

**The United States in Conflict: A Comparative Study of *Persian Gulf* Conservatism and the
American Foreign Policy Tradition**

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Submitted to:

Central European University

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts and Sciences

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Budapest, Hungary

2008

Thesis Abstract

The research conducted in this thesis is done to prove two main problems common today in works on US foreign policy. These are problems based on the largely unpopular two terms of President George W. Bush. The misgivings of his foreign policy have cast a negative light on his policy brethren in the mostly conservative 1980s and 1990s compared to other presidential terms over history. First, this thesis proves that this recent conservative time period is not different from past Democratic ones, or other periods in general (i.e WWI, WWII, and the Cold War). Second, this thesis shows that the United States has a homogenous foreign policy. This means that not only is this period the same as the past, but *every* period of US foreign affairs are the same *in essence*. To evidence this, I use the methods of historical narrative, case study, and analytic narrative. Major findings of this work include the establishment of US *national security* as a phenomenon and concrete ideal, the similarity of the 1990s with the past, and the disclosure of a definite trend in US foreign policy over the course of its life. Democratic or Republican, conservative or liberal, young nation or super-power, the USA and its leadership seem to fall into a certain role *all the time* when addressing international situations.

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1.1: Thesis Introduction

All eyes are on the democratic nominees for the 2008 United States' presidential election. The rhetoric and bantering between Hillary Clinton and Barak Obama has been even more closely reported than the equally important Democratic Party's fight against Republican John McCain. Why is this? Democratic supporters expect 2008 to be a *Democrat's year*. Essentially, Democratic voters feel that a Democratic victor is not only long overdue, but also the most deserving for the next executive slot. This idea is based on what Democrats see as eight years of blundering by President George W. Bush, and before that nearly a decade of conservative oriented oval offices (Bill Clinton not wholly exempt). It is certainly understandable that American voters might want fresh blood, new energy and progressive ideas in their next leader.

The US 1990s can be characterized as a period of acute nationalistic unrest, like the Persian Gulf War and the Bosnian War of 1995, instead of overarching global conflict like WWII or the Cold War. After the Cold War finally thawed, 1990s decade presidential administrations were purposeful and motivated, but ultimately confused as the United States became a lone super-power. The 2000s and President Bush definitely follow this trend with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq (despite a global appeal for a *War on Terror*). There is no longer a clear villain; hence, the Middle East has quickly filled the void as the current democratic experiment.

1.2: Thesis Definition of *National Security*

The United States has had a rich national security tradition for almost all of its life. For my purposes here, I will definite *national security* (NS) in three parts and as related to US foreign policy. This is important because despite the copious use of the term in US presidential

speeches today, the term is seldom clearly defined. First, NS is a condition of national government to protect the nation from threats, usually *outside* but sometimes *inside*. President Bush's *Department of Homeland Security* was created to deal particularly with the interior aggression characteristic of terrorism. Second, it is the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and international freedom of US actions. As an international super-power the US claims the right to maintain its powers and hold its interests. Third, national security is a phenomenon of anxiety and awareness placed on citizens to maintain control of the country during crisis.¹ The best example of this is the 2000-decade *terror alert level* of yellow, orange and red broadcasted nightly on news programs.

So, national security is about government protection, territorial integrity, and control of the person. Such a definition is necessary to differentiate NS from nationalism, or in the US case patriotism. They are different phenomena for the United States; even if in subtle ways, and this must be explained before the corpus of this thesis. Nationalism is generally considered as a nation's right to constitute an autonomous political community based on shared history and common destiny.² Absent from this definition, that NS has, is the idea of conflict. Although nationalism can be born from (or lead to) conflict, NS refers to *conflict* (War, Violence, or Political Unrest) as a means of protection, control and national anxiety.³ Thus *conflict*, and the NS jargon of politicians, is used to keep a nation aware of danger lurking around them.

¹ Sam C. Sarkesian, John A. Williams, Stephen J. Cimbala, *US National Security*, (New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 56.

² Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, (New York: Polity, 2002), 45.

³ (Sarkesian, *Security*), 59.

1.3: Purpose of Thesis

The scope of this thesis will be American foreign policy between the years 1981-2008. Specifically, this is between the presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. I have named this period for the purposes of this thesis as *the Persian Gulf Era* due to the Persian Gulf War that changed *how and why* the US fights today. And, although Central and Eastern Europe were also frequented, the Middle East was the most consistent battleground. Of note, I am including Ronald Reagan as a Persian Gulf president. Although a 1980s president, his ideas on international policy have an overwhelming amount in common with 1990s conservatism.

My thesis will argue that Persian Gulf presidential administrations conduct foreign policy no differently than past US administrations. This is an important topic because of media and academic accusations that PG presidents, and George Bush especially, are radically different and dissident from the American tradition. I will deal mostly with foreign policy based on how the United States defines, contains, and punishes national enemies. Today, *national enemies* are called *enemies to national security*, and although the terms might be different, such framing of national aggression is not new. The United States has never changed in how it protects itself, and no matter the label, *national security* has been a top (and almost cultish) American priority.

The method of this piece will be to trace *national security* as a phenomenon through US history. The purpose is to establish that the United States *certainly has* this phenomenon and that it *definitively guides* US foreign policy. Such evidence seeks to suggest that it is the mold (national history), not the clay (executive office) that governs American foreign policy. I will find such evidence using two processes, two constants in American history, and two starting

points of time. The processes will be historical narrative, case study and analytic narrative. This will be applied to the constants, --legislation and *visual entertainment media* (VEM; to be defined). My historical narrative will begin just after the American Revolution, while my case studies will be drawn post-World War II. This is to acknowledge that the role, goals, and essence of the United States changed with super-power status (arguably circa WWII). The remainder of this introduction will be to explain my choice of constants and the thesis structure.

1.4: Thesis Constants

The United States prides itself on being a nation *founded on laws and procedures*. This notion is not a modern one. Law is perhaps the single most consistent variable in US history. All the branches of government have the power to create, inhibit, or change laws at any given time. But, in order to keep these laws just, law making is directed by a myriad of intricate procedures. It is for this reason that I have chosen *legislation* (government imposed law) as my first constant. Like all American legislation, national security legislation can be traced through time. However, I believe that this legislation ought to be referred to as a class called *conflict legislation* (CL). This is due to its routine and similar use during all US national conflicts. By identifying CL in as many presidencies as possible, I will prove that Federal protection of the United States has not changed *in essence* since the American Revolution. This *essence* is to define, contain, and sometimes punish groups hostile to the United States. By including the Persian Gulf Era in this narrative, it should become apparent that this presidential bloc is maintaining a US security heritage (not defying it).

If legislation is the biggest imposition on the American people, then Hollywood can be considered in the same light, but as an exposition internationally. Hollywood entertainment is perhaps the most globally identifiable and mass consumed US export. Thus, my second constant

will be *visual entertainment media*. I define VEM as dramatic television programs, TV movies, and silver-screen films. VEM is distinctly different than *news media*, which will be a section of chapter four. VEM is such a suitable constant for three reasons. First, all American entertainment is made for the domestic market (although paradoxically the international market produces more profit). This means that American citizens are intended as the main beneficiaries of entertainment messages. Second, Hollywood supremacy conveniently coincides with the advent of US super-power status. Third, entertainment appeals to the emotions and senses of people, something truly powerful and vacant in other forms of media.

Hence, by tracing the trends and messages of entertainment over time, it will show what issues the people are most receptive to, and what issues society (individuals and government) *wants* people to be receptive to. This constant also directly converges with the third part of my definition for national security. To repeat, national security creates feeling of anxiety and awareness in the population. Given that art imitates life, and visual entertainment captures the most pertinent and engaging problems of the times, it can be an invaluable tool for national security agendas. Moreover, since American entertainment is geared toward the domestic market, it is no stretch to consider that entertainment messages have hold over American emotions. Of course, this thesis will deal solely with politics in entertainment, from the genre of political thrillers and political dramas. Of note, it is also interesting that the current decade has also seen the largest rise in politics as an entertainment genre yet.

1.5: Thesis Structure

The structure of this thesis will be divided into four chapters. Chapter *One* will seek to unite the presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush into a bloc. In order to prove that these presidents are integrated into traditional US

foreign policy, I first need to prove that they are similar. That will be the purpose of this chapter. These *Persian Gulf administrations* (1981-2008) have a characteristic conservative orientation. This will be done through analytic narrative in order to flesh out small case studies and political ideas. Only after I prove the PG clan as a bloc can I juxtapose them next to the rest of history.

Chapter *Two* will be concerned with the review and application of Michael Foucault. It will be a straightforward literary review to give my arguments foundation. Foucault does a good job of explaining the many parts of a *punitive society*, which the United States is based on legislation and police powers. His theory will apply to my thesis in two ways. First, Foucault especially elaborates on how society can define criminal actors, which directly ties to my argument on the use of legislation. Second, Foucault's ideas on society *disciplining* can be connected to the use of entertainment as a motivator of citizen support for government-sponsored conflict.

Chapter *Three* will be the historical narrative of US conflict legislation to prove a continuous trend. It will begin with President John Adams until present times. This will show that the US has always had a certain idea of national security, which is prominent and powerful. Then, the bloc developed in Chapter One can be suitably compared. The United States vehemently attempts to uphold its dedication to the rule of law, but make no mistake about it--- even in the hands of the most timid administrations conflict legislation was as powerful and sudden as any gun.

Chapter *Four* will focus on the power of visual entertainment to the United States. This will begin approximately around 1970 and US intervention after WWII. The purpose of entertainment case studies will be to prove the impact of messages on the public, compare the artistic influences of each time period, and most importantly compare the sentiment and

messages of each piece to each other. I pose that each case study will show an overwhelming influence on the people during times of conflict and similarities in the kinds of messages conveyed.

2.1: Chapter One—Defining The Persian Gulf Bloc

2.2: Chapter One Introduction

Conservative? Neo-conservative? Neo-liberal? War-mongering? Moralistic?

Certainly, the list can go on for the multitude of popular nicknames of the US presidents beginning with Ronald Reagan. Admittedly, Persian Gulf Era administrations characteristically did exert force, push national agendas on the international community, and stubbornly promote democratic norms as major constituents of their foreign policy. True, conflicts like the Persian Gulf War and the missile campaigns of Central and Southeastern Europe attested US habit of entering the affairs of others during this time.

Are Persian Gulf administrations really so different from other presidencies in US history? This is the main question of this thesis, which I would like to repeat at the outset of this chapter. Is the promotion of *Freedom* today really so different than the promotion of *Democracy* 20 years ago? As another example, is President Bush's *fight against barbarism* really unique considering other fights against imperialism, fascism and communism through the 20th century? Taken smaller, can individual US conflicts even be differentiated in a major way? Were not the Korean, Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars all caused by the invasion of neighboring aggressors? These are all questions worth considering as we progress through this chapter.

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it is to define the common characteristics of a Persian Gulf administration. This is both to justify the label (*Persian Gulf administration*)

and to develop 1981-2008 into an airtight foreign policy bloc. Second, this chapter will juxtapose the PG timeframe against the rest of US history. Combined, these purposes will evidence policy unity from Ronald Reagan and beyond while suggesting that they are not *different, dissident, or estranged* from an American leadership tradition. Also, I think it necessary to uncover that government jargon is constantly recycled. For example, *Freedom* today and *Democracy* of yesteryear are meant and used in the same manner.

Such a chapter relates to the rest of this thesis in three main ways. First, in a thesis trying to prove the homogeneity of US foreign policy over 220 years, it is important to find common and applicable characteristics. This is even more motivated when dealing with an era so misunderstood and controversial as the current one. So then, why choose 1981-2008? No other period in US history has so grossly polarized politics than this one. Whereas the past can boast unpopular-armed conflict, the present is almost *entirely* unpopular. Common citizens and academics are losing faith in PG *politics and policy* at an astounding rate. It is often referred to as the *age of extremism* and as the loss of moderate voices.

Second, the Persian Gulf Era is, in my view, not studied objectively. Such a statement describes mainstream media programs and academic literature that typically overly criticizes policy of the time. Like all historical research, I feel that the PG era finally deserves an objective review. Third, the Persian Gulf Era needs a proper and articulated place in history. The 2008 presidential victor will be responsible for continuing, changing and translating what the last eight years meant. US foreign policy *now* needs a face and a trend as we enter into 2008. It will quite possibly be a remarkable and transformative year for the US presidency and the United States of America.

Chapter One will be broken up into four sections. These sections will be divided chronologically on the basis of *President*, *conflict*, and *ideology*. Thus, it must be stressed that I am *only* interested in the foreign policy traits of Persian Gulf executives. This is a thesis comparing US *foreign policy* over US history. Of course, all these presidents did have different ideas for domestic and economic reforms, which will not be covered here in detail. However, I will pose that domestic policy was less prioritized under the PGs because of their massive foreign initiatives.

First, I will deal with the two terms of Ronald Reagan. The conflicts in question will be the Invasion of Grenada, and the Iran-Contra Affair. His main ideology can be considered *conservative Cold War containment*. Second comes the single term of George H.W. Bush. His term is most responsible for the Persian Gulf War and *New World Order* speech. Next there are the two terms of Bill Clinton. This will focus on the campaigns of Central and South Eastern Europe (Bosnia 1995 and Kosovo 1999). His driving policy platform was the subtle *democratic enlargement plan*. Finally, I will explain the two terms of George W Bush. This will cover the War of Afghanistan and the current Invasion of Iraq. His main ideology is of course the *War on Terror*.

2.3: Ronald Reagan: Grenada, Iran-Contra, Containment

The two terms of Ronald Reagan dominated much of the 1980s. Let me pose here, that although in office between 1981-1989, I think it suitable to group him in the Persian Gulf trend because of extensive commonality. He was conservative Republican, which by itself is a tremendous departure from the mostly Democratic Cold War. Additionally, he marks a sharp change in policy priorities than presidents that came before him (again, mostly Democratic). For example, Reagan reversed many of Jimmy Carter's relationship reforms with Cuba (and much of

the progress).⁴ Relations with Fidel Castro were frozen when Reagan came into office, a trend continued by every president since. This is one of many small examples.

Specifically, the Reagan administration's reasons of conflict directly reflected (or rather possibly began) international intervention so typical in the 1990s. For my purposes, Reagan can be seen as a *bridge*. His foreign policy was consumed by the same Cold War politics of his predecessors.⁵ However, he involved the United States in small precision battles to promote good morals like those who came after. In this section, I will explain and analyze the Invasion of Grenada, the Iran-Contra affair, and his *conservative containment* Cold War policy. This section will proceed (along with the others in this chapter) with a brief description of the conflict/ideology followed by an explanation.

The Invasion of Grenada was the precursor to the Iran-Contra affair, and quite possibly can be considered the first Persian Gulf style conflict. Such a style, or change in style, from Democratic conflicts beforehand derives from the Republican desire to avoid *Vietnams*.⁶ The Democratically lead Vietnam War was perceived such a disaster as to scar US military efforts into complete transformation. For example, until the Vietnam War, War was always declared by Congress as was constitutionally appropriate.⁷ However, technically Congress (thus the USA) never declared war after 1975 because of executive loopholes and abridged military practice. So, instead of committing the complete breathe and weight of US armed forces to battles after Vietnam, conflicts were fought by small units and technology. Thus, it can be surmised that a

⁴ Ellen Schrecker, ed., *Cold War Triumphalism*, (New York: The New Press, 2004.), 138.

⁵ (Schrecker, *Cold War*), 257.

⁶ Douglas Little, *American Orientalism*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.), 74.

⁷ (Schrecker, *Cold War*), 97.

PG style conflict is one of *tactics and technology* instead of *commitment and dedication* by the USA.⁸ This is not to say that soldiers were not dedicated after Vietnam, but that conflicts were secretive, smaller, and purposefully distant from US political process.

The Invasion of Grenada (*Operation Urgent Fury*; 1983) was a Cold War hot spot under Reagan.⁹ Like most pre- Vietnam War, Cold War conflicts, Grenada was conceptualized as a fight by *natives* with tactician and guidance by US advisors (CIA). But, Grenada's situation worsened as Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was executed and replaced by Cuban-backed military dictator Hudson Austin. President Reagan was not happy with *another* communist dictator coming to power in the Caribbean. So, the original plan was scrapped for live, but mitigated, US military force. The United States, along with allied Caribbean armies, went to eliminate Austin.¹⁰

Urgent Fury was successful in its objective to restore Grenada back to a democratic regime. *Reagan's Democracy*, still deeply entrenched in presidential Cold War jargon, was the ideological impetus to depose dictator Austin. However, it was received by criticism of US right to intervene elsewhere in the world.¹¹ Interestingly enough, it is the same criticism heard today in Iraq nearly 30 years later. And, there is obviously much more than passing resemblance of Grenada to Iraq. The United States government justified such a move as *saving* Grenadian locals and fostering democratic norms. For example, US TV sets were inundated with images of local students kissing their beaches in the wake of victory.¹² US success in Grenada, and Republican pride of overcoming Vietnam stigmas, then turned Reagan's eye to Nicaragua.

⁸ John B. Judis, *The Folly of Empire*, (New York: Lisa Drew/Scribner, 2004.), 157.

⁹ (Little, *Orientalism*), 247.

¹⁰ Ibid., 249.

¹¹ (Schrecker, *Cold War*), 263.

¹² Ibid.

The Iran-Contra Affair (1986) is comprised of two different events, in two different parts of the world. This chapter is most concerned with Reagan's support of the Contras, a band of rebels in Nicaragua. Ronald Reagan was adamant to invade Nicaragua, exactly like he did in Grenada, in order to oust the Sandinista military dictatorship.¹³ However, his Democratic Congress was not receptive despite Reagan's success in the Caribbean. Congress denied him the *right* and the *funds* to invade Nicaragua. Thus proceeds the Iran scandal, where Reagan officials sought to *free Nicaragua* anyway. The Reagan administration sold weapons to Iranian factions in order to free six American hostages (which was a success). However, National Security Council member Oliver North decided to use those funds to secretly support the Contras.¹⁴

The Iran-Contra Affair was extremely intricate and would have politically ruined President Reagan if not for the end of the Cold War in 1989. The actual military effort of the Contras was never fully realized, although the Contras did receive illegal funds and support for a short time.¹⁵ However, despite the terrible results, Iran-Contra does follow the Grenadian and PG example perfectly. The Sandinistas were again a group of military despots that took hold of Nicaragua. The Contras were native pro-democracy soldiers willing to accept American aid. The USA *would have* sent units to create democratic infrastructure, but at half effort the US still send money and advisory aid to the Contras to topple the Sandinista regime.¹⁶ The key tenets to keep in mind here are the PG ideas of *invading* a hostile region, *eliminating* enemy military forces, and sometimes *removing and reinstituting* government. This is all on the grounds of democratic and do-gooder norms.

¹³ (Little, *Orientalism*), 250.

¹⁴ (Schrecker, *Cold War*), 51.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 54.

In addition to the typical, Iran-Contra has other implications not seen in Grenada. This is the PG tendency to be *stubborn* and *headstrong*. Of course, this was not seen with Grenada because Reagan got his way. Invading Nicaragua was not permissible by Congress, and also not popular with the American people.¹⁷ Contra rhetoric was not well received by American citizens before the illegal arms dealing. However, Reagan (who before the arms dealings incessantly fought Congress for funds) thought it appropriate and essential with or without proper support. Had Reagan the necessary funds without bothering Congress, he probably would have invaded and asked permission later. President Reagan thought that invading Nicaragua was best for his people, even without them on board.¹⁸

With both Grenada and Nicaragua, President Reagan did not break the Cold War tradition of *support battles*.¹⁹ This is when the USA (through the CIA) gives money, weapons, and personnel for natives to fight their own battles. However these are battles of US national interest. The Reagan years are sometimes referred to as *the Second Cold War* because of how fast he revitalized past tensions after the relative thaw of the 1970s. This is mostly because Ronald Reagan did not break with the ideology of *Containment*.²⁰ Proposed by Harry Truman and adopted by every president since, containment sought to not wholly defeat communism, but keep it within boundaries so the system eventually collapses under itself. Reagan was stubbornly committed to containment, and the promotion of *Democracy*, until around 1987 when Reagan made a huge policy shift (partly to recover from the Iran-Contra affair).

In 1987, Reagan met with Soviet leader Gorbachev in Ohio to talk about arms reducing treaties. There, they successfully negotiated the ABM 1987 support treaty to reduce

¹⁷ Judis, *Folly*, 144.

¹⁸ Ibid., 147.

¹⁹ (Schrecker, *Cold War*), 22.

²⁰ Ibid., 99.

middle-range missiles.²¹ Certain scholars consider this *the end of the Cold War* (there are many other positions), and I will use it as mine in this thesis. For Reagan, this meant a career altering policy reversal. In 1981, Reagan spoke of the Soviet Union as the ultimate evil, and even somewhat religiously as a US foil and agent of destruction for the world.²² He was so hugely dedicated to the evil of the Soviet Union that the 1987 reversal was surreal. In fact, he abruptly ended all activity against the Sandinistas late 1986 stating that Nicaragua is over because the Soviet Union is no longer an enemy.²³ It seemed as if Ronald Reagan was politically born anew.

The Grenada and Nicaragua conflicts were started for the precise reason to stop communism mere years earlier. Hence, we can see another PG trend. Related to ideology, PG administrations are susceptible to quick transformations in policy. They usually balance extreme stubbornness at one end with progressiveness when an advantage pops up. Reagan completed the Soviet friendly 1987 ABM treaty within only two years of his anti-Soviet SDI space-weapons plan. PG administrations make these transformations, in part, because of legacy considerations. For example, Ronald Reagan left office with a 64 percent approval rating, far up from 46 percent right after the Contra scandal.²⁴ His policy change was a way for him to save face as George H.W. Bush was instated.

2.4: George H. W. Bush: The Persian Gulf War and the *New World Order*

George Bush senior came into office on the ticket of being a *kinder and gentler* version of Ronald Reagan.²⁵ Here, we need remember the PG characteristic of *legacy*. It is important to

²¹ (Little, *Orientalism*), 253.

²² Judis, *Folly*, 148.

²³ Ibid., 149.

²⁴ Ibid., 18.

²⁵ David A. Deese, *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.), 140.

realize that the Iran-Contra Affair seriously hurt Reagan's, and the Republican Party's, popularity. Without positive closure for Reagan, Bush would not have won the oval office. Certainly, Bush only had a shot at being elected because of his predecessor's help with the end of the Cold War.²⁶ But, the electorate did not forget Reagan's deception in 1986. Bush had to promise a more inviting international policy in order to assuage American voters.

Thus, Bush's term can best be defined as *transitional*. Of course, he was a one-term president bookended by two two-termers. Moreover, he was the middle ground between staunchly Republican Reagan and Democratic Clinton. But, more than that, he was responsible for guiding the USA through a time without a Cold War. Reagan was PG oriented, but unequivocally a Cold War president. H.W. Bush was burdened with what the USA's new identity should be. In his single term, the Persian Gulf War stands out as Bush's most enduring policy contribution. It is here that the Middle East becomes a standout American priority. This section will look into the Persian Gulf War and Bush's *New World Order*, an attempt to redefine a world after the Freeze.

The Persian Gulf War (*Operation Desert Storm*; 1990) begins with a sudden Iraqi invasion of small, sovereign state Kuwait.²⁷ Such an attack went heavily noticed by the press, as comparisons were made between Saddam Hussein and 1930s German aggression. The world was certainly not ready for another Hitler, and the United States was disturbed by Middle Eastern subjugation and unification.²⁸ However, fighting Saddam meant far more military commitment than simply supporting native freedom fighters. It looked as if Kuwait might *need* to turn into another Vietnam. This was not popular at all with the American public.

²⁶ Ibid., 133.

²⁷ (Little, *Orientalism*), 138.

²⁸ Ibid., 140.

Nevertheless, the ramifications of allowing Hussein his way were very unsettling. If Iraq controlled Kuwait it held nearly a quarter of the world's oil. Moreover, it would give Hussein's army strategic advantage to move into other Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia. Further control of the Middle East would have given Saddam as much as 50 percent control over global oil reserves.²⁹ Bush used this to sell his war to the American people while also packaging it with tried and true PG rhetoric. Bush was adamant about freeing the Kuwaiti people from a tyrant they did not want. Bush fought the Persian Gulf War with American troops, outward financial support, and state of the art technology.³⁰ Gone were the Cold War days of covert aid and fighting. Persian Gulf fighting was fast, powerful and high-tech, changing the way the United States fought wars thereafter.

President Bush succeeded in his objectives, to free the Kuwaiti people, reseal the border, and drive the Iraqi invasion forces back into Iraq. After the United States retook Kuwait, the second phase of the War began.³¹ A native Iraqi insurrection, supported but not fought by the United States, attempted to remove Saddam's regime. However, the insurrection failed. Saddam quickly put down the insurrection, but he also went further to punish the rest of the Iraqi population.³² What followed was a purge reminiscent to those of Joseph Stalin in Eastern Europe. Hussein sent a message of fear to all the people of Iraq to obey him once again. Bush was heavily criticized for not taking his war effort far enough, to depose Saddam and prevent this massacre.

The Persian Gulf War was not like the Invasion of Grenada, but far more typical (although still not officially declared by Congress). It was fought fully by American manpower

²⁹ (Judis, *Folly*), 205.

³⁰ Ibid., 157.

³¹ (Deese, *Foreign Policy*), 142.

³² (Judis, *Folly*), 155.

and artillery. However, the technology used helped to limit the amount of soldiers in battle. It is for this reason that the Persian Gulf War is within, and optimizes, the PG characteristic of precision fighting. Also, this war began resting on conscience concerns. George Bush appealed to free Kuwait and rid the Middle East of a potentially tyrannical imperialist. These justifications were used to overshadow the main one, to protect and secure global oil and US Middle Eastern allies. Again, we see the use of emotional appeal in foreign politicking.

This leads us to the native insurrection of the second phase. George Bush specifically prohibited direct US intervention *in Iraq* so to avoid the bad press of Reagan and Cold War puppet regimes. However, Bush absolutely gave financial support and weaponry to insurrectionists.³³ So, here we can see Bush as a transitionist. He opted *not* to directly depose and replace Iraq's regime. He purposefully wanted to stay away from those techniques championed by Reagan and other Cold War presidents. Bush was criticized heavily for this move by fellow Republicans (and even some Democrats).³⁴ But, Bush took a departure from the policies of Reagan, and actually began the more watered down intervention policies that Bill Clinton continued with Bosnia. More stand-offish (but clearly PG) foreign policy was a major part of Bush's new global structure.

For only one term, President Bush was determined to make a heavy impression. The Persian Gulf War was an intricate conflict not seen since Vietnam. Adding to that list, Bush's *New World Order* (NWO) speech was iconic internationally. Also during Bush's term, the Soviet Union had collapsed. The United States became the lone super-power of the world—without a real clue of what that meant. NWO hoped to give some purpose. Bush was careful not

³³ Ibid., 157.

³⁴ (Deese, *Foreign Policy*), 42.

to include tired *leader of the free world* jargon in his plan.³⁵ However, even without the words, it was very apparent what President Bush intended. True, there was no longer anything to *contain*. Additionally, there was no ideological opposite the USA to talk against. However, NWO definitely called for *democracy and prosperity* (capitalism) for all.³⁶ It was the same rally of Democracy, under the name of *Freedom*, for a new age.

Specifically, NWO desired the multilateral efforts of all countries through established international organizations (like the UN and NATO).³⁷ Bush was appealing to Cold war critics who opposed the United States and the Soviet Union as two separate unilateral agents in the world. During the Cold War, since the Soviet Union was a permanent Security Council member the UN was always stalemated and generally obsolete. Global organizations simply did not work because the global powers were too far divided.³⁸ Now the powers were reconciled, and Russia was looking to start anew, thus Bush was fast to re-use old templates.

The New World Order agenda fits into the PG 1990s in two main ways. First, Bush noticed that the United States was an immensely powerful player in most multinational organizations. For example, Bush did not invade Kuwait on his own accord. Honorably, he was not hypocritical and enacted NWO for his pet project. The president worked through the UN, secured 14 unanimous votes to stop Iraq (including crucial Arab countries) and went into the Middle East with content allies.³⁹ But, with the political pull of the USA in these organizations, the jury is out on how *real* these procedures were. US persuasion within these organizations was so high as to make them again obsolete.

³⁵ (Schrecker, *Cold War*), 264.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ (Deese, *Foreign Policy*), 66.

³⁸ Ibid., 148.

³⁹ (Judis, *Folly*), 131.

Second, despite their campaign rivalry, Clinton adopted the ideas of NWO in his own *Democratic Enlargement* policy. Certainly, the ideas in the New World Order were broad. However, they can arguably be seen as the driving force of foreign policy up until 2000 and George W. Bush. This transfer of NWO ideas is another example of how PG presidents recycled jargon. Not only could NWO be considered unilateralism with a face-lift (complete with appeals for democracy and freedom), but also Bill Clinton cleverly put the same product in a new box as he *tried* to fully transform the United States from conservatism.

2.5: Bill Clinton: The Balkans and *Democratic Enlargement*

The two terms of Bill Clinton seemingly have the potential to interrupt what I am trying to prove in this chapter—that PG decade presidential administrations (of whom are mostly conservative) can be united as a bloc due to similarities in foreign policies. Bill Clinton was a Democrat and came into office on a platform against Republican norms. Admittedly, he stuck to them in matters of domestic and economic policy. However, in matters of foreign policy he was unable to buck the trend. He fell into the same practices of his cohorts. But, to continue nicknaming, if Reagan was a *bridge*, and Bush senior *transitional*, than Clinton is definitely a *break*. That is not a break with PG conservative conventions, but the first PG administration to leave the past behind.

To this president, the Cold War was dead and buried. It was no longer appropriate to straddle unilateralism and call on old ghosts, but time to start something fresh.⁴⁰ Honestly, this is characteristic of Democratic nominees. Take a look at Barak Obama's platform today and one could notice similar *revitalization* messages. However, although Clinton *did* change his rhetoric, and even take foreign policy into a new location, the nature of Clinton is still definitively PG.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 156.

The three Clinton international issues most prevalent here are the Bosnian War in 1995, the Kosovo campaign of 1999 and Clinton global vision called *democratic enlargement*.

The Bosnian War (*Operation Deliberate Force*; 1995) was a crucial turning point in President Clinton's foreign policy.⁴¹ Clinton's intervention here denotes his return to PG form. When Bill Clinton first entered the oval office, he was completely disinterested in foreign policy. One reason for this was because of his disgust of Republican obsession with it for nearly 12 years prior. Clinton was actually ready to delegate all foreign affairs to a lower committee to avoid it altogether.⁴² A second reason for such inactivity was because he wanted to focus on domestic policy. He was upset with its neglect by the Republican leadership before him. In 1994, Clinton ignored the genocide of Rwanda, paralyzing the UN on intervention and causing the genocide.⁴³ He felt that the United States had no business in other's affairs, despite disregard of human rights and human life. Clinton was heavily criticized for ignoring Rwanda. Jacques Chirac even commented that upon his visit to Washington DC, America's position of Commander in Chief was disturbingly vacant.⁴⁴

Clinton listened to the scathing criticism and made a deep policy change. In 1995, the Bosnian Civil war had escalated to dangerous heights. At this time, people were unsure what to call it. To some it was genocide (Bosniaks and the international community), to others an act of aggression (Croatia), and still to others a civil war (Serbia).⁴⁵ However, to Bill Clinton it was an atrocity that he would not ignore like Rwanda, and a measure of instability in the former-Yugoslav region. Thus, Clinton reverted to the policies of President Bush before him. President

⁴¹ Ibid., 159.

⁴² (Deese, *Foreign Policy*), 73.

⁴³ Ibid., 108.

⁴⁴ (Judis, *Folly*), 158.

⁴⁵ (Schrecker, *Cold War*), 226.

Clinton wanted to push back Serbian aggressors from Bosnia using NATO. Again, like Bush's 14 vote garner for Kuwait in the UN, Clinton single-handedly pushed *Deliberate Force* through NATO.⁴⁶ Once the mission was ratified, NATO and Clinton began extensive missile campaigns throughout the region.

In the Kosovo War (*Operation Allied Force*; 1999), Clinton pushed NATO to intervene in the former Yugoslav region once again. Of note, the Bosnian and Kosovo Wars were the only two major military campaigns of NATO from its inception.⁴⁷ Obviously, Clinton was determined to finally set NATO precedent, give the organization some teeth, and see results. This time, the Republic of Serbia was committing genocide against Kosovo- Albanians in the region. This genocide burgeoned from another Yugoslav civil war in between the two ethnicities in 1996.⁴⁸ The Kosovo War was again a series of bombing runs much like Bosnia in 1995. NATO and the United States also gave support to the KLA, a band of Kosovar guerrillas against Serbia. In the end, *Allied Force* effectively drove Serbian military from the *Kosovo province*, changing it into a US/NATO protectorate *mandate*.⁴⁹

When Clinton committed NATO to the aid of Kosovo, this time there was substantial outcry by the international community. Clinton was unable to find ratification by the UN Security Council because of an unsympathetic Russia and China. They threatened to veto any attempts to enter the conflict.⁵⁰ Thus, Clinton used NATO as a second resort to start bombings. US Republicans were strangely quiet, however fellow Democrats criticized Clinton for *changing*

⁴⁶ Ibid., 214.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 243.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ (Little, *Orientalism*), 311.

sides and becoming too imperialistic.⁵¹ By ignoring the UN and *using* NATO, Clinton looked far less multi-lateral to some.

In foreign policy, Clinton essentially resembled the presidential *freedom fighter* typical of conservatives at the time. Moreover, he completely changed direction from uninterested to highly active abroad. Both Bosnia and Kosovo have the same impact on Clinton's administration. First, they stay true to the PG model of precision fighting. Both campaigns were fought by strategic missile attacks and US supported natives on the ground (along with few US covert units). Second, Clinton made the same policy shift that we saw in Reagan. This president stubbornly tried *to be different*, and to be internationally apathetic.

After 1994, *indifferent* foreign policy meant ignoring brutal genocides, which was unfitting for a country with resources like the USA. In a year's time, Clinton became a powerful (and somewhat controversial) international figure much like Reagan and Bush before him. Now, eight years later, President George W. Bush has addressed (and helped conclude) open policy from the Kosovo War. Interestingly enough, Clinton began what a conservative president ended with the independence of Kosovo in 2008.

This leads to the final section on Bill Clinton, that being his idea of global order in *democratic enlargement (DE)*. Clinton's international plan was far less idealistic than Bush's New World Order, however it was not terribly different.⁵² As stated above, much of DE actually seems adopted straight from the tenets of NWO. Bush desired multilateralism through legitimate channels like NATO and the UN because he felt countries *wanted* to cooperate with each other. Bush's plan, not surprisingly, was based largely on emotion (because cooperation

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² (Deese, *Foreign Policy*), 72.

was *right*).

Similarly, Clinton wanted to foster multilateralism through international organizations because he felt it would be the *most prosperous* solution. To do this, the democratic leader added more international organizations to the list like the IMF, WTO and the World Bank. Clinton believed that *all* cooperation (including in financing and trade) would increase global wealth, leading to more peace.⁵³ He argued under the assumption that *democracies do not attack each other*.⁵⁴ Hence, more democracy in the world would generate more prosperity. Like his domestic policy, Clinton devised this foreign policy in *dollars and cents*.⁵⁵ It was as if he wanted to *sell* the idea to the world.

So, was DE so different from what came before? The answer is an enthusiastic no. *Democratic enlargement* is really no different than Bush's *new world* cooperation and Reagan's *containment*. Of course, the main difference is again the jargon. Clinton presented his plan internationally in economic terms, like a sales pitch. He changed what Democracy should mean to the world, but it was the same Democracy festering in the White House since the 1960s.⁵⁶ President Clinton championed *Democracy* as a quick and sure way to wealth (Peace). But, between this and Democracy as Freedom (Reagan), or Democracy as Liberation (Bush senior), the ideas are the same that Democracy should prevail.

2.6: George W. Bush: The Invasion of Afghanistan, the Invasion of Iraq, The War on Terror

So far, all the presidents that we explored had some unique characteristics to overcome.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ (Little, *Orientalism*), 263.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ (Schrecker, *Cold War*), 129.

For example, Reagan was based in the 1980s, Bush senior was a one-termer and started a *full-scale* war, and finally Clinton was a Democrat. Like President Clinton, George W. Bush seemingly throws a wrench into uniting the Persian Gulf bloc. Bush junior may be a return to a Republican oval office, but academically he is commonly placed in a new era of American foreign policy. This is the era of Neo-conservatism and Post-9/11 unilateralism. President W. Bush leaves behind the *League of Nations* style foreign policy of H.W Bush and Clinton in favor of unofficial coalitions.⁵⁷ He was not happy with the progress of Wilsonian policy that dominated literally all of the 1990s.

This final section will look at the War in Afghanistan, the current Invasion of Iraq and Bush's *War on Terror* foreign policy. Like the previous sections, the best one word to describe George W. Bush would be *beyond*. Bush casts off the tedious politicking of global organizations (something of a *pretense*, as seen earlier) for a new policy path. Like Reagan who was a Cold War president flirting with the Persian Gulf, Bush is a PG president interested in policy not fully visible yet. It will take someone new to prove whether or not the 2000-decade yielded any true changes. Thus, although with one foot out of the PG era, Bush is still heavily influenced by the time period.

The War in Afghanistan (*Operation Enduring Freedom*; 2001) was directly linked and justified by the tragedy of 9/11. The Twin Towers are often referred to as *the spark* much like Pearle Harbor was to enter WWII.⁵⁸ The War in Afghanistan was relatively well received at home and abroad because of its objective to find Osama Bin Laden and dismantle Al Qaeda. Bush used the moral justification that stopping the terrorist cell soon would save lives and future targets. However, this objective developed into familiar territory, that being to topple the

⁵⁷ (Judis, *Folly*), 161.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 175.

Afghani Taliban government and stabilize the country.⁵⁹ The US and UK initially lead bombing runs which lead to precision troops on the ground to round up Taliban officials. NATO later joined the effort, however the organization was not a player from the beginning. In the end, the Taliban was replaced by a pro-American democracy. However, recently, Taliban forces have regained portions of the country.

Afghanistan followed the PG formula to a tee. That is to invade a country on moral high ground, eradicate hostility using precision and to set up American favored infrastructure. In Grenada this meant a new government, in Kuwait peacekeepers, and in Kosovo US lead mandate control. However, here we also need to acknowledge glaring differences from the 1990s. It was not since Ronald Reagan that the United States actually forcefully removed another government.⁶⁰ The objectives of father Bush and Clinton, although invasive, always fell short of deposing a hostile government (Iraq and Serbia respectively). Thus, Bush marked a return to the aggressive, hard-line policy of Reagan and other Cold War presidents. Moreover, this exact cycle would repeat itself once more with a new fight against Saddam Hussein.

The Invasion of Iraq (*Operations Iraqi Freedom*; 2003) found President Bush in murky waters. Because of the post 9/11 patriotic swell and a relatively justified cause, Afghanistan was supported nearly globally. However, Iraq looked like an afterthought from the very beginning.⁶¹ Traditional US allies France and Germany opposed the US mission from the outset. Also, along with typical moral rhetoric, Bush added Israeli security and WMD destruction to his list of Iraqi insults. The Israeli state was a touchy subject internationally to begin with, while Iraqi WMD

⁵⁹ Ibid., 166.

⁶⁰ (Schrecker, *Cold War*), 286.

⁶¹ Ibid., 250.

accusations had no real evidence.⁶² In addition, Bush did not listen to his Afghanistan critics, that he failed to satisfy international forums like the UNSC and NATO. Like Afghanistan, Bush established informal coalition forces (with close partner Tony Blair) based not on international diplomacy but leader relations. Critics complained that it was as if Bush was going into Iraq with a fleet of golf buddies.⁶³ Also, Iraq was a definite war effort like the Persian Gulf War, not a surgical team like Kosovo and Afghanistan. However, Congress was unfortunately left out of the process both to declare and advise the war effort.

President Bush declared that Saddam be removed as a tyrant against humanity, and that the Iraqi people need be freed. The initial campaigns on Baghdad flooded TV sets with usual *liberation set pieces*, as natives exalted in the streets and Saddam statues were destroyed.⁶⁴ Bush tried to look victorious even though much of the war still needed to be fought. The rest of the war was fought similarly to the Persian Gulf of Bush senior. US and coalition artillery joined tactical teams on the ground and missile runs from above. Also, again Iraqi insurrectionists emerged and the US was fast to give them training and weapons.⁶⁵ Saddam was deposed and executed, and democratic councils were installed to lead the country.

Militarily, coalition forces are losing faith, while US critics are louder than ever before. The US government eventually wants to leave Iraq *Vietnamized (Iraqized?)*.⁶⁶ This was the Vietnam-based exit strategy where more and more military control is given to local forces as US troops go home. However, Bush has been stubborn to implement it fully, and is expecting to see more progress. As a result, he is quickly becoming one of the most unpopular US presidents in

⁶² Ibid., 251.

⁶³ (Judis, *Folly*), 194.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 157.

⁶⁵ (Deese, *Foreign Policy*), 255.

⁶⁶ (Schrecker, *Cold War*), 289.

recent history. It seems as if Iraq will continue into the next oval office. It has become one of the most poignant issues for all the current Presidential nominees. Will Iraq ever suitably be resolved? It is this author's concern that PG politics will not fully disappear until it is. With Iraq as a constant trouble spot, future administrations might find it difficult to move on from the past (the last 18 years).

The Invasion of Iraq does not need too much further elaboration than Afghanistan. For fear of redundancy, I would like to focus here on what Iraq might mean for Bush's legacy. Of course, *Iraqi Freedom* was built on lofty promises, designed for liberation, and fought by precision groups.⁶⁷ *Democracy* (Freedom) was meant to replace the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. It seemed that Bush junior did not forget the Baghdad Massacre of *Persian Gulf* 1991, and he used that to rouse the American people and eventually burn Saddam in International Court.

But, despite all these other characteristics, what we still might see is a deep PG policy change. Will President Bush make a drastic change on Iraq in his last few months to secure a positive legacy and help butter in John McCain? Maybe. Already, Bush has completely changed his views on Global Warming and Green energy from his beginning years. For example, his new Climate Change Plan outlined a reduction of Greenhouse emissions by 2025. Also, Bush's *fiscal stimulus package* in January 2008 reversed Bush's prior insistence that the US economy is strong. These changes have already made McCain regain some popularity as a Republican. As we have seen, it is certainly within Persian Gulf tradition for presidents to make such changes with the end of terms in sight.

Both the War in Afghanistan and the Invasion of Iraq are formally *fronts* within the bigger *War on Terror*. However, in this thesis I would like to consider this *War* an outline of

⁶⁷ (Deese, *Foreign Policy*), 256.

foreign policy instead of a real conflict. Upon taking office in 2000, George W. Bush was completely inactive internationally. In fact, he replicated the beginning years of Bill Clinton as a president totally apathetic to foreign policy.⁶⁸ In fact, it was lovingly recorded that Bush confused Slovakia and Slovenia in a speech making an attempt to address Central and Eastern Europe.⁶⁹ But, also like Clinton, Bush reclaimed Commander in Chief after 9/11. If this Tragedy was the PG version of Pearl Harbor for the USA, than for Bush 9/11 was his *Rwanda*. On September 11th, 2001 Bush claimed that he *saw Evil*.⁷⁰ Such statements immediately recant Reagan's similar volley that the Soviet Union was an *agent of Armageddon*.⁷¹

Thus, President Bush's foreign policy developed as a way to combat evil forces. This is explained far less idealistically in that Bush reclaimed the mantle of *freedom fighter* held by every PG president up until that time. W.Bush claimed that the world was involved in a battle now between civilization and barbarism.⁷² Civilization was the power of good in the world striving towards democratic norms and prosperity. Barbarism was the complete opposite, based on tyranny and destruction of good people. So, to Bush *terrorists* became the definition of modern day savages or barbarians. They did not have respect for *life*, so for Bush *Democracy* was the surest way to preserve life. Bush made it his mission to remove terrorists from within civilized countries.⁷³ Also, Bush had a complimentary mission to *bring civilization* where it did not exist. This is exactly what he tried to do in *Iraqi Freedom*.

⁶⁸ (Judis, *Folly*), 180.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 202.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid., 143.

⁷² Benjamin R. Barber, *Fear's Empire*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003.), 129.

⁷³ Ibid., 152.

In terms of concrete policy, this idealistic jargon meant two big changes. First, President Bush was skeptical of international organizations. He blamed UN caution for allowing Saddam to remain in power through *Desert Storm*, leading to the Baghdad killings. Countering Clinton, Bush was particularly skeptical of international financial institutions like the IMF, WTO and World Bank. He believed that their economic sanctions on Iraq (Clinton's method of addressing terrorism) had no effect on terrorism.⁷⁴ From unsure military leader, Bush developed into a literal Reaganist, headstrong and very stubborn. Bush wanted nothing to do with the procedures, processes and tedious red tape of international power checks. However, the world did not see this as a man dedicated to fast results. They instead criticized Bush for acting unilaterally, imperialistically, and selfishly. This criticism reflected in Bush's blatant disregard of Constitutional US procedures as well.⁷⁵ The Bush administration wanted results no matter the cost.

The second change was a return to pre- World War policy, not seen for almost the entire 20th century. Such was the *Big Stick* policy of Theodore Roosevelt. Teddy Roosevelt applied this policy only within the Western Hemisphere however. President Roosevelt reserved the right to guide and even outright bully Latin American countries because he felt it secured hemispheric security.⁷⁶ The United States had comparatively more resources than neighboring countries, and using them it should act as Father or Big Brother and care for the hemisphere. This was often against the wishes of those Latin American countries. However, Roosevelt was like Reagan (or vice versa) believing that sometimes the people *do not* know what is best.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ (Little, *Orientalism*), 318.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 264.

⁷⁶ (Judis, *Folly*), 70.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 55.

Thus, President Bush can be accused of applying Teddy's *Big Stick* to the world. Bush was under the exact same impressions, of US power and big brother status. This explains Bush's overly stubborn convictions, still strong after almost five years of failing Iraqi policy. Admittedly, Teddy Roosevelt was not absent from the 1990s. However, the difference is that *Big Stick* was combined with Wilsonian *cooperation*, hence diluting its strength.⁷⁸

As we observed in *Rwanda*, neglect ate at Clinton's conscience. He too believed that US resource should be used to fight international battles. However, he (and Bush senior) engaged those battles in what was internationally acceptable. Although sometimes formalities, at least Bush and Clinton respected them. The difference with Bush junior is that he does not care what is traditional. He more desired to drag his neighbors along for the ride than to appease them and make them part of the solution. With battles like Iraq, such hard-line policy isolated the international community and made them feel involved in conflict they did not want.⁷⁹

But, *father knows best* policy was not completely defunct under President Bush. In the Independence of Kosovo in 2008, Bush's immediate recognition of the new state encouraged other global powers to do the same like France, the UK, Germany and Italy. Kosovo was a hot and stalemated topic in the UN. Honestly, it probably would not have been resolved using Wilsonian cooperative policy. It is definitely one of Bush's accomplishments that complimented US past history, especially Bill Clinton. Although by different means, Bush was able to close what Clinton began, and bring a little more stability to the former Yugoslav area. So, perhaps at least a little something could be said for Bush's conviction and purposeful outlook.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 197.

⁷⁹ (Deese, *Foreign Policy*), 174.

2.7: Chapter One Conclusion

Freedom, Liberation, Peace, Prosperity, Democracy—the 1980s and 1990s have been a time of lofty ideals. This chapter was situated between 1981-2008. Specifically, we looked at major conflicts within these years and the policy ideology that drove them. This was a time bloc dedicated to promoting democracy, precision fighting, and conscience moralizing.

Chronologically we carefully analyzed each president. First, with Ronald Reagan (the *bridge*) we focused on the Invasion of Grenada, the Iran-Contra Affair, and his version of *containment*. Reagan brought Cold War hard lines into the PG. Second, we looked at the term of George H. W. Bush (the *transition*). He was responsible for the Persian Gulf War and the *New World Order*. Bush was ready to define what the PG era should be.

Third came the internationally reluctant Bill Clinton (the *break*). With him, we looked at the Bosnian War, Kosovo War and his plan of *democratic enlargement*. Clinton was ready to completely change US foreign policy, however ended up in familiar territory. Last, we addressed the controversial foreign policy of George W. Bush (*beyond*). Bush's additions include the War in Afghanistan, the Invasion of Iraq, and the *War on Terror*. Bush was framed in the PG past. For example, he used Clinton's *rouge state* to describe terrorists, and removed governments like Reagan. However, his policy adoption of Teddy Roosevelt suggested aspirations for something utterly transformed.

3.1: Chapter Two: The Punishment Theory of Michael Foucault

3.2: Chapter Two Introduction

It would be a mistake to consider Michel Foucault's "*Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*"⁸⁰ as solely a historical account on how society managed to develop a new disciplinary system. Behind the detailed descriptions and narratives of ancient punishments, one can certainly feel that an entire new philosophy is being born to discuss the evolution of torture into modern times. As Foucault himself states, his work is the history of the modern soul on trial, with justifications behind the power to punish⁸¹.

In this literary review of Foucault's piece, I will give the basic summary, progression and tenets of his writing. Throughout, I will also expose popular criticisms of the book by other scholars, in addition to my own opinions on his ideas. *Discipline and Punish* offers a theoretical backbone for my research, which I feel will be necessary to complement current events. In his book, Foucault provides me with both a vibrant historical quilt and abstract ideas about torture, punishment, and surveillance.

The purpose of Chapter Two is two-fold. First, as mentioned above this chapter will provide theory. This is theory to explain why the United States might act like it does. Of course, by dissecting this work of Foucault I am not peering into the minds of US government officials.

⁸⁰Michel Foucault, (*Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison*), 1975. *Discipline and Punish: The birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York: Vintage, 1977)

⁸¹*Ibid.*,23

But, I am however using the philosophy of an expert to shed some light on the Federal government's assumed right to punish.

Second, Chapter Two is meant to be a brief pause from the density of Chapter One. Before moving on to another equally dense Chapter Three, which will extend the argument made in One, theory will be helpful to add perspective before jumping back into history and national security issues. As such, this chapter will be presented differently than the others. This will be a simple literary review, summarizing and opining on the book *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. The structure will cycle through detailing Foucault's text and applying it to the United States government where appropriate.

3.3: The Nature of Punishment

Foucault starts his analysis with a picture of *Damien's* torture⁸² as a symbol of punishment for the eighteenth century. The body of the condemned was both the primary target of penalty and made into a public spectacle at this time. Torture was intended to symbolically mirror the crime and provide judicial satisfaction. The second half of the eighteenth century discovers a new era for the penal system.⁸³ Apart from the abolishment of old laws, judicial reform, and new penal codes, Foucault's main interest becomes the elimination of torture as a public spectacle⁸⁴. Foucault believes that the primary source of this abolition is a new set of power tactics⁸⁵.

The real reason behind the transformation that took part within the penal system was the power relationship between criminal body and government. He develops an important term, the

⁸²Ibid.,3

⁸³Ibid.,12

⁸⁴Ibid.,14

⁸⁵Ibid.,23

technology of power, which is a common principle of humanization of the penal system. It is not the mere overlapping of penal law and human science that produced a differently punishing society, but the politics of the body that influenced such a transformation.⁸⁶

For the United States, it seems that eighteenth century practices are not altogether forgotten. However certainly, as Foucault mentions, the idea of torture has been replaced by the more civil methods of court and laws. But, this does not mean that *the body*, *public spectacle*, and *symbolism in punishment* are still not upheld. The trial of Saddam Hussein is the perfect example here. First, the body, here a rather ruffled and rather demoralized Iraqi leader, is put on trial before a jury and *on camera* before the world. His crimes are read and fought over publically for all to see, hear, and internalize. Lastly, a verdict is given as punishment to fit the crime. Perhaps the crowning goal of all US style court verdicts is the idea of proportional punishment.

In sustaining this theory, Foucault acknowledges the role of previous scholars in the matter, respectively *Rusche* and *Kirchheimer*.⁸⁷ They relate systems of punishment with systems of production. Thus, with the passing of society from slave, feudal, mercantile and finally industrial, the condemned ceases to be a civil slave and becomes a prisoner, subject to corrective detention. The necessities of society are expressed in the way power is managed over men. It was certainly an imperative dictated by how to punish more completely, not punish less⁸⁸. At this point, it is worth mentioning that Foucault does not attribute the change from one model of

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷G. Rusche and O. Kirchheimer, *Punishment and Social Structures*, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1939), 24

⁸⁸(Foucault, *Discipline*, 82)

punishment to the other to the humanism of legal scholars of the time.⁸⁹

3.4: Humanizing Punishment

By considering penal practices less as legal theory and more as socio-politics⁹⁰, Foucault brings a different dimension in the analyses of punishment. Although fundamental laws were proposed in order to end barbarian punishments, to him humanism was just a spontaneous effect of power regulation without a definitive meaning⁹¹. The great reformers of the time, such as *Servan, Beccaria, Lacretelle, Dupont*,⁹² were proclaiming better methods of punishment with the idea of humanity as the objective to be achieved. Foucault believed that reform in the penal machinery cannot be simply attributed to these ideas, but is to be found in the historical background of crimes losing their violence.⁹³

The idea of *humanizing punishment* is a goal seen progressively through the 1990s. As mentioned in Chapter One, this would be George H.W. Bush's and Bill Clinton's insistence on international organizations. Such insistence suggests that these American leaders do not trust the ability and value of individual countries to provide justice (maybe including their own). Usually, going to war is an act of retaliation, a form of punishment. For example, in the Persian Gulf, Iraq invaded Kuwait and coalition forces retaliated by invading. In Bosnia of 1995, Serbia was committing genocide and Bill Clinton bombed regions of Bosnia to drive Serbian militants away. By appealing to international organizations, US presidents had much more of a moral high ground, thus more legitimate retaliation, than if they acted on their own. At least, this was the

⁸⁹Ibid., 23

⁹⁰Ibid., 28

⁹¹Ibid., 92

⁹²Ibid., 75

⁹³Ibid., 62

perception.

3.5: Punishment from Person to Property

While *eighteenth century high legal affairs*⁹⁴ of the philosophers and magistrates received high attention, popular reaction did not. Foucault agrees that the suppression of popular solidarity against execution became the aim of the police and penal reforms.⁹⁵ Most importantly, with the rise of living standards and the increase of wealth, the target of new crime went from man to property.⁹⁶ It is this shift *from criminality of blood to criminality of fraud*⁹⁷ that refined punitive practices and made the law more attentive to property relations. The contradiction of the legal system, which hosted arbitrariness as well as privileges, brought a reality of many diverse interests⁹⁸.

It was exactly this anarchy of power management that captured the attention of reformers and constituted their main criticism: power distribution was terribly regulated. The imbalance of power distribution dictated new politics of punishment that came neither from a single origin nor from the nobility of humanism.⁹⁹ Indeed, it came from within the legal system, from a large number of magistrates, the majority of whom were not reformers. Philosophers such as *Voltaire*, publicists such as *Brisot* or *Marat*, judges or advocates like *Le Trosne* and *Lacretelle*, *Moreau*, *Sevan* and *Dupaty*¹⁰⁰, certainly contributed their ideas in the creation of a new power to judge.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid., 63

⁹⁶Ibid., 77

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸(Foucault, *Discipline*, 80.)

⁹⁹Ibid., 81-92

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

However, Foucault is less impressed and even less grateful for their contributions. Critics such as *Hunt* and *Wickham*, suggest that Foucault does not have a theory of law.¹⁰¹ *Duncan Kennedy* criticizes Foucault for not considering law seriously enough and for giving a pre-realist view of juridical power.¹⁰² According to him, “*law and legal discourse play super structural and mystical roles in Foucault’s disciplinary society, analogous to their roles in Marx’s political economy.*”¹⁰³

This idea of transferring punishment from the person to property is very interesting for 2001. Effectively, President George W. Bush has moved to a foreign policy that both punish the person and his property, or at least one that *can do* either. For example, detention facilities like Guantanamo Bay definitely punish *people*. Alleged terrorists who have committed crimes, or are suspected to do so, are held in these facilities. However, today detaining the person may not be enough because of the extension and power of money. A leader can be eliminated only for a new one to rise up, funds in tow, to do the same mission. It seems, that terrorist plots rely far less on people (unlike say 1930s Fascist governments that relied on charisma), and more on infrastructure. To cope, Bush has moved onto freezing funds to help in stopping terrorist plots.

3.6: The Relation Between Punishment and Disciplining

Foucault continues his analysis of transformation marked by the start of a new punishment era: that of disciplines.¹⁰⁴ Disciplines created the opportunity of a constant coercion

¹⁰¹Hunt, Alan, & Gary Wickham, *Foucault and Law* viii, (Liverpool: Sage Publications, 1994), 22

¹⁰²Kennedy Duncan, *The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault in Sexy Dressing Etc.: Essays on the Power and Politics of Cultural Identity*, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1993)

¹⁰³Ibid.,122

¹⁰⁴(Foucault, *Discipline*,138)

over the body, by supervising the process of their activity¹⁰⁵. In other words, disciplines became the art of the human body, the new method of dominance.¹⁰⁶ Foucault believes that scholars, such as *De La Salle*, *Leibniz*, *Buffon*, treated theoretically the creation of the man of modern times.¹⁰⁷ Discipline was everywhere in the military, industrial labor, education, and hospitals¹⁰⁸.

According to Foucault, although historians attributed the dream of the perfect society to the jurists and philosophers, there existed another dream: “...*the military dream of the society...*”¹⁰⁹ The foundations of discipline were laid down “...*not only by jurists, but also by soldiers, not only councilors of state but also junior officers, not only the men of courts, but also the men of camps*”.¹¹⁰ One might easily observe Foucault’s hesitation in attributing *disciplination* entirely to the scholars or jurists of the time due to the tremendous role of soldiers.

The idea of disciplining, especially in relation to *soldiers*, is important to this thesis. Unfortunately, my conception of disciplining will not be explained until Chapter Four and the emergence of Visual Entertainment Media. However, I will still try to convey some meaning to drive this point. Today, soldiers are the symbol of discipline. Soldiers are *intensely* disciplined themselves by way of military training. Also, in foreign lands, they usually elicit *awe* amongst natives. In the news, the image of American soldiers as *liberators* is extremely powerful. For example, the *lifting of the flag* monument of Hiroshima WWII, or the tearing down of Saddam in Iraq 2003 are classic American military symbols (amongst others).

However, there is another facet of *disciplining* that transmits to everyday citizens through

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.,137

¹⁰⁷Ibid.,140

¹⁰⁸Ibid.,141-142

¹⁰⁹Ibid.,169

¹¹⁰Ibid.

entertainment like movies and television programs. Since 9/11, there has been a dramatic rise in movies and television shows that deal with American military. Some of these are completely fictional, however most are based on real events. For example, *Black Hawk Down* (2001) is completely based on the Somali Civil War and super-realistic. Likewise, *Munich* is based on the 1970s Israeli Olympic assassinations and the larger Arab-Israeli Conflict. Movies like this *discipline* the audience. They inundate viewers with realistic images only outdone by *actually being there*, and with dramatized messages that cause emotional attachment. The blurring between fiction and reality has the power to control political voice much like Foucault explains *controlling the body*.

3.7: The Impact of Technology on Punishment

Foucault considers the idea of a total control over the body as personified in what Bentham called the *Panopticon*.¹¹¹ While "...the juridicism of modern society seems to fix limits on the exercise of power, its universally widespread panopticism enables it to operate..."¹¹² Panopticism and disciplinary techniques were the counterpart of judicial norms, and they were at the very heart of the foundation of society and sciences. A person, who is under the idea of being always observed, will always be obeyed. Thus, surveillance becomes the key to power, control and order.

Although Foucault admits that this transition was due to several economical, political, juridical and scientific processes¹¹³, he does not analyze sufficiently neither the juridical, nor the scientific process, but over-emphasizes his disciplinary-panopticism explanation. Giving all his ideas equal room to breathe could have made his arguments more clear. He asserts that

¹¹¹Ibid.,200

¹¹²Ibid., 223

¹¹³Ibid., 218

psychology, psychiatry, criminology, and the *sciences of man* had at their core the disciplinary analyses.¹¹⁴ But, without detailing all parts of his theory, Foucault remains rather speculative in his belief that discipline *gave birth* to the sciences.¹¹⁵

These ideas of *total control*, *surveillance*, and *science of man* are the basis of Chapter Three. US *military* and *weapons* have gone through a tremendous transformation since 1991 and the Persian Gulf War. US military boasts that it can win wars with fewer men, less casualties, and with more certainty than ever before. Of course, this is certainly true since the traditional warfare methods of WWI and II.

However, US intelligence has been changing since the 1970s. Now in 2008 (because of the *War on Terror*), we have perhaps the most perfect form of US intelligence seen yet. However, it is based on the supervision of its people. Today, everything is electronic including shopping with a credit card. The Federal has gone out of its way to register these electronic trails in a way that can *watch* people. This omnipresent *surveillance* is the main way the US government apprehends criminals today.

3.8: Foucault's Praise of the Prison System

Foucault's last major point focuses on the institution of prison and strongly suggests that the main effects of imprisonment remain its production of delinquents, recidivism and failure to diminish the crime rate.¹¹⁶ He then asks why every *new* idea about the penitentiary has remained the same for almost a hundred and fifty years.¹¹⁷ But ultimately, his conclusion is quite shocking:

¹¹⁴Ibid., 222

¹¹⁵ Harcourt Bernard, *Reflecting on the subject: A critique of the Social Influence conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows theory, and Order-Maintenance policing*, (New York Style, in 97, Mich. L. Rev. 2, November, 1998)

¹¹⁶(Foucault, *Discipline*, 264-267)

¹¹⁷Ibid., 268

prison *does not* fail in accomplishing its objective.

Although prison may serve the interests of a certain class, it keeps the crime-oriented people far from disturbances.¹¹⁸ It is troublesome to read his words in today's democratic and law-promoting world:

*...It would be hypocritical or naive to believe that the law was made for all in the name of all; that it would be more prudent to recognize that it was made for the few and that it was brought to bear upon others; that in principle it applies to all citizens, but that it is addressed principally to the most numerous and least enlightened classes...*¹¹⁹.

Has the prison system succeeded in the United States like Foucault poses? Simply stated, the jury is out on this one. Guantanamo Bay has been one of the most hated of George W. Bush's policy points during the *War on Terror*, and he certainly has an impressive list. In fact, Guantanamo Bay has even been criticized by former Secretary of State Colin Powell and George Bush himself, who said that the prison ought to be closed. However, unfortunately he has taken no measures to make such statements into reality. Guantanamo prisoner treatment also falls into normal US prison debates. Critics say that US prisons are merely a drain on taxpayer money because prisoners just *sit*. They are held in containment without contributing back to society, without being given real help to reform, and without proper reflection on their crimes. In addition, prisons do not really help *any class* because of their financial needs and *lock and key* nature. How can prisoners help society if they serve their entire terms in stasis?

3.9: Chapter Two Conclusion

Foucault believes that society has passed from punishment to surveillance, through a three-fold procedure: the monarchical law, the reformers' dreams, and the *incarcerated* society.

¹¹⁸Ibid., 275

¹¹⁹Ibid., 276

The key to punishment is to be found in the relation that the body establishes with the soul, and not in the way that it is inserted into the legal system.¹²⁰ Foucault believed that the history of the human soul could be written without the *intense* traces of law in it, and that punishment can be seen as very personal.¹²¹ He believed that legal scholarship was not alone on its theoretical progressiveness, but was helped by the development of disciplines. Finally, Foucault strongly emphasized his idea that sciences were the noble name of disciplines, while *the sciences of the body* were the major *transformers* that converted punishment into surveillance.

Related to the United States, this chapter applied Foucault to six main points. First, punishment in the United States conforms to eighteenth century norms. Those are punishment as *corpus* (to the body), *public* (in front of witnesses), and *symbolic* (based on the crime). Although not arbitrary and based on a legal system, punishment can still be called a *ceremonial affair*. Second, with the 1990s punishment became more humanized. This was through presidential insistence that penalties against countries should go through international organizations before being enacted. The perception of international cooperation gave punishment more legitimization.

Third, in 2001, punishment moved from *person to property*. Terrorism is hostility based less on people and more on resources and infrastructure. Terrorist leaders can be eliminated only for new ones to take their place and use their funds. So, Bush (actually beginning with Clinton in 1996) began to freeze assets rather than chasing men (like the failure in finding Osama Bin Laden). Fourth, the *soldier* became a symbol of discipline, while *entertainment* became an every day vehicle of it. Bush raised *the soldier* to a higher level of respect than in the past, while

¹²⁰Ibid.,131

¹²¹Hugh Baxter, *Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault*, (Stan. L. Rev. 449, 455,1996)

movies and TV shows at home would create emotional attachment to conflict abroad.

Fifth, the influx of intelligence technology from the 1970s, and military technology from the 1990s, created a new electronically based society. Fighting abroad became super-high tech with whole wars fought by few warriors or even only missile campaigns. At home, the government took advantage of the digital age by attaching registers to see who is doing what. Criminals could now be caught based on normal, every-day interactions. Sixth and final, perhaps the US prison system is not a success as Foucault says prison systems might be. The controversy surrounding Gitmo style detention facilities, and normal national penitentiaries, challenges Foucault.

4.1: Chapter Three: Legislation As the Ultimate Defense Against *Enemies to National Security*

4.2: Chapter Three Introduction

The United States prides itself on the power, reliability and consistency of its laws. Although many countries can boast longer democratic tradition, few others see themselves so strongly as a *nation of laws*, governed by *the rule of law*. Such law comes from the generalities of the Constitution, the peculiarities of precedent, and ever building bureaucratic procedure. Nevertheless, critics today are disgusted with the current Bush administration's disregard for this American tradition. They contend that Bush has turned what should be binding legislation into a pretense. In his efforts to fast track progress, President Bush has done wonders to ignore many of the procedures of US checks and balances.

Nevertheless, it is wrong to pin this behavior solely on President Bush. These same critics ignore the similarly abridged measures of other executives during a United States in

conflict. Is it dangerous to the sanctity of US legislation for President Bush to disregard them? Yes, of course it is. However, should critics treat such behavior as uniquely PG conservative, Bushian, or post-9/11? No, not at all. In fact, such a stance can be considered not objective. With the security of the nation in the balance, Democratic and Republican executives have *always* impeded the rights of the people. They have always chosen security over liberty in times of conflict, of course with the hope that liberty can be restored once crisis is averted.

As a brief refresher, Chapter One united President George W. Bush with 1980s and 1990s US leaders as a solitary foreign policy bloc. This was based on *why* these presidents entered conflicts, *how* they fought them, and *what* international plan they followed as an ultimate goal. The evidence proved that these leaders were all invasive and moralistic to stabilize regions and secure interests. This chapter will deal solely with President George W. Bush. This choice is based on two main reasons. First, Bush is to be *the PG representative* since it was already proven that he was the same as the others. It is not efficient to use all those presidents over again. Thus, if President Bush is similar to the rest of US history, than Reagan to Clinton are as well. Second, Bush is the most recent, controversial and raw of all the PGs-ers. He does not hide behind Wilsonian pretense like Bush senior and Clinton did in the 1990s. Using him as a control is the most pertinent to current times and the most interesting given his nature.

The purpose of this chapter is to prove that President Bush is not the first, and probably not the last, to suspend rights in favor of security measures. Americans abroad, and other nationals, are often targeted, solicited, or at least inconvenienced by US national security measures. A small example of this is of course *War on Terror* airport security measures present in international airports, and even adopted by the European Union. It is this author's fear that other similar national security measures of the past have been forgotten, and President Bush is

being considered unfairly *dissident*. The truth is however that he is acting by way of precedent that was developed over hundreds of years. I want to show that the use of *conflict legislation*, and the disregard of *normal legislation* (Constitution, treaties, etc.), is common throughout US history. Of note, the purpose of this chapter, in line with this thesis, is not to prove *right* or *wrong*, but what simply *is*.

This chapter relates to my thesis in two main ways. First, combined with Chapter One, Chapter Three completes my argument of US foreign policy homogeneity *by way of the US government*. Hence, this chapter is used to evidence that the US government has acted the same in foreign policy matters since just after the American Revolution. Again, the US government has a unified trend, over time and despite political bias, in dealing with conflicts, national enemies, and national security. Second, this chapter shows *how* the US government maintains this policy. This chapter argues that *legislation* is the main guide of US conflicts, just as legislation is guide of affairs during peacetime. *Conflict legislation* (as earlier defined, legislation ratified during conflict) can be considered the Federal's main weapon on how to isolate enemies within the United States and conduct international conflict. All other powers, like police powers, the use of force, and the suspension of liberty are legitimized by legislative process.

This chapter will be divided into three sections. First, a historical narrative is constructed in order to show the frequency and nature of conflict legislation over approximately 200 years of US history. This is much less daunting than it sounds because I will be using only the most prominent conflicts, of which there are few but decisive pieces of legislation. The scope of the narrative will be from President John Adams to President Bill Clinton. Second, I will dedicate one whole section to liberty reduction by President George W. Bush. Here, detail will be used

(instead of general narrative) to more thoroughly prove Bush's integration into history to dispel any further doubt. Third, I will use the controversial USA PATRIOT act as a case of *conflict legislation*. As many details as are appropriate will be given to show how powerful such legislation can be.

4.3: US Conflict Legislation Through History

The USA has a rich history of conflict legislation during times of war and high alert. However interestingly, once the threat ended, such legislation was rarely considered during following periods of peace.¹²² It was always as if *conflict* and *normal* legislation were relegated to different spheres, and never crossed paths. But, in 2001, the declaration of an ambiguous *War on Terror* finally mixed the spheres of peace and war. So, although President Bush is staying true to the American traditions of conflict legislation, the difference with him is the boundaries of his conflict. There is no clear sign of where the *War on Terror*, and *life under terror*, begins. This is why today it seems as if bending rules is tolerated far more than it was in the past. The best example of such ambiguous legislation is the USA PATRIOT Act.¹²³ But, before addressing this piece of legislation, it is important to analyze some history.

In 1798, 2nd President John Adams and his Federalist party passed the much disputed Alien and Sedition Acts. These acts made any false, scandalous and malicious statements against the United States government punishable by fine and imprisonment. Most importantly, the president was also given the exclusive authority to deport any foreigners considered a threat to national security.¹²⁴ Although written in broad language, the AS acts were meant to target

¹²² (Rosenberg, *Death of Privacy*), 144.

¹²³ (Northouse, *Matters*), 16.

¹²⁴ Russell F. Weigley. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977), 58.

leftover French nationals, French supporters and Anti-Federalist party members (anti-Constitutionalists). Since the American Revolution, the government was wary of French Revolutionary spirit (ending 1799) undermining the young United States.¹²⁵

Beginning in 1861 with the American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the US prided Writ of Habeas Corpus in order to hush Confederate members and sympathizers. The Writ allows prisoners to seek detention relief, and for the *unlawfully* detained to defend themselves against the US government.¹²⁶ This action of suspension has much in common with the *unlimited time* Guantanamo detention policies of President Bush. With this in the 1860s, Maryland was put entirely under martial law due its notorious amount of Confederate sympathizers. Lincoln essentially *detained* an entire American state. As a result, thousands of Southern sympathizers, Union army draft dodgers, and Army deserters were denied access to courts.¹²⁷

In 1917 and 1918, President Woodrow Wilson enacted the Espionage and Sedition Acts due to WWI fever. As a side, this act does well to stress the inter-connectedness of US history. The ES acts were grossly similar to the Alien and Sedition acts of 1798. The First World War was among the US's first international conflicts (the Spanish-American War being the first) since its post-Civil War isolation period. Wilson was paranoid of Axis spies within the United States who would undermine US victory and Wilson's League of Nations pet. The 1917 Espionage Act allowed the US government to imprison or execute meddling individuals against

¹²⁵ Ibid., 62

¹²⁶ Paul M. Johnson, *A History of the American People*, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999), 153.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 156.

the US military.¹²⁸ The Sedition Act of 1918 reserved the right to imprison persons who *spoke out* (including profanity) against the US government at this time. Here, the challenge to *freedom of speech* is obvious.¹²⁹ These years began the First Red Scare. The AS terminology of *spy* and *rabble-rouser* was used to catch the real enemy, American communists who threatened the Federal. Thousands of Americans were arrested allegedly committing the above charges.

In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt signed (a three-term, powerful and immensely controversial president) the Alien Registration or Smith Act. The Great Depression made Communism look like a very attractive ideology within the United States. The act had two parts. First, all foreign nationals living in the USA had to register with the Federal government. This clause was aimed towards German and Japanese Americans, and USACP members. Second, the act deemed illegal and severely punishable violent *desires* to overthrow the government.¹³⁰ This was all in response to both cries to *enter* WWII and *stop* communism. The result was the imprisonment of artists, writers, and leftist political activists prosecuted for conspiracy against the US government.¹³¹ This act would directly influence the late 1940s and the Second Red Scare of McCarthyism.

In 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 ten weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. It must be explained that *executive orders* are a Constitutional right of the executive during wartime, and are as binding as Congressional bills, but are not susceptible to Congressional ratification process. 9066 shows how powerful a tool they can be for an American president. Widespread panic on the West coast resulted in the internment of 120,000

¹²⁸ (Johnson, *History*), 170.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 172.

¹³⁰ Paul Buchheit, ed. *American Wars: Illusions and Realities*. (New York: Clarity Press, 2008), 98.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

people of Japanese descent. Almost all of these were registered American citizens. The US army could establish military zones in civilian territories, and *eminent domain* property based on allegations of treason.¹³² This was all in the attempt to assure other American groups of actions taken against the Japanese, and to punish these same people for the attack. Pearl Harbor and EO 9066 are almost mirror images of the Twin Towers and the PATRIOT act today. 9066 resulted in the uprooting of nearly 90 percent of all Japanese Americans.¹³³

In 1947, Communist paranoia was resurrected after the close of WWII. President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9835, which created the Federal Employees Loyalty Program. This program created review boards with the power to investigate federal employees and fire them if their loyalty to the United States was at all in doubt.¹³⁴ This led to the House Committee of Un-American Activities (HUAC) and investigation by Senator Joseph McCarthy of American communists (alleged or actual) because of mostly imagined ideas of subversive activity during the initial Cold War. Hundreds of Americans were branded, and imprisoned, as Communist sympathizers (which resulted in a *Scarlet Letter syndrome* for necessities like employment).¹³⁵ These domestic policies resulted in Truman's actions in the Korean War abroad.

In 1961, President John Kennedy gives a chance to apply this narrative of conflict legislation to the international community. By now, it is apparent that US presidents used such legislation often to control matters within the United States. However, just as Vietnam War calls were picking up steam, Kennedy enacted the Strategic Hamlet Program shared by the United States and South Vietnamese. The program attempted to settle South Vietnam's rural population

¹³² (Johnson, *History*), 220.

¹³³ (Northouse, *Matters*), 6.

¹³⁴ (Buchheit, *Wars*), 110.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 182.

into fortified camps. The purpose was to isolate regular citizens from insurgents and increase government control of the countryside.¹³⁶ However, the plan only made those citizens more vulnerable to insurgents as guerillas quickly infiltrated the camps. The uprooted population was also upset with leaving their ancestral lands. These farmers ended up paying high rents to insurgent warlord/landlords. And, after spending to *set up* the program, the government was unable to fix the corruption that developed within it.¹³⁷

In 1990, President George H. W. Bush, in conjunction with the United Nations, signed UN Resolution 661. From the 1940s to now, it is apparent that a shift was made in US conflict legislation (regardless if it was issued by the UN). Legislation has gone global and international. But, despite the change of scope, the idea is the same. The United States sought to control hostile groups with legislation before it made any other moves. 661 imposed strict economic sanctions on Iraq as it invaded Kuwait. The hope here was that Iraq would fall back without military intervention to have them removed.¹³⁸ The resolution stipulated for a full trade embargo excluding food, medical supplies and other *humanitarian necessities* deemed by the UN Security Council. The purpose of 661 was to make *life uncomfortable for the Iraqi people*. This would cause them to revolt against Saddam Hussein. The sanctions ultimately failed as the general Iraqi population was too afraid to revolt, and the ones who did were punished by the Baghdad Massacre. Instead of punishing Saddam's invasion forces, 661 actually severely punished innocent Iraqi citizens.¹³⁹ The sanctions were responsible for the death of Iraqi children and the general impoverishment of the population.

Finally in 1996, Bill Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

¹³⁶ (Johnson, *History*), 330.

¹³⁷ (Buchheit, *Wars*), 130.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 151.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 153.

(AEDPA). This piece of legislation came after the Oklahoma City bombing, which contributed (if not began) the anti-terrorist feeling promulgated by President George W. Bush. The main impact of the bill was on the power of Habeas Corpus in the USA, much like Abraham Lincoln over 100 years earlier. Specifically, federal judges were limited in how much legal relief they could offer without appropriation by the applicable state courts.¹⁴⁰ This translated to a federal court system unable, or severely limited, to remedy unjust convictions and unfair detainee periods.

This act complimented the 1994 Federal Death Penalty act, which extended federal death penalty to 60 new offenses. Among those were added terrorism, drug trafficking, use of WMDs, and the murder of federal officials. Used in conjunction, these two laws could effectively detain individuals and condemn them to the death penalty before, or without, correction of unjust legal process. Such measures were used against Timothy McVeigh, executed for the murder of eight federal agents.¹⁴¹ It is here with Clinton's legislation that we see the boundaries blurring between normal and conflict legislation. In defined conflicts, like World War II or the Persian Gulf, acts were used to protect the United States within the course of tension. However, with Oklahoma City and the permeation of terrorism, conflict could arise *whenever* and within seconds.¹⁴² Of course, Americans wanted the promise of security in this new threat, but the question never answered was how much is enough?

4.4: Liberty Reduction in the *War on Terror*

In the last section, I gave a few samples from the major conflict time periods of the United States of legislation devised to protect the United States. Of course, there are many other

¹⁴⁰ (Johnson, *History*), 453.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 468.

¹⁴² Ibid.

examples to explain, but the ones mentioned should give sufficient evidence to show that as a leader George W. Bush is not unique in *his* measures. The purpose of this section is to clearly outline exactly what those measures are. What is making George W. Bush so controversial?

Before starting headlong into legislative detail, it might be prudent to give some theoretical background to the Bush's 2000 decade. Since September 11th 2001, a debate began within the Bush administration (and between academics) on the costs between liberty and security. Fittingly called the *Liberty v. Security debate*, proponents on both sides can be attributed to the direction of US foreign policy right after the 9/11 tragedy. Today, it seems as if the security side has won. Nevertheless, L and S are only the polar extremes; there are many other intermediary camps that fall in between.

First, there is the *Security First Position*. This camp says that if we do not modify some of the traditional constitutional norms limiting government powers, we will not be able to fight terrorism, function as a reasonably safe society, and enjoy our liberties. Little personal constrictions are worthwhile for liberties gained in the end. Opposite is the *Liberty First Position*. This camp professes that granting governmental agencies uncontrolled investigative powers will forever weaken law-abiding society. In the case of the USA, increased security will destroy the spirit of its treasured Constitution for ages to come. In this camp little modifications are not tolerated, even if the end result is more liberty. To give an example, former Secretary of State Colin Powell changed sides from security to liberty after leaving office.¹⁴³

George W. Bush and his cabinet primarily adhere to the Security First Position. President Bush has tailored speeches to reflect his *means to an end* mentality to achieve democracy wherever he can. Increased airport security, air marshals, cell phone tapping, strict visas, border

¹⁴³ Ibid., 19.

policies---these are ways to ensure that terrorists will be stopped as they blend in with American society.¹⁴⁴ National securitizations of old like Cuba, nuclear proliferation, and communism have given way to Middle East management and pre-emptive strikes. In fact, it is Bush's *doctrine of pre-emptive strike* that solidifies his position as a Security First President. To him, the security of the United States is more important than unwarned missile attacks.

To do this, the Bush administration developed new technologies for a tighter grip. For example, the Pentagon entertained the Total Information Awareness Network (TIA), in which a massive virtual database could be created to identify American citizens. The federal government would have open to them instant access to personal e-mails, calling records, credit cards, banking transactions and travel documents—almost like a highly sensitive and classified *Google*.¹⁴⁵ The government justifies such unlimited data reserves due to the invisibility of terrorism.¹⁴⁶

Government organizations like the NSA, CIA, and FBI have also been given much more power. President Bush secretly signed an executive order that gives the NSA permission to spy on American citizens and take action based on information alone.¹⁴⁷ The CIA, although historically difficult to control by both Congress and the president¹⁴⁸, has been given more power to act in Middle Eastern countries without proper legal permission. Also, the FBI has been given more international jurisdiction. Terrorism is now among its top three priorities (next to drug trafficking and organized crime). Through all these measures the United States has cast its arm over much of the Eurasian continent, and its espionage units have become more like international

¹⁴⁴ Arthur R. Miller. *The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers*. (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1971), 26.

¹⁴⁵ (Northouse, *Matters*), 3.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁴⁸ (NOMOS, *Privacy*), 109.

police forces.¹⁴⁹

Lastly, the Privacy Act of 1974 has been resurrected from use in the Cold War to the *War on Terror*. Congress, as a measure to curb the federal government's collection, dissemination, and use of personal information, originally created the Privacy Act.¹⁵⁰ In reality, it became just an empty half-measure. It sought to prohibit the trading of individual information from one agency to another, and that information needed to clear special commissions to ensure it was being used for specific reasons. All this was created to ensure that information was used for a purpose and quickly forgotten to protect individual privacy.

Nevertheless, 30 years later, the Privacy Act is now an instrument of government justification. The new Privacy Act stipulates that if data is being used for a purpose, it can be used *routinely* (over and over again). Thus, if legal, there is no time limit to the exposure of private information. As a result, all federal employees have access to information that should be classified for only the highest ranks (or at least certain ranks).¹⁵¹ This creates an uncomfortable situation where all government officials know, and have access to, the intricacies of US citizens.¹⁵²

So, with these advances in the name of national security (and many others), how has the American public viewed this infringement on their privacy? As of July 2005, nearly fifty publicly released surveys have asked these questions.¹⁵³ Two main agents shape the public voice. Those are mass media coverage and interest group affiliations like professional, ethnic,

¹⁴⁹ (Miller, *Assault*), 142.

¹⁵⁰ (Northouse, *Matters*), 13.

¹⁵¹ (Rosenberg, *Death of Privacy*), 146.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 13-14.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 19.

and political communities.¹⁵⁴ However, these surveys also show that concern over privacy invasion did not start in 2001. In the 1970's-1990's there was a sharp rise in public concern for personal privacy. In 1995, 82 percent of Americans said that they were concerned about their privacy and rights. Of that 82 percent, 47 percent said that they were *very concerned*. Also, 51 percent of those surveyed had distrust in government supervision.¹⁵⁵ American citizens are not particularly thrilled with government insight into their lives. However, these surveys show that such has been a concern for almost 40 years.

National IDs were another point of survey, and are a hot topic today amongst 2008 presidential candidates. After 2001, the National ID debate of the 1990's was revived, however 56 percent of the public opposed them due to possible discrimination in the workplace. 75 percent were in favor of them if certain privacy safeguards were added for matters of health care.¹⁵⁶ Right after 9/11, six of the ten increased investigative procedures were supported by 93 percent of Americans. In a June 2005 survey, 4 years showed a depreciated and predictable change from the post-9/11 security zeal. Nearly every category, including National ID's, police investigative power, and technology monitoring decreased by 7-17 percent. Some of them were still majorities, but all of them fell.¹⁵⁷ These surveys show a few things. One, the general public started out with unwavering enthusiasm for security measures, but finished less impressed. Two, the public is indeed concerned about their privacy. Three, privacy is perceived to be reduced. This leads us to the biggest political battleground in recent years within the L/S debate---the USA PATRIOT Act.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 20.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 21.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 22.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 25.

4.5: Conflict Legislation Champion: The USA PATRIOT ACT

The USA PATRIOT Act (*Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act*, here, abbrev. USAP or Patriot act) was enacted in 2001 following 9/11. In 2005, USAP and the Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act (TPR) were reauthorized. TPR was a resurrection of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention (IRTP) Act of 2004. USAP has been a hotly contested piece of legislation since it was signed into law. Democrats tried hard to kill it in 2004 when it expired, however its reauthorization gives it new life into 2009. The acts main purpose was to restructure and update all of the 1970's Cold War intelligence legislation for use in the *War on Terror*.¹⁵⁸

The main clauses of USAP will be given here. However, the reauthorization provided important additions worth mentioning first. First, like Clinton's Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 2005 Patriot created new provisions for the death penalty of terrorists. Otherwise, the act further enhanced security at seaports, attacked terrorist finances, gave power to Secret Service, and added *gag rule* provisions for terrorists in court.¹⁵⁹ These are in addition to many other small and technical clauses not necessary for elaboration in this section. What is important however is the range and scope of this legislation. Lasting now nine years, it has become a part of life instead of solely securing it. It is criticized for its omnipresent and harsh punitive clauses. However, it is praised for its help in apprehending organized crime and drug elements.

The original purpose of Patriot was to expedite the process of information acquisition. This falls right in line with Bush's tendency to scoff at time consuming procedure. Conservative government officials blamed American sluggishness to stop 9/11 on too much procedure to

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 14.

¹⁵⁹ (Buchheit, *Wars*), 178.

access classified information. For example, as explained by the September 11th Commission, any leads that the FBI had on the 9/11 conspiracy became dead ends either because they could not get the right information to proceed, or because obtaining that information took too long.¹⁶⁰

Despite its criticism of acclaim, there are many troubling privacy clauses. The popular ones are those on cell phone ciphery, Internet monitors, and relaxed investigatory procedure. Law enforcement can obtain warrants easier, can have unlimited permission to wiretap, and can detain for longer periods of time at the suggestion of terrorism. But, perhaps the most interesting and little known adoption is FISA. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 was reconfigured, and put at the base of the USA PATRIOT Act.¹⁶¹ Originally, the Bush administration opposed FISA because they said it was an unconstitutional infringement on executive powers. FISA created the FISC, a FISA court that approves intelligence methods based on constitutionality. Under the previous Democratic Congress, FISA and FISC were intended to stop USAP abuse. But, when the Federal turned Republican soon after, FISA became an invaluable tool. Although Bush did not support FISA before, he used it to justify many of his security ventures. By having all his intelligence approved by FISC, it looked as if his measures were legitimate.

In addition to organized crime and drugs, other praise is aimed at the act's insistence on agency cooperation. The act repeals all legal barriers between intelligence and criminal investigators. It is most certainly pro all forms of information sharing.¹⁶² Moreover, section 215 of the Act allows the FBI to seek *the production of tangible things*. The FBI can seize books, documents, reports, and media—anything necessary for foreign intelligence. 215 also discretely

¹⁶⁰ (Rosenberg, *Death of Privacy*), 139.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 15-17.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 142.

allows the monitoring of library accounts and bookstore purchases.¹⁶³ Lastly, section 213 allows investigators to *sneak and peek*. Normal search procedure wants an officer to ask to search property and provide a warrant. The property holder can turn down (or accept) an unauthorized search, or at the very least examine the warrant document. However, under 213, officers can delay notification of a searched residence if the individual is suspected to be a threat to national security.¹⁶⁴ This means that the property holder has no right to warrant inspection or even a right to know if his residence was searched.

Of course, under tension mitigated procedure *can* mean the difference between stopping and absorbing an attack. However, USAP's infringement on privacy is obvious. Nearly the entire individual and his property are totally transparent to the government. Such concerns lead to Patriot controversy. Patriot allows for unrestricted and unwarranted wiretaps by the FBI and the NSA. However, in US criminal proceedings such evidence would be seen as illegal under any other circumstances because of how they were obtained. Thus, the act actually allows evidence obtained by usually illegal methods to be used in a US court.¹⁶⁵

Another provision is that Patriot allows law enforcement to freeze assets that may be entirely unrelated to a crime. The person may not even be convicted or suspected, and his assets may be frozen in the name of national security. The freezing itself is problematic, but so are some liberties connected to it.¹⁶⁶ If a person's assets are frozen he cannot exercise certain constitutional rights, like the right to counsel. A suspect cannot pay a lawyer if he has no usable funds. Information no longer needs intent, only a *significant purpose* in the investigation.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Ibid., 146.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 150.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 165.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 166.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 167.

Intelligence no longer needs an ultimate end, only a role in apprehension. The information can be used for an investigation that may have another *primary* purpose not related to intelligence and national security (although those may be secondary purposes).

4.6: Chapter Three Conclusion

In the process of technological progress the US government has created a society of tracks and trails. People can be identified in any number of ways, including medical records, library records, credit histories and Internet access. One outcome of the Cold War was an explosion in surveillance techniques and technologies. Those, in conjunction with advanced civilian technologies in the 1990s, have created a dangerous society for civil liberties. Privacy has given way to the Orwellian notion that Big Brother is watching. Such developments are to be expected after statewide traumas like 9/11. However, how long should they last? Can governments really just give privacy back to the people after taking it? Is something lost in the process—are liberties eroded?

This chapter looked at conflict legislation in the United States. Over the course of its history, such legislation has developed from acute to broad, specific to general. In the past, conflict legislation was limited within wars (like the Civil War or World War II) or high alert periods (like post-Revolution or the Red 20s and 50s). However today, the spontaneous nature of terrorism has moved conflict legislation into *normal life*. There has been little distinction between war and peace when terrorism touched radar with Clinton in 1994. Starting in 2001, it seems that conflict legislation also lost another distinguishing feature, *the sunset clause*. Such is the expectation that after crisis is averted, conflict laws will be defunct. However again with terrorism, crisis boundaries are blurred and bills have seemingly unlimited shelf life.

Using historical narrative and case-study detail, this chapter proved that the United States has never changed in how it protects itself. This is protection that uses legislation and targets society groups (based on everything from ethnicity, to religion, and political party). Recently, President George W. Bush has been criticized for his disregard of individual liberties and racism against Arab-Americans. However, after the evidence shown here, I believe he (and other PG presidents) cannot be singled out as overly discriminatory. If there is a problem it is with US national security as a whole, not only the recent band of presidents.

First, we looked at conflict legislation over US history. This showed that such legislation has remained the same as a powerful weapon against national enemies. Second, I investigated conflict legislation during the Bush administration in detail. This section outlined why Bush is seen as so controversial, what his acts have been, and how they compare to the past. Last, we went in depth into the praises, criticisms, and clauses of the USA PATRIOT Act. The USAP section is a testament to how powerful conflict legislation can be, how far-reaching this particular one is, and how it fits into US history.

5.1: Chapter Four: The Role of Media in Affecting Emotions and Guiding the Public

5.2: Chapter Four Introduction

Early and late night newscasters have always been a trusted source of information for the American people. Good looks, charisma, and a touch of humor in news personalities has become the trusted formula for good ratings. With a charming face at bow, it is expected that viewers will form emotional and fiduciary ties to particular news programs (and networks). Before the days of graphics and special effects, dynamic delivery by anchors made news an experience that went beyond simple information relay. Today, even with the advent of sophisticated graphics,

the newscaster has remained integral in the combination of presentation and information.

Personalities like Bill O'Reilly, Anderson Cooper, and Nancy Grace have built fan bases comparable to some movie stars. Today, it is typical for networks to have multiple standard and opinionated news programs to attract a wide audience.

On a basic level, the newscaster is a storyteller. He is the narrator of current events. International exploits, human tragedy, and national victory—these are often the topics of both domestic and international stories. From military campaigns to social security, newscasters turn problems and solutions into engaging reports. This makes them both more memorable as issues, and conversely belittles them as catchy water-cooler talk. The *best* (most popular) news stations are usually the ones with up to the second stories *and* cutting edge presentation.

For example, developments in the unfortunate *Virginia Tech* shooting last year were treated like twists in an elaborate plotline. On its own, the shooting was a horribly disturbing tragedy. But, networks like *Fox* presented every detail in a way that made it dramatic and addictively engaging. Also, almost every network cancelled its regular scheduled programming to dedicate time to new developments. After 2001, big stories (beginning with 9/11) like the Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were treated in such dramatic fashion to combine American desires for information and entertainment panache.

As of the early 1990s, one could see a gradual change in the impact of news media compared to the 1970s. Such coincided with new government policies to regulate images in the news.¹⁶⁸ For example, after the first week of reporting, the government prohibited the repetition of Twin Towers' crash videos in the name of decency. As a result of limiting policies, news networks were forced to replace content with graphics and trite stories. This is the basis of

¹⁶⁸ W. Lance Bennett, *News, the Politics of Illusion*. (New York: Longman, 1983), 48.

criticism that 1990s and 2000s news is overly superficial. News media lost its ability to pull heartstrings and reach people on an emotional level. Thus, in the PG era, we see an explosion of production values and political messages in *visual entertainment media* (movies and dramatic television).

The purpose of Chapter Four is to explore the relationship between entertainment (in this chapter only referring to VEM) and politics today. It is a role in which the media provides emotional connection to government issues. Such was the role of news media before massive regulation in the early 1990s.¹⁶⁹ Specifically, I will prove that news media lost its power, followed by the rise of entertainment to take its place. While the news can get people to care about issues, entertainment has developed into an entirely comprehensive experience for people to *live* them. Recently, themes of the *silver screen* and *black box* have looked eerily more and more like real life.

This chapter is related to my thesis in a number of ways. In Chapters One and Three we looked at the form and power of foreign policy in the United States. This was foreign policy based on controlling people, groups, and situations both inside and outside the USA. Such control can be effectively named a national security agenda as far as the USA has had international interests. Hence, so far we looked at the homogeneity of national security *from the government side*. This chapter will explore that homogeneity *from the people*. What do Americans think about national security policies? What motivates American citizens, and forms *how they think*? Have they always thought that way? My hypothesis is that the media has always guided people into certain opinions, the trend of opinions are the same, and that during PG they are heightened by VEM.

¹⁶⁹ Richard Davis and Diana Owen, *New Media and American Politics*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 98.

The structure will be as follows. First, I will compare and contrast the Vietnam War and Persian Gulf War as the markers of media transformation. The Vietnam War was the height of media objectivity and news media domination. While, the Persian Gulf War reduced the impact of news and turned it subjective. Next, I will analyze the rise of entertainment media and how it made people concerned about US foreign policy. This will include cases in the 1980s (which refer to Vietnam and the 1970s) and the PG era.

5.3: Vietnam: A War for All to See

If newscasters can be considered storytellers, then the Vietnam War is perhaps the most tragic American tale ever told. It is also the most pertinent example of how news reports have touched their audiences on an emotional level. Never before in modern US history, not even today with the largely unpopular Iraq Invasion, have the American people acted out against US foreign policy. The tremendous, sometimes 100,000 fold, Vietnam protests between 1968 and 1974 are a direct testament to the power of news reports.¹⁷⁰ However, considering the massive following of such movements like *May Day*, it is hard to believe that the Vietnam Era is one classically representative of objective reporting.¹⁷¹ One would never think *objectivity* to create such intense civil unrest.

The Vietnam era was one of many lessons learned. One such lesson was the appropriate role and freedom of on-site war journalists. Vietnam on-site reporters had virtually no limitations on where and what they could film.¹⁷² The Vietnam era characteristically represents

¹⁷⁰ Robert Sherill. *Why They Call It Politics: A Guide to America's Government* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 56.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹⁷² Michael Parenti. *Democracy for the Few*, (New York: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2002), 43.

objective reporting, however one must wonder from the whole experience whether or not such reports were healthy.

It must be mentioned that to the Vietnam journalist objectivity meant capturing *everything*. Objectivity in this period (that being 1968-1974) did not refer to neutral or balanced reporting, but to trigger-happy filming and unrestrained narratives.¹⁷³ This created a picture of Vietnam that was incredibly brutal and unfathomable to people watching from their living rooms. Americans were inundated with the intricacies of war—including first-hand violence—often times without the general knowledge of *why*.

Videos and pictures of fighting in the Vietnam jungles often accompanied the dinner hour. At this time, journalists were allowed full access to battlegrounds along with their cameras and crews. Usually, reporters were assigned to soldier regiments.¹⁷⁴ In fact, it was not uncommon for journalists to have similar war stories to soldiers, those of being rescued from certain death and forming camaraderie. As a result, Vietnam news feeds were rife with shooting, killing, and fallen bodies. In addition, the American public eye-witnessed crimes and atrocity *by American soldiers* against the Vietnamese. For example, the rampage of the US army in the *My Lai Massacre* of 1968 was broadcasted for all to see. The massacre resulted in the deaths of around 500 unarmed civilians, and flooding news images began the heaviest period of US protest beginning in 1969. Vietnam was a war effort that was candid for all to see, and all to scrutinize.

From the 1920s, news objectivity was a rich and highly pursued commodity. The very best newspapers and radio reports were those that provided the most objective reporting.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ (Bennett, *News*), 78.

¹⁷⁵ Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, (California: University Press, 1990), 89.

However, in contrast to Vietnam objectivity, the *Roaring Twenties*, *Depression Thirties*, and *World War Forties* championed accurate, fair and balanced stories. These were narratives that presented carefully constructed completeness, not a broad umbrella of the action. Pre-1950s objectivity was also properly complimented by commentary.

Perhaps the biggest problem with Vietnam was that journalists and newscasters did not properly explain the terrible images that were shown night after night.¹⁷⁶ Between the horror stories abroad, an uphill cause to begin with (both in victory and selling the war at home), and gratuitous images, the Vietnam War became a nightmare for soldiers abroad, viewers at home, and government officials at the helm.

The result of Vietnam objectivity was disastrous. As Vietnam soldiers were being brought home by 1973-1975, the American people vilified them. Journalists showed plenty of dramatic images, but they failed to explain accompanying war-practices like chain of command. The American public was appalled by the gruesomeness of Vietnam, and they mistakenly blamed it on the behavior of soldiers.¹⁷⁷ Although terrible, destruction like *My Lai* was very exceptional, but the American people thought it prominent based on its emotional power. For example, *70 soldiers committed My Lai*—all belonging to one infantry unit (the 11th). The total Vietnam US warrior commitment was approx. 550,000. Statistically, that is far less than even half a percent of US soldiers. Due to the news, Americans stereotyped the inhuman treatment of some Vietnamese by few soldiers to the entire American military presence.

It was no question that the new practices of objectivity born from Vietnam should be carefully analyzed. The experience taught the US government and news networks a valuable

¹⁷⁶ (Bennett, *News*), 80.

¹⁷⁷ (Sherrill, *Politics*), 34.

lesson. News programs realized that they should closely filter what they sent to televisions. While, the government decided that it needed to regulate networks, specifically journalists and cameramen, so that the problems of Vietnam would not be replicated in other conflicts.

5.4: The Persian Gulf: War Loses its Remaining Humanity

These Vietnam fears were addressed almost 20 years later with the Persian Gulf War. Here, we see *objectivity* concede to *subjectivity* in the news, as a way to deal with a lack of images and on-site reporting. Opinions were expected to fill the void left by war journalists in the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁷⁸ Thus, news programs switched from *showing* the news to *telling* the news. Also, the newscaster changed from being a picture prop to an ideological center. Entire news hours showcased the ideas and philosophy of the newscaster instead of tales of the events.¹⁷⁹ These news personalities became more like interpreters instead of mere anchors. Now, Americans could sit down with a bias that they personally sympathized with. However, major criticism of the PG period was that news was reduced to markets. People were able to watch, and only watch, their own special brand of politics without being exposed to other angles.¹⁸⁰

News content was changed through government policy, which specifically focused on the major problem of Vietnam—the *no-bounds journalist*. Throughout the Persian Gulf War and into Iraq today, journalists could not freely travel in combat areas anymore.¹⁸¹ They were only allowed aboard passenger convoys, many of which traveled the fringes of combat zones. Also,

¹⁷⁸ (Davis, *New Media*), 90.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ (Parenti, *Democracy*), 109.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 110.

they needed extra credentials to be near military personnel.¹⁸² Thus, real-time images of war-effort were few and far between. In addition to a reduction of images, even general information about soldiers, like casualty counts, are not offered by television. The PG era is one of information heavily guarded from civilians.

News networks combated this regulation by updating news-casting technology. For example, although relegated to the fringe, night vision goggles, infrared, and long-range microphones were used to capture *different kinds* of war coverage. This was coverage not based on intimate details but on *coolness and awe*.¹⁸³ Journalists boarded planes in order to film bomb drops. Small web cameras were put on the heads of missiles to document trajectory. And, explosions became the typical nighttime news image to symbolize American victory.

For average Americans, *the human factor* was altogether removed from war. The Persian Gulf era is characterized by the *mechanization of war*, which transferred to later conflicts like Kosovo's missile campaigns by President Clinton.¹⁸⁴ The news simply adapted to mechanized war by mechanizing how war was reported on. However, by removing humans from war, the news removed the ability of emotional attachment. The emotional connection between the battleground and the audience at home was greatly reduced.

From the Persian Gulf War onwards, US conflicts were criticized as too removed from the American people.¹⁸⁵ So, the Persian Gulf Era can be called the opposite extreme of Vietnam. This development of apathy towards conflict has been attributed to the relative silence of Americans (the majority) against the Invasion of Iraq, especially compared to Vietnam. It is

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ (Davis, *New Media*), 120.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 125.

¹⁸⁵ (Rhodes, *Politics/Desire*), 95.

hard to empathize with soldiers (and their families) when the conflict resembles a videogame.¹⁸⁶

2001 and September 11th mark an increase of PG subjectivity (as well as some increases in journalist restrictions). Post 9/11 subjectivity does not apologize for being completely subjective and biased. News programs now advertise liberal and conservative bias to entice audiences.¹⁸⁷ There have even formed *commentaries on the commentaries*, like John Stewart and Stephen Colbert, who jokes about current events. But, the PG trend has remained the same. News is still so subjective because dramatic content is so hard to film. Thus, movies and dramatic TV have risen to provide this content again. This is why recent politically based movies are so similar to real life.

5.5: Hollywood and Television: The Revival of War Time Emotions

Up until now, the sections of this chapter were meant as a build-up to the impact of entertainment on the American people and foreign policy issues. Before diving headlong into such impact, it was important to show the historical progression of how entertainment developed into its emotional role. Of course, certain movies before the 1990s and 2000s *did* already have this role before the advent of subjectivity. Mostly movies from the 1980s about Vietnam, I will include those here as part of the trend.

I will be using *popular* cases of entertainment media in this section. Also, these are cases of the *political thriller* or *military genre*. The assumption is that *popular media* has the most impact on the general population because more people internalize its messages. If people internalize political messages more than likely they their opinions are affected as well. The evidence used to show popularity will be box office sales and network ratings. The logic moves

¹⁸⁶ (Davis, *New Media*), 126.

¹⁸⁷ (Rhodes, *Politics/Desire*), 97.

then that high ratings mean high popularity, which leads to heavy impact (emotional attachment) on the general population.

It is important to establish a ratings and box office ceiling to properly judge individual entertainment statistics. These numbers are all based on domestic grosses. First, for movies, *Titanic* is the highest grossing film in history. It grossed more than \$600 m domestically, and any movie grossing half as much, or even a quarter as much, can be considered very successful and popular.¹⁸⁸ For TV programs, *Seinfeld* garnered around 21 million viewers. This was over the course of almost a decade and 9 different seasons. However, around Season four, *Seinfeld* netted about 12.7 million viewers. Again, any TV show watched by half, or even a third, of those numbers can be considered very popular.¹⁸⁹ Most shows today have a shelf life of about four or five seasons, so this 12.7 m. figure may be more appropriate.

In 1982, Director Ted Kotcheff's *Rambo: First Blood* was released to a United States only seven years removed from the Vietnam War. This is important because almost all other acclaimed Vietnam timepieces were released between 1985 and 1989.¹⁹⁰ As a comparison, Oliver Stone's *World Trade Center* in 2006 was heavily criticized for dramatizing an event *too soon*, and still seared in the public conscience. *Rambo* grossed more than \$150 million, amazingly comparable to productions today.¹⁹¹ It also spawned a number of sequels, one of which was just released early 2008. *Rambo* might be an odd pick, however *First Blood* should be considered influential and different than its muscle-bound sequels.

The movie is about Sylvester Stallone's John Rambo, a Vietnam Veteran harassed by

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 36.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 37.

¹⁹⁰ (Koppes, *Hollywood*), 67.

¹⁹¹ (Rhodes, *Politics/Desire*), 37.

local town police. It acts as a commentary on *Vietnam Syndrome*, or the psychological effects of Vietnam fighting on US soldiers.¹⁹² John Rambo reacts to the harassment as if he is still in the Vietnam theatre, leading to the classic action scenes the series is known for. However, this first movie was *meant* to be a serious commentary on the Vietnam War for two reasons. First, fighters needed help to readjust to society. This led to government policy to help guide veteran employment. Second, the American people discriminated against veterans. Such discrimination was prominent even throughout the 1980s.¹⁹³ The final scene of Rambo is his eventual breakdown in a department store as he is being chased by local authorities. One cannot help but feel the pain as similar veterans returned to a country they did not recognize, and to one that did not receive them as expected.

Rambo is an example of pre-1990s filmmaking (very similar to PG movies) and a *commentary on impact*.¹⁹⁴ Although Rambo is a destructive individual, the movie wants the audience to sympathize with him. More than Rambo's violence, the problem is with *the local police* (a symbol of American discrimination) who are unable to understand the Vietnam hero. The purpose of the movie, using surface dynamism like action, is to *show* people what some Vietnam vets were feeling. At the time, veterans were unable or unwilling to share their problems on their own.¹⁹⁵

In 1986, Oliver Stone wrote and directed his masterpiece *Platoon*, another Vietnam War specific movie. *Platoon* brought in about \$138 million at home, and was widely acclaimed for its depiction of realism in both Vietnam battlegrounds and emotional displays.¹⁹⁶ Stone's piece

¹⁹² (Koppes, *Hollywood*), 78.

¹⁹³ (Bennet, *News*), 57.

¹⁹⁴ (Koppes, *Hollywood*), 120.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ (Rhodes, *Politics/Desire*), 37.

is widely regarded as the first Vietnam epic, with a range of gifted and now famous actors.

Whereas *Rambo* was about an after-effect of Vietnam, *Platoon* is *about* Vietnam. More precisely, it is about what soldiers were thinking and doing on battlegrounds at the time. The movie pits two US platoons against each other, both lead by different commanders. The movie is about their different sense of purpose within the greater Vietnam War. Although fighting the same enemy (Vietcong), and on the same side, they could not feel more detached from each other in the conflict.

Platoon is best described as a *commentary on action*.¹⁹⁷ The movie does well to explain the effects of war by using war itself. It is almost as if it gives the audience a window into the Vietnam War. For many of the Vietnam generation, this was a way to have them remember the haunting news coverage during the actual war years. But, for a new generation of young Americans who never witnessed the war first hand, this movie was a *like life* replication of action in the theater and news at home. *Platoon* is usually referred to as the most powerful anti-war film ever made.¹⁹⁸ But, this is due to showing powerful scenes, not preaching. Because of the interactions of opposing US platoons *and* the secondary enemy of the Vietcong, the audience gets a sense of how dangerous, uncomfortable and hopeless the situation is for the soldiers. For example, a classic scene is in the beginning when young Private Chris Taylor (Charlie Sheen) is obviously out of his element just walking the jungles (without firing one bullet).

Here, we make the jump to the PG era. Vietnam movies came years after the actual conflict, mostly *commenting* on events after the fact. PG, including 9/11, movies generally try to persuade its audience to feel a certain way. The first example is Ronald Emmerich's *The Patriot* in 2000. Grossing \$113 million, *The Patriot* is one of the most popular US historical movies to

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 89.

¹⁹⁸ (Koppes, *Hollywood*), 67.

date.¹⁹⁹ Although criticized as *too harsh* on British brutality during the American Revolution, it was a movie that Americans enjoyed for its entertainment value and storybook telling of the Revolution.

The Patriot deals with a distant time period, and director Emmerich wanted his audience to *live through* what is on screen. The purpose of this movie is to create an *image of the past*.²⁰⁰ Americans today celebrate the founding every year, but for all it is very hard to really visualize what it was like. This movie, and similar period movies, does just this. Recently, HBO has also created *John Adams* (2008), a TV mini-series about the first 50 years of the USA. These productions try to give Americans a passion for the past, much of which is difficult to picture.

In May 2001, Michael Bay's *Pearl Harbor* was the 2000-decade's attempt at another *Titanic*. Netting a whopping \$198 million, *Pearl Harbor* was advertised as an epic account of American intervention in WWII.²⁰¹ Criticized for its anachronisms, *Pearl Harbor* was far more adored by the general public than movie critics. The main story is about two boyhood friends who enlist in the Armed Forces after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The movie is told through the eyes of Rafey (Affleck) and Danny (Hartnett). It was a classic, if not cliché, *war and love story* movie, however it has implications worth entertaining.

First, this movie shows building nationalism in American society before September 11th. The movie came out just shy of the tragedy, meaning that feelings were already present to recreate and retell the sudden bombing of Pearl Harbor.²⁰² Second, in addition to creating past

¹⁹⁹ (Rhodes, *Politics/Desire*), 37.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 101.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 37.

²⁰² (Koppes, *Hollywood*), 110.

images, *Pearl Harbor* has another purpose of *relating tragedy* to a new generation.²⁰³ The 2000s generation (of which 20 and 30 year olds were the primary audience) were not able to see this tragedy first-hand. Movies like *Pearl Harbor* try to get people of one generation to sympathize with tragedy in another time period. To compare, *Platoon* came only ten years after its topic. Many of those who saw it also lived through Vietnam. With *Pearl Harbor*, the target audience in no way lived through WWII almost 60 years prior. This movie's goal was to show how it was like, and tell how to feel about it.

In 2002, Ridley Scott made his *Platoon*-like masterpiece with *Black Hawk Down* (*BHD*). Specifically based on US/UN intervention in the Somali Civil War in 1993, the movie was hugely acclaimed for its *like being there* experience. The movie made audience feel like they were *with* the US tactical units used in Mogadishu. Making about \$109 million, *Black Hawk Down* was based on actual events, where two black hawk helicopters were shot down over Mogadishu, and about 100 US Rangers had to survive days without supplies, real contact, and engulfed in hostility.²⁰⁴ *BHD* is known for its blending of fact and fiction to tell the story of Mogadishu while also creating a truly dramatic experience.

Black Hawk Down is very much like *Platoon*. In fact, critics call it *Platoon* for the Persian Gulf generation.²⁰⁵ Similarly, the movie follows a unit of soldiers through a foreign land and a military campaign almost doomed from its beginning. Most of the soldiers are young, despite the Ranger rank, and all look very uncomfortable in the Somali capital. However, the difference with *Platoon* lies with the movie's intent. *Black Hawk Down* is a commentary on this black hawk mission of 1993 used *during* another similar conflict. This can best be described as

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ (Rhodes, *Politics/Desire*), 37.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 70.

creating a link between US history. Somalia of 1993 looked just like the Invasion of Afghanistan going on since 2001.²⁰⁶ *Black Hawk* ends happily enough, with the US soldiers escaping to safety. However, the Mogadishu operation is disastrous and does not help the Civil War. Such a message suggests that the current war might also be a lost cause. *BHD* is a movie made during the Invasion of Afghanistan, about the Somalia 1993, to compare two US conflicts to the American public and create anti-war feelings.

The last case is *24*, the immensely popular television drama of November 6th, 2001 to present. Broadcasted by *Fox* and netting 13 million viewers at its peak of seasons four, five and six, *24* is the epitome of the 2001 television drama.²⁰⁷ Simply put, this section would not be complete without this show as the post 9/11 representative. Spanning now the entire *War on Terror* through the *about to release* season seven (2008-2009), there is no better example of the role of political television dramas today. Each season spans only one day of federal agent Jack Bauer. Jack Bauer is a respected field agent in imaginary federal bureau CTU (Counter Terrorism Unit), and each season focuses on a terrorist threat against the United States.

24 is best described as a *mirror of the present*.²⁰⁸ Whereas *Black Hawk Down* recreates the past for the present, *24* uses hypothetical current situations to mimic what is going on in real life. For example, in season one Jack Bauer is needed to protect a presidential nominee from assassination while supposed Serbian terrorists try to take down the country. Also, at least three seasons of *24* deal with Islamic terrorism, at least two with nuclear bombs on American soil, and two separate seasons deal with Chinese and Russian hostility. The show is characteristically

²⁰⁶ (Koppes, *Hollywood*), 134.

²⁰⁷ Wheeler Winston Dixon, *Film and Television After 9/11*, (Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004), 150.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 146.

unafraid to portray provocative situations, some being topics of mercenaryism in the USA (Americans helping terrorists for money)²⁰⁹, using real country names, and even showing corruption in the US government. The show is relatively good at *showing all sides* of conflict, but it is sometimes criticized for being over-dramatic and gratuitous.

As a mirror, the purpose of *24* is to show people *what could, or what might* happen.²¹⁰ This is immediately shown in rumors of season seven, which might cast a woman as President of the USA (which before was filled by two African-American brothers, and a neo-conservative to name a few). The show puts Jack Bauer into situations that could feasibly arise in the real world. The idea is to suggest that maybe current government policy is not as useless as some critics may say. In addition, *24* plays out American fears. For example, in season six a nuclear bomb actually is detonated on American soil, whereas in the past it was always stopped in the nick of time.

Lastly, Jack Bauer as a character is telling of messages in the show. Agent Bauer is a government official basically without family (or estranged to it). At the end of every season, he swears off his job only to return to it again for one reason or another (like feelings of duty, or the death of a friend). Importantly, he puts his own well being at risk for the sake of the United States. For example, in season 3 Bauer is willing to crash a nuclear bomb by plane out of harms way, of course killing himself in the process. In season 6, after being detained by the Chinese for months, he is willing to be released by the USA and immediately transferred back into captivity by Islamic terrorists. Certainly, the situations are far-fetched. But, the audience identifies with Bauer as the ultimate patriot.²¹¹ Jack Bauer as a symbol is the ultimate icon of

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ (Koppes, *Hollywood*), 98.

²¹¹ (Dixon, *Film/Television*), 160.

duty to one's country, which viewers tune into every week almost religiously.

5.6: Chapter Four Conclusion

In this paper, we looked at the new role of VEM after massive news regulation during the Persian Gulf War (extending into the PG era). First, we looked at news media during the Vietnam War. This was a period of relatively unrestrained journalism. It was a time characterized by *too much* coverage, imagery, and wartime emotion. Second, we examined the direct opposite to Vietnam War coverage, the Persian Gulf War. Journalism was so regulated here that the war effort resembled a video game, and people at home could not empathize with it on an emotional level. Such regulation caused networks to fill their news time (and nightly program slots) with opinionating. The post-9/11 part of PG extended this trend, but exaggerated it, with the most news subjectivity ever seen so far.

Last, we looked at the result of Persian Gulf regulation, the emergence of *visual entertainment media* to fill the emotional void in politics (especially conflict). To this end, I analyzed a number of entertainment cases beginning with the 1980s (about the 1970s) to the 2000s (about the 2000s). This was done to give samples of trends in entertainment media, to establish that such media has impact via statistics, and that such impact affects the American people. This was all made to prove that entertainment keeps national security issues in the national mind, and that such entertainment exploded after PG news regulation.

6.1: Thesis Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to show the homogeneity of US foreign policy over the course of its life. It asked the question, *are the Persian Gulf administrations really so different from the rest of US history?* And, *does US foreign policy have a single discernable*

trend over the course of its history? This thesis proved that *no*; despite rampant criticism the PG years are no different than the rest of US history, *in the essence* of their foreign policy. Also, it proved *yes*; that US foreign policy has a single trend and idea throughout history. Summed up in a phrase, that foreign policy can be called the *promotion of peace and prosperity*. These are promises of peace and prosperity abroad in order to increase peace and prosperity at home.

The main method was to show this trend using *conflicts, legislation, and entertainment*. This was done using case study, historical narrative and analytic narrative. Conflicts through the 1970s to the 2000s were used to show that the United States *fights* similarly over history. In the Persian Gulf era this means small units, technology and precision forces. Also, it shows that the United States has gone to war for many of the same reasons despite the political bend of the Commander and Chief.

Legislation was used to show homogeneity of foreign policy from a *government-centric* position. This is mainly that the US government uses legislation to control its population, and after 1970 to control international actors as well. Legislation has always had the same purpose, to define, limit and punish US deemed hostile groups. Similarly, entertainment (limited to movies and TV shows) shows the same homogeneity from a *population-centric* view. From the 1960s entertainment media was used to comment on US foreign policy. This was in addition to free and gratuitous news coverage of conflict (i.e. Vietnam War). From the 1990s entertainment was used to *affect opinion* on US foreign policy. This was in substitution of news coverage that was heavily regulated. However though both times, entertainment presented national security issues in dramatic fashion to keep them in the public mind. It can be considered another control of the people to think, feel, and respond to conflict in a certain way.

To the end listed above, the thesis was divided into four main chapters. Chapter One was dedicated to uniting 1981-2008 into a bloc of foreign policy called the Persian Gulf period. This is a bloc based on intervention in other countries, moralizing as justification, and small, precision conflicts. Chapter Two was meant as a brief pause in the thesis' main arguments, and to create a theoretical foundation. In this chapter, a literary review of Michael Foucault was applied to US foreign policy in order to relate them to each other. Foucault is particularly articulate on the development of punishment and surveillance in a civil society.

Chapter Three resumed the arguments of One by uniting the rest of US history. Effectively, Chapter One could be compared with Chapter Three to show homogeneity throughout. Also, Three showed the power of legislation to US foreign policy. Legislation was the main way in which US presidents were able to control hostile groups in the population. Last, in Chapter Four, we explored media in US society. Specifically, we looked at the effect of news media during the Vietnam War, the loss of objectivity in the news as it was regulated during the Persian Gulf War, and the new role of entertainment during the PG era. This was a role of making people *feel* for conflicts like battlefield images did during Vietnam. As tied to the main argument, it proved that entertainment controls the emotions of the population, has done so since it was respectable, and helps to keep national security as a priority.

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