

**INFLUENCE OF EU CONDITIONALITY ON DOMESTIC
POLITICS AND PUBLIC OPINION
CASE STUDY OF CROATIA AND SLOVAKIA**

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ABSTRACT

While scholars had opened ‘the black box’ of pre-accession negotiation process and had scrutinized phenomenon of EU conditionality, they often give more attention to explain reactions of applicant country’s government to the EU pressures, while neglecting to research the impact and consequences that government reactions can have on level of public support for the EU membership. The thesis’ research fills the gap by investigating government strategies and public reactions in the pre-accession process on the case of Slovakia and Croatia. The thesis finds that in the pre-accession process both government and public act rationally – weighing cost and benefits of EU reward and compliance with EU rules. Further, thesis finds that government strategies in dealing with EU conditionality have a significant influence on domestic opinion for the EU membership. Main conclusion brought from the findings is that the government adoption of EU rules will not affect negatively public support for the EU membership if the public approves government strategies and perceives that EU membership as the ultimate prize is higher than the costs of EU conditionality (vice versa).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: DEBATE ON RATIONALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE FOCUS.....	4
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW	4
1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	7
CHAPTER 2 – SLOVAKIA AND CROATIA IN COMPARISON.....	11
2.1 AWKWARD COUNTRIES	11
2.2 COMPARISON OF ELEMENTS THAT CAN AFFECT THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE EU INTEGRATION	15
2.3 COMPARISON OF ELEMENTS THAT CAN AFFECT THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE PRE-ACCESSION PROCESS	17
2.4 GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR AS THE POSSIBLE CAUSE OF DIFFERENT LEVEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT IN SLOVAKIA AND CROATIA.....	19
CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC BEHAVIOR IN PRE-ACCESSION PROCESS IN SLOVAKIA AND CROATIA	22
3.1 EU CONDITIONALITY PRESSURES ON SLOVAKIAN GOVERNMENT.....	22
3.2 ARE SLOVAK GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES RATIONAL OR CONSTRUCTIVIST?.....	28
3.3 EXPLANATION FOR THE SLOVAK EURO-OPTIMISM	34
3.4 EU CONDITIONALITY PRESSURES ON CROATIAN GOVERNMENT	36
3.5 ARE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES RATIONAL OR CONSTRUCTIVIST?	43
3.6 EXPLANATION FOR THE CROATIAN EUROSCEPTICISM.....	48
CONCLUSION	52
APPENDIX 1	56
APPENDIX 2	58
BIBLIOGRAPHY	59

INTRODUCTION

The Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn had stated that “Our enlargement policy has been called the EU’s most successful foreign policy tool.”¹ Indeed, the EU conditionality principle that had been institutionalized in Copenhagen membership criteria² had turned out to be a very successful EU’s tool for fostering process of democratization and transition to market economy in applicant countries.

However, this means that applicant countries need to go through significant transformation process in the pre-accession period in order to meet EU membership criteria. Through its conditions, the EU often requests that applicant country makes a number of political and economic reforms that influence whole applicant’s society.

Furthermore, pre-accession process is determined with large asymmetry of bargaining power in favor of the EU where applicant countries do not have much ‘space’ for negotiation and forcing their demands to the EU.³ Therefore, this “unique environment” and “stubborn negotiation formula” in the pre-accession process creates ‘unpleasant’ atmosphere in the applicant country and can affect negatively level of domestic public support for the EU.⁴

However, there are different levels of public support in the pre-accession process across applicant countries. In the Eastern enlargement stronger support for the EU membership had for example Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Cyprus, Slovakia, while Estonia and Latvia had

¹ Olli Rehn, “A Stronger Europe through Deepening and Widening“. Speech at the EPP Conference on enlargement and consolidation of the European Union, Brussels, April 8, 2008, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/184&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, (accessed March 30, 2009)

² Accession criteria, the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm, (accessed May 30, 2009)

³ Peter Javorcik, Miriam Toplanska, “Negotiation Theory and the EU Accession Negotiations: Slovakia’s Experience, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, No. 1 (2003), 82-83

⁴ Rulikova, “The Influence of Pre-Accession Status on Euroscepticism in EU Candidate Countries“, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol.5, no.1 (2004), 31

weaker support for the membership.⁵ From candidates that are currently in negotiation process, in Macedonia 76 percent of population support EU membership, in Turkey there are 49 percent of supporters, while in Croatia there are only 35 percent of supporters.⁶

With regards to the above, it seems puzzling that there are such differences on the support for the EU membership among countries. Through principle of conditionality the EU puts pressures on applicants' governments to implement changes that affect whole society and that are often not very welcomed in the eyes of the public. Therefore, can applicant's government reactions and responses to EU pressures be the cause of different level of public support?

Despite considerable debate on EU conditionality, the attention is often more given to explain reactions of applicants' government to the EU pressures, while neglecting to research the impact and consequences that government reactions can have on the level of public support for the EU membership. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the influence of applicant's country government responses to EU pressures on the public opinion for the EU membership.

The influence of applicant's country government responses to EU pressures on the public opinion for the EU membership will be scrutinized through the case study of Slovakia and Croatia. Slovakia and Croatia have been chosen because these countries have many similarities, historical and contemporary ones. Moreover, both countries experienced EU pressures that have been likely to create negative reactions among domestic public. I will assess Slovak and Croatian government's behaviors concerning these pressures and see whether the government's behavior is the cause for different public support in Slovakia and Croatia.

⁵ 2003 Eurobarometer survey, Public opinion, European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm, (accessed May 22, 2009)

⁶ Eurobarometer survey, Public opinion, European Commission, November 2007, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm, (accessed May 22, 2009)

The first chapter will set up a theoretical framework, as well as hypotheses for the thesis' research, based on rational and constructivist theory. Second chapter will compare Slovakia and Croatia in order to show similarities of the countries and to eliminate them as a possible cause of the different level of public support. Further, third chapter will assess whether the Slovak and Croatian government's strategies in pre-accession process, as well as the reactions of Slovak and Croatian public to these strategies can be better explained by rational choice or by constructivist theory. The assessment will be made through three models namely 'rational' external incentives model, 'constructivist' social learning model and 'constructivist' lesson drawing model. Finally, testing of the hypothesis drawn from the model that explains Slovak and Croatian government behavior the best will allow answering why there are different levels of public support for the EU membership in these countries.

CHAPTER 1 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: DEBATE ON RATIONALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE FOCUS

The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical basis for further research. First part of the chapter gives insights on the existing literature and main developments in the research field of EU issues. A literature review enables us to discover current debates on the EU in general, and subfields that are relevant for further research in the thesis in particular. Furthermore, it evaluates previous research on the EU and reveals which are the areas that are still not sufficiently explored. The second part of the chapter sets up a theoretical framework on which the thesis is built.

1.1 Literature Review

Since the scope of this thesis belongs to the enlargement policy it is worth to investigate debates and developments in this particular area. The EU enlargement policy, its impacts and consequences is an interesting research area for a number of scholars. The literature on the EU enlargement started to grow significantly after the fall of the communism in 1989, the prospect of Central and Eastern European countries' accession into the European Community and even more with their accession in 2004 along with Cyprus and Malta. The big 'enlargement' debate on the incentives for successful conclusion of pre-accession process on both, the EU and applicants' side, started to emerge between scholars, namely between rationalists and constructivists. While Moravcsik and Vachudova,⁷ under Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism theory claim that 'rational' national interests (economic, security and geopolitical) and state power represents the main enlargement preferences, constructivists argue that shared collective identity and respect for democratic values and norms are

⁷ Andrew Moravcsik, Milada Anna Vachudova, "National Interests, State Power and EU enlargement", *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 17, no. 1(2003): 43.

necessary and ‘sufficient’ for successful end of the pre-accession process.⁸ Schimmelfennig,⁹ on the other hand, combines two approaches and argue that rationalism can explain ‘input’ – the initial bargaining process and the association between the EU and CEE countries as its outcome, while constructivism explains norm-based ‘output’ – opening of pre-accession negotiation and final decision for enlargement.

Furthermore, with the introduction of accession criteria¹⁰ in 1993, scholars have started to give more attention to the impact that the EU has on applicant countries, more precisely CEE countries. The EU has been given synonym ‘transformative power’ as through conditionality it had a great influence on ‘designing democracy’ in countries that aspire to join the EU. A number of authors like Grabbe, Pridham, Haughton, and Schimmelfennig¹¹ investigate how the EU has used conditionality to foster applicant countries to implement reforms. While on one side they claim that the principle of conditionality is important for explaining of why have applicants decided to fulfill criteria eventually¹² and that the EU has been at times “the motor of change” in CEE countries¹³, the authors also argue that power of conditionality had varied depending on the policy area¹⁴ and on political commitment and motivation of the CEE governments.¹⁵ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier provide theoretical framework through which they explain why effective implementation of EU conditionality had varied across

⁸ Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union" in *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, eds. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 153-154

⁹ Ibid, p. 166

¹⁰ Accession criteria, the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm, (accessed March 30, 2009)

¹¹ Heather Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Tim Haughton, "When Does the EU Make Difference? Conditionality and Accession Process in Central and Eastern Europe", *Political Studies Review*, Vol. 5, no. 2 (2007), pp. 233-246; Geoffrey Pridham, *Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel (eds.), *International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)

¹² Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative...*, 2

¹³ Haughton, "When Does...", 233

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 233

¹⁵ Pridham, *Designing Democracy...* 84, 95

policies and countries.¹⁶ Moreover, researchers also investigate is the conditionality still ‘powerful tool’ after the fifth enlargement and in the current candidate countries.¹⁷

Notwithstanding scholars had opened ‘the black box’ of pre-accession negotiation process and had scrutinized the phenomenon of EU conditionality, they often give more attention to explain reactions of applicants’ government to the EU pressures, while neglecting to research the impact and consequences that government reactions can have on level of public support for the EU membership.

Meanwhile, the phenomenon of the euroscepticism in the applicant countries also becomes a growing research field. However, the scholars mostly investigate an applicant country’s euroscepticism on the party level¹⁸, while mass-level euroscepticism is understudied. Few authors like Szczerbiak, Stulhofer and Rulikova analyze public support in the pre-accession process. While Szczerbiak¹⁹ and Stulhofer²⁰ put more effort to define the profile of Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptics in specific applicant countries, Rulikova²¹ gives a broader picture of euroscepticism in pre-accession period investigating similarities and differences of the pre-accession process of different countries. She also stresses that euroscepticism of applicant countries differs from euroscepticism of member countries significantly.

¹⁶ Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe“, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 11, no. 4 (2004): 669-687

¹⁷ Rachel A. Epstein and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Beyond Conditionality: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe after Enlargement“, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 15, no. 6 (2008): 795-805; Frank Schimmelfennig, EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 enlargement: consistency and effectiveness, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 15, no.6 (2008):918-937

¹⁸ Alex Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, “Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and party systems: Party-based Euroscepticism in the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe“, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 3, no.1 (2002):23-41; Alex Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, “Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party system of the EU candidate states of Central and eastern Europe“, *European Journal of Political Research*, no.43 (2004):1-27

¹⁹ Alex Szczerbiak, “Polish Public Opinion: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership“, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 39, no.1 (2001):105-122

²⁰ Aleksandar Stulhofer, “Euroscepticism in Croatia: on the far side of rationality?“, in *Croatian Accession to the European Union: The Challenges of Participation*, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance, 2006)

²¹ Marketa Rulikova, “The Influence of Pre-Accession Status on Euroscepticism in EU Candidate Countries“, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol.5, no.1 (2004): 29-60

However, the literature of the impact of EU conditionality on applicant's governments and the literature on euroscepticism in the pre-accession process often neglect the importance of causal connection of these two phenomena. The EU conditionality affects the level of public support since it request that applicant country make a number of political and economic reforms that influence whole applicant's society. Further on, Pridham²² stresses well that "national governments [are] the driving force behind the implementation of conditionality in their own countries." Therefore it can be concluded that reactions of the applicant country's government to the pressures of EU conditionality can affect the level of public support for the EU membership significantly. Notwithstanding the fact there are many factors that can affect the level of public support in pre-accession process; I claim that applicant's government's reactions and responses to pressures of EU conditionality play one of the crucial roles.

The next section sets theoretical framework that will enable the development of thesis hypothesis.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

Since the scope of the thesis is pre-accession process, it is worth to set a theoretical framework that can serve as the basis for assessment of applicants government's reactions to EU pressures on one side and, as a consequence, the reactions of the public on the other side.

Rationalist-constructivist debate accounts for the explanation of the negotiation process between the EU and applicant country in the pre-accession phase. Moravcsik and Vachudova²³ argue that the applicant country and the EU enter the process of negotiation with certain preferences. However, with the presence of the asymmetrical interdependence in the process, the applicant as the more 'interdependent' make concessions in order that pre-

²² Pridham, *Designing Democracy...*, 133

²³ Andrew Moravcsik, Milada Anna Vachudova, "National Interests, State Power and EU enlargement", *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 17, no. 1(2003): 44.

accession phase can finish with the ultimate goal – the EU membership. On the other side, constructivists argue that institutions shape actors' incentives, preferences and identity.²⁴ Therefore in the pre-accession process the EU's values and norms influence applicants' preferences and motivate it to fulfill demands of EU conditionality.

In order to explain why the applicant's government accepts to fulfill the EU's conditions namely, to 'adopt' the EU's rule, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier²⁵ propose three models. First of them is rationalist bargaining "external incentives model"²⁶. The model shows that in the bargaining process the actors have "relative bargaining power"²⁷. The actors have different levels of power due to asymmetrical distribution of information and benefits. In other words, the actor that has less information and would have more benefit from the bargaining process is the 'weaker' and can be manipulated by the 'stronger' one. If the 'weaker' actor does not want to fulfill the requirements of the 'stronger' actor, the 'stronger' actor can threaten the 'weaker' one by non-cooperation. Since it has more benefit from the bargaining process, the 'weaker' actor ultimately make concession and fulfill the requirements. In the EU pre-accession process the applicant's government is the 'weaker' actor since it wants membership more than the EU and posses lesser information on the pre-accession process. Since the applicant's government also needs to cope with domestic pressures, it makes cost-benefit analysis before concession. Therefore the authors claim, under the external incentives model, that "a government adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs."²⁸ The first hypothesis that can be drawn from external-incentives model is that the applicant's government adoption of EU rules affects

²⁴ Mark Pollack, "International Relations Theory and European Integration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.39, no. 2, (2001): 234

²⁵ Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe", in *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 9-26

²⁶ Ibid, 10

²⁷ Ibid, 10

²⁸ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, "Introduction...", 12

negatively the level of public support if at the moment of the adoption the public does not perceive that EU reward is higher than adoption cost.

The second and the third model which Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier propose for the explanation of the applicant's government adoption of EU rules are constructivist models. Under "the social learning model"²⁹ the applicant's government "adopts EU rules if it is persuaded by appropriateness of EU rules."³⁰ In other words the applicant's government fulfills EU's condition because it shares the same values and norms regarding that specific condition. Furthermore, the applicant's government can be persuaded to adopt EU rule either by the EU or by the domestic groups. The hypothesis drawn from this model is that applicant's government adoption of EU rules affects negatively the level of public support if at the moment of the adoption public is not persuaded by the appropriateness of EU rules.

"The lesson-drawing" is the third model on Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier's list of EU rules adoption explanations. According to this constructivist model "a government adopts EU rules if it expects these rules to solve domestic policy problems effectively."³¹ Basically, the model assumes that the applicant's government decides to fulfill EU condition not because of EU membership as the ultimate reward, but because it is not satisfied with domestic situation regarding that particular issue. The third hypothesis drawn from the lesson-drawing model therefore claims that applicant's government adoption of EU rules affects negatively the level of public support if at the moment of the adoption public is not convinced that these rules will solve domestic policy problems.

Since the present thesis investigate influence of government behavior in the pre-accession process on the level of public support for the EU membership, applicant's government responses to EU pressures need to be assessed first. The assessment will be made through

²⁹ Ibid, 18

³⁰ Ibid, 18

³¹ Ibid, 22

three models mentioned above. After the assessment, three posed hypothesis which presuppose government influence on the level of public support can be tested. Further on, the assessment of the applicant's government responses to EU pressures, as well as testing of the thesis hypothesis will allow assessing whether the decisions in pre-accession bargaining process can be explained by rationalism or constructivism.

However, in order to assess the applicant's government responses to EU pressures as the factor that created different levels of public support in the thesis comparative case study, other factors that can influence different levels of public support need to be eliminated. The next chapter presents which other factors can influence public support in the pre-accession period, as well as provide justification that those other factors can be eliminated in present comparative case study.

CHAPTER 2 – SLOVAKIA AND CROATIA IN COMPARISON

This chapter compares Slovakia and Croatia on three different levels. The comparison is made in order to show similarities of the countries and to eliminate them as a cause of the different level of public support. First, examination of historical background in the 1990s of Slovakia and Croatia is made. Further, the factors that influence the level of public support in general, and the factors that influence level of public support in pre-accession process are assessed and compared in the case of Slovakia and Croatia. Further on, the data on levels of public support in Croatia and Slovakia are shown. Finally, Slovak and Croatian government's behavior and responses to EU pressures are put forward as the difference that could have caused different level of public support.

2.1 *Awkward Countries*

Slovakia and Croatia have been often categorized as “non-mainstream”³² and “awkward”³³ countries whose paths to the EU have not been easy. As Field³⁴ argues, both countries have experienced slower pre-accession process than their Central and Eastern European neighbors, mainly due to the presence of ‘unsuitable’ political climate in the 90s.

Slovakia and Croatia have many similarities, historical and contemporary ones.³⁵ Fisher³⁶ distinguishes Slovakia and Croatia from other CEE countries as being the only countries with Western tradition in which nationalist right parties had dominated the party politics during 1990s. Further on, she argues that even though they have gained independence differently –

³² Fruzsina Siger, “EU Achor in “Non-mainstream Countries' Transition Path: The Case of Slovakia and Croatia“, Tiger Working Paper Series, no. 115, (Warsaw, 2009), available at <http://www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/TWPN0115.pdf>, (last accessed May 18, 2009)

³³ Heather Field, “Awkward States: EU Enlargement and Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia”, in *Perspectives on the Enlargement of the European Union*, ed. Cameron Ross (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002), 215

³⁴ *Ibid*, 215

³⁵ Sharon Fisher, *Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: from Nationalist to Europeanist*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 7

³⁶ *Ibid*, 7

Croatia through war and Slovakia in a peaceful way, during 1990s the countries had chosen the same path. Instead of the path ‘return to Europe’ that most of the CEE countries have chosen, Slovakia and Croatia had “move(d) toward illiberal democracy and authoritarianism, using cronyism and corruption to shore up their political base, populism and nationalism to mobilize population in their favor.”³⁷

Furthermore, both Slovakia and Croatia have been categorized as the ‘second best’ group of transition countries along with Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania.³⁸ Both countries have needed to face difficult transition reforms in order to develop free market economy. According to Siger³⁹, Slovakia and Croatia’s EBRD transition indicators show (See Appendix 1) that the countries are very similar considering transition reforms. Over the years, Slovakia and Croatia show similar trends for small scale privatization, banking reforms, competition policy, enterprise restructuring and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. Only price liberalization and reform in trade and forex system have been faster in Croatia, while Slovakia shows better trends for large scale privatization and overall infrastructure reform.

A number of authors highlight the fact that both countries have been part of multinational federations with state socialism – Slovakia as a part of Czechoslovakia, while Croatia as a part of Yugoslavia.⁴⁰ Federalism legacy has been important for the development of party politics in both countries in the 1990s.⁴¹ Throughout the 1990s the ruling parties in Slovakia and Croatia have been the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Croatian

³⁷ Ibid, 3-7

³⁸ Laszlo Csaba, “A szovjet model összemomlása és a rendszerváltozás első szakasza”, (“The collapse of the Soviet model and the first phase of transition”), in *Gazdasági rendszerek, országok, intézmények: bevezetés az összehasonlító gazdaságtanba*, eds. Zoltan Bara and Katalin Szabo, (Budapest: Aula, 2000), p. 338, used in Siger, 3

³⁹ Siger, 15-18

⁴⁰ Sharon Fisher and Tim Haughton, “The Post-Federal Experience and the Development of Centre-Right Party Politics in Croatia and Slovakia“, *Party Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 4, (2008), 436; Siger, 4

⁴¹ Fisher and Haughton, 436

Democratic Union (HDZ), respectively. HZDS leader Vladimir Meciar and HDZ leader Franjo Tudjman had not wanted to listen to Western politicians' recommendations to change their nationalist policies. Although Slovakia has signed the European Agreement that entered into force in 1995, Meciar had not wanted to fulfill conditions of the Agreement claiming to the Slovak public that the EU "needs Slovakia as geopolitically an exceptionally well-situated country, implicitly bridge between east and west".⁴² Similarly, Croatian political elite had not felt the necessity to obey the EU conditions since Croatia 'has always been in Europe' since it has strong historic, cultural and geographic ties with the Europe.⁴³ Basically, Meciar and Tudjman had not wanted to cooperate with Western governments because that would threaten and diminish their power; the price they had not been ready to pay.⁴⁴ Therefore, their non-cooperation had led to isolation of Slovakia and Croatia from the international community during 1990s since, as Siger⁴⁵ argues, the EU had started to dislike them.

However, in both countries HZDS and HDZ had managed to convince the electorate that they should stay on power throughout almost whole 1990s. As Fisher argues, they succeeded through defining as the 'others' all non-supporters that could threaten the regime (Belgrade and Prague government, Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Serbian minority in Croatia and internal non-supporters), insider privatization, cultural organizations that had been under nationalist influence and media control.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, with the negative 'avis' that Slovakia received in 1997 and with Tudjman's death in 1999, Slovak and Croatian public started to mobilize. In the following elections in both Slovakia and Croatia pro-European opposition parties made coalitions and won, with the

⁴² Field, 222

⁴³ Siger, 25

⁴⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, "The Impact of EU Political Conditionality", in *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 35-40; Siger, 25

⁴⁵ Siger, 21

⁴⁶ Fisher, 13-18, 90-96, 103-106, 129-134

leader of the Slovak Democratic Coalitions Mikulas Dzurinda as the new Prime Minister of Slovakia and with the leader of the Social Democratic Party Ivica Racan as the new Prime Minister of Croatia. The changes in governments have been welcomed by the EU, since Slovakia got positive 'avis' in 1999, while Croatia signed Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2000.

However, here the paths of Slovakia and Croatia's EU integration process started to diverge. In 2000 Slovakia and the EU started the negotiation process and Slovakia managed to join the EU with the rest of the CEE countries in 2004 enlargement. Further on, Dzurinda was elected for the second time in 2002 so Slovakia was guided with the same government through the whole negotiation process.

On the other hand, Croatia got a positive 'avis' in 2004 and started negotiation process in 2005. Further on, in 2003 HDZ won the elections again, but this time with a new leader Ivo Sanader who had 'transformed' the party and moved it more towards the centre⁴⁷. In addition Sanader's government was more willing to face the EU and domestic pressures compared to Racan's government.⁴⁸

This section shows that Slovakia and Croatia have had very similar political and economic path during 1990s. Familiarizing oneself with historic background of Slovakia and Croatia is an important base for the present research since factors that can influence the level of public support for the EU are deeply connected with a country's history. The next section evaluates these factors and makes their comparison in case of Slovakia and Croatia.

⁴⁷ Fisher and Haughton, 448

⁴⁸ Fisher, 195

2.2 Comparison of Elements that can Affect the Level of Public Support for the EU integration

The thesis divides the factors that could have influenced the level of public support aside from applicant government's responses to the EU pressures into two categories: the factors that are usually tested when the level of public support of EU member country is investigated, namely 'general factors', and the factors that can influence public support in the pre-accession period, namely 'pre-accession factors'.

The literature argues that recent studies have shown that factors that can influence the level of public support for the EU integration of the EU member states are: "(a) positive or negative feelings about national institutions, (b) hostility to and distrust of supra-national institutions, (c) fears about the loss of national identity because of European integration, and (d) personal interest-based utilitarianism."⁴⁹

In order to evaluate the feelings of Slovak and Croatian public towards national institutions the Eurobarometer⁵⁰ survey data will be checked. When looking at Eurobarometer survey data on trust in national institutions such as government, parliament and political parties it can be inferred that both in Slovakia and Croatia people have had extremely low trust in their national political institutions during pre-accession period. Furthermore, Slovaks and Croats have bigger trust in government and parliament than in political parties.

Furthermore, Eurobarometer⁵¹ data for trust in supra-national institutions like the EU Commission (EC) and the EU Parliament (EP) regarding Slovakia and Croatia shows that

⁴⁹ Lauren McLaren, "Explaining Mass-level Euroscepticism: Identity, Interests and Institutional Distrust", Conference Paper, (Washington, DC, 2005), p. 2, available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/4/0/5/2/pages40527/p40527-1.php, (accessed May 20, 2009)

⁵⁰ Eurobarometer survey, Public opinion, European commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm, (accessed May 22, 2009)

⁵¹ Eurobarometer survey, Public opinion, European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm, (accessed May 22, 2009)

during the pre-accession process the level of public trust for both the EC and the EP have been higher than level of trust in national political institutions. Both Slovakia and Croatia have more confidence in the EP than in the EC. Nevertheless, where Slovaks' trust in the EU supra-national institutions had grown slightly in the 2001-2003 pre-accession period, Croats' trust has slightly deteriorate in the 2004-2008 pre-accession period. However, this finding goes along with the fact that Slovakia had high support for the EU membership, while Croatia has not.

Regarding fears about the loss of the national identity Slovaks and Croats again have similar opinions. 2005 Eurobarometer survey shows that 34 percent of Slovaks and 33 percent of Croats see themselves only as citizens of their countries and never as Europeans. Furthermore, 36 percent of Slovaks and 32 percent of Croats see themselves in the future only as citizens of their country, while 58 percent of Slovaks and 60 percent of Croats see themselves in future first like citizens of their countries and Europeans at the same time. Therefore, both countries have similar expectations about their future identity.

Further, Rulikova⁵² argues that those individuals who are the losers of the transition reforms are more likely to be supporters of the communist regime and more likely to be against the EU and vice versa. It can be argued that Slovakia and Croatia have had similar level of expectations of who will be the winner and who will be the loser of the EU integration. This personal-interest based utilitarianism can be assessed through the fact that both countries have once been under the communist regime and socialist planning economy. Alike, both countries have needed to go through a number of transition reforms for which it has been argued that they have had a similar pattern (according to EBRD transition indicators). Therefore it can be concluded that the number of individuals who consider themselves as the losers i.e. the winners of the transition and therefore of the EU integration, are on the similar level.

⁵² Rulikova, 50

Therefore personal-interest based utilitarianism cannot be considered as the cause of different level of public support.

2.3 Comparison of Elements that can Affect the Level of Public Support in the Pre-accession Process

Rulikova⁵³ argues that “unique environment” and “stubborn negotiation formula” in the pre-accession process creates an atmosphere that is very fertile for the creation of euroscepticism. Therefore, in this section the factors that can influence public support in the pre-accession process will be examined, along with a comparison of presence of these factors in Slovakia and Croatia. First of all, the pre-accession process for the EU membership does not follow standard negotiation formula namely, that the EU and an applicant country have equal negotiation power. Since Slovakia and Croatia are rather small countries and are not exceedingly important for the EU in economic terms, their pre-accession processes have been determined with large “asymmetry of bargaining power”⁵⁴ in favor of the EU. In both countries the EU had set the rules of the pre-accession game, where the negotiation process seemed like “countries adopting the Union *acquis*.”⁵⁵

Alike, the EU represents complex structure consisting of 27 member states therefore it is rather “rigid”⁵⁶ and cannot be a flexible negotiation partner. Furthermore, the EU conditionality has a number of demands which applicant needs to fulfill without any complaints, therefore it can be argued that pre-accession process is more like “entrance

⁵³ Rulikova, 31

⁵⁴ Peter Javorcik, Miriam Toplanska, “Negotiation Theory and the EU Accession Negotiations: Slovakia’s Experience, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, No. 1 (2003), 83

⁵⁵ P. Nicolaides, A. den Teuling, “The Enlargement of the European Union: Prerequisites for Successful Conclusion of the Accession Negotiations“, Summary of Conference Proceedings from 19-20 February 2001 in EIPA, Maastricht, p. 4, available at http://eipa-nl.com/public/public_publications/01/34201EnlargProc.htm, (accessed May 22, 2009)

⁵⁶ Rulikova, 35

examination.”⁵⁷ Both Slovakia and Croatia went through thorough examination of their principles and norms of democracy and market economy. The countries needed to improve their principles and norms in order to meet the EU standards of democracy and market economy.

Moreover, through EU conditionality the EU reinforces “the double-standard treatment”⁵⁸ since it asks that applicant needs to fulfill some conditions that are not shared in some member states. In the case of Slovakia and Croatia the EU forced both countries to improve minority rights, while on the other side some member states like Greece also has problems with minority rights.

Furthermore, asymmetrical negotiation power can also negatively affect the level of public support since it can imply “new hegemony”⁵⁹ for small states like Slovakia and Croatia that have only recently gained their independence.

Since Slovakia and Croatia went through the ‘examination’ and needed to fulfill requests of EU conditionality with little or any bargaining power to force their own demands, while on the other hand the EU enforced the double-standard principle on them, the ‘unpleasant’ position of their countries was very likely to create “complex of inferiority”⁶⁰ among public and negatively affect the level of public support.

One more fact that can influence negatively the level of public support is that pre-accession process is determined with uncertainty.⁶¹ In both Slovakia and Croatia the feeling of uncertainty has been present. In case of Slovakia the feeling of uncertainty was present since its pre-accession had been part of the Eastern enlargement project during which it was often

⁵⁷ Javorcik and Toplanska, 82

⁵⁸ Rulikova, 50

⁵⁹ Rulikova, 43

⁶⁰ Rulikova, 36

⁶¹ Rulikova, 38

speculated whether the Eastern enlargement will be finished successfully or if the cooperation between CEE countries and the EU will stay only at economic level. In case of Croatia, the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty and enlargement fatigue that have occurred in some member countries like Ireland creates the uncertain feeling whether and when the Croatian pre-accession process will be finished.

Slovakia and Croatia have been faced with postponement of negotiation process, one more fact that can influence the level of public support in the pre-accession process. In 1997 Slovakia got a negative 'avis' and was therefore excluded from the 'first wave' of the enlargement process, while the Croatian start of the negotiation process had been delayed due to lack of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

To sum up, in both Slovakia and Croatia factors that can influence negatively the level of public support have been present. Both countries had experienced asymmetrical negotiation power, entrance examination, where uncertainty of pre-accession process has been influenced even more with the postponement of accession negotiations.

2.4 Government Behavior as the Possible Cause of Different Level of Public Support in Slovakia and Croatia

The comparison of Slovakia and Croatia has been made on three levels. The comparison of historical background shows Slovakia and Croatia had similar economic and political situation during 1990s. The comparison of the 'general factors' that can influence the level of public support shows that both countries had similar level of trust in national and supranational institutions, similar expectations about their future identity and similar expectations on gains and losses of the individual. Finally, in the pre-accession process the countries found themselves in similar 'unpleasant' environment where the EU had more

bargaining power and had enforced ‘double-standard principle’ on both countries. Similarly the uncertainty of enlargement project has been even more fueled by the postponement of the negotiation process in both Slovakia and Croatia. After examination of all similarities of Slovakia and Croatia one can assume that public support for the EU accession should be at the similar level.

However, the level of the public support for the integration of the Slovakia and Croatia shows different trends. The Eurobarometer⁶² survey demonstrates that Slovak public support had been on a level of around 55-60 percent in the 2001-2004 period, while in Croatia the level of public support had been around 30-35 percent in the 2005-2008. The Eurobarometer⁶³ survey from 2008 shows that only 23 percent of Croats think that EU membership is good for their country.

Since all other factors that can cause euroscepticism in pre-accession in Slovakia and Croatia are similar, these factors cannot be the reason for different level of public support. However, both countries have had several EU pressures during pre-accession. These pressures have been non-negotiable and if not ultimately fulfilled and solved could have caused postponement or ‘freezing’ of the negotiation process. Moreover, non-fulfillment of the democratization pressure in case of Slovakia and non-cooperation with ICTY in case of Croatia actually resulted in the postponement of the negotiation process in both countries. Furthermore, the EU pressured both countries for the improvement of the minority rights. Finally, the EU exerted pressure that Slovakia needs to close down Bohunice nuclear power plant reactors where Austria even threatened ‘to freeze’ the negotiation process if Slovakia

⁶² Eurobarometer survey, Public opinion, European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm, (accessed May 22, 2009)

⁶³ Eurobarometer survey, Public opinion, European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm, (accessed may 22, 2009)

did not obey this condition. In case of Croatia, border dispute with Slovenia actually caused ‘freezing’ of the negotiation process.

In all EU pressures mentioned above Slovakian and Croatian government’s responses have been extremely important due to, as already stressed, “...national governments (are) the driving force behind the implementation of conditionality in their own countries.”⁶⁴ It has been argued that although Slovakia and Croatia had similar political and economic situation in the 1990s, their paths started to diverge in 2000s. Therefore it can be claimed, aside from the pressure of the negative ‘avis’, that since Dzurinda’s government finished the negotiation process rather quickly, it did not permit EU pressures to slow down the process. On the other hand, since Croatia is still in the pre-accession process, it can be claimed that Racan’s and Sanader’s governments had allowed EU pressures to slow down negotiation process. Therefore, it can be concluded that Slovakian and Croatian governments had reacted differently to EU pressures.

Furthermore, already mentioned Slovakian and Croatian similarities on three different levels - similar experience in the 1990s, similar appearance of factors that can influence the level of public support in general and in the pre-accession process in particular mean that all of these factors can be rejected as a cause of the different level of public support in Slovakia and Croatia. Therefore, Slovak and Croatian government’s behavior and responses to EU pressures could have caused different level of public support. I will assess Slovak and Croatian government’s behaviors concerning these pressures and see whether the government’s behavior is the cause for different public support in Slovakia and Croatia.

⁶⁴ Pridham, 133

CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC BEHAVIOR IN PRE-ACCESSION PROCESS IN SLOVAKIA AND CROATIA

This chapter will attempt to assess whether the Slovak and Croatian government's decisions in the EU pre-accession process, as well as the reactions of the Slovak and Croatian public to these decisions can be better explained by rational choice or by constructivist theory. The assessment is made through three models that serve as a theoretical framework of the thesis, namely the 'rational' external incentives model and the two 'constructivist' models - social learning model and the lesson-drawing model. After the finding which model serves best for the explanation of the Slovak and Croatian behavior, the hypothesis drawn from that model can be tested. On the other side, the hypotheses drawn from the other two models can be rejected due to the fact that the Slovakian and Croatian government and public did not behave according to the features of these models. Finally, the one accepted hypothesis will serve to explain why the level of public support in the pre-accession process in Slovakia was high, while Croatia has low level of public support during pre-accession process.

3.1 *EU Conditionality Pressures on Slovakian Government*

The first pressure to be investigated in the case of Slovakia is the EU pressure for the implementation of democratic norms, which Slovakia failed to do at first and therefore got a negative 'avis' in 1997. Notwithstanding the fact that in Meciar government's program it was explicitly said that "the implementation of the program of European integration (is) foremost task"⁶⁵ and that Slovakia signed the European Agreement that came into force in 1995, in reality Meciar's government refused to listen to frequent EU concerns and several official warnings (*demarches*) considering democracy level in Slovakia. The negative feedback from

⁶⁵ Henderson, "Slovakia and the democratic criteria for EU accession", in *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*, ed. Karen Henderson (London and Philadelphia: UCL Press, 1999), 227

the EU had not succeeded in producing a change in the political environment in Slovakia. In fact, *demarches* actually caused even more disobedience in the Meciar's government. For example, after the second demarche which criticized the Government's behavior towards the President, the Government became even more intolerant towards those who often criticized the government's decisions.⁶⁶ Therefore Slovakia was named the "black hole of Europe"⁶⁷ and ultimately got negative 'avis' on the base that it did not "satisfy the political conditions laid down by the European Council in Copenhagen."⁶⁸ Meciar stated that the Commission's negative 'avis' is "not a catastrophe"⁶⁹, which meant that he had no intention to improve the situation in Slovakia.

However, the situation started to change after 1997. The Slovak exclusion from the 'Luxembourg group' made the previously non-cooperative opposition start 'awaking'.⁷⁰ In previous 1992 and 1994 elections opposition could not win due to their different programs. However, Slovak exclusion made the opposition parties converge their programs having EU membership through improving democracy their most important and common goal.⁷¹ The opposition's idea of "returning Slovakia to Europe"⁷² was helped by a number of civic groups whose campaign OK '98 had the aim to raise public awareness and turnout in the forthcoming 1998 parliamentary elections.⁷³

Right before the 1998 elections a public opinion survey showed that 79 percent of Slovaks thought that EU membership was good for their country⁷⁴, despite the fact that Slovakia had been excluded from the 'Luxembourg group' as the only country that had not fulfilled the

⁶⁶ Haughton, "When Does...,3-4

⁶⁷ Siger, 30

⁶⁸ European Commission, "Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union", available on <http://ec.europa.eu/agenda2000/overview/en/agenda.htm>, (accessed May 23, 2009)

⁶⁹ Henderson, "Slovakia and..., 235

⁷⁰ Michelle Cini (ed), *European Union Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 219

⁷¹ Fisher and Haughton, 442, 444, Vachudova, 170

⁷² Vachudova, 170

⁷³ Fisher, 140

⁷⁴ Fisher, 127

basic condition for the EU – existence of liberal democracy. Further on, the survey showed that only 13 percent of Slovaks thinks that Slovakia has good international position.⁷⁵

However, the 1998 elections brought many changes. The opposition managed to form the Government with the SDK leader Mikulas Dzurinda as the Prime Minister, since together they won around 60 percent of votes.⁷⁶ Haughton⁷⁷ demonstrates that from the beginning of the Dzurinda's mandate the new government had worked to improve Slovakian international position. Dzurinda had made a number of diplomatic visits to the EU countries during first year of his mandate in order to show Slovakian willingness for cooperation with the EU.

One more issue on which the EU had pressured Slovakia during pre-accession process was the improvement of the ethnic minority rights. Hungarians represent the largest ethnic minority in Slovakia (10 percent of the population), while the second is the Roma (1.7 percent of the population, although unofficially the Roma account for around 10 percent of Slovak population).⁷⁸ The reason why part of ethnic Slovaks had hostile treatment towards Hungarian and Roma minority is closely connected with Slovak nationalism. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in the Meciar's nation building process during 1990s Hungarian minority was defined as the 'others', namely those who can threaten the new established Slovak Republic and the country's territorial integrity.⁷⁹ The fact that Hungarians had once ruled over Slovaks, during Austro-Hungarian Empire, creates in Slovaks, who do not have their own 'golden history', the complex of inferiority which then has a tendency to turn into hostile behavior.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Fisher, 127

⁷⁶ 1998 election results, Parliamentary Chamber: Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, available on http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2285_98.htm, (accessed May 24, 2009)

⁷⁷ Haughton. "When does..., 5

⁷⁸ Kyriaki Topidi, "The Limits of EU Conditionality: Minority Rights in Slovakia", *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, No. 1 (2003), 10, 12

⁷⁹ Fisher, 16

⁸⁰ Karen Henderson, "The Slovak Republic: Explaining defects in democracy", *Democratization*, Vol. 11, No. 5 (December 2004), 145

In the period 1994-1998 the position of minorities in Slovakia had deteriorated significantly due to Meciar's politics, i.e. the use of Hungarian language was constrained⁸¹ and a number of Hungarians were expelled from state administration jobs.⁸² Through 1998 Accession Partnership, the EU highlighted that change of the legislation considering minority language is necessary, as well as better protection of the minority's rights through policies and institutions' development.⁸³

Slovakia got negative 'avis' in 1997 partially due to the fact that Meciar did not make any progress considering better position of ethnic minorities. However, after the 1998 elections, Dzurinda made several changes that the EC in its 1999 Report assessed as "significant progress".⁸⁴ Primarily, the EC was satisfied with the Slovak progress because one of the parties of the winning coalition was the Party of Hungarian Coalition. Further more, by July 1999 Dzurinda changed the Law on the Use of the Minority Languages. The improved Law stated that the localities in which more than 20 percent of the locality's population belongs to an ethnic minority can use their language in equal manner like Slovak, the official language.⁸⁵ As the change of the Law on the Use of the Minority Languages was the last obstacle for the opening of the negotiation process, in 1999 Slovakia was invited to start negotiations.

However, the EU pressures for the improvement of the minority rights continued. 2000 EC report highlighted that Roma situation needs to be improved and that the minority laws were not implemented in the right manner.⁸⁶ In order to show willingness for improvement of the minority rights and against discrimination of any form, Dzurinda's government developed

⁸¹ Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, "International Socialization...", 112-113

⁸² Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, *The Situation of Hungarians in Slovakia* used in Topidi, 13

⁸³ COUNCIL DECISION of 30 March 1998 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the accession partnership with the Slovak Republic (98/262/EC), available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&type_doc=Decision&an_doc=1998&nu_doc=262&lg=en, (accessed May 25, 2009)

⁸⁴ James Hughes and Gwendolin Sasse, "Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs", *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Issue 1 (2003), 26

⁸⁵ Topidi, p. 17

⁸⁶ European Commission, *2000 Regular Report on Slovakia's Progress Towards Accession*, used in Topidi, 8

two action plans for the period 2000-2003.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the ‘Roma Strategy’⁸⁸ was developed in order to improve Roma position regarding the areas in which Roma population has often been discriminated: education, healthcare conditions, housing and employment.

However, despite strategies and laws which has been reinforced even EU acknowledged that in Slovakia “practical improvement” of the laws was “minor if not unnoticeable.”⁸⁹

The EU also pressured Slovakia to close two reactors of the nuclear power plant in Bohunice on the basis that their upgrade to meet the international safety standard would be too costly.⁹⁰ However, under the Meciar government there had not been any signs that Slovakia is working to fulfill this condition. Even more, Meciar’s plan regarding nuclear energy had been that nuclear power plant in Bohunice should stay open, with upgrading Bohunice’s two other reactors and with completion of the nuclear power plant Mochovce’s construction.⁹¹

Nuclear energy is a very important source of Slovak electricity production since it accounts for around 60 percent of total electricity production. Closing down of the two reactors would represent a loss of around 20 percent of Slovak electricity production.⁹²

However, Dzurinda’s government had different strategy than Meciar and immediately expressed the willingness to cooperate with the EU on this issue. Under Slovakia’s 1999 EU Accession Partnership, “Slovakia has undertaken to close Unit 1 of the Bohunice V1 nuclear power plant by 31 December 2006 at the latest and Unit 2 of this plant by 31 December 2008

⁸⁷ For more see: Topidi, 25

⁸⁸ For more see Topidi, 25-28

⁸⁹ Topidi, 37

⁹⁰ Eric Van Der Linden, Speech at conference “Can Slovakia secure energy supply and sustainable development without nuclear?”, Bratislava, May 2004, available at <http://www.sjforum.sk/cd/PDF/SessionI/I01Van-der-Linden.pdf>, (accessed May 26, 2009), 7-8

⁹¹ John van Oudenaren, “The Limits of Conditionality: Nuclear Reactor Safety in Central and Eastern Europe, 1991-2001“, *International Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2001), 480

⁹² Eric Van Der Linden, Speech at conference, 8

at the latest and subsequently decommission these units“⁹³, where this provision was included in the Accession Treaty, Protocol 9. Since the closing would, as already mentioned, cause significant costs, the EU granted its assistance.⁹⁴

However, in the EC Report from 2001, the EC stated that there had been no significant progress regarding development of alternative sources of power.⁹⁵ Further, soon after Slovakia's accession in 2004, some Slovakian voices revived the story of postponing the closing down of Bohunice's reactors. The Minister of Economy Pavol Rusko stated that Slovakia had significant problems with energy sources. Therefore, Rusko argued, it is better for Slovakia to delay closing of the first Bohunice reactor or at least if both reactors can be closed at the same time in 2008. However, Rusko's suggestion was rejected. With the Russian gas crisis in 2008, right before the deadline for closing down of the second Bohunice's reactor, Prime Minister Robert Fico again raised the issue of Slovak energy sources. Nevertheless, Fico had not managed to convince the EC that closing should be postponed.⁹⁶

On the other side, it seems that EU pressure regarding nuclear energy issue had not worried Slovak public like it had worried Slovak governments. Although in campaign for 2002 parliamentary elections Robert Fico, head of the Social Alternative for Slovakia (SMER), declared that if his party won the elections he would not allow closing down of the Bohunice's reactors since they represent “a pillar of the Slovak economy”⁹⁷, his party won only 13.5 per cent of the votes. The pro-western government won again, with Dzurinda as the Prime Minister.

⁹³ The Accession Treaty, Protocol 9, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:0297:0336:EN:PDF>, (accessed May 26, 2009)

⁹⁴ The Accession Treaty, Protocol 9, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:0297:0336:EN:PDF>, (accessed May 26, 2009)

⁹⁵ Lubica Kubosova, “Slovakia: Barking After a Lost Bone“, March 10, 2005, *Transitions Online*, 4, www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=8F1195E2-D3A1-4E3B-A412-C07F8AC2867D, (accessed May 26, 2009)

⁹⁶ Beata Balogova, “Reaching for the Bohunice gun“, January 19, 2009, *The Slovak Spectator*, http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/34118/11/reaching_for_the_bohunice_gun.html, (accessed May 26, 2009)

⁹⁷ Kalin Ivanov, “Legitimate Conditionality?The European Union and Nuclear Power Safety in CEE“, *International Politics*, Vol. 45 (2008), 161

3.2 Are Slovak Government Strategies Rational or Constructivist?

In this section the Slovak's government behavior is assessed through the three models explained in Chapter 1. The finding which of the models explains Slovakian behavior the best allows us to conclude which of the three hypotheses regarding public opinion can be confirmed. Finally, through the approved hypothesis the reason of high level of public support in Slovakia can be drawn.

From three EU pressures that have been examined in the previous section – pressure for the implementation of the liberal democracy, the pressure for the minority rights' improvement and the pressure for the closing down of two reactors of Bohunice nuclear power plant it can be seen that Slovakia during Meciar's government had not wanted to fulfill EU demands. Meciar ignored EU *demarches* regarding democracy level in Slovakia. Minority rights had not improved but instead even deteriorated. Considering nuclear power plant issue, Meciar had not wanted to close the reactors, but even to expand nuclear power production. Consequently, non-cooperation from Slovakian side resulted with non-cooperation from the EU side. The EU, as the 'stronger' actor in the pre-accession process, gave Slovakia a negative 'avis' and excluded it from the first wave of the negotiation process.

However, as the external incentives model explains the behavior of the 'weaker' actor, Slovakia's government ultimately fulfilled all EU demands and conditions, although costs have been present. The first EU pressure resulted with the change in the government. That new government's desire for the EU membership as the ultimate reward was significantly higher than the costs in this case can be seen on several occasions. First, after the 1998 parliamentary elections, the opposition parties managed to form the government which was rather colorful. It consisted of "reformed Communists, Christian Democrats and parties of the

Hungarian minority.”⁹⁸ However, due to desire to get positive ‘avis’ and the invitation to join the EU as soon as possible, all government parties declared that their major goal is Slovakia’s membership in the EU and NATO.⁹⁹ While in the previous elections the opposition parties could not unite because of their differences,¹⁰⁰ it seems like the uniting after 1998 elections became possible given that the integration into the EU as the common goal of Dzurinda’s government was higher than the cost of overcoming the party differences.

Second, the SMK inclusion in the government represented one more cost for the Dzurinda’s government. Although Dzurinda’s government could have been formed even without the SMK¹⁰¹, it was included in the government as a signal to EU that Slovakia is willing to improve minority rights and to improve “the image of Slovakia *vis-à-vis* our (government’s) EU ambitions”.¹⁰² However for some parties, like the SDL, the SMK inclusion represented a cost due to party tensions.¹⁰³ Since both parties decided to be part of the pro-western government coalition, it seems, they had been willing to pay the cost.

Further on, the SMK declared several times that it wanted to step out of the government, therefore staying in the government represented the SMK’s willingness for cost payment. The SMK had threatened its coalition partners that it would leave the government after the decision that there would not be a change in the Slovak constitution regarding the fact that the constitution refers to the population of Slovakia as the ‘Slovak nation’ and not like to the ‘citizens of Slovakia’.¹⁰⁴ The SMK was also not satisfied with the decisions on regionalization, since the SDL and the SOP voted with the opposition for not increasing the number of the Slovakian administrative districts. Since the SMK’s wish to make the region

⁹⁸ Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, “International Socialization..., 121

⁹⁹ Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, “International Socialization..., 121

¹⁰⁰ Haughton and Fisher, 442

¹⁰¹ Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, “International Socialization..., 122

¹⁰² George Pridham, “EU Enlargement and Consolidationg Democracy in Post-Communist States-Formality and Reality“, Journal of Common Marker Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2002): 964

¹⁰³ Pridham, “ EU Enlargement..., 964

¹⁰⁴ Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, „International Socialization..., 124

Komarovo a separate district had not been fulfilled, the SMK threatened again that it would leave the government. However, Dzurinda and even more importantly EU Commissioner Verheugen and the ambassadors of the US and UK in Slovakia stated that the break-up of the government could threaten, Slovakia's path to the EU and NATO. At the end the SMK decided to stay in the government.¹⁰⁵ Therefore again the prospect of the EU membership was higher than the cost the SMK had needed to pay.

Therefore, Dzurinda's government had almost fallen apart due to high costs that parties needed to pay. However, the desire to get positive 'avis' and to enter the EU with its neighbors was the strongest "glue" of Dzurinda's government.¹⁰⁶

Immediately after Dzurinda's government had been formed, Dzurinda started to work on the improvement of the minority rights, as already mentioned. The 1999 EC report marked Dzurinda's work as "significant progress."¹⁰⁷ However, the controversies over the Law on the Use of the Minority Languages show that Dzurinda's government was willing again to overcome the differences and to pay the price for the EU membership. The SDL declared that it wanted to leave the government, while the SMK was not satisfied with the final version of the law and it voted against it. The SMK accused Dzurinda that the law has "the aim of pleasing EU officials rather than ethnic minorities [...] in order to meet the deadlines for the EU entry negotiations which were to commence as the Helsinki summit."¹⁰⁸ Indeed, Dzurinda said that it is necessary to approve the law "by the end of June to allow the EU to move Slovakia up to the 'fast-track' group in accession talks."¹⁰⁹ A few months later the EC stated that Slovakia met the political criteria, since EU stated that adoption of this law is the last

¹⁰⁵ Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, „International Socialization..., 124

¹⁰⁶ Marek Rybar, "From Isolation to Integration: Internal and External Factors of Democratic Change in Slovakia", in *Socializing Democratic Norms: the Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe*, ed. Trine Flockhart, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), 187

¹⁰⁷ Hughes and Sasse, "Monitoring..., 26

¹⁰⁸ Michael J. Kopanic Jr., "The New Minority Language Law in Slovakia", *Central Europe Review*, Vol. 1, No.2 (1999) used in Topidi, 17

¹⁰⁹ Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, "International Socialization..., 123

issue that Slovakia need to deal with so that negotiations for membership could start.¹¹⁰ Therefore, the EU reward was bigger than the costs the parties needed to pay.

The issue of closing down of the Bohunice's reactors as the third pressure that have been examined in the case of Slovakia also shows that Dzurinda's government had strategy of pleasing the EU and paying the cost in order that Slovakia starts negotiations as soon as possible. It has already been mentioned that closing of these reactors would represent a significant change in Slovakia, with the loss of about 20 per cent of electricity production.¹¹¹ However, Dzurinda pledged to close down the reactors. The opposing voices had been present, however, foreign minister Eduard Kukan and Slovak President Rudolf Schuster accused the opponents "not to put party interests over the country's goals",¹¹² which means EU integration.

Finally, that for Dzurinda's government the reward of Slovakia's membership in the EU was higher than any cost the government needed to pay can be seen from government representatives who stated that they "would do everything for the EU to decide in favor of inviting Slovakia to membership negotiations in 1999"¹¹³ Furthermore, from the slogan of Fico's Smer, the opposition party, "To the European Union! But not with naked bottoms!"¹¹⁴ can be concluded that at times, as some scholars argue, Slovakia looked like "an obedient dog faith following its master's instructions."¹¹⁵ Therefore, Slovakia under the Dzurinda's

¹¹⁰ Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, "International Socialization...", 123

¹¹¹ Eric Van Der Linden, Speech at conference "Can Slovakia secure energy supply and sustainable development without nuclear?", Bratislava, May 2004, p. 8, available at <http://www.sjforum.sk/cd/PDF/SessionI/I01Van-der-Linden.pdf>, (accessed May 26, 2009)

¹¹² Martina Pisarova "KDH Doubts Nuclear Closure Promise", Slovak Spectator, October 15, 2001, quoted in Ivanov, 161

¹¹³ Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, "International Socialization...", 122

¹¹⁴ Fisher, 189

¹¹⁵ Tim Haughton and Darina Malová, "Challenge from the Pace-Setting Periphery: The Causes and Consequences of Slovakia's Stance on Further European Integration' in W. Sadurski et al. (eds), *Après Enlargement: Legal and Political Responses in Central and Eastern European States to the EU*, Florence: Robert Schuman Center, 2006), pp. 323-338, quoted in Haughton, 7

government ultimately decided to fulfill the EU conditionality, with rather clear strategy of obeying the EU demands, since the reward was bigger than costs.

Under the ‘constructivist’ social learning model, the second model that offers explanation for the behavior of the Slovak government, the applicant’s government fulfills EU’s conditions because it has same values and norms as the EU does.¹¹⁶ However, behavior of the Slovak government cannot be explained through this model due to several reasons.

Meciar government non-cooperation with the EU and the negative ‘avis’ as the EU response to it clearly means that Meciar and the EU had not shared same norms and values. On the other hand Dzurinda’s government wanted to cooperate with the EU; however there are several points that show that this cooperation might not be due to new government shared the same values as the EU. First, the parties included the SMK in the government. However, later on the SMK was complaining that the government did not fulfill their promises regarding minority issues.¹¹⁷ Therefore it can be argued that although the Hungarian parties were included in the Slovak government, neglecting the SMK demands means that government included the SMK to ‘grow in the eyes of the EU’ and not because they share the same values. Second, although the Dzurinda’s government at first made several changes regarding minority rights which the EC marked as significant progress¹¹⁸, later on the EC stated that there the laws regarding minority issues had not been rightfully implemented.¹¹⁹ Third, it cannot be argued that Dzurinda’s government brought the decision to close the Bohunice’s nuclear reactors because it shared same ‘green’ values like the EU. Immediately after the Slovak accession to the EU, the Minister of Economy started to complain that closing of the reactors will represent a significant problem for Slovakia. It can be concluded that the

¹¹⁶ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing..., 18

¹¹⁷ Fisher, 187

¹¹⁸ Hughes and Sasse, “Monitoring..., 26

¹¹⁹ Hughes and Sasse, “Monitoring..., 26

although Dzurinda's government had been more than willing to cooperate with the EU, it seems that it did not cooperate due to share the EU's values and norms, but just wanted to be included in the negotiation process. Therefore the social learning model cannot explain government behavior in the Slovak case.

Under the third model, namely the constructivist lesson-drawing model, the applicant's government fulfills EU demands not because of the EU membership as the ultimate reward but because of changes which would solve domestic problems.¹²⁰ However, this model cannot explain the government behavior in the case of Slovakia. Since Meciar's government did not want to cooperate with the EU, he did not think that cooperation would solve domestic problems. Dzurinda's government wanted cooperation but not for solving domestic problems but because of the EU membership as the ultimate reward. Several points prove that.

First, it is not likely that the opposition would have become stronger and would have managed to overcome the differences and to form the government after the elections, had it not been for the exclusion of Slovakia from the first wave of the negotiation process. As scholars argue, the EU membership as the ultimate goal was only thing that kept Dzurinda's government together.¹²¹ Further, regarding minorities, Dzurinda's government had changed the laws and defined strategies for improvement of the minority situation. However, the EC report stated that the law was not being implemented in the right manner.¹²² Even more, the EC stated that in Slovakia "practical improvement of the daily life of the minorities is very minor if not unnoticeable".¹²³ Third, the government had not made the decision to close the Bohunice reactors due to improvement in domestic situation. The desire of Economy Minister Rusko to postpone the closing, complaints about the financial and energy losses that Slovakia will have

¹²⁰ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, "Introduction: Conceptualizing...", 21

¹²¹ Rybar, 187

¹²² Hughes and Sasse, "Monitoring...", 26

¹²³ Topidi, 31

when the reactors will be closed, as well as the fact that Slovakia would have to rely on the import after the closing¹²⁴ shows that the closing of the reactors would cause even more problems. Finally, it is not likely that changes in the government, regarding minority and environment issues would have occur if they had not been spurred by the EU influence. In conclusion, Dzurinda's government did not fulfill EU demands in order to solve domestic issues, but due to EU membership as the ultimate reward. Therefore, the lesson drawing model cannot explain behavior of the Slovak government.

3.3 *Explanation for the Slovak euro-optimism*

Previous section has showed that responses of the Slovak government to the EU pressures in the pre-accession process can be best explained through 'rational' external incentives model. Thus, Dzurinda's government fulfilled the EU demands due to EU membership as the ultimate reward has been higher than costs the government needed to pay. Through the testing of the hypothesis drawn from the external incentives model, this section shows why Slovakia had high level of public support for the EU membership, although the EU pressures towards Slovakia have been rather strong.

Hypothesis drawn from the external incentives model says that the applicants' government adoption of EU rules affect negatively level of public support if at the moment of the adoption public does not perceive that the EU reward is higher than the adoption cost. There are several facts which can be served as a proof that for the Slovaks the EU membership as the final reward has been higher than costs of fulfillment of the EU pressures and, moreover, that Dzurinda's government responses to EU pressures has been approved by the Slovak public.

First, the negative 'avis' and the exclusion from the first wave of negotiation process had not affected Slovaks in negative way. The fact that majority of Slovaks had been deeply worried

¹²⁴ Kubosova, 2-3

about the Slovak exclusion and how the international community perceives Slovakia¹²⁵ shows that Slovaks have not been immune to the Western criticism like Meciar has been. In fact, the situation had fostered Slovaks to mobilize prior to 1998 parliamentary elections and to play an active role in bringing about change. Slovaks NGOs had organized major get-out-the-vote campaign which had helped electorate mobilization with ultimate result of 84 percent of turnout in the 1998 elections.¹²⁶ Although new government has been very heterogeneous (consisted out of four ideologically different parties, with two of these parties as coalition of several parties),¹²⁷ the Slovaks have been willing to pay the price and to have shaky political system, but at the same time pro-western one, than to have non-western oriented Meciar's government.

It appears that Slovaks did not mind the lax Dzurinda's government which, at the same time, has been like "obedient dog"¹²⁸ fulfilling the EU demands which represented a lot of sacrifice for domestic parties and bringing about drastic changes in the country. That can be seen from the fact that Dzurinda's party has managed to form the government again, after the 2002 parliamentary elections. The fact that Fico's campaign in which he stated that Slovakia sacrificed a lot for the EU and in which he criticized Dzurinda's strategies towards the EU¹²⁹ had not draw much of the Slovaks attention (his party won only 13,5 percent of votes)¹³⁰ shows one more proof that Slovaks has been satisfied with Dzurinda's policy towards the EU.

¹²⁵ Schimmelfennig, "The Europeanization...", 40

¹²⁶ Fisher, 146

¹²⁷ Henderson, *Slovakia: the escape...*, 49

¹²⁸ Tim Haughton and Darina Malová, "Challenge from the Pace-Setting Periphery: The Causes and Consequences of Slovakia's Stance on Further European Integration' in W. Sadurski et al. (eds), *Après Enlargement: Legal and Political Responses in Central and Eastern European States to the EU*, Florence: Robert Schuman Center, 2006), pp. 323-338, used in Haughton, "When Does...", 7

¹²⁹ Fisher, 189

¹³⁰ Ivanov, 161

That Slovaks approved Dzurinda's government responses to the EU pressures can be seen from the 2002 poll in which majority of Slovaks declared that after the 2002 elections they want that foreign policy and strategy towards the EU remain unchanged.¹³¹

It can be concluded that Slovaks had also, like Dzurinda's government, perceived that the benefits of EU membership are higher than costs Slovakia needs to pay. Thus both, Slovak public and government had made 'rational' cost-benefit analysis in the pre-accession process. Furthermore, it can be concluded that Dzurinda's government responses to EU pressures suited Slovaks and that they supported Dzurinda's strategy in the pre-accession process. Therefore in the case of Slovakia, hypothesis drawn from the external incentives model can be accepted. The government adoption of EU rules had not affected negatively public support for the EU membership due to Slovaks approved Dzurinda's strategies and due to Slovaks thought that EU membership as the ultimate prize is higher than the costs of EU conditionality. In other words, public support in Slovakia has been high in the pre-accession process due to there has been consensus between Slovaks and their government on strategies for dealing with EU conditionality.

3.4 EU Conditionality Pressures on Croatian Government

One of the most important pressures that the EU has exerted on Croatia during pre-accession process has been cooperation with the ICTY. Several Croatian generals and members of military personnel have been accused of crimes committed towards ethnic Serbs in the post-Yugoslav wars of 1991-1995 and through the military operations 'Flash' and 'Storm'.¹³² Tudjman saw the Homeland War (the war through which Croatia gained independence) as

¹³¹ Fisher, 189

¹³² Fisher, 178

defensive one and thought that accused personnel does not have to defend themselves in the ICTY¹³³.

On the other hand, immediately after the parliamentary elections in 2000 when Racan's government has been formed, the EC greeted new government's willingness to cooperate with the ICTY saying that it represents "a turning point in relations between the EU and Croatia."¹³⁴ However, Racan's cooperation with the ICTY turned out to be rather cautious due to a number of protests organized by the veteran's groups which sometimes counted more than 100,000 people. The veterans had accused new government for "intentionally minimizing the army's contribution to Croatia's war for independence".¹³⁵ Therefore, when the ICTY sent indictments for Ante Gotovina, accused for crimes in the 'Storm' operation, and for Rahim Ademi, accused for crimes towards ethnic Serbs in Croatia in 1993, Racan kept that information from Croatian public for several months until the formal indictment had not been announced. In the meantime Gotovina went into hiding, while Ademi decided voluntarily handover himself to the ICTY.¹³⁶ It seems like Racan's government has been unwilling to capture Gotovina due to fear of massive demonstrations. Consequently, when Racan's government declared that it cannot arrest Gotovina and transfer him to Hague, the ICTY accused the government let Gotovina to escape.¹³⁷ When the ICTY sent indictment for Janko Bobetko, the general who was also accused for the crimes committed in 1993 on ethnic Serbs in Croatia, Racan declared that he will not be transferred to the ICTY due to Bobetko

¹³³ Fisher, 179

¹³⁴ COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, Opinion on Croatia's Application for Membership of the European Union, April 20, 2004, available on <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0257:FIN:EN:PDF>, (accessed May 23, 2009)

¹³⁵ Fisher, 180

¹³⁶ Davor Butkovic, "Smije li (i kada) vlada lagati?" (Is the Government Allowed (and When) to Lie?), available at http://www.jutarnji.hr/komentari/kolumne/clanak/art-2009,3,7,butkovic_kolumna,154828.jl, (accessed May 25, 2009)

¹³⁷ Dejan Jovic, "Croatia and the European Union: a long delayed journey", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 8, No. 1. (April 2006), 96

has been in poor health.¹³⁸ The Racan's stance on Bobetko case deteriorated relations with the EU even more, with British and Dutch refusal to ratify Croatia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).¹³⁹ Along with problems with Croatian public and the EU, Racan's government faced one more shock when the Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLs) stepped out of the government due to its dissatisfaction with the ICTY cooperation.¹⁴⁰ Due to rather unsuccessful balancing between domestic public and political pressures on one side and the EU pressure on the other, Racan did not manage to win on 2003 parliamentary elections.

On the other hand the HDZ, which won on 2003 parliamentary elections, has been more determined to cooperate with the ICTY. Six military officers, accused for the war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, accused for the crimes committed during 'Storm', voluntarily turned themselves in.¹⁴¹ Consequently, in April 2004 the EC gave positive 'avis' to Croatia. However, the EC stated that further cooperation is essential and that Gotovina, who had been still hiding, needs to be turned in to the ICTY.¹⁴² Nevertheless, the negotiation process has been postponed and the EU had not wanted to set the date for accession talks until Gotovina is not turned in. Croatia's government has been once again in unpleasant position, since on one side, it has been accused by the ICTY's chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte that Gotovina is hiding in Croatia,¹⁴³ and on another side has been pressured by the Croatian public which thought that Gotovina is not a criminal, but rather a hero.¹⁴⁴ However, the Sanader's government ultimately fulfilled EU conditionality. During 2005, the government secretly developed the Action Plan with the EU and the ICTY with the

¹³⁸ Fisher, 181

¹³⁹ Fisher, 194

¹⁴⁰ Fisher, 195

¹⁴¹ Fisher, 195

¹⁴² COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, Opinion on Croatia's Application for Membership of the European Union, April 20, 2004, available on <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0257:FIN:EN:PDF>, (accessed May 23, 2009)

¹⁴³ Fisher, 196

¹⁴⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig, "EU Political Accession Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 15, No. 6 (September 2008), 929

aim to arrest Gotovina. Therefore the EU finally acknowledged that Sanader's government fully cooperates with the ICTY and that all necessary prerequisites for the start of the negotiation process have been fulfilled. Gotovina's arrest in the beginning of 2006, only few months after the negotiation process had started, proved that full cooperation with the ICTY has been present.¹⁴⁵

Overall, it can be concluded that EU pressure of cooperation with the ICTY had caused severe obstacles for both Račan's and Sanader's government. While Račan's government strategy towards ICTY has been rather cautious one, Sanader's government strategy has brought more fruitful results and managed to satisfy the EU side. However, Croatian public stayed rather unsatisfied that generals have been transferred to the ICTY.

Further on, when the EU in 2004 gave Croatia positive 'avis', it has emphasized, among the other conditions, that Croatia needs to improve minority rights.¹⁴⁶ As a consequence of wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia national minority rights in Croatia has been deteriorated significantly during 1990s. The national structure in Croatia was radically changed. The 2001 Census has showed ethnic Croats make 90 percent of the population, which is significantly higher than some ten years ago, when ethnic Croats made 78 percent of population. Ethnic Serbs, which has been constitutive nationality and made 13 percent of population before the war, in 1990s became minority since 2001 Census has showed that only 4,5 percent Serbs are residents of Croatia.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, during 1990s Tudjman had, as a part of the nation building process, defined Serbs as the 'others', namely those who can threaten Croatia as the

¹⁴⁵ Mario Susic, "Croatian Strategy of EU Integration 2000-2007-A Comparative Study", Political Thought: Croatian Political Science Review, No. 5 (2007), available at www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=C70A2A6A-E88F-4F93-B19A-04821B8A7FEE, (accessed May 25, 2009), 106

¹⁴⁶ COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, Opinion on Croatia's Application for Membership of the European Union, April 20, 2004, available on <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0257:FIN:EN:PDF>, (accessed May 23, 2009)

¹⁴⁷ Antonija Petricusic, "Wind of Change: The Croatian Government's Turn towards a Policy of Ethnic Reconciliation", *European Diversity and Autonomy Papers*, EDAP 6/2004, pp. 14-15, http://aei.pitt.edu/6163/01/2004_edap06.pdf, (accessed May 27, 2009)

nation and Croatian integrity as well.¹⁴⁸ Alike, many of the Croats saw the Croatian war for the independence “as defensive and saw themselves mainly as victims of Serbian aggression.”¹⁴⁹ Therefore, it can be assumed that Croats had tendency to be hostile towards Serbs minority.

The EC stated there have been improvements in minority rights under Racan’s government, like enactment of the constitutional Law on National Minorities. However, process of returning of refugees has been slow with refugees facing many obstacles.¹⁵⁰ Racan declared that his government will foster return of Serbs refugees and ensure full national minorities’ integration into society. However, the implementation of the law has been poor, while many refugees did not return to Croatia.¹⁵¹

After 2003 parliamentary elections Sanader’s HDZ has been helped by several minority representatives to form the government, including representatives from Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). Therefore, Sanader showed the will for ethnic reconciliation in Croatia and that HDZ, as a previous nationalist party, has been transformed.¹⁵² However, Human Rights Watch World Report 2005 - Croatia does not give so good grade for minority rights improvement. This report stated that Croatia made progress in 2004 toward membership in the European Union but did little to improve its still checkered human rights record.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁸ Fisher, 16

¹⁴⁹ Fisher, 179

¹⁵⁰ For more see: COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, Opinion on Croatia's Application for Membership of the European Union, April 20, 2004, available on <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0257:FIN:EN:PDF>, (accessed May 23, 2009)

¹⁵¹ Petricusic, 9-10

¹⁵² Petricusic, 10

¹⁵³ Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 2005 – Croatia*, January 1, 2005, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,,HRV,421da3107,0.html>, (accessed May 29, 2009)

The second Sanader's government has resulted with some improvements. The EC Progress report¹⁵⁴ for Croatia from November 2008 stated that some progress has been present regarding the implementation of the Law on National Minorities. Nevertheless, some provisions' implementation has been limited. Furthermore, Action Plan for implementation of the Housing Care programs has been developed in June 2008. However, for there are still obstacles present, especially regarding housing.

One more pressure that the EU has exerted on Croatia has been "to resolve border issues with neighboring countries [...] and issues arising from unilateral declaration of the protected "Ecological and Fishing Zone" (ZERP) in the Adriatic."¹⁵⁵

Croatia has unresolved border disputes for almost two decades since Croatia became independent state. In 2001 Racan's government had reached an agreement with Slovenia regarding maritime border in the Piran Bay. However, Racan had not ratified the agreement since he was under pressure of Croatian public for whom "the deal was very unpopular."¹⁵⁶ Therefore, dispute over Piran Bay stayed unresolved. Furthermore, according to the United Convention on the Law of the Sea, in 2003 Racan's government had proclaimed ZERP, with the aim that decision comes into force in 2004.¹⁵⁷ The ZERP proclamation initiative had

¹⁵⁴ For more see: Commission of the European Communities: Croatia 2008 Progress report, Brussels, November 5, 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/croatia_progress_report_en.pdf, (accessed May 29, 2009)

¹⁵⁵ COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, Opinion on Croatia's Application for Membership of the European Union, April 20, 2004, available on <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0257:FIN:EN:PDF>, (accessed May 23, 2009)

¹⁵⁶ Tihomir Loza et al, "Slovenia and Croatia: Truck-ulent Neighbors" from February 21, 2005, Transition Online, available on www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=105bac50-81e9-4a05-8057-60803990c04d, (accessed May 25, 2009), 2-3

¹⁵⁷ The decision on Croatian jurisdiction extension on Adriatic Sea, available on <http://www.mmpi.hr/UserDocsImages/nn-157-03-Odluka%20o%20pro%C5%A1irenju%20jurisdikcije%20RH%20na%20Jadranskom%20moru.htm>, (accessed May 25, 2009)

came on the basis that without it Croatian fishery suffers significant loss since Italian ships yearly catch 300 million euro worth fish from this zone.¹⁵⁸

However, before the ZERP came into force in 2004, Sanader's government made amendment that the ZERP would not imply for the EU member states.¹⁵⁹ Public and the most of parliamentary parties were not satisfied with the solution with some parliamentarians stating that they will organize referendum about ZERP together with the Fishery Union.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, under domestic pressure Sanader's government made amendment that the ZERP will apply for the EU member states starting from January 1, 2008.¹⁶¹ However, after March 2008, when Rehn warned Croatia that the ZERP issue could slow down negotiation process,¹⁶² Sanader decided not to apply ZERP to EU members until Croatia enters the Union. Sanader stated "We have been facing a dilemma about whether we should continue with EU negotiations and at the same time postpone implementing ZERP or implement ZERP and face the fact that the negotiations have been blocked. We think it is better for Croatia to finish with the negotiation process as soon as possible."¹⁶³

Nevertheless, Sanader's government faced new obstacles regarding maritime disputes when it wanted to use some documents for EU negotiation on new chapters. The issue of unresolved dispute over Piran Bay with Slovenia came once again to the focus. Slovenia managed to

¹⁵⁸ "HSS najavio referndum o ZERP-u", ("HSS announced referendum regarding ZERP issue") from June 2, 2006, Poslovni dnevnik, (Business Journal), available on <http://www.poslovni.hr/14446.aspx>, (accessed May 25, 2009)

¹⁵⁹ The amendment on the decision on Croatian jurisdiction extension on Adriatic Sea, available on <http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/312173.html>, (accessed May 25, 2009)

¹⁶⁰ "HSS najavio referndum o ZERP-u", ("HSS announced referendum regarding ZERP issue") from June 2, 2006, Poslovni dnevnik, (Business Journal), available on <http://www.poslovni.hr/14446.aspx>, (accessed May 25, 2009)

¹⁶¹ The amendment on the decision on Croatian jurisdiction extension on Adriatic Sea, available on <http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/128861.html>, (accessed May 25, 2009)

¹⁶² "Ako se ZERP brzo ne riješi, doci će do zastoja u hrvatskim pregovorima, ("If ZERP issue will not be solved quickly, there will be delay in negotiations" from March 7, 2008, Business Journal, available on <http://www.poslovni.hr/72847.aspx>, (accessed May 25, 2009)

¹⁶³ Natasa Radic, "Croatia gives up ZERP", Southeast European Times, March 13, 2008, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2008/03/13/feature-02, (accessed May 25, 2009)

“freeze” negotiation process claiming that Croatia wanted to use documents that include border issues. Sanader declared that no documents of such kind are used and suggested to solve the dispute legally, before international justice bodies.¹⁶⁴ Sanader stated firmly that “Croatia isn't and won't be ready nor will it ever accept blackmail, which has no place in the EU. (...) We won't buy our membership of the EU with territory.”¹⁶⁵

3.5 Are Croatian Government Strategies Rational or Constructivist?

As has been shown in the Chapter 1, thesis's theoretical framework offers two explanations for the applicant country behavior in the pre-accession process. This section will assess whether Croatian government behavior in the pre-accession process has been rational or constructive. The assessment is made through three models namely, the ‘rational’ external incentives model, ‘constructive’ social learning model and ‘constructive’ lesson drawing model.

First explanation for Racan's and Sanader's governments can be provided through external incentives model, which come under rational models of behavior. Under this model the Croatian government as the ‘weaker actor’ in the pre-accession process decides to fulfill EU conditions due to ultimate reward (the EU membership) is higher than the costs of the EU conditionality.

The EU pressures on Croatia examined in the previous section, namely cooperation with the ICTY, improvement of the minority rights and border disputes settlement with neighbor countries showed that EU as a ‘stronger’ actors forced both Racan's and Sanader's governments to make cost-benefit analysis regarding EU membership. In 2000 when Racan's

¹⁶⁴ “Croatian EU Negotiations Depend On Slovenia”, from October 22, 2008, News portal “Javno”, available on <http://www.javno.com/en/croatia/clanak.php?id=195144>, (accessed May 25, 2009)

¹⁶⁵ Elitsa Vucheva, “Slovenia to block Croatia EU accession talks”, December 18, 2008, available on <http://euobserver.com/9/27314>, (accessed May 25, 2009)

government has been formed, Racan expressed will to foster pre-accession process for EU membership. It seems that for Racan initially the EU membership as the prize has been higher than the costs. His government accepted cooperation with the ICTY, started to make amendments on the Law on National Minorities and programs for the refugee return and made an agreement with Slovenia over the Piran Bay. However, Racan's government has been very slow and cautious in action: Gotovina managed to escape the arrest, the law on minorities has been approved after two years of delays; refugees that wanted to come back still had faced many obstacles; the agreement set with Slovenia at the end had not been ratified. Since Racan's government also faced significant domestic pressure regarding mentioned issues,¹⁶⁶ it seems that for his government adoption of the EU rules had had too high price at the end.

Sanader's government has been more proactive in fulfillment of the EU demands. However, at first it seemed that Sanader had not wanted to cooperate with the ICTY due to rather often warnings from the EU representatives. For example, Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy warned that cooperation with ICTY is of essential importance for the opening of the negotiation process.¹⁶⁷ Bronislaw Geremek, member of the European Parliament stated that it is important for Croatia to fulfill the EU demands the sooner the better in order to start negotiation process, since "the mood inside the EU toward enlargement is changing."¹⁶⁸ On the other side domestic pressures had also been present since the public perceived Gotovina as a hero, and not as a war criminal with more than 80 percent of those who thought that Gotovina should not be judged in ICTY.¹⁶⁹ Ultimately Sanader fulfilled EU condition and Gotovina has been arrested. It can be concluded that Sanader

¹⁶⁶ Fisher, 194

¹⁶⁷ "Solana: Suradnja Hrvatske s Haskim sudom od presudne vaznosti", (Solana: Cooperation with Hague Tribunal is very important"), April 25, 2005, Index news portal, <http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/solana-suradnja-hrvatske-s-haskim-sudom-od-presudne-vaznosti/262037.aspx>, (accessed May 30, 2009)

¹⁶⁸ Zeljka Vujcic, "Euro-scepticism on the Rise", September 28, 2005, Euractiv portal, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/croatia-euro-scepticism-rise/article-145117>, (accessed May 30, 2009)

¹⁶⁹ Frank Schimmelfennig, "EU Political Accession...", 929

made cost-benefit analysis in which he perceived that opening of negotiation process is higher than cost.

Although EU pressure regarding minority rights' improvement and refugee return represents area in which adoption of EU condition seemed to have less success than in other pressures, the cost-benefit analysis has been again present. From the fact that Sanader included members from ethnic minority parties in the government and through that pledged that he will foster refugee return can be seen that for Sanader the benefit (getting positive 'avis' from the EU) has been higher than the possible costs (non-approval from the public).

Further, it seems like Sanader also made cost-benefit analysis on the ZERP issue too. Two times his government made amendments on the ZERP – first time it decided that it not refers to the EU member states, second time that it does. It seems that in the first case the EU reward played the role, since almost at the same time Croatia got positive 'avis' from the EC. However, the cost of possible referendum made Sanader's government to make second amendment. Ultimately, Sanader fulfilled EU condition that ZERP do not apply for EU member states due to he had assessed that EU membership as the ultimate reward is higher than cost of domestic pressure. Regarding unsettled border dispute with Slovenia Sanader is firm in saying that Croatia "will not buy membership of the EU with territory."¹⁷⁰ However, with his acceptance to solve the issue legally, Sanader again weighted that EU influence and EU benefits are bigger than costs, because cost perceived by the domestic public in this case have been high since the day that negotiations on dispute settlement came to focus, under Račan's government.¹⁷¹

Therefore, it seems that Račan's and Sanader's governments have been weighing the benefits (getting the positive 'avis' and opening of the negotiation process) with the costs of fulfilling

¹⁷⁰ Vucheva, <http://euobserver.com/9/27314>, (accessed May 25, 2009)

¹⁷¹ Loza, 2-3

the EU demands regarding three investigated pressures (non-approval of domestic public). However, while Racan has been rather cautious in fulfilling EU demands, Sanader's had been more willing to pay the cost of the EU reward. Thus, it can be concluded that Racan's and Sanader's government behavior can be well explained through the external incentives model.

On the other side, under constructivist social learning model applicant country's government fulfills EU conditions due to it shares same values and norms as the EU. However, this model cannot explain Racan's and Sanader's government behavior due to several reasons.

Initially, it seemed that Racan's government had the same values like the EU regarding pressures investigated in the previous section. Racan accepted cooperation with the ICTY, pledged to change the law on minorities and to foster refugee return and made an agreement for border dispute settlement with Slovenia. However, Racan's government has been hesitating "to speak openly about war crimes committed by Croats"¹⁷² and to transfer Bobetko and Gotovina to the ICTY. That gives impression that Racan's government accepted cooperation with the ICTY only due to EU pressure. Furthermore, the law on minorities has been approved only after two and half years of constant delays. Alike, refugees who returned to Croatia faced many obstacles at the local level. Overall, Racan has been "uncomfortable about making any grand gestures towards the Serbs."¹⁷³ Therefore, Racan's government pledged to improve minority rights due to EU pressure. Finally, the fact that an agreement with Slovenia has never been ratified give the impression that it served only to show the EU Croatian willingness for solving border disputes with neighbor countries. Therefore, it seem like Racan's government will to cooperate with the EU has been more matter of EU influence on Croatia and less matter of sharing the same values.

¹⁷² Fisher, 179

¹⁷³ Fisher, 194

Although Sanader's government fulfilled EU demands it also seems, like it was the case with Racan's government, that it did not obey the EU rules due to it has shared the same values like the EU. First, the postponement of negotiations and often remarks from the EU representatives that the negotiations will not start until Gotovina is in The Hague made Sanader "to comply with unpopular demand (since) high incentives (has been) in close reach"¹⁷⁴, namely to cooperate with the EU and ultimately fulfill EU condition. Further, Sanader included representatives of the minorities in the government due to without their support he could not form the majority. Finally, back-and-forth game with the amendments on the ZERP seems like Sanader comply with the EU demand in order to get positive 'avis' and due to warnings from the EU that ZERP could slow down negotiation process. Therefore, it seems like Sanader's government deeds has been more the result of the EU conditions than result of sharing the same values with the EU.

Since ultimate compliance (or non-compliance in the Racan's case) with the EU demands is more likely result of the EU conditions than sharing of the EU's values and norms, social learning model cannot explain the behavior of both Racan's and Sanader's government.

The last, lesson drawing model, suggests that applicant country's government fulfills EU demands due to it expects that it will solve effectively domestic problems and not due to EU membership as the ultimate reward. However, Racan's government and Sanader's government behavior cannot be properly explained through this model due to several reasons.

It seems that Racan's initial willingness for cooperation with the EU on the three issues examined in the previous section is drawn more by the prospect of membership than the thought that compliance of EU demands will solve domestic problems. Racan could presuppose that his decision to cooperate with the ICTY will cause strong reactions in the

¹⁷⁴ Schimmelfennig, "EU political accession...", 929

public since large majority of Croats did not perceived Croatian generals that defended their country in 1991-1995 Yugoslav wars as war criminals¹⁷⁵. Further, he could also presuppose that Croats will not be fond of the refugee return since only few years before the war has been finished. Therefore, Racan's government knew that expressing of the willingness for fulfilling of the EU demands can create even more problems. Thus, it is not likely that Racan wanted cooperation with the EU due to it will solve domestic problems.

Sanader's government behavior also does not fit to lesson drawing model. Sanader knew, from the experience of the Racan's government, that domestic public is not fond of cooperation with the ICTY¹⁷⁶, refugee return and an agreement on the border dispute that has been reached with Slovenia.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, Sanader knew that with fulfilling of the EU conditions there is possibility that public non approval would be even higher. However, ultimately Sanader's government fulfilled EU conditions. Alike, it is not likely that if was not for the EU influence Sanader's government would foster refugee return that the Croatian military personnel would be judged in front of ICTY for the war crimes and that ZERP would not apply to the EU member states. Therefore, Sanader's government fulfilled the EU conditions due to EU influence and not due to he thought fulfillment will solve domestic problems.

3.6 *Explanation for the Croatian euroscepticism*

With the finding from the previous section, namely that external incentives model explains the best Croatian government's responses to EU pressures this section will test the hypothesis drawn from that model which will further allow answering why Croatia has low level of public support for the EU membership.

¹⁷⁵ Schimmelfennig, "EU Political Accession...", 929

¹⁷⁶ Fisher, 180

¹⁷⁷ Loza, 2-3

The look on the surveys show Croatian public support for the EU membership has deteriorated significantly over the last decade. According to Croatian Centre for Market Research Gfk,¹⁷⁸ support for the EU membership has been around 75 percent in 2000-2003 period with around 10 percent of opponents. However 2004-2005 period shows different numbers with around 50 percent of supporters and around 50 percent of opponents. The Eurobarometer survey shows, as it has already been shown in section 2.4., that Croatian support for the EU membership is on a low level for several years with a level around 30-35 percent in 2005-2008 period and with the percentage of opponents increasing from 24 to 38 percent (see Appendix 2).¹⁷⁹

Hypothesis drawn from the external incentives model says that the applicants' government adoption of EU rules affect negatively level of public support if at the moment of the adoption public does not perceive that the EU reward is higher than the adoption cost. There are several facts which can be served as a proof that for the Croats the EU membership as the final reward has been lower than costs of fulfillment of the EU pressures and, moreover, that Racan's government strategy has been approved due to it has been hesitating to comply with EU conditions, while Sanader's government responses to EU pressures have not been approved by the Croatian public.

It seems like government behavior had a great impact on public opinion for EU membership. High support for the EU membership during Racan's government can be explained with the fact that public perceived that EU reward is higher than the costs. In fact, since Racan's government has been slow in responding to EU demands and ultimately did not fulfill EU conditions, as has been found in sections 3.4. and 3.5., the costs for the public has been very low. Therefore, Racan's rather cautious strategy with not very fruitful results in compliance

¹⁷⁸ Gfk research on public opinion for the EU membership, used in Stulhofer, 139

¹⁷⁹ Eurobarometer survey, Public opinion, European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm, (accessed May 28, 2009)

with the EU rules seemed to suited Croatian public and did not affect their high support for the EU membership. However, since Racan did not fulfill EU conditions hypothesis cannot be tested in this case.

On the other hand, hypothesis can be tested regarding public reactions to the Sanader's pre-accession strategy. During Sanader's government support for the EU membership has fallen significantly although Croatia got positive 'avis' and opened negotiation process for the EU membership.

Nevertheless, it seems that Croatian public does not perceive that EU membership as the reward is higher than costs. For example, the public perceived Gotovina as a hero, and not as a war criminal with more than 80 percent of those who thought that Gotovina should not be judged in ICTY.¹⁸⁰

Furthermore, Sanader's government strategy which has not been very transparent, with back-and-forth decisions, could be one more reason for low public support. When opening of the negotiation process has been postponed due to insufficient cooperation with the ICTY Sanader, knowing that the cost for domestic public is high, tried to convince the EU that opening of negotiations should start and that that would not diminish further Croatian cooperation with the ICTY, sending the signal to the public that he will not pay this price easy.¹⁸¹ However, negotiation process started only after Gotovina has been arrested. Furthermore, unclear strategy is obvious in the case of ZERP where, like sections 3.4. and 3.5. show, Sanader first decided, under pressure from EU and in order to get positive 'avis', that ZERP will not apply for the EU. Nevertheless, under domestic pressure he changed the decision that ZERP will apply for the EU, while ultimately deciding, again under pressure

¹⁸⁰ Frank Schimmelfennig, "EU Political Accession...", 929

¹⁸¹ Vjucic, "Eurocepticism..."

from the EU, that ZERP will not apply for the EU. Therefore, Sanader's rather unclear strategy, with no plans and priorities could be the cause for low public support.

It can be concluded that Croats, like Racan's and Sanader's government, had made 'rational' cost-benefit analysis in the pre-accession process. Racan's noncompliance with EU demands seemed to suite the public and did not have negative effect on public support for the EU membership. On the other hand, it seems that public does not approve Sanader's unclear strategy and that affected negatively public opinion on the EU membership. Furthermore it seems the public, unlike Sanader's government, did not perceive that benefits of EU membership are higher than costs Croatia needs to pay.

Therefore, in the case of Croatia, hypothesis drawn from the external incentives model can be accepted. The Sanader's government adoption of EU rules had affected negatively public support for the EU membership due to Croats did not approved Sanader's strategies and due to Croats thought that EU membership as the ultimate prize is not higher than the costs of EU conditionality. In other words, public support in Croatia has been low in the pre-accession process due to there has not been consensus between Croats and their government on strategies for dealing with EU conditionality.

CONCLUSION

The present thesis has tried to discover why there are different levels of public support for the EU membership in the pre-accession process. Identifying the gap in the scholarly debate, namely neglect of the research on the impact and consequences that government reactions can have on level of public support for the EU membership, the thesis' research fills the gap by investigating government strategies and public reactions in the pre-accession process on the case of Slovakia and Croatia.

Theoretical framework, developed in the first chapter, presented three models that served as a base for thesis' research. These models, namely 'rational' external incentives model, 'constructivist' lesson drawing model and 'constructivist' social learning model. The models explain why the applicant's government decides to fulfill the EU conditions. While first model presupposes that government acts rationally, namely makes cost benefit analysis before the compliance and adopts EU rules due to EU reward is bigger than the costs of compliance, second and third model are constructivist models which implies that government adopts the EU rules due to it shares same values and thinks that adopting will solve domestic problems. Three hypotheses have been drawn from these models, which served to answer thesis research question in the third chapter.

However before applying these models to investigate government and public behavior in Slovakia and Croatia, other factors that could influence public opinion for the EU membership needed to be eliminated. Therefore, in the second chapter Slovakia and Croatia has been compared on three different levels. First, examination of historical background in the 1990s of Slovakia and Croatia showed that countries had very similar political and economic path. The nationalist semi-authoritarian rulers did not want to foster cooperation with the EU, therefore their non-cooperation had led to isolation of Slovakia and Croatia from international

community during 1990s since EU had started to dislike them. Furthermore, similar EBRD transition indicators show that Slovakia and Croatia have been in similar economic situation as well. Further, ‘general’ factors and ‘pre-accession’ factors that can influence public opinion on EU membership has been scrutinized with the finding that all the factors has been similar, therefore these factors cannot be the cause of different level of public support in Slovakia in Croatia.

In the third chapter three pressures that EU has exerted on Slovakia and Croatia have been chosen in order to see Slovak and Croatian government’s strategies for compliance with EU rules. EU pressures for democratization, improvement of minority rights and closing of the Bohunice nuclear power plant reactors has been used in Slovak case, while in Croatian case EU pressures that have been investigated were cooperation with the ICTY, improvement of minority rights and solving of the border dispute with Slovenia. The thesis finds that strategies of both countries’ governments can be best explained through external incentives model, since governments done cost benefit analysis of EU rewards and adoption costs when fulfilling EU conditions. We have seen Dzurinda’s government in Slovakia fulfilled all EU conditions rather fast and looked like “obedient dog faith fully following its master’s instruction.”¹⁸² On the other side Racan’s government has rather cautious and ultimately did not fulfill EU conditions due to it not perceived that EU reward (getting the positive ‘avis’ for Croatia) is higher than domestic adoption costs. On the other side, Sanader’s government ultimately complied with EU demands due to EU reward (opening of negotiation process) has been higher than costs, however with unclear strategy of changing the decisions under EU and domestic pressures.

Further, the hypothesis drawn from external model, which claims that applicant’s government adoption of EU rules affect negatively level of public support if at the moment of the adoption

¹⁸² Haughton and Malova, quoted in Haughton, 7

public does not perceive that EU reward is higher of adoption cost has been tested. In both cases, Slovak and Croatian, hypothesis has been accepted.

The finding is that both Slovak and Croatian public made cost benefit analysis regarding EU pressures. Further, thesis finds that Slovaks approved Dzurinda's strategies and thought that EU membership as the ultimate prize is higher than the costs of EU conditionality. Therefore, it can be concluded that public support in Slovakia has been high in the pre-accession process due to there has been consensus between Slovaks and their government on strategies for dealing with EU conditionality.

In the case of Croatia, Racan's noncompliance with EU demands seemed to suite the public, while it seems that public did not approve Sanader's unclear strategy. Furthermore, it seems that for Croatian public the costs of compliance with EU rules have been higher than EU membership as the reward, since under Racan's government public support has been high, while under Sanader's government adoption of EU rules had affected negatively public support for the EU membership. Therefore in the case of Croatia, public support has been low in the pre-accession process due to there has not been consensus between Croats and Sanader's government on strategies for dealing with EU conditionality.

Bringing to the larger theoretical picture, it can be concluded that both public and government behave rationally when complying with EU demands in the pre-accession process. Furthermore, it has been shown that government responses can be the cause of different levels of public support for the EU membership across countries. Therefore, when there is a consensus between government and public regarding responses to the EU pressures, public opinion for the EU membership will not be negatively affected. However, if the public does not approve government strategies, the cost of compliance for the public is higher than EU

membership as the reward. Thus, the government strategies will be the cause of the low level of public support for the EU membership.

APPENDIX 1

Table 1: Croatia: Transition indicators

	Large scale privatization	Small scale privatization	Enterprise restructuring	Price Liberalization	Trade & Forex system	Competition Policy	Banking reform & interest rate liberalization	Securities & non- bank financial institutions	Overall infrastructure reform
1989	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.67	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.33
1990	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.67	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.33
1991	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.67	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.33
1992	2.00	3.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.33
1993	2.00	4.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.33
1994	2.00	4.00	2.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	2.67	2.00	1.67
1995	3.00	4.00	2.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	2.67	2.00	1.67
1996	3.00	4.33	2.67	4.00	4.00	2.00	2.67	2.00	2.00
1997	3.00	4.33	2.67	4.00	4.00	2.33	2.67	2.33	2.00
1998	3.00	4.33	2.67	4.00	4.00	2.33	2.67	2.33	2.00
1999	3.00	4.33	2.67	4.00	4.00	2.33	3.00	2.33	2.33
2000	3.00	4.33	2.67	4.00	4.33	2.33	3.33	2.33	2.33
2001	3.00	4.33	2.67	4.00	4.33	2.33	3.33	2.33	2.67
2002	3.00	4.33	2.67	4.00	4.33	2.33	3.67	2.67	2.67
2003	3.33	4.33	2.67	4.00	4.33	2.33	3.67	2.67	3.00
2004	3.33	4.33	3.00	4.00	4.33	2.33	4.00	2.67	3.00
2005	3.33	4.33	3.00	4.00	4.33	2.33	4.00	2.67	3.00
2006	3.33	4.33	3.00	4.00	4.33	2.33	4.00	3.00	3.00
2007	3.33	4.33	3.00	4.00	4.33	2.67	4.00	3.00	3.00
2008	3.33	4.33	3.00	4.00	4.33	2.67	4.00	3.00	3.00

Source: EBRD Transition indicators used in Fruzsina Siger, “EU-Anchor in “Non-Mainstream” Countries Transition Path: The Case of Croatia and Slovakia”, Tiger Working Paper Series, No. 115,(Warsaw, 2009), available at <http://www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/TWPN0115.pdf>, (last accessed May 18, 2009)

Table 2: Slovakia: Transition indicators

	Large scale privatization	Small scale privatization	Enterprise restructuring	Price Liberalization	Trade & Forex system	Competition Policy	Banking reform & interest rate liberalization	Securities markets & non-bank financial institutions	Overall infrastructure reform
1989	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	NA	1.00
1990	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	NA	1.00
1991	4.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	NA	1.00
1992	4.00	4.00	2.00	2.67	1.00	1.00	1.00	NA	1.00
1993	4.00	4.00	2.00	2.67	2.00	1.00	1.00	NA	1.00
1994	4.00	4.00	3.00	2.67	2.67	1.00	1.00	NA	2.00
1995	4.00	4.00	3.00	2.67	2.67	1.67	2.33	NA	2.00
1996	4.00	4.33	3.00	2.67	2.67	1.67	2.33	NA	2.00
1997	4.00	4.00	3.00	2.67	2.33	1.67	2.33	NA	2.00
1998	4.00	4.33	3.00	2.67	2.33	1.67	2.33	2.00	2.00
1999	4.00	4.33	3.00	2.67	2.33	2.00	2.33	2.00	2.00
2000	4.00	4.33	3.00	3.00	2.33	2.00	2.33	2.33	2.00
2001	4.00	4.33	3.00	3.33	2.33	2.33	3.00	2.33	3.00
2002	4.33	4.33	3.00	3.33	2.33	2.67	3.33	2.67	4.00
2003	4.33	4.33	3.00	3.33	2.67	3.00	3.33	2.67	4.00
2004	4.33	4.33	3.33	3.67	2.67	3.00	3.33	2.67	4.00
2005	4.33	4.33	3.33	3.67	2.67	3.00	3.67	3.00	4.00
2006	4.33	4.33	3.33	3.67	3.00	3.00	3.67	3.00	4.00
2007	4.33	4.33	3.33	3.67	3.00	3.00	3.67	3.00	4.00
2008	4.33	4.33	3.33	3.67	3.00	3.00	3.67	3.00	4.00

Source: EBRD Transition indicators used in Fruzsina Siger, “EU-Anchor in “Non-Mainstream” Countries Transition Path: The Case of Croatia and Slovakia”, Tiger Working Paper Series, No. 115,(Warsaw, 2009), available at <http://www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/TWPN0115.pdf>, (last accessed May 18, 2009)

APPENDIX 2

Support for EU membership – Slovakia

EU membership for your country will be:

Year	a good thing %	a bad thing %
2001.	58	5
2002.	58	5
2003.	58	8
2004.	57	4

Source: European Commission: Candidate countries Eurobarometer: Reports Autumn 2001, 2002, 2003, Standard Eurobarometer 62, available on
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm

Support for EU membership – Croatia

EU membership for your country will be:

Year	a good thing %	a bad thing %
2004.	30	24
2005.	34	26
2006.	32	n.a.
2007.	35	25
2008.	23	38

Source: European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer 62, 64, 66, 68 and 70, available on
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm

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