

How to Steal the Vote:

Typology of Elections in Non-democracies

by

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Abstract

This work raises the question “*What are the types of elections in non-democratic regimes?*” arguing that method of the electoral manipulation is a relevant phenomenon informing us about the nature of the given regime with possible implication on regime stability.

This question is answered in the theoretical part of the work. Building on the works of normative democratic theory and comparative politics on the procedurally defined democracy, it derives four dimensions of electoral regimes. Establishing the dichotomous coding criteria with democratic elections serving as the positive pole, it identifies 15 types of elections in non-democratic elections.

The empirical part of the thesis applies the typology to four recent cases of elections in non-democratic regimes – Uganda (2006), Singapore (2006), Peru (2000) and Venezuela (2006) to examine the purposefulness of the typology. Case studies provide detailed account of the subject matter in the four dimensions, and are subsequently classified according to the typology.

The work concludes by providing a comparison of the cases finding out that both competitive authoritarian regimes and hegemonic authoritarian regimes manipulate the less visible parts of the electoral processes, especially the condition and the playing field. The work contributes to the scholarship on non-democracies by providing a framework for analysis and the typology for classification of elections in non-democracies.

In its own final assessment, the work suggests a need for the overarching principle for future investigation of the elections in non-democracies based on the principle of democratic uncertainty.

Dedication

To the memory of my father.

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Part I: Theoretical Considerations

Introduction

Why should one study elections in non-democracies? Elections in countries such as North Korea, Zimbabwe or Venezuela, clearly perform a different function than elections in democratic ones – they are not the prime channels for selection of political elites and changes of the governments. But that does not mean that elections do not matter – on the contrary – they just have a different purpose. As Philippe C. Schmitter persuasively argues (Hermet-Rose-Rouquié 1978: 149) “if they are held, they must have some reason or motive; they must contribute in some way to sustaining (or undermining) the mode of political domination.” This thesis explores the variety of elections in the non-democratic regimes, and provides a framework for their analysis and classification.

There are at least two good reasons for studying elections in non-democracies. First, as already alluded to, even when such elections do not normally bring about government change, they should not be considered inconsequential. They were found an important method of ensuring regime stability (Magaloni 2006; Gandhi 2008), or dividing opposition (Lust-Okar 2005, 2006). In other contexts, elections in non-democracies were found to contribute to the regime changes, such as in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) so significantly that they were dubbed, “electoral revolutions” (Bunce-Wolchik 2007, Lindberg 2008).

Second, elections are easy to observe, high-profile events reflecting the internal logic of the non-democratic regime. This thesis assumes an internal logic to the method of manipulation. The choice *how* the regime manipulates the election is hardly a random one

and I suspect that different regimes types choose different ways of manipulating elections. Observing the method of the manipulation by the regime thus allows us to learn more about the regime itself. In a sense, an election could be considered a microcosm of a non-democratic regime¹.

Elections in non-democracies are a frequent subject of scholarly interest –mostly as a final proof of the undemocratic character of the regime. Few, however, go further than noting that the elections have been “undemocratic” or “flawed” (see also Bjornlund 2004: 118-121). In addition, it has been also argued that elections in non-democracies contribute both to the demise and stability of the non-democratic regimes (Magaloni 2006; Gandhi 2008; Brownlee 2007; Lindberg 2006, 2008; Howard-Roessler 2006; Teorell-Hadenius 2008). Both of these claims might be valid, depending on the particular conditions, among which I suspect one should be the method of the electoral manipulation. In short, stealing ballots is different than not allowing the opposition to run and should have different implications.

This cannot be assessed if elections in non-democracies are treated as an all-encompassing residual category, as is the case today. It is surprising how little attention have the elections in non-democracies received as unit of analysis and an independent variable. This thesis addresses this problem and fills the conceptual white space by answering the research question “*What are the types of elections in non-democratic regimes?*”

¹ Merkel (2004: 38) singles out electoral regime as having a “central position” among other partial regimes. While I agree with the importance put on the electoral regimes, I find Merkel’s conceptualization of the partial regimes confusing. Among others, it is not clear how freedom of association can be excluded from electoral regime (Merkel 2004: 42, figure 2). In a way, Merkel fails to address the internal embeddedness of his partial regimes.

The contribution of this thesis to the literature on the comparative non-democratic regimes is a typology capturing the nature of non-democratic elections, more precisely the method in which they had been manipulated. The purpose of the typology is purely descriptive. However, I expect that types of manipulated elections identified by the typology would find a good use in quantitative treatments of the hybrid regimes, or any other non-democratic regime holding elections. Also, the typology could be used to track historical trends in the electoral manipulation.

This thesis is structured into two main parts: 1) a theoretical part (Part I) aimed at developing the typology of electoral regimes in non-democratic regimes, and 2) an empirical part (Part II) focused on testing the usefulness of the developed typology empirically on four real-world examples. The theoretical part of the work first justifies the reasons for the research by discussing the state of the field (chapter 1), and then provides the framework for analysis (chapter 2). It concludes by identifying 15 types of non-democratic elections (chapter 3).

The empirical part (Part II) first discusses the research design (chapter 1) and then presents a detailed analysis of the electoral regimes present in Singapore and Uganda (chapters 2 and 3), followed by two case studies: Peru and Venezuela (chapters 4 and 5). Chapter 6 provides a summary comparison of the four cases. Finally, the work concludes by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the typology/applicability to real world examples and suggestions for the future research.

1. State of the field

Today, almost all countries in the world hold elections for the top legislative and executive functions. Yet only a fraction of all elections is democratic (Geddes 2005: 2). How do we explain elections in non-democratic regimes? If not for democratic purposes, why do regimes hold them and what is their significance?

While studies of every possible aspect of elections in democracies are plentiful and have been a stable industry of the political science field, elections in non-democratic regimes thus far received scant attention. Hermet's lament that "the body of literature devoted to various forms of non-classical elections is very small...mainly descriptive and devoid of methodological innovations" (Hermet 1978: 10) still applies today.

Elections² have been considered an institutional demonstration of a democracy, the political regime allowing for the competitive selection of leaders (Huntington 1989:15).³ Although such a procedural definition of democracy might be sub-minimal to some (Mainwaring, Brinks and Perez-Liñán 2007: 128-130), there is universal consensus on the point that "democracy cannot be *less* [than elections]" (Pastor 1998: 154).

While the interest of this work is not democracy, the discussion on the nature of the procedural definition of democracy sheds light on issues of relevance for this study, specifically it hints to the diversity of elections. Huntington (1989: 11-13) pointedly notes

² The terms elections and electoral regimes in this work refer to the same phenomenon - "national elections for the direct selection of the authoritative executive leaders or for a parliament that selects authoritative executive leaders" (Howard-Roessler 2006: 367). The notion of regime indicates a certain degree of stability of the institutional arrangement in "both formal and informal rules of a political game" (Remmer 1985: 65).

³ For the overview of the approach see Diamond 2003: 31, especially notes 32 and 33.

that even the modest [procedural] meaning of democracy is quite robust. In my reading of the phrase, Huntington suggests that the procedural requirements of the elections have to be reflected in their content – both in the *form* of elections and specific *substance* has to be present to result in *competitive (democratic) elections* essential for democracies.

In other words, competitive (democratic) election is only one of the possible types of elections. This thesis answers the question that begs to be asked – “what are the other types of elections?” The concept of “democratic elections” must be “disaggregated”, if other types of elections are to be found. The constitutive attributes of the democratic elections have to be identified, and subsequently these attributes must be assigned to more general theoretical dimensions.

I will use the procedural definition of democracy to identify such theoretical dimensions. This should not be considered as conceptual stretching due to the key position of elections in the procedural definitions of democracy. J. J. Linz⁴ (Linz 1975, cited 2000: 58) conceptualized democracy as a system that:

“allows the (1) free formulation of political preferences, through the use of the (2) basic freedoms of association, information and communication, for the purpose of (3) the free competition between (4) leaders to validate at (5) regular intervals by (6) non-violent means their claim to rule; a democratic system does this without (7) excluding any effective political office from that competition or (8) prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their political preference by norms requiring the (9) use of force to enforce them.” (emphasis and numbering mine)

While this definition captures the essence of elections in democracy, it is quite unstructured and bulky. Furthermore it lists the procedural requirements (freedom of communication)

⁴ Consensus seems to have been reached on fundamentals of democracy when defined procedurally. The definitions of Bingham Powell (1982: 5), Guillermo Munck (2009: 90) or Mainwaring, Brinks and Perez-Liñán (2007:125-128) are essentially equivalent to Linz’s.

along with the phenomena they contribute to (competition) without discussing their relation (see also Appendix 1). Another attempt, Schedler's Chain of the Democratic Choice (Schedler 2002: 39) manages to a large extent to avoid the problem of unspecified relations⁵, but does not solve the problem of bulkiness.

Munck's Index of Democratic Elections is probably the most sophisticated treatment of democratic electoral processes at the moment (Munck 2009: 96-110). Drawing on the democratic theory and informed by the electoral observation literature, it presents both a parsimonious and well-operationalized model with four dimensions and 14 components. It also clearly spells out the logical relations and the salience of the dimensions (weights) for the final numerical product (index).⁶

Yet, a dispersed conceptualization of the freedom for campaigning results in poor conceptual validity. There is no good theoretical reason why the "basic guarantees for an electoral campaign" should relate only to the candidates and exclude voters.⁷ First, if the purpose of the campaign is to allow interaction of the voters and candidates; both of the actors need to be free to take part. Second, even if the candidates had different levels of freedoms in the campaign than voters, it would be folly to assume that these spheres do not interact. For example, state repression of the opposition candidate does not only limit her ability to campaign, but send a clearly intimidating signal to the supporters.

⁵ The main problem is the Schedler's first dimension "object of the choice" which is more interested in the effective powers of the office holders than the procedural character of the choice. For the comparison of the thesis' model and Schedler's Chain, see Appendix 1.

⁶ While Munck's final product is a composite index measuring "democraticness" of elections and not a typology, it could be transformed into one by treating sub-dimension as incommensurable, allowing only logical, not numerical recombination.

⁷ Indeed, this results in the coding the same phenomenon twice – first in the "integrity of the voter preference" (II.3), and second in Basic guarantees for an electoral campaign (III.6). Consult Munck 2009: 90, as well as Appendix 1 of this work for the details.

Owing a significant intellectual debt to both Schedler and Munck, I present my model in the next part of this chapter. I describe four theoretical dimensions of *any* elections: *agents of the choice*, *objects of the choice*, *environment of the choice* and *aggregation of the preferences*.

I conceptualize and operationalize the property space of electoral regimes along these four dimensions using democratic elections as an ‘ideal type’. I also clearly spell out aggregation rules constituting a democratic election and identify the remaining “other than democratic elections”.

2. Conceptualization of Electoral Dimensions

The model presented identifies four theoretical dimensions of *any* elections: *agents of the choice*, *objects of the choice*, *environment of the choice* and *aggregation of the preferences* in this order. Following the advice on data generation in comparative political method (Munck-Verkuilen 2002:7), this work conceptualizes dimensions of the electoral regime, describes their measurement, and finally demonstrates the aggregation logic that applies to them.

For the proper application of the model, it is important to state what the model does not conceptualize. Even if the current literature (Mozaffar-Schedler 2002; Elklit-Reynolds 2005; Hartlyn-McCoy-Mustillo 2008) recognizes electoral management as an important topic, for this thesis, the control of electoral management is rather a strategic point from which the elections can be influenced. Similarly, the voter education (Lindberg 2006, Elklit-Reynolds 2005) is treated only as a part of the “agents dimension”. Lastly, the model does not include electoral boycotts (Beaulieu-Hyde 2009; Posusney 2002; Hartlyn-McCoy-Mustillo 2008) and its strategic effects on the type of elections.

2.1 Agents of the choice

The first dimension of the electoral regime surveys the nature of the constituency. In other words – who got to vote?

The positive (democratic) pole in this dimension builds on one of the oldest traditions in political science emphasizing the close link between democracy and the concept of

universal citizenship (Huntington 1989; Minogue 2000: chapter 1). Moral and political equality of human beings is recognized by the democratic theory that requires that voting rights and meaningful exercise of this right is universally granted to the entire adult population with the same weight (one man - one vote' principle; Dahl 1998: chapters 6 and 7).

While in agreement with “one person-one vote” principle, this model accounts for the vote's weight in the “aggregation of the preferences” dimension. The rationale behind this decision is that unequal weight for votes is just a different method leading to ‘unequal aggregations’ of the voter's preference, similar to multiple voting, stuffing of the ballot box or gerrymandering.

The dimension is measured by one indicator: the effectively realizable universal voting rights measured dichotomously⁸. The coding rule is the following: any systematic and one-sidedly discriminatory action preventing voters from exercising their voting rights at any stage of the electoral process (registration, access to vote) should result in 0 (restricted).⁹ Dichotomous nature of the measurement makes all other cases receive 1 (universal). Information on this dimension should be collected before and during the elections, and relevant sources include legal documents (formal franchise) and electoral observers' reports (practice) (Munck 2009: 99).

⁸ All of the dimensions in the concept are measured dichotomously. This pragmatic choice (following Collier-Adcock 1999) can be justified by the research objective (coming up with a typology of the manipulation not degrees of manipulation) and parsimony (too many combinations), even if it results in the large-grained types. Furthermore, in the absence of ready concepts, and appropriate tools to measure manipulation more precisely this it serves to preserve concept validity (see Collier-Adcock 1999).

⁹ Following instances for the disenfranchisements are not considered to be a violation of the universality – mental sanity requirement, reasonable requirement on the residence in the voting district and country. Also temporal disenfranchisements of the prison inmates should not be considered a systematic violation (adopted from Massicotte – Blais – Yoshinaka 2004: 18).

2.2 Objects of the choice

The second dimension of the elections is operationalized around the question “who could compete in the elections” and has been labeled as “objects of the choice”.

Again, normative democratic theory sets a requirement for the democratic pole. Political equality is also translated into equal political competence requiring the fullest possible inclusion of candidates and political parties. While democratic theory does not prohibit some minor formal restrictions on the candidacies¹⁰, the restrictions must not violate the general right to candidacy.

The coding rule for this dimension is dichotomous and examines the systematic exclusion of candidates. Elections are considered to be open (1, democratic pole) in cases where there are no reports of systematic exclusion¹¹, whereas all other cases should be treated as ‘restricted’ (score 0).

Relevant sources for coding this indicator are any official regulations as well as cross-checked observers’ reports containing information on actual prohibitions of candidacies, political bans or any other effective mechanism preventing those interested from running. Data should be collected well before the actual poll.

2.3 Environment of the Choice

The third dimension of electoral regimes conceptualizes the conditions in which the campaign contestation takes place and was derived from ideal of democratic electoral

¹⁰ Including age, citizenship and residence requirement, monetary deposit or supporting signatures. Also, limited scope of the incompatibilities should be tolerated (Massicotte – Blais – Yoshinaka 2004, chapter 2: 40-66).

¹¹ In cases of the direct presidential election, platform consideration can be dropped, as even a single exclusion can be of significant consequences.

regimes requiring that voters make a ‘free and informed’ choice¹². The campaign environment is observed in two sub-dimensions – freedom of the campaign and leveled playing field.

The sub-dimension of freedom of the campaign surveys if “voters and candidates are able to conduct electoral activities without undue pressure or fear of reprisal” (Munck 2009: 90). The positive answer to this question results in the score 1 (free). It should be noted that among other possible manipulation methods, any problems with the secrecy of the ballot or voter intimidation of any sort^t that occurs should result in a score 0 (unfree) on this sub-dimension.

The sub-dimension of leveled-playing field requires the candidates’ roughly equal access to the public resources when campaigning. The logic of this sub-dimension flows from the requirement of equal chances for the candidates.¹³

The coding rule in this dimension should be following: Abuse of state resources for campaigning or favoritism for a candidate or a group of candidates with respect to public resources is a sufficient condition for calling the environment of the choice “unfair” (score 0). Remaining elections should be called “fair” (score 1) with respect to this sub-dimension.

Information on both sub-dimensions should be compiled from the official regulations and informed observers of their application in the practice such as international human rights groups or electoral observers. They should be evaluated before and during the electoral

¹² Dahlian “enlightened understanding” (Dahl 1998: 38) is most likely too ambitious.

¹³ While the uneven distribution of political resources (Dahl 1998: 177-78, 182) transforms the equality of candidates’ chances into an ideal, the logic here is very simple: prevent the use of public resources that would lead to further inequity of monetary resources.

campaign.

2.4 Aggregation of the preferences

The aggregation of the preferences is the logical conclusion of any elections. The concept of democratic elections requires that the voters' preferences are preserved and faithfully translated into seats for their political representatives. In the understanding of this concept, the aggregation phase takes place mostly after the voters signified their preferences.¹⁴

This dimension is best understood as a three-step process (effectively sub-dimensions). Firstly, voter's preferences must be preserved. Secondly, these voters' preferences must be translated into seats respecting the principle of equal consideration. And finally, winners must be allowed to assume the seats.

Preservation of the preferences sub-dimension should be considered satisfied (score 1, technically clean) in the absence of systematic manipulation with the preferences as signified by the voters. All other cases should be scored 0 (doctored).

Translation of the votes into seats should be judged with the normative requirement of equal consideration in the mind. This sub-dimension is better anchored by its negative pole as democratic theory does not establish an appropriate vote translation formula. However, it is quite clear what constitutes translation of unequal consideration (scored 0) – systematic practices as malapportionment or gerrymandering developed or maintained by a regime

¹⁴ Although prevention of voting by all means influences the result, it mostly infringes on the effective right to vote and is coded as such.

leading to discrimination of specific (groups of) candidates in the electoral competition¹⁵. The absence of such transgressions results in score of 1 (equal consideration).

Finally, the winners must be allowed to *assume the seats* (consequential vote)¹⁶. The elections should be scored 0 (inconsequential vote) when found that lawful winners were prevented from assuming their office.

The coding of all dimensions should be based on both official documents (for example in the case of malapportionment), and the reports of electoral observers (especially for first and third sub-dimensions). It should be carried out throughout the whole electoral process.

To summarize, the dimension of aggregation of preferences in the electoral regimes is composed of three sub-dimensions: preservation of the preferences, translation of the votes into seats and assuming of the seat. The coding rule for the dimension is following: aggregation should be called clean (code 1) only if all sub-dimensions score 1. In all other cases it should be scored 0 (fraudulent).

2.5 Overview of the Model's Dimensions

This chapter has introduced a multi-dimensional concept of elections (summarily presented in the Table 1) and identified its dimensions in which it should be analyzed –

¹⁵ Note that the definition includes also legally clean electoral rules. Eagerness in re-drawing the electoral districts or changing the electoral formula on the side of the regime should be considered suspicious, especially if other relevant players had not been consulted. The systematic effect of such measures resulting in the adverse effect on specific and politically relevant groups has to be documented. Special requirements for the minority groups should be excluded from this assessment, unless it can be proved that they are a tool of manipulation.

¹⁶ This dimension and model *does* not conceptualize the effective power of the elected representatives to execute their prerogatives. Although an important topic investigated by some scholars (O'Donnell 2004), it is out of scope of interest of the 'procedural' conceptualization of electoral regimes (and democracy).

agents of the choice, objects of the choice, and environment of the choice and aggregation. All of the dimensions have been operationalized in a dichotomous manner either by specifying a democratic or manifestly non-democratic pole of the continuum with the provision of the coding rules. The following chapter explains the logical steps from the dimensions of the electoral regime to a typology of elections in non-democracies.

Dimension	Sub-dimensions	Issue at stake	Terminology	
			Democratic pole	Other
A. Agents of the Choice	1. Universal suffrage	Who could vote?	Universal	Restricted
B. Objects of the Choice	2. Open elections	Who could run for the office?	Open	Exclusionary
C. Conditions of the Elections		What were the conditions of the vote?	Free&Fair	[Combination]
	3. Freedom from coercion	Were voters and candidates able to conduct electoral activities without undue pressure or fear of reprisal?	Free	Unfree
	4. Leveled-playing field	Did candidates have roughly equal access to public resources?	Fair	Unfair
D. Aggregation			Clean	Doctored
	5. Preservation of the vote	Were the ballots counted fairly?	Technically clean	Tampered
	6. Translation of the vote	Did the translation formula respect principle of equal consideration?	Equal consideration	Unequal Consideration
	7. Respect for the vote	Were the winners allowed to assume their positions?	Consequential	Inconsequential

Table 1: Dimensions of the electoral regime

3. *Types of Electoral Regimes*

So far, the conceptual part of this work has identified four theoretical dimensions of elections. It operationalized their meaning, and provided coding criteria enabling their measurement. To arrive at the end product of this part – types of election – it has still to establish a rule informing how to recombine the four dimensions, in other words, aggregate them.

Informed by the democratic theory, we know the *sole combination* of the dimensions' scores corresponding with democratic elections. Democratic performance in every dimension is a necessary condition for democratic elections and only the combination of such scores is a sufficient condition for calling elections democratic. In other words, the aggregation rule for the democratic elections stipulates that the dimensions are interactive and non-compensatory.

All other combinations of dimension scores lead to non-democratic elections. The aggregation rule for identifying authoritarian elections is opposite to the previous one: an election should be considered un-democratic, if it fails to meet democratic criteria in at least one of the dimension of electoral regime.

The four dimensions operationalized in a dichotomous matter (democracy/non-democracy) allow for 16 logical combinations, out of which one has been already identified as a democratic election.¹⁷ The remaining 15 major options¹⁸ are types of non-democratic

¹⁷ *Sensu stricto* – there is no reason why an authoritarian regime could not hold election conforming to the requirements on the democracies, especially when conceptualized procedurally. I expect this to be very unlikely situation that should not, nevertheless, be ruled out.

¹⁸ Two of the dimensions are already a logical construct constituted by their sub-dimensions. Again, the same logical relations among the sub-dimensions result in the similar counting. Thus there are 7

elections derived from violations of procedural rules put on the democratic elections. All sixteen types and their configurations are presented in the Table 2 and will be discussed shortly.

		3. Environment			
		Free&Fair(1)		Unfree (0)	
1.Agents		4. Aggregation			
Universal (1)	2.Objects	Clean (1)	Fraudulent (0)	Clean (1)	Fraudulent (0)
	Open (1)	1,1,1,1	1,1,1,0	1,1,0,1	1,1,0,0
	Restricted (0)	1,0,1,1	1,0,1,0	1,0,0,1	1,0,0,0
	2.Objects				
Restricted (0)	Open (1)	0,1,1,1	0,1,1,0	0,1,0,1	0,1,0,0
	Restricted (0)	0,0,1,1	0,0,1,0	0,0,0,1	0,0,0,0

Table 2: Types of elections (configuration)

A brief digression to make a few methodological observations— the model meets the logical requirements put on typology formation: it is both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive with respect to the studied objects (Collier-Laporte-Seawright 2008: 157; Mair 2007:7; Bailey 1994: 3). The mutual exclusivity requirement is met by clear specification of the dimensions that conceptualize related but distinct attributes of electoral regimes. Listing all possible configurations of performance of electoral regimes, whether democratic or undemocratic, the model is also collectively exhaustive. The typology is partially-ordered¹⁹ (Collier- Laporte-Seawright 2008: 156-157) which results in limited comparison among some types. A case violating two dimensions is more manipulative than the case violating just one²⁰ (for example 1,1,1,0 compared with 1,0,0,1).

(2³-1) ways in which regime can violate the aggregation, and 3 ways of manipulating the electoral conditions 3(2²-1). However, I suggest that the 15 main types are exhaustive enough, and the principle of parsimony should rule over here. This does not mean that the way the particular way of manipulation is unimportant.

¹⁹ Configurations 1,1,1,1 (top left) and 0,0,0,0 (bottom right) serving as ideal types

²⁰ This originates from the logic of aggregation put on the democratic elections. If it suffices to manipulate only one dimension of the electoral regime to steal an election than regime that steals more than one is doing an over-work and is more “procedurally authoritarian”. I leave this as an assumption that might be tested elsewhere.

The table should be read in a specific order – the first number assigns a score in the agents sub-dimension, second in the objects sub-dimension, third in environments sub-dimensions, and the last number is the score of case in the dimension of aggregation. Clearly identifiable endpoints are democracy (1,1,1,1) in the top left corner and completely flawed elections (0,0,0,0) in the bottom right corner.

The greater part of the identified types has no established terms (marked by “?” in the table 3), most likely because there is no procedural theory of non-democratic elections, or non-democratic regimes, and shall not be discussed here further.²¹ Names for electoral regimes performing undemocratically in just one dimension can be constructed as diminished types of democratic electoral regime.²² Elections identified by this strategy are presented in the Table 3.

		3. Environment			
		Free&Fair(1)		Unfree (0)	
1.Objects		4. Aggregation			
Universal (1)	2.Subjects	Clean (1)	Fraudulent (0)	Clean (1)	Fraudulent (0)
	Open (1)	1,1,1,1	1,1,1,0	1,1,0,1	1,1,0,0
		Democratic	Rigged	Unfair	“Formal”
	Restricted (0)	1,0,1,1	1,0,1,0	1,0,0,1	1,0,0,0
		Restricted	?	?	?
	2.Objects				
Restricted (0)	Open (1)	0,1,1,1	0,1,1,0	0,1,0,1	0,1,0,0
		Exclusionary	?	?	?
	Restricted (0)	0,0,1,1	0,0,1,0	0,0,0,1	0,0,0,0
		Selection	?	?	Ideal type

Table 3: Types of elections (recognized types)

²¹ For a similar observation see Morlino 2008.

²² While their names include democracy, it serves as just an identifier of the root concept that becomes qualified by the adjective that exactly points describes why the case is not a democracy! (Collier-Levitsky 1997, 2009) I suggest using the diminished type strategy only with one missing attribute. More missing attributes would lead to greater problems with aggregation and conceptual confusion as it is not clear that why the democracy should be used as a root concept (see also Bogaards 2009).

Rigged elections (1,1,1,0) represent elections that conform to all requirements, but manipulate the aggregation. *Unfair elections* (1,1,0,1), contrary, conform with the aggregation criteria, but the conditions in which the campaign takes place violates the fair play to such degree that it makes the exercise undemocratic²³. Failing to meet the criteria of universality, an *exclusionary*²⁴ (0,1,1,1) election type is identified. I also identify the case of *restricted elections* (1,0,1,1) systematically preventing candidates from contesting the election.

I also propose two more labels outside the diminished types strategy. I suggest that the configuration combining universal right to vote and stand for a vote with unfair conditions and manipulative aggregation (1,1,0,0) should be called “*formal elections*”. Finally, configuration restricting both universal right to stand and vote, but allowing fair campaign conditions and aggregation (0,0,1,1) should be called “*selection*”.

On a final note, the application of the framework on the real-life cases might show that some of the configurations have no empirical referents.²⁵ I suspect that this might be the case for most of the unlabeled types who should manipulate elections in two or three dimensions. While not a priori impossible, an election characterized by full effective universal suffrage with few candidates who compete under unfair conditions that in the end disrespects voters preferences looks quite unlikely.

²³ Both rigged and unfair elections are generic terms that can be narrowed by specifying the manipulated sub-dimension.

²⁴ See Remmer (1985) on exclusionary democracy and Dahl (1971:33-40) discussing competitive oligarchies.

²⁵ However, reader should bear in mind that case selection would be of an utmost importance here. Historical cases of exclusionary and fraudulent elections (see Zittman 2009) perhaps might not have empirical counterparts in today’s world, but that does not make it a meaningless type. This way the electoral manipulation can be assessed in the evolutionary perspective.

The only way to test the meaningfulness of the presented typology is to put it through a test. This is will be done in the following part of the thesis that opens with discussion on its research design, continues with the empirical studies themselves and finally provides a brief comparison of the cases.

Part II: Application of the Framework

1. *Research Design*

In the previous section, I presented an analytical framework for electoral regimes, which lead to creating of a typology of elections in non-democracies. The typology was produced with the hope that it would allow for more precise and conceptually sound classification, and in turn, more meaningful comparison of elections in non-democratic regimes. To see whether the developed framework is a meaningful analytical tool, I apply it to four recent elections in non-democratic countries: Singapore (2006) and Uganda (2006), Peru (2000) and Venezuela (2006). This chapter explains the research design of the study, mostly its qualitative character and case selection.

The research design is in part driven by the unavailability of the appropriate data required by the model that had to be generated (see table 4). Due to time constraints and the complexity of the task, the comparative analysis takes a form of a qualitative small-n study the main tool being the developed typology. Although such research design cannot result in any major generalizations, it evaluates whether the presented typological is a useful analytical tool. In addition, the selection of the cases allows for a limited testing of type of manipulation within and across two regime types (see further).

Some of the data required by the model, especially those measuring competitiveness and freedoms from coercion correspond well with the established concepts in the field, and multiple data-sources that could be used. Most of the remaining data (preservation of the vote, freedom from coercion, leveled-playing field) is measured directly or could be recombined from the Data on International Electoral Monitoring project at the Duke

University. However, the project data is not available for public use, and will be released only in 2010 (DIEM 2009).

Finally, there is no data available for three (sub-) dimensions as conceptualized—effective franchise, translation of the vote and assumption of the seats. The most sophisticated measure of suffrage I am aware of comes from Paxton et al. (2003), but as it suffers from serious conceptual and measurement problems, it is ill-equipped for the task.²⁶ Perhaps stemming from the inconclusive normative discussion on the electoral systems and districting, there is no overall measure for the equality of the vote translation. Even when scholars recognize the salience of the issue and collect the data on malapportionment (Samuels-Snyder 2001), unfair districting practices such as gerrymandering have not yet been reported summarily in the datasets. Lastly, there is no summary source that reports whether elects were allowed to assume their positions.

²⁶ It measures legal franchise reduced by reported restrictions. In cases where the degree of exclusion cannot be calculated from available data, it adopts dummy penalties ranging from 0.25 to 1 percent without any justifications (Paxton et al. 2003:95, 113-117). For the complexity of measuring suffrage see Munck 2009: 41-44.

Dimension	Sub-dimensions	Best readily available data source	Commentary
A. Agents of the Choice	1. Universal suffrage	Paxton et al.	Measures only formal restrictions of the suffrage, poor conceptual fit
B. Objects of the Choice	2. Open elections	DIEM r03r, Polity IV Parcomp	Good conceptual fit for r03r, partial for Parcomp
C. Conditions of the Elections			
	3. Freedom from coercion	DIEM <i>r112r</i> , <i>r114r</i>	Combination of r112r and r114r would render conceptual fit
	4. Leveled-playing field	DIEM r111r	Good conceptual fit, save for the abuse of the media coded by DIEM separately in <i>r113r Media</i>
D. Aggregation			
	5. Freedom from coercion	DIEM <i>r112r</i> , <i>r114r</i>	Combination of r112r and r114r would render conceptual fit
	6. Leveled-playing field	DIEM r111r	Good conceptual fit, save for the abuse of the media coded by DIEM separately in <i>r113r Media</i>
	7. Respect for the result	?	No indicator available

Table 4: Model Data Availability, data: DIEM 2009, Marshall-Jagers 2009, Bollen-Paxton (2007)

However, information on these phenomena is available from the secondary sources, such as reports from the international electoral observers. This allows the qualitative treatment; the original data was coded according the rules established in the conceptual part of the model (Part I, Chapter 2). All data was coded by the author of this thesis, a substandard method resulting from time and format constraints. Nevertheless, referencing of the sources, the publication of the coding as well as aggregation rules, and the availability of the disaggregate data allow for replicability and verification of this process (Munck 2009: 27-28; King-Keohane-Verba 1994:26).

Case selection, was driven by two main factors: availability of the electoral observers'

reports²⁷ and the intent to study elections with multiple candidates.²⁸ Furthermore, the cases from two types of non-democracies had been selected – Peru and Venezuela representing the competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky-Way 2004, 2009), and Singapore and Uganda as electoral authoritarian regimes (Schedler 2006:3; Clark 2006: 137). The described case selection allows for double comparison – to see whether the regimes of the same category manipulate elections in the same way, and whether regimes of different types manipulate elections in different ways.

Cases selected are summarized in the table 5, and should be considered as quite stable at the time of elections – Peruvian president Fujimori had been in power for 10 years and Hugo Chavez for eight years. Authoritarian tradition was even longer entrenched in Uganda and Singapore – Museveni was effectively in power for 20 years in Uganda and People’s Action Party for over 40 years in Singapore at the time. Peru and Uganda were at the time still struggling with low-intensity domestic terrorism, but the governments had effective power in all cases.

Uganda and Peru held the legislative and executive elections at the same time. In both cases, *only the executive elections* are classified – a decision driven by the pre-dominance of the executive in the institutional setting of the countries, and subsequent availability of the data. Even when unclassified, such elections had been used as unit of observation providing relevant information on dimension of environment.²⁹

²⁷ One of the case studies lacks first-hand account of the elections Singapore. However, it is based on two pre-electoral assessment studies, and good number of the secondary literature. The reports are used as the information source – the methodology of the cases assessment is the one presented here.

²⁸ This in a way consciously puts the typology through harder test – as it willingly opts for “no-variance” in one of its dimensions.

²⁹ Similar to my reasoning to the nature of the campaign for voters and candidates, I stipulate that the synchronously running campaigns cannot be meaningfully coded separately, especially if they are contested by the same actors.

Country	Year	FH Scores (PR, CL)	Population (in mil.)	Regime type	Election Type	Electoral System	Previously held elections
Singapore	2006	5;4	4,49	Electoral Authoritarianism	Legislative	Party bloc vote, FPTP	1996, 2001
Uganda	2006	5;4	28,2	Electoral Authoritarianism	Legislative, Executive	FPTP	1996, 2001
Peru	2000	5;4	27	Competitive Authoritarianism	Legislative, Executive	Majority run-off	1990, 1995
Venezuela	2006	4;4	25,73	Competitive Authoritarianism	Executive	FPTP	1998,2000, 2004*

Table 5: Cases Overview; based on CIA Factbook 2000, 2006; IFES Election Guide 2009a, Freedom House 2009

In this chapter, I have established the research design of the empirical part of the thesis. The small-n qualitative research design is driven by the unavailability of the appropriate data, and the complexity of the task at hand. Cases of elections were selected based on by the data availability and the intent to survey elections that allowed for free candidatures.

The next four chapters discuss the elections in Singapore (2006), Uganda (2006), Peru (2000) and Venezuela (2006). They follow the same structure – first they introduce the country and general situation, then they proceed with detailed discussion of the dimensions and sub-dimensions of the electoral regime. They conclude by providing a classification of the electoral regime. After these chapters, the cases will be discussed and compared before presented the findings at the end of the thesis.

2. Singapore³⁰

Singapore is small a multi-ethnic island state in Southeast Asia of 5 million citizens known for its phenomenal economic development, ban on chewing gums, and, most disconcerting, the lack of democracy. In more than 40 years of its independence, Singapore has known only three prime ministers³¹, all coming from the People's Action Party (PAP).

Among the non-democracies, Singapore is a rare case of receptive, generally not repressive and effectively-run state where citizens enjoy one of the highest living standards in the world. Singaporean politics is, unlike in many other non-democratic countries, uneventful, predictable and dull, electoral season being the notable times when opposition competes with the government.

Yet, an observer should not expect too much democracy. James Chin rightly notes that elections in Singapore do not lead to alternative governments and are “best understood as a referendum on the governmental performance... [where] voters know that the PAP will be returned to power” (Chin 2007: 706).

The electoral manipulation à la Singapore will be examined by the case of the 11th General Elections of 2006 (GE). These were considered important for two reasons– it was the first election in 15 years that could have resulted in the alternative government³² and the

³⁰ This chapter draws upon and updates the author's undergraduate thesis, *Political Regime of Singapore*, defended in early 2007.

³¹ Lee Kwan Yew (1959-1990), Goh Chok Tong (1990-2004) and Lee Hsien Loong (2004-) who is a son of Lee Kwan Yew.

³² Opposition in three previous GE consciously contested less than half of the seats. This should have allowed citizen enjoy the certitude of the PAP rule combined with increased oppositional presence.

first election for Lee Hsien Loong as the prime minister.³³

2.1 Agents of the choice

Voting in Singapore is universal and compulsory, explaining the high 95 percent turnout rates (IDEA 2009). Failure to take part in the elections results in a small financial sanction and a voter's removal from the electoral registry (Hwee 2002: 210). The register of the voters is available to the parties, and as of 2006 no political actor has complained about its accuracy. No direct actions preventing voters from exercising their voting rights were reported, and thus the requirement of the dimension has to be considered satisfied (score 1).

2.2. Objects of the choice

The legal requirements set for the candidates for Member of Parliament (MP) positions are generally inclusive.³⁴ The same can be said of political parties which total around 20. At the same time the Constitution defines grounds for the limitation of passive voting right, an option used by the regime from time to time. Singapore has seen cases of oppositional politicians fined, bankrupted, stripped of their mandate³⁵ and prevented from running in next elections.

The regime uses legal provisions originating from the British colonial rule (Mauzy-Milne 2002: 127) to achieve this goal. The first step in the procedure is the use of libel and innuendo suits filed by the PAP against an opposition politician (Mauzy-Milne 2002:134).

³³ Lee Hsien Loong became a prime minister in 2004 in the long planned leadership change. He held previously important ministerial positions in the administration.

³⁴ This cannot be said of the requirements for the presidential candidates. Both in 1999 and 2005 they were, according to the Electoral Commission, met by only one candidate who was subsequently declared a president. See also Rodan 2006: 183.

³⁵ The disqualification provisions and have been used to strip J.B.Jayeretnam from his mandate after being re-elected in 1984 (Musalib 2004: 143).

The judiciary then finds her guilty and fines her just enough to be ineligible to stand for elections.³⁶ This is a warning shot from the regime. In the case where the politician continues in adversarial behavior, especially if she is a leading politician, he might find himself bankrupted, again with the help of compliant judiciary and libel laws (BTI 2006a: 6).

Most recently, such provisions had been invoked against the leader of Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) Chee Soon Juan. Failing to pay half a million Singaporean dollars in rewards to Minister Mentor, Lee Kuan Yew and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong for the campaign remarks he made in 2001 GE campaign, Chee found himself bankrupt in 2006, and unfit to stand for election (ARDA 2006: 27).

It seems that the regime's aim is not to prevent the opposition from contesting the elections, but to intimidate them. A high profile opposition figure bankrupted then serves as a referential case for the regime. Despite the above stated the 44 non-PAP candidates have contested the 2006 election, and regime should be considered as generally respecting the requirement of open elections (score 1).

2.3 Environment

The environment of the elections in Singapore is both unfree and unfair. The opposition is prevented from effective campaigning out of the short electoral season, the media from informing. In addition, the government abuses its control over the public resources and reduces the demand for opposition by creating alternative channels of interest representation.

³⁶ Anyone convicted and sentenced by the court for more than one year, or fined no less than SG \$ 2000 (approx.€1000) is according to the Constitution disqualified from standing in election for five years (Kurian 2007:24).

2.3.1 Freedom

The electoral campaigns' freedom is severely restricted by limiting and criminalizing preconditions for campaigning proper such as freedom of speech and assembly. In a nutshell, the regime tries to control communication channels of the opposition both in direct meetings and by denying access to media.

Holding an outdoor public political meeting is subject to the authorization by a police unit; which constitutes a lengthy, three to four weeks procedure. Such requests from the side of opposition often result in rejection on the grounds that they could turn "inflammatory and lead to law and order problems."³⁷ The degree of the control over the freedom of expression is well illustrated by denying speaking permits even to elected opposition MPs in their own constituencies (Gomez 2006: 108-110).

The state effectively controls domestic media by means of ownership and control over the licensing procedures (Case 2005: 218). Media are considered generally free and competent with the exception of domestic politics where journalists report self-censorship (George 2005: 11-16). Critical international media, among others International Herald Tribune, Wall Street Journal, and Far Eastern Economic Review have been tamed by a series of regulatory procedures limiting their circulation in the country and heavy financial losses resulting from the lost libel and defamation suits (Rodan 2000: 219-222).

In this subsection, I argued that due to the heavy-handed prevention of basic liberal rights such as freedom of speech, assembly and press, the environment of Singaporean

³⁷ References to maintaining public and security in the multi-ethnic society are one of the regime's mantras. Singapore has not seen any large-scale ethnically or religiously motivated violence in past 40 years. Yet, the regime invokes the formulas that applied to tumultuous times of 1960s threatened by communist insurgency and endemic poverty (see Turnbull 1977: 257-297).

elections has to be considered unfree (score 0). This has been demonstrated in the cases of candidates, activists, domestic and international media. The following subsection establishes why the electoral environment is not fair.

2.3.2 Leveled playing field

National Democratic Institute reported in 2001 that “the electoral playing field is tilted decisively in its [government’s] favor” (NDI 2001: 11). Such a statement was still valid in 2006 as this brief subchapter will show. Two broad areas of “leveling” will be discussed – tweaking of the electoral institutions, and the abuse of the control of the economy.

The regime tweaks electoral institutions in two major ways – it reduces the demand for the opposition by creating alternative channels of the representation and radical time limitations of the campaigning periods.

First, Singapore creatively alters the electoral environment³⁸ and political competition by guaranteeing representation of the opposition in the legislature under the scheme of Non-Constituency Member of the Parliament (NCMP) and Nominated Member of the Parliament (NMP). The NCMP posts have been offered from 1984 to the three to six best performing candidates of the opposition who fail to win their constituency in the elections, provided that the opposition as bloc wins less than the specified number of seats (3 in 2006). The number of the NCMPs seats is reduced by every oppositional mandate won.

The NMP scheme introduced in 1991 is a quasi-corporatist mechanism co-opting

³⁸ While this mechanism has also impact in the aggregation dimension, it is most effective in creating unleveled playing field. The political resource of being a non-PAP is diminished in value by guaranteeing second-class mandates.

interest groups' representatives (Rodan 1996: 103). The participation of up to nine NMPs should have provided, according to former prime-minister Goh, "a more consensual style of governing where alternative opinions get listened to and constructive criticism accepted" (*Straits Times*, 30.11.1988 in Mutalib 2004: 329). Even if NMPs and NCMPs do not have the full voting powers their guaranteed presence in the parliament most likely alters the demand for the elected opposition, and alters the playing field. The timing of the introduction of the schemes suggests that they were introduced and serve to pre-empt demand for the "genuine opposition" (Kurian 2007: 35-38).

The regime's second major interference with the elections is the length of the campaign. Although often times omitted from analysis of campaigns, it is important factor in Singapore as it is the only period during which the opposition is unhampered in promoting its positions, and receives permits for its meetings (Gomez 2006: 109-110).

While electoral campaigns can last anywhere from 9 days up to 8 weeks, since 1972 campaigns average 10 days.³⁹ The GE in 2001 and 2006 had the shortest campaign period possible – just nine days (Kurian 2007: 34). This creates a very tight schedule, especially for the opposition parties who might not have insider information about the early dissolution of the legislature. For example, electoral districts are known only with the announcement of the elections, leaving opposition parties that have no part in the proceedings of the district delimitation with a serious disadvantage in campaign organization and candidate recruitment. To demonstrate the lightning pace of the proceedings – the 10th Parliament was dissolved on 20 April 2006, parties had to have their candidatures ready by the Nomination Day seven days later, and the actual voting took place nine days after the Parliament was dissolved (May

³⁹ This corresponds with period when regime consolidated.

6, 2006).

The second strategy leading to unlevelled playing field rests on the usage of sophisticated mixture of economic sticks and carrots. Some of the carrots are untargeted. For example, the “progress package” distributed to the citizen by the government before the elections totaled SG\$2.6 billion, and included cashable “growth dividends” ranging between SG\$200 and SG\$800 per household (Chin 2007: 704).

Some of the carrots are targeted, and work as a simple pork-barrel tit-for-tat game. Districts voting for the government are promised upgrades of the public services and the housing units.⁴⁰ The 2006 electoral campaign saw the former prime minister Goh promising two oppositional districts upgrades worth SG\$180 million if they return PAP candidates (Chin 2007: 704-705). Districts voting for the opposition are effectively denied upgrades. With no secrets about this policy, Goh warned in 1997:

[If] You vote for the other side that means you reject the programs of the PAP candidate... If you reject it, we respect your choice. Then you'll be left behind, then in 20, 30 years' time, the whole of Singapore will be bustling away, and your estate through your own choice will be left behind. They [sic] become slums. That's my message.

(Da Cunha *passim* Lawson 2001:80)

In addition to not receiving carrots, there are sticks attached with voting for the opposition⁴¹ – opposition candidates cannot use part of the previously accumulated funds for the constituency development (Hwee 2002:221, Mauzy-Milne 2002: 146). All of the money used for the housing upgrades or constituency development is public. There is no good reason

⁴⁰ Approximately 75 per cent of the voters live in the long-term rented flats owned by the government.

⁴¹ Considerable concerns have been voiced on the vote secrecy. Singaporean ballots and the counterfoils from which they are torn are serially numbered. Voter's registration number marked on the counterfoil leads to opportunity of back-tracking the vote (ARDA 2006:11). Although back-tracking was not reported, even the possibility of such action is problematic, as it can lead to intimidation.

why a ruling party should enjoy discretionary access to public funds and use it in the clearly manipulative way in the electoral campaign.

To summarize – conditions of the 2006 electoral campaign must be considered both unfree due to restrictions on the freedoms of speech and association, as well as unfair (score 0) due to manipulations of electoral institutions and abuse of the public resources.

2.4 Aggregation

Singaporean GE of 2006 were technically clean, and candidates assumed their seats, but they failed to translate political preferences with equal consideration. This is largely the effect of the electoral system with one of the strongest majoritarian effects – party block vote. This model applies the logic of the first-past-the-post systems in multi-member constituencies.

Out of 84 elected seats of the 11th Parliament, 75 seats were distributed by the block vote – in nine districts of the 5-mandates magnitude, and five districts of the 6-mandates magnitude. The remaining seats were single-mandate constituencies. The mechanical effect of the electoral system was the following – PAP won 95.45 (42/44) of the contested seats ⁴² with 66.6 percent share of the votes (Kurian 2007: 35, 56). Although this calculation might be slightly skewed due to aggregation from districts to national level – the point made here should be clear – the electoral system in use translates voters' preferences into mandates highly disproportionately.

Second, there are good reasons to believe that the regime practices gerrymandering.

⁴² Opposition did not contest 38 seats, and PAP candidates 'walked-over' on the nomination day (Kurian 2007: 56)

Indeed the introduction of the bloc vote itself in the 1980s and subsequent increasing of their magnitude can be treated as a “packing” type of gerrymandering. In a recent article, Joel S. Fetzer provides convincing statistical evidence for the claim, and finding that the “system...does appear to have been partly designed to disadvantage the opposition by the abolishing its strongest districts (Fetzer 2008:142).

2.5 Summary

The electoral regime of Singapore allows for open elections (objects score 1). Voters are free to cast their ballots (agents score 1), although the secrecy of their vote might be in doubt. Furthermore, they cast their votes knowing that returning opposition candidate might lead to suspension of economic benefits in their districts, in a clear abuse of the public money. Some opposition candidates are intimidated by the threats of lawsuits and bankruptcies. The opposition and the citizenry are denied basic political freedoms necessary for effective campaigning. Such condition must be considered both unfree (score 0) and unfair (0). Finally, the electoral formula is obviously manipulated to the benefit of the ruling party and is detrimental to the requirements of equal consideration with opposition earning only less than five percent of seats while earning a third of the votes (score 0).

Dimension	Sub-dimensions	Score (Quant/Qual)	
A. Agents of the Choice	1. Universal suffrage	1	Universal
B. Objects of the Choice	1. Open elections	1	Open
C. Conditions of the Elections		0	Unfree&Unfair
	1. Freedom from coercion	0	Unfree
	2. Leveled-playing field	0	Unfair
D. Aggregation		0	Doctored
	1. Preservation of the vote	1	Clean
	2. Equality of the vote	0	Unequal
	3. Respect for the result	1	Consequential

Table 6: Singapore 2006: Classification

3. *Uganda*

Uganda is a country of approximate 30 million people in the East Africa. A former British colony gaining its independence in 1963 had arguable one of the most turbulent transformations with the military coup being the most common mode of power-transition. It has been a way of seizing power for infamous Idi Amin in 1971, Milton Obote in 1980, and most recently for Yoweri Museveni in 1985.

Museveni has been in power ever since and under his leadership Uganda had undergone a considerable economic development, reduced its poverty and HIV infection rates. It is one of the ‘pet projects’ of international donors who finance more than half of the governmental expenditures (BTI 2006b:20). The government has been less successful in solving the armed insurgency in the northern parts of the country. From the late 1980s the conflict waged by Lord’s Resistance Army tolled more than 12.000 casualties, and displaced more than 2 million (out of 30 million) from their homes (IRIN 2008).

The 2006 presidential elections had been only the third since 1985 when Museveni assumed the power. For the first ten years, the regime did not hold the elections for the chief executive position and when it finally did in 1996 and 2001, they took place under the so-called “movement system” (see subchapter 3.3.2). Both of the races were easily won⁴³ by Museveni, although the 2001 elections have seen bitter and violent competition (Gloppen et al. 2006: 4, also referred to as CMI report). The 2006 Ugandan presidential election is

⁴³ 1996 Museveni won with 75 percent of the vote, 2001 with 70 percent of the vote (African Elections Database 2006)

characterized by two features- it witnessed the abolishment of the “movement system” (Commonwealth 2006:11) and were essentially a re-match of the 2001 contest.

This case study analyzes the presidential election, although legislative elections took place at the same time. This decision was driven by the data availability⁴⁴ and the arguably bigger importance of the presidential office in the Ugandan presidential system (BTI 2006b: 16). Nevertheless, the actions of political actors or campaign environment cannot be meaningfully attributed to just one of the campaigns and from time to time this work will draw on the observations of the parliamentary election.

3.1 Agents of the choice

Active voting rights in Uganda are universal and voluntary. Citizens willing to vote in 2006 presidential elections had to sign up with the new voting register as the government decided to scrap the old one after the 2005 referendum (Gloppen et al. 2006: 14). Three points need to be mentioned with regard to the effective voting rights – first, some parts of the population have been prevented from registering; second; the register was of a dubious integrity; and third, some voters have not been properly informed about being moved to different voting districts.

Although the registration of the voters is a legal duty, compliance with the provision is not enforced. Under these circumstances large numbers of opposition supporters had not registered, and decided to do so only upon news of 2001 presidential candidate Kizza Besigye return from self-imposed exile. This left them with only four days to register (EU 2006a: 20), as the regime was unwilling to substantially prolong the registration period,

⁴⁴ As was the case with the other ‘parallel’ elections in this study, it would be wise to study both of the elections in detail to see whether regimes used different strategies in them.

granting only two extra days (Gloppen et al. 2006: 14-15).

Second, the integrity of the register was also disputed. Some 150 to 300 thousand voters (approximately one to three per cent of total voters) had been removed from the register without being notified or able to challenge the decision. Observers suggest that this did not provide an advantage to any party or candidate (EU 2006a: 20, Commonwealth 2006: 37).

Finally, some of the voters have been moved to newly-created voting districts without being properly notified about the new location. On Election Day, even if they found out that they could not vote at particular polling station, they had to search around until they found the one where they could vote. There are no data or estimates available informing about the number of affected voters (Commonwealth 2006: 37).

Despite the above-mentioned problem, the suffrage should be considered as effective (1). Given the type of election and electoral system under consideration, problems noted should be considered of low-intensity, and most likely unsystematic.

3.2 Objects of the choice

The presidential candidates in Uganda must be citizens by birth, between the ages of 35-75, and fulfill the requirements put on the parliamentary candidates (Uganda 1995: art. 102). The inclusive system becomes severely restrictive by adopting the education census/clause: all candidates are required to have completed the Advanced Level (equivalent of *Abitur*, or high school leaving exam). In country where only 15 per cent of the children attended high schools between 1994 and 2006 (EU 2006a:10, n.9) this requirement should be clearly

considered a violation of the normative principle of inclusiveness.

Although the presidential elections have seen six different candidates running, the nomination was hardly a formal procedure for Kizza Besigye, the main candidate of the oppositional and the 2001 election runner-up. Besigye, a long-time acquaintance of President Museveni, used to be to his personal doctor during in the Obote Campaign, and held an important position in the regime's administration before he defected and decided to run for the presidency in 2001. Losing the elections, he went for a self-imposed exile in the South Africa, only returning to Uganda to stand in the 2006 elections. However, shortly after he returned with the intention to run, a mixture of judicial and administrative harassment had been invoked to prevent him from running (EU 2006a: 8).

Besigye was arrested and accused of treason, rape, terrorism and illegal possession of weapons in civilian and military courts (Africa Confidential 2006: 1). The trial and detention was not only detrimental to the public image of Besigye, but it could have legally prevented him from being a candidate.

Candidates have normally to hand in their nominations in person, something Besigye being held in prison, would fail to do. However, the main electoral body ruled that *in absentio* candidature would be permissible, effectively allowing Besigye to stand for election (Gloppen et al. 2006: 17-18). This was much to the dislike of Attorney General (Minister of Justice) who previously argued that Besigye was not of the "same level of the innocence" as the other candidates due to pending charges, and who accused the main electoral body of the

constitutional breach ⁴⁵ of not respecting his advice (Gloppen et al. 2006: 17).

The judicial proceedings have seen a heavy involvement of the military parading around the courthouses and judges stepping down from the cases citing external pressures, as well as military courts ignoring the decision of the civilian ones (EU 2006a: 13). Finally, Besigye was acquitted from most of the charges and the treason charge was discontinued after the elections and never closed, leading to speculations that it might be invoked at another time (VOA 2009).

Second, the candidature of the incumbent president Museveni deserves some attention. Technically, the candidature of the president was permissible as the 2005 Constitutional Amendments lifted the ban on the presidential terms. However, Museveni had been in power for twenty years at that moment and if counted in 5-year terms, he would be running for his fifth (Gloppen et al. 2006: 11). In the absence of the normative agreement on the term limits, this should be considered a demonstration of Museveni's desire to stay in power, rather than an authoritarian feature of the electoral regime.

As the Ugandan 2006 presidential elections saw multiple candidacies on different platforms, the regime scores 1 (open) in this dimensions. However, the constraints put on the oppositional candidate must be taken into account, and will be scored in the "leveled playing field" sub-dimension.

⁴⁵ Rulings of the electoral body and courts on Besigye were seen as test of their independence. The CMI Report suggests that President Museveni personally intervened with the members of the electoral body to prevent Besigye's nomination (Gloppen et al. 2006: 18). The partial autonomy of the judiciary and electoral body could be seen as the presence of the arenas of contestation in the understanding of Way and Levitsky (2002: 54-60).

3.3 Environment

3.3.1 Freedom

The dimension of the campaign environment assesses the freedom to campaign, and whether candidates competed at the leveled-playing field. The case of Ugandan 2006 presidential elections has been found lacking in both dimensions. The freedom to campaign was severely restricted for the opposition candidate Kizza Besigye. In the words of the Commonwealth Report (2006: 21):

Generally, four presidential candidates were able to conduct their campaigns without hindrances, while Besigye spend the first weeks of the campaign period in jail, and, later was forced to divide his time between court hearings and campaigns. This affected his ability to campaign effectively throughout the country – and consistently portrayed him in a negative light in the news media; as an HIV-positive rapist and adulterer, as a traitor and terrorist, and as a forger of school certificates.

All sources agree the 2006 presidential election have been less violent than the previous one (EU 2006a: 3, Commonwealth 2006: 26, Gloppen et al. 2006: 22). It is not clear whether they should be considered peaceful or free. Quite contrarily, the evidence suggests that opposition candidates and their supporters had been at times physically attacked as well as harassed by judiciary through being charged with criminal offences⁴⁶.

Commonwealth observers noted: “...the widespread use of intimidation and harassment tactics by the security forces and some armed NRM-O supporters against the opposition ...” (Commonwealth 2006: 27). Most of the reported violence was low-profile, the prominent cases being shooting at a crowd or ramming an opposition crowd with

⁴⁶ This relates mostly to the legislative elections but demonstrates well the overall atmosphere of the elections. Two opposition candidates had been accused of crimes that were later dismissed by the judge suggesting that the evidence was a ‘crude and amateur attempt at creative work’ (HRW 2006: 13). Regime also used sedition laws against the opposition member who called a president a liar failing to fulfill a promise he gave earlier. Released on bail, the candidate had to report every-day at the police station (HRW 2006: 13-14).

a truck. However, the fact that incidents involved military and security forces combined with the failure or unwillingness to investigate these cases is worrisome (Gloppen et al. 2006: 22, HRW 2006:17-18), and has led to the general perception of their impunity. Interestingly enough, the president's meetings were never disturbed by the presence of the security forces (Makara 2006: 68).

Museveni's regime was more crude in dealing with journalists than with the high level politicians. Domestically, the regime at the time regulated the profession. With respect to international media it claimed they had become "a security threat" (HRW: 21) and prevented some from entering the country (EU 2006a: 30). From time to time the executive also arrested journalists and threatened the prosecution on grounds of libel and security reasons leading to "keenly felt control" in the media (US Dept. 2006, 2007a, BTI 2006b: 7). The practice of self-censorship had also been said to be widespread among the journalists (US Dept. 2006, 2007a).

Taken altogether, the electoral regime has to be considered un-free (score 0). The regime has at times prevented politicians from campaigning; Besigye was effectively barred from a third of the campaign. The regime contributed to the atmosphere of impunity by failing to investigate the violence. By the harassment and prosecution of journalists it made it clear that political dissent is not welcome.

3.3.2 Leveled-playing field

The requirement of the leveled playing field was among the most visibly violated ones in the 2006 presidential campaign – a point emphasized in the observers' reports (Commonwealth 2006: 23, EU 2006a 1, 5-6). The striking inequality will be illustrated on two instances – timing of the elections and the abuse of the state resources.

As mentioned in the introduction, the elections were taking place at a time of political transition into a multi-party system. The previous “national movement” political system had been effectively a single-party state,⁴⁷ allowing multiple candidacies that could not be supported by the political parties. The National Resistance Movement (NRM), chaired by Museveni, was the single party penetrating the state⁴⁸, and all citizens were considered to be its members. Although the movement-system has been abandoned⁴⁹ after 2005, the NRM has never been fundamentally separated from the state, and has remained state-financed until the elections, unlike the other parties who received almost no public funding (Makara-Rakner-Svåsand 2009: 187).

The elections were considered to be rushed by the international observers, especially in the light of the transition to multi-party politics (Gloppen et al. 2006: 12). The campaign period lasted only 61 days, after the elections were rescheduled to take place one month earlier (Commonwealth 2006: 23, EU 2006a: 5). This significantly influenced the campaigning options for the emerging parties who had not yet developed internal structures⁵⁰.

According to all observers’ reports available to this researcher, the president has abused

⁴⁷ Makara notes that although the constitution explicitly prohibited one-party state structure, regime has been indeed acting as a one party state (Makara 2006: 63). For the more extensive discussion of the of the ‘movement system’ see Makara-Rakner-Svåsand(2009: 187-189) and Carbone (2005: 3-5).

⁴⁸ The party tiered-structure is very close to the structure of the movement political system. See Kania 2005.

⁴⁹ It has been argued that Museveni facing the factions within NRM decided for the transition to multi-party democracy as a house-cleaning exercise. This should allow him to consolidate to identify the defectors he would later defeat in the elections (Makara-Rakner-Svåsand 2009: 189-193).

⁵⁰ This most likely influenced the parliamentary elections than the presidential ones that require higher degree of sustained effort and coordination. Also, the reader is advised to take into account that both presidential and parliamentary elections were taking place at the same time, understandably a heavy task for just emerging parties. Although most likely benefiting the incumbent and his Movement with developed structure, this most likely should not be judged as an attempt to create an unlevelled field.

the state resources in the campaign (Commonwealth 2006: 25, EU 2006a:24-25, Gloppen et al. 2006:24). This was largely due to Museveni's "transformation" of the National Resistance Movement into his political vehicle National Resistance Movement-Organization. The party also continued using the resources of the original movement in the campaign, despite them being a state-property (EU 2006a: 24). There was also an evident overlap of the campaign and original movement staff; plus the campaign operated from the same buildings.

Such "transformation" led to confusion about two Movements – a poll commissioned by the U.S.-based National Republic Institute found that most voters had problems distinguishing between Movement as the form of government, as the party and as the state-sponsored organizations (EU 2006a:19). Commonwealth mission reports that "government pronouncements were routinely made at NRM-O rallies, mixing the NRM-O platforms and manifesto with government affairs in a way that was indistinguishable from bribery" (Commonwealth 2006: 26).⁵¹

The spending on the presidential campaign might be illustrative – the NRM-O disclosed spending of 50 billion shillings compared to 740 million spent by Besigye (Makara-Rakner-Svåsand 2009: 187). Even with the latter figure, reduced to 10 billion would still outspend the oppositional candidate more than 13.5 times (Makara 2006: 79-80). The reader should take into account that the benefit of having ready access to the NRM infrastructure is not included in the calculation, but doubtlessly significantly contributed to the NRM-O campaign success.

Even the regime insiders acknowledged the uphill battle for the opposition. Minister Okello was cited by newspaper *New Vision* predicting: "There is no way Museveni is going

⁵¹ Similarly, President also abused his competencies ordering authorities to stop collecting taxes or evictions of forest encroachers (Gloppen et al. 2006: 24).

to lose the elections. Not with all the government machinery at his disposal. I am in government and I know what I am talking about.” (*passim* HRW 2006: 19, n.77)

By all means, the playing field in the 2006 presidential elections cannot be considered fair. The timing of the elections did not provide enough time for the emerging parties to prepare, and the ruling party abused the state resources in various forms (infrastructure, money, human resources and media) to its advantage. The playing field must be thus considered skewed with score 0.

3.4 Aggregation

Lastly the dimension of aggregation is assessed in three sub-dimensions – count and tallying proper, translation of votes into mandates (electoral formula) and assuming of the positions by elects.

The 2006 presidential election in Uganda was using a majority run-off system providing for a second round should the winner of the first earn less than 50 per cent of valid votes (Uganda 1995: art. 103-5). This often practiced electoral formula can be considered confirming with the requirement of equal consideration. Similarly, the sub-dimension of assuming the seats was non-problematic as president Museveni has been inaugurated for his 3rd term under 1995 Constitution on May 12, 2006 (Mail&Guardian Online 2006).

The count has been also found fair, and domestic and international observers confirmed that integrity of the official results declaring Museveni winner with almost 60 per cent of the vote (Commonwealth 2006: 40, Gloppen et al. 2006: 27, EU 2006a:3).

3.5 Classification and Aftermath

The 2006 presidential in Uganda have to be classified as “unfair elections” (configuration 1,1,0,1). They provided for the effective universal suffrage (score 1) and were open to the candidacies (score 1), although a more sensitive coding would have to recognize certain level of manipulation in both of the dimensions. The attempts to prevent voters from last-minute registrations, and the controversial candidacy of the president Museveni demonstrate well the authoritarian nature of the regime.

While the aggregation of the voters’ preferences was in the line with the democratic criteria (score 1), this cannot be said of the condition of the elections. The electoral campaign was both unfree (score 0) with the opposition being intimidated and unfair(score 0, overall score 0) with the regime abusing the access to the public resources.

Dimension	Sub-dimensions	Score (Quant/Qual)	
A. Agents of the Choice	1. Universal suffrage	1	Universal
B. Objects of the Choice	1. Open elections	1	Open
C. Conditions of the Elections		0	Unfree&Unfair
	1. Freedom from coercion	<i>0</i>	<i>Unfree</i>
	2. Leveled-playing field	<i>0</i>	<i>Unfair</i>
D. Aggregation		1	Clean
	1. Preservation of the vote	<i>1</i>	<i>Clean</i>
	2. Equality of the vote	<i>1</i>	<i>Equal</i>
	3. Respect for the result	<i>1</i>	<i>Consequential</i>

Table 7: Uganda 2006: Classification

Finally, in a déjà vu-like situation from 2001, the 2006 elections have seen Besigye’s petition with the Supreme Court requesting an annulment of the vote. In a close ruling, the Supreme Court has upheld the result of the vote, but found that the main electoral body had not complied with electoral laws. The Supreme Court acknowledged procedural problems

resulting in disenfranchisement and some vote rigging, but ruled that they did not affect the results in a substantial manner. Tellingly, it also ruled that there was insufficient evidence to allegations of illegal practices on side of President Museveni (EU 2006a: 40).

4. Peru

The 2000 Peruvian presidential and congressional elections were dubbed “among the most controversial and irregular in recent Latin American history” (Transparencia 2001a: 7). This impressionistic claim, as the report does not provide any comparison, is however, quite plausible. It is also clear that the blatant manipulation contributed to the demise of the Fujimori’s regime when it resurfaced just four months after the elections.

Peru, a Latin American country of almost 30 million, has been dominated by Alberto Fujimori, a surprise elect of the 1990 presidential vote who stayed in office until 2000 when he equally surprisingly fled the country amidst corruption scandals. Soon after the legislature removed him from the office, new presidential elections were held this time fulfilling all requirements for democratic elections (Schmidt 2003: 344).

Despite its authoritarian character, Fujimori’s administrations was relatively popular and performed quite well– the hyperinflation got under control, a Maoist insurgency of Shining Path was contained to a large degree, and the long-running territorial disputes with Chile and Ecuador were peacefully concluded (Cobian et al. 2000: 60).

At the same time, Fujimori’s regime is yet another proof that effective government does not have to equal to a democratic government. Two years in the office, Fujimori performed a self-coup (*auto-gulpe*)⁵², disbanded Congress, and governed extensively relying

⁵² The analysis of the relations between Fujimori and military, arguably one of the most determining features of the regime, cannot be analyzed in detail here. Just to provide a brief account – it has been argued that military was ready to topple the regime in 1990, and that Fujimori essentially adopted its Green Plan (Plan Verde). The closest Fujimori’s aide, Montesinos, was a former military. And finally,

on the use of emergency powers unrestrained to combating Shining Path insurgency (MSI 2000: 44-6). Under international pressure, Fujimori convoked Constitutional Assembly that drafted a new constitution strengthening the position of the president. Among other things it allowed for a second-term reelection of the standing president (Conaghan 2001: 4). The new Constitution was popularly approved in 1993 referendum by a 5 per cent margin (PDBA 2001). Fujimori won his second term in 1995 obtaining 64 per cent of the popular vote in the first round (PDBA 2008a) in elections “full of irregularities” (Cobian et al. 2000: 3). Soon after the re-election, speculations whether Fujimori might try to stand for another presidential election in 2000 appeared (OAS 2000: 6), a problem analyzed in the dimension of the objects of the choice.

The object of analysis in here is the first round of 2000 Peruvian presidential election. The second round, boycotted by the oppositional candidate, went undocumented by the international observes and thus cannot be reliably assessed in all dimensions. The presidential election is preferred because of the salience of the function in the institutional system, and also because of the better data availability. Legislative election is invoked when the two cannot be meaningfully separated, or when they demonstrate well the nature of the regime.

4.1 Agents of the choice

Voting in Peru is universal and compulsory for citizen aged from 18 to 70. Members of the armed and police forces were disqualified from voting (NDI/CC 2000: 12). A voters' register was for the first time in Peruvian history which was inspected before the election by

military unwilling to back-up president in 2000 the bribery scandal likely contributed to the demise of the regime (Cameron 2004).

domestic group Transparencia was found generally sound (NDI/CC 2002: 15). Some complaints about the inclusion of military and deceased voters have been noted. The problems were mostly unsystematic and could not significantly influence the electoral processes (NDI/CC 2000: 20). The performance in this sub-dimension was corresponding to the standard democratic practice scoring 1 (effective universal suffrage).

4.2 Objects of the choice

The 2000 presidential election in Peru demonstrates well how much the question “who is running?” reveals about the political regimes. First, it has to take into account who is legally allowed to stand for the election. Second, it shows whether the regime complies with its own criteria and allows those entitled to effectively run for the office. At the same time it allows observation on whether it prevents those not entitled from running. The last point of interest led to major contention in the 2000 presidential election.

The presidential elections of 2000 were open, with nine different candidates (PDBA 2008b) meeting the inclusive legal conditions (35 years old, born in Peru and with active voting right; Cobian et al. 2000: 51) and no reports of candidacies prevented.⁵³ However, some would argue that at least one candidacy should have been prevented - that of incumbent president Fujimori.⁵⁴

Although the 1993 Constitution allows for the second term of standing presidents, it provided no transitory clauses informing as to how Fujimori’s terms should be counted. Soon

⁵³ Cobian et al (2000: 50-51) mention another legal impediment that was to the author’s best knowledge not applied. Its basic spirit ran against the presumption of innocence, and it was thought that they could be used to prevent unsolicited candidates by bringing charges against them. See also Schmidt 2002: 347.

⁵⁴ The problem of term limits could be analyzed on the normative plane. Yet, to my best knowledge, there is no theoretical agreement on executive or legislative term limits.

after the president's intention to run for a third term became evident in 1996, the regime took a series of efforts to ensure the legality of such act. Doing so, the regime trampled over the remaining semblances of constitutional democracy.

Given the salience of the issue, the cleanest way would have been a new constitution approved by national referendum. This has been recognized by the members of the ruling block as well; however knowing that "referendum would not produce the desired result" they decided for an alternative route (Conaghan 2001: 4). Congress passed "Law of the Authentic Interpretation of the Constitution" stating that presidential terms prior 1993 Constitution do not count, effectively allowing Fujimori to run.

The opposition tried to prevent Fujimori's candidacy in two ways - it challenged its constitutionality, and planned to hold a referendum on the issue. Both of the strategies went astray, but unmasked the lengths the regime was willing to run to achieve its goal. The power struggle fought by legal means resulted in crippled Constitutional Court unable to rule on the unconstitutionality of any law. Once crippled, the legislature changed the procedural rules on referenda that could not be met by the opposition and effectively established a clear road for Fujimori's candidacy (Conaghan 2001: 6)

In a final note on the dimension – Fujimori's nomination was co-sponsored by a small party *Frente Nacional Independiente Peru 2000* founded shortly before the elections. More than million signatures in its nomination sheets were found forged with suspicion of secret police involvement (Cobian et al. 2000: 35). Although the party was banished from the presidential *Peru 2000* coalition, the scandal was never fully investigated (NDI/CC 2000:22, 33).

Even if clearly illustrative of the regime's authoritarian nature, the actions of the regime do not prevent it from scoring as allowing for "open elections" (score 1).

4.3 Environment

The pre-election observation mission of the National Democratic Institute and Carter Center found environment and institutional framework "marked by serious flaws" (NDI/CC 2000:16). The situation has not changed, and the Organization of American States' observers could state that:

the conditions...did not assure a fair and equitable contest and that they were plagued with repeated inadequacies, irregularities, inconsistencies, and inequities that prevented the citizenry from enjoying the conditions for holding a proper election in accordance with the fundamental principles and practices that ensure the effective exercise of democracy (OAS 2000: 15).

This subchapter provides evidence supporting the above-stated assessment, and scores the elections in two sub-dimensions– freedom to campaign, and leveled-playing field.

4.3.1 Freedom

The freedom of the opposition to campaign seems to have been generally unrestrained, although the U.S. Department of State noted "credible incidents of wiretapping and surveillance...with little effort to investigate these incidents" (State Dept. 2000). Also the NDI/Carter Center report notes complaints of harassment and efforts disrupting the campaigning, but cautions that "few victims amassed concrete evidence linking these episodes to a concerted pro-Fujimori effort" (NDI/CC 2000: 19, for opposing view see Conaghan 2001: 14).

The regime abstained from using "brute force" against the opposition politicians; instead it launched a concentrated smear campaign that became known as a "dirty war"

(Schmidt 2002: 349).

Interestingly, journalists and media outlets were the top target of the regime's pre-electoral activities. 2000 was the second year when Fujimori got listed in the "Top Ten Enemies of the Press" chart produced by the Committee to Protect Journalists (Conaghan 2001: 9), an award well-deserved in the regime not only failing take measures against the violence against the journalists - but also suing them for libel and defamation (US Dept. 2001).

Where the regime failed to co-opt (see further), intimidate by force or judiciary⁵⁵, it used the state and corrupted media to discredit the journalists. The tabloids under the governmental control "carried hundreds of stories defaming them [oppositional journalists] with bizarre labels: "a mental midget," "a she devil," "undercover terrorist," "paid coup provocateur" (McZillan-Zoido 2004: 11).

Citizens were for the most part exempted from the state intimidation. However, huge propagandist inscriptions *Peru 2000* in the military zones could be interpreted as a somewhat threatening way of demonstrating support of the military (Taylor 2000: 397). It also seems that some voters have been misinformed about the secrecy of the vote, and possibly intimidated by the armed forces before the vote (OAS 2000: 12, 14, 17).

These facts only add additional reasons for classifying the campaigning environment of the 2000 presidential election as "unfree" (score 0) in this sub-dimension.

⁵⁵ The most notorious cases demonstrating the abuse of the judiciary includes stripping the owner of TV Channel 2 Baruch Ivcher of his naturalized citizenship in 1997. This resulted in the revocation of the license for his Channel 2 station (Conaghan 2002: 8, Burt 2006: 54). Regime also used tax authorities to harass outlets critical to government (Management Systems International (MSI) 2000: 23).

4.3.2 Leveled field

The uneven playing field in the 2006 presidential election will be demonstrated by two cases about the abuse of the public resources for the Fujimori's campaign, and the manipulation of the media by the regime.

The abuse of the public resources in the campaign ranged from quite innocuous use of the state infrastructure such as buildings and vehicles (Schmidt 2002: 350) to cases bordering on outright vote buying attempts using its poverty alleviation programs as the platform for campaigning (US Dept. 2001)⁵⁶. The employees of the programs were made to campaign on the Fujimori's behalf and distributed the campaign materials along with the food aid. In addition, threats have been made about aid stoppage should the communities be uncooperative (NDI/CC 2000: 20, US Dept. 2001, Taylor 2000: 398, OAS 2000: 14).

Two main regime strategies can be identified in the media sphere – the extensive use of the state-owned media⁵⁷, and co-optation of the private ones. The importance of the media in the regime strategy is evident from statement made by the secret police head Montesinos. He is found explaining on one of his famous tapes (see further): “this is the only way, that is why, damn, we have won [the election], because we have sacrificed in this way” (McMillan-Zoido 2004: 9).

⁵⁶ The detailed listing of the abuse of the state infrastructure is the subject of Ombudsperson's Report that, was, however unavailable to the author. OAS 2000 report (OAS 2000: 68) lists extensively headings of the report that, among others, include: “distribution of political propaganda during dissemination of information about public works” or “Exhortations by the prefect in favor of the reelection of the President”.

⁵⁷ At the moment, Peruvian government owned directly a TV station, a newspaper, a radio station and a news agency. With no data available to the present writer, it appears that their market share was quite small, although this might be caused by other researchers over-reporting the bribery scheme (see further). However, due to sheer number of the private media involved, this seems to be unlikely (Conaghan 2002: 32n22).

Private media, especially the televisions and large tabloids had been to a large extent co-opted and became part of the regime's propaganda toolbox. Most of the Peruvian private media challenged by serious economic hardship welcomed the helping hand of the state. The help was provided by manipulating the ongoing judicial processes, access to cheap state credit and state-funded advertisement⁵⁸, as well as in-cash-payments. The project was orchestrated by the Fujimori's closest aide and the director of the secret service, Volodimiro Montesinos. The degree of the regime's interference can be documented by Montesino's own words: "They [TV owners] are all lined up. Every day at 12:30 pm I have a meeting with them . . . We plan what is going to be aired in the evening news" (McMillan-Zoido 2004: 9).

Montesinos kept detailed records of the bribery schemes he supervised, which also included legislators, and the judiciary. McMillan and Zoido using the original data compared the size of the bribes for different actors and found out, in further demonstration of the importance of the media for the regime that:

"[t]ypical bribe paid to a television-channel owner was about a hundred times larger than that paid to a politician, which was somewhat higher than that paid to a judge. One single television channel's bribe was five times larger than the total of the opposition politicians' bribes" (McMillan-Zoido 2004: 2).

The total amount of the bribes spent on the televisions amounted to three million dollars monthly and covered private channels 2, 4, 5, 9, 13 and Channel CCN. Essentially, it left only one TV station without influence – Channel N. Similar practices were used to tame the press – especially the tabloid press with the large circulation. The perversity of the 'carrots' in the bribery can be demonstrated by the incentive scheme for media that received different pays depending on the placement of the article (\$ 3.000 to \$4.000 for the front-page

⁵⁸ Peruvian state was with in 1998 and 1999 the biggest advertiser in the country (McMillan-Zoido 2004: 10). State spending on advertising doubled from 1998 to 1999 in the contracting market. State spent according to the findings of Peruvian Ombudsperson 3.6 times more on advertising than all parties combined at the height of the campaign! (Schmidt 2002: 349-350)

headlines, \$500 for a shorter article, \$5.000 for a full page article; McMillan-Zoido 2004: 8).

The efforts paid off, perhaps a little too obviously. Media analysis carried by domestic watchdog Transparencia research on TV-coverage has found out “extraordinarily skew[ed] coverage among government-allied and state-run television stations, with Channels 2, 4, 7, and 9 featuring coverage of Fujimori in the 80 percent to 95 percent range in some of the months studied” (cited from Conaghan 2002: 11). Electoral observers agree that the media coverage of the elections was inequitable⁵⁹, biased, and marked by the smear campaigns (OAS 2000: 10-11, NDI/CC 2000: 5).

In the conclusion of this subchapter – the campaign environment was both unfree and unfair (overall score 0). The regime harassed and intimidated journalists or tolerated for it, and abused its economic power by linking the campaign propaganda with provision of the welfare support. Finally, the regime blatantly manipulated the media system by the mixture of bribery and intimidation.

4.4 Aggregation

Requirement of the equal consideration was the only sub-dimension of aggregation that has not been manipulated in the 2000 presidential.⁶⁰ Using the standard majority run-off system, it automatically passed the criteria of equal consideration, and regime is classified as

⁵⁹ In a quite absurd turn, private television channels also refused to sell the airtime to opposition (OAS 2000: 35, 50).

⁶⁰ The assuming of the mandates was violated in the case of the congressional elections, not in the presidential elections. Oppositional candidates were ‘invited’ by the military to change their party affiliations or suffer the consequences. Some 12 elects defected to *oficialista* alliance (NDI/CC 2000:32) between May 28 and July 24, 2000. In the most obvious case, Luis Caceres Velasquez denied seat for his previous criminal conviction was returned after he declared his intention to change to government party (US Dept. 2001).

providing equal consideration to electorate's votes (score 1).

There are, however good reason to be at least cautious about the counting of the presidential votes. The counting of the votes in *legislative* election was shamelessly manipulated. Even in the presidential election, the irregularities such as pre-marked ballots, or missing name of the oppositional candidate were reported (NDI/CC 2000: 25, OAS 2000: 63).

Observers were, at times, prevented from monitoring the count and accompanying the ballot boxes to the counting centers. "Phenomenal delays" in delivery of the ballot boxes occurred, leading to suspicion that regime used this time to doctor the vote (Taylor 2000: 406).

The counting and processing of the parliamentary vote brought about several spectacular occurrences. The results published by the electoral authority displayed a million more votes than the number of the participating voters (NDI/CC 2000: 25). In addition, mysterious vote fluctuations for the parties in congressional elections were noted, as well as computing systems failures resulting in losses of all data (Taylor 2000: 407). OAS noted the totals changes in the fluctuations did not add up to zero, and more than one thousand votes went missing, resulting in the gains for pro-governmental parties (OAS 2000: 36). Officials failed to provide plausible explanations, and it was widely believed that more that process of tabulation was "influenced at least partially by political factors...rather than being a purely mathematical exercise" (NDI/CC 2000:25). Furthermore, verification of the result by means of recount was impossible, as ballots were destroyed at the collation centers according to law (Taylor 2000: 405).

In the presidential election, parallel-vote tabulations performed by the electoral

observation mission were published before the official ones and arguably prevented regime from declaring Fujimori winner in the first round election. Official results were released three days after the vote did not significantly differ from the tabulations by observers (US Dept. 2001, compare Schmidt 2002: 351), and indicated the need for the run-off. The full results were released only 19 days after the poll (NDI/CC 2000: 26), adding further to suspicion.

The final assessment is an irksome one. While there is no proof of the manipulation of the presidential vote count manipulation⁶¹, the machination in the parliamentary count show the willingness of the regime to tamper the process. Regime might have double-manipulated the vote – first attempted to steal the vote, and the subsequently amended the results to comply with the independent counts. Being a clearly border-case, I suggest that for the lack of the effective evidence in the presidential elections, it should be scored 1 (technically clean). Regime also allowed third sub-dimension – as it allowed both candidates to contest in the second round of the elections (score 1, consequential).

4.5 Classification

The Peruvian presidential election in 2000 allowed for the effective universal suffrage (agents dimensions score 1), multiple candidacies (objects dimensions score 1), thus they should be considered competitive. The objects dimension illustrates well the authoritarian nature of the regime especially the Fujimori's efforts to establish legal standing as a candidate.

However, the elections must be found deviating from the democratic pole in the

⁶¹ Congressional election would be found providing equal consideration of the vote. Unlike the presidential elections they would have to be found manipulated in the translation dimension, especially due to documented manipulation of preferential votes (Taylor 2000: 409, Schmidt 2002: 451, OAS 2000:63). As already mentioned in the footnote 60, congressional election would be found lacking on the dimension of assuming the office.

conditions of the electoral campaign – due to regime and military interference the campaign must be considered unfree (score 0, freedom sub-dimensions). Regime also bribed its way with the media, and generally abused the access to public resources (score 0, fairness sub-dimensions), resulting in final score 0 (unfree and unfair) in the conditions dimension. Finally, the first round of Peruvian 2000 presidential election can be considered respecting all sub-dimension of the aggregation of the votes (score 1, clean), despite serious concerns and suspicion of malicious vote counting.

None of the above discussed problems was properly investigated after the first round. Even if some of deficiencies were partially remedied – the overall conditions remained so unfit for a meaningful election that most of the 27 electoral observation missions including joint NDI/ Carter Center mission and the European Union decided not to observe the second round (MSI 2000:49, Transparencia 2000b: 39).

Ultimately, the opposition presidential candidate withdrew 10 days before the second round arguing that “scaffolding of fraud has not been dismantled” (Schmidt 2002: 355). The voting took place despite his resignation and was characterized by one third of the ballots spoiled in protest. According to the official statistics Fujimori won the second round with almost 75 per cent of the valid votes (IFES 2009b).

The regime crumbled soon after the elections. The meticulous records of its own corruption brought it down after one of the few uncorrupted media channels aired the first “Montevideo” – an authentic video of Montesinos bribing the political elites. It is still not quite clear who made the record available, and military intervention is suspected. The effect on the regime was shattering – shortly after the first video was aired, both Fujimori and

Montesinos fled the country and opened the way for the regime transition.

Dimension	Sub-dimensions	Score (Quant/Qual)	
A. Agents of the Choice	1. Universal suffrage	1	Universal
B. Objects of the Choice	1. Open elections	1	Open
C. Conditions of the Elections		0	Unfree&Unfair
	1. Freedom from coercion	<i>0</i>	<i>Unfree</i>
	2. Leveled-playing field	<i>0</i>	<i>Unfair</i>
D. Aggregation		1	Clean
	1. Preservation of the vote	<i>1</i>	<i>Clean</i>
	2. Equality of the vote	<i>1</i>	<i>Equal</i>
	3. Respect for the result	<i>1</i>	<i>Consequential</i>

Table 8: Peru 2000: Classification

5. Venezuela

The 2006 presidential election in Venezuela is the last study of the thesis' empirical part. Venezuela is a Latin American country of roughly 28 million people with economy dependant on oil⁶². Traditionally one of the most stable and democratic countries in the Latin America, it became recently known for its eccentric and authoritarian president Hugo Chávez. Chávez, an unsuccessful coup leader of 1992, became a surprise winner of 1998 presidential election, campaigning on a populist platform criticizing political corruption and the unhappy state of the public economy (Coppedge 2002: 3). The presidential elections of 2006 were his third contest for the most important office in Venezuela.

To properly understand and classify the 2006 presidential election, a brief historical detour has to be taken. Shortly after he assumed the office, President Chávez initiated constitutional changes concluding the era of Punto-Fujismo.⁶³ A new, Bolivarian Constitution was adopted, and the institutional position of the president strengthened (Mayorga 2006: 150). Two years after he was first elected, Chávez called early elections, and easily won his second term.

Chávez's second presidential term saw fierce opposition to his regime. First, a group of military officers with tacit support of the opposition toppled the regime in 2002 and displaced Chávez for two days. Second, the opposition organized a series of general strikes aiming to paralyze the oil exports dependent economy and force the president's resignation. Despite heavy damages to the economy, president survived with the help of the military that not only

⁶² According to Bertelsmann's Transformation Index: "petroleum business accounts for between one-fourth and one-third of the country's GDP, four-fifths of its export earnings, and over half of the central government's operating revenues" (BTI 2006c: 2).

⁶³ Punto-Fijo regime gets its name from a location of a famous 1958 elite settlement that served as a guiding principle for almost 40 years. For a detailed analysis of the period see Myers 2004: 11-29.

seized the industry, but also distributed food and ran the basic services (Mayorga 2006: 152, Corrales –Penfold 2007:102, ICG 2007:8-11).

The final challenge was the recall referendum organized by the opposition. The referendum was marred by the administration mounting technical and administrative hurdles in the way as well delaying the actual vote (Myers 2004:13, Kornblith 2005: 129). Even if in the end almost 60 percent of the voters expressed their preference for president to stay in the office (ElectionGuide 2009b), the referendum cannot be considered free and fair.

The regime used several tricks, if not outright manipulations in the referendum campaign. Senator Tascón, Chávez’s campaign leader, made copies of the referendum sheets publicly available on the internet to allow voters ‘verify their signature’ (Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2008: 17 citing *El Universal*, January 15, 2003). In reality the Tascón list became a tool of the political discrimination against the people signing the referendum, establishing ‘reverse accountability’ (Corrales 2006: 35).

In addition the regime effectively used the public finances to buy votes. Although Chávez long professed a need for redistributive policies to aid the Venezuelan poor, it was only before the recall referendum when the massive social spending in form of so-called ‘missions’ began.

Linking the provision of social welfare with the possession of an ID-card (lacked by many poor at the time) the regime managed to effectively enfranchise “more than one million” citizens in two months time (EU 2006b: 20).⁶⁴ Although it is not clear how much

⁶⁴ An ID-card is also required for the voting. Issuing of the IDs and the enrollment in the voters’ register were virtually merged although they were traditionally separate administrative procedures (EU 2006b: 19, Penfold-Becerra 2006:20).

more, a million new voters would compose roughly 7 percent of 2004 voters.⁶⁵

There is nothing wrong with enfranchising the previously excluded. However, the obviously corrupt voting machine linking enfranchisement and social spending has been created. Social missions have enfranchised population that, due to its social situation, and the social missions established would in return vote for Chávez.

The recall referendum was followed by the 2005 legislative election. In a surprise and later regretted turn, these were at the last-minute boycotted by the opposition (EU 2006c: 4)⁶⁶, further contributing to the highly polarized and distrustful political environment. However, in 2006 opposition changed its mind and decided to compete in the presidential election that will be analyzed now.

5.1 Agents of the choice

Suffrage is universal and voluntary in Venezuela since the adoption of 1999 Bolivarian Constitution. Previously, the members of the armed forces have been disenfranchised and each citizen had an obligation to vote. The right of universal suffrage is generally respected, and actively encouraged by the government.

Venezuela has an active register of voters, requiring registration by citizens. It had been

⁶⁵ Comparison of the official records shows higher increase of suffrage – from 11.720.660 in 2000 to 14.037.900 in 2004. In relative terms, voting register in 2004 was roughly 120 per cent of the 2000. Presidential election of 2006 saw increase of another 8 percent (own calculation based on official electoral body data; CNE 2004a,b, and IFES 2009c).

⁶⁶ Opposition raised a number of issues detrimental to the conduct of elections - such as controversial staffing of the electoral body, districting problems, and most importantly problems with the secrecy of the vote (EU 2006b: 13). The boycotts of the elections led to single-colored legislature and thus further deterioration of checks on the executive powers.

Secrecy and, thus, free vote, is a long-standing concern in Venezuela utilizing electronic voting machines. The threat to vote secrecy was evaluated by the EU Monitoring Mission as “very remote” (EU 2006b: 25, 27).

previously, most notably in the 2004 recall referendum, a source of contention. However, the independent audits prior the legislative election of 2005 found the register generally fit, as well as the political parties (EU 2006c: 17).

The absence of evidence indicating interference with the execution of the voting rights should be considered a sufficient reason to code this dimension as effective suffrage (score 1).

5.2 Objects of the choice

The regime allowed for wide-spread participation of the candidates; the elections saw 14 candidates running for the office. The two main contenders were incumbent Hugo Chávez and Manuel Rosales, a candidate of the opposition and two-time governor of the federal state Zulia (ICG 2008: 5).

The eligibility criteria for president are quite standard - Venezuelan by birth, being at least thirty years old, and not subject to any final legal conviction (EU 2006c: 10). The number of the contestants running on different ideological platforms and the absence of any complaints about the nomination procedure should be considered a sufficient reason to evaluate elections as “open” (score 1).

5.3 Environment

So far one could consider the 2006 Venezuelan presidential elections a model one – being open and allowing effective suffrage. Yet the cited reports fall short of the notorious ‘free and fair’ or other judgment unequivocally certifying their regularity. The main reason is that the electoral campaign had been both unfree and unfair.

There is no single ‘smoking gun’ that would allow for such classification, but assessed

together the following paragraphs should warrant this assessment, especially if one includes the previously unaddressed grievances from 2004 referendum.

5.3.1 Freedom

The freedom of assembly and association was respected during the 2006 campaign, however, there are numerous questions regarding the freedom of speech. The Human Rights Practices Report of the U.S. Department of State indicate that the oppositional journalists were harassed by judiciary (defamation, libel and slander laws), and media outlets critical of the president suffered from a disproportionate interest of the tax authorities during the electoral year. The Government also failed to investigate physical attacks on the journalists (US Dept. 2007b).

The campaign has not seen the voters' targeted action. Yet it would be folly to disregard the regime's previous history of using the electoral records for political discrimination.⁶⁷ The already mentioned Tascón lists were upgraded into 'Maisanta' computer program providing detailed data on 12 million voters covering whether the voter "had signed the recall referendum against Chávez, abstained in earlier elections, [or] participated in the government's missions..." (Human Rights Watch 2008:19-20).

Although the database does not contain information on the voting per se, in numerous cases just signing the recall referendum was considered a sufficient reason for losing a job⁶⁸,

⁶⁷ The Foucaultian-like argument on the unfree atmosphere builds on the assumption of the voters' memory, and readily available information on the abuse of the electoral information. It has to be noted that the 2006 presidential elections respected the secrecy of the vote, and did not provide opportunity to collect personalized voting information. However, the widely misunderstood role of the fingerprint scanners used along the voting itself has hardly alleviated the atmosphere of mistrust. On the role of the fingerprint readers consult Carter Center (2006:17).

⁶⁸ A reader should be reminded that the regime had demonstrated willingness to use its economic power to stifle the dissent. Roughly twenty thousand workers of the state-owned petrol company lost their jobs in the aftermath of the 2002 general strike, and found themselves blacklisted for jobs related

governmental contracts or being denied services (HRW 2008: 21).

While the political discrimination resulting from the Tascón lists took place mostly in 2004 and 2005⁶⁹ (HRW 2008:15-27, see also Hidalgo 2009:83), the electoral campaign of 2006 saw similar threats. The president of the state-owned oil-company PDSVA reminded employees that “the company is red, very red” referring to the colors of ruling party. President Chávez not only approved of the action, but also encouraged other members of administration to repeat the message (Corrales-Penfold 2007:110).

5.3.2 Leveled playing field

The regimes second major strategy is more of the voters-targeted ‘carrots’ strategy, and thus logically assessed in the dimension of the leveled-playing field. Although Venezuela is the fourth-largest exporter of the oil in the world⁷⁰, a large part of its population lives in poverty (BTI 2006c :7,17). As was already noted, Chávez’s administration shortly before 2004 started so-called missions addressing the endemic poverty and providing access to healthcare, education and discounted food (Hidalgo 2009: 81). The missions-political machine continued in 2006 as well.

Missions often operate outside the traditional administrative structures; they are the President’s ‘pet project’ funded from special unaccountable presidential fund (BTI 2006c:

to the petrol industry. On the other hand, regime is obviously distributing spoils to those sympathetic to its goals, see Economist 2007.

⁶⁹ The government’s openness on the issue is spectacular. After winning 2005 recall referendum, President Chávez publicly acknowledged the discrimination and called their end in the public television: “It was a moment that we’ve put behind us....the famous list certainly fulfilled a useful role at a given moment, but that moment has passed...” (El Universal, April 16, 2005 passim HRW 2008: 18-19).

12). That in turn is financed from the oil-business, especially PDVSA incomes. The size of the fund was estimated at roughly 2-3 billion USD dollars a year, approximately 2.5 – 3.75 per cent of the country's GDP (Penfold 2006:5, ICG 2007: 13).

The welfare spending is not an outright case of vote buying by itself. However it turns to be one, if its distribution is distributed as a 'reward' for previous pro-Chávez vote (Ortega - Penfold 2008: 26, 30; BTI 2006c:13). In addition, the programs are delivered in Chávez's name, as if "the president was personally giving everything to the people" (ICG 2007:30) effectively eliminating the line between the administration and the political regime itself.

The blurry line of the presidency and regime was noted in the EU pre-electoral media monitoring analysis. It has reported "the excessive resort to various forms of institutional propaganda (publicity paid by state institution, such as ministries, public corporations or regional or local authorities) played in favor of the President [Chávez]" (EU 2006c: 30). Institutional propaganda made up 61 per cent of total advertising in the newspapers, and in 19 out of 20 cases, it promoted the incumbent president (ibid).

It can be concluded that the electoral campaign took place in an unfree and unleveled environment. The economic power of the state was used to tilt the playing field to incumbent's advantage, as documented on the cases of the social mission, and the advertisement spending. Furthermore, the elections took place in an atmosphere of 'covert repression' with the regime taking actions against those demonstrating their disapproval against President Chávez. Finally, the treatment of some journalists could be classified as a not-so-covert attempt to stifle the dissenting views.

5.4 Aggregation

The president of Venezuela is elected by the relative majority in the direct popular elections (EU 2006c: 9) ruling out suspicions of the gerrymandering or malapportionment. Chávez was inaugurated into his second term under the Bolivarian Constitution on January 7, 2007 (PBS 2009). The electoral regime thus earns score 1 for the sub-dimensions of the equal consideration and assuming of the office.

The third sub-dimension of the aggregation was also unproblematic. The counting procedure in the 2006 presidential elections was honest and quick due to utilization of the electronic voting machines. Although previously a source of conflicts, this time the voting machines have been thoroughly and repeatedly inspected and approved by the political parties and the international observers (EU 2006c: 23).

The results of the vote indicating victory of the incumbent president Chávez with almost 63 per cent of the vote had been corroborated by the independent quick counts (parallel tabulation) of the domestic observers *Ojo Electoral* and *Sumate* (EU 2006c:42).

In addition, the electoral body organized a so-called ‘audit’ of elections – a verification of the results by manual inspection of the ballot receipts printed along the electronic vote. The audit took place in 54 per cent of the polling stations (statistically an oversized sample), and confirmed the official results. The recount results differed only by 0.19 per cent and majority of the miscalculation was within one to five votes (EU 2006c: 23-24, 51).

The opposition also quickly recognized the results of the vote (EU 2006c: 36). The regime thus complied also with the integrity of the count requirement, meeting all

requirements put on the democratic electoral regimes in this sub-dimension

5.5 Classification

The Venezuelan presidential election of 2006 cannot be considered democratic, despite meeting the democratic requirements in three out of four electoral dimensions. To briefly summarize: election were contested by the multiple candidates, regime allowed for the effective use of the voting rights, and counted and translated the voters' preferences in the way respecting the requirement of the equal consideration.

However, the election has to be considered a flawed one: the conditions of the campaign, especially in the light of the previous actions the regime did not allow for a free campaign conditions, nor did the candidates compete on the leveled playing field with the massive state social spending.

The case study of the 2006 presidential election in Venezuela concludes the detailed empirical part of this study. The following chapter compares the four cases examined, and evaluates the purposefulness of the used analytical framework.

Dimension	Sub-dimensions	Score (Quant/Qual)	
A. Agents of the Choice	1. Universal suffrage	1	Universal
B. Objects of the Choice	1. Open elections	1	Open
C. Conditions of the Elections		0	Unfree&Unfair
	1. Freedom from coercion	<i>0</i>	<i>Unfree</i>
	2. Leveled-playing field	<i>0</i>	<i>Unfair</i>
D. Aggregation		1	Clean
	1. Preservation of the vote	<i>1</i>	<i>Clean</i>
	2. Equality of the vote	<i>1</i>	<i>Equal</i>
	3. Respect for the result	<i>1</i>	<i>Consequential</i>

Table 9: Venezuela 2006: Classification

6. Comparison of the case studies

In this chapter, I address the question “what did we learn about the regimes by using the typology?”, leaving the question “what did we learn about the typology?” to the last chapter of this work.

The final classifications, presented in the tables 10 and 11, shows that Uganda, Venezuela and Peru belong to the same type of “unfair elections” (1,1,0,1). with Singapore being the only outlier holding formal elections (1,1,0,0).

Dimension	Sub-dimensions	Singapore 2006	Uganda 2006	Venezuela 2006	Peru 2000
A. Agents of the Choice	1. Universal suffrage	1	1	1	1
B. Objects of the Choice	1. Open elections	1	1	1	1
C. Conditions of the Elections	1. Freedom from coercion	0	0	0	0
	2. Leveled-playing field	0	0	0	0
D. Aggregation					
	1. Preservation of the vote	1	1	1	1
	2. Translation of the vote	0	1	1	1
	3. Respect for the result	0**	1	1	1*
Final Classification		1,1,0,0	1,1,0,1	1,1,0,1	1,1,0,1
		“formal elections”	“unfair elections”		

Table 10: Overall classification

		3. Environment			
		Free&Fair(1)		Unfree (0)	
1.Objects		4. Aggregation			
Universal (1)	2.Subjects	Clean (1)	Fraudulent (0)	Clean (1)	Fraudulent (0)
	Open (1)	1,1,1,1	1,1,1,0	1,1,0,1	1,1,0,0
		Democratic	Rigged	Unfair	“Formal”
	Restricted (0)	1,0,1,1	1,0,1,0	1,0,0,1	1,0,0,0
		Restricted			
	2.Objects				
Restricted (0)	Open (1)	0,1,1,1	0,1,1,0	0,1,0,1	0,1,0,0
		Exclusionary			
	Restricted (0)	0,0,1,1	0,0,1,0	0,0,0,1	0,0,0,0
		Selection			Auth. ideal type

Table 11: Overall classification (spatial)

The regimes manipulated the elections in virtually the same way: they do not steal the votes or stuff the boxes⁷¹, but use more subtle methods; they manipulate the conditions in which they took place to arrive at desired result.

The “no-variance” sample in the objects dimensions ensured that all cases surveyed had competitive elections. Similarly, none of the cases demonstrated any considerable problems with the effective use of suffrage – although actual voting was problematic in Uganda where voters could not find their voting stations.

In all of the elections surveyed, the elects were allowed to assume their seats. This is hardly surprising as the elects were always pro-regime candidates in the presidential elections (Peru, Venezuela, Uganda), and the number of the opposition mandates was negligible in the case of Singapore. Nevertheless, the examples of Peruvian congressional election parallel to presidential election of 2000 show that this dimensions is important and its manipulations is part of the manipulation toolbox in the races for multiple mandates.

The manipulation of the freedoms and the unleveled playing field went hand in hand in this survey. All elections had both sub-dimensions of the campaign manipulated, which might be an interesting finding that should be further investigated.

The elections in Singapore stand out from the sample. It is the only regime that has manipulated the aggregation dimension of the elections by hand-tailoring the electoral regime

⁷¹ Perhaps the presence of electoral observers and good knowledge on the methods of manipulation in this sub-dimension prevented the regimes from stealing the elections by doctoring the vote counts, although Peru might have double-doctored it. However, there are very good reasons to believe that Peru manipulated the aggregation of the vote in the legislative elections.

and electoral districts. This might have been influenced by the fact it was the only case of legislative elections with *multiple mandates at stake* – in fact districting and electoral formula was a non-issue in other cases.

It is also significant that Singapore was the only regime manipulating elections in more than one dimension. While Peru, Venezuela and Uganda constrained themselves to the manipulation of one, Singapore has gone further and manipulated two dimensions– electoral system and environment. In a sense, regime was ‘overdoing it’, especially when the incumbents would most likely win without any manipulation. Such regime behavior has been previously explained by the regime’s desire to demonstrate its strength and point out futility of any dissent (Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2008). Should this be observed in more cases then we could treat degree of regime electoral manipulation as a proxy for the degree of non-democratic rule.

Finally, we note only a partial convergence of the regime type and type of manipulated election. While elections in both competitive authoritarian regimes were classified the same, the same is true for Uganda representing a different regime type. Thus, while the case studies provide some evidence for the regime type-manipulated election type linkage hypothesis, this should be examined on the larger sample, ideally larger and random one.

In the following, concluding chapter of the thesis, I restate the objective of the thesis and its approach. Most importantly, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the established typology of elections, and provide some observations on the contribution and the future research agenda.

7. Conclusion

This work has raised and answered the research question “*What are the types of elections in non-democratic regimes?*” The theoretical part of this work invoked the research question arguing the lack of valid and precise concepts describing the electoral contestation in other than democratic conditions. It has provided an answer to the question in a form of four-dimensional typology identifying 15 types of non-democratic elections. The empirical part of this work has applied the typology to four contemporary elections in the authoritarian regimes to test the typology’s usefulness. This concluding chapter will assess its strengths and weaknesses as they became apparent, and will point to further research agendas.

To briefly remind the reader, following four steps were taken when deriving the typology: (1) the procedural model of democratic elections (procedural democracy) was disaggregated and (2) four theoretical dimensions of *any elections* had been identified – *agents of the choice*, *objects of the choice*, *environment of the election*, and the *aggregation of the preferences*.

The dimensions were operationalized on the following questions - who could vote (*agents of the choice*), who could run for the vote (*objects of the vote*), in what conditions did the campaign take place (*environment*) and how were the preferences translated into mandates (*aggregation*).

The dimensions were (3) measured dichotomously. Informed by the normative democratic theory, democratic elections served as one of the end points of the dimensions. Cases were either found conforming to the democratic practice, or not. Dichotomous nature

of the measurement of the four dimensions allowed for (4) identification of 15 types of non-democratic electoral regimes, and one democratic electoral regime.

To see whether the typology is a meaningful tool for the classification of the non-election in the non-democratic regimes, four qualitative cases studies were carried out on the recent elections in four authoritarian countries - Singaporean legislative election in 2006, Uganda presidential election in 2006, Peruvian presidential election of 2000 and Venezuelan presidential election of 2000.

The main question is whether the presented typology managed to capture the essence of the elections. If yes, there is a good chance that is set up rightly. I am optimistic about this being the case. Although there is no way other way to test this than by inter-coder reliability studies, my impression is that the three elections (Uganda, Peru, Venezuela) do indeed share the same traits and their “within-type” variation is small. The difference between this group and Singapore is well-observable, and provides further justification to the typology as presented.

Results of the empirical analysis seem to suggest some overlap of the regime type and type of election. Even if more robust testing on sample as random as possible is necessary to confirm or reject the hypothesis, it hints that the typology is most informative when comparing different regime types. A user of the typology should thus expect most informative results at the intermediate levels of generality.

This thesis does not providing any causal explanations that could be readily used in another type of research. Yet it provides a conceptually sound and meaningful tool to

describe elections in non-democratic regimes upon which future findings will be based. I expect that it could be meaningfully applied in the project comparing old and new authoritarianism, theorizing on hybrid regimes, or research on the regime stability. I suggest that the all-encompassing category of non-democratic election is disaggregated and specific types of electoral manipulation enter the testing on the regime stability.

The application of the typology has also revealed some limitations; though these should not be understood as the limitation of the typology in the light of the research question per se, but rather in the related research agenda on the election in non-democracies. From my perspective the significant problems is that the typology provides only for limited comparison among the types.

The typology is at best partially-ordered (Collier- Laporte-Seawright 2008: 156-157) due to the equal weights of the electoral dimensions. Thus, while can say that the regime violating two dimensions is “violating more” than the regime violating one dimension, this is informative only when we are interested *in what* has been manipulated not to what degree the elections had been manipulated. Also, the typology provides no answer to question how two regimes with the same number of violations in different dimensions should be compared.

One of the ways to solve the conundrum would be to move away from solely procedural treatment of the elections, and adopt an overarching principle on which the weight or logical structure of the dimensions could be assigned. As a future research agenda, I suggest that combination of the time of the manipulation/reduction of the democratic uncertainty as presented by Schmitter with Karl (1991: 82-83), and Przeworski (1991: 10-15) should be surveyed

8. Appendices

8.1 Appendix 1: Comparison of the available models

Linz's definition of democracy (2000:58)	Critique/Overlap
1. Free formulation of preferences	Result – not a dimension
2. Basic freedoms of association, information and communication	Campaign conditions (3)
3. Free competition	Result – not a dimension
4. Between leaders	Objects of choice (2)
5. Regular intervals	Scope condition
6. Nonviolent means	Campaign conditions (3-1)
7. Excluding any effective office	Scope conditions
8. Non-prohibition of expressing the preferences	Agents of Choice (1)
9. Force	Campaign conditions (3-1)

Table 12: Linz's Model: Comparison

Schedler: The Chain of Democratic Choice (2002:39)	Kurian 2009 (Dimension)
1. Object of choice	Outside the scope of a procedural definition
2. Range of choice	Objects of choice (2)
3. The formation of preferences	Campaign Environment (3)
4. The agents of choice	Agents of choice (1)
5. The expression of preferences	Sub-dimension of Campaign Conditions (3-1)
6. The aggregation of preferences	Sub-dimension of Aggregation (4-1)
7. The consequences of choice	Sub-dimension of Aggregation (4-3)

Table 13: Schedler's Model: Comparison

Attributes	Components and subcomponents of attributes	Issue at stake
A. Inclusive Elections	1. Universal and equal suffrage	Who is legally allowed to vote?
	2. Conditions for the use of the right to vote	
	i. Registration	Are there any significant hurdles to register to vote?
	ii. Electoral roll	Is the information in the electoral roll accurate?
	iii. Polling station access	Are there significant or legal hurdles to get to a polling station or otherwise cast a vote?
	iv. Vote casting	Are all eligible and willing voters able to cast their vote as intended?
B. Clean Elections	3. Integrity of voter preference	Are voters able to vote without any outside pressure or fear of reprisals?
	4. Faithful recording of voters preferences	Are all ballots scrutinized (i.e. checked and counted) and/or tabulated (i.e. aggregated) impartially?
C. Competitive Elections	5. Right to run for office	Are there unreasonable legal hurdles to become a candidate?
	6. Basic guarantees for an electoral campaign	
	i. Equal security	Is the physical security of all candidates and party personnel guaranteed?
	ii. Equal opportunity	Do candidates compete on a level playing field?
	iii. Right to free press and to information	Do the voters have the information needed to make an informed choice when they cast their votes?
	iv. Freedom of association, assembly, expression, and movement	Are candidates for the office and the electorate allowed to organize and interact freely?
D. Elective Public Offices	7. Regular elections for top national offices	Are the main electoral offices (i.e. the national executive and legislature) filled through regular elections?
	8. Irreversibility of electoral results	Are the winners of elections duly installed in office?

Table 14: Munck's Conceptualization of Index of Democratic Elections

Dimension	Sub-dimensions	Issue at stake
A. Agents of the Choice	1. Universal suffrage	Who could vote?
B. Objects of the Choice	1. Open elections	Who could run for the office?
C. Conditions of the Elections		What were the conditions of the vote?
	1. Freedom from coercion	Were voters and candidates able to conduct electoral activities without undue pressure or fear of reprisal?
	2. Leveled-playing field	Did candidates have roughly equal access to public resources?
D. Aggregation		
	1. Preservation of the vote	Were the ballots counted fairly?
	2. Translation of the vote	What was the translation formula?
	3. Respect for the vote	Were the winners allowed to assume their positions?

Table 15: Thesis' conceptualization

Attribute (Munck dimension)	Phenomenon	Differences and/or corresponding dimensions
Suffrage (1, 2i-iv)	Partial fit.	Effective application measured together with legal provisions (1).
Integrity of voter preference (3)	Partial fit.	Measured in “freedom from coercion” (6) – there is no good explanation why the phenomenon should belong to “clean” elections measuring respecting for voters’ preference at polls (Munck 2009: 88). Intimidation of voters is an important campaigning technique.
Faithful recording of voters references (4)	Fit	Measured as “preservation of the vote” (3)
Right to run for office (5)	Partial fit	Effective application measured together with legal provisions (2).
Equal security (6-i)	Fit	Measured as freedom from coercion (6)
Equal opportunity(6-ii)	Fit	Measured as leveled-playing field (7)
Right to free press and to information (6-iii)	Partial fit	Not a specific unit of analysis, but rather a unit of observation in 6 and 7.
Freedom of association, assembly, expression, and movement (6-iv)	Partial fit	Measured in 6.
Regular elections for top national offices (7)	Missing	Not dealt with in the concept, dealt in case selection in this work
Irreversibility of electoral results (8)	Fit	Identical to the respect for the vote (5)
Absent		Equality of the vote not measured by Munck – (4)

Table 16: Comparison of the models: Munck-Kurian

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