ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: THROUGH THE LENS OF TWO GENERATIONS OF SOCIETAL SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis sought to investigate whether there was utility in dividing the Copenhagen School's societal security concept into two generations. This process led to the creation of two distinct theoretical frameworks each professing distinct explanatory qualities, which were then tested against the case study of the Solomon Islands 'Tensions'. This test showed that such a division is justified, and that the both generations of societal security when analytically used independently provide a novel insight into the multiple features that concern the construction of identity, society and security.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

GRA	Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army
IFM	Isatabu Freedom Movement
MEF	Malatian Eagle Force
MP	Member of Parliament
PM	Prime Minister
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands
RSIP	Royal Solomon Islands Police
SIPL	Solomon Islands Plantations Ltd

INTRODUCTION

The study of security has traditionally been "related more to states than to people."[1] It has focused on the relationships between states, the ability of states to mobilize internal power, and the size of their militaries. However, conformity to this logic was cast into question in the late 1980s when a number of security scholars realised that, though answering a number of security questions, the traditional security framework could no longer answer them all. Indeed, academics observing the challenges of migration, intrastate and trans-border conflicts and even social dissent concerning the enlargement of regional powers, "called for dropping the traditional assumption that security could be understood and practiced within an interstate framework."[2] This movement led to the security agenda in Europe to expand "security questions beyond the more narrow military issues,"[3] and forced scholars to face the reality that they were surrounded by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fragmentation of the Eastern Communist Bloc and the transformation of Yugoslavia into a battleground of competing ethnic groups. To make sense of this new situation, a new model, referred to as 'societal security,' was developed by several academics at the Copenhagen Institute for Peace Research. Based on the security realities of that time, "'Societal security' [was] another concept designed to address the limitations of existing conceptual tools in analysing contemporary developments."[4] The suggested aim of the theory, as Barry Buzan, a founding scholar, was:

> "Rather than abandon existing theory … by taking the reductionist path to individual-based security logic … we saw it as a challenge to devise a theoretical conception of identity-related

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[1] Pinar Bilgin, "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 2 (June 2003): 203.
[2] Ibid., p. 207.
[3] Jef Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe," *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 4 (1998): 482.
[4] Bilgin, p. 211.

security issues that was at the unit level, and therefore interoperable with classical security theory."[5]

Buzan, along with Ole Waever, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, pieced together a framework in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (1993), where a duality of state and 'societal groups' were considered referent objects of security where the state found security through *sovereignty*, and society, defined as prominent ethno-national or religious groups, maintained security through the preservation of *identity*. These social 'units' based on identity could operate both in unison with state security concerns, or independently. They could also become involved in security dilemmas; however, this downward spiral could be caused by either military or non-military cultural means. This *identity-based* approach to security was the 'Copenhagen School's' first attempt to articulate a theoretical response to Europe's security reality, and while it endured some criticism (Huysmans: 1995; Lapid and Kratochwil: 1996)[6], most significantly because of its seemingly objectivist approach to the construction of identity, (McSweeney: 1996, 1997) it made for a better tool than the traditional "national security" framework for the study and practice of security.[7]

This original formulation of societal security theory produced various investigations into European conflicts. Waever et al. (1993) used case studies of Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between the Middle East and Europe and the issue of migration and terrorism in the 'new' Europe to test the utility of the new theory. Four other case studies using the original societal security framework have since been made; the first by Graeme Herd and Joan Lofgren (2001) who focused on the societal security response in the Baltic

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[5] Barry Buzan and O. Waever. "Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 2 (April 1997): 24.

[6] Jeff Huysmans (1995) argues that there is a risk when prioritising identity as the sole referent for threat articulation and that the subjectification of choosing what is identity and what is threat may lead to some undesired results, such as attacks upon migrants etc. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (1996) argue that societal security establishes societal groups as ministates and never ventured outside the parameters of traditional 'state-centric' security paradigms.

[7] Bilgin, p. 211.

states to minority groups introduced through 'sovietisation' after gaining independence;[8] secondly Pinar Tank (2002) investigated the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish perceptions of state and societal security arising from the process of Cypriot accession to the EU;[9] and the third and fourth cases studies were performed by Paul Roe (2002, 2005) who argued that the societal security dilemma framework best explained the events preceding the Hungarian and Romanian ethnic conflict in 1991 and the struggles between the Serbs and Croatians over the 'Croatianisation' of Croatia after the disintegration of Yugoslavia.[10]

However, in the mid-1990s societal security underwent a transformation. It seemed that Buzan and Waever were not totally satisfied with the ability of societal security to describe the dynamics they observed both in the construction of identities and the construction of threats. In 1995 Waever addressed this shortfall and posited his notion of '*securitisation*' in *On Security*, where he argued that security be regarded as a 'speech act',[11] explaining that "… security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act… By uttering 'security', a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it."[12] The potential of securitisation, was further developed in the next Copenhagen School publication, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998). In this book, Buzan et al. articulate a structured process through which the use of security "takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as

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[8] Graeme Herd and J. Lofgren. "'Societal Security', the Baltic States and EU Integration," *Cooperation and Conflict* 36, no. 3 (2001)

[9] Pinar Tank, "'Re-solving' the Cyprus problem: Changing perceptions of states and societal security," *European Security* 11, no. 3 (2002): 149.

[10] Paul Roe, "Misperception and Ethnic Conflict: Transylvania's societal security dilemma," *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 1 (January 2002); Paul Roe, *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005)

[11] Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization." in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 55.

[12] Ibid.

above politics."[13] This, he argues, is what constitutes 'securitisation' which can thus be "seen as a more extreme version of politicisation."[14]

The securitisation process refers to the utterance of security by a securitising actor and the *intersubjective* establishment of existential threat by a socially prepared audience, leading to the pronouncement of emergency measures by the securitising agent for the defence or removal of the perceived threat. It is founded upon the precise constructivist theory deemed as lacking in the original conceptualisation of societal security. Securitisation thus allows the analyst to both investigate the constructed nature of security and the constructed nature of threats and indeed, identity. And through the acceptance of a 'speech act' constituting security, the theory can now relate to a wide diversity of referent objects. In reality, though, "only certain actors using a certain language in certain situations will be able to successfully securitise": namely states and societal groups.[15] In spite of securitisation encountering some criticism (Eriksson: 1999, Hansen: 2000, Bigo: 2002)[16] concerning the non-applicability of the theory to non-western environments due to the dependence on the 'speech act' to determine security, and a theoretical ambivalence concerning the relationship of the securitising actor to the audience, this second rendition of the societal security theory is regarded by many scholars as excelling in the field of security studies.

The study of societal security using the securitisation model has been used widely and recently in several case studies. In his contribution to *On Security* (1995), Waever offered four cases of securitization and *de*securitisation. His third case concerning securitisation in the

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[13] Barry Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 23.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Paul Roe, "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 3 (September 2004): 281.
[16] Johann Eriksson (1999) argues that securitisation increases the security field so that almost everything can be described by political acts as being 'in the interests of security' instead of clarifying what is security and what is not. Lene Hansen (2000) argues that the "speech act" implicit within the securitisation move mean that those without a voice, such as women under oppressive domestic regimes, cannot enunciate a real security threat, however real it may be. Didier Bigo (2002) argues that the realm of institutional non-discursive security is ignored by securitisation, as this theoretical ignorance severely limits its utility in explaining certain security actions.

societal sector describes how security is 'spoken' by institutions and actors within a society as they voice threat to their identities, and warns of the increasing 'securitisation' of immigration and integration of refugees, asylum seekers and minority groups.[17] Jef Huysmans' (2000) case analysis elicits similar results for the utility of securitisation. However, he develops the argument that securitisation within the EU bureaucracy has caused these groups to be increasingly "presented as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labour market stability: [indeed] it has been securitised."[18] Roe (2004) offered a further use of the securitisation concept in the study of societal groups as he investigated the unsolvable dilemma between minority rights and desecuritisation. He argues that since minority groups define their own identity and survival through distinctiveness, "desecuritisation [or the removal of threat] of minority rights may thus be logically impossible."[19] The final case analysis performed by Claire Wilkinson (2007) outlines that, in the context of Kyrgyzstan, the securitisation theory is limited due to its conceptual foundation upon a European security experience and therefore the 'speech act'.

Huysmans argues in his article "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe" that this progression of thought from the original conception of societal security in 1993 to its later 'constructivist emancipation' in 1998 epitomises the contribution of the Copenhagen School to the study of security in Europe.[20] His framework of studying the transformation of the Copenhagen Schools theory is well known and regarded. However, it never made explicit the distinction between the two conceptual frameworks proffered by the Copenhagen School. This thesis wishes to take Huysmans' framework one step further and suggest that through its evolution the Copenhagen

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[17] Waever, 1995, pp. 66 – 68.

[18] Jef Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, no. 5 (December 2000): 752.

[19] Roe, 2004, p. 290.

[20] Huysmans, 1998.

School had in fact developed '*two generations*' of societal security; each offering a distinct range of conceptual qualities that can provide different, if not perhaps complementary, lenses through which to observe and analyse societal conflict. This division of societal security into two generations is important since it clarifies two distinct logics presented by the Copenhagen School. The first generation of societal security relies upon the '*sedimented*' identity of social identity and an objective definition of threat in order to observe a progression of conflict, while the second-generation utilises the securitisation process to observe the construction of threats within a societal group, and therefore determines the reasons behind a conflict. But which generation should an analyst use when investigating an instance of societal security? This thesis will seek to answer this question through first outlining the features and operational mechanics of the two generations, and then test their utility through a case analysis of the Solomon Islands 'Tensions'. This case has been chosen since it offers an example of conflict between two strongly identity-driven societal groups in a multi-layered struggle to preserve their highly constructed identities and indeed, their survival. The nature of the 'Tensions' will challenge the explanatory qualities of both the first and second generation of societal security in such a way as to provide an insight into the strengths and weaknesses of their distinct conceptual frameworks. This thesis will then use the results of the case study to make this comparison and comment on their strengths and limitations, and through the process provide any future analyst the ability to best select their conceptual tool when seeking to investigate societal security.

To achieve this aim the thesis will be divided into four chapters: Chapter One will deal with a detailed account of the processes and frameworks of the first generation of societal security; Chapter Two will explore the transformation of the Copenhagen School's realisation of 'societal security' and a summary of the main features and operational framework of the second generation of societal security. Chapter Three will establish a historical background

11

and cultural analysis of the Solomon Islands. This chapter will draw from a wide range of commentary before, during and after the "Tensions' to capture an image of the ethnic conflict of 1999 to 2004. This will lead into Chapter Four in which the two-generations will be tested against the case study and their results compared.

CHAPTER ONE – FIRST GENERATION

As indicated in the Introduction, the concept of 'societal security' was founded through a collaborative effort of Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre entitled *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (1993). However, this was not its first reference. In fact Buzan initially coined the term 'societal security' in his book, *People, States and Fear* (1991) as one of five sectors of security, the others being military, political, economic and environmental.[21] Although the book offered little alternative to the traditional state-centric notion of security, it assisted in framing the response of the Copenhagen Institute for Peace Research to the escalating intrastate disturbances and conflict in Europe at the time. This chapter will provide a summary of societal security as it was initially designed by the 'Copenhagen School' according to the following layout: (1.1) main components, (1.2) how it can be used, (1.3) use in previous case studies and ultimately (1.4) how it will address the case study in this thesis.

1.1 Main Components

In his 1993 book, Waever argued, "Societal security is not just a sector of state security, but a distinctive referent object alongside it."[22] Refining the notion made first by Buzan that society was a sector of state security, Waever suggested that, instead, "Society is both an alternative place ('civil society') and the ultimate source of power for the state."[23] He claimed that though states may well be a referent object for security, a societal group performed a similar function as an object around which a collective of individuals form an attachment, or form an *identity*. Identity is the root of societal security, whereas, in the state, sovereignty is the key to

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[21] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 133.
[22] Ole Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, and P. Lemaitre. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 27.
[23] Ibid., p. 19.

survival. Therefore the *maintenance* of identity is the key to the continued existence of a societal group. At its most basic, social identity is what enables the word 'we' to be used "as a means by which to identify collectively the 'thing' to be secured."[24] But what in reality constitutes a collective that exhibits such dominant identity cohesion that it corresponds to such a 'we'? Waever suggests that, "The main units for analysis for societal security are thus politically significant ethno-national and religious identities."[25] Indeed, these 'societal groups', "differ from other social groups in that they have a high degree of social inertia across generations and a strong infrastructure of norms, values, and 'institutions' in the wider sense."[26]

To this end Waever defines societal security as, "... the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom..."[27]

Ultimately then, societal groups can be defined as being strongly cohesive collective units that depend on the shared loyalty[28] of its members for its survival. Hence the greatest threat to such a group must come from something, or someone who attacks this cohesion to a shared identity. Buzan suggests that "... forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through closure of places of education and worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community"[29] are the main examples of existential threat to societal groups. These threats may occur independently, but may also occur simultaneously, 'attacking' the societal group

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[24] Waever, 1993, p. 17.

[25] Ibid., p. 22.

[26] Ibid., p. 21.

[27] Ibid., p. 23.

[28] Buzan, 1998, p. 123.

[29] Waever, 1993, p. 43.

14

from many sides. In his later text, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Buzan considers

three avenues through which these threats can originate: (1) migration (dilution of identity);

(2) horizontal competition (from competing societal groups); and (3) vertical competition

(from levels of authority outside the control of the societal group). [30] These threats can be

"placed on a spectrum running from intentional, programmatic, and political at one end to

unintended and structural at the other."[31] Roe argues that indeed "… we may not know

automatically what kind of actions will harm the identity of the group. This all depends on

how it defines its societal security requirements…"[32] In fact, he implies, the constitution of

the society's identity, in fact, defines which developments can be perceived as existential

threats and which developments can be ignored.[33] It follows then, that while a societal group

may be faced with multiple threats, there may only one or a few that directly engage with the

identity of the group and are therefore perceived as a definable existential threat. So how, in

response to these threats to identity, can a societal group react? There are two distinct

possibilities, the first being the use of traditional military orthodoxy: the second is a response

through culture. Roe argues that, (1) "Societal identity can be defended using military means.

This is particularly the case if identity is linked to territory: the defence of the historic

'homeland'. In this way, if the threat posed by one group to another is a military one (armed

attack from a neighbouring society), some kind of armed response will of course be

necessary."[34] But because many 'attacks' emanate from non-military, or cultural sources the

response of a society can also be (2) cultural. Waever himself suggests that, "For threatened

societies, one obvious line of defensive response is to strengthen societal identity. This can be

done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure

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[30] Buzan, 1998, p. 121.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (March 1999): 196.

[33] Buzan, 1998, p. 119.

[34] Roe, 2002, p. 66.

that society reproduces itself correctly."[35] In this way "if one's identity seems threatened... the answer is a strengthening of existing identities. In this sense, consequently, culture becomes security policy."[36] On the other hand, in some cases the strengthening of identity can lead to dynamic changes in the original identity, as Roe argues:

"In defending against perceived threats, societal identity is (re)constructed and thus also strengthened. It is this new, revised identity which constitutes the nature of the object around which security processes will take place. This is because societal identity is not relevant as a referent object of security until it is (perceived to be) threatened; until its very existence is (seen to be) brought into question."[37] This is observable in the examples of Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan where, when under threat, Islamic leaders promoted actions that may be considered fundamentalist, even to their own societies, but serve to strengthen the collective's ties to the 'threatened' identity.

An important aspect of the first generation of societal security is the societal security dilemma. Using a traditionalist security framework, Roe recreates the security dilemma in a societal security context:

> "By combining the concept of the security dilemma with that of societal security, an (inter-) societal security dilemma could be said to exist when: the actions of one society, in trying to increase its societal security (strengthen its own identity), causes a reaction in a second society, which, in the end, decreases the first society's own societal security (weakens its identity)."[38]

This description, used in various first generation case studies, assists in showing how societal groups, though perhaps living peacefully together for generations, can spiral downwards into identity-based conflict. As mentioned above, the commencement of a security response depends on what constitutes the identity of the societal group. For example: a societal group

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[35] Waever, 1993, p. 191.
[36] Waever, 1995, p. 68.
[37] Roe, 1999, p. 196.
[38] Ibid., p. 194.

may strengthen its identity through the use of language, leading to the possibility of a competing societal group feeling threatened, particularly if it too depends on language for its cohesion, whereas another competing group may not perceive any threat from language as it forms a cultural identity around eating a particular type of food.

But now that the main components of the first generation of societal security and the societal security dilemma has been described, how may an analyst use this theory in practise?

1.2 Operational Framework

Waever explains that an analyst can best observe threats to societal security through "…studying the processes whereby a group comes to perceive its identity as threatened, when it starts to act in a security mode on this basis and what behaviour this triggers."[39] He is contending that it is important to (1) find records pertaining to the societal group *before* the conflict and indeed, what constituted its prime identity; (2) observe what constituted the threat; (3) how the societal group reacted, and if this led to a societal security dilemma, and (4) how, and if, the conflict was resolved. Several scholars have already used a similar framework to offer explanation concerning identity-based conflicts in their chosen cases. Recognition of their contributions is essential to appreciating the operational qualities of first generation societal security, therefore a thematic exploration of the concepts promoted in each case analysis will follow below.

1.3 Previous Case Study Approaches

A theme that two scholars have focussed on in their case studies has been the societal security dilemma. Tank (2002), in her investigation of the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish perceptions of state and societal security arising from the process of Cypriot accession to the EU[40], and Roe

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[39] Waever, 1993, p. 23.
[40] Tank, p. 149.

(2002, 2005) in his studies of both the Hungarian/Romanian ethnic struggles of 1990[41] and the conflict surrounding the state-building actions of Croatia and its effect on the minority Serbs[42]. Both provide good examples of how to use the societal security dilemma concept to explain a deterioration of peace. Roe's Hungarian/Romanian case provides the best example of a formulated societal security dilemma analysis. Firstly, he details the historical, and therefore identity, make-up of the two groups, and then proceeds to map the misperceptions on both the Hungarian and Romanian sides. In this case it was the language of the Hungarians that was their prime identifier, and it was this same Magyar language that constituted notable insecurity to the Romanians in Transylvania.[43] The restrictions placed by the Romanian government on how much Hungarian was be taught in Transylvania caused the Hungarians to react strongly to such a perceived threat, even to the intensity of urban violence in Tirgu Mures in 1990.[44]

A second theme that can be observed in the remaining societal security case studies is the use of Buzan's three avenues of threat: horizontal, vertical and migration. [45] In Roe (2002, 2005), Tank (2002), Waever et al. (1993) the simpler conceptualisation of threat proposed by Waever is used; however, in the study of the societal conflict in the Baltic States, Herd and Lofgren (2001) observe the superior function of Buzan's framework as they saw threats emanating from all the three avenues in their study of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They mapped out how Russian minorities were threatened by anti-Russian government policy (vertical) and the Baltic nation's attempts to improve their own identity security (horizontal),

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[41] Roe, 2002, p. 58.
[42] Roe, 2005, pp. 76-110.
[43] Ibid., p. 70.
[44] Roe, 2002, p. 71.
[45] Buzan, 1998, p. 121.

while also observing that these same Baltic nations felt threatened by Russians living within their recently formed sovereign states (migration).[46]

Other themes hinted on were the significance of external actors upon the appreciation of threat to a societal group, mentions in regard to the example of the EU influence on the interactions between Turkish Cypriot and Turkish mainlanders,[47] and, more in line with the second generation framework, that a threat to a societal group never really disappears. Instead, factors contemporary to a conflict situation possess the power to 're-securitise' the issue of identity as a source of threat and insecurity,[48] and in circumstances where historical grievances continue to play a role in securitising identity, desecuritisation may never fully occur.[49]

1.4 Proposed Method of Case Study Analysis

From this summary of the main components, operational framework and previous use (with examples) of first generation societal security this chapter can now conclude with a description of how the theory will engage with the case study. The analysis of the Tensions using first generation societal security will begin with (1) identifying the involved groups and their prime identities; (2) discerning the threats to each group; (3) mapping the order of response and reaction to threat by both parties and (4) concluding how, or whether the conflict was resolved. Through this process the theory will attempt to explain how concerns over group identity escalated to such as level as to begin the 'Tensions', and how this conflict was self-reinforcing as both groups sought greater levels of identity survival.

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[46] Herd, p. 276.
[47] Tank, p. 161.
[48] Herd, p. 292.
[49] Ibid.

CHAPTER TWO – SECOND GENERATION

To better display the distinction between the two generations of societal security the initial segment of this chapter will be dedicated to describing the debate between Bill McSweeney and Buzan and the 'process of transformation' suggested by Huysmans in his article *"Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe"*.

The original version of societal security proposed by the Copenhagen School sustained criticism from a wide range of scholars.[50] However, the most important critiques came in three consecutive articles during the mid-1990s where McSweeney and Buzan debated three points of concern, of which only two are relevant here, regarding the first generation position taken by the 'Copenhagen School'.[51] The first point of concern McSweeney's raised was that Waever et al. projected, "Both 'society' and identity … as objective realities, out there to be discovered and analysed,"[52] and that this Durkheimian approach oversimplified the constructed nature of a society and identity. Indeed, he argued that the Copenhagen School did not offer a sufficient conceptualisation of society, but one that "… loses all touch with fluidity and process, resulting in a near-positivist conception of identity" and that "Identity is not a fact of society; it a process of negotiation among people and interest groups."[53] Buzan disagreed with McSweeney's arguments, replying that his (Buzan's) position adequately incorporated the 'constructed' reality of society and identity into societal security, arguing that to take identity as a possible object of securitisation demands that the referent object has

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[50] Notes concerning the other critiques of the first generation of societal security can be found in footnotes to the Introduction.

[51] Coined originally in "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School" (1996) as the 'Copenhagen School' by McSweeney

[52] Bill McSweeney, "Review: Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 1 (January 1996): 83.

[53] Ibid., p. 85.

become relatively stabilised in social practise."[54] Buzan clarifies that, "This does not imply that identities do not change, only that we should not expect everything to change all the time: certain things stay the same throughout the period relevant for an analysis."[55] The second point that McSweeney noted was that the 'Copenhagen School' singled out 'identity' as the prime identifier of a society's security concerns at the cost of ignoring, or at least downgrading the importance of other variables.[56] In reply, Buzan argued that to investigate the "individual-level" attributes of a collective has "severe consequences"[57] Indeed, Buzan remarked that, "We resist this turn because the state cannot be reassembled from individual-level attributes; it has *sui generis* state level attributes and one has to see the state itself as a unit reality."[58] Societies have attributes in their own right, he says, through the intersection of identity and that by pursuing the study of all variables within a collective the theoretical framework would hold no theoretical power to offer a model for analysis.

McSweeney rejected Buzan's response, retorting "Durkheim was wrong… about the character of social fact and the objectivity of society…" But Buzan had anticipated McSweeney's reply in his previous article, where he explained that the 'Copenhagen School' had encountered the issues inherent in the first incarnation of societal security and had "developed a way of specifying security as an extreme form of politicisation (in whatever sector) and thus of avoiding the proliferation of securitisations that has tended to accompany the wider sector."[59]

This summary of the debate between Buzan and McSweeney illustrates the motivation that drove the need for Waever and Buzan to reconceptualise how they were going to theoretically

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[54] Buzan, 1997, p. 243.
[55] Ibid.
[56] McSweeney, 1996, p. 90.
[57] Buzan, 1997, p. 245.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., p. 241.

deal with the interaction between security, identity and threat. They achieved this through a new framework that "specified security as an extreme form of politicisation"[60] or the process of securitisation.

This 'transformation' of the societal security theory into its second generation is best described by Huysmans in his article *'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe'*, where he "revisited" its distinctly European roots. After pointing out that the first generation of societal security formed its assumptions "from specific European security experiences and/or questions"[61] he expands his analysis, explaining that from its European background the Copenhagen School originally developed an appreciation of society and identity that sat between the objectivist and constructivist camps even though its original appreciation of threat was certainly objectivist. After incurring criticism, not least from McSweeney, the Copenhagen School sought to strengthen its position and developed its study of societal security through their new concept of securitisation. Huysmans argued that through this "revised" theory the Copenhagen School had overcome its "objectivist drawbacks" and created a tool that could be applied more universally in engagement with a wider "diversity of social problems".[62] Huysmans suggested that with the development of securitisation the Copenhagen School made an effort to become completely constructivist, especially in regard to its portrayal of threat, which Waever notes is no longer seen objectively, but that "security changes from a perception into a speech act."[63] That being said, they never fully succeeded in their desired aim as even societal security within the framework of securitisation failed to propose an alternative to the previous slightly objectivist appreciation of society and identity. Through Huysmans' study of the Copenhagen

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[60] Buzan, 1998, p. 241.
[61] Huysmans, 1998, p. 483.
[62] Ibid., p. 490.
[63] Ibid., p. 492.

School the point in which the first and second generations of societal security divided can be clearly observed. The first generation operates within a more traditional security framework where societal groups defend their '*sedimented*' identity against an objectively established set of threats, while the second generation offers a perspective based on dismantling the construction of identity and threat through the concept of securitisation. It will be the aim of the remaining portion of this chapter to describe the (1) main components of the second generation of societal security, (2) how it can be used, (3) its use in previous case studies and ultimately (4) how it will address the case study in this thesis.

Securitisation, first coined by Waever in his chapter *"Securitisation and Desecuritisation"* in *On Security* (1995), and later more thoroughly in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), is a process "that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics."[64] It is the operational logic with which the second generation of societal security can locate "when and how something is established by whom as a security threat."[65] As mentioned before, securitisation overcomes the objectivist shortcomings of the original attempt by the Copenhagen School to investigate societal groups and identity through conceptualising security as being essentially constructed through what Waever defines as a 'speech act'. This constructed security is thus intersubjectively accepted or rejected by an audience, without limitation to its identity or construction. In this way, the second generation of societal security opens up another framework for the study of threats and responses involving societal groups and identity. As a result, the following narrative will be dedicated to a thorough investigation of what (2.1) constitutes the process of securitisation; (2.2) how it can be used in the investigation of societal security; (2.3) how it has been used in recent case studies and (2.4) what lessons can

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[64] Buzan, 1998, p. 23.
[65] Ibid., p. 176.

23

be learnt for its application in this thesis. But before the case of the Solomon Islands 'Tensions' is examined, this chapter will conclude (2.5) with a restatement of the importance of the distinction made between the two generations of societal security.

2.1 Main Components

The process of securitisation is simple to describe. Roe provides the best summary of its structure:

> "Securitisation is thus a kind of 'call and response' process: an actor [securitising actor] makes a call [speech act] that something is a matter of 'security', and the audience must then respond with their acceptance of it as such. The argument has to be framed in such a way as to achieve the level of resonance [intersubjective establishment of existential threat] required to legitimise emergency measures. If there is no such level of acceptance, then securitisation [securitising move] will have failed."[66]

The first component for analysis in this process is the 'securitising actor'. Buzan avers that a securitising actor can be anyone "in a position of authority, although this is not be defined as official authority."[67] The person must be able to manipulate or control their relationship with the audience in such a way so that the audience readily absorbs the spoken revelations of insecurity and existential threat. The person must therefore not only identify the threat, but also provide an option for emergency measures or a possible way out.[68] In this regard the securitising actor must fulfil the second of Buzan's 'facilitating conditions': have a favourable relationship with the audience on the specificity of the asserted security and be able to temper the response to such a threat through the indication of emergency measures.[69]

In a '*speech act*' the securitising actor defines the existential threat, the referent object, the audience and the emergency measures. The 'speech act' is essential to the success of any securitisation move and must include positive considerations from within the speech and

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[66] Roe, 2004, p. 281.
[67] Buzan, 1998, p. 33.
[68] Ibid., p. 24.
[69] Ibid., p. 33; Roe, 2004, pp. 281-282.

24

outside but relative to the speech.[70] *Internal* aspects of a successful speech act include the language or grammar used to link the subject to security, such as references to existential threat, point-of-no-return and the possible way out.[71] *External* aspects include the 'social capital' of the securitising actor. As suggested earlier, this actor must have a favourable relationship with the audience, and be able to enunciate the perceived reality of the situation, such as troop movements or high rates of immigrant crime.[72] Such features in the speech act make it more acceptable to the audience, which is required to intersubjectively assess its worth before allowing emergency measures.

The 'audience' is vital to the process of securitisation, as it is the key to any successful securitisation act. The audience can be any group that exhibits a similar identity, and is prepared to legitimise the use of emergency measures or validate their use, while maintaining moral or legal authority. The relationship between the audience and the securitising actor is an important consideration, especially in regard to how skilfully the securitising actor relates to specific experiences and perceptions of the audiences. Thierry Balzacq suggests, "… the success of securitisation is contingent upon a perceptive environment,"[73] since "when the concept 'security' is used, it forces the audience to 'look around' in order to identify the conditions (the presumed threats) that justify its articulation. In other words, the context 'selects' or activates certain properties of the concept, while others are concealed."[74] Thus the use of context-specific phrases in the utterance of security is essential to the negotiation of

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[70] Buzan, 1998, p. 33.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 182.

[74] Ibid., p. 182.

securitisation between the securitising actor and the audience in the legitimisation of emergency measures. [75]

It is also important to understand that through this process of engagement between the securitising actor, 'speech act' and audience, the audience 'subjectively' approaches a securitising speech and internally analyses its legitimacy. Buzan referred to this process as the '*intersubjective*' establishment of existential threat, as he assumes that security is self-referential, that "different states and nations have different thresholds of defining threat",[76] and finally that "securitisation is intersubjective and socially constructed."[77] A failure to reach this intersubjective rapport is termed by Buzan as a '*securitising move*'. "If no signs of such acceptance exist we can talk only of a securitising move, not of an object actually being securitised."[78] This means that though the securitising actors have presented their case to securitise an issue to a specific audience, that audience could intersubjectively reject the 'securitising move", effectively nullifying the rest of the securitising process and the achievement of full securitisation.

Emergency measures required to respond to a perceived existential threat can encompass many different actions, as long as they can actually be legitimised and practically achieved by either the securitising actor or audience. Otherwise, effective securitisation cannot occur and the process has achieved no more than advanced politicisation, or the advancement of a particular issue to a political agenda. The achievement of emergency measures has much to do with the constraints of securitisation as proposed by Michael Williams. Williams argues that the securitisation process is structured firstly "by the different capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats" and secondly through "the forms in which these

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[75] Balzacq, p. 184.
[76] Buzan, 1998, p. 30.
[77] Ibid., p. 31.
[78] Ibid., p. 25.

claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as situations to which these actors can make reference."[79] This means that, in reality, only certain actors within certain groups can perform securitisation, since only certain groups maintain internal characteristics suitable for the articulation of existential threat, and also the means with which to deal with such a threat. Roe supports William's argument, suggesting that in "practical terms the imposition of this 'traditional' logic serves to maintain the fairly narrow nature of the concept."[80]

One last feature of securitisation proposed by the Copenhagen School is the process of *de*securitisation. Both Buzan and Waever prefer the notion of desecuritisation, since in their eyes, "security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics."[81]

Roe suggests that not only is desecuritisation desirable in terms of its 'potential efficacy', but also due to its "greater 'democraticness'" and "because of the very impossibility of securitisation itself in an uncertain world and for the possibilities it offers for reordering the domestic in a perhaps more just way."[82] But desecuritisation is not always possible, as suggested by Herd and Lofgren in their study of the Baltic States and to be mentioned later in Roe's case study on securitisation and minority groups.

2.2 Operational Framework

There are several points from this summary of the characteristics of securitisation that an analyst can utilise when conducting a study using the second generation of societal security. Buzan et al. suggest the "The way to study securitisation is to study discourse."[83] The process by which securitisation is used in reference to a case study analysis is explicitly detailed by

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[79] Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitisation and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 503.
[80] Roe, 2004, pp. 281-282.
[81] Buzan, 1998, p. 29.
[82] Roe, 2004, p. 284.
[83] Buzan, 1998, p. 25.

Buzan in Chapter 8 of his *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998). Here Buzan advances a three-stage process[84] by which securitisation can successfully locate and provide explanatory utility concerning "when and how something is established by whom as a security threat."[85] Stage One (1) or *choice of units* is quite simple. It refers to "… three kinds of units – referent objects, securitising actors, and functional actors"[86] that should be central to any securitisation analysis. Stage Two (2) or the *choice of method*, is also initially quite straight forward:

> "The obvious method is discourse analysis, since we are interested in *when and how something is established by whom as a security threat*. The defining criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse."[87]

Indeed, such a study of discourse should be made "… in the sense that discourse is studied as a subject in its own right, not as an indicator of something else."[88] He suggests a simple technique: "… Read, looking for arguments that take the rhetorical and logical form defined here as security."[89] But to Buzan, analysing discourse is not the only method to study securitisation. A fuller and more complete study requires the inclusion of, "… more traditional political analysis of units interacting, facilitating conditions, and all of the other dimensions of security complex theory."[90]

In Stage Three (3) the *choice of material and sources*, Buzan suggests that, "The analysis should be conducted on texts that are central in the sense that if a security discourse is operative in this community, it should be expected to materialise in this text because this occasion is sufficiently important."[91] These materials can take any form, be they newspapers,

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[84] Buzan, 1998, p. 176.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid., p. 171.
[87] Ibid., p. 176.
[88] Ibid. (emphasis added)
[89] Ibid., p. 177.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.

chat rooms, notations of government addresses and perhaps even records and investigations into the 'memory' of communities over what was said in official community events and by whom. In the study of societal security using the mechanism of securitisation an analyst would look for utterances of security in reference to any component that recommends the preservation of artefacts of identity in response to a threat from either horizontal, vertical or 'migrant' competition, or a combination of all three. Buzan warns however that,

> "Often it will therefore be easier to find the first part of the securitisation move – arguing for existential threat and urgency – and less clear whether this points to specific emergency measures and a violation of normal politics or established rules."[92]

A way to counter this problem is to survey selective texts that offer a "complete representation of securitisation,"[93] search for security arguments in each and investigate the context, referent object and the perceived threat.[94]

There are, however, another two points crucial to how securitisation should be used in a case analysis. One, Roe notes, that "…successful securitisation is determined in hindsight – if security logic is *ex post facto* apparent."[95] This means that an analyst cannot pre-empt securitisation, but must wait until it happens in order to study it! And second, Buzan observes that, "… the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitisation."[96] Thus the study of securitisation, and an appreciation of the constructed nature of security within a societal group, is a difficult task. It requires not only an understanding by the analyst on how the

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[92] Buzan, 1998, pp. 177 – 178.
[93] Ibid., p. 178.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Roe, 2004, p. 281.
[96] Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (September 2007): 377.

societal group's identity is constituted, not within the premise of objectivism, but also with regard to the contextual environment that Balzacq proposes. It also requires the analyst to be aware of what the actors are uttering concerning security, and how this is being intersubjectively perceived by the audience or audiences within the societal group. A brief exploration on how other scholars have engaged cases through securitisation is very instructive to see how they have used this constructivist and sometimes-difficult concept.

2.3 Previous Case Study Approaches

In the third of his four case studies in "Securitisation and Desecuritisation" (1995) Waever returns once again to the duality of security for the state and security for the society, to investigate the emergence in Europe of societies no longer being able to 'call on their state' to protect their interests.[97] Waever explains that security is 'spoken' by institutions and actors within a society,[98] and that through analysing the discourse an analyst can deconstruct the perceptions and therefore reactions to threats to such identity based societies.

Claire Wilkinson argues that securitisation is based on a 'European security experience' and therefore less suitable for the exploration of security concerns outside of the 'Westphalia straitjacket'. Focusing on the 'Tulip Revolution' in Kyrgyzstan,[99] she argues that the "degree of continuity, stability and cohesion" of identity that societal security requires to operate is not present in "many Second and Third World countries."[100] Wilkinson notes three instructive features relevant to a study using securitisation: *firstly,* that the process of securitisation may not follow a linear progression, but that the "process may in practice start at any point, with component parts developing simultaneously." *Secondly*, she states that "securitising moves do not exist in isolation, and may be simultaneously or subsequently linked to other securitising

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[97] Waever, 1995, p. 67.
[98] Ibid., p. 69.
[99] Claire Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?" *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (2007): 10.
[100] Ibid.

moves that in total contribute to a securitisation even if they are individually unsuccessful."[101] And *thirdly*, that "physical action overtook any speech act", meaning that she supports Hansen's critique of Waever's assumption that security is only constituted through a speech act.

Roe investigates the unsolvable dilemma of minority rights and desecuritisation. He argues that there is a dilemma between desecuritisation, or the subtraction of elements pertaining to threat from perceptions concerning a referent object, and the need for minority rights to maintain their 'distinct collective identities' through observing external threat.[102] Roe thus notes that, "desecuritisation of minority rights may thus be logically impossible,"[103] suggesting instead that transformation or management of the security issues is the answer.[104] Roe provides a suggestive case example of securitisation where he suggests that perhaps the end result of the securitisation process is unachievable once started.

Huysmans claims in his case analysis that current situations of financial stress, unemployment, revival of xenophobic parties and estrangement of politics from the masses, that multiculturalism, and indeed its immigration precursor, "has been increasingly presented as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labour market stability: [indeed] it has been securitised."[105] He argues that EU officials have been in a position to frame internal security, cultural security and the crisis of the welfare state as security and have thus institutionalised the negative iconification of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers within the EU.[106] This has resulted in cultural realities and national policies regarding welfare

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[101] Wilkinson, p. 20.
[102] Roe, 2004, p. 280.
[103] Ibid., p. 290.
[104] Ibid., p. 292.
[105] Jef Huysmans, "Migrants as a Security problem: Dangers of "Securitising" Societal Issues," in *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*, eds. R Miles and D Thranhardt, (London: Pinter, 1995), p. 752.
[106] Ibid., p. 758.

31

access to follow suit.[107] Thus through the process of securitisation, European nations, drawing on a contracted identity of cultural homogeneity and a more expansive identity of EU membership, have increasingly perceived immigrants in a negative and dangerous light.

2.4 Proposed Method of Case Study Analysis

The analysis of the Tensions using second-generation societal security will apply Buzan's three-stage process. Stage One (1) or *choice of units* will study the referent objects, securitising actors, and functional actors involved in the securitisation process that brought about the Tensions. In Stage Two (2) or the *choice of method*, a discourse analysis will be performed, providing observations on "*when and how something is established by whom as a security threat*."[108] This will be the most difficult stage in the analysis, as such a study of the securitisation process using discourse as a analytical source requires the inclusion of relevant historical and cultural data to discern (a) what is being inferred by what is being said, (b) what is the relationship between the securitising actor and the audience and how does the 'speech act' modify this relationship, and (c) what actions or discourses are returned by the audience to display evidence of intersubjective approval of the emergency measures proposed by the 'speech act'. Stage Three (3) or the *choice of material and sources*, has already been made through the contribution of the case study chapter and thus is not as important to the analysis as the first two stages. However, the choice of various artefacts of 'discourse' presented in the case study chapter has been made according to Buzan's position that source texts should be chosen that are central to the security discourse operative in the specific community.[109] Using this three-stage approach the theory will attempt to explain how the constructed identities in Solomon Islands societies and the 'speech acts' of a few politicians and cultural leaders

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[107] Huysmans, 1995, p. 767.
[108] Buzan, 1998, p. 176.
[109] Ibid., p. 177.

32

caused the issue of Malaitans living on Guadalcanal land to be so securitised so as to lead to the atrocities perpetrated in the Tensions.

2.5 The Importance of the Distinction

From the two summaries of the main components, operational framework and previous use (with examples) of first and second generation societal security found in Chapter One and Chapter Two, this chapter will now conclude with a short narration as to the importance of the distinction between the two generations of societal security and a description of how the theory will engage with the case study. The main aim of this thesis is to show that the neat division between first and second generation societal security can be made, and is important to the clarity of a case study analysis in that both generations offer a different explanatory utility.

This thesis will demonstrate through the following case study that *both* generations can potentially offer quite distinct explanatory utility in contrast to each other. In this respect the analysis of the case study using the first generation of societal security will use the parameters established at the conclusion of Chapter One and the analysis using the second generation will use the parameters set out above. With these two conceptual frameworks established, this thesis will endeavour to prepare the ground for their comparison through performing a detailed account of the Solomon Islands 'Tensions'.

CHAPTER THREE – SOLOMON ISLANDS CASE STUDY

The ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands, called the 'Tensions', occurred with varying degrees of intensity between 1998 and 2003. To give an accurate description of the multidimensional nature of Solomon Islands society this chapter will be divided into two halves. The *first* half will (3.1) provide a general history of the origins of the Solomon Islands and then it will investigate the three major levels of identifiable societal strata that persist within the Solomon Islands, namely (3.2) Melanesian *Kastom*[110] (a pidgin word identifying the cultural customs and values of the Melanesian people), (3.3) the influence and status of Christianity and the 'Missions', and (3.4) the influence of the Colonial British and subsequent features of the (3.5) independent Solomon Islands government. Within this investigation, details will be given of how these societal 'layers' interact and how they directly and/or indirectly influenced the emergence of the Tensions. The structuring of this investigation into the construction of Solomon Islands society is intentionally designed, neither to provide an exhaustive anthropological nor political science analysis, but instead to identify clearly the key characteristics of Solomon Islands society that are important to a societal security analysis. The *second* half (3.6) of this chapter will present a detailed linear narrative concerning the progression of the Tensions between 1998 and 2003 as a lead into the final chapter of this thesis, which, using this information, will test and compare the utility of the first and second generations of societal security.

3.1 General Description

A study of the Solomon Islands must not discount its origins and geographic location. The Solomon Islands is situated "around 1,200 miles northeast of Australia in the south-western

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[110] A Pidgin word identifying the cultural customs and values of the Melanesian people of the Solomon Islands

part of the Pacific Ocean"[111] within the Melanesian Chain. It's land area of around 28,369 square kilometres is made up of six large forest-clad islands, surrounded by smaller atolls and reefs.[112] Spanish explorers were the first European to set foot in the archipelago,[113] however only after imperial Germany gifted the islands to the British Empire at the closure of the 19th century were the Solomon Islands brought under directly Colonial administration.[114] Christian missionaries arrived during these imperial projects and spread Western culture as they began to converted the Islanders. Today, the Solomon Islands operates a unicameral Westminster style of government reminiscent of its Colonial past and its population of around 460,000 people, according to the 2004 census[115], identify themselves within this intertwined framework of Melanesian *Kastom*, Christian belief and the sovereignty of the Solomon Islands state.

3.2 Melanesian Kastom

An understanding of Melanesian *Kastom*, or the traditional knowledge of rules and laws, is essential to understand any event or issue in the Solomon Islands. This section will describe: (3.2.1) the configuration of Melanesian society and (3.2.2) the *kastom* or laws regarding the 'compensation' of injury or insult within these societal units.

3.2.1 Melanesian Society

In the Solomon Islands, before the influence of Europeans, "kinship was the cement of each society, binding the individual to the group."[116] This association or kinship was typically based upon the common recognition of "an apical ancestor who first cleared patches in the

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[111] Jon Fraenkel, *The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands*, (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2004), p. 20.
[112] Ibid. (See Appendix 1)
[113] Ibid. p. 19.
[114] Judith Bennett, "Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands - Though Much is Taken, Much Abides: Legacies of Tradition and Colonialism," (Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University) Discussion Paper 2002/5, p. 3.
[115] Fraenkel, p. 20.
[116] Bennet, 2002, p. 2.

forest, cultivated and settled land or fished a reef,"[117] and was therefore used as a basis to claim "terrestrial and maritime resource for food production and other necessities."[118] This identification of kinship through ancestral linkage with 'land' meant that the typical Melanesian society would not normally move outside its established land boundaries, other than for long distance marriages or head-hunting raids.[119] Members of these kinship groups identified each other through the term '*wantok*'[120] and had a deep-rooted responsibility for the care and upkeep of others in their family unit. The governing structure of these small groups tended to recognise "… three main bases of authority, which were represented by spiritual, political and warrior leaders."[121] The spiritual leader mediated between the people and the spirit world. The political leader, 'Big-Man' or Chief dealt with matters of politics within the society, such as disputes, reconciliations, compensation and in dealings with the larger tribe or clan. A Big-Man would hold his position through exerting influence on those around him usually through his organisational skills and through his generosity at feasts. The warrior leader was responsible for raids and revenge killings.[122] In most cases, Solomon Islands societies were structured according to this system of governance, though in most cases leadership authorities were vested in only two, or even a single leader.[123]

3.2.2 Compensation

As mentioned previously the Big-Man was responsible for duties regarding 'compensation'. Compensation, or the offering of value items, such as shell money or pigs was an essential offer of respect before negotiating peaceful settlement to a dispute. Compensation *kastom*

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[117] Bennet, 2002, p. 2.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid.
[120] '*Wantok*' being the term used to define close family linkage of language group; however, it is also used to describe persons belonging to the same community, tribe, region and even nation according to context. Literally "one-talk."
[121] Sam Alasia,*"Party politics and government in Solomon Islands,"* (Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University) Discussion Paper 1997/7, p. 3
[122] Ibid., p. 2.
[123] Ibid.

including the amount per offence, the type of shell money used and the ceremony held, differed across the archipelago.[124] This un-unified legal system, strong attachment to small kinship groups and ancestrally-owned land is the cultural reality that persists in Melanesian Solomon Islands till today, and influenced both Christian and introduced political institutions in the archipelago.

3.3 Christian Influence

The first missionaries entered the Solomon Islands during the initial stages of Colonial governance and although at first encountering high levels of rejection by local populations, including gross acts of massacre and cannibalism, missions have played a more gradual but also more enduring role than perhaps other introduced Western institutions. [125] Early missionaries criss-crossed the already elaborate "ethno-linguistic mosaic of the islands"' [64 individual language groups] dividing islands and villages alike into zones based on Christian affiliation.[126] Christianity was essential to the construction of today's Solomon Islands through opening an avenue to interact with the wider world, "just as it opened paths between communities by facilitating the intermingling of people from different societies and the reconciliation of former enemies."[127] The missions have been so successful in their efforts in the islands that all but a few pagans in central Guadalcanal and Malatia's Kwaio region, regard themselves as strongly belonging to one Christian denomination or another.[128] However, through this same process elements of Christianity have undergone a form of 'indigenisation'. [129] This intermixing of *kastom* and Christian ideas and values led in turn to

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[124] Fraenkel, p. 110.
[125] Ibid., pp. 19-20.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Anglican 32.8%, Catholic 19%, SSEC 17%, SDA 11%, Methodist 10%; Fraenkel, p. 21.
[129] Ibid., p. 185

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the early political movements in the central and western provinces[130]; however, it has constructed some somewhat eccentric behaviour in Malaita through the formation of the 'Deep Sea Canoe' Movement. This evangelical movement proclaims that the Solomon Islands are the 'uttermost parts' referred to in Jesus' Sermon on the Mount.[131] The observed corruption and immorality of the politicians and youth is perceived as a result of being so far away from Jerusalem, and that the only way to preserve their spiritual integrity and identity[132] is to return to a pure *kastom*-based upon laws and rules passed down by their ancestors whom they believe is the 'Lost Tribe of Israel'[133] Thus both *kastom* and Christianity in the Solomon Islands are resources that can be "employed dynamically and creatively in people's everyday politics … to support peace or to exacerbate existing fault lines between ethnic and religious groups, and between national élites and rural communities."[134]

3.4 Colonial Government

The rule of the British over the Solomon Islands archipelago, from 1893 to 1978, contributed the greatest observable change in Solomon Islands culture and self-realisation.[135] Indeed, the British established the formative boundaries of the modern state, organised the legal and administrative systems, declared customary acts such as head-hunting and vengeance killings illegal, and brought the first modernising industries to the country. Three policy decisions by the British administration are important in relation to this case study: namely the (3.4.1) recognition by the administration of vacant land in central and western Solomon Islands, (3.4.2) encouraging the development of labour intensive copra and palm oil plantations in the

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[130] Judith Bennet, *Wealth of the Solomons: A History of a Pacific Archipelago, 1800-1978*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 246-264.
[131] Jaap Timmer, "*Kastom* and theocracy: a reflection on governance from the uttermost part of this world" in *Rebuilding the State in Solomon Islands*, ed. S. Dinnen and S. Firth, (Sydney: Asia Pacific Press, 2008), p. 203.
[132] Ibid., p. 208.
[133] Ibid., p. 206.
[134] Ibid., p. 199.
[135] Bennet, 2002, p. 3.

38

same area and (3.4.3) the discouragement of indigenous involvement in the Colonial administration.

3.4.1 Vacant Land

From the start, the small colonial administration in the Solomons chose not to forsake *kastom* land ownership in its new territorial acquisition and leaving about 95 per cent of the land in the hands of customary indigenous owners.[136] However, in 1900, Resident Commissioner Woodford observed large areas of seemingly unoccupied land, mainly in the western region, and opened them up for development.[137] What he had not factored into his decision was the preceding 60-year escalation of headhunting and raiding, taking advantage of new steel weapons, that drove the "depleted coastal populations inland to safe, hidden locations."[138] Though later, over half of this 'waste land' was re-claimed by Islanders, the Colonial government's initial allocation of large tracts of land to plantation developers antagonised the 'traditional' landowners.[139]

3.4.2 Copra and Palm Oil Plantations

Large companies such as Lever's Pacific Plantations and Burns Philp's subsidiaries took advantage of the government's offer and cleared and established plantations in these areas with the help of Solomon Islander labour.[140] In these coconut plantations, where for two years of their lives thousands of men from all over the Solomon Islands worked, knowledge was shared between Solomon Islanders from a variety of islands and communities, as were customs and the "colonial workplace, and its systems, as well as inducting many into the rudiments of the cash economy."[141] Thus the seeds of nationhood were planted. In addition,

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[136] Bennet, 2002, p. 5.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid., p. 4.
[141] Ibid.

workplace relations invoked the emergence of regional and sometimes island-based solidarity among the employees, "most markedly for Malaitans who made up almost two-thirds of the workforce."[142] Even at this early stage of Solomon Islands history, anxiety about the immigration of Malaitans was emerging. Indeed, Malaitans were considered dangerous and other ethnic and regional groups tended to tread lightly when with Malaitan groups, through fear of conflict due to the Malaitan sensitivity to slights against their customs and a mutual fear of sorcery.[143] In these mixed ethnicity workplaces, "controversy often arose due to failure to reach agreement owing to different sums conventionally paid for crimes on the different home islands of the workers.'[144] As evidence of this ill feeling, field reports from Guadalcanal in the 1950s show that "the worst fear the Tasimboko people have is in regard to the immigration of Malatia people"[145] But the Colonial masters maintained order, and peace reigned in the 'Happy Isles'[146].

3.4.3 British 'Only' Administration

The British administration of the Solomon Islands tended to avoid educating indigenous persons in the techniques of politics or bureaucracy, at least until after World War Two.[147] Causing the political structures bequeathed by the British to not sit well on Melanesian foundation.[148] During the colonial administration, the Islanders noticed "the colonial servants, though they may have had many cultural blind spots, were rarely dishonest."[149] This led to a strange paradox in the mid-70s when many of the Solomon Islanders "were content to see the

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[142] Bennet, 2002, p. 4.

[143] Ibid.

[144] Fraenkel, p. 113.

[145] C. Allen, citied in M. Chapman, "Population Movement: Free of Constrained?" in *Independence, Dependence, Interdependence The First Ten Years of Solomon Islands Independence*, eds. R. Crocombe and E. Tuza, (Honiara: Government Printing Press, 1992)

[146] An ironic self-referential term to describe the peaceful trouble free life of the Solomon Islands

[147] Alasia, p. 3.

[148] Bennet, 2002, p. 1.

[149] Ibid., p. 7.

British stay longer, though a few university graduates called for independence."[150] After independence in 1978, when Britain left the Solomon Islands with a small monetary package and somewhat functional civil service, the honesty and efficiency of the past colonial masters installed "expectations of similar behaviour from their successors."[151] This was not to be.

3.5 After Independence

After independence, (3.5.1) regional disunity, (3.5.2) economic corruption and the squandering of resources and (3.5.3) disenfranchisement with the political system abounded in the 'Happy Isles'.

3.5.1 Regional Disunity

Issues of regional disunity usually focused on the capital, Honiara, and perceptions that Guadalcanal took a disproportionate share of resources.[152] This is in fact quite true. Honiara, increased in size, trebling its population of 5,000 in the 1960s to around 15,000 in 1978. Containing the "predictable array of government offices, as well as a hospital, hotel, clubs, churches, banks, stores, warehouses, a market, a 'China Town', picture theatre, sports ground, schools, and an artificial harbour,"[153] politics, industry and a sizable 'leaf house' settlement grew up around the capital (some on un-owned customary land)[154] to benefit from such a 'service-rich' site. Records show that in 1999 "including dependants, this entailed around 8,000-10,000 migrant settlers associated with SIPL [Solomon Islands Plantations Ltd] activities out of the northern plains [of Guadalcanal]."[155] The aspirations for greater development and political autonomy by provincial governments and regions in the Solomon Islands discussed options such as succession, federalism and reformed provincial government

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[150] Bennet, 2002, p. 7.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid., p. 8.
[153] Ibid, p. 6.
[154] Fraenkel, p. 49.
[155] Ibid.

to neutralise the perceived disparities between Honiara and the rest of the Solomon Islands. The regional disunity between underdeveloped Malaita and Guadalcanal certainly contributed to the birth of the Tensions.[156]

3.5.2 Economic and Political Corruption

Perceptions towards political and economic corruption mainly centred on the resident elite in Honiara. In the late 1970s and 1980s, though still dependent on copra and palm oil exports and additional revenue from the Gold Ridge gold mine, the Solomon Islands economy began to consume its largest resource – its forests. Asian-based logging companies taking advantage of the loose regulations and corruptibility of political leaders poured into the Solomons.[157] Logging gained favour as the preferred method of raising revenue, at both a governmental and provincial level since the "Asian way of doing business, smoothed by gifts and favours [as seen above in the description of Melanesian *Kastom*], fell within the cultural ambit of Solomons' societies."[158] This led to noticeable instances of corruption and self-serving within the Honiara elite.[159]

3.5.3 Political Disillusionment

In the decades after independence Islanders saw the decline of political morality. By the early stages of the 1990s, Islanders had given up hope of cleaning up their governance processes and accepted the quasi-Westminster/*Kastom* style government because they realised that the only means of fulfilling their own needs was through soliciting 'favours' from their representative in government. "Thus by putting such men in place the people are propping up a weak, rotting state."[160] This general decay of political morality and regional unity was

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[156] Bennet, 2002, p. 8.
[157] Ibid., p. 9.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid., p. 10.

exacerbated by a rapidly rising population, which continued to grow faster than GDP.[161] "This was a youthful population with higher aspirations than its parents. But in the towns it fed upon reports of conflict in neighbouring Bougainville and on images from the shabby video parlours that portrayed violence as a means to satisfy those aspirations."[162]

To summarise this chapter so far, "The twenty years since independence, and the preceding era of trading contact and colonial rule, had, by 1998, bequeathed a volatile blend of regional, socio-economic and religious loyalties, underpinned and in some ways reinforced by an uneven, migrant labour-dependent programme for economic growth."[163]

3.6 The 'Tensions'

The Tensions began in 1998-1999, ostensibly as an indigenous uprising by Guadalcanalese against Malaitans living on Guadalcanal[164] land, with the "Isatabu insurgency driving settlers from the neighbouring island of Malatia, who were perceived as disrespectful guests, off the island of Guadalcanal."[165] This second half of the chapter will now provide a detailed account of the Tensions, using subheadings to divide the conflict into areas of similar interest.

3.6.1 The *'Demands by the Bona Fide and Indigenous People of Guadalcanal'*

The first sparks could be seen in August 1997, when Bart Ulufa'alu, a Malaitan, was elected Prime Minister. His administration faced a sick development-dependant economy, struggling with not only corruption in the political ranks but also with disturbances made by the 1997 Asian economic crisis.[166] Ulufa'alu, breaking with a tradition of previous corrupt governments, began down the track of implementing better regulations concerning logging, decreasing the size of the public service and the privatisation of government interests. It was

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[161] Bennet, 2002, p. 10.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Fraenkel, p. 42.
[164] For map of Guadalcanal see Appendix 2
[165] Fraenkel, p. 7.
[166] Bennet, 2002, p. 10.

an attempt to improve the chances of lifting the Solomon Islands from its economic depths.[167] However, these policies were abruptly halted in mid-1998 when the ex-Prime Minister and aspiring Guadalcanal Province Premier, Ezekiel Alebua, demanded that the national government pay compensation for 25 Guadalcanalese people who had been murdered by various Malaitans over the preceding 20 years. He went on to seek, among other things, "the return of lands purchased, rented, or occupied by Malaitans and payment from the national government for using Guadalcanal lands for its capital."[168]

> "We believe that the lack of respect for the people of Guadalcanal and their properties by people from other provinces that the people of Guadalcanal have and are continuing to experience will have no end unless the national capital is relocated."[169]

The *'Demands by the Bona Fide and Indigenous People of Guadalcanal'*, officially submitted in February 1999, was pre-empted by an earlier claim of compensation made by the parents of two Malaitan girls raped at a Guadalcanal provincial school in May 1998. Alebua saw injustice in how the Malaitan Prime Minister paid compensation from the national coffers only to deduct the amount from the grants due to Guadalcanal province.[170]

3.6.2 First Raids Against Malaitan Settlements

Whatever the immediate cause, Alebua's declaration had certainly lit the flame of conflict and was perceived by Guadalcanalese as blanket authorisation to harass Malaitans. This escalated as Guadalcanalese youths, calling themselves the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA) pillaged, raped, and otherwise attacked Malaitans, leaving at least 28 dead by August 1999.[171] Not surprisingly, these attacks on the Malaitans were conduced by youths in Guadalcanal who

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[167] Judith Bennet, *Pacific Forest: A History of Resource Control and Contest in Solomon Islands c. 1800-1997*, (Cambridge and Leiden: White Horse Press and Brill, 2000), pp. 379-383.
[168] Bennet, 2002, p. 10.
[169] Fraenkel, p. 48.
[170] Bennet, 2002, p. 10.
[171] Ibid.

had been arming themselves since 1996 for such an event.[172] This "… low intensity civil war … was fought by bark cloth-clad, or second-hand military fatigue-garbed, insurgent groups armed mainly with home-made guns, .22 pigeon-shooters, shotguns, clubs, sticks and bows and arrows, [initially] against the considerably superior armed forces of the state and, in the later stages, against an associated urban-based militia group."[173] These raids on Malaitan settlements "generated countless rumours and counter-rumours, and consequently great uncertainty about who was involved, what were the objectives and what was happening on the ground."[174] Some persons recount that, "Most of the militant men smoked with our husbands and ate in our homes but all of a sudden they came in the night and burnt our houses."[175] Those attempting to articulate what was occurring in the Malaitan settlements constantly referred to 'racial persecution' and 'ethnic cleansing' on Guadalcanal."[176] The Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) and the Harold Keke led GRA based themselves on the 'inaccessible' southern coast, or 'Weather Coast' of Guadalcanal and began to draw a large number of followers.

> "The most important issue that inspired me to join the Guadalcanal militancy was what I perceived as the disrespect that settlers (especially Malatians) had towards our people and our land."[177]

3.6.3 The Effects of the Unrest

The initial response of the Malaitan settlers was to flee their homes in the Northern Plains. Many fled to the safety of Honiara's city limits with their large Malaitan communities. The Malatians weren't the only casualties of this rural conflict: it now included the indigenous

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[172] Tarcisius T. Kabutaulaka, "Beyond Ethnicity: The Political economy of the Guadalcanal Crisis in Solomon Islands," (Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University) Working Paper 2001/1

[173] Fraenkel, p. 7.

[174] Ibid., p. 8.

[175] "Militants Launch Surprise Attack," *Solomon Star*, 13 May 1999.

[176] Fraenkel, p. 8.

[177] G. Gray, "Habuna Momoruqy (The Blood of my Island): Violence and the Guadalcanal Uprising in the Solomon Islands," (Canberra: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University) Discussion Paper 2002/3, p. 4.

urban Guadalcanalese living in Honiara. As the tensions rose, with reports of attacks on

Malaitans in rural areas and GRA raids on weapons caches, attacks on Guadalcanese in

Honiara became more frequent and a growing number of Guadalcanalese relocated.[178] The

disturbances at this time also forced the closure of SIPL, the major employer in the province

and a significant revenue-earner for the country, as much of its workforce were being

evacuated and its grounds the battlefield for the rebel militia.

3.6.4 The Government Response

The response of the government to stop the GRA rebels was two-pronged. First, it declared a

four month state of emergency, "widely viewed among Guadalcanalese communities as akin

to 'a declaration of war,'"[179] issuing greater powers to the Royal Solomon Islands Police

(RSIP) and especially to its overwhelmingly Malaitan paramilitary wing, the Police Field

Force (PFF). During the initial stages of the conflict the police operated with "restraint and

hesitation,"[180] but due to the disproportionate number of Malaitans (around 75 percent)[181] and

the increased number of attacks focused upon their *wantoks*, this changed quickly. The second

response was to appeal for peace through a reconciliation ceremony. This ceremony, called

the Honiara Accord, was held in May 1999 and incorporated Christian and *Kastom* elements

as well as a rather secular distribution of Solomon dollars. This act, said Andrew Nori, "was

the most untraditional, most stupid and most irrelevant and abnormal ceremony ever held in

Melanesia."[182]

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[178] Fraenkel, p. 57.
[179] *The Emergency Powers (Islands of Guadalcanal) Regulations of the 17th June 1999 and Amendments of 28th June 1999*, Honiara.
[180] Fraenkel, p. 67.
[181] Ibid., p. 49.
[182] Andrew Nori, "Beneath Guadalcanal – Inside SIAC." *Solomon Star*, 7 March 2000.

3.6.5 The Malaitan Response

The flight of the Malaitans steadily increased. By November 1999 some 35,309 people had reported themselves as having been displaced, with 70 percent of these from rural Guadalcanal and 30 per cent from within Honiara."[183] This large number of 'refugees' either remained in Honiara or were repatriated back to Malatia with the assistance of the Solomon Islands Red Cross.[184] In November 1999 the Malaitans still residing in Honiara marched to the national parliament demanding compensation for their loss of land and damage done by the GRA.[185] The pleas of these homeless Malaitans to the government were refused, as the "Prime Minister Ulufal'alu denied that the national government owed compensation."[186] This move by the Malatian Prime Minister to ignore the requests of 'his' *wantoks* led to a greater deterioration in the perceived legitimacy of the government and led in part to the formation of a Malatian militia, the Malatian Eagle Force (MEF).[187] The delay in the creation of the MEF was due in part to Malaitans regarding the actions of the RSIP as being the *de facto* Malaitan response toward the GRA and IFM.[188] The MEF, led by Jimmy 'Rasta' Lusibaea, aimed at achieving two goals; one, the forceful removal of the Prime Minister and the selection of a new Prime Minister more accepting of their requests for compensation, and two, to respond to the insults and injury performed towards the Malaitans on Guadalcanal by the IFM and GRA.[189]

By the conclusion of 1999, fighting has escalated, with IFM and MEF bunkers facing each other on the outskirts of the town. These bunkers were No Go zones where the brutality of the conflict was openly displayed. One such instance was the beheading of a Guadalcanalese man

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[183] Fraenkel, p. 55.
[184] Ibid., p. 61.
[185] Bennet, 2002, p. 11.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Fraenkel, p. 78.
[189] Bennet, 2002, p. 11.

in the Honiara market and a responsive killing of a Malaitan man by the IFM with his head being impaled at an IFM roadblock east of Honiara.[190]

3.6.6 Polarisation in Society

During 1999 the polarisation of the larger Solomon Islands society sharpened – even Malaitans who had strong bonds to indigenous Guadalcanal communities found themselves "swept up into the anti-settler campaign"[191] and were forced to leave their homes. It even influenced how mixed-blood Islanders were viewed by either side. Intermarriage had become quite normal and acceptable over the colonial years, but during the Tensions, mixed ethnicity marriages collapsed at an extraordinary rate with both GRA and Malaitan militia groups targeting 'mixed-bloods' whom they suspecting as spies.[192]

At the same time the 'Deep Sea Canoe' movement, with its belief in the distinctiveness of Malaita, gained greater following amongst the Malaitan populations in both Guadalcanal and Malaita who observed the threat to their *kastom*, and reinforced it through this radical notion.[193]

This polarisation was not only observable on Guadalcanal and Malatia, but also in the West, where numerous Malaitans had immigrated for employment. Claims that "Malaitan men, from an over-populated island, were marrying New Georgian women to gain land,"[194] were loudly spoken and in both island groups, Guadalcanal and the Western Province, there was "expressed a distaste for Malaitan pollution taboos associated with women and … upon the

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[190] Fraenkel, p. 84.
[191] Ibid., p. 59.
[192] Ibid., p. 61.
[193] Timmer, p. 206.
[194] Freankel, p. 60.

Kwaio pagans who had not accepted the Christian faith."[195] Put simply by GRA Commander

George Gray, "We are anti-Malaitan."[196]

3.6.7 The 2000 Coup

By early 2000 the MEF and the GRA were established, well-trained armies. Indeed, they were

mirror-stage armies, "used by marginalised elites in pursuit of political and financial

objectives" and both used a similar constitution of forces from the disenfranchised under-

employed generations on both sides of the ethnic divide.[197] Strategically, however, the GRA

had achieved much of its original goal, the elimination of Malaitans from the Guadalcanal

plains. The MEF had yet to fully respond. "Victims are victims and being victims may breed

the urge to retaliate."[198]

On June 5, 2000, the MEF with officers from the RSIP seized control of weapons armoury at

Rove, captured a naval vessel and cordoned of Honiara. They detained the Prime Minister in

his home and forced his resignation.[199] This action scared most of the non-Malaitans in

Honiara and precipitated a mass evacuation of the city leading to a complete failure of the

civil service.[200] During the coup "the MEF publicly declared 'all out war' on the IFM and

fighting flared up to the east and west of Honiara"[201] which in turn closed down the last

remaining source of income to the beleaguered government, the mining operation at Gold

Ridge.[202] In late June a 'constitutional' change of power in the Parliament set Choiseul MP

Mannesah Sogovare as the new Prime Minister.[203] This more "pliable premier"[204] insisted on

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[195] Freankel, p. 60.

[196] Ibid.

[197] Ibid., p. 78.

[198] S. Priest, "An Account of the Current Situation." *Solomon Star*, 16 November 1999.

[199] Bennet, 2002, p. 11.

[200] Fraenkel, p. 87.

[201] Ibid., p. 90

[202] Bennet, 2002, p. 11.

[203] Fraenkel, p. 87.

[204] Ibid., p. 93.

a more *kastom*-based approach towards reconciliation, or "payment before peace."[205] This robbed the state treasury of even more of its foreign donated and borrowed money, and reflected the true level of corruption among the political elite. The 'payment before peace' philosophy "reflected the Melanesian way of resolving conflict by allowing justice before peace rather than peace before justice,"[206] a justice usually granted to the *wantoks* of the incumbent Prime Minister and his cabinet.

During 2000 the conflict between the MEF and GRA escalated with more attacks along the Honiara 'No-Go zone'. One of the government's Australian-donated patrol boats indiscriminately fired 55-millimetre shells inland towards the IFM positions during an attack on an IFM bunker.[207] A locally brokered peace settlement was finally signed between the two groups, the MEF allowing the GRA control over rural Guadalcanal and the GRA allowing the MEF control of urban Honiara, and in addition, a number of suburban settlements.[208]

3.6.8 Townsville Peace Agreement Failure

Meanwhile, the Australian and New Zealand governments had become more than a little anxious about the 'failing' status of their neighbour and initiated a peace council to be held at the Australian Defence Force base in Townsville. The meetings in October 2000 achieved the Townville Peace Agreement, regarded widely as a hasty and flawed document. However, Nori, as spokesman for the Malaitan side, announced, "As far as the MEF/Joint Operation is concerned the war on Guadalcanal is over."[209] This peace, supported by the extravagant reconciliation payments made by the Sogovare government lasted for almost a year but was not to last. During the Townville Peace Review in September 2001 talks were derailed by the execution-style shooting of an IFM commander near the Japanese War memorial in the hills

[205] Fraenkel, pp. 95-96.
[206] Ibid., p. 95.
[207] Ibid., pp. 96-97.
[208] Ibid., p. 97.
[209] *Solomon Star*, 17 October 2000.

behind Honiara. The culprits were Malatian militants under the direct control of the MEF supreme commanders.[210] By the eve of 2002, neither Harold Keke of the GRA nor Jimmy 'Rasta' Lusibaea of the MEF, showed any intentions of surrender.[211] In fact Keke had become an "obsessive evangelist, preaching hell, fire and fury, and the defence of the motherland."[212]

3.6.9 Budget Crisis

There was some hope after the December 2001 elections and the appointment of Sir Allen Kemakeza as the Prime Minister, an important man in the brokering of the Townsville Peace Agreement.[213] But as the budget was drawn up in March 2002 the devastation of Sogovare's "payment before peace" initiative came to light. The new budget required an unsupportable 60 per cent of funding to come from foreign aid donations.[214] This led to Kemakeza requesting external assistance, not only to improve the Solomon Islands economy, but also to quell the long-standing conflict.

3.6.10 RAMSI

"On 24 July 2002 at 7:00 am, the first of that day's 13 Royal Australian Air Force C-130 Hercules Transport Planes touched down at Henderson Airfield."[215] Simultaneous operations, including a amphibious landing by Australian Defence Force personnel on Red Beach, near Honiara, instilled the desired sensation of 'Shock and Awe' on the region. "The militants were to surrender with barely a whimper. Not a single shot had to be fired in anger."[216] And by Christmas 2003 most of the militant leaders had been arrested.[217] This was the end of the

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[210] Fraenkel, pp. 128-129.
[211] Ibid., p. 141.
[212] Ibid., p. 144.
[213] Ibid., pp. 137-138.
[214] Bennet, 2002, p. 11.
[215] Fraenkel, p. 159.
[216] Ibid.
[217] Ibid., p. 174.

violence of the Tensions and the beginning of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon

Islands (RAMSI) occupation of the Solomon Islands.

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CHAPTER FOUR – CASE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON

With summaries of the main components, operational framework and previous uses of the first and second generations of societal security provided in Chapter One and Chapter Two and the detailed history and account of the Solomon Islands 'Tensions' in Chapter Three, this chapter will now proceed to conduct a dual case analysis, first (4.1) utilising the conceptual framework of the first generation of societal security and second (4.2) using the theoretical components prescribed by the second generation of societal security. In conclusion this chapter (4.3) will detail in the course of the analysis the strengths and weakness of each generation and compare their conceptual utilities, to elicit some form of answer regarding the generation best suited for what type of analysis. The results of this case study test will reflect directly on the conclusions of this thesis concerning the theoretical value of dividing the concept of societal security into two distinct generations, and the implications this may have on future research.

4.1 First Generation

To conduct the analysis of the Solomon Islands Tensions using the first generation of societal security, the framework mentioned at the conclusion of Chapter One will be used. This framework model will provide some explanatory results pertaining to how the conflict came about, what the main actions were that caused the conflict to escalate and what actions were able to end the conflict. *Firstly* this study will (4.1.1) identify the involved groups and their core identities; *secondly* it will (4.1.2) discern what constituted the threat to each group; *thirdly* it will (4.1.3) describe how each group defended itself, and *finally* (4.1.4) how the conflict was resolved.

4.1.1 Core Identities

In the first generation of societal security Waever suggests that the main units for analysis are "politically significant ethno-national and religious identities,"[218] with a longstanding history of group cohesion and the ability to recreate notions of identity across generations. In Chapter Three, Melanesian society is quite cleared portrayed as consisting of various groups featuring the characteristics of this definition. In the case of the Solomon Islands Tensions two groups with politically significant ethno-national, or *kastom*, identities were involved – the Malaitans and the Guadalcanalese. These groups conform to a typical Melanesian definition of society, where "identification with place and region" [219] and their particular practice of *kastom* is embedded in their worldview. The *core identities* of the Malaitans and Guadalcanal ethnic groups are thus based upon ownership and control of land, and the respect for their individual *kastoms* and laws. Every member, or *wantok*, of the ethnic group, would internalise these core identities. This means, according to the first generation of societal security logic, that these two groups would feel threatened and insecure if either land ownership and control was contested, or disrespect was felt toward their *kastom* or *wantok*.

4.1.2 Threats to Identity

Buzan suggests that "... forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through closure of places of education and worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community"[220] are the main actions that threaten societal identity, and that these threats can originate through either migration, horizontal competition or vertical competition.[221] At the beginning of the Tensions there were up to 8,000-10,000 migrant settlers[222], (two-thirds of which were Malaitans), on Guadalcanal land working on the plantations, many displaying a

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[218] Waever, 1993, p. 22.
[219] Bennet, 2002, p. 12.
[220] Waever, 1993, p. 43.
[221] Buzan, 1998, p. 121.
[222] Fraenkel, p. 49.

longstanding feeling of fear towards the immigrating Malaitans. [223] These immigrants had brought their aggressive *kastom* with them[224], openly disrespecting the *kastom* of the Guadalcanalese and 'illegally' settling on Guadalcanal customary land. Therefore, according to the first generation societal security logic the Guadalcanalese societal identity was indeed under threat by the immigrant Malaitans, and the means to solve their societal insecurity was to force the Malaitans out of Guadalcanal and back to Malaita.

Concurrently, the threats to Malaitan societal security were based upon dual threats: to the lives of *wantoks* and to the integrity of Malaitan *kastom.* The raids in August 1999 when the GRA pillaged, raped, and otherwise attacked Malaitans, leaving at least 28 dead[225] proved an existential threat to the physical survival of the Malaitan population and the integrity of their long-standing aggressive *kastom*. Malaitans, known for their 'vengeance,' could not tolerate the insult of 'their' people being treated by Guadalcanalese in such a way. [226] Thus the first generation societal security framework can clearly distinguish a link between the 'sedimented' identity of a societal group and the instance of threat.

4.1.3 Defence of Identity

According to the first generation of societal security identity can be defended "using military means"[227] or through cultural/identity strengthening.[228] During the Tensions the Guadalcanalese and Malaitans used both strategies to defend their identity.

Guadalcanalese, observing the threat of the immigrant Malaitans on their land, and their disrespectful attitude towards Guadalcanal *kastom* used armed militia in the form of the GRA

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[223] Fraenkel, p. 32.
[224] Bennet, 2002, p. 4.
[225] Ibid., p. 10.
[226] Priest
[227] Roe, 2002, p. 66.
[228] Waever, 1993, p. 191.

to chase the Malaitans back to Malaita, as a means of increasing their societal security. [229] The Malaitans, in a similar way, after first relying upon the 'unofficial' military action by the RSIP,[230] formed their own militia, the MEF, to counter the attacks by the GRA upon their *wantoks*.[231]

To strengthen their societies culturally both ethnic groups simultaneously targeted mixed-blood members of 'their' communities, treating them as outsiders and sometimes attacking them as spies.[232] And within the Malaitan ethnic group there was an increase of fellowship within the 'Deep Sea Canoe' Movement that proclaimed the cultural distinctiveness of Malaitans above those in other islands.[233]

Thus each societal group attempted to defend its societal security through a pattern explained in the first generation of societal security, and in so doing increased the level of insecurity in their competing 'other'. In a marginal way, this falls into the traditional pattern of the societal security dilemma as described by Roe in Chapter One,[234] excepting the misperception clause, since the militant actions of the Guadalcanalese could not constitute anything other than aggression, which explains how the situation quickly spiralled downwards to where the Solomon Islands government bankrupted itself in an attempt to reconcile the two parties through traditional and more modern techniques of compensation.[235]

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[229] Bennet, 2002, p. 10.
[230] Fraenkel, p. 78.
[231] Bennet, 2002, p. 11.
[232] Fraenkel, p. 84.
[233] Timmer, p. 206.
[234] Roe, 1999, p. 194.
[235] Bennet, 2002, p. 11.

4.1.4 Resolution of Conflict

The resolution of the Solomon Islands Tensions was not found in an appeal to customary compensation[236] or hastily brokered peace agreements[237] but through the intervention of a heavily armed military force known as the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands or RAMSI. [238] This resolution to the conflict sits well with the conceptual tenets of the first generation of societal security since the military and policing actions undertaken by RAMSI guaranteed security and justice to the combatants. It halted the societal security dilemma-induced spiral that had caused the conflict to escalate to its most revengeful level in 2002. Thus the first generation societal security framework not only assists in clearly identifying the reasons behind an ethnic conflict, but also explains the pattern through which such a conflict occurs and how it can, in fact, be halted.

However, one limitation that is quickly observed in the framework of the first generation of societal security is that it cannot stipulate clearly why the conflict between the Guadalcanalese and Malaitans occurred in 1998, since the underlying threat of increased migration and settlement on Guadalcanal land had been recorded as being present since the 1950s. The strengths and other weaknesses of the first generation will be properly detailed and then compared in the later stages of this chapter.

4.2 Second Generation

Through the use of the second generation of societal security, an analyst seeks to explain "*when and how something is established by whom as a security threat*."[239] To discern this information in relation to the Solomon Islands Tensions, this analysis will use the three-stage

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[236] Fraenkel, p. 95-96.
[237] *Solomon Star*, 2000.
[238] Fraenkel, p. 159.
[239] Buzan, 1998, p. 176.

process detailed earlier in Chapter Two.[240] In Stage One, (4.2.1) the units for analysis will be defined. In Stage Two (4.2.2) a discourse analysis of the case will be the method through which instances pertaining to the securitisation process will be identified. Stage Three or the *choice of material and sources*, as previously mentioned in Chapter Two, has already been conducted through the process of presenting the Solomon Islands case study. In using this three-stage approach, the second generation of societal security will attempt to offer an explanation as to "*when and how something is established by whom as a security threat*"[241] in the context of the Solomon Islands Tensions.

4.2.1 The Choice of Units

Before undertaking the discourse analysis to determine the constructions of threat in the Tensions, the units of analysis should first be defined. Buzan indicates two main units that require identification: *referent objects* and *securitising actors*.[242] Determining the *referent object* is important since it locates the source from which both the securitising actor and audience can be elicited. In the case of the Solomon Islands, determining the referent object is straightforward, as it is simply the identity-based societal groups of the Malaitans and the Guadalcanalese. As explained earlier, in the analysis of the first generation the referent objects of societal security are groups that have "politically significant ethno-national and religious identities,"[243] with a longstanding history of group cohesion and the ability to recreate notions of identity across generations. Within the Malaitan and Guadalcanal ethnic groups are persons that 'utter security', or *securitising actors*. Essentially, a securitising actor can be anyone with authority within the group.[244] However, according to Williams' argument that only certain actors can make legitimate claims concerning particular constructions of

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[240] Buzan, 1998, p. 177.
[241] Ibid., p. 176.
[242] Ibid., p. 36.
[243] Waever, 1993, p. 22.
[244] Buzan, 1998, p. 33.

threat,[245] the number is nonetheless limited to persons with enough 'recognised authority' to be able to engage an audience concerning security. In the Solomon Islands, securitising actors would be seen as being Big Men, *kastom* leaders, church elders and ministers, and politicians belonging to either the provincial or national level. These are the only people that sustain enough 'social capital'[246] to successfully 'utter security' in the modern Melanesian context.

4.2.2 Discourse Analysis

With the units of analysis established, a discourse analysis can now be performed in the case of the Solomon Islands Tensions. It begins with a search for the first 'utterances of security' that can locate and lock into a time-frame the initiation of the process of securitisation. To find these 'speech acts' Buzan suggests looking for arguments that take the rhetorical and logical form defined as security."[247] In the Solomon Islands case one particular 'speech act' by the ex-Prime Minister and Guadalcanal Premier Ezekiel Alebua fits this profile. Alebua's 1998 speech concerning the *'Demands by the Bona Fide and Indigenous People of Guadalcanal'* links phases such as "lack of respect"[248] by Malaitans, "have no end"[249], "relocation of the capital"[250] and "return of lands"[251] and thus contains a combination of all the *internal* aspects of a successful 'speech act:' references to existential threat, point-of-no-return and the possible way out.[252] His position as ex-Prime Minister and as a *kastom* leader also fulfils the *external* aspects required for such a 'speech act' to be successful.[253]

But was this 'speech act' successful in obtaining the i*ntersubjective* approval of the indigenous Guadalcanalese audience? Were they 'bracketed', in the 'speech act'? Any

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[245] Williams, 2003, p. 514.
[246] Buzan, 1998, p. 33.
[247] Ibid., p. 177.
[248] Fraenkel, p. 48.
[249] Ibid.
[250] Ibid.
[251] Bennet, 2002, p. 10.
[252] Buzan, 1998, p. 33.
[253] Ibid.

intersubjective approval of the audience depends greatly upon the 'speech act' itself, but is also contingent upon "a perceptive environment"[254] or context within which the audience finds itself. In the Guadalcanal case this environment of mounting annoyance and fear towards immigrants from surrounding islands is well evident, thus predisposing the Guadalcanalese to a disposition to listening and reacting to "utterances of security" regarding the implied threat. The intersubjective approval of the Guadalcanalese, however, is difficult to determine using the discourse analysis approach. As even Buzan observes, "Often it will therefore be easier to find the first part of the securitisation move..."[255] To reconcile the inadequacy of the discourse analysis method in locating the intersubjective approval in this study this analysis will instead use the approach suggested by Wilkinson which observes the "physical action"[256] of the audience, rather than its discourse. Indeed, through this approach the intersubjective establishment of existential threat can be found in the raids by the GRA in August 1999.[257]

The ensuing emergency measures solicit a typical societal security response by the Guadalcanalese; to attack the Malaitans with military means and thus strengthen their culture to defend it against the now constructed threat to identity. This analysis must, however, be careful to not fall into the trap of observing isolated instances of 'speech acts' and proffering that later events were a direct result of Alebua's 'utterings'.[258] Conversely, this discourse analysis has shown that the process of securitisation can offer an insight into "when and how something is established by whom as a security threat."[259]

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[254] Balzacq, p. 182.
[255] Buzan, 1998, pp. 177–178.
[256] Wilkinson, p. 20.
[257] Bennet, 2002, p. 10.
[258] Stritzel, p. 377.
[259] Buzan, 1998, p. 176.

On the Malaitan side of the conflict a discourse analysis is also instructive. The proliferation of targeted anti-Guadalcanal rhetoric, plus the lack of a societal security response[260] during the initial phases of the Tensions, show an intersubjective *rejection* by the Malatian societal group to the securitising moves made by its leaders. Indeed, it seemed that although being threatened as a society the Malaitans did not wish to securitise what they still wished to see resolved through normal politics. This of course changed in due course, as the government faltered and failed in its political attempts to restore peace. But as the societal security of the Malatians was increasingly threatened, the formation of the MEF and the aggressive attacks on the GRA and IFM were close to inevitable.

Thus, through the discourse analysis and observation of the process of securitisation, the second generation of societal security can elicit explanations as to why the Tensions occurred in 1998, after being initiated by a successful securitisation move by the Premier of Guadalcanal, and not in preceding years. It can also explain how Malaitans became the designated targets of Guadalcanalese societal security responses, even though members of other islands were resident in Guadalcanal at the time, since Malaitans were constructed as a singular threat in the securitisation move. However, a weakness can be observed in the framework of the second generation of societal security, and that is that it focuses too heavily on discourse analysis as the method to provide insight into instances of societal security, and that perhaps, as shown by the inclusion of Wilkinson's argument, other observations are necessary to locate stages along the securitisation process.

4.3 Comparison

From the two case analyses performed above this chapter will now detail the observed strengths and limitations of each generation and then compare their conceptual usefulness.

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[260] Fraenkel, p. 78.

4.3.1 First Generation Strengths and Limitations

The *strengths* of the first generation of societal security include, (1) its ability to clearly distinguish a link between the 'sedimented' identity of a societal group and the instance of threat. For example: Guadalcanalese identify themselves through land, thus their identity is threatened if their land is contested. Not only can the first generation (2) identify the reasons behind which an ethnic conflict occurs, but also (3) explain the pattern through which such conflict occurs and therefore, how (4) it is to be halted. For example: the societal security dilemma explains how the insurmountable societal security problems concerning the Malaitans living on Guadalcanal land spiralled into self-reinforcing conflict in which each side, through increasing its own security, decreases that of its opponents, exaggerating the crisis until external intervention halted the spiral through the provision of societal security for both sides.

A observed *limitation* of the first generation theory is that it cannot clearly stipulate why a conflict occurred at a certain point in time, since it observes more generally the context surrounding societal security and not the specific 'construction' of a 'perceived' threat.

4.3.2 Second Generation Strengths and Limitations

The *strengths* of the second generation of societal security include (1) its ability to utilise the method of discourse analysis and the securitisation process to identify why at a certain point in time conflict occurred. For example: the Guadalcanal Premier 'speaks' that Malaitans are an existential threat in 1998 and through contextual dependant approval by the Guadalcanalese can initiate violence against Malaitan settlers. It can also explain through this same process how (2) specific threats are chosen or constructed out a wide range of apparent threats. For example: Even though Malaitans and Isabellans are both residing illegally on Guadalcanal custom land, Alebua targets only the Malaitans as being the threat and therefore they alone become the objects of a societal security response by the Guadalcanalese.

An observed *limitation* of the second generation theory was that it depends too much on the method of discourse analysis used to investigate the securitisation process and that perhaps, as shown by the inclusion of Wilkinson's argument, other observations may be necessary to locate stages along the securitisation process.

4.3.3 Utility

Thus it can be clearly observed that both the first and second generations of societal security offer different explanatory value when tested against a case of societal security. According to their distinct conceptual frameworks the two generations offer a dual utility: the *first* being able to explain in more detail the general patterns and behaviours attributed to societal security, while the *second* allows for a more in-depth investigation into the *construction* of the threat and the subsequent response within a specific societal group. However, when investigating an instance of societal security, which generation of societal security should an analyst use? The use of either generation depends on the requirements of the analyst as each generation offers important insights into security concerns relating to "ethno-national or religious groups" as has been shown in the contents of this thesis, leading, perhaps to a wider scope of investigation and a more detailed explanation of why a dual usage of the first and second generation may be suitable, if not advisable.

CONCLUSION

The analysis provided in this thesis using two generations of societal security in a case of ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands has successfully indicated, *firstly,* that a clear distinction can legitimately be made between the first and second generations of societal security as the pattern of thinking shifted within the Copenhagen School, and *secondly,* that such a distinction offers an important contribution to the study of societal-based conflict through clearly distinguishing between two robust theoretical frameworks that can engage in quite separate investigations into the phenomena of identity, society and insecurity. The first generation of societal security offers policy-makers and security analysts a versatile conceptual model for elucidating the reasons for societies to enter into conflict and indeed, a framework within which such conflict can be mapped, if not predicted. The second generation of societal security presents these same policy-makers and security analysts a formidable conceptual tool for investigating at the basic rhetorical level the interaction between identity and the construction of threat, and thus a means to extrapolate "when and how something is established by whom as a security threat." [261]

In addition, the comparison between the two generations of societal security displays that, though operating with different operational features and observing societal conflict through two distinct lenses, the two generations do not act as competitors to extract greater explanatory values, but in fact complement each other, filling in the gaps left behind by their theoretical limitations.

With these final observations this thesis would thus posit that the first generation of societal security, though often neglected in favour of its successor, still holds some explanatory potential in relation to the study of societal conflict. Furthermore, that clarity in the distinction

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[261] Buzan, 1998, p. 176.

64

between the two generations of societal security, though instrumental to this thesis, must not forestall any attempt to utilise the *combined* strengths of their operational frameworks to investigate future societal conflict. A 'two generation approach' may elucidate broader understanding in regards to the inner- and out-workings of identity, society and security.

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69

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