CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2009
| Author | Cicic, Damir Behudin |
|---|---|
| Title | Frankfurt-type Examples and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities |
| Summary | To be morally responsible a person must be able to perform the action he does not actually perform, that is, a person must have alternative possibilities. This is how philosophers traditionally conceived moral responsibility. But, recently Harry Frankfurt presented an example which persuaded many philosophers that having alternative possibilities is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. On the other hand, many philosophers argued that Frankfurt’s example does not show what it was designed to show. Philosophers persuaded by Frankfurt’s original example replied by offering more sophisticated versions of his example. However, I argue that there is at least one way to show that even the new versions of Frankfurt-type examples fail to accomplish their aim. I believe that if the ability to perform an unperformed action is understood as a disposition, it is possible to demonstrate that Frankfurt-type examples do not show the irrelevance of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. Furthermore, the ability to perform an unperformed action is a disposition. |
| Supervisor | Ferenc Huoranszki |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2009/cicic_damir.pdf |
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