

CYPRUS:
The “Experiment” of Politics

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Abstract

The Cyprus conflict has been in the centre of interest not only for Greece, Turkey and Great Britain but for the international community as well. This thesis, “Cyprus: The “Experiment” of Politics” discusses the roots of the conflict with special attention to the plans that took place all these years between the two communities. However, more specifically this paper tries, through the analysis of the theory of the consociational model of democracy in plural societies introduced by Arendt Lijphart, to prove that the Cyprus conflict is very difficult, if not impossible, to be resolved.

Acknowledgements

Even though I have Greek origins and I was always listening about the Cyprus conflict in my country I was never able enough to understand how complicated the situation is. Only when I started the research for this thesis paper I understood that a resolution of the conflict is vital for the development of the island. Moreover, I realized that what I have learned in the high school regarding this issue is only a part of the reality and that the real facts lie between the histories that Greece and Turkey are presenting. Unfortunately, Cyprus is not the only place in the world that experiences such kind of situation.

I would like to thank my family for their love and the great and unconditional support all these years, my second family in Budapest who made me feel “like home”, and my friends Christina Borsos, and Kemal Abacioglu, for giving me power to continue. Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Zsolt Enyedi for his contribution to this thesis paper, my friend Fatih Abay for his support and for helping me formatting this thesis paper (and for founding books in the library) and my classmates for making this year in Central European University pleasant.

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Introduction

For fifty – four years, Cyprus has been the center of interest, conflict, and “experiment” of different political policies of three different countries: Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain. The very small island, with the very crucial importance in the Mediterranean Sea, is consisted of 802.500 inhabitants that have been divided by the so-called “Green Line.” Except of the fact that these people have witnessed their county becoming a British colony, then an independent state and finally a divided state, they have been also the victims of political mistakes that accounted for the death of many people and are responsible for the unresolved conflict that exists until the present. These changes in the geographical shape of the island, in the political scene and in the division of the two communities can be characterized as experimental political policies of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain which affected and are still affecting the life in the island irreparably.

The purpose of this thesis paper is to make a review of the events that took place these fifty-four years and to examine in depth the roots of the conflict between the two communities. However, during the paper, we will realize that the conflict in Cyprus did not and does not exist only between the two communities that inhabit in the island but from the very beginning had taken bigger dimensions affecting simultaneously Greece and Turkey and their between relationship. Nevertheless, this paper will not try to be a judge and to criticize which community, the Greek or the Turk, was right or wrong. On the contrary, it will focus on the characteristics that did not allow a consociational model of democracy to come into force and at the same time to be successful in Cyprus.

For the purpose of this analysis the consociational model of democracy and its characteristics, introduced by the work of Arendt Lijphart seem to be a necessary starting point.

According to his theory, in order for a consociational model of democracy, introduced in plural societies, to be successful some specific favorable factors have to be in existence. These factors are the distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures, a multiple balance of power among the subcultures, external threats, a relatively low load on the system, moderate nationalism, popular attitudes favorable to government by grand coalition, widespread approval of the principle of government by elite cartel, the length of time a consociational democracy has been in operation, the internal political cohesion of the subcultures, adequate articulation of the subcultures interests, segment isolation and federalism, small country size, overarching loyalties, moderate multiparty system, representative party system, crosscutting cleavages, tradition of elite accommodation, geographical concentration of segments, no majority segment plus segments of equal size, small number of segments and socioeconomic equality.¹

By examining the above factors we will be able to understand why the consociational model of democracy, which was introduced in Cyprus in 1960, failed. Moreover, this analysis will help us to make a comparison of the favorable factors being in existence in 1960 and the favorable factors being in existence in 2004 when the Annan Plan was introduced by the UN to the two communities. This comparison will help us to draw several hypotheses whether the consociational model of the Annan Plan would have been successful or not if it had been accepted. This thesis' stance, however, is that the Annan's Plan would have been one more failure in the political history of Cyprus.

The thesis paper has been divided into two main sections. In the first section, a historical retrospect is presented in order to show the political background of the island as well as to

¹ Matthijs Bogaards. *The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review*. European Journal of Political Research 33. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998. p 478

observe the main elements of the London Agreement and the main elements of the Annan's Plan.
The second section introduces the theory and at the same time applies it in the case of Cyprus.

Historical Retrospect of Cyprus

Due to its strategic position, Cyprus has been the target of every emperor from ancient times until today. In the 14th century, after being a Greek colony, the island passed consecutively to Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Byzantium and finally in the 15th century, it was occupied by the Ottoman Empire.² The population of Cyprus at that time was approximately a little bit less than 200.000 people and it was consisting solely by Greek-speaking people. After the occupation of Ottoman Empire approximately 30.000 Turks were sent to the island in order to form a Turkish power.³

In 1878, the Ottoman Empire had just been at war with Russia and there were fears that their capital Constantinople was very much in danger. The British in order to protect the Ottomans intervened. Because of this intervention the Ottoman Sultan granted the control of the island of Cyprus to the British under the Cyprus Convention.⁴

However, with the outbreak of World War I, Great Britain and Turkey found themselves in opposite sides. In addition, many of the Greek Cypriots on the island participated in the war in the side of Great Britain and fought against the Ottomans.⁵

After these incidents, the Turkish side correctly was claiming that the British Empire illegally proceed in the annexation of Cyprus in 1914. However, after the end of the World War I, Turkey as well as the other countries (the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and the

² Christos H. Halazias, Cyprus: 50 years of plans («Κύπρος: 50 χρόνια Σχέδια επί Σχεδίων»)(Athens: Kaktos 2004), 11

³ Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz.”The Cyprus Conflict and the Annan Plan: Why One More Failure?” p.30

⁴ The British Empire: <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/cyprus.htm>

⁵ The British Empire: <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/cyprus.htm>

Serb-Croat-Slovene State) signed the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24 1923, where it was stated the following regarding Cyprus:

ARTICLE 20

“Turkey hereby recognizes the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November 1914.”⁶

ARTICLE 21

“Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the local law, and will thereupon lose their Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted.

Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the present Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality in consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon lose their Turkish nationality.

It is understood that the Government of Cyprus will be entitled to refuse British nationality to inhabitants of the island who, being Turkish nationals, had formerly acquired another nationality without the consent of the Turkish Government.”⁷

⁶ Hellenic Resources Network: Lausanne Treaty

<http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/>

⁷ Hellenic Resources Network: Lausanne Treaty: <http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/>

Therefore, even if we accept the illegal policies of the British Empire, finally Turkey gave its consent, under the British pressure, for the annexation of Cyprus in the British Empire in 1923, which became officially a British colony in 1925⁸.

From 1925 to 1960: the years under the British Occupation

The population of Cyprus in 1925 was consisted by 82% Greek-Cypriots and 18% by Turkish-Cypriots who had remained in the island after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. None of the cities and the villages was inhabited solely by the Turkish population due to its small proportion. Moreover, there was not a specific region or part of the island that was belonging particularly to the one or to the other population. On the contrary, there was a mixture of citizens in most of the parts of Cyprus.

However, we have to refer again in the article 21 of the Lausanne Treaty in order to clarify who were these Turkish-Cypriot citizens. As it was shown in the previous session, the Treaty was given to the Turkish population of Cyprus two options: either to continue living in the island by acquiring the British nationality and simultaneously losing the Turkish nationality or to keep the Turkish nationality by leaving the island and immigrating to Turkey⁹. As Bestami Sadi Bilgic claims in his article “The Cyprus Crisis of October 1931 and Greece’s reaction,” the Turkish government opened up a consulate in Nicosia in 1925 in order to provide Turkish Cypriots with information and assist them in migration to Turkey. Moreover, the Turkish government asked Britain to extend the time permitted for those who wished to take Turkish

⁸ The British Empire: <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/cyprus.htm>

⁹ The Journal of Turkish Weekly: The Cyprus Crisis of October 1931 and Greece’s reaction (2007)

<http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=174>

nationality to make their declaration from three to twelve months. Ultimately, only about nine thousand Turkish-Cypriots applied for Turkish nationality, and only about half of the applicants actually immigrated to Turkey¹⁰.

If we suppose that the article 21 of the Treaty went into force, fact that is actually proven by the efforts of Turkey and the immigration of some Turkish-Cypriots to Turkey, then we can conclude that the rest of the Turkish population that chose to remain in the island acquired the British nationality. Even if consider that these people who remained in the island continued to act as being Turks and had this patriotic feeling towards Turkey, officially we can suppose that in Cyprus in 1925 there was a majority of Greek-Cypriots and a minority of British population. On the other hand, if these people did not acquire the British nationality then the article 21 of the Lausanne Treaty was trespassed.¹¹ Why it is so important to clarify the changes in the ethnic population of Cyprus? As we will see later in the paper, the Greek Cypriot side never accepted that the Turkish Cypriot side can have rights over the island and one of the reasons is that the Lausanne Treaty forced the Turkish population to leave the island but only a part of them actually left it.

The Greek population in the island, on the other hand, was very connected with Greece. Except of the fact that they had always wanted the unification of the island with Greece, everything regarding education, religion, and politics had the Greek element. These elements

¹⁰ The Journal of Turkish Weekly: The Cyprus Crisis of October 1931 and Greece's reaction (2007)

<http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=174>

¹¹ The Journal of Turkish Weekly: The Cyprus Crisis of October 1931 and Greece's reaction (2007)

<http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=174>

continued to exist even after the British occupation. The education programs, the professors and the books in the Cypriot schools had to be first approved from the Greek state. In the classrooms, there was the portrait of King Konstantine of Greece, or of Prime Minister Eleutherio Venizelo and not the portrait of the British Monarch. The obligatory map of Cyprus was showing Greece and not solely Cyprus. These elements were not meant to be anti-British but they were showing that the Greek population in Cyprus wanted to keep its Greek identity.¹²

During the British occupation, these elements had to change. With strict measures the British officials tried to pass the British culture and rule into the population. In the following years, Cyprus was found to be under a kind of “dictatorial regime.” In order to put down the resistance of the Cypriot people, Great Britain had put in prison many people who had participated in the rebellions, had prohibited the participation in the election processes, the teaching of the Greek history in the schools, and had increased the taxation. Seven years after these strict measures, Great Britain realized that 25% of the Cypriot population suffered from hunger and then the situation started to change.¹³

For the first time after its establishment in 1926, the Communist Party of Cyprus had become legal and its influence over the Greek-Cypriot population had increased significantly. Another political movement also was established; The Ethnarchia movement with Archbishop Makario as its leader succeeded to collect, through a referendum, 95.7% of the Greek-Cypriots who were standing in favor of the Unification of Cyprus with Greece. However, Greece was declaring that Cyprus was not in its national assertion. The Greek Prime Minister, Plastiras refused to accept the official records of the Cypriot referendum and in 1954 he refused the

¹² Heinz A Richter.. The History of Cyprus. (*«Η Ιστορία της Κύπρου»*) Athens: Estia, 2007:328

¹³Halazias, 12-13

request of the Ethnarchia movement for Unification. Makarios denounced in UN the attitude of Greece towards the Unification with Cyprus but UN postponed the conversations and the decision.¹⁴

On 1 April 1955, the National Organization of Cypriot Soldiers (EOKA A) with General Georgio Griva Digeni as its leader started the armed fight against the British. In addition, the Turkish Cypriots established their own organization, the so called Volkan which was later replaced by the Turkish Defense Organization (TMT)¹⁵. The British on the other hand, except of the creation of concentration camps and the executions they did almost everything to prevent the cooperation between the Greek-Cypriot majority and the Turkish-Cypriot minority. The British policy was the division of the population of the island according to the nationality and a nudge to the Turkish-Cypriots for the creation of their own army. The same year, the British government called for a meeting with representatives from Greece and Turkey in order to discuss the future of Cyprus. However, the discussions failed due to a bomb that was set in Kemal Ataturk's house in Thessaloniki.¹⁶

By 1959, the population of Cyprus had two different desires; On the one hand, the Greek population, consisting the 80% of the island, was asking for Unification (ENOSIS) of the island with Greece. On the other hand, the Turkish population, consisting 18%, was calling for “a partition of the island in case its constitutional status changed.”¹⁷ After several rebellions and

¹⁴ Halazias,14

¹⁵ Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz.”The Cyprus Conflict and the Annan Plan: Why One More Failure?” p.30

¹⁶ Halazias,14

¹⁷ Ulrich Scheneckener. “Making Power-Sharing: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation.” Journal of Peace Research (2002): 207

negotiations with the British side, finally an agreement, the so-called London Agreement, was achieved upon an “institutional framework for an independent Cyprus, which provided for Greek-Turkish power sharing under the international auspices of the three powers: Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain”.¹⁸

The London Agreement

On February 19, 1959 Greece, Turkey and Great Britain after several discussions and negotiations signed the London Agreement. This agreement was calling for a Cypriot Republic with a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President with a five year term in office.¹⁹

The Council of Ministers had been composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers and the decisions had to be taken by an absolute majority. Legislative authority passed to the House of Representatives which were elected separately by each community with proportion of 70% for the Greek community and 30% for the Turkish community. Decisions in the House of Representatives were taken by simple majority of the members present.²⁰

Both communities had to establish their own communal chamber and each one of them was supposed to impose taxes and exercise authority within the community regarding religious, cultural, educational, teaching questions and questions of personal status.²¹

¹⁸ Ulrich Schneckener. “Making Power-Sharing: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation.” *Journal of Peace Research* (2002): 207

¹⁹ The World of Cyprus *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960)*.
http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_d_part_iii.html

²⁰ The World of Cyprus *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960)*.
http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_d_part_iii.html

²¹ The World of Cyprus *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960)*.
http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_d_part_iii.html

Moreover, a High Court of Justice was established which was composed by two Greeks, one Turkish and one neutral judge. In case of civil dispute between members from the same community, the tribunal had to be composed by judges belonging to the same community. If the members of the dispute were from different communities then the composition of the tribunal had to be mixed and had to be determined by the High Court of Justice.²²

Both the President and the Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus, separately or conjointly had the right of final veto of any law. Moreover, they had the power to return any laws and decisions to the House of Representatives for reconsideration.²³

The President and the Vice President of the Republic were the responsible persons to appoint the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Inspector General, the Treasurer and the Governor of the Issuing Bank. These appointed officials were supposed not to come from the same community as their principals.²⁴

The civil service was composed by 70% of Greek Cypriots and 30% of Turkish Cypriots. The army had to have 2000 men, from which 60% had to come from the Greek community and 40% from the Turkish community. Moreover, the security forces had to be consisted by 2000 men with a proportion of 70% and 30% for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively.²⁵

²²The World of Cyprus *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960)*.
http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_d_part_iii.html

²³The World of Cyprus *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960)*.
http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_d_part_iii.html

²⁴ The World of Cyprus *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960)*.
http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_d_part_iii.html

²⁵The World of Cyprus *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960)*.
http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_d_part_iii.html

In addition, the Turkish community had to be responsible for one of the following Ministries: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Finance. The official languages were the Greek and Turkish and a common neutral flag had to represent both communities of the Republic of Cyprus.²⁶

The creation of separate municipalities in the largest cities of Cyprus was also included in the agreement. In each of these cities, a body which was supposed to supervise the work was formed composed of two members chosen by the Greek municipalities, two members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a President chosen in agreement by both municipalities

More importantly the three countries, Greece, Turkey and Great Britain, agreed to maintain the independence, the territorial integrity, and the security of the island. In addition, they signed for the prohibition of promoting directly or indirectly either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other state or the partition of the island.²⁷

Nevertheless, the people of Cyprus did their best to ensure the smooth functioning of the new state, but their efforts were doomed to failure.²⁸ The Constitution that was established under the London Agreement proved to be insufficient. Several provisions that had been made in the London Agreement were seemed to expand the time of the process of decisions and this fact was making the constitutional design more difficult into action. Because of this reason in November

²⁶The World of Cyprus *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960)*.
http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_d_part_iii.html

²⁷ The World of Cyprus *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960)*.
http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_d_part_iii.html

²⁸ Giorgos Zaharias, „The Cyprus Problem : Historical Review and the latest developments” (Published by the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus , 1996)

http://kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/p_london.html

1963 the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios introduced thirteen amendments regarding the constitution. These amendments were proposing the following²⁹:

1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned.
2. The Vice President of the Republic to deputize for the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence on incapacity to perform his duties.
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Ministers of the House and the Vice President by the Turkish members of the House.
4. The Vice President of the House of Representatives to deputize for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
6. Unified Municipalities to be established.
7. The administration of Justice to be unified.
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished.
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to determined by a Law.
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

²⁹ Republic of Cyprus: Press and Information Office. "13 Points" (30 November 1963)
[http://www.pio.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/0740E0A1B3A45039C2256D6D00340AB1/\\$file/13%20points.pdf](http://www.pio.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/0740E0A1B3A45039C2256D6D00340AB1/$file/13%20points.pdf)

11. The number of the Members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.
12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.

Most of these amendments were meant to help in the better decision load but in the same time, were giving more constitutional power in the hands of the Greek Cypriot side. The right of veto which had been given in both communities was considered to be a negative power for the Greek Cypriot side claiming that it was limiting the better decision making in the parliament. However, the veto right was a very important element for the Turkish Cypriot side because they had only 30% of the members in the parliament. Without this right, it would be very difficult for the Turkish members to stop decisions which favored the Greek side.

The change in the number of members in the civil service and in the Forces of the Republic was another negative amendment for the Turkish Cypriot community. As it was analyzed earlier, the Turkish Cypriot community had 30% in the public service, 40% in the army and 30% in the Security Forces. If the amendment was going to be into practice then the members in all these sectors were going to be appointed according to the population. Considering the small percentage of the Turkish Cypriot population, this amendment was decreasing the power of the Turkish community in all the sectors.

In the House of Representatives, the Greek Cypriot side had 35 members while the Turkish Cypriot side 15. However, due to the need of separate majorities even two Turkish representatives could stop a decision if three of them had taken part in the vote. If the amendment

number five had been accepted then the Turkish Cypriot side would have lost one more of his powers against the Greek Cypriot side.

Moreover, one of the amendments was proposing that the numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces had to be determined by a Law. However, this law was supposed to be decided by the parliament and if there was no veto right then the absolute majority was in the hands of the Greek Cypriot side.

Nevertheless, after the presentation of the above amendments, the Turkish side left the government by rejecting the proposals. As the result, the independent constitutional design collapsed and the tensions in the island increased.

Negotiations after the Collapse of the London Agreement

After the collapse of the London Agreement, many attempts have been made by the USA and the UK to resolve the conflict in Cyprus and to suppress the tensions that had been increased between the two communities.

One of the first proposals for the resolution of the conflict came from USA in 1964 through the UN Secretary General, Dean Acheson. Acheson presented a plan to both communities in which “Cyprus would have been united with Greece, and it return, Turkey would have received the Greek island of Kasstelorizon and a military base on Cyprus. Furthermore, the island would have two cantons for the two communities”³⁰. However, the plan was rejected from

³⁰ Ahmet Sozen. The Cyprus Negotiations: From the 1963 Inter-Communal Conflict to the Annan Plan. Department of International Relations University of Bahcesehir , Istanbul Turkey 2004, p.3

the Greek community due to the consideration that the military base that Turkey would be given on Cyprus, it would simultaneously create more strategic power in the side of Turkey.³¹

Despite this negotiation atmosphere that existed between the elites of the two communities, the tensions in the island were worsening. In the Greek-Cypriot side, General Griva, the leader of EOKA A' organized teams that had attacked violently the Turkish-Cypriot regions. In return, Turkish-Cypriots asked for help and Ankara answered with bombardment, which killed many Greek-Cypriots.³²

The next proposal/plan came a few months later from the UN Secretary General Galo Plaza. His plan was suggesting the restoration of the constitutional design introduced by the London Agreement. Moreover, he suggested that the Greek Cypriot side had to resign from the unification plans.³³

In the meanwhile, the political situation in Greece was becoming worse and worse. The Prime Minister had been dismissed by the King Konstantine and new elections were going to be held. On 21 April 1967, (just weeks before the scheduled elections), a group of right-wing army officers seized power in a coup d'etat. This coup d'etat is said to have been held with the help of United States and CIA because of fear that Greece would pass under a communist regime.³⁴

³¹ Ahmet Sozen. The Cyprus Negotiations: From the 1963 Inter-Communal Conflict to the Annan Plan. Department of International Relations University of Bahcesehir , Istanbul Turkey 2004, p.3

³² Halazias,17

³³ Ahmet Sozen. The Cyprus Negotiations: From the 1963 Inter-Communal Conflict to the Annan Plan. Department of International Relations University of Bahcesehir , Istanbul Turkey 2004, p.3

³⁴ Halazias,19

Makarios in Cyprus, by trying to adapt himself in the new circumstances, arrested Rauf Denktas (the traditional leader of the Turkish Cypriots) and brought him into a trial. The Greek- Cypriots found the opportunity and attacked to the Turkish-Cypriots. Turks threatened with war.³⁵

Grivas who in the meanwhile had returned in Greece, in 1971 was sent again back to Cyprus in order to establish the EOKA B. EOKA B was a nationalist organization that tried through violence and terrorism to win the support of the Cypriot population. The military Junta in Greece was in favor of the Unification of Cyprus with Greece while Makarios had changed his previous desire and he wanted Cyprus to become an Independent state. The gap was worsening day to day. That is why the main purpose of EOKA B was the overthrow of the Makarios government.

Finally, in 1974, Greek troops invaded the Presidential Residence in Cyprus in order to overthrow and kill Makario. Makarios succeeded to escape while the Junta was reporting that Makarios had been killed. Due to this unexpected Greek coup d'etat in Cyprus, the former President of the Cypriot Parliament, Glafkos Kliridis, took on greater responsibilities and became the President of the Republic of Cyprus.³⁶

“On July of the same year, using as a pretext the coup of 15 July 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus allegedly as a "guarantor" of the island's independence. On 20 July 1974, 40.000 Turkish troops landed on the island assisted by Turkish air and naval forces, in violation of the U.N. Charter and all principles governing international relations as well as her own contractual obligations. On 14 August, Turkey launched a second invasion in violation of the Security

³⁵ Halazias, 20-21

³⁶ Halazias, 24-25

Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal, and of the agreements, it signed at Geneva.”³⁷

Finally, approximately 37% of the total territory of the Republic of Cyprus came under Turkish military occupation and about 40% of the total Greek Cypriot population was displaced. Moreover, thousands of people, including civilians, were killed or ill-treated and many more disappeared and are still missing. Turkey also pursued a deliberate policy aimed at terrifying the occupied areas and at destroying the cultural heritage of Cyprus.³⁸ In addition, the houses that were located in the side in which Turkey had invaded were not given to the Turkish-Cypriot citizens but to citizens that were brought in the island from the east side of the Turkey.

“Turkish officials justified their country's actions by citing the terms of Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee made on Zurich negotiations, noting the impossibility of joint action with Greece and the reluctance of Britain to use Military force to restore the "state of affairs" established by the constitution of 1960.”³⁹

³⁷ Georgios Zaharias, “The Cyprus Problem : Historical Review and the latest developments” (Published by the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus , 1996)

http://kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/p_london.html

³⁸ Georgios Zaharias, “The Cyprus Problem : Historical Review and the latest developments” (Published by the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus , 1996)

http://kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/p_london.html

³⁹ Georgios Zaharias, “The Cyprus Problem : Historical Review and the latest developments” (Published by the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus , 1996)

http://kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/p_london.html

On December 1974, Makarios returned to the island founding an explosive situation. 200.000 Greek-Cypriots were living in tents, 50 % of the population was unemployed, and the plan for the division of the island had been into action.⁴⁰

Negotiations after the Turkish Invasion

After the Greek coup d'état and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, the UN Security Council Resolution 353 called for the guarantor powers to enter into negotiations in order to restore peace in Cyprus. The guarantor powers held three Conferences in Geneva during 1974 in an attempt to bring peace to Cyprus. In the first round of the negotiations, the Turkish side failed to submit the proposals it had promised and moreover Turkey made it abundantly clear in New York that she was against any meaningful negotiations and tried to prolong the talks in order to consolidate the faiths accomplish created through the use of armed force against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. After hearing the views of the two sides, the General Assembly (R/3395) demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops without further delay.⁴¹

Makarios that had won in the meanwhile the Presidential elections was suggesting that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could live together in peace without outside interference.⁴² Under the

⁴⁰ Halazias ,25

⁴¹ Giorgos Zaharias, "The Cyprus Problem : Historical Review and the latest developments" (Published by the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus , 1996)

http://kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/p_london.html

⁴² Halazias,30

auspices of the UN, the two sides later held five rounds of inter-communal talks during April 1975 to February 1976, which are known as the Vienna talks.⁴³

On 27 January 1977, the Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktas invited the Greek-Cypriot President Makario to have direct meetings with scope to evaluate and continue the previous talks. These direct meetings resulted in the emergence of the basis for future negotiations – “The Four Guidelines”:

1. An independent, non –aligned, bi-communal federal Republic
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability, productivity, and land ownership.
3. Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis for a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties, which may arise for the Turkish community.
4. The powers and the functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the state.⁴⁴

The conversations about the Cyprus issue continued on May 18, 1979 between Denktas and Kiprianou. During this round of negotiations, the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim

⁴³ Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Negotiations: From 1963 Inter-communal Conflict to the Annan Plan” (Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir 2004), 5

⁴⁴ Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Negotiations: From 1963 Inter-communal Conflict to the Annan Plan” (Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir 2004), 5

produced the “Ten-Point Agreement” which was the basis of the future proposals and documents.

According to this “Ten-Point Agreement”:

1. “It was agreed to resume the inter-communal talks on 15 June 1979
2. The basis of the talks will be the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the UN resolution relevant to the Cyprus question.
3. There should be respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.
4. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects
5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the settlement of Varosa under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosa has been reached it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.
6. It was agreed to abstain from any action, which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote good-will, mutual confidence, and the return to normal conditions.
7. The determination of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed.
8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in completely or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.
9. The inter-communal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.

10. The inter-communal talks will take place in Nicosia”.⁴⁵

In November 1981, Waldheim created an evaluation paper, which is known as the Interim Agreement. “This agreement was calling for the reopening of Nicosia's international airport to civilian traffic, the placing of Varosa under UN administration, and the lifting of some 70 per cent of the economic restrictions imposed by the Republic of Cyprus on the Turkish Cypriots.’ The proposal was the result of a series of inter-communal talks, starting on 9 August 1980, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General's special representative in Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo Juan Gobbi. “The result of this Interim Agreement was negative at the end by the time that both sides rejected it. However, at that time Denktas found the opportunity to declare the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” due to the fact that Kiprianos refused to have face-to-face conversations and accept him as “equal.”⁴⁶

In 1984, the UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar produced the “Draft Framework Agreement.” According to this agreement:

1. “Federal Republic would include two provinces or federated States and would compromise the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community the members of whom would be citizens of the Federal Republic.
2. The official language of the Federal Republic would be Greek and Turkish.
3. The Federal Republic would have a neutral flag and anthem to be agreed

⁴⁵ Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Negotiations: From 1963 Inter-communal Conflict to the Annan Plan” (Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir 2004), 6

⁴⁶ Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Negotiations: From 1963 Inter-communal Conflict to the Annan Plan” (Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir 2004), 6-7

4. Powers and functions of the Federal Republic would be delineated.
5. The legislature of the Federal Republic would be composed of two chambers: a lower chamber with a 70-30 Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representation and an upper chamber with a 50-50 representation.
6. The system of government of the Federal Republic would be a presidential system.
7. The President would be a Greek – Cypriot and the Vice President would be Turkish Cypriot. They would separately have the right to veto any law or administrative decision.
8. The Council of Ministers would be composed by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Ministers on a 7 to 3 ratio.
9. One Greek, one Turkish and one non-Cypriot voting member, would compose the constitutional Court of the Federal Republic”.⁴⁷

The Turkish- Cypriot side accepted this agreement while the Greek-Cypriot side did not. Perez de Cuellar tried later to present some alternations of the plan and asked the Greek-Cypriot side to reconsider its decision. In response, “the Greek-Cypriot side asked the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the North, the implementation of the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement, the right to own property anywhere in the island and provision of effective international guarantees as a precondition to any settlement”. Finally, the conversations and the decisions were paused due to the elections that were held in February 1988 in the Greek-Cypriot

⁴⁷ Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Negotiations: From 1963 Inter-communal Conflict to the Annan Plan” (Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir 2004), 7-8

side in which Kiprianos lost the elections and Vasileiou became the next Greek-Cypriot President.⁴⁸

During 1990, the leaders of both sides met more than forty times in Nicosia and then the meetings were transferred at the UN Headquarters in New York. Although the two communities agreed that the general principles of the solution to be with a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic, they now were moving towards the details of the solution.⁴⁹

In August 1992, the “Set of Ideas” was created by the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali. This plan was the most detailed plan that had ever been created in order to resolve the Cyprus conflict and the UN were very optimistic that this plan would bring the final solution in the case of Cyprus. Despite these optimistic views, the plan was seen as unacceptable by both sides and finally it was rejected.⁵⁰

According to this detailed plan, named “Set of Ideas”, a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal state will be established with a Lower House and an Upper House with proportion of 70:30 and 50:50 respectively. The Council of Ministers would be with proportion 70:30 and the

⁴⁸ Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Negotiations: From 1963 Inter-communal Conflict to the Annan Plan” (Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir 2004), 9-10

⁴⁹ Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Negotiations: From 1963 Inter-communal Conflict to the Annan Plan” (Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir 2004), 10

⁵⁰ Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Negotiations: From 1963 Inter-communal Conflict to the Annan Plan” (Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir 2004), 11

Supreme Court: would be composed by equal number of judges with rotated presidency. In addition, the Federal force would have equal number of members from both communities.⁵¹

By 1992, the UN realized that one main reason for the unsuccessful negotiations between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was the lack of trust between these two sides. For this purpose, Boutros Ghali created a series of “Confidence Building Measures” for the two sides of the Cyprus conflict. However, for one more time, by 1994 the two leaders failed to reach an agreement of Ghali’s plan due to the high politicization of the “Confidence Building Measures” by both communities’ leaderships.⁵²

Towards the Annan’s Plan

After four years that there was no meeting between Kliridi and Denktas, the invitation of the new UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, brought together the two leaders for face-to-face talks on July 1997 in New York and August of 1997 in Geneva. However, these two meetings were held at the same time when the European Union opened negotiations with the Greek-Cypriot side for accession and finally were paused.

The next plan that was created by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in order to resolve the Cyprus issue, the so-called Annan’s Plan, was based partly to the “Set of Ideas” that had been created by Boutros Gali. This complex and lengthy document was first presented in 2002 but due

⁵¹ Government Web Portal Set of Ideas on an Overall Framework Agreement On Cyprus 1992.
[http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/\\$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20\(1992\).pdf](http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/372B6BAF332C88E3C2256D6D00348CF1/$file/Set%20of%20Ideas%20(1992).pdf)

⁵² Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Negotiations: From 1963 Inter-communal Conflict to the Annan Plan” (Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir 2004), 11-12

to the fact that the two communities of our concern were not reaching an agreement, the plan changed five versions.⁵³

The negotiation positions of the two communities that were taking place in the discussions can become clear in the following table:

Table 1: Official Negotiation Positions of the Disputed Parties in the Cyprus Conflict

Issues of Negotiation	Greek (Cypriot) Position	Turkish (Cypriot) Position
Political System	A unitary state structure is preferred. A federation in which the Turkish Cypriot can have “autonomy” is offered. May accept a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation without the equality of the Turkish Cypriot community. However, enormous side payments are needed for the acceptance of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation in which the two federated states will have political equality.	“Two sovereign states” or a bi-zonal, bi-communal “confederation” of “two sovereign states” is preferred. However, with substantial side payments, a bi-zonal, bi communal federation with specific political equality for the Turkish Cypriot community may be accepted.
Federal Powers	Strong federal (central) system.	Very weak confederal/ federal (central) system
State Powers	Very weak and limited powers	Very strong and extensive powers. Specifically the states will be sovereign.
Sovereignty	Single sovereignty for the whole island (i.e. for both communities)	Separate sovereign for each people/nation (community) based on the self-determination right of each community
Representation	Greek Cypriot President, (maybe) Turkish Cypriot Vice-President (no rotational presidency). Ratio of Greek to Turkish Cypriots in council of ministers, federal legislature and institutions to be based on population ratio (80:20 Greek to Turkish Cypriot).	Rotational Presidency: 50-50 Greek and Turkish Cypriot representation in (con)-federal institutions.

⁵³ Amanda Akcakoca, “ Cyprus- Looking to a Future Beyond the Past” (European Policy Centre: Issue Paper No 32, 2005), 4

Guarantorship	A multi-national force, such as NATO, or UN force. No unilateral intervention right for Turkey	1960 Treaty of Guarantee to remain without any change (unilateral intervention right for Turkey)
Freedom of Movement	Absolute Freedom	Freedom with very small restrictions (for former EOKA terrorists)
Freedom of Settlement	Absolute Freedom	Freedom with restrictions (a quota to be imposed so the bi-zonality is respected)
Freedom of Property Ownership	Absolute Freedom	Strong restrictions and after a moratorium.
Territorial Adjustment	Greek Cypriot State having 80% of the land. May go down to around 75%.	Turkish Cypriot State to retain 29+% of the land.
Military Buildup	Demilitarization of the island. A multinational force and lightly armed police force of Cypriots maintaining order.	Separate forces of defense and police for each state. Turkey keeps a contingent on the island for the security of the Turkish Cypriots.
Displaced Persons & Properties	All displaced persons have the right to return to their properties	Restricted access to the displaced persons. Compensatory payments for the displaced persons and territorial adjustment to respect the bi-zonality.
Settlers/Immigrants	All Turkish settlers should go back to mainland Turkey	All Turkish immigrants should stay in Cyprus.
EU Membership	Strongly Supports	Supports membership only after a final solution, separate referenda for the two communities and special relations of Cyprus with Turkey (i.e. Turkey having the same rights as the other EU members in Cyprus).

Source: Data based on the interviews Ahmet Sözen conducted in Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, Brussels and London 1997-98, the daily news from the local media in Cyprus, Turkey, Greece as well from the international media and updated in 2004.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Ahmet Sözen, "The Cyprus Negotiations: From 1963 Inter-communal Conflict to the Annan Plan" (Department of International Relations, University of Bahcesehir 2004), 16

During the discussions of the plan, in 2003, new Presidential elections were held in the Cyprus Republic and Tassos Papadopoulos replaced Glafko Kliridi in the Presidency. Everything seemed positive. The two communities as well as the USA and UK were very optimistic that the plan would bring finally an end in the Cyprus conflict. “For the first time in the long history of Cyprus, peace negotiations, the formula of a settlement along the principles of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation already agreed by the parties in 1977, had been translated into a detailed blueprint: from the constitution and federal laws for the United Cyprus Republic, to the constitutions for the two constituent states, down to the new flag (horizontal blue, yellow and red fields separated by thin white lines) and a national anthem.”⁵⁵

In 31 March 2004, the final version of the Annan’s plan was completed and the two communities had to call two separate referendums, one for each community in order to decide whether the plan will be accepted or not.

This constitutional design was calling for an independent state, the United Cyprus Republic, with a federal government and two equal constituent states, the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State.

The federal parliament was supposed to be composed of two chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Each of these chambers had to have forty eight members. In the Senate, the two communities had to be equally represented while the composition in the Chamber of Deputies had to be “in proportion to persons holding internal constituent state citizenship status of each constituent state, provided that each constituent state shall be attributed no less than one

⁵⁵ Amanda Akcakoca, “ Cyprus- Looking to a Future Beyond the Past” (European Policy Centre: Issue Paper No 32, 2005), 5-6

quarter of seats”⁵⁶. Moreover, “the decisions in the Parliament had to have the approval of both Chambers by simply majority rule, including one quarter of voting Senators from each constituent state”.⁵⁷

The President and the Vice President of the Presidential Council had to be elected by the Council with rotation of the seats every twenty months. Moreover, the Vice President would be able to replace the President in case of the incapacity of the President to perform his duties. The Greek Cypriot members in the Council were supposed to be responsible for the Ministries of European Affairs, Finance, Home Affairs, and Finance and Justice. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot members of the Council of Ministers had to be responsible for the Ministries of Communications and Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs and Defense and Trade and Economy⁵⁸.

Moreover, the plan was calling for the independence of the Central Bank of Cyprus, the Office of the Attorney – General and the Office of the Auditor-General. The Supreme Court had to comprise nine judges, three from each community and three non-Cypriot judges. Finally, the two communities of the United Cyprus Republic had to have a common flag and a common anthem which were going to represent the state internationally.⁵⁹

However, the referendums that were held on 24 April 2004 in both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot side proved that the Annan’s plan was one more failure in the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. The Greek-Cypriot side voted “no” for the plan with 75.83% while the Turkish-

⁵⁶The World of Cyprus: The Annan’s Plan: http://www.kypros.org/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf

⁵⁷ The World of Cyprus: The Annan’s Plan: http://www.kypros.org/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf

⁵⁸ The World of Cyprus: The Annan’s Plan: http://www.kypros.org/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf

⁵⁹The World of Cyprus: The Annan’s Plan: http://www.kypros.org/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf

Cypriot side voted “yes” with 64.90%. This “no” answer of the Greek-Cypriot side meant the collapse of the peace negotiations that had taken place in the last years between the two communities and the continuity of the conflict between Greece and Turkey.⁶⁰

Table 2: The Main Plans of the Cyprus Conflict

	London Agreement (1960)	Acheson Plan (1964)	Perez De Cuellar Plan (1977)	Ghali Proposal (1992)	Annan Plan (2004)
Political System	Cyprus as an independent state with Greek-Turkish power-sharing.	Cyprus unification with Greece. Turkey would receive the Greek island Kasstelorizon and a military base in Cyprus.	Independent, Federal Republic with two federal states	Bi-zonal, bi-communal federal state	Federal government with two equal constituent states.
Representation	Greek Cypriot President-Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. Council of Ministers, Civil Service and Security forces: 70:30, army: 60:40. High Court of Justice: two Greeks, one Turkish and one neutral judge.	-	Greek Cypriot President and Turkish Cypriot Vice President. Two chambers: Lower House 70:30 and Upper House with equal number of members. Council of Ministers with 70:30 ratio. Constitutional Court should be composed by one Greek, one Turkish and one neutral judge.	Lower House 70:30, Upper House 50:50. Council of Ministers: 70:30. Supreme Court: equal number of judges with rotated presidency. Federal force of equal size for both communities.	Rotated Presidency every twelve months. Equal representation in the senate. Chamber of Deputies: in proportion to persons holding internal constituent state citizenship status of each constituent state. Supreme Court: equal number of judges + neutral judges.

⁶⁰ Aggelos M. Sirigos, The Annan’s Plan: The Inheritance of the past and the perspectives of the Future («Σχέδιο Ανάν: Οι κληρονομίες του παρελθόντος και οι προοπτικές του μέλλοντος») (Patakis 2005) , 30

Introducing the Theory

The theory that had been chosen to be part of this thesis can be divided into three main parts which are meant to be important elements for the application of a consociational model of democracy in Cyprus. The first session is concerned with the identification of Cyprus as a plural society. This part tries to understand what constitutes a plural society and what the characteristics are that make Cyprus a plural society both in 1960 and in 2004. The second session is concerned with the characteristics of a successful power-sharing system in order to check if the Cyprus power-sharing system both in 1960 and in 2004 was in accordance with these characteristics.. Finally, in the last session, the favorable factors that have to be in existence in order for the consociational model to be successful and to survive are presented. All of these elements will help us to understand why the consociational model in Cyprus failed as well as to prove that the consociational model which was introduced in 2004 would have failed if it had been accepted.

Cyprus as a Plural Society

How can we identify a plural society? Is it just a society with different ethnic orientations? Are there societies more pluralistic than others? According to Arendt Lijphart, it is more convenient to analyze societies in various degrees of pluralism than to make a strict distinction between plural and homogeneous societies. However, he recognizes the fact that it is very difficult to measure the degrees of pluralism. For this reason, he suggested four parameters that can be used

in order to help determining whether a society is completely plural or deviates from perfect pluralism.⁶¹ According to these four parameters in a completely pluralistic society:

1. The segments in which the society is divided have to be clear and identifiable.
2. The exact size of each segment has to be known.
3. There must be perfect correspondence between segmental boundaries and the boundaries between the political, social, and economic organizations.
4. An election must be a segmental census.⁶²

If we apply the above parameters in the case of Cyprus in 1960 we can see that most of them were in existence. By 1960 in Cyprus there were two major segments: the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot. We know also that the Greek Cypriot segment was consisting the 80% of the population while the Turkish Cypriot the 18%. We can further state that in the elections people were going to vote according to their ethnic origin in order to safe their rights and especially the Turkish Cypriot community. Finally, we cannot say that there was a perfect correspondence between segmental boundaries in the political, social and economic organizations because under the British occupation segmental differences in organizations were not in existence.

However, the Cyprus society's characteristics as we realized from the historical retrospect that it was made in the previous session changed a lot during the years. By 2004, in my belief, Cyprus could not be characterized as a segmented society and more specifically it could not be

⁶¹ Arendt Lijphart. Consociational Theory: Problems and Prospects. A Reply. Comparative Politics, Vol.13, No 3, (April., 1981) p. 355

⁶² Arendt Lijphart. Consociational Theory: Problems and Prospects. A Reply. Comparative Politics, Vol.13, No 3, (April., 1981) p. 356

characterized as one society. On the contrary, it was a country where two different states located in it. On the one hand, there is the Cyprus Republic, a recognized, developed and independent state which is consisted solely by the Greek Cypriot population and has its own political, social and economic organizations. On the other hand, we have the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a state recognized only by Turkey and which depends solely on Turkey for economic, political and military support. It is consisting only by Turkish Cypriot population and it has its own political social and economic organizations. Even though, people in case of the acceptance of the Annan's Plan would vote according to their ethnic origin, this factor is not enough to characterize Cyprus as a plural society. Therefore, by the time that there are no segments, no correspondences between segmental boundaries because the communities are connected in no ways, then we can conclude that Cyprus in 2004 cannot be characterized as a plural society not even as one society.

Why it is so important to make an analysis whether Cyprus is a plural society or not? In order to apply a theory in a country case we have first to understand the circumstances under this theory is going to be applied. The theory of the consociational model of democracy in which this paper is based on applies in plural societies. Therefore, we can assume that the success of this theory in a country case depends also on the degrees of pluralism in that specific country.

In 1960, we can certainly answer that Cyprus was a plural society. However, the events that took place, according to my belief, during the years changed the political, social and economic environment so negatively that created not only a divided society as many characterize the society in Cyprus but they contributed in the creation of two different states that it would be very difficult to be united. If this is the case, then in 1960, the consociational model of democracy had more probabilities for success than the model introduced in 2004.

Cyprus and the Characteristics of Power-Sharing Systems

According to Ulrich Scheneckener, “power sharing systems contain typically the following institutional arrangements which are either formalized and legally binding or based on informal agreements and unwritten rules:

“Power –sharing executive: The government includes representatives from all relevant groups in society in the form either of a great coalition among the main parties of all party governments or of temporary round tables. In each case, it would be decisive to secure the participation by the leaders of all significant segments.

Proportional Representation: all groups or segments are adequately represented within the executive, the parliament, the legal system and the public service including the army or state owned companies.

Veto rights: Each group has the opportunity to block political decisions by using its veto rights. The right to veto could apply unrestrictedly to all decisions, it could be conditional and just refer to some basic laws or it could just have a delaying effect in order to renegotiate disputed issues.

Segmented autonomy: each group enjoys some degree of self-government; it maintains its own elected bodies, institutions and competencies. Only few issues have therefore to be coordinated with other segments of society. This can be organized on the basis of territorial or non territorial arrangements. The former implies that consociationalism will coincide with a federal type structure. The latter implies that the various groups are organized on the basis of the personality principle, irrespective of their territorial basis.

Arbitration: In case of a dispute it is necessary to develop mechanisms for conflict settlement. Measures include informal meetings among the group leaders, ombudspersons, formalized

mediation committees, independent commissions or special arbitration courts in which all sides are presented.”⁶³

From the analysis that it was made in previous sessions for both the London Agreement and the Annan’s plan we can see that all the above characteristics were in existence. First, regarding the power-sharing executive, the leaders from both segments participated in the form of grand coalitions of the main parties of each segment.

Second, in the London agreement there was proportional representation by the time that both segments were represented according to their population size. In the Annan’s plan, on the other hand, I believe that the Turkish Cypriot population would have been over-presented if we consider the small percentage of its population in comparison with the Greek Cypriot population. How come the small minority which consists only the 18% of the population to govern the 82% for a certain period of time? Nevertheless, both plans can be characterized as proportional.

Moreover, in both plans there was the right of veto. None of the segments could pass a law or to take an action which was not in accordance with the other side of the governance. Lastly, both plans included mechanisms for dispute settlement through courts, and UN mediators.

Therefore we can conclude that both plans were qualified for a successful power-sharing system. However, one of them failed and the other was not accepted. This fact drives us to look to other possible reasons that contributed in the continuity of the conflict.

⁶³ Ulrich Scheneckener. “Making Power-Sharing: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation.” *Journal of Peace Research* (2002): 204-205

Cyprus and Consociational Democracy

The concept of consociational democracy was first introduced by Arendt Lijphart in his attempt to explain political stability in divided societies⁶⁴. According to his theory, “consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy”⁶⁵. However, his theory does not explain only how political stability can be achieved in plural societies but also it explains under what circumstances it can be successful. Even though these circumstances or “favorable factors” as Lijphart is introducing them do not derive from the consociational theory, the experiences that derive from one country to another make them important in understanding on which factors the success of the consociational model of democracy depends.⁶⁶

In his works of 1968, 1969, 1977 and 1985, Lijphart presented lists of favorable factors that have to be in existence in order for a consociational model of democracy to bring political stability in plural societies.⁶⁷ The favorable factors which derived from all his works are: the distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures, a multiple balance of power among the subcultures, external threats, a relatively low load on the system, moderate nationalism, popular attitudes favorable to government by grand coalition, widespread approval of the principle of government by elite cartel, the length of time a consociational democracy has been in operation, the internal political cohesion of the subcultures, adequate articulation of the subcultures

⁶⁴ Matthijs Bogaards. *The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review*. European Journal of Political Research 33. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998. p 475

⁶⁵ Arendt Lijphart. *Consociational Democracy*. World Politics Vol 21, No2 (Jan, 1969) p. 216

⁶⁶ Matthijs Bogaards. *The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review*. European Journal of Political Research 33. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998. p 478

⁶⁷ Matthijs Bogaards. *The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review*. European Journal of Political Research 33. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998. p 478

interests, segment isolation and federalism, small country size, overarching loyalties, moderate multiparty system, representative party system, crosscutting cleavages, tradition of elite accommodation, geographical concentration of segments, no majority segment plus segments of equal size, small number of segments and socioeconomic equality.⁶⁸ However, not all of these factors can be found in all of his lists. The lists have only four favorable factors in common: the segmental isolation, the external threats, a balance of power between the segments or no majority segments and segments of equal size and a small country/population size or a reduced decision load.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, the favorable factors have been a reason for debate for many scholars who applied them in country cases and for this reason it would be wise to include their work in this paper. First, Adriano Pappalardo, after studying several favorable factors in the cases of the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria reached the conclusion that the two factors that affect the consociational model of democracy are the stability among the subcultures and the elite predominance. However, none of these factors has been included in the works of Lijphart.⁷⁰

Jimmy K. Tindigarukayo on the other hand, after choosing several factors introduced by Lijphart he adds the popular legitimacy of the ruling elites, the respect for institutional rules and

⁶⁸ Matthijs Bogaards. *The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review*. European Journal of Political Research 33. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998. p 478

⁶⁹ Matthijs Bogaards. *The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review*. European Journal of Political Research 33. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998. p 477

⁷⁰ Matthijs Bogaards. *The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review*. European Journal of Political Research 33. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998. p 482

procedures and compromise, trust and good will among the political leaders as the most important factors for the success of consociationalism.⁷¹

Undoubtly, different plural societies have different characteristics and its society needs its own analysis for the better understanding of the conditions in which the theory of the consociational democracy will be applied. Moreover, because of this differentiation that exists in plural societies we cannot reach concrete conclusions of which factor is more important than the other and which one is the most important prerequisite for the success of consociational democracy. For this reason, this paper will use the favorable factors introduced by Lijphart in his last two works of 1977 and 1985 which are also the factors most commonly used by scholars in country cases. The favorable factors that were chosen to be analyzed in the Cyprus case, therefore, are the following:

Segmental isolation and federalism: the groups have to be territorially segmented in order for territorially arrangements to be made. Moreover, the segmental isolation is necessary for regional independence.

External threats: the consociational model has to be into force by voluntarily compromises and not be threat by external forces.

No majority segments or segments with equal size: There must be no difference in the size of the segments that constitute the society or at least there must be no segment with an absolute majority.

⁷¹ Matthihs Bogaards. The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review. European Journal of Political Research 33. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands 1998. p 482

Socioeconomic equality: there must be no segment which is economically disadvantageous significantly in comparison with the rest of the segments.

Small population size: the country must be small in size of its population.

Small number of segments: the higher the number of the segments, the more the different positions of each segment and it is more difficult to make compromises and to find solutions in order to satisfy all the segments.

Overarching loyalties: None of the groups must claim that it is the “owner of the state”.

Tradition of elite accommodation: Compromises that were made in the past among the different segments of the society can serve in future compromises because of a common past which results in a common political culture.

Representative party system: All the segments must be equally represented in the political scene.

Moderate multiparty system: There must be several political parties which can represent most of the different groups of the population in order for democratic politics to take place.

Crosscutting cleavages: “Due to ethnicity and language differences, cleavages are created. The more politically relevant membership overlaps, the more stable the consociational system is. Electoral behavior proves to be very important element for cross cutting cleavages. People vote according to ethnicity and language or according to political skills?”⁷²


⁷² Ulrich Schneckener. “Making Power-Sharing: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation.” *Journal of Peace Research* (2002): 213

Favorable Factors in Cyprus in 1960

Geographical concentration of segments:

As we saw in the historical retrospect that it was made, Cyprus until 1960 was under the British occupation. The two communities were not territorially segmented. On the contrary both the Greek Cypriots as well as the Turkish Cypriots could be found all around the island until 1974.

Figure 1: Map of Ethnic Distribution in Cyprus in 1960



As we can see from the above map which shows the ethnic distribution of Cypriot population in 1973 we can see that even though the majority of the Turkish Cypriot population was living in the northern part of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot population can be found in the southern part of

Cyprus as well. This fact shows that the two communities were living next to each other without any disadvantageous consequences.

External Threats:

By 1959 it became obvious that the will of the Greek Cypriot population was the unification of the island with Greece. However, this could not be done. First, because there was Turkish Cypriot population in Cyprus and they were against to this plan as well as because Great Britain did not want to lose its control over the island. The only solution that the two communities finally agreed to sign was the independence of the island through the London Agreement. Even though this agreement was not considered to be the best solution for the Greek Cypriot population it was made under voluntarily compromises and not by external threats.

No majority segments or segments with equal size:

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and with the annexation of Cyprus to Great Britain, the island was consisting of two major communities: the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot. However, the size of each of these groups had a significantly difference. On the one hand, the Greek Cypriot population had the 80% of the population while the Turkish Cypriot side only the 18%. Therefore we can conclude that there was a majority segment on the island.

Socioeconomic equality:

Under the British occupation both communities were economically in equal terms. The strict tax measures had been applied in both communities by the British administration and none of them were more economically advantageous or disadvantageous.

Small population size:

It is estimated that Cyprus in 1960 had 572.707 residents. From this number the Greek Cypriots were 447.901 together with Armenians and Manorites, the Turkish Cypriots were 103.822 while 20. 984 were others mostly British. Therefore, Cyprus in 1960 had a small population size.⁷³

Small number of segments:

In 1960, Cyprus had two major segments: the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot. Even though several other minority groups were existed in the island like Armenians, Manorites and British, the two communities of our concern had the control of the island.

Overarching loyalties:

Due to the higher population size as well as due to the history of the island, the Greek Cypriot community was always claiming that it was the “owner” of the island. Moreover, the Greek influence had been a crucial factor in this perception.

Tradition of elite accommodation:

The two communities in Cyprus had never had a tradition of elite accommodation. The island had been under occupation for many years and it was always represented by Greece and Turkey. Moreover instead of a tradition of elite accommodation, the two communities had a common disadvantageous past. On the one hand, as it was already mentioned, the Greek Cypriot population was always connected with Greece. The occupation of Greece by Turkey for four

⁷³ Census of Population and Agriculture 1961, Vo. 1, Population by Location, Race and Sex, and Demographic Report 1987, Department of Statistics and Research.
http://www.kypros.org/Cyprus/cy_republic/demography.html

hundred years and the Asia Minor catastrophe in 1922 which was considered to be genocide against the Greek nation constituted a feeling of hate against the Turkish community.

Representative party system:

The consociational model introduced by the London Agreement as it was analyzed in a previous session was representing the two communities according to their population size. Even though the two communities had no equal representation, both of them had the opportunity of participating in the political scene and their actions were interrelated, through the right of veto for both sides, in order none of them to be affected by inappropriate actions of any side.

Moderate multiparty system:

Under the British occupation, elections in Cyprus were not held. This fact had as a consequence the absence of political parties. With the exception of the Communist party of Cyprus that was established in 1926, no other party had been formed in the Greek Cypriot community. Only when the time for the Cypriot independence came new parties started to be formed. The Ethnarchia Movement as well as the Democratic Union was established for the Greek Cypriot side.⁷⁴

In the Turkish Cypriot side on the other hand political parties had been formed since 1943. The first of them was the Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus (KATAK) and a few years later the Turkish Cypriot National Union Party.⁷⁵

Even though there were not many different political parties in Cyprus in 1960 we can say that both communities had a moderate multiparty system.

⁷⁴ Halazias, 48

⁷⁵ Halazias, 49

Crosscutting cleavages:

Because of the small population size of the Turkish Cypriot community, it was very difficult for crosscutting cleavages to be formed. Each community had to protect its rights and not the common good. Moreover, the differences in language, culture, religion and the common negative past were acting as obstacles in the cooperation of the two communities.

Out of eleven factors that we examined in this session, Cyprus proved to satisfy six of them; the external threats, the socioeconomic equality, the small population size, the small number of segments, the representative party system, and the moderate multiparty system. On the contrary, the factors like the segments of equal size, the tradition of elite accommodation, the crosscutting cleavages, the overarching loyalties, and the geographical concentration of segments do not seem to have been in existence in 1960.

However, If we concentrate in the factors that were absent in 1960, we will see that most of them were related to the between relationship of the communities. This fact shows that there was no good relation and trust between the two segments and this resulted to the collapse of the consociational model.

Favorable Factors in Cyprus in 2004

Geographical concentration of segments:

By 2004 many changes occurred in the territory of Cyprus. In 1960, we saw that both communities were living next to each other all around the island. However, after the Turkish invasion in 1974, the island has been divided into two main territories.

Figure 2: Map of Ethnic Distribution in Cyprus in 1960 and in 1999



As we can see from the above map which shows the ethnic distribution of Cypriot population in 1960 and 1999 we can see that after the Turkish invasion, the Turkish Cypriot population

occupied the northern part of Cyprus. Therefore, we can conclude that by 2004 the two communities were territorially segmented.

External Threats:

With the Turkish invasion and the creation of the divided state, the international community highlighted that a solution in the Cyprus conflict is necessary for the development and the future of the island. As we already figured out the UN made several plans for the resolution of the conflict to be achieved but none of them proved to be a final solution. With the introduction of the Annan's plan the two communities had taken also a final warning. The acceptance of the final plan would have been the key towards the membership in the European Union.

Although, threats and high pressure were made in both communities by the international community, the final plan was finally rejected by the Greek Cypriot side. However, what is interesting is that the referendum for the acceptance or rejection of the plan took place two days before Cyprus accession to the European Union.

No majority segments or segments with equal size:

After the collapse of the London Agreement and the creation of the divided state the size of the two segments did not change significantly in comparison with their size in 1960. The Greek Cypriot community remained the largest one with population size of 642.600 residents out of 802.500 while the Turkish Cypriot community had 87.400 and the rest 72.500 foreign residents.

Therefore, even after so many years that passed in 2004 there were not segments of equal size. On the contrary, the Greek Cypriots continued to constitute the majority.⁷⁶

Socioeconomic equality:

During the years the socioeconomic inequality between the two communities increased significantly. In order to show the degree of the difference we are going to use two economic indicators: the GDP and the GDP per capita. The Greek Cypriot side had \$17.7 billion and \$21.740 respectively. The Turkish Cypriot side on the other hand had \$4.54 billion and \$7.135 respectively.⁷⁷ So we can conclude that the economic background of the two segments it was completely different. Of course this difference was also due to the fact that the Turkish Cypriot state is recognized only by Turkey and it has economic and trade relations only with Turkey, fact which makes international trade and the development of their economy very difficult.

Small population size:

It is estimated that Cyprus by 2002 had 802.500 residents. From this number, the Greek Cypriots were 642.600, the Turkish Cypriots were 87.400 and the rest 72.500 foreign residents. Therefore, Cyprus continued to have a small population size.⁷⁸

Small number of segments:

⁷⁶ Cyprus Net. Population of Cyprus

http://www.cyprusnet.com/content.php?article_id=2776&subject=standalone

⁷⁷ Middle East Desk. Org : Cyprus

<http://middleeastdesk.org/article.php?id=85&printsafe=1>

⁷⁸ Cyprus Net. Population of Cyprus

http://www.cyprusnet.com/content.php?article_id=2776&subject=standalone

By 2004, Cyprus continued to have two major segments: the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot.

Overarching loyalties:

Like in 1960, the perception of the Greek Cypriot population that the island belongs to them and that Turkey illegally invaded to Cyprus in 1974 remained.

Tradition of elite accommodation:

By 2004, the two communities not only they did not have a tradition of elite accommodation but the relations between them had been worst in comparison with 1960 due to several events. First of all, the only decision that had taken in accordance by both communities, the independence of Cyprus with the London Agreement, had collapsed three years after have been into force. Except that, the Turkish invasion in 1974, deepened the conflict and initiated the era of a divided state. In addition, the so many negotiations of failure that took place from 1974 till the presentation of the Annan's plan showed that the elites that represent the two communities cannot reach an agreement easily.

Representative party system:

The analysis of the Annan's plan in a previous session made it clear, that with its acceptance the two communities were going to be equally represented in the political scene. If we try to compare the party system introduced by the London Agreement with the party system introduced by the

Annan's plan, we will see that the Turkish Cypriot community would have been more representative in the last plan if we take into consideration its small population size.

Moderate multiparty system:

By 2004, many political parties were established in each one of the two communities of our concern. In the Greek Cypriot side, some of them were the Movement of Social Democracy United Democratic Union of Centre, the Progressive Party of Working People, the Democratic Party and others. In the Turkish Cypriot side a multiparty system was established as well. Some of them are the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), the National Unity Party, the Democratic Party, the Peace and Democratic movement and others.

Crosscutting cleavages:

Even though there were several relevant parties which had been formed in the communities, none of them could cooperate with each other for a common result because as it was mentioned, from 1974 Cyprus has been divided in two main societies with no cooperation with each other. Therefore, crosscutting cleavages could not be formed.

If we make a comparison of the favorable factors that existed in Cyprus in 1960 with the factors existed in 2004, we will figure out that we have three main differences. In the 1960 we did not have a geographical concentration of segments fact with changed positively by 2004. However, two disadvantageous factors occurred as well; the rise of more pressure of the international community for the resolution of the conflict and the socioeconomic inequality which increased significantly.

In addition, we can notice that some factors like the tradition of elite accommodation did not only remain absent but due to the events that took place the relationship between the dominant elites worsened.

If we suppose that the London Agreement failed because of the absence of several factors that were related to the between relationship of the communities as well as because of the population size difference of the segments, then the Annan's plan would have failed also not only because of the internal relationship between the segments which did not become better but also because of the occurrence of the socioeconomic inequality and the superiority in economic terms of the Greek Cypriot side as well as because of external threats.

Why no solution for Cyprus?

The main final position of this thesis paper is that a solution for the Cyprus conflict is very difficult to be achieved for many reasons. If we turn back to the past we will see that even though the two communities lived together, next to each other, for many years until 1974 a common Cypriot identity could not be formed. Why did this happen?

First of all, the two communities differ in terms of ethnic origin, religion and language. These differences did not allow an interaction and the creation of common elements among them except of the fact that all of them were living in the same land.⁷⁹

Second, under the Ottoman Empire each community had its own rights and its own judicial and administrative officials. Moreover, its community had its own education system which had been transferred from Greece and Turkey to the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively. Therefore the conflict that always existed between Turkey and Greece was transferred through the education system to the two communities of our concern. This fact resulted in the tendency of the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community to identify themselves with Greece and Turkey respectively.⁸⁰

Moreover, in order for a successful solution to be achieved and to last, several factors have to be in existence. From the favorable factors that we used for our analysis, we realized that some of them exist and some of them do not in the Cyprus case. However, the quantity of factors is not as important as their quality. Even though a geographical concentration of segments, the small population size, the small number of segments, a representative party system, and a moderate multiparty system exist they are not enough in order to build a stable basis for the establishment of a consociational model of democracy. The reason for this conclusion is that these factors are not related to the internal relationship of the communities. On the contrary, we

⁷⁹ Yilmaz Ercan Muzaffer. "The Cyprus Conflict and the Annan Plan: Why One More Failure?" Balikesir University; p.32

⁸⁰ Yilmaz Ercan Muzaffer. "The Cyprus Conflict and the Annan Plan: Why One More Failure?" Balikesir University; p.32

saw that those factors that are related to the relationship of the communities are not only absent both in 1960 and in 2004 but also have worsened during the years.

Another factor that existed in 1960 but not in 2004 plays also a significant role in my concern. The socioeconomic inequality that increased during the years in a great extent between the two communities deepened more the division. On the one hand, the Greek Cypriot community succeeded to reach a great development and to become a member of the European Union. On the other hand, in the Turkish Cypriot side there is no development, trade is limited and it is a recognized state only by Turkey. This means that Cyprus will have an advantageous position in the negotiations that will take place the following years, and it would be very difficult to accept any plan that will not satisfy most of its claims.

Moreover, except of the favorable factors that were taken from Arendt Lijphart, reference must be given to the two factors introduced by Jimmy K. Tindigarukayo regarding to the respect for institutional rules and procedures and the trust between the two communities. In the case of Cyprus, these factors could play a significant role in the resolution of the conflict if they were in existence. The two communities had shown several times that they do not have respect to the rules. This became obvious from the Greek Cypriot actions after the collapse of the London Agreement, the Turkish invasion in 1974, and the failure of the negotiations that took place since 1974. More importantly, from the historical retrospect that it was made it became clear that a climate of antitrust exists between the communities which contribute to the continuity of the conflict.

In addition, as it was mentioned earlier, Cyprus is not considered to be a plural society in this thesis paper. After 1974 and with the establishment of the Cyprus Republic and the Turkish

Republic of Northern Cyprus, two new states were created which do not constitute a plural society. By the time that the consociational model of democracy refers and applies to plural societies we cannot be sure that it would be successful in the case of Cyprus.

Finally, the interference of Greek and Turkey in the negotiations as well as the identification of each community with their motherlands creates one more factor which makes the Cyprus conflict difficult to be resolved.

In his article, “The Cyprus Conflict and the Annan Plan: Why One More Failure?” Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz makes an analysis of possible reasons that resulted in the failure of the Annan’s plan. Except of the absence of a common identity, the interference of Greece and Turkey and the mistrust that exists between the two communities he also mentions that the actions of mediator in the presentation of the Annan plan had disadvantageous consequences.

However, even though the first three reasons that he mentions are absolutely agreeable with the position of this paper, the last reason does not seem to be very reliable. The UN mediators for years tried to bring a solution in the Cyprus conflict. None of them was successful. However, the reasons of this failure lie more in the mistrust that exists between the two communities, in the disproportion of the population among the segments, the common negative history and the socioeconomic inequality that had been created during the years than to unsuccessful actions of the mediator.

Moreover, Yilmaz states that a solution to the Cyprus conflict is very difficult to be achieved but not impossible. However, this thesis paper considers that even though the two communities will reach to an agreement with a plan similar to the last one which was introduced

in 2004, it would be very difficult to survive due to the great differences that were analyzed in the thesis paper.

What we can realize through this thesis is that even if several plans and negotiations are introduced a final solution in the Cyprus conflict is very difficult to be achieved. However, we could also realize that even though no solution was found all these years, the two independent states that exist in Cyprus since 1974 could stand to each other with no further disadvantageous events. Therefore the only solution that this paper is proposing is that the existence of two independent, separate states must continue and the Turkish part of Cyprus must be recognized. This solution is more feasible and less costly for both communities.

Conclusion

Combining all the events that took place all these years in Cyprus, we can conclude that the wrong policies of the Greek and Cypriot governments as well as the illegal invasion of Turkey in the island created a difficult and long-lasting situation in the island, which could not be solved until today even though the countless negotiations, that took place all these years.

However, the mistakes had a greater impact on the Turkish-Cypriot side due to the fact that this part of Cyprus remains underdeveloped until today and it is recognized only by Turkey, fact that has further consequences in economic sense. The Greek-Cypriot side on the other hand succeeded to overcome at least the inter-conflicts and due to its economic development succeeded to become a member of the European Union in 2004. This fact will have several consequences in the Cyprus problem. First, it will make the accession process of Turkey in the European Union more difficult, Greek-Cypriot side will have a strategic position in the further negotiations that will take place, and most probably, none of the plans in the future will satisfy the Greek-Cypriot government enough in order to accept it.

Considering Cyprus society as plural in 1960 it would be absolutely correct and moreover it would be a base for applying the consociational model. However, this thesis paper considers Cyprus society as not plural in 2004. On the contrary, it is believed Cyprus to be a country with two different states where consociationalism is too difficult to be applied.

By taking into consideration the favorable factors for consociationalism, we realize that all the factors that are related to the relationship between the two communities are absent. Moreover, the high socioeconomic inequality and the significant difference in the size of the population of each segment contribute in the disadvantageous base for the existence of a consociational model of democracy.

However, the absence of favorable factors and the inability of solving the Cyprus problem depend more on the interference of Greece and Turkey in the political scene of the island which simultaneously results in antitrust between the two communities.

Nevertheless, Cyprus is in the center of interest not only for Greece, Turkey and Great Britain who do not want to see their control over the island to getting lost but for the international community as a whole. Notwithstanding, we cannot forget that many people lost their lives, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, many people lost their houses, and many people are still missing.

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