He then nominates ministers, who also have to go through the procedure of being confirmed by the House of the Representatives. Other state institutions are The Constitutional Court, The Central bank of Bosnia and the committee for military issues (Bieber 2005: 47; O'Halloran 2005: 106).

Further on, entity institutions of Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are almost the mirror image of the Bosnian state institutions; they consist from Presidency, Council of Ministers, ministries, House of the Representatives and House of the Peoples. Before the year 2002 when High Representative changed the constitutional arrangements, power-sharing functioned only among Bosniaks and Serbs; with these new constitutional arrangements, also Serbs are included in the power-sharing system (Bieber 2005: 69-70). In addition, governmental structure of ten cantons in Federation is made from cantonal parliament, cantonal government and ministries.²²

On the other hand, executive power of Republic of Srpska consists from the president, vice-president, prime minister and ministries, while legislative branch represents 83-member National Assembly. This parliamentary does not ensure ethnic representation, however, mentioned constitutional changes in 2002 established also Council of Peoples, whose members are being elected by the National Assembly; here all three ethnic groups are evenly represented by 8 representatives, and 4 members of those that belong to category of "Others" (Bieber 2005: 80),²³ as are classified other ethnic groups or those that identify themselves as Bosnians by the Dayton constitution.

²² Official web site of Canton Sarajevo (<http://www.ks.gov.ba/index.htm>).

²³ See also official web site of Republic of Srpska Government (<http://www.vladars.net/sr-SP-Cyrl/Pages/splash.aspx>).

All this been said, the problem of this power-sharing system is that it is, as I would call it, 'too ethno-territorially precise'. The biggest critique is directed at the fact that Serb from Federation cannot be elected to the parliamentary assemblies and as well Croats or Bosniaks from Republic of Srpska. Beside this, other ethnic groups or people that do not wish to declare themselves in the ethnic terms are excluded from this system, or are only minimally represented. The other critique is high level of bureaucracy that is said by the opponents of this system to be too expensive and it is perceived to be one of the biggest reasons of economic stagnation of the country.

Moreover, the power-sharing system is being weakened by the uneven support of the main political parties; Bosniak parties opt for strong central government, while Serb and Croat parties are in favor of high decentralization (Bieber 2005: 46); it can be said that these political party ideologies have essential impact on the development/stagnation of the country.

2.2 ETHNIC POLITICS IN BiH

2.1. OUTLINE OF THE ETHNIC POLITICS IN BiH

Today's ethnic politics in BiH are in large part continuation from the first democratic elections in BiH that were held in November 1990, when three national parties (SDA, SDS and HDZ) won coalition in National Assembly (Kaldor 1999: 33). Actually elections results corresponded in a great part to the results of ethnic census (Andjelic 2003: 189; Bieber 2006: 22), even though there existed also cross-ethnic support for the national parties due to pre-election campaign where national parties were calling for the mutual support (Bieber 2006: 23). As Andjelic writes, there has been lack of the political alternative to the nationalist concept; at the beginning of the 1990s movement Democratic Alliance that was formed out of the former Youth Organization, and Sarajevo intellectuals had prepared plan for the new constitution where BiH was declared as a state of citizens based on the patterns of liberal democracy. However, this was not more than just an indication that also other movements existed not only those that were following the ethnic politics (Andjelic 2003: 206). Though, ethnic politics in BiH is nothing new, also at the beginning of 20th century when political parties and cultural organizations were formed, they were as well based on the national lines (Bieber 2006: 7; see also Imamović 2006).

After the war, Dayton Agreement Constitution institutionalized this ethnic politics, and provided "framework for a multi-ethnic federal state that claims to guarantee constitutional protection of individual rights but, at the same time, establishes a government model that may

be characterized as ‘cultural-pluralist’ - meaning that the political unit is not the individual but the ethnic group” (O’Halloran 2005: 108).

Actually, it could be said that from the beginning of 1990s, when coalition broke down due to the most crucial debate on whether BiH should stay as part of Yugoslavia or to get independent (Bieber 2006: 25), to today, each of the ethnic parties has more or less unchanged agenda that can be traced also in the analyzed programs. Concerning HDZ, as Donais observes, it had been taking advantage of the fact that Croats had not got their own entity with Dayton Agreement, taking a hard line and obstructionist politics, regularly calling for establishment of entity of their own. On the other hand, SDA is, as articulated by the same author, the “Bosniak counterpart to HDZ,” supporting the idea of multi-ethnic BiH throughout the war, however, it has taken also more nationalist stance in recent years. According to Donais, among all nationalist parties, it is SDA and Bosniak political elites that support the civic state-building in BiH, but the influence of nationalist hardliners within the party and struggle for power has made SDA unreliable ally of international organizations in building of the civic Bosnian state. Concerning leading Serbian party, SDS, here still following Donais’s outline of the BiH politics, it has been focusing on such aspects of Dayton Agreement that helped to emphasis sovereignty of Republika Srpska. However, due to the removal of many entity’s nationalists by the High Representative and impoverishment of Republika Srpska, politicians from this entity have started to cooperate with the international community, and even more, it seems they have accepted their fate as being part of BiH (Donais 2005: 59-61).²⁴ Even though these three parties have dominated politics in BiH during the war and after, there has been gradual increase of the political plurality, mostly due to the growing popularity of SDP and Party for BiH on account of SDA, but also support of Socialist Democrat Party

²⁴ Pieterse writes that ethnic politics is about protest of those that do not want to be subordinated or excluded by the nation (1996: 25). And also ‘ethnicitization’ can be interpreted as caused by shift to multiparty system, therefore with introduction of democracy (Pieterse 1996: 27).

(SDS) has decreased due to the rise of moderate parties in Republika Srpska, only the power of HDZ has been left without the serious competitor (Donais 2005: 61) in Croatian ethnic politics.²⁵ Actually, what happened with regard to Serbian ethnic parties is that SDS lost its dominance to the popularity of SNSD.²⁶

At the beginning of the 2001 there was a moment of plurality of the politics with emergence of 'civic option' with so called 'Alliance for Change', however, after less than two years it was replaced by nationalist parties due to the fragmentation within the alliance (Donais 2005: 62). There is only a little doubt whether this would be possible without international brokering (ibid). Nevertheless, at this moment 'civic option' seems to be back, since so called non-nationalist parties (SDP, Party for BiH and SNSD) have gained the most of the seats in governmental positions.

²⁵ Donais uses the terminology of "Croat and Bosniak dominated areas," however, this is in my opinion problematic terminology since it is based on the nation-state framework; talking about majorities and minorities only reinforces the power struggle for domination. I find it important to bring this power struggle from territory based to abstract level, with for example talking rather about ethnic politics.

²⁶ SNSD 'contributed' also the famous prime minister of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik; a person that actually seems as the main spokesman and protector of the constitutivity of Republika Srpska.

2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF 'ETHNIC' AND 'CIVIC' IN THE PROGRAMS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN BiH

2.2.1 SDA – “PRESERVING BOSNIAN IDENTITY”

We can find in the program of the SDA, that this party is self-defined as the centrist “Bosnian people’s party”, whereas it sees BiH as a state of equal peoples and citizens. One of SDA primary goals, judging from being mentioned almost at the beginning of the program, is preserving “Bosnian identity.”²⁷ Moreover, Bosnian identity is defined as a shared determinant of all citizens of BiH, meaning “nourishing and development of the traditional values of tolerance and coexistence of our peoples of different cultures and religions.” Bosnian identity, according to SDA, should be considered as a development of sense of belonging to the Bosnian state, and thus to the Bosnian nation, and not as a negation of ethnic and religious belonging of Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats and others. In this respect, culture of every people in BiH is stated to be part of cultural heritage of all, and not only of the people from who it originates.

Concerning the question, how state should include existence of people of different cultures and religions, it is said that ethnic rights should not be playing counterpart to the interests of state of BiH. What is more, Bosniaks as the most numerous people are seen as one that should secure the equality of peoples but also the interests of the Bosnian state. What is intriguing here is that right in the next sentence is mentioned SDA’s commitment to support implementation of education, cultural and humanitarian projects that are necessary for “full

27 SDA program has been issued on 26 May 2005 in Sarajevo. http://www.sda.ba/sekcije.php?cat_id=1; retrieved on 3 December 2007.

Also in SDA program as in program of HDZ, religion is explicitly mentioned; SDA mentions that the political position of party is adopted with “belief in God,” whereas HDZ defines its principle on the basis of Christianity.

affirmation of Bosniaks and their traditional values.” In this respect SDA will work on confirmation of Bosnian language and securing its equal position.²⁸

Another mentioning of size of people when it is said that SDA supports BiH as a state where human right and freedoms are respected on the whole territory without regard to the numbers of individual peoples. SDA also suggests that specifics and cultural differences in BiH could be addressed in education system through “ethnic group of classes,” which should need adjusting of the contemporary European practice with the cultural history in BiH.

2.2.2 HDZ BiH – “SECURING CROATIAN EXISTENCE IN BiH”

HDZ program focuses on the broad variety of aspects such as family, young and elderly, monetary policies, economy, return of the displaced people, church and religious communities, or Croatian veterans.²⁹ HDZ BiH is defined as the main party of Croatian people in BiH, with a goal to secure “Croatian existence in BiH; preserving integrity of the Croatian nation (*nacija*) and the Croatian national (*narodnosno*) being in joint state of three independent, equal and constitutive peoples on the whole of its territory...”³⁰

HDZ emphasizes crucial importance of right of every people to information, communication and education on its own language; this includes own education programs and learning of own history and other national specifics, however, it is pointed out that this does not exclude learning of other people’s culture. HDZ strongly supports initiative to establish Croatian Academy for Science in BiH. Further on it obliges to protect Croatian cultural heritage and institutions. Also they support continuation of University in Mostar with Croatian education

²⁸ Bosnian language is perceived to have continuity from Middle Ages to contemporary times.

²⁹ HDZ program has been issued on 11 May 2007 in Mostar. www.hdzbih.org/download/xx-program.pdf; retrieved on 3 December 2007.

³⁰ Croatian Council of Defense (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane) is argued to be a legal defense force of Croatian people in BiH. In program is also mentioned “Homeland war” (Domovinski rat) described as fight for freedom and equality of Croatian people in BiH.

program and teaching in Croatian language. There is also explanation why is this important: “Croatian language and national education program are the most important sources of own existence (*samobitnost*).” According to HDZ program, it is the right of Croatian people, as it is of every other people, to have schooling in Croatian language, using own education programs so one can learn his history and other “national specifics.”³¹ Moreover, because of cultural, linguistic and “education” specifics of constitutional peoples in BiH, and because students and parents have constitutional right to choose their school, language and education plan, as HDZ argues, Croatian education program should not mean segregation of individuals and peoples. Actually, as it is explained, own education program prevents assimilation of one people by other people.

Media is another area where HDZ argues for changes, stating that they will fight for the establishment of public radio-television channel in Croatian language, explaining that “free media enable shaping public opinion and through responsible work help to control state power.” Moreover, they explain that right to information is one of the basic principles of democracy.

2.2.3 SNSD – “IMPORTANCE OF MECHANISMS FOR PROTECTION OF NATIONAL AND CIVIL INTERESTS”

SNSD, a main moderate party in Republika Srpska focuses of all analyzed programs the least on ethnic issues.³² Republika Srpska is said to be established as a state of Serbian people and “all its citizens” but later began to get more “multiethnic character” due to decisions of Constitutional Court, however, despite this fact it, as it is explained, it is going to be still

³¹ Education programs on all levels should include “basic values of national identity, belonging to Western-European cultural circle,” and also religious education.

³² SNSD program has been retrieved on 3 December 2007; http://www.snsd.org/lat_program.html.

considered as “condition for survival of Serbian people.” In this sense, it is the only party that expresses satisfaction with entity divide of BiH. SNSD sees that state of BiH should respect complexity of internal “habitus” and take into consideration demands of European integrations. They emphasize importance of existence of “different mechanisms for protection of national and civil interests,” and express their commitment to “protection of national awareness.” Moreover,

“nationality (*nacionalnost*) is protected with development of democracy, economic position, culture, tradition, education, cooperation with the parent state, but with regards to the other peoples in the neighborhood. Right to national affirmation of one people means acknowledging these rights also of other peoples through cooperation and mutual responsibility.”

For SNSD beside peace and justice also dedication to sovereignty and territorial integrity together with political independence of BiH represents the framework for functioning of both entities. Dayton Peace Agreement is seen as a minimum of political consensus in BiH; it has established balance that “enables protection of national interest of all three constituent peoples.” However, SNSD perceives revision of this Agreement to bring new tensions and conflict throughout the region. Thus, constitutional framework can be changed only with “consensus and sincere will of entities, constitutive peoples and citizens in BiH, and only in direction of creating efficient and nondiscriminatory system, compatible with European standards. Also, SNSD warns that any attempt of “majorisation” and “imposing the solution from outside or inside” would result in destabilization of the future. According to this, as program states, SNSD will build BiH as “a common state established by Peace Agreement.”

2.2.4 SDP – “CITIZEN AS THE MAIN POLITICAL SUBJECT”

In SDP program³³ that is the lengthiest and the most elaborated of all analyzed programs, citizens are perceived as the main political subjects in BiH. However, at the same time SDP party members acknowledge equality and constitutivity of peoples and importance of their participation as groups (*kolektiviteti*) in the governmental structure. Their position is that democracy cannot function if there does not exist subject, which is citizen, what they find necessary for implementation of this political process on the level of whole BiH. In order to establish BiH on the democratic principles which correspond to the “European standards,” they find necessary existence of consensus of all political parties and as well active role of international community.

SDP is defined as a multiethnic party of whole BiH, having a leftist political orientation and being party of workers, but also as an organization of “indigenous, constitutive peoples (and national minorities) and citizens that develop and cherish values of social state and civil society.” Moreover, they express their commitment to the development and the perseverance of national and state identity. What is more, character and complexity of Bosnian “minority-national state structure” is considered to be part of the tradition, “a social and state particularity that has been created with centuries-long historical process.”³⁴

SDP sees of vital significance respecting and nurturing all national cultures equally, but also they find important to foster all that is mutual in cultural and historical heritage of Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, Jews, Roma, Albanians and other peoples.³⁵

³³ SDP program has been issued in November 2002. <http://www.sdp.ba/Default.aspx?categoryid=27&sub1=4>; retrieved on 3 December 2007.

³⁴ It is very interesting to see that the personality of Josip Broz Tito is part of the values of SDP because of his fight against fascism and Stalinism, non-alignment movement and fight against colonialism but also because of his contribution to the peace and peaceful coexistence and his respectfulness toward statehood of BiH and its “three-national structure” and the equality of peoples. In this respect SDP sees BiH as “one, with respect to centuries long coexistence, no matter of what religion.”

³⁵ SDP sees important to develop and to modernize joint state cultural institutions that they find of special importance for whole state, and all peoples and minorities that live in BiH. However, at the same time they

Furthermore, they express support for full equality of writings and languages in BiH, saying that will and choice of citizens should be respected which language or writing they want to use, therefore there should be equal use of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian as official languages, on the whole territory of BiH. On the other hand education programs should function on the joint basis throughout BiH. What is more, multiculturalism of BiH in their opinion cannot be preserved with exclusiveness of education programs and also not with programs that overstress the differences. Nevertheless, implementation of collective rights should be conducted through direct participation in the power structure and not through political-territorial principle. In this respect, the majority principle is seen as the main basis of democratic decision-making; however, it should not be used in the decisions that concern basic collective rights of constitutional peoples and national minorities.

2.2.5 PARTY FOR BIH – “WHOLE BIH OR LOST OF EVERYTHING”

Party for BiH dedicates of all analyzed political parties the biggest part to inter-ethnic relations and the situation that is a result of a war.³⁶ Actually program of Party for BiH surprisingly seems to be more ethnic/nationalistic than the programs of declared ethnic/nationalistic parties.³⁷ Actually, Party for BiH is the only party that explicitly mentions war, in respect of warning of war in future. First of all, because of continuing existence of ‘the

support affirmation of cultural specifics in BiH through framework of special national cultural institutions. There is also mentioning of group rights of national minorities should be secured with Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities and with European Treaty for Regional Languages and Languages of Minorities, saying that these rights should encompass rights to education, language, information and as well representation in governmental institutions.

³⁶ Party for BiH retrieved on 3 December 2007. http://www.zabih.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21&Itemid=53.

³⁷ We can find quite a few strong words in program of Party for BiH: for instance, democratic forces should prevent establishment of “neo-fascist dictatorships”; “who does not accept this obvious fact (the integrity of BiH), that person chooses war”...

great-state pretensions” of neighboring countries, Party for BiH warns that war still “awaits above Balkan region.” Also, it is said that BiH cannot be partitioned peacefully, since it would sooner or later result in war. They state that whole BiH, as “a sovereign state and multicultural society,” is a key condition for the peace in the region. But moreover, it is said that to accept the situation created with genocide and mass killings, therefore talking about newly created entities, it would be a sign that with the same means could be created even more tragic reality.

Party for BiH addresses in their program citizens of BiH, saying that people are in their essence (*po prirodi*) different but through social relations they have to be equal. Citizens here are defined as “a historically formed community of people that are different through religion, ethnic belonging and cultural tradition.” Party for BiH sees of crucial importance for existence of citizens of BiH to accept unity in differences. Moreover, SBiH argues that citizens and peoples of BiH are today in front of choice: “Or whole and democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina or lost of everything.”

We can find also interesting critique directed at “one political party representing Bosniaks,” therefore SDA, that is accused of accepting “thesis on partition of the country - as the final solution,” saying that this kind of politics leads Bosniak people to “catastrophe.” On the other hand, Party for BiH talks about BiH as “multinational”, “multireligious” and “multicultural” society. They refer to the culture, the same as SDA and SDP, as the shared heritage of all peoples, however stressing the importance for state to enable untrammelled development of all “national cultures and their intermingling,” similarly as is being suggested by SDP. But unlike as SDP they refer to the inhabitants of BiH as “Bosnians and Herzegovinians,” mentioning

quality of “Bosnianism” (bosanstvo) and existence of Bosnian identity in past, when ancestors in BiH were known as “good Bošnjani,” therefore, taking the same stance as SDA.³⁸

2.3 FRAMING THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES: CIVIC, ETHNIC AND MULTICULTURAL

Analysis of political programs in BiH shows that there exists considerably clash of visions of organizing society in BiH. We can actually sum up five political programs into three approaches: One approach is that differences should be ignored and similarity of Bosnian culture emphasized (SDA, SBiH); other approach is that particularities of cultures are the one that should be emphasized and developed (HDZ, SNSD); and third is that at the same time similarities of all three cultures and particularities should be developed on two levels (SDP).

There is an option to frame this conflict between different approaches as conflict of three types of nationalism, as elaborated by David Brown: civic nationalism that perceives community as equal citizens; ethnocultural nationalism where community is perceived as united on the basis of common ancestry and ethnocultural sameness; and multicultural nationalism where status of component ethnic groups are perceived to be equal, and their cultural autonomy is being promoted. Actually, as Brown suggests, tensions between ethnic and civic nationalism are seen to be joined by multicultural nationalism (Brown 2000: 126). Even though these categorizations can be disputable, and there should be further discussion what does nationalism actually mean, it seems that when we use terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ we act exactly out of this kind of perception of today’s world societies. Nevertheless, Brown makes very interesting and useful points:

³⁸ Motto of Party for BiH is: “Whole, Free, Democratic, Prosperity, Just, Bosnian, Our Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

Contemporary nationalist politics involves ideological confrontation between competing constructions of the nation. Groups and individuals within the same state differ as to whether they aim at a civic nation of equal citizens, and ethnocultural nation of ethnic sameness, or a multicultural nation of equal status (of) ethnic or ethno-regional segments. They also differ, in some cases, as whether they seek this vision within the existing state, or through formation of the new state. (Brown 2000: 153)

This kind of ideological confrontation can be observed also between dominant political programs in BiH. There seems to be competing constructions of the Bosnian nation by SDA and Party for BiH, therefore it could be interpreted that they opt for civic nation of equal citizens, whereas SDP notion of nation seems more to resemble to multicultural nation constructed from ethno-religious segments. On the other hand HDZ and SNSD support the existence of ethnocultural nations in BiH. Moreover, SDA and Party for BiH call for Bosnian nation can be articulated with words of Wayne Norman,

Nationalism at the state level appeals to liberals today first and foremost as a strategy for enhancing stability and unity in states that might otherwise fragment along regional, ethnocultural, or even class lines. The basic idea here is that national identity is the best form of social cement in modern societies... National identities are the intended and unintended product of intellectual, political, and cultural activity, including the public discourses structured by political leaders... (Norman 2004: 87)³⁹

Therefore, nationalist clashes, as Brown suggests, can be interpreted not to be fundamentally about interests but about ideologies (Brown 2000: 154).

On the other hand, analysis of political programs shows that programs of dominant parties in BiH are not as inter-exclusionary as one would expect. All programs emphasize the importance of acknowledgment of collective group rights in state structure, even though they perceive different identities to be salient in state building.⁴⁰

³⁹ This could be called also 'nation-building', a political activity that implies creating a nation "out of some other form of community, or making a national identity stronger" (Norman 2004: 87). Norman argues that in most cases national identity already exists, and that political actors are only shaping it with appealing to the values and beliefs that characterize it, as well the sentiments to recall it (ibid).

⁴⁰ Another aspect in which all parties agree is implementing of European standards.

Another aspect that becomes visible with above analysis is that the concepts of citizen and peoples exist on the same level in political programs of SDP, SDA and Party for BiH. This seems quite confusing; at first sight, it appears as if ethnic groups would exist as group per se *and* citizens as another group. However, these two categories could be seen as implying acknowledgment of importance of collective rights, what as already said seems to be position of all parties, even though they use different discourses.

What is more, SDA program that sees role of Bosniaks as the most numerous people to secure the protection of equality of all peoples, touches the sensitive questions of “majorities and minorities” in Bosnian politics. HDZ and SNSD express exactly the fear of assimilation and “majorization”, referring to the politics of Bosniaks that are the largest ethnic group in BiH. Therefore, politics of HDZ and SNSD can be seen (conditionally) as a reaction to the politics lead from SDA and as well Party for BiH.

3. POST-WAR INTERVENTION IN BiH: BUILDING A NATION?

3.1 INTERNATIONAL ACTORS' DISCOURSE ON 'LACK OF SOCIETAL GLUE'

Christian Schwarz-Schilling, one of the former High Representatives, stated that the transition in South-East Europe is difficult because of numerous different religions and history (2007: 163-4). Here he, although most probably unintentionally, portrays diversity to be a problem which blocks the development of a state, not questioning whether other factors could be causing problem in such 'diverse' areas as is South-East Europe.

However, Schwarz-Schilling is not the only one that sees diversity of religions to be 'problematic'. Kimberly Coles, an anthropologist, conducted research in BiH on perception of Bosnian society amongst the "Internationals," as those working for international organizations refer to themselves. Her international informants expressed their awareness of historical and ideological construction of ethnicity and identity in BiH; they supported their view with testimony of local colleagues who were not conscious that they are Serbs or Muslim before the war. Thus, as Coles writes, they would often diminish ethnicity as being relevant category and for that reason, as for an example, avoid learning the ethnicity of their Bosnian colleagues (Coles 2006: 259). Ethnicity here seems to be understood as problematic, since it appears the one that divides the people. For that reason it understandable that there exists there exist calls for existence of a mutual identity.

High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch expresses this need for the mutual identity to connect the people in one of the speeches, where he sees its absence to be the cause of the stagnation of a country,

... lack of ‘Bosnian identity,’ this crucial feeling for mutual goal and civil responsibility – and this is what is hardest to accomplish after such ‘uncivilized war’ – resulted not only with that Bosnia and Herzegovina was not accepted into Partnership for Peace in June 2004 in Istanbul. This lack hardens also continuation of implementation of constitutional reform process which presents actual issue. Building a state in Bosnia-Herzegovina will end with failure as long as much smaller but far more efficient administration system will not be established. There is a need for movement that will have its roots in a civil society, a wide homebred coalition of same thinkers – the key actors of Bosnian future – that honestly try to fight for place in modern Europe. (Petrich 2004: 9-10).

Here Petritsch equalizes on one side Bosnian identity and on other side unfunctionality of the state, however the question is whether such equalization is necessary. Moreover, same High Representative in one of his speeches states that there is a need to act as one nation in BiH, as is the case in rest of Europe,

If Bosnia and Herzegovina expects to take its rightful place in the family of modern sovereign nations its leaders must start acting as if it is such a nation, and not a patchwork of local bosses and sectarian interests motivated by the notion of ethnic separation.⁴¹

However, it is clear in the last two words what he is criticizing, therefore, perceiving the solution to a “sectarianism” conducted by politicians would be solved with “acting as one nation.” Coles explains these invocations of BiH as being part of Europe in public discourse as “one strategy for constituting a new inclusive, imagined community” (Coles 2006: 262). The new imagined community is seen to bring remedy to the all problems.

This option to create one inclusive community is called upon also by Michael Schmunk, ambassador of Germany in BiH, who mentions that one of most important areas which Bosnians should tackle by themselves, and not by the ‘internationals’ is “the creation of the ‘social glue’ that is needed in each and every society to form a country, if not a nation” (2007:

⁴¹ Speech by the High Representative, Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch to the UN Security Council, New York, 8 November 1999.

171).⁴² We learn here that imagined community is constituted from imaginary ‘social glue’ that conditionally could be called also a ‘nation’.

Another way of holding the country together is suggested in writing of Paddy Ashdown, a former High Representative, in a book he published after his mandate in BiH had ended, *Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century*. Ashdown states that a conviction that a person can have only one identity does not fit into today’s world, and can be as well dangerous. He declares this kind of “mono identity,” to be part of nation-states period, which has already ended or is about to end. In his view today’s person can describe himself only through multiple identities, where he refers to a person being a Catholic in Northern Ireland, and being at the same time Irish and British, and he puts also in the same category of definitions someone that can be Serb and to be Bosnian. What is more, he writes that contemporary ‘nations’ are becoming more and more diverse, where he, as one can guess, aims at the immigrations to Western-European countries (Ashdown 2007: 105-6).⁴³ Therefore, also existence of the multiple identities are perceived to be the one that can hold the country together; one can have his ethnic identity as long he accepts as well the other supra-identity. Another aspect that is here interesting is that Ashdown uses word ‘nations’ that are becoming diverse, and not for instance societies.⁴⁴

⁴² He sees this social glue in developing civil society. The other assignment is to adopt law and political order according to EU standards, where Dayton constitution should be replaced with “a modern, less complex and less costly constitution” (Schmunk 2007: 171).

⁴³ Ashdown in one of his speeches mentions that “our task is not to submerge or destroy ethnic identities’ but to ‘build a state that protects those identities, celebrates them and harnesses them for everyone’s benefit’” (Speech by the High Representative Paddy Ashdown to the RS National Assembly, Banja Luka, 13 September 2002). However, it would be interesting to see what would be a reaction if he would mention his conviction in multiple identities.

⁴⁴ The language, terms being used could be said to be of vital importance. Ashdown writes that Serb and Croat flags in BiH continuously fly in the “Croat and Serb areas of Bosnia” (Ashdown 2007: 106), where he attaches ethnicity to territory. It is hard not to think that this kind of rhetoric does not influence the nationalist (exclusivist) rhetoric being in use by the radicals. Or when Ashdown uses expressions as “nationwide programs,” when he for instance talks about combining together single civil service (Ashdown 2007: 109). Here is the provocative question: what is meant by that nationwide program? It is obvious that here nation stands for state, however, this is inappropriate since in BiH exists three nations.

Talking about the ‘substance’ which should connect the society in BiH seems to be a *leit motif* in the rhetoric of the high international officials. This kind of rhetoric is present also in one of the speeches of the Senior Deputy High Representative Peter Bas-Backer, which was given at the 1st Balkan Mosaic Conference in BiH,

...there is still an obvious ‘lack of societal glue’ in BiH, the sort of ‘glue’ that is provided by widespread trust, expectations of good will and a general consensus about why and how the constituent peoples and the ‘others’ should share this land.”⁴⁵

In the Bas-Backer’s speech it is obvious that the ‘lack of societal glue’ that should hold BiH together is understood as the lack of acceptance of certain political actors to accept BiH as a state where they live. Therefore, it is not actually the identity that is the one that holds the country together but the actions of the political elite.

After the establishment of this point, it is interesting to note that rhetoric of Miroslav Lajčák, the latest High Representative is quite different from the discourse of most of the different from previous actors on this function. Lajčák does not talk about ‘social glue’ and the ‘lack of Bosnian identity’, but he refers only to the strict Dayton Agreement language, repeating that in BiH exist three constituent peoples (and ‘Others’), therefore taking very pragmatic stance to political situation in BiH.⁴⁶ He also instead of arguing that there is a problem in identity

⁴⁵ Remarks by Senior Deputy High Representative Peter Bas-Backer at the 1st Balkan Mosaic Conference in BiH, Sarajevo, 24 April 2007. Bas-Backer sees social glue rather in existence of “civil society.” “But society [original emphasis] means far more than concord among national groups and the politicians that represent them. It also means crosscutting alliances and shared interests among social classes, professional associations, businesspeople, trades unions, students, sportsmen and so-called ordinary citizens. This is what defines ‘civil society’. It is also why a vigorous, engaged and demanding civil society is so necessary. For the war destroyed more than lives and property. It also destroyed that ‘societal glue’ – the hope and the sense of belonging that makes any country more than the sum of its administrative parts: the villages, cities, cantons, and entities from which it is constructed and the peoples and citizens who inhabit them.”

⁴⁶ Usually he repeats that in BiH exist three constituent peoples in BiH when there are accusations from the media that some of the representatives of national groups were ignored in certain negotiations, usually this refers to Croats (see for instance Interview with Miroslav Lajčák, DANI, 17 August 2007).

speaks of the main problem in politics in BiH to be problem of nationalism, more exactly, using his word, “the national issue.”⁴⁷

To conclude, it is interesting that Lajčák is using the most non-ideological stance compared to other High Representatives, and avoids making any presumptions on what identity BiH needs in order to be a sustainable state. At this point I will not get in details of comparison of why individual high officials have the stance they use toward issues in BiH, but it is obvious that each of them have their own approach. Nevertheless, as we can see above, there exists certain thinking that ethnicity and diverse identities are problematic, and that there should be some effort put in order to ‘solve this issue.’ However, the question that arises from this analysis what is actually a social glue of one country that brings peoples in one state together? Actually, it could be said that the main problem lies in the political elite and their positions and not so much in the ‘ordinary’ people. So the main issue here seems to be, twisting the question around, what is a glue to hold national political elites together in one state?

3.2 FRAMING THE INTERNATIONAL IDEOLOGIES: NATION-BUILDING?

Here I wish to connect the rhetoric of high officials in BiH with the nature of international intervention itself, which had changed in 1990s from being used for security issues to being a tool for humanitarian purpose, including mediation in peace-settlements, giving aid to refugees and displaced persons, supervising demobilization and assisting in political accommodation (reconstruction/rebuilding) (Talentino 2002: 27). The latter political intervention is part of more general process referred to as ‘peace-building’ or ‘nation-building’, with aim to rebuild politics in such a way to prevent another out-bursting of

⁴⁷ See High Representative’s keynote address to Institute of the Danube discussion EU-Integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina – a Mission Impossible?, Vienna, 21 April 2008.

violence (ibid). Moreover, this process of so called ‘nation-building’ is different from the other forms of peace-building, standing for “defining, shaping, and facilitating the creation of new processes and organizations, rather than reforming existing structures” (Talentino 2002: 28).

Term peace-building was first introduced in 1992 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Former United Nations (UN) secretary-general, with argument that in order to make peacekeeping effective it has to secure the peace. According to his understanding, this process should have aim to rebuild government institutions after the conflict, however, this process expanded and now includes as well reforming economic and social institutions. BiH is the first case of such all-encompassing intervention (Talentino 2002: 28). Peace-building, beside being referred to as nation-building, is called sometimes also state-building. This project has been used also in 1993 in Cambodia, UN supervising the elections; in 1994 in Angola but failing to secure peace; in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to create multi-ethnic democracy; in Kosovo to protect Serbs from “victorious” Kosovars; in East Timor to create the government after leaving of Indonesian militias (Ignatieff 2003: 93). What I am interested here is why terms peace-building, state-building and nation-building are used interchangeably? If the process of state-building is also process of ‘nation-building’, therefore process of building a nation, what nation is being built in BiH? Or is this just a mere issue of terminology in English language?

Andrea Kathryn Talentino in her article “Intervention as Nation-Building: Illusion or Possibility,” while assessing successfulness of civil aspect of international intervention in BiH writes that this part of the mandate (beside military intervention) includes among other things “healing the social fabric of the nation to allow inter-ethnic cooperation” (2002: 33). What nation is then being exactly healed in BiH? However, we can understand from other sections of the article what precisely is meant with the notion of nation. Talentino describes nation-building as “building a state from scratch....” (2002: 29), therefore in her writing nation is

equated with a state. However, coming from the position that nation is actually meant to be a state (see Introduction) the discussion in Introduction on the terminology issue), then all groups are regarded to be only 'ethnic' groups, according to Smith's classification, and not as well nations. Therefore, in this process, what is rebuilt is the 'state-nation' (Tägil 1995).

In the light of rebuilding this 'state-nation' can be observed in strengthening the central institutions. For instance, introduction of common currency (Bosnian Convertible Mark) after the war when there were used different currencies along ethnic lines could be seen as an attempt of consolidation of Bosnian identity (see Coles 2006: 267). Coles summarizes Eric Helleiner's thoughts when she writes that "unique national currencies became a part of state building and unifying projects starting in the mid-nineteenth century. It was felt that linking territoriality and currency affairs would strengthen collective national identities" (2006: 267).

Intervention in BiH, as described by Talentino, is "seeking to create entirely new structures of interaction in all parts of government and society. International organizations are building not just peace but a nation, maligned though the idea may be" (2002: 28).

All this been said, there is a difference of building a government, as an institution, and building a nation. This 'state-building' or better to say 'nation-building' project conducted in today's post-conflict states can be compared with the situation in the immediate post-colonial period, when there was present instability of newly declared states.

Deutsch for instance writes about the difference between 'national growth' and 'nation-building', former suggesting a living object with its own stages of development, while latter implying a mechanical model, where nation is being built according to the plan (1963: 3). Emerson describes nation-building as a plan, a program, where effort has to be put in to build a state, for people to identify with it,

A superficial bridging of the gap between the new state and the traditional societies can, no doubt, be accomplished by the adoption of such ceremonial forms as drums, dancing, and the use of traditional dress... Insofar as programs are being translated into reality, the states are already being fully used by the dominant party leaders, who, uninhibited by scruples of laissez faire and free enterprise, see them as central instruments for nation-building and the attainment of national goals. (Emerson 1963: 115-6)

National-building project is said to be consisting also of 'national integration' process (Emerson 1963: 6) that could be once again explained in the framework of forming 'state-nation'. Deutsch describes this process in postcolonial context as "overcoming tribalism" or attachment to certain ethnic group. He sees this as a process that has several possible steps; first is ethnic group's denial of the membership in the nation and rise of a conflict against other groups that are actually their co-citizens. Then there is an acceptance of the state, when there are no more upheavals in the crisis situations. This follows with state counting on their "good citizenship" "even though" they have preserved their ethnic, cultural, linguistic affiliation and refuse to intermarry with other groups. Deutsch compares this national integration with British nation and its inclusion of English, Welsh and Scots, and with Swiss nation (Deutsch 1963: 6-7; see also Sokolović 1997). Deutsch therefore thinks of creation of state nation where identity exists in concentric circles or meta-contrast ratio (missing quote), saying,

In terms of political loyalty, all the diverse groups may be integrated solidly and dependently into a single nation or united in one amalgamated national state, federal or unitary. (Deutsch 1963: 7)

However, even more, Deutsch is of opinion that these different groups, once they constitute a single nation could become entirely assimilated to the majority concerning language and cultures, including here intermarriages between groups and development of closeness in personal relations, "until they have become indistinguishable as a group" (Deutsch 1963: 7).

Also Emerson writes that worldwide nations have come into existence from “diverse and hostile communities which have been brought into a common framework over the centuries, often through living together in a superimposed state” (Emerson 1963: 96). Therefore, both above authors, Deutsch and Emerson consider assimilation as one of the possibilities in the process of creating a nation.

According to Emerson, to build a feeling of national community in newly emerged states at least sizeable percent of people have to have sense that their interests are connected with such a state and them being its members. This building of a national feeling is about feeling that one lives in distinct entity from those that exist across state borders (Emerson 1963: 116). Here, nation-state is ideal, since it should “be made to appear as the source of good and desirable things” (Emerson 1963: 115).

Also for Strayer, nation-state is a model for building new states which he does not question. In the beginning of 1960’s he wrote that “(b)uilding a nation-state is a slow and complicated affair, and most of the political entities created in the past fifty years are never going to complete this process” (Strayer 1963: 25). For success of such a state he mentions four factors: (1) borders corresponding to existence of previous political unit, (2) where certain sense of identity has been developed through experience of co-existence in continuing political unit, (3) overlapping of political unit with existence of distinct culture, and (4) connection of indigenous political milieu with borrowed institutional forms from outside. Here it could be said that second factor corresponds to the notion of forming ‘state-nation’ and the third factor to formation of ‘nation-state’. Following from this, Strayer makes a very intriguing conclusion, when he says that non-existence of these factors would mean that such a state will not become nation and it would probably stop existing as a state (Strayer 1963: 25). Therefore, becoming a nation is a norm in Strayer’s writing, without which state cannot exist. Even more, what happened is that with colonialism old organizational order has been

mostly destroyed and nation-state had been taken as universal remedy for establishing political order. But at the same time in Europe idea of nation-state has started to be questioned (Friedrich 1963: 30).

Nevertheless, Friedrich writes that one cannot control political language, giving as an example how “tribal conglomerates” such as Congo and Nigeria and “cultural entities” as for instance India are referred to as nations, even though they are in “morphological” sense different than French or Italian nations (Friedrich 1963: 31). In this sense organization as is the United Nations coming from the (Western) European tradition “makes every constituent group legally, ideologically, and emotionally, a ‘nation’” (Friedrich 1963: 31). However, what happens, when one state, a member of United Nations has more than one nation?

CONCLUSION

The problem in BiH emerges when it is being framed through prism of nation-state, that is to say, how to incorporate more than one salient identity into one state in the European environment, where there is a tradition of framing a state only with one identity.

This thesis shows that if there exists more than one identity, as is the case in BiH, and there are political crises that play around the identity, the problem is usually not perceived in the actors of this crisis but in the identity. The issue here is that international actors perceive political clashes between national(ist) parties as being solved through existence of multiple identities, or in other words, through framing more group identities in one inclusive identity. This seems to be directed by a belief that in order state to function, there has to exist one supra-identity which creates loyalty to a state. However, why is it necessary to have one homogenous identity in order state to be functional? In the Bas-Backer's speech it is obvious that the 'lack of societal glue', which should hold BiH together is understood as the lack of acceptance of certain political actors to accept BiH as a state where they live. Therefore, it can be said that is not actually the identity that is the one that holds the country together but the actions of the political elite.

I suggest that international interventions in BiH, although being implemented in the different situations, first, in the form of stopping the war with negotiation plans (Cutilheiro Plan, Vance-Owen Peace Plan...) and the Dayton Agreement, and later on the intervention with 'state-building' project to reconstruct the state, are guided by the idea that society will have bigger possibility to achieve peace when territory is ruled with people of one identity, that is to say nation. Moreover, every state with one nation, exclusive or inclusive in its nature, can be, as I suggest, considered as a nation-state. Consequently, this concept of thinking in

‘conflict resolution’ carries implications of creating a ‘nation-state’, although inclusive in its nature, which on the other hand has been long rejected as an organizational principle in state-making. Therefore, with this thesis I address more generally the problem of adequate grasping the diversity of identities in the international solutions to ‘ethnic conflicts’.⁴⁸

As shown above, international intervention in its mediation to end the conflict in BiH recognized group identity – ethnicity – as the primary principle to reorganize (divide) the territory. This kind of ‘federalization’ of the territory institutionalized consequences of the war and even more, it could be said that allowing ethnicity as the principle for reorganizing the territory perpetuated the war itself with contributing to the psychological effect on ‘war-makers.’ Similar critique on international engagement in Bosnian war, however in general terms, is found also in Malcolm’s writing, when he says that destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be contributed also to “miscomprehension and fatal interference of the leaders of the West” (Malcolm 1994: 251).

The question here is whether it is necessary for the consociationalism ‘package’ to include also federal arrangement. Bieber writes that there exists a problem of fear of secession when ethnic group is territorialized with federal structure; the same fear is present also in other interethnic conflicts in the world, “especially when the demand for federalization is raised at times of high tensions” (2005: 62). Moreover,

Decentralized territorial units that are defined primarily in ethnic terms tend to accelerate the homogenization of these units or, in the case of Bosnia, delay the “re-mixing” of the population. The territorialization of ethnic identity follows the (flawed) assumption that ‘good fences make good neighbours’. The resulting segregation and minimal contact between the nations, however, rather reduces the political and emotional investment of the nations constituting the state and precludes a reconstruction of trust through interaction on an every-day basis. (Bieber 2005: 62)⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Methods of resolving so called ‘ethnic conflicts’ usually include demographic separation or partition, power-sharing, international engagement in state-building, suppression and reforming ethnic identities into wider inclusive civic identity (Kaufmann 1997: 444, 459; Kumar 1997: 22).

⁴⁹ More on the assumption of ‘good fences make good neighbors’ see Nina Caspersen. 2004. “Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? A Comparison of Conflict-Regulation Strategies in Postwar Bosnia,” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, no. 5, 2004, p. 569–588.

George Schöpflin also argues that federal or cantonal territorial arrangements as a solution in South-Eastern Europe worsen the situation, rather than improves it; as he says, “ethnic federations tend not to work well, because they generate aspirations for autonomy that cannot be fulfilled, together with distrust based on fear of secession” (2000: 274). Moreover, according to the same author, federal solution, as shown in practice, work only in mono-ethnic states, as for instance Austria or Germany (Schöpflin 2000: 275).⁵⁰

Moreover, it is important to note, here quoting Graham, who says that successfulness of Switzerland and Canada is not necessary consequence of consociationalism or cantonal practice (1995: 16). Therefore, there exist also other factors that should be considered when contemplating what exactly makes some states stable and others not. This has been already examined by some; according to Gagnon, in federalism, “partnership” is crucial, without it plural societies can “easily fail the test in time” (1993: 18). Also according to Franck federations fail if there is no ideological commitment from their leaders and as well “followers” (quoted from Burgess 1993: 108).

Furthermore, project of building civic state is until certain degree very intriguing; does it mean that there has to exist also a civic Bosnian nation with ethnic subgroups of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs for BiH to exists as a state?, an option that is being pushed forward by SDA and Party for BiH, but also by international officials. Similar stance where the existence of the state is perceived as conditioned with the existence of one nation can be found also in scholarly literature. Enforcement of so called ‘civic option’ as the only alternative for BiH seems to be connected to, as Bieber writes, the perception of nationalism by many scholars as a negative phenomenon, therefore being a phenomenon that should be overcome. Thus, also ethnic politics are seen as not welcome (Bieber 2001: 112). Danilo Zolo is for example of

⁵⁰ Alain C. Cairns picturesquely mentions that federalism can function only where “ethnic groups in question are territorially concentrated and thus capable of escaping from each other...” (quoted from Gagnon 1993: 23).

opinion that ethnic politics should be dismissed, seeing assimilation as the only alternative to it (quoted from Bieber 2001: 112). Also other authors view identities that could or should be influenced in 'post-conflict' societies. Ryan for instance puts forward idea that divisions will exists between ethnic groups, secondly, people get tired of violence, thirdly, individuals and societies can be changed, but also the fact that identities are not unchangeable (Ryan 1996: 160). As well O'Halloran writes that if the goal is to build multinational civic state, it is necessary to promote "ideational change concerning citizenship, ethnic identity, and place (homeland)" (O'Halloran 2005: 116). We can find similar stance in Fowkes's writing, when he talks about a great missed opportunity with regard to failure of Austro-Hungarian authorities to create Bosnian nation during their rule in BiH from 1878-1918, since this would "overcome the confessional divide and build a nation on a purely territorial basis" (Fowkes 2002: 61). Nevertheless, enforcing "civic option" seems not likely to bring remedy to BiH problems, since, as Bieber warns, negation of ethnic politics would be substituted by "the national conception of the predominant group, and not by anational politics" (Bieber 2001: 112-3).⁵¹

It can be said that democracy seeks to eliminate divide between groups referring to past experience when groups, which lived together were divided through hierarchical relationships. Therefore, democratic state required unifying criteria that became a nation. Because in most countries "Demos and Ethnos" coincide, making a political choice actually means making a "national choice." But in Western European countries because of the assimilation and other factors, "multinational" elements have disappeared, which actually hides this fact. Although this also had changed in recent decades with immigration flows to

⁵¹ Also Coles notes that "the conscious avoidance of ethnic marking does not liberate Bosnian peoples from dangerously reductionist representations. Rather, the conviction that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a single nation-state may also further the solidification and maintenance of singular representations" (Coles 2006: 259).

countries in Western Europe, which requires reconsideration of this overlap between Nation and Demos (Bieber 2001: 110-1).

Bieber writes that connection of ethnic politics in multinational societies, such as BiH, caused a conceptual crisis in the institutionalization of democracy in these kinds of societies. This author suggests that in cases such as BiH or Kosovo, ethnic diversity should not be viewed as the “root of evil” in ‘ethnic conflict,’ since it is not “ethnic politics per se” that is cause of such conflict but “abuse and instrumentalization of ethnic politics of personal power, absolute political predominance and hatred” (Bieber 2001: 118).

The wars in Bosnia and in Kosovo should not be seen as the remnants of a delayed 19th century war, but as the embodiment of the challenges democracy and ethnic diversity pose to European and global societies for the year to come. (Bieber 2001: 118).

All this said, this thesis opens up the question of constituting a country without a titular nation. The problem seems to be the principle (or conviction) that every state has to have one identity as a glue to keep state together, as Yugoslavia had to have Yugoslavs and Britain has to have British. But, is it possible to have a state and to not have one name for its people, a common identity? What else is the social glue? Should this social glue have to have one name? It is interesting what Ashdown stated about forming loyalty to state. During his mandate as High Representative in BiH, there were three events which “created more sense of pride in and attachment to Bosnia” in comparison to all the efforts of the international community in BiH. These events were winning the Oscar (film maker Danis Tanović for the film *No man’s land*), beating Denmark in the European Championship in football, and the ceremony of opening the newly reconstructed Old Bridge in Mostar that was broadcasted on world television sets (Ashdown 2007: 106-7). Therefore, it seems that already events in the frame of one state connect people together and forms ‘the loyalty to state’.

To sum up, Lovrenović writes that Bosnian-Herzegovinian social and historical situation is hardly interpretable (2001: 217), when trying to explain it through the lens of “any exclusively political, national way of feeling and thinking; within that framework Bosnia is and remains an insoluble enigma and permanent headache” (ibid: 225). From this derives the question, posed by many, whether BiH should be considered as an ‘integral entity’ or as a ‘mechanical sum of nations’ (see Lovrenović 2001; Šašić 2007; Mahmutćehajić 1998). As explicated by Mahmutćehajić, according to the first argumentation, BiH is understood as “organic, historical unity,” and in second one it is said to be “‘unnatural establishment’ consisting of multiple separated parts” (1998: 9). Argumentations coming from these two understandings have implications on (un)acknowledgment of uniqueness of BiH as an entity, what actually equals with recognizing BiH as a state. Plans that come from the perspective of unity of BiH, following here Mahmutćehajić’s explanation, are more “connected to emotions than to rational insights into strengthening Bosnian-Herzegovinian society and Bosnian-Herzegovinian state” (1998: 9). However, according to the understanding of BiH as an ‘unnatural entity’, Bosnian territory should be divided into two parts and joined to Croatia and Serbia (ibid). Coming from this, there exists a dilemma on if BiH is to be perceived as an ‘integral entity,’ then it should have a ‘substance’ to hold it together, an identity.

Of similar opinion were also Austro-Hungarian officials, when BiH came under their administration in 1878. At that time, national identifications of Croat and Serb have already been in use, while national identification of the Muslims was the least developed (Ramet quoted from Velikonja 1998: 163). In order to safeguard stability, Austro-Hungarian authorities focused on not allowing the spread of national separatism, and saw a solution in forming a feeling of Bosnian nationhood (Lovrenović 2001: 149-50). With this aim, Benjamin Kállay, head of the administration, tried to formulate the existing spontaneous feeling of

Bosnian identity in national terms (ibid). However, this policy is said to be failed since it could not reverse already started process of shaping separate national identifications (ibid).

Here Lovrenović notes, that Kállay's project of building a Bosnian nation, failed not because of idea of 'Bosniansm' on which it was based, but because of attempt to counterbalance existing national identities with introducing the same political model with creating a new nation (Lovrenović 2001: 225). Similarly, also the 'First Session of ZAVNOBiH' (Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of BiH) during the Second World War, focused on integral character of BiH, however, it recognized also existing national ideologies, saying that BiH is at the same time "Serbian and Croatian and Muslim" (Lovrenović 2001: 225).⁵² However, Lovrenović criticizes this approach that existed in Yugoslavia toward BiH, since it does not overcome framework of summing together national identifications through or-or-or/and-and-and. Because of this ideology, as Lovrenović writes, the only solution for BiH can be only as recognizing it as a Bosniak, Croat or Serb land (2001: 226). Why is this so, is nicely explained by another author, Zdravko Grebo, who points out the issue which aroused with collapse of Yugoslavia, since all successor states were formed as nation-states, the solution for BiH, since it cannot be become nation-state, it should not exist at all (2007: 281), at the same time illustratively emphasizing, "If we invest supernatural energies and employ out best talents, we cannot be a nation state or a nation which will have its state" (ibid).

However, not being possible to frame BiH as having one nation, does not mean that authors argue that there is no such thing as 'Bosnian'. According to Lovrenović, term 'Bosnian' should not be understood in the sense of national, regional or territorial classification (2001: 227), but as a "way of culture" (ibid: 228), where the "content," as he calls it, lies in the "permanent cultural interaction" (ibid: 227).⁵³ Actually, what Lovrenović does is that he

⁵² On the basis of ZAVNOBiH BiH was incorporated into Yugoslavia.

⁵³ Lovrenović suggests that the past distinction between 'high' and 'folk' culture, which existed until mid 19th century in BiH, can be telling of reality in Bosnian society. He explains that in high culture were present three

recognizes 'Bosnia' as a unique area, even though he eradicates the notion of Bosnia as an 'integral entity', or as he says, representing "drowning [of national identifications] in a new (supra) national construction" (2001: 227). His definition of 'Bosnia' is actually very interesting,

In this process of interaction as a constant (its name is Bosnia) national cultures participate as variables, retainining their special identities and exposing themselves to continuous culture-creating relations of receiving and giving. (Lovrenović 2001: 227-8).

Lovrenović therefore finds the uniqueness of BiH in the fact it provides a frame for the different national groups to meet and share experience. There are also others that share similar opinion; for instance Bosnian Franciscan, Luka Markešić, quotes war time president of BiH, Alija Izetbegović, who stated in front of the UN parliament in New York in 1994, that Bosnia is not just a country but it is an idea, moreover, a faith that people of different religions, nationalities and cultural religions can live together (1995: 170).⁵⁴

These statements are clearly emotional with implied wish that framework of BiH would be preserved which enables possibility of the interaction of different groups. Nevertheless, with accepting Lovrenović's definition above, there is no more need for engineering with the identities. This also diminishes the question 'what' is the glue that holds BiH together.

cultural units, being isolated from each other, but in folk culture existed common area where they blended and were shared (Lovrenović 2001: 100). The prime example is said to be the notion of 'komšilik' (good neighborliness) (ibid). Lovrenović concludes from this, that "mechanisms and laws that govern this cultural sphere, (are) reflecting the triple cultural and religious schism in a completely different way from the high culture" (2001: 224).

⁵⁴ Franciscans in BiH are known for active fight during the war to preserve the whole BiH of all three peoples (see Markešić 1995).

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
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APPENDIX




Picture 1: SFR Yugoslavia

(Malcolm Noel. 1994. *Bosnia: A short history*. London : Macmillan)




Picture 2: The Vance-Owen Plan

(Tindemans, Leo et. al., eds. 1996. *Unfinished peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*. Berlin: Aspen Institute and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)




Picture 3: The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan

(Tindemans, Leo et. al., eds. 1996. *Unfinished peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*. Berlin: Aspen Institute and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)



Picture 4: The Contact Group Plan

(Tindemans, Leo et. al., eds. 1996. *Unfinished peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*. Berlin: Aspen Institute and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)



Picture 5: The Dayton Agreement

(Tindemans, Leo et. al., eds. 1996. *Unfinished peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*. Berlin: Aspen Institute and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)