

Gender and Ukrainian Politics: the Making of Yuliia Tymoshenko

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Abstract

The thesis, conducted in the frames of the qualitative research field of gender studies, using comparative approach and visual iconographic analysis, is developed as a case study of the political figure of the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yuliia Tymoshenko. The goal of the study is to look at Yuliia Tymoshenko's political career and her current official visual self-representation in order to see what role gender plays in the process of her entering the political field and maintaining her high level of popularity in Ukrainian politics. The study is situated within the body of literature on women, as political actors and is mainly aimed to fill the gap in the research on gender and politics in Ukrainian post-soviet context. The results of the analysis showed that although Yuliia Tymoshenko's political career can hardly be considered engendered, as her start in Ukrainian politics is primarily conditioned by the peculiarities of the Ukrainian recruitment system, based on lobbying and kinship relations; Tymoshenko's visual self-representation is created around the notion of gender which is used as a successful political communication strategy in order to maintain popularity and power. In addition, the research showed that although in Ukraine a woman holds the post of the head of the government, Tymoshenko's example, due to the peculiarities of her start in politics and general characteristics of her political image cannot be considered an indicator of general women's advancement in the country.

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Introduction

The political figure of Yuliia Tymoshenko, a woman, who managed to reach the Olympus of power in post-soviet country and become the Prime Minister of Ukraine in less than 10 years after she entered politics, is often called in the press “the Phenomenon”¹ (Kryjaniivskyi 2006; Vlast I Pravo, the 2007; LigaBiznesInform, the 2007).² Many political analysts link Tymoshenko’s phenomenon to the populist strategies she uses in her political campaign, some journalists connect this phenomenon to her business empire and financial scandals in which she was involved in 1990s, others explain it by her astonishing political self-representation which includes a variety of different, often controversial elements. My firm belief is that the phenomenon of Yuliia Tymoshenko lies *prima facie* in the way all the abovementioned aspects are combined in an astonishing blend, rooted in populism. Indeed, it is rather hard to find another woman politician with such a rich and impetuous political career, such a vivid and memorable style, and such a great success and popularity among people. For sure, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s political persona, created as one of the most successful products of political marketing, represents an extraordinary object of research.

The central goal of this thesis is to look at Yuliia Tymoshenko’s political figure from a gender perspective, in order to analyze the constituent parts of the phenomenon of one of the most remarkable women leaders in the world of politics, and to see in what way gender matters when it comes to political leadership in Ukrainian context. In order to do so, I will first look at Yuliia Tymoshenko’s official and unofficial biography, in order to investigate the main factors which enabled her to enter the political field of post-communist Ukraine and to analyze to what extent her gender was a part of this process. My next step is to dismantle

¹ Translations are mine, if it is not mentioned otherwise.

² The very word “phenomenon” creates an interesting *calembour*, as the masculine gender of this word in the Ukrainian language runs counter to Tymoshenko’s visual self-representation, based, as it will be shown further in the study, on normative codes of femininity.

Tymoshenko's political self-representation in order to identify the main elements of her political image, which made her one of the most popular women politicians both in Ukraine and outside the country, and to analyze how gender can be instrumentalized as a political strategy to insure one's popularity among people.

The main argument of the research is that although the process of Yuliia Tymoshenko's entering politics can hardly be considered as gendered, her visual self-representation is based on the notion of gender, rooted in visual codes of normative femininity which is centered on symbolic nationalistic concepts and artificially created chastity. Thus, the main findings of the research suggest that gender is not the determinative factor in the process of Yuliia Tymoshenko's becoming a politician, as her political start was mainly conditioned by the peculiarities of the recruitment process in Ukraine of the 1990s which was mainly based on kinship relations, lobbying and corruption (Szeleniy and Szeleniy 1995; Makarkin 2005; Naumova 2007). At the same time, the analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko's visual self-representation shows that gender has been instrumentalized in Tymoshenko's political image as an important technique of political communication for maintaining the high level of her popularity.

The significance of the study may be explained first of all by the gap in general and case-study scholarly research on the role gender plays in the process of entering the political arena and gaining people's popularity in Ukraine in particular and in post-soviet context in general. The second main reason behind this study is conditioned by a noticeable lack of research on Yuliia Tymoshenko's political career and her political self-representation, conducted from a gender perspective. Thus, I managed to find only one academic work, written by Ukrainian scholar Oksana Kis (2007), which is aimed at the deconstruction of Tymoshenko's political representation in order to explain the tremendous popularity of this female politician in Ukraine. In this study I will occasionally refer to Oksana Kis' findings, in

order to complement and add to them, as my research is based on a different empirical, methodological and theoretical basis. Thus, Kis' (2007) research on Tymoshenko's political image is aimed at explaining the popularity of the Prime Minister of Ukraine: it has a rather descriptive character and is based on various materials, such as images, cartoons, articles and interviews from official and unofficial sources from late 1990s till 2007. The aim of my study is to see how gender is used in Tymoshenko's current visual political image,— therefore I focus on the iconographic analysis of her official photographs, offering the study of her political self-representation from 2004.

The contribution of this thesis to the general scope of scholarly literature is first of all conditioned by the application of gender approach and the established theories on women in politics³ to a specific case of Yuliia Tymoshenko — a female politician of the higher rank in the post-soviet context of Ukraine, as this problem received little attention and is still a relatively neglected area of concern. Second, through the investigation of the main factors which influence the level of representation and popularity of female politicians, this study is aimed to draw attention to the differences in the relations between women and politics in “Western” democracies⁴ and post-soviet Eastern European countries — Ukraine in particular. Third, the analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko's political self-representation can lead to a better understanding of the roles and strategies women politicians use in order to confirm to the voters' expectations, which, in its turn, may result in the reconsideration of the gender-biased expectations of the electorate. Finally, the findings of the study result in two main theoretical innovations regarding women and politics. Thus, the study allows me to contribute to Anna Kravchenko's (2006) classification of self-representation of women politicians⁵, adding it to it a new type of political image, — that of Yuliia Tymoshenko. In addition, the research,

³ I will describe these theories in detail in the further chapters of the study.

⁴ In this work under “Western” democracies” I understand non-Scandinavian Anglo-Saxon countries, described in the literature, used as a theoretical framework of the study.

⁵ See Section 1 in Chapter III for Kravchenko's (2006) classification.

conducted in the study enables me to argue that although in Ukraine a woman holds the post of the Prime Minister Tymoshenko's example, because of the peculiarities of her entering Ukrainian politics and the characteristic features of her political self-representation, cannot be considered as an indicator of a high level of general women's advancement in Ukraine.

The study is done in the frames of the qualitative research field of gender studies, using comparative approach and such methods as case study and visual analysis. The thesis consists of two main parts which are based on different sets of data and involve different methodological approaches. The first part of the research, aimed at the analysis of the process of Yuliia Tymoshenko's entering the political field of Ukraine, is built as a case study, involving comparative approach. The material, used in this part of the study mainly includes biographical data of Yuliia Tymoshenko and sixteen other women politicians who, together with Tymoshenko, became the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation.⁶ Taking into account the lack of access to the primarily source of information – Yuliia Tymoshenko herself, and the peculiarities of the political sphere, where different data from a politician's life may be hidden or distorted, depending on the sources, – the incompleteness of the analyzed material is recognized in the research. In order to reduce the limitations conditioned by the usage of secondary sources, and to present as diverse and accurate information as possible, a comparative approach is used to the biographical data of Yuliia Tymoshenko which is taken from her official website as well as other sources which include journalistic investigations and newspapers articles. The usage of both official and unofficial biographies is of great importance as the latter includes the details from Tymoshenko's personal life which, as it will be shown further in this work, play a crucial role in the understanding of the way she became a politician.

⁶ "Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" is the name of Ukrainian Parliament.

Another limitation, acknowledged in the research, is that one case study may not be recognized as a complete representation of all similar cases. Taking into consideration this statement, it is recognized that the purpose of the study is to present a particular case in order to contribute to the understanding of complex relations between women and politics in Ukraine. Though, at the same time, it is admitted that the prominence of the investigated case enables to draw certain generalizations about these relations and general Ukrainian cultural and political contexts.

The main ethical dilemma that can be singled in the first part of the study is connected to the peculiarity of the case study research as such which presupposes a certain degree of intervention into the private space of the world of a person. Thus, as Stake (2003) points out, ethical problems may arise because of the limited access to the persona, investigated in the research and inability to negotiate with them the main issues and the outcomes of the study. This problem is also related to the issues of objectivity of interpretation and over-interpretation, I will discuss in the methodology section.

The second part of the research, aimed at the dismantling of Yuliia Tymoshenko's self-representation, is based on the analysis of photographs of Yuliia Tymoshenko since 2004, when, after the Orange Revolution, her current political image was eventually shaped. Thus, the empirical basis of the analysis is constituted by the photographs chosen from Yuliia Tymoshenko's official website. These images are of two sources: they are either made by her official photographer or are extracted from the printed press. The choice of the resource is conditioned by the object of the research: the political self-representation of Yuliia Tymoshenko. Thus, it may be stipulated that the images on Tymoshenko's official website are carefully chosen by Tymoshenko's team according to the criteria, she wants to correspond to in her political self-representation. In order to dismantle the main elements of Tymoshenko's visual image and to see the main strategies she uses in her self-representation, the

iconographic analysis is used. I will describe the peculiarities of the iconographic method, as I use it in the study, and the main problems connected with it in the methodology section of the thesis.

As to my position as a researcher, I acknowledge that it is of a rather privileged nature, as it is my prerogative to conduct the analysis and to offer its interpretation. At the same time it should be stressed that in this study I am analyzing Tymoshenko's carefully thought-out political communication which is expressed through visual elements of her political self-representation. Thus, when describing Tymoshenko's representation in the third chapter of the study, I refer exclusively to her political image, a product of political marketing which includes only those elements and issues that Tymoshenko, her spin doctors and image makers communicate to the world.

The thesis consists of three main chapters. In the first chapter, I will describe the main method of the study – iconographic analysis, its stages and problems. I will also establish general theoretical framework of the research and explain main concepts I refer to in this work. In the second chapter I will look at the main factors which generally favor women's representation in politics, compare them to Ukrainian context and analyze Yuliia Tymoshenko's biography in order to identify the most significant factors which enabled her to enter the political field of Ukraine. In the third chapter I will analyze official photographs of Yuliia Tymoshenko, in order to dismantle her political self-representation, to single out main elements of her image and to see the role that gender plays in her political communication. I will also point out some of the main reasons which can explain why Yuliia Tymoshenko picks and chooses so many different elements for her political image and the centrality of gender in her political visual self-representation.

Chapter I. Methodology and Theoretical Background

In this chapter I will look at the peculiarities of the iconographic analysis applied in the second chapter of the study, describe the main problems I encountered using it and the measures I took in order to resolve them. Then I will establish general theoretical framework of the study, name the main theories I apply in it, and state the main reasons why I use these theories. In addition I will define and specify the notions of political communication, political self-representation and political image, as I will often refer to them in the study.

1. Iconographic Analysis and its Main Problems

In this work I use Erwin Panofsky's approach to iconography who defines it as the "branch of history of art which concerns itself with the subject-matter or meaning of works of art, as opposed to their form" (Panofsky 1982, 26). The iconographic method of visual analysis, as it is applied in this research, includes three main stages, pointed out by Erwin Panofsky (1982, 28-29) and later described by Walker and Chaplin (1997, 131-132). These stages include description, classification and interpretation, which involve the movement from the content analysis of the image to the in-depth understanding of meanings, which stand behind this content. At the first level of iconographic visual analysis a researcher identifies factual level of an image (i.e. what is depicted in the picture) and looks at its expressional level (i.e. how it is depicted by the author). At the second level, the main concern of the iconographic analysis is to understand the themes and concepts which are represented by what is depicted in the picture. At the third level, the analysis is aimed at the understanding of the image as a whole, as a representation of certain culture and society it belongs to. Thus, the usage of iconography presupposes contextual and interdisciplinary approaches, where various sciences which describe certain cultural and historical context are addressed in order to do as accurate interpretation of an image as possible (Walker and Chaplin 1997, 131-132).

The iconographic method is chosen as the main method for analyzing Yuliia Tymoshenko's visual self-representation for two basic reasons. First, iconography allows not only to dismantle the main elements of Tymoshenko's political representation, but to decode the symbolism of its particular elements which may be perceived as such that refer to certain cultural, religious or historical concepts which exist in Ukrainian society. The second reason why iconography was chosen as the principle method of the study is connected to the way Tymoshenko is depicted on her images, which resemble, as it will be shown further in this work, the iconographic traditions of both Christianity and the soviet art of propaganda. In order to draw the similarities between the iconography of Yuliia Tymoshenko and that of the soviet posters and Christian icons, I will often refer to Victoria E. Bonnell's (1999) empirical research, in which the author analyses, traces the genesis and decodes general meanings, produced by the soviet posters.⁷

Despite all advantages of the iconography, it has several problems which are acknowledged in this study and which are divided into two main types: those connected with the selection of the material; and those, related to the identification of the meanings of the pictures and their interpretation. Thus, one of the first problems I encountered when selecting visual material for the analysis was how to choose a number of the most "representative" photographs from thousands of them. This problem may generally be solved either by choosing a number of images characteristic to a certain historical period of time, or by classification of the images to several groups on the basis of their formal characteristics or content "themes". In this research I applied both approaches. Thus, I selected the pictures for the analysis from a certain period of time (i.e. 2004-2009) and divided them according to the similarities in their form (e.g. style, space, structure, etc) and content (where, when and how Tymoshenko is represented).

⁷ The comparison of Yuliia Tymoshenko's visual communication and the iconography of soviet leaders is important as it will allow me to point out that the continuity is one of the key factors of her political success.

The main problem, related to the identification of meanings is the issue of a limited access to the producers of the images, so there is no opportunity to articulate about the initial purpose and meanings of the image. In this case, as suggested by David Perlmutter: “When we look at the images, the very notion of authorship must be broadened” (Perlmutter 1994, 16) and it is more useful “to consider the institutional or social context of the production” (Perlmutter 1994, 16). Therefore, the interpretation of the images with Yuliia Tymoshenko is done from a certain historical, cultural and time standpoint, revealing only those issues, which the image can handle down to me.

The majority of the problems of visual analysis, as well as the analysis of the biography of Yuliia Tymoshenko and sixteen other women deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of II convocation, are related to the notion of interpretation, more specifically to the issue of biases the researcher has towards the subject or object of the study. As to this problem, I find the notions of openness (Alcoff 2003) and reflexivity (Wasserfall 1997) to be useful. Both of these notions presuppose sensitivity towards what the object of the study can tell, as well as awareness and appropriation of one’s prejudices towards the object of the study. Thus, being a Ukrainian citizen, I am aware of the fact that my personal political preferences and views as well as the influence of nationalistic and political discourses which are imposed on me, to some extent may influence the analysis I conduct in the study. Though, as a researcher, I acknowledge that my recognition of the subjective influence I have towards the object of the study enables me to monitor and appropriate it, and to present as accurate data of the study, as possible.

2. Theoretical Background: Women in Politics

The research, conducted in this study, lies at the intersection of several disciplines: political science, cultural anthropology, and gender studies, — therefore I will apply a number of approaches and theories from the three above mentioned fields. Considering the constraints

of space and the structure of the chapters of my work (in which I start from theoretical background and/or apply the theories in their body) the theories I use in this study are described at large in the further chapters of the thesis. Therefore, I will use this section in order to explain the main goals I strive to by applying the existing scholarly theories to the particular case of Yuliia Tymoshenko and the significance of their application.

2.1. General Framework of the Study: Women as Political Actors

With significantly more women entering the public sphere, exploring of the implications of gender for political theory have become more and more important. Generally, the scope of literature on women in politics can be divided into three main thematic groups. First, there is a considerable body of literature where general questions connected to the comprising of the social construction of gender in political theory are addressed. These questions are mainly connected to such general topics as for example the interrelation of private and public, social and political (Pateman 1989; Morris and Lyon 1996) or feminism and citizenship (Narayan 1997; Burns, Schlozman, Verba 2001). Second, there is a scope of literature on women voters, where such issues as women suffrage (Pateman 1994), or for instance women's electoral behavior, or the factors which influence women's preferences (Kelly and Mirer, 1974; Inglehart and Norris 2000) are investigated. Third, there is literature which refers to women as political subjects who are actually doing politics. Such studies are mainly focused on the investigation of problems, connected to the level of women's representation in politics (Norris, Lovenduski 1993; Phillips 1996) and the peculiarities of communication styles and strategies, which are used in the political representation of female politicians (Kravchenko 2006; Mayhead 2005; Herrnson, Lay, Stokes 2003). I situate my project within the body of literature that belongs to the third group, mentioned above: i.e. literature on women as political actors.

Thus, in this work I use the body of literature on women as political actors in order to apply the established theories on the representation of women in “Western” democracies (Norris, Inglehart 2000; Matland, Montgomery 2003; Norris, Lovenduski 1993) and “post-soviet” countries (Einhorn 2006; Pavlychko 1997; Kolodiy 2000) to a specific case of the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Yuliia Tymoshenko, so that to see the peculiarities of the Ukrainian recruitment system in general and in case of Tymoshenko in particular. Thus, the second chapter of my study is based on the theoretical model of legislative recruitment, which consists of several main aspects of the socio-economic, cultural, political levels of a country and a level of the recruitment process as such which influence women’s representation on the political arena. In this study, I first describe the main factors, which contribute to women’s representation in politics, then I analyze how advantageous these factors are for women leaders in Ukrainian context and to what extent they matter in Yuliia Tymoshenko’s case.

In this way I am filling the gap in scholarly research on the peculiarities of women’s representation and entering Ukrainian politics in general, and in case of the current Prime Minister of Ukraine in particular, as both of these topics have been a rather neglected area of concern. In addition, the application of the theories, mentioned above, to the political figure of Yuliia Tymoshenko enables me to offer relatively new theoretical insights into the scope of literature on gender and politics, and to contribute to general research on “new elites” which have been lately emerging in world politics.⁸

In addition, in the last chapter of this study, I am incorporating the theories related to the general subject of political communication and representation (Norris 2004; Squires, 1999; Pitkin, 1967; Mansbridge 1999), theories related to the notion of populism (Kuzio 2007; Baranov 2001; Ropp 2005; Hayward 1996) and those, which point to close relations

⁸ I use the term “new elites” referring to a new generation of politicians from tycoons (e.g. Silvio Berlusconi, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahvan or Yuliia Tymoshenko) whose political careers challenge the conventional politics by reducing the role of the gender factor in the process of entering the political field, as their political start is mainly based on money and lobbying.

between politics and popular culture (Zoonen 2000; Corner and Pels 2003) in order to dismantle Yuliia Tymoshenko's political representation, to single out main elements and strategies she relies on in her political image and to explain the diversification of her political image. I use these theories to exemplify how gender can be instrumentalized as a political strategy for securing the popularity of a female politician in general and Yuliia Tymoshenko in particular. At the same time, the combination of the above mentioned approaches applied to a particular case enables me to explore a new phenomenon, how a female body of a politician, manifested through such visual codes as clothes, looks, posters and non-verbal communication, may be considered to be a lucrative and a more diverse source of political communication than a man's body.

2.2. Terminology: Political Communication, Image and Representation

In this research I use political communication as a rather broad term which is used to describe a wide range of means used by a politician on all stages of electoral campaign and further in his or her political career in order to maintain their popularity, prestige and power (Trent, Friedenberg 1995, 12-14). In my study I accept Pippa Norris' approach to political communication, who defines it as "an interactive process concerning the transmission of information among politicians, the news media and the public" (Norris 2004, 1). Thus, in case of political communication such aspects as what is transmitted, why it is transmitted, how it is transmitted and through what means it is transmitted are of main significance. Recognizing the importance of establishing general terminological basis in my research, in what follows I will elaborate on these aspects.

As to the means of political communication, generally political marketing is targeting audiences, using various channels of mass communication (printed press, television, the Internet) (McNair 2003, 7; Perloff 1998, 8-10; Tedesco 2004, 509). As to the modes of political communication, there are two main types of modes, generally singled out in

scholarly literature: controlled modes or those which may be prepared in advance, such as political advertisements or prepared speeches; and those involving spontaneous communication such as debates, face-to-face communication or speeches given on the spot (Kaid 2004, 156). As to the reasons of political communication, its main goal is to target the audiences from whom electoral votes are sought in order to receive their support and to gain access to power (McNair 2003, 6-7; Lilleker 2006, 10). What should be stressed is that the ultimate goal of a politician, i.e. the victory on the elections, may not be possible without gaining the popularity first, as according to Olga Gujva, the amount of popularity is “in direct ratio to power, which the bearers of the popularity have” (Gujva 2004). The notion of popularity, in its turn, is in a close relation to the question of what is transmitted by political communication, as popularity is one of the most important structural components of a successful political image.

Thus, the political communication is aimed at creating a successful political image which I, using V. Komarovskiy’s definition, understand as “a portrait of a certain person, organization or event, which is purposefully formed in order to have a certain emotional and psychological affect on a certain group of people” (Kamarovskiy 2003, 98). The main characteristic of a political image is that it is created artificially in order to be adjusted to the needs and expectations of certain social groups which form the constituency. Thus, a political image is the core of political self-representation which, as H. D. Pitkin states, means “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967, 209). In sum, a politician creates his or her political image, represents it and communicates it to the public in a way that can speak to the constituency and consequently, bring a politician a certain amount of popularity and political power.

Political images of politicians, as Judith Squires states, are created in order to communicate certain ideas, particular interests and identities (Squires 1999, 194). Depending

on what a politician represents, scholars (Squires 1999; Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 1999) generally distinguish between three main types of representation. The first type, symbolic representation, as Pitkin states, exists when instead of choosing the representative based on the same values, commitments or shared experiences that the electorate has, in order to make sure that their interests and needs are satisfied, people choose a candidate according to certain emotional ties that evoke between them (Pitkin 1967, 213). According to Judith Squires, symbolic representation indicates that “a person symbolizes the identity or qualities of a class of persons” (Squires 1999, 203), or a nation as a whole, and resembles the relationships that exist between the queen and the people. The second type of representation, distinguished by the authors, is social or descriptive representation. This type of representation is one that is built on identities or certain characteristics, shared by the electorate groups (Squires 1999; 203). These characteristics usually include such aspects as race, class, social status, gender, similar background or experience (Mansbridge 1999, 638). Finally, the third type — substantive representation, is when the representative seeks to advance the group’s preferences and interests through certain issues, policies and actions (Pitkin 1967, 213).

The analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko’s political self-representation, conducted in this study, is built as inclusive of the first two types of representation described above: symbolic and social or descriptive. This choice is conditioned by the peculiarities of the nature of the three above-mentioned types of representation and by the empirical data and goals of the research. Thus, because only visual representation of Yuliia Tymoshenko is considered in the research, — substantive representation, which usually manifests itself through certain policies and discourses of a politician, is not analyzed in this study.

My choice to concentrate on visual aspect of Tymoshenko’s self-representation is conditioned *prima facie* by the nature of political communication as such which, according to Pitkin (1967, 213), means acting, i.e. making an impression of something, — which in its turn

very much relies on the aspect of visualization. I also base my research on visual image of Yuliia Tymoshenko, as according to a number of studies political representation has become more visually or imaged-oriented, rather than issue-oriented (McNair 2003, 103; Kaid 1999, 425-427). Thus, numerous scholars in such scientific fields as political communication, psychology or social studies consider visual aspect to play the central role in the construction of a certain political image (Barry 2005; Graber 1996; Kepplinger 1982; Tiemans 1978).

Such value is given to the visual representation for several main reasons. Thus, visuals are considered to be one of the most memorable modes of learning (Brosius 1993). Moreover, they have a very productive informative and accumulative capacity, as they “include a more comprehensive and error-free grasp of information, better recall, and greater emotional involvement” (Graber 1996, 85). In addition, they have an immediate impact on the viewer, as “a single photograph can have a clear impact on voters’ judgments regarding a candidate’s congressional demeanor, competence, leadership, ability, attractiveness, likeableness, and integrity” (Rosenberg, Bohan, McCafferty and Harris 1986, 123). In sum, politics has become more imaged-oriented as visuals have a strong persuasive effect, dramatization function and very powerful rhetorical impact. Thus, images give political leaders an opportunity to control the agenda setting, to create it in a correspondence with the voters’ expectations, and therefore to increase the level of their popularity.

I will focus on the issues of political communication, image and representation in the third chapter of my research, when analyzing Tymoshenko’s official photographs. In the next chapter I will focus on Yuliia Volodymyrivna’s⁹ political career in order to single out main factors which enabled her to enter the political field of Ukraine.

⁹ I will occasionally refer to Yuliia Tymoshenko as Yuliia Volodymyrivna, as Volodymyrivna is her patronymic name.

Chapter II: “Natural Selection” of Women in Ukrainian Politics: the Case of Yuliia Tymoshenko

*There is not a single goal,
I haven't reached in my political biography.*

Yuliia Tymoshenko

(from the interview to the “Komsomolskaya Pravda”, 2006)

On Yuliia Tymoshenko's official website there is a short commentary about the press-conference with journalists held in Odessa on the 9th of February, 2006. During the question-answer session, she was asked why there are so few women in the electoral list of her party BYuTy. “Men in my team said that I am alone is already too much for them”, — replied Tymoshenko, smiling. At the same time she emphasized that today the question of gender politics is of great importance. The current Prime minister of Ukraine stressed that politics is very cruel and forceful, and that woman “have to go through “natural selection”, to be able to bring benefits to their country”¹⁰.

The answer, Yuliia Tymoshenko gave at the conference, compared to her own political career and the career of other women politicians who together with her became the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation, leaves a strong feeling that being politically correct she dissembles and understated the true peculiarities of the situation of women in Ukrainian politics. If the process of women's entering is “natural”, as Tymoshenko puts it, how is it possible to explain that in a country, where in general there are so few women on the top level of politics (today, the list of the parliament members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine includes the names of 414 men and only 37 women deputies (Spysok Narodnyh Deputativ Ukrainy VI sklykannia (2007-), a woman managed to climb the Olympus of power to the chair of the Prime Minister of Ukraine, who shares with the President the heights of Ukrainian politics. What factors enabled Tymoshenko to become the

¹⁰ The source of the interview with Tymoshenko: <http://www.tymoshenko.com.ua/ukr/news/first/2715/>

people's deputy within a year after she entered the political party? What aspects in Tymoshenko's biography allowed her, of all other women, who were elected with her to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the II convocation, to reach the top level of Ukrainian politics? To what extent does gender matter when it comes to Yuliia Tymoshenko's political career and political leadership in Ukrainian post-soviet context? The goal of this chapter is to find the answers to these questions and to dismantle the "naturalness" of the recruitment process of women in Ukrainian politics, by analyzing the internal socio-economic, cultural and political situation in Ukraine after it gained its independence in 1991, and by identifying the crucial factors which favored Tymoshenko's entering the top level of politics in the late 1990s.

The analysis, conducted in the research enables me to reconsider the "natural" in the way Yuliia Tymoshenko became a politician of the higher rank. On the contrary to the "natural selection", Tymoshenko mentioned, her political start became possible due to the peculiarities of the recruitment process of the 1990s, based on kinship relations, lobbying and corruption, favored by the general peculiarities of the socio-economic, cultural and political situation in Ukraine. In addition, the process of Tymoshenko's becoming a politician can hardly be considered as gendered, as in case of Yuliia Volodymyrivna, her individual level (that is the availability of the necessary resources, which include both human capital and financial assets) and the general characteristics of the political context in Ukraine were the factors that mattered in her political start the most.

The research is developed as a case study of Yuliia Tymoshenko's political figure and includes the analysis of biography and political career of her as well as sixteen other women who were elected together with Tymoshenko as the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the II convocation. The chapter is built on the theoretical model of legislative recruitment, which influence one's entering and participation in politics (Lijphart 1994; Norris and Inglehart 2000; Norris 2003; Rule 1987; Matland 1998; Matland and Montgomery 2003). The structure

of the applied model includes three main levels which constantly influence and interact with each other. The first level is represented by the general social, economic, and cultural context of a country. The second level consists of the general political context, which includes legislative competition, electoral and party systems, as well as ideology and organization of single parties. The third level includes the characteristics of individual candidates (ambition, motivations and resources) and the peculiarities of the recruitment structure and process.

The objectives of the research and the model of legislative recruitment taken as the basis of the study determine the structure of this chapter. First I will look at Yuliia Tymoshenko's biography in order to define the main periods of her life and factors which influenced her political career. Second, I will look at the main characteristics of the general socio-economic and cultural context which are considered to support women's representation in politics, compare them to the situation in the first decade of Ukraine as an independent country, and identify the main factors which helped Tymoshenko to enter the politics in comparison to the other sixteen women, who became the deputies of the VR of the II convocation. Third, I will analyze the political variables which favor women's entering politics and compare them to those of Ukraine in order to see what enabled Yuliia Tymoshenko to become the deputy of the Ukrainian Parliament. Finally, I will look at the correlation between the main elements of the recruitment process, which favor women's representation in politics, and the peculiarities of the recruitment process in post-soviet Ukraine in general, and in case of Tymoshenko in particular. The analysis of the three levels of legislative recruitment in Ukrainian context allows me to single out main factors, which enabled Yuliia Tymoshenko to enter the top level of politics and to see to what extent her gender was a part of this process.

1. From Rags to Riches: the Biography of Yuliia Tymoshenko

Prima facie it should be noted that similarly to biographies of many other politicians of the higher rank, there is an official biography of Yuliia Tymoshenko, situated on her official website and published in official press, and her unofficial biography, which is usually put together by journalists and political analysts. The main difference between the two is that in the latter Tymoshenko's life course events are added with personal details about, for instance, her origin, private life or the "shadow sides" of her business (for details see Table 1). In order to present as diverse and accurate picture as possible, in this study the biographical data of Yuliia Tymoshenko is taken from her official website as well as unofficial sources which include journalistic investigations and newspaper articles. The usage of the two types of sources is also determined by the fact that personal details from Tymoshenko's family and business career, as it will be shown further in the study, play a crucial role in the understanding of the way she became a politician. For now, I will identify the main life course events of Yuliia Tymoshenko's biography, as I will often refer to them further in the study.

Yuliia Tymoshenko, nee Grygian, was born in an ordinary family in Dnipropetrovsk in 1960. At the age of three Yuliia's father left the family, so the girl was raised by her mother, a teacher in a local school who had to work on several jobs in order to support the family. Probably, at that time neither of them thought that at the age of 38 Yuliia will become the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, at the age of 45, she will be ranked by the *Forbes* (2005) magazine the third place among the most powerful women in the world, and in another three years she will head the list of the most influential people in Ukraine (Focus, the 2008). I will trace the most important periods of Yuliia Tymoshenko's bibliography, the steps she took to go from rags to riches, from a girl raised in hardships of a single-parent family to the Prime minister of Ukraine.

In 1978 Tymoshenko entered the economic department of Dnipropetrovsk State University. In a year she met her husband Oleksandr Tymoshenko and married, although she

was only 19 years old. Her marriage with Oleksandr, one of the heirs of the representative of the former Communist Party and business elite, determined her future business and later her political career. Tymoshenko's father-in-law, Gennadiy Tymoshenko, held different posts on several levels of government in the USSR. In 1991 he occupied the position of the chairman of Kyrovskiy district executive committee and was considered to be "a serious and individual 'master' of the region" (Brovko 2009). In addition, his ownership of a company, specializing in the provision of film-showing facilities, enabled the Tymoshenkos to gather enough money to open their first business, as at that time such business was bringing considerable incomes.

Thus, in 1988, Yuliia Tymoshenko, together with her husband and father-in-law, became the owner of a network of video shops in Dnipropetrivsk. In a year, when the business started to develop, she was appointed to the post of commercial director of the "Terminal" youth center. Thirteen years later, in 1991, Yuliia Tymoshenko, her husband and her father-in-law started to build a family business empire: Genadiy Tymoshenko pulled the strings to gather the start-up capital in order to open the "Ukrainian Petrol Corporation", where Yuliia Tymoshenko had the position of commercial and later general director of the corporation which held the monopoly of providing agriculture of Dnipropetrivsk with oil products. At that time this was one of the most lucrative branches of business, as 1991 was the year of "the collapse of a huge governmental and economic structure, inflation and almost immediate death of Ukrainian agriculture" (Brovko 2009).

In 1995 this company was transformed into the "United Energy Systems Corporation", which was the richest and the most influential company on the market of energy resources in Ukraine. In 1996, the Corporation started to experience political hardships (one of its partners Pavlo Lazarenko became the rival of the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma who started to use all accessible methods to remove his rival from the electoral campaign) and as a result, financial difficulties. Thus Yuliia Tymoshenko entered the political field of Ukraine, as

participation in politics let of the leash and enabled to protect and to develop one's business on the highest possible level of power.

In 1997 Tymoshenko became the first deputy chief of Pavlo Lazarenko's party "Gromada" and in a year she was elected to Ukrainian Parliament — the Verkhovna Rada of the II convocation. A year later, she founded and became the head of her own party "Batkivshchyna" (Fatherland), which stood in opposition to Leonid Kuchma's regime. The same year she was appointed to the position of the vice-Premier Minister responsible of the country's fuel and energy issues. In 2001 Tymoshenko was dismissed from her post and a criminal case was fabricated against her by the Kuchma's team, which led to her imprisonment for 42 days. In 2002, a year later after the verdict of not guilty, Tymoshenko was reelected to the Ukrainian Parliament as a head of the coalition of parties named "Bloc of Yuliia Tymoshenko" (BYuTy).

In 2004 BYuTy and presidential "Bloc Nasha Ukrayina" (Our Ukraine) created a coalition in order to support Victor Yushenko's candidature for the post of the President of Ukraine. As a reward for Tymoshenko's help during the Orange Revolution, Yushenko assigned her to the post of the Prime Minister. Although a year later Tymoshenko was discharged, she was reelected again in 2007 and still holds the post of the Prime Minister of Ukraine. Moreover, she is going to run for the post of the President of Ukraine, the elections for which are to be held in December 2009.

Yuliia Tymoshenko by leaps and bounds climbed the ladder of Ukrainian politics. She managed to reach the top of Ukrainian politics being in her thirties. In the following sections I will look at the general socio-economic, cultural and political context of Ukraine in order to conclude how friendly it was to women politicians in 1990s and to single out main factors which enabled Tymoshenko to enter the political field of Ukraine, and to identify the role, her gender played in this process.

2. The Level of Socio-Economic and Cultural Factors of Recruitment

The general socio-economic and cultural contexts, which are considered to be such that increase women's representation in politics, consist of several main aspects (Lijphart 1994; Norris and Inglehart 2000; Norris 2003). These aspects constantly interact with one another and often define each other, including economic development of the country, the strength of women's movement and the level of political and societal culture of the country's population. In this section I will first describe general conditions of socio-economic and cultural factors which are considered to be such that favor women's representation in politics. Then, I will look at the main peculiarities of the general context in Ukraine during the first years of the transformational period on the country in order to see whether it promoted women's entering the political field. Finally, I will look at Yuliia Tymoshenko's political career and the career of other sixteen women, whose names appear in the list of the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the II convocation, in order to identify main factors, which enabled her to become first the MP and then the Prime Minister of Ukraine.

2.1. Socio-economic and cultural factors that support women's representation in politics

One of the main factors, which foster women's representation in politics, as argued by Richard Matland and Kathleen Montgomery (2003, 34-35), is the high level of economic development of a country. The more economically and politically developed a certain country is, state the authors, the more resources women have to enter the politics and the more willing the parties are to accept and promote women. This statement may be easily contested, as for example, in the Soviet Union the level of women's representation in politics, though not on the high-profile positions, is considered to be high — up to 30-40 % (Starovoytova 1996), its economics is often characterized as “ineffective and inflexible” (Akimbekov 2009). Thus,

although in this study it is accepted that generally, the high economic development of a certain country opens new possibilities to increase the level of political and societal culture of people, which in its turn increases the level of support of the female candidates and politicians by the voters (Norris 2003, 312). Still, it is recognized in this research that along with the economic development of a country, a lot of other factors, such as political regime and system, and the peculiarities of the recruitment process define the number of opportunities for women to enter the politics.

The second factor that helps to increase women's participation in politics is the existence of strong women's movements in the country (Lovenduski 2003). On the one hand, women's movements assert women's rights and interfere into political institutions, claiming to increase women's representation. On the other hand, they promote the shift of the societal values from conservative to egalitarian, ensuring equal access of men and women to power, high-status professions and other resources (Lovenduski 2003).

Third, the high level of societal, gender and political culture of society influences the number of women's in politics. Thus, as Norris (2003) and Inglehart (2000) claim, the level of women in politics is considered to be higher in a women-friendly society, where egalitarian values prevail over traditional ones and where there is a small gap between the access of men and women to power and high-status professions.

In what follows I will look at the context of Ukraine, in order to see whether these factors were favorable to Ukrainian women in general and in what way they promoted Tymoshenko's entering the political arena.

2.2. Ukrainian Socio-economic and Cultural Context

The conducted analysis of the level of socio-economic and political development of Ukraine after it gained independence, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, allows me to argue that it did not create a friendly environment for women to get engaged in active social

and political life of the country. The percentage of women on the top level of politics is indicative of this claim. Thus, in the Soviet Ukraine, the Marxist-Leninist ideology towards the women's emancipation resulted in the gender paradox, when high level of women's representation in employment and education was accompanied by a low representation of women on the highest political levels. Although communist leaders widely promoted the discourse of gender equality and insured women's political participation through mandatory quotas, women were still absent on the top level of the government, in the Central Committees and Politburos. Thus, according to A. Andreenkova (2000) the amount of women who participated in party convention of the USSR in 1989, was less than 16%. This situation aggravated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which resulted in a significant drop in the political participation of women in the sphere of national governance in many new states.

Thus, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, post-communist heritage together with other economic, cultural and social factors, generally, with the exception of, probably, only the Baltic states, led to the continuation of the tradition of women's underrepresentation in numerous spheres of public life, including the higher levels of politics. In 1990 there were only 3% of women in Ukrainian parliament. Democratic elections did not bring significant changes, as the number of women in the Verkhovna Rada in 1994 composed 5,7%, in 1998 this number increased only to 7,8% (Tystchenko 2006). Such underrepresentation of women is explained by the presence of a number of problems, citizens had to encounter in the process of transformation from communism.

Many authors, such as F. Heyat (2002), R. Solchanyk (2001) or J. Dawson (1999) indicate that the process of transformation was far more complex than it was expected. Post-communist countries had to encounter a number of changes, which brought turmoil and disruption to people's lives. The process of transformation was accompanied by the change of a state-owned command economy to a privatized market system. The state-led industries were

not ready to work according to the principles of free market economy of the capitalistic world. This led to a considerable drop in gross national product and, consequently, to unemployment, limited access to healthcare, education, child-care, maternity and pension benefits. The new prices set by the market, immediately skyrocketed, aggravating already falling standards of living.

The consequence of the transformational process in post-soviet countries set up a number of obstacles for women's participation in politics. Thus, as pointed out by Barbara Einhorn (2006), the emphasis on the economic development of these countries, or rather their survival and adaptation to market economy, centralized the issues related to economic stabilization, paying little attention to the question of gender mainstreaming and gender equality. At the same time, the hardship of life, the lack of time and resources, the presence of a double burden and the prime responsibility of women for their families, left women no time and desire to enter the political arena (Einhorn 2006).

Another factor, which did not favor women's representation in Ukrainian politics was the weakness of women's movements in Ukraine due to a number of factors. *Prima facie*, the problem of women's discrimination or gender inequality did not exist in the dominant discourse of the USSR, therefore people saw no need to defend women's rights and, consequently, to create women's movements (Andreenkova 2000, 120-123). Among other reasons, which kept women from involvement in women's organizations, Jane Dawson (1999) mentions hardships of the transformational period, limited access of women to mobilization recourses and absence of group identities and solidarity, upon which one could create a unifying platform of the movement.

Thus, first years of Ukraine as an Independent country were characterized by fragmented and disorganized women's movement, and weak political participation of women in the life of the country. According to N. Lavrinenko (1995, 11), in 1995 about 97% of

Ukrainian women did not belong to any political organization. Solomea Pavlychko (1997, 229) also mentions that although during the first five years of independence the number of Ukrainian women's organizations increased to 70, their influence on society and politics was very poor. Most women's organizations, as pointed out by the author, were regionally based and had small membership, composed almost exclusively of middle-aged or elderly women, often housewives. In addition, feminism was almost absent in their discourse and even if they mentioned it in their works, they would "quickly add a footnote distancing themselves from it" (Pavlychko 1997, 229).

The level of societal and gender culture of society in Ukraine after 1991 also did not favor women's political participation. People were not acquainted with feminist theory and gender stereotypes towards women had a dual character. On the one hand, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Ukrainians, similarly to a lot of other post-communist peoples, turned to nationalistic ideologies, the manifestation of which was strong before the formation of the communist state, but was significantly lowered during the communist rule. According to this ideology, as pointed out by Oksana Kis (2002), women were called *Berehynias* – mothers, wives, the keepers of the family and the nation in general. At the same time, as A. Kolodiy states, additional image of women was alive as a reminiscent of communist discourse of emancipation, which presented an ideal woman, suitable for demonstrational purposes: loyal, kind, intelligent, able to combine family and work and to keep the stability of the system, but in no way revolutionary, resolute or too active (Kolodiy 2000, 7). Both of these images assigned women with qualities little suitable for active political life and therefore did not favor women's political activism.

In addition, there was a sufficient increase in the gap in the equal access of men and women to power, high status professions and opportunities. Before Ukraine gained its independence, the politics of the Soviet state was aimed at the full incorporation of all citizens

into the workforce. State discourse of gender equality portrayed women as both mothers and laborers, who work nip and tuck with men for the sake of happy future of the communist society. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the result of the hardships, brought about by the process of transformation, women were first to lose their jobs, as men were considered to be the breadwinners of the family. In addition, numerous authors, for instance L. Attwood (1996) or A. Kolodiy (2000) mention that many women were tired of the equality of the proletariat, imposed on them by the former soviet system. They did not want to combine work and family, choosing the latter as “a silent corner of bourgeois inequality” (Kolodiy 2000, 11), where they could have a rest from the double burden.

The emergence of new sectors of economy also proposed new career options for women. As pointed out by Jane Dawson women were usually offered places of executive assistants, secretaries and receptionists which kept them away from money and power (Dawson 1999, 32). Moreover, women were no longer protected by the state laws, — therefore they had to face unfair lay-offs, glass-ceiling, discrimination and sexual harassment. Thus, in 1990s, the totality of economic, legal and social factors, as well as the increased level of discrimination, provided women with limited access to top level management, which, for sure, did not bring about more opportunities to start in politics.

In sum, the transformation of Ukraine from communism to a new democratic country generally did not create favorable conditions for women’s political participation. The first years of Ukrainian Independence were characterized by low level of socio-economic development, weak women’s movements, gender discrimination and traditional gender stereotypes towards the roles of men and women. And although I argue that general cultural and socio-economic situation of Ukraine did not favor women’s participation in politics, it should be mentioned that in case of Yuliia Tymoshenko, some aspects of general context of

Ukraine played into her hands. The analysis of these aspects will be conducted in the following subchapter.

2.3. Yuliia Tymoshenko: Paving the Way into Politics

One of the by-passes of economic transformation in Ukraine which helped Tymoshenko to use her resources to become a politician was the increase of the level of corruption which accompanied the process of privatization. This situation broadened the gap in income and wealth between different classes of Ukrainian population. As a result, numerous business elites appeared in the country, who acquired sources and opportunities needed for entering the political field. Thus, Yuliia Tymoshenko's capital was earned because of the "loopholes" in Ukrainian law and economy, which enabled her to create a new business and to become a member of the business, and later the political elite of Ukraine.

In Ukraine, as well as in many other post-soviet countries, late 80s and early 90s was the time of creation and development of cooperatives – the predecessors of modern business structures (Kryger 2008). Thus, while the changes brought about by the transformation affected negatively the vast majority of the population, for some young and enterprising people, including Tymoshenko, it opened numerous opportunities for starting private business. Thus, in 1988, Yuliia Tymoshenko, together with her husband and father-in-law, opened several shops, which in ten years grew into a family business empire - the "Ukrainian Petrol/Oil Corporation". The loopholes, created in economic and legislation systems of the country by the transformation, enabled the company to work in the grey zone of Ukrainian economy. Thus, in order to avoid taxation, a part of the company's nominal capital was kept in the offshore funds in Cyprus. In addition, the company used a number of barter schemes, due to which in the situation of total shortage, it managed to receive large volumes of agricultural production at low figure directly from the producers.

Later, between 1995 and 1997 Yuliia Tymoshenko became the head of the corporation “United Energy Systems of Ukraine”, which worked on barter deals: it exchanged the production of Ukrainian enterprises for energy resources. Since Ukrainian economics, which was still recovering after currency reform and inflation, suffered from the lack of circulating assets, and enterprises had little experience in market management, the corporation successfully dealt as a reseller. The company returned a part of funds to the enterprises, while another part was kept as a payment for the services.

By the beginning of 1997, the “United Energy Systems of Ukraine” controlled 25% of Ukrainian economics. The corporation included 20 industrial and commercial organizations, research institutes, air company and two banks. At this time, Ukraine starts to ring with Yuliia Tymoshenko’s fame: the press teemed with numerous articles and video materials about a new business-woman. Her post of the head of the “United Energy Systems of Ukraine” brought her new nickname — “Miss 11 Billiards” and enough resources and business relations with other elite structures to be able to enter the field of Ukrainian politics. That was the time when Tymoshenko became famous, but first as a business-woman, not as a politician whom she became a year later, when she was elected the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of the second convocation. In about ten years she became the Prime Minister of Ukraine.

It should be added that among the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the second convocation there were 17 women, elected from different regions of Ukraine. The analysis of their registration cards, situated on the official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, as well as their further political careers, show that all of them had similar characteristics (see Table 2). The average age of the women deputies of the second convocation was about 45-50 years, all of them had never been MPs before, all of them had higher education, being economists, teachers, lawyers, agriculturists or doctors. The majority of these women didn’t belong to any party, 4 of them were members of the Communist party, one woman belonged

to the Socialist party and one to the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists. All of these women were promoted and elected in different regions of Ukraine.

Later, more than a half of these women were more than once reelected as members of parliament of further convocations, many of them held high offices in Ukrainian government. Thus, for example V.P. Semeniuk-Samsonenko, in 2005-2008, held the post of the Chief of the State Property Fund; Goroshovska V.A. was appointed to the position of the Deputy of the National Security Council of Ukraine in 2005; V.O. Zavalevska, in 2005, became the member of the Central Election Commission; and, for instance, N.M. Vitrenko for the last 15 years has been one of the most active female politicians in Ukraine, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, who in 2004 was fifth in the electoral race for the presidential post.

Still, out of the seventeen women deputies of the II convocation only Tymoshenko managed to reach the highest rank of Ukrainian politics – the post of the Prime minister of Ukraine. The analysis of Tymoshenko's biography and career shows that she indeed had two main important differences from other female deputies of the VR of II convocation. The first aspect that differentiates Tymoshenko among other women deputies is the fact that she was the youngest among them: at the moment of the Parliamentary elections Tymoshenko was in her mid-30s. This distinction is important for several main reasons. Thus, as a representative of a new young generation, she had more skills, energy and opportunities to start her own enterprise. In addition, as a result of the reason, stated above — Tymoshenko's belonging to the class of new entrepreneurs, who were “younger, better educated, and specifically technocratic in its skills and orientation” (Szeleniy and Szeleniy 1995, 617), meant simultaneously her belonging to one of the most lucrative sources of the recruitment of political elite in Ukraine¹¹. Moreover, Tymoshenko's “membership” in the class of the young generation of politicians allowed her to build her image as an “immaculate” by both previous

¹¹ This point will be looked upon in details in the fourth section of this chapter, where the four sources of the political elite recruitment in post-soviet Ukraine are considered.

regimes, people were tired of and highly malcontent of: the communist regime and the “nomenclative-oligharchal” (Naumova 2007) regime of the second President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005). This aspect of her image, which will be described in the second chapter of the thesis, enabled her to become one of the most successful figures in Ukrainian politics.

The second main distinction between Tymoshenko and other women deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of II convocation was the fact that Tymoshenko was the only one who at the moment of entering the Verkhovna Rada was the director and the co-founder of a business company. Thus, in case of Yuliia Tymoshenko, the transformation period in the 90s brought her the opportunity to start own business and to gain high profits which became the primary engine: the main source of capital and interest, necessary to enter the political field. The capital, in its turn, enabled Tymoshenko to change the usual recruitment system: she herself, not the party, performed the role of the gatekeeper on her way to power.

Thus, although the process of transformation in Ukraine resulted in socio-economic situation which was far from being favorable to women’s representation in politics, it was advantageous for individual representative of business elites, who due to their capital and established relations could easily enter the politics. The crucial factor, which determined one’s chances to be a politician, was the amount of resources, available at their disposal. The availability of these resources was the most important factor which enabled Tymoshenko to become the MP. At the same time her gender was not a disadvantage, — what was an advantage in itself. Thus, indirectly, her gender may be considered a subsidiary aspect, which helped her to start the political career, as it is through her marriage with Oleksandr Tymoshenko she gained the access to the necessary resources.

3. The Level of General Political Factors of Legislative Recruitment

The main aspects of the political system, which have crucial influence on the women's representation in politics, include such variables as legislative competition, electoral and party systems, structure and ideology of a particular party. In what follows I will look at which parameters of the aspects mentioned above have a positive influence on women's representation in politics. Then, in order to define whether Ukrainian political environment has been favoring women's political participation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I will describe the peculiarities of the political regime, electoral system and the party system in Ukraine. In the third subsection I will look at Yuliia Tymoshenko's biography in order to identify what factors played the key role in her entering politics.

3.1. Political factors that support women's representation in politics

Thus, according to a number of studies (Rule 1987; Norris 1993; Lijphart 1994; Matland 1998; Matland and Montgomery 2003), among all ballot systems, proportional representation is considered to be the best when it comes to women's representation. Thus, in general, countries with PR system have twice as many women in politics than countries with other electoral systems (Rule 1994, 18). In addition, the positive influence of PR system on women's entering the political arena increases when it presupposes high district and, consequently, high party magnitudes (Matland 1998, 76) and when the whole country composes one district (Lijphart 1994, 11-12).

As to the legislative competition (the number of aspirants for election), Norris (1993) argues that the weaker it is, the more chances the women have to enter the politics. However, when it comes to the party systems, the stronger the competition among different political parties in a multi-party system is, the more diverse they want to be, — the better the chances for women to be nominated are (Norris 1993, 317). In addition, the PR system together with high party competition increases the chances that the process of contagion may occur, by

which parties copy policies of other parties, representing therefore more diverse issues and recruiting more diverse members (Norris 1993).

The importance of the parties for women's representation is determined by the fact that they are considered to be the main gatekeepers, which select, nominate and promote their candidates. What matters for women in the party context is first of all the ideology, accepted by the party as well as the organization of the party (Norris 1993, Matland and Montgomery 2003). As concerning party organization, women are better represented by parties with strong organization and formal rules which prescribe the process of the nomination of the candidates (Norris 1993). As to the party ideology, women do best in parties with high commitment to gender equality, implemented in programs; and in parties which use strategies aimed to bring women into politics (such as rhetorical strategies, positive action, positive discrimination, etc.) (Lovenduski 1993, 8). Women are also considered to be less represented by the rightist parties because of the conservative views of the party leaders towards women's roles and, consequently, because of a limited number of women, willing to enter rightist parties. On the contrary, the high level of women is noted in New Left and Green parties, which share the ideas of gender equality (Matland and Montgomery 2003). Now I will look at how the analyzed factors influence women's representation in politics in Ukrainian context.

3.2. Ukrainian Political Context

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been numerous attempts to define the political system of Ukraine. In this paper I use Svitlana Lukavenko's (2007) classification, according to which Ukraine has one of the modifications of neo-patrimonial political regimes. According to the author, neo-patrimonial political regimes are characterized by the discrepancy of the "outer characteristics" of a modern state (such as constitution, laws, electoral system, etc.) and the inner logics of their functioning. This type of regime was reinforced by the implementation of the presidential type of republic, introduced after Ukraine

gained its independence, which concentrated the majority of power in the President's hands and the hands of his milieu.

In her work Svitlana Lukavenko (2007) points out a number of main characteristics, typical of the neo-patrimonial regime, I am listing in order to understand whether the political situation in Ukraine was favorable to women's representation in politics and to identify main categories of people, this political system opened opportunities to for entering the political arena. First, as Lukavenko states, in the neo-patrimonial regime the personalization of power leads to the situation, when personality of a political leader is more important than his or her political programs. Second, Ukrainian political relations are very often built as patronage on the basis of kinship, regional, ethnic or national relationships. The clan nature of such relations leads to the bursting levels of corruption in Ukraine, which in its turn represents one of the most important means of reaching the political goals. Thus, in order to secure ones business, many entrepreneurs of the independent Ukraine strive to establish close relations with the top-level politicians or to be come one of them themselves. Thus, although in the 90s, political regime was far from being democratic inherently, therefore it did not favor women's entering politics, it created a number of opportunities for Tymoshenko to enter the political field through the kinship and business relations with the representatives of Ukrainian political elites.

Ukrainian electoral system of 1990s also did not favor women's representation in the political arena. The first elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were conducted in single member constituency on the basis of the majoritarian electoral system. In 1998, when Tymoshenko became the deputy, the elections were held with the mixed majoritarian-proportional formula. Thus, 225 deputies were elected in single member constituency according to plurality rules, while another half of Ukrainian deputies was selected using close-list proportional representation system with a 4% threshold (Tystchenko 2009).

The new electoral system had a number of peculiarities (Zakon Pro Vybory Narodnyh Deputativ 2001), which are important to consider in this analysis. First, the multi-seat electoral district was changed to the single national district. Second, the principle of so-called “strict” electoral lists was used, according to which only the names of the first candidates of the party were included into the electoral bulletin, although voters were giving their votes for the whole party list. On the one hand, the usage of closed lists was a factor that should have favored women’s participation in politics. On the other hand, the fact that the party lists were completely controlled by its leaders, the problems of the socio-economic and cultural situation, imposed on women, as well as the usage of mixed electoral system and the general peculiarities of political situation built on clan relations, overbalanced the advantages, proposed by the usage of the closed list.

Another specificity of Ukrainian political system in 1990s was the fact that the party institute as such was poorly developed. The atomism in the party system of Ukraine and general characteristics of the process of creation of new parties also did not contribute to women’s representation in Ukrainian politics. Thus, according to A. Kynev (2003) and N. Zakorevskiy (2004), the history of the multi-party system of Ukraine has several periods. At the end of the first period, in 1991, there were 12 parties in Ukrainian politics, 11 of which did not support communist ideology. During the second period, from the end of 1991 till the beginning of 1993, the Department of Justice of Ukraine registered 15 more political parties. During the third period, from 1993-1994 till nowadays, more than 100 political parties were officially registered. Such quantity and fragmentation of political parties, as concluded by R. Muzer (2003), led to a great competition among parties. As a result, the candidates, who are placed on the top of the electoral lists, are elected. In addition, often the bulletins include many names of independent candidates. As a rule, states the author, in both cases, the candidates are men.

In addition, as Aleksander Kynev (2004) points out, parties often admitted or even were founded by the owners or managers of large enterprises or business structures — the so-called oligarchs, who had enough resources to hold the election campaign. The parties were seen as technological pre-election projects, the instruments of lobbying different financial and industrial groups. For the sake of securing economic and legal position of their businesses, these groups had a strong interest of getting into the politics.

Therefore, although in general, according to ideological, political characteristics, Ukrainian parties of the third period may be divided into left (communists and socialists), central-left (social democrats), central (liberals), central right (national democrats) and right (national radicals) (Golubutskiy O.P., Kryvoruchko T.G., Kulyk V.O., Yakushyk V.M., 1996), most parties, in order to attract the majority voters (who had a low level of political culture), chose centrist niche (Vodolazov 1993, 12) and had general slogans which appealed to various social groups of people. Among the main issues promoted by the centrist parties was the assertion of national sovereignty, market reforms, national politics, development of national economy and production (Krylyuk 2003).

Thus, on the whole, it is possible to conclude that generally the political, electoral and party systems of Ukraine did not favor women's participation in politics. However, such political context offered a number of opportunities for Yuliia Tymoshenko as a member of Ukrainian elite, which will be explained in the following subsection.

3.3. Yuliia Tymoshenko: a Happy Chime of Circumstances

This subsection is devoted to the analysis of two main aspects, created in the general political context of Ukraine, which predetermined Tymoshenko success in the electoral campaign and, as a result, her ability to enter the parliament. The first aspect is designated by the peculiarities of Ukrainian electoral system and general party system (its atomistic nature, based on business networks and lobbying). The second aspect is defined by general

ideological and campaign strategies, chosen by the leaders of the “Gromada” party, Tymoshenko belonged to, which chose centrist niche, supported populist ideology and favored the representation of oligarchs.

First, I will recall the main steps of Tymoshenko’s meteoric political career. Thus, Yuliia Volodymyrivna enters the high level of politics in January 1997, when she, as an unaffiliated candidate won the mid-term elections in the Kyrovograd district. In September 1997 Yuliia Tymoshenko becomes the deputy of Pavlo Lazarenko, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Formation “Gromada” (Community). In 1998, she was elected to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the 99th single-member district, being at the same time under number 6 in the party list.

The peculiarities of Ukrainian electoral and party system were among the main factors, which allowed Tymoshenko to become the deputy at such a short notice. First, the key role in the formation of the party lists belonged to the central leadership of the party. Pavlo Lazarenko, a former governor of Dnipropetrovsk oblast, was not just the leader of the party, Yuliia Tymoshenko entered in 1997. Before this he had been her business partner for a number of years, — therefore he supported Tymoshenko’s intention to enter the politics, for a greater protection of their enterprise. Second, as Erik Herron (2002) describes, the legislative behavior in mixed political system enabled to create the dual candidacy on the elections: “PR legislators who tend to conform with the party and [simultaneously] SMD legislators who tend to advocate for local constituencies” (Herron 2002, 367). Thus, a candidate could be placed both, on a party list and in the single-member district, as it was in case of Tymoshenko. This insured the safety of her seat, as even if she had lost one of the races, she would have still gained her seat in the parliament.

In addition, the atomic nature of the party system in Ukraine and the low level of political culture of the population defined the centralist ideological and political niche,

“Gromada” leaders chose for their party. The support of the central ideology by “Gromada” members and the range of the election campaign, which was one of the most massive and expensive at that time, secured the position of the party. In 1998 eight parties overcame 4% threshold and got into the Parliament. Pavlo Lazarenko’s “Gromada” received 4, 68% on the elections and Yuliia Tymoshenko became the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of the II convocation.

Thus, in 1990s Ukrainian electoral system was not favorable to women in politics. The political parties also did not focus either on program issues, which favor women’s representation in politics, or on strategies, aimed to bring women into politics. Yuliia Tymoshenko’s opportunity to become the deputy was conditioned not by her gender, but by a number of specific features of Ukrainian electoral system and political parties, in which a lucrative environment for entering politics is created only for certain people. Thus, what favored Tymoshenko’s starting in politics was her belonging to the oligarchic class of Ukraine and such realities of Ukrainian political context as the low level of political culture of people, the uncertain ideology of “Gromada”, which appealed to different social groups, and of course, the patronage-oriented recruitment system, which is looked upon in details in the following section.

4. The Level of Recruitment

The process of women’s recruitment may be formally divided into two main levels: individual level and the level of recruitment structure and process. The first aspect of the individual level of the aspirants is determined by their personal ambition, interest and motivation. Thus, in order to be selected by the gatekeepers and then by the voters, a person should first select themselves for participation in politics. The second aspect is the number of resources one has in order to become a politician. These resources generally include financial

support, sufficiency of time and a high level of an aspirant's human capital that includes education, health, experience, status, etc (Matland 1998; Matland and Montgomery 2003).

The aim of this section of the chapter is to analyze Yuliia Tymoshenko's recruitment path and to identify the main factors on the level of the recruitment process, which helped her to become the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. In the first subsection I will point out a number of variables, which are considered to favor women's representation in politics and analyze the peculiarities of the recruitment process in post-soviet Ukraine. In the second subsection I will look at the process of Yuliia Tymoshenko's recruitment in particular, in order to identify which factors influenced most her entering Ukrainian political field.

4.1. The Recruitment System that Supports Women in Politics: General and Ukrainian Contexts

The level of the recruitment structure and process favors women's representation in politics under several main conditions. First of all, the recruitment structure and process should be characterized by a relative openness of political system and the process of recruitment. Thus, formal-localized recruitment process is considered to be the best for women (Norris 1993, 325-326). This type of recruitment process is the most common in the majority of "Western-European" countries and is characterized by the bureaucratic form of recruitment system, where the rules of recruitment are clearly set and do not depend on the patronage and/or preferences of the party leaders. It is also better for women if the process of recruitment is centralized, as it provides more opportunities (slots) for women to enter the politics (Matland and Montgomery 2003, 32).

Taking into account the aspects described above, it may be concluded that general recruitment process in Ukraine was different from what is considered to be propitious for women. Moreover, together with the burden of socio-economic problems in the country and low level of cultural and political culture of the population, which left women with little opportunities and desire to become politicians, the recruitment structure and process can be

considered as another obstacle for the increase of the number of women in politics. So what are the main aspects of the transformational process in Ukraine, which led to the unfavorable to women recruitment system, built on lobbying and corruption?

As mentioned in the previous section, the transformation of Ukrainian politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union, accompanied by the transformation to the market economy, high level of inflation, imperfect legislation system and high level of corruption, was marked by the appearance of business elites. In the middle of 1990s, driven by various economic interests, these elites started to compete for political and administrative spheres of influence. Thus, as Irina Rojkova (2007) points out, different business groups were the main initiators of the formation of new political parties, which were the instruments in the struggle for economic and political space. This leads to the high level of “personalization” of politics, when the last word in the process of campaign and recruitment depends on the decision of the party leaders (Rojkova 2007).

In addition, as A. Andreenkova (2000) and K. Bondarenko (2003) point out, there are four main sources, from which Ukrainian political elite appeared in the 1990s. First group is constituted by the former members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, different legislative, executive or social structures. These people had a considerable political experience and had different bonds in various political fields. According to the data, proposed by National Institute of Strategic Research (2006), about half of Ukrainian political elite is constituted by former soviet politicians (Andreenkova 2000; Bondarenko 2003). The second group is constituted by the managers of different enterprises who after the collapse of the Soviet Union became the owners of the business. The process of privatization allowed them to accumulate the start-up capital and to develop the business, gaining enough resources to enter the politics. The third group of people, who became Ukrainian political elite, included the *crème de la crème*: intelligentsia. These people were usually the representatives of

academic elite who after the collapse of the Soviet Union turned to business. Finally, the fourth group is constituted of new entrepreneurs, who managed to use the process of privatization and marketization to their advantage and quickly scraped together a fortune. Very often, as Bondarenko (2003) argues, these oligarchs of the new generation were children or other relatives of already successful fathers who created them a base for developing their own businesses.

The four sources of Ukrainian political elite, described above, were the results of the transformational period of Ukraine, which was accompanied by the interpenetration of business and power structures. The unity of business and politics prearranged the nature of Ukrainian clan politics and the peculiarities of the recruitment process, built on lobbying. These characteristics of Ukrainian political context made the individual level of the candidate (the availability of sources and motivation) and the process of recruitment the most important factors on the way to the top-level politics. The analysis, conducted in the following subchapter allows me to argue that these characteristics were crucial for Yuliia Tymoshenko's political career. In what follows I will look upon in details which factors of the recruitment system in Ukraine enabled Tymoshenko to start her whirlwind political career.

4.2. Yuliia Tymoshenko: the Game is Worth the Candles

As it was concluded in the previous subchapter, the decentralization of the recruitment process, the low external pressure of the voters and the patronage-oriented recruitment system did not favor women's representation in politics. At the same time these characteristics of the recruitment system of Ukraine were extremely advantageous for the political participation of certain individuals: oligarchs and entrepreneurs, who could use the openness of the political system in their advantage. Moreover, for the representatives of the new generation of entrepreneurs, entering politics was a game that was worth the candles, as through politics they could protect and develop their business. The belonging of Yuliia Tymoshenko to

business elite of the country, which provided her with both motivation and opportunities, was the crucial factor that helped her to enter the politics. What were Tymoshenko's individual level and the level of her recruitment into Ukrainian political arena like?

On the individual level, in 1996 Yuliia Tymoshenko had enough resources to enter the politics. She was young, ambitious and well-educated entrepreneur, the head of one of the biggest corporations in Ukraine. The multi-million revenue of the "United Energy Systems of Ukraine" provided Yuliia Tymoshenko with enough financial capital for entering Ukrainian politics. In addition, the convergence of business and politics in Ukraine and growing competition between the elites on the market of energy resources resulted in her strong interest to become a politician.

In 1996, the "United Energy Systems of Ukraine" reached the level, when business becomes the main tool of power. Being the fifth biggest company in CIS, the corporation was subjected to attacks from other business structures. In addition, the president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma started throwing spanners into the corporation's works, as one of its heads – Pavlo Lazarenko was Kuchma's potential rival on the prospective presidential election in 1999. Thus, in 1997 the owners of the company were charged with a debt of \$42 millions, the company's accounts were frozen and the Superior arbitration tribunal accused the company of the violation of the currency legislation. The urge to save the business and the aspiration of the leverages to influence its further development, fed Yuliia Tymoshenko's motivation to become a politician.

Another factor that increased Tymoshenko's opportunity to become the deputy of VR was her business and kinship relations with prominent power and business elites of 1990s. Thanks to her father-in-law and her business career, Yuliia Tymoshenko had quite a few influential business partners, the most prominent of whom was, probably, Pavlo Lazarenko. In 1990 the industrial field of Dnipropetrovsk oblast was in the hands of its governor

Lazarenko. Thanks to the personal connections with Lazarenko, Gennadiy Tymoshenko managed to establish numerous relations with the representative of business and political elite. Lazarenko was also considered to be the “godfather” of Tymoshenko’s “Ukrainian Petrol Corporation”. He, as the former Prime Minister and the leader of “Gromada”, helped Tymoshenko to enter the political party, to gain the support of the lobby of Dnipropetrovsk and to win the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Thus, Tymoshenko’s belonging to the young generation of Ukrainian oligarchs, the availability of sufficient financial and motivation resources, connections with business political elite, and the peculiarity of the Ukrainian recruitment system, based on clan and kinship relations, allowed her to enter the field of Ukrainian politics.

5. Summary

The analysis of Ukrainian context, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s biography and her political career, as well as the political career of other 16 women deputies of the VR of II convocation led to several findings. First of all, it showed that general cultural, socio-economic and political context of Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union consisted of the opposite aspects to the main variables favorable to women’s participation in politics in democratic countries. The poor economic development, the weakness of women’s movements, the prevalence of traditional values in society over egalitarian, low level of people’s political culture did not favor women’s representation in neo-patrimonial politics of Ukraine. However, the particular circumstances of Ukrainian context (such as the loopholes in political, economic and legal systems) were used as an advantage by many representatives of business or political elites, including Yuliia Tymoshenko. These circumstances placed the process of recruitment, based on kinship, business connections and money, as the key factor, which influenced a person’s capability to enter the political field. Although, it is recognized that such process of recruitment became possible only due to specific features of

transformational process in Ukraine which created the opportunities for new business and political elites.

Thus, the research showed that generally Yuliia Tymoshenko's gender was not the most important factor in the process of becoming a politician. In case of Tymoshenko's her individual level (strong ambitions, interest and motivation, enough resources and human capital) and the peculiarities of the recruitment structure and process of Ukraine, based on lobbying and corruption, was crucial. At the same time, her gender played an indirect role in her political career, as it is through her marriage with Oleksandr Tymoshenko, the son of an influential functionary in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, she obtained the necessary capital and relations for becoming the MP. At the same time, Tymoshenko's charismatic personality, existent thanks in no small part to successfully created political image, based on the combination of gender, power and nationalism, was a factor which provided her with national support and popularity, and enabled her to climb successfully the political ladder and to become the Prime Minister of Ukraine. This argument will be looked upon in details in the third chapter of the thesis.

Chapter III. Political Self-representation of Yuliia Tymoshenko

Yuliia Tymoshenko is one of few [politicians] who attract voters not with bread but with circuses.

Viktor Diachenko, Ukrainian journalist, 2006.

A Warrior Princess, Princess Leia, Gass Princess, Revolutionary Princess, Lady Yu, Yuliia the Tigress, Samurai in a Skirt, Ukrainian Jeanne D’Arc, Iron Lady, — those are only few of the most popular examples of how Yuliia Tymoshenko is named in the press. Indeed, Tymoshenko’s image in the media is characterized by a great diversification: she can appear tough and strict as Margaret Thatcher, gentle and feminine as Lady Diana or purposeful and determined as Jeanne D’Arc. Looking only at the five most popular electoral posters, which abandoned Ukrainian cities and villages after the Orange Revolution, one could wonder how different the current Prime Minister of Ukraine can be (see Figures 1-5 in the Appendix).¹² So what are the main elements of Yuliia Tymoshenko’s political self-representation, which made her one of the most successful politicians in Ukraine? How does Tymoshenko instrumentalize gender as a political strategy in order to insure her popularity among the electorate? This chapter is devoted to the identification of the main strategies and elements of Tymoshenko’s populist political self-representation, she picks and chooses in order to stay one of the most popular and discussed women politicians in Ukraine and outside the country.

The research is based on the analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko’s self-representation since 2004, when, after the Orange Revolution, her current political image was eventually shaped. The material of the analysis is represented by photographs, chosen from Yuliia Tymoshenko’s official website. The pictures were analyzed using the iconographic method, described by Ervin Panofsky (1970). The iconography was chosen as it allows me to dismantle the main

¹² All pictures, used in this study, are taken from Yuliia Tymoshenko’s web site: www.tymoshenko.com.ua.

elements of Tymoshenko's political representation communicated through her official photographs, to decode their symbolic meanings and to perceive them as certain cultural concept or a representation of a particular society it belongs to. In addition, I use iconography because the way Tymoshenko is depicted on most of her images is rooted, as it will be shown further in this chapter, into iconographic traditions of both Christianity and post-soviet art of propaganda (Bonnell 1999).

The results of the analysis allow me to argue that although gender is not the determinative factor which enabled Yuliia Tymoshenko to enter the field of Ukrainian politics, her gender is crucial for Tymoshenko's staying at the top level of popularity, as her political self-representation is very much built on the notion of femininity¹³ which, in its turn, is based on the combination of normative femininity and that, rooted in chastity and nationalistic concepts. Thus, according to the research, each of the three general types of images, singled out in Tymoshenko's visual self-representation: the image of Berehynia; Beautiful Modern Woman and Politician, — implement the visual codes of femininity which is manifested in Tymoshenko's representation through such elements as colors, the emblem of the heart, clothes and non-verbal communication.

This chapter consists of three main parts. In the first section I will look at the historiography of Yuliia Tymoshenko's image-making from the image of a victim of injustice to the image of a strong and determined, but at the same time tender woman, a competent politician, a mother of Ukrainian nation, a celebrity of the people. The second section is devoted to the dismantling of Yuliia Volodymyrivna current political image. Thus, I will look at the main elements which constitute and contribute to the three above-mentioned images of Tymoshenko's political self-representation, singled out in this study, in order to see what

¹³ In this study I understand the notion of femininity as a socially-constructed phenomenon that represents often "exaggerated beliefs about appropriate behaviors and traits that relate to gender roles" of women (Boles, Hoeveler 2004; 291).

place gender occupies among these elements. In the third section I will point out some of the main reasons which can generally explain the usage of feminine gender together with a variety of other, often controversial elements in Yuliia Tymoshenko's political image, in order to see why her image-making strategy is so popular among so many Ukrainians.

1. Form Victim to Conquer: the Transformation of Tymoshenko's Political Image

In one of her articles, Anna Kravchenko (2006), the editor in chief of the newspaper the "Ukraine Daily", describes three images that world female leaders generally tend to adopt in their political career. The first image, pointed out by Kravchenko (2006), is called 'women-males'. Such women, according to the author, usually play the gender card of femininity, although they may often be just as vicious, imperious and brutal as any man. The most vivid example of this image is that of Margaret Thatcher, who despite her firmness in political questions was an example of elegance and exquisite taste. The second image is called by Kravchenko (2006) "blue stocking". According to the author, women, who chose this type of representation, such as Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, or Tarja Halonen, the President of Finland, do not build an extravagant political image, and tend to shade their normative feminine part in order to play on equal terms with male politicians. The third image is called by the author 'women sexual symbols'. Such women, as for instance Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the 6th President of Latvia, or Ilona Staller, a Hungarian-born Italian politician, have irreproachable appearance and a vivid political image: they absolutely rely on the notion of femininity, often overstressing it in order to achieve their political goals (Kravchenko 2006).

The uniqueness of the political figure of Yuliia Tymoshenko lies in the fact that at different time of her political career she managed partially correspond to all three images, described by Kravchenko (2006), ending with a completely new one. First, Tymoshenko corresponded to the image of a "blue stocking", a victim of a corrupt Kuchma's regime, a secret martyr of Ukrainian nation. Though later, as the situation in Ukrainian politics changed,

she banked on the image of a revolutionary “woman-male” politician and then on a symbol of femininity. However, the notion of femininity, Tymoshenko’s self-representation has been rooted in, was not that much sexualized as essentialized, creating therefore a new, fourth type of political image, a woman leader can correspond to, which is based on normative femininity, symbolic nationalistic concepts and artificial chastity.¹⁴ In what follows I will trace major changes in Tymoshenko’s political self-representation from late 1990s to nowadays, and identify main factors in Ukrainian political life which correspond to these changes.

In the late 1990, Tymoshenko’s political image was not notable for any special traits. She was a young ambitious politician who just started her career on the top level of Ukrainian politics, and hadn’t reached the all-Ukrainian fame yet. Probably, at that time such a great attention wasn’t paid to her image as it wasn’t the main factor, which helped her to enter the politics.¹⁵ The first important stage of her political self-representation was reached after 2000s, when the news about her arrest reached the farthest corners of the country. Thus, on January 19, 2001 she was accused of embezzlement and was committed to prison for 42 days.¹⁶ At that time the news buzzed with messages how unfair her arrest was and how hard it was for her to be in jail. When Tymoshenko was finally released in March the same year, she looked very slim and exhausted, as Yuliia Volodymyrivna later told, she was kept in extremely harsh conditions, where she didn’t drink or eat much, being afraid of poisoning (see Figure 6).

Despite all challenges Tymoshenko faced in jail, the future Prime Minister of Ukraine managed to go through all obstacles: justice triumphed and Yuliia Volodymyrivna gained the victory over her tormentors. Thus, “Victim, who concurs her tormentors”, — according to a number of works (Kis 2007, Kryvdyk 2008, Piskunova 2008) was the image of Yuliia

¹⁴ See section 2 in Chapter III for the details.

¹⁵ See Chapter II for the details.

¹⁶ See Table 1 in the Appendix.

Tymoshenko after 2001. At that time numerous pictures appeared which depicted her in the setting of the court room: pale, tired, in a modest grey sweater, without a hint of makeup on her face (see Figure 6). She corresponded to the image of a victim of the cruel and unjust political regime who got hurt in an unfair battle for justice and verity.

Why was this image chosen? For sure there are a number of reasons; I will mention the main ones. First, the circumstances Tymoshenko was in (the imprisonment, suffering, injustice) favored this image very much as she has always been famous for being able to come off clear from any situation or even take it for her own advantage (recall her relations with Lazarenko and then, Kuchma, she disowned when the circumstances changed).¹⁷ Second, the image of a victim was adapted to the peculiarities of Ukrainian mentality (Piskunova 2008). Thus, at that time, the majority of Ukrainian population had to face constant political battles and the hardships of the transformational period. In addition, as Kryvdyk (2008) mentions, under the influence of numerous soap operas, which flooded Ukrainian television in the 1990s, many people sympathized Tymoshenko: a victim of a cruel regime, — and felt high compassion for her. Third, being a religious society, many Ukrainians expressed sympathy towards Tymoshenko, as the challenges she had to face resembled Christian suffering of saints. In addition, sympathetic feelings towards Tymoshenko were heated by the Regilione of St. Barbara the Great Martyr, which was granted to Yuliia Volodymyrivna by the Orthodox Church in 1998, and which she often wore afterwards.¹⁸

What did Tymoshenko communicate through her image after 2000? “Hope, then belief and later – love”, — says Ukrainian journalist Ostap Kryvdyk (2008). Thus, in 2001, Ukraine was bustling by two major events – the disappearance and death of Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze and the notoriously famous “cassette scandal”, when tapes were told to be found which proved the President Leonid Kuchma’s involvement in this case. At that time

¹⁷ See Table 1 in the Appendix for the details.

¹⁸ Later in this study I will show how the aspect of religiousness and chastity are used as one of the central elements of Tymoshenko’s political self-representation.

Yuliia Tymoshenko took advantage of the situation, started her action “Ukraine without Kuchma” and then created the “Forum of National Rescue”, which was aimed to dismiss Kuchma’s criminal regime. By this, Tymoshenko declared war to injustice and gave hope to Ukrainians to reinstate the order in the country, to lead it out of economic stagnation and to defeat the corruption.

In 2002, BYuTy – the oppositional party of Yuliia Tymoshenko, won the elections and received 20 seats in the Ukrainian Parliament. In 2004, being one of the most prominent figures of the Orange Revolution, after which Kuchma’s regime was considered to be dismissed, Tymoshenko gave belief to many Ukrainians that she, in the Orange coalition with Yuschenko’s party “Nasha Ukraina” (Our Ukraine), was able to lead the country towards stability and prosperity. Later, before Parliamentary re-elections in 2006, fences and posts in Ukrainian cities were covered by bright red hearts – the symbol of Tymoshenko’s BYuTy, which carried the message of cordiality and love.

Indeed, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s image has drastically changed since 2001 (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). From an ill, pale and exhausted woman – a sacred martyr, a victim of injustice, she turned into a powerful, determined, beautiful cosmopolitan woman, a successful politician, a true representative of the Ukrainian nation. In the next subchapter I will dismantle Yuliia Tymoshenko’s political image, she acquired after 2004, in order to see its constituent parts and the role that gender plays in her political self-representation.

2. Yuliia Tymoshenko: A Jack of All Traders

General analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko’s visual representation allowed to single out three main images, it is constituted of: Berehynia; Beautiful, Modern Woman; and Politician. What should be mentioned is that each of her hypostases is a multi-layered construction that consists of different elements, often symbolic, — which trace their origin in Ukrainian traditions, folklore, art, philosophy, religion and culture in general. In what follows I will

analyze in detail Yuliia Volodymyrivna's visual images and the constituent parts of her political self-representation, she communicates through symbolic and national loading of her photographs which refer to Ukrainian political, socio-economic and cultural context. Though first, I will specify the meaning of the notion of symbol, I use in this study.

In this work I use two main approaches to the notion of symbol, which exist in the literature. Thus, I agree with Volodymyr Shyian that symbol is "a combination of words and ideas, expressed in one sign" (Shyian 1987, 766), which refers to cultural "spring wells" of the nation, its moral and spiritual depth. In addition, I share David Rasmussen's approach to symbol, who places it "at the center of culture [as] the well-spring which testifies to the human imagination in its poetic, psychic, religious, social and political form" (Rasmussen 1974, 2). Thus, I refer to the symbolic nature of different elements, used in Yuliia Tymoshenko's self-representation, primarily because I admit the importance of symbolic systems which occupy the central place in world cultures in general and in Ukrainian culture in particular. At the same time it should be noted that I am aware that primarily due to the fact that world and national symbolic systems are incredible diverse and rich, some symbols, I will refer to in the study, are used in Yuliia Tymoshenko's political representation purposefully, while others are not. This thesis leads to the problem of the borders of interpretation, I discuss in the methodology section.¹⁹ Keeping that in mind, I will continue with the analysis of the constituent aspects of Yuliia Tymoshenko's image of Berehynia.

2.1. Berehynia

In this subchapter I will look at how the constituent notional parts of Tymoshenko's image of Berehynia, i.e. "Ukrainian-ess" (Ukrainian culture and nation), Chastity and Religiousness, and "Womanhood" are constructed. In this, following Pierre Bourdieu's statement that it is through "the details of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners" (Bourdieu 1977, 94) that

¹⁹ See Chapter I for the details.

the message about a certain culture, person, or in this case, a political image, is created, — I will look at how the image of Berehynia is performed with the help of four symbolic elements: colors, hairstyle, clothes and nonverbal communication, which mainly includes position, posture, gestures and gaze. Though first, I will write about the myth of Berehynia in general and the role it plays in Ukrainian culture.

2.1.1. Berehynia as an element of Ukrainian culture

The image of Berehynia, although under different names, can be found in mythologies of many Indo-European nations. Thus this secret image may be recognized in small female figures, found in Troy or on Crete, in Scythian “stone women” or in the images of niads (Lozko 2007). Ancient Slavs believed that Berehynia was either great goddess who gave birth to the world and protected it (Kalashnikov 2003), or a shadowy Rusalka who lived on the water-banks (Galkovskiy 1916). Thus, according to folk-beliefs, Berehynia was a young beautiful woman with green eyes and long fair or green hair (Melnikov 2006). Berehynias were also often considered to be pure young brides, who took their own life because their fiancés cheated on them right before the wedding (Slav mythology, 2004).

The two images of this ancient mythological creature (as goddess and Rusalka) correspond to the etymology of the word. Thus, on the one hand the word ‘Berehynia’ is similar to Old Slavic word ‘pregynia’, meaning ‘a hill, covered with forest’ and Ukrainian ‘bereh’ or Russian ‘bereg’, meaning a ‘river bank’: as Slavic people performed rituals to call for Berehynias on the hills near the rivers (Slav Mythology 2004). On the other hand the word ‘Berehynia’ is similar to Ukrainian word ‘berehty’ or Russian ‘berech’ which mean ‘to protect’. Thus, as a goddess, Berehynia protected the world and people, created by her, from evil and misfortunes (Slav Mythology 2004).

The image of Berehynia also has a religious connotation. Thus, in pre-Christian Ukraine, Berehynia, as a goddess called Makosh, was often pictured on the pottery of the

ancient Trypilska culture as a woman with her hands up – as a protector, who stops evil forces (Rybakov 1981). This image looks very much as Christian Oranta – a rare image of praying Madonna, portrayed without a child, holding her hands up in a prayer (Lozko 2007). In fact, one of the most famous mosaic pictures of Oranta is situated in the heart of Ukrainian Capital – in the apse of the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, built in the 11th century. The image of Oranta is considered to be the most important beseecher of Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation, who gives people hope, belief and protection from evil spirits and misfortune.

In sum, the image of Berehynia, as an ancient symbol of life, fertility, motherhood which gives life and protects it, – is deeply rooted into Ukrainian culture and beliefs, and often appears in literature and songs, on embroidery and averters (Lozko 2007). In addition, as Ukrainian scholars Marian Rubchak (2001, 2005) and Oksana Kis (2002, 2008) point out, Berehynia, as the hearth mother of Ukrainian family and nation, the protector of the home, – is still one of the most popular elements of Ukrainian national and political discourses. For instance in 2001 the monument of Berehynia was placed in the center of Kyiv at the highest point of Maidan Nezalejnosti (Independence Square), however it is Archangel Michael who is considered to be the protected of the city. The image of Berehynia was also transformed into Tryzyb (Trident) – Ukrainian Coat of Arms. Today, the concept of Berehynia is often mentioned in political speeches, in Ukrainian press, in titles of organizations or folk festivals.

No wonder that an image that has such a great popularity and such a rich and powerful connotation was used at the center of Yuliia Tymoshenko's political self-representation. The connotation of the image of Berehynia consists of three basic aspects. These aspects refer to "Ukrainian-ess", as the image of Berehynia is considered to be one of the most important national symbols or myths, as Rubchak puts it (Rubchak 2005); to Chastity and Religiousness, as this image is rooted both into pre-Christian pagan beliefs, signifying a great goddess, and Christianity, resembling the icon of Oranta; and to "Womanhood", as the image

of Berehynia, according to Kis (2008) and Rubchak (2005), is a symbol of the mother of the nation, femininity and womanhood in general. In what follows, I will look at the way colors, the emblem of the heart, clothes, hairstyle, and nonverbal communication, used in Tymoshenko's visual self-representation, refer to the image of Berehynia, and, consequently, to the notions of "Ukrainian-ness", "Womanhood", Chastity and Religiousness.

2.1.2. "Ukrainian-ess"

Tymoshenko's image of "a true Ukrainian woman" is a significant aspect of her political self-representation. The usage of nationalism may be considered a political strategy, used by Tymoshenko in order to secure her position in Ukraine, where, similarly to many other post-communist countries, the Independence was marked by the reinforcement of nationalistic ideas and beliefs. The image of Ukrayinka is used, first, to symbolize a new independent country and to shape Ukrainian nation, referring to the collective pre-soviet national memory, as well as to establish imagery ties with Ukrainian nation, its history, traditions and culture.

The ties, between Yuliia Tymoshenko's political representation and Ukrainian nation and a newly created Ukrainian state are first and foremost established through the correspondence of Tymoshenko's self-representation to several of the five roles which, according to Anna McClintock (1993), Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1989), are played by women in relation to national processes. These roles include: a role of biological reproducers; reproducers of the boundaries of national/ethnic groups; reproducers of the collectivity and transmitters of its culture, signifiers of ethnic/national differences; and participants in national, military, economic and other struggles (Anthias, Yuval-Davis 1989; McClintock 1993). The mentioned above roles are used in Tymoshenko's self representation in order to set the boundaries of the state and the nation and therefore, to create a legitimization of the object, over which the power is expressed. Thus, as Joan Landes states:

“Women [...] are constituted as political subjects [...] in and through the complicated process of visual identification with iconic representation of virtue and nationalism” (Landes 2003, 18). Thus, the symbolic representation of Tymoshenko as “Ukrayinka” and the “mother of the nation” plays an important role in the process of her identification as a political subject and in her legitimization as a politician who creates a new Ukrainian state and has close ties with Ukrainian people and culture.

The results of the visual analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko’s photographs allow me to argue that the ties between Tymoshenko’s political figure and Ukrainian nation and state are mainly established through such elements of her image as colors and the emblem, used in the symbolics of her party BYuTy, her clothes and hairstyle. In order to trace how these elements contribute to Yuliia Volodymyrivna’s image of a “True Ukrainian Woman”, I will look at the symbolic meanings they bear in Ukrainian culture.

The first element of Tymoshenko’s image of a “True Ukrainian woman”, I discuss in this subchapter – the red color, has a specific symbolic meanings in Ukrainian cultural and ritual systems. Thus, according to K. Mateyko (1977), red color was the most widespread color in Ukrainian traditional clothes, as it was connected to the cult of sun and life, cherished by many agricultural peoples. In addition, if white color signified god’s purity, red stood for profane purity, beauty, love and protection from evil (Ukrainski Zamovliannia 1993, 268). Thus, Ukrainians often drew a small red cross on the door of their houses, painted window chess in red and kept red Krashankas and Pysankas, Ukrainian decorated Easter eggs, to keep their households clean from evil spirits and misfortune (Mateyko 1977). The combination of red, white and black is also considered to be traditional for Ukrainian folk art, especially embroidery, where red stands for life and future. In sum, red color is easily associated with Ukrainian symbolic system, beliefs, art, rituals, and national culture in general, complementing to Tymoshenko’s imagery ties with Ukrainian nation.

The second element I am analyzing as a constitutive part of Yuliia Tymoshenko's image of Ukrayinka is the emblem, chosen for Tymoshenko's party BYuTy – the red heart (see Figure 8 and Figure 9). Thus, the symbol of the heart has its central place in one of the most famous and powerful current of Ukrainian philosophic thought – Cordiocentrysm or the “philosophy of heart”. Thus, Ukrainian Cordiocentrysm, which is considered to be in the core of Ukrainian literature, folk art and mentality, goes back to pre-Christian tradition, though it was shaped by Ukrainian philosopher Grygoriy Skovoroda (1722-1794), and later developed by Pamfil Yurkevych (1826-1874) and Dmytro Chyzhevskyi (1894-1977) (Kovalevsky, 2002). According to the “philosophy of heart” a human heart is at the very center of one's essence and power, spiritual life and morality. Therefore, in order to cognize the world, people should look at it through the lens of their hearts, morality, emotions and feelings (Valiavko 2004).

The philosophy of Cordiocentrysm is considered to be characteristic not only of Ukrainian thought and literature, but of Ukrainian mentality as such, which relies on emotions and feelings. For instance, Ukrainian philosopher O. Kulchitskyi (1895-1980) who developed the concept of “Ukrainian psyche” stressed that Ukrainian mentality and psychics if founded on the predomination of sensibility, feelings, affects and moods over rational thinking (Kulchitskyi 1995, 160). Therefore, the heart as the emblem of BYuTy may be considered as a very successful example of element of Tymoshenko's political communication, as it refers both, to general values and emotions, life and spirituality, and to a special symbol, which stands at the core of Ukrainian mentality and culture.

The image of “Ukrayinka” is also created by Yuliia Tymoshenko's traditional Ukrainian clothes, which she often wears in public on special occasions, as well as by her everyday outfit, which is often decorated with traditional elements and accessories (see Figure 10 and Figure 11). What is interesting about Yuliia Volodymyrivna's national outfit is that,

unlike many other Ukrainian politicians who wear Ukrainian Vyshyvankas (national embroidered shirts) on any suitable occasion, corresponding to a fashionable nowadays brand of “Ukrainian-ess”, she consciously approaches the issue. Thus, Tymoshenko is dressed in traditional garments only on special occasions, such as national holidays or her party’s overall meeting, and her clothes are usually hand-made and always fit her in a perfect way, with accordance to her general style and the two colors of her political party.

In addition, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s traditional outfit is also often combined with modern elements (e.g. high-heeled shoes, or a coat by Louis Vuitton) or vice versa, a modern dress may be decorated with traditional Ukrainian shawl or embroidery (see Figure 10 and Figure 11). Tymoshenko’s outfits are a vivid example of how she picks and chooses different elements to create a political image that can satisfy different groups of Ukrainian constituency. Thus, the combination of traditionalism with modernity in Tymoshenko’s clothes carries at least two messages. First of all, this combination allows her to mark her belonging to the nation, her “Ukrainian-ess” and patriotism, at the same time emphasizing her cosmopolitanism and modernity, — in order to get support from both vigor nationalists, pro-European and pro-Russian Ukrainians. Second, the combination of traditional and modern elements in Tymoshenko’s political representation may be used as a strategy to smooth her, considered by many, false belonging to Ukrainian ethnicity what is usually argued by two main reasons: her maiden name and her knowledge of the Ukrainian language.²⁰

Although the colors and garments Tymoshenko uses in her self-representation are important for the image of a “True Ukrainian Woman”, her hairstyle — the plait, or “basket” as it is occasionally referred to, constitutes the core of both, the image of Berehynia and her political self-representation in general. For sure his type of hairstyle may be considered to be one of the most successful elements of a political image ever. The plait does not only make

²⁰ For details see Table 1 in Appendix.

Tymoshenko immediately recognizable, but also has a complex meaning, as it embodies a threefold symbol which refers to patriotism and traditionalism, as it is rooted into Ukrainian cultural tradition; power, as this hairstyle resembles a crown; and chastity and divinity, as Tymoshenko's plait very much looks like a nimbus above the heads of Christian Saints.²¹

Thus, the plait is used in Tymoshenko's image to create a special Ukrainian archetype and to highlight her traditionalism, patriotism and belonging to the Ukrainian nation in general, as it immediately evokes several associations, in regards to Ukrainian culture. First of all, the plait is an ancient Ukrainian folk hairstyle which can be seen in numerous illustrations to the books of traditional Ukrainian fairytales. In addition the plate resembles the hairstyle of a famous Ukrainian poetess Lesia Ukrayinka (1871-1913), who is a symbol of revolution and devotion to the nation, as she continued to write her patriotic poems, being very sick. The golden color, Tymoshenko dyes her hair in, is also extremely important, as it adds to her image of traditional Ukrainian women as well (see Figure 12). The flaxen color of Tymoshenko's plait resembles the color of wheat, which bears a very important symbolic meaning for Ukrainian nation, as Ukraine is famous as a European granary and Ukrainian flag consists of two colors, where blue stands for the sky and yellow for a field of wheat.

Thus, Yuliia Tymoshenko's belonging to Ukrainian culture and nation is mainly emphasized by several elements: colors, the emblem of the heart, hairstyle and clothes, which refer through their symbolic meaning to Ukrainian traditions, philosophy, art and famous personalities. In the next subchapter I will look at how the second constituent part of Tymoshenko's image of Berehynia — chastity and religiousness is created in the pictures, analyzed in the study.

²¹ In this section I will illustrate how Tymoshenko's hairstyle communicates the image of Ukrayinka, later I will analyze how her hairstyle contributes to such elements of Tymoshenko's image as chastity and religiousness.

2.1.3. Chastity and Religiousness

The second constituent aspect of Yuliia Tymoshenko's image of Berehynia refers to the notions of chastity and religiousness. In this subchapter I will first look at how Tymoshenko's chastity is stressed by the symbolic meaning of such elements of her political image as colors, the emblem and hairstyle. Then I will establish the connection between the notion of religiousness and Yuliia Tymoshenko's looks, postures and gestures which she uses in the pictures, analyzed in the study. In order to do this I will compare photographs with Tymoshenko to the iconographic tradition of Christianity, through the iconography of power of the soviet posters, which derives from the former (Bonnell 1999).

Thus, the first element which refers to the notion of religiousness in Tymoshenko's political image, is the color of white which is the main color of Yuliia Tymoshenko's garments and one of the official colors of her political party. Thus, white color has the meaning of cleanness, purity, joy and virtue, though it can also be associated with power and law and of course, with religion (Vinker 1900). For instance, in Christianity white is the color of divinity, which symbolizes simplicity and unity with God. White is the color of manna from heaven, it is the color of angels, shroud and many saints' clothes. The usage of white color in Tymoshenko's self-representation may be explained as an attempt to stress her chastity, openness and stainlessness, especially after her business relationships with Pavlo Lazarenko and the court trial in 2001.

The emblem of BYuTy — the red heart (see Figure 9) also contributes to Tymoshenko's image of purity and religiousness. Thus, the shape of the heart belongs to one of the most powerful positive symbols in the world, meaning life, truth, cordiality, spirituality, emotions and, of course — love. In addition, in many religions, heart is the symbol of consciousness, truth, moral purity and connection with God. For example in Christianity, the heart is considered to be the God's temple (Encyclopedia of Signs and Symbols, 2006). The symbol of heart is also often used as an attribute of Christian saints. For instance, there are

icons, picturing Virgin Mary with a glowing heart in her chest. This heart, called the Immaculate heart of Mary, stands for Mary's love towards God, Jesus and people.

Tymoshenko's hairstyle — the plait, can also be interpreted as an element used to emphasize her chastity and religiousness. First of all, the very form of Tymoshenko's hairstyle resembles a nimbus above the Saints' heads, portrayed on traditional Orthodox icons (see Figure 13). Besides, in Christian religious tradition, the plait is connected to divinity and symbolizes ascetic way of life. Thus, in Catholic and Orthodox religions priests cut a small round piece of hair on the back of their heads as a symbol of unity with God and commitment to a strict way of life. In addition, during Cossack times in Ukraine, Cossack widows whose husbands were killed in the battle or women who led a very strict way of life, had an honor, first, similar to priests, to cut a small piece of hair, and later, to braided a plait around their head (Veles, 2007). Thus, the plait helps Yuliia Tymoshenko to communicate the message of purity and sincerity, as well as to stress in her political representation the notions of chastity and religiousness.

In fact, there are a lot of official images, which portrait Tymoshenko as a religious woman (see Figure 14). The reference to religion is very important element of Yuliia Volodymyrivna's political self-representation, as Ukrainian society has always been characterized by a powerful influence of the Orthodox Church. Of course, during the Soviet Times, the level of religiousness of Ukrainian people dropped, though it boosted with new vigor after the fall of the Soviet Regime. Thus, today, as the research officer of the Department of Social structures of the Institute of Sociology of Ukrainian Academy of Science Olga Ivaschenko, reported to Inerfax (2009), Ukrainians are in the top ten of the most religious societies in Europe. Only Cypress, Poland, Slovakia and Portugal are ahead of Ukraine.

Such important factor of Ukrainian mentality as religiousness could not skip Tymoshenko's image makers. Thus, Tymoshenko's self-representation has always been based on artificially created chastity: first Yuliia Volodymyrivna was a sacred martyr, later she implemented an image of a true believer, who goes to church, prays and constantly communicated with priesthood, and that of a divine madonna which was communicated through her hairstyle, white color, clothes, looks and gestures. In addition, Tymoshenko's artificially created chastity is reinforced by stressing her "maidenhood", peculiar of female saints and novices. Thus, although Yuliia Volodymyrivna is still married to Oleksandr Tymoshenko, one could hardly find a picture of them together. The emphasis of Tymoshenko's singleness in her political self-representation is a part of the codes of femininity built of chastity, around which her political communicative image is centered.

Similarly to the aspect of "Ukrainin-ess", the notions of chastity and religiousness are stressed in Tymoshenko's political communication in order to form the basis on which a new Ukrainian state and solid nation can be created and a clear break with previous political regimes can be made. At the same time, many pictures, analyzed in the study, emphasize Yuliia Tymoshenko's religiousness by depicting her in accordance with Christian iconographic tradition, which, in its turn served as a basis for the iconography of power of the Soviet leaders (Bonnell 1999). In what follows I will look at how Tymoshenko's position, gestures and gaze resemble those of the communist leaders, in order to establish the similarities between Tymoshenko's images and Christian iconography through the mediation of the soviet iconography of power.

The first peculiarity of photographs with Tymoshenko, through which her visual representation can be traced back to that of the *vozhd* (leader) of the Proletariat, and further to the Christian iconography, is the fact that she is often pictured up to her waist or shoulders (see e.g. Figure 16, Figure 17). According to Tom Lubbock (1993), such head-and-shoulder

portraits were among the most popular types of posters in the pre-Glasnost era. Similarly to Soviet posters, many of Tymoshenko's portraits are created on the background of propaganda symbols: flags, emblems, portraits, etc (see Figure 16). Furthermore, in a similar to soviet posters way, Tymoshenko's images are often polished, so her skin looks like that of a porcelain doll (e.g. see Figure 18).

On the majority of portraits on which Yuliia Tymoshenko is pictured to her waist, she either looks slightly to the side of the camera, making the portrait look natural and spontaneous (e.g. see Figure 16, Figure 18), or gazes directly at the viewer (see Figure 17). According to Bonnell (1999), these two types of gaze were common for the soviet posters, where strategy of the side gaze was used before Stalin's rule and the strategy of the direct gaze was finally established after his rise to power. The direct gaze at the viewer showed exceptionality, strength and power of the person, depicted on the poster. What is important is that the tradition of the direct gaze is rooted into Orthodox iconography, which was called the "great-eye" of the saint (Bonnell 1999, 159). Thus, on many of her photographs, Yuliia Tymoshenko very often to a great deal resembles such Christian Icons (see Figure 15, Figure 18). Thus, her postures, gaze and her hairstyle, which looks as mandorla, emphasize Tymoshenko's chastity and compare her to Christian saints, such as Virgin Mary without a child, or St. Barbara (see Figure 18 and Figure 19).

Besides the gaze, Yuliia Tymoshenko's gestures also refer to the iconographic tradition of both, soviet art and Christian iconography. Generally, the analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko's images showed that there are three major gestures, typical of Yuliia Volodymyrivna's self-representation. The first gesture is when Yuliia Tymoshenko starches both of her palms upwards (see Figure 20). In psychology such gesture refers to sincerity, openness, devotion and honesty of a person (Piz 1998, 55-70). In addition this gesture is

deeply associated with the image of Oranta – a very powerful, religious, feminine symbol of Ukrainian culture, previously discussed in the chapter (see Figure 21).

The second gesture, typical of Yuliia Tymoshenko, is when she folds two or three of her fingers together and lifts her arm, usually right, keeping the elbow bent (see Figure 22). Such gesture is also not new for both, Christian and Soviet iconography (Bonnell 1999, 144 - 145) (see Figure 23 and Figure 24). However, Tymoshenko's gesture is more gentle and careful, than that of soviet leaders; it rather resembles that of Christ of the Saints on Orthodox icons, whose "right hand conferred a blessing, while the left hand held a book or scroll" (Bonnell 1999, 144).

The third gesture, typical of the Ukrainian Prime Minister, is the greeting gesture: a starched out hand lifted up to the head (see Figure 25). This gesture was widely accepted by the political marketing in Soviet times (see Figure 26), and is still often used today, when politics and pop culture are in such a close relations. It is interesting that similarly to Soviet leaders, Yuliia Tymoshenko is often depicted elevated compared to the crowd on the background (see Figure 25). Such posture, as Bonnell (1999, 142) points out, was used in order to stress simultaneously the superhuman qualities of the *vozhd* and his popular essence: his power and divine simplicity.

In sum, the colors, the emblem of Tymoshenko's political party and her hairstyle contribute to one of the three aspects of the political image of Berehynia – Religiousness. In addition, the analysis of photographs of Yuliia Tymoshenko enabled me to establish the relations between these images and the iconography of Christianity, which was taken as a basis of soviet posters of the communist leaders. My next step is to identify in what way Tymoshenko's political self-representation corresponds to the third aspect of the image of Berehynia – i.e. "Womanhood".

2.1.4. “Womanhood”

In this section I will discuss how the notion of womanhood, as a constituent part of the image of Berehynia, is appropriated by and communicated through Yuliia Tymoshenko’s political self-representation. Thus, according to Marian Rubchak (2005), as it was mentioned earlier in the study, the myth of Berehynia has been widely appropriated by political discourses as a concept, deeply associated with domestic madonna and hearth mother of the nation, the preserver of Ukrainian culture, language and identity (Rubchak 2005). As for Yuliia Tymoshenko’s self-representation, her visual communication very much relies on the image of the “mother of the nation”: loving, caring and sympathetic, — leaving the aspect of domesticity aside.

Thus, there are only few images on Yuliia Tymoshenko’s website, where her self-representation corresponds to the image of domestic madonna. In these pictures, Yuliia Volodymyrivna is usually depicted in unofficial environment: at home or in the garden, where she is preparing tea or laying the table (see Figure 27). However, it should be noted that these pictures appear only before the Orange Revolution, — afterwards one could hardly find similar pictures or pictures where Tymoshenko is portrayed with her husband, daughter, friends or family. The absence of such images after 2004 may be explained by the changes in Tymoshenko’s image and her unwillingness to correspond to the stereotypical depiction of women as housewives, as the image of domestic madonna could undermine her authority and competence as a politician.

As to the image of the mother of the nation, it was vice versa more emphasized in Tymoshenko’s political communication after 2004, as her political image was created as such that has numerous ties with Ukrainian culture and nation. The images, which stress Tymoshenko’s national motherhood, usually express such qualities as sympathy, care and love. Thus, on such pictures Tymoshenko is sending blow kisses into the crowd (see Figure 28); she is expressing immense distressfulness and sympathy towards Ukrainians on the days

of national morning (see Figure 29); she is portrayed among children, playing with them or kissing them (see Figure 30), or helping to make young girls the same hairstyle as she has (see Figure 31). In point of fact, the aspect of womanhood as the “mother of the nation”, communicated through Yuliia Tymoshenko’s image of Berehynia, plays an important role in the process of her legitimization as a political leader, who represents the Ukrainian state and takes care of the Ukrainian nation.

2.2. Beautiful, Modern Woman

The second main image, Tymoshenko corresponds to in her political self-representation is that of a Beautiful, Modern Woman. Indeed, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s visual self-representation has always been perceived as such that creates an image of one of the most stylish, elegant and beautiful women both, in Ukraine and outside the country. The analysis of visual images of Yuliia Tymoshenko, conducted in this study showed that many of her portraits are created in close correspondence to gender stereotypes, or special cognitive structures, which link one’s personal behaviors and attributes to the social categories of male and female (Deaux, Lewis 1984, 991-1004). Thus, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s image is often based on such (considered to be typically feminine) features as prettiness, gentleness, softness, compassion, tenderness etc. In this section I will analyze in what way Yuliia Tymoshenko’s femininity and beauty are stressed in her political self-representation, through her clothes, looks, postures and gestures.

First, the link between Tymoshenko’s image and the notion of beauty, as pointed out by Oksana Kis (2007), is stressed in the inscriptions of several pictures. For example, one of her posters that appeared right after Orange Revolution portrays smiling Tymoshenko giving flowers to the armed guards with an inscription “Beauty will save the world” on it. Thus, Oksana Kis points out that the link between female leader and the concept of beauty, proves Ukrainian people’s expectations as to the mission of a woman in politics – “to defeat evil

using the power of beauty” (Kis 2007, 53). Indeed, Yuliia Tymoshenko, in her discourse, often emphasizes that Ukrainian politics needs women, as only they can defeat cruelty and immorality of political environment by the unique strength of women that can defeat the evil by the beauty and “strength of their spirit, not weapons” (Tymoshenko’s speech about the role of women in stabilization of the dangerous world, Brussels 2008). As a point of fact, Tymoshenko’s reference to the notion of beauty stresses the gendered nature of her political communication. Thus, it is rather hard to imagine a male politician referring in his self-representation to the notion of beauty, as it is generally considered to be a female attribute.

The performativity in Tymoshenko’s self-representation of the so-called normative femininity is also expressed through her clothes and postures. Speaking about clothes and their role in the construction of femininity and masculinity, I find it relevant to mention Susan Bordo’s quote, pointing out to the same topic:

Consider this particularly clear and appropriate example; the nineteenth-century hourglass figure, emphasizing breasts and hips against a wasp waist, was an intelligible, symbolic form, representing a domestic, sexualized ideal of femininity. The sharp cultural contrast between the female and male form, made possible by the use of corsets and bustles, reflected in symbolic terms, the dualistic division of social and economic life into clearly defined male and female spheres.

(Bordo 1993, 181)

Similarly to Bordo’s (1993) statement, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s garments emphasize visual codes of normative femininity. Thus, on the images, analyzed in this study, Tymoshenko’s official outfit usually consists of fitted costumes, composed of a jacket and a skirt and dresses, she wears exclusively high-heel shoes and never appears without makeup and jewelry (see Figure 32, Figure 33). Tymoshenko’s clothes are always neat, fitted and elegant, highlighting her slim “sand-glass like” figure. Her garments are usually full of small details, such as round pearly buttons, laces, quilling or fancy rollers, — the necessary elements of her carefully worked-out style which are present in her every outfit.

Together with Tymoshenko's clothes, her postures also emphasize femininity in her political self-representation. Though before analyzing photographs of Tymoshenko, I need to refer to the American scholar Sandra Bartky (1988), who provides a theoretical framework for understanding how gestures and postures draw the difference between what is considered to be essentialized masculinity and femininity. Hence, according to Bartky (1988), women usually sit "with their arms close to the body, hands folded together in their laps, toes pointing out straight ahead or turned inward, and legs pressed together" (Bartky 1988, 97), looking small, tense, taking up as little space as possible. Many of Tymoshenko's pictures follow Bartky's description (see Figure 32 or Figure 33). Although what should be pointed out is that Tymoshenko's postures look somewhat restricted not exclusively in order to communicate the codes of normative femininity, but because they are very much conditioned by the ethical code, that she as a politician has to follow.

Overall, Yuliia Tymoshenko's self-representation is very much built around the notion of normative codes of femininity, performed by her clothes, looks, postures and gestures. The majority of her pictures portray her as a beautiful, elegant, modern cosmopolitan woman, whose image corresponds to the notion of normative femininity, which exists in "Western" societies. Though, of course, as a politician, Tymoshenko cannot stick to an image of a Beautiful, Modern woman alone. Thus, in order to assert herself as a serious, competent leader, her image has an aspect of a politician. I will look upon it in the next section.

2.3. Politician

The third important element of Yuliia Tymoshenko's self-representation is her image of a politician. In what follows, I will describe five main groups of pictures, singled out as a result of the analysis on the basis of their thematic characteristics, which conform to different aspects of Tymoshenko's image of a politician, such as an insider in the politics, a serious and competent leader, a woman in the men's world, a politician of the people and a celebrity.

The first group of photographs, singled out in the analysis, depicts Yuliia Tymoshenko as an insider in the political field. These photos picture Yuliia Tymoshenko shaking hands, talking or simply posing with the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian and world politics: Margaret Thatcher, Vladimir Putin, Nicola Sarkozy, Tarja Halonen, and many other top level politicians (see Figure 34). On the one hand these pictures show the openness and variety of diplomatic relations Yuliia Tymoshenko contributes to. On the other hand, they stress the prominence of the Prime Minister herself, emphasizing her belonging to the cream of world politics.

The second group of pictures portrays Yuliia Tymoshenko as a hard-working, serious, strict and focused leader. This group of pictures includes photographs, picturing Tymoshenko at her work, performing her function. The great majority of such pictures portray Yuliia Volodymyrivna in the motion: writing, signing, reading, talking on the phone or giving a speech, while sitting at a desk or standing in an assembly hall (see Figure 35). Some images depict Yuliia Volodymyrivna carefully listening to an invisible narrator who captures her entire attention (see Figure 36). Looking at these portraits, images of the soviet leaders immediately evoke in my mind, especially those of Stalin (see Figure 37 and Figure 38). The similarity between the images of these two politicians from “different worlds”: communist and post-soviet, as well as their resemblance of pictures of numerous modern politicians, — leads to a conclusion that the iconography of power, proved to be successful in the past, is often taken as a basis for political communication of politicians, who are paving their way in politics nowadays.

The third group of photos, distinguished in the analysis, pictures Tymoshenko as a woman leader in the men’s world of politics. On these pictures, Yuliia Tymoshenko’s slender figure and colorful outfits stand in contrast to men’s almost identical dark suits, by which she is surrounded (see Figure 39). These pictures are very speaking, in a sense that they illustrate

how being a woman creates more possibilities in political communication than being a man. Thus, a political self-representation of a woman politician can be more successfully variegated than that of men thanks to a number of elements, such as clothes, colors, hairstyle or looks and nonverbal communication in general, which are usually more diversely presented in women's image than in that of men. Thus, a woman leader has at her disposal more resources of her body and looks, which can be successfully used as means of communication of certain ideas, concepts or symbolic meanings.

The fourth group of pictures, singled out in the analysis, refers to the image of Yuliia Tymoshenko as politician of the people: i.e. a politician who stands for people, who represents people, and who is popular among them. Generally, such images are quite widespread in the political self-representation of many politicians, as they refer to the key concept of political communication – i.e. authenticity. According to Darren Lilleker (2006), the concept of authenticity presupposes a depiction of a politician in non-political contexts, as “being “real people”, intrinsically a part of a community they represent, rather than being detached and a part of an elite” (Lilleker 2006, 39). Thus, in pictures of this group, Tymoshenko appears in non-official environment, surrounded by “ordinary people” of different social groups and professions: Ukrainian Immigrants in Italy, Kyiv veterans of the Second World War, students, workers from various fields, etc, — hugging and kissing them, listening to them or explaining something to them (see Figure 40 and Figure 41). What is similar about all pictures from the three groups, described above, is that they convey the feeling of love and compassion, friendship and gratitude, resembling to a large extent Tymoshenko's image of the mother of the nation, discussed earlier in this work.

The final, fifth group of pictures, singled out as a result of the analysis, conducted in this study, refers to Yuliia Tymoshenko's image of a celebrity: a famous, public personality with original and vivid style. The photographs from this group resemble pictures of famous

singers, actors, artists and sportsmen. In such pictures Tymoshenko is often portrayed giving autographs to people, waving from the limousine to her fans and admirers (see Figure 42); or surrounded by a dozen of microphones, cameras and voice recorders (see Figure 43). This group of pictures presents a vivid example of the blurring of boundaries between popular culture and politics, which results in the construction of political image of a political leader on similar basis of that of a media celebrity (Zoonen 2000; Corner and Pels 2003).²²

3. The Diversity of Images of Yuliia Tymoshenko's political figure or Why the More is the Better?

The analysis of visual self-representation of Yuliia Tymoshenko showed how different Tymoshenko can be and how diverse her political image is. She seems to be a jack-of-all-trades: tender, but tough, traditional, but cosmopolitan. Today, she sits in a richly decorated office, and tomorrow she, in work wear and helmet, descends into the coal mine. Though, isn't it too much for one political figure? Why does she refer to such a great variety of different elements in her political self-representation? In this subchapter I will point out some of the main reasons, which can explain why Tymoshenko builds her image on so many different, often controversial aspects and why her gender holds a central position in her self-representation. These reasons generally may be divided into two main groups: those, connected to the peculiarities of politics as such, and those, connected to the Ukrainian political context. I will start with the first group.

3.1. Tymoshenko's Image Diversification: General Context

General reasons why Yuliia Tymoshenko, as well as many other politicians, uses so many diverse images in her political self-representation are conditioned by two main factors: the nature of political representation and the close relations between politics and popular culture. As to the nature of political representation, as it was already mentioned, one of the main characteristics of a political image is that it is aimed at gaining power through gaining

²² For details see section 3.1. in Chapter III.

popularity.²³ Indeed, as the title of David Collenette's work says: "Politics is about Winning" (Collenette, 2006), — politicians try to variegate their political images in order to satisfy expectations of as many voters, as possible, which further can bring them popularity together with people's votes, the victory on the elections, and, consequently, the access to power.

As to the relations between politics and popular culture, first let's learn more about the issue. Generally, the study on the interconnection between "'high' political representation and 'low' popular entertainment" (Corner and Pels 2003, 2) started to develop mainly in 1970s-80s. At that time scholars began to notice that politics is closely connected to popular culture because, as Liesbet von Zoonen states, if one sets the politics apart from the culture, "not only it [the politics] will not survive the competition for spare time, but more importantly it will also be separated, different, and distant from everyday life" (Zoonen 2000, 3) and therefore, it will become "an alien sphere, occupied by strangers no one cares and bothers about" (Zoonen 2000, 3).

The result of the blurring of the boundaries between the politics and the popular culture is that politics "has become not only a persuasive but a performance art" (McNair 2003, 222). Today, similarly to popular culture, under the influence of massive visibility, consumerism, celebrity and cynism (Corner and Pels 2003, 1-8), politics had undergone the process of aestheticisation, which means that in political image the priority is given to style and presentation, rather than to the substance (Lilleker 2006, 25). Moreover, today politics works according to the laws of popular culture: as commercial marketing (McNair 2003, 7) and as a performance or a theatre, focusing on "spectacle, style, emotion, and the cult of personality" (Corner, and Pels 2003, 8).

Thus, the popular nature of modern politics is the second main reason, why Tymoshenko, as well as many other politicians, use such a diverse spectrum of political

²³ For details see section 3.2. in Chapter I.

images in their self-representation. Hence, similarly to popular culture, a sense of drama is often created in the political campaigns around certain political figures or events (Zoonen 2000). This sense of drama is created in order to receive the effect of entertainment consumption: to maintain the electorate's interest and to get the necessary amount of votes that will help to win the elections. No doubts that the more diverse one's political image is, the more "spectacular storylines and flamboyant personalities" (Corner and Pels 2003, 2) can be created around it. And the greater drama may be created around a certain personality, the more people, or political consumers will be attracted to it, insuring the leader's popularity and, consequently, the number of votes received at the elections.

3.2. Tymoshenko's Image Diversification: Ukrainian Context

Together with the group of reasons, connected to the peculiarities of modern politics, the diversification of Tymoshenko's political self-representation may be explained by the specific features of Ukrainian cultural and political context. Generally, I distinguish between two main explanations of the diversification of Tymoshenko's political representation, which are related to Ukraine in specific. The first explanation refers to populism and the peculiarities of its manifestation in Ukraine, Yuliia Tymoshenko uses in her political communication and representation. The second reason is connected to general peculiarities of Ukrainian electorate. In what follows I will look at both groups of explanations in details.

3.2.1. The "Queen" of Ukrainian Populism

Thus, the fact that Yuliia Tymoshenko uses so many different hypostases in her political self-representation may be explained by the fact that she, according to Ukrainian journalist Mykola Ryabchuk (Iliyin 2007), is the one, who is the most often called a populist politician. In what follows I will define the notion of populism, look at the main reasons why populism was born in Ukraine and point out its general characteristics in order to explain why Tymoshenko has such a diverse number of elements in her political self-representation.

According to N. Baranov (2001), populism may be defined as “a political activity, based on the manipulation of values and expectations, widely-accepted and popular among people” (Baranov 2001). Numerous scholars (Baranov 2001; Ropp 2005; Hayward 1996) conclude that populism usually appears and gains tremendous popularity in countries, which are undergoing through certain changes and are being subjected to stressful forces. In such situation populist leaders are of a great popularity, as they offer simple decisions to difficult questions.

Taking into account the claim that stress gives rise to populism, it is possible to conclude that Yuliia Tymoshenko had a very lucrative ground for the formation of her populist political representation in Ukraine. Thus, in late 1990, when she starts her career in politics, many people were suffering from difficulties brought about by the transformational period in Ukraine.²⁴ Tymoshenko’s current political image was formed after another stress, lived in the country — the Orange Revolution of 2004. In what follows I will look at two main reasons, which may be considered as such that influenced Tymoshenko’s decision to variegated her political self-representation.

First, after 2004 many people felt deep disappointment in the Orange Revolution and needed a new, charismatic personality who would be able to explain what is wrong, to promise to change it, and to lead the country in the “right” direction. Thus, according to the data of the research center IFAK (2006), about 80% of Ukrainian people felt dissatisfied with the results of the revolution. In the circumstances of unstable economic, social and political situation, massive dissatisfaction and disappointment of people in current politicians, strong, determined, charismatic, populist leaders easily get the trump-card. Yuliia Tymoshenko took the advantage of the situation and variegated her political image in order to find a place in Ukrainian politics.

²⁴ See Chapter II.

Second reason that can explain why Tymoshenko modified her political representation may be explained by the fact that after 2004, a popular element played an important role in Ukrainian politics, as many people believed that their votes actually can influence political situation in the country. Thus, as Iryna Rojkova (2007) states, one of the main characteristics of the Orange Revolution was that it symbolized the unprecedented before in Ukraine phenomenon when the political elites were forced to change certain political decisions from the bottom: under the constraint of people. The events during the Revolution assured people of their at least relative power and made politicians to compete harder for the votes and therefore to correspond to the expectations of as many parts of the electorate as possible. In addition, the constituency, which was already characterized by a variety of different social groups, was generally divided between the two political trends: nationalistic, who supported pro-Western political course and those, who favored pro-Russian course. Such state of things can explain the modifications, brought into the political self-representation of Yuliia Tymoshenko, and the fact that her self-representation is built on the oppositions: cosmopolitan celebrity, but of people; nationalist, but western; patriot, but neutral to such sensitive questions as, for instance NATO.

On the whole it may be concluded that the Orange Revolution, as the most massive and vivid example of the manifestation of democracy in Ukraine, was a turning point in Yuliia Tymoshenko's political marketing. Thus, Tymoshenko's political self-representation was modified and verified to a great extent in order to conform to the expectations of the continuity, — so that she could stay on the wave of popularity among people and, consequently, on the top of Ukrainian power. Thus, Tymoshenko's new political image is created as such that represents a new Ukrainian state and makes a clear cut with previous regimes: Soviet and that of Kuchma. However, despite the fact that on the symbolic level Tymoshenko's image is created as such that represents new Ukrainian democratic state, on

the substantive level, the correspondence of Tymoshenko's visual representation to that of Soviet leaders²⁵, and the peculiarities of her political career and the way she actually became a politician²⁶ refer back to both Soviet and Kuchma's regimes.

3.2.2. Target: the "Better Half" of the Electorate World²⁷

As it was shown in the visual analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko's self-representation, although her political representation consists of a number of various elements, gender is a constituent part of every one of these aspects. In my opinion, there are at least two main reasons why gender is such an important part of Tymoshenko's political image. In this section I will look at them in details.

The first reason why feminine gender is placed at the core of Tymoshenko's visual political image may be explained by the fact that she, as a populist politician, uses gender as one of the instruments that can insure her popularity among different social groups of Ukrainian electorate. This strategy is quite common among women leaders. Thus, according to MacDonald (1995), as described in Zoonen's article, the representations of women politicians "can be brought back to four popular myths of femininity: femininity as enigmatic and threatening, femininity as nurturing and caring, femininity as sexuality and femininity as bodily practice" (Zoonen 2000, 93). Yuliia Tymoshenko goes further, incorporating in her political self-representation several myths of normative femininity described above and combining them with other elements of political image, i.e. chastity and "Ukrainian-ess".

The second reason why Tymoshenko places gender at the basis of her political image is connected to the peculiarities of Ukrainian electorate, which is, similarly to many other countries, mostly consists of women (Lowen 2008), as according to the last population census, conducted in 2001, women present 53,7% of Ukrainian population (Population census

²⁵ See section 3.2. in Chapter III.

²⁶ See Chapter II.

²⁷ I use the expression "better half" of the electoral world" as a calque from the Ukrainian expression "krascha chastyna liudstva" (the better half of the world), meaning women.

2001). Thus, gender is used by Tymoshenko as an important element of descriptive representation in order to receive votes: by representing a certain social group, a politician insures the support from this group. Of course, it should be noted that there are studies that show that the level of sexism towards women candidates is higher and that women generally tend not to vote for women politicians (Rosenwasser, Rogers, Fling, Silvers-Pickens, Butmeyer 1987). Why Tymoshenko stresses her femininity then, one could ask. The answer is two-fold. Firstly, not all women are not eager to vote for female politicians, many feel no bias against women leaders or even hope that it is a woman who can bring changes men couldn't (Chaney, Sinclair 1994; Leeper 1991). Thus, as it was mentioned above, gender is used as a political strategy to insure the votes of this part of electorate. Secondly, the combination in Tymoshenko's image of gender with other elements allows to smooth the image of a purely female politician and to influence in positive way women voters, who do not want to vote for female leaders because of their gender biases. Tymoshenko's political self-representation includes a number of elements, thus everyone can find there something appealing to them, despite the gender factor. It is worth mentioning that the strategy to combine gender with other aspects in Tymoshenko's image appears to be successful. Thus, according to the results of several polls, conducted among Ukrainians after the last parliamentary elections, there are more women in the electorate of Yuliia Tymoshenko's party BYuTy than men. Thus, for instance the data, received by the Institute of social and political psychology of Ukraine, shows that among the respondents who gave their preferences to BYuTy, women's group is 6,5% bigger than that of men (Pozniy 2007).

4. Summary

Overall, the iconographic analysis of official photographs of Yuliia Tymoshenko enabled me to single out three main images she corresponds to in her political self-representation: image of Berehynia; Beautiful, Modern Woman and Politician. Each of these images consists,

in its turn, of several additional aspects, contributing to general complexity and diversification of Tymoshenko's self-representation. The variety of different elements, Tymoshenko uses in her political self-representation may be explained by the goal of every politician to correspond to the expectations of as many voters as possible, the blurred boundaries between popular culture and politics, and the populist nature of Tymoshenko's political image. The images distinguished in Tymoshenko's political self-representation are mainly manifested through such elements of visual representation as colors, the emblem, clothes, hairstyle and non-verbal communication. The latter element, allowed me to trace similarities between Tymoshenko's iconography and that of soviet leaders, which is rooted in iconography of Christian tradition.

The analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko's self-representation allowed me to draw two main conclusions. First, Tymoshenko's image is centered on conservative gender roles, on visual codes of normative femininity, based on artificial chastity and nationalistic concepts. Therefore, although Tymoshenko's gender was not the most important factor that enabled her to enter Ukrainian politics, Yuliia Volodymyrivna uses gender as a useful source for maintaining popularity and power. Second, the analysis, conducted in the research showed that generally, being a woman opens a wide range of possibilities for creating a many-sided political image. Thus, the variety of such elements as clothes, colors, looks and nonverbal communication allows a woman politician to use her body and looks as a means of communication in a number of diverse ways; Tymoshenko's versatile self-representation serves as a confirmation of this statement.

Conclusion

The aim of my research was to analyze the current Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yuliia Tymoshenko's political figure from a gender perspective, in order to see the role gender has been playing in her political electability. In particular, I wanted to investigate whether gender was a part of Yuliia Tymoshenko's entering the political arena of a post-communist country and how gender has been instrumentalized as a political strategy in Tymoshenko's visual self-representation. To serve the goals of my study, first I looked at general socio-economic, cultural and political context of Ukraine in order to see whether it was favorable to women's representation in politics. Then I conducted the analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko's official and unofficial biography that enabled me to single out main factors which allowed her to start in Ukrainian politics. Finally, I used iconographic analysis of the official photographs of Yuliia Tymoshenko in order to identify main elements of her political visual self-representation and the role gender occupies in it.

The results of the study enable me to conclude that Yuliia Tymoshenko's start in post-soviet Ukrainian political context which was not favorable to women's representation in politics can hardly be considered engendered, as not gender but the peculiarities of the neo-patrimonial political system and the recruitment process in Ukraine based on kinship relations, lobbying and corruption, were the determinative factors in Tymoshenko's entering the political arena. At the same time, the analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko's official visual self-representation allows me to state that feminine gender, rooted into normative codes of femininity, symbolic nationalist concepts and artificial chastity, has been instrumentalized as an important strategy in order to smooth Tymoshenko's tough way of governing, to create an appealing image that could speak to different groups of the constituency and, consequently, to maintain the high level of popularity and power.

The findings of the research provide two main theoretical innovations regarding women and politics in general and in Ukraine in particular. First, the analysis of Yuliia Tymoshenko's visual communication allows me to complement Anna Kravchenko's (2006) classification of female leaders' self-representation with a new type of political image. Thus, Yuliia Tymoshenko's visual self-representation, based on essentialized normative femininity, artificial chastity and symbolic "Ukrainian-ess", fits well neither into the image of "blue stocking", nor into the image of "woman-male", nor into that of a "sexualized symbol", — exemplifying therefore a new type of political image that women leaders can communicate in their self-representation.

The second theoretical innovation of my study relates to the question of the extent an example of a female leader who holds the office of the head of the government of a country can be demonstrative regarding the level of democracy and general women's advancement in this country. Thus, on a formal level, Yuliia Tymoshenko's political figure, as that of a female politician who shares with the President the heights of Ukrainian politics, could be considered an indication of advanced gender politics in Ukraine. However, the analysis of Tymoshenko's political career and her visual self-representation enables me to argue that on the substantial level of Ukrainian context this is not the case. Thus, the analysis of Ukrainian political context showed that Ukrainian neo-patrimonial political system is not open for women in general, but only for those, who have sufficient financial resources and certain business and kinship relations. Moreover, I claim that Tymoshenko's political figure can not only be taken as an example of democratic manifestation of a high level of women's advancement in Ukraine, but also may be considered as such that expresses prejudicial nature regarding women in politics. Thus, Tymoshenko's political visual image that relies on the normative codes of femininity, defines a limited space for women in politics, a space that goes back to traditional pre-modern discourse of essentialization.

With respect to further research, I hope that my work can provide several main insights into the follow-up studies. Thus, this study can contribute to the research on the implications of gender in the political figures of the new generation of tycoon politicians who challenge the conventional politics, and the role that gender is considered to play in it. The case of Yuliia Tymoshenko can also be taken as an example to a research of how a female body can be used as a lucrative mode of conveying political representation, as its visual characteristics, such as clothes, looks and postures are generally characterized by a greater variety than those of men and therefore, create more possibilities for political communication.

In addition, it should be mentioned that taking into account the diversification of Yuliia Tymoshenko's political image and the variety of means it can be communicated through, I was not able to cover Tymoshenko's representation in its entirety. In this study I focused solely on the visual manifestation of her symbolic and descriptive self-representation, communicated through her official photographs. Thus, the substantive representation and the manifestation of Tymoshenko's political communication on the level of the public (i.e. among the constituency) as well as her unofficial political representation were not considered in my research. Therefore, the possible area of focus for further research could be Tymoshenko's symbolic, descriptive and substantive self-representations, communicated through first her official discourses, second discourses, pictures and cartoons, represented in popular media and third the peculiarities of Tymoshenko's political image as it is perceived by the constituency. Furthermore, since a few weeks, Tymoshenko occasionally appears in public without her famous plait, wearing a modest bun instead. This may be a first step towards new changes in Tymoshenko's political self-representation towards the image of a more serious, experienced, Europe-oriented politician. These changes before the upcoming presidential elections in Ukraine in which Yuliia Tymoshenko is going to participate, for sure will provide scholarly research with more material for the analysis.

Yuliia Tymoshenko's Biography

Official Biography ²⁸	Unofficial Biography ²⁹
CHILDHOOD	
<p>November 27th, 1960 Yuliia Tymoshenko was born in Dnepropetrovsk.</p>	<p>Nonofficial biographical sources generally add two details, which deal with her family and origin.</p> <p><u>Family:</u> Tymoshenko's father, Volodymyr Abramovych Grygian, left the family, when Yuliia was about 3 years old. Her mother, Liudmila Mykolayivna Telegina, was working as a teacher in a local school.</p> <p><u>Origin:</u> Many nonofficial sources stress the "non-Ukraininess" of Yuliia Tymoshenko, tracing the origin of her father's family name. According to these sources, there are possible origins of Tymoshenko's maiden name Grygorian:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Grygian is of Armenian origin; 2) Grygian is of Latvian origin: this point of view is supported by Tymoshenko herself. As the BYuTy leader says, there was a mistake in the Passport Office, where her Latvian forefathers' surname Grygianis was changed to Grygian. 3) Grygian is of Jewish origin or the origin of Armenian Jews.

²⁸ The data of Yuliia Tymoshenko's official biography is taken from the following source: Biography of Yulia Tymoshenko, Last accessed May 18, 2009. <http://www.tymoshenko.com.ua/eng/about/>

²⁹ The data of Yuliia Tymoshenko's nonofficial biography is taken from the following sources:

- 1) Bizness Ledi iz Khrushchevki (Business Lady from Khrushchevka) / (online issue) the Time No.233, 2007. Last Accessed April 4, 2009. <http://www.vremya.ru/2007/233/5/194472.html>;
- 2) Kriger, Aleksandr Klan Tymoshenko Mify i Realnost (The Clan of Tymoshenko: Myths and Reality), 2008. Last Accessed April 25, 2009. <http://www.gazeta-nd.com.ua/rubrics/vdnh-ua/841.php>;
- 3) LigaBusinessInform Tymoshenko, Yuliia: Dossier / LIGABusinessInform. Personalities, 2008. Last accessed April 4, 2009. <http://file.liga.net/person/26.html>;
- 4) Makarkin, Aleksey Orangeviy Bizness i Novaya Vlast v Ukraine (the Orange Business and New Power in Ukraine), 2005. Last Accessed May 3, 2009. <http://www.politcom.ru/249.html>;
- 5) Premyer-ministr Yuliia Timoshenko-Gugian/Telegina Neoficialnaya biographiya (The Prime Minister Yuliia Timoshenko-Grygian/Telegina. Unofficial Biography) (online edition) The Ukrainian Truth, 2005. Last accessed April 4, 2009. <http://www.pravda.com.ua/ru/news/2005/2/4/1475.htm>;
- 6) Public online library of V. Prybil'skiy Tymoshenko Yuliia Vladimirovna, 2006. Last accessed April 4, 2009. <http://www.anticompromat.ru/tymoshenko/timoshbio.html>;
- 7) Silkin O. Mejdu Ukrainoy, Armeniyey, Latiyey i...: Yuliya Timoshenko Skrivaet Svoe Proishojdeniye (Between Ukraine, Armenia, Latvia and...:Yuliia Timoshenko Conceals her Origin), 2008. Last accessed April 4, 2009. www.regnum.ru/news/989417.html;
- 8) Vlasti Net, the (online newspaper the "Power — No") Yuliia Timoshenko skrivaet svoe proishojdeniye (Юлия Тимошенко скрывает своё происхождение) / online magazine the "Vlasti Net": Ukraine. Politics, 2008. Last accessed April 4, 2009. <http://vlasti.net/news/5724?print=1>;
- 9) Brovko, Vladymir Yuliia Vladimirovna Kapitelman — Grygian — Tymoshenko, Pavel Lazarenko I VSE-VSE, 2008. Last Accessed April 4, 2009. <http://maidan.org.ua/static/narnewslviv/1223553950.html>;
- 10) Zaycev, Stepan Printsessa na Bobah (The Princess on the Beans) / Magazin Career No.3, 2001. Last Accessed April 28, 2009. <http://www.kariera.orc.ru/03-01/Rabot042.html>.

YOUTH	
<p>In 1979, while studying at the economic faculty of Dnipropetrovsk State University, she married Oleksandr Tymoshenko and her daughter Eugenia was born in 1980.</p>	<p>According to both, official and nonofficial biographies, Yuliia Tymoshenko met her future husband accidentally. Oleksandr dialed the wrong number, Yuliia answered, they talked for a while and then decided to meet.</p> <p>Oleksandr Tymoshenko's father - Gennadiy Tymoshenko, is the representative of the old communist political elite. In the USSR he hold different posts on several levels of government. In 1991 he occupied the position of the chairmen of Kyrovskiy district executive committee. In addition, he owned a company, specializing in the provision of film-showing facilities.</p>
BUSINESS CAREER	
<p>In 1984 Yuliia Tymoshenko was graduated from the University with an honor degree. As any young specialist, she got an assignment (the usual practice in the USSR days) to work as an economy engineer at the machine-building plant in Dnipropetrovsk.</p> <p>In 1988 Yuliia and her husband Oleksandr opened a public service enterprise, a video-renting shop, started with 5.000 of Soviet roubles they borrowed. The profits made from this first venture were used to open the video rentals chain.</p> <p>From 1989 till 1991 Yuliia Tymoshenko worked as the business manager of the "Terminal" youth center of Dnipropetrovsk.</p>	<p>Some nonofficial sources of Tymoshenko's biography claim that it is thanks to her father-in-law's help and protection she was able to graduate from the University.</p> <p>Numerous sources stress the Tymoshenkos were able to gather that amount of money and to float in the new business world full of criminal authorities only thanks to Gennadiy Tymoshenko's help and his relations with different business and political elites.</p> <p>One of the initiators of the "Terminal" youth center was Oleksandr Tulchynov, who later became the right-hand-man of the BYuTy party leader.</p>
<p>In 1991 she became the managing director of the "Ukrainian Oil" corporation (UOC). All the funds available UOC has directed to purchasing of oil products. It was the most important business trend for the society: 1991 saw the collapsing of the huge state and economic structure. It was the year of monstrous inflation and the near-instantaneous demise of the Ukrainian agriculture. Later the UOC was transformed into the "United Energy Systems of Ukraine" (UESU).</p>	<p>In 90s the agricultural sector, as well as the majority of Industrial enterprises in Dnipropetrovsk oblast was controlled by the governor Pavlo Lazarenko and his team. Thanks to Gennadiy Tymoshenko's good relations with Lazarenko's, it became possible to gather a lot of former members of communist political elite, new business elite and limbs of law under the leads of the UOC.</p> <p>The company worked in the shadow economy, using barter schemes, due to which in the situation of total shortage, it managed to receive grate volumes of agricultural production at low figure directly from the producers.</p>
<p>In 1995 Yulia Tymoshenko became the president of UESU. Shortly after, the Corporation devised a new model of supplying the Ukrainian industry with energy sources. The economic was struggling without access to the cash flow as result of the last currency reform and inflation. Factories became victims of the lack of experience in market management. In this situation, UESU undertook the mission of trading, with Russia mostly, the major source of energy resources in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The circulating capital was brought to the domestic economy and it was used to revitalize the production</p>	<p>The company continued to work in the shadow economy of Ukraine. By 1997 the company controlled about 25% OF Ukrainian economics. The prosperity of the company is often connected to the top of power possessed by Pavlo Lazarenko.</p>

<p>and to pay wages. Meantime, UESU was trading with Russia, delivering metals, pipes and other products of Ukrainian heavy industry in exchange for gas and oil.</p> <p>By 1997 the multi-billion debts of Ukraine to Russia for the natural gas were fully liquidated due to the UESU's activity. Ukraine has renewed its international economic relations in the spheres of machinery-building, house-building and pipes production, doubling the Ukrainian export to Russia.</p> <p>Thus, the development of the UESU corporation got to that level when business outgrows itself, becoming the major political factor. The usual scenario was launched that is still popular today: the corporation leaders were sued for the debt of \$ 42 millions to "Ukrasprom", the Revenue and Tax police arrested the Corporation's accounts and the Supreme Court of Arbitration fined UESU on more than \$ 300 millions after having it accused of the currency legislation infringement.</p> <p>It was the hard blow for the "United Energy Systems of Ukraine" which the public and the mass media alike called "the pre-ordered persecution". The UESU was one of the top five most powerful business structures on the territory of CIS at the time.</p> <p>The succession of events left only two choices for Yulia Tymoshenko: to stay in the big business and be engaged in confrontation with the state officials or to become a politician and fight for the independence of business from authority and for the state liberalization.</p>	<p>The contribution of the UESU to the Ukrainian Economy is Janus-faced. On the one hand, as Tymoshenko and her official sources stress, the company helped to resolve the economic problems, as thanks to its deals a multimillion debt for natural gas was paid back to Russia, the product stream to Russia almost doubled, international economic relations with other countries were developed. On the other hand, the UESU were the "pioneers of incorporating of the tolling schemes of tax evasion and of pulling out the floating assets of Ukrainian enterprises" (Tymoshenko, Yuliia: Dossier 2008).</p> <p>In 1997 the UESU reached the level, when business stops being just business, the company had to develop new means to protect its positions. In addition, in 1997 the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, who saw in Pavlo Lazarenko a potential rival on the forthcoming presidential elections, created financial problems to the company, which virtually demolished it. Lazarenko was laid off his post of the Prime Minister of Ukraine and went to the opposition to Kuchma.</p> <p>In order to secure the business and to receive additional opportunities for its development, Yuliia Tymoshenko decides to go into politics.</p>
POLITICAL CAREER	
<p>In the end of 1996 Yuliia Tymoshenko was nominated for the parliamentary election. She got 92,3% of votes in the majority constituency of the Kirovograd region.</p> <p>In 1997 Yuliia Tymoshenko became the first deputy chief of the "Gromada" party.</p> <p>Since 1998 she was working as the chairman of the strategic committee on budgeting of the Parliament. During this period, Yuliia Tymoshenko has developed projects for the Budget and Tax codes, new systems of pension and medical provision, mechanics of clearing off pensions and salaries. In addition, under her guidance, the Budget committee devised the "100 weeks to the proper life" program.</p> <p>In 1998 Yuliia Tymoshenko becomes the deputy of the Parliament for the second time and again heads the Budget committee.</p>	<p>At that time the leader of the party "Gromada" was Pavlo Lazarenko, who appointed Yuliia Tymoshenko to the post of his deputy.</p>
<p>In 1999 Yuliia Tymoshenko became the leader of the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivschina" (Fatherland) party.</p> <p>Meanwhile, she successfully upholds a thesis named "The State Regulation of the Taxation System", receiving PhD in economics. Still, it was not the end of her scholar activity: Yuliia Tymoshenko wrote more than 50 works on different scientific themes.</p> <p>On the December 30, 1999 Yuliia Tymoshenko</p>	<p>In 1999 Pavlo Lazarenko, being under an accusation of embezzlement, money laundering and fraud, escapes to the United States with about \$200 000 000 (0,4% of Ukrainian gross national product).</p> <p>After Lazarenko's escape from the country, Yuliia Tymoshenko quickly breaks all bonds with "Gromada" and founds her own oppositional party "Batkivschina" (Fatherland).</p> <p>On her post of the vice-Prime Minister of the</p>

occupies the post of vice-Premier Minister responsible of the country's fuel and energy issues.	country's fuel and energy resources she managed to arrange the liquidation of debts., which by some was named as an attempt to pay the UESU debt from the public treasury.
<p>In 2001, the disappearance of journalist Georgy Gongadze has caused the huge political scandal searing through the country. The opposition claimed that the President Leonid Kuchma and other authority figures of the highest rank are involved in disappearance and death of the journalist. The ill-famous "cassette scandal" followed. Then the action "Ukraine Without Kuchma" has begun.</p> <p>On the January 19, 2001 Yuliia Tymoshenko was dismissed from the post of vice-Premier Minister.</p> <p>On the 13th of February, 2001 she was arrested on the charges brought by the General Prosecutor's office.</p> <p>Later this year all charges were dismissed.</p>	The reputation and the authoritative power of Leonid Kuchma exploded, and Tymoshenko becomes too dangerous rival for the Kuchma Regime (both, business and political). Therefore they decided to put her out of the way and imprisoned her.
<p>In 2004 the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc announced a coalition "Power of the People" with the Viktor Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine" bloc to support Yushchenko during the presidential elections in October.</p> <p>On February 4, 2005 the President Viktor Yushchenko presents Yuliia Tymoshenko as the prospective Prime Minister to the Parliament. The new record was set: 373 members of Parliament voted in support of her and she became the head of the Government.</p>	During the Orange revolution Tymoshenko becomes one of the most prominent figures of Ukrainian politics. As a reward for her help during the revolution, Viktor Yushchenko appoints her to the post of the Prime Minister of Ukraine.
<p>In September 2005 Yuliia Tymoshenko's team leaves the government, but continues to work on the prospective projects of the Ukraine's development.</p> <p>The elections of March 26th, 2006 emerged with the following totals: Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc got 22,29% of votes, winning the elections in the half of Ukraine's regions and in its capital Kiev.</p> <p>On December 18, 2007 – The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine appointed Yuliia Tymoshenko new Prime-minister of Ukraine.</p>	<p>Tymoshenko was dismissed because of constant conflicts inside the executive branch of power. One of the main reasons, named by non-official sources of Tymoshenko's biography, is strained relationships with people from the President's "inner circle", especially Petro Poroshenko (godfather of Yushchenko's child), who in 2005 was the Secretary of the National Security Council.</p> <p>This became possible due to public pressure, as Tymoshenko became extremely popular mainly thanks to her political image and populist politics, as well as people's disappointment in the Orange Revolution and governmental peripetia.</p>

Table 2.

Women Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of II Convocation (1994-1998)

#	Name	Date of Birth	Education	Profession	Place of Work	Party	Electoral District	Previously Elected as a Deputy	Further Elected as a Deputy
1	Goshovska Valentyna Andriivna	19.01.48.	higher	teacher	First Deputy of the Head of the Balakliyskyi district State Administration	---	#386, Kharkivska oblast (Eastern)	---	The deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of III convocation
2	Grygorovych Liliia Stepanivna	12.09.57.	higher	doctor, allergist	Ivano-Frankivsk district hospital, allergist	---	#204, Ivano-Frankivska oblast (Western)	---	The deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of III, IV, V, VI convocation
3	Karpachova Nina Ivanivna	12.08.57.	higher	lawyer	National University of Symferopol, assistant professor	---	#28, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Southern Ukraine)	---	The deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of V convocation
4	Krandakova Olena Vasylivna	20.09.51.	higher	economist	Agroindustrial firm "Zolote Pole", economist	---	#38, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Southern Ukraine)	---	---
5	Markovska Nina Stepanivna	18.10.47.	higher	doctor	the head of the chair of Vinnytskyi Medical Institute of M Peremohy	---	#47, Vinnytska oblast (Central-West of Ukraine)	---	The deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of III convocation
6	Pasechna Liudmila Yakivna	16.07.48.	higher	teacher	The Principle of school #17 in Konstyantinivka	Communist Party	#126, Donetska oblast (Eastern Ukraine)	---	---
7	Pshenychna Olga Mykolaivna	13.11.48.	higher	teacher	The Head of the department of people's education	---	#40, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Southern Ukraine)	---	---
8	Samoilyk Kateryna Semenivna	20.12.51.	higher	teacher	Teacher of the Russian language and literature	Communist Party	#403, Hersonska oblast (Southern Ukraine)	---	The deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of III, IV, V, VI convocation
9	Semeniuk-Samsonenko Valentyna Petrivna	04.06.57.	higher	economist	Rujinska public administration, The governor of socio-economic department	Communist Party	#159, Jytomyrska oblast (Northern Ukraine)	---	The deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of III, IV, V convocation

10	Shtepa Nataliia Petrivna	16.11.51.	higher	teacher	the vice head of the Committee of the workers' trade union	Communist Party	#42, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Southern Ukraine)	---	The deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of III convocation
11	Starovoytova Galyna Maksymivna	20.11.40.	higher	lawyer	Public Prosecutor in Krasnoperekopsk procurency	---	#32, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Southern Ukraine)	---	---
12	Stetsko Yaroslava Yosypivna	14.05.20. – 12.03.03.	higher	political analyst	The Head of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	#201, Ivano- Frankivska oblast (Western Ukraine)	---	---
13	Shulejko Mariia Yakivna	01.03.56.	higher	economist	The Head of the colhosp "Slava"	---	#421, Cherkaska oblast (Central Ukraine)	---	---
14	Tymoshenko Yuliia Volodymyrivna	27.11.60.	higher	economist	The head of the "United Energy Systems of Ukraine"	---	#229, Kirovogradska oblast (Central Ukraine)	---	The deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of III, IV, V, VI convocation
15	Vastchuk Kateryna Tymofiivna	20.01.47.	higher	agriculturist	Agroindustrial firm "Kolos", General executive	---	#69, Volynska oblast (Western Ukraine)	---	The deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of III, IV convocation
16	Vitrenko Natalia Myhaylivna	28.12.51.	higher	economist	VR, adviser on socio-economic context	Socialist Party of Ukraine	#346, Sumyska oblast (South-North of Ukraine)	---	---
27	Zavalevska Valentyna Oleksandriivna	23.10.56.	higher	economist, manager	Former representative of the President of Ukraine in Vilshanskiy district	---	#232, Kirovogradska oblast (Central Ukraine)	---	---



Figure 1.



Figure 2.



Figure 3.



Figure 4.



Figure 5.



Figure 6.



Figure 7.



Figure 8.



Figure 9.



Figure 10.



Figure 11.



Figure 12.



Figure 13.



Figure 14.



Figure 15.



Figure 16.



Figure 17.



Figure 18.



Figure 19.



Figure 20.



Figure 21.



Figure 22.



Figure 23.




Figure 24.



Figure 25.



Figure 26.



Figure 27.




Figure 28.



Figure 29.



Figure 30.



Figure 31.



Figure 32.



Figure 33.



Figure 34.



Figure 35.



Figure 36.



Figure 37.



Figure 38.



Figure 39.



Figure 40.



Figure 41.



Figure 42.



Figure 43.

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