

CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY

THE LIMITS OF RHETORICAL ENTRAPMENT:  
NATO ENLARGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

BY

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SUBMITTED TO

CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER  
OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES

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BUDAPEST, HUNGARY

5 JUNE 2008

16 000 WORDS

## Abstract

NATO enlargement has been recognized as the most successful policy the Alliance has embarked on since the end of the Cold War. The enlargement has been subject to many theoretical explanations aiming to explain the driving force behind the decision to expand the Alliance and extend invitations to former adversaries. Rationalist and constructivists theories of international relations confirmed to be puzzled by NATO's decision to pursue eastern enlargement. The following work employs the "rhetorical action" conceptual lens, which explains the enlargement puzzle for the first and the second round of NATO expansion. However, the third round of enlargement questions the relevance of the "rhetorical action" and places this theoretical framework in the same group of theories that fail to fully explain the enlargement policy of the Alliance. This thesis will first examine how the argumentative strategies employed by the proponents to enlarge to candidate countries at the 1997 Madrid Summit and the 2002 Prague Summit succeeded in persuading opponents of enlargement to uphold to their commitments. Secondly, this thesis shows how 'rhetorical action' failed to influence the enlargement decisions taken at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. The third round of enlargement and the outcome brings the debate back to rationalist conceptual lens where the rational preferences dominate accession decisions of the Alliance by placing the emphasis on preserving Alliance unity. In conclusion, this thesis argues that the rational calculations are in the center of NATO's enlargement decision making policy

## Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Erin Jenne. Her direction and support is the most appreciated. Also, I would like to express my appreciation to the wonderful members of the International Staff in NATO HQ Brussels, especially Mr. Gabriele Cascone. All of them have been more than helpful in supporting my research for my MA thesis.

Also, I would like to thank my boss General Charles Baumann, who has supported and encouraged my critical thinking. Thank you Sir!!!

Finally, words alone cannot express the support and understanding that I had from my family during the past year. Thank you for being always there for me.

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## Introduction

*“As I have said, NATO expansion is no longer a question of whether, but when and how. And the expansion will not depend of the appearance of a new threat in Europe. It will be an instrument to advance security and stability for the entire region.”<sup>1</sup>*

President Bill Clinton, Warsaw, July 1994

The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the post Cold War period is one of the main drivers defining the international politics within the new emerging Europe. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has portrayed the enlargement as a “Major step towards a long-standing NATO objective: a Europe free, united and secure in peace, democracy and common values.”<sup>2</sup> The alliance has embarked on a project of erasing the dividing lines of Europe using the momentum and unique opportunity to promote security through enlargement in the entire Euro-Atlantic region. To that end, 1997 Madrid Summit has brought in three new member states--Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland--and the 2002 Prague Summit the following seven members--Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and the three Baltic states. NATO's

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<sup>1</sup> "Clinton Hints NATO Would Defend East From Attack." International Herald Tribune 13 Jan. 1994.

<sup>2</sup> “Enhancing Security and Extending Stability through NATO Enlargement,” NATO publication, [http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement\\_eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/enlargement_eng.pdf)

Open door policy, which is founded on the provisions of the Washington Treaty, stipulates that membership is open to any “European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.”<sup>3</sup> Following the principles to which the Alliance has committed itself and faced with the third enlargement round after the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has opened its doors at the 2008 Bucharest Summit to Croatia and Albania--but closed the door to Macedonia. The outcome of the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit creates room for debate on the overall enlargement policy, including the ‘why’ and ‘how’<sup>4</sup> questions that the ‘Study of NATO Enlargement’ has tackled in order to explain the rationale behind NATO enlargement to post-communist Europe. The decision from the last round of enlargement acquires even greater significance, not only on the eve of forthcoming enlargement, but also for future enlargements, NATO’s positioning when dealing with partners and future aspirant countries.

### ***Literature Review and Contribution***

The scholarly literature on NATO enlargement attempts to explain the decision to enlarge by addressing the process from several different angles. The enlargement has inspired academics to produce an extensive literature aiming to theoretically frame the enlargement phenomenon. However, the studies produced so far have proven too weak to theoretically encompass the changing dynamic of the process as a whole, instead

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<sup>3</sup> NATO. “Enhancing Security and Extending Stability through NATO Enlargement”.

<sup>4</sup> NATO. “NATO Handbook”, *NATO Public Diplomacy Division*, 2006, p. 185

focusing on single cases<sup>5</sup> or specific aspects of enlargement. The existing literature mainly focuses on why aspirant countries wanted to become NATO members and how and why NATO arrived at the decision to proceed with the enlargement process as well as what shaped the decision and the selection of the new member states.

Explanations that grounded in the rational school of thought explain why the candidate countries aspire to join the Alliance, while failing to explain why NATO decided to expand, notwithstanding the negative balance of expected costs and benefits from enlargement.<sup>6</sup> Andrew Kydd, using a rationalist approach to explain enlargement, has offered an alternative account that explains NATO's decision to enlarge as a function of promises of candidate country compliance, which are made credible by increasing the price of admission to the club.<sup>7</sup> In other words, the states that are ready to pay the price set by NATO in the form of extensive membership criteria will obtain the trust of the Alliance, hence paving the way to admission. Furthermore, Kydd explains the material benefits the Alliance acquires from enlargement. His explanation draws on the benefits that the newly admitted countries will bring to the Alliance in terms of fostering cooperation in Eastern Europe and erasing the dividing lines in Europe.

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<sup>5</sup> Mark Kramer, "NATO and the Baltic States and Russia: A Framework for Sustainable Enlargement", *International Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4.(2002)

<sup>6</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, "*The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*", (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.37 – 51

<sup>7</sup> Andrew Kydd, "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement", *International Organization* 55, 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 801-828

Contrary to the above, Frank Schimmelfenning provides arguments that demonstrate the limits of the rationalist theoretical frameworks. Schimmelfenning argues repeatedly that NATO enlargement has gone beyond the instrumental pursuit of egoistic interests within the international system. He founds his view on constructivist approaches. According to Schimmelfenning, NATO is an “organization of an international community of values and norms”<sup>8</sup> that engages in a process of “international socialization”<sup>9</sup> in order to socialize the candidate countries with the community adopted norms and values and facilitate their internalization. Schimmelfenning has attributed NATO eastern enlargement to the success of this exercise. States that have proven to adhere to the same values have been accepted as members of the Alliance.

Kydd, in contrast, argues against the relevance of constructivist theoretical lens for understanding NATO enlargement, stating that the constructivist approach is not sufficiently convincing since the socialization and adoption of the above-mentioned norms and values have not silenced the vociferous objections to extending invitations to new members.<sup>10</sup> The features of the third enlargement round, as we will see in this thesis, lend empirical support to the rationalist arguments employed by Kydd.

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<sup>8</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO's Enlargement to the East: An Analysis of Collective Decision-making”, EAPC-NATO Individual Fellowship Report 1998-2000, <http://www.ifs.tu-darmstadt.de/pg/regorgs/regorgh.htm>, p. 7,8

<sup>9</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, “Introduction: The impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern European States – Conceptual and Theoretical Issues,” in *Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International organizations on the Central and East European States*, edited by Ronald H. Linden (Oxford 2002), p.7

<sup>10</sup> Andrew Kydd, “Trust Building, Trust Breaking...”p. 806



Regional security and stability are also elements that shape the enlargement preferences of the Alliance. Boyka Stefanova and Jonathan Eyal elaborate on the security based assumptions that feed the debate in the literature on enlargement relevant for this thesis. These assumptions build on the importance of the regional security and stability, which are mirrored in the Alliance's enlargement policy. Utilizing a rationalist framework, Stefanova attributes NATO expansion to the political leverage the new members would bring to the Alliance, explaining in that manner the robust enlargement of 2004. Jonathan Eyal builds on the same assumptions and places the focus on NATO objectives to ensure security and stability on the old continent by erasing the dividing lines and preventing the emergence of new divisions and security alliances.<sup>11</sup> Enlargement to post-communist Europe emerged as a policy that was thought to ensure and maintain stability and security in Europe. However, NATO's quest for security and stability is not a sufficient explanation of NATO expansion when taking into account the outcomes of the 2008 NATO summit.

Notwithstanding the fact that all these explanations offer important insights into NATO enlargement, new developments in the ongoing enlargement continue to challenge existing accounts of NATO expansion.. Such is the case with the "rhetorical action" theoretical explanation provided by Frank Schimmelfenning, which successfully accounts for the first and second post Cold War enlargements. The scholars, to which I have referred earlier, have all touched upon aspects that play a significant role in the

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<sup>11</sup> Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision", *International Affairs* " Vol. 73, No. 4, 1997, pp. 695-719, p. 703

“rhetorical action” theoretical explanation of NATO enlargement, where the candidate countries, by adopting argumentative strategies based on the norms, values, security and stability goals and objectives have entrapped the Alliance to follow through with their stated ideals of enlargement.

This thesis challenges the ‘rhetorical action’ argument by using the third wave of enlargement to show why rhetorical action explained CEECs enlargement and cannot explain SEECs where Macedonia was not invited. Macedonia has engaged in just as effective argumentation as the previous aspirants, but did not succeed in getting admitted. Thus, rhetorical entrapment, which Schimmelfenning used to explain the first two waves of enlargement, proves inoperable for explaining the most recent wave. Given that Macedonia fulfills the criteria for NATO membership just as much as the other two countries, yet failed to gain admission where the other two, Albania and Croatia succeeded, suggests that candidate countries have much less control over the accession decisions than previously thought. The decision to enlarge does not appear to be the result of a comprehensive enlargement strategy, but rather purely rationalist preferences of the NATO member countries at any given time. The third round of enlargement thus undermines the rhetorical entrapment theory of NATO expansion, and instead suggests that NATO is an organization through which the member states pursue their rational interests with regard to the eastern countries. The rhetorical action-based arguments from the third round of enlargement provide a different case where rational based assumptions prove triumphant over the community upheld norms and values.

This thesis therefore will challenge the the ‘rhetorical action’ suggested by Frank Schimmelfenning as an explanation for eastern NATO enlargement. Considering that the scope conditions of this research cover the period of NATO enlargement after the end of the Cold War, Schimmelfenning has left a gap which will be the main focus and contribution that my thesis will bring to the existing literature. He has attributed NATO enlargement to the strategically used rhetoric of the NATO officials as well as the actions of proponents of enlargement and candidate countries that have shamed and bargained with the Alliance over membership. As a result, NATO has become entangled in its own promoted norms, values and criteria, which candidate countries adopted with the expectation of NATO membership.<sup>12</sup> This latest wave of accession not only presents a puzzle for the rationalists, as argued earlier, but also for the constructivists including Schimmelfenning’s “rhetorical action.” ‘Rhetorical action’ and the strategic use of arguments that builds on norms and values have successfully intervened in community institution such as NATO and have brought in the forefront the 1999 and 2004 NATO enlargement. The 2008 NATO enlargement provides a case where the outcomes of the bargaining and shaming have functioned differently than expected. NATO recognized the equivalent status of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia at the 2008 Bucharest Summit in the processes of reform and transformation as well as adoption of western norms and values, but extended an invitation to only to Albania and Croatia. The outcome of the Summit

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<sup>12</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*. p. 263

not only challenge the ‘rhetorical action’ approach to enlargement, but also raise questions as to what drives the NATO decision making process.

In making this argument, it is essential to understand the requirements for accession that NATO has put forward to candidate countries. The research question of my thesis takes these requirements into consideration since they are the foundation on which the candidates have based their arguments in support of gaining membership in the Alliance. Rhetoric based on the requirements, values, norms, NATO’s past commitments and treatment of the former applicants and the rhetorical entrapment have all failed in the case of Macedonia’s attempt to gain accession to NATO. Why has rhetorical action failed in this case? And Why wasn’t the Alliance rhetorically entrapped in the commitment it made to this candidate country?

These questions indicate that NATO enlargement has been insufficiently analyzed. Different preferences have been in the background of the first and the second round of enlargement. The outcome of the third round brings to the forefront a different set of preferences, where the politics have dominated strategic concerns. Developing a clear understanding of the preferences that drive enlargement over all three waves might help NATO develop a more consistent method of enlargement, while informing aspirant countries how to position themselves in order to gain accession to NATO. Having identified this gap, I hypothesize that regardless of whether NATO has adopted a standardized approach toward enlargement in the form of community upheld norms and

values, the aspirant countries would have not been able to ensure their admission based on their own efforts to meet the standards of NATO accession or by adopting effective argumentative strategies to gain membership. That is because NATO enlarges when and where it has a perceived interest to do so; it is not a decision automatically triggered by compliance with a set of standards. Additionally, I argue that NATO, as an international institution, expands on the basis of egoistic preferences of NATO member countries which are satisfying their instrumentally driven goals. This confirms my hypothesis that regardless of what the countries do, NATO will decide to expand by following the instrumentally driven member states egoistic preferences.

### ***Methodology and Structure of the Thesis***

My research will be based on analysis and comparison of NATO documents, media publications, public speeches, official meetings, and interviews I have collected and conducted during my research trip to NATO HQ in Brussels. Interviews with NATO officials and International Staff (IS) who have been directly involved in the NATO enlargement have proved to be the main tool for gathering data on the decision-making behind NATO enlargement.

I have started my analysis with documents such as the Study on NATO Enlargement and the Membership Action Plan which identify the requirements for admission. I have supplemented this information with interviews with experts who have

drafted NATO official documents facilitated the preparation stages for the candidate countries. The scholarly literature has helped me to select the theoretical framework that will support my empirical data. Analysis and comparison of the available documents with the conducted interviews that explain the principal enlargement decisions for each of the rounds individually will enable me to infer what accounts for the decisions made at certain points of time. In-depth discourse analysis that followed the enlargement processes in all three cases will serve as a basis to compare the official rhetoric.

For the purpose of my research I formulate a null hypothesis that I test in the light of the three waves of NATO enlargement. My null hypothesis states that eastern enlargement is driven by candidate countries' compliance with the standards NATO has given for membership including social rules, norms, values and various policy requirements. My working hypothesis is that enlargement is the result of NATO members' individual and self-centered preferences and bargaining power.

The first chapter of my thesis provides the theoretical framework – 'rhetorical action' that I employ in my analysis. In order to test the rhetorical action premises, I draw on the publicly available data and interpret the argumentative strategies contained in the public speeches, on the basis of which I build my study of the NATO enlargement policy outcomes. The second chapter provides a summary and background of the enlargement process including the requirements the Alliance imposes on candidate countries. The third chapter deals with the enlargement in CEECs and elaborate the impact of rhetorical

action on enlargement. Chapter four will use the outcomes of the latest 2008 NATO Summit to challenge the theory of ‘rhetorical action’ as something that can explain NATO enlargement. The conclusion of my thesis presents an overview of the NATO instrumentally driven preferences to enlargement.

## Chapter I: Theoretical Framework - Rhetorical Action

This Chapter explores the aspects which are at the core of the ‘rhetorical action’ and rhetorical entrapment debate. Rhetorical action provides the connection between the egoistic interest driven preferences on the one side and norm compliance outcomes on the other that stemmed the enlargement process. In order to elaborate the normative outcome i.e. enlargement, this chapter will explain the premises that constitute the “rhetorical action” conceptual framework. Schimmelfenning describes rhetorical action as a “strategic use of norm and rule-based arguments,”<sup>13</sup> which intervenes by connecting the instrumentally driven egoistic preferences with the liberal community image upheld by NATO.

Two aspects play pivotal role in the “rhetorical action” concept. The first aspect relates to the community upheld common values and norms, while the second is the rhetorical action itself, where the rhetorical actors strategically chose community values and rules - related arguments in order to pursue their objectives and ensure compliance. When these two aspects are put together, the rhetorical action becomes a “strategic use and exchange of arguments to persuade the other actors to act according to one’s preferences.”<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 1, (Winter, 2001), p. 48

<sup>14</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*. p. 5



In order to be effective, “rhetorical action” maneuvering builds on an established and institutionalized international community that has committed to uphold commonly developed identity, norms, values and rules. Moreover, it requires firmly fixed “focal points,”<sup>15</sup> which are established, recognized, accepted, internalized and practiced within the international community. The collective identity of all the members in the international community is developed through loyalty pledges, commitments to mutual requirements, shared values, and ideologies and consequently is usually mirrored in public statements in the form of rhetorical commitments. This process creates “identity markers”<sup>16</sup> which the rhetorical actors can appeal to when eliciting congruence with the features that portray the community identity.

The second pillar of the rhetorical action concept is the strategic action, which plays an essential role within the entire rhetorical exercise. Habermas has categorized strategic action as a distinct success-oriented and purposeful social action where interaction between actors equals pure influence (1984, 84-101, 286-87).<sup>17</sup> If we make distinction between the proponents and opponents of the enlargement process by labeling the latter as “brakemen” and the former as “drivers,” the strategic action undertaken by the proponents strives to influence and ensure compliance with the “driver’s” preferred

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<sup>15</sup> James Johnson, “Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory and Rational Choice,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1, (Mar., 1993), p. 81

<sup>16</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 4, (Dec., 2001), p. 500

<sup>17</sup> Jurgen Habermas, “The Theory of Communicative Action”(Volume 1. Boston: Beacon Press 1984) in the work of James Johnson, *Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory and Rational Choice*, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1, (Mar., 1993), p.75

policy choices. This "linguistically mediated strategic action,"<sup>18</sup> builds on the above elaborated collective identity and their rhetorical commitments and by selecting argumentative strategies in support of their objectives influence the opponents to change their behavior. As Schimmelfenning argues, the behavior is changed in line with previously established identity markers that are founded on past commitments and rhetoric of community members.<sup>19</sup>

This is accomplished through a causal mechanism and a form of "persuasion game"<sup>20</sup> where through moral appeal,<sup>21</sup> values and norms assert themselves against self-interested preferences and change uncooperative conduct. The subjects of influence respond by changing their behavior because of the discomfort they feel from pursuing policies that are not in line with previously established identity markers. The rhetorical actors develop argumentative strategies that refer to identities, norms and values that are accepted and recognized in a given community in order to, firstly, justify their claims, and secondly, exercise influence and persuade the "brakemen" to respect their past commitments and respond accordingly.<sup>22</sup> The potential for discomfort on the part of the actors that are shamed, by being reminded of the values, norms and rules they have committed to, strengthens the persuasive power of the rhetorical action. Consequently, when all these arguments are brought to the fore, the rhetorical commitment leads to

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<sup>18</sup> Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (Volume 1. Boston: Beacon Press.1984.) in the work of James Johnson, "Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory and Rational Choice," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1, (Mar., 1993), p. 80

<sup>19</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments". p. 500

<sup>20</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action ..." p. 62

<sup>21</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments". p. 500

<sup>22</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*". p. 193

rhetorical entrapment.<sup>23</sup> Even minor shifts in the direction to which the actors have previously committed and which differs from the identity markers, may result in discomfoting inconsistencies<sup>24</sup> if called into question by the proponents. Using rule based rhetorical arguments, as a result, can silence opposition to certain policies and induce compliance.<sup>25</sup>

The developed “putative status markers”<sup>26</sup> and its shared understanding by the actors in the system is the prerequisite for success of rhetorical action. Nonetheless, within a system of shared community markers, the actors may instrumentally pursue their own interests and egoistic preferences, which are not in line with the community adopted and practiced norms and values. Regardless of the fact that these actors belong to the community, their preferences are not necessarily tailored to the system itself.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, they still develop egoistic and material interests. In other words, they adopt competing interests and at times when they face specific decision-making situations, these actors “often develop and instrumentally pursue egoistic, material interests that compete with their commitment to the community values and norms.”<sup>28</sup> This window of opportunity is used by the rhetorical actors, whose objective is to pursue certain policy that is in line with the community defined norms and values, in order to advance their preferred outcomes.

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<sup>23</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action...” p. 66

<sup>24</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”. p. 500

<sup>25</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*,” p. 193

<sup>26</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”. p. 502

<sup>27</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms...”p. 62-63

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. 62-63

In line with the above are two aspects that are of great concern for the community members. The expectations they face in terms of what they stand for and represent as a community lie on one side, while on the other is the concern about their reputation and good image. The expectations-related features is consistent with Kratochwil's argument that "Saying something is doing something."<sup>29</sup>

The second aspect, which is also of great concern to community members, is the question of their image and reputation. In an organization, such as NATO, the community representatives are highly concerned about the image they project as well as their reputation. Cultivating a trustworthy image and reputation gives legitimacy to the actions and preferences of the community members. Consequently, the question of legitimacy is the driving mechanism behind norm compliance decisions of the community members.<sup>30</sup> What appears to be in the core of the norm compliance behavior are the "private material benefits of future exchange,"<sup>31</sup> which actors strive to ensure in order to facilitate future interactions as legitimate and credible economic agents. Therefore, the obstacles that may create discrepancy and prevent "normative conduct and instrumental success"<sup>32</sup> in future actions may undermine community members' legitimacy as a result of the absence of

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<sup>29</sup> Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs*, (Cambridge University Press 1989), p. 7-8

<sup>30</sup> Kreps, D. M. (1992) "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory." In *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*, edited by J. E. Alt and K. A. Shepsle, pp. 90-143. (London: Cambridge University Press) in the work of: Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 4, (Dec., 2001) p. 490

<sup>31</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments". p. 490

<sup>32</sup> Axel Honneth edited by Charles W. Wright, "Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on a Theory of Recognition" in *The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in Social and Political Philosophy*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 258

recognition. Congruence with community rules thus is driven by their objective to “maintain the impression that they are living up to the many standards by which they and their products are judged.”<sup>33</sup> This creates room for the rhetorical actors to advance their preferred outcomes.

### **1.1 Elements of rhetorical action and social influence**

The elements that rhetorical action builds on include: strategic use, arguments, shared ideas and persuasion. Strategic use of arguments entails instrumental selection of the most persuasive arguments within the context of the prevailing beliefs within the institutional environment. The arguments are composed of three central elements: “claims,” “grounds,” and “warrants.”<sup>34</sup> The *Claims* are the preferred outcomes - enlargement, *grounds* are the community rules and norms and *warrants* take the form of past commitments.

Shaming is one of the channels through which rhetorical actors assert social influence. Johnston labels this process “pro-norm behavior”<sup>35</sup> that elicits compliance. Schimmelfenning defines shaming as “public exposure to illegitimate goals and behaviors,” which requires previous identification with the community rules, norms and values and previous public support and commitment to these identity markers. Shaming

<sup>33</sup> Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, (Penguin Group 1959) p. 243

<sup>34</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*. p. 202

<sup>35</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” p. 499

is effective because community members are egoistic actors who tend to avoid shaming and social sanctions,<sup>36</sup> and therefore “are motivated by a desire to avoid the sense of shame or social disgrace that commonly befalls those who break widely accepted rules.”<sup>37</sup> This mechanism is used by rhetorical actors in situations when community members may adopt divergent preferences that reflect their self-interest and not the community adopted preferences.

A successful shaming strategy will make the subjects strive to avoid “painful feelings to protect their image and to save their face”<sup>38</sup> and stay in line with past positions and commitments. As a result, the community is entrapped and entangled in its own words and commitments and in order to protect its credibility and reputation is forced to comply.

Rhetorical action and rhetorical entrapment may appear to explain NATO enlargement in the post Cold War context. Rhetorical actors appear to have been successful in pursuing rhetorical strategies and in using channels of social influence in order to ensure compliance of the Alliance. The next chapter presents the requirements for NATO membership, based on which the candidate countries have built their argumentative strategies.

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<sup>36</sup> Batson, C. D. (1987) “Prosocial Motivation: Is It Ever Truly Altruistic? Advances in Experimental Social Psychology” 20:65-122 in the work of Alastair Iain Johnston, “*Treating International Institutions as Social Environments*”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 4, (Dec., 2001), pp. 487-515, p. 502

<sup>37</sup> Oran Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables.” *In Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, edited by J. N. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempel, (1992) pp.160-194. (Cambridge University Press). In the work of Alastair Iain Johnston, “*Treating International Institutions as Social Environments*,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 4, (Dec., 2001), pp. 487-515, p. 502

<sup>38</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, “The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric”. p. 197

## Chapter II: Requirements for NATO Membership

The Alliance has developed a set of criteria to select and evaluate the candidate countries aiming to join NATO. The framework includes rules, norms and values the Alliance has identified as requirements that candidate countries must meet prior to admission. The membership requirements are stipulated in number of official documents and present NATO's commitment to the aspirant countries.

The main requirements that countries must meet in order to gain NATO membership are grouped in three categories, covering political, military and economic preconditions. Each of the categories consists of a subset of targets that countries have to meet in order to qualify for membership. Functional democracy and mature political system, democratic civil-military relations and equal treatment of minorities fall into the political category. Functional market economy is in the economic category while the military contribution, compatibility and military interoperability with NATO member states are in the military category.<sup>39</sup> Considering the high importance of stability and security to the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area, great emphasis has been placed on the peaceful settlement of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes and military

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<sup>39</sup> Thomas S. Szayna, "NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping," Rand 2001, p. 68  
[http://rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1243/MR1243.ch4.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1243/MR1243.ch4.pdf) accessed on May 5,

contribution to peace-keeping and collective defense missions that strengthen the Alliance and its role in international security.<sup>40</sup>

Furthermore, the Alliance represents a community organization with members that share liberal norms and values in their domestic and international conduct. The “Study on NATO Enlargement” from 1995 also addressed the main prerequisites for membership. “States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.”<sup>41</sup> In other words, the Alliance attempts to influence the aspirants by reiterating the Community values, which when formed as requirements for admission, will take precedence over competing domestic values.<sup>42</sup> This is how the enlargement policy contributes to dissemination of the community identity markers and expands its membership.

The values of the Alliance are reflected in the basic treaties. The treaties describe a community of like-minded democracies in the trans-Atlantic region. The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty signed in 1949 stipulates: “They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles

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<sup>40</sup> NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “*NATO Handbook*”, 2006, p. 185  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm>

<sup>41</sup> NATO Publication, “*Study on NATO Enlargement*,” September 1995,  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9502.htm>

<sup>42</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*” p. 73



of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”<sup>43</sup>

NATO adopted an exclusive strategy to communicate its norms, values and rules to candidates. This strategy is based on an intensified process of socialization with the active involvement of the Alliance. The Alliance on one side communicates its fundamental rules, values and norms to the aspirants and on the other expects advanced level their implementation in the domestic system of the candidate

For the purposes of supporting the above mentioned strategy, NATO has initiated an ongoing dialogue with the candidate countries. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was created in 1991 and later replaced with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), is designed as a joint forum to facilitate the process of multilateral consultation and cooperation. Partnership for Peace (PfP), as part of the above mentioned exclusive strategy, was launched in 1994 to influence the aspirants through bilateral cooperation.<sup>44</sup> PfP was designed as mechanism that would serve as a period of transition and “probationary stage”<sup>45</sup> wherein the candidates would grow into “producers as well as consumers of security”<sup>46</sup> It is a channel through which the Alliance teaches the candidates about the rules, values, norms and practices that the community

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<sup>43</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>

<sup>44</sup> NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “*NATO Handbook*”, 2006, p. 186-187, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm>

<sup>45</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*,” p. 93

<sup>46</sup> Robert E. Hunter, “Enlargement: Part of a Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe,” *NATO Review* 43, no. 3 (1995): 3-8, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1995/9503-1.htm>

members uphold.<sup>47</sup> Although PfP is primarily intended to integrate states into “joint force planning, internationally military command structure and established complex of transgovernmental political process for making political and security divisions,”<sup>48</sup> it is also the means whereby states become familiarized with the multilateral norms adopted by the community members.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, the so called Membership Action Plan (MAP) was introduced to help and guide the countries and strengthen their candidacy by periodic evaluations on their progress and regular supervision by the North Atlantic Council.<sup>49</sup> Since then the Membership Action Plan indicates the level of readiness of the candidate countries for admission.

Considering the number of countries committed to join the Alliance after the end of the Cold War, one must conclude that they have identified the Alliance as an institution whose membership is worth the investment of time and resources. This has been a driving mechanism that has inspired the eastern European states to seek to emulate the model and endeavor to complete the transformation processes.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* p. 93

<sup>48</sup> Daniel Deudney and g. John Ikenberry, “The nature and sources of liberal International order” *Review of International Studies* (1999), 25, 179–196

<sup>49</sup> NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “NATO Handbook”, 2006, p. 189,  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm>

<sup>50</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*, p. 90

In spite of the institutionalized system for admission the enlargement is affected by divergent preferences. As a result, the aspirant countries adopted a strategy aiming to make a strong case for membership in the Alliance. They invoked rules, norms and values to influence the decision of the Alliance to enlarge. The following Chapter will apply the rhetorical action theory to the CEECs enlargement in order to determine why rhetorical entrapment worked in the case of the CEECs enlargement. Chapter IV will apply the rhetorical action to SEECs enlargement and determine why it did not work in the case of one of the aspirant countries Macedonia.

### Chapter III: Rhetorical action and NATO enlargement in Central Eastern Europe

The requirements and socialization processes that NATO has institutionalized in support of its enlargement policy were eagerly accepted by the aspirant countries trying to pave their way toward future membership in NATO. Intensified dialogues, NACC, PfP, MAP and the other initiatives were positively received and acted upon, which made it inevitable for the aspirant countries not to expect results from their efforts. However, regardless of the fact that these institutionalized forms of cooperation were initiated by a community that upheld shared values and norms, the enlargement preferences of the NATO member states were not always uniform. Furthermore, there was the question of ‘whether’ to enlarge the Alliance after the end of the Cold War, which divided the members of the Alliance into “drivers” and “brakemen”. Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Plan, to some extent, occurred due to the existence of these divergent preferences within the Alliance. The partnership was designed as a delaying tactics and can be observed as an outcome of a bargaining process between the “drivers” and the “brakemen” to postpone the process.<sup>51</sup> Senior member of the international staff with NATO recognized the lack of consensus for initial embarking with the process of enlargement. Additionally, he refers to questions that hampered the process in the beginning, such as the pending relationship with Russia, preferences of individual

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<sup>51</sup> Frank Schimmelfenning, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* p. 191

countries and the general interest of the Alliance in terms of what will be gained and in which direction the Alliance will develop. Before analyzing the rhetorical action and rhetorical entrapment that followed the NATO enlargement in the Central Eastern Europe, I set the context by presenting the events within which the proponents to enlargement developed its argumentative strategies.

### ***3.1 Opposition to the Central Eastern Enlargement***

When the first demands for membership from Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) arrived at the NATO's front door in 1991, the Alliance was still not ready to decide if the enlargement is an option in the post Cold War period. Thus, having in mind other forms of cooperation, "the Alliance has made it clear that it cannot for the foreseeable future invite these countries to become members nor offer them security guarantees",<sup>52</sup>

The arguments behind the Eastward enlargement were mainly revolving around the Russian factor. The Alliance was concerned with Russian reaction and did not want to exacerbate the relations with the old enemy. Some of the arguments were also anticipating that Russia and its future governments may perceive NATO's expansion as

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<sup>52</sup> Manfred Wörner, "NATO transformed: The significance of the Rome Summit" *NATO Review* 39, No. 6 (1991) : 3-8, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9106-1.htm>

seeking dominance over a former adversary.<sup>53</sup> Additionally, the Alliance was concerned with preserving its unity and since enlargement would have brought in new Allies, there was a potential that it may weaken the consensual NATO decision-making practices. Russia has fed NATO's fears by opposition to NATO's expansion. Therefore, when the CEECs demanded to put the enlargement question on NATO's agenda, they received a signal to refrain from applying. A window of opportunity was created in 1993 when Russia "untied" Poland and by signing the Russian–Polish declaration allowed Poland to pursue its interest of joining the Alliance.<sup>54</sup> Regardless of this incremental improvement in the position of Russia towards its former satellite country, the opposition to enlargement did not weaken within NATO. Observing the negative reaction to the prospect of enlargement in the Russian,<sup>55</sup> NATO abstained from making resolute commitments to enlargement.

Brussels Summit in 1994 introduced a middle solution to meet the expectations of both, CEECs demands for membership and Russia, by establishing the Partnership for Peace program to focus on enhancing cooperation and dialogue with the partner countries i.e. aspirants. It was, among the other things, designed to appease the restless public of

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<sup>53</sup> Trevor Taylor, "NATO and Central Europe", *NATO Review* 39, No. 5 (1991):17-22  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9105-4.htm>

<sup>54</sup> K. M. Fierke; Antje Wiener, "Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement," *Journal of European Public Policy* (6:5 December) 1999, p 735

<sup>55</sup> Alexei Pushkov, "Russia and the West: An Endangered Relationship?" *NATO Review* 42, No. 1: 19-23  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1994/9401-5.htm>

Russia.<sup>56</sup> Considering that PfP was an initiative to enhance stability and security in Europe, NATO offered this program of familiarization and cooperation with NATO internalized practices and rules to all partners. Since it was designed as central to the security in the Euro-Atlantic area,<sup>57</sup> the aspirant countries joined PfP as a step towards membership. PfP delayed the decision to enlarge the Alliance by indicating that “countries entering the Alliance will need to pass a period of transition before truly becoming producers as well as consumers of security.”<sup>58</sup>

Events unfolded, without silencing the Russian opposition, since “as it was expected, eastward enlargement was not possible without signaling threat to Russia.”<sup>59</sup> Besides the opposition to the initial enlargement of the Alliance, Russia has made it clear that it will not tolerate expansion that will stretch to its borders and embrace the Baltic States.<sup>60</sup> Considering that Baltic States were seen as Russian backyard, expansion to a territory of the former Soviet Union was a threat to the NATO-Russia relations.<sup>61</sup> Therefore, the opposition to enlargement was not coming only from the Russian side, but NATO itself felt that it was not ready to deal with the backlash from offending Russia. The voices from Russia were clear and loud stating that the relationship will be in

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<sup>56</sup> K.M. Fierke, “Dialogues of Maneuver and Entanglement: NATO, Russia and the CEECs,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (1999). p. 41

<sup>57</sup> NATO Handbook, “The Brussels Summit”, *NATO Publication*, (2002), <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb010302.htm>

<sup>58</sup> Robert E. Hunter, “Enlargement: Part of a Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe, *NATO Review* 43, no. 3 (1995): 3-8, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1995/9503-1.htm>

<sup>59</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 25 Apr. 2008

<sup>60</sup> K.M. Fierke, “Dialogues of Maneuver and Entanglement: NATO, Russia and the CEECs,” p. 47

<sup>61</sup> Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO Entrapped: Debating the Next Enlargement Round,” *Survival*, vol 40, (Autumn 1998), pp. 170-86, p.171-172

jeopardy had NATO decide to offer membership to one or more Baltic States.<sup>62</sup>

Therefore, NATO enlargement did not have a smooth start. The ‘brakemen’ were coming from within and from outside the Alliance. The opposition from within NATO was explained as avoiding new divisions and new hardships with Russia.

### **3.2 NATO’s view on Central Eastern European Enlargement**

NATO was established in 1949 to protect Europe from the Soviet Union based on the principles of collective defense. With the absence of the Cold War enemy, NATO has basically lost its relevant mission. Therefore, the “most successful Alliance in history”<sup>63</sup> faced a question of its existence. While this question was contemplated by the Alliance, the CEECs declared their interest for the services of the Alliance. NATO perceived this momentum as a proof of continuous relevance of its mission.<sup>64</sup>

Additionally, NATO has portrayed the end of the Cold War as a victory for the liberal democratic values on which the western societies were built.<sup>65</sup> The Western institutions encouraged the CEECs to follow the western ideal, which was the driving mechanism, besides their security concerns, to join the Alliance. The enlargement created a momentum for the Alliance to continue its relevance and as a result it framed

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<sup>62</sup> Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO Entrapped: Debating the Next Enlargement Round,” p.175

<sup>63</sup> Johan Jorgen Holst, “Pursuing a durable peace in the aftermath of the Cold War,” *NATO Review* 40, No.4, 9-13 <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1992/9204-2.htm>

<sup>64</sup> K.M. Fierke, “Dialogues of Maneuver and Entanglement: NATO, Russia and the CEECs,” p. 44

<sup>65</sup> K. M. Fierke; Antje Wiener, “Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement,” p 730 - 731



the process as “It can help provide a deep sense of security for European countries which do not join NATO as well as for those which do - in the process avoiding a new division of the Continent,”<sup>66</sup> which sounded appealing to any country seeking a new home in the aftermath of the Cold War divisions.

Clinton’s speech in Warsaw hinted as well that NATO will defend East by stating “.... *NATO expansion is no longer a question of whether, but when and how.....*”<sup>67</sup> Consequently, in 1994 the foreign ministers in NATO decided to proceed with enlargement.<sup>68</sup> Enlargement was perceived as putting an end to the Cold War divisions.<sup>69</sup> The earlier fears, that it might recreate the divisions in Europe, were rendered obsolete. NATO has obviously shifted from not knowing if enlargement is an option to committing and expecting enlargement of the Alliance.

Due to the significance of the Russian threat to enlargement and the reservations it articulated for NATO expansion stretching to its border, NATO adopted a strategy of seeking a ‘genuine partnership’ with Russia and developed a political framework for security cooperation and consultation in order to cement the relationship and build common trust.”<sup>70</sup> The Russian opposition was ameliorated in 1997 with the “equitable

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<sup>66</sup> Robert E. Hunter, “Enlargement: Part of a Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe, *NATO Review* 43, no. 3 (1995): 3-8, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1995/9503-1.htm>

<sup>67</sup> “Clinton Hints NATO Would Defend East From Attack,” *International Herald Tribune*, 13 January 1994.

<sup>68</sup> K.M. Fierke, “Dialogues of Maneuver and Entanglement: NATO, Russia and the CEECs, p. 44

<sup>69</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 25 Apr. 2008

<sup>70</sup> “Highlights of NATO Secretary General’s address to the Russian Council on Foreign and Security Policy, in Moscow,” *NATO Review* 44, No. 3 (1996) <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9603-d.htm>

and stable partnership”<sup>71</sup> signed between NATO and Russia where both made a commitment at the highest political level.

The above presented provides the background conditions within which the CEECs framed their arguments to influence the Alliance and ensure membership. The candidate countries and NATO proponents founded their ‘claims’ for admission on the ‘grounds’ on which NATO has built its image of a security architecture and community of liberal states. Furthermore, by appealing to the ‘warrant’, which is NATO’s commitment to uphold the rules, values and norms, the CEECs aimed to shame the Alliance into rule compliant behavior. The following sub-section takes closer look at the rhetorical strategies the CEECs employed to influence the Alliance.

### ***3.3 Central Eastern European Rhetorical Strategies***

The rhetorical actors pushing for eastern enlargement, in this case both the candidate countries and NATO enlargement proponents were “the drivers.” They adopted a strategy that enabled them to justify and add legitimacy to their preferred policies, which were in line with the community commitments, upheld norms, rules and values. Through social influence, they intended to influence the “brakemen” into rule-compliant behavior. This is a strategy used by the CEECs.

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<sup>71</sup> NATO Online Library, “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation,” Paris, (May 1997), <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/fndact-a.htm>

NATO members portrayed themselves as a community culture with shared rules, norms and values especially after the end of the Cold War in order to support the “new democracies and market economies in Central and Eastern Europe”.<sup>72</sup> In terms of its enlargement endeavor, NATO leaders have clearly voiced their constitutive norms, values and culture in joint statements at the NATO summit in Brussels in 1994: “We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East.”<sup>73</sup> Furthermore, as the candidate countries proved successful in their reform and transformation-related efforts, almost all public declarations stated the Alliance’s commitment to support these states and related their success to the liberal and democratic criteria that they met as the prerequisite for admission. These are the grounds on which the rhetorical actors build their claims.

CEECs used a moral appeal and a framing strategy to create an image for themselves that resembles the image of the community they apply to join. Their speech acts demonstrate that CEECs have presented themselves as true sons and daughters of Europe upholding the same values and meeting the criteria for accession. The Central and Eastern European countries have portrayed themselves as traditionally inclined towards the western liberal values and norms even during the period of Europe’s artificial

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<sup>72</sup> Antony Lake, "Lecture, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C, September 21, 1993, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html>

<sup>73</sup> NATO Online Library, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/ North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace: Invitation, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, (10-11 January 1994) , <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110a.htm>

division.<sup>74</sup> In this context, the President Havel has framed his address to NATO in 1991 stating, “I am happy that I can address you today as a representative of a democratic and independent country that shares your ideals and wishes to cooperate with you and to be your friend.”<sup>75</sup> The Lithuanian Ambassador Stankevicius similarly asserted that “Despite 50 years of suppression, the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian nations have managed to preserve their affinity to Western European civilization and they are basing their development on the model of Western democracy. The integration of Lithuania and the other two Baltic States into the community of Western nations means a return to their natural places in the international community”.<sup>76</sup> Besides articulating their original place of belonging, the CEECs have, as well, reiterated the values they share with the western democratic countries. Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Melescanu emphasized these values arguing that “With the Cold War over, ....democracy, the market economy and full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms have become the main elements of an 'identity card' claimed by every nation throughout Europe.”<sup>77</sup>

The CEECs have additionally used a strategy of appealing to NATO commitments in support of their claims. Besides identifying positively with western community norms, values and rules, the CEECs have also employed strategic arguments.

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<sup>74</sup> Neumann, Iver B. 1998. European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus. Alternatives 23 (3):397-416. in the work of Frank Schimmelfennig, “*The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union*,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1, (Winter, 2001), pp. 47-80, p. 68

<sup>75</sup> NATO “HQ. Brussels, March 21, 1991,” [http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1991/2103\\_uk.html](http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1991/2103_uk.html)

<sup>76</sup> Ceslovas V. Stankevicius, “NATO enlargement and the indivisibility of security in Europe: A view from Lithuania,” NATO Review 44, no.5 (.1996) 21-25, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9605-5.htm>

<sup>77</sup> Dr. Teodor Melescanu, “Security in central Europe: A positive-sum game,” NATO Review 41, No.5 (1993) 12-18 <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9305-3.htm>

Considering that liberal democracy, capitalism and western values have confirmed triumphant at the end of the Cold War and NATO and the western leaders have committed to upholding these principles, the CEECs when faced with uncertainty for their candidacy appealed strategically to NATO commitments to legitimize their claims. President Havel appealed to West commitments in his address before NATO in the early 1990s “The democratic West ... has given encouragement and inspiration to citizens of our countries, too. .... Because of that, the West bears a tremendous responsibility...”<sup>78</sup> Similarly, Romanian Foreign Minister Melescanu affirmed “We, however, believe that today's Europe is to be found wherever its democratic, liberal and humanist values and practices succeed in shutting the door on the nightmare of authoritarian regimes...”<sup>79</sup> referring to NATO’s commitment to these values.

The candidate countries have been building their cases to accelerate the process of admission by founding their argumentative strategies on the criteria for accession. They wanted to demonstrate their individual accomplishments, but also wanted to marshal NATO’s explicit support. President Havel has in this context called NATO to explicitly support the progress of the aspiring countries. He asked for NATO to respond in timely manner in order to prevent the deterioration of the young and fragile democracies by stating “.....our countries are dangerously sliding into a certain political, economic and

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<sup>78</sup> Havel, Vaclav (1991) "Address to the NATO Council", NATO Review, 39, 2, 31-5. in the K. M. Fierke; Antje Wiener, “Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement,” Journal of European Public Policy 6:5 December 1999, p 729

<sup>79</sup> Dr. Teodor Melescanu, “Security in central Europe: A positive-sum game,” NATO Review 41, No.5 (1993) 12-18 <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9305-3.htm>

security vacuum...it is becoming evident that without appropriate external links the very existence of our young democracies is in jeopardy.”<sup>80</sup> Another example is the statement of the Polish Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk who referred to the Partnership for Peace form of association as the best route that his country has selected to meet its goal of compatibility with NATO. He tied this to an earlier statement of the Alliance, which declares that "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East...".<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, the minister referred to a speech by U.S. President Bill Clinton in Warsaw 2001, affirming, “Now, only such questions as when? and how? remains.”<sup>82</sup> With this rhetoric, the candidates not only referred to the institutionalized formal requirements of NATO membership, but brought to the fore public promises made by NATO and tied them together.

Exposing NATO’s behavioral inconsistencies by shaming it is another strategy that CEECs have used in their rhetoric. The objective of this rhetorical action was to remind NATO of its past commitments, promises and past treatments of countries and match them against NATO’s current conduct. “The North Atlantic Alliance was able to serve for so long as a firm safeguard of stability, freedom and prosperity ... We saw that a free society respected itself to such an extent that it considered it worthwhile to defend itself against the threat of totalitarianism ... From this arises a great responsibility for the

<sup>80</sup> NATO “HQ. Brussels, March 21, 1991,” [http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1991/2103\\_uk.html](http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1991/2103_uk.html)

<sup>81</sup> Piotr Kolodziejczyk, „Poland – a future NATO Ally,” *NATO Review* 42, No. 5 (1994) 7-10, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1994/9405-2.htm>

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

West. It cannot be indifferent to what is happening in the countries which - constantly encouraged by the Western democracies ...”<sup>83</sup> This is how the candidate countries appealed to community markers where the past commitments were brought to the fore and held up as a mirror at NATO in order to shame the Alliance into respecting its commitments to enlargement. Non-compliance of the Alliance with their previous commitments to liberal values would have undermined the legitimacy of the Alliance’s norms and values. A Hungarian ambassador to the United States stated that “Temporizing on enlargement will raise doubts about the commitment of the West to that region.”<sup>84</sup> Another aspect that is perceived as a promise is contained in the wording of the conclusions of the 1997 Madrid Summit “NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership.....”<sup>85</sup> If NATO abstains from inviting new members this promise may question the credibility and legitimacy of the Alliance since it creates room for the candidate countries to build their rhetorical strategies and bring into the fore this promise of the Alliance.

<sup>83</sup> NATO “HQ. Brussels, March 21, 1991,” [http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1991/2103\\_uk.html](http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1991/2103_uk.html)

<sup>84</sup> Clemens Clay, *NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security*, (Basingstoke, Macmillan 1997)

<sup>85</sup> NATO Press Release, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, July 1997, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm>

After the first round of enlargement, the above stated was a concern of the countries who stayed outside NATO borders and who feared the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. Lithuanian Ambassador Stankevicius referred to the Clinton's letter of 27 November 1994 to Estonia's President Meri where he stated that "the goal of the United States was to expand across all of Europe the area of democracy, stability and welfare that had been achieved in Western Europe after the Second World War. .... "New Europe" united by common values, where there is no room for "spheres of influence."<sup>86</sup>

Judging by the outcome, the rhetorical actors – CEECs seemed to be successful in these strategies. They invoked community rules, values and norms and called into question the credibility of the organization in order to prevent derailment of enlargement to their countries. They highlighted inconsistencies between the past rhetoric and current conduct towards the aspirant countries and in that way, raised the credibility issue and used social influence to achieve a normative outcome. We may say that the case of the CEECs enlargement subscribes to "A policy will fail regardless of ones purpose in pursuing it if it cannot be presented as legitimate and plausible."<sup>87</sup> However, one aspect that made this policy plausible for the CEECs are the efforts of the Alliance balancing between two conflicting demands, CEECs and Russia. The following chapter analyzes NATO's rhetoric which was also a source of arguments for the rhetorical actors.

<sup>86</sup> Česlovas V. Stankevicius, "NATO enlargement and the indivisibility of security in Europe: A view from Lithuania," NATO Review 44, No. 5 (1996): 21-25, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9605-5.htm>

<sup>87</sup> K.M. Fierke, *Changing games, Changing Strategies: Critical investigation in security*, Manchester University Press (1998), p171



Furthermore, it depicts NATO's gradual move to enlargement and creating room to keep the past promises.

### ***3.4 Rhetorical Strategies and Entrapment in NATO***

NATO rhetorically supported the demands of the CEECs to join the Alliance. Furthermore, the proponents of enlargement have presented the policy as a moment for erasing the old dividing lines by embracing the new democracies from the East. In that direction Clinton advocated enlargement justifying the policy on the grounds of “we will not let the Iron Curtain be replaced with a veil of indifference.”<sup>88</sup> Additionally, considering that enlargement was perceived as an opportunity to ensure survival, German Defense Minister Ruhe warned that denying the eastern democracies their legitimate right to join the Alliance will threaten the “survival” of NATO.<sup>89</sup>

NATO proponents underlined liberal order and the importance of preserve the democracy that has proven victorious for the western countries. President Clinton has emphasized this aspect in his supportive speeches for expanding NATO to the East. “NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats, and create the conditions for

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<sup>88</sup> NATO Speeches, Transcript of the Remarks by President W. J. Clinton To People Of Detroit, 1996, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961022a.htm>

<sup>89</sup> Interview Federal Ministry of Defense in Schimmelfenning, *The EU and NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*, p. 243

prosperity to flourish.”<sup>90</sup> His speech was a rhetorical answer to the call from the CEECs to protect the democracy that was inspired and build by following the success from the western democracies.

After the first round of enlargement, the commitment to the new democratic societies was re-emphasized in the conclusions from the Summit “We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty...no European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.”<sup>91</sup> According to a member of the international staff in NATO the Alliance wanted to make sure that everybody will understand that there will be another round and the Alliance will ensure that there will not be another artificial divide. <sup>92</sup> Furthermore, he underlined that the Alliance has purposely downplayed the military features and underlined the liberal order and democracy. Thus, in order to balance between the conflicting demands from the opposition from Russia and demands from the remaining CEECs that were not admitted in the first round of enlargement, the Alliance described the Partnership for Peace “Instead of drawing new lines that divide nations, the Partnership For Peace will establish new lines that connect nations,”<sup>93</sup> which is mechanism designed to enhance the cooperation between the allies and partners.

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<sup>90</sup> Speech by Bill Clinton, In his own words, *New York Times*, October 23, 1996, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D02E3D61530F930A15753C1A960958260>

<sup>91</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm>

<sup>92</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 23 Apr. 2008.

<sup>93</sup> Les Aspin, “New Europe, New NATO,” *NATO Review* 42, No.1 (1944): 12-14 <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1994/9401-3.htm>

Regardless of the roles of PfP, NATO proponents have continued emphasizing that it will not stand in the way of enlargement. The PfP document wording signals that NATO's door remains open "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe."<sup>94</sup> However, the reassurance was needed since the rhetorical argumentation coming from the aspirant countries was gaining dynamics and thus NATO representatives continued underlining at the meetings with the official from CEEC that NATO's door stays open.<sup>95</sup>

The biggest opposition to the eastern enlargement was coming from Russia and was especially directed to the membership of the Baltic States who based their arguments on the community upheld rules, values and norms. Member of the international staff in NATO acknowledged the rhetorical action of the Baltic countries that have tied their democratic societies with their active participation in the NATO arranged activities and cooperative efforts.<sup>96</sup> Another entangling momentum for NATO might be seen in the speech of President Clinton at the Warsaw University Library in Poland "All of Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe as Europe's old democracies have."<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Online Library, Ministerial Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110a.htm>

<sup>95</sup> Online Library, Speech by the Secretary general, Sofia, Bulgaria, July 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990708a.htm>

<sup>96</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 23 Apr. 2008

<sup>97</sup> <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9402E6DF1531F935A25755C0A9679C8B63>

The rhetorical argumentation from NATO members, which were in favor of enlargement, created room for entanglement. The rhetoric revolved around the incremental mechanisms the Alliance introduced towards enlargement such as the PfP, social influence among the Allies and moral pressure to hold the Allies responsible for the verbal commitments and promises contained in the relevant documented summit conclusions to act upon them. Rhetorical action may explain CEECs' admission to NATO on the basis of their rhetorical entrapment of the Alliance by appealing to community, rules and norms, but only if we omit the variable which is the opposition from Russia. All the incremental moves and action building mechanisms such as PfP, periodical meetings and visits to the countries aspirants, encouraging rhetoric from NATO were building towards the decision for enlargement. However, enlargement was only possible when the partnership with Russia was signed.

### ***3.5 The Success of the Rhetorical Action***

The success of the rhetorical action may be attributed to the rhetorical entrapment of the Alliance in its past promises, which the candidate countries used when uncertain about their admission. Past promises were mainly related to past commitments and in the case of Eastern enlargement with the victory of the liberal democratic principles of the western society. Considering that NATO community and its values represented a model

that CEECs have followed and were asked to follow in order to qualify for membership, inconsistent behavior would have damaged the image of NATO and would have been seen as a threat to the values it upholds.

Therefore NATO was to some extent entangled in its past promises and past rhetoric. However, the other important element in the decision to enlarge is the role of Russia. All the above presented rhetorical argumentations have in the back the ongoing Russian opposition to NATO expansion in the East. Thus, PfP is created as a delaying maneuver to appease the opposition of Russia,<sup>98</sup> on one side but as well to respond to the pressure from the CEECs for membership. Robert Hunter, a permanent US representative described NATO's maneuvering towards enlargement as developing a strategy that will stability through NATO-Russia relationship and PfP arrangements.<sup>99</sup> However, this strategy of maneuvering conflicting demands created additional commitments for NATO towards the PfP countries. It was another source of arguments for additional entangling of the Alliance.

NATO's rhetoric, support and justification of enlargement on the basis of avoiding creation of new dividing lines in Europe, was a concurrent process with NATO's pursuit of the partnership with Russia. In other words the Alliance was balancing these two conflicting demands. This questions the powers of the rhetorical

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<sup>98</sup> K.M. Fierke, "Dialogues of Maneuver and Entanglement: NATO, Russia and the CEECs." p. 41

<sup>99</sup> Robert e. Hunter, "Enlargement: Part of a Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe," *NATO Review* 43, no. 3 (1995) 3-8, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1995/9503-1.htm>

action to explain the enlargement based on community upheld rules, norms and values. In this case, NATO was not entangled but was maneuvering between the demands for enlargement from the CEECs and enlarged without threatening Russia. CEECs pushed NATO into brokering an agreement with Russia in order to enlarge and in that way keep the promise. On the day when the decision to enlarge was made, the North Atlantic Council met with the Russian Foreign Minister to discuss and further the relationship with Russia.<sup>100</sup> Senior official with the NATO international staff affirmed that “few other significant decisions have been taken prior the enlargement decision and one of them was the three NOs: NATO has no plan, no reason, and no intention to deploy nuclear weapons on the soil of new MS,”<sup>101</sup> which confirms that NATO has committed to find balance between the two conflicting demands. Furthermore, he stated that despite the success of the Baltic states, who face the biggest opposition from Russia, the enlargement would have not worked unless there is the agreement with Russia for the critical steps in the area.<sup>102</sup> This confirms that rhetorical action worked only because it was in interest of the Alliance to pursue the enlargement policy. The next chapter applies the rhetorical action to an enlargement case with a different outcome than admission. The purpose is to determine why rhetorical action did not work in the case of SEECS.

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<sup>100</sup> K. M. Fierke; Antje Wiener, “Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement”, p 736

<sup>101</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 22 Apr. 2008

<sup>102</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 22 Apr. 2008

## Chapter IV: Rhetorical action and NATO enlargement in South Eastern Europe

NATO enlargement in South Eastern Europe is the latest enlargement endeavor of the Alliance. The pending decision at this stage of the process is formulated around the question of ‘when’ and not ‘whether’ and ‘who,’ will join as it was the case of the immediate post Cold War enlargements. Balkan region has great significance for the Alliance considering its extensive involvement in the period following the dismantling of Yugoslavia, which challenged NATO’s future role.

Albania, Macedonia and Croatia were deemed unprepared for membership in 2002 at the Prague Summit while at the next Summit in Istanbul, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to enlargement “NATO’s door remains open to new members, and encouraged Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to continue the reforms necessary to progress toward NATO membership.”<sup>103</sup> Peaceful resolution of disputes, ethnic reconciliation, civilian control over the armed forces, promotion of democracy and rule of law, cooperation with international organizations were among the prerequisites identified to stand in the way of ensuring place in NATO in 2004.<sup>104</sup> As the countries were developing their capabilities required for admission, ‘drivers’ and ‘brakemen’ followed the process as well, mainly divided in terms of at which performance level the aspirants

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<sup>103</sup> NATO Press Releases, Istanbul Summit Communiqués, June 2004

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>

<sup>104</sup> NATO Press Releases, Prague Summit Declaration, November 2002,

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>

will be invited to join the Alliance.<sup>105</sup> NATO had opened the same mechanisms, described in Chapter II to the SEECS to prepare them for membership. As all three countries have met the preconditions and raised their performance up to the par,<sup>106</sup> the 2008 Bucharest Summit has followed up the commitment from the previous Summit and the Foreign Ministers of NATO agreed to open the door to membership to Croatia and Albania, but split over the invitation to Macedonia.

The outcome of the Bucharest Summit allows me to test the limits of the rhetorical action and rhetorical entrapment and infer if and when NATO entangles itself in the dialogues and rhetoric following its enlargement policy. In the following chapter I set the context by presenting the events within which the proponents to SEE enlargement developed its argumentative strategies.

### **3.1 Opposition to the South Eastern Enlargement**

The countries from the SEE region aspiring for membership face a different set of obstacles when compared to the previous two waves. With a history of regional instability followed by nationalism inspired nation-building initiatives, SEECS were perceived as a security consumer, which was not a favorable position for the countries to commence their journey toward NATO membership. Considering that NATO had to

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<sup>105</sup> Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Elke Krahmann, Mark Webber and Jolyon Howorth, "One in, all in? NATO's next Enlargement," *International Affairs* 78, 4, (2002,) 713-729, p. 724

<sup>106</sup> NATO Press Releases, Bucharest Summit Declaration, April 2008, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html>



deploy forces to prevent civil war in the region, the quality of the signal received from the region was significantly weaker than the signal coming from the CEECs.<sup>107</sup> Therefore, the requirements for membership were individually tailored for the aspirants in accordance with the specific conditions and issues that the countries were dealing with. Hence, NATO placed emphasis on the problematic areas and opposed enlargement based on the evaluated success of the implementation of the suggested reforms.<sup>108</sup> Different preferences are also in the background of the decision to invite countries from SEE. Opposing voices indicate the lack of progress in reforms, political maturity and transition to democracy.

The end of the post Cold War era gave rise to different security challenges and in this context NATO tailored its enlargement policy. Constraints to enlargement emerged from the new threats the Alliance was facing. In order to evaluate the candidates for membership, NATO adopted a performance-based evaluation that drives the decision to invite a country. The President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly indicated in 2007 the defense reforms, military contributions and the nature of the society as composing elements that underline the meaning of “performance.”<sup>109</sup> Therefore, opposition to the Western Balkan round of enlargement, mainly builds on good governance, rule of law, minority rights, democratic principles along with the military contribution which are all

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<sup>107</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 25 Apr. 2008

<sup>108</sup> Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Elke Krahmann, Mark Webber and Jolyon Howorth, “One in, all in?” p. 723

<sup>109</sup> Speech by Mr. José Lello, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly before the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, November 2007, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1362>

the grounds on which the rhetoric from enlargement proponents builds its claims to ensure compliance.

Furthermore, there is an additional constrain that Macedonia faces which distinguishes her candidate position from the other two members of the same group of aspirants. A longtime NATO member, Greece had articulated reservations to Macedonian membership in NATO, if the country continues to pursue to join the Alliance under the name Macedonia. Greek public opinion reaction powerfully affirmed that “Greek people will not accept another Macedonia.”<sup>110</sup> Greece argues that Macedonia is a region in the northern part of Greece and seeks to maintain sole ownership over the name creating in this way a split over the invitation of Macedonia.

The above presented aspects provide background conditions within which South Eastern Europe countries have been advocating their cases to influence the Alliance and ensure their membership in NATO. The candidate countries and NATO proponents, as drivers, have founded their ‘claims’ for admission on the ‘grounds’ on which NATO has built its image and its new role within the context of the new security environment. Furthermore, by appealing to the ‘warrant’, which is contained in the NATO commitments to uphold to public promises and past conducts, rules and norms, SEECS have made an attempt to shame the Alliance into rule compliant behavior.

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<sup>110</sup> “Two countries at odds over a name,” BBC News, March 2008  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7278023.stm>

### **3.2 NATO's view on South Eastern European Enlargement**

NATO's move towards the next enlargement was no longer a question of relevance of its mission and existence. The context has changed and the question of NATO's existence changed into a question of adjusting to meet the new threats. NATO has faced a new challenge after the events from 9/11. The Alliance has invoked Article 5 as a response to the attacks on the United States. Consequently, NATO became involved in Afghanistan and Iraq and as a result gradually started developing an image of an organization "which has the capability to be the principal military and security arm of the transatlantic alliance of democracies facing global challenges."<sup>111</sup> NATO has officially committed to its new mission at the 2004 Prague Summit by giving primacy to the new security threats and endorsing out-of-area operations doctrine in order to tackle the new challenges related to international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.<sup>112</sup> Riga Summit has also placed an emphasis on the capabilities and its relevance for the future NATO role.<sup>113</sup> Therefore, developing and obtaining effective and efficient capabilities to carry out the new strategic concept came to the fore of the Alliance interests.

Within this changed context, NATO framed its enlargement policy and the requirements in order to ensure that the new Allays bring value added to the new initiatives. The enlargement has reflected the changed image of the Alliance from only

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<sup>111</sup> US Department of State, "NATO/Riga Summit Issues," October 2006, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/73756.htm>

<sup>112</sup> NATO Press Releases, Prague Summit Declaration, November 2002, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>

<sup>113</sup> NATO Update, "NATO sets priorities for new capabilities for next 15 years," November 2006 <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/11-november/e1129b.htm>

existing to doing something.<sup>114</sup> The new security environment has shifted the attention back to the military approaches. Enlargement was seen as a support to the new missions and therefore the need to strengthened capabilities surfaced among the priorities that the Alliance expected from its members

Within this new security context, SEECs were lined up at NATO's door. NATO's motive behind expanding the Alliance in SEE relates to stabilization of the region. The "battle between the forces of integration and disintegration"<sup>115</sup> after the Dayton Accord, NATO air campaign and Ohrid Framework Agreement is only to be brought to an end if the region is integrated in the Euro-Atlantic structures. As a result, the Alliance recognized the geo-strategic significance of the SEE.<sup>116</sup> The objective behind NATO's South East strategy is to ensure self-sustainability of the region. In that context is the address of the former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, who primarily stressed the importance of the stability and security of the South – East Europe and furthermore the critical role the candidate countries have for the security of the region.<sup>117</sup>

Riga Summit declaration underlined set of rules, values and norms NATO expects from SEECs. The declarative statement "solidarity and democratic values, remains necessary for long-term stability... cooperation in the region, good-neighborly relations,

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<sup>114</sup> US Department of State, "NATO/Riga Summit Issues," October 2006, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/73756.htm>

<sup>115</sup> Carl Bildt, "Between integration and disintegration", *NATO Review*, December 2004, p.10

<sup>116</sup> Boyka Stefanova, "NATO's mixed policy motives in the Southeast – European enlargement: Revisiting Balkan Geopolitics," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, vol 13, No. 1, 39-58, (April 2005,) p. 45

<sup>117</sup> NATO Update, Lord Robertson addresses the issue of security in South-East Europe, June 2002 <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/06-june/e0624a.htm>

and working towards mutually acceptable solutions to outstanding issues,”<sup>118</sup> describes the community the candidates aspire to join and rules and norms they are expected to adopt. The above stated depicts the political security issues and security and stability related capabilities as two main components of the decision to enlarge NATO.<sup>119</sup>

As part of the NATO’s South Eastern enlargement initiative is the Adriatic Three<sup>120</sup> (A3) concept NATO introduced in order to strengthen the process and facilitate the integration of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia.

The above presented provides the background conditions within which the South Eastern European countries advocated their cases to influence NATO’s decision to enlarge. The candidate countries and NATO proponents founded their ‘claims’ for admission on the ‘grounds’ on which NATO has built its image and new role placing emphasis on the security of the region, required capabilities, and principles of the community of liberal states. Same as with the case of the CEECs, the SEECS have applied the strategies of appealing to the ‘warrant’, which is the NATO’s commitment to uphold to the requirements they posed as prerequisites for admission and attempted to shame the Alliance into rule compliant behavior.

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<sup>118</sup> NATO press Releases, Riga Summit Declaration, November 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>

<sup>119</sup> Boyka Stefanova, “NATO’s mixed policy motives in the Southeast – European enlargement..” p. 40

<sup>120</sup> Ministry of Defense publication, “The Adriatic Charter and NATO,” Republic of Macedonia, 2007, p.2

Along with the NATO institutionalized processes preparing the countries for admission undergoes Macedonian-Greek dispute over the name of the country aspiring to join the Alliance. Considering that the Alliance has declared its expectations from the candidate aspirants and framed them in its rhetoric and official documents, the issue with the name was circumvented by the Alliance. A senior NATO official stated “we have never talked about this, we never mentioned this in any of our speeches.”<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, he additionally explained “I think the Alliance can not resolve internal things like the name question because it is not an internal Alliance thing, it is Macedonian Greek thing,”<sup>122</sup> which indicates that the Alliance has resolutely abstained from any interferences in this bilateral affair issue. Contrary to the approach that NATO undertook when addressing the Russian issue, that might have been a deal breaker threatening to jeopardize the previous enlargement processes, this time the Alliance has pursued the enlargement socialization of the countries by practicing all other institutionalized mechanisms but abstained to interfere in the reservations that were clearly articulated by Greece. The analysis of the rhetorical strategies used by the candidate countries from South East Europe, that follow in the next sub-section, build on the above elaborated context within which the enlargement in the South Eastern Europe unfolded.

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<sup>121</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 22 Apr. 2008

<sup>122</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 22 Apr. 2008

### **3.3 South Eastern European Rhetorical Strategies**

The rhetorical actors from the SEECS have also adopted a strategy that enabled them to justify and add legitimacy to their preferred policies, i.e. invitation to join the Alliance, which were in line with NATO's commitments, upheld norms, rules and values. Through social influence, SEECS intended to influence the "brakemen" into rule-compliant behavior and avoid any further delay of the process. They based their strategies on the new changed security environment within which NATO was developing and framing its new role. This chapter will closely examine the strategies employed by the candidate countries Albania, Croatia and Macedonia in the last wave of NATO enlargement. Furthermore, this will also set the foundation to test if and how NATO responded to these argumentative strategies and whether it changed their behavior and rhetoric in order to avoid inconsistent conduct.

SEECS have applied same framing strategies as the CEECS. The candidates from the third wave have brought to the fore the past promises of NATO as a form of moral appeal. They have used past promises to build a context within which they presented their countries as key pillars for the regional security. Due to the extensive involvement of the Alliance in the Balkans, NATO has repeated numerous times that it holds the key for maintaining the stability and security in the region. Macedonian Foreign Minister Mitreva has appealed to this promise and urged the Alliance to keep enlargement high on the agenda since it is the only channel through which NATO can maintain visibility in the

Euro – Atlantic area.<sup>123</sup> Within this context, the Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha affirmed “Acceptance of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia in NATO would create a more secure and sustainable southeast branch of NATO.”<sup>124</sup> Another example of this framing strategy is contained in the Minister Mitreva address before NATO in 2004 where she referred to the multi-ethnic democratic society that Macedonia has built and NATO has acknowledged as an example of a functioning model in the region. She called for early invitation for Albania, Macedonia and Croatia by pointing to the success the Alliance will accomplish by securing the democratic societies that were built under NATO’s mentorship and asked for explicit support from the Alliance.<sup>125</sup> Furthermore, Macedonian Ambassador to NATO has shed light on the aspect that has distinguished Macedonia from the other actors in the region striving to broker compromise and seek peaceful solution of the conflict it faced in 2001.<sup>126</sup> The Ambassador has framed the image of the country as a leader in the region that seeks to support NATO vision for the Balkans. By appealing to the warrant, which is the NATO commitment to peaceful conflict resolution, he identified his country positively with the principles upheld by the Alliance and underlined the level of their internalization.

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<sup>123</sup> NATO Speeches, Address by Dr. Ilinka Mitreva, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Macedonia, EAPC Foreign Affairs Ministers, NATO HQ, December 2004  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041209n.htm>

<sup>124</sup> For Adriatic Charter countries, promises come with challenges, *Southeast European Times*, October, 2007,  
[http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en\\_GB/features/setimes/articles/2007/10/22/reportage-01](http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2007/10/22/reportage-01)

<sup>125</sup> NATO Speeches, Address by Dr. Ilinka Mitreva ...2004

<sup>126</sup> Nano Ruzin, “Looking forward to a Balkan Big MAC,” *NATO Review*, December 2004, p.48,  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/special.html>



Manipulation with the accession criteria is also used by the rhetorical actors in South Eastern Europe in order to accelerate the process. In that direction they described Partnership for Peace as a “significant forum for mutual cooperation, as an impetus for domestic reforms,”<sup>127</sup> giving legitimacy to the incentives for reform and transformation that NATO has institutionalized. Consequently when SEECS felt uncertain about their position they appealed to past statements “the differences in preparedness between the Prague invitees and the remaining aspirants are no greater than two or perhaps three MAP cycles,”<sup>128</sup> where their accomplishments were recognized.

The new strategic concept of the Alliance and the challenges it faces in the new security environment have shifted the focus toward NATO’s military arm. The SEECS have used this opportunity and considering their intense involvement in NATO-led missions portrayed themselves as *de facto* members of the Alliance. The Croatian Defense minister Jozo Rados, in his speech before the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, affirmed that Croatia “stands ready to provide direct support, including making its airspace, airports, harbors and other infrastructure available to the Allies.”<sup>129</sup> Macedonian Foreign Minister Miloshevski underlined Macedonian contribution to NATO missions but also emphasized that “Aiming at enhancing the operability of our troops and for purposes of their equal participation together with the Allies’ troops ... Macedonia

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<sup>127</sup> NATO Speeches, Address by Dr. Ilinka Mitreva, ...December 2004  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041209n.htm>

<sup>128</sup> Nano Ruzin, “Looking forward to a Balkan Big MAC,” *NATO Review*, December 2004,  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/special.html>

<sup>129</sup> NATO Speeches, Remarks by H.E. Jozo Rados, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Croatia at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Defense Ministers session, December 2001 ,  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011219k.htm>

adopted a decision to reduce to the minimal level the national caveats,”<sup>130</sup> which indicates a performance level of non-NATO member equal to NATO member performance level.

Macedonian officials have moved toward employing strategies of social influence by disclosing the behavioral inconsistencies and shaming the Alliance. The objective of this rhetorical action was to remind NATO of its past commitments, promises and past treatments and match them against its current conduct. Macedonia, once security consumer, was inspired by the involvement of the Alliance in the region to transform its forces into stability generator.<sup>131</sup> The stability in the region to which NATO was committed and furthermore once extensively involved, will be in jeopardy if NATO does not invite the Adriatic Three to join NATO. The countries have shamed NATO to take the responsibility of maintaining peace and upholding to the commitment to the region. In that direction Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski stated in the aftermath of Kosovo's secession "important for the further and final stabilization of the region if Macedonia, Croatia and Albania were invited at the NATO summit in April to become members of the alliance.”<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Opinions NATO, Address by H.E. Antonio Milososki Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Macedonia1 at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministers session on Afghanistan, January 2007,

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070126d.html>

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> “Macedonia wants NATO membership to help over Kosovo,” Reuters, February 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0630667520080206>

Macedonian officials, to respond to the serious opposition to their candidacy, employed strategies of social influence underlining the inconsistencies of the Alliance. In that context Macedonian Foreign Minister Milososki referred to the role Macedonian troops play in NATO-led missions affirming "If other NATO countries, including Greece, do not mind when our soldiers employed in Afghanistan wear on their uniforms the name of our country, Macedonia, and our flag why would Greece mind if we joined the alliance after we have fulfilled all the relevant criteria?"<sup>133</sup> As the Greek opposition was becoming more vociferous, the strategies of shaming and social influence were intensified. Additionally, the Prime Minister Gruevski tried to shame the Alliance not only in the context of its past promise to the stability and security of the region but, as well, for the lack of internal unity, considering the split between the Allies who wanted to see the A3 countries in and Greece who was seriously obstructing the process for Macedonia. In that context Minsiter Gruevski affirmed "A Greek 'No' to Macedonia is a 'No' to the governments of the United States, Germany, France, Turkey, Slovenia and all other NATO members who are interested in seeing Macedonia, Croatia and Albania as members of the alliance."<sup>134</sup>

The rhetorical actors, as we have seen, invoked past promises, values and norms to call into question the credibility of the organization and prevent derailment of the

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<sup>133</sup> "Two countries at odds over a name," BBC News, March 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7278023.stm>

<sup>134</sup> "FYROM pleads for 'justice' and a place in NATO," Macedonian news, March 2008, <http://www.vmacedonianews.com/2008/03/fyrom-pleads-for-justice-and-place-in.html>

enlargement process. They highlighted inconsistencies between the past rhetoric and current conduct of the Alliance, raised the question of credibility to ensure a normative outcome. Finally, NATO acted upon its promises but only in the case of Croatia and Albania. The public promises did not work in the case of Macedonia. The next subsection looks into the rhetoric that NATO employed in response to the rhetorical action of the candidates for membership.

### ***3.4 Rhetorical Strategies and Entrapment in NATO***

Considering that enlargement mirrored the new missions and security challenges for NATO, they framed the policy not only as joining a community of liberal norms and values, but also as an organization that is the most relevant guarantee for the security in Southeast Europe. In that context, the Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer presented the security interest of the Alliance in the region “This logic of integration through NATO enlargement remains as valid as ever... I strongly believe that for this region, Euro-Atlantic integration offers the only feasible way forward. There is simply no alternative.”<sup>135</sup>

Common values and common threats dominated the rhetoric of NATO enlargement proponents. Scheffer portrayed the common values as the core feature holding the Alliance together, but also pointed out the new threats to these common

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<sup>135</sup> NATO Speeches, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Albanian parliament, July 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060706a.htm>

values. He stressed “What has changed – is the way in which those common values are threatened, and the manner in which we have to defend them.”<sup>136</sup> He framed the expansion in the Balkans as crucial for the Alliance’s security and affirmed “it enhances prosperity and security for us all.”<sup>137</sup> Supporters of the third wave have even described integration as “this is a critical time in world history. It is a time when no single nation can stand alone...*upon the conduct of each depends the fate of all.*”<sup>138</sup>

Incremental moves that were building up the decision for enlargement are contained in the conclusions from the 2006 Riga Summit, which have recognized the success of the aspirant countries and their contribution to regional security and NATO-led missions. A wording from the Summit has created an entangling momentum for the Alliance announcing “At our next summit in 2008, the Alliance intends to extend further invitations to those countries who meet NATO’s performance based standards and are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability”.<sup>139</sup> Within that context, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense has portrayed the Albanian and Macedonian perspectives

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<sup>136</sup> NATO Speeches, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Albanian parliament, July 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060706a.htm>

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> US Department of Defense Speeches, “NATO in the 21st Century: Albanian and Macedonian Perspectives: An American View of Partnership,” February 2007, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1116>

<sup>139</sup> NATO Press Releases, Riga Summit declaration, November 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>

“two former security assistance “consumers” - have transformed themselves, in a very short time, into direct contributors to global security...”<sup>140</sup>

Secretary General speeches, during the visits of the three countries were focused on extending the zone of security and seeking to bring up to the par a credible partner in the region. NATO kept the accession criteria to the fore and placed the main emphasis on the improved parliamentary elections procedures for Macedonia and Albania, political maturity, defense reforms, rule of law and Croatia's cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.<sup>141</sup> Secretary General Scheffer explained his visits to the aspirant countries “It is to commend all three countries with the impressive progress they have made in preparing for NATO membership – and to reassure them that they will accede to NATO, if they keep up their efforts.”<sup>142</sup>

The commitments that could potentially entangle NATO were not only verbal but documented declarations such is the 2006 declaration on support for NATO membership for Adriatic three countries. NATO Parliamentary Assembly has acknowledged the

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<sup>140</sup> US Department of Defense Speeches, “NATO in the 21st Century: Albanian and Macedonian Perspectives: An American View of Partnership,” February 2007, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1116>

<sup>141</sup> NATO Press Releases, Riga Summit declaration, November 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>

<sup>142</sup> NATO Speeches, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Albanian parliament, July 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060706a.htm>

progress of these three countries and their commitment to resolve the challenges upholding the basic community principles of NATO.<sup>143</sup>

All these public speeches, visits to the countries and documented declarations were incrementally building the momentum for decision to enlarge and acquired a form of action driving mechanisms for NATO to make the decision. To answer to SEECs strategies NATO supporters of enlargement stated “When ... NATO aspirants become ready for NATO...NATO must be ready for them.”<sup>144</sup> Additional entangling rhetoric comes for the Secretary General himself when speaking before the Albanian Parliament “once a country has done what we expect from it, NATO will keep its own part of the deal – and open its doors for new members. And this means that your country’s accession to NATO is clearly no longer a question of “if”, but only of “when”.<sup>145</sup>

Since Macedonia presented a distinct case, a significant amount of rhetoric was specifically addressing the issue of this aspirant. There has been increasing support from the NATO members, who have argued in support of the progress of Macedonia including its commitment to alleviate the opposition from Greece and declare with constitutional

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<sup>143</sup> NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Declaration on support for NATO membership for Albania, Croatia and the Macedonia, 30 May 2006, Paris  
<http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=950>

<sup>144</sup> David I. McKeeby, “NATO's Door Must Remain Open, State's Volker Says: Transforming alliance's partnerships, missions to top November Riga summit agenda,” *America.gov*, May 2006  
<http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/May/20060504103754idybeekcm0.2108728.html>

<sup>145</sup> NATO Speeches, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Albanian parliament, July 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060706a.htm>

amendments no potential territorial claims on the neighboring states.<sup>146</sup> Officials from countries members of the Alliance have clearly stated that "A name cannot be an objection for the accession of a country."<sup>147</sup> In this regard is the Secretary General explanation of the role of the Bucharest Summit for the evolving mission of the Alliance. His explanation of what the invitation is based on creates another incremental move that could have brought the invitation for Macedonia. Scheffer stated that NATO is committed to invite countries at Bucharest "that meet our performance-based standards."<sup>148</sup> Considering that Macedonia has been recognized successful in meeting all performance based standards, a senior official from the international staff in NATO observed that NATO members were sending strong signals that Macedonia will get in"<sup>149</sup>

### ***3.5. The Failure of the Rhetorical Action***

Despite the rhetorical argumentation that mirrors the rhetoric used by the CEECs, rhetorical action did not produce results in the SEECs enlargement. One missing variable in this round is NATO's involvement in balancing the conflicting demands of Macedonia and Greece. Besides the small insignificant consultations, between the NATO Secretary general and Greece, NATO mainly refrained from any direct involvement in the

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<sup>146</sup> Spencer P. Boyer, "NATO: Expansion and Division," Center for American progress, March 2008, [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/03/nato\\_expansion.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/03/nato_expansion.html)

<sup>147</sup> "Greece rejects Macedonia NATO bid," BBC News, March 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7280723.stm>

<sup>148</sup> Bucharest: the place where answers take place, NATO review, 2008 <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/03/ART3/EN/index.htm>

<sup>149</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 22 Apr. 2008



opposition coming from an Ally. “The name issue is obviously a potential complication but NATO is, as an organization, simply cannot get involved in this discussion.”<sup>150</sup> Regardless of all the argumentative strategies used by Macedonia, appeals to past commitments, community principles and improved capacities, the rhetorical action has failed in ensuring rule compliant behavior. NATO Secretary General stated ““As long as the neighboring country persists in a position of intransigence, the answer is 'no solution means no invitation.'”<sup>151</sup>

Even the incremental action building rhetoric from NATO proponents who stated “...once a country has done what we expect from it, NATO will keep its own part of the deal ...”<sup>152</sup> have not entangled the Alliance into rule compliant behavior. The rhetoric has failed due to the missing variable which in the case of CEECs was the brokered agreement with Russia. The results from this study provide sufficient evidence to exclude my null hypothesis that enlargement is driven by candidate’s countries compliance with standards for membership. My working hypothesis confirms that NATO in contrast enlarges based on individual and rational preferences when and where it has perceived interest to do so.

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<sup>150</sup> NATO opinions, Pre-summit press briefing by the NATO Spokesman James Appathurai, March 2008, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080326a.html>

<sup>151</sup> “Two countries at odds over a name,” BBC News, March 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7278023.stm>

<sup>152</sup> NATO Speeches, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Albanian parliament, July 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060706a.htm>

## Conclusion

Rhetorical action was supposed to provide the missing link between the egoistic preferences and norm conforming behavior through strategic use of norm and rule based arguments justified on the basis of community rules, norms, values, where the rhetorical actors from the CEECs and SEECs shamed the ‘brakemen’ to comply and enlarge the Alliance. Schimmelfenning argues that NATO was entrapped to enlarge in the two post Cold War enlargement waves due to the use of arguments that founded on rules and norms and community markers. I argue that unless NATO signed an agreement with Russia, the entrapment would have not been possible. The Alliance had an interest to enlarge and thus pursued with alleviating the opposition from Russia. The Alliance has seen the CEECs as a way out of the death trap. The interest of NATO in the first wave was to maintain relevance, while in the second to maintain momentum. As a result, the Alliance, while gradually balancing between the competing demands from CEECs and Russia, brokered ‘genuine partnership’ with Russia. While pursuing its self-interest, the Alliance acted instrumentally and chose an option which will maximize its own interests and benefits.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Schimmelfenning p.19

In the third round of enlargement NATO has responded to the strategic use of arguments by the aspirants who justified their claims on the basis of the rules, values, norms and standards but only in the case of Albania and Croatia. Due to absence of strong opposition to Croatia and Albania, NATO allowed to be entrapped within the entangling language that questioned its image, reputation and credibility. The third round of enlargement and the case of Macedonia confirms that the rhetorical entrapment does not work. Rational school of thought considers international organizations as associations that states use to pursue their own goals.<sup>154</sup> Thus trying to entrap an organization where states join to pursue their own interests has confirmed inoperable. NATO had to deal in the third wave with opponent to the enlargement policy that comes from within its lines and is a long time member. Greece had an issue with the name of Macedonia which is perceived as a question of national interest for the country. In an organization that is based on consensual decision making with members pursuing their self-interests, the image of the organization, its reputation becomes a lower priority than countries national interest. In the case of Macedonia, the Alliance was faced with a case, which in order to be fixed, had to be influenced internally and coerced to compliance. Considering that NATO decides based on the “collective will of sovereign states”<sup>155</sup> the Alliance main interest was to preserve its unity. A senior official in NATO underlined “When country joins NATO, it does not lose its sovereignty and every member is equally regarded regardless of its seniority and size in the organization.”<sup>156</sup> Therefore, NATO besides some

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<sup>154</sup> Schimmelfenning p.19

<sup>155</sup> NATO handbook

<sup>156</sup> NATO International Staff, Senior Official . Personal Interview. 21 Apr. 2008.

small incremental moves to address this issue has circumvented the obstacle to Macedonian enlargement. The absence of agreement brokered by NATO and Greece or NATO and Macedonia is the missing variable in the background conditions that could have made the rhetoric work in the case of the SEE enlargement.

This confirms the limits of the rhetorical entrapment. My contribution is that rhetorical entrapment is not as powerful as constructivists would argue. Constructivist assumptions that norms and values strategically used result with rule compliant behavior render obsolete when faced with strong opposition from a member country. Therefore, Clinton was too quick to judge when he stated in the Warsaw Library in 1993 the question is no longer whether but when and who.

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