POST-MODERN EUROPEAN MILITARIES: ONCE MORE UNTO THE BREACH

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary
2008
Wordcount: 13 647

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

With the development of the European Security and Defence Policy since the conference of St. Malo the future of European defence and security has attracted both media coverage and academic analysis. Despite speculations of a common European army however, the actual missions European forces have engaged in, the joint training sessions and exchanges between military personnel have received little attention when compared to the political wrangling. During the Iraq crisis, for example, much of the discussion focused on the conflict between old and new member states, but little information was provided on the military capabilities of either, or on the fact that armies actually continued to collaborate during the crisis. This thesis therefore examines how and if the nature of European armies has changed, while paying special attention to what the future of civil-military relations is likely to be.

In order to asses the changes armed forces have gone through, this thesis uses the theory of Post-modern militaries (PMM). According to this theory the Cold War transformed public attitudes in Western European states to such an extent that armed forces were no longer acceptable unless they came to represent and enforce the values their host societies held. The changes in the attitudes of individuals in and outside the army therefore transformed the institution itself so as to bring it in line with the rest of society and make it post-modern in its nature as well as structure. The counterargument was that while the nature of the geo-political system changed along post-modernist lines, the military itself adapted, but did not essentially change.

Post-modern military theorists tested their model in several of the western states that are part of the European Union before publishing the results in 1999. This thesis re-examines how many of those conclusions are still valid, and also moves forward and makes an assessment of how much the model fits the realities in the new member states. However, while PMM theorists chose to make a post-modern argument using an essentially modern methodology, this thesis takes an interpretative approach based on the constructivist notion of role perception developed by Lisbeth Aggestam.

Chapter 2 – Theory and Method

2.1 Modernity and Post Modernity

Modernity and post modernity are both difficult to define since their use is extremely popular and their meaning often unclear. Both terms have been interpreted to refer either to historical periods or intellectual and artistic movements. Nevertheless, neither meaning has a clear definition or terminus point, thus making it difficult to identify how and when changes in the values of societies and not geo-political shifts are relevant to the transformations of military structures. Dandeker[1] pointed to the end of the Cold War as the beginning of "new times" that sparked the need for the army's role in society to be redefined. More recently, Edmunds[2] added the rise in civil conflict and the terrorist attacks of September 11 to the list of events that influenced the same process. However, in order to have a clearer understanding of the philosophy behind the PMM debate, this section reviews the ideas behind modernity, as well as what and when followed after it.

2.1.1 Modernity

The beginning of the modern era has been placed anywhere from the XVI to the XIX century, depending on what historical moment is made reference to. In any case one point of agreement is that modernization encompasses all the social, economical and political changes occurring with the advent of industrial society. Ernest Gellner[3], defined modernity as the period following the end of agrarian society. He described the change from one type of society to another in terms of societal structures, religion, industry and so on, but focused on nationalism as the fundamental element of modernization. Gellner therefore associated modernization with the rise of the modern nation state, and in that sense one of the most relevant historical moments is the 1648 treaty of Westphalia which established the principle of sovereignty.

[1] Christopher Dandeker. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Dec., 1994):637.
[2] Timothy Edmunds. "What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe." *International Affairs* 82, no. 6 (November 2006): 1059-1075.
[3] Ernest Gellner. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Brian Downing referred more specifically to the "military revolution,"[4] which supposedly occurred between the XVI and XVII century period. He argued that a new dynamic was introduced to civil-military relations when autocrats began building armies under monarchic power, thus centralizing military authority. The defining moment in terms of what this thesis defines as modern militaries, however, is the French Revolution in 1793 when mass conscription was formally enforced for the first time, though it was never used again until the First World War. This was the period of leaping technological advances, which completely changed the mechanics and strategies of warfare. In fact, railways and the telegraph greatly expedited the unification of Germany in 1871. Another important change was the regularization and formalization of the rules of war into law, the first instance of which is the 1856 Declaration of Paris. This pact and the ones soon following it would not have existed without the increasing pattern of alliances and international treaties. While the tendency to make secret agreements might have led to World War I, the removal of secrecy now led to the creation of a body of international law which in time established bounds on sovereignty and international responsibility.

The ideational base of modernism can however be traced to the principles of enlightenment, which are well summarised by Jane Flax[5]. According to Flax, modernism assumes the existence of a knowable self, who, through rational enquiry, can reach objective, universal truths. This kind of reasoned analysis produces science, the only form of knowledge that is acceptable, which in turn leads to undeterred progress. Furthermore, according to this system of beliefs, "freedom consists in obedience to laws that conform to the necessary results of the right use of reason."[6] Therefore, existence in modern society implies compliance with moral imperatives and civil obligations, in order to ensure order and stability. Within society continuity and certainty was observable in the maintainance of a coherent and hierarchical social order.

Gellner argued that the unwavering belief in reason and scientific progress was based on two elements: consistency (the similar treatment of cases) and efficiency (the rational selection of a course of action). These beliefs transfered to the academic

[4] Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
[5] Jane Flax. "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory." *Signs*, Vol. 12, No. 4, Within and Without: Women, Gender, and Theory (Summer, 1987): 621-643.
[6] Ibid. 624.

environment as the doctrine of positivism, which crystalized all the above mentioned concepts and pronounced that for a theory to be valid, it needed to be testable and predictive.

The modern conception of the military therefore needs to be understood in terms of it being developed as the sovereign state emerged, and as enlightenment thinking dominated. The purpose of the military was therefore rationally defined to be to ensure the survival of the nation state. Furthermore, since the coherence of modern society was defined against the anarchy that reigned outside it, the military acted as a protector of stability. In fact, Christopher Coker[7] argued that the state itself became the embodiment of all that is virtuous, and therefore the ability to protect the state in the chaos of battle was the only thing able to grant the rights of full citizenship. Bethke Elshtein[8] also brought up arguments that, due to universal male conscription, the very notion of modern citizenship became linked to the physical defence of sovereignty, thus defining citizenship as militarized. According to this line of thought, because military service is the ultimate form of civil service it ends up protecting not only the national territory, but also its very basic social structure and mores. Michel Foucault actually implied that the modern military attempted to create and replicate the ideal modern society:

> „Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century; but there was also a military dream of society; its fundamental reference was ... to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, ... to permanent coercions, ... to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility. . . While jurists or philosophers were seeking in the pact a primal model for the construction or reconstruction of the social body, the soldiers and with them the technicians of discipline were elaborating procedures for the individual and collective coercion of bodies."[9]

[7] Christopher Coker, "Humanising Warfare, or Why Van Creveld May be Missing the Big Picture" (*Millennium* vol.29, no.2, 2000)
[8] Bethke J. Elshtain. „'Shooting' at the Wrong Target: A Response to Van Creveld" *Millennium:* (*Journal of International Studies*, Volume 29, Number 2, 1 June 2000): 446
[9] Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 169.

2.1.2 Post-modernity

Post modernism replaced the belief in perpetual progress and the certainty of scientific inquiry with relativism and interpretation. Like "modernity," the term itself is used in reference to either to a time period or to an abstract concept. The end of modernity is often placed at the end of the Cold War, even though the origins of post-modernism can be traced further back. With regards to the military, however, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the type and immediacy of threat it represented was a terminus point, since it completely changed what was expected of Western European militaries.

In an abstract sense, post modernism can refer either to the complex social, political and economic changes occurring after the end of modernity as defined by industrialized nations, or to the intellectual movement that sought to go beyond the "scientific" absolutes of the previous era. Post-modernist ideas were first expressed in the 1960s as part of a new intellectual movement observable in anything from painting to music to architectural style. It was only ten years later that the academic environment created an articulation of what would become postmodernism, and it initially took the form of literary criticism. Its philosophic inspiration however, is considered to be the experience of World War II and the rigidity of thought that led to it. By contrast, the post-modern philosophical writers such as Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard criticised the intellectual orthodoxism of modern thought. Lyotard argued that modern scientific reasoning did not create objective, universal truths but rather that it created meta-narratives, such as Marxism for example. He did "not understand why so many sociologists continue to embrace positivism, and strive to model their discipline after a version of the physical sciences that has long been abandoned."[10]

The problem was that while rejecting the ordered certainty of the modernist model, post-modernism did not, and could not, offer anything but diversity and fragmentation in return. Since it is so reliant on the negation of modernism, establishing the limits of what phenomena post-modernism encompasses is difficult, particularly since the same dynamics have been described as late modernity or

[10] Jean-François Lyotard in John W. Murphy, "The Relevance of Postmodernism for Social Science," *Diogenes.* 143 (1988): 98.

globalization. The concept therefore received much criticism and was at one point considered a form of intellectual confusion In fact, Pauline Rosenau stated that as a post-modernist academic "you can say anything you want,[11]" thus bringing about the most outlandish of theories in the spirit of teenage rebellion. Instead, John Murphy[12] argues, post-modernists do not eliminate rules, but rather they make a conscious, critical choice as to whether to follow them or not. Thus, if modernism had an enthusiasm for the regulated accumulation of knowledge, post-modernism was focused on re-organising that knowledge critically so as to make it functional. Therefore, establishing whether something is true is irrelevant compared to knowing who or what makes it true.

This type of thinking meant that post-modernists were far more sensitive and aware to the distribution of power, a theme that is particularly prevalent in the work of Foucault. The rejection of absolutes, together the awareness that social hierarchies were imposed rather than "natural" or scientific, meant that obedience was no longer inherently virtuous. Therefore the ideal of ordered social hierarchies was recognized as a "meta-narrative" that can no longer be perpetuated in a post-modern world without being challenged. This may lead in principle to a more egalitarian world, but the resulting instability has also been interpreted as the decline o modern society. David Elkind talks, for example, of the collapse of the traditional family unit and its urbanization.[13] He points to the decline in the number of traditional nuclear families as an example of the intermingling between personal and public space and proof of the deterioration of ties between the individual and society at large.

According to Ronald Inglehart[14] this is not restricted to the family unit; instead, post-modernity brings with it a commitment to individuality and self-development as opposed to the focus on the greater good/unit and scientific rationality. Since progress can no longer be delineated clearly through a rational process, threats are also less clearly identifiable and therefore performing compliantly in the military looses some of its moral high ground. Post-modernity thus severs the military's automatic

[11] Pauline Rosenau. *Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992):137.
[12] John W. Murphy, "The Relevance of Postmodernism for Social Science," *Diogenes* 143 (1988):106-108.
[13] David Elkind, "Schooling and Family in the Postmodern World," in *Rethinking Educational Change with Heart and Mind*, ed. Andy Hargreaves (Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1997): 27-42.
[14] Ronald Inglehart in Christopher Coker, "Humanising Warfare, or Why Van Creveld May be Missing the Big Picture" *Millennium* vol.29, no.2, (2000)

connection to the "soul" of the nation, and therefore its primary role as protector of it. The uncertainty inherent in being part of the military in this new post-modern environment has been mentioned repeatedly by military personnel[15] as transformative of training and education techniques as well as combat practices. Apparently, even during training absolute hierarchies and abstruse orders are no longer enough to motivate soldiers. In addition, during combat, the blurring of civilian and military targets means that more on the spot decisions need to be made, and therefore designing or following complex campaign plans is no longer entirely achievable. Mary Kaldor[16] described the change to how militaries interact with their new geo-strategic environment with the term "new wars." These conflicts, she argues, do not respond to the reactions ingrained in traditional training. The "new wars," differ from traditional conflicts in that their goals are identity led rather than geo-political, their financing is decentralized rather than totalized and autarchic, and methods and training become guerrilla like compared to the attrition based armies of the early twentieth century.

The more self-aware members of the society, faced with "new wars," and having different priorities can no longer have the same relation to their defenders. Max Silverman termed these changes "the revenge of the civil society,"[17] meaning that the military is increasingly required to reflect the character of the nation that pays for it. And, Silverman argues, since societies are becoming increasingly diverse and humanistic, military conduct even in war would need to be more civil and compassionate. In that sense the "nation building" role of the military is reversed and the belief that when soldiers go out into the world to fight they no longer need to keep to the usual ethical standards, what Coker terms the "heroic warrior" ideal, is no longer acceptable. The post-modern military education therefore need to ensure that soldiers are citizens first and warriors later. The result, Coker says, is that "the individual becomes the subject of history for the first time."[18]

These changes within militaries and the doubts over what they are becoming have received as much criticism as the concept of post-modernism itself. Rather than

[15] Burridge, Brian. "Post-Modern Military Education: Are We Meeting the Challenge?." *Defence Studies* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2001): xiii.
[16] Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2006).
[17] Max Silverman. *Facing Post Modernism: Contemporary French Thought on Culture and Society* (London: Routledge, 1999).
[18] Christopher Coker. "On Humanizing War." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* vol.1, no.2 (Autumn 2000).82.

considering it an evolution, different arguments have been made that we are observing the decline of the (modern) military. On the one hand, cultural approaches have made the argument that there is a collapse in the discipline and culture of the military. Christian Rouillard[19] for one argued that when respect for hierarchies and allegiance to military values, with their base in nationalism and order, no longer function, the very base of western military strength becomes corrupted. Martin Van Creveld[20] also took a traditional positivist approach and started off from the belief the army has a historically confirmed organizational structure that is derived from and fundamental to its ability to protect its host society. Thus, to him, any significant organizational change is by definition a perversion, a decline. In fact, he equates the extent of post-modernization with the extent of integration of women as well as privatization of security and argues these caused a decline in both effectiveness and "spirit".

2.2 Post-modern Military Debate

Although much has been written on the subject of civil-military relations by postmodernists, the theory that this thesis is concerned with was elaborated in a volume edited by Charles Moskos, John Williams and David Segal[21]. However, even within that book two sides of the debate were present. On the one hand, Charles Moskos, is the one to have formulated the core of the theory and set out the variables. He argued that in North America and Western Europe the extent and type of changes that have occurred within military organizations since the end of the Cold war were enough to consider them „post-modern."[22] On the other hand, David Segal argued that there was no significant shift in what military organizations are, but instead they are merely reforming in order to adapt to an increasingly post-modern world.

[19] Christian Rouillard, "From Cynicism to Organizational Disillusion: New Public Management as Confusion Factor," *Choices* 9, 6 (August 2003): 20–36. LU BONDY
[20] Martin Van Creveld. „The Great Illusion: Women in the Military", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000): 429-42.
[21] Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal. Edit. *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)
[22] Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal. "Armed Forces after the Cold War" in Moskos et al. (1999):1.

2.2.1 Post-modern military

The essential shift that makes militaries "post-modern" is that, much like Max Silverman[23] had predicted, citizens are no longer willing to support armed forces which do not represent the values of society at large. According to Moskos, and most of the authors in the volume, the end of the Cold War was the major impulse for the transformation of military organizations that caused them to have looser ties to the nation state. "The basic format shifts toward a volunteer force, more multipurpose in mission, increasingly androgynous in make-up and ethos, and with greater permeability with civilian society"[24]

In order to prove that the term Post-modern is necessary and relevant, the authors identify three major historical periods during which changes occurring within military organizations are observed through the use of eleven variables. Charles Moskos is the one who described the variations of the variables, which is represented in the table bellow. When examining the reform patterns, he found that usual modern to post-modern historical division was not sufficient. Thus he introduced the Cold War period as a distinctive middle stage named the "late modern" period, between 1945 and 1990. Although his analysis refers to the case of the United States military in particular, he argues that the same patterned occurred throughout most Western European states. The model was therefore tested, using the same variables, in study cases of the United Kingdom by Christopher Dandeker, France by Bernard Boëne and Michael Louis Martin, Germany by Bernard Fleckenstein, the Netherlands by Jan S. van der Meulen, Denmark by Henning Sorensen and Italy by Marina Nuciari.[25] However, the purpose of the volume was not to capture the exact reforms in each state, but rather to determine a pattern of changes and potentially gain some insight into where armed forces are heading. The difficult part was to prove that, if it exists, the discovered path is essentially "post-modern."

[23] Silverman, 1999.
[24] Moskos et al. 1.
[25] Moskos et al. (1999)

Table 1.

Variable	Modern 1900-1945	Late modern 1945-1990	Post-modern Since 1990
Perceived Threat	Enemy invasion	Nuclear war	Subnational
Force Structure	Mass army conscription	Large professional army	Small professional army
Major Mission Definition	Defence of homeland	Support of alliance	New missions (humanitarian, peacekeeping)
Dominant Military Personnel	Combat leader	Manager or technician	Soldier statesman/scholar
Civilian Employees	Minor component	Medium component	Major Component
Spouses and the Military	Integral part	Partial involvement	Removed
Women's Role	Separate corps or excluded	Partial integration	Full integration
Homosexuals in the Military	Punished	Discharged	Accepted
Conscientious Objectors	Limited or prohibited	Routinely permitted	Subsumed under civilian service
Public Attitude toward Military	Supportive	Ambivalent	Indifferent
Media Relations	Incorporated	Manipulated	Courted

Based on Moskos et al. 15.

Despite stating in the beginning that what makes the current militaries distinctive is precisely the relationship they have with their host societies, Moskos clearly states that the model he sets out is focused on capturing only organizational changes within the military. The variables he uses can however be divided based on whether they are strictly organizational or hint at the shift in the relationship with the wider public.

Four variables refer to the organization of the military per-se and its self definition. The *perceived threat* referrers to the threats to which the military had responded at different times. According to the established typology, modern militaries responded to threats to territorial integrity within the bounds of conventional warfare. The Cold War period, with the advent of nuclear weapons, invasion was no longer important when compared to the threat of complete annihilation. During the post modern period brought about the non-state threats of terrorism and non-conventional warfare. In that sense the instability of new wars was enough to cause a threat. It is interesting to note that Moskos ascribes the Golf war to the late-modern period, despite its oil-driven motivation. It is also important to note that Moskos argues that

what is being threatened within society has changed, but does not talk about how society itself perceived or understood these threats. This particular variable tested positively across European countries and France in particular, according to John Allen Williams who wrote the conclusion to the volume and the final results of the study cases[26].

The second organizational variable, the *force structure*, describes the size of military forces and the degree of professionalization present. According to Williams this change has been driven mainly by the decreasing military budgets, since popular support for military activity is difficult to garner.[27] The issue of private military forces, which has been present in the literature and particularly vital in Britain at one point, is not discussed at all however. The treatment of *conscientious objectors* is a variable assessing the openness to diversity, meaning the willingness to consider motives beside religion for not wanting to take part in military operations, or offering the possibility of alternative service. With the end of conscription, however this variable becomes practically irrelevant. The *major mission definition* refers to the major role played by the military and type of situations it was called on, meaning defence of the homeland, support of and alliance and the multiple post-modern types of missions of recent history. Strangely, he includes "geo-economic[28]" motivations in the third type even though he had excluded the Gulf War earlier for the same reason. In addition, he does not include "invasion" types of operation, which could arguably describe the recent war in Afghanistan, in which European forces were involved and which better fits the second type of motivation. In fact an attack on any NATO member is likely to bring about the same type of traditional response. Arguably therefore, it is not a case of a change of mission definition as much as a change in geo-strategic environment. When assessing how well the variable tested, Williams argued that even though the type if missions involved may not fit the traditional definition of military action, they are becoming the rule rather than the exception.

The next two variables refer to the military personnel within military structures. The *dominant military personnel* variable refers to the role the "ideal soldier" is supposed to play. Williams found that rather than shifting from one ideal to another, the three types (combat leader, manager or technician and soldier statesman/scholar)

[26] John Allen Williams. "The Postmodern Military Reconsidered" in Moskos et al. 267.
[27] Ibid. 267.
[28] Moskos et al. 17.

actually coexist or simply overlap[29]. In fact, the combat leader in particular needs to be able to perform all roles and therefore military education should not only provide strict technical knowledge, but also to ability to use that knowledge functionally. The other component of the military, Moskos argues, the number of *civilian employees* has steadily increased over each period once again due to decreasing budgets. Furthermore, the functions performed by civilians have in number and substance from strictly acting as support personnel to performing a number of expert tasks, particularly as part of the new post-modern civilian missions.

Four of the variables have a more sociological valence and make a better attempt at describing the type of connection between the host society and the members of the military: *spouses and the military, women's role,* and the presence of *homosexuals in the military*. Spouses are supposedly increasingly removed from the modern role they has as "social facilitators," especially as wives to officers. With the advent of post-modern individuality, spouses develop their own lives and no longer accept being defined bases on their partners' careers. The situation of women and homosexuals in the military has been particularly contentious in the academic literature and visible for the wider public. As indicated in the previous chapter, Martin Van Creveld saw the presence of either group in military sources as a cause and indicator of decline in both ethos and efficiency. In the same vein, a former American army officer talked of the "emasculation" of the army as the only way feminists had managed to infiltrate military ranks by provoking "gender scandals.[30]" He went on to describe the change involved in training women and the necessity to "be nice" and say that weapons will maim and not kill people. The integration of women, and homosexuals in other cases, meant that the moral foundations of prejudice that were inculcated in and during military training were no longer acceptable. Furthermore, the gentling of language and the requirement of civility irrespective of rank are particularly relevant if analysed from a post-modernist perspective because they reveal a change in the language, and therefore world of meaning that the military produces. For this thesis therefore it is not the number of women or homosexuals in the military that is, per se, relevant, nor is absolute efficiency. Instead, it is pertinent to investigate what kind of role either

[29] Williams in Moskos et al. 268.
[30] Brian Mitchell, "Clintonite's slap reveals Marines at war with feminization." *Human Events* 53, 45 (28 Nov. 1997): 3.

group is allowed to take, why, and what the reaction to reform in this area is from both the military and society.

Finally the last two variables describe the *public attitude toward the military* and the *media relations* with armed forces. Moskos argues that the end of subscription decreased the salience of military issues and that "willingness of a country to accept casualties in wartime is positively related to the proportion of elite youth who are putting their lives on the line."[31] However, contrary to the predicted indifference, the findings of the studies of {insert authors we} were that at least in western Europe the public had remained supportive of the military, without wanting to participate in it themselves. As to *media relations*, in this case Williams concluded that the expected move from incorporation, through manipulation, and to cooperation was respected, with the reservation that in the United States the pattern was different.

[31] Moskos et al. 20.

2.2.2 Post-modern world

Bradford Booth, Meyer Kestnbaum and David R. Segal[32] wrote about the same organizational changes described by PMM theorists, but interpreted the situation not as fundamental change to the nature of the military but rather as the rational adaptation of an organization faced with a changing environment. The new type of missions and the internal reorganization, the authors argue, are not exclusive to this time period. To support this they quote David Harvey[33] and Segal and Segal[34] with studies that identified continuities to the internal reforms and maintenance of the basic military hierarchies. In fact they argue that what occurred was that "modernism crystallized since the end of the cold war."[35] The authors are concerned with the application of the term "post-modern," especially when it is taken to mean merely post-Cold War. They therefore set up three standards that will make the term, and the change it describes, relevant:

> (1) observed changes in the organization of the armed forces accord with or correspond to central patterns of organizational change specified in postmodern social theory; (2) these changes can adequately be said to have been caused by a process specified as distinctly postmodern by postmodern social theory; and (3) the changes are more adequately captured by postmodern social theory than by some other alternative.

By applying this test to the PMM theory they find that as for any formal organization, some degree of flexibility and change in organizational structures are necessary to survive in a rapidly changing environment. Furthermore they argue that since some of the changes predate the Cold War the assignation of the historical period as post-modern in the model does not stand. In addition, since the changes occurred over time in a cumulative fashion, they do not represent an identifiable post-modern shift.

[32] Bradford Booth, Meyer Kestnbaum and David R. Segal. "Are Post-Cold War Militaries Postmodern?." *Armed Forces & Society (Transaction Publishers)* 27, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 319-342.
[33] David Harvey. *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers, 1989).
[34] David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, "Change in Military Organization," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 151-170.
[35] Booth et al. 320.

2.3 Unto the Breach

Although the theme of the PMM volume is post-modern, the methodology is not, and Williams[36] clearly states that the study cases used are all empiricist in their approach. Thus one of the criticisms made by the opposite side of the debate is that it is incongruent to set up a relativist argument by using positivist, empirical causal links. A further criticism is that by focussing exclusively on the organizational changes taking place within the military the PPM theorists loose sight of the extent to which soldiers and the organization as a whole interact with society at large. This is a serious fault seeing as the driving argument is that the cause for reforms is the post-modern character of society and its members. Therefore, this thesis not adopt the traditionalist methodology used in the PMM volume study cases, and will instead take an interpretative, post modern approach. The methodology is based on the constructivist concept of role perception in the spirit of Lisbeth Aggestam.[37] As the society's *expectations* of the how the military should act take a post-modern turn, the military's own self *conception* changes and *performance*, logically gains a new direction and new standards. The data analysed in the following is either secondary literature or primary sources, mainly statistical, on armed forces of the old and new members of the European Union, mainly covering the period since the end of the Cold War. The aim is to use the organizational reforms occurring in military organizations to establish how and when the post modern character of society manifests itself is those reforms.

[36] Williams in Moskos et al. 265.
[37] Lisbeth Aggestam. "Role Identity and the Europeanization of Foreign Policy: A Political-Cultural Approach", in *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy* eds. Ben Tonra & Thomas Christiansen. (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press., 2004): 88.

Chapter 3 – Western Militaries

This chapter attempts to find whether the findings of the PPM theorists still apply to the militaries of Western EU members, and what the implication of that would be. An empirical approach is taken to asses the strictly organizational changes and to some extent some of the causal links established in the model, particularly military expenditure. Secondary literature will then be used to investigate the changes of roles within the military and the relationship with host societies.

3.1 Western Militaries in Numbers

The study cases present in the PMM volume led Williams[38] to state that Western states have followed the path described by the model, though some individual differences remained. This section examines the extent to which that assessment is still valid for the states that are members of the European Union. However, since changes have not occurred across all variables, only the pertinent ones will be discussed here, and by enlarge in reference only to the period after the volume was initially published in 1999.

The *major mission definition* value of "new peacekeeping and humanitarian missions" accurately describes all of the missions that European armed forces have been involved in since 1999. The exceptions may be the 2001 campaign in Afghanistan and the 2003 operation in Iraq, which may also fit into the description of invasions, though they have not been formally framed that way on the international scene. Without going into the rift that the Iraq campaign created in diplomatic relations in Europe and with the United States, the fact remains that this type of operations are the exceptions rather than the rule. Notably, all of the current operations under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) fall under the new missions' definition established by the PMM volume. (See Table 2.)

[38] John Allen Williams. "The Postmodern Military Reconsidered" in Moskos et al. 272.

Table 2. Current ESDP missions[39].

WESTERN BALKANS
EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea)
EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM)
European Union rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO)
MIDDLE-EAST
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)
EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah)
EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (Eujust Lex)
ASIA
EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN)
AFRICA
EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau)
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
EUPOL RD CONGO
EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo)

However, unlike in the original volume, for the interest of this thesis it is not only the absolute value of the variable that matters, but also its perception by host societies. From this post-modern approach the assessment of how successful the *major mission definition* variable is in describing the situation is not nearly as clear-cut. In fact, according to a survey conducted by Pilippe Manigart[40] for a Special Eurobarometer on Public Opinion and European Defence, 94% percent of the population still sees the primary role of the military to be the protection of the nation state (See Table 3). While it is true that 80% also mentioned the new missions, these results emphasize that the temporal divisions set by the PMM model do not accurately describe the situation, since the value of the *major mission definition* in the modern period is clearly still valid. What can and has been said by Manigart[41] that, as the number of "new missions" has increased, their reception by the public has been quite positive,

[39] http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g
[40] Philippe Manigart. „Special Eurobarometer 146 - Public Opinion and European Defence" *The Transformation of Europe's Security and Defense Policy: Public Opinion and European Security*. (July 2001) Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/ebs_146_en.pdf
[41] Philippe Manigart. "Risks and Recruitment in Postmodern Armed Forces: The Case of Belgium." *Armed Forces & Society* 31, no. 4 (July 2005): 559-582.

and in addition they have indeed increased the reputation of armed forces that have taken part in them.

The model also seems to fail in the case of predicting the value of the *public attitude toward the military* variable. Indeed the special survey indicated that the military was the most trusted national institution (over 70% of citizens were rather confident in the military). However, correlating this value with the perceived *major mission definition* and the fact that most media coverage has focused on the political side of military operations, the high trust in the institution need not be strictly relevant. Though the following argument has been made by Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster [42] only in relation to new member states, a similar conclusion can be made in this case. If the public is not aware of how the very nature, capabilities and mission of the military have changed, than the trust they exhibit may well be a remnant of modern assumptions.

The predicted *perceived threat* variable fares much better in describing the opinions of the European public: the first three most mentioned threats are indeed subnational and of the type mentioned in the PMM model (organised crime, accident in a nuclear plant and terrorism, all by over 70% - See Table 3). However, traditional threats of the type described as modern and late modern (nuclear and conventional warfare) are still held by nearly half of the European citizens, thus indicating that the fixed temporal periods are still not effective.

By contrast, Table 4 bellow mostly confirms the Conclusions drawn by Williams in the conclusion. The military expenditure, which is used as indicative of both public support and military size, has gone down since 2000 with very little variation. While motivations may be different, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have maintained relatively more forces and invested more compared to the other member states, as is evident for example in the financing of ESDP missions[43] (between 13% and 20% of GNI). Furthermore, only six of the western states maintain conscription and most offer an alternative to strict military service – thus meeting the predicted values for *force structure* and *conscientious objectors*. The presence of women is no longer completely barred in any of the western states, though a few maintain restrictions on participation special units (in UK, Portugal and the Netherlands).

[42] Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster. "Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist Europe: Assessing the Transition." European Security 14, no. 1 (March 2005): 11

[43] EU Council Secretariat. "Financing of ESDP operations." (June 2007). Available from: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june_2007.pdf

Table 3. PMM variables, their expected value and the values found in the Eurobarometer 146[44].

Variable	Predicted Value	Current Value
Perceived Threat	Subnational	• Organised crime (77 %) • Accident in a nuclear power plant (75 %) • Terrorism (74 %) • Nuclear conflict in Europe (44 %) • Conventional war in Europe (45 %) • World war (45 %)
Major mission Definition	New missions (humanitarian, peacekeeping)	• Defence of the country (94 %) • Helping the nation in case of (natural, ecological or nuclear) disasters (91 %) • Peacekeeping or peacemaking (80%) • Defending values such as freedom and democracy (70%)
Public Attitude toward Military	Indifferent	• The military was the most trusted institution among the 16 mentioned by Eurobarometer 146. • Across Europe - 71 % - rather confident in the military • Highest - Finland (91 %) • Lowest - Spain (65 %) • Four other below the European average: Denmark (66 %), Italy (67 %), • Belgium (67 %) and France (68 %).

[44] Philippe Manigart. (July 2001) Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/ebs_146_en.pdf

Table 4. Unless otherwise mentioned, all information was obtained from the CIA World Factbook[45] except for military expenditure as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) which came from the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute[46]

Country	Conscription	Women	Military Expenditure (% of GDP)*
Austria	– 18-35 years of age for compulsory military service; – 16 years of age for male or female voluntary service; – service obligation 7 months of training, followed by an 8-year reserve obligation (2006)	N/A	0,8 % (2006)
Belgium	– **No Conscription** – 18 years of age for voluntary military service;	Women may serve in any military branch;	1,3 % (2006)
Denmark	– 18 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service; – conscripts serve an initial training period that varies from 4 to 12 months according to specialization; – reservists are assigned to mobilization units following completion of their conscript service;	Women eligible to volunteer for military service (2004)	1,5 % (2006)
Finland	– 18 years of age for male voluntary and compulsory national military and nonmilitary service; – service obligation 6-12 months (2007)	Women between 18 and 30 years of age have the possibility of voluntarily undertake military service in the Defence Forces or in the Border Guard. Females serve under the same conditions as men, with the exception that during the first 45 days of service they have the option to leave the military without consequences.	1,4 % (2006)

[45] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
[46] http://www.sipri.org/

France	– **No conscription** – 17-40 years of age for male or female voluntary military service; – 12-month service obligation;	Women serve in non-combat military posts (2005)	2,6 % (2006)
Germany	– 18 years of age – conscripts serve a 9-month tour of compulsory military service (2004)	Women can serve in all branches without restriction since 2001, but they are not subject to conscription.	1,3 % (2006)
Greece	– 18 years of age for compulsory military service; during wartime the law allows for recruitment beginning January of the year of inductee's 18th birthday, thus including 17 year olds; – conscript service obligation - 12 months for the Army, Air Force; 15 months for Navy; – 17 years of age for volunteers;	Women are eligible for voluntary military service (2007)	3,8 % (2006)
Ireland	– **No Conscription** – 17-25 years of age for voluntary military service; – 16 years of age can be recruited for apprentice specialist positions; – maximum obligation 12 years; – 17-35 years of age for the Reserve Defense Forces (2008)	N/A	0,5 % (2006)
Italy	– **No conscription** – 18-27 year of age for voluntary military service; – 10-month service obligation, with a reserve obligation to age 45 (Army and Air Force) or 39 (Navy) (2006)	Women may serve in any military branch;	1,8 % (2006)
Luxemburg	– **No Conscription** – 17-25 years of age for male and female voluntary military service; – soldiers under 18 are not deployed into combat or with peacekeeping missions; (2008)	Women serve without restrictions on positions or specialities, including combat.	0,8 % (2006)

Netherlands	– **No Conscription** – 20 years of age for an all-volunteer force (2004) – Both women and men can serve in two major categories: Contract for an indefinite period of time or Short Term Contract.[47]	Women serve in military services, except the Submarine service, Marine Corps and the Commando Corps[48]	1,5 % (2006)
Portugal	– **No Conscription** – 18 years of age for voluntary military service;	Women serve in the armed forces, on naval ships since 1993, but are prohibited from serving in some combatant specialties (2005)	1,9 % (2006)
Spain	– **No conscription** – starts at 20 years of age	Women are able to serve in all posts without any restriction, including combat functions.[49]	1,2 % (2006)
Sweden	– 19 years of age for compulsory military service; conscript service obligation: – 7-15 months (Navy), 8-12 months (Air Force); – after completing initial service, soldiers have a reserve commitment until age 47 (2006)	Women serve without restrictions on positions or specialities, including combat.	1,5 % (2006)
United Kingdom	– **No conscription** – 16-33 years of age (officers 17-28) for voluntary military service (with parental consent under 18); – must be citizen of the UK, Commonwealth, or Republic of Ireland; – reservists serve a minimum of 3 years, to age 45 or 55;	Women serve in military services, but are excluded from ground combat positions and some naval postings;	2,6 % (2006)

[47] http://www.nato.int/ims/2001/win/netherlands.htm
[48] Ibid.
[49] http://www.nato.int/ims/2001/win/spain.htm

The value of the media relations variable also presents an interesting puzzle. Most of the missions in which European forces have participated have been "internationalized" and contained personnel from several states. The interaction with the media has tended to function through the managing international institution, meaning mostly through the European Union press releases. The coverage has therefore been focused on the political implications and missions were presented as acts of international prestige rather than military prowess. It is thus difficult to assess whether the media has been courted or manipulated, since the lack of glamour and clear victories of new missions has attracted very little actual media coverage. In addition, the treatment of *homosexuals in the military* has improved, as evidenced for example by the United Kingdom changing its policy in 2000. However, acceptance is still not the value that can be attributed to cases other than those already mentioned at the time of the publication.

Overall, the conclusion drawn by Williams in the conclusion of the PMM volume is till valid, with the only important exception being the perception of the *major mission definition* variable.

3.2 Implications of Having Post-Modern Militaries

Although the variables examined in the previous section follow the patterns described by the PMM theorists that is not to say that the term readily applies. One the one hand the objections raised by the opposing side of the debate still stand in terms of proving that this is a complete shift rather than cumulative adaptation. Furthermore, the information needed to asses many of the other variables is not accessible due to the nature of the subject. Nevertheless, a more post-modern approach to the issue might prove more relevant in assessing what the consequences of having a PMM. To that end, the impact of some of the social phenomena described as post-modernist will be assessed in terms of its effects on the military and its role in society. To capture this several themes will be considered organized on three analytical levels are examined that of the individual, the organization and society at large.

3.2.1 Individuals – Motivations and Risk

In the discussion of post-modernism the rejection of absolutes and unswerving allegiance were mentioned. According to Ronald Inglehart[50] this led, during the 1960s, to a rejection of cold rationality and materialist logics. Instead there was an increasing emphasis on self development and a new sense of adventurousness. This also reflect in the way that individuals interact with organizations, therefore, for post modern thinker acting as part of an organization is neither about belonging nor about material gain, but rather finding a path to self-development. The modern obsession continuous progress has been driven inward, bringing with it increased self reliance, and therefore a severance of links with authority. In terms of the military, Fabrizio Battistelli[51] was one of the first to do a study case with the members of the Italian army and create a typology to understand why soldiers are willing to take on the most irrational of tasks: risking their lives. After doing a case study of motivations given by soldiers that took part in military operations in Albania and Somalia, Battistelli found that the responses fell into three types that correspond to the PMM periods. He found that pre-modern motivations were largely normative, modern ones were instrumental or utilitarian and post-modern ones revolved around experiencing and adventure. However, Battistelli does not ascribe each of these motivation types to a clear time line. Instead, he argues that the three are synchronic and not mutually exclusive. He also found that the highest percentage of motivations given were post-modern, even though the percentages differed based on whether the men were drafted or professional soldiers.

Table 4.

Batistelli's Results - Italy			
Mission	Pre-modern: Traditional	Modern Utilitarian	Post-modern Adventure
Albania	15%	40%	45%
Somalia	14%	33%	53%

Table 5.

Manigart's Results - Belgium			
Educational level	Pre-modern: Traditional	Modern Utilitarian	Post-modern Adventure
Officer Candidates	5-20%	50%	77-79%
Enlisted Personnel	15%	80%	50%

[50] Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)
[51] Battistelli, Fabrizio. "Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier." *Armed Forces & Society (Transaction Publishers)* 23, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 467-484.

Manigart[52] applied Battistelli's model to the armed forces in Belgium, although he used surveys made by the military rather than custom tailored to the subject. His findings confirm Battistelli's finding on the increase of numbers that cite post-modern motivations and in fact it has apparently been on the rise among officer candidates since 1997. However, just like Battistelli, Manigart found that enlisted personnel tends to be far more materialistic in their choice, desiring either a stable job in the national military bureaucracy or experience they can afterwards use in other jobs. For both cases the high number of post-modern type motivations given is not relevant in and of itself as it might simply indicate what kind of people tend to enlist. Furthermore, the existence of post-modern motivations does not preclude utilitarian ones, but the primacy of one or the other is relevant. The most relevant result for this thesis is that the percentage of experience and adventure type motivations is on the rise in both cases, thus indicating that attitudes are continuing to change along the path predicted by PMM theorists.

Having the type of post-modern adventurous motivations that Inglehart predicts does not however translate to an increase willingness to take risks, as Manigart mistakenly argues. Instead, this type of near narcissistic behaviour emphasises self preservation as much as self-fulfilment. Risk of death or bodily harm is not acceptable to the post-modern individual, and since modern and post-modern thinking coexist the desire to experience is moderated by the desire to not come to harm. The propensity to avoid risk is also reflected in Manigart's findings: among the jobs recommended those involving a formal degree of risk received the lowest ratings (gendarmerie, police and military).[53]

3.2.2 Organization – Military Structure and Bureaucracy

This increasing degree of risk aversion had had an effect on two of the variables considered by both sides of the PMM debate: *force structure* and *major mission definition*. The PM world theorists argued that the size of military forces has decreased both because of the changing geo-political situation and the lack of funds. However, one aspect that was not carefully examined was the armed forces' ability to recruit personnel, which decreases if the organization is not capable of offering new incentives that match the new post-modern individual. On the other hand, the same self-preservation instinct has influenced mission definitions in terms of increasing demands for a type of "no harm rule." The missions that

[52] Manigart. (2005).
[53] Manigart, 569.

PMM will take part in will therefore be only the ones in which minimal casualties can be insured, as was described by Manigart in the case of the Belgian armed forces.

These types of policies are discussed by both sides of the debate as examples of either organizational adaptation or the influence of postmodernist mores on the ethics of combat. The organizational argument functions on a modernist neo-liberal institutionalist type of logic in which the army is a "sticky" institution attempting to ensure its survival. In fact the explanation for the previously mentioned "no harm rule," for example, would be explained through a "late-modern" rationalism in that as the army need to maintain enlistment numbers up, it modifies its policies so as to become more appealing to potential recruits. Modern rationality also makes an imprint on everyday management and policy formation, and according to military personnel the absorption of industrial age techniques in human resources management in the military has actually had a counter effect on efficiency and cohesion.

The other side of the debate would enquire into why it is that what constituted incentives has shifted for prospective recruits, and how and why an institution that is as rigid as the military is willing to modify rules that appertain to its very definition. The first question was addressed in the previous section and the second is addressed bellow. Needless to say that politics have also had a significant sway in the matter, but this section focuses on the military as an organization.

From a strictly institutional point of view, the structural changes observed by the PMM theorists are seen as proof of increasing responsiveness and flexibility, two characteristics not usually used to describe military bureaucracies. In fact Snider and Watkins[54] argue that modern military bureaucracies are often non-adaptive, incapable to respond to change and modify the path of the institution as a whole. In fact this very rigidity and reticence is something that has entered the public understanding to such an extent that it is seen as a defining characteristic of the military. Any significant changes to the characteristics of the military bureaucracy would therefore also be indicators of significant change, rather than of simple organizational restructuring. If a fixed hierarchical and panoptical structure is what characterised the military bureaucracy, it did so based on a modern logic that assumes that obedience to a higher (state) authority is virtuous and that social structures are fixed and

[54] Don Snider and Gayle Watkins. „Project Conclusions" in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Snider, Don; Watkins, Gayle and Matthews, Lloyd J. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2002)

natural. Foucault[55], among others, applied Bentham's concept of the *panopticon* to the military institution in terms of creating and maintaining a sense of discipline. Everything from the uniforms, ranks, postings and reports regulate the life of soldiers and are meant to instil them with what Foucault calls "docility-utility."

The *dominant military personnel* variable investigates the extent to which the military ideal has shifted from Combat Leader to Technician and finally to the Soldier Statesman/Scholar, but does little to expressly address the shift away from docility, or lack thereof. Moreover in the end of the volume Williams clearly stated that the three types do not belong to the three stages exclusively, but rather are all three represented at any given time. A better understanding can be obtained from the typology of professionalism created by George Forsythe. Scott Snook, Phillip Lewis and Paul Bartone[56], which is based on Kegan's[57] concepts of psychological maturation. Forsythe et al. establishes a better model for understanding how modern and post-modern attitudes are represented by military personnel, especially since he refers primarily to attitudes instead of job descriptions. This model is also more appropriate because it makes distinctions based on the intensity of self-awareness exhibited by military professionals. The first type, non-professionals, corresponds to the PMM Combat Leader, in that this type of individuals have a rigidly defined worldview and tend to be found in the traditional military roles, such as dealing with weapon systems, and adopt a hyper masculine persona. Their occupational motivation will be primarily modern and self-interested, even though they might adopt a patriotic discourse. For this type post-modern peace-keeping missions are difficult to understand and be motivated for. Furthermore, the attachment to traditional hierarchies together with the materialist self-interest tends to lead to careerism and the perpetuation of non-adaptive bureaucracies. Those in the second type, limited professionals, are less monochromatic in their views, and are motivated partly by self interest and partly by moral values they associate with the military, such as duty and honour. However while this means they will not restrict their careers and attitudes to the traditional soldiering, they will be exceedingly reliant on social norms and therefore resistant to change. The third type, whom Forsythe et al. called true professionals, tend to have a more flexible attitude towards traditional military modern mores and make a critical choice one whether to perpetuate a norm. This flexibility in turn allows them to

[55] Foucault in Bondy, Harry HB. "Postmodernism and the Source of Military Strength in the Anglo West." *Armed Forces & Society* 31, no. 1: 46-47.
[56] George B. Forsythe, Scott Snook, Philip Lewis, and Paul T. Bartone, "Making Sense of Officership: Developing a Professional Identity for 21st Century Army Officers," in Bondy, Harry HB. "Postmodernism and the Source of Military Strength in the Anglo West." *Armed Forces & Society* 31, no. 1: 46-47.
[57] Ibid. 45.

actively participate in the reform of military bureaucracy. The fourth type constitutes the post-modern ideal, an individual that is capable of recognizing and changing the narratives of military life. These, Forsythe argues, should be the leaders of the military capable of addressing and managing the failures of all other types and reforming military bureaucracy and structures. Moreover these are individuals that are capable of traversing the civil military divide and acting similarly to the PMM Soldier Statesman/Scholar.

Actual case studies of the distribution of these types in military structures have not been made, especially since a survey would need to be even more complex and difficult to achieve than the one assessing motivations. Nevertheless, logic would dictate that since flexibility and increased acceptance of diversity has been manifesting with increasing frequency in Western militaries, the number of type three and four individuals is increasing. Since empirical evidence does not exist, an examination of the education of military personnel will prove edifying at least as to what the expectations and the ideals of the military have shifted. Education is particularly relevant when discussing the final stage of professionalism, since the post modern ideal is constructed around a basis of intellectual flexibility and interdisciplinary skills.

3.2.3 In Between One and Many: Education and Command

The importance of changing the nature of military education to match post-modern militaries was mentioned by John Allen Williams[58] in the conclusion, but not elaborated on. The move is not inherently difficult, since research has shown that people with higher education tend to have less of a materialist perspective and take on post-modernist values[59]. Indeed, in the above-mentioned study case of Belgian officer candidates tend to be motivated by post-modernist ideals far more than enlisted personnel, and indeed the percentage that fits this pattern has been increasing since 1997. In the United Kingdom, air vice-marshal Brian Burridge[60] talked of the way in which the Joint Services Command and Staff College faced the challenge of providing post-modern-military education. He argued that the changes in the nature of war, the reductions in staff and the increased frequency of joint actions mean that "individual posts bear responsibility for a much broader range of activity"[61] and require the

[58] Williams. 268.
[59] Manigart. 572.
[60] Burridge. xi.
[61] Ibid. xxi

ability to provide "'informed' military judgement."[62] Those that take part in the courses are personnel with operational experience in Peace Support Operations (75%) and combat experience (28%). The greatest challenge, according to Burridge, is to shape the attitudes of these soldiers towards their profession and set their field experience into a greater context. Thus the technical knowledge obtained in combat is complemented by technical classes and accompanied by attempts to promote "intellectual agility," the ability and willingness to make quick decisions based on intuition. Furthermore, in echo to Forsythe's work, the Staff College attempts to instil emotional maturity, which seems to imply a willingness to be open to diversity and adapt to international cooperation. The educational model offered by Burridge seems to offer an argument for the PM World side of the debate, since the reasons given for the reforms are mostly contextual, and the attitudes of experienced soldiers he mentions needs to be "shaped" in order to become post-modern. Nevertheless, combined considered together with Manigart's findings, the result seems to indicate that at least in for those attempting to be a part of higher ranks, even if their perspective is not initially post-modern, military education will increasingly require them to at least adopt more flexible attitudes.

The fact that post-modernist attitudes are increasingly a part of military leadership is also discussed by Charles Kirke and James York[63] in relation to British military defence doctrine. The Doctrine was initially based on the experience gained during World War I and II[64] and was formulated by the Ministry of Defence. Its basic tenets were very much in line with modern concepts, and it was stated to be "essentially enduring in nature" and aimed to set down the British understanding of the nature of war and the steps necessary to obtain battlefield victories. This belief in the possibility of having a rational structured set of principles, together with the highly hierarchical organizational principles, conforms to the basic modernist principles of rationality and progress. The main principle of command is eliminating uncertainty and ambiguity, the emblems of a post-modern context. The described decision process is linear and implies taking all relevant factors into consideration and rationally taking a decision that is afterwards passed down the hierarchical ladder in a clear fashion. However, the second edition of the doctrine, while not strictly post-modernist, puts far more emphasis on the individual experience and instant reactions rather than "rigid

[62] Ibid. xxi
[63] Charles Kirke and James York. "Postmodernist Command: A Contradiction in Terms for the British Army?." *Defence Studies* 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 305-322.
[64] Ibid. 309-310

adherence to prescriptive rules"[65] and objective truths. Furthermore, this new emphasis on personal experience is also revealed in the fact that a commander now has to have "vision and intellect," be able to be react quickly and aim not strictly at traditional victories but rather at paralysing the will of the opposing commander. The doctrine therefore recognises that the carefully planed attrition wars of the modern era are not what the military deals with anymore, and now each soldier or commander will be far more important because of their individual qualities and not just as part of a body-count. The main point of post-modern command is that despite the technological access to more information, the aim is not to create a new linear framework for its processing, but rather using experience, technical knowledge and creativity to obtain a favourable result.

3.3 Civilianization or Isolation

All of the issues brought up so far in this chapter create a clearer picture of the intermingling of the military and social sphere, or lack thereof in fact. According 94% of the European public the role of the primary role of the military is still the protection of the nation state. Van Creveld for one argued that the essential purpose of the military will always be drawn from being the physical defenders of sovereignty and all that it implies in terms of nationalist values. The potential violence entailed in being part of the military means having as a mission the transgression of fundamental rules of society. That in and of itself may well mean that it is not possible to immerse military culture in post-modern norms. And yet this chapter had sought to prove that the increasing number of individuals with post-modern attitudes has brought on constant change in military policies and structures.

Whether or not the reforms are post-modern or not, both sides of the debate recognize the major changes that have been taking place all across western militaries. The fact that the public still has a "modern" understanding of the military signifies a considerable break in communication. Relevant from this point of view is the coverage of developments on the European Security and Defence Policy. Most of the media coverage has centred on the political wrangling and the potential conflict with the United States or Russia. By contrast, very little information has been made available from military personnel or on cooperation taking place within the policy as it stands, common training programs and so on. All of the

[65] MOD, *Design for Military Operations*: *the British Military Doctrine*, 2nd edition, Army Code 71451 (1996), Foreword, and p.1. in Kirke and York. 314

joint actions[66] that have taken place under ESDP have been operated by forces from different countries on non-traditional missions, practically the internationalization heralded as the advent of post-modern military forces. And yet, despite the continuously increasing number of civilians involved in post-modern type missions there seems to have been no effect on either the perception of military forces by civilians or the ability of militaries to increase their social capital. What seems to be missing, in fact, is the soldier statesman, or rather the fourth type of leader described by Fosythe. In fact the Western notion of democratic control of the military seems to have often translated to being incapable of producing personnel that can use their technical knowledge in a functional manner that would allow them to interact with civilian authorities and the public efficiently.

[66] Foloseste site!!!

Chapter 4 – Central and East European Militaries

Armies of the states beyond the Iron Curtain performed a completely differently role in their societies during the Cold War, or to use the term PMM the "late-modern" period. This section makes an overview of how well the PMM model describes developments in the militaries of continental new member states of the European Union. Although Romania and Bulgaria are also taken in consideration, the term Central and East European countries (CEE) will be used for the sake of expediency. However, this chapter is not aimed at making in depth case studies, but rather a general assessment of how armies in this part of Europe have evolved since 1990, and whether the civil-military relations have taken on a post-modern character. While not all the variables in the PMM model can be assessed, this section covers part of the organizational and social variables, and opens the path for further research.

4.1 Beyond the Curtain

When discussing the armies present in this part of Europe it is important to note that much like in the West these countries did not follow the exact same path, even though all were under heavy Soviet influence. However, there were still some differences as to the status of the army in society, which in turn had a significant impact on the relationship of the military with civilian authorities after the collapse of communism. However, this thesis attempts to trace patterns of change rather than to provide in depth descriptions. In that sense, the *major mission definition* of CEE armies was indeed the support of the alliance with the USSR, willingly or not. However, unlike in the west, where armies continued to perform the traditional role of protection of sovereignty, the same cannot be said of CEE, where armies where under too much Soviet pressure to perform independently. Formally however, the *force structure* was the same as in the West: armies were large, supported by high defence spending and manned through universal male conscription. Indeed, conscription also meant that the military functioned as one of the mechanism of dispersing the socialist narrative to the public, and military structures themselves were therefore politicised. However, within limits, the defence policy, strategies and internal organisation was still under national military

command[67]. This in turn meant that at the end of the Cold War, rather than attempting to protect communist leaders, armies generally sided with national authorities, despite fears of the opposite. In Romania, Hungary and Poland, in particular, democratic control of the military was established with relative ease precisely because the attachment to soviet authority was superficial.

By mid 1990's most of the CEE countries had taken steps to institute democratic control and problems occurred only when civilian authorities could not find a way to distribute authority among themselves. Therefore, unlike in Turkey, where the military actively intervened and supported or collapsed governments, nothing of the sort occurred in the CEE states. However, the disadvantage of the independence the military had enjoyed in managing itself was that once the communist system collapsed there were no civilian structures with any experience in dealing with military staff or defence policy. In fact, even after the legal reforms establishing the authority of civilian leaders over defence policies was in place, the challenge was to create efficient civilian institutions and train appropriate personnel[68]. In fact Poland, Latvia and Hungary[69] introduced a series of reforms during the 1990s meant to address these problems.

The second outcome of how civil-military relations functioned before the end of the cold war was that as an organization, the military tended to be even more rigid than in the west. Military leaders may not have been willing to actively oppose the democratic process, but neither were they willing to hand in the reigns of defence policy easily. The same problems that plagued communist bureaucracies in all areas, were perhaps even more entrenched in the military, including corruption, incompetence and nepotism. Therefore neither the PMM modern nationalism logic nor the late modern rationalist-materialist attitudes accurately describe the state of CEE militaries at the end of the Cold war. Any understanding of the attitudes perpetuated in military bureaucracies need to take into consideration the character of the "Homo Sovieticus," a term coined by sociologist Aleksandr Zinovyev[70]. Homo Sovieticus is self-interested, but not in the sense of the careerism existent in the western bureaucracies. By contrast, the motto is the classical "we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us," meaning that the lack of monetary incentives leads to everything from lack of motivation and

[67] See Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, editors, Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978)
[68] Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster. "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces & Society (Transaction Publishers)* 29, no. 1 (September 2002): 31-56.
[69] Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster. "Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist Europe: Assessing the Transition." *European Security* 14, no. 1 (March 2005). 6.
[70] Aleksandr Zinovyev. Homo Sovieticus. Athlantic Monthly Press, 1986.

initiative to petty thievery, perpetuating a shadow economy and endemic corruption. Furthermore, the self interest is not driven towards self development, but rather a passive acceptance of formal rules while adhering in practice to an informal, unwritten code.

The PMM model, designed after all to describe western states, is incapable of describing these type of attitude or resulting military structures. Nevertheless, if the world in which CEE states found themselves after 1990 was as post-modern as it was for their western neighbours, than this is the perfect ground for testing which side of the debate makes the stronger argument.

4.2 Central and Eastern European Militaries

This section takes a closer look at how well the PMM model describes the evolution of military reforms in CEE, focusing much like the original volume on organizational changes. In practical terms, the post-socialist economies could no longer sustain the same defence budgets, and military expenditure (as part of GDP, see Table 8) decreased each year across all CEE states, now reaching the Western European average. The decrease in funding bought with it changes to the force structure, meaning a decrease in military sizes.

However these changes need to be considered together with the geo-political and social context in which they were occurring. The drive for reform in order to become, once again, part of Europe has been described in the literature as either modernization or Europeanization[71]. The concept of Europeanization is most often used to refer to the process of accession to the European Union exclusively, but the debate as to how it functions is quite similar to the PMM one. On the one hand the changes are interpreted as the result rational self-interested adaptation according to an external incentives model, and on the other they are the result of a desire for expanding a neo-liberal normative Europe[72]. However, in terms of the military in particular the reforms were attributed to the change in geo-strategic context, meaning Russia being perceived as a traditional threat at the end of the Cold War, or a rationalist attempt to increase the international standing and power of CEE states in the new unipolar environment. The second argument was particularly relevant for Poland, which Olaf

[71] For the definition of europeanization see Claudio M. Radaelli. "Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change" *European Integration online Papers* (EIoP), Vol. 4, No. 8, July 17, 2000. and for the mechanics see Heather Grabbe. "How does Europeanization Affect CEE governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity." *Journal of European Public Policy* 8, no. 6 (December 2001): 1013-1031.

[72] For more on this debate see Frank Schimmelfennig. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization* 55:1 (2001): 47-80. and Checkel, Jeffrey and Moravcsik, Andrew. "A Constructivist Research Programme in EU Studies?" *European Union Politics* 2(2) (2001): pp.219-249.

Ossica argued was attempting to regain the status or regional power[73]. By 1998 however, only 6% of the public in CEE countries saw Russia as a threat (slightly more so in the Baltic States), and 52% saw NATO membership as a means of guaranteeing the more abstract "security and stability in the region."[74] The desire to join NATO, and the related requirements for participation in the post-modern peacekeeping operations taking place during the Yugoslav conflict worked together to direct the reform of military forces towards creating small, elite forces specialised in narrow fields such as communications or command and control[75]. The *dominant military personnel* variable for can therefore be said to have remained in the PMM "late-modern" denomination of technicians. This tendency has been amplified by the desire to demilitarise society and the politicisation of defence policy to the extent to which military leaders have little say in the public sphere, and therefore there is a low possibility for soldier-statesmen to perform an active role.

While the above mentioned reforms allowed CEE countries to effectively take part in NATO missions, Christopher Donnelly argued it also led to unbalanced militaries, in which elite forces were far better prepared than the bulk of the armed forces[76]. In that sense, the primary national defence function of the military, as defined by the public, remains once again unfulfilled. Therefore, in terms of the PMM *major mission definition* variable, there is a conflict between what society perceives to be most important, and what the military has reformed itself to achieve. In addition, while in the United Kingdom, for example, the studies of military education indicate that there is at least an attempt to remediate this situation, in new member states the opposite is occurring. The over-enthusiasm of former candidate states to conform to the international standards of democratic control and specialization may well have squashed both the potential for creating military leaders capable and willing to use their technical knowledge in the civil sphere as well as the overall military unity and force to act as effective protectors of national sovereignty.

Moreover, participation in peace-keeping missions, while popular with CEE publics, has been seen more as a political exercise in being good European citizens/candidates. In addition, the small size of the elite units did nothing to contradict the public perception of

[73] Olaf Osica. "In Search of a New Role: Poland in Euro-Atlantic Relations." *Defence Studies* 2, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 21.
[74] European Commission. "Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Nr. 8."
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ceeb/ceeb8/ceeb08.pdf
[75] Andrew Cottey et al. (2005): 8.
[76] Christopher Donnelly. „Reshaping Armed Forces for the 21st Century." *NATO Think Piece.* (August 2001) http://www.nato.int/docu/articles/2000/a000913a.htm

these missions as cosmetic attempts, and the resulting general indifference from both public and media.

Related to the same need to adapt to the NATO requirements is the professionalization of the military forces, which is once again related to the *force structure* variable (See table 7). Out of the 10 continental new member states, six no longer have conscription, but these reforms were relatively small to begin in 2003 in Slovenia, and ending with Bulgaria this year. The reluctance to renounce the practice is likely associated to the role the perception of the military as a test of maturity for young men and perpetuator of moral national values, which had been even stronger due to the above mentioned use of conscription as a socialist propaganda technique. Particularly in Baltic States the military was therefore resented and seen as an institution that maintained Soviet oppression. By contrast, in Romania and Poland the army was perceived as a relatively independent institution, which reflects even now in the high levels of trust. In fact, Cottey et al.[77] argued that the high level of trust that the population of CEE states have in the military only serve to prove that public attitudes towards the military had been embedded since before communism, and are in fact only now re-emerging. This, they argue, indicates that CEE militaries may eventually follow the same path as that established in the west, but the process will be slow and gradual. Cottey et al. base the argument on the fact that while the strictly organizational PMM variables have been moving along the path described by the model, the more social variables related to the presence of women and homosexuals in the military have been far less visible, if at all.

However, the article of Cottey et al. was published in 2005, and since then the pattern seems to have already changed somewhat. Already in 2005 a series of country reports written for NATO were assessing the presence and roles that women performed in CEE militaries (see Table 7.). The policies of CEE militaries have practically all removed restrictions on the presence of the women in the military, and all recent information indicates the increase of their presence has increased, as well as the areas in which they participate. Considering the amount of time involved in the transformations of the Western states within the PMM model, the changes occurring in CEE are considerably faster.

[77] Andrew Cottey et al. (2005): 11.

Table 7. PMM variables and the values found in the CIA World Factbook and NATO country reports.

Country	Conscription (*Force Structure*)	*Women's Role*
Poland	– 17 years of age for male compulsory military service after January 1st of the year of 18th birthday; – 17 years of age for voluntary military service; conscript service obligation shortened from 12 to 9 months in 2005; by 2008, plans call for at least 60% of military personnel to be volunteers; – only soldiers who have completed their conscript service are allowed to volunteer for professional service;	Women are only allowed to serve as officers and non-commissioned officers (2006) All women with college nursing or veterinary degrees have to register for compulsory service.
Czech Republic	– 18-28 years of age for voluntary – 19-28 for compulsory military service (2008)	There are no specializations in the Czech Armed Forces from which women would be barred. That being said, most women hold economic, administrative, legal, personnel, and technical positions at the lower management level.[78]
Slovenia	– **No conscription;** (since 2003) – 17 years of age for voluntary military service;	All women are employed as candidate professional soldiers and must complete 13 weeks of Basic Military Professional Training.[79]
Slovakia	– **No conscription;** (since 2006) – 17-30 years of age for voluntary military service;	Women are eligible to serve in all branches except in military transportation, military music andmilitary physical education[80]
Hungary	– **No conscription;** (since 2004) – 18 years of age for voluntary military service; – 6-month service obligation, with reserve obligation to age 50 (2006)	Female personnel are integrated at all levels but fill only limited positions at the command level. Although women can serve in almost all career fields, including combat, the majority of them

78 http://www.nato.int/ims/2003/win/national_reports/czech.pdf

79 http://www.nato.int/ims/2005/win/national_reports/slovenia.pdf

80 http://www.nato.int/ims/2005/win/national_reports/slovakia.pdf

		perform their duties in administrative, personnel, and medical positions.[81]
Estonia	– compulsory military service for men between 19 and 28; – conscription lasts 11 months for junior NCOs and reserve platoon leaders; reserve officers and designated specialists have a different conscript service obligation; – Estonia has committed to retaining conscription for men up to 2010 and has no plan to transition to a contract armed forces; – 17 years of age for volunteers; – reserve commitment up to the age of 60 (2006)	N/A.
Lithuania	– 19-45 years of age for compulsory military service; 18 years of age for volunteers; 12-month conscript service obligation (2006)	Women are only allowed to serve and are represented in all branches (ratio of women in the military has been more or less stabile over the years at the level of 15-12 per cent)
Latvia	– **No conscription;** (since 2007) – 18 years of age for voluntary military service; – under current law, every citizen is entitled to serve in the armed forces for life (2006)	Women are accepted in the professional service from 19 years of age; represented 18,2% in 2006
Romania	– **No conscription;** (since 2006) – 18 years of age for voluntary military service; – all military inductees (including women) contract for an initial 5-year term of service; subsequent voluntary service contracts are for	Women are eligible to serve in all branches, but represent only 5% of armed forces (out of which 36,1% in administrative positions and 31,5% in combat branches)(2005[82])

81 http://www.nato.int/ims/2001/win/hungary.htm

82 http://www.nato.int/ims/2005/win/national_reports/romania.pdf

	successive 3-year terms until the age of 36 (2006)	
Bulgaria	– **No conscription;** (since 2008) – 18-27 years of age for voluntary military service; – As of May 2006, 67% of the Bulgarian Army comprised of professional soldiers; – Air Defense Forces and Naval Forces became fully professional at the end of 2006 (2008)	Women are eligible to serve in all branches, but represent only 6% of armed forces (2005[83])
Malta	– **No conscription;** (since 2008) – 17 years 6 months of age for voluntary military service; (2008)	N/A
Cyprus	– Greek Cypriot National Guard (GCNG): 18-50 years of age for compulsory military service for all Greek Cypriot males; – 17 years of age for voluntary service; age of military eligibility 17 to 50; length of normal service is 25 months with a minimum of 3 months (2006)	Women are not conscripted;

83 http://www.nato.int/ims/2005/win/national_reports/bulgaria.pdf

Table 7. Military expenditure as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. [84]

Country	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Poland	[2.6]	[1.9]	[2.8]	[2.4]	[2.4]	[2.7]	[2.4]	[2]	[2]	[2]	2	1.9	1.9	2	2	2	2	2.1	2
Czech Republic	-	-	-	-	-	2.3	2.3	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.9	2	2	1.9	2	2.1	1.9	2	1.7
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	[2.2]	[1.8]	[1.7]	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.9	3.2	3	2.3	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.7
Hungary	[3.8]	[3.1]	2.8	[2.4]	2.4	(2.2)	2.1	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.2
Estonia	-	-	-	-	0.5	0.8	1	1	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	-	[0.6]	[0.4]	[0.4]	[0.4]	[0.6]	[1]	[0.9]	[1.4]	[1.3]	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.9	1	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8
Romania	[4.3]	[4.7]	[4.6]	[4.8]	[4.3]	[2.7]	[3.1]	[2.8]	[2.5]	[3]	[3]	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.1	2	2	1.8
Bulgaria	-	[4]	[3.5]	[2.8]	[2.7]	[2.4]	[3.6]	[2.6]	2	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.3
Malta	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.9	1	1	1	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Cyprus	3.8	3.6	5	4.9	6.2	2.7	2.7	2.2	3.2	4	3.4	2	2	2.3	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4

[84] http://www.sipri.org/

On the other hand, social attitudes towards homosexuals across the new continental member states are usually perceived to be fairly conservative. However, the 2006 Eurobarometer Special Survey (see next page) shows that attitudes on this issue are not separated along the east-west divide (in the Czech Republic only 19% of the population sees homosexuality as taboo, compared to Portugal where the percentage is 83%) but rather if anything along the north-west line (Greece with 85% and UK with 36%).

While this is not particularly indicative of where or when reform on the military policy in this area will be taking place, it is important to notice that this particular variable is not particularly reliable for Western European states either. For example, Britain, which is seen as one of the best examples of post-modern military forces, only changed its policy in 2000, 30 years after homosexuality was decriminalised.

Question: QA3_2. Please tell me whether you personally totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree with each of the following statements.

Option: Homosexuality is still a taboo in (OUR COUNTRY)

Answers: Agree

Country Results	
Cyprus	86%
Greece	85%
Portugal	83%
Italy	68%
Slovenia	67%
France	59%
Malta	58%
Ireland	57%
Austria	56%
Poland	56%
Sweden	52%
Finland	50%
Hungary	49%
European Union (25)	48%
Spain	46%
Luxembourg	46%
Lithuania	45%
Slovakia	45%
Estonia	41%
Belgium	39%
Latvia	38%
United Kingdom	36%
The Netherlands	34%
Denmark	31%
Germany	28%
Czech Republic	19%

Other Countries	
Romania	58%
Bulgaria	45%



From Eurobarometer Special Survey 263[85]

[85] Eurobarometer Special Surveys. "Discrimination in the European Union." (January 2007) Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_263_en.pdf

4.3 To Modernize or to Gain Entrance

Without more in-depth studies into the motivations of military personnel and structures it is difficult to asses the effectiveness of the PMM model for describing CEE states. Nevertheless, of the eleven variables described by Moskos et al. the *force structure* (small, specialised, mostly professional) *perceived threat* (regional stability), the *major mission definition* (peace-keeping), the *women's role* (full formal integration), the presence of *conscientious objectors* (problem removed in all states that removed conscription) as well as the *public's attitude* (indifferent despite having high trust in the institution) - six of the variables seem to be moving in the described direction. Of the remaining ones only two, only the dominant military personnel type and the presence of homosexuals in the military, are not confirming to the pattern.

However, the problem is that while formally the variables hold the expected values, there is nothing to indicate that the changes are occurring due to a significant post-modernist shift in either the worldview of individual members, bureaucracy or society at large. Both the form and the direction of the reforms was provided by NATO or copied from western states. Therefore the pattern encountered in CEE states is better explained by the post-modern world side of the debate, or the external incentives model. That is not to say that the formal changes will not trigger deeper ones, or that the post-modern process has not already begun. However, so far the lack of critical enquiry and debate beyond the search for international approval or confirmation is simply not sufficient to indicate a post-modern shift in CEE militaries.

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

The theory of Post-modern militaries provides a good description of the dynamics of military restructuring in old member states and it does a good job of indicating what the direction of formal reforms in all European militaries is likely to be. However, the fundamental conflict between the empiricist methodology and the post-modern subject means that the model never manages to capture the subtle attitudinal changes that would prove the point. The overemphasis of a fixed division of the time line and the focus on purely organizational changes cannot produce a good understanding of the interaction and overlap of the civil and military spheres.

By contrast, due to using the interpretative approach, the findings of this thesis indicate that in the old member states militaries have more often than not opted to embody the values of their host societies and conform to their new role. However, in the new member states the lack of congruency between the required formal changes and the attitudes of the public means that the logic of the PMM model is simply incapable of producing an accurate prediction of how civil-military relations function. Nevertheless the implications for the future of European military cooperation is that at the very least formal structures will soon be compatible. What both sides lack at this point however, is the essential soldier/statesman. The project of post-modernism is built around the idea of self development and individualism, and thus without a military individual self capable to carry the values of society and at the same time make military knowledge functional, a significant post-modernist shift in civil-military relations is practically unachievable in a true sense.

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