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# **THE CROATIAN SWITCH IN DOGMATISM : FROM COMMUNISM TO NATIONALISM**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis deals with a switch in dogmatism that has happened during the late eighties and nineties of the twentieth century in Croatia. In this period a very influential discourse of communism was effectively replaced by the discourse of right – wing authoritarianism and extreme nationalism. Methodology of the thesis is based on comparative analysis of the sources.

Tito was huge point of common identity between culturally, economically and religiously rather diverse ethnic group. After his death in 1980 sudden manifestation of rigid and extreme nationalism appeared. Nationalisms were developed on the basis of martirology and especially strong religious identity.

During the communist era political elites tried to impose the national identity of Yugoslavism which is founded and developed on the works of Josip Juraj Strossmayer and during the interwar period Jovan Cvijić. After the fall of both communism and Yugoslavia Croatian ethnic nationalism replaced supraethnic Yugoslav nationalism.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

In this thesis I will discuss a switch in dogmatism that has happened during the late eighties and nineties of the twentieth century in Croatia. In this period a very influential discourse of communism was effectively replaced by the discourse of right – wing authoritarianism and extreme nationalism. In the major political and economic crisis it is easier to impose dogmatic thoughts in the prevalent narrative no matter how it differs from the earlier ones. *Communism has created subjects without ideas who were quick to embrace uncritically the nationalisms that had been preserved in their most primitive form beneath the structure of communism*<sup>1</sup>.

The thesis that dogmatic thought has been notably linked with economic backwardness is also present in the case of Croatia. It is noted to the extent that even war and transition of political systems did not have major influence on that trend and that economically passive areas are more prone for the occurrence of the shift between communist and nationalist ideology.

The methodology for my work will be comparative analysis of texts that represent the authors who are members of nationalist and communist ideological currents. It will also be the comparative analysis of the supraethnic narrative and narrative of ethnic nationalism. Points of relevance would be a research on the similarities and differences in indoctrination of both political systems through intellectual climate. Nationalism is in the words of Benedict Anderson an imagined community and I will frame my thesis in the direction that will show that the reawakening of Croatian nationalism came

with the appearance of political, institutional and most important economic crisis.

On a personal note, I must mention that I am from Croatia and although that does not mean that I would be necessarily biased, it means that I was educated in the terms of the mainly manicheistic, serbophobic Croatian historiography. As well as my peers in Croatia, I was subjugated to the dominant nationalist worldview. This situation is unavoidable but it comes in more destructive forms and results in more negative consequences in the society which was struck both by war and the propaganda of war – mongering from each side if we compare it to the other societies in transition which did not have gone through these situations. Therefore, this topic has a significant importance in the Yugoslavian case. Although historiographies of other European countries have major works in this field we must have in mind that in the Croatian context this field of research is just beginning to develop. I am aware that in the other contexts it would be too broad theme to grasp. The works on this subject in Croatian historiography in previous times were marked by political opportunism and the wish to forcefully and unscrupulously impose a regime – friendly stance. I can hardly say that political pamphlets actually can contribute to the national (and not nationalistic) historiography.

This topic is very controversial because Croatian society has a great balast with the differences in views on the topics of 20th century history. Political debates in Croatia are still immersed in the diverse perspectives of not so recent historical events. Croatian case is different because after the fall of the communist regime country went through the process of nation – building

as well as the process of radicalization of the political scene which was both the cause and the consequence of the war.

I will certainly try in my work to be objective and give the actual evaluation, but there is always the danger that my contextualization of the historical events and the interpretations will be marked by my previous education. Dealing with this topic in present historiographical context definitely needs and deserves this kind of clarification.

Second World War was marked by the atrocities that were made among the Yugoslavian ethnic groups in the names of ethnic pride and extreme right – wing ideologies. The victors of the war in Yugoslavian context were antifascists which were led by the Communist Party ruled by Tito. After the war communists installed Tito as a totalitarian leader of the second Yugoslavia. Major ideological position of the communist was supraethnic formation of the Yugoslavian state which would be correlated with communist cosmopolitanism and international proletarianism. The introduction of the ideology of Yugoslavism during communist regime was swift and effective. First reason is the strong memory of hardships and atrocities of the Second World War for which the communists accused the ideology of nationalism and its representatives. Second reason is the breach between Tito and Stalin that began in 1948. Faced with the danger of conflict with international giant it was easier for the communists to shift the attention from the internal fallacies of the regime and also to unite the populace. The idea of Yugoslavism was centered around the supposed independence from both the capitalist West and the communist East.



After Tito's death in 1980 came the liberalization of the country and the main reason for that was the sole death of the renowned dictator who had successfully worked within the cult of personality. *Political crisis has appeared with crisis of identities of modern Yugoslav society which emphasizes nationalisms who seek their own state<sup>2</sup>.*

Tito was probably the biggest connection between those culturally, economically and religiously rather diverse ethnic group. No one emerged as a Tito after Tito and the power was put to the Central Committee which chose on yearly basis new leader from the different ethnic group. Nobody in the political scene emerged as the new strongman partially because of the latent ethnic strifes which were suppressed by the regime and stapled as an antiregime activity. The rapture between ethnic groups resulted in the fact that after Tito's death regime was not able to single out a successor but rather agreed upon the rule of the collective presidency with the annual changes at the position of the president of the presidency. That raised the question of ethnicity because more power was vested in hands of the party organisation on the level of each republic. Those organisations had rather diverse interests and they have put a lot of pressure on their representatives in the Central Committee. The party had not changed in her ambition to continue with the totalitarian system but a big factor of collective identity was now gone.

The decentralization of the power meant less efficient political control over populace which resulted in the introduction of vivid intellectual dialogue in 1980s. But while in the cases of most communist countries it mainly resulted in the critique of the regime from the liberal and democratic point of view, in Yugoslavia the critique of the regime was to a large extent

channeled via the extreme nationalist discourse of the treachery of one ethnic group for the benefit of the others. Historiographical interpretations in 1980s were openly conveyed in the key of ethnic nationalism. New narrative was introduced that have put more accent on the adoration of medieval past in which Croatia had a vast country. Right – wing's regime initial goal was to pursue the establishment of independent Croatia in these boundaries. A perspective on the antifascist struggle was changed and sometimes with the lack of subtlety which brought major critiques from western democracies.

The population in the communist totalitarian system had relatively easily been influenced by the ideology of right – wing nationalistic authoritarianism. The concepts of brotherhood and unity had been replaced by the ethnic self – pride and resentment towards the particular ethnic groups (Serbs, Bosniak Muslims) with which Croatians have been living in relative peace for almost half a century. Influential leaders that eventually emerged could only function as a national leader :*the crowd cheered to Milošević : Tzar Lazar, you did not have the luck of having Milošević by your side*<sup>3</sup> or with a cult of personality closely connected to religious identities. *At the ceremony in church from a crowd of people one pious man goes to the altar and on the very same altar near the cross he puts a picture of Milošević*<sup>4</sup>.

Resentments between Serbs and Croats that have been suppressed by the communist government have bursted into the sinister hate that has resulted in the war of the 1990s. *Croatian nationalists were interpreting the war as a continuation of politics of communist Yugoslavia. By their words chetnik barbarians and the troops of Yugoslav army have just*

*replaced red star on their forehead with Serbian national insignia*<sup>5</sup>. In the January of 1990 most important and most read publications were the antiestablishment ones. *Bestsellers on the book market are Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti by Franjo Tuđman, Podrijetlo Hrvata by Ivan Mužić, Vllasi by Milenko Vučetić and Moj slučaj by Vlado Gotovac*<sup>6</sup>. First book is from dissident, historian and general and future president of Croatia, second is from historian who tried to re – open debates about the slavic ethnogenesis of Croatians. Third book was written by Serbian historian about controversial member of Communist Party from Kosovo and fourth book is autobiography written by one of the most famous Croatian dissidents and leaders of Croatian Spring who was imprisoned in 1971.

First work that differed from the unofficially proclaimed canon was the work of Vladimir Dedijer who was the official biographer of Josip Broz Tito. Dedijer was born in Belgrade, capital of Serbia, in 1914 and died in 1990. He published several books on the life of Tito and among them a very controversial work *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* (New Contributions for the Biography of Josip Broz Tito) in 1981. In this work he mentions the executions of the civilians and also among fighters themselves in the antifascist movement. He also writes about secret talks of the Partisan leadership with Germans in March of 1943 and attacks some notable politicians of the Croatian organisation of the Communist party. Dedijer accused Vladimir Bakarić (General Secretary of the Croatian Communist Party for already 4 decades) that he was concealing documents about atrocities of the *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska* (Independent State of Croatia) and its Ustasha regime towards a Serbian population. The Dedijer's work gave an

important impetus towards the so – called ethnicization of the research on the second world war. From the uniform historiographies of the Titoist era now the rapture appeared among historians on the ethnic basis. After this numerous books appeared that tried to rethink about the nature of both Yugoslav states. The historians turned to assessments based on the ethnic key. Dogmatism of vulgar marxism was replaced by the nationalistic fervor which had its climax in the 1990s. *The conflicts between ethnic groups were forming during 1960s and 1970s in the cultural area and later they gained economic and political characteristic until these differences resulted with a war*<sup>7</sup>. The replacement of the discourses and strengthening of nationalisms was not sudden but rather came as a strong trend after Tito's death.

The crisis started with the aggressive Milošević's stance against Albanians in Kosovo: *Those who support the terror in Kosovo are giving a blow to the both Serbia and Yugoslavia. Serbs on Kosovo are not alone in their hardships. Every home in Serbia is with them. And every family in Serbia is ready to go to Kosovo to support them*<sup>8</sup>. (Politika, Beograd 6. 2. 1990.). Although the signs of worsening of the situation could be seen none of the major intellectuals predicted that the eventual demise of Yugoslavia would be manifested in total chaos and havoc. Main reason for the effectiveness of war mongering was the successful reawakening of collective memories of past injustices which one ethnic group caused to the other. There was a strong perception from other ethnic groups that Yugoslav national identity is in peril by constant conflict between two major ethnic groups: *The two largest nations of Yugoslavia, the Serbs and Croats, increasingly attempted to manipulate the federal system in order to forward their own*

*national interests*<sup>9</sup>. Economic inequalities between ethnic groups were also huge. *The difference between the richest and the poorest ethnic group in Yugoslavia is equal to the economic difference between England and northern Africa*<sup>10</sup>. Croatians tried to portray their position in Yugoslavia as subject to the dominance of Serbs. *There were very strong nationalist and chauvinistic theories that stated that Croatia was in both Yugoslavia's exploited by Serbs and Serbian nationalism*<sup>11</sup>. The new nationalist elite shared the machiavellist methods of the communist predecessors. *What is there to say about Slobodan Milošević as a human being? Beneath all that pragmatism which so blatantly marks his whole political persona, will for power and ruthlessness are also his important characteristics*<sup>12</sup>. Former president of Russia Boris Yeltsin claimed that Milošević *was a man without any principles*<sup>13</sup>.

The clutch of historiography under the influence of Communist Party weakened and the clumsy hierarchical system in political organisations was the main reason of the appearance of strong ethnic sentiments. The war has produced a renewed atmosphere of the curtailment of the freedom of the media. Newly established government of HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica - Croatian Democratic Union) imposed a strict pressure on media and academia which was result of the wish to homogenize the populace in the times of war which served as a good excuse of introducing such measures. Extreme nationalism in Croatia was a result of the aggressive stance from Belgrade. *The sin of croatian maximalists is that they, after the chetnik propaganda appears, respond with ideology of Ustaša*<sup>14</sup>. Democratically elected regime introduced authoritarian measures. New narrative was introduced that have put more accent on the adoration of medieval past in

which Croatia had a vast country. Right – wing's regime initial goal was to pursue the establishment of independent Croatia in these boundaries. A perspective on the antifascist struggle was changed and sometimes with the lack of subtlety which brought major critiques from western democracies.

Croatian case is different from the cases of other postsocialist countries because after the fall of the communist regime country went through the process of nation – building as well as the process of radicalization of the political scene which was both the cause and the consequence of the war. Political extremism is connected to the economic downfall . *At the end of 1970s and at the beginning of 1980s a quarter century long trend of swift economic and social development has come to an end. It is replaced by stagnation. These happenings are not just a coincidental episode but rather the phase in the deterioration of previous trend<sup>15</sup>.*

Macroeconomic indicators started to fall rapidly. *Yugoslavia constantly decreased the gap in comparison to other countries. Yugoslavia's GDP per capita was compared to the world 64% of its value in 1950, 86% in 1960, 115% in 1970 and 131% in the year 1975<sup>16</sup>.*

The standard of living of the citizens who were used to live comfortably from economic perspective has also fallen as well as the state economy. With it efficiency of work also fell: *While in 1979 labourer worked 14 minutes in order to buy a kilogram of bread, five years later he had to work 29 minutes to obtain the same amount of bread<sup>17</sup>.* These economic troubles brought with it the climate of frustration and dissatisfaction with the government. Economic troubles forced political elites to pursue issues of ethnic nationalism.

There were basically no politicians which had among their top priorities solving economic issues. *President of the federal government Ante Marković was the only one who had support from Americans. From their perspective he was the only leader who had economic reforms and development as his priorities*<sup>18</sup>. During the era of communist rule the economically backward area of Croatia, as well as in other republics, gave an extremely high percentage of the ruling people. Even after the emergence of democracy the trend had not changed.

## 2. INTERPLAY BETWEEN CROATIAN AND YUGOSLAV IDENTITIES THROUGH TIME

Formation of Croatian identity became the part of modern nation – building currents in 1830s. Works of the authors and political figures of Illyrism were crucial in that matter. Modern Croatian nationalism had its foundations in the language reform of Ljudevit Gaj who strived towards the enforcement of Štokavian dialect in the use as an official language in the institutions. But, in the long term *illyrism of Ljudevit Gaj had for its goal formation of linguistic basis for the unification of South Slavic state*<sup>19</sup>.

In the 1860s Croatian identity became intertwined with idea of Yugoslavism. Authors of Illyrian ideology had in the long term idea of unifying all the South Slavs in one state. *Illyrians do not have one government but rather many. Therefore, in an effort to have good relations, they have to create new common culture and pursue the idea of common ethnogenesis*<sup>20</sup>.

Yugoslavism is the concept which is based on the striving towards the unification of the whole South Slavic territories. Its rationale was that the South Slavs are ethnically and culturally one nation. The implementation of that ideology would be of major importance because the South Slavic population was among the least influential in big imperial systems (Habsburg Monarchy and Ottoman Empire) and were subjugated to these powerful governments. It is interesting to notice that idea of Yugoslavism was put forward by the influential representatives of the Roman Catholic church in Croatia like the historian and roman catholic priest Reverend Franjo Rački



(1828 – 1894) and bishop of Đakovo Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815 – 1905). Strossmayer was a crucial figure regarding the founding of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1867. In Pest he entered the circle around Jan Kollar. Strossmayer also cooperated with František Palacky and shared with him the idea of cultural and political cooperation of Slavic ethnic groups. He was famed for his idea of tight relations between Catholic and Orthodox South Slavs. It is undisputable fact that both Rački and Strossmayer pursued the programme of cultural and political unification of South Slavic ethnic groups. Historian Korunić claims that *Many politicians pursued cultural, national and political individuality amongst South Slavic people. Because of the danger of eventual hegemony from Vienna or Pest their aspiration was the unification in South Slavic federative community*<sup>21</sup>.

Formation of the extreme Croatian nationalism which started in 1860 with the activities of the Croatian Rights Party (Starcevic, Kvaternik, Sufflay...). This ideological current trace its beginnings in staunch resistance towards the politics of two major political centres in the politics of Habsburg Monarchy, Vienna and Budapest. These intellectuals were also eager to oppose the strivings towards the formation of the unified South Slavic state, no matter whether it will be centralised or formed as a federation. The formation of the both Yugoslavian and Croatian identity happened in the middle of the 19th century and from that time also began the process of their intertwining.

## **2.1. FORMATION OF CROATIAN IDENTITY THROUGH THE WORK OF STJEPAN RADIĆ AND ITS DEVELOPMENT TILL 1918**

Stjepan Radić was the most renowned Croatian politician and public figure in the first half of the interwar period. He was born in 1871 in a rural place in central Croatia. The foundation and strengthening of HSS is inevitably connected to the figure of Stjepan Radić. Radić himself had roots from the numerous peasant family. His parents had eleven kids. His brother Antun was an important party member and his sister Kata Jajnčeroва was a noted ethnologist (probably the first Croatian female ethnologist). Brothers Antun and Stjepan Radić were the most renowned ideologists of the HSS.

HSS was developing from the small, marginal formation which had during the breakdown of the Austro – Hungarian Monarchy just three members of the parliament. Later it became huge and very important political party that served almost as a national movement of the Croatian people. The ability to gain political and electoral popularity for HSS was possible only in the interwar period after the peasants gained the right to vote. They were comprising the biggest portion of the supporters of HSS. About 90% of the population of Croatia at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century were peasants

A very important part of his political and ideological formation and education were his contacts with the political activists in Prague. That city was a hotbed for the idea of both Panslavism as well as Austroslavism in the nineteenth century. Radić became a member of Slavia, academic society which cherished the idea of unity among the Slavs in the Monarchy. He saw

his political agenda as a mission: *I am very excited because I am preparing, with the help of the merciful and eternal God and my sincere and loyal friends, to help liberate Croatia, our God given country*<sup>22</sup>. He is the part of almost every major political antiregime action in the parts of his residence after 1895. In his youth the idea of Slavism was a dominant mark in Stjepan Radić's political ideology which was in contrast with the ideology of his brother Antun whose priority was an idea of agrarianism and strong peasantry. It seems that in early political days Stjepan Radić did not held ideas which were so popular among wider strata of population because the idea of austroslavism was foreign to the Croatian population. In contrast to that, this concept was rather popular in the urban centres and among the literate people.

Radić proposed an European version of pacifism and recent Croatian historians connected the roots of this orientation with his admiration towards Mahatma Gandhi who was already noted by his political activity in both South Africa and India before the times Radić held great popularity among Croatian populace. The pacifist component in the ideology of Stjepan Radić was also one of the reasons why he did not have good cooperation with the communists who tried, in the interwar period, to overthrow the government violently. This was also the reason why he destroyed any connections which HSS party members initially had with chauvinistic Croatian nationalists. HSS, as a party, officialy declined any use of the violence and to fight against the opposing side just with constitutional means, and if that is not possible, than with speeches and publications. Josip Horvat, renowned Croatian interwar publicist, describes Radić in this way:

*He attentively listens to the pulse of his own people. He hears and knows what populaton wants. The main goal of the people is peace becuae they have experienced volatile and brutal war. And therefore Stjepan Radić, as a attentive listener, is a noted pacifist and antimilitarist<sup>23</sup>.*

Radić often emphasized his antichauvinist stance. He claimed that he always wanted and pursued the unity and brotherhood of all South Slavs but still merely on the political level. He took pride in defending Serbs in the political scandal between Croats and Serbs of Austro – Hungarian Monarchy which took place in Zagreb in 1902. Nikola Stojanović published an article in *Srbobran* (major Serbian newspaper in Zagreb) which was titled *Serbs and Croats: Till we die or till you die*. Already in the title it is evident that the author wanted to instigate conflicts among two ethnic groups in the monarchy. Radić was opposing the antiSerbian demonstrators and was imprisoned for that action. The nationality can not be so easily forgotten and replaced by some forced and false identity.

*Our common language is a very strong and powerful connection for the South Slavs. But still we must understand that nationality is something much deeper and wider than the way we speak<sup>24</sup>.*

Radić thought not only that the most appropriate goverment for Croatians would be the republican one, but also thought and expressed his opinion that it is very popular idea among the Croatian populace. He explained that by connecting the enthusiasm about the fall of the Austro – Hungarian monarchy with the satisfaction of the demise of one powerful monarchical system.

His idea was that Croatia first must come to agreement and unite with other Slavic states. It would be volatile for Croatia to rush into the union with victorious Serbs and Montenegrins, especially in the times in which Slovenia is only becoming the state in its natural and historical boundaries.

*All of us South Slavic ethnic groups must create a big republican confederation with Czechs and Poles and after some time with Russians as well*<sup>25</sup>. Radić found diverse rolemodels for his ideal society.

*HSS will work vehemently that our state would be modeled by traditions of Western Europe and United States of America. It is in our best interest that we apply this aim to our own tradition and principles. And by our own tradition I mean that we must pursue the agrarian and popular programme*<sup>26</sup>.

Radić was anticlerical Roman Catholic who still recognised the right of the believers of the other faiths to practice their religion. In the case of South Slavic states it meant that Radić propagated equal rights for three major faiths: Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Islam.

His major interest was to lessen the burden of the peasants and the workers. These two social groups are, in Radić's opinion, backbones of the society. With these perspectives Radić was expressing the stances of the rebellious and revolutionary Croatian people which in his own words lost their confidence in other, *Urban* parties.

*Urban parties were remnants of the past. And that past is forgotten by the people because of their enhanced national and social sense*<sup>27</sup>.

During the war Radić often spoke against the huge social differences between diverse strata of the population. His major goals were: democratization of the government, revision of economic policies, solving the problem of peasantry which was going through economic hardships, opening diplomatic contact with the forces of the Entente and the unification of the all South Slavs in the Monarchy in one territorial formation. Radić was strongly opposed to the atrocities against the Serbian population in Srijem. Radić was very blatant in his critique of the Austro – Hungarian Monarchy and the dynasty of the Habsburgs.

## **2.2 THE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN RADIĆ'S CROATIAN NATIONALISM AND CVIJIĆ'S YUGOSLAV NATIONALISM**

The Yugoslavian vision was victorious after the end of First World War because the demise of Austro – Hungarian Monarchy resulted in the foundation of the Kingdom of SHS (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). New state was the social experiment for the theory of Yugoslavism which has captured mind of many intellectuals in the past years. Implementation of the theory in this particular practice did not go well. The Kingdom of SHS (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) was created after the First World War, in 1918. The new state merged all South Slavic ethnic groups without Bulgarians. First Yugoslavia was made of *three nations: Serbs with Montenegrins (38.8%), Croats (23.8%), Slovenes (8.5%)*<sup>28</sup>. This new state was based, in the words of Garde *on the idea of Southslavism ... which meant that the linguistic and religious differences which separate these ethnic groups are trivial and should not prevent the cohabitation*<sup>29</sup>.

The existence of new state was ideologically rationalized within the framework of Southslavism but many differences between the ethnic groups proved as insurmountable. The regime did not successfully tackle differences in institutions, cultural background, ideologies and the level of economic development. The existence of many ethnic groups, political ambitions, different interests was not recognized.

Stjepan Radić was in the very beginning against the dominance of the Serbs in government and in public offices. He was one of just two members of the National Council who were opposed to the programme of the unification which gained support from everyone else. The second member who was against the Svetozar Pribičević's programme was ardent Croatian nationalist and member of the Croatian Rights Party Dragutin Hrvoj. This was one of the biggest arguments of his Serbian opponents and politicians against Radić. They claimed that the Peasant Party leader was opposed to the very idea of supraethnic South Slavic country. In the speech given in front of the National council on November 24th 1918 he offered his vision of government for the new state:

*State would be a confederation. The highest State Council would include Serbian king, Croatian ban and president of the Slovenian National Council... State parliament would give the right of 10 members to Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia, 4 to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 to Dalmatia, Montenegro, Istria and Vojvodina. Six federal states would have their own parliaments and governments<sup>30</sup>.* It is obvious that Radić's proposal put too much power in the hands of western parts of the state, especially if we have in mind that Radić proposed to give 2 members for both Dalmatia and Istria,

provinces that were basically going to fall under the governance and political influence of Croatia. His antagonistic stance against Kingdom of SHS was seen by future Croatian generations as prophetic perspective.

Among the generals in the army from the „*total number of 165, there were 161 ethnic Serbs and just two Croats*<sup>31</sup>. And although Serbians formed just a relative majority in the ethnic structure of the population they gave every prime minister except the Slovenian Anton Korošec.

Croatians are, in Radić's perspective, against monarchism and the idea of Great Serbia which is immanent to the idea of Yugoslavism.

*The Serbs are for centralism. They want to restore the great state of Tzar Dushan. They are trying to revive the myth of the battle on Kososvo field. We are against that and will not serve to anyone, not to the stranger and neither to the brother. The state must be formed on republicanism and staunch social sentiment as we can see in United States of America and in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*<sup>32</sup>.

Radić thought that in the actual political context Yugoslavism was just a disguise for the ideology of Serbian hegemony. While Radić was a proponent of political Croatian nationalism, the latter propagated supraethnic racial Yugoslav nationalism.

The introduction of racial justification of the introduction of Yugoslavism was a big point of legitimation of the regime and justification of the existing territorial context. Ethnic groups that were comprising new state had diverse religious identities, historical experiences and tradition. The only way to transcend and overcome these differences was to pursue a strong agenda of creating the new Yugoslav identity which would be justified and not



solely explained on the common interest of these diverse ethnic groups to live in the more powerful state.

After the establishment of Kingdom SHS, HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) became a cornerstone of the whole social life in Croatia with its strivings to educate peasants and bring them to higher cultural level in order to make it most important political strenght. In opposition to regime ideologists, Radić did not held elitist views and did not see the need to bring closer peasants and upper strata of population by inventing common points of identity. Radić was in many ways revolutionaire and his political legacy basically consists on fighting against political establishments. In the interwar period Vienniese court was replaced by the one in Belgrade. Deep resentment for the rich people in comparison with other important political figures and movements can probably be rivaled only by communists. That was the most important reason why HSS was slightly less popular in big urban centres, especially in the first part of the interwar period when social issues were more important than the national question. Another major breach came when Stjepan Radić went to USSR in 1924 and then signed the admission to the organization of the agrarian parties called Peasant's International. HSS was banned by the authorities after this Radić's trip to USSR. So basically a party that had support from a vast majority of the Croatian population was outlawed and Radić himself was imprisoned. The readiness of the authorities to do such an act gave rise to the tremendous growth of suspicion to the monarchical regime.

Tremendous popularity of HSS can be explained by the abilities of their leaders (especially by Vladko Maček in the later phase and

Stjepan Radić to a lesser extent) to relate their social policies with national issues. HSS organized societies throughout Croatia which were very popular and widespread. Activity in these societies was important part of life of a peasant. HSS was a party of Croatian national movement and were for most of the time a staunch opposition to the monarchical regime in Belgrade. The majority of politicians in these areas advocated for the bigger self – government of different regions of the Kingdom.

Radić was the main and most important proponent of the idea of federalism in the Kingdom of SHS. Although ethnic parties did not win on the general level they were very powerful in their own regions. One of the reasons for the big growth of popularity of ethnic parties was the ban on Communist Party, and the dissatisfaction with the social problems and the regime in general turned the communist voters into supporters of the ethnic parties. Already in the first elections which took place in November of 1920 the country was almost split in two in terms of structure and ambitions of parties which were dominant in the specific parts of Kingdom of SHS. In the 419 – member parliament HSS won 50 seats in the first elections in 1920. In the elections of 1923 HSS reached a huge support from the Croatian electorate. They took 70 seats in the parliament and positioned themselves as the most relevant party of the opposition.

Although Radić was a leader of the Croatian national movement he nourished the belief that his political activity would be attractive to the peasants in others parts of the country although he did not achieve that goal in terms of electoral support but rather tried to portray and position himself as a national leader.

*We dont want to perserve the actual situation that among Croatians there are two kinds of people. Now there are the Masters who educate themselves, pick paychecks, and give orders and the plain populace. Plain populace is consisted mainly of peasantry which has to work, obey and pay taxes. Nor in public, nor in private life should there be any difference between these two groups. We want that we all became one people and therefore we need a voice which would pursue that goal<sup>33</sup>.*

In the moment of the appearance of the new state Radić had behind him more than two decades of the noted and intensive political activity. Radić got involved in the political struggle for the votes of the urban workers. To oppose the strenghtening of the communist influence on the workers HSS, on the Radić's initiative, founded Hrvatski Radnički Savez (Croatian Workers Alliance) in 1921. Radić was a staunch rival to the communist ideology becuase he was for the perservance of the private property and also propagated the importance of religion in the public life. That is one of the biggest reason why he was put aside as a historical figure during communist era in terms of collective memory. Communists could not go openly with the critique of Stjepan Radić because of his huge popularity in the first quarter of twentieth century among Croatians. Main critique of the actions and programme of the agrarian party came across as a critique of his succesor at the post of the party leader, Vladko Maček.

In 1928, a couple of representatives of HSS were killed in the parliament by Puniša Račić, a Montenegrin representative of the ruling Radical Party. Among the killed representatives was a leader of HSS, Stjepan Radić. The funeral of the unofficial Croatian leader was an anti – regime

protest and a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the existing political circumstances. In the words of Garde *that murder creates a shock among the Croats. The leader who had enjoyed trust of the people and has acted just with peaceful and democratic methods was removed with a criminal act. In their eyes the monarchy of Karađorđević's is now just a dungeon of ethnic groups. Radić is still celebrated among the Croats as a martyr*<sup>34</sup>.

In opposition to other politicians of the time who came from rural areas the Radić was a proponent of ideology that favored disadvantaged which mostly included peasantry. Radić felt a big rapture between city and the village which would only be deepened during time and which could be overcome only by putting the peasantry as the leaders of the country. His social ideas lost importance when they collided with the delicate national question in the interwar Yugoslavia. Both sides of the political spectrum want to appropriate the legacy of Radić to its own political gains. Political left saw Radić as a very important proponent of universal franchise that propagated social reforms. Political right in Croatia sees Radić as an exemplary figure in the battle against Serbian hegemony which was led by the Karađorđević dynasty. HSS is even today especially strong in rural areas. Although their goal is to cover the whole Croatia and seek support in every region of the country, agrarian party today is mainly supported in Northern Croatia (to be more specific, Slavonija).

Radić was undoubtedly for the formation of the Kingdom of SHS, but not at every cost. He seeks the full equality of the diverse ethnic groups in new state. He thinks that there is a real danger that the new kingdom will be turned into the formation which would be dominated by the

Serbs. His goals were to destroy socialism with the agrarian programme, Serbian chauvinism with progressive Slavism and defeat clericalism with live faith.

The parties of the western ethnic groups of the South Slavs strived towards the unification of South Slavs but the power of decision – making in the interwar period was reduced to a small circle of politicians which were loyal to Karađorđević dynasty, and therefore they betrayed the interest of the people. Dragović – Soso states that the interwar regime was depicted as a *monarcho – fascist dictatorship and subject to Great Serbian hegemony (supported by other non – Serbian bourgeoisies<sup>35</sup>)*. Was that a necessary acknowledgment of the sufferings of Serbs during the war and their liberation of the western South Slavic parts? If that is the case that we should accept some positive sides of the rulers of Serbia before 1918. Of course, this was unacceptable for the communist ideologues whose major concept was dichotomy between exploiter (Karađorđević's dynasty) and exploited (majority of the populace). With this recognition they would give the ruling dynasty an added legitimacy and that was unacceptable especially if we have in mind that Communist Party was banned in the Kingdom of SHS during almost the whole interwar period. Tito tried to please the Croats and Slovenes who were distrustful of the Belgrade regime by founding the Communist Party of Croatia and Communist Party of Slovenia in 1937.

When Serbia united with western South Slavs in the Kingdom of SHS, a different framework was set after 1918 with Jovan Cvijić as a main proponent of the idea of Yugoslavism. Jovan Cvijić was born in year 1865 in Loznica, small town in eastern Serbia. His father was a merchant from the

eastern parts of Herzegovina that was populated by Serbs. His mother was from the wealthy family of carpenters from Serbia. This ancestry from the two different states and cultures provided Cvijić an impetus of forming identity which would bring closer South Slavs from both Austro – Hungary and Ottoman Empire. Cvijić often emphasized that in his works: *Dynaric type of man is deeply connected with his ancestors and also feels that way*<sup>36</sup>

He was a famous Serbian social scientist, a founder of Serbian Geographic society, president of Serbian Royal Academy (now Serbian Academy of science and arts), professor and dean of Belgrade University, honorary PHD of Sorbonne and Charles University in Prague with broad interests. His fields of interest included social and physical geography, geomorphology, ethnography, geology, antropology and history and he is actually considered a founder of Serbian geography. Cvijić was educated at College of Physical Geography in Vienna. Vienna was at that time one of the major academic centers in the Europe in the field of geography. He defended his PHD there with the thesis titled *Das Karstfenomen*. This thesis made him famous in broad circles because it was a pioneering work in the field of Karstology.

Over 30 years he traveled throughout the Balkan penninsula which resulted in many works and the foundation of antropogeographic school. He traveled in relatively perilous societal and political circumstances, especially in the countries which were under the control of Austro – Hungarian Monarchy and Ottoman Empire.

Thanks to his research he also made a innovative step because he was the first to present the theory of Balcanic psychological types

which he elaborated in his work *Balkan Peninsula* which was published in 1918. He passionately dedicated his whole life to intellectual work and continued his research travelling to Carpath mountains and Anatolia. But most of the times he travelled through the Balkan Peninsula travelling very often to Slovenia and Croatia, the least which was even more frequent when those South Slavic countries became unified in 1918.

Cvijić believed that a Yugoslav nation could and would be created as an amalgamation of South Slavic ethnic groups which had great similarities while most of the Serbs and Croats belonged to a Dinaric type. The official political terminology of the interwar monarchical regime was that the Yugoslavs were one population formed by three tribes.

Cvijić tried to put forward an idea of synthetic Yugoslav culture. He gave to each South Slavic ethnic group its positive characteristics. The behaviour of Serbs was marked by limitless idealism and an ethic of self – sacrifice which can be shown in the cases of heroic figures like Saint Sava, Car Lazar and Miloš Obilić. In Cvijić's view Serbs would contribute with their observational gift as well as their capacity for fantasy and intuition. Some negative sides of the Serbs could be eliminated by merger with the western South Slavic parts. Croats have a particular talent for cultural and scientific work and more discipline than Serbs. Slovenes will bring in their capacity for hard work and their rationalism into the South Slavic mix.

Cvijić's racial Yugoslavism was further continued in the works of many social scientists and public figures. The most noted author on the topic of racial Yugoslavism in the second half of the interwar period was

Vladimir Dvorniković, the author of *The Characterology of Yugoslavism* which was published in 1939. But while Cvijić respects the differences of non Yugoslav ethnic groups Dvorniković claims the superiority of South Slavic epic man. So, while Cvijić was trying just to elaborate specific Yugoslav identity Dvorniković offered an ideology of Yugoslav superiority. It is an undisputable fact that Cvijić lived and worked in the era of both Serbian and Yugoslavian national renaissance when the process of nation building was at a peak and the territorial expansions was effectively pursued. He stresses the importance of the development of a strong national feeling that must not be confused with chauvinism, but must give birth to the most elevated civic and national values – liberty, social justice and religious tolerance.

Political left praised Cvijić for strengthening the ideology of Yugoslavism which was based on racial theory but without the chauvinistic sentiment. In 1947 Serbian academy of science and arts founded a geographical institute named by Jovan Cvijić and his name is still in use today which means that he was highly regarded by the both Yugoslav communist regime as well as by post communist Serbian society. He was one of the rare famous people from the interwar period who was plausible to be inserted in the collective memory by the communist regime. He was thinking that it was important to employ scientific argumentation and findings in order to achieve national goals. Cvijić was closer to the Yugoslav orientation and did not completely agree with the proponents of Serbian nationalism like a leader of Radical Party and most influential Serbian politician in the first quarter of twentieth century Nikola Pašić (1845 – 1926). Pašić was a leader of the



Radical Party in Serbia. In the interwar Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes Pašić's Radical Party was the most successful. He started his political career as an adherent of socialist ideology of Svetozar Marković (1846 – 1875) and his movement against Obrenović's monarchical rule. He founded the Radical Party in 1881 and shifted from the socialist ideology. In the period of Kingdom of Serbia Pašić relied on the Czarist Russia and after the unification on France. He was pursuing politically a theory that the Serbian experience of independence should give them the leading post in the new state of South Slavs.

### 3. NATIONAL QUESTION AND SOCIALISM IN BOTH YUGOSLAVIA'S

The formation of the idea of socialism in the case of Croatia started roughly in the beginning of the last third of nineteenth century. Socialism was propagated by the limited number of thinkers which were influenced by the ideas that were coming from more prosperous states in Western Europe. In most cases these thinkers from the Balkans were educated in big intellectual centers abroad, or were in the close connection and having intensive communication with the members of socialdemocratic parties abroad. That was especially the case with the strongest and most influential socialdemocratic party at a time, German SPD. This party served as a strong example for the Balkan intellectuals in the terms of political agitation and ideologies.

Croatian intellectuals became very influenced by the works of Svetozar Marković (1846 – 1875) who was a founder of the ideology of socialism in the Serbia. So, Marković is considered to be a founder and main proponent of the idea of socialism in those first, formative years not just in the terms on influence he had in Serbs but rather on the whole South Slavic area. Socialist ideology was also gaining strenght in the South Slavic parts of the Austro – Hungarian Monarchy. Croatian Social Democratic party was founded in 1894, in Slovenia in 1896 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1903 and they had a strong contact with social democrats in Vienna and Budapest. Although they did not initially have such a popularity as in Serbia the bigger economical and technological development meant that the methods of propagating would

be more effective. After finishing high school in Belgrade he went abroad to study in Petrograd (today St. Petersburg) and Zurich. In 1871 he goes back to Serbia and in the same year establishes first socialist newspapers in Serbia called *Radenik* (Worker). Because of the critiques of the regime in the newspaper articles he was imprisoned in 1874. In which he idealized the old Balkan family structure called Zadruga, which was similar to Mir in Russia. After his death the circle around him began to soften a socialist element within his work and have put more stress on the elements of ethnic struggle rather than social agenda.

After the elimination of Marković's idea in his initial circle, socialists sought to voice their ideas in new mode. They founded Social Democratic Party in 1903 and Dimitrije Tucović (1881 – 1914) was the leader of that current. He had achieved a doctorate on law in Berlin and he got acquainted with a lot of politicians from German SPD. When he got back became a very influential figure in the party but the party on the state level was not important at all. That initial Social Democratic Party served as a referential point of Tito's regime in the field of ideology. The left factions of the party was renamed in the Communist Party just after the end of the First World War. In the interwar period the Communist Party were a strong opposition to the regime with considerable strength. Terrorist acts by communists were justification for the the regime to ban this political movement and weaken it.

Economic and demographic losses of the war as well as a new, bigger national formation were very much suitable for the extreme – left agenda. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was founded in 1919 and had great success in the election in the following year. This new party basically

unified a large proportion of members of the pre – war social democratic parties. Of course, there were some defections. A considerable number of members of pre – war parties became politically passive or joined the other parties but still a great amount of members of pre – war parties joined the newly founded Communist Party. As in other cases their major electoral base were the workers in big industrial centers and intellectuals. Basic issue regarding the popularity of the Communist parties was their readiness to accept the national discourse and their skill on voicing it. This is especially important in the wake of crisis. In the crisis populace tends to move to more extreme sides of the political spectrum and in that context communist parties were more appealing and powerful because they have put an accent on the national agenda with which they attracted the broader portion of population who would normally be repelled by their eclectic discourse.

The cooperation between HSS and communists became possible in the extreme circumstances of Second World War and even in this situation the collaboration was limited to some CPP members because the leader of the party Vladko Maček went into political passivity. In the letter to his wife Marija, Stjepan Radić, the previous leader of the CPP stated that the *communists want to give their unequivocal support for the Kingdom of SHS*<sup>37</sup>. After the agreement between CPP and the regime the communists went to further criticize the situation. In the words of Dedijer the agreement *gave more rights to Croatian bourgeoisie, while terror in Croatia put upon the working class and masses grew*<sup>38</sup>.

In the first elections which took place in November of 1920, the CPY won 58 seats in the 419 – member parliament and they were the third

party in the terms of numbers of representatives in the parliament. In the interwar period the Communist Party or its members were not considered to be a part of the large anti – regime opposition bloc, mainly because of the rivalry between the representatives of the CPP and CPY. Their considerable force worried the regime and the Communist Party was banned just after those elections by regime which issued the *Obznana* directive. They were, after all *the only party besides the winning Democratic Party that had representatives from all the states of Yugoslavia*<sup>39</sup>. The regime justified that by stating that communist ideology was incompatible with the regime itself. In the words of Banac *no group seethed in greater agitation against the post – 1918 Yugoslav system than the Communists*<sup>40</sup>. It happened in the midst of the series of assassinations or assassination attempts on the official figures, mainly by the communists. After the *Obznana* a communist party member killed a minister of interior Milorad Drašković. An assassination attempt was also made on a king Aleksandar. These terrorist acts by communists were justification for the regime to ban the party.

Communists were antimonarchists and they took more care of applying the policies of other communist parties than they were ready to observe the situation from within the national framework. Therefore, they were qualified as traitors and rebels. Most of the leading members of the Communist party were imprisoned, the whole organisation destroyed and the party became illegal. That was a big setback for a movement. Communist Party after Second World War built a whole mythology around the party members that were killed or tortured in the interwar period. The biggest point of reference was the death of the seven members of the Communist Party

Youth (*Sedam Sekretara SKOJ-a*) which were killed by the police in the interwar period. Auty says that *the disheartening syndrome of violent demonstrations followed by arrests and imprisonment, had by 1928 destroyed the party leadership and reduced its membership to a mere handful*<sup>41</sup>. The party would probaly have never recovered totally by itself becuae throught the whole interwar period their illegal activity was rather unimportant and hardly influenced anyone.

Communist Party expressed a dissatisfaction with the regime even on the basis of not solving the ethnic question. In the words of Vlačić *CPY's official stance was state centralism and national unitarism until 1924*<sup>42</sup>. In the National Conference of 1924 CPY stated that *the unification of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene people in the common state goes with the line of the historical progress and interest of the class struggle of proletariat. But if that unification is to fulfill its mission, the common state must be based upon the voluntary alliances and full equality of its parts, which was not the case so far*<sup>43</sup>.

This was a great *proof* for Croatian historians post festum that the true nature of regime and its perspective on ethnic question was so obvious that even the supranationalists in the Communist Party recognized the existing enforced policies of Serbian hegemony. In the 1937, when Josip Broz Tito became General Secretary of the Party, it was reorganized. Separate sections of the parties were established in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the crucial push for the emergence of the party was Second World War when the antifascist forces around the Communist Party was the major force of resistance, especially in the western parts of Yugoslavia. The

fear from fascism helped the CPY *to build up their membership from a few hundreds in 1935 to 1 500 in 1937, 3 000 in 1939, and 12 000 in the spring of 1941*<sup>44</sup>.

Besides the fact that the marxist historians tried to depict the independence of the CPY and difference from the other political forces in Yugoslavia, after Second World War there was an attempt to define the uniqueness of the CPY among the groups of the communist parties. The reason for this attempt is the fact that Yugoslavia had political rapture with USSR in 1948 and the official historians had to stress the importance of the existence of independent paths of communist parties in different countries.

### **3.1 MAJOR ISSUES BETWEEN SERBS AND CROATS DURING COMMUNISM**

There are several major breaches in terms on perceptions between Serbian and Croatian historians. Three major issues need a special stress to understand the breach between Serbs and Croats. These are: Jasenovac, Alojzije Stepinac and Andrija Hebrang.

First on the list is Jasenovac, a city in northern Croatia. Near the city a large concentration camp was established in the August of 1941. On the territory of the NDH there were initially 26 camps but most of them were dissolved and the inmates were send in Jasenovac. Most of the imprisoned were Serbs, Jews or political opponents of the regime, Serbs being

the by far the largest group. The main debate between the Serbian and Croatian historians is the number of death in that concentration camp. Jasenovac is still a major issue considering the disagreements of Croatian and Serbian historians. Serbian politicians during the war against Croatia were often stating alleged genocidal nature of Croats and their deep hatred towards Serbs by stressing the example of Jasenovac. The camp served its purpose in the Serbian politics as a focal point of homogenization and martirology. Some Croatian historians even during the times of communism published researches that had smaller number of death in Jasenovac. This is the case with Franjo Tuđman (1922 – 1999), very important historical figure in the Yugoslav context. He was a head of a very important institution, an Institute of the History of the Workers Movement. In 1990 a right – wing, nationalist party HDZ under Tuđman's leadership won elections. Tuđman was a first president of Croatia until his death. Reason why he was expelled from the Party was infact his attempt to curtail the proportion of the crime in Jasenovac. Tuđman argues that the number of dead was 30 000. In 1990 a right – wing, nationalist party HDZ under Tuđman's leadership won elections. Tuđman was a first president of Croatia until his death. Under the rule of HDZ state formed a Research Commission of Victims of War which estimated that the number of victims in Jasenovac is 238. Serbian politicians during the war against Croatia were often stating alleged genocidal nature of Croats and their deep hatred towards Serbs by stressing the example of Jasenovac. The camp served its purpose in the Serbian politics as a focal point of homogenization and martirology.



Another controversial topic is the political activity of Andrija Hebrang (1899 – 1949). Hebrang was one of the major Croatian politicians in the communist party and the Secretary of Industry in the short post – war period. He was imprisoned during the political rapture between Tito and Stalin in 1948 and died in the cell a year after the imprisonment. Official records state that he committed suicide but the general agreement among historians is that he was killed.

The main controversy here is the political positioning of Hebrang. Nobody denies that he was a victim of Tito's regime but the debate is whether he was a stalinist or a communist with considerable Croatian national sentiment. That debate somehow surpasses the national historiographies because that dichotomy is inherent even from within one national historiography. Some circles of historians in Croatia consider him a nationalist. Political elites in 1990s in Croatia were introducing the view that Hebrang was a great fighter for Croatian national interests. Their interpretation is that if his goal was not to achieve the independent Croatia certainly he strived towards the better position of Croats through greater autonomy in second Yugoslavia.

Another point of rapture between Croatian and Serbian historiography is the role of Alojzije Stepinac and the Roman – Catholic church in general during Second World War. *Tito has stated that the catholic priests had played reactionary role during war times. Their actions were in opposition to the behaviour which they were supposed to propose* <sup>45</sup>. Influence of the Roman Catholic church in Croatia was silenced. *The relations between Roman catholic church and communist government in Croatia after 1945 was*

*not in the center of interest among the historians in Croatia. That topic was in a way a taboo and the publications reflected negative views about Roman Catholic church* <sup>46</sup>. As in the other communist state Yugoslavian regime had also staunch and harsh stance towards religious institutions. *Religion was completely expelled from educational system. Catholic press was suppressed*<sup>47</sup>. Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac (1898 – 1960) was an Archbishop of Zagreb, capital of Croatia, in these times and therefore an unofficial head of Roman – Catholic church in the state in which about 9/10 of the population adhered to that religion and that was crucial because *religious identities were the most important segment of life in the period of both Yugoslavias*<sup>48</sup>

Communists initiated court proceedings with the intentions of eliminating him and discrediting the Church in Croatia in the eyes of the world by accusing it of collaborating with the Nazis. The charge against him could be summarised as follows: collaboration with the Germans; contacts with the Pavelic government; introduction of chaplains in the Croatian army; forced conversion of the Orthodox and resistance to the Communist authorities.

Of course, as in the other communist countries harsh stance against priests was introduced. *The arrests, imprisonments and executions of priests were very often the methods of the communist government*<sup>49</sup>. Stepinac himself was imprisoned in 1946 and put under the house arrest but he still was nominally the head of the church. Notwithstanding that Stepinac died peacefully at home, he quickly became a martyr in the view of his supporters and many other Catholics. There is no evidence that he was killed, but they argue that the declining health of his last years was in some way a consequence of his imprisonment.

. Pope John Paul II beatified him in 1998 and that decision raised controversies. Some saw his promotion to within one step of sainthood as a gratuitous provocation, one result of which is that to his most severe critics he has become known as the patron saint of genocide. The beatification re-ignited old controversies between Catholicism and Communism and between Serbs and Croats.

Marxist historiography of course adhered to the anticlerical views and from that perspective held Stepinac accountable of being a major persona in a reactionary organisation. Stepinac was criticised for his alleged cooperation with the Pavelić regime, ideological preparation of the genocide towards Serbs and Jews and also forced baptism of the Serbs (in terms of religion mainly Orthodox population) and ethnic Jews (mainly of Jewish religion).

Serbian historians after Tito's death have put a lot of accent on Stepinac's stance toward Serbs. They have quoted some of his negative statements on the Serb – dominated first Yugoslavia. His negative attitudes towards the Serbs were often interpreted as a sign of a conspiracy from Vatican which in their perspective often held an anti – orthodox policies. In Croatia the alleged poisoning of Stepinac brought about almost a cult of Stepinac worshipping.

#### 4. PREVALENCE OF ETHNIC KEY

There was a constant need of the communist regime to subjugate racial ethnical nationalism to the cultural supraethnic nationalism. Partisan movement, led by Tito, was presented as a morally infallible force which was fighting for the liberation of people of Yugoslavia from antisemitical and genocidal regimes. Dogmatism was heavily emphasized in the postsocialist times. Historian Mladen Ivezić said that *Croatian communists, malicious Jews and Serbs, as well as the other dark forces, did not want objective analysis of foundations of Ustashi movement*<sup>50</sup> and also stated that *Ustaša ideology was by its tenets in opposition to fascism*<sup>51</sup>. So, historians tried to form a justification for the parties which were not close to communist movement. All the parties that operated in the interwar period, in which the communist party was banned, were discredited as national traitors and their treachery consisted in helping the second world war regimes or conforming with them. The parties and politicians which were not strictly supporting regimes but were conforming were accused as reactionary enemies who tried to more or less restore the pre – war order. All the parties that operated in the interwar period, in which the communist party was banned, were discredited as national traitors and their treachery consisted in helping the second world war regimes or conforming with them. The parties and politicians which were not strictly supporting regimes but were conforming were accused as reactionary enemies who tried to more or less restore the pre – war order. Politically controlled historiography described the pre – war regime as a monarcho – fascist dictatorship and the power of decision –

making was reduced to a small circle of politicians which were loyal to Karađorđević dynasty, and therefore they betrayed the interest of the people. Serbian pre – war politicians were also accused of conforming with the system of the first Yugoslavia which was Serb – controled.

The question of relation between Croatian and Serbian historiography is always actual question because work of every historian is marked by the societal context. The texts of those historians were very much versed into ideology and state control. During the nineties years of the twentieth century members of Croatian or Serbian historiographical milieu were trying to curtail the truth and adapt the ideology of nationalism within the methods of history. Works of the most extreme publicists clearly show the tendency of highly educated and well informed men to foist the theory that Serbs or Croatians are genocidal people and that the deep animosity cannot be surpassed.

A specific feature in Yugoslavian historiography is that the line between historians and publicists is very vague and unclear. Many people from outside the profession of history are dealing with the historical subjects because they have a political agenda or a personal story which they sense they need to make public. So, the major difference between historiographies in Serbia and Croatia from the other Central and Eastern European historiographies is that historiography is strongly immersed in political context even after the fall of communism. Croatia and Serbia are highly political societies and are still burdened with the events that had happened more than a half century ago.

After the death of Josip Broz Tito and during the worsening of situation in Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) the rise of nationalism occurred. The shift in political terms also meant the change in the assessment of both interwar and second Yugoslavia in the works of publicists and historians. Both historiographies reflected with great precision the political circumstances.

Even in the 1980s marxist thought was slowly replaced by the ethnic doctrines which after the beginning of the war in early 1990s became dominant. The consensus of the Serbian intellectual elite on the topic what should be a new direction in the intellectual thought was best shown in the Memorandum of SANU (Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti – Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts) in 1986. Dragović – Soso claimed that the *document has become probably the most – cited text of contemporary Serbian nationalism, both in Yugoslavia and abroad; it has been widely regarded as a blueprint for war*<sup>52</sup>. She claims that *for the first time since 1971 it directly raised the question of the Serbs of Croatia, this time more forcefully and radically, by portraying them as victims*<sup>53</sup>. The intellectual atmosphere in SFRY reflected the one that already existed in the circles of Serbian and Croatian population that lived abroad after their flight in the years during and around the Second World War. Most of these publicists in the emigres circles recycled old ethnic tensions and adapted a staunch critique of the communist regime to their ethnic key.

Although Serbia and Croatia have a long tradition of historical examination modern historical trends have yet to be introduced. Nuanced views on the interwar past, or any major topic from the recent

history, were almost non – existant. The pursue of the intellectual honesty and fairness became almost a sort of national treachery. Serbs and Croats openly began to praise the politicians of their ethnic group and especially those who showed a greater resentment towards consensus between the two ethnic groups. Stjepan Radić's opposition of the initial agreement with Serbs before the unification were seen as a prophetic words of a visionary from the Croatian point of view.

Because of the diversity of the sources from which the major historiographical work could appear (newspapers, reviews, literary publications) it is not so easy to detect the changes of the trend. In the year 2000 the regimes of Tuđman's HDZ and Milošević's SPS were ousted. The political change brought with it a major liberation of historiographies from the shakles of political circumstances. For the first time in history, in the new millenium the political circumstances can give a lot of space for the development of modern historiographies. The fall of authoritarian regimes meant a great step forward towards the actual democracies but also a legitimization of different opinions on the interwar period within the same country.

In Croatia the circle of young historians around Ivo Goldstein on the History Department of Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb began with reconsiderations about the sanctity of the Croatian political leaders in the interwar period. The likes of Tvrtko Jakovina and Hrvoje Klasić are disputing the manicheistic take on the biggest taboos of the recent Yugoslavian history. In the 1990s he was the sole major historian who tried to contest these historical interpretations. Drago Roksandić is a major historian on that

university who also tries to contest nationalist dogma and give a scrupulous perspective on the relations between Serbs and Croats by researching the early Modern age. At the time undisputed national leader and political figure Stjepan Radić was even accused of anti – semitism by Goldstein in his work *Holocaust in Zagreb*. He was pointing finger on Radić's political pamphlet called *Work without Jews*. The image of infallibility of great national leader was tarnished. As a move against this intellectual opposition Tuđman's regime even founded the Faculty of Croatian Studies with the aim to give the intellectual support for the national ideology.

Regarding the new Serbian historiography Maja Miljković claims that *one of the biggest blunders is the one of possibility of survival of ethnically homogenous state and realization of ethnic question by the ethnic state unification, obsession of territories and borders*<sup>54</sup>. Historians in Serbia were also involved in an ideology of nation – building and were mostly transmitting the historical background which would justify the immense ambitions of territorial expansion for regime. The breaches between the official historiographies of the two ethnic groups are too big at the time to create a sort of common perspective on the period of cohabitation which would transcend the mere factography. A great majority of historians showed their national bias in their opus and also selected historical documents for their own purposes.

As in the case of Croatia, Serbian historians who tried to resist the nationalist interpretations were the pillars of the opposition to the regimes. The likes of Ivo Goldstein or Latinka Perović were seen as a cornerstones of a movement for building civil societies in these countries. The beginning of the



Serbian historiography which was free from dogmas of ethnic mythologies was located around the circles of Andrej Mitrović, Ljubinka Trgovčević and Perović. In the words of Miljković *behind the figures of Mitrović and Trgovčević some sort of historiographical school was formed and the members of the school are noted for their acceptance and usage of diverse theoretical models and perspectives*<sup>55</sup>.

Serbian and Croatian historiographies in the period of 1990s were based on parochialisms and the call for expansions to the other territories. Bosnia and Herzegovina was a crucial battleground for exerting these ideas whether through political agitation or by weapon. A large portion of both historiographies negated the independent identity of the Bosniak Muslims and described them as a part of Serbian or Croatian populace that were converted to Islam. A lot of books were published with the attempt of justifying this policy. This rhetoric was also prevalent in the interwar period among major politicians and historians who tried to correlate the ethnogenesis of Bosniaks with their respective ethnic group.

With the attack on the respective identities also came the attacks on the distinctive parts of the identity of these ethnicities. Serbian Orthodoxy and Croatian Roman Catholicism were frequent points of dispute and critique. Croatian historians tried to portray Croatia as a borderline of Christianity (*Antemurale Christianitatis*) against the Islamic invasion and false Eastern version of Christianity. Radić's blatant anticlericalism was toned down.

The assessment of the communist period was succumbed to the general perspective on the modern history. This period in the 1990s was seen, in both historiographies, as a continuation of animosities between Serbs and

Croats. The political change somewhat loosened the request on historians to falsify history and propagate xenophobia but still some old stereotypes are present in discourses of both historiographies.

#### 4.1. NATIONAL IDENTITY IN CROATIA IN THE 1990S

Croatian president Franjo Tuđman was an autocratic and authoritarian president who was a subject of the elaborate adoration which almost went ahead to become a cult of personality: *Mr Tuđman is a real gentleman, and it is visible from his every gesture. He is always calm and polite... Besides that, president is an extremely beautiful man. He is tall, handsome and has beautiful gray hair*<sup>56</sup>. Tuđman had a lot of similarities with Milošević in terms of his political behaviour and ideology. *All close cooperates of president Tuđman knew that he was fascinated with Slobodan Milošević, with his harsh and rigid stance towards international community, as well as Serbian unity in the most important questions*<sup>57</sup>. He was supported by the voters who wanted strong and rigid figure at the post of the president. *Parties of the right – wing have a support of the electorate which wants authoritarian figures*<sup>58</sup>. Political left was puzzled by the popularity and also the austerity of both Milošević and Tuđman. *They even tried to reason the rapture by personal tragedies of both Milošević and Tuđman*<sup>59</sup>. Tuđman was a founder of the state and the ideology of the new state viewed the fight against the Serbs as just and necessary. One of the most important politicians of HDZ Vlatko Pavletić

who was briefly president of Croatia after Tuđman died stated the following: *Besides aggressive nationalism there exists our, defensive nationalism*<sup>60</sup>. The official state ideology functioned in the paradigms of autoisolation and antimodernism. This is an example of rethoric of Joško Čelan, the noted journalist in 1990s who was close to the regime: *Rock music is more grave danger than even Chetniks*<sup>61</sup>. Also all the traces of communism and even cultural achievements during that time were denigrated. This is the statement from Ljilja Vokić, Secretary of Education: *Krleža depicted all the Croatian soldiers as morons*<sup>62</sup>. Ivan Šarić said the following about famous poet Tin Ujević: *We teach children that Tin Ujević was a boheme. Actually, he was not a boheme but a bump*<sup>63</sup>.

The lack of high military technology brought out again the descriptions of slaughters in the collective memory of Serbs, Croats and Bosniak Muslims. Waging of this type of war furtherened the process of war mongering among all sides involved in the conflict. *Unlike other recent wars, the fighting in Yugoslavia was not dominated by high technology and detachment from the enemy. Instead, people killed those they knew, neighbour versus neighbour, and often with short – range weapons*<sup>64</sup>

In the period of the 1980s it became more and more obvious that the Yugoslavians are actually Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Bosniak Muslims... and a large segment of the population identified no more with a national identity but rather with an ethnic identity or a very important religious identity: *On existing catholic and orthodox religious cultures national cultures emerged*<sup>65</sup>. His party tried to play on both cards of Serbian (not Yugoslav) nationalism and socialist tradition: *Milošević succeeded in tricking both the*

*communists and the nationalists: the communists believed he was only pretending to be a nationalist and the nationalists that he was only pretending to be a communist*<sup>66</sup>. This newly awakened nationalism was obvious in his aggressive stances which were aimed against other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. *Milošević said at the conference : We in Serbia do not have complexes any more that we are the most populous ethnic group in Yugoslavis. Therefore, we need to more to hide in the foxhole and to avoid voicing our interest in fear of disturbing smaller ethnic groups*<sup>67</sup>. The shift that occurred in the context of war was also a determining factor for change in ethnic structure of the society. The number of other Yugoslav ethnic group in the country was virtually decimated because of the national conflict especially in rural areas and the regions which were beset by war. On the other hand capital cities of the republics of former Yugoslavia were becoming important centers for manual labor from former Soviet republics, especially Ukraine.

Croatian nationalist tried to depict the political situation in Yugoslavia as one of the dominance of the other republics by the Serbs via positions in the state hierarchy and especially military:*From the personnel of JNA (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija – Yugoslavian People's Army) in 1991 out of 78 600 officers 49 124 or 62.5% were Serbs and 8 178 or 10.4% were Croats. Among 12 038 higher officers (ranks higher than major) 63% were Serbs and 10.5% were Croats*<sup>68</sup>. Serbs also had the agenda of territorial expansion on the other republics like the Croats did with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lots of Serbs lived outside the boundaries of Republic of Serbia. *The fact that the frontiers of the Serbian state did not coincide with the boundaries of the serbian nation lent a galvanic quality to the very notion of*

*Serbian nationality*<sup>69</sup>. Serbs were openly claiming territories which they inhabited in Croatia. *If we ever get out from Croatian state, although I think that will not happen, we will take with us the territories where are ancestors lived hundreds of years. Besides, when you look from historical perspective these areas were never under the control of Croatia.*<sup>70</sup> Ideological background for the war was conveyed from the Serbian side, as in Croatian case, by the high officials from the respective churches. This is a statement of Lukijan who was at the time high Orthodox priest in Slavonic region: *We have to learn first the Old Testament and in it the Book of Moses which says the rule by which Montenegrins and Albanians live – eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, bruise for a bruise and young man for a young man. When we learn that than we will shift to New Testament*<sup>71</sup>. Explicit marks of extreme nationalism were openly conveyed by political elites. Milošević stated for a Croatian newspaper that *All the Serbs want to live in one state*<sup>72</sup>.

Besides high ranking church officials academia, publicists and intellectuals and their works were crucial of firing the spark of xenophobia and ardent nationalism *Serbian church and the most important intellectual institution of Serbian people SANU (Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti – Serbian Academy of Science and Arts) were the cornerstones of anticatholicism and chauvinism pointed out on Croatians*<sup>73</sup>. The attacks on the existing situation of the national question came in large part from the very elites and establishment that had big influence on politics and moreover on public opinion: *Cultural and intellectual elites had, if not most important than certainly very important role in both unifying and breaking of Yugoslavia*<sup>74</sup>. 1990s were marked by manifestations of obvious political opportunism.

Although SDP and HDZ were parties with opposite ideology and programme, still there were lots of defections to the HDZ from ranks of SDP: 70 000 members of the SDP (*Social Democratic Party*) went to the ranks of HDZ (*Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica*)<sup>75</sup> The peril of being in opposition continued in Croatia through 1990s.

#### **4.2. APPEARANCE OF STRONG REGIONAL IDENTITIES AS AN OPPOSITION TO THE CROATIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY**

Zagreb is the seat of the central government, administrative bodies and all government ministries. The transport connections, concentration of industry, scientific and research institutions and industrial tradition underlie its leading economic position in Croatia. After the fall of the system that was pursuing egalitarian policies were deepened breaches between different strata of society and village and city.

While during the existence of Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia it was the second centre of the country slightly lagging in economic and political importance to Belgrade, Zagreb became in late 1980s a centre of Croatian national building project. Big difference in economic development and importance between Zagreb and other urban centres brings the appearance of the fear of uneven development. Strong regional parties such as IDS (*Istarska Demokratska Stranka – Democratic Party of Istria*) and HDSSB (*Hrvatski Demokratski Savez Slavonije i Baranje – Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja*) have appeared as a result of the domination of Zagreb

as a capital of the state which does not have any major city to counterbalance the influence of Zagreb.

Post-socialist cities develop as imitations of western European cities. Non – Yugoslav post-socialist cities are adapting to the greater extent to the models of cities in western Europe while Yugoslav cities are not so strong in coping with that process. Blocked and limited transformation of the society is marked by the introduction of political pluralism which is going parallel with the centralization rather than decentralization of power like in the other post-socialist countries. The introduction of free – market economy was very limited especially if we have in mind relatively large influence of free market in socialist Yugoslavia in comparison to the other socialist countries.

Zagreb's traditional social life is characterized by individualism, pluralism, cosmopolitanism and tolerance which stands in contrast to the collectivism, traditionalism and provincialism of the newcomers to the city. Like in the cases of many post-socialist city Zagreb has negative demographic trend which is compensated by the immigrants that are coming mostly from rural parts of Croatia. Demographic crisis is indeed deepening during time span and that is a big problem for Zagreb and even more to the other areas of Croatia, especially rural parts. The crisis is deeper in the countryside because major urban centres in Croatia are getting regular influx of the population at the expense of the villages. The process of clustering of migrants and refugees in certain parts of the city and its suburbs (Kozari Bok, Bukovec, Novaki, Little Bosnia in Sesvete) is explained by the settlers' eagerness to maintain their cultural identity and connections with communities of similar origin. Most of the people who emigrate from Zagreb go abroad. Zagreb has

experienced a large emmigration during the times of war, especially at the beginning of the conflicts.

Roman Catholicism, the religion of the great majority of Croatian populaton, became even more important during war in all parts of Croatia as well as in Zagreb. The portion of Roman Catholics in the city is higher than ever. *The survey in 2001 showed that 87.09% of the citizens considered themselves Roman Catholics and that the biggest religious minority in the city are agnostics with 4.06%*<sup>76</sup>. War has strenghtened the process of uniformity also in the terms of religious identity. The religious practice was not forbidden during the time of communist rule, but also was not encouraged. Roman Catholic church was one of the most important focal points of identity and organisation that have forged the nation – building project in late 1980s. Authors from Serbia also viewed Roman Catholic church as an important impetus of development of Croatian nationalism. *Vatican is using their whole force to break Yugoslavia with clerical policies , indoctrinated priests and the most important segment of Croatian chauvinism – Ustash movement.*<sup>77</sup> The common perspective is that they are the bearers of newly established democracy and the demands for estates from the sides of the Church is huge. Since large majority of the population are Catholics state goverment nor municipal goverment can show much resistance to the claims of the Church. Church has now been focused on repossesing the properties which were nationalized during communist regime.

After the proclamation of Croatian independence in 1991 Zagreb became the capital city of newly established state. During the Croatian War of Independence, it was a scene of some sporadic fighting surrounding its



JNA (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija – Yugoslav People's Army) army barracks, but escaped major damage. There is a great animosity from politicians of different regions who criticize the obvious process of clustering all the political power in Zagreb and the process of rapid economic growth of Zagreb which is not followed by other parts of the country. In the recent Parliament Assembly there are two regional parties (IDS and HDSSB) and in the 1990s DA (Dalmatinska Akcija – Dalmatian Action) was very influential in the political life on the national level.

The political development of the city has to a large extent followed the trends on the state level. The cases of the other post-socialist countries show that moderate left had greater influence in the bigger urban centres than in the rest of the country. The similar process was happening in the ex – Yugoslav republics but the breach here was between nationalist parties which proposed autoisolation and reformist parties than tended to be more western oriented. In all capital cities of former Yugoslav republic western oriented parties had more influence than in the other parts of the country. In Croatian case HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – Croatian Democratic Union) was a right – wing authoritarian and isolationist party which went through the process of reform and shift to western orientation after the elections in 2003 when they regained the government. On the other side was SDP (Socijalnodemokratska Partija – Social Democratic Party), the party of former communist but which renounced communism at the brink of the war and was a part of the nation – building project. SDP had also close contact with many European parties even from different ideological background. War was a reason also for a lag of former Yugoslav countries in the terms of

acceptance by the major European organisations. Political partisanship was very important because of the emergence of crisis in 1995 in which winning parties did not manage to post their own mayor due to president

It was widely believed that the national euphoria following Operation Storm in the summer of 1995 and Croatian military successes in the last stages of still ongoing Bosnian War, together with massive propaganda from media that were loyal to the HDZ, would lead to Tudjman comfortably winning majority in new assembly. The Croatian legislation stipulated that the mayor of Zagreb had to be confirmed by the president. This was seen as a mere formality but Tudjman appointed mayor Marina Matulovic – Dropulic from the HDZ ranks.

During political crisis in November of 1996 the Croatian government denied Radio 101 which was owned by Zrinka Vrabec-Mojzeš radio concession renewal and gave the concession to EPH. EPH was a media company which was in a hands of noted Croatian tycoon. Radio 101, on the other side, was a popular radio station known for its sharp criticism of Tuđman (and one of the few media that was opposing Tuđman in the country at the time). The announcement of the shutting down of Radio 101 sparked protest of citizens of Zagreb and around 120,000 people gathered in the city's major square of Ban Josip Jelacic.

The spectacle of the nation's capital having two administrations not recognising each other and the country's leader refusing to acknowledge the will of the voters led many to believe that Croatia had experienced a dramatic drop in democratic standards during the war, and that this state of affairs won't be alleviated as long as Tudjman was in power.

The crisis lasted for the year and a half until the new elections in 1997 in which new political scandal appeared. Namely, HDZ won 24 from 50 seats and secured the majority of the seats in the municipal assembly by getting the loyalty of two representatives of opposition parties. Four months after the defeat at the elections for the state parliament in 2000, HDZ also lost the municipal elections for Zagreb which were won by Milan Bandic, controversial politician and populist from SDP, who is still the mayor of the city. His strong political background and influence both within the party ranks and in the public life gave him an enormous power in ruling the city. The position of the mayor in Zagreb is a special case of concentrated political power, combining the function of a politician, urban governor and entrepreneur.

Many cities in the 1990s have become more independent in administrative and political sense and therefore they are more influential on the decisions regarding development and immigration. The initial hardships which was the experience of all eastern European states during the process of transition was deeper in the cases of postsocialist countries of former Yugoslavia. Relatively mild socialist regime of Yugoslavia would probably be a factor of rather harmless transition from socialism to capitalism but diverse ethnic picture of the country and different identities of ethnic groups brought the country to the volatile demise.

## 5. CONCLUSION

Story of development of national identity in Croatia is marked by the intertwining of Croatian and South Slavic identities. Formation of Croatian identity became the part of modern nation – building currents in 1830s. Authors, political figures of Illyrism and their works were instrumental in that matter. Modern Croatian nationalism had its foundations in the language reform of Ljudevit Gaj. After the formation of Kingdom of SHS Croatian ethnic identity was formulated in the direct opposition to the supraethnic Yugoslav identity. Stjepan Radić's nonchauvinistic political nationalism had its antagonist in Jovan Cvijić's supraethnic Dinaric paradigm. Animosity between two major ethnic groups in Yugoslavia was formulated through the diverse position and ethnic inequalities in the first Yugoslavia and strengthened with the atrocities of the second world war. Totalitarian communist ideology reinvented Yugoslav national identity in order to suppress possible ethnic strifes. HSS, the biggest Croatian party was accused of the reactionary politics which favored small landowners. Vladko Maček, the leader of the HSS was described as a man who did not support the antifascist struggle. The party was dissolved and members dissolved into three camps: 1) supporters of the Pavelić, 2) supporters of Tito, 3) conformists. Communist historiography tried to force the depiction which stated that most of the HSS party members belonged to the first camp. The similar situation happened in Serbia with the Democratic Party of Milan Grol. Stance of the communists was criticized by eminent politicians who tried to portray themselves as successors of ideology of HSS. Former mayor of Zagreb and an important member of HDZ claimed that *if*

*Stjepan Radić was alive he would not be just a member of HDZ, but rather the most passionate member of the party*<sup>78</sup>.

National identity of second Yugoslavia had strong justification in political *sonderweg* and the fact that Tito seemingly maintained independence from both blocs in Cold war. Croatian Spring in 1971 was an event that marked the diverse paths in the development of national identity in Croatia. Major groups that appeared during Croatian spring can be divided on the moderates that belonged to the highest hierarchy of the communist party in Croatia, and on the radicals among which were comprised largely of the students of Zagreb University who wanted Croatian independence. Party leaders were expelled from the party and some of the students were imprisoned.

The whole historiography of Yugoslavia in the second part of the twentieth century was tremendously oriented towards the political history. At a first glance it seems like paradox that the censorship and auto – censorship were less present in late communism than even today. That is also very important issue on which a Yugoslavian case differs from the cases of the other countries in democratic transition. Communism dogmatism from the Titoist era was later replaced by a national dogmatism. The replacement was not sudden but gradual in the sense that during the 1980s Yugoslavian historiography enjoyed a relative freedom from the control of state. But still that cacophony of voices brought with it disaster. A examination of lot of taboo – themes and unresolved topics brought great frustrations on the populace which resulted in the rise of extreme nationalisms which were orchestrated by the ideologues on the respective ethnic level.

Roman Catholic church was a very important focal point of Croatian national identity in previous times and through communism also, and was and still is the organisation that have forged the nation – building project in late 1980s. Croatia's experience of war from 1991 till 1995 resulted in setback in terms of importance of the country in international context. During 1990s a very influential discourse of communism was effectively replaced by the discourse of right – wing authoritarianism and extreme nationalism.

1990s were marked by economic downfall which was both a cause and a consequence of the war. *The break-up of former Yugoslavia through war and violence has delayed the economic reforms and move toward a market economy in both Serbia and Croatia* <sup>79</sup>. War and economic hardship brought with it the rise of right-wing political extremism. But, during 1990s a regionalist paradigm in Croatian context has also become stronger which is shown by the strong influence of the parties with regional lists in Istria and Dalmatia, and in the beginning of the twentyfirst century in Slavonia.

Croatia was a scene of the shift from the totalitarian communist regime to the right – wing authoritarian regime, the feat which happened also in the case of Serbia. The antimodernist and autoisolationist political forces were dominant in the political and public life of both Croatia and Serbia until the electoral defeats of the right – wing nationalist regimes in 2000. The government which was installed after the elections of 3rd of January, 2000. ended with the process of authoritarianism and autoisolation of Croatia. In the case of both countries regime did not admitted electoral defeats on the different levels of administration. In Croatian case this process manifested itself in denial of the regime to admit defeat in the elections for Assembly of

Zagreb in 1995. The demise of the totalitarian system shifted the process of decision making from the state to both state and municipality. Huge economic growth of Zagreb in transition years in comparison with other parts of Croatia gave birth to a huge resentment of the non – Zagreb political echelons. That process resulted in creation of influential regional parties whose main agenda is decentralization. The gap between Zagreb and other relatively minor urban centres in Croatia is widening in terms both of the size of population and economic development. That gives place for the resettlement of politicians from rural areas and regional centres towards political elites of the capital city and at state level.

Whole Croatian history from the midst of the nineteenth century was immersed in the more or less intensive dialogue and intertwining between Croatian and Yugoslav or South Slavic identity. With the fall of communism and Yugoslavia supraethnic Yugoslav identity was replaced by ethnic Croatian identity which was strengthened and reawakened mainly through strong Roman Catholic identity of Croatian populace.

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- <sup>1</sup> Pavlowitch:108
  - <sup>2</sup> Golubović:47
  - <sup>3</sup> Đukić:64
  - <sup>4</sup> Jelić:74
  - <sup>5</sup> Hitrec:205
  - <sup>6</sup> Vjesnik 17.1.1990:1
  - <sup>7</sup> Tatalović:43
  - <sup>8</sup> Politika 6.2.1990:1
  - <sup>9</sup> Naimark:147
  - <sup>10</sup> Horvat:136
  - <sup>11</sup> Mandić:44
  - <sup>12</sup> Owen:152
  - <sup>13</sup> Jeljcin:279
  - <sup>14</sup> Banac,1992:189
  - <sup>15</sup> Županov:5
  - <sup>16</sup> Vinski:77
  - <sup>17</sup> Bilandžić:119
  - <sup>18</sup> Kovačević:45
  - <sup>19</sup> Jelavich:46
  - <sup>20</sup> Šulek:133
  - <sup>21</sup> Korunić:387
  - <sup>22</sup> Krizman:92
  - <sup>23</sup> Horvat:143
  - <sup>24</sup> Dom 9.10.1918:1
  - <sup>25</sup> Dom 21.10.1918:1
  - <sup>26</sup> Radić:8
  - <sup>27</sup> Šidak:381
  - <sup>28</sup> Sančević:76
  - <sup>29</sup> Garde:50
  - <sup>30</sup> Radić:61
  - <sup>31</sup> Perić:120
  - <sup>32</sup> Dom 21.10.1918:1
  - <sup>33</sup> Hrvatski narod 31.3.1905:1
  - <sup>34</sup> Garde:54
  - <sup>35</sup> Dragović – Soso:71
  - <sup>36</sup> Cvijić:366
  - <sup>37</sup> Krizman:471
  - <sup>38</sup> Dedijer:258
  - <sup>39</sup> Dedijer:87
  - <sup>40</sup> Banac, 1984:329
  - <sup>41</sup> Auty:51
  - <sup>42</sup> Vlajčić:70
  - <sup>43</sup> Macan:354
  - <sup>44</sup> Auty:52
  - <sup>45</sup> Damiš:258
  - <sup>46</sup> Jandrić:19
  - <sup>47</sup> Benigar:503



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- <sup>48</sup> Hadžijahić:66  
<sup>49</sup> Kustić:42  
<sup>50</sup> Dežulović; Lucić:24  
<sup>51</sup> Panorama 17.7.1994:26  
<sup>52</sup> Dragović – Soso:177  
<sup>53</sup> Dragović – Soso:180  
<sup>54</sup> [http://www.iis.unsa.ba/prilozi/29/29\\_maja\\_miljkovic.htm](http://www.iis.unsa.ba/prilozi/29/29_maja_miljkovic.htm), last checked on 3.6.2008  
<sup>55</sup> [http://www.iis.unsa.ba/prilozi/29/29\\_maja\\_miljkovic.htm](http://www.iis.unsa.ba/prilozi/29/29_maja_miljkovic.htm), last checked on 3.6.2008  
<sup>56</sup> Dežulović; Lucić:329  
<sup>57</sup> Granić:130  
<sup>58</sup> Kasapović:89  
<sup>59</sup> Matvejević, Stevanović, Dizdarević:89  
<sup>60</sup> Pavletić:20  
<sup>61</sup> Dežulović; Lucić:348  
<sup>62</sup> Dežulović; Lucić:351  
<sup>63</sup> Dežulović; Lucić:352  
<sup>64</sup> Finnan:7  
<sup>65</sup> Ćimić:131  
<sup>66</sup> Vreme 21.9.1992:6  
<sup>67</sup> Vjesnik 22.1.1990:5  
<sup>68</sup> Globus 24.1.1992:53  
<sup>69</sup> Lederer:405  
<sup>70</sup> Rašković:206  
<sup>71</sup> Danas 12.3.1991:5  
<sup>72</sup> Danas 15.1.1990:10  
<sup>73</sup> Krišto:169  
<sup>74</sup> Jović:58  
<sup>75</sup> Ribičić:31  
<sup>76</sup> <http://www.zagreb.hr/zgstat/documents/Ljetopis%202006/stanovnistvo.pdf>,  
last checked on 2.6.2008.).  
<sup>77</sup> Živojinović:511  
<sup>78</sup> Dežulović; Lucić:272  
<sup>79</sup> Vejvoda:232

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