CEU eTD Collection (2008); Simon, Eszter: Democratic Regime Types and the International Risk-taking of Democracies: Comparing the United States and Great Britain

CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2008
Author Simon, Eszter
Title Democratic Regime Types and the International Risk-taking of Democracies: Comparing the United States and Great Britain
Summary It is almost a commonplace to claim today that democracies, at least, vis-à-vis each other, are more peaceful than autocracies. But are all democracies equally peaceful? This dissertation contends that parliamentary and presidential systems do differ in their international risk-taking propensity and offers a new institutionalist explanation for why it is so and that the relationship between regime type and accountability is curvilinear.
The dissertation contributes to three bodies of literature: first, it refines the definition of democratic regime types by separating the permanent (constitutional) and the temporary (political) dimensions. Second, working out the relationship between the democratic peace theory and the literature on the diversionary use of force, it contneds that the relationship between accountability is curvilinear. That is, some constraints (accountability to the electorate) make states behave in a risk-averse manner, while other constraints (accountability to the political elite i.e. the parliament and the cabinet) propel international risk-taking. Prospect theory is used to clarify the conditions under which the curvilinear relationship between accountability and risk-taking appears.
The time frame of the six qualitative case studies (Korea 1950-1953, Dominican Republic 1965, and Grenada 1983, Malaya 1948-1957, Kenya 1952-1956, and Suez 1956) are the Cold War and . The approach taken is qualitative. The empirical analysis is limited to the period of the cold war and examines only the necessary conditions of risk-taking. It controls for the influence of personality, party ideology, and conflict intensity and includes wars under both domestically safe and adversarial conditions.
Case studies provide support for the hypotheses, but minor modifications appear to be in order. Conflict intensity appears to be an important intervening variable. The present conceptualization of accountability can be expanded to explain the difference in risk-taking among autocratic and democratic regimes, and, thus, resolve the dilemma of the existence of some constraints on non-democratic leaders. The findings also suggest that the lack of unequivocal findings in the diversionary literatures may be, at least in part, due to the literature’s strong focus on the United States. In other words, diversion has been examined most in a context where it is least likely to occur.
Supervisor Tamas, Meszerics
Department Political Science PhD
Full texthttps://www.etd.ceu.edu/2008/pphsie01.pdf

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