Central European University

Humanitarianism on Trial in Sudan: Implications of the Incommensurability of the "New" Humanitarian and the Original Human Security Paradigms

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Abstract

The expulsion of 13 international humanitarian organizations at the beginning of March from the country that hosts the largest humanitarian mission in the world has raised essential questions reflecting the nature of humanitarian missions today. Largely through the case of the humanitarian crises in Sudan, the thesis draws attention to the effects of the multiple transformations within both human security and humanitarian paradigms on the humanitarian organizations' ability to effectively respond to emergency needs and alleviate human suffering. While evaluating the changing relationship between humanitarian action and politics, this research paper explicitly argues that the "new" humanitarianism and its tendency to focus on root causes of conflict-induced crisis continually jeopardizes the tension between need-based life-saving activities and longer-term objectives of achieving human development and state-building.

At the same time, the thesis traces numerous attempts to institutionalize human security concerns in state foreign and defense policies with the primary goal of revealing the shift back towards state-centric approach within the human security paradigm and its ontological incommensurability with the original human security doctrine. After outlining some of the dangers of the convergence agenda of the "new" humanitarianism, as well as the human security, the thesis concludes with a plea for a revival of the individual-focused security approach.

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Introduction

New interventionism, or "willingness to combine political and humanitarian missions,"[1] coupled with the increasing influence of human security as well as state building discourses, have become intertwined and played a crucial role in shaping the changing nature of the security problematic since the 1990s. On the one hand, the transformation of humanitarianism from the periphery to the center of the international policy agenda resulted in development of a new norm within the human security framework that force can legitimately be used as a response to humanitarian challenges, such as those facing the Kurds and Shiites in 1991, the human tragedy in Somalia in 1992 or massacres in Kosovo in 1999. After the end of the Cold War, the "new" humanitarianism appeared to shift the focus to "an emphasis on the right of individuals, often posed counter to the right of states."[2] While expanding into development in line with the model of the original individual-centric human security, the "new" humanitarianism incorporated on their agenda more long term structural threats to international security, such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, global warming with the primary goal of empowering individuals and providing "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear."[3]

On the other hand, further transformation of the "new" humanitarianism resulted in a shift towards extension of involvement "from the provision of immediate assistance to victims of conflict to the greater commitment of solidarity and advocacy work for victims and concerns for the long-term protection of human rights for "at risk" groups."[4] The

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[1] Anne Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2
[2] David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building*. (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p. 27
[3] United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 22
[4] David Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 23. (2001): 682

consequence of this move was achievement of an international consensus amongst international institutions, Western governments and non-governmental organizations that "international state-building interventions are essential to address a wide range of problems emerging in many regions of the world."[5] In the aftermath of 9/11 where the subsequent "war on terror" discourse has further highlighted that "problems in the South do not remain there but affect the everyday lives of ordinary people everywhere,"[6] the discourse of state building has once more placed the state at the centre of security concerns emphasizing the importance of states for maintaining international stability.

Importantly, a similar shift in language away from the "human-centered" framework towards a traditional "state-centered" approach has occurred within the human security paradigm as well. Countries or political entities that have operationalized the idea of human security either at the level of discourse or that of practice, advocated for coordination of long term development or state building policies with short term humanitarian relief missions focusing on the state as the referent object.

The debate on new interventionism and human security among international relations scholars, lawyers and policymakers is broadly represented in the existing literature. The human security paradigm was developed in major UN reports (United Nations Human Development Report, An agenda for Peace, The Brahimi Report, Report of Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Human Security for All), by academics (Kaldor and Glasius,[7] Maclean, Black and Shaw,[8] Duffield,[9] Chandler[10]) and

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[5] David Chandler, *Statebuilding and Intervention. Policies, Practices and Paradigms.* (London: Routledge, 2009), http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/chapters/Statebuilding%20Chandler%20Introduction.pdf

[6] Mike Fell, "Is Human Security our Main Concern in the 21st Century," *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol. 4, No. 3. (2006): 6

[7] Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor, "A Human Security Vision for Europe and beyond," in *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe,* ed. Glasius and Kaldor (London: Routledge, 2006)

[8] Sandra J Maclean, David R Black, and Timothy M Shaw, *A Decade of Human Security, Global Governance and New Multilateralisms.* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007)

[9] Mark Duffield. *Global Governance and the New Wars, the Merging of Development and Security.* (London: Zed Books, 2001)

[10] David Chandler, "Human Security: The Dog that didn't Bark," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 39, No. 4, (2008)

reports sponsored by states (Human Security Now, The Responsibility to Protect). However, despite the fact that the existing literature[11] has extensively addressed the question whether human security represents a paradigm shift, there has not been a serious enough effort to operationalize the term in its various stages of development both as a concept and a policy tool. Moreover, scholars have been reluctant to address a broader theoretical question on the compatibility of the initial human centered agenda of the human security paradigm with the current international state building discourse.

A critique of the concept of human security is mostly focused on the lack of analytical clarity. Paris suggests that human security should serve as a "label for a broad category of research in the field of security studies that is primarily concerned with nonmilitary threats to the safety of societies, groups, and individuals, in contrast to more traditional approaches to security studies that focus on protecting states from external threats."[12] Another issue raised by the scholar is the fact that since the concept is extraordinarily expansive and vague "it does not help decision-makers in their daily life of allocating scarce resources among competing goals."[13] Acknowledging this problem, Krause suggested that the "freedom from fear" agenda is the best agenda in terms of coherent policy making,[14] whereas Owen asserted that the human security definition should focus on the level of threats rather than on the origin of the threat.[15] In their attempt to address the common critique about human security being broad and vague, however, Paris, Owen and Krause similarly to Duffield and McCormack did not focus on empirical work to investigate what the consequences of the shift back to state-centered framework might be for the achievement of the original human security paradigm's agenda.

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[11] Particularly, the works of Chandler, Owen, Paris, Ambrosetti, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy
[12] Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security*, Vol 26, No. 2, (2001): 94
[13] Ibid, p. 92
[14] Keith Krause, "The Key to a Powerful Agenda if Properly Delimited," *Security Dialogue*. Vol. 35, No. 3, (2004): 367
[15] Taylor Owen, "Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition," *Security Dialogue,* Vol. 35, No. 3, (2004): 382

Unlike the bulk of the literature on the human security paradigm, the process of transformation within the "new" humanitarian paradigm, has been addressed by numerous scholars particularly, David Chandler,[16] Fiona Fox,[17] Joanna Macrae,[18] Michael Barnett.[19] Although a number of articles has been written on the expanding scope and scale of humanitarian action, it neither extended to a broader assessment of the "new" humanitarianism with regard to key elements of the human security paradigm, nor indicated how these paradigms are intertwined.

Since the international security literature has not provided a substantial evaluation of interconnectedness and, at the same time, incommensurability of the "new" humanitarian and the original human security paradigms, the work will identify this inconsistency explicitly. The thesis seeks to meet two objectives. While evaluating how the ontological shift within both humanitarianism and human security paradigms was made possible, this research paper will focus on the process of the "new" humanitarian state-building norm formation, its main agents and the methods used that enabled socialization of the norm in general. Departing from this point, however, the thesis will address a broader theoretical question of possible implications of the transformation of humanitarianism and human security with their new focus on long-term involvement, assistance and state building for the original human security agenda.

In order to analyze how the norm of the "new" humanitarianism evolved and how the shift within the human security paradigm occurred and became internalized, the thesis draws upon the method of in depth examination of secondary post-Cold War legal and human rights

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[16] David Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda": 678-700

[17] Fiona Fox, "New Humanitarianism: Does it Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century?" *Disasters*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2001): 275-289

[18] Joanna Macrae, "New Humanitarianisms: Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action," in *Humanitarian Policy Group Report 11,* 2002, http://www.odi.org.uk/programmes/humanitarian-policy-group/activities-resources.asp

[19] Michael Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed," *Perspectives on Politics,* Vol. 3, No. 4, (2005)

literature. To demonstrate that there has been a shift in the human security discourse towards state-centered framework, I will engage in a comparative analysis of the official UN documents (United Nations Human Development Report, An agenda for Peace, The Brahimi Report, Report of Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Human Security for All), reports sponsored by states (Human Security Now, The Responsibility to Protect, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe), and speeches by state representatives. Furthermore, in order to demonstrate the possible consequences of these shifts and the changing relationship between humanitarian action and politics, the thesis will evaluate the international response to the humanitarian crises in Darfur. Although Darfur hosts the largest humanitarian mission in the world today, scholars have not yet assessed the effectiveness of the actions of humanitarian agencies from the human security perspective. While focusing on two periods, the humanitarian engagement of international NGOs and the UN institutions during the early 1990s, and the international response to the latest outbreak of violence in 2003, the thesis will demonstrate the consequences of relief activities for the original human security agenda during the transformation period towards the "new" humanitarianism. The case of Darfur will explicitly outline the broader implications of incommensurability of the "new" humanitarian and the original human security paradigms in practice with regard to key elements of the human security agenda.

The structure of my thesis will be as follows. The first chapter will reflect diverse approaches regarding the ongoing conceptualization of human security and trace the process of institutionalization of human security either at the level of discourse or that of practice. Chapter two is concerned with the process through which the core ideas of humanitarianism have been transformed, focusing on the shift in the politics of humanitarian intervention towards a state-building approach and establishing the ways in which this transformation undermines the initial human security agenda. Following this framework, the last chapter will

test the coherence of the argument based on the analysis of the humanitarian response to the

crises in Darfur.

Chapter 1: Evolution and Mainstreaming of the Human Security Approaches

As one of the essential components of the international system, the security problematic has been a contested issue of continuous analytical and conceptual discourses, as well as policy debates. In order to properly locate the contribution of the concept of human security, it is necessary to examine various approaches to the conceptualization of security. Realism provides the foundation of traditional approaches to security, equating security with the survival of the state and the promotion of its national interests.[20] The predominant concept of security for decades was state-centric, upholding the principle of state sovereignty and focusing on threats to state borders. Following the emergence of nation states, "the primary responsibility of maintaining security was vested with states that ultimately led to linking all notions of security with territorial integrity and national sovereignty."[21] In this traditional formulation, security is understood as use of force by states to deter threats to their autonomy, territorial integrity, and their domestic political order primarily from other states. The realist paradigm and its conceptualization of security dominated the academic and policy fields up until the end of the Cold War, emphasizing the state as the main object of security and the military as the primary threat.

The traditional national security formulation has been criticized on various grounds, especially with the emergence of the notion of widening during the 1980s, when scholars argued that the conceptualization of threats needed to be expanded beyond those posed by

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[20] Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security*. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 2
[21] Venu Menon, *Human Security: Concept and Practice*. Munich Personal RePec Archieve, p. 3, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2478/

other states and their militaries. Building on Richard Ulman's[22] critique of the narrow, realist view of security, Barry Buzan proposed five possible dimensions of security including political, economic, military, environmental and societal.[23] However, the state still remained the main referent object of security. It was not until the beginning of the 1990s when a new challenge to the traditional security paradigm emerged that aimed at shifting the referent from the state to the individual. Reconceptualization of security towards a people-centered approach was motivated by the overarching observation that "the very nature of conflict has been altered since wars have become largely within states."[24] According to Mahbub ul-Haq, former Pakistan finance minister and consultant of UNDP, "of the 82 conflicts in the last decade, 79 were within nations and 90 percent of the casualties were civilians, not soldiers."[25] The shortcomings of the state-centric approach to security with its emphasis on the state as the provider of security rather than the source of individuals' insecurity have been increasingly recognized as the "deepening"[26] debate continued.

Human security developed in the context of evolution of security discourse. Scholars of international relations in the post-Cold War period have attempted to enlarge the agenda of security studies moving away from a narrow conceptualization of national security. According to Wibben, "human security frameworks show continuities with the debates in critical security studies more generally" since they clearly intend to broaden and deepen understanding of security.[27] By broadening it is meant the consideration of nonmilitary security threats, such as overpopulation, environmental scarcity, mass refugee flows,

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[22] Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1983):133-135
[23] Barry Buzan, "New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century," International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3, (1999): 432-434
[24] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.* (New York: United Nations, 1999), 7
[25] Mahbub ul-Haq, "Global Governance for Human Security", in *Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global Governance,* ed. Majid Tehranian. (London: I.B. Tauris&Co Ltd, 1999), 79
[26] Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security.* 8
[27] Annick T.R. Wibben, "Human Security: Toward an Opening," *Security Dialogue,* Vol. 39, No. 4, (2008): 458

terrorism, etc.[28] Deepening refers to the propensity of the field to focus not on external threats to states, but on the security of individuals and groups.[29] Despite the fact that "human security is gaining ground in international relations and becoming an increasingly influential idea in the foreign policies of nations and in the policies of international organizations,"[30] there is no comprehensive and established concept of human security. For this reason, in order to avoid misinterpretation of crucial assumptions of this approach, it is important to examine various stages of development of human security both as a concept and a policy tool.

§1.1. UNDP conceptualization of human security: the linkage between sustainable development and security

The first international attempt to conceptualize human security unfolded in 1994 with the publication of the United Nations Human Development Report called *New Dimensions of Human Security*. Before proposing a new concept of security, the report criticizes the widespread focus on state security and negation of "the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily life."[31] The UNDP Report emphasized that in the post-Cold War world even if a state is secure from external threats, it could still cause insecurities for individuals inhabiting that state. The report asserted that there is a necessity for widening the security politics by incorporating seven interconnected areas of security: a) economic; b) environmental; c) food; d) health; e) personal; f) community; g) political.[32] In a separate section on human security titled *Redefining Security: The Human Dimension,* the report reflected Mahbub Ul Haq's perception that security is people centric rather than state

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[28] Jessica H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 68, No. 2, (1983): 135
[29] Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace", *International Security,* Vol. 24, No. 1, (1999): 127-155
[30] Fairlie Jenson, "The Practice of Human Security Theory: A Case of US and EU Policy in the Middle East and North Africa," *Human Security Journal,* Issue 2, (2006): 1
[31] United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Report.* 22
[32] Ibid, 24

centric. The report gives a clear definition of security for the first time in its inception – "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want," a model of human security that contains two central aspects: "safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression; and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities."[33] Although freedom from want and freedom from fear present a broad range of potential threats to human security, the report does not attempt to prioritize the goals and principles that make up the concept since they believe that the "all-encompassing" and "integrative" qualities of the human security concept is its major strength.[34]

Importantly, the UNDP was not only the first to draw global attention to the concept of human security, but it explicitly focused on development by launching its annual *Human Development Report* in the 1990s, which is dedicated to "ending the mismeasure of human progress by economic growth alone."[35] The type of development that constitutes the foundation of the UNDP concept of human security can be more accurately defined as sustainable development that is a "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."[36]

Under the banner of sustainable development, formal development practice embraced a human, people-centered focus that not only "prioritized the development of people ahead of states," it also "decoupled human development from any direct or mechanical connection with economic growth."[37] The shift towards sustainable development was a move away from an earlier dominance of state-led modernization strategies based on the primacy of economic

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[33] Ibid, 23

[34] Ibid, 24

[35] United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

[36] Adams, "Sustainable Development and the Greening of Development Theory," in *Beyond the Impasse: New Directions in Development Theory*, ed. F.J. Schuurman. (London: Zed Books, 1993), 208

[37] Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, "Securing Humans in a Dangerous World," *International Politics,* 43, (2006): 5

growth and assumptions that the underdeveloped world would, after passing through various stages, eventually resemble the developed. Rather than economic growth *per se*, a broader approach to human development emerged "based not simply on the income aspects of poverty, but poverty as a denial of choices and opportunities for living a tolerable life."[38] The introduction of the Human Development Index, in particular, with its composite measure of population welfare that includes per capita income, life expectancy and educational attainment, was seen as part of the "paradigm shift" towards the emerging consensus that "development progress — both nationally and internationally — must be people-centered, equitably distributed and environmentally and socially sustainable."[39]

The UNDP played a crucial agenda-setting role at the initial stage with its focus on human security. Sustainable development defines the type of "development" that is securitized in human security. In promoting diversity and choice, it is concerned with relations and institutions able to act in a regulatory manner on populations as a whole to maintain their equilibrium. While making a distinction between income poverty and human poverty (illiteracy, short life expectancy, etc), the UN documents have not only identified the threat but also indicated measures that need to be employed. With respect to the security dimension of human security, the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* was one of the first systematic elaborations of the idea that the post- Cold War period was defined by threats to people's well-being rather than inter-state conflict, therefore, "the referent object of security was presented to be the individual rather than the state."[40] This document created a possibility for new forms of addressing sustainable development issues and instigated means of coordination and centralization that have the human being rather than the state as the referent object of both development and security.

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[38] Caroline Thomas, "Global Governance, development and human security: exploring the links," *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 22, No. 2, (2001): 163
[39] Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, "Securing Humans in a Dangerous World," 5
[40] Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace- Keeping.* 42–43

§1.2. Middle-power approaches to human security and its institutionalization

After 1994, a number of governments have attempted to institutionalize human security concerns in their foreign and defense policies, simultaneously contributing to further conceptualization. Comprehensive implementation of the human security approach was first undertaken by the Canadian government. In 1997 Canada's foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy argued for extension of the security framework to incorporate a vast range of threats since the "end of the Cold War failed to enhance global stability."[41] The article presented by the foreign minister in 1997 was the first to elaborate a set of human security issues, which Canada was to put on its national agenda. Specifically, it was emphasized that it is necessary to establish a peace building capacity, ban anti-personnel landmines, address the situation of children with regard to sexual abuse, child labor and their protection from violence.[42] It is crucial to highlight, however, that Canada favors the more narrowly defined "freedom from fear" perspective that incorporates "protection from physical violence and adherence to the law in respect of basic human rights, above all the right to life."[43]

One of the most crucial human security policies advocated by the Canadian government has been the campaign against anti-personnel landmines, which resulted in the signing of the Ottawa Treaty in 1997. The Canadian contribution to promoting the Anti-Personnel Landmines Ban revealed that middle powers could influence global policy when "conducting diplomacy in terms of a rather unconventional, bottom-up approach."[44] Working together with civil society groups, the Canadian foreign minster managed to promote the landmines

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[41] Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership," *International Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 2, (1997), 183

[42] George MacLean, "Instituting and Projecting Human Security: A Canadian Perspective," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54 , No. 3, (2000): 269–76

[43] Roland Paris, "Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" 89

[44] Richard A. Matthew et al., *Landmines and Human Security*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 270–72

treaty, the success of which led Canada to try to build up a human security "alliance" in 1997. While attempting to institutionalize the network of actors that had successfully negotiated the landmine treaty, Canada signed the Lysoen Declaration with Norway in 1998 that focused on issues both countries perceived as a vital part of their human security agenda. The content of the partnership agenda "reflected the prominence of disarmament and human rights/rule of law issues: the effort to create an International Criminal Court, the role of human rights and international humanitarian law, especially in the context of organized violence."[45]

Additionally, in 1999 Canada organized a middle power conference with Norway and formed the Human Security Network together with Austria, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand, and South Africa (as an observer).[46] The issue identified as the most important were small arms, children in armed conflict, and human rights education, which explicitly reflected the Canadian human security agenda. Importantly, the topics dealt with at the annual ministerial meetings and in the overview of the network's initiatives also emphasize a "freedom from fear" perspective.[47] However, overall the Human Security network member-states tended to reemphasize that "human security is a people-centric concept."[48]

A radical shift within the Canadian human security approach evolved in the process of extensive discussion by the Canadian government of the genocide prevention issue. This interest was triggered in the aftermath of the events in Rwanda in 1994 when peacekeepers under the command of Canadian General Dallaire were not able to stop the violence. The Canadian officials and Axworthy contended that it is necessary to "reevaluate the principle of state sovereignty *vis-à-vis* the moral and legal obligations of the UN to maintain international

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[45] George MacLean, "Instituting and Projecting Human Security: A Canadian Perspective," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54 , No. 3, (2000): 269–76.
[46] Venu Menon, *Human Security: Concept and Practice*. (Munich Personal RePec Archieve), 10, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2478/
[47] Ibid
[48] Ibid

peace and security as laid out in the Charter."[49] Although the foreign minister acknowledged the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states as a basic principle of maintenance of international peace and security, he held that "in cases of extreme abuse, as we have seen in Kosovo and Rwanda, among others, the concept of national sovereignty cannot be absolute."[50]

This perception led the Canadian government to the creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, a final report of which was presented in September 2001. The ICISS *Responsibility to Protect* report intended to address the experiences of Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and the questions of when to intervene, under whose authority, and how.[51] In *The Responsibility to Protect* the primacy is given to issues of global circulation. It is emphasized that in an interconnected and globalized world "in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities" the existence of failed states who either harbor those that are dangerous to others, or are only able to maintain order "by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere."[52] Importantly, not only does the report incorporate a new narrative of failed states as a threat, but also the Commission suggests that when a state is unable or unwilling to ensure the human security of its citizens "the principle of non-interference yields to the international responsibility to protect."[53] The ICISS report effectively set out to shift the terms of the debate by arguing that "state rights of sovereignty can coexist with external intervention and state-building."[54] As emphasized by Duffield and Waddell, *The Responsibility to Protect* "sees human security as the heart of a redefinition of the nature of

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[49] Rob McRae and Don Hubert, *Human Security and the New Diplomacy*. (Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 113

[50] Ibid, 114

[51] The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 53-55

[52] Ibid, 5

[53] Ibid, 8

[54] David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building*, 31

sovereignty in respect of the state and the international community," which unlike the realist/neorealist paradigm treats international intervention as a moral responsibility of "effective" states.[55] However, according to Robert Keohane, "the ICISS report is not at all devaluating sovereignty, merely it is reinterpreting it, to bring the concept more into line with the modern world."[56] The report is based on the assumption that "state and human security coexist and are considered mutually dependent by human security advocates,"[57] however both Owen and Keohane have failed to acknowledge that this was a new ontological shift in the human security discourse.

By arguing for reconsideration of the norm of non-intervention and accentuating the need for intervention in cases of gross human rights violations, Canada's human security policy revealed a shift in language away from the "human-centered" framework of a right of intervention towards "'a state-centered' framework of the 'responsibility to protect'."[58] According to the report, in order to put an end to intra-state violence and to restore order, it is necessary to "promote conditions favoring strong and democratic states"[59] – if necessary by humanitarian intervention. Unlike Canada's initial commitment to human-centric conceptualization of human security, the ICISS report explicitly assumes that stable state structures represent an indispensable prerequisite of "freedom from fear." This Canadian conception of human security seems to put a particular emphasis on the promotion of stable and democratic states that provide human rights and have a legitimate monopoly over the use of force, therefore placing the state once more at the centre of security concerns.

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[55] Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell. "Securing Humans in a Dangerous World," 8
[56] Robert Keohane, "Political authority after intervention: gradations in sovereignty," in *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 276
[57] Taylor Owen, "The Critique that Doesn't Bite: A Response to David Chandler's 'Human Security: The Dog That Didn't Bark," *Security Dialogue,* Vol. 39, No. 4, (2008,), 449
[58] David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building*, 31
[59] The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 4

§1.3. A human security perspective based on human development and "freedom from want"

Simultaneously to the evolution of the Canadian conceptualization of human security, a broader approach to human security, one incorporating sustainable human development and the "freedom from want" perspective was being advocated in Japanese documents and speeches. The address given by the Japanese Prime Minister Murayama to the UN General Assembly in 1995 characterized human security as "respect for the human rights of every citizen on earth" and protection from "poverty, disease, ignorance, oppression and violence."[60] However, in 1998 the newly elected Prime Minister, Obuchi, changed the focus of the new concept locating the need for human security in foreign policy, primarily on the grounds of Asia's economic decline. He argued in two speeches in December 1998 that "taking the current economic crisis into consideration, we must seek new strategies for economic development which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term development of our region."[61] Attempting to conceptualize human security, the prime minister asserted that "human security is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats."[62] Unlike the Canadian perception of human security, Japanese human security policy emphasizes the importance of economic development and provision of basic human needs. Although the protection of people is an important part of human security, for Japan human security is a much broader concept that incorporates both "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear." The foreign affairs minister argued that "so long as human security's objectives are to ensure the survival and dignity of individuals as human beings, it is necessary to go beyond thinking of human security solely in terms of protecting human life in

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[60] Bert Edström, "Japan's Foreign Policy and Human Security," *Japan Forum,* Vol. 15, No. 2, (2003), 212
[61] Ibid, 213
[62] Ibid

conflict situations."[63]

Japan's preferred way of implementing human security was working closely with the UN and its organizations. In contrast to Canada that focused on negotiation of new treaties to protect civilians, the Japanese government in 1999 established a Trust Fund for Human Security at the United Nations whose budget had risen to some $170 million by 2002.[64] Since the revisions to the fund's guidelines conducted in January 2005, the following projects were included: "projects considering a wider range of interconnected regions and areas with the participation of multiple international organizations and NGOs; and projects that intend to integrate humanitarian and development assistance through strengthening people's capacities to implement seamless assistance in the transitional period from conflict to peace."[65] The idea that seems to be dominating all these programs is a human-centric perspective.

Besides the channeling of human security through multilateral settings such as the UN, the Japanese government initiated the independent Commission on Human Security in 2001, co-chaired by former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen. The Commission was intended "to promote public understanding", and to develop the concept as "an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation," while proposing "a concrete program of action to address critical and pervasive threats to human security."[66] Rather than recommending a particularly new definition, the emphasis within *Human Security Now* is on encouragement of complex and extensive forms of coordination and centralization necessary for the regulation of global populations. The report argues that it is important to ensure protection "through the building of a comprehensive international infrastructure that shields people's lives from menacing threats."[67] This requires working

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[63] Ibid, 214
[64] Trust Fund for Human Security. (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21/t_fund21.pdf
[65] Venu Menon. *Human Security: Concept and Practice,* 22
[66] Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: United Nations Publications, 2003)
[67] Ibid, 3

institutions at every level of society, including police systems, the environment, health care, education, social safety nets, diplomatic engagements and conflict early warning systems.[68] In achieving this ambitious aim, it is mentioned that there already exist numerous loose networks of actors including UN agencies, NGOs, civil society groups, and private companies that are currently operating such agendas independently of each other. The report argues that instead of inventing something new, these numerous separate initiatives should be incorporated into a coherent global strategy. However, importantly, the Commission on Human Security, unlike the UNDP's Human Development Report, makes a direct reference to traditional notions of state security, presenting human security as complementary when highlighting that "its understanding of human security does not replace the security of the state with the security of people: it sees the two as mutually dependent."[69] Moreover, while specifying what complementarity entails, the Commission emphasizes that it is concerned with additional referent objects, threats, agents and new means that include both protection and empowerment, directly reflecting the traditional security framework.[70]

Therefore, the Canadian and Japanese conceptualizations of human security differ in terms of scope and content. While the Canadian government tends to focus on issues which represent impediments to an end to a violent conflict and successful transitions to democracy, Japan's human security agenda resembles people-centered approaches to development assistance by focusing on health care, education, and economic security. Issues of sustainable development assistance play a minor role for Canada and efforts towards economic development and empowerment of the individual are seen as secondary when the biggest threat to the individual is posed by uncontrolled use of military force. While the Japanese conceptualization shares Canada's view that the spread of small arms and landmines, as well as a lack of stable state structures, are reasons for human insecurity, it does not believe that

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[68] Ibid, 132
[69] Annick T.R. Wibben. "Human Security: Toward an Opening," 458
[70] *Human Security Now,* 3

the former are the key factors in human insecurity. Importantly, however, despite crucial conceptual differences, both the Canadian and Japanese evolution of human security perception heralded the shift back towards state-centric security. The Japanese approach has a more holistic nature with the aim of establishing the concept of "human security" as a complement to conventional state security, while the whole agenda of the Canadian approach since the 2001 ICISS report is constructed on the assumption that human security can be guaranteed only by states that are liberal democracies, and in which the government and individuals can be held accountable.

§1.4. Conceptualization of human security at the EU level

Two opposing perceptions of security policy in Europe are shaping the current scholarly and policy debate. According to the first, developments in the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as adoption of the European Security Strategy by the Council in 2003 have indicated some modest progress towards a "post-national strategic culture."[71] The second, however, asserts that a strong political force in Europe that calls for a common defense policy is absent and, therefore, "European security policy simply means progress in capabilities and maybe in institutions but does not mean a real common strategic culture or a real understanding of larger political strategy."[72] Despite these differing assessments of whether the EU possesses strategic culture, numerous scholars have argued that although the political and strategic goals of ESDP are poorly articulated, "certain essential features of the idea of human security can be found in current ESDP discourse."[73]

Mary Kaldor, "a leading advocate of reconceptualising state-based security in terms of

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[71] Janne Haaland Maltary, "When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?", *Security Dialogue*. Vol. 37. (2006): 100
[72] Stepanie Fletchner, *Towards "Human Security,"*
http://opendemocracy.net/terrorism/articles/humansec221206
[73] Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin, Sabine Selchow, "Human Security: a New Strategic Narrative for Europe," *International Affairs*. Vol. 83. No. 2. (2007): 274

human insecurity"[74] and one of the authors of *Human Security Doctrine for Europe,* presents a very eclectic view on human security. She argues that the first principle of a human security policy is "respect for human rights and protection of civilians."[75] Although she believes that the main focus of European security policy should be individuals, not states, the scholar claims that establishment of legitimate institutions and political authority is the second principle. However, Kaldor acknowledges that in the process of institution building the opinion of the population should be prioritized (bottom-up approach), as well as the fact that "legitimate political authority does not necessarily have to be wielded by a state since it could rest in local government."[76]

The Doctrine's reference document is the European Security Strategy of December 2003, which was endorsed by the European Council. The study suggests that European Security Strategy should be based on seven principles: "the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force."[77] The authors make a crucial point about the linkage between the use of inadequate types of force and legitimacy arguing that "human rights have become much more prominent, and an intervention that uses traditional war fighting means, such as bombardment from the air, may be unacceptable when viewed through the lens of human rights."[78] Since "in human security operations, protection of civilians, not defeating the enemy, is an end in itself," interventions will increasingly be judged in terms of military methods beyond the existing regulations on weapons and their use.[79]

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[74] David Chandler, "Review Article: Theorising the Shift from Security to Insecurity – Kaldor, Duffield and Furedi," *Conflict, Security&Development,* (2008): 266
[75] Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor. *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, 12
[76] Ibid,13
[77] Mary Kaldor et al. *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities.* (Barcelona: 2004),14
[78] Ibid, 9
[79] Ibid, 15

The Report further emphasizes that the intention of all EU operations is to "uphold human rights and to act in support of law and order."[80] Therefore, the goal of such use of force is the promotion of the basic values discussed above. Importantly, the authors of the report acknowledge that current EU missions tend to be top-down and focus on relations with states. As a result, it is suggested that "bottom-up effectiveness and legitimacy be embedded in the institutional framework of European security policy through three means: political communication and debate with the local population; public availability of the common rules of engagement and the legal framework governing missions; complaints procedures."[81]

However, not only does the report indicate what the basic principles of a human security approach are, but it effectively provides detailed practical guidelines for implementation of a security policy based on those principles. According to the authors, the EU will need "an integrated set of civil-military capabilities that would be suited to carry out human security operations, as well as a legal framework that underpins decisions to intervene as well, forming the basis for a law-enforcement approach to operations."[82] Moreover, the Barcelona Report suggests that a Human Security Response Force be established composed of various capabilities that already exist within the ESDP framework. However, what is crucial to emphasize is that similarly to the Canadian approach to human security, the report highlights the necessity to establish good governance and democratic procedures referring to coordination of short term conflict prevention operations with long term state-building policies as a crucial condition for the success of the human security agenda. Despite the fact that individuals and their needs are still prioritized in the report, while advocating for coordination of long term development or state building policies with short term crisis management operations Kaldor does not acknowledge the fact that the state building approach contradicts the initial human-centered framework of the human security doctrine.

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[80] Ibid, 2
[81] Ibid, 27
[82] Ibid, 20

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This chapter intended to reflect diverse approaches regarding the ongoing conceptualization of human security. While first focusing on the original international conceptualization of human security by the UNDP, the chapter proceeded with evaluation of numerous attempts to institutionalize human security concerns in state foreign and defense policies. Particularly, the focus was on countries or political entities that have operationalized the idea of human security either at the level of discourse or that of practice. The primary goal was to emphasize that regardless of a broad or narrow conceptualization of human security or divergence of approaches in terms of scope and content,both the Canadian, Japanese, as well as the EU's perception of human security heralded the shift back towards state-centric security.

Chapter 2: The New Humanitarian Approach and the Process of State-building Interventionism Norm Formation

In part reflecting the broadening and deepening trend of international security agenda identified in the previous chapter, the humanitarian system has experienced multiple transformations in the past decade both in terms of its scope and the very meaning. While classical humanitarianism adhered to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, enshrined in the Geneva Convention of 1864, today's international humanitarianism expands into development in line with the model of human security and becomes part of a wider agenda of conflict management and state building. This chapter is concerned with the process through which the core ideas of humanitarianism have been transformed, focusing on the shift in the politics of humanitarian intervention towards a state-building approach. It discusses how integration of development and security agendas might affect the capacity of the aid system to alleviate human suffering as a contributing factor to human security.

§2.1. The ICRC's founding principles and "classical humanitarianism"

Humanitarian principles were recognized in international law only in the second half of the nineteenth century when the wealthy Genevan businessman, Jean Henri Dunant, shocked after witnessing the slaughter and the suffering on the battlefield of Solferino in 1859 started lobbying for the 1864 Geneva Convention, "the first attempt to bind states to distinguish between lawful and unlawful conduct in war."[83] Dunant and his colleges facilitated the emergence of the concept of humanitarian relief through its institutionalization in the form of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Geneva Convention granted the

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[83] Roberto Belloni, "The Trouble with Humanitarianism," *Review of International Studies*, Vo. 33, (2007): 452

International Committee of the Red Cross the role of guaranteeing respect for the outlined humanitarian rules during times of war. The Red Cross established that "humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and universality were the underlying principles of any humanitarian intervention."[84] From the beginning the principle of neutrality was the crucial aspect of the ICRC's mandate. Incorporated in its list of fundamental principles, neutrality was depicted as, "the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature."[85] Therefore, in conformity with the principle of neutrality, it refrains from political involvement, and particularly from taking sides between the parties in conflict. The principle of humanity derives from the aspiration to assist the victims independently from any political constraint, recognizing a common humanity.[86] The principle of impartiality is based on the necessity to assist the wounded and suffering giving priority to the needs and vulnerabilities of the victims. The principle of universality highlighted that the ICRC approach and the humanitarian values that it stands for are shared universally. These four principles aimed to separate the humanitarian field from political action.[87]

The ICRC's principles of neutrality and impartiality were adopted by the majority of humanitarian agencies. Importantly, the separation of politics and aid became essential to the definition of humanitarianism. Michael Ignatieff argues that "humanitarianism was the core of the ICRC's nonpolitical outlook since it makes no distinction between good wars and bad, between just and unjust causes, or even between aggressors and innocents."[88] Similarly, Amnesty International, founded with the goal of working for "the release of prisoners of

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[84] David Chandler. "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda," 679
[85] Fiona Fox, "New Humanitarianism: Does it Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century?" 277
[86] Roberto Belloni, "The Trouble with Humanitarianism," 452
[87] Daniel Warner, "The Politics of the Political/Humanitarian Divide," *International Review of the Red Cross,* No. 833, (1999): http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JPT3
[88] Michael Ignatief, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience.* (New York: Metropolitan Books 1998), 119

conscience,"[89] launched a universal movement for the rights of political prisoners independently from the regimes carrying out persecutions. Thus, Amnesty was not concerned with the specific beliefs of the inmates but with all prisoners receiving a minimum of universal standards of treatment.[90] The United Nations institutions, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN International Children's Emergency Fund, and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Fund, adhered to the humanitarian values avoiding politics as well. In addition, various relief aid charities were founded in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars, such as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam) or Save the Children Fund that envisaged filling the gap of humanitarian need that was not addressed through political means.

The affirmation of humanitarian principles continued even in the end of the 1940s since the charity and relief organizations shifted their focus towards international suffering in the third world. Because of their universalist approach and neutrality, they played an essential role in providing aid in regions abandoned by the West. The political neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian agencies resulted in their capacity to put the interests and needs of individuals above the political confrontation between the USSR and the US. During the Cold War period, there was an explicit division between state-centered development aid, and neutral humanitarianism. The humanitarian crisis in Biafra in 1968 was the first illustration of aid and relief NGOs' capacity to mobilize resources despite international disapproval.[91]

However, the Biafra crisis highlighted the limited electiveness of traditional humanitarianism. While the ICRC continued to follow its founding principles of neutrality and impartiality, thousands died. The famine was caused by the civil war between Igbo

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[89] The History of Amnesty International: http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/history
[90] David Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda," 680
[91] Thomas G. Weiss, "Principles, Politics and Humanitarian Action," *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol.1, No. 3, (1999)

secessionists of Biafra state in southeastern Nigeria and the federal government.[92] Since the secessionists did not receive any diplomatic support, and they lacked UN or outside government relief, the humanitarian aid effort was led by the NGOs. However, major NGOs and the ICRC did share a similar view over the nature of humanitarian action, which lead Oxfam to "break its commitment not to act unilaterally, as well as take an openly partisan approach claiming that the price for a united Nigeria is likely to be millions of lives."[93] Unlike Oxfam and several other international NGOs, the ICRC held a noncritical position and did not question the federal government's prohibition of aid flights.

In response, French doctor Bernard Kouchner resigned from the ICRC claiming that "the Red Cross' silence over Biafra made its workers accomplices in the systematic massacres of a population."[94] In 1971, a group of young French doctors founded Doctors Without Borders, a volunteer organization that aimed at offering an alternative to the ICRC by providing aid even if that meat entering the sphere of politics. This approach increasingly led the humanitarian action to extension beyond the ICRC's founding principles. Therefore, the whole notion of neutrality that actually demands that agencies remain silent and abstain completely from the politics of crisis has come under severe scrutiny. The new humanitarianism was expressed in the proactive attempt to protect individuals and groups, and to prevent massive human rights violations both during an ongoing conflict and after mass violence has ended, regardless of the consent of the parties.[95]

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[92] Roberto Belloni, "The Trouble with Humanitarianism," 452
[93] Maggie Black, *A Cause for Our Times: Oxfam the First Fifty Years.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)
[94] David Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 23, (2001): 684
[95] Fiona Fox, "New Humanitarianism: Does it Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century?" 277

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§2.2. "New political humanitarianism" and the transformation of humanitarianism from the periphery to the center of the international policy agenda

Throughout the 1990s while the security agenda was broadening and deepening to include new threats, the very meaning of humanitarianism became more elusive since a new set of actors claimed it as part of a more interventionist international order. Moreover, when the idea of human security was put forward, this broadening has been reflected in the changing scope of the work of the UN institutions and humanitarian NGOs. By the late 1990s relief and aid agencies were including humanitarian issues on their agenda, alongside more long term structural threats to international security, such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, global warming, etc. In order to address the problems of the Third World, some NGOs included development on the humanitarian agenda arguing for a long-term involvement rather than short-term emergency aid.[96] As a result, the founding principles of the traditional approach that separated humanitarianism from politics crumbled during this period as humanitarianism's agenda ventured beyond relief and into the political sphere, and agencies began working alongside, and with, states.

According to Michael Barnett, four global processes facilitated the emergence of a more inclusive humanitarian agenda. This chapter will evaluate two of the outlined factors relevant for this work.[97] He argues that while the end of the Cold War paved the way for the end of at least some conflicts, in others the disengagement of the superpowers provided for the emergence of an apparently more deadly and intractable political economy of war.[98]

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[96] Joanna Macrae, "New Humanitarianisms: Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action," in *Humanitarian Policy Group Report 11,* (2002): 6, http://www.odi.org.uk/programmes/humanitarian-policy-group/activities-resources.asp

[97] The third factor is claimed to be the political economy of funding, and the fourth factor contributing to politicization is a change in the normative and legal environment

[98] Michael Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed," 7

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While the origins of these "new wars"[99] can be traced back to conflicts of colonization and decolonization, the structural shift of the international system in the end of the 1980s has shaped a perception that "there appeared to be more humanitarian crisis than ever before."[100] Whether in fact there were more emergencies or whether great powers were now willing to recognize populations at risk, humanitarianism was placed at the centre of the international policy agenda. While paying more attention to humanitarian emergencies, states linked these populations at risk to an expanding discourse of security. Because after the Cold War, increasingly it was becoming obvious that domestic conflict and civil wars were leaving hundreds of thousands of people at risk, creating mass flight, and destabilizing entire regions, "the Security Council authorized interventions on the grounds that these conflicts challenged regional and international security."[101] The rules governing international intervention in internal wars have become more opaque, and were being redefined.

Interestingly, states gradually became willing to support operations whose declared function was to protect civilians at risk, and even to consider the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.[102] In order to address the humanitarian consequences of wars in states such as Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti, military interventions were launched. Complex political and aid policies were merged in the attempt to mitigate the humanitarian effects of conflict and to stabilize violent states. Within the UN, there is evidence of organizational change to reflect the position of humanitarian assistance in the new security agenda. In 1999, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations –known by the name of the Chair of the Panel, Lakhdar Brahimi – proposed "the integration of UN humanitarian and peacekeeping

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[99] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

[100] Rony Brauman, "From Philanthropy to Humanitarianism: Remarks and an Interview," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 103. Vol. 2, No. 3, (2004): 401

[101] Anne Orford. *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 2

[102] General Assembly Resolution A/Res/46/182. *Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations*, (1999), HTTP://WWW.RELIEFWEB.INT/OCHA_OL/ABOUT/RESOL/RESOL_E.HTML

activities, whereby humanitarian resources would be subsumed into wider peacekeeping, and placed at the disposal of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)."[103] Since the publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000 and reaffirmation of centrality of integrated missions within the UN humanitarian reforms in 2006, the UN's perception has grown into a very coordinated system where "humanitarian action is structurally subordinated to economic, military and security visions."[104]

The "coherence" initiative, proposing reinterpretation of the function of humanitarian assistance, was controversial. Many NGOs within the humanitarian community argued that using aid in this way threatened neutrality and impartiality, and would therefore compromise access.[105] MSF asserted that "the humanitarian imperative of saving lives and meeting immediate needs should be prioritized and independent from political solutions to crises."[106] Secretary General of the UN, Annan, supported both the incorporation of humanitarian action under a political umbrella, and argued for its separateness, however it seems that at the end the emphasis appeared to be more on the latter. Therefore, similarly to many other governmental bodies, the UN has been ambiguous in its interpretation of the relationship between humanitarian and political action, in particular whether and how the former should be subsumed under a wider peace building agenda.

The normative and legal framework of humanitarian intervention was being modified, which inevitably led to controversial discussions on state sovereignty that became conditional on states adherence to particular codes of international behavior, specifically a "responsibility to protect" their societies, and having attributes such as the rule of law, markets, and

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[103] Lakhdar Brahimi, *Report of the Panel of experts on United Nations Peace Keeping Operations* A/55/305-S/2000/809. (New York: UN, 2000), HTTP://WWW.UN.ORG/PEACE/REPORTS/PEACE_OPERATIONS/
[104] Eric Stobbaerts, Sarah Martin and Katharine Derderian, "Integration and UN Humanitarian Reforms," 18, HTTP://WWW.FMREVIEW.ORG/FMRPDFS/FMR29/18-20.PDF.
[105] Joanna Macrae, "The Death of Humanitarianism?: An Anatomy of the Attack," *Disasters,* Vol. 22, Issue 4, (1998), 312
[106] Eric Stobbaerts, Sarah Martin and Katharine Derderian, "Integration and UN Humanitarian Reforms," HTTP://WWW.FMREVIEW.ORG/FMRPDFS/FMR29/18-20.PDF.

democratic principles.[107] As discussed in chapter 1, sovereignty was redefined in a way, which placed human security at its centre. These developments created a normative space for external intervention and encouraged a growing range of actors to expand their assistance activities. International aid agencies were not only responsible for providing immediate relief during conflict situations, but they also started focusing on projects that attempted to eliminate the root causes of conflict and create legitimate states.

The second factor, which, according to Michael Barnett, might have triggered the fusion of politics and humanitarianism, was the development of "complex humanitarian emergencies that are characterized by a high degree of breakdown and social dislocation and, reflecting this condition, requiring a system-wide aid response from the international community."[108] These emergencies, which seemed to be augmenting and proliferating around the world, entail a variety of aspects such as state failure, refugee flight, militias, warrior refugees, and populations at risk from violence, disease, and hunger. In the encounter with the new complexity of contemporary conflict, the question of neutrality came under increasing attack. These humanitarian crises created a demand for new strategies of interventions and conflict management tools. International relief and aid institutions that were delivering emergency assistance, human rights organizations aspiring to protect rights and create a rule of law, and development organizations keen to sponsor sustainable growth began to interact and to take responsibility for the same populations.[109] The growing interaction between different kinds of agencies facilitated the emergence of a relief-rights-development linkage within a humanitarian discourse. While international institutions began to consider complex multilevel solutions to these emergencies, "humanitarianism" came to include a wider range of policies and goals such as human rights, access to medicine, economic

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[107] The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
[108] Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London: Zed Books, 2001, p. 13
[109] Michael Barnett. "Humanitarianism Transformed," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol.3, No. 4, 2005, p. 7

development, democracy promotion, and even building responsible states.

While these developments have broadened the meaning of humanitarianism, some international aid and relief agencies remained loyal to the foundational principles of traditional humanitarianism such as ICRC, however the actions of other organizations went beyond emergency relief of needs-based humanitarian aid. Undermining core principles of traditional humanitarianism, these agencies have started investing more in development projects rather than focusing on short-term emergency relief.[110] Although many of the institutions, including Save the Children, Oxfam, and Word Vision International, were founded in wartime and, therefore, focused mainly on rescuing populations at risk, they expanded into development and other activities designed to assist marginalized populations. Importantly, however, this shift has fostered a "people-centered" approach to development since international NGOs neglected the effectiveness of state-based development aid focusing on alternative grassroots models. Concentrating on projects that attempted to help the poorest sections of society, the international NGOs developed the concepts of "empowerment," "capacity building," and "civil society." Humanitarianism handed development agencies a new function that made them a necessary factor for post-conflict reconstruction and structural prevention—central to humanitarian action.[111] Relief, therefore, became part of a wider development response to emergencies. In fact, development was regarded "as a sustainable process of self-management that has economic self-sufficiency at its core."[112] Adopting the human security approach, humanitarian NGOs argued that "development should involve households having control of sufficient productive resources to provide for their food security

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[110] David Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda", *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 23, 2001, p. 686
[111] Mark Duffield, Joanna Macrae, Devon Curtis, "Editorial: Politics and Humanitarian Aid," *Disasters*, Vol. 25, Issue 4, (2001): 272
[112] Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001), 101

and immediate social and welfare needs."[113]

Over time some humanitarian NGOs also undertook human rights advocacy. The rights-based approach was adopted by many aid agencies in their long-term development work. While traditional humanitarianism was mainly concerned with providing relief and meeting basic needs, new humanitarianism argued that numerous activities might alleviate suffering and improve life circumstances, including protection of human rights and economic development.[114] This approach led to an understanding that alleviation of human suffering in itself is not a sufficient response to a humanitarian crisis. Clare Short, the British International Development Secretary, attempted to set out the principles of a new humanitarianism emphasizing that "many now want to go beyond private charity which simply alleviates the worst symptoms of crisis to search for and support a just regulation of the conflict."[115]

§2.3. Humanitarianism with its new focus on long-term involvement and state building

While shifting their focus from "simply" providing relief to eliminating the underlying causes that placed individuals at risk, humanitarian NGOs became closely involved with state-building missions. The relief agencies, along with leading Western states and policy think tanks argued that "international state-building interventions are essential to address a wide range of problems emerging in many regions of the world: from the management of post-conflict peace processes and the protection of human rights, the spread of international principles of good governance and the rule of law to addressing problems of economic growth and poverty reduction."[116] The role of the state in economic and social

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[113] Ibid
[114] Fiona Fox, "New Humanitarianism: Does it Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century?" 278
[115] Ibid, 278
[116] David Chandler, "Introduction: Beyond Managing Contradictions," 2

development, ensuring basic health and education services was reconsidered. As a result, international state building has become fundamental to international policy concerns and has marked a clear shift in humanitarian discourse encouraged by the leadership of the United States and the European Union.

The US administration adopted a state-building agenda focusing on democracy promotion and strengthening states' capacity for good governance as a strategy to address the issue of failed states. While articulating the rationale behind intervention, advocates go beyond asserting the need to merely stabilize a failing state and specifically suggest that democratic governance should be encouraged "as this is good for newly liberated citizens and the political system most likely to mitigate the catalysts for internal instability."[117] The reconstruction process is therefore specifically concerned with introducing institutional changes at the state level and establishing conditions for good governance.

Interestingly, this perspective is not unique to the United States and has been a key component in the foreign policy agenda of the EU. While EU policymakers actively advocate for incorporation of humanitarian assistance into a strategy to resolve conflicts, new mechanisms are being developed under the CFSP to allow the EU to integrate different pillars of EU activity, as well as coherence of civil and military capabilities that would support the political process of state building.[118] In June 1999, a European Rapid Reaction Force was established which "combined military and civilian assets, including quasi-military civil protection forces."[119] New institutions and organizing structures are emerging within the EU to support these forces, and to provide political direction to assistance strategies. The concept of civil-military coordination (CMCO) adopted by the Council in 2003 refers to the internal

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[117] Aidan Hehir, "The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A challenge to the Conventional Wisdom,*" Journal of Intervention and State building.* Vol. 1, No. 3, (2007): 311
[118]Joanna Macrae, "New Humanitarianisms: Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action", in *Humanitarian Policy Group Report 11,* (2002), 8, http://www.odi.org.uk/programmes/humanitarian-policy-group/activities-resources.asp
[119] Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin, and Sabine Selchow, "Human Security: a New Strategic Narrative for Europe," 276

coordination of the EU's military and civilian crisis management efforts.[120] In addition to the

potential for links between EU humanitarian aid and military action, the development of a

Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) creates the possibility of overlap between its functions

and those of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) that has resisted efforts

to bring EC humanitarian assistance under the umbrella of the Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP) framework. The main aim of the RRM is to integrate existing Community

conflict prevention instruments, such as election monitoring, human rights initiatives, media

support, police training, border management and mediation, into a single intervention.

Conflict prevention addresses not only short-term causes of conflict, but focuses on

institutional reform as well through actions in the security sector, the judiciary and

governance.[121] The RRM can draw on existing Community instruments and budgets,

including "humanitarian missions' and 'emergency assistance, rehabilitation and

reconstruction."[122] Although the RRM cannot be invoked in situations where ECHO funds

have already been applied, this mechanism made it possible for the EU humanitarian

assistance projects to be included within a broader security agenda of state building.

The consensus that international state building intervention is a necessary strategy for

fixing failed states and alleviating human suffering tends to dominate the new humanitarian

discourse. It is argued that "relief creates dependency and reduces the capacity of local

communities, while long-term developmental support builds capacity."[123] However, as

correctly asserted by Macrae, "humanitarianism was never expected to play a role in conflict

resolution or sustainable development."[124] The engagement with political projects of state

building and elimination of the underlying causes for human sufferings has no connection

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[120] Civil-military coordination, Doc. 14457/03, 2003 as quoted by Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin, Sabine Selchow. "Human Security: a New Strategic Narrative for Europe", *International Affairs.* Vol. 83. No. 2. 2007, p. 276
[121] Ibid, 278
[122] Joanna Macrae, "New Humanitarianisms: Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action," 9
[123] Joanna Macrae, "The Death of Humanitarianism?; An Anatomy of the Attack," 312
[124] Ibid, 314

with emergency relief of needs-based humanitarian aid. It was effectively argued by Barnett that "the transformation of humanitarianism is leaving its imprint on the organizational culture of humanitarian agencies, producing changes that potentially undermine the core principle of impartial relief."[125] Moreover, the scholar appropriately draws attention to the fact that not only need ceases to be unconditional, but aid organizations are also attempting to determine who is worthy of aid based on states' human rights record.[126] In addition, Kurt Mills questioned the impact of the new humanitarianism "characterized by the embeddedness of humanitarianism within, rather than at the margins of, contemporary conflict," arguing that humanitarianism is being explicitly manipulated for political or military gain on the ground in a conflict or as a substitute for political and military action.[127]

Engagement with state-building practices of humanitarian agencies has been largely criticized as well. Building on the work of Simon Chesterman, a policy-oriented collection *Making States Work* suggests that stated aspirations and ideals of external social engineering – peace, development, democracy and good governance – are rarely met by the reality of policy practices, which are generally "inconsistent, inadequate or inappropriate."[128] David Roberts has effectively articulated this approach of recognizing the limits of state building, along with stressing that the state building paradigm of Western interventionists bringing "democracy" or "development" to non-Western "others" reflects a post-colonial liberalizing development agenda.[129] Roberts asserts that the reasons for the limited and rather superficial impact of external state building are based not so much on the fact that the wrong policies were pursued, but in the fact that "policy-making in this are operated within paradigms that

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[125] Michael Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed,"17
[126] Ibid
[127] Kurt Mills, "Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of Humanitarian Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict," *Global Governance*, Vol. 11, (2005),162
[128] Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur, "Conclusions: The Future of State-building", in *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance*, ed. Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur (New York: UN University, 2005), 374
[129] David Chandler, "Introduction: Beyond Managing Contradictions," 13

appeared to ignore the importance of structural factors shaping the operation of a given society and its institutions."[130] Nevertheless, Beate Jahn questions the state building paradigm's underlying assumptions. She convincingly illustrates how "similar to the modernization paradigm, international intervention in the form of state building is based on the assumption that "Western liberal capitalist states are the teleological end point of progress to which all states need to transition and that it is their failure to make this transition which is the cause of instability and security threats."[131] Unlike Roland Paris,[132] she argues that it is crucial to question the paradigm of state building intervention, which assumes that social, economic, ethnic and political problems in the rest of the world can be resolved by projects promoting good governance and democracy.

However, the critique of the new humanitarian practices never extends to a broader assessment of state building interventions with regard to key elements of the human security paradigm. As illustrated in this chapter, the past decade has seen a rapid transformation in the policy and institutional context of humanitarianism. Humanitarian institutions, which used to follow a universalistic approach of providing emergency aid solely on the basis of need and adhered to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, have expanded the range of humanitarian assistance significantly. The expanding scope and scale of humanitarian action created new opportunities for agencies to help more people since they increasingly adopted a "people-centered" approach. Importantly, humanitarian organizations fostered an "individual-focused" approach both to development and security issues, therefore, contributing to the human security agenda. No longer satisfied with saving individuals today so that they can be at risk tomorrow, humanitarianism now aspires to transform the structural conditions or root causes that make populations vulnerable. Toward that end, however, aid agencies strive not

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[130] Ibid
[131] Ibid, 15
[132] Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

only to spread development, and human rights, but also to join a state-building agenda that aspires to create stable, effective, and democratic states. Similar to the human security discourse, the humanitarianism transformed into a framework of long-term involvement, assistance and capacity building. While attempting to combine the humanitarian and political mission, humanitarian agencies started focusing on state-level institutional changes and good governance establishment that clearly undermined the initial human security agenda. In order to reveal the possible implications of this shift, the next chapter will closely evaluate the international response to the humanitarian crises in Darfur.

Chapter 3: Humanitarian Involvement in the Darfur Crisis from a Human Security Perspective

The last chapter was an attempt to critically examine the changing relationship between humanitarian action and politics. While tracing different understandings of the role and scope of humanitarianism, the chapter explicitly argues that "new" humanitarianism and its tendency to focus on root causes of conflict-induced crisis continually jeopardizes the tension between need-based life-saving activities and longer-term objectives of achieving human development and state-building. Reflecting the wider debate within the international humanitarian community about the importance of ICRC's founding principles and the appropriate relationship between humanitarianism and political missions, the chapter illustrated how the "new" humanitarianism along with the UN humanitarian reforms and its underlying integration or coherence agenda, has been increasingly supported and accepted by many international actors. In line with the holistic nature of human security, "new" humanitarianism emphasized the need for a coherent approach to emergency relief and humanitarian assistance embracing development and long-term state-building agendas while advocating for conditionality of aid. This chapter outlines the implications of the international approach to humanitarian assistance in Sudan, focusing in particular on relief activities in the country during the transformation period towards the "new" humanitarianism. While discussing the humanitarian engagement of international NGOs and the UN institutions during the early 1990s, as well as the international response to the latest outbreak of violence in 2003, the chapter raises questions about the possible consequences of new humanitarianism in practice from the human security perspective.

§3.1. Conditional development assistance and the mitigation of human suffering in practice

With 13.000 humanitarian workers and a hundred relief agencies, Darfur hosts the largest humanitarian mission in the world.[133] Although the aid apparatus started its full deployment in mid-2004, humanitarian organizations have been engaged in Sudan for more than a decade. In March 1989, the international humanitarian community launched a major relief effort to help civilians suffering from food deprivation in Sudan's civil war. Operation Lifeline Sudan took the lead in galvanizing world public opinion, spearheading global fund raising, and providing international presence while it was believed that the deaths of some 500,000 persons from famine occurred during that civil war.[134] In addition to raising international awareness, Lifeline delivered humanitarian aid, specifically emergency food distribution that not only "fed people through general food provision or special programs for pregnant women, and children," but also caused local food prices to drop benefiting the population as a whole.[135] Furthermore, since the late 1980s international aid agencies operating within Lifeline attempted to address the abject conditions of displaced Southerners forced to live in the North.

After the beginning of the war in 1983, the UN asserted that approximately "4 million Southerners have been internally displaced from the war zone in South Sudan."[136] While about half of the 4 million were thought to be settled in or around Khartoum, most of the remaining internally displaced were settled in the so-called "transition zone" – "the socially ill-defined border areas between North and South Sudan where Arab and African ethnic

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[133] Fabrice Weissman, "Humanitarian Dilemmas in Darfur," in *Humanitarian Issues: Making Sense of Darfur*. (2008), http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/category/darfur/humanitarian/page/2/
[134] Larry Minear, *Humanitarianism under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan*. (Washington: The Red Sea Press, 1990), 34
[135] Ibid, 43
[136] UNHCU. *Estimates IDPs in Government Areas in Sudan*. Khartoum: UNHCU, 1998

groups respectively overlap."[137] Most of the transition zone was not characterized by open conflict, however it was an area of occasional tension and inter-group clashes. Within this zone, displaced Southerners mainly lived in small, poorly appointed settlements or camps usually close to established villages or towns. Although humanitarian agencies attempted to provide assistance to the internally displaced people, in the late 1980s, the government restrained the access of expatriate members of international NGOs and UN agencies to the transition zone. Following the military coup in 1989, during the early 1990s, an official "program of Sudanisation" regarding the staffing of international NGOs reinforced this policy. In general, the government preferred that "expatriates only fill the most senior Khartoum-based posts."[138] In addition, all recruitment of Sudanese staff had to take place through, or with the knowledge of, the Sudan Labor Office. As a result, although international NGOs were still allowed to operate within the transition zone, Sudanese nationals, mainly Northerners, ran their offices and projects.

Most of the displaced in South Darfur are Dinka from the Mulwal clan originating from northern Bahr el Ghazal.[139] Since they lost their direct access to cattle and other subsistence resources, the survival of the majority of Southerners in the "transition zone" was contingent on wage labor and periodic relief assistance. Importantly, the displaced Southerners represented the main focus of many aid agencies in North Sudan for well over a decade. However, their poor health, their economic marginality and other human security aspects were not adequately addressed until the early 1990s when developmental concerns were incorporated into the framework of humanitarian agenda. As discussed in the second chapter,

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[137] Mark Duffield, "Aid and complicity: The Case of War-displaced Southerners in Northern Sudan," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 1, (2002): 84

[138] Government of Sudan (GOS). Agreement Adopted by the Joint GOS/INGO/UN Meeting. (Khartoum: Government of Sudan, 1993)

[139] John Ryle, *Displaced Southern Sudanese in Northern Sudan with Special Reference to Southern Darfur and Kordofan.* (London: Save the Children Fund, 1989), http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:N0AxH8ID0SIJ:www.sudanarchive.net/cgi-bin/sudan%3Fa%3Dpdf%26d%3DDl1d42.2%26dl%3D1+Displaced+Southern+Sudanese+in+Northern+Sudan+with+Special+Reference+to+Southern+Darfur&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&client=safari

the shift in humanitarianism generated an understanding that it is no longer sufficient for humanitarian agencies to "simply" save lives, rather their activities must also support and emulate development efforts aimed at creating self-sufficiency among the groups with which they work.[140] During this transformation, humanitarian agencies adopted the incipient human security approach embodied not only in the attempt to focus on individuals as the main referent object, but also in the growing links between development and security. Consequently, humanitarian agencies adopted a new development paradigm that "puts people at the centre of development, regards economic growth as a means and not an end, protects the life opportunities of future generations as well as the present generations and respects the natural systems on which all life depends."[141] Concerning Africa, while in the past development used to be associated with "modernization resulting from the efforts of an international regime of investment, technology transfer and trade to stimulate economic growth,"[142] during the transformation period the notion of development became premised upon economic self-sufficiency

This new thinking was based on the assumption that mere relief assistance creates dependency among the recipients.[143] Although this concern was emphasized by aid agencies since the 1970s Sahelian famine, it was not until the changed international humanitarian discourse of the 1990s that this idea "began to translate into cuts in humanitarian aid"[144] for internally displaced people in Sudan. The government of Sudan also supported this growing international tendency calling for cuts in food aid on the grounds that "such assistance was internationally demeaning, that is was aiding the rebels in the South and, importantly, was

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[140] Joanna Macrae, MarkBradbury, S.uzanne Jaspars, Douglas Johnson & Mark Duffield, "Conflict, the continuum and chronic emergencies: a critical analysis of the scope for linking relief, rehabilitation and development planning in Sudan," *Disasters* Vol. 21, No. 3, (1997): 323-43
[141] United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Report 1994,* 4
[142] Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: the making and unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995)
[143] Mark Duffield, "Aid and complicity: The Case of War-displaced Southerners in Northern Sudan," 90
[144] Fiona Fox, *The Politicization of Humanitarian Aid*: *a discussion paper for Caritas Europa.* (London: CAFOD, 1999)

undermining its attempts to economically integrate displaced Southerners and hence increase their self-reliance."[145] Given this situation, one of the main effects of the policy of linking relief to development in Sudan was a major reduction in food aid during the mid 1990s despite the continuing disruption of war and inability of displaced Southerners to secure their daily needs.

Despite the absence of confirming evidence, the concern among international humanitarian agencies about creating dependency and, therefore, undermining the economic independence of the receiving groups prevailed in shaping this shift. Between 1994 and 1995 food aid provided under the umbrella of the UN's Operational Lifeline Sudan (OLS) program dropped by 70%.[146] Furthermore, by 1997 in North Sudan the Brussels Headquarters of the European Commission began "rejecting NGO requests for food aid despite such petitions being supported by survey evidence and having the agreement of the EU delegate in Khartoum."[147] In addition, from the mid I990s, the reduced food aid available was repackaged by NGOs as "food-for-work projects,"[148] implying that by limiting free food distribution during the pre-harvest lean season, and only providing a partial ration, the project would help the Dinka to cultivate their own farms and, at the same time, encourage them to work as hired agricultural labor.

Another crucial aspect of the new humanitarianism, the rights-based approach adopted by many humanitarian actors in their long-term development work, was reflected in aid organizations' policies in Sudan. Internally displaced persons became part of a shift in aid policy towards embracing a human rights approach, whereby advocating for the rights of aid beneficiaries and partners, especially the right to protection and development, became a

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[145] Mark Duffield, "Aid and complicity: The Case of War-displaced Southerners in Northern Sudan," 90
[146] Ibid, 91
[147] Mark Duffield et al, *Sudan: the unintended consequences of humanitarian assistance - a report of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO).* (Dublin: Trinity College, 2000)
[148] Atual Karim et al, *Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS): a review.* (Geneva: Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1996), http://www.cf-hst.net/UNICEF-TEMP/Doc-Repository/doc/doc388691.PDF

central project aim. Agencies such as CARE, OXFAM, UNICEF and SCF-UK developed a rights-based dimension to their humanitarian work in Sudan. However, it is important to emphasize that the UN redefined "protection" in terms of establishing the conditions necessary for achieving self-management for internally displaced persons.[149] Hence, the most important aspect of protection was not guaranteeing social, economic or cultural rights, but "strengthening the IDPs' own self-support through meeting their basic needs such as food production, rebuilding livestock assets, and contributing toward health and education services."[150]

Therefore, the transformation within humanitarianism towards long-term development assistance and incorporation of human rights aspects into the humanitarian agenda was explicitly reflected in the way aid agencies responded to the needs of millions of displaced persons in Darfur. While adopting measures to encourage self-reliance among displaced Dinka, aid agencies did not succeed in their attempt to improve the IDP's economic position, health, or physical well-being. In fact, not only did reduction in food aid not facilitate lessening of dependency, but it forced a greater reliance among the Dinka on "highly exploitative and non-sustainable forms of agricultural labor."[151] At the same time, those resources provided or loaned to the displaced to decrease their economic disadvantage usually ended up in the hands of more powerful surrounding groups. Hence, while attempting to achieve a long-term development ideal by reducing food and other necessary humanitarian aid, relief agencies risked their ability to carry out emergency need-based assistance further subjugating displaced Southerners to the political project of the government.

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[149] UNHCU, Confidential Annex to South Darfur Resettlement Proposal (for Donors). Protection of the South Darfur War Affected Displaced: the critical role of socio-economic factors in protection - the South Darfur resettlement proposal. (Khartoum: UNHCU, 1999)
[150] Mark Duffield, "Aid and complicity: The Case of War-displaced Southerners in Northern Sudan," 101
[151] Ibid, 100

§3.2. The "coherence" agenda, state-building and expulsion of humanitarian aid

organizations

A new chapter in Sudan's civil war opened in February 2003 when open warfare erupted between the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) forces and Khartoum's government military in frustration at "decades of political marginalization and economic neglect."[152] The rebels were relatively successful in the beginning of the conflict, however the government responded to the insurgency by deploying some of its troops, in addition to arming and supporting Arab tribal militias and the Popular Defense Forces in the South called the Janjaweed militias. After various attempts to negotiate a ceasefire during late 2003, the government of Sudan launched a major ground and air offensive, which eventually resulted in the announcement by President Bashir that the government had established "control in all theatres" and restored law and order.[153] However, violence and hostilities continued leading to another round of ceasefire negotiations in Chad which produced two poor drafted agreements that failed to hold. In January 2005 Naivasha Accords formally ended North-South war with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which incorporated SPLA/M into a Government of National Unity (GNU), and created a schedule for 2009 national elections.[154] However, the Darfur Peace Agreement was undermined by the absence of other parties.

Meanwhile, in the intervening 14 months, the civil war accelerated into "one of the most violent conflicts in the world," generating what is now widely regarded as "the world's greatest humanitarian crisis."[155] While Khartoum's counter-insurgency operations spilled across the border into Chad, approximately "30.000 people were killed and 1.2 million were

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[152] Paul D. Williams, Alex J. Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 27, (2005): 30
[153] Ibid
[154] International Crisis Group. *Crisis in Darfur,* http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3060&l=1
[155] Eric Reeves, "Catastrophe on Darfur," *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 31, No. 99, (2004): 160

forced to flee Darfur."[156] Around 200.000 became refugees and are believed to have crossed into Chad, while the majority of civilians remained internally displaced within camps in Darfur again in need of emergency humanitarian assistance. By the middle of 2004, the World Health Organization claimed that "between 240 and 440 people were dying every day as a result of the conflict,"[157] and the situation was described within the UN system and international humanitarian community as "the most serious humanitarian emergency in the world today."[158] By September 2004, the situation had deteriorated further. Now in its sixth year, the conflict has resulted in the deaths of 450.000 people, leading to large-scale displacement and leaving approximately 4 million dependent on outside aid.[159]

Because of sustained and systematic obstruction by the government of Sudan, very little progress was made in humanitarian action on the ground in the beginning of the conflict. Humanitarian access to Darfur was extremely limited primarily "because of insecurity and government restrictions on travel."[160] Without sustained access to the civilian population, the ability of humanitarian agencies to respond was limited. Despite the fact that some agencies were already present in Darfur, and others managed to establish programmers, these have been largely restricted to responding to "the needs of IDPs in urban centers."[161] While humanitarian agencies were prevented from working in late 2003 and early 2004, the Sudanese army and air force alongside the Janjaweed militia committed assaults on civilians, their villages, their infrastructure and their livelihoods which went beyond the doctrines of measured counterinsurgency, "indicating an evident strategy of male massacre, rape, forced

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[156] Human Rights Watch, *Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan.* 2004, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/05/06/darfur-destroyed-0
[157] United Nations, "Verbatim Record of the 5015th Meeting of the UN Security Council," 2004. Quoted in Eric Reeves. "Catastrophe on Darfur," *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 31, No. 99, 2004
[158] Ed O'Keefe, Jeffrey Marcus, "Crisis in Sudan," *Washington Post,* September 9, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20765-2004Jul1.html
[159] Sudan in Crisis, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/interactives/sudan/
[160] HPG Briefing Note, "Humanitarian issues in Darfur," 2004, 1, www.odi.org.uk/hpg/
[161] HPG Briefing Note. "Humanitarian issues in Darfur," 2

displacement and land-grabbing."[162]

International agencies continued to advocate for humanitarian access to Darfur in the context of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region. As one of the aspects of the campaign, the UN and humanitarian agencies within Sudan attempted to reveal the facts about the situation, directly or through third parties. For instance, the UN's Humanitarian Coordinator in Khartoum, Mukesh Kapila, spoke openly in March about "ethnic cleansing in Darfur" to the BBC and drew a direct comparison with the early stages of Rwanda's genocide.[163] However, this did not affect the situation on the ground since visas and permits for humanitarian workers were still suspended or blocked. The turning point in negotiations was the N'djamena talks that refocused discussion from political onto humanitarian matters. An agreement was finally signed on 8 April, which was clearly a military pause to enable humanitarian access, and was duly called the "Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur."[164] Towards the end of May the government of Sudan started the process of authorization of visas for international humanitarian staff, although they still stalled humanitarian logistical work by their restrictive import procedures. Humanitarian access increased and large-scale operations eventually became possible for UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs. By October 2004, around 70 organizations and 6.100 humanitarian workers were providing assistance in Darfur.[165]

Importantly, the Darfur humanitarian crisis unfolded at a time when the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development was mediating the peace process between the government of Sudan and the SPLA in the south. The humanitarian catastrophe and the IGAD peace process were intertwined in various ways. The International Crisis

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[162] Hugo Slim, "Dithering over Darfur: A Preliminary Review of the International Response," *International Affairs,* Vol. 80, No. 5, (2004): 814
[163] Sudan Slams the UN for "heap files," BBC News, March 22, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3559621.stm
[164] Hugo Slim, "Dithering over Darfur: A Preliminary Review of the International Response," 817
[165] United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan*. 2004, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep04.html

Group asserted that "the IGAD peace talks have been prioritized at the cost of holding the government accountable for its actions in Darfur."[166] Moreover, the ICG argued that the Khartoum regime assumed that the international community would not criticize it at a crucial point in the peace process, so slowed the process down while launching a major offensive in Darfur. At the same time, the IGAD, as the major development organization in the region that claims to pursue "food security and environmental protection" along with "promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs"[167] preferred to focus on the political process aimed at resolving the conflict. While attempting to converge humanitarian and political missions based on the "coherence" doctrine, the IGAD's actions compromised the immediate humanitarian need to ensure that populations are protected from violence and raised questions about the dangers of linking humanitarian action uncritically to political processes that do not necessarily prioritize humanitarian outcomes.

In 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was reached to end the southern insurgency in Sudan. The CPA formed an "Interim Government of National Unity (GoNU) and also opened the possibility of southern Sudan's secession, depending on the outcome of a referendum to be held in 2011."[168] The CPA also established a separate Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) with its own Constitution and ministries. While GoSS was challenged by the task of constructing state institutions and establishing a new state structure, the existing international organizations were supporting justice and security development programs concentrating "almost exclusively on building the capacity of the nascent GoSS."[169] In order to overcome "unsustainable" justice system, UNMIS and UNDP undertook various programs to strengthen judicial capacity. In 2006 Capacity Building of Sudan Judiciary

[166] International Crisis Group. *Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis*. 2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2550
[167] About IGAD: http://www.igad.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=43&Itemid=53&limit=1&limitstart=1
[168] Bruce Baker, Eric Scheye, "Access to Justice in a Post-conflict State: Donor-supported Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Southern Sudan," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2009): 174
[169] Ibid, 176

project was launched by UNDP with the main objective being "strengthening the capacity of the Judiciary to: enhance its independence; build the knowledge-base of judges; and empower the judiciary to effectively and fairly apply the law and deliver justice."[170] Justice and police development plans for establishing state institutions clearly reflect the international project of state-building that focuses on "reforming security institutions of the state in order to control borders, maintain the rule of law and improve the state's capacity to police its territory."[171] In accordance with this logic, state building is perceived to be integral to resolving the urgent security and humanitarian challenges. However, although the outcome of justice and policy development programs remains to be seen, at the moment "the local networks are the only viable means of delivering services to the vast majority in southern Sudan."[172] Therefore, international organizations might need to look beyond their current 'state-building' model, and reorient their activities providing support to local non-governmental and civil society organizations, as well as justice networks to address immediate needs of the population.

Finally, another salient indicator of international humanitarian organizations' adherence to the principles of the "new" humanitarianism is their alleged missions and primary objectives during the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The expulsion of 13 international aid agencies and dissolution of Sudan's three largest indigenous organizations at the beginning of March 2009, following the international criminal court's (ICC) indictment of President Omar al Bashir for crimes against humanity, has devastated the world's largest humanitarian operation. The departure of organizations like "the health charity Doctors Without Borders which had to abandon hospitals and clinics in several areas, and Oxfam Great Britain, which provided clean water and latrines to hundreds of thousands of people in camps across the region," as well as International Rescue Committee and CARE that

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[170] Capacity Building of Sudan Judiciary: Background, http://www.sd.undp.org/projects/dg7.htm
[171] Kamil Shah, "The Failure of State building and the Promise of State Failure," *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 30, No. 1, (2009), 19
[172] Bruce Baker, Eric Scheye. "Access to Justice in a Post-conflict State: Donor-supported Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Southern Sudan," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2009): 182

provided "medical treatment, food and shelter for millions of Sudanese in Darfur," put the lives of millions of displaced people at risk.[173] While aid groups argue that "they have gone out of their way to avoid even the appearance of collaboration with the ICC," the Sudanese government accused them of conspiring in the court case providing false evidence and helping prosecutors gather testimony from the victims."[174] Importantly, however the aid organizations affected, including "the International Rescue Committee, CARE, Oxfam Great Britain, Save the Children, Doctors Without Borders represent about 40 percent of the 6,500 international and local aid workers in Darfur,"[175] which raises the question why some of the world's most respected humanitarian relief agencies are accused of being agents of neo-colonialism.

Focusing on the four recognized leaders in humanitarian emergencies whose programs were suspended in March, it is feasible to trace the expanded scope and range of activities of the "new" humanitarian agenda. As argued in the second chapter, while expanding into development and other activities designed to assist marginalized populations, humanitarian organizations shifted their focus from "simply" providing relief to eliminating the underlying causes that placed individuals at risk. Unlike the majority of international humanitarian agencies that combine political and humanitarian missions, Doctors Without Borders remained loyal to the principles of impartiality and neutrality arguing that "the humanitarian imperative of saving lives and meeting immediate needs should be the primary goal of humanitarian assistance which is incompatible with political solutions to crisis."[176] Along with providing emergency medical care, the organization used to focus on water and sanitation, and nutritional assistance, including food rations to children and basic supplies in

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[173] Lynsey Adda Rio, Lydia Polgreen, "Aid Groups' Expulsion, Fears of More Misery," *New York Times,* March 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/world/africa/23darfur.html?_r=1&scp=5&sq=&st=nyt
[174] Ibid
[175] Neil Macfarquhar, Marlise Simons, "Bashir Defies war Crime Arrest Order," *New York Times*, March 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/world/africa/06sudan.html
[176] Eric Stobbaerts, Sarah Martin and Katharine Derderian. "Integration and UN humanitarian reforms," 18, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR29/18-20.pdf

ten villages where the people were forced to move.[177] Making clear the role of humanitarian aid and demonstrating a commitment to impartiality and neutrality, MSF representatives argued that "the current crisis in Darfur highlights that humanitarian assistance is not necessarily compatible with punishing war criminals or, for that matter, the armed protection of civilians."[178] Importantly, the president of the International Council of MSF asserted that independence from the ICC is not enough to avoid being blocked from providing emergency humanitarian aid since "recent events demonstrate that whatever position international groups have taken with regard to the ICC, emergency assistance in Darfur is being held hostage to political wrangling between the international community and the Sudanese government."[179]

Save the Children was among 13 international humanitarian groups whose registration was revoked. Until the suspension of their work, the organization conducted programs for children and families "providing protection for the most vulnerable, conducting education, health and livelihood programs, and assisting in the coordination and management of four camps."[180] In addition to their emergency relief programs, the organization launched Economic Opportunities and Livelihoods sustainable development program in order to increase the standard of living by improving household incomes. International Aid agency Oxfam Great Britain went further in their mission statement claiming that "their activities are designed not only to keep people healthy and reduce disease, but also to help them maintain their basic human dignity and reduce their reliance on external assistance."[181] While providing Sudanese people with vital humanitarian and development aid, Oxfam pursued political solutions and continues to advocate for an end to the violence and protection for civilians "urging the international community to do more to achieve a cessation of hostilities,

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[177] MSF in Sudan, http://doctorswithoutborders.org/news/country.cfm?id=2369
[178] Darfur: Punishment or Aid?, http://doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=3516&cat=op-eds-articles
[179] Ibid
[180] Save the Children in Sudan, http://www.savethechildren.org/countries/africa/sudan.html
[181] Darfur Crisis in Depth, http://www.oxfam.org/en/emergencies/darfur/in-depth

to deploy a strong protection force and to put pressure on the various actors to conclude an inclusive peace agreement."[182] Similar to Oxfam, CARE focused on development programs yet making their adherence to the principles of the "new" humanitarianism more explicit. Their mission statement indicates that CARE "tackles underlying causes of poverty so that people can become self-sufficient."[183] While launching nutrition, economic development, education, health, HIV/AIDS programs, the organization placed special emphasis on working with women to create lasting social change and minimize the effects of underlying causes of poverty in the country. Finally, The International Rescue Committee, which launched humanitarian aid programs in Darfur in early 2004, provided "vital health, water, sanitation and education services for more than 650,000 people affected by the ongoing crisis."[184] The IRC was among a number of international aid organizations assessed in June 2008 by the Government of Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission, the outcome of which was the forced closure of IRC women's community centers and rule of law programs that promoted human rights and access to legal aid. Furthermore, the IRC not only focused on relief programs during conflicts but also "programs along the continuum of relief through post-conflict recovery, supporting conflict-impacted communities and countries in their transition to sustainable peace and development."[185] According to the organization's logic, assistance to war impacted communities cannot solely be provision of humanitarian assistance, it must also "attempt to restore and strengthen physical and social institutions, as well as rebuild and restore social cohesion, trust and confidence between people and between people and their institutions."[186] Similar to CARE, the IRC's work in post-conflict settings focuses on understanding the root causes of conflicts while working on structural responses.

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[182] Oxfam Programs in Darfur,
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/emergencies/sudan/what_oxfam_is_doing
[183] CARE's work, http://www.care.org/careswork/whatwedo/index.asp
[184] IRC Programs in Darfur, http://www.theirc.org/news/irc-programs-in-darfur1003.html
[185] Post-Conflict Development, http://www.theirc.org/what/the_postconflict_development_initiative.html
[186] Ibid

Therefore, critical evaluation of the humanitarian responses to the civil wars in Sudan during different periods explicitly reflected the changing nature of humanitarianism. The international humanitarian relief effort launched in the late 1980s aiming to provide assistance to the internally displaced people illustrated the transformation within humanitarianism towards sustainable development assistance and incorporation of human rights aspects into the humanitarian agenda, while justice and police development programs established after the outbreak of violence in 2003 for creation of state institutions clearly reflect the international project of state-building. Finally, the expulsion of 13 aid organizations in March 2009 leaving the vast needs of the population unaddressed and creating a huge void in assistance, impossible for any remaining agency to adequately fulfill, raises questions about unintended consequences of the convergence or coherence agenda of the "new" humanitarianism and their effects on humanitarian organizations' ability to effectively respond to emergency needs and alleviate human sufferings.

Conclusion

Sudan's decision to suspend operations of 13 relief organizations in March 2009 on accusations that they provided false evidence to the International Criminal Court led to humanitarian efforts being cut in half, placing lives of millions of people at risk. The basic needs of Sudanese refugees and internally displaced persons will now be impossible for the remaining aid groups to meet, which will have grave humanitarian implications, particularly, cause deterioration of the welfare of millions who rely on humanitarian aid for survival. The current crisis in Darfur highlights the need for humanitarian organizations to acknowledge the incompatibility of humanitarian missions with a political agenda of punishing war criminals. However, this is not to claim that the "coherence" doctrine or combination of two missions was the main reason behind the expulsion, since my intention here was not to focus on an explanation of the recent incident. On the contrary, in this research paper, largely through the case of the humanitarian crises in Darfur during different periods, I have attempted to illustrate the effects of the multiple transformations within both human security and humanitarian paradigms on the humanitarian organizations' ability to effectively respond to emergency needs and alleviate human suffering.

Throughout the 1990s, while the original human security paradigm was being conceptualized placing the individual at the centre of security concerns, the scope and the very meaning of humanitarianism was being significantly modified. In part, reflecting the broadening and deepening debate, aid agencies included humanitarian issues on their agenda, alongside more long term structural threats to international security, such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, global warming, etc. The integration of development into the framework of humanitarian action was made possible because of the effective collapse of the firewall that had divided aid and politics for more than a decade. Importantly, it is argued here that while

incorporating sustainable development on their agenda and concentrating on projects that attempted to meet the diverse needs of individuals, humanitarian agencies adopted the original human security approach with the primary goal of empowering individuals and providing "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear." Therefore, based on the evaluation of the international humanitarian community's major relief effort, Operation Lifeline Sudan, launched in the early 1990s to help civilians suffering from food deprivation in Sudan's civil war, the thesis illustrates how the transformation facilitated fulfillment of the original human security agenda by enabling relief agencies to address both "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" while focusing on the individuals as a referent object.

By contrast, the further modification of the humanitarian agenda, as well as the transformation within the human security paradigm placed the state once more at the centre of security concerns. Embracing a more holistic approach to the concept of human security, scholars and policy makers have argued that state and human security are mutually dependent assuming that stable state structures represent an indispensable prerequisite of "freedom from fear," as well as "freedom from want." While encouraging a combination of political and humanitarian missions, the human security advocates argued that international state building intervention is a necessary strategy for fixing failed states and alleviating human suffering. Similar to the human security paradigm, the humanitarianism transformed into a framework of long-term involvement, assistance and capacity building. No longer satisfied with saving individuals today so that they can be at risk tomorrow, humanitarianism now aspires to transform the structural conditions or root causes that make populations vulnerable. Toward that end, however, aid agencies strive not only to spread development, and human rights, but also to join a state-building agenda that aspires to create stable, effective, and democratic states. The analysis of the justice and police development programs established in Sudan after the outbreak of violence in 2003 for the creation of state institutions, and the actions of the

world's most respected humanitarian relief agencies before the expulsion in March 2009, revealed the ontological contradiction between the international project of state-building that primarily focuses on state structures and the original human security agenda, which advocates for prioritization of individual security needs. Furthermore, while adopting a more holistic approach and incorporating a political agenda of state building into the framework of humanitarian missions, aid organizations risk to be deprived of their fundamental purpose of saving lives and providing emergency relief, which again demonstrates the ontological incompatibility of the two agendas.

Proceeding to the broader theoretical implications of this research, it was crucial for the thesis to emphasize the necessity of evaluating the two paradigms together since human security and humanitarianism are intertwined both at the level of discourse and that of practice. This approach will enable researchers to observe how future shifts might affect the fulfillment of the original human security goal. At the moment, however, the shift back towards state-centric security raises questions about unintended consequences of the convergence or coherence agenda of the "new" humanitarianism and their effects on humanitarian organizations' ability to effectively respond to emergency needs and alleviate human sufferings. Clearly the expulsion of 13 humanitarian agencies demonstrates the necessity for the international community to reconsider the coherence of the holistic state-centric human security approach. Humanitarian organizations need to acknowledge the necessity to prioritize individual security needs over the state security if the original human security agenda is to be implemented.

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