

# **Media Freedom and Democracy: Does Culture Matter?**

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**Submitted to  
Central European University  
Department of Political Science**

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary  
(2009)

# Abstract

The importance of the free and independent media for the emergence and consolidation of democracy is widely accepted, both by academia and practitioners. The factor the importance of which for democracy and free media is not so unanimously accepted is culture. What is the relationship between culture in society and democracy, culture and freedom of the press? Can the differences in culture among the countries explain the differences in the way institutions are built and perform in society? In order to answer these questions, the data for 74 countries is statistically analyzed. The findings suggest that such cultural factors as power distance in society, level of uncertainty avoidance and individualism have a significant impact on the level of press freedom and democracy; moreover the cultural profile of a country significantly influences its level of democratic.

# **Dedication**

**For my mother**

## **Acknowledgements**

I want to thank my supervisor Kate Coyer for her patience in reading my drafts, for being demanding and supportive. It was a pleasure to work with her and I appreciate her help very much.

I would also like to thank my Professor Carsten Schneider for his help and valuable comments on the research proposal, Tamas Rudas and Levente Littvay my two Professors in statistics, for the knowledge they were sharing with us in class and for the useful and productive feedback on my thesis.

And I also thank my academic writing Professor Eszter Timar for her support during the whole year, her patience and her help with all my papers in general and the Thesis in particular.

Finally, I want to thank my colleagues who helped my providing feedback or just supporting me, and especially Jakub Parusinski, who was always near and always ready to help.

Thank you very much!

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# Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Much scholarly work has been done on the relationship between media and democracy, and the importance of this relationship is generally accepted, although at present there is no consensus among the scholars about the exact role that media plays in democracy. There are different opinions on this issue, as media can be viewed either as the consequence or the cause of democracy, as an indicator of democracy or it may be considered to play a negative role and hinder democracy, being the voice of antidemocratic forces, or playing little role at all (McConnell and Becker 2002, 1). Perhaps, media can play all these roles at different periods of time; in different contexts depending on the relationship with wider social, political and economic forces; or rather different types of media may play different (and possibly contradictory) roles.

Several authors find that a free press influences the development of well functioning democracies, which is done by the better fulfillment of the three democratic functions of the press: agenda-setting, watch-dog activities, and providing the public with a forum for debate (Gurevitch and Blumler 1994, Curran and Gurevitch 2005, Norris 2006, McConnell and Becker 2002). In her article, Norris analyzes the nature of the relations between the media and democracy, using regression analysis to measure the impact of press freedom on the democracy, as conceptualized by Polity IV, Vanhanen, and Przeworski et al. (Norris 2006, 84). In the models she used the logged GDP per capita, being a former British colony, being a Middle Eastern country, ethnic fractionalization and population size as control variables, thus she controlled for the economic development of the countries and for the historic and cultural factors. The results of the analysis suggest that press freedom has a considerable impact on democracy (found to be significant in all three models). In my opinion, however, an inverse

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<sup>1</sup> For the background information see Kovalenko and Parusinski (2009).

claim can be just as valid. An autonomous media can encourage political agents to make institutional changes that are socially beneficial, but if such institutional arrangements already exist, it is easier for media to be autonomous (Coyne and Leeson 2004, 23).

Moreover in a set of the three models, Norris finds the Middle Eastern and Ex-British Colony (dummies) to be significant each in one model out of three (each model uses one of the proposed measurements of democracy, namely Polity IV, Vanhanen, and Przeworski et al.). This would suggest that the cultural or historic factors have little impact on the development of democracy. I believe, however, that culture has a broad impact on social patterns of behavior, institutional arrangements and their functioning. This can be observed in the different approaches to the provision of social rights in countries around the world, amongst other rights. This would also confirm the social-centric theory of media which claims that the structure of the media reflects the nature of the society in which it operates (McQuail 1994) and psychological anthropological approaches to political culture, which explains the differences in political culture in terms of psychological features prevalent in the society as well as with the reference to the values, traditions, and beliefs of the society (Almond and Verba 1989).

Therefore the broad topic I am interested in and will address in the following chapters is the relationship between media and culture, the relationship between culture and democracy, and the intersection of the two. The specific research questions are: *Which cultural dimensions are significantly related to democracy? To press freedom? Can cultural dimensions explain the differences in the level of democracy and press freedom between countries?* I will argue that media freedom and democracy have a positive relationship and that cultural dimensions have a significant impact on both media freedom and democracy.

Democracy is a complicated concept with a number of different definitions and conceptualizations. For example, Rousseau viewed democracy as a social contract between

individuals; the classical school and Schumpeter in particular, base their definition on the idea of the competitive election of the representatives, who will act in the common interest. In my research I will use the definition proposed by Dahl, who views democracy as a polyarchy - an institutional arrangement in which decisions are made according to the principle of competition and participation (Dahl 2003). Competition is important because in theory it gives citizens the option of the meaningful choice. Participation or inclusion is important because, in this framework, it enables voting citizens to voice opinions as acting representatives of wider populations.

Classically media freedom referred to independence from governmental control, but nowadays it is generally accepted that the market forces and other powerful and elite groups can also become threats to media freedom. Therefore independent and free media should not be controlled by any single force, but have multiplicity of the voices, opinions and owners (Rozumilowicz 2002, 12; Lichtenberg 2002, 181; Norris 2006, 64). Some scholars argue that media freedom does not constitute a value in itself, but only when it contributes to more important values, such as democracy, human development and protection of human rights, is its value fully realized (Rozumilowicz 2002; Price and Krug 2000). In my research I will use the definition of media freedom which includes four main elements, namely structural conditions, operating conditions, opportunities to gain access to the channels of communications and benefits from the quality of content (McQuail 1994, 140). I find this definition the most useful as it gives a possibility to operationalize the concept in order to measure it. Moreover it includes important structural and institutional aspects, which is closely related to the democracy as an institutional arrangement of political system and also these aspects can be influenced by the institutional or structural culture, the understanding of culture that I use it in my research (I will discuss the definition further).

The factor which might influence both media freedom and democracy is culture. There are at least three distinctive ways of thinking about culture: first, the understanding of the phenomena used in cultural studies (for example Birmingham and Frankfurt schools); secondly the way culture is referred to in various policy documents, such as UNESCO conventions or EU Agenda for Culture; and lastly viewing the culture as values, attitudes, beliefs and their influence on behavior, which I mean by culture in this research. The concept of culture and cultural factors will be used interchangeably, meaning “a collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede 2001, 9). Culture is only a part of a wider concept of mental programming, and culture includes values and system of values, which are invisible but can be observed only in practices, such as rituals, symbols and heroes, ideas which will be further explored in the thesis (Hofstede 2001, 10-11).

While acknowledging the difficulty of measuring such a broad concept as culture, I chose to focus on more structural or institutional aspects of culture rather than a definition that draws more from cultural studies traditions. Specifically, I will use Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as measurements of culture. In these dimensions culture is referred as the national culture, and “[...] the concept of the dimensions of culture is introduced through the inquiry into the philosophical opposition between the specific and the general, the different and the similar” and they represent fundamental problems of society (Hofstede 2001, 1). These dimensions, namely power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance<sup>2</sup>, were found empirically, but were predicted theoretically by other scholars long before Hofstede (Inkeles and Levinson 1969, 45-50; Albere, Cohen, Davis, Levy and Sutton 1950; Naroll 1970).

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<sup>2</sup> These four dimensions in the text mean features of society when written normally, while capitalized dimensions refer mainly to the variables included into analysis. For example, the feature of particular society will be written power distance, while talking about the variable I will write Power Distance or Power Distance Index.



The dimensions of culture are considered to be important factors that affect the way institutions are built and the way institutions work (Hofstede 2001, 11). For example which groups are treated as a minorities depends on the facts such as distribution of the population, economic situation of the groups, the nature of the population groups' interactions, patterns of the migration and mobility of the population groups, but also depends on cultural values and cultural practices (languages, identities and interpretation of history), ), economic and social capital, and other historical and contemporary factors, that will lead to different treatment of minorities from assimilation to integration (Hofstede 2001, 429). Furthermore, culture has often been identified as a strong factor influencing the structure and functioning of a given society's institutional arrangement. Indeed culture, religion and social norms can have a significant impact on the organization of bureaucracy, individual ambitions, and interpersonal relations (Weber 2002). Moreover, social facts can be viewed as having an independent existence, playing just as significant a role as the actors that make up society (Durkheim 1982; Bottomore and Nisbet 1973; Almond 1960).

As the result of such differences, Hofstede states that the world is not moving towards Western values, particularly towards democracy, but rather, that authoritarian governments will prevail in most of the world, and there is no universal concept of human rights (Hofstede 2001, 431-432). If one takes such a position that would mean that only particular countries with particular types of culture can be democracies and have free media. This seems to be a bit too radical a claim and presupposes cultural determinism. Almond and Verba argue that culture influences the structure of institutions and their functioning, but institutions also shape behavior and attitudes. Moreover orientations (cognitive, affective and evaluative) are subject to change over time, being influenced by socialization process, international influence and different events (Almond 1990, 144; Diamond 1994, 9). Also the belief that culture determines political and other institutions would contradict empirics, in

particular a number of examples of democratic consolidation in countries with an authoritarian past (Diamond 1994, 9-10). Thus, culture does influence the political system and the structure of institutions, but is not the static determinant, rather a constraint, which might change over time influenced by external and internal forces, particularly by the process of the globalization.

In the first chapter I will investigate theoretical foundations, review the main works in the field of culture, media freedom and democracy. The first section is devoted to the conceptualization of the main concepts; the second section builds the theoretical framework for the future empirical research.

In the second chapter empirical research will be used to test the hypotheses and address the main questions. The first section of this chapter addresses the operationalization of the main concepts and the measurements used in this work. The second section will discuss the empirical findings connected with the theory, and also highlight the findings of other scholars concerning it. In the last section I will present the statistical analysis, which is used to test the hypothesis, discuss the findings and provide explanations for the statistical results.

In order to address the questions of my thesis, I will conduct comparative large-N study research which includes 74 countries (see Annex 1). I will use statistical analysis in order to test my hypotheses. In order to find out which (if any) of the four cultural dimensions have an influence on media freedom and democracy I will run two types of regression models: with democracy and press freedom as response variables respectively. I also want to test whether the direction of the relationship between media and democracy coincide with predicted by theoretical framework. Then I attempt to divide countries into groups with similar culture, so basically to create profiles of culture for groups of countries, based on cultural dimensions which showed to have a significant influence on democracy and press freedom. In order to make the groups cluster analysis will be used, and afterwards I will

explore whether such a classification shows patterns in respect to media freedom and democracy (using analysis of variation). This may show if culture has significant influence on the development of democracy and free media, whether these phenomena exist only within a particular culture group or if any society can be democratic and have free media if it creates effective democratic institutions. So media freedom and democracy will be my **response variables**, and culture (measured by cultural dimensions of Hofstede) will be my **explanatory variable**, with economic factors, namely GDP and index of inequality (Gini index) being control variables.

Following, I will provide the analysis of findings and in the conclusion I will summarize the findings and discuss the possibilities for further research.

# Chapter 1: Theoretical framework

## 1.1. Conceptualization

In this section I intend to discuss the main concepts which I use in my research, namely culture, democracy and media freedom. I will review the main definitions of these phenomena, come up with the definition the most suitable for my research and justify the choice. All the phenomena are very wide therefore there is no one single definition for them and different scholars conceptualize them from a number of different angles.

The first phenomenon to be addressed and defined is *culture*. The idea that culture influences a given country's political regime, the way institutions are built and perform has been discussed since Plato and Aristotle, as such issues as social stratification and the nature of the education system, even geographical distribution, have been known to influence political culture (Almond and Verba 1989, 2-5). Since the enlightenment, sociology and psychoanthropology have had a strong impact on the way we perceive the relation between culture, institutions and politics. Many authors refer to early years of education and social interaction as being decisive in structuring an individual's understanding of future interpersonal relations and political orientations.

In book *The Civic Culture Revised* (Almond and Verba 1989) the authors discuss the impact of the civic culture on the stability of the democratic regime. However, according to the authors, not only education has an impact on culture, attitudes and values and political views, they also seem to be significantly affected by national and group historical experiences (ibid, 24). Moreover some aspects of civic culture, such as level of awareness and the need to be informed about current affairs, willingness to share one's own opinion. As Lijphart (1989, 38) notices, civic culture is closely related to general social and interpersonal relations. I think

that not just civic culture influences the democracy, but also the culture in broad understanding has a significant influence on the way institutions are built and the way they function. The civic or political culture is highly influenced by the general values, attitudes, traditions and patterns of behavior of the population, as the values and patterns of behavior which determine the way people perform in political sphere are often shared or closely related to the values people refer to in other spheres of life, such as family, social or professional sphere.

Culture is a very broad concept and has been defined in many ways. Kroeber and Kluckhohn<sup>3</sup> propose the taxonomy of the definitions, which reflects the development of concept and also shows the wide range of stresses and angles from which the phenomena can be defined (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, 41-72). The first set of the broad definitions of culture, which views culture as “a comprehensive totality” and includes all the possible kinds of cultural content, is usually influenced by Tylor’s conceptualization, namely “Culture, or civilization, [...] is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor 1871, 1 cited in *ibid*, 43). In the second group are the historical definitions, which emphasize one aspect of culture, namely the social heritage and traditions. For example, Angyal defined culture as “organized body of behavior patterns which is transmitted by social inheritance, that is, by tradition, and which is characteristic of given area or group of people” (Angyal 1941, 2 cited in *ibid*, 48). The third set of definitions is more concentrated on culture defined through values, attitudes, beliefs orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society (Harrison and Huntington 2000, xv; Thomas 1937, 8; Sorokin 1947, 313). The other groups emphasize the rule or way; psychological aspects such as “adjustment or culture as a problem-solving device” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, 55), learning and habit;

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<sup>3</sup> All the definitions in taxonomy are cited in Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952).

structural aspects such as patterning or organization of culture (Linton 1945; Willey 1929); genetic aspects of culture such as “culture as product or artifact” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, 64), ideas and symbols (Sorokin 1937, I vol.; Bernard 1942; Kluckhohn and Kelly 1945).

Another way to define culture includes both the result and the ‘process’ of culture, for example the definition proposed by Kluckhohn, namely “culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values” (Kluckhohn 1951, 86). Hall defines culture “as both the means and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes, on the basis of their given historical conditions and relationships, through which they ‘handle’ and respond to the conditions of existence; and as lived traditions and practices through which those ‘understandings’ are expressed and in which they are embodied” (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott 1995 [1982], 27). This definition emphasizes the cultural expressions and therefore touches the importance of media for culture as an important mean of expressing the ‘understandings’.

In the next couple of paragraphs I am going to discuss two distinctive ways of conceptualizing culture, which, although being absolutely valid, are different from what I will mean by the culture. One of the distinctive ways of looking at culture is the one used by policy-makers, for example as defined in UNESCO *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* or in EU *European agenda for culture in a globalizing world*. From this point of view culture mainly refers to the results of creative work of individuals and organizations. In the UNESCO convention the concept of “cultural expressions” is used and it refers to “those expressions that result from the creativity of

individuals, groups and societies, and that have cultural content” (UNESCO 2005, 5). In European cultural agenda and cultural policies the concept of culture mainly refers to “fine arts, including a variety of works of art, cultural goods and services” or as a “basis for a symbolic world of meanings, beliefs, values, traditions which are expressed in language, art, religion and myths” (European agenda for culture 2007, 3)

The second distinctive way of looking at culture emerges from the field of cultural studies. Two main schools of cultural studies (Frankfurt and Birmingham) conceptualize culture in rather different ways, although there is no one single definition even within the framework of each school. As Kellner (2002) argues both schools stressed the connection of culture and ideology, and pointed out the critique of the ideology as the central aspect of the critical cultural studies. Moreover they both see culture as the resistance to the modern capitalist society. “Later British cultural studies would valorize resistant moments in media culture and audience interpretations and use of media artifacts, while the Frankfurt school tended, with some exceptions, to see mass culture as a homogeneous and potent form of ideological domination – a difference that would seriously divide the two traditions” (Kellner 2002, 5). Hall emphasized that the Birmingham school of cultural studies didn’t have a “single, unproblematic conception of culture” (Hall 1993, 522), but there are two main rather different ways of conceptualizing culture within the school. The first one refers to “the sum of the available descriptions through which societies make sense of and reflect their common experiences”, a general social process through which the common meanings are developed; the second conceptualization emphasizes the social practices and has more anthropological point of view (ibid, 522-523).

Although these are valid ways of looking at culture, it is not the aspect of this concept I am addressing in my research. I will use the definition of culture proposed by Hofstede that is built based on the concept of mental programming, which I find the most

useful for the purposes of my research because on the national level it helps to explain, why different nations being in similar situation and having similar problems to resolve, adopt completely different structural and institutional arrangements. He states that mental programming is a concept which is not observable directly; rather, what one can observe is behavior such as words and deeds. One can view mental programming as a construct that is stable in time and which determines that individual's actions are more or less similar in the analogous situations. Each individual has some part of the mental programming which is unique and some part which is shared with others. Hofstede proposes a three-level model of mental programming, in which the most basic is universal, shared with almost all humans; the second level is the collective programming, which is shared with some humans or groups of people, but not with everybody; and the last level is individual, each person possesses a unique part of mental programming, which is never the same for any two individuals. The distinction between these levels is very fuzzy, as it is difficult to distinguish which part is individual and which is culturally or societal determined (Hofstede 2001, 2-3).

'Mental programming' can be described by two main concepts – values, which might be hold by individuals and collectives, and culture, which is collective (Hofstede 2001, 5-7). Kluckhohn defines value as the “conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, ends and actions” (Kluckhohn 1951/1967, 395 cited in Hofstede 2001, 5-7). The same value might be used in different situations; moreover, due to the fact that values are mostly formed at early stage of person's life, they are not rational and might often be conflicting with each other inside the value system of individual. Values should not be equalized with deeds as the latter depend not only on the individual's values, but also on the situation. It is very difficult to measure values as the universe of values is not defined;



hence each researcher has to make his own list. As the result the content validity of such list of values is quite low<sup>4</sup> (Hofstede 2001, 5-7).

Thus, the concept of *culture* is defined as “*a collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another*” (Hofstede 2001, 9) Therefore culture is only a part of the mental programming. Culture in this sense includes values and the systems of values. Values are invisible until they result in some observable manifestations, but culture can be observable in practices, namely rituals, heroes and symbols (Hofstede 2001, 10-11).

The second phenomenon I will look at in this section is *democracy*. The study of democracy is currently one of the core concerns within comparative politics. A number of theoretical definitions were created and sophisticated statistical methods developed in order to do the research. The scholars widely debate the definition of democracy, in order to avoid the extremes by including many features of democracy (maximalist) or too little of them (minimalist). Munk and Verkuilen point out that minimalist definitions make it easy to find the instances of the concept and allows for a study of numerous empirical questions, but if the definition is so minimalist that all cases automatically become instances, then the researcher have to add some attributes, which might lead to the problem of the omission of relevant attributes. On the other hand, the maximalist definition is the one which includes too many concepts and therefore has potential drawbacks such as losing the usefulness of the concept as it has no empirical referents, and even if referents could be found such a definition might have little analytical use (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 9).

One of the prominent definitions is the one proposed by Rousseau, who viewed the democracy as the social contract between the individuals, who “while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before” (Dahl, Shapiro and Cheibub

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<sup>4</sup> For more information on content validity see also Adcock and Collier 2001

2003, 2).<sup>5</sup> The social pact requires commitment of every citizen in order to function, basically if somebody disagrees to follow the common will, the whole society should force him to comply. General will is not the will of all, as the former refers only to common interests, whereas the latter to what individuals want; only if individuals are properly informed and do not communicate with each other, the huge amount of small differences in opinions will produce the general will, otherwise if individuals gather into groups the biggest group wins, and the general will becomes just the most prevailing private opinion (ibid, 3). This definition seems to be very idealistic and not very useful for the empirical research.

The classical doctrine of democracy (see for example, Schumpeter) defines democracy as an institutional arrangement that allows to arrive to political decisions which are in line with the common good through the elections of representatives of people's will<sup>6</sup> Such an institutional arrangement should result in the decisions made by 'Common Will' which is accepted by all reasonable individuals and which is consistent with the common good, happiness and welfare (Dahl, Shapiro and Cheibub 2003, 5). The other variation of this type of definition is based on the competitive elections, namely the theory of Competition for Political Leadership defines democracy as the institutional arrangement "in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (ibid, 9) These definitions have been largely criticized for being minimalist, with critics arguing that elections are not enough for the peaceful life and non-violent conflict resolution (ibid, 13)<sup>7</sup>, criticizing the concept of the common good and the notion of the rational individual.

In order to undertake empirical research concerning democracy, political scientists turned their attention to the procedural component of democracy. One of the definitions is

<sup>5</sup> Excerpted from: Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1968. *The Social Contract*. Translated by Maurice Cranston. London: Penguin books.

<sup>6</sup> Excerpted from: Schumpeter, Joseph. 1976. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Allen & Unwin.

<sup>7</sup> Excerpted from: Przeworski, Adam. *Minimalist Conception of Democracy: Defence*. In Shapiro, Ian and Casiano Yacker-Cordon. 1999. *Democracy's Value*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

proposed by Huntington (1991), who argues that democracy is a system in which “the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for voters and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote”. This definition is particularly close to Dahl’s definition of democracy as mentioned previously (2003), Dahl defines democracy as polyarchy, which is based on two main attributes – contestation or competition and participation or inclusion. These two aspects can be operationalized with the following components: free and fair elections which result in elected officials, inclusive suffrage, right to run for office, political rights and civil liberties. Rozumilowicz (2002, 11) argues that competition is necessary in order to have real choice for voters and also to ensure accountability of elected officials after they have been elected. At the same time inclusion and participation is needed in order for those who vote to be able to represent a wider political community. As Munck and Verkuilen (2002, 9) state in their article such a definition helps to avoid both the problem of minimalist and maximalist definitions.

Finally, I turn to the concept of *media freedom*. Scholars argue that free media, independent of any control or dependency, basically free from the state, government, business and any powerful groups, is better able too promote democratization, especially its main components: participation and contestation (Rozumilowicz 2002, 12). It is claimed that media freedom should not be the goal by itself, but only when it contributes to other more important values and goals, such as democracy, human development, human rights, cultural understanding and diversity. On the one hand, media freedom and independence enables individuals to express their opinions and thoughts and also provides as public forum for discussion in the society; on the other hand, free media is needed to inform citizens, bring new ideas, view points and culture into society and as a result contribute to human development and improve the quality of life (ibid, 12; Norris 2006, 64-65).

Although classically the concerns of media freedom and independence were linked to independence from governmental control and interference, many scholars currently admit that leaving mass media to market forces leads to another serious threat, such as commercialization and concentration of media, commoditization of media content and dependence on advertising (Rozumilowicz 2002, 12). Media concentration interferes with one of the democratic principles: the right to equally participate in the “collective self-determination” and decision making (Baker 2007, 7). Diversity of ownership creates the environment in which speakers with better arguments will be able to gather larger audiences and therefore prevent elite control and indirect state censorship which in turn reduces quality of journalism, as it does not allow to cover some topics or articulate certain opinions (ibid, 8). Backer (2007, 38) also argues that the commercialization of media, caused by the privatization of media outlets, makes media a subject of market control, and therefore based on profit orientation and strongly influenced by advertising possibilities; advertisement, being the main source of funding, subjects the process of creating content valuable for society and providing positive externalities to the process of selling “media product to the audience while selling the audience to advertisers”.

In the *Foundations and limits of freedom of the press* Judith Lichtenberg (2002, 181) defined two main components of press freedom, namely noninterference, which refers to the freedom of speech and of expression, and multiplicity of voices, for which editorial independence and autonomy is crucial. McQuail (1994, 130) states that the “notion of free press is unsuppressable and provides a firm defense against censorship, licensing, political control and the victimization of journalists for reporting unpopular opinions, telling the truth or refusing to tell lies”. For the purposes of this research I find McQuail’s definition of free media to be the most suitable as he defines four main elements of media freedom: structural conditions that refer to the legal freedom to publish or transmit; operating conditions that refer

to the real independence from the economic and political pressures and also independence of journalists within the media system; opportunities to access to the channels of communications for a wide range of voices; and benefits from the quality of the content (McQuail 1994, 140). This definition allows operationalizing the concept in order to measure it quantitatively.

Having defined all the main concepts, in the next section I intend to build the theoretical framework of the research, based on the main literature. I will discuss the possible relationships between the phenomena and build an argument in favor of one, which I will test in the empirical section.

## ***1.2. Theories of Culture, Media and Democracy***

### **1.2.1. Culture and democracy**

The need for the population of a country to possess a specific set of political values, orientations and attitudes in order to have democracy is widely discussed by both modern and classical theories of democracy (Diamond 1994, 1). Currently there are different views on the role of culture for the emergence and persistence of democracy. Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi propose three different views on the relationship between these two phenomena. The advocates of “non-culturalist” view argue that no democratic culture is needed for establishing the democracy and democratic institutions in the country, as well as none needed to sustain them over time (the authors themselves argue for this view; Przeworski 1991, chapter 1). The scholars who support the “weakly- culturalist” view argue that democratic culture is needed for the emergence of democracy, but this democratic culture does not necessarily have to be compatible with population’s other more general traditions and values, as these values and traditions are subject to relatively easy change. Finally, the “strongly culturalist” scholars (for example, Almond and Verba 1989; Lipset 1959) claim that

democracy is not compatible with all cultures, and some societies just need to find other institutional arrangements (Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 2003, 181).

Nevertheless, scholars who are doing research in the relationship of democracy and economic development frequently mention cultural factors and distinctive characteristics of countries' populations as an important intervening variable (see Lipset 1988; Marks and Diamond 1992; Inglehart 1990). Until recently cultural factors were often neglected in the research on democracy; and if not, researchers mostly focused on elite culture and its role in emergency and transition to democracy (Diamond 1994, 2-7; Dahl 1971, 36-37; Lijphart 1977, 103). This might be justified while talking about elite culture only on the stage of emergence of democracy when, as Dahl points out, "the rules, the practices, and the culture of competitive politics developed first among a small elite, [...] later, as additional social strata were admitted into politics they were more easily socialized into the norms and practices of competitive politics already developed among elites" (Dahl 1971, 36-37 cited in Diamond 1994, 2). Currently, the shift of the stress can be observed from elite culture to the mass culture and its importance for the consolidation of democracy. This shift of attention can be seen in the increased emphasis on citizen education, mobilization and activism (see for example Diamond 1992; Almond and Verba 1989).

One of the most important works on the relationship between culture and democracy is *The Civic Culture* by Almond and Verba (1989). Although the scope of the research is limited to the narrow segment of culture, namely 'civic' or political culture and not the modal personality or national character (Almond and Verba 1989, 11), I believe that this work provides a good theoretical framework based on the 'psychocultural approach' (See, for example, Benedict 1934; Inkeles and Levinson 1969, Pye 1962) for my research. Moreover I believe that the dimensions of civic culture proposed by authors are closely related to the dimensions of culture proposed by Hofstede, as the values and attitudes which influence

political behavior also influence the behavior in social, economic and personal life (I will come to this point in the later chapters).

The concept of political culture refers only to “political orientations – “attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond and Verba 1989, 12). The political system is seen as internalized in people’s feelings, evaluations and attitudes. So we can say that the political culture is the specific distribution of ‘mental programming’ of the citizens, which reflects the orientation towards the political objects and political system in general (Almond and Verba 1989, 13). This definition can be rephrased as the frequencies of the cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations among the population toward the political system in general, the place of the individual citizen in it, its input (the flow of demands from the citizens and the process of transformation of these demands into policies) and output (the process of application and enforcement of policies) aspects (Almond and Verba 1989, 16). Therefore the political culture can be classified into three clear groups: parochial, subject and participant political culture.

The examples of parochial political culture can be found in the “African tribal societies”, where political roles are usually not separated from economic and religious, the parochial does not expect anything from the political system, and the orientations towards it are mostly affective and normative (ibid, 16-17). In the subject political culture the citizen knows about political system and its specialization, has some affective and evaluative orientations toward it, but his own role is passive, there is no “differentiated input structure” and the output policies are perceived as the “downward flow” (ibid, 17-18). The third major type is the participant political culture, in which citizens are fully oriented toward political system, both towards the input and output, and attribute an ‘activist role’ to themselves (ibid, 18-19). Political systems and political cultures are not necessarily congruent with each other, which justifies their change. Generally, parochial culture is claimed to be most congruent with

traditional political structure; subject political culture – with centralized authoritarian; and participant culture – with democratic political structure. The pure types can be found very rarely nowadays, but one can talk about the mix of all three with some being more frequent. Perhaps, the democracies of the Third wave failed to become consolidated because of the incongruence of the political culture of the population with the new political systems being attempted to implement (ibid, 16-20).

As previously mentioned, the theories related to culture and democracy have been present since Greek philosophers (Almond and Verba 1989, 2-5; Diamond 1994, 10), more modern scientists such as Verba, Almond, Inkeles, Dahl and Lipset also adduced such features of citizens necessary for maintenance, development and consolidation of democracy as “moderation, cooperation, bargaining and accommodation” (Diamond 1994, 10; see also Almond and Verba 1989; Inkeles, A. and Levinson 1969; Lipset 1988; Dahl 1971). These dimensions of political culture are closely related to Hofstede’s dimensions of culture more generally. As Diamond (1994, 10) explains, “moderation and accommodation implies tolerance” not only of different political beliefs and positions, but also of any other differences; trust in other political actors; willingness to compromise, pragmatism and flexibility. These features are closely related to uncertainty avoidance and individualism, because high uncertainty avoidance results in treating people, who are different in any ways, as a danger, and hence low uncertainty avoidance includes also tolerance; at the same time more individualistic citizens are more ready to accept views, attitudes and thoughts different from their own. Pragmatism also relates to power distance as it means that issues are open to negotiation and bargaining, nobody has the exclusive monopoly on truth, and citizens are free to participate in decision making.

Acceptance of the importance of the political culture for sustainable democracy does not presuppose cultural determinism. Almond argues that culture (value, attitudes and



orientations) influences the way institutions are built and the way citizens perform, but also the institutions and structure shape attitudes and values, so culture might be the constraint for the political structure and performance, but surely not the determinant (Almond 1990, 144). From Almond and Verba we could see that the orientations (cognitive, affective and evaluative) may change over time, being influenced strongly by historical experience, performance of the political structure and the socialization process (1989, 20; Diamond 1994, 9). Moreover treating political culture as the determinant of political structure means that many countries would be deprived from hope for change and evolution, which contradicts the numerous empirical cases of democratic consolidation in countries with an authoritarian past (Diamond 1994, 9-10). Thus, culture does influence and constrain the political system and performance in the country, but it is not static and has a possibility for change, being influenced both by internal factors, such as political socialization, history and current performance of institutions'; and external factors, such as globalization, international relationships, treaties and organizations.

Thus, the relationship between culture (both in general and political or civic culture in particular) and democracy is quite complex, and many models have been offered of how political culture causes the emergence, consolidation or erosion of democracy. But parsimonious models hardly can explain the complex causal paths between the culture and political regime, as historical factors, social structure, and economy, political institutions also affect the democracy. Consequently, culture can be viewed as an intervening variable, which is not a precondition for democracy, but the process of democratization necessarily leads to changes of mental programming, values, beliefs and attitudes.

### **1.2.2. Media Freedom, Culture and Democracy**

Considering the complexity of the concepts of culture, media freedom and democracy and the relationship between them, it would be unreasonable to believe that one

theoretical and methodological approach can make it possible fully to understand the cultural environment and its connections with media freedom and democracy, but some of the theoretical frameworks are more suitable for certain tasks, others are beneficial others. There is an agreement among the scholars that mass media is an important factor for democracy, but the debates are going around the particular role of media. McConnell and Becker explain that on media might be considered as the cause or consequence of democracy, might impede democratization being controlled by antidemocratic forces, or by just an indicator of democracy (McConnell and Becker 2002, 1). Perhaps, media plays all these roles at different periods of time, or different mass media plays different roles.

Liberal theorist argued that only free and independent press in the country will contribute to the process of democratization by promoting and protecting human rights such as freedom of expression, strengthening accountability of government, and providing a platform for discussion among wide range of citizens, groups and opinions (Norris 2006, 64). Rozumilowicz claims that freedom of press is not the goal by itself; it has value only when it promotes other fundamental values and goals, such as democracy, human development, cultural understanding and diversity and human rights, for example, freedom of expression (Rozumilowicz 2002, 12).

Many scholars were emphasizing the importance for media to perform its pro-democratic functions, which it has to fulfill in order to contribute to the democratization and sustainability of democracy (Curran and Gurevitch 2005, Gurevitch and Blumler 1994, Norris 2006, McConnell and Becker 2002; Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008). Gurevitch and Blumler proposed such functions as the “surveillance of sociopolitical environment”, agenda setting, platform for advocacy for different groups and voices, the dialogue between power and citizens, mechanism for holding politicians accountable, education and encouragement of the involvement of citizens, resist the forces aiming to subvert the independence of media

(Gurevitch and Blumler 1994, 26). Pippa Norris stresses three main pro-democracy functions of media: agenda-setting, watch-dog activities, and providing the public with a forum for debate (Norris 2006, 66-70). Price and Krug summarized three main tasks of media, namely “to provide information, to enlighten the public so that it is capable of self-government, and to serve as a watchdog on government” (Price and Krug 2000, chap. 1).

Taking into account the definition of democracy based on competition and participation, discussed previously, free and democratic media should contribute to more democratic system, which is more competitive and participatory, allows more diffusion of power. Berman and Witzner (1997) argue that freedom of access and exchange of information and opinions is essential for democracy, moreover free communication through plural channels in the very nature of democracy and is crucial for sustaining the democratic practices (McConnell and Becker 2002). Rozumilowicz argues that the role of media should not be restricted only to enabling of democratic political system, free media can also support economic system by informing customers about various products; promote different societal values, beliefs and cultural norms such as tolerance and societal understanding by giving voice to different groups in society, especially minorities. Thus, media freedom means “non-monopolization, whether by the government, the market, or by dominant social forces” (Rozumilowicz 2002, 11-13).

Ensuring freedom of the press should be done on two levels, namely on the level of laws and regulations which should create the legal framework for such freedom; and on the level of culture and civil society (Rozumilowicz 2002, 16-17). The socio-cultural level should support the institutional and legal framework by culture and values, which are open and tolerant to different opinions, dissemination of information and competition among different ideas, opinions and views (Price and Krug 2000). Moreover Price and Krug (2000) claim that although laws are necessary to create a legal framework for independent media but they do

not guarantee that media will function appropriately, as the society needs appropriate culture of democratic values, effective and pluralistic media, development of civil society, protection of human rights and freedoms. For Rozumilowicz (2002) such values and attitudes can be developed from professional training of journalists and media professionals, general educational system which develops democratic values, training of politicians and civil society.

I have already emphasized that culture is not a static concept, but might change over time, influenced by different forces such as process of socialization, historical events and current performance of the institutions, globalization, international relationships, treaties and organizations. The nature of globalization remains the subject of heated debates. From one point of view it is a “continuation of modernization and a force of progress, increased wealth, freedom, democracy, and happiness” (Kellner 2002, 285). From the other point of view “it is a cover concept for global capitalism and imperialism and is accordingly condemned as another form of the imposition of the logic of capital and the market on ever more regions of the world and spheres of life” (Kellner 2002, 285). Generally, one should avoid both purely technological or purely economic or any other one-sided view of globalization in favor of a view that theorizes globalization as a highly complex, contradictory, and thus ambiguous set of institutions and social relations, as well as one involving flows of goods, services, ideas, information, images, technologies, cultural forms, and people (Appadurai 1996 quoted in Kellner 2002, 286).

Media has an important influence on the process of globalization and can be considered as having the central place in it for three reasons, Flew (2007) argues. Firstly, media corporations are largely globalizing their operations. Secondly, telecommunication corporations were in the center of development of the infrastructure for the global communication, which enabled global information flows and as the result cross-border

commercial activities. Finally, global media are the sources from which we get information about events in different countries and continents, and this information, ideas and images are the basis for creating of the shared systems of values, attitudes, and shared experiences across the nations, cultures and religions (Flew 2007, 70-72).

Price states that globalization of media results in the messages they produce dominating the world' consciousness, creates the space for shaping common narratives, competing of ideologies and therefore influences the stability and development of institutions (Price 2002, 3-13). McQuail highlights that the movement toward the global culture can be caused by the huge capacity of the global mass media to transmit images and sound to the large audiences across the borders, time and space (McQuail 1994, 112-113). As a result, citizens of different countries acquire similar values; have the same or similar heroes and traditions. Therefore media can be viewed as the channel through which values and systems of values are transmitted and shared among the people of the whole world.

## Chapter 2: Methodology and data description

### 2.1. Methodology

In order to address the research questions about the relationship between media freedom and democracy; and the influence of culture on both phenomena, I will do a statistical analysis which includes data for 74 countries (see Annex 1).

On the first step, I will use the regression analysis in order to identify which cultural dimensions are significantly related to media freedom and democracy; and whether the dimension of the relationship between democracy and press freedom abide by the theoretical framework. Two different models will be tested: first, with democracy and second, with press freedom as response a variable. Cultural dimensions are the independent variables, with economic factors (GDP per capita and Gini index of inequality) will be included as the control variables. Regression analysis is used to show the relationship between the response and explanatory variables, by demonstrating how the variation in the response variable depends on the variation of the explanatory variables.

I will use simultaneous estimation of the multiple regression on this stage as this method is one of the most reliable statistical methods. The data suits this method quite well as all my variables are scales; therefore other methods of linear modeling such as loglinear do not fit the data. Although I have some minor violations of regression assumptions (see the section on limitation of data), these violations does not lead to disregarding of the model, but only to being cautious with the results. The problem which I face at this level is that the number of variables is relatively high comparing to the number of observations; therefore I risk my estimates of the regression line to be unreliable.

I will also use stepwise regression, in order to check whether unreliability of the estimates is the case, and compare the results of two methods (if both will show the same

results I will have the reason to believe that my findings have been corroborated). The stepwise regression helps me bypass the problem of too many variables. In addition it shows some insights, which are not shown in the simultaneous regression, for example the amount of variance additionally explained by each variable. This type of regression has a few specific drawbacks, which is why I do not rely on it as the main method, but rather as additional one. Among the drawbacks usually named in the literature three are the most important. First is the bias in parameter estimation (the stepwise regression is done by model selection, which is performed by the testing whether parameters are significantly different from zero, which can lead to bias in parameters and in significance tests); the second is a problem with the algorithms and interpretation (especially in our case when the independent variables are correlated, a number of them can affect the dependent variable, while only one will be entered in the model; moreover the interpretation of the model is problematic, as it includes not one test of hypothesis, but rather multiple testing); finally, as only one model is selected, this also leads to the possibility that other similarly good models are not found (Whittingham, Stephens, Bradbury and Freckleton, 5-8).

Then I attempt to divide countries into groups with similar culture, so basically to create profiles of culture for groups of countries, based on cultural dimensions which showed to have a significant influence on democracy and press freedom. In order to make “conceptually meaningful groups of objects that share common characteristics” cluster analysis will be used (Tan, Steinbach and Kumar 2006, 487). I will use the K-Means clustering method as and the oldest method and the most respected for its simplicity and efficiency. This method has its strengths, for example it is not terribly sensitive to the initialization problem; but also its drawbacks, such as, for example, this method has difficulties with finding the clusters which are not sphere-shaped or have different sizes and densities and

also is very sensitive to the outliers (Tan, Steinbach and Kumar 2006, 510-513). In order to avoid the latter I will check my data for the outliers and filter them out before clustering.

Afterwards I will explore whether such a classification shows patterns in respect to media freedom and democracy. This may show if culture has significant influence on the development of democracy and free media, whether these phenomena exist only within a particular culture group or if any society can be democratic and have free media if it creates effective democratic institutions. This will be done by entering the new variable which shows the number of cluster for each country in the regression model instead of the cultural dimensions. The goal is to see whether this variable will achieve significance in explaining the variation of media freedom and democracy after accounting for the variation that can be explained by other variables in the model.

So my **response variables** are media freedom and democracy, and my **explanatory variable** is culture, with economic factors, namely GDP and index of inequality (Gini index) being control variables.

## **2.2. Description of Data**

All the variables in the model are not directly observable and therefore hard to operationalize and measure. Thus in this section I will link the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter with the empirical measurements of concepts. “In empirical research, I look for measures of the constructs that describe mental programs; that is, I have to operationalize them. I need to find observable phenomena from which constructs can be inferred” (Hofstede 2001, 4). The three main concepts in the models which need conceptualization and measurement in the research are culture, democracy and media freedom, two economic factors (Gini index and GDP per capita) are also included (See Annex 2 for the detailed description of data). In this section I will describe the sources and the specificities of data that I use for measuring my concepts.

The first concept that is going to be discussed is *culture*. As stated in the theoretical chapter, I will use the definition of culture defined as “a collective programming of the mind



that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede 2001, 9). There is a disagreement between the scholars studying culture as to whether culture can be compared. On the one hand, scholars stress the uniqueness of cultures, arguing that it is meaningful to “compare apples with oranges”; on the other hand, the aspects of culture which might be compared are stressed, arguing that although apples and oranges are different, they are both fruits and can be compared on different aspects. These approaches are usually referred as nomothetic and idiographic or, as Kenneth, proposed etic and emic (for example, see Headland 1990). In order to compare cultures one should find some universal dimensions along which countries or other groups of people can be compared, therefore in comparative research more nomothetic view of culture should be used. In the political science Przeworski and Teune defined two main approaches to comparison of countries, namely the “most different systems design”, if one wants to prove the universality of laws, and the “most similar systems design”, if one wants to see the differences in societies which are similar in many aspects (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 31 cited in Hofstede 2001, 28).

I will compare cultures of different countries using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, which are linked to fundamental social factors, and empirically identified as four main dimensions of culture: Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, and Uncertainty Avoidance. Many scientific arguments are held among the scholars who study cultural issues about how real and valid such measures are. Hofstede (2001, 2) himself acknowledged the problem of measuring culture and stated: “[...] there is no such thing as objectivity in the study of social reality: I will always be subjective, but I may at least try to be ‘intersubjective’, pooling and integrating a variety of subjective points of view of different observers”.

As stated above, these dimensions of culture are empirically found. But all of them were also theoretically anticipated by different scholars, many of them long before they were empirically identified by Hofstede (2001, 1). In 1954 all four dimensions were predicted by Inkeles and Levinson (1969) within the framework of modal personality, the concept which is closely related to the concept of mental programming used by Hofstede. Authors mention the

relation to authority, which is linked to the Power Distance (Inkeles and Levinson 1969, 45); conception of self, which includes individuals concepts of masculinity and femininity and also the individual security system which refers to the position of individual in the society and is linked to the individualism and collectivism proposed by Hofstede (1969, 47); and the “primary dilemmas or conflicts and ways of dealing with them” which refer to such dilemmas as “trust versus basic mistrust, autonomy versus shame and doubt, initiative versus guilt” and which can be considered as closely related to Uncertainty Avoidance Index in the Hofstede (1969, 49-50) cultural dimensions. A number of other scholars also theorized some of the dimensions, which can be grouped into categories, which are in line with cultural dimensions (See Albere, Cohen, Davis, Levy and Sutton 1950; Naroll 1970). These cultural dimensions are considered to be well conceptualized and having high measurement validity, which is why I use them in my model.

The first cultural dimension is **Power Distance (PDI)**<sup>8</sup>, the acceptance and expectations by less powerful members of society, institutions and organizations of the inequality in power distribution. This represents inequality (more versus less), but defined from below, not from above. This dimension suggests that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by the leaders.

The second dimension **Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)** deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity; it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules, safety and security measures, and, on the philosophical and religious level, by a belief in absolute Truth; 'there can only be one Truth and we have it'. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional, and

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The description of dimensions is available on the website <http://www.geert-hofstede.com/>

motivated by inner nervous energy. The opposite type, uncertainty accepting cultures, are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to; they try to have as few rules as possible, and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many beliefs to coexist. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative, and not expected by their environment to express emotions.

The third cultural dimension is **Individualism (IDV)**, as opposed to collectivism, the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. On the collectivist side, we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families (with uncles, aunts and grandparents), which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. The word 'collectivism' in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group, not to the state.

Finally, the fourth cultural dimension **Masculinity (MAS)**, opposed to femininity, refers to the distribution of roles between the genders. The IBM studies revealed that (a) women's values differ less among societies than men's values; (b) men's values from one country to another go from very assertive and competitive (strongly different from women's values), to modest and caring (similar to women's values). The assertive pole is 'masculine', and the modest one 'feminine'. Feminine societies are characterized by similar variations amongst men's and women's roles while masculine ones have greater gaps.

The fifth dimension, namely **Long-Term Orientation** is not included in the model because it is calculated only for very few countries. So each country gets four different scores on culture – one for each of the four dimensions.

The second important concept is *democracy*, which I conceptualized with Dahl's definition of democracy as polyarchy. For the measurement of democracy I found the **Polity IV** scores to be the most suitable, as the Polity scheme consists of six component measures (competitiveness of political participation, regulation of participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment and institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive) that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition (Polity VI). The problems and strengths of this data are widely discussed by scholars, in particular by Munck and Verkuilen, and I will mention the most important. One of the aspects that remain problematic is that this index excludes the attribute of participation, which can be explained by the fact that the scope of this data covers period of time since 1800 to current days, with the key feature of that time – gradual expansion of the right to vote. Although *de jure* the restrictions on the right to vote nowadays are not found nowadays in the democracies, but the informal constraints are still in place in many cases. The other problem of this measurement is redundancy, as it uses two identifiers for one aspect of democracy, namely (competitiveness and regulation of participation) for the competitiveness of elections and (competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment) to find out whether offices are filled by means of elections or some other procedure.

I choose this particular measurement of democracy for two particular reasons. Firstly, it does not use media freedom as an element of its component measures, which is especially important for the research as the goal is to see the relationship between media and democracy. The second reason is that among different indexes of democracy Polity IV is considered one of the most reliable because of its replicability, as not only the coding rules are specified with clarity and explicitly, but also it is one of a few measurements that uses multiple coders and tests the intercoder reliability. As the result each country in my data base

was given a "Polity Score" which captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The countries are categorized into three groups: "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5), and "democracies" (+6 to +10).

Finally, for *press freedom* defined by McQuail the **Freedom House index of press freedom** suits the needs of the research. Freedom House defines media freedom as being linked to “the legal environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting, and economic factors that affect access to information” (Becker, Vlad and Nusser 2005, 50). The index is measured separately for printed and broadcast media on a 100-point scale based on “how much the diversity of news content is influenced by the structure of the news industry, by legal and administrative decisions, the degree of political influence or control, the economic influences exerted by the government or private entrepreneurs, and actual incidents violating press autonomy, including censorship, harassment and physical threats to journalists” (Norris 2006, 70). As the result countries are given a total score from 0 (absolutely free) to 100 (absolutely not free). Freedom House also divides countries into three groups: free (0-30), partly free (31-60), and not free (61-100).

According to the description of Freedom House methodology, the ranking of countries is done by the analysts, who draw their conclusions on the information “from professional contacts in a variety of countries, staff and consultant travel, international visitors, the findings of human rights and press freedom organizations, specialists in geographic and geopolitical areas, the reports of governments and multilateral bodies, and a variety of domestic and international news media” (Freedom House). Experts fill in the standard questioner in which the country gets certain amount of points for each question in each of three categories, namely legal, political, and economic environment (see Annex 3). The rankings are reviewed both individually and in comparison to the countries of the same

region, and also with the results of the previous years and any considerable differences are investigated more precisely. Freedom House data is limited by incompatibilities in time due to changes of methodology. But as I will use the data only for one year this critique is not relevant.

The economic factors are used as the control variables in the models and the data for them is taken from the Central Intelligence Agency. I find that the GDP per capita corrected for purchasing parity should be a better measure than its raw correspondent value as it takes into account price variance and can more accurately predict if households have the disposable income to purchase newspapers, radios, or news channel subscriptions. The Gini coefficient is used to measure inequality of income or wealth distribution in the society. The coefficient has values from 0 to 1; the low values mean more equal distribution of the income or wealth, whereas the high values indicate high inequality of the distribution. In my research I use the Gini index which has values 0 to 100 percent (percentage of Gini coefficient).

### **2.3. *Limitations of data***

The problem of case selection appears to be very important in large-N studies. In this case the data for 74 countries is available. Such a selection of cases is determined by the availability of data, but I suppose that the bias should not be as critical because the countries of all the continents, levels of economic and political development, and also all cultural zones are present. The deeper analysis shows that authoritarian countries are underrepresented in the sample, but the variance is similar to the one in the population<sup>9</sup>. Therefore some caution while making the conclusions and inferences is needed.

The other potential problem occurs with cultural dimensions, as here the level of analysis was changed by the Hofstede from individual level, where data was originally

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<sup>9</sup> See Annex 2 for the details.

collected, to aggregated country level. The problem here occurs as the correlations between the individual level data, between aggregated data and between individual and aggregated data is most likely to be not equal. The confusion between the within-system (on individual level) and between-system (between countries – ecological) correlations is known as ecological fallacy (Hofstede 2001, 16; Adcock and Collier 2001). The opposite case of reverse ecological fallacy occurs when the data on countries is treated as they were individuals. I avoid these problems by doing my analysis only on one level and being cautious about the conclusions I draw from it.

The other problem I encounter is the violation of some assumptions of regression analysis, namely the lack of the multivariate normality and lack of linearity of the relationship. The lack of normality might be caused by the fact that the sample has overrepresentation of democracies (due to the fact that our selection of sample countries is driven by data availability) or by the lack of normality in this particular phenomenon in general. Therefore at the stage of interpretation of results I have to be careful with the reliability of F-statistics. The absence of the linearity might lead to big errors and the transformations of data do not seem to help; therefore the plots with the predicted and real values should be investigated.

Overall these limitations of data should not lead to the dismissing of the model, as the violation although being quite important, are not too strong, and therefore in case the results of model are highly significant, the results should be considered as reliable, being only cautious with F- and t-statistics as it is sensitive to these violations. Moreover the findings should not be extrapolated beyond the sample data.

## Chapter 3: Empirical research

### 3.1. Previous analysis, Expectations and Predictions

As argued before, political culture is largely influenced by the general culture of society, and in this section I will look at the empirical evidence that can reveal this connection. Moreover, I will discuss previous findings considering the relationship of cultural dimensions with political culture, democracy, press freedom and institutional factors.

In order to investigate the relationship of the political culture and cultural dimensions, I will look at empirical evidence gathered by Almond and Verba for the *Civic Culture* (1989), which describes the aspects of the political culture in five democratic countries, namely UK, USA, Germany, Italy and Mexico. The empirical dimensions of civic culture, investigated by Almond and Verba, seem to be very close to the dimensions found by Hofstede by their nature and meaning. In order to confirm this claim, I looked at the correlations between the empirical dimensions of civic culture and Hofstede's cultural dimensions for these five countries. As the data is available only for five countries, therefore the relationship shown is valid only for these countries, while I can only speculate about other countries, and the further statistical analysis will test them for 74 countries.

The first dimension of political culture is the index of “subjective competence” found by Almond and Verba (1989, 137); it refers to the belief in the possibility of citizens to exert a political influence on national and local government and officials. The percentage of people who believed they can exert such influence on local government (local competents) for the five countries showed to be significantly negatively correlated ( $r = -0,973^{**}$ ) with the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) (see Annex 2 for details). So in countries with higher UAI citizens believe they have less possibility to participate in political decisions.



Interestingly, the percentage of national competents showed to be significantly ( $r=-0,894^*$ ) negatively correlated with Masculinity (MAS), so the feminine countries seem to have a much stronger belief that they can influence the national government.

The other interesting finding is that the expected treatment by governmental bureaucracy and police in different countries (measured by Almond and Verba 1989, 70) is strongly correlated with PDI, UAI and IND. Almond and Verba within the framework of their work on civic culture asked the next questions: “Suppose there were some questions that you had to take to a government office – for example, a tax question or a housing regulation. Do you think you would be given equal treatment – I mean, would you be treated as well as anyone else?” for the bureaucracy and “If you had some trouble with police – a traffic violation maybe, or were accused of a minor offence – do you think you would be given equal treatment? That is would you be treated as well as anyone else?” (Almond and Verba 1989, 70). The percentage of those who believe that they would be treated equally by bureaucracy and police has strong negative correlation with UAI ( $r_{bur} = -0,978^{**}$ ;  $r_{pol} = -0,93^*$ ) (see Annex 2 for details). So the countries with high Uncertainty Avoidance Index expect unequal treatment both by police and bureaucracy and the opposite way around, low Uncertainty Avoidance goes together with a belief in equal treatment. The percentage of those who believe the treatment by bureaucracy and police will be unequal is strongly positively correlated with PDI ( $r_{bur} = 0,977^{**}$ ;  $r_{pol} = 0,971^{**}$ ) and strongly negatively with IND ( $r_{bur} = -0,931^*$ ;  $r_{pol} = -0,908^*$ ), as well as the percentage of those who believe that police will treat them equally is correlated negatively with PDI ( $r_{pol} = -0,926^*$ ) and positively with IND ( $r_{pol} = 0,917^*$ ). Therefore the expectations of unequal treatment are more likely to occur in collectivistic countries with high Power Distance Index, as in these countries inequalities are more widely accepted as natural; contrary to the individualistic countries with low PDI, where people expect everybody to have equal treatment.

Power Distance Index is also correlated with the expected amount of consideration of one's point of view from bureaucracy and police. In their research Almond and Verba (1989, 72) asked the next two questions: "If you explained your point of view to the officials/police, what effect do you think it would have? Would they give your point of view serious consideration, would they pay attention, or would they ignore what you had to say?" The percentage of those who believe that their point of view will be taken seriously is strongly negatively correlated with the PDI, and those who believe that their opinion will get little consideration or would be ignored is correlated positively, which would mean that in countries with low Power Distance Index people expect their opinion to be heard and to be treated seriously, while in high Power Distance countries people do not expect officials to take the opinion of citizens into consideration. That might also presuppose that in countries with low Power Distance mass media are more accessible to citizens so they can voice their opinion and therefore media have more freedom and authorities exercise less influence on them.

Power Distance was also found to be significantly correlated ( $r = 0,51^{***10}$ ) with the level of domestic political violence (see Van de Vliert, Schwartz, Huismans, Hofstede, and Daan 1999). Countries with high PDI tend to have relatively stable, authoritarian governments, as the society with high-PDI expect their powerful members to increase their wealth using their power, and although theoretically everybody is equal before the law, in such countries the cases are mostly won by the most powerful (Hofstede 2001, 111). Hofstede explains that the main sources of power in the societies with high PDI are family and friends, charisma, and the ability of the person to use force. As the result of the last factor military dictatorships frequently appear on this side of the Power Distance scale. Moreover the powerful actors are expected to be involved in various scandals, which would be covered, and

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<sup>10</sup> Significant at 0,001 level.

if something becomes public the responsibility and blame will be put on the people lower in the power hierarchy (Hofstede 2001, 111). Consequently, the press is expected to be less free in these societies as it is fully accepted by members that powerful actors may use media for their purposes and therefore intervene in editorial independence and infringe the freedom of journalists.

Countries with the middle level of PDI are more likely to have revolutionary changes in government as the government can no longer count on the acceptance of high inequalities by the population, especially by new middle classes; therefore since 1970s one can see mostly revolutionary changes in government in the countries with the middle level of PDI, for example in Argentina, Iran, Greece, Portugal, Chile, Thailand and Peru (Hofstede 2001, 111). The countries with low PDI tend to have relatively stable pluralistic political systems, in which revolutions are unpopular and changes occur in an evolutionary way. In these societies the power, money and status are not necessarily going together and in theory they should not. Thus, Hofstede continues, the main sources of power are the official position, expertise and the ability to give rewards. Contrary to high-PDI societies, scandals involving politicians usually lead to the end of their career (Hofstede 2001, 111).

If one looks at the level of Individualism (IDV) in the society, the weaker the individualism among the citizens, the more probable is that the state will intervene considerably in the economic system, and the opposite is also meaningful, as the stronger the individualism the greater the tendency to the market capitalism (Hofstede 2001, 245). But collectivism does not necessarily lead to communism, as although communism demands some level of collectivism in society, many collectivist countries have never been communistic (Hofstede 2001, 243). In the first edition of *Culture's Consequences* Hofstede also found a considerable correlation between the press freedom and Individualism ( $r = 0,51^{***}$  across 39 countries). But in the stepwise regression only GDP per capita for year 1970 showed to be ale

to significantly predict press freedom. Nevertheless, I believe that Individualism might have a significant impact on press freedom nowadays, which I will test in further analysis.

Analyzing the political situation in the society it is meaningful to look at the two dimensions, IDV together with UAI (Hofstede 2001, 248). Although the existence of religious, linguistic and ethnic minorities is determined by historical factors, it is reasonable to believe the way societies deal with intergroup conflicts depends largely on culture (Hofstede 2001, 248). Countries with strong uncertainty avoidance and collectivism, for example Arabic-speaking countries, Turkey, Mexico, Israel and Iran, usually tend to deny the conflict, and direct the policies to assimilate the minorities and repress them. Collectivist countries with weak uncertainty avoidance, such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Jamaica, will usually find the solution so the groups will tolerate each other and peacefully live together. Individualistic countries with strong uncertainty avoidance, for example France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Israel, will at least formally guarantee everybody the same rights, although there might be an antagonism in society towards minorities. Finally, individualistic countries with low uncertainty avoidance, such as Canada, USA, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden and South Africa, tend to integrate minorities and to provide equal rights to everybody.

### **3.2. *Empirical findings***<sup>11</sup>

In this section of the thesis I will describe the results and findings of the research. As stated above, there is a consensus between scholars about the importance of the relationship between freedom of media and democracy. But the impact of culture on media and democracy is often questioned. As already stated before, my research questions are about the relationship between culture and democracy, as well as about culture and media freedom. Therefore my hypothesis is: *Cultural dimensions have a significant impact on the variation of democracy*

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<sup>11</sup> For the background analysis see Kovalenko and Parusinski (2009).

and press freedom among countries, after accounting for the variation explained by other variables.

In order to find out which cultural dimensions have a significant impact on media and democracy, multiple linear regression was used firstly with democracy being the response variable with press freedom measured by Freedom House, cultural dimensions measured by Hofstede and two economic factors used as control variables, namely GDP per capita corrected for purchasing power and Gini index of inequality. Secondly, press freedom being the response variable and democracy and variables which were initially included into analysis being explanatory. The findings are valid only for the countries included in the analysis, and it should be extrapolated with great caution to other countries, preferably after careful analysis.

For the polity as the independent variable, the result of the regression shows that only three explanatory variables were significant in the model, namely press freedom, Gini index and Uncertainty Avoidance Index. The model achieved high R-Square ( $R^2=0,723$ ;  $R^2_{adj}=0,691$ ) therefore this model can explain the variance in the level of democracy very well (Table 1). The model shows to be significant according to F-statistics at 0,01 level.

**Table 1. Polity. Multiple regression**

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients
	B	Std. Error	Beta
(Constant)	5,457	3,064	
Press Freedom	<b>-0,199 (**)</b>	0,023	-0,907 (**)
Power Distance Index	0,019	0,022	0,084
Individualism	-0,008	0,023	-0,038
Masculinity	0,012	0,018	0,047
Uncertainty Avoidance Index	<b>0,037 (*)</b>	0,015	0,177 (*)
GDP per capita	0,000	0,000	0,070
Inequality index	<b>0,116 (**)</b>	0,041	0,234 (**)
R Square	0,723	Dependent Variable: Polity	
Adjusted R Square	0,691	** Significant at the 0.01 level	
F	22,382(**)	* Significant at the 0.05 level	
Std. Error of the Estimate	2,685		

As predicted by the theory the biggest part of variance in Polity is explained by the Press Freedom variable (the biggest Beta coefficient =-0,907 (\*\*)), which gives alone R-Square of 0,62. This confirms the strong relationship between the democracy as measured by the Polity variable and the level of press freedom. The coefficient shows a direct relationship<sup>12</sup>, so when the level of democracy in the country increases, the level of freedom of press also increases.

The second significant variable is the Gini index, which has a positive coefficient. This means that countries with a higher level of inequality are more likely to be democracies. I can suggest that such a result might be explained by the fact that in non-democratic countries most of the population is equally poor (for example, a number of African countries), while in democratic countries there is a percentage of very rich population together with relatively poor (this does not stand true for the Northern-European countries, for example). One explanation is the theory proposed by Kuznets which I will discuss in the analysis of findings. Moreover, other economic factors should be included into the analysis in order to fully explain this finding. But the extensive explanation of this finding is out of the scope of my research.

The last significant variable is Uncertainty Avoidance Index of Hofstede's cultural dimensions. An interesting and controversial finding is that Uncertainty Avoidance cultural dimension has a positive coefficient. This means that countries with high Uncertainty Avoidance Index are expected to be more democratic. Such a result contradicts the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence from other sources, as citizens with high Uncertainty Avoidance are expected to have weaker belief in the possibility to influence and participate in governmental decisions, expectation of unequal treatment by police and bureaucracy and also if the population is collectivistic with high Uncertainty Avoidance then the minorities tend to

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<sup>12</sup> For the Press Freedom index measured by the Freedom House the low values of index show high level freedom of press and the high values of index mean low press freedom.

be treated in a very repressive and coercive manner. This type of behavior and attitudes is not usually considered democratic. Although being quite surprising, this might be explained by the fact that undemocratic states are underrepresented in the sample, and that a lot of countries in Europe (which are considered at the same time more democratic) have high Uncertainty Avoidance Index, while for example China and India have a low UAI, due to their religious and philosophical heritage. Moreover, although significant in the model, it is quite clear that the relationship is far from linear. Therefore this relationship needs more investigation in future with more countries included into analysis.

Concluding, some of the results are consistent with the theory, namely the importance of the strong relationship between media freedom and democracy. The other finding, which is in line with the expectations, is that at least one cultural dimension (Uncertainty Avoidance) is significant in the model, but the direction of the relationship is quite controversial and needs more investigation. Considering the economic factors, the GDP showed to be insignificant after the coefficient of inequality of wealth or income was added, while being significant previously. That means that Gini index can account for the variation in democracy better than just GDP. The direction of the relationship is quite controversial and thus requires further research.

The next model being tested is the regression model for the Press Freedom as measured by Freedom House, with democracy measured by Polity IV, four cultural dimensions measured by Hofstede being explanatory variables and two economic factors used as control variables: GDP per capita corrected for purchasing power parity and the Gini index measuring inequality. Only four variables showed to be significant, namely Polity, Individualism, Power Distance Index, and Gini index. The achieved R-Square ( $R^2=0,815$ , Adjusted R-Square=0,793) is quite satisfactory. The F-statistics indicate that our model is significant at 0,01 level (Table 2). Constant and Policy are significant at 0,01 level, while the

Power Distance is significant at 0.05 level. Individualism does not achieve significance in simultaneous estimation of the multiple regression (Sig =0,082), while it is significant at 0,05 level in the stepwise regression (that might be due to the lack of linearity of relationship between the variables); therefore I will still interpret the results. Moreover the idea that Individualism has an impact on press freedom seems to be quite reasonable.

Policy explains the biggest part of variance in Press Freedom, and thus is first to enter the analysis. So if the level of democracy increases, the level of freedom of press will also increase (decrease of Press Freedom index), this also is consistent with our theory. I find that two more variables were to exert a statistically significant impact on the response variable, namely Power-Distance, and Inequality as measured by the Gini index.

**Table 2. Press Freedom. Multiple regression**

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients
	B	Std. Error	Beta
(Constant)	37,113 (**)	10,684	
Policy	-2,765 (**)	0,322	-0,607
Power Distance Index	0,184 (*)	0,080	0,182
Individualism	-0,147 <sup>13</sup>	0,083	-0,162
Masculinity	0,032	0,069	0,028
Uncertainty Avoidance Index	0,017	0,059	0,018
GDP per capita	0,000	0,000	-0,077
Inequality index	0,357 (*)	0,154	0,159
R Square	0,815	Dependent Variable: Press Freedom ** Significant at the 0.01 level * Significant at the 0.05 level	
Adjusted R Square	0,793		
F	37,678 (**)		
Std. Error of the Estimate	10,000		

There is one significant cultural dimension in the model. Power Distance has a positive regression coefficient (significant at 0,05 level), meaning that the value of the Press Freedom variable increases with the increase of Power Distance. Thus, I expect countries with higher Power Distance Index to have lower level of press freedom. This finding fits my

<sup>13</sup> Significance level 0,082, and it becomes significant in the Stepwise regression model (See Annex 7).



expectations as higher tolerance of power inequality leads to higher tolerance of abuse of media freedom. As I stated before, countries with high PDI are likely to tolerate their powerful actors to be involved into different scandals and problems, which are expected to be covered. Therefore the population hardly presumes the media to uncover such events and issues.

Individualism does achieve significance at a 0,1 level<sup>14</sup> in the simultaneous regression, and it is significant at 0,05 in the stepwise regression, and it has a negative coefficient, so the score of the Press Freedom variable will decrease (the actual level of press freedom increase) with the increase in Individualism. This fits our expectations that more individualistic societies value the watchdog functions of the media more, leading to higher levels of press freedom in those countries. The more collectivistic countries are less likely to accept criticism of their own community and the leaders and therefore might not welcome, for example, investigative journalism.

Finally, Gini-type inequality is also significant at 0.01 level with a positive coefficient. This indicates that increase in Gini will lead increase in the Press Freedom variable, which means that increase in household inequality leads to decline in press freedom. As the more the difference in economic conditions among the population the more it is likely that more powerful actors will use the media for their own purposes.

The findings of this model are in line with the theory and my expectations, as the cultural dimensions are significant in the model, and democracy has the biggest explanatory power of the level of press freedom. The fact that GDP is not significant in the model can be explained by the including of Gini index which accounts for the variation in press freedom among the countries better, while in the model without Gini index, the GDP per capita was

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<sup>14</sup> Although the interpretation of variables with a significance at 0,1 level is not widespread in social sciences, there are strong theoretical and logical foundations backing a cautious interpretation of this variable.

significant and the coefficient showed that the higher the GDP the higher is the freedom of press. Such a result appears to be in agreement with main economic theories.

In the next step I intend to create the culture profiles of the groups of countries in order to see whether culture has some considerable influence on the level of freedom and democracy. Therefore I assign the countries into groups (called clusters), so that countries in the same group are more similar to each other in terms of cultural dimensions than countries from different groups, using cluster analysis of the countries based on cultural dimensions. Afterwards I intend to use analysis of variance, which will show whether there are considerable differences in the levels of press freedom and democracy among different clusters of countries.

In *Cultural Consequences* Hofstede divided 53 countries, for which scores were available at that time, into 12 clusters with some clusters being historical or linguistic areas (2001, 62-63). The cluster analysis in my research (using K-means method) showed three clusters to be the most meaningful (Table 3). As the K-means cluster method is particularly sensitive to outliers, I filtered the three biggest outliers, namely Slovakia, Singapore, and Jamaica.<sup>15</sup> These cases seem to have especially high values on some of the dimensions, which are not characteristic of the countries with similar history and current situation, and therefore should be investigated more precisely in order to explain such extreme values. The observation of the three obtained clusters can provide us with several general insights. For the purpose of clarity I gave them names according to their main feature, namely UAI-ers (as the cluster has high Uncertainty Avoidance Index), Individualists and Collectivists.

**Table 3. Cluster analysis based on cultural factors  
(without outliers 3 country)**

	Cluster means		
	UAI-ers	Individualists	Collectivists
<b>Power Distance Index</b>	74	33	67

<sup>15</sup> See the graphs with justification of the selection of outliers and results of the analysis with all the countries included in the Annex 5.

<b>Individualism</b>	27	73	35
<b>Uncertainty avoidance Index</b>	57	54	89
<b>Number of Cases in each Cluster</b>	28	19	24

The countries in the first cluster, which I will refer as to UAI-ers, have high Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance Index (see Table 3). In regards to this cluster, I find a predominance of countries with strong Spanish and French influence (see Table 4). These are either due to colonial domination (mainly Latin American countries) or the export of institutional solutions (Eastern European countries and Turkey). Japanese colonial influence seems to play a similar role in this regard, explaining the case of South Korea. The case of Greece would go against the above mentioned argumentation, together with the missing African and Latin American countries also strongly influenced by the French and Spanish models.

The second cluster, named Individualists, includes the countries with high Individualism and middle level of Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance. Perhaps the most obvious connections can be found in this group as I observe principally Northern European countries, with a common hanseatic tradition, and several of their colonies. These countries possess some of the following characteristics (though not necessarily all): a strong tradition of separation of powers, a politically powerful trade sector, and significant protestant populations. In regards to the colonies of these countries I can observe that only the ones in which the immigrant groups represented a significant portion of the population are included in this group (thus indicating that the cultural influence was not diluted by other groups within the countries). The cases of Italy and Hungary, however, present a certain problem in this case as they do not fit into the above mentioned explanation (although Hungary would fit the Weberian explanation due to its significant Protestant population).

The third cluster, which I called Collectivists, is characterized by high power distance and quite strong collectivism. This group seems to be the most diverse, including

countries from the Sinosphere, the Indosphere, and the Arab countries. The inclusion of Venezuela in this group is quite surprising, as it is the closest to European countries by its institutions and culture.

**Table 4. Countries grouped into clusters (without outliers Slovakia, Singapore, Jamaica)**

<b>Cluster 1: UAI-ers</b>	Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay
<b>Cluster 2: Individualists</b>	Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA.
<b>Cluster 3: Collectivist</b>	Bangladesh, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra L, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia <sup>16</sup> .


The above mentioned insights are by no means a comprehensive analysis. Rather it is an attempt to identify broad similarities that may have led to the common grouping of these countries, and provide some basic lines along which further research could be conducted. I can see that only the second cluster seems to be homogeneous (Figure 2), but considerable variation is present in the other two clusters, moreover the clusters are strongly overlapping (although less in the case of press freedom). The division of clusters is ambiguous and has several problematic cases. However, these are only approximate results and in order to assess whether the level of democracy and press freedom is influenced by cultural factors, I will use regression analysis in order to assess whether the differences in the level of the above mentioned concepts can be explained due to the cultural profile of the country, basically by the clusters of countries. Nevertheless, the cluster analysis provides an important insight, which can be the basis for further research. Namely the clustering of countries can be viewed as a comparative assessment of the achievements of different institutional models in terms of fostering the development of freedom of press and democracy. In this sense a more in-depth

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<sup>16</sup> After filtering out three outliers, namely Slovakia, Jamaica and Singapore, the results of the clusters remained mainly the same, except three countries (Morocco, Pakistan, Taiwan) moved from the first cluster (UAI-ers) to the third (Collectivist), which made the clusters more culturally based, and less based on economic development.

analysis of clustered institutional groups, including the evolution over different time periods and in respect to both other related measures, and other measures used to assess press freedom and democracy could improve our understanding of the mechanics behind the development of institutional infrastructures.

**Figure 1. Variation of Polity and Press Freedom according to clusters of countries**



If the numbers of cluster for each case are entered in the original regression, instead of three cultural dimensions by which the cluster analysis was done, the numbers of cluster show

to be highly significant for Polity, and highly insignificant for Press Freedom (See Table 5 and 6).<sup>17</sup>

**Table 5. Polity. The influence of cluster numbers**

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients
	B	Std. Error	Beta
(Constant)	5,574 (*)	2,557	
Press Freedom	-0,173 (**)	0,025	-0,788 (**)
Masculinity	0,017	0,019	0,063
GDP per capita	-3,817E-6	0,000	-0,012
Inequality in income or expenditure	0,109 (*)	0,042	0,224 (*)
Cluster Number	1,316 (**)	0,451	0,233 (**)
R Square	0,718	Dependent Variable: Polity	
Adjusted R Square	0,694	** Significant at the 0.01 level	
F	30,006(**)	* Significant at the 0.05 level	
Std. Error of the Estimate	2,652		

For the Polity, press freedom and Gini index are significant, as in original model. The variables in which each case is attributed a number of cluster also shows to be significant, this means that the differences in culture between the countries explain the variance in the democracy among the countries of different groups. This variable has the second biggest Beta coefficient, which means that the variation in democracy can be most precisely explained by the freedom of press, and then by the placement of the country into a certain cluster.

**Table 6. Press Freedom. The influence of cluster numbers**

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients
	B	Std. Error	Beta
(Constant)	46,146 (**)	8,466	
Policy	-2,634 (**)	0,376	-0,577 (**)
Masculinity	0,074	0,075	0,059
GDP per capita	0,000 (**)	0,000	-0,364 (**)
Inequality in income or expenditure	0,383 (*)	0,166	0,172 (*)

<sup>17</sup> The ANCOVA analysis of the model (includes Masculinity, GDP per capita, Inequality in income or expenditure and Press Freedom variables as covariates for Polity, and the Cluster Number as the factor; for the Press Freedom includes Masculinity, GDP per capita, Inequality in income or expenditure and Polity variables as covariates, and the Cluster Number as the factor) showed the same results (see Annex 6 for detailed results).

<b>Cluster Number</b>	0,594	1,884	0,023
<b>R Square</b>	0,793	Dependent Variable: Press Freedom	
<b>Adjusted R Square</b>	0,776	** Significant at the 0.01 level	
<b>F</b>	45,279(**)	* Significant at the 0.05 level	
<b>Std. Error of the Estimate</b>	10,359		

For Press Freedom the number of cluster for the country did not show to be significant.

At the same time, except Polity and Inequality, GDP per capita showed to be significant. That means that the differences in the level of press freedom can be explained much better by the economic development than by the place in certain clusters.

Such results testify to the fact that, although being quite useful for the understanding of general patterns, clusters can not by themselves fully explain the level of press freedom, but they are quite useful in understanding variations in democracy level among the countries. The interpretation of such results might lead us to the conclusion that the notion of democracy (at least as conceptualized and measured by Polity IV) is culturally sensitive; basically these concepts are influenced by the Anglo-Saxon way of thinking and culture. On the other hand the press freedom (conceptualized and measured by Freedom House) is more dependent on the economic development, than on the culture profile.

### ***3.3. Analysis of the findings***

Based on the theoretical background and empirical evidence I would expected the cultural dimensions to be significant in my regression models both for press freedom (with polity, cultural dimensions, GDP per capita corrected for purchasing power parity and Gini index of inequality) and democracy (with press freedom, cultural dimensions, GDP per capita corrected for purchasing power parity and Gini index of inequality). However, the analysis showed that not all the dimensions are significant for both democracy and media freedom. At the same time the relationship between the media and democracy showed to be highly significant, which complies with the theory.

*Power Distance* was expected to have a negative relationship with democracy and press freedom, which would mean that countries with higher Power Distance Index are expected to be less democratic and have lower freedom of media. The theoretical explanation is that societies with higher power distance tend to accept inequalities in power, authority, wealth and treatment and often treat such inequality as natural. Practically that means that in high PDI societies it is not likely that citizens would seek to criticize the government as it represents higher authority, so they would not expect press to do so, and will not strive for participation and influencing the political decisions as the belief in the ability to influence these decisions tends to be very low (Hofstede 2001, 111; Van de Vliert, Schwartz, Huismans, Hofstede, and Daan 1999). The statistical analysis of the data for 74 countries showed that power distance has a significant relationship only with the press freedom with the same direction of relationship as predicted. But this dimension of culture did not show to be significant for the level of democracy, which means that other variables included in the model explain the variance of the Polity variable better than Power Distance in the society.

*Individualism* was predicted to have a positive relationship with both media freedom and democracy. The societies with high collectivism tend to dislike any criticisms of their community and therefore are not likely to welcome mass media which criticizes the government or the leaders of communities. Moreover more individualistic societies are likely to be more tolerant, encourage equal rights to all the citizens and to respect the rights of minorities. Thus, more individualistic societies were predicted to be also more democratic. According to the findings of the analysis, individualism reached significance only in the stepwise regression for the press freedom, which seems to make sense and corresponds with the theory.

Opposed to the previous two, *Uncertainty Avoidance* was expected to have a negative relationship with democracy, as citizens in societies with higher Uncertainty



Avoidance are expected to have less belief in the possibility of participation in political process, moreover they tend not to expect their opinion to be treated with respect; therefore the countries with high Uncertainty Avoidance Index were predicted to be less democratic. The findings of the analysis turned out to be quite controversial, as the model showed that countries with higher Uncertainty Avoidance Index are expected to be more democratic. This finding contradicts the expectations of the theory and therefore needs more explanation and analysis. One of the possible explanations can be that the democratic countries are over represented in the sample, and many of them have middle or high level of Uncertainty Avoidance (most of the European countries) comparing to such countries as China and India, who have low Uncertainty Avoidance, while not being considered democratic. Therefore this relationship needs to be investigated more in future with cultural scores available for more countries.

The last dimension of *Masculinity*, as conceptualized by Hofstede, does not seem to have high impact on political and institutional system, as it refers more to the individual values connected with the family. Masculinity dimension is rooted with the balance of power at home, between father and mother, and the outside situation depends on many other factors like Individualism and Power Distance (Hofstede and Associates 1998, 19). For this dimension, when referred to politics, femininity is connected more with the welfare state, namely with such values as preservation of environment, helping the needy, assistance to developing countries, international conflicts resolving by finding the compromise; while the masculinity is connected with the priority on the economic growth, small amount of money spent on assistance to poor states, resolving of conflicts by showing the strength (Hofstede and Associates 1998, 17).

Another interesting finding that is contrary to expectations and in opposition to a number of empirical studies which claim that economic development (in particular GDP per

capita) should have a significant impact on the level of democracy and press freedom. In my models GDP per capita didn't have significant relationship neither with Polity, nor with Press Freedom. At the same time the Gini index of inequality was significant in both models. This presumes that the index of inequality can explain the variance in the response variables better than GDP, and thus it is not the amount of money earned that matters but the way it is distributed among the members of society. For press freedom the model shows that in countries with lower inequality the press freedom is higher, the direction of the relationship of the level of democracy and the level of inequality of income or wealth is surprising. The model shows that more democratic countries are expected to have higher inequality. Such a result can be explained by the Kuznets theory which states: "capitalist industrialization tends to increase inequality, but this inequality contains the seeds of its own destruction, because it induces a change in the political regime toward a more redistributive system" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2002, 184). Basically the increase of inequality is dangerous for the political regime stability, therefore the elites are forced to democratization and institutional changes which encourage redistribution and as the result reduce inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2002, 183). Although the Kuznets curve suits well to the empirical data for some countries (European: UK, France, Sweden, Germany; Latin American: Colombia and Brazil), the inequality shows to decrease monotonically in others (European: Norway and Netherlands, Asian: South Korea, Japan and Taiwan) (ibid 2002, 183). Therefore in order to provide more grounded explanation (which lies outside the scope of this paper) the countries need more investigation. Considering the fact that in my sample more than half of the countries which are considered democratic (have polity score 5 or more) are the countries of the third wave of democratization, I can speculate that the results of my model just show that the countries are not at the stage of increase or peak of inequality and inequality will tend to decrease in future.

The cluster analysis divided the countries into three groups with similar cultural profiles. Such a division is quite meaningful, as the countries with similar history, religion, and international influences were placed in the same clusters. Nevertheless this classification had some problematic cases, and should be treated with some caution. In the regression model while for the press freedom it was insignificant. Likewise, in the model for the press freedom with cluster numbers included instead of cultural dimensions the GDP per capita became significant, although it was not in the models with cultural dimensions. This means that, while the level of press freedom in the country is quite significantly explained by the scores on particular cultural dimensions, it is better explained by the wealth of the country than by the big cultural group which it belongs to. Therefore, the findings of the analysis suggests that the level of press freedom is better explained by internal values of society, in particular the level of individualism and the power distance, than by the historical legacies or the part of the world the country belongs.

The analysis of the influence of cluster membership on the level of democracy results in the conclusion that cultural profile has a considerable and significant influence on the Polity. This presupposes that not only particular cultural dimension (uncertainty avoidance) influences the level of democracy, but also the general cultural groups of the countries, for example historical heritage, main religion or international influences. Therefore democracy might be considered a culturally-sensitive concept, and for some countries some other institutional arrangements should be found.

# Conclusion

In answer to research questions considering the relationship between the media freedom and culture, democracy and culture, and the direction of the relationship between the media freedom and democracy the research conducted showed interesting results. Although these questions were addressed by many scholars, to my best knowledge, the quantitative research including large number of countries has never been done before, therefore empirical findings can be considered as unique contribution to the field.

In the course of the analysis I have found a strong relationship between press freedom (as measured by Freedom House) and democracy (as measured by Polity IV). This may suggest that they influence each other or that they measure, to some degree, the same thing. The latter should not be the case as Polity IV does not include press freedom as its component (Polity IV; Norris 2006); therefore I can conclude that the results of my analysis can be interpreted as a strong relationship between these two phenomena. Furthermore, I found that cultural dimensions have a significant impact on press freedom (Power Distance and Individualism), and democracy (Uncertainty Avoidance), as conceptualized by the respective institutions. As I found the cultural factors to be significant and having, in our opinion, quite sizable standardized coefficients, as opposed to the inferences that can be made from Norris's models, where the historical and cultural factors such as being a Middle Eastern country or Ex-British Colony have only marginal influence on the level of democracy, measured by Polity IV, Vanhanen, and Przeworski et al. (Norris 2006, 83). Surprisingly I found GDP per capita corrected for purchasing power to be insignificant in all our models. This suggests that the previously found relations in the literature may have been better captured by other variables in the model, such as inequality index. The significant impact of

the Gini index, however, indicates that in-between household inequality is strongly related to the institutional quality in a given country.

By means of the cluster analysis I found that a strongly cohesive group made up principally of North European countries and their colonies (in which immigrants make up a significant part of the population), scores high on both policy and press freedom. The French, Spanish and Japanese also seem to have some beneficial effect regarding our two response variables. However, variation within clusters shows that apart from the second cluster the effects are quite diluted. The regression analysis showed that the cluster membership is significant only for the polity, while being insignificant for press freedom.

The findings support the strongly culturalist point of view, which emphasizes the importance of culture in the society for the sustainability of democracy and media freedom, it also points out that democracy is not suitable for all cultures, and political culture should be in consent with more general values and traditions of society (Przeworski, Cheibub, and Limongi 2003, 181). At the same time, it is generally accepted that only free and independent press is able to support democracy and perform its democratic functions; and the findings support the view that the appropriate legal environment, although crucial for media freedom, is not enough by itself. The society needs to possess democratic values, tolerance, and competition among ideas and views in order to have freedom of press. This view does not mean cultural determinism, as political culture and general values of society are viewed as the phenomenon that can change over time influenced by different factors, such as historical events, international relationship, change of institutions, etc.

The fruitful future analysis is one which will contribute to a clearer distinction between the various clusters and improve the problematic issues of the data. This study didn't aim at an in-depth study of the countries, but only at identifying general patterns and trends. Therefore a detailed study of each country's institutional histories, cultures and social

structures that could provide many insights, possibly explaining their similarities in regards to press freedom and polity structure, could undoubtedly lead to interesting findings. A second issue to be addressed is the severe limitations of the data. In this regard, a comparative analysis using different indicators could provide a clearer view of the mechanisms involved. Moreover inclusion of other countries, for example Eastern Europe, but also more countries that are not considered democratic, would extend the study.

This thesis might be useful for the organizations that work in the field of media and democracy development, as it emphasizes the importance of culture for both media freedom and development. It is argued that cultural factors of the society influence the way institutions work in the given country; therefore before implementing the institutional arrangements borrowed from the best international practices, implementing organizations should investigate whether such a system will fit the cultural and historical environment. Moreover it might bring up some ideas for scholars who address the causes of the full or partial failure of the democratization in many countries of the Third Wave.

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# Annex 1

## Countries in the research<sup>18</sup>

Bangladesh\*, China\*, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia\*, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago\*, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam\*, Zambia, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia\*, Finland, Germany, Hungary\*, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria\*, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic\*, Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco\*, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland\*, Portugal, Romania\*, Russia\*, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, Uruguay.

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<sup>18</sup> \* Estimated values

\*\* Regional estimated values:

‘Arab World’ = Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

‘East Africa’ = Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia

‘West Africa’ = Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone

## Annex 2

### Description of Data

Variable	Values	Source
<b>Polity</b>	From -10 (Strongly Autocratic) to 10 (Strongly Democratic) Division: "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5), and "democracies" (+6 to +10).	Polity IV
<b>Press Freedom</b>	From 0 (Very Free) to 98 (not at all) Division: free (0-30), partly free (31-60), and not free (61-100).	Freedom House
<b>Uncertainty avoidance Index</b>	From 8 (high tolerance of uncertainty) to 112 (low tolerance of uncertainty)	Hofstede Cultural Dimensions
<b>Individualism</b>	From 6 (highly collectivist) to 91 (highly individualist)	Hofstede Cultural Dimensions
<b>Power Distance Index</b>	From 11 (low power-distance) to 104 (high power-distance)	Hofstede Cultural Dimensions
<b>Masculinity</b>	From 5 (low masculinity) to 110 (high masculinity)	Hofstede Cultural Dimensions
<b>GDP per capita (PPP)</b>	Measured in USD, corrected for the purchasing power parity.	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>Gini index</b>	From 0 (more equal distribution of the income or wealth) to 100 percent (high inequality of the distribution)	Central Intelligence Agency

### Descriptive Statistics

	Policy	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	PressFr	GDPcap	Gini Index
<b>N Valid</b>	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	65
<b>Missing</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
<b>Mean</b>	5,97	60,65	41,70	49,18	67,00	40,15	20253,52	39,411
<b>Median</b>	8	64	38	50	68	35	14900	36,2
<b>Mode</b>	10	80	20 <sup>a</sup>	52	68	21	1500	34,3
<b>Std. Deviation</b>	5,749	21,063	23,650	16,680	20,416	23,007	15594,73	9,7980
<b>Skewness</b>	-1,550	-0,381	0,488	-0,147	-0,060	0,469	0,581	0,522
<b>Std. Error of Skewness</b>	0,285	0,285	0,285	0,285	0,285	0,285	0,285	0,297
<b>Kurtosis</b>	1,088	-0,401	-0,960	0,880	-0,683	-0,906	-0,662	-0,638
<b>Std. Error of Kurtosis</b>	0,563	0,563	0,563	0,563	0,563	0,563	0,563	0,586
<b>Range</b>	20	93	85	90	89	85	60100	38,2
<b>Minimum</b>	-10	11	6	5	23	9	700	24,7
<b>Maximum</b>	10	104	91	95	112	94	60800	62,9

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

Policy				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Autocracy	9	12,7	12,7	12,7
Anocracy	11	15,5	15,5	28,2
Democracy	51	71,8	71,8	100,0
<b>Total</b>	71	100,0	100,0	

Press Freedom				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Free	36	48,6	48,6	48,6
Partly free	23	31,1	31,1	79,7
Not free	15	20,3	20,3	100,0
<b>Total</b>	74	100,0	100,0	

## Annex 3

### Correlations between the Hofstede cultural dimensions and Almond and Verba civic culture measurements

	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI
Citizen competence - local	-0,675	0,733	-0,856	<b>-0,973**</b>
Citizen competence - national	-0,423	0,592	<b>-0,894*</b>	-0,844
Subject competence -male	<b>-0,958*</b>	0,743	-0,493	-0,726
Subject competence -female	<b>-0,947*</b>	<b>0,886*</b>	-0,64	<b>-0,909*</b>
Methods of influence - collective	-0,208	0,379	<b>-0,887*</b>	-0,652
Methods of influence - individual	-0,409	0,203	0,497	0,001
Expected consideration of the point of view for bureaucracy (%) - serious	<b>0,976**</b>	0,845	-0,605	-0,833
Expected consideration of the point of view for bureaucracy (%) - little and ignore	<b>0,926*</b>	-0,814	0,253	0,4997
Expected consideration of the point of view for police (%) - serious	<b>-0,944*</b>	0,836	-0,628	<b>-0,891*</b>
Expected consideration of the point of view for police (%) - little and ignore	<b>0,954*</b>	-0,813	0,306	0,566
Expected treatment by bureaucracy (%) - equal	-0,822	0,869	-0,816	<b>-0,978**</b>
Expected treatment by bureaucracy (%) - not equal	<b>0,977**</b>	<b>-0,931*</b>	0,496	0,686
Expected treatment by police (%) - equal	<b>-0,926*</b>	<b>0,917*</b>	-0,754	<b>-0,930*</b>
Expected treatment by police (%) - not equal	<b>0,971**</b>	<b>-0,908*</b>	0,456	0,634

\*\* Significant at the 0.01 level

\* Significant at the 0.05 level

## Annex 4

Checklist of Methodology Questions for 2007

### A. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT (0–30 POINTS)

1. Do the constitution or other basic laws contain provisions designed to protect freedom of the press and of expression, and are they enforced? (0–6 points)
2. Do the penal code, security laws, or any other laws restrict reporting, and are journalists punished under these laws? (0–6 points)
3. Are there penalties for libeling officials or the state, and are they enforced? (0–3 points)
4. Is the judiciary independent, and do courts judge cases concerning the media impartially? (0–3 points)
5. Is freedom of information legislation in place, and are journalists able to make use of it? (0–2 points)
6. Can individuals or business entities legally establish and operate private media outlets without undue interference? (0–4 points)
7. Are media regulatory bodies, such as a broadcasting authority or national press or communications council, able to operate freely and independently? (0–2 points)
8. Is there freedom to become a journalist and to practice journalism? (0–4 points)

### B. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT (0–40 POINTS)

1. To what extent are media outlets' news and information content determined by the government or a particular partisan interest? (0–10 points)
2. Is access to official or unofficial sources generally controlled? (0–2 points)
3. Is there official censorship? (0–4 points)
4. Do journalists practice self-censorship? (0–4 points)
5. Is media coverage robust, and does it reflect a diversity of viewpoints? (0–4 points)
6. Are both local and foreign journalists able to cover the news freely? (0–6 points)
7. Are journalists or media outlets subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor? (0–10 points)



### **C. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT (0–30 POINTS)**

1. To what extent are media owned or controlled by the government, and does this influence their diversity of views? (0–6 points)
2. Is private media ownership transparent, thus allowing consumers to judge the impartiality of the news? (0–3 points)
3. Is private media ownership highly concentrated, and does it influence diversity of content? (0–3 points)
4. Are there restrictions on the means of journalistic production and distribution? (0–4 points)
5. Does the state place prohibitively high costs on the establishment and operation of media outlets? (0–4 points)
6. Do the state or other actors try to control the media through allocation of advertising or subsidies? (0–3 points)
7. Do journalists receive payment from private or public sources whose design is to influence their journalistic content? (0–3 points)
8. Does the economic situation in a country accentuate media dependency on the state, political parties, big business, or other influential political actors for funding? (0–4 points)

#### ***Legend***

#### **Country**

**Status: Free (0–30)/Partly Free (31–60)/Not Free (61–100)**

**Legal Environment: 0–30 points**

**Political Environment: 0–40 points**


**Economic Environment: 0–30 points**

**Total Score: 0–100 points**

## Annex 5

### Cluster analysis

#### Outliers



#### Results without filtering out the outliers

#### Cluster analysis based on cultural factors

	Cluster means		
	Collectivists	Individualists	UAI-ers
Power Distance Index	76	34	67
Individualism	28	71	34
Uncertainty avoidance Index	54	52	87
Number of Cases in each Cluster	27	20	27

#### Countries grouped into clusters

<b>Cluster 1: Collectivists</b>	Bangladesh, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia
<b>Cluster 2: Individualists</b>	Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
<b>Cluster 3: UAI-ers</b>	Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, Uruguay

## Annex 6

### ANCOVA analysis of influence of cluster membership on the level of democracy and press freedom

#### Press Freedom

Descriptive Statistics			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
UAI-ders	58,55	17,132	22
Individualists	17,21	6,179	19
Collectivists	36,00	16,395	24
Total	38,14	21,875	65

#### ANCOVA: The influence of cluster numbers on the level of press freedom

	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F
<b>Corrected Model</b>	24483,673 <sup>a</sup>	4896,735	47,037 (**)
<b>Intercept</b>	2993,686	2993,686	28,757 (**)
<b>GDP per capita</b>	487,199	487,199	4,680 (*)
<b>Gini Index</b>	649,733	649,733	6,241 (*)
<b>Policy</b>	4314,446	4314,446	41,444 (**)
<b>cluster</b>	299,823	149,912	1,440
<b>Error</b>	6142,081	104,103	
<b>Total</b>	125171,000		
<b>Corrected Total</b>	30625,754		
R Squared	0,799	Dependent Variable: Polity	
Adjusted R Squared	0,782	** Significant at the 0.01 level	
<b>Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances<sup>a</sup></b>		* Significant at the 0.05 level	
<b>F</b>	3,565 (*)		

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

#### Polity

Descriptive Statistics			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
UAI-ders	2,14	5,743	22
Individualists	9,74	,933	19
Collectivists	8,63	1,313	24

### Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
UAI-ders	2,14	5,743	22
Individualists	9,74	,933	19
Collectivists	8,63	1,313	24
Total	6,75	4,793	65

### ANCOVA: The influence of cluster numbers on the level of democracy

	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F
<b>Corrected Model</b>	1050,412 <sup>a</sup>	210,082	29,536 (**)
<b>Intercept</b>	98,987	98,987	13,917 (**)
<b>Press Freedom</b>	294,779	294,779	41,444 (**)
<b>GDP per capita</b>	,350	,350	0,049
<b>Inequality</b>	47,208	47,208	6,637 (*)
<b>Cluster</b>	58,467	29,233	4,110 (*)
<b>Error</b>	419,650	7,113	
<b>Total</b>	4435,000		
<b>Corrected Total</b>	1470,062		
R Squared	0,715	Dependent Variable: Polity	
Adjusted R Squared	0,690	** Significant at the 0.01 level	
<b>Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances<sup>a</sup></b>		* Significant at the 0.05 level	
<b>F</b>	23,385 (**)		

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.