Measuring Socialisation: An Empirical Analysis of the 'Europeanisation' of Neutral Identities and Interests – Case Study: Austria

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Abstract

In the late 1990s, many scholars recognised that international relations theory had taken a decidedly constructivist turn. Debates between the traditional IR theories of realism and liberalism were no longer as effective or relevant in discussing and explaining world politics. In turn, constructivist scholars have sought to move beyond the individualism inherent in the more mainstream IR theories and to regard the relationship between structure and agency in international relations as mutual constitutive. Jeffrey Checkel, a key constructivist scholar, stresses that it is clear that institutions can socialize, but the challenge remains in specifying *when, under what conditions and through what mechanisms* socialisation occurs.

This thesis will engage in a methodologically and empirically stringent analysis that goes beyond measuring *whether* socialisation has taken place with respect to the identities and interests of European neutral states in the context of the European Union. It is the goal of this research to determine *when, under what conditions, and through what mechanisms* such socialisation has occurred. In order to provide a more coherent and concise analysis, focus will be limited to a specific case study on Austrian neutrality; the hopeful implication being that such research can then be applied more widely to understand socialisation in other European neutral states, as well as the broader process of socialisation. Two levels of analysis will be examined: socialisation at both the elite and grassroots levels. This will illustrate that there has been a disconnect between socialisation at the grassroots level and that at the elite level.

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Introduction

In the mid-1990s, Austria, Sweden, and Finland all acceded to the European Union. The accession of three European neutral states raised many questions surrounding the maintenance and continued relevance of neutrality as a policy and as part of the identity of these states. In this regard, Austria, more than either of the other acceding countries, was pressured by key actors and institutions of the European Union and essentially persuaded to reconsider its status as a neutral state. What was once a key policy consideration and element of national identity now stood as an obstacle to full active participation in international relations. While it has become increasingly clear that the meaning of neutrality has changed dramatically, the implications of this change for the identities and interests of Austria as a European neutral state are unclear. To further complicate these issues, there appears to be a disconnect in the relationship between neutrality and identity at the elite level and that at the grassroots level. That is to say, neutrality no longer remains the centrepiece of the foreign, security, and defence policies of Austria, yet it is still regarded as a cornerstone of the national identity of its population.

While explicit changes to neutral policy are easily observed, subtle changes in national identity are more difficult to measure. As a major criticism of the constructivist approach to international relations study, many scholars and observers have stressed the lack of methodologically and empirical stringent analyses in understanding key concepts and phenomena, including that of socialisation – the constitutive effect of institutions in shaping agent's identities and interests. Building on a call for further research from international relations scholar and sociologist Jeffrey Checkel, it is no longer relevant to solely examine whether socialisation has taken place, but rather how the process takes place. With respect to the case study at hand, it is evident that certain conditions and mechanisms have allowed

socialisation to occur on the elite level; however, the same cannot be said of socialisation on the grassroots level.

The purpose of this thesis is to engage in a methodologically and empirically stringent analysis that goes beyond measuring *whether* socialisation has taken place with respect to the identities and interests of European neutral states in the context of the European Union. It is the goal of this research to determine, in Checkel's words, *when, under what conditions, and through what mechanisms* such socialisation has occurred. The specific case study on Austrian neutrality will hopefully allow for such research to be applied more widely in order to understand socialisation in other European neutral states, as well as the broader process of socialisation. The examination of two levels of analysis, socialisation at both the elite and grassroots levels, is intended to explicate why and how socialisation has occurred in some instances and not others.

Given these issues and debates, the following overarching research questions emerge: How has the European Union affected the interests and identities of Austria as a neutral state? Why has socialisation taken place at the elite level and not at the grassroots level? What are the implications of this process of socialisation and the developed model?

It will be argued that through a process of social learning and argumentative persuasion, the interests and identities of European neutral states have been socialised at an elite level through accession to the European Union, specifically when coupled with the requirements of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, in the absence of these conditions and mechanisms, the same process of socialisation has not taken place at a grassroots level.

To answers the questions and test the hypothesis above, this thesis will employ the following structure. In the first chapter, a substantive literature review will be provided to evaluate the current state of knowledge on the topic. As such, key texts on socialisation and Europeanisation from both sociology and international relations theory will be considered. A critique will assess the merits and shortcomings of the examined body of literature, as well as the topic more broadly. The second chapter will present the methodology to be utilised and tested in the case study. This will include the explication of several hypotheses on social learning and argumentative persuasion as modified from Checkel, in addition to a categorisation of different stages in the process of socialisation. Moreover, the data requirements necessary for such research, but specifically this case study, will also be outlined. In the third chapter, the case study on Austrian neutrality will be presented in application to the designed methodology. As the more substantive part of the thesis, this section will include the necessary background information on Austrian neutrality, as well as a condensed secondary literature review to Austrian neutrality today. The findings from the completed data requirements will be empirically assessed to apply the aforementioned hypotheses to both the elite and grassroots level. In turn, these findings will allow for an assessment on the stages of socialisation, as well as the relationship between the different levels of analysis. The conclusion of the thesis will highlight the implications of the completed research. With regards to constructivist research more broadly, the success of the model will be considered, noting areas for improvement and a call for further research. In addition, the implications of the analysis for Austrian neutrality and identity will also be discussed, as well as those for the other key European Union neutral states, Sweden and Finland. It is hoped for that, through the application of the questions, thesis, and structured outlined above, the research and analysis to follow in this thesis will allow for contributions to both the study of neutrality and constructivist research.

Chapter One: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

In the late 1990s, it was recognised by many international relations scholars that IR theory had taken a decidedly 'constructivist turn'.[1] Debates between the traditional IR theories of realism and liberalism were no longer as effective or relevant in discussing and explaining world politics. Beyond the assumption that the world is not natural or given but constructed, constructivist scholars have sought to move beyond the individualism inherent in the more mainstream IR theories and to regard the relationship between structure and agency in international relations as mutual constitutive. To this extent, constructivism emphasises the constitutive effect of institutions in shaping agent's identities and interests; that is to say, socialisation. Jeffrey Checkel, a key conventional constructivist scholar, stresses that it is clear that "institutions can socialize and that time/exposure may make socialisation more likely. However, the challenge is to specify *when, under what conditions, and through what mechanisms* this occurs."[2] That is to say, the problem is in measuring socialisation and changes in identities and interests.

In order to better understand the methodology employed in this analysis and apply it appropriately to the case study on Austria, it is first necessary to understand the larger process of socialisation in sociology and international relations theory. This chapter will examine a range of literature in order to present an encompassing and critical understanding of socialisation from a variety of perspectives. First, as Checkel's approach to social constructivism is the inspiration for this analysis, his understanding of socialisation will

[1] For example, see Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics*, 50 no. 2 (1998), 324-48 and Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, 23 no. 1 (1998), 171-200.
[2] Jeffrey Checkel and Andrew Moravcsik, "A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?" *European Union Politics*, 2 no. 2 (2001), 225.

provide the starting point. Second, socialisation will be explored from both sociological and international relations perspectives; the sociological approach will provide a foundational understanding of the concept, while the IR approach will apply this fundamental base to international politics. Third, this broader understanding of socialisation will then be narrowed to examine the phenomenon of Europeanisation. While some of this literature, Checkel's in particular, contains insight on the methodology necessary for measuring socialisation, such discussion will be contained in the following chapter on methodology. Finally, several critiques against the conceptualisation of socialisation will be presented and addressed. The concluding section of the chapter will assess the merits and utility of this approach for the purposes of this analysis and case study. It will be argued that Checkel's conceptualisation of socialisation in international relations may be utilised as a methodological foundation for understanding changes in agent's identities and interests.

1.1 Socialisation

1.1.1 Checkel's understanding of socialisation

Before engaging in the more substantive review of literature, it is first important to acknowledge the constraints in which Checkel's conceptualisation has been framed. Checkel is a mainstream constructivist scholar; that is to say, he presents a middle ground constructivism that does reject positivism in its analysis of international politics. Fierke draws a distinction between three constructivisms: conventional (middle ground), critical (includes post-structuralist approaches), and consistent constructivism (social ontology and epistemology).[3] The implication of selecting Checkel's approach for this analysis is that, while other approaches emphasise the post-positivist nature of constructivism, this particular

[3] Karin M. Fierke, "Constructivism," *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, (Oxford: Oxford University, 2007).

approach allows for a more a methodologically stringent model with testable hypotheses to be formed. Moreover, this more moderate variation of constructivism:

> explore[s] the role of social facts – norms or culture – in constructing the interests and identities of states and/or agents. True to their ontological underpinnings, such "construction" comes about not only or primarily through strategic choice but also through dynamic processes of persuasion or social learning.[4]

Guzzini, citing Adler as having placed constructivism in the 'middle ground', notes that such an approach allows for a critical engagement with the mainstream, greatly contributing to debate in international relations. Arguing that this approach has, in fact, created a sort of redundancy or eclecticism in constructivist scholarship, Guzzini, like Checkel, seeks to create greater "theoretical coherence and tries to rebuild bridges to empirical research."[5]

Checkel, like other constructivist scholars, understands institutions more broadly to include norms and discursive structures. In turn, these institutions possess a constitutive effect, meaning they may constitute agency in the sense of defining what or who an agent is. To say that institutions have a constitutive role is to acknowledge an identity-shaping role. This occurs through the phenomenon of social learning. Social learning is understood as a "process whereby actors, through interaction with broader institutional contexts, acquire new interests and preferences – in the absence of obvious material incentives."[6] That is to say, the interests and identities of agents are shaped through social interaction. His understanding of this concept goes beyond simple learning and deals with complex learning, holding that the

[4] Joseph Jupille, James Caporaso, and Jeffrey Checkel, "Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union," *Comparative Political Studies*, 36 no. 1/2 (2003), 15.
[5] Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations*, 6 no. 2 (2000), 148.
[6] Jeffrey Checkel, "Social construction and integration," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6 no. 4 (1999), 548.

former can be applied to a rationalist framework where new information allows for a more effective pursuit of interests. Complex learning concerns a shift in interests.[7] To clarify:

> In adopting community rules, socialisation implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions.[8]

Checkel's strong emphasis on communication and language is explicit in his conceptualisation of social learning, which he then ties to theories on argumentation and persuasion as means of social learning. Checkel describes persuasion as a "cognitive process that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion; put differently, it is a mechanism through which social learning may occur, thus leading to interest redefinition and identity change."[9] This distinction between principled persuasion and manipulative coercion must be recognised, in that persuasion can have a causal effect changing the values of that actor being persuaded, but the same is not necessarily true for coercion.[10] Argumentative persuasion is better understood as "a process of *convincing* someone through argument and principled debate", not manipulation.[11] In short, normative diffusion and socialisation occurs as agents, through the processes of social interaction – argumentative persuasion, in particular – internalise new norms, interests, and identities.

1.1.2 Socialisation in sociology

The concept of socialisation was not founded in constructivist international relations theory, but has deeper roots in theories of sociology. In this context, socialisation can be defined as "a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community."[12] The shift from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness can also be understood

[7] Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn," 344.
[8] Idem, ed., *International Institutions and Socialisation,* (New York: Cambridge University, 2005), 5.
[9] Idem, "Social construction," op. cit., 549.
[10] Idem and Moravcsik, "A Constructivist Research Program?"
[11] Ibid, 221.
[12] Idem, *International Institutions and Socialisation,* 5.

here. Moreover, a distinction can be made between coercion and persuasion in the process of such norm diffusion. To this extent, symbolic interactionist theory in sociology also figures into understanding socialisation:

> Individual identities and interests are formed through a process of interaction, with two mechanisms being key: imitation and social learning. Since imitation does not involve interaction (and, thus, mutual constitution), it is the social learning dynamic that plays a more central role in the constructivist accounts.[13]

Checkel, himself, logically draws on a great deal of sociology theory in his conceptualisation of socialisation, noting that a combined sociological and constructivist approach is necessary in understanding the process of socialisation. Here, too, institutions are understood more broadly than in rational choice or historical institutionalist theories. He stresses that for sociological institutionalists "not only in the distant future, but in the near-term, institutions constitute actors and their interests."[14] That is to say, such an approach subscribes to the mutual constitution of agency and structure, holding that institutions constrain as well as shape agent's identities and interests. Schimmelfennig also draws on the work of sociological institutionalists. He notes that "social phenomenon cannot be reduced to aggregations or consequences of individuals' attributes or motives. Rather, the actors, their interests, and preferences must be endogenized, that is, analysed and explained as the products of intersubjective structures and social interactions."[15] Therefore, rationality is understood as constructed and agents act through logics of appropriateness. Moreover, the sociological institutionalist approach stresses that institutions are shaped by the international community, which then constitutes a community identity. Agents' identities and interests are bound and changed by the values and norms of these institutions. Schimmelfennig, however,

[13] Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn," 344.
[14] Idem, "Social construction," 547.
[15] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organisation*, 55 no. 1 (2001), 58.

focuses on shaming as a primary mechanism of socialisation and intentionally stops short of equating shaming with persuasion.[16]

1.1.3 Socialisation in international relations

Sociology theory on socialisation clearly lends to the constructivist understanding of the concept in international relations. However, there are other IR theories worthy of at least acknowledgement in this discussion. Traditional IR theories, focusing on states as the primary actors in international relations, generally downplay the role of institutions in shaping actors' interests and identities. The logic follows that state interests shape state actions, but the impact of norms and other institutions on state interests and resulting actions is neglected. Rational choice institutionalism regards institutions as weak; they constrain but do not shape identities and interests. Historical institutionalism concurs that institutions remain 'thin' in the short-term, but may provide some 'stickiness' in the long-term. At best, the function of institutions provided by more traditional IR theories is that of an intervening variable.

Risse encapsulates March and Olsen's dual logics: rationalist approaches follow a logic of consequences where actors "enact given identities and interests and try to realise their preferences through strategic behaviour," while constructivist and sociological approaches follow a logic of appropriateness where actors are "imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations."[17] While both rationalist and constructivist theories

[16] Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap," 65.
[17] Thomas Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration," *European Integration Theory*, ed. A. Wiener and T. Diez (Oxford: Oxford University, 2004), 162-3.

contend that institutions matter to a greater or lesser extent, they also differ with respect to what is considered an 'institution':

> Rationalists generally define institutions as rules of the game that provide incentives for rational actors to adopt certain strategies in pursuit of their preferences. In contrast, constructivist scholars generally define institutions more broadly to include informal norms and intersubjective understandings as well as formal rules.[18]

Essentially, and as has been illustrated through Checkel's argument, while constructivists define institutions more broadly to highlight their constitutive effect, rationalists are, at best, sceptical of the socialising effects of institutions, instead emphasising bargaining as a key tool of agents.[19]

While Checkel focuses on persuasion as a means of social learning, other scholars have examined other mechanisms of norm diffusion and socialisation. Some observers have argued that socialisation occurs when incentives lead to changes in behaviour, which in turn, lead to practices. For example, Ikenberry and Kupchan have examined socialisation with respect to hegemonic power, finding that the socialisation of elites plays a greater role than that of the masses.[20] Moreover, Pevehouse has explored the relationship between socialisation and democratic transition, concluding that membership, or desired membership, in regional international organisations plays a significant role in successful transitions to democracy.[21]

Still, Checkel is far from the only IR scholar to present socialisation as a process emphasising persuasion as a mechanism for changes in interests and identities. Gheciu has examined NATO expansion into Central-Eastern Europe, holding that, despite material incentives, the norms and beliefs of states change through persuasion to allow for

[18] Mark Pollack, "International relations theory and European integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39 no. 2 (June 2001), 221.
[19] Risse, "Social Constructivism," 163.
[20] John Ikenberry and C. Kupchan, "Socialisation and Hegemonic power," *International Organisation*, 44 no. 3 (1990).
[21] John Pevehouse, "Democracy from the Outside-in?" *International Organisation*, 56 no. 3 (2002), 515-49.

enlargement.[22] Finnemore has also explored the normative influence of institutions on states, regarding intergovernmental organisations as 'suppliers of norms'.[23] Beyond formal institutions, Bearce and Bondanella discuss the socialising effects states have on each other, arguing that states with membership in the same IGOs will likely share interests and, thus, similar behaviour.[24]

1.2 Europeanisation

Literature on Europeanisation illustrates efforts to apply theories on socialisation in international relations to the European level and to bring greater empirical stringency to these theories. The concept can be broadly understood as socialisation at the European or European Union level. Radaelli explicates:

> Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies.[25]

Understanding the EU as an emerging polity, Risse holds that EU membership involves a socialising effect in that "the EU deeply affects discursive and behavioural practices, that it has become part of the 'social furniture' with which social and political actors had to deal with on a daily basis."[26] He also reiterates Checkel's work on social learning at various EU levels, settings, and institutions, holding that communicative practices allow for an understanding of the EU as more than an intergovernmental bargaining table, but as discourse. Risse contends that constructivist accounts of socialisation are superior in explaining certain realities of the EU and looks specifically at a case study on EU enlargement to Eastern Europe. In another more theoretical account of Europeanisation, Diez

[22] Alexander Gheciu, *NATO in the "New Europe"*, (Stanford: Stanford University, 2005).
[23] Martha Finnemore, "International Organisations as teachers of norms," *International Organisation*, 47 no. 4 (1993), 565-97.
[24] David Bearce and S. Bondanella, "Intergovernmental Organisations, Socialisation, and Member-state interest convergence," *International Organisation*, 61 no. 4 (2007), 703-733.
[25] Claudio Radaelli, "Europeanisation: Solution or problem?" *European Integration*, 8 no. 16 (2004).
[26] Risse, "Social Constructivism," 164.

engages in discourse analysis, arguing that "attempts to capture the EU's nature both in the political and the academic debate themselves take part in the construction of the Euro-polity."[27]

As mentioned above, Schimmelfennig has developed an approach to Europeanisation, also focusing on Eastern enlargement. He shows that liberal intergovernmentalism provides an effective account of the first steps of integration with CEE states, but falls short in explaining full membership. To this extent, he draws on sociological institutionalism and Adler and Barnett's work on security communities to argue that "the EU constitutes a liberal community of states committed to the rule of law, human rights, democracy, and to a social market economy."[28] These norms form a collective EU identity and constrain actors, trapping member states in rhetorical commitments to community values, including offers of accession negotiations, despite initial preferences against enlargement. Here, Schimmelfennig draws a strong distinction between rationalist and constructivist approaches, in that the former is incapable of accounting for how membership into the EU changes national preferences, as well as for the institutional power of the EU in constraining and shaping actors' preferences. However, in more recent work, he has sided more with the bridge-building camp.[29]

Jupille et al. examine a number of early empirical efforts made towards understanding the process of socialisation in Europe. The authors are especially partial to the work of Kreppel and Hix and their analysis on the shift from grand coalition to ideological competition in the European Parliament.[30] Through this examination, Kreppel and Hix

[27] Thomas Diez, "Speaking 'Europe': the politics of integration discourse," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6 no. 4 (1999), 598.
[28] Risse, "Social Constructivism," 172.
[29] Schimmelfennig, "Strategic Action in a Community Environment," *Comparative Political Studies* 36 no. 1-2 (2003), 156-83.
[30] Amie Kreppel and S. Hix, "From 'Grand Coalition' to Left-Right Confrontation," *Comparative Political Studies*, 36 no. 1-2 (2003), 75-96.

conclude that neither a rationalist nor a constructivist approach accounts fully for the changes that have taken place. Instead, and coinciding with the research of Jupille et al., they argue for a "'mixed' (synthetic) model in which a short-run, rational-calculative logic coexists with a longer run, constructivist account grounded in logics of appropriateness and identity."[31] In more recent work, Schimmelfennig is also partial to this bridge-building approach, holding that "both approaches apply in part of the enlargement domain and that a sequential model of dialogue opens space for both approaches to explain a piece of the puzzle."[32] He stresses that strategic considerations serve as an initial socialising mechanism in the adoption of policies and norms. Jupille et al. also examine Lewis' analysis on EU institutions and decision-making.[33] He explores the competing claims of rationalists and constructivists on socialisation and finds considerable support for the "possible constitutive and socialising effects produced by recurrent face-to-face interaction within established institutions."[34]

In opposition to these more constructivist-leaning, or at least bridge-building-, approaches, Pollack takes up the rationalist argument, with specific regard to comitology.[35] As expected, he finds that the rationalist approach provides a more convincing explanation of the phenomenon and rejects the applicability of constructivism to such areas. Beyers also presents an argument that holds that the "so-called contact hypothesis for socialisation is in fact seriously underspecified, and must be supplemented with additional national-level factors."[36] More moderately, Kelemen, in his analysis on EU federalism, contends that the two approaches are at times complementary and at others competitive.[37] He concludes that

[31] Jupille, "Integrating Institutions," 32.
[32] Idem, "Integrating Institutions," 33.
[33] Jeffrey Lewis, "Institutional Environments and Everyday EU Decision-Making," *Comparative Political Studies*, 36 no. 1-2 (2003), 97-124.
[34] Jupille, "Integrating Institutions," 32-3.
[35] Mark Pollack, "Control Mechanism or Deliberative Democracy?" *Comparative Political Studies*, 36 no. 1-2 (2003), 125-55.
[36] Checkel, *International Institutions and Socialisation*, 21.
[37] R. Daniel Kelemen, "The Structure and Dynamics of EU Federalism," *Comparative Political Studies*, 36 no. 1-2 (2003), 184-208.

"in one key area, dealing with the expansion of federal powers, constructivism and rationalism offer complementary rather than competing theoretical claims. In the areas of state autonomy, by contrast, they compete directly."[38]

1.3 Critique

Checkel's conceptualisation of socialisation is not without its critics. Both broader criticism of constructivism and specific questions regarding socialisation must be acknowledged in an effort to assess the utility of the approach. Rationalism presents the primary challenger to constructivism. Key rationalist scholars, most prominently Moravcsik and Pollack, argue that constructivism is a critical approach in that it does not seek to explain anything per say, but rather aims to understand the outcome and impact of integration on states. Risse acknowledges that social constructivism "does not represent a substantive theory, but an ontological perspective or meta-theory", yet he stresses that being a substantive theory is neither expected nor required.[39] Such rationalist criticism also implies that the approach does not construct distinctive testable hypotheses. Critics stress that even when constructivists do succeed in this, these hypotheses do not employ methods that are capable of distinguishing predicted results from those already suggested by other theories.[40] However, establishing testable hypotheses is not necessarily the intention of all constructivist scholars, in particular those who subscribe to post-positivist approaches. Moreover, as a middle ground conventional constructivist, Checkel does not reject positivism.

Rationalists also criticise the alleged overlap between rationalism and constructivism. Smith charges that the basic assumptions of Checkel's account of constructivism are quite similar to those of rationalist approaches.[41] Checkel contends that this is a claim made by

[38] Jupille, "Integrating Institutions," 33-4.
[39] Risse, "Social Constructivism,"174.
[40] Pollack, "International relations theory."
[41] Steve Smith, "Social constructivisms and European studies: a reflectivist critique." *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6 no. 4 (1999), 685.

theoretical purists and that overlap in hypotheses is not a major problem. The goal of both schools of thought is to find hypotheses that represent empirical reality. Smith, too, acknowledges that this is also why Checkel believes that the two schools can be bridged, but still contends that his is "a very specific take on constructivism and one that is very different indeed to some of the other constructivisms."[42] Nevertheless, Checkel agrees that specific and valid analytical frameworks have indeed been neglected by constructivists and, therefore, seeks greater methodological rigor. Finally, Pollack himself notes that many constructivists would argue that rationalists have set the bar too high.

Nevertheless, there are still significant questions and concerns that remain with respect to the more particular concept examined here, socialisation. Some observers question whether agents in international relations can effectively be treated as people. That is to say, while mechanisms of social learning apply aptly to human socialisation, it may not be appropriate to apply the same mechanisms to states and formal institutions. Other scholars have questioned the limits of socialisation in shaping the behaviour of agents, holding that other explanations may exist to explain such phenomenon and socialisation may not always be effective in affecting change. Rationalist, in particular, critique that, while constructivists focus on what the influence of ideas is, they fail to explain how this is done; that is to say, they take for granted that ideas also influence policymakers. Moreover, the socialisation argument lacks a concrete theory to explain how actors can be persuaded to accept new ideas.

Based on this analysis, it can be argued that Checkel's model of socialisation in international relations may be utilised as a methodological foundation for understanding changes in agent's identities and interests; however, there are still significant challenges to the approach that must be addressed in order to be applied to this thesis' analysis and case

[42] Smith, "Social constructivisms," 685.

study. First, the merits: this conceptualisation of socialisation is based in a developed and encompassing mixture of sociological and constructivist approaches; it allows for bridge-building with other theories of international relations, specifically rationalism; this approach has been successfully applied to a variety of case studies examining a range of processes of socialisation, institutions, and agents; it provides a sound conceptualisation of socialisation and a worthy attempt of addressing the methodological problems associated with such approaches. However, there are still major obstacles and questions surrounding this conceptualisation of socialisation as outlined above. Nevertheless, this analysis can serve as evidence of a willingness to address such criticism and engage in the methodological challenge of proving the merits and utility of a constructivist conceptualisation of socialisation in international relations.

Chapter Two: Methodology – the challenge of measuring socialisation

With a thorough background of key theories, issues, and criticisms addressed in the relevant literature on socialisation and Europeanisation, it is now possible to examine the methodology necessary for engaging in a substantive assessment of socialisation and its application to a case study. As was illustrated in the above literature review, this has been no simple task for constructivist scholars. The methodological challenge to which Checkel refers concerns the argument that constructivist research that too little attention has been paid to methodology and operationalisation. Moreover, such criticism is not completely without grounds and has been more or less acknowledged by constructivist scholars. With regards to research on socialisation specifically, it was highlighted that the goal of analysis is no longer to simply recognise processes of socialisation, but rather to understand the conditions and mechanisms that allow such processes to take place. To this extent, Checkel has sought to provide in his model a rigorous framework capable of measuring socialisation and changes in identities and interests.

As this thesis will utilise Checkel's model, it is important to provide an encompassing assessment of the methodology proposed for such an undertaking. As such, this section will examine each of the main elements of his methodology, adding to the model specific elements and indicators framed for analysis on the socialisation of neutral identities and interests to be assessed in subsequent case study. The first two sections will present several hypotheses on the necessary conditions for the occurrence of social learning and the effectiveness of argumentative persuasion. In the third section, an additional element to Checkel's model will be introduced. Of particular importance given the inclusion of multiple

levels of analysis in the case study (elite and grassroots levels), various 'stages' in the process of socialisation with be identified. Finally, three operational techniques for measuring socialisation will be outlined. The data sources necessary for this analysis consist of a standard method of triangulation, including media analysis, official document analysis, and interviews. As will be completed for each element of the methodology, these requirements will also be explained in relation to Checkel's model, and then tailored to fit the specific case study at hand, The examination and modification of this methodology will create an appropriate framework for application to the case study on Austrian neutral identities.

2.1 Hypotheses on social learning

Checkel's four hypotheses on social learning outline several situations in which socialisation is most likely to occur. These hypotheses are helpful in answering the question of *under what conditions* does socialisation occur. They are as follows:

1. Social learning is more likely in groups where individuals share common professional backgrounds.
2. Social learning is more likely where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure.
3. Social learning is more likely where a group meets repeatedly and there is high density of interaction among participants.
4. Social learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure and exposure.[43]

Before engaging in analysis on any of these hypotheses, it must first be determined exactly who comprises the 'groups' under examination. As already mentioned above, this thesis is concerned with two levels of analysis – elite and grassroots. The elite group consists of Austrian government and officials and policy makers during the period of analysis (circa 1994-5), in particular those mentioned in the assessed data sources outlined below. The grassroots group is ideally representative of the mass population or wider society; here, those participant to the interviews conducted will serve as this group.

[43] Checkel, "Social construction," 549.

For the first hypothesis, the indicators to gauge common professional backgrounds can be easily observed. Categorisations including student, academic, professional, government, and business may be utilised for the case study. The second hypothesis, that on crisis and policy failure, is more difficult to measure, as it is essentially a matter of perception. For the case study, it is essential to recognise the use of certain language within the various data sources. This includes regarding the concept of neutrality as being outdated or no longer relevant, or the absence of the concept from discussion altogether. Moreover, noting the limitations of the maintenance of neutrality in contemporary international affairs could also indicated that a group feels faced with a crisis or policy failure. For the third hypothesis, repeated and frequent interaction among the participants can be measured through records of meetings, conferences, debates, and other avenues for social interaction. However, even with a smaller representative sample of the mass public, it is difficult to assess relationships and interaction between participants. The final hypothesis is more problematic than the others, given the rather unclear meaning in its wording. For the purposes of this analysis, 'insulated from direct political pressure' is understood to mean that the group is not only shielded from coercion by political actors and institutions, but also absent from any in-depth involvement in outside political affairs. The indicators for measuring each of these hypotheses can now be used to analyse the data sources to help in understanding the conditions under which social learning is more likely to take place.

2.2 Hypotheses on argumentative persuasion

As was also discussed in the literature review, the four hypotheses on social learning outlined above illustrate the important role of communication and language in socialisation. In turn, these assumptions on social learning are built upon to develop four hypotheses on argumentative persuasion, highlighting the conditions under which agents are more open to

socialisation by such methods. These hypotheses are employed to better answer the question of *through what mechanisms* does socialisation take place. They are as follows:

1. Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyse new information.
2. Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuadee had few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader's message.
3. Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs or want to belong.
4. Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader does not lecture or demand, but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument.[44]

Once more, before subscribing indicators to the hypotheses, it is first necessary to establish the persuader and persuadee in this relationship. For analysis on the elite level, the role of the persuader is fulfilled by the various agents and institutions of the European Union that are active in accession negotiations and agreements, while the persuadee is the Austria elite comprised of government officials and policy makers. For analysis on the grassroots level, the persuader is generally regarded as the Austrian national government, that is the elite, still allowing some role for the agents and institutions of the EU.

For the first hypothesis on the novel and uncertain environment, key indicators will include discussion of a shift in foreign and security policy concerns or the introduction of a new security discourse. Moreover, there maybe evidence of instrumental changes in policy or even institutionalisation. The second hypothesis is of particular concern as it addresses issues of prior beliefs, which in this case study should be read more widely to include values, interests, and identities as well. Indicators to disprove the hypothesis here include a historical identification of neutrality as an element of identity and the maintenance or defence of traditional security concerns, especially neutrality, despite the introduction of new discourses. The third hypothesis on in-group membership can be assessed by examining the status of the persuader, the persuadee's perception of this, and the persuadee's goals in

[44] Checkel, "A Constructivist Research Program?" 222.

engaging in this relationship. For the fourth hypothesis on deliberative argumentation, the techniques of the persuader must be observed, as well as the perceptions of the persuadee on the receiving end of these techniques. Again, these indicators will be applied to the case study through the employment of the data sources outlined below in order to assess the primary mechanism through which socialisation occurs.

2.3 Stages of socialisation

Once the content of the data sources has been fully analysed and the findings applied to the case study through the examination of the above hypotheses, different stages in the process of socialisation should become increasingly apparent. To elaborate on these various stages in the process of socialisation, the work of Rieker is of particular importance as her model was developed in application to other European neutral states.[45] These stages are particularly useful in answering the question of *when* has socialisation taken place. She outlines five stages in the process of socialisation:

1. Traditional security concerns prevail
2. Introduction of new security discourse and defence of traditional policies
3. Instrumental change (require strategic adaptation to gain benefits)
4. Persuasion (convinced norm compliance is the right thing to do – social rationality)
5. Institutionalisation[46]

While Rieker's model was initially intended to measure socialisation at the elite level, these stages can nevertheless be utilised at other levels, including the grassroots level for this analysis. Again, each of these stages can be further developed to include specific indicators for greater applicability to the case study at hand. At the first stage where traditional security concerns prevail, one may point to indicators such as neutrality, national defence, or peacekeeping. The second stage of analysis, new discourse but traditional defence, major changes in international affairs or domestic politics may indicate this stage; however, such

[45] Pernille Rieker, *Europeanisation of national security identity: the EU and the changing security identities of the Nordic states*, (London: Routledge, 2006).
[46] Ibid.

changes must be accompanied by the maintenance of the aforementioned traditional policies. For the study on Austrian neutral identity, this would mean that as a new discourse is introduced, for example European security and defence integration, neutrality is still defended. At the third stage, instrumental change is starting taking place. This is measured by the recognition that potential benefits, in this case EU membership and its associated benefits, will require real change, such as a reconceptualisation of neutrality. In the next stage in the process of socialisation – persuasion, the indicators outlined in the previous section on argumentative persuasion will be useful in identifying this stage. Finally, the last stage of socialisation, institutionalisation, is marked by the embodiment of these change in legal or government documents, institutions, or practices, for example an amendment to the Austrian Constitution with respect to European defence participation. Even before any substantive research was undertaken, it already appeared as though full socialisation/institutionalisation had taken place on the elite level, while traditional policies were still defended on the grassroots level. The more detailed analysis to follow will consider these indicators in connection to the findings from the various data sources in order to better understand not only when socialisation has taken place, but also the different stages in the process.

2.4 Data requirements

Checkel has also highlighted the data requirements necessary for measuring whether and to what extent socialisation has occurred. He utilises three operational techniques standard in most empirical analysis: interviews, media analysis, and official document consultation. This thesis will employ a similar method of triangulation to answer its key research questions. With respect to the first requirement, interviews and re-interviews engage those subjects who are the target of socialisation. Interviewees are to "characterise their social interaction context intersubjectively, suggesting four ways to portray it: coercion,

bargaining, emulation, or persuasion/arguing."[47] In examination of socialisation on the elite level, no interviews were personally conducted. This thesis will nevertheless utilise several critical interviews conducted by other scholars and observers with key political figures on the issues, including a former Austrian president.[48] On the grassroots level, questionnaires delivered as interviews were conducted with follow-up informal discussion with several of the participants (See Figure 2.1: Questionnaire). A total of twenty interviews were completed. Interviewees were randomly selected based on willingness to participate, resulting in a range of interviewee demographics – ten students, two professors, four professionals, and four 'other/not specified', with an age range of 21 to 64 years old and almost split evenly on gender (nine women, 11 men). Sometimes when multiple answers were given, participants were asked to clarify by ranking the importance of their responses. All interviews were completed in Vienna, utilising a combination of English and German. (A copy of the questionnaire is included in **Appendix 1**.)

On the second element of triangulation, the intention of media analysis is to gauge the motivations and beliefs of those involved in the socialisation process. Content from the two leading Austrian newspapers was considered: *Der Standard* and *Die Presse*. Scope was limited to the periods immediately before and after accession to the European Union. That is to say, accession to the EU took place on 1 January 1995; therefore the articles examined were published between 27 December 1994 and 5 January 1995. Given the necessity of coherent, organised research and the realities of time constraints and translation, this limited analysis to a maximum of 20 issues, ten from each publication. Each issue of both papers was examined for articles on the EU broadly, then on Austrian accession to the EU more specifically. Within these articles, the keywords 'neutrality' and 'identity' were sought.

[47] Checkel, "A Constructivist Research Program?" 223.
[48] Drawn from Günter Bischof, A. Pelinka, and R. Wodak, ed., *Neutrality in Austria*, (New Jersey: Transaction, 2001).

Finally, the articles were read, translated, and analysed. Due to various constraints surrounding time, accessibility, and translation, other forms of media (radio, magazines) were omitted.

Finally, the last element requires the consultation of official documents and records, including meeting minutes and summaries, diaries, and memoirs. For the purposes of this thesis, key documents pre- and post-accession to the EU were considered. Two primary documents of particular importance are the Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria (1955) and the so-called Article 23f of the Federal Constitutional Law (1999). Additional resources provided by the Austrian Foreign Ministry include pamphlets and booklets on Austrian history, politics, culture, and economy. Moreover, several speeches from Austrian officials will be considered.[49] Again due to time, translation, and access constraints, other forms of primary documents, such as memoirs or meeting minutes, will be omitted. These three standard operational techniques, along with the hypotheses and indicators outlined above, provide the appropriate methodological framework to now properly assess the socialisation of Austrian neutral identity at both the elite and grassroots levels.

[49] Drawn from Bischof, *Neutrality*; Hanna Ojanen, ed., *Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe Today*, (Espoo: FIIA, 2003); and Emily Munro, ed., *Challenges to Neutral and Non-aligned Countries and Non-Alignment: Countries in Europe and Beyond*, (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005).

Chapter Three: Case Study – Austria

With a solid theoretical and methodological foundation on socialisation, the developed framework can now be applied to the case study on Austria. As such, this chapter will present both the application of the model and its findings. A background section will provide the necessary information on Austria's history as a neutral state, examining critical changes to the Austria interpretation of neutrality and highlighting the inclusion of neutrality as a key aspect of Austrian national identity. Moreover, a brief secondary literature review, which will also be drawn upon in the analysis, will shed light on the current state of neutrality in Austria. Building upon this, the findings from the various data requirements – media analysis, official document analysis, and interviews – will be assessed. This analysis will include the application of the aforementioned hypotheses and stages of socialisation to both the elite and grassroots level, presenting an assessment of *when, under what conditions, and through what mechanisms* socialisation has occurred, if it has at all. In the conclusion of the chapter, the relationship between these two levels of analysis will also be discussed.

3.1 Background

Liberated from Germany in April 1945, Austria was divided into four foreign occupation zones. In an attempt to re-establish sovereignty, Austria sought the creation of a state treaty as to require its occupiers to recognize its independent status and withdrawal. However, Soviet fears of a potential repeated Austrian *Anschluss* to a rearmed West Germany stood as the primary obstacle to the signing of such a treaty. It was not until negotiators introduced neutrality into discussions that Soviet hesitations subsided.[50] In fact, the Soviet Union hoped that the establishment of Austrian neutrality would "contribute to undermining

[50] E. Talos and E. Horvath, *Facts and Figures*, (Vienna: Federal Chancellery/Federal Press Service, 2000), 47.

NATO and similar political and military organisations, and … to prevent the recently independent, former colonial states in Africa and Asian from joining political and economic organisations under the auspices of the United States."[51] The Austrian State Treaty was signed May 1955 and constitutionally enshrined in October that same year. Through the accompanying Neutrality Act, Austria independently declared its permanent neutrality "for the purpose of the permanent maintenance of her external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory," allowing for the restoration of sovereignty and the withdrawal of its occupying forces.[52]

Austria's newly sovereign position quickly led to its participation in international institutions, a departure from the 'Swiss Model' that had inspired the Austrian concept of neutrality. Becoming a member of the United Nations in December 1955, Austria utilised a highly independent interpretation of its status, based primarily on a policy of non-intervention. The UN had given Austria a special status exempting the country from any measures under Chapter VII and those found to be in contradiction to neutrality. Austria's status as a neutral country, while creating an enormous sense of newfound national identity, was not to limit its participation in international affairs.

In the 1970s, Austria's permanent neutrality shifted to a policy of active neutrality, allowing for greater multilateralism, frequent diplomatic visits, and increased participation in the UN.[53] Permanent neutrality described the initial vision of neutrality (usually understood as neutrality in terms of military, ideology, culture, and economy), whereas this policy of active neutrality provided for participation in a wider range of trade and customs

[51] Sven Allard, *Russia and the Austrian State Treaty*, (University Park, Pennsylvania State University, 1970), 238.
[52] Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria, art. I, sec. 1.
[53] Talos, *Facts and Figures*, 84.

agreements.[54]Vienna became headquarters to numerous international organizations, including the IAEA & United Nations Industrial Development Organization. It was also during this period that Austria became a key player in the so-called 'N+N' (Neutral and Non-aligned) group, offering mediation and good offices and championing the policy of *détente*.

Until 1991, Austria remained exempt from all measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, with the end of the Cold War, the political conditions for Austria's foreign policy also changed. After 1991 (specifically, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), Austria adopted a more legal view of neutrality, one that was secondary to UN obligations. Recognising the supremacy of the UN obligations over neutrality allowed for participation in Chapter VII missions. Since the Gulf War, foreign aircraft and tanks for combat have been authorized permission to pass through Austrian territory.

In 1995, Austria joined the European Union, acknowledging that community law superseded national legislation and constitutional law. Many observers viewed membership as a logical extension to existing trade and customs agreements, arguing that neutrality was compatible with membership since the concept applied only in war. The main objection to membership surrounded the fear of some EU actors that including Austria would "challenge one of the fundamental pillars of the new EU structure (Pillar II: Common Foreign and Security Policy)."[55] Critics believed that, not wanting to compromise sovereignty and status, neutrality would prevent Austria from becoming a full active member. As such, the constitution was accordingly amended to permit membership, noting that neutrality had became subordinate to EU law. While fundamental principles remained protected from the EU's supranational structure, neutrality was not part of Austria's core laws, not actually contained in the Constitution. What remains of the concept is that Austria will neither

[54] Jeffrey Lantis and M. Queen, "Negotiating Neutrality: the double-edged sword of Austrian accession to the European Union," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 33 no. 2 (1998), 154.
[55] Lantis, "Negotiating Neutrality," 160.

"accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign states on her territory," as outlined in the neutrality Act.[56] Any future changes to this document will require referenda.

The relationship between the CFSP/ESDP and neutrality requires brief examination. Once part of the EU, Austria amended its constitution to include a so-called Article 23f. The amendment stressed that "participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy would not be impeded by the Neutrality Act," which was also made compatible with ESDP.[57] Austria is also committed to equal contribution to the Headline Goals and capability goals of ESPD, including the Petersburg Tasks. In Austria's 2001 Security and Defence Doctrine, the government pledged support for EU reforms on CFSP and its active participation in ESDP, promising "priority support to any future efforts to realise the possibility of a common European defence," in accordance with the close participation of the EU with NATO.[58]

3.1.1 Secondary literature review: Austrian neutrality today

Heinz Gärtner and Olmar Höll examine the history of neutrality in Austria, emphasizing several major changes that have altered the concept since its adoption, including UN and EU membership.[59] Even with respect to NATO membership, Austrian neutrality is flexible enough to allow for participation in Partnership for Peace, but this, they argue, does not necessitate full membership. Moreover, the authors correctly note that public opinion remains strongly against NATO membership and in favour of the maintenance of neutrality. They stress that changes in its interpretation illustrate how flexible neutrality is within the existing legal framework, but that the concept has not lost its meaning. To dispute oft-cited

[56] Constitutional Law, art. I, sec. 2.
[57] Ojanen, *Neutrality and Non-Alignment*, (Espoo: FIIA, 2003), 10.
[58] Munro, *Challenges to Neutral and Non-aligned Countries*,10.
[59] Heinz Gärtner and O. Höll, "Austria," *Small States and Alliances*, Erich Reiter and H. Gärtner, eds., (New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001), 183-194.

claims that neutrality has become obsolete, the authors present four counterarguments of varying success. First, the concept of neutrality as understood during the Cold War only truly applied to Finland and Austria. Second, neutrality existed before the Cold War. Third, at the end of World War II, Switzerland faced demands to abandon neutrality and then the Cold War erupted. Finally, neutrality will remain as a political principle as long as conflict remains. It holds that neutrality has not lost its meaning with the end of the Cold War, but that the concept must continue to adapt as its environment and alliances also change.

On a theoretical level, Jeffrey Lantis and Matthew Queen present a two-level game theory to examine questions on Austrian neutrality and EU membership.[60] In two-level game theory, leaders seek to maximize their ability to satisfy domestic pressures while minimizing the consequences of foreign developments. In the Austrian context, Lantis and Queen purport that Austria's foreign policy redirection was the result of leaders seizing international opportunities by forming domestic coalitions in support of EU membership. On the international level, Austrian leaders were constrained by the status of permanent neutrality, economic conditions, and bilateral relations between Austria and Germany. At the domestic level, pressures included political coalitions, party organizations, interest groups, and public attitudes. To simplify, the 'campaign at home' aimed to build support in Austria for EU membership and the 'campaign abroad' sought to engage Austria in high-level negotiations in Brussels, negotiations primarily on neutrality. In their conclusion, the authors argue that the evolution of Austrian foreign policy is perhaps evidence that neutrality is going out of style. By utilizing a more flexible, pragmatic approach to foreign policy, Austrian neutrality is undermined. Lantis and Queen contend that, while neutrality will not be abandoned overnight, Austria's redirection indicates important developments are to come. This analysis

[60] Lantis, "Negotiating Neutrality," 152-182.

is of particular significance as it illustrates how leaders persuaded the public to accept membership in a non-neutral organization. Still, the authors fall short in assessing why a neutral state would want to join an organization such as the EU. Such discussion here, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Two more recent issues of concern for European neutral states include the proposed and ever-pending EU Constitution and the European Security Strategy. Hanspeter Neuhold illustrates how Austrian neutrality has been made legally compatible with full EU membership and participation in European security and defence integration.[61] He argues that the changes made to neutrality in order to be consistent with broader EU policy have eroded its meaning and that further integration will continue to weaken the concept. He notes that strong public support, however, stands as the main obstacle to the abandonment of neutrality.

3.2 Empirical analysis of data requirements

With a clear understanding of the history of Austrian neutrality, as well as key issues and debates surrounding its status, a proper assessment of the socialisation of Austrian neutral identity can now be undertaken. This section will empirically analyse the various data sources employed in this research, highlighting the main findings. For specifics on the methodology employed, please refer back to the chapter on methodology. However, it is only in the subsequent section that these findings are then applied to the hypotheses on and stages of socialisation as outlined in the methodology; that is to say, inferences on and implications of this data will not be examined until the subsequent section.

3.2.1 Media analysis

[61] Munro, *Challenges to Neutral and Non-aligned Countries*, 7-16.

In the five days preceding accession, *Die Presse* produced eight articles on broader EU happenings and ten articles on Austrian accession, only one of which discussed neutrality. Titled "It is about the neutrality of Europe",[62] the article argues that despite a majority of the *Nationalrat* wanting to maintain neutrality, two leading parties – the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian Peoples' Party (ÖVP)[63] – have very different opinions on what the concept should mean. The author argues that, given the impact of European defence initiatives on transatlantic relations, the European Union should declare itself as neutral.[64] Other accession related articles concerned the impact of EU membership on social welfare and the cost of living, the environment, and EU funding to the region. Interestingly, *Die Presse* did not release issues for 31 December 1994 or 1 January 1995 – that is, neither the day preceding nor the day of accession. In the five days following accession, *Die Presse* published six articles on the EU more broadly and seven articles on Austrian accession, again with only one article on neutrality. The article "ÖVP – end of neutrality"[65] argues that only the ÖVP seeks to programmatically move away from the concept of neutrality, desiring instead integration in European defence.[66] Additional articles on Austrian accession again discussed cost of living, EU funding, and social welfare, as well as EU medicine, border control, and Austrian Christian values in the EU. None of the articles examined explicitly tied Austrian accession or neutrality to issues of Austrian identity.

In the five days preceding accession, *Der Standard* published eight articles on EU issues and eight articles on Austrian accession, of which three dealt with neutrality. The first article, "Looking Outward: Disagreement or Solidarity",[67] examines the history of neutrality in Austria and holds that what remains of the concept (*Rest-Neutralität*) will not hurt

[62] *"Es geht um die Neutralität Europas."*
[63] *Die Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich* and *die Österreichische Volkspartei*
[64] Franz Pesendorfer, "Es geht um die Neutralität Europas," *Die Presse*, December 28, 1994.
[65] *"ÖVP – ende der Neutralität"*
[66] "ÖVP – ende der Neuralität," *Die Presse*, January 5, 1995.
[67] *"Nach außen – Dissens oder Solidarität?"*

Austrian relations internationally. Given the public's desire to remain a neutral country, it is NATO, not the EU, which presents the greatest issue with respect to neutrality.[68] In the other two articles, neutrality was mentioned more in passing than as the substantive content of the articles. First, a 'Year in Review' excerpt acknowledged demands for the modernisation of Austria's neutrality law in light of EU accession.[69] Second, Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky was quoted in a captioned photo as having stated that Austria was entering the EU as a "neutral country" ("*neutrals land*").[70] Like those from *Die Presse*, other articles from this period concerned cost of living and social welfare, as well as banking, Euro-scepticism, and business-government relations. While *Der Standard* did produce issues for each day examined in this analysis, the issues on the day of and proceeding accession were condensed editions devoid of any articles on the EU, accession, neutrality, or identity.

In the five days following accession, *Der Standard* produced three articles on the EU more broadly and three articles on Austrian accession, only one of which concerned both neutrality and identity. Moreover, there were four articles that dealt with Austrian-EU relations beyond those issues related to accession. The article "Austria's National Identity: Neutral Past or European Future?"[71] is the sole article from this sample that deals explicitly with neutrality and identity.[72] The author argues that in order to present an informed assessment on Austrian neutrality, one must consider a less historical or nostalgic view of the concept. Because the meaning of the concept has been misunderstood in the past and continues to be at present, he holds that neutrality should be understood as only the core of what it always had been. It is his view that, "Austrian national identity should feel as part of

[68] Egon Matzner, "Nach außen: Dissens oder Solidarität?" *Der Standard*, December 27, 1994.
[69] "Year in Review," *Der Standard*, December 30, 1994.
[70] Photo caption, *Der Standard*, December 31, 1994/January 1, 1995.
[71] *"Österreichis Staatsidee: Neutrale Vergangenheit oder Euro-Zukunft?"*
[72] Erich Reiter, "Österreichs Staatsidee: Neutrale Vergangenheit oder Euro-Zukunft?" *Der Standard*, January 4, 1995.

a larger European identity."[73] Finally, other articles on Austrian accession at this time considered cost of living and EU-regional funds. One article of particular interest highlighted that public confidence in federal leaders had dropped following Austria's 'EU-Start'. When asked whether one believed that the Chancellor had a clear vision for Austria's future, 57 percent of the population surveyed were confident in his outlook after accession compared with 73 percent prior to accession.[74]

There are several factors that may account for the lack of EU coverage in these two papers at the time of Austria's accession to the European Union. Other news stories may have overshadowed the accession of three small states; featured most prominently in the headlines at the beginning of 1995 was the Russian bombing of Grosny in Chechnya. Moreover, especially when compared to more recent waves of EU accession, the joining of Sweden, Finland, and Austria was rather uncontroversial, thus garnering less media attention. Finally, with respect to articles on the EU but beyond the accession of these countries, the EU was simply a smaller, less integrated organisation at this time, perhaps less worthy of frequent headline coverage.

3.2.2 Official document analysis

There are two official government documents that are of particular significance with respect to the socialisation of Austria's neutral identity: the Constitutional Law of the Neutrality of Austria and Article 23f of the Federal Constitution. These two documents are important as they are not European Union documents, but those of the national government of an EU member state. Moreover, as constitutional documents, they provide an understanding of socialisation/Europeanisation from a legal perspective. Finally, the two

[73] *"Österreichs Staatsidee sollte sich also Bestandteil einer größeren europäische Identität empfinden."*
[74] Editorial, *Der Standard*, January 5/6, 1995.

documents highlight socialisation on multiple levels and points in time. First, examination of the Constitutional Law illustrates how neutrality became cemented as part of the Austrian national identity, as Austria's primary interest at the time was not neutrality but independence and Austria only adopted neutrality upon the persuasion of its occupiers. Second, the inclusion of Article 23f shows how elites were persuaded to reconceptualise neutrality in order to accede to the EU, yet the concept remains a key element of the national identity of the Austrian people.

The Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria is a launching document that built upon the 1945 Declaration of Independence, which reinstated the 1920 Federal Constitution with the 1929 amendments.[75] However, the Neutrality Law was actually included in the 1955 Treaty of Vienna (also referred to as the Austrian Independence Treaty or the Austrian State Treaty), which established full sovereignty after the post-World War II occupation. While issued by the Austrian federal government and declared 'of her own free will', it is well understood that negotiating officials were acting under the constraints of its occupiers, particularly the Soviet Union. As mentioned above, the main reason for the creation of the Neutrality Act was to end Austria's foreign occupation and the gain full sovereignty, in order to reinstate of domestic control and increase international involvement. The purpose of the document then was to establish neutrality as a precondition for the Soviet withdrawal from Austria. The document was successful in that the stated objective of the establishment of neutrality did indeed fulfil the end goal of full independence. However, as this analysis highlights, the meaning of neutrality has been reduced to its bare minimum since its establishment.

Article 23f of the Federal Constitution should be viewed as a follow-up document, linked explicitly to the Treaty on European Union and the Nice Treaty in reference to the

[75] Constitutional Law, art. I-II.

Common Foreign and Security Policy.[76] Established by the Austrian federal government following its accession to the EU in 1995, the document went into effect with the Amsterdam Treaty. Created in an attempt to quell criticism and concerns regarding Austrian participation in EU foreign, security, and defence policies, the purpose of the document was to illustrate Austria's willingness and legal capacity to participate in such areas. While there are no stated objectives included in the document, the four major neutral states in the European Union were actually effective in shaping Pillar II of the Maastricht Treaty to illustrate their commitment to these EU policies. Using their collective influence, the 'Irish Clause' was established highlighting the ability of the neutral states to be full active participants in the CFSP. As one observer has noted, Austria, along with the other European neutrals, is 'in, but not too in'.

In an anthology on neutrality in Europe, Thomas Hajnoczi, the head of the Department of Security Policy in the Austrian Foreign Ministry, presents an official government line on changes in Austrian neutrality.[77] He acknowledges specific ways in which the concept has been adapted to remain compatible with Austria's changing security environment, but his assessment lacks depth beyond description. He shows that neutrality has been altered by a number of developments, including Article 23f of the Constitution, the development of the ESDP, and the precedence of UN obligations over neutrality; however, he fails to acknowledge the significance of the reduction of the concept to its core substance.

3.2.3 Interviews

Again, rather than evaluate the findings of the interviews conducted, this section will more simply report the data obtained, which will then be analysed in the following section.

[76] Constitution of Austria, art. XXIII, sec. f.
[77] Hajnoczi, Thomas, and Hanspeter Neuhold, "Austria," *Challenges to Neutral and Non-aligned Countries*, 7-16.

The first section of the interview gauged opinions on the traditional security concerns of Austria. Participants were first asked to highlight a few examples of Austria's traditional security concerns. An overwhelming 18 of the 20 participants listed neutrality as one example, with other popular exampled including national territorial defence and peacekeeping. They were then asked whether these concerns reflected the interests and values of Austrian elites, the mass public, or both. Almost all of those who answered neutrality to the previous question held that this was an interest and value of both elites and the public. However, eight participants noted that they were uncertain or did not feel informed enough to make such a judgement. As a follow-up, participants were asked if there is a difference between elite and public interests and what this may be. Again, some of the participants expressed uncertainty, while several others emphasised a distance between the elites and the public. Still, 12 respondents noted either that European defence integration, as well as NATO participation, registered as more important to elites, while neutrality was a greater concern for the public. Finally, respondents were asked to consider whether they felt that there has been a shift in Austria's security interests and values. Again, a compelling number of participants, 17 of 20, contended that there had been a shift in security interests. When asked to describe the shift and ponder what may account for it, nine participants noted that this referred to the government level, with respondents split fairly evenly on potential explanations: six felt that the end of the Cold War allowed for this shift, seven argued it was the accession to the European Union and greater international participation, including that with NATO, and two noted a decreased relevance in the concept of neutrality.

The next section of the interview focused specifically on neutrality. As a launching point, participants were asked what Austrian neutrality meant to him/her personally. Responses included non-participation in war, non-membership in alliances, and limited involvement in international conflicts including those beyond military concerns (i.e. conflicts

over economic sanctions, for example). Seven participants noted that neutrality is key element of Austria's Cold War history, five questioned its continued utility, and 16 respondents linked neutrality to identity. As follow-up questions, it was inquired as to whether he/she feels that the mass public and elites share this view. Essentially, every person taking the questionnaire felt that the general population would more or less agree with his/her understanding of neutrality; however, eight participants felt that this view was not shared by elites. Probing the issue of identity further, it was inquired as to whether, in the past, one would describe neutrality as having been part of the Austrian national identity. Compared with the 16 respondents who noted this relationship in the previous question, all 20 respondents now made this link. In the follow-up, a strong majority of the participants (14) felt that this was also true for the rest of the public, but less so for elites. The same question was then posed, but in a contemporary context. 17 of the participants felt that neutrality remained part of the Austrian identity, and again most felt that this was also true for the general population. However, 13 of the respondents noted that this was no longer as true for those in the government. Finally, the participants were asked to consider whether the meaning or importance of neutrality has changed. Six respondents stated they did not know, some of who noted feeling removed from the concept, while 14 respondents answered yes. As was the case when asked about shifts in traditional security concerns, most of the respondents noted this shift on the level of the government and pointed to the end of the Cold War, accession to the EU, and greater international participation as explanations for the shift.

The third section of the interview considered the relationship between the European Union and Austrian neutrality. When asked if he/she felt that neutrality was or is incompatible with EU membership or full participation in the EU, six participants held that they did not know or could not make an informed opinion on the question. Still, ten respondents felt that neutrality and EU membership were generally compatible, noting some

areas of contradiction, such as defence. Four of the participants felt that neutrality was entire incompatible with EU membership. While many had not mentioned the EU has as the strongest contributing factor to changes in security concerns and neutrality, when asked specifically what role, if any, the European Union played in shaping Austrian security concerns and neutrality, many participants now noted that accession to the EU required some adaptation to the concept. However, this may not represent a case of the interviewer planting ideas or responses in the participant; recall that in the previous section, a majority of respondents did feel that there was some incompatibility between neutrality and membership. Here, 15 of the participants felt that the EU did indeed shape Austrian security concerns and neutrality. Moreover, 12 of the participants believed that the EU had pressured Austria to redefine neutrality through various mechanisms, while only two respondents felt that the EU played no role here, and six did not know. None of the 20 respondents, however, felt that this pressure was then extend to the mass public by either the EU or the Austrian government. In fact, several of the participants noted that they actual felt reassured that neutrality would not be impacted by EU membership.

The final, concluding section of the interview, participants were asked why they think Austrian elites have maintained a policy of neutrality. The vast majority of the respondents (18) held that a combination of history and links to identity explained the continuation of neutrality. However, several participants noted in their explanations that while some form of neutrality has been maintained, this is a different form from what existed in the past. Others stressed that neutrality remains more important to the general population than to the government, and that is where one can truly witness a continuation of the concept. When asked about the future of Austrian neutrality, only three participants foresee a completely abandonment of the concept, with most of the respondents (14) believe that neutrality will continue to decrease in importance, but will still be maintained.

Finally, interviews conducted by other scholars can be utilised to in this analysis, especially to reveal the interests and concerns of elites. For example, developing her own methodological approach, Karin Liebhart combined the history of neutrality in Austria with interview responses from experts on the topic to create a novel approach in understanding Austrian neutrality.[78] She outlined three characteristics or qualifications of the 'memory experts' she interviewed; they were proper authorities mediators through the media, universities, and military and time witnesses who have experienced first-hand the development of neutrality. She then sought to understand the formation of Austrian neutrality as part of the nation's cultural memory through the reconstruction of retrospective interpretations and description of current discourse. This was achieved through a detailed questionnaire on the historical and actual meaning of Austrian neutrality. There were some dimensions in which the experts were in agreement, such as the close link between neutrality and the identity of the Second Republic. In other areas, however, opinions differed, as was the case on the future of foreign and security policy options. What is significant about her work is that it becomes apparent that neutrality had varying interpretations and significance for the different experts, yet all of them stressed the importance of neutrality as part of the Austrian identity. Interesting results are revealed in her interview with former Austrian president Rudolf Kirchschläger, who held that during the Cold War there was very little disagreement between political parties on the conceptualisation of neutrality. Especially interesting, rather than arguing that neutrality's decreased relevance led to considerations on EU membership, he holds that these considerations actually led neutrality to viewed as less relevant. He also stresses that neutrality has lost not only its political import, but also much of its symbolic value, holding that "we [Austrians] have given it up."[79]

[78] Karin Liebhart, "Transformation and Semantic Change of Austrian Neutrality: its Origins, Development, and Demise," *Neutrality in Austria*, 7-36.
[79] Ibid, 30.

3.3 Summary of findings

Based on the data collected from the above research, the four hypotheses on social learning and the four hypotheses on argumentative persuasion can now be applied to both the elite and grassroots levels. Moreover, an assessment can be made as to better understand the various stages in the process of socialisation in the specific contexts of the two levels of analysis. Finally, this will in turn summarise the questions of *when, under what conditions, and through what mechanisms* socialisation takes place can be properly assessed.

3.3.1 Elite level

The first hypotheses asserts that social learning is more likely in groups where individuals share common professional backgrounds. This presence of this condition was easily confirmed on the elite level as the group under analysis was the Austrian government. Clearly, the government officials and policy makers would share a common professional background in government and politics. This was also evident in the interviewees selected by Liebhart in her analysis. Second, social learning is more likely where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure. Evidence confirming the presence of this condition include the article on the ÖVP's desire to end neutrality and the interview with Kirchschläger. The general agreement on the elite level that neutrality no longer served a purpose is indicative of feelings of a policy failure or crisis.

The third hypothesis charges that social learning is more likely where a group meets repeatedly and there is high density of interaction among participants. While frequent meetings or debates on concept of neutrality were not undertaken, the opposite can be said of meetings and debates on accession to the EU, which were taking place at the time under analysis here. The same group of elites negotiating Austria's accession to the European Union were those who are under analysis her with respect to identity. Finally, social learning

is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure and exposure. This element was found to be most problematic because what actually constitutes 'direct political pressure' is unclear. It could be questioned as to whether persuasion or conditionality is indicative of direct political pressure. If that were the case, this condition of social learning would present an obstacle to any analysis, not only this one. As such, neither confirmation nor rejection could be assigned to this hypothesis; the result is not found.

The first hypothesis on argumentative persuasion asserts that it is more likely to be effective when the persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyse new information. The historical analysis on changes to neutrality, especially the Lantis-Queen article on foreign policy redirection, newspaper analysis on the status of neutrality, and interview responses on shifts in security concerns illustrate that Austria's domestic and international political scene was changing dramatically in the 1990s. Finally, argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuadee had few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader's message. This measure of argumentative persuasion is also problematic. As the elite conception of neutrality changed over time, it remains debatable as to whether neutrality could be considered an 'ingrained belief'. While the government made the case to the public that neutrality and membership were not incompatible, some agents within the group may have actually believed this. If that were the case, neutrality could not be viewed as an ingrained belief incompatible with accession. However, given these questions, again neither confirmation nor rejection can be assigned to this hypothesis.

Third, argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs or want to belong. This was clearly the case for the elites in this analysis. As is the case in most EU accession negotiations, it is better to be in than out. To highlight Austria's goals in accession, they were

not to maintain neutrality by any means. Rather, Austria desired greater involvement in European and international affairs. In order to achieve this, elites were much more open to the demands of the EU. Finally, argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader does not lecture or demand, but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument. In the media sources examined and interviews conducted, while pressure against Austria was evident, it was not in the form of coercion, shaming, or force. Moreover, there was very little criticism of against Austria more broadly or on neutrality specifically.

On the elite level, three of the four key hypotheses on when social learning is likely to occur were founded. This illustrates that the conditions necessary for socialisation were in place on the elite level. Moreover, three of the four hypotheses on when argumentative persuasion is likely to be effective were founded. This indicates that the mechanisms necessary for socialisation were also in place on the elite level. This stands to reason that socialisation was likely to occur and it indeed has. (A table summarising these findings is included in **Appendix 2**.)

3.3.2 Grassroots level

First, social learning is more likely in groups where individuals share common professional backgrounds. This condition of social learning was rather easily reject by simple logic and observation. An entire population of a country clearly does not share a common professional background. Moreover, even the sample selected for the interviews illustrated a high degree of diversity with respect to this measure. Second, social learning is more likely where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure. It was shown through numerous newspaper articles, government statements, and interview responses, that the public was persuaded to think that neutrality was not

incompatible with accession. As such, the population did not feel itself in a situation of crisis or policy failure, thus disconfirming this hypothesis. The third hypothesis holds that social learning is more likely where a group meets repeatedly and there is high density of interaction among participants. This hypothesis was can also be rejected using the same logic and observation as the first hypothesis. It simply is not possible for entire populations to meet as such. Again, even the sample for the interviews does not fulfil this criterion. Finally, social learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure and exposure.

First, argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyse new information. While the public was aware of accession to the European Union, the interviews have made clear that they were unaware of the intricacies of the government negotiations and policy deliberations. That is to say, the general population would have been less likely to recognise the novelty or uncertainty of the situation. The second hypothesis holds that argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuadee had few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader's message. This hypothesis is problematic at the grassroots level. On this level, neutrality was indeed an ingrained belief inconsistent with accession. However, the persuader's message in this case was that the two were actually compatible. Whether this was truly believed on the elite level is unclear, but if that were the case, neutrality would not be viewed as a irreconcilable ingrained belief. As such, the hypothesis is neither confirmed nor rejected.

Third, argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs or want to belong. While the population of Austria did vote to join the European Union, the persuader when examining the grassroots level is more accurately understood as the Austrian government. As such, the argument of wanting to join an in-group is not entirely valid in the case. Moreover,

even if we do understand the persuader as the EU, the interviews conducted indicate that the population was almost entirely removed from the influence of the EU, thus negating this hypothesis. Lastly, argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader does not lecture or demand, but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument. This final hypothesis should also be rejected as not only did the elite no lecture of demand change from the public, it did not engage in serious deliberation either. As the analysis from the interviews and media analysis indicate, the government made more of an effort to convince the public that accession would not require changes to neutrality, rather than attempt to persuade the Austrian public of the merits of accession with an altered conceptualisation of neutrality.

On the grassroots level, three of the four key hypotheses on when social learning is likely to occur were rejected. This illustrates that the conditions necessary for socialisation did not exist on the grassroots level. Moreover, three of the four hypotheses on when argumentative persuasion is likely to be effective were rejected. This indicates that the mechanisms necessary for socialisation were also lacking on the grassroots level. As such, socialisation was not likely to occur and has not occurred. (A table summarising these findings is included in **Appendix 2**.)

3.3.3 Assessment of stages of socialisation

At the elite level, one can observe a completed process of socialisation through the examination of changes to Austrian neutral identity at each stage of socialisation. The historical analysis has illustrated, throughout the Cold War and the first part of the 1990s, the traditional Austrian security concern of neutrality, along with peacekeeping and territorial defence, prevailed. This was also validated through the sections of the interviews on traditional security concerns and neutrality; this marks the first stage. At the second stage, the

new security discourse of European security and defence integration was introduced, but the defence of traditional policies outlined above were maintained. The historical analysis also presents these processes, with the interviews and media analysis highlighting key issues and concerns. The third stage, instrumental change, which stresses that gaining benefits requires strategic adaptation, was marked by accession to the European Union. Austrian elites were then persuaded to comply with the EU security framework at the expense of neutrality. This pressure towards norm compliance is the fourth stage and is closely linked to the final stage. Lastly, changes to Austria's neutral identity at the elite level were institutionalised through the creation of Article 23f of the Federal Constitution, the analysis of which outlined the changes that took place under stages four and five.

Again, at the grassroots level, this same process of socialisation cannot be observed. Nevertheless, it is revealing to apply the various stages of socialisation to the case study on Austrian neutral identity at the grassroots level. The first two stages here are identical to those observed on the elite level. First, the traditional security concern of neutrality is dominant, and then this neutrality is defended alongside the introduction of a new European security discourse. At the third level, however, no instrumental change is observed, as the public is assured that the benefits of accession do not require neutrality to change. Recall the photo caption stating that Austria is entering the EU as 'a neutral state', which in reality was quite misleading as Austria altered the conceptualisation of neutrality in its constitution not long after accession. Moreover, at the fourth stage of socialisation persuasion of norm compliance is not witnessed, although the population may have been persuaded to believe that no change was even necessary. Finally, despite the change in legal documents on neutrality and EU security and defence integration, this institutionalisation is not seen at the grassroots level. In the interviews, many of the participants noted having felt removed from

the policy process not only of the EU, but also of the Austrian government. (A flowchart summarising these findings for both levels of analysis is included in **Appendix 3**.)

It should now be clear that through various conditions and mechanisms socialisation of Austrian neutral identity has taken place at the elite level; however, the same process has not occurred at the grassroots level. In turn, this raises issues surrounding the relationship between these two levels of analysis. More specifically, two questions emerge. First, why did socialisation not take place at the grassroots level? As the research above illustrates, the necessary conditions and mechanisms to allow for socialisation, while present on the elite level, simply did not exist on the grassroots level. Moreover, this analysis also indicates that neither Austrian elites nor EU officials engaged in meaningful attempts to persuade the public of change. This begs the second question: why did Austrian elites not attempt to socialise the grassroots level? First, while the Austrian government was persuaded more directly by the EU to change its conceptualisation of neutrality to accede, the Austrian public was much farther removed from such EU pressure. Second, and related, not only is the mass population distanced from the pressure of the EU, it is also removed from the inner workings of not only the EU, but also that of its national government. This lack of knowledge on policy processes, government operations, and Austrian-EU relations, creates a sort of naïveté to the reality of what may be occurring. In the case of neutral identity and accession to the EU, the research shows that the public was more or less unaware that neutrality was being reconceptualised to allow for membership and full participation in the EU. Finally, again as indicated by the previous analysis, neutrality is an important element of the national identity of Austrian citizens. It may have been the case that elites, recognising this deep entrenchment of neutrality in nation identity, realised that attempts at socialisation would be a loosing battle with the potential to not only alienate the public, but also to damage domestic affairs.

Conclusions

4.1 Implications for Austrian neutrality, identity, interests

In Austria, neutrality has been severely weakened, perhaps more so than in any other neutral state. Since its inception in 1955, Austrian neutrality has faced a series of challenges that have weakened its concept of neutrality, including UN membership in 1955, policy changes in the 1970s, participation in international missions in the 1990s, EU membership in 1995, and inclusion in European defence integration. What remains is its military core – its non-membership to military alliances, the prohibition of the stationing of foreign troops on Austrian soil, and its non-participation in war – although, these core characteristics, too, are coming under increased challenge.

For Austria, neutrality is not internationally binding, meaning that Austria can alter or abolish neutrality at any time. To some observers, Austria's neutrality has become little more than a strategic burden actually interfering with international security operations. Moreover, the constant modifications to Austrian neutrality may reduce its legitimacy internationally. These continuous amendments are "symbolic of a status that may be going out of fashion in the twenty-first century."[80] Still, Austria does not even seriously consider the possibility of joining NATO.

However, as the interviews and media analysis have shown, neutrality is still a important element of national identity on the grassroots level and this is unlikely to change in the future. Moreover, there is "no real neutrality debate actually taking place and … the neutrality discussion is not a primary concern expected to be solved by the government."[81] While Austrian neutrality is a weak concept on the elite level, it is unlikely that the

[80] Landis, "Negotiating Neutrality," 176.
[81] Liebhart, "Transformation and semantic change," 27.

government will completely abolish the policy, as it remains an element of national identity on the grassroots level. Moreover, it is just as unlikely that the Austrian population would suddenly abandon this key part of Austrian identity, As such, in the future, neutrality is likely to be maintained as a concept to some extent by the government, as well as remain linked to national identity by the people.

4.2 For other neutral states and their identities and interests

As mentioned in the introduction, one of the intentions of the research conducted in this thesis is the wider application of its findings to understand processes of socialisation in other European neutral states. This section will examine the relationship between neutrality and identity for Sweden and Finland, providing the necessary background information on the concept as necessary. These two countries alone, and not Ireland, will be considered, as the oft-cited 'Nordic dimension' of the Swedish-Finnish perspective provides an especially interesting model to assess neutral identities.[82]

4.2.1 The 'Nordic dimension'

4.2.1.1 Sweden

Swedish neutrality originated in 1815 under the Congress of Vienna and has evolved into a key element of foreign policy and national identity. Still, Sweden's concept of neutrality has changed dramatically since its inception. With the end of the Cold War, it was argued that neutrality no longer served a purpose – a military attack against Sweden is unlikely and Europe is increasingly stable. In turn, Sweden has recognized the need to increase cooperation with other states and has adjusted its institutions and policies accordingly. The concept of neutrality, therefore, has effectively been reduced to military

[82] For analysis on Irish neutrality, please see Thomas E. Hachey, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Irish Neutrality," *New Hibernia Review*, 6 no. 4 (Winter 2002), 41 and Neal Jesse, "Contemporary Irish Neutrality: Still a Singular Stance," *New Hibernia Review*, 11 no. 1 (Spring 2007), 74-95.

non-alignment. Sweden's neutral policy does not formally exclude any security cooperation other than binding agreements on mutual security guarantees.

Neutrality was not key issue for accession to the EU in 1995. While some opposition to membership existed, the policy was not abandoned entirely nor has it been given any explicitly special status. To avoid criticism, Sweden has argued that its commitment to "non-participation in military alliances is correspondingly one of active participation in building international security."[83] Participation in CFSP and ESDP is largely without limitations; however, defence initiatives must remain within the framework of UN. Involvement in such missions has essentially become a non-issue and neutrality is not viewed as a limiting factor of working with the EU, UN, or NATO.

Sweden's policy of non-membership in military alliances is dependent upon the public's will for its existence, which currently enjoys strong majority support. As neutrality remains a part, albeit a reduced part, of Swedish foreign and security policy, as well as its defence, this has translated into the formation of neutrality as a key element of national identity. In fact, neutrality is the ideological core of Swedish identity.[84] While there was a brief identity crisis following the end of the Cold War, the government has redefined neutrality to suit the changed international environment, yet it remains part of the national identity.[85] Even with this changed perspective, the Swedish government has aimed to maintain the link between neutrality and national identity. In fact, membership in a military alliance, whether within the EU or NATO, is not viewed solely as a challenge to neutrality, but one also to identity. Moreover, Swedish citizens view neutrality as "an unbreakable part

[83] Ojanen, *Neutrality and Non-Alignment*, 43.
[84] Johan Eliasson, "Traditions, Identity, and Security: the Legacy of Neutrality in Finnish and Swedish Security Policies in light of European Integration," *European Integration*, 8 no. 6 (2004), 13.
[85] Anders Bjurner and B. Huldt, "Sweden," *Challenges to Neutral and Non-aligned Countries*, 42.

of national identity."[86] Therefore, support for European defence integration and NATO membership is strikingly low.

4.2.1.2 Finland

Declaring its policy of neutrality in the aftermath of World War II in an attempt to establish and strengthen its international position, Finnish neutrality has faced many changes since the end of the Cold War. Ambiguous in its initial conception, Finnish neutrality was based on its "sovereign right and obligation to defend its own territory … and maintain as strong a territorial defence as was possible in the situation."[87] With the end of the Cold War and no longer constrained by the Soviet Union or dependent on Sweden, neutrality has evolved into a more active policy based on military non-alliance and an independent defence. This has allowed for increased room for action in international affairs, greater opportunities for collective action, and identity formation. In fact, the government holds that its significant contribution to military crisis management operations is not only compatible with neutrality, but that such operations actually support the maintenance of Finland's territorial defence.

The 1992 White Paper made clear that Finland's interpretation of neutrality as the hardcore of neutrality was to not limit EU accession possibilities and, in 1995, Finland joined the EU for its implicit security guarantees, reflecting a shift in interests from national defence to global security.[88] However, Finnish neutrality was viewed as incompatible with the EU's solidarity clause, requiring the concept to be reduced to stipulate that Finland cannot remain impartial to conflict between the EU and a third party. Some observers have argued that, with EU accession, "Finland decided to abandon neutrality in the broad sense, as it was seen as

[86] Eliasson, "Traditions, Identity, and Security," 4.
[87] Ojanen, *Neutrality and Non-Alignment*, 19.
[88] Tapani Vaahtoranta and Tuoman Forsberg, *UPI Working Paper 29: Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?* (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000).

irreconcilable with membership."[89] With respect to CFSP/ESDP, the Finnish government remains pragmatic and relaxed, not excluding the future possibility of joining a common EU defence. Such an approach would "guarantee freedom of action and would keep different options open should a new defence arrangement be contemplated."[90] More startling perhaps, the 2004 Finnish Security and Defence Policy does not explicitly mention the concept of neutrality anywhere. This demonstrates that "neutrality is no longer regarded as useful a tool in policy making or in the debate in foreign policy."[91] As such, neutrality is closer to becoming obsolete in Finland, more so than in any other neutral state.

While there is a desire to remain militarily non-aligned, there is no attachment of neutrality to the national identity. In terms of perceptions on the grassroots level, some scholars would go as far as to argue that neutrality is no longer widely supported by the public and that it is not unwillingness, but a lack of preparedness that prevents Finland from joining a military alliance.[92] Government officials interpret neutrality with greater flexibility and are hesitant to link the policy to identity. For Finnish citizens, "identity is not rooted in neutrality the way it is in Sweden, and public influence on the policy has traditionally been negligible."[93]

4.2.1.3 A Nordic dimension?

When discussing the relationship between neutrality and identity, it is important to consider what is often referred to as the 'Nordic dimension'. Some scholars and observers view Sweden and Finland as a single entity representing classical neutrality. Indeed, the two countries share many similarities in domestic values, foreign policy orientation, and security

[89] Telja Tiilikainen, "The Finnish Neutrality – Its New Forms and Future," *Small States Inside*, 169.
[90] Munro, *Challenges to Neutral and Non-aligned Countries,* 18.
[91] Ibid, 23.
[92] Möttölä, "Finland, the European Union, and NATO."
[93] Eliasson, "Traditions, Identity, and Security," 4.

and defence policy. While the two have formed closely linked security and defence policies and their publics support the maintenance of a common Nordic identity, a past Finnish foreign minister has stressed that the two are 'sisters, but not twins'. The historical and ideological roots of Swedish neutrality and the pragmatic and survival-based neutrality of Finland are evident in their differing conceptualisations of neutrality. Identity theory, historical experiences, and foreign policy orientation can all account to varying extents for this difference; however, the implications of, rather than the reasons for, this divergence in neutral identities are what are of greater concern here.

Given the relationships between neutrality and identity in these two states, the future of neutrality is likely to be different in each. In Sweden, because neutrality is rooted in the national identity, it is plausible that the policy will continue to garner great support from both the government and public. Throughout its history and continuing at the moment, the policy of neutrality enjoys enormous support across parties and populations. Citizens and elites are unlikely to abandon this core element of their identity. In Finland, where neutrality does not comprise a key part of national identity, support for the continuation of the policy is increasingly uncertain. Because neither the government nor the public link neutrality to their identity, it could, theoretically, be abandoned more easily. In fact, as was illustrated in a previous section, neutrality is closer to becoming obsolete in Finland than in any other European neutral state. Because of the pragmatism of Cold War neutrality, for many "it is easier to give up the rhetoric of neutrality because neutrality is seen either as a failed policy or as a means to achieve distance from Moscow."[94] Nevertheless, Finnish citizens "firmly support the government's policy of non-alignment and independent defence as the basis of Finnish security policy"; in fact, "even among political parties there seems to be a broad

[94] Vaahtoranta, *UPI Working Papers 29*, 13.

consensus prevailing about security policy."[95] It is unlikely that Finland would abandon its policy of military non-alignment; however, this should not be understood as a link between identity and neutrality.

What the above analysis illustrates is that, like Austria, Finland and Sweden have been accepting decisions and engaging in policies that previously had been against their official security policies. The EU has influenced both of these neutral states to become more or less politically and militarily allied.[96] Sweden and Finland are excellent cases for comparison, as their different domestic institutions have led to varied responses to such integration. When discussing motivations for acceding to the EU, Finland joined primarily for security concerns, while Sweden did for economic ones. Motivations aside, the EU has influenced Finland and Sweden to change their security policies through a variety of mechanisms. These include repeated interpersonal actions, mutual interdependence, shared responsibilities and common objectives, and the shame of free-riding.[97] As a result, Sweden and Finland have accepted communal values, domestic structural changes, and integration of security policies. Finally, both states will have to continue to adjust their perspectives and policies as the EU integrates further and ties to NATO are deepened. However, some scholars have argued that it is unlikely that domestic changes would alter the importance of neutrality in either state. Rather, the development of ESDP is more likely to change security policies or relationships with the EU and NATO.[98]

4.3 Implications for constructivist research/socialisation

One of the greatest criticisms against constructivism more broadly surrounds the

[95] Tiilikainen, "The Finnish Neutrality," 178.
[96] Eliasson, "Traditions, Identity, and Security," 1-24.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Vaahtoranta, *UPI Working Paper 29*.

difficultly of creating testable hypotheses and rigorous methods. The hypotheses on social learning and argumentative persuasion utilised in this thesis would require further modification and 'fine-tuning' in order to present a more accurate and complete understanding of the processes at play here. In future research efforts on this topic, greater attention to certain hypotheses or additional research on them will also allow for a more coherent and convincing argument. Most problematic in this analysis surrounded the fact that these hypotheses are designed to measure socialisation in much smaller groups. As such, they cannot be appropriately applied to measure changes in larger groups or populations. Moreover, the research here could stand from greater attention to the formulation of the various indicators to be drawn upon throughout the application of the model.

Several shortcomings regarding the data requirements were highlighted in the earlier section on methodology. With respect to interviews, the first data requirement, the analysis personal interviews with elites may prove to be more insightful than depending of the interviews of other scholars. Moreover, instead of questionnaires with follow-up informal discussions, focus groups could allow for fresh perspectives and unforeseen topics to emerge. On the second element of the data requirements, media analysis, this analysis could have benefited from the examination of a wider variety of forms of media, including radio, television, and magazines. Broadening the scope of the time period examined would more than likely improve the analysis and findings of the thesis. In regards to the final data requirement, the inclusion of additional sources, including memoirs and meeting minutes, would have been advantageous in official document analysis. However, as mentioned in the methodology chapter, constraints surrounding time, translation, and accessibility prevented such improvements from being made in this thesis.

An additional limitation of the model employed in this thesis surrounds the case study. While limiting analysis to a single case study provided focus to the empirical test,

there were also disadvantages.[99] First and foremost, a single case study is hardly representative of the whole. That is to say, conclusions drawn from an examination of the socialisation of neutral identities in one state cannot be held constant when examining additional cases. Nevertheless, generalisations will still be attempted in an effort to apply the findings of this analysis to other cases of socialisation, in both neutral states and constructivist research more broadly (see subsequent sections). A comparative analysis of two or more neutral states could function as an option for overcoming the problems associated with making generalisations based on a single case study.

Taking into consideration the above areas for improvement, there are two broad, but overlapping areas in which further research should be conducted. First, in the field of constructivism, more empirical testing, and more stringent empirical testing, must be completed on the socialising effects of institutions such as the European Union and its values and ideas. As highlighted in the literature review, a number of studies have already been competed assessing socialisation. These more recent analyses have served as important first steps, the work of which must be continued and deepened. However, this body of research focuses heavily on socialisation on the European level, within the various bodies of the EU, or, at its broadest, on the impact of the EU on member or candidate states' federal government. The process of socialisation on the grassroots level could benefit from a great deal of additional research. Beyond examining the socialisation of interests, little work has been completed on the socialisation of national identities on either the elite or grassroots level. Moreover, the methodology outlined in this thesis combines a series of already developed models with necessary modifications. Original research on a concrete theories or

[99] Given the time constraints and page limitations of this thesis, however, a single case study was the most feasible option. In fact, engaging in a more substantive comparative analysis may actually have served to reduce the overall coherence and effectiveness of the argument.

methodologies for measuring socialisation could be developed and re-developed. Finally, in order to quell criticism primarily from the rationalist camp, meaningful efforts towards bridge building between the theories must be made.

Second, the field of neutrality in Europe could stand from fresh and insightful analysis. Far from becoming obsolete as an element of identity, if not policy, the maintenance of the concept it should be better understood. Surprisingly little in-depth examination has been undertaken on neutrality and neutral identity; this is especially true for the Austrian and Irish cases, less so for the Nordic and Swiss cases. Moreover, comparison between the various European neutral countries is even scarcer. What is outlined below as implications of this thesis' findings for other neutral states, serves more as an overview or preview of a veritable wealth of potential research opportunities. However, it quickly becomes apparent that there is a serious shortage of literature on the future of neutrality and neutral identities. Where the fields of socialisation and neutrality overlap, similar analysis as contained in this thesis should be completed in examination of the other European neutral states – Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and even the Swiss case could offer an interesting perspective. Moreover, as mentioned above, such comparative research is truly necessary for complete empirical analysis.

Appendix 1: Questionnaire

On traditional security concerns:

1. What are a few examples of Austria's traditional security concerns?

2. Do these concerns reflect the interests and values of Austrian elites (policy makers, government officials), the mass public, or both?

2 (a). If there is a difference between elites and the public, what is it?

3. Do you feel that there has been a shift in Austria's security interests and values?

3 (a). If yes, describe.

3 (b). If yes, what do you think may account for this shift?

On neutrality:

4. What does Austrian neutrality mean to you?

4 (a). Do you feel that the mass public shares this view?

4 (b). Do you feel that this view is shared by elites?

5. In the past, would you describe neutrality as having been part of the Austrian national identity?

5 (a). Is this true for both elites and the mass public?

6. At present, would you describe neutrality as part of the Austrian national identity?

6 (a). Is this true for both elites and the mass public?

7. Do you feel that the meaning or importance of neutrality has changed?

7 (a). If yes, describe.

7 (b). If yes, what do you think may account for this shift?

On the role of the European Union:

8. Do you feel that neutrality was or is incompatible with EU membership or full participation in the EU (e.g. security and defence policies)?

9. What role, if any, do you think the European Union has played in shaping Austrian security concerns and neutrality?

9 (a). Do you believe that the EU pressured the Austria government to abandon or redefine neutrality in order to join the EU? If yes, how so?

9 (b). Do you feel that this pressure was then extended to the mass public either by the EU or the Austrian government?

In conclusion:

10. Why do you think Austrian elites have maintained a policy of neutrality?

10 (a). Do you foresee the maintenance or abandonment of Austrian neutrality in the future?

Appendix 2: Hypotheses as applied to case study

Conditions of Social Learning

	Elite	Grassroots
Professional Background	Yes	No
Crisis/Policy Failure	Yes	No
Interaction	Yes	No
Insulated from direct pressure	??	Yes

Conditions of Argumentative Persuasion

	Elite	Grassroots
New Environment	Yes	No
Prior Beliefs	??	??
Persuader Authority	Yes	No
Deliberative Argument	Yes	No
Interactive Setting*	Yes	??

*Omitted from analysis

Appendix 3: Stages of socialisation

Elite Socialisation

Traditional security concerns prevail	Neutrality
⇓	⇓
Introduction of new security discourse and defence of traditional policies	EU security discourse/defence of neutrality within this framework
⇓	⇓
Instrumental change (requires strategic adaptation to gain benefits)	EU accession
⇓	⇓
Persuasion (convinced norm compliance is the right thing to do – social rationality)	Persuaded to comply with EU security framework at expense of neutrality
⇓	⇓
Institutionalisation	Article 23f

Grassroots Socialisation

Traditional security concerns prevail	Neutrality
⇓	⇓
Introduction of new security discourse and defence of traditional policies	EU security discourse/defence of neutrality within this framework
⇓	⇓
Instrumental change (requires strategic adaptation to gain benefits)	EU accession/told benefits of accession do not require change
⇓	⇓
Persuasion (convinced norm compliance is the right thing to do – social rationality)	No persuasion – or persuaded to believe that change is not required
⇓	⇓
Institutionalisation	Change in legal documents (Article 23f)/ not seen at grassroots level

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