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MULTI-LEVEL DIPLOMACY? THE SOCIALIZATION OF EUROPEAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ROMANIA AND BULGARIA - A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

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ABSTRACT

The question of administrative governance in the European Union reflects the links between the decision-making process and the national member states. The Permanent Representations are the key institutions translating the Brussels policies into the national sphere. This thesis contradicts the constructivist/Europeanization arguments for *thick* socialization of permanent representatives and focuses on Romania and Bulgaria, in the institutional medium of the Political and Security Committee. I claim that the adaptation - *thin* socialization - of the permanent representatives can be measured differently, within a theoretical framework based on intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and Brusselization. Specific for the Bulgarian representatives is their slow pace in acquiring the formal and informal procedures of the committee, while the Romanian diplomats have a different relation with their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both countries are similar in terms of networking and their logics are driven by national interests. I conclude that it is important to look at these countries as a potential model of comparison between member states, in how they integrate in the multi-level diplomatic layers in Brussels.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP   Common Foreign and Security Policy

CESDP   Common European Security and Defense Policy

CIVCOM   Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

COREPER   Committee of Permanent Representatives

EU   European Union

EPC   European Political Cooperation

ESDP   European Security and Defense Policy

GAERC   General Affairs Council

iCOPS   Temporary/Interim Political and Security Committee

MFA   Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PSC/COPS   Political and Security Committee

PoCo   Political Committee

Relex   Foreign Relation Counselors

Introduction

In 2002 the European Council officially started negotiations to welcome Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union. In order for these countries to do so they had to fulfill certain prerequisites, the Copenhagen criteria and the roadmap for both countries that comprised, reforms of the administrative, economic and judicial capacities, and gradual implementation of the *acquis communaitaire*.[1] The accession treaty for both countries was signed in April 2005, setting the membership starting with 1 January 2007. Nevertheless, there were many critics of the accession of the two. For example, in an article symbolically named "Two new entrants into the EU", on *The Economist,* stated that Romania and Bulgaria were "the new kids on the block, characterized by economic and political backwardness".[2] This was typical of a generally negative opinion on the two new members.

In terms of foreign policy after 1989, the two post-communist countries have had quite a similar route. They both are pro-atlanticist countries, even if there have been notable distinct preferences in relation to the Russian Federation. EU accession has been a major objective in terms of foreign policy. Their foreign policy discourses, before and after 2007, was based on the idea of returning and integrating in Europe. Thus, NATO membership and EU accession was seen as a major achievement, in the sense of getting back on the tracks of history, for the first time after the 1989 revolutions.

The multitudes of theories explaining the accession of new member states have scarcely touched upon the question of administrative governance. This is an important

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[1] For more information on the process of accession of Bulgaria and Romania, and the specific roadmaps drawn by the Commission see the summary of legislation and mainly the European Commission's opinions, accessible on http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50011.htm, accessed on 15 may 2009.

[2] The Economist, "Two new entrants into the EU", 4th of January 2007, accessible on http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=548554&story_id=E1_RQJ NVQJ, accessed on 15 may 2009.

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question in terms of how the inside decision-making process of the EU occurs. Moreover, a gap in the literature is constituted by the lack of individual studies which address the question of how they have new member states have integrated in the EU institutional medium. Therefore, this thesis seeks to bring in new theoretical perspectives and to facilitate a theory-based explanation- on the one hand, more generally of the EU's administrative governance, and, on the other hand, more specifically, of the Council working groups such as the Political and Security Committee, in relation to the Permanent Representations of its newest members: Bulgaria and Romania.

It is important to permanently link the EU literature with the possible effects of enlargement over inner institutional changes. Therefore, it is extremely puzzling that the branch of European Studies that looks at administrative governance, has not examined so far the accommodations of new member states in the Council framework. In this light, the aim of the present research is (1) to link the theoretical framework drawn in the first chapter, with the institutional medium of the Council of the European Union, especially the Political and Security Committee (PSC), in relation to Romania and Bulgaria. (2) To criticize the concept of socialization used mainly by constructivist/Europeanization scholars such as Jeffrey Checkel, as a central explanation for the adaptation of the Permanent Representatives and to advance a theoretical and research scheme based on a combination of intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and Brusselization. (3) To reveal the adaptation/socialization profiles of the Romania and Bulgaria, inside the PSC. [3] The overall goal is to approximate the differences between the two countries, in terms of how they fitted to the Brussels institutional medium. Subsequently the main research questions to which my inquiry relates to is:

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[3] Throughout this study I use adaptation not as synonym of socialization, but more as a thin concept which can reflect the effect over the two Representations, implicitly the dependent variable. Although the two are juxtaposed, the second is more close to the idea of a means of adaptation, a process, and an independent variable.

1. To what extent does socialization play a role in the case of the Bulgarian and Romanian Permanent Representations, after 2007?

2. How do Bulgaria and Romania interact with one another, and the other member states in the working groups of the Council, more exactly inside the Political and Security Committee?

3. Is there any notable difference in the process of adaptation between Romania and Bulgaria?

So far the literature does not present any study on the two countries, which examines their accession, from the spectrum of EU administrative governance. Mainly, the existing research scrutinizes the accession of the two countries, concentrating on the process of negotiations, implementation of the *acquis,* or drawing cost-benefit analysis of the integration. It is important to grasp the newcomer's involvement in the Council medium, as a way to analyze the efficiency of the European Institutions, and the links that they create between member states. This is the main reason why I chose to deal with the cases of Bulgaria and Romania.

The closest relevant study written on the topic is that of Ana Juncos and Karolina Pomoroska, which investigate the potential impact of the 2004 enlargement process, over the committee governance of the CFSP and how the new member states have adapted to the working groups medium.[4] However, their research generally studies and traces adaptation patterns, having the lack of any personalization, as major flow, because they analyze the 2004 countries, as a block, and not individually. Therefore, the cases which I selected are meant to cover this literature gap, and more importantly, to complete it by designing a parallel which differentiates between the two. Without differences, the already existing research, generalizes and misses out the point of each country's specificity.

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[4] See Ana Juncos, Karolina Pomoroska, "The deadlock that never happened: the impact of Enlargement on the Common Foreign and Security Policy Groups", *European Political Economy Review,* No.6, March 2007.

My first hypothesis is that the level of adaptation/socialization of the Representations of the two countries, in the PSC is determined by a high level of involvement of the representatives in the Committee. Implicitly, through involvement I precisely refer to an increase of adaptation/socialization, in relation with the involvement of the national diplomats inside the PSC. Thus, a higher degree of activity from the diplomats leads more likely to a greater adaptation/socialization. Nevertheless, my second hypothesis is that socialization does not correspond with an internalization of norms. The nature of this hypothesis relates to the theoretical model, laid out in my first chapter, in which I criticize the concept of socialization, as being too thick, in order to define the adaptation of Brussels based diplomats.

The dependent variable of the present research relates to the overall process of adaptation of the Permanent Representatives, particularly inside the PSC, after Romania's and Bulgaria's accession period. Challenging is to set out the measurements of this adaptation process. Therefore, the independent variables seize the concept of socialization, in different relations and constitute the dimensions, at which this study looks empirically. The indicators are drawn out from my alternative hypotheses (see chapter III, table 1) which form the independent variables used to differentiate between the two countries: relation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), national interest, speed of adjustment to formal and informal procedures, coalition formation and networking.

The above-referenced items make up the question of the methodological toolkit, used in examining the two Representations. I employed a qualitative study, based on semi-structured interviews of the Romanian and Bulgarian officials of the Permanent Representations (see appendix 1). At the same time, I addressed similar, but yet slightly different questions (see appendix 2), to third party Representatives, in order to obtain their perspective, on the adaptation/socialization of the first two inside the Political and Security Committee. The interviews were gathered from diplomats with various functions. In order to

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evaluate the differences between the two countries, the data collected and the indicators are subject to a scheme of evaluation and are tested through the method of Difference. The purpose of the latter method is that of depicting what differentiates Romania and Bulgaria, on the level of EU diplomacy, revealed from the activities of their representatives in the PSC working group.

This study proceeds as following. The first chapter presents the concept of socialization presented by the constructivist and Europeanization literature, and criticizes its assumptions by forming a different theoretical model based on: intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and Brusselization. The second chapter focuses on the institutional medium of the Council, and explicitly analyzes the institutional features of the PSC. Finally, my third chapter evaluates the differences between Bulgaria and Romania in terms of their adaptation to the PSC and the Brussels spectrum.

Chapter I

Examining the Brussels Permanent Representations – A Theoretical Model

The nature of the EU bureaucratic system is both administrative and regulatory. This division has been fused inside the bureaucratic system of the EU. The bureaucratic machinery of the EU and most of its regulative nature involves the Council working groups. Although the Weberian model of bureaucracy has been conceived in accordance to the developments of the modern state, most of its features can be transfused to the new features of the EU polity. The fundamental of the Weberian theory of bureaucracy is that it captures the legalistic-rationalistic features through on account of its staff. Max Weber distinguishes between two types of authority. The first is "a system of authority which regulates corporate behavior, is called an administrative authority" and the second one is a "system of authority which governs other social behavior, and thereby protects persons who have a stake in the system, is called a regulatory authority".[5] His distinctions can be used in analyzing today's European bureaucracy, or at least underlining its premises, despite the fact that the EU is different from the classical nation-state, in this sense.

This chapter challenges the concept of *Socialization*, present in the debate on Socialization/Europeanization of the EU literature. The concept cannot provide an accurate explanation for the way in which the Permanent Representations have adapted to the Brussels medium. The concept of socialization displayed by constructivist authors such as Jeffrey Checkel, Jeffrey Lewis or Michael Zurn, is too *thick* in order to explain the diplomatic interaction between the national representatives. I base my alternative argument on a

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[5] Max Weber, *Basic Concepts in Sociology, (*New York: Carol Publishing Group Edition- 1993), p. 113.

combination of three theoretical elements, which can accurately portray these relations: Intergovernmentalism, Institutionalism and Brusselization.

1.1. Socialization- sociological insights

The term *socialization* has spread in all of the other disciplinary fields from sociology. Socialization was initially a concept used by sociologists such as Emil Durkheim in order to explain- "the process through which individuals develop from the stage of being driven by instinct to being a sociable human being".[6] Following from this there is a distinction between two types of individualities which relates to a division between two types of life: personal and public. What is important in my account is the public dimension of the two, in respect to the public office, in which the modern official, as Max Weber would argue, "always strives for and attains a distinctly elevated social esteem vis-à-vis the governed".[7]

For example the new stream of sociological thought personified by authors such as Peter J. Burke, focuses the debate on identity and of the self. In constructing *identity control theory*, he uses the concept of socialization as a focus on identity, through which: "a person with strong commitments to a role identity, by being tied to many others through that identity and by having a strong emotional tie with that identity, will be more likely to activate that identity".[8] These statements offer an introduction into the field of identity studies, and they constitute a general scheme from which the analysis of socialization can begin from. Thus, reviewing it identity functions on common standards and on assuming a certain feeling of belonging to an institution, a community or a social practice. Linking this definition with that of the authors I focus on, the operational definition of *socialization* resumes to: actors

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[6] Emile Durkheim, *Education and Sociology*, (New York: Free Press, 1956), p.71.
[7] Max Weber quoted in *Classical Sociological Theory*, Craig Calhoun (Ed.), *Classical Sociological Theory, (*Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) p. 225.
[8] Peter J. Burke, *Extending Identity Control Theory*, Extending Identity Control Theory: Insights from classifier systems", *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 2004) p.575.

internalizing norms and standards of behavior by acting in social structures.[9] In more simple terms, adapting to a social medium requires internalizing its standards, norms and rules in order to integrate in a social milieu.

In addition to these, Pierre Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* is useful to the extent that it displays "generative power of dispositions in regards to the social medium in which two agents interact".[10] This has important consequences for the agency-structure debate, from which *socialization* draws its epistemological features. A brief summary of the sociological insights presumes that certain socializing agents/institutions such as academia or the military are places in which individuals acquire certain standards of behavior and knowledge. Implicitly, it is the goal of International Relations theory or the discipline of European Studies to study specific socializing settings such as the State or the Council of the European Union.

1.2 Socialization- the Constructivist turn

The concept of Socialization has been seen by Alastair Johnston as a "neglected source of cooperation in International Relations theory".[11] By analyzing the importance of the concept for IR theory in general, among the few theories that underline the centrality of social interaction, social constructivists are noteworthy.[12] Constructivism highlights the "inseparability of a social ontology and epistemology, which accepts the possibility of reality being constructed".[13] One of its main premises is that the material world is socially constructed, and that concepts presume a large degree of inter-subjectiveness:

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[9]Jeffrey Checkel, Michael Zurn, *Getting socialized to construct bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-state, International Organization,* vol. 59, no.4, 2005, *p.* 1045.

[10] Pierre Bourdieu, *The logic of Practice, (*Cambridge: Polity Press, (1990) p.53.

[11] Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments", *International Studies Quarterly* , 45, p. 487.

[12] Ibid. p.492.

[13] Fierke, K.M., *Constructivism in International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity,(* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007*),* p. 174.

"Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and it is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world".[14]

Jeffrey Checkel emphasizes that in relation to IR theory, the concept of socialization is paradoxically used, meaning that it loses its sociological significance and gets closer to the idea of soft power.[15] Checkel has been classified as a conventional constructivist scholar, which seeks a middle ground for constructivism as an approach and the discipline of International Relations.[16] In defining socialization, Checkel and Michael Zurn take into account several basic external properties of the concept, which can be structured on four levels: "international institutions, political systems and agents that become socialized, properties of the issues and norms regarding which socialization takes place, properties of the interaction between socializing and socialized agents".[17] These four causal relationships represent the factors which define the output relations of socialization.

The question that underpins the definition of socialization from Checkel's perspective is: "In what times, under what conditions and through what mechanisms can socialization be understood"?[18] However before reaching that point there has to be a clear difference in how socialization is understood in different contextual and theoretical frameworks. On the one hand, socialization is seen as an effect, as a dependent variable, with a teleological meaning, a factor which evokes a concrete pathway, a process with clear consequences over actors. On the other hand, socialization presumes a constant process of institutional formulation and other socialization agents which are continuously driven by sentiments. Moreover, in

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[14] Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in World Politics*, European Journal of International Relations, 3; 319. 1997,* p.322.

[15] Jeffrey Checkel, "Social construction and Integration", *Journal of European Public Policy, 1999,* p. 546.

[16] Emanuel Adler, *Seizing the middle ground,* p.319.

[17] Jeffrey Checkel, Michael Zurn, *Getting socialized to construct bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-state,* p. 1055.

[18] J. Checkel and A. Moravcsik, *A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?, European Union Politics* 2.2, 2001, *p. 225.*

analyzing socialization Checkel adopts a Habermasian perspective which is oriented to achieving, sustaining and reviewing: "a consensus which is based on inter-subjective recognition, and which looks at explaining the persuasion that ostensibly makes it possible for resonant normative ideas to become shared understandings".[19]

The question that the author stresses the most in his definition involves the mechanisms of socialization. The mechanism/concept of social learning determines a set of hypothesis which he uses to describe social learning, and which I recall in my third chapter. Extending the reflections on social learning, Checkel argues that "agents may behave appropriately, by learning a role, acquiring knowledge that enables them to act in accordance with expectations- irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it. The key is the agents knowing what is socially accepted in a given setting or community."[20] The author defines this through the logic of appropriateness as "a shift from a conscious instrumental calculation to a conscious role playing".[21] This is what he generally means by socialization. However, the idea behind it is originally formulated by J.G. March and Johan Olsen.[22] In the context of institutional analysis, March and Olsen state what they mean by rules, which are learned as:

> "routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms and technologies around which political activity is constructed- also beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge that surround, support, elaborate and contradict those roles and routines".[23]

On the one hand, Checkel's type one- socialization focuses on the adoption of community rules, as a process which implies that "an agent switches from following a logic of

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[19] Rodger A. Payne, *Habermas, Discourse Norms, and the Prospects for Global Deliberation,* International Studies Association, working paper available on http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/par01/, accessed on 5 May 2009.
[20] . Checkel, *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, International Organization,* vol. 59, no.4, 2005, p. 804
[21] Ibid., p. 805-806.
[22] J. March and J. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics,* (Free Press, New York, 1989) p.160.
[23] Ibid. p. 22-23.

consequences to a logic of appropriateness".[24] On the other hand, a type two of socialization "requires the actors to go beyond role playing and implies that agents accept community or organizational norms, as a normative stance, taking for granted the idea that this is the right thing to do".[25] Constructivist hypotheses that the EU institutions have *thick* socializing effects on actors, that "goes beyond instrumental adaptation and strategic calculation to include the internalization of norms and rules into self-conceptions".[26] Checkel's argumentation on socialization is that of a process of social learning, deeply rooted in the phenomenon of social interaction.

With all this, the dependent variable- *the degree of international socialization in Europe-* sought by Checkel and Zurn, tends to explain socialization as a phenomenon with a greater impact on the domestic level.[27] At this point, I suggest that the theoretical framework created by the authors leaves room for improvement, in accounting the administrative governance of the EU, as a distinct part, without considering the specific polity and governmental apparatus that the is formed inside the Communities. The interpretation of the constructivist approach presumes that the staff working in the Permanent Representations is usually alienated from the demands of their capitals, and socially tend to act inside the supranational framework and allegedly being loyal to it.

In this context, "a prolonged exposure to the EU environment causes many diplomats to acquire a certain sense of We-ness".[28] In day-to-day activities, the EU bureaucrats are exposed to the official discourse which makes it hard, for any of them to go beyond it. Adopting the official EU "language", rhetoric or dress code, inherently has psychological

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[24] Checkel, *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe,* p. 804.
[25] Ibidem.
[26] Ibid. 140.
[27] Zurn, Checkel, *Getting socialized to construct bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-state,* p. 1047.
[28] Jan Beyers, "Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The case of Council Officials*", International Organization,* vol. 59, no.4, 2005, p.899.

effects and establishes a certain sense of positive vanity among the EU staff. I think of it in terms of adopting a social role. The effects of socialization are more a matter of prestige, and concomitantly there can be no place for an empty/senseless socialization.

1.3 Socialization- "Janus faced approach"

This section looks particularly at the "double-hating" approach of Jeffrey Lewis's, as a concept encompassed in the debate on socialization. At the same time, it looks at Alexandra Gheciu's reflection on socialization, as merely a pedagogic process. Lewis applies his assumptions in examining the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The logic of appropriateness, adopted by him, is an expansion of the self, through non-instrumental, pro norm behavioral and internalizing norms.[29] The Permanent Representatives are characterized by a dual loyalty, a dual personality, in dealing with the interest of their member states and in contributing to the Community role. This is what Lewis calls the Janus faced personality of the Permanent Representatives. COREPER is a "locus-classicus for opt-out negotiations, where the importance of informal signs and elements of theatricality are important, making the Permanent Representatives to experience the phenomenon of double-hatting, of playing several roles".[30] The common sense hypothesis advanced by the author at this point is that: "the internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line with group-community norms is more likely when individuals are in settings where contact is intense and sustained".[31] In this sense one of the central features of COREPER diplomacy is a high degree of insulation from the normal currents of domestic constituent pressures, the fact that the COREPER meetings are under closed doors, with no external

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[29] Lewis, "The Janus face of Brussels*", International Organization,* vol. 59, no.4, 2005, p.940.
[30] Ibid., p. 968.
[31] Ibid., p.947.

participant or observers, validates his hypothesis that socialization is more likely to occur in "less politicized and more insulated in-camera settings".[32]

In addition to Lewis's argument, Alexandra Gheciu seems to complement the idea of socialization with another perspective, namely the idea of a teacher-student relation.[33] Based on this relation she examines the socialization effects of NATO over Central and Eastern European countries. Her argument is that NATO redefined itself after the post-Cold War period as a "beacon which spreads liberal values, and socializes its adherent countries into a normative manner".[34] All in all, Gheciu's main argument is that the EU enacts as a pedagogue which channels its members towards certain political, economical and social standards.

1.4. Socialization- the Europeanization narrative

One of today's fashionable theoretical trends in relation to the European Union is that of Europeanization. I include a brief analysis of the term in this subchapter, due to its conceptual resemblance and associations with socialization. Europeanization is envisioned as a process of socialization. One of the classic definitions describes Europeanization as "the emergence and development at the European level of distinctive structures of governance."[35] More thoroughly, Claudio Radaelli explains Europeanization as consisting in processes of:

"a)construction, b) diffusion, c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures, and public policies".[36]

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[32] Ibidem.
[33] Alexandra Gheciu, "Security Institutions as agents of Socialization*?", International Organization,* vol. 59, no.4, 2005, *p. 981.*
[34] Ibid. p. 983.
[35] Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, Thomas Risse (eds.), *Transforming Europe, (Ithaca-London: Cornell University, 2001),* p.3.
[36] Claudio Radaelli, "Europeanization: Solution or problem*,?",* European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 8 (2004) No 16; accessible on http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm, p. 3.

This definition is close to that of socialization, encompassing the normative dimension given by internalizing beliefs and norms, and more importantly "ways of doing things". This definition touches on the essence of all of the possible institutional mechanisms of socialization. In the same light, Johan Olsen identifies five interpretations of Europeanization. Among them, the institutional facet is important by means of developing institutions at the European level, which determines the EU to "constantly looking for a formula of building lasting and stable institutions". [37] His reflection depicts the institutionalized setting in which the EU tries to form its own brand, and acts towards driven by a supranational approach.

In a comprehensive analysis of the concept of Europeanization, Claudia Major manages to adopt a parsimonious definition of the concept "as having the aim of retracing the effects of the integration process at the national level". [38] With all this, one important aspect is that the concept of Europeanization entails in her view two dimensions. The first is a *defining property* coined as downloading and explained as the domestic change caused by an EU generated impact. [39] The second is the *accompanying property*- the uploading dimension which is translated into a projection of national ideas to the EU level. [40] Thus, the Europeanization process has much to do with socialization, from bottom-up to top-down procedures, in a two-way process. Moreover in the case of diplomacy and foreign policy, Major notes that "due to its intergovernmental structure, the CFSP does not prescribe any type of models for the national member, states have to adapt to, and because intergovernmental institutions have weak powers in the Europeanization process, they cannot act as promoters of it". [41] On the contrary, I argue that intergovernmental agents such as the Permanent

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[37] Johan Olsen, The many faces of Europeanization, *Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (5), 2002,* p. 923.
[38] Claudia Major, "Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy*", Politics* 25(3), 2005, p.177.
[39] Ibidem.
[40] Ibidem.
[41] Ibid. p.185.

Representatives have an important role in inducing the outcomes of the so called Europeanization process at the national level.

1.5 Socialization - the Alternative: Intergovernmentalism, Institutionalization, Brusselization

The aim of this section is to diverge from the traditional approach of socialization in regards to the European Union. I present an adequate theoretical alternative model to the above underlined socialization debate. Consequently, I draw my assumptions on intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and Brusselization, as a way of forming a personal perspective on how Brussels has developed a common institutional culture, with increasing effects on other variables, through which the concept of national diplomacy and the problematic at hand of the Permanent Representations can be grasped.

In contrast to the socialization concept of Europeanization which assumes a certain degree of supranationalization or what Ben Tonra calls *communitarization*[42] induced from a European level to a national one, I claim that there is a gradual shift in paradigm following the three above mentioned alternatives. Therefore, intergovernmentalism (A) constitutes the primary logic through which the Permanent Representatives guide themselves. Secondly, the relation between them and the supranational representatives of the Union is an institutionalized one (B). Thirdly, this takes place in a Brussels based setting, (C) which witnesses, besides the development of an individualized strategic and institutional culture, the growth of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).

1.5.1 Intergovernmentalism

One of the oldest debates regarding the formation of the European Communities is intergovernmentalism which emphasized on the centrality of nationalities and the importance

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[42] B. Tonra, "Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41/4, 2003, p.733.

that the European project had to achieve for the interest of the states.[43] One of the apologists of intergovernmentalism, in the form of liberal intergovernmentalism, Andrew Moravcsik, is more oriented in analyzing the national preference formation and intergovernmental strategic interaction. He claims that integration does not take place due to supranational institutions but thanks to national preferences which choose them through bargaining.[44]

The question now is how socialization can be instrumentalized into acquiring rational features? On this point, my claim is that there is a certain degree of rationalization in assuming an identity. Are the actor's consciousness of the role they have to play, and internalize its norms and rules in a rational fashion? In this respect the intergovernmental account of actors maximizing their own profit and using the European pathway as leeway for pursuing their interests, serves as a more comprehensive explanation of the rationale behind the Permanent Representations in Brussels.

However, the intergovernmentalist logic alone cannot provide the necessary background for reflection and action inside these representations. Given that the European Union is a "densely institutionalized structure which would seem an ideal laboratory and social soil within which actor preferences might be transformed."[45] Exactly due to the institutional setting of the European Union, the national agents are shaped in their interaction with the Brussels based institutions. Thus, institutionalism can bring an important contribution in the analysis of the EU institutional framework given the assumption that they

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[43] Ben Rosamond, *Backlash, Critique and Contemplation, Theories of European Integration, (*London: MacMillan, 2000) p. 76.
[44] Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community, A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies* p. 475.
[45] Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, Thomas Risse (eds.), *Transforming Europe,* p. 20.

originate from the values of their functions and actors create these institutions in order to realize these values.[46]

1.5.2 Institutionalism

There are several accounts of the Institutionalist paradigm. Historical Institutionalism, for example, sees politics as a conflict among rival groups to gain resources; institutional organization is the primal factor structuring collective behavior and generating distinctive outcomes.[47] Moreover, the concept of historical time and the idea of path dependence are important for historical Institutionalist and their accounts of institutions as formal procedures developed along historical lines.[48] Contrastingly, for sociological institutionalism the key term is that of culture and identity: "Institutions are culturally constructed products. They are a symbol system, cognitive scripts, and moral templates and portray frames of meaning to human action."[49]

The main idea is that institutions play a cultural role and that individuals are socialized in having certain roles, and in addition to this institutions do not only shape preferences but create identities.[50] In relation to EU foreign policy this is what Michael Smiths calls *institutionalization*. In examining it he applies a perspective of "bounded rationality", in the sense that "while actors may have certain self-serving goals, when they first choose to participate in the EU foreign policy, they do not have all the information necessary to make optimal decisions, or they have far too much information to process".[51] He covers a rationalist perspective over institutionalization, which bases its assumptions on economic incentives and on the idea that "actors have a fixed set of preferences and their behavior is driven towards

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[46] Peter Hall, Rosemary Taylor, "Political Science and three New Institutionalisms*", Political Studies,* 44:5 p.942.
[47] Ibidem
[48] Ibid. p.936
[49] Ibid, p.944.
[50] Ibidem
[51] Michael Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. The institutionalization of cooperation*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 26.

maximizing gains through strategies and calculations".[52] In contrast, Tonra argues that "while there is no formal *communitarization* of CFSP decision-making, a system is under construction that has certainly moved away from formal intergovernmentalism".[53] The author argues that the CFSP has developed more as an "identity project, and it can be understood better in terms of identity than as an exclusively rationally based exercise in national self-interest".[54] In spite of all these Institutionalist approaches, authors such as Christoph Knill warn that we have to understand that there is a "deterministic bias of institution based explanations, rooted in the presumption that everything could be explained by reference to institutional factors".[55] However, my interest focuses on the pressure that the EU has on the Permanent Representation in Brussels, especially the newcomers, and assumes that the process of institutionalization began before their accession period.

1.5.3 Brusselization

The concept of Brusselization depicts a different integration in the Brussels social milieu, other than through socialization. In this thesis, the concept can be investigated through three different approaches. The first looks at Brusselization as in respect to the development of the EU as an international actor, and its attempts to develop an individual foreign policy apart from that of its member states. David Allen claims that there is more than one foreign policy making culture in Brussels. The Brusselization of foreign policy is translated in "the steady enhancement of Brussels based decision making bodies that show no signs of abating".[56] The main idea behind this is that Brussels tends to become a center of power

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[52] Ibidem.

[53] B. Tonra, *Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach,* p. 733.

[54].Ibid. p. 737.

[55] Christoph Knill, *The Europeanization of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 30.

[56] Allen, David, *Who speaks for Europe?,* in John Peterson, Helene Sjursen, *A common foreign policy for Europe? Competing visions for CFSP, (*Routledge: London and New York, 1998), *p. 42.*

which to a certain extent constrains the national foreign policies. The Brusselization process is synonym with "a gradual transfer in the name of consistency of foreign policy, shifting authority away from the national capitals to Brussels".[57] This transfer is made through a Brussels based machinery and institutional framework. Thus, the meaning behind the first interpretation is that of a power transfer from the capitals to Brussels, at least at a symbolical level.

Secondly, the concept of Brusselization reveals the "policy formulation process of the CESDP as a new brand of the European Union".[58] Jolyon Howorth examines the CESDP development through the process of Brusselization which "forges an ever more coherent common approach to broad policy issues and has already taken the CESDP process beyond traditional intergovernmentalism".[59] The author notes that the role of heads of state and government, acting through the European Council, has been, and will continue to be, "instrumental in co-ordinating approaches."[60] The question that rises in this context is to what extent does this new CESDP brand affect the institutional interaction between the Permanent Representations and supranational representatives?

Thirdly, the concept of Brusselization, presumes a negative meaning in the sense that the Brussels based institutions are criticized for being too bureaucratic, and suffering from a democratic deficit. Implicitly, the representations focus and follow their activities in this medium, being influenced by it institutionally, strategically and culturally. However, the term implies a negative meaning, exactly in the sense in which I find the arguments on socialization to be too thick. Consequently, the term Brusselization better reflects the socialization process, starting from an agent A- in our case EU institutions such as the

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[57] Ibid. p. 53.
[58] Howorth Jolyon, *European Defence and the changing politics of the European Union: Hanging together or hanging separately?, Journal of Common Market Studies,* vol. 39, no.4., 2006, p. 766.
[59] Ibid. p.787.
[60] Ibidem.

Council and the Commission, to an agent B- the Permanent Representations. Thus, Brusselization only bares a negative connotation in contrast to the member state capitals. In spite of this argument, the situation on the ground seems to be the opposite. I claim that Brussels is only the forum of interaction between the interests of the Representations, where they promote their views and interests, translated into policies, at the Communities level.

Consequently, there is hardly any means of socialization coming from the Council or the Commission in regards to the Permanent Representatives, which are more prone to consensus and which "tend to act strategically, taking into account the social and normative context in which they are embedded".[61] Brusselization entails a form of specific governance which reunites the supranational Institutionalist features of the Commission and of the Council, in an effort to condensate the national policies, and to provide the adequate framework, in which 27 national interests are mixed. I argue that in deep contrast to a mere socialization, Brusselization encompasses the necessary institutional framework, in which the Representatives manage their interests.

1.6. Socialization: concluding remarks

The authors that treat the concept of socialization in regards to the European Union foreign policy often misread that the process takes places on a long term and that the shifting from one role to another implies a degree of adaptation. In this sense, presumably the Permanent Representatives not only fulfill their function or play a role, but internalize that *esprit de corps* mentioned by many authors. What is essentially misinterpreted in the above views is the fact that the literature does not manage to capture the final normative outcomes of the socialized Representatives, and the aftermath of the socialization process is not reflected by any of the authors.

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[61] Ana Juncos, Karolina Pomoroska, *The deadlock that never happened*,, p. 8.

It is rather difficult to set out specific patterns of socialization outcomes, but the literature does not present any diplomatic profile, and tends to focus specifically on the decision-making process, the interaction between the diplomats and socialization mechanisms, such as *consultation-reflex*. This being the case, socialization is reduced in the literature only to its internalizing features, with reference to factors such as prestige or a strong sense of *We-ness*. However it is hard to measure the existence of such of feeling among Permanent Representatives.

An accurate reflection of socialization is that of Juncos and Pomoroska, which concludes that the Representatives act in a strategic manner, taking into account a rational cost-benefit calculation.[62] In comparison to their rationalist approach, and to the logic of appropriateness and social learning, emphasized by Checkel, through my theoretical position I extend on the first approach in order to explain the differences in socialization between the 2007 member states. Thus, I incline more towards the rationality emphasized by Juncos and Pomoroska, in the decision making of the Representatives, and less towards the internalization of norms and values, in the sense of an identity formation, stressed by Checkel. Simultaneously, I distinguish between two types of socialization: *thick*, advocated by the latter author, and *thin* in the sense of adaptation to the rules of the game, seen as normal in order for member states to pursue their national interest. In addition, the *thin* concept of socialization is more effective in revealing the differences between adaptation of member states, dimension not taken into account so far by the literature, and with which my study deals in the third chapter.

I advance the idea that intergovernmentalism, combined with Institutionalist features and the *Brusselization* framework, portrays a more accurate theoretical stance towards understanding the nature of the Permanent Representations. The first reflects the decision-

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[62] Ana Juncos, Karolina Pomoroska, *Playing the Brussels game: Strategic socialization in the CFSP Council Working Groups,* p. 4, accessible on *http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2006_011a/33.*

making process and the rationale behind it. The second represents the setting in which this process occurs, a densely institutional one, in which the national diplomats forcefully adapt to the already existing rules of the game. The third is more in relation with the social milieu of the Brussels medium, and regards the bureaucratic aspects of the process. Thus, a mix between all the three, driven particularly by the intergovernmentalist logic, is more prolific in exposing the process faced by Representatives, in contrast to the *thick* concept of socialization, which entails a certain degree of supranationalization.

Chapter II

The Political and Security Committee- Socialization agent or intergovernmental forum?

As I have shown in the previous chapter, the socialization theory, especially the one highlighted by constructivism is too *thick* in order to explain my key variable, the adaptation of the new Permanent Representations in Brussels. Thus, an alternative explanation made out of a combination between Intergovernmentalism, Institutionalism and Brusselization is the theoretical key used by this study. Nevertheless, in order to maintain the theoretical layout of the paper, and more importantly to underline its accuracy, I examine in this chapter the exact institutional medium from which I derive my hypotheses: the Political and Security Committee, chosen for two reasons.

The first is that the Political and Security Committee is a relatively new institution, which has gained during its short existence important prerogatives, especially in the field of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Secondly, and most importantly, the purpose of examining the PSC is linked with the overall aim of my research, and provides the institutional background on which I attach the third part my empirical assessments.

The question raised so far, is to what extent the PSC can represent a factor of socialization or a neutral medium driven by an intergovernmental logic? Thus, the PSC depicts the adequate diplomatic environment which can portray, whether or not, there is a top-down socialization process affecting the Permanent Representatives. In this respect, the historical evolution of the Committee is tackled in the following instance.

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2.1. From the Political Committee to the Political and Security Committee

The European Union consists of an institutional web which encompasses a regulating logic, organized in a new form of polity. In examining the administrative network of the EU, Simon Duke and Sophie Vanhoonecker make a clear Weberian distinction between the administrative level and the political dimension of the scheme.[63] Implicitly, administrators are not elected and have long-term positions, their goal being that of providing "expertise to the political level and professional continuity".[64] Taking the discussion at a different level, Anne Stevens asserts that there is a certain "depoliticisation" of the administrators in relation to the political level.[65] With all this, the historical nature of the PSC has to be unpacked first of all, in order to understand its present functions.

The institutional landscape of the European Union, enriched after 2000 with new working groups, which had the aim of providing expertise on the political level for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defense Policy frameworks. However the majority of the Council working groups do not fulfill the attribute of "connecting the Union to its citizens"[66]. On the contrary, one of the literature main's assumptions is that this working groups and especially the PSC forms a "government in the shadow".[67]

The Political and Security Committee did not develop in the early 2000 starting from institutional scratch. The PSC has been the case of a historical evolution. Its predecessor, the

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[63] Simon Duke, Sophie Vanhoonecker, *Administrative governance in the CFSP*, *European Foreign Affairs Review, 11, 2006, p.*164.

[64] Ibidem.

[65] Anne Stevens, Handley Stevens, *Brussels Bureaucrats? Brussels Bureaucrats? The Administration of the European Union,(* New York- Palgrave, 2001)*, p. 220.*

[66] The European Commission, *European governance. A white paper, p.28., published on 25.7.2001,* accessible on *http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf*

[67] Ana Juncos, Christopher Reynolds, "The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the shadow", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 12, 2007, *p. 142.*

Political Committee (PoCo) dates back to the establishment of the European Defense Community (1950-1952) and the Fouchet Plans. More specifically, in the context of developing the framework of European Political Cooperation as a major breakthrough of the European Communities in terms of cooperation in foreign policy, and due to the Luxembourg Report of 1970, the Political Committee materialized. PoCo was "composed of the Directors of Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministries of the Member States, which initially met four times a year, having as main tasks: the organization of the Ministerial level discussions, to establish and direct the work of the Working Groups, to appoint groups of experts relating to a specific issue".[68]

Four aspects of its activity are relevant for today's COPS. Firstly, it is not clear whether, PoCo was a pure intergovernmental forum, which avoided a certain supranationalization, but contrary to this idea, Commission officials participated at its meetings, in order to "ensure communautaire aspects of the Union".[69] Secondly, the PoCo officials had an important relation with the national capital, from which they received instructions. Thirdly, Duke notices that due to its small size, the Committee soon developed a "somewhat clubby atmosphere"[70], aspect important for the overall atmosphere of the debates inside the PSC as well. However, this led to a process of "consultation reflex".[71] Finally, the last notable aspect is that COPS "inherited from PoCo the turf battle with COREPER II".[72] Thus, there is a problem in terms of authority, that today's PSC has to face, due to the institutional "conflicts" with COREPER. Officially, the prerogatives of the two have been

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[68]   Simon   Duke,   *Linchpin   COPS,   Working   Paper,   2005/W/05,   accessible   on* *http://www.eipa.eu/files/repository/product/20070815142132_FC0505e.pdf, p.7.*
[69] Ibidem.
[70] Ibidem
[71]   Ben Tonra, *Committee Governance and CFSP, in Thomas Cristiansen and Emil Kirchner, (*Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), *p.* 146.
[72] Michael Merlingen, *EU Security and Defense Policy: What it is, How it works, Why it matters,* Chapter 4: Administrative Actors and the EU Foreign and Security Policy Process, Forthcoming, p.4.

settled with the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and by developing the pillar structure of the European Union, in 1992, PoCo's attributes were clearly specified:

> "Shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission. Within the scope of this title, this Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations".[73]

However the conflict between the PSC and COREPER II still prevailed at least at the level of political influence. More specifically, it was a conflict between "the old ways of the EPC" and the COREPER which concentrated on law and procedure as well as opinion, "outside the charmed circle of diplomacy".[74] With all this, in 1992, an agreement was reached that stipulated the subordinate role of the PoCo vis-à-vis COREPER, which specified that the first can deliver political analysis to the General Affairs Council (GAERC), while the Permanent Representatives managed the organization of the Council, and dealt with the legal, financial and institutional part of the issues.[75] The only, change highlighted by in 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty was that PoCo should not have been made only of Political Directors, transforming it in the "primary body of advice on and the conduct of CFSP".[76]

Due to the CFSP, during the 90's, the European Union started to develop its own identity in terms of foreign policy. Implicitly, the Kosovo episode was particularly important in this sense. Yet, the incapacity of the Union to deal with the Balkan crisis was obvious, and consequently, the major discussions inside the European Union were on developing its capabilities and on creating its own security dimension, by integrating the Petersburg Tasks of

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[73] European Union, *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the European Union and of the Treaty establishing the European Community*, Article 25, accessible on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:PDF, accessed on 10 may 2009.
[74] Simon Nuttall, *European Foreign Policy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 246.
[75] Simon Duke, *Linchpin COPS*, p. 12.
[76] Ibidem.

the Western European Union, into its strategic culture. The German Presidency debated at the

Helsinki Council in 1999 the idea of reforming PoCo:

> "New political and military bodies will be established within the Council to enable the Union to take decisions on EU-led Petersburg operations and to ensure, under the authority of the Council, the necessary political control and strategic direction of such operations".[77]

In the context of developing the institution of High Representative, the same year, Jacques Chirac, which upheld that PoCo should be transformed into a Political and Security Committee, composed of permanent representatives, of ambassadorial rank. More importantly, during the Helsinki Council three interim institutions were developed: the interim EU Military Committee, the interim EU Military Body and the interim COPS (iCOPS).[78] Officially, the Council Decision regarding the establishment iCOPS, adopted in February 2000, was the political testament of PoCo, which "in fact was not an institution but a network and its members have not disappeared".[79] The main prerogatives of the new interim body were shaped in accordance with the High Representative. Consequently, iCOPS had to: "(a) prepare recommendations on the future functioning of the common European policy on security and defense; (b) deal with CFSP affairs on a day-to-day basis."[80]

Although, initially iCOPS was developed as a bridging point between CFSP and ESDP, it eventually became a body more concerned with the latter policy. It did so due to the relations that it carried out with its NATO counterpart, the North Atlantic Council, in order to

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[77]European Council, Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, accessible on http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20European%20Council%20-%20Annex%20IV%20of%20the%20Presidency%20Conclusions.pdf. , accessed on 10 May 2009.
[78] Ibid. p.16
[79] Jolyon Howorth, Anne Marie Le Gloannec, *The institutional logic behind EEAS, in The EU Foreign Service: How to build a more effective common policy,* European Policy Center, Working Paper 28, p. 31, accessible on http://www.epc.eu/TEWN/pdf/555858396_EPC%20Working%20Paper%2028%20The%20EU%20Foreign%20Service.pdf, accessed on 10 May 2009.
[80] Council of the European Union, *Council Decision of 14 February 2000, setting up the Interim Political and Security Committee,* Official Journal of European Communities, L49/1, 22.2.2000, accessible on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:049:0001:0001:EN:PDF, accessed on 10 May 2009.

foster agreements on common security issues, and it was seen as the institution underlining the need of a European Security dimension.[81]

2.2. The PSC- features and prerogatives

The decisive moment in developing the actual functional Political Security Committee was the Nice Council of 2000, and the framework of the Nice Treaty. At this point, the major input was given by the function of High Representative of CFSP, particularly Javier Solana, over the institutional development of the PSC. One of its major definitional attributes, "linchpin" has been established during its construction, and it responded to the essential need of "a single body that should have access to all the information, proposals and initiatives relating to the crisis involved in order to make a global assessment- this role would fall to the Political and Security Committee".[82] Thus, the PSC is seen as the main administrative body of the new ESDP, responsible mainly for implementing its military and political aspects.[83] The Committee's main prerogatives are:

a) "**keep track of the international situation** in the areas falling within the common foreign and security policy, help define policies by drawing up 'opinions' for the Council, either at the request of the Council or on its own initiative, and monitor implementation of agreed policies, all of this without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and to the powers of the Presidency and of the Commission;

b) **examine the areas of GAC draft conclusions** in which it is involved;

c) **provide guidelines for other Committees** on matters falling within the CFSP;

The footnotes.

[81] Simon Duke, Linchpin COPS, p. 17.
[82] Council of the European Union, European security and defence policy- Contribution by the Secretary General/High Representative: reference framework for crisis management, Article 3, accessible on http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/00/st13/13957-r1en0.pdf, accessed on 10 May 2009.
[83] Ibid, article 5.

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d) **maintain a privileged link with the Secretary-General/High Representative** (SG/HR) and the special representatives;

e) **send guidelines to the Military Committee**; receive the opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee. The Chairman of the Military Committee (EUMC), who liaises with the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), takes part, where necessary, in PSC meetings;

f) **receive information, recommendations and opinions from the Committee for Civilian Aspects** of Crisis Management and send it guidelines on matters falling within the CFSP;

g) **coordinate, supervise and monitor discussions on CFSP issues** in various Working Parties, to which it may send guidelines and whose reports it must examine;

h) **lead the political dialogue** in its own capacity and in the forms laid down in the Treaty;

i) **provide a privileged forum for dialogue on the ESDP** with the fifteen and the six as well as with NATO in accordance with arrangements set out in the relevant documents;

j) **under the auspices of the Council, take responsibility for the political direction of the development of military capabilities**, taking into account the type of crisis to which the Union wishes to respond. As part of the development of military capabilities, the PSC will receive the opinion of the Military Committee assisted by the European Military Staff."[84]

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[84] Council of the European Union, *Council Decision of 22 January 2001, setting up the Political and Security Committee, 2001/78/CFSP, accessible on http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/l_02720010130en00010003.pdf.*

Basically, what needs to be taken into account is the fact that, the PSC status is purely political, and its nature is diplomatic. It is an intergovernmental type of institution, composed of high-ranking national diplomats, close to the ambassadorial rank, which are authorized on the one hand, to monitor the international situations and to respond to any crises, and on the other hand to coordinate the military capacities of the Union, in close relationship with the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff. In this function, lays in its primary attribute, that of a *linchpin* between the CFSP and the ESDP. In addition to the CFSP agenda that PoCo had to meet, the PSC has to coagulate the political will of the member states, being the first body which has to react to international crises, and therefore it has the political capacity to mobilize the Union's military capabilities, prior to alarming the ultimate decisional forum, General Affairs Council (GAERC).

In order to understand the relations between the PSC and the other institutional structures of the Council, I drew up figure 1. It illustrates the complex linkages between the PSC apparatus, the Council working groups, and primarily the source of mainly all of its members, the Permanent Representations.

Many of the members of the Council receive advice from third party diplomats, due to a more generalist approach and specialization of the PSC diplomats.[85] One important body of advice is that of the (A) **Foreign Relations Councilors (RELEX)** which together with the Commission, look at the horizontal aspects of CFSP/CSDP decisions, a process in which they basically check the Actions and Positions of COPS in order to ensure legal conformity and financial sustainability of EU's foreign policy.[86]

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[85] Interview- Relex Counsellor, 7 April 2009.
[86] Michael Merlingen, *EU Security and Defense Policy: What it is, How it works, Why it matters,* Chapter 4, Administrative Actors and the EU Foreign and Security Policy Process, p. 5.

Figure.1.[87]

General Affairs Council (GAERC) (IGV)

Secretary General/High Representative

COREPER (IGV)
Legal, Financial and Institutional part of the issues analyzed by PSC
(1 Observer to PSC meetings)

Political and Security Committee (IGV)
(Ambassadorial level, Deputy Ambassador)

RELEX/CFSP Counselors

Nicolaidis Group

European Correspondent's

European Commission
DG RELEX- financial, legal and institutional expertise.
Attend PSC meetings
(Supranational)

ANTICI GROUP

EU Military Committee

Political Directors Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA's)

36 Working Groups

EU Military Staff

Permanent Representations of National Member States

The network of (B) **European Correspondents** in all Member States and the Commission coordinate daily CFSP business; prepare meetings of the PSC and any CFSP points of the GAERC.[88] The Correspondents maintain day-to-day contact on CFSP issues by means of the COREU (CORrespondance EUropéenne) a network which is ciphered and

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[87] The figure represents the relation between the PSC and other Committee's, and aims at showing exactly the source from which most of them draw their staff: the Permanent Representations of the member states.
[88] Simon Duke, Sophie Vanhoonecker, Administrative Governance in the CFSP, p. 172.

which links the capitals with the Council and Commission. The system, which started under EPC, saw around "4,800 communications per annum by the mid 1970s, rising to 13 000 by the mid 1990s, over 20000 by the new decade and now around 25 000 per annum".[89] This system was upgraded by the CORTESY (COREU Terminal System) in the latter part of 2000. The routine and increasingly frequent contacts between the Correspondents and the Political Counselors in the permanent representations of the Member States in Brussels are of particular importance in shaping agendas and outcomes.

The (C) **Working groups** are the institutional places where the most of the negotiations between representatives are held. These groups are divided either thematic- e.g. Terrorism, or geographical- e.g. Western Balkans, and are considered by some the place where the real decisions are taken, and implicitly, due to its political level the PSC is foreseen as having more diplomatic attributes, and keeping the balance and shaping the final decisions which are delivered to the Council.[90] Among these working groups, one of particular importance is the **Politico-Military working group**, which along with the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), offer the PSC expertise in the field of ESDP, especially on civilian aspects and it is in charge with dealing with the meetings that concern NATO as well.[91]

Due to the fast development of ESDP and its subsequent operations, the PSC could not handle the great volume of work and that led eventually to the creation of a group called, similar to the **Antici Group**, which prepares the agenda of COREPER. Its PSC twin the (D) **Nicolaidis Group** (named after its first chairman during the Greek Presidency).[92] The Nicolaidis Group assists the PSC with the "organization of meetings, and going through the

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[89] Ibidem.
[90] Interview- Relex Counselor, April 7th 2009.
[91] Simon Duke, Linchpin COPS, p. 22.
[92] Ibidem.

provisional agendas in advance, fixing the order in which items for discussion would be taken and dealing if necessary with the practical arrangements for the meeting" .[93] The group is also able to act as a "useful point of contact" between the delegations and the General Secretariat. The role of the group has grown relatively quickly and since the Luxembourg Presidency, in the first half of 2005, they now meet twice a week as well as before every PSC meeting where they look at the agenda and procedural issues.[94]

Drawing a scheme of the whole decision-making process, which involves the PSC is very intricate. For example a political issue in Serbia, with possible military repercussions, and which could trigger refugee waves in neighboring EU countries is a hypothetical scenario. Before the issue gets on the PSC agenda its entire subsidiary committees will mobilize. The Western Balkan working group will assemble, and create a briefing of the situation, and if there are military issues the Politico-Military working group, together with the EU Military Committee will prepare their expertise on the matter. CIVCOM is mobilized, if the military aspects have had consequences on the civilian population. At the same time, the European Correspondents get from the Political Directors back home their MFA's and implicitly the government's position on the issue. The PSC ambassadors have to be aware first and foremost of their government position, and afterwards find out the position of their counterparts. At this stage the Nicolaidis group will prepare the agenda for the PSC meeting. On the other side of the spectrum, supranational figures such as the High Representative of the CFSP and the Presidency representatives are expected to chair the PSC meeting. At a different level, the Relex counselors will analyze the financial and legal prerequisites of the decisions. If it is not Tuesday or Friday, the days when the PSC regularly meets, and due to the emergency of the

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[93] Simon Duke, Sophie Vanhoonecker, *Administrative Governance in the CFSP*, p. 174.
[94] Ibidem.

situation, the session can take the shape of an extraordinary meeting, which can easily consist in over one hundred people.[95]

The mission of the PSC will be at this point twofold. First it drafts its position on the dossier and takes a decision before it reaches the ultimate forum, in this case GAERC. Usually A points are pre-agreed decisions, which the Ministers only rubberstamps and B points are dossiers which remain open and have to be "dealt with in substance by the Council".[96] Mainly, it has been estimated that "approximately 70 percent of the total items in the GAERC agenda has been previously agreed in the prior Council working groups".[97] Secondly, it coagulates the necessary political will of the Member states in an effort to reach a consensus before the Council, but regularly, extreme situations end up as B points. Based on this mechanism, theorists who examine the PSC have reached the conclusion that this institution is "a specific animal in the Council machinery" and many PSC ambassadors continue to see their committee as COREPER III".[98]

2.3. PSC- the nature of interaction

Does the PSC have the capacity of socialization over its members, or is it just an intergovernmental forum? Does the nature of the meetings presume a socialization pattern, in terms of its members internalizing certain values, norms, rules and procedures? These are two questions that rise at this point. My assumption is that the PSC remains an intergovernmental type of institution, with a vague trend towards supranationalization, but which does not have any consequences at the level of decision-making. In terms of loyalty the

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[95] This entails Simon Duke to contest the possibility of collegiality, and implicitly the formation of a club spirit. See Simon Duke, *Linchpin Cops,* p.21.
[96] Michael Merlingen, *EU Security and Defense Policy: What it is, How it works, Why it matters,* Chapter 4: Administrative Actors and the EU Foreign and Security Policy Process, p.3.
[97] Simon Duke, Sophie Vanhoonecker, *Administrative governance in the CFSP, p.169.*
[98] Interview quoted in Michael Merlingen, *EU Security and Defense Policy: What it is, How it works, Why it matters,* Chapter 4: Administrative Actors and the EU Foreign and Security Policy Process, p.5.

Permanent Representatives, implicitly the PSC ambassadors are still there to represent the interests of their states. This gives the intergovernmental flavor of the negotiations, which is still the main logic, reflecting the national positions. It is however a multi-level diplomatic game, which does not constrain its actors, in terms of socialization, but offers them the choice of a "different logic of diplomatic appropriateness with important repercussions over the traditional sense of diplomacy".[99]

Officially, the PSC constitutes the key strategic actor leading the formulation and implementation of the ESDP operation.[100] Thus, the diplomatic responsibilities of its representatives are extremely important. Observers of the Brussels medium have come to the conclusion that there is a certain familiarity inside the working groups, which entails a certain *esprit de corps,* a club spirit "which does not necessarily imply that actors, the diplomats of the new member states internalize certain norms".[101] An interesting detail of the PSC gatherings is that there are no available translations, all of the meeting workings are done either in English or in French. Moreover, another part which supports the idea of familiarity is that the Ambassadors do not address themselves with the delegation name, but through their first name.[102]

Thus, the PSC represents and interaction forum with its own set of prerogatives, norms and pre-defined informal rules. Among the informal processes that are carried on inside the "coordination reflex" and "consensus-building" are most important. The first one is

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[99] Josef Batora analyses the concept of European diplomacy, and comes to the conclusion that there are three instances in which the European Union affects the classic definition of diplomacy. First of all, the bilateral relation between the member states and the Union develops an intra-European approach. Secondly, and more close to my thesis is that the EU administration in Brussels shapes the classical definition of diplomacy by affecting the Permanent Representations, formed of diplomats which interact with representatives of the Commission or the Presidency, guiding the discussions to a communitarian level as well. Thirdly, the way in which the European Union conducts foreign policy affects the westphalian concept of the state, and tries to "implement socialization procedures normal at the national foreign ministries"- see Josef Batora, "Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?",*Journal of European Public Policy,* 12, (2005), p.61-62.
[100] Nice European Council, Council Conclusions, Annexes III–VI, 9 December 2000.
[101] Ana Juncos, Karolina Pomoroska, *The deadlock that never Happened: the impact of Enlargement on the Common Foreign and Security Policy Working Groups,* p. 8.
[102] Anna Juncos, Christopher Reynolds, *The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the shadow*, p.137.

defined by Tonra as a process in which the "policy-makers see themselves not as emissaries of pre-defined positions but as policy arbiters, seeking to internalize the identity ambitions of colleagues so as thereby to see that their own positions are at least complementary".[103]

More specifically, the coordination reflex built inside the Committee and outside its walls is constantly maintained through e-mails, mobile phones and frequent meetings with other colleagues in the corridors, and most importantly during lunch.[104] The goal of the informal meetings is double-edged. On the one hand, during them there is a massive exchange of information, on the positions of their governments, which lead to the fact that almost up to 90% of the issues are negotiated outside the formal meetings.[105] On the other hand, the exchange of information leads to the formation of "like-minded groups", which approach issues having the same position, most likely around the old member states.[106] At the same time, consensus building is an important informal mechanism of interaction inside the PSC. It is characterized by the overall search for consensus in taking decisions; and as one diplomat noticed: "compromise is the king in Brussels".[107] The mechanism of "coordination reflex" deliberately influences the development of "consensus-building", because the exchange of information implicitly transforms the relations between the diplomats.

Although, intergovernmentalism is the logic of taking decision inside the CFSP/ESDP frameworks, there is a "general practice" to reach a compromise. According to Tonra, this "develops a sense of common identity and collective purpose, which has given way to what might be described as a formal internalization of shared norms and precedents".[108] The question is if the PSC can be characterized by a certain sense of communitarization? I argue

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[103] B. Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001), p. 12.
[104] Ana Juncos, Karolina Pomoroska, *The deadlock that never Happened: the impact of Enlargement on the Common Foreign and Security Policy Working Groups, p.14*
[105] Ibid. p.15.
[106] Ibid. p. 16.
[107] Interview Relex Councilor, April 8th 2009.
[108] Ben Tonra, Committee governance and CFSP, p. 159.

that it mostly represents the interests of its representatives, being an intergovernmental forum, definable through a combination of: intergovernmentalism as a rationale, institutionalism, procedural rules and Brusselization for the overall setting and its effects on traditional diplomacy.

In assessing the effects of the 2004 Enlargement process over the working groups, Juncos and Pomoroska notice that the Permanent Representations are "self-reflective actors situated in an institutional context".[109] However, their account of the 2004 wave of Enlargement is that the new member states where socialized to a certain extent in adapting to the formal and informal procedures of the CFSP working groups, in the present case of the PSC. Nevertheless, my contribution is to disconfirm the possibility of *thick socialization* in the PSC, and to extend and analyze in my third chapter whether such a process affected, and how could it differentiate between the newest member states: Romania and Bulgaria.

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[109] Ana Juncos, Karolina Pomoroska, *Playing the Brussels game: Strategic Socialization in the CFSP Council Working Groups, p.3.*

Chapter III

Romania and Bulgaria - the Socialization of Permanent Representatives?

This chapter provides the background in which I set the link between my theoretical model and the institutional setting of the PSC, in relation to my study cases: Romania and Bulgaria. It first creates the profiles of Romania and Bulgaria, at the diplomatic level in Brussels. Secondly, I criticize the hypotheses of Jeffrey Checkel in order to construct my own set of hypotheses which I apply to the PSC medium, and from which I derive the indicators which differentiate between the two countries.

3.1. Country profiles

3.1.1. Bulgaria

Before 1989, Bulgaria was under the soviet sphere of influence. After the collapse of its communist regime, the discourse adopted by Sofia was more pro-West oriented. In 2004, it became a member of the NATO, and starting with January 1[st,] it became a member of the European Union. There are three memorable episodes in Bulgaria's accession to the EU period. The first regards the Commission's accusations of political corruption; secondly the EU requested the Bulgarian government to shut down Unit 3 and 4 of its reactors from Kozloduy nuclear power plant, and thirdly the Cyrillic alphabet episode, which entailed Bulgaria to request the Euro to be spelled with Cyrillic letters.[110]

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[110] For more information see http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSL1868684020071018

Bulgaria sees its relations with the European Union as an "essential partnership", and a gateway towards development.[111] Its diplomatic relations and all the day-to-day necessary coordination is directed from the Permanent Representation in Brussels. After its accession the Representation has suffered two major changes: logistically and strategically. First, the number of its personnel was increased up to 106 members, which made it one of the largest Representations in Brussels.[112] Strategically, and at the internal level the representation has adopted a few action plans in order to deal with its priorities in the CFSP, mainly the Western Balkans, and to "coordinate through different channels of communication with the Presidency, Council and the Commission".[113]

In terms of third party opinions on Bulgaria, the Dutch and Hungarian representatives interviewed stated that the Bulgarian representatives demonstrated a lack of cooperation in the case of the "Evro" dispute, when they threatened to block the EU financial initiatives towards Montenegro.[114] At the same time, they see Bulgaria CFSP approach limited only to Macedonia and Serbia. Also, the Bulgarian representatives were sometimes portrayed as having" a lack of practical knowledge and that they are not up to the standards".[115]

In the light of these statements a preliminary profile can be outlined for the Bulgarian Representatives, drawing on possible specificities. The Bulgarian representatives are friendly towards other countries, willing to learn and self-aware of their technical errors and slow pace adaptation, and with a complicated foreign policy orientation. They envision Romania as a closer partner, admired for its active approach. Inside the PSC, the Bulgarian Representatives rely on the "personal-qualities of the PSC ambassador". At the same time, the Bulgarian

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[111] Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy views, accessible on http://www.mfa.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8682&Itemid=451, accessed on 16 may 2009.
[112] Interview, Nicolaidis Group, April 9th 2009.
[113] Ibidem
[114] Interview, Western Balkan group, April 10th 2009.
[115] Interview, PSC Counselor, Foreign Policy Unit, April 10th 2009.

Representatives are nursed by their MFA, with specific instructions. The only two events that brought Bulgarian Representatives in the spotlight, was the case of five Bulgarian medics accused in Libya of infecting 400 children with HIV, resolved with the help of the European Union;[116] and the "Evro" dispute of 2007.

3.1.2 Romania

While most of the 1989 revolutions were settled peacefully through table negotiations, the Romanian case differed through its violent character. In the first years of 1990's, the political regime tended to isolate the country in the sphere of international affairs. However, improvements were sensed in the middle 90's and in 1995 Romania applied for EU membership. Two issues were problematic in Romania's accession period: its system of agricultural subsidies which was not clearly developed and secondly, and more presented by the media, the high-corruption scandal, which involved former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase and many former MP's. In terms of foreign policy, after 1989, Romania has adopted a euro-Atlantic centered discourse, in 2004 entering NATO. From February 2005, Romania received the status of active observer in the EU Council working groups and in the Commission. This was an important step in the future adaptation in the Council working groups, particularly in the Political and Security Committee.

After the accession period, the Romanian representation became the "main channel of communication between the EU institutions and the Romanian authorities", and faced two major changes.[117] First, it had to shift from its pre-accession strategy, focused mainly on

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[116] For a brief summary of the problem see http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L06860095.htm, accessed on 20 may 2009.
[117] For more information see the official website of the Permanent Representation of Romania in Brussels, accessible on http://ue.mae.ro/index.php?lang=ro&id=179, accessed on 17 may 2009.

implementing the *acquis communautaire*, towards a high-degree of specialization. Secondly, the Representation was specialized through a division of labor and an increase of its personnel, which reached up to 80 people, recruited mainly from the home Ministry.[118] One of the main challenges, pointed out by the diplomats, was to organize and prioritize the massive flow of information, which was send to the capital, in order to receive specific information on different issues.[119]

The view of third party representatives over their Romanian colleagues was useful in initially creating a profile for their representatives. The Romanian representatives are seen as open and vivid, flexible on compromise making, and in the full process of acquiring the formal and informal procedures.[120] At the same time, what was highlighted in their case is the value of their diplomats, and most importantly their "good command of language".[121] These skills have helped the Romanian representatives to focus sharply on their interests and to participate actively in the PSC meeting, by forming alliances. An initial profile of the Romanian Representatives in the PSC shows that they are practical, realist, topic and policy oriented. In comparison to the Bulgarian case, the Romanian representatives are seen as depicting a more proud foreign policy tradition. Although the Representatives have a greater autonomy, their relation with the MFA reveals a special case, a first flaw. These concerns the need to translate the EU policies into expertise and to send an input to Bucharest, so that the MFA will follow the procedures admitted in Brussels. At a first glance this looks like a socialization mechanism, however it is more an institutional problem, where the MFA's has

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[118] Interview, Deputy Permanent Representative April 8th 2009.
[119] Interview, RELEX Counselor, April 8th 2009.
[120] Interview, PSC First Secretary, April 10th 2009.
[121] Interview, PSC Counselor, Foreign Policy Unit, April 10th 2009.

the last word in taking decisions in the case of sensitive issues, and having the ability to periodically shift the personnel based in Brussels.[122]

3.2 Socialization hypotheses

As expressed earlier, theoretically my study differentiates through criticizing the concept of socialization, and adopting as an alternative a combination between: intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and Brusselization. Furthermore, my analysis first discredits the possibility of thick socialization occurring inside the Political and Security Committee, and secondly looks at the differences of adaptation between Romania and Bulgaria, inside this institutional framework. Initially I did not expect any differences between the two countries, due to the similar process, roadmaps and verification mechanisms that they had to face- as EU indicators, and due to the fact that they are post-communist countries- facing similar economic, political and corruption problems.

In the following, I construct several testable hypotheses using indicators that oppose to two of Jeffrey Checkel's causal mechanisms of socialization, social learning and argumentative persuasion:

- "Social learning is more likely in groups where individuals share common professional backgrounds.
- Social learning is more likely where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure.
- Social learning is more likely where a group meets repeatedly and there is high density of interaction among participants.
- Social learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure and exposure".[123]

These hypotheses are irrelevant to my study, because they provide a *thick* and general account of socialization, which cannot explain the differences in adaptation/socialization of two countries to the same institutional medium. For example in the PSC case, all the staff has

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[122] Ibidem.
[123] Jeffrey Checkel, *Social construction and integration*, p. 549.

diplomatic background- thus common professional backgrounds. It is not the case of any

policy failure but more of coordination between the representatives. Thirdly the interaction

assumption is close to my initial hypothesis, but however it does not take into account

different levels of interaction and degrees of involvement from the participants. Finally, on

the contrary most institutional mediums have to face political pressures, which they cannot

exempt from. In general what is faulty about his assumptions is that it requires a process of

learning through social interaction, but it does not look at the rationale behind it, the

incentives and interests gained by the representatives, in this case.

In addition, the hypotheses revealed by both Checkel and Andrew Moravcsik for

argumentative persuasion are:

> a) "Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuadee is in a
> novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new
> information.
> b) Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuadee had few
> prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader's message.
> c) Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader is an
> authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs or want to belong.
> d) Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader does not
> lecture or demand, but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument
> e) Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader-persuadee
> interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated in-camera settings."[124]

Like the previous set, these hypotheses cannot explain the differences between two

countries. The main argument is that through socialization, "actors are induced into certain

norms, rules, values, and modes of behavior, in a given community, either in a form of role

playing or via internalization".[125] My alternative hypotheses, (see Table 1) develop my

personal framework of analysis, relied on the theoretical combination of:

intergovernmentalism-institutionalism-Brusselization. I base these hypotheses on common

sense assumptions, sketched from the logic of the three theories: rationale of national interest,

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[124] Jeffrey Checkel and Andrew Moravcsik, "A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?" p. 222.
[125] For more information see Table 1, in Michael Zurn and Jeffrey Checkel, *Getting socialized to build bridges,* p. 1050.

institutional importance of the relations and control exercised by the Ministry, the size and institutional features of the Representation, the capacity to form alliances in the Brussels medium. The scope is to test them using my empirical observations. I argue that all in all, representatives adapt- *thin socialization-* to the Brussels medium, but my purpose is to see how this process occurs.

From the aforementioned hypotheses I derive the indicators that I use in order to evaluate the differences between Romania and Bulgaria. Hypotheses 1, 5 and 7, reveal on the one hand the relation between the Representatives and the MFA, and on the other hand the importance of the previous experience of the PSC ambassador- used in his interaction, mainly through Networking. Hypothesis 2 and 4 shows that there is a causal relation between adaptation/socialization and the amount of time spent in the PSC, between two countries, therefore there is a speed of adjustment to the formal and informal procedures of the Committee, correlated to the size of the Representation and that of the country. Hypothesis 3 looks at the rationale that drives the Representatives, mainly national interest. Hypothesis 6 and its sub-hypothesis look at the reasons for coalition formation inside the PSC, influenced by mainly geopolitical and economic ties. At the same time, the general outline of this hypothesis looks at the themes of discussion and interaction between the two countries.

Table 1- Alternative hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: The closer the relation between the PSC ambassador and his home ministry, the likely that he will receive specific instructions.
Hypothesis 2: The smaller the amount of time spent in the PSC by the new ambassadors the less likely they had time to adapt to the formal and informal procedures.

Hypothesis 3: The sharper the notion of national interest of the PSC ambassador, the less likely he has been socialized.
Hypothesis 4: The bigger the Representation, the less likely that they adapt fast and easily to the procedures of the assembly.
Hypothesis 5: The smaller the country the more likely that the Representatives will ask the MFA for specific instructions.[126]
Hypothesis 6: Coalitions in the PSC are based on pre-existent foreign policy views, geopolitical and economic ties, between two countries.
- Sub-hypothesis 6: Coalitions in the PSC are mainly based on security and geographical ties, influenced by each country's interest.
Hypothesis 7: The bigger the country's foreign policy tradition, the more likely MFA will send and rely on an experienced ambassador in the PSC.

3.3 Evaluation: Bulgaria versus Romania

The profiles initially sketched for the two countries are more or less a first attempt to formulate certain characteristics of the new member states, and their work inside the Political and Security Committee. This subchapter correlates the empirical findings with the above indicators.

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[126] This hypotheses contradicts Juncos and Pomoroska claim that the bigger the country, for example: Germany or France, the likely that they receive specific instructions, see Ana Juncos, Karolina Pomoroska, *The deadlock that never happened,* p.25. The smaller the country is, the most likely the representatives will be closely monitored by their Ministry, due to the importance attributed to diplomatic relations with the EU.

3.3.1. The relation with the MFA and Networking

The relation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs back home is crucial in understanding the function of the Representation and the activity of the PSC ambassador. This relates to three of my hypotheses: H1, H5 and H7. For example, the Bulgarian Representatives receive the general instructions- "red lines"- but usually ask for specific instructions.[127] There is a two-way relation: Sofia sends in the specific instructions, which are demanded by the Representatives, in an effort to present precisely the countries national interest, leaving however the impression that the Ministry exerts a strict control over the Representation. A proof in this sense is the permanent phone contacts with the Ministry during the meetings.[128] At the same time, the diplomats noted the important relation between the Political Director of the MFA and the PSC ambassador, seen as the key mechanism of coordination between Sofia and Brussels, in terms of sending and receiving instructions.[129]

In the same way, the Romanian counterparts point out in that the Political Directors "contribute very much in the decisions taken by the Representation".[130] Similarly, the MFA provides the general mandates, the documents that provide the general framework through which the Representatives act, and when sensitive issues are discussed in the PSC, "the instructions are specific and read out loud".[131] This validates my first hypotheses (H1). However, in contrast to the Bulgarian representatives, Bucharest expects expertise from Brussels, leaving them a certain room for maneuver in formulating policies.[132] (See figure 2) Thus, in the Romanian "the nuances are given by the Representation, which has its

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[127] Interview, Nicolaidis group, April 9th 2009.
[128] Ibidem.
[129] Interview, PSC First Secretary, April 9th 2009.
[130] Interview, Deputy Permanent Representative, April 8th 2009.
[131] Interview, Relex Counselor, April 8th 2009.
[132] Interview, Political Director MFA, April 24th 2009.

intellectual autonomy".[133] Nevertheless, the safety measure taken up by the MFA is to shift periodically the personal of the Representation, as a means of control over the Representation. This validates only partially my fifth hypotheses.

Figure 2

Networking as a means of adapting mostly informal rules is seen by the Bulgarian representatives as "normal and rather good between the members of the Committee".[134] The Bulgarian Representatives noted that social events have a strictly professional orientation, and in this sense they "rely on the capacities and personal qualities of the PSC ambassador to carry out these social duties".[135] The Bulgarian diplomats envision networking as a process coordinated from Sofia.

The Romanian counterparts depicted more pride in their foreign policy views specified in informal settings. Luncheons were portrayed as the key moments of the day, when problems are clarified before the meetings. These "informal meetings", set the agenda of the formal meetings, and represent moments when diplomats agree on the topics of interest and tend to form alliances.[136] One example mentioned by a Romanian representative shows that these gatherings are crucial in speculating the level of interest on different topics: "representatives which are concerned with the Middle East will get together at a table and

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[133] Ibidem.
[134] Interview PSC First Secretary, April 9th 2009.
[135] Ibidem
[136] Interview, Relex Counselor, April 8th 2009.

discuss the matter".[137] This shows that the Representations see these events as crucial in terms of socializing, but it does not necessarily validate my seventh hypothesis, although the Bulgarian emphasized that they rely on the personal qualities of the ambassador to deal with these events.

3.3.2 Speed of Adjustment to formal and informal rules

In terms of acquisition and compliance with formal rules the diplomats have argued that it is normal to play by the rules of the game. Although, Representatives admitted that not complying with these rules would most probably affect their credibility.[138] A similar explanation is offered by Juncos and Pomoroska, in explaining the rationale behind the 2004 member states, for which.[139] However, I claim that compliance is too general for an indicator. To differentiate between two countries it is important to see how fast they processed the formal and informal rules.

The Bulgarian representatives stated that this adaptation has been "smoothly and progressive so far"[140]. However, they admitted that the process of adaptation has not ended yet, and that they are working on a mechanism of coordination inside the PSC.[141] Thus, a full grasp of informal procedures has yet to be fulfilled: "we are still in the process of learning these procedures".[142] At the same time, informal procedures such as "consultation-reflex" or "consensus-building" are still being learned, through practice.[143] A partial explanation for this could be the large size of the Representation, correlated to a small amount of time. The Bulgarian Representation has 106 personnel, making it one of the largest Representations in Brussels.

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[137] Ibidem.
[138] Ibidem
[139] Ana Juncos, Karolina Pomoroska, *Playing the Brussels game,* p.12
[140] Ibidem
[141] Interview, PSC First Secretary, April 9th 2009.
[142] Interview, PSC First Secretary, April 9th 2009.
[143] Ibidem

Differently, the Romanian representatives suggested that the process of adjustment and compliance to the formal rules occurred mainly during the observer status. Thus, from 2005 to 2007, the Representatives have learned the basic procedures of their working groups, transmitted to the newcomers. Without knowing these procedures, one diplomat noticed that they would have been "sitting ducks".[144] At the same time, the formal rules of the PSC are constant subject for lawyers which provide legal counseling.[145]

However, in terms of adapting to the informal procedures of the PSC, the Romanian diplomats expressed that this is still "learned by doing", interestingly due to the fact that these change along with the shift of the Presidency, making it an "evolving challenge".[146] The Romanian representatives seemed aware of the "consultation-reflex" and when a new issue arises, the tendency is to speculate and to find as fast as possible the position of the other 26 member states, which is why "90 % of the energy is focused on the position of the others".[147] "Consensus-building" is seen as the prime mechanism of cooperation inside the PSC, because it deals with sensitive issues and is more political, being more prone to reach consensus, in contrast to lower level working groups, where the atmosphere is more relaxed, but where the Representatives simply state their positions. Consequently, one Representative noted that the PSC is in this sense a "Council of Wisdom".[148]

Thus, the Romanian representatives differentiate in this dimension, because they took an active approach during the observer status, in familiarizing with the formal rules, and constantly employing legal consultancy in understanding them better. At the same time, they emphasized the importance of compromise for adapting in the group. However, the view from

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[144] Interview, Deputy Permanent Representative April 8th 2009.
[145] Interview, RELEX Counselor, April 8th 2009.
[146] Ibidem.
[147] Ibidem.
[148] Ibidem.

Bucharest seems to incline to the Bulgarian case. The Political Director claims that it will take Romanian representatives at least five years to fully integrate and learn the procedures.[149] Thus, the variables of time and size of the Representation validates my H2-H4 and reflect a main difference between Romania and Bulgaria. The first started the adaptation process sooner, and its Representation is smaller in size than the latter one.

3.3.3. National Interest

Due to its discrete political nature, the PSC is seen as a forum in which the states juggle their national interests, and focus on tactics in an attempt to speculate the other countries position. Tactics are important in the sense because they presume a certain strategy adopted by Representatives, which confines them in different alliances. At this point, this is where my theoretical alternatives come into play. Intergovernmentalism as the rationale behind the actors- the PSC representatives, acting in an institutionalized setting- which presumes certain rules and norms, formal or informal, with which the actors get used to in time, and finally through having a specific flavor- that of Brusselization- as a specific form of governance, as the setting in which all the deliberations take place, and which pinpoints certain changes in the nature of traditional, bilateral diplomacy. Although is a frequent interaction among these diplomats, they do not manage to change each others views.

Inside the PSC negotiations are guided by brute national interest and competition is seen as the mechanism underlining the general struggle. However, when the new 2007 members entered the PSC structures, "they felt a certain inferiority complex felt by the new member states in relation to the experienced ones".[150] I argue that this feeling derived from the limits of the country's own national interest. As one Bulgarian diplomat stated, in CFSP

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[149] Interview, Political Director, April 24th 2009.
[150] Interview, Political Director, April 24th 2009.

matters, their national interest revolves mainly around the Western Balkans, leading him to declare that: "we cannot be concerned with African issues. That would not make us look serious".[151] At the same time, the Romanian diplomats noted that Brussels represents a different setting, but inside the PSC: "you speak in the name of your government".[152] There are two implications. The first comes from the question of who defines the national interest, and as previously shown the input of the home ministry is essential. Second, the clearer the national interest of a representative is, the clearer their position in going to be, in the PSC, and consequently and in relation to my H3, the fewer the chances of the ambassador to be socialized. However this hypothesis applies partially, because smaller states as Bulgaria are considered to have complicated foreign policy views, therefore they are more likely to be influenced by other states.

3.3.4 Coalition formation and Bulgarian-Romanian Interaction

In constructing alliances, the Bulgarian representatives emphasized two major factors. The first is given by the weight of economic ties. Bulgarian representatives are more prone to ally with countries with which they have strong economic ties, mostly Germany.[153] Secondly, the design of the alliances is thematic and geographical. These variables interrelate to one another, Bulgaria considering its main dossier in the PSC: Macedonia.[154]

For the Romanian representatives alliance formation is a feature which reflects a full integration: "it is not good to remain isolated".[155] Thus, critical is to undertake different tactics, and to seize the most suitable coalition, as to "fault other states".[156] Romania emphasized on the geopolitical and economic weight of the alliances, being most likely to join

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[151] Interview, Nicolaidis Group, April 9th 2009.
[152] Interview, Relex Counselor, April 8th 2009.
[153] Interview, Nicolaidis group, April 9th, 2009.
[154] Interview, PSC Counselor, April 8th, 2009.
[155] Interview, Deputy Minister, April 8th 2009.
[156] Interview, Political Director MFA, April 24th 2009.

a group where the French portray their interests.[157] This relates to my sixth hypothesis, and to the idea that pre-existent traditional alliances on the on hand, and geographical ties, on the other, have an important weight for the establishment of alliances. This contradicts the assumption of Juncos and Pomoroska that new member states tend to act as a block.[158]

However, when it comes to the interaction between Romania and Bulgaria in the Committee H6 is partially validated, because one would presume that geopolitical and geographical ties are important, and the two countries should have a special relation due to their geographical proximity. Although, the Bulgarians consider that there is a certain "synergy" between them and Romania, they paradoxically invoke having "the same language" in the dossier that concerns lifting visas for the United States. However, on the technical level and in foreign policy choices, highlighted especially a "difference of analysis in Middle East dossiers", pointed out disagreements.[159] As well they have a different position on Kosovo, which the Bulgarian representatives stated that they: "perfectly understand- as a matter of tactics".[160] The Romanian representatives have different perspectives their contact with Bulgaria. The dominant one is that between the two there is an ongoing "healthy competition" in which disagreements between the two parties are seen as a normal feature of the PSC. [161] The only regional topic, in which they coordinate, is the *Black Sea Synergy*, in which Romania "is considered to hold up the flag".[162] However, third parties noticed a weak normative bond between the two, due to "close historical ties and their similar accession process".[163] This disconfirms my sub-H6 in terms that relations are always made in the name of geographical linkages.

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[157] Ibidem
[158] Juncos, Pomoroska, *The deadlock that never happened, p.20.*
[159] Ibidem.
[160] Interview, Nicolaidis group, April 9th 2009.
[161] Interview, Relex Counselor, April 8th 2009.
[162] Ibidem.
[163] Interview, PSC Counselor, Foreign Policy Unit, April 10th 2009.

3.4 Method of Difference

The evaluation above showed that there is a difference in adaptation between countries in general, and Bulgaria and Romania specifically. After their evaluation I have drawn a simple-qualitative differentiation (see figure 3). Besides this scheme, I use the Method of Difference to contrast the two countries. A handbook definition of the Method of Difference is that: "the investigator chooses cases with similar general characteristics and different values on the study variable. If we seek to establish the causes of the study variable, the investigator then asks if values on the study variable correspond across cases with values on variables that define its possible effects".[164]

Figure 3 - **Evaluation scheme**

Criteria	Relation with the MFA	Networking	Speed of Adjustment	National Interest	Coalition Formation	Interaction (between the two)
Bulgaria	+ + + + +	+ + + + -	+ + - - -	+ + - - -	+ + + - -	+ + + - -
Romania	+ + + + -	+ + + + + +	+ + + - -	+ + + + -	+ + + - -	+ + + - -

This method is based on the assumption that two countries are similar systems, differentiating only on one issue. All the variables are the same, except one- in this case the speed and the overall compliance with formal and informal rules. I assert that in the Romanian case this has been done faster, and eventually this is what differentiates between the two representatives in the PSC, based on the Bulgarian representative's recognition of the fact and on the third party opinions.

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[164] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Research,* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.57.

Method of Difference

Romania   Bulgaria

IVa	IVb	IVc	IVd	IVe	IVf
Relation MFA	Networking	Speed Adjust.	National Interest	Coalition Formation	Interaction
Yes	Yes	(Yes)	Yes	Yes	Yes

IVa	IVb	IVc	IVd	IVe	IVf
Relation MFA	Network.	Speed Adjust.	National Interest	Coalition Formation	Interaction
Yes	Yes	(No)	Yes	Yes	Yes

DV: Differences in Adaptation- RO-BG

However, in the real case other indicators point out to some differences as well. In their relation with the MFA, the Romanian representatives have a larger room for maneuver and are expected to send expertise to Bucharest, while the Bulgarian representatives ask and receive specific information from Sofia. In terms of Networking there are no major discrepancies, both of the PSC representatives use every informal event, as a means to involve and strengthen their position. It is clear to both parts that their mission is to pursue their national interests, although the Bulgarian side has been accused of having complicated foreign policy views, while their counterparts are more confident in their approach. In terms of coalition formation, what is interesting is that both of them have emphasized that besides thematic alliances, most of them are based on pre-existent geopolitical and economic ties; Germany is favored by Bulgaria, while France is preferred by Romania. However, their interaction is not special although they had similar accession roads and close regional ties. Without any further explanation, the conclusions touch upon these points as well.

Conclusions

The Permanent Representations of the national member states in Brussels maintain the crucial link between the capitals and the institutions of the European Union. This study dealt with the topic of administrative governance inside the European Union, and more specifically with the Political and Security Committee. So far, the existing literature does not cover the issue extensively, and does not provide any answers for my dependent variable: differences between the countries in terms of socialization. This is the gap that this thesis has addressed and extended on the case of Romania and Bulgaria.

This study has three main achievements. I have criticized the *thick* meaning of the concept of socialization, assessed by authors such as Jeffrey Checkel, Michael Zurn or Jeffrey Lewis, and their idea that actors internalize norms, rules and values and are socialized in an institutional setting based on the judgment that it is "the right thing to do". The possibility of *thick* socialization occurring in the PSC is rather obsolete. This confirms my second general hypothesis, that socialization does not entail an internalization of norms, rules, values. There is a certain group-feeling, which arises as a normal feature and in the context of them spending more time with their colleagues then with their families.[165] However, this feeling does not have any potential impact on the decision-making of the Representatives. Thus my argument relies on a *thin* version of the concept, which sees the adaptation of new member states as a process with different degrees. A combination of three alternative theories offer a more adequate portrait of the process: Intergovernmentalism- the rationale behind the decision-making process, Institutionalism- portrays the setting in which Representatives act, and finally, Brusselization- represents a symbolical transfer of power, without effects on the intergovernmental power of the Representations. The representatives only use Brussels as the

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[165] Interview, Deputy Minister, April 8th 2009.

medium in which they promote their views and national interests, translated into policies at the domestic level, and do not emphasize on the European dimension of problems.

Secondly, I have investigated the institutional milieu of the socialization/adaptation process. Socialization in the PSC is not a rule. Basically, the degree of supranationalization of the Council working groups, especially the PSC, is relatively small. The Committee is seen as a forum of interaction, between the member states, characterized by a game of political tactics, which officially makes the link between the CFSP and ESDP. As Jan Beyers noticed, national representatives as diplomats are not "structural idiots".[166] Socialization in the Brussels medium comes as a complementary identity, and the possibility of these diplomats to shift their allegiances towards the Community, is more a problem of "fundamentals" as one of them stated. However, socialization as envisioned by constructivist scholars is a concept which presumes more substantively the acquisition of European values. On the contrary, diplomats are aware of the Communities goals and principles, but they hold that their primary function is to serve their countries. All in all, the system is characterized by a multi-level diplomatic game, different from the bilateral settings.

Thirdly and most importantly, my contribution is that I have created and tested a set of hypotheses used to provide the possibility of differentiating between two countries in adapting to the PSC medium. I have combined the indicators to form a scheme of evaluation and processed them through the Method of difference. The main discrepancies between the adaptations of Romania and Bulgaria regard the speed of adjustment and compliance to formal and informal rules, the capacity to formulate a coherent national interest. At the same time they involve in different coalitions, based on pre-existent economic ties. Similarly, they are close to their MFA, which excludes the option of them being socialized. In terms of how they interact, there is no special relation between the two. The Bulgarian diplomats are more

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[166] Jan Beyers, "Multiple Embeddedness and socialization in Europe: the case of Council Officials", p. 933.

institutionally shy, while their counterparts are more active and outspoken. From this perspective, they have not been socialized by the overall structure, but have brought with them their own way of socializing.

However, the possibility of Bulgaria and Romania influencing through their accession, the framework of the PSC is slightly unrealistic because, upon their arrival the procedures and norms were already settled. Even the previous wave of Enlargement, when ten new members joined the Union, did not manage to change but only affect its dynamics.[167] This has not been the case with the 2007 members. The Romanian and Bulgarian diplomats are more or less half-way through, self-aware of their need to adapt more to this competitive institutional environment. All things considered, this study opens the question of research that would scrutinize more the implications of diplomacy in the European Union, from an administrative point of view.

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[167] Ana Juncos, Karolina Pomoroska, *The deadlock that never happened*, p. 28.

Appendixes:

Appendix 1

Semi-structured Interview- Bulgarian-Romanian Representation

Brussels – 6th-10th April 2009

General guidelines

Set 1: General- Introduction

a) Briefly, what were the major institutional and administrative changes inside the Representation after the accession in 2007?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………

b) Implicitly, would you please briefly describe your current activities of the Representation, or what are the main projects/foreign policy issues that are underway at the moment?

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

 c) One present idea in the literature is that the members of the diplomatic staff in Brussels know each other very well. How were the contacts between your Delegation and the PSC, before entering the European Union?

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

Set 2- COPS

a) How is the communication with the national Foreign Ministry back home, being kept? It is my assumption that the Permanent Representations have a greater level of autonomy than any other missions throughout the world. In this sense, could you please tell me where the national interest is defined, (concerning regular activities) in the Representation or in MAE? Do you as a PSC Representative have to negotiate more with the MFA, is this the case? If so do you get detailed instructions?

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

b) How did the representatives of the mission integrate in the COPS/COREPER meetings after the accession period? The academic position is that it takes more for the newcomers to adapt to both the formal and informal rules of the working committee's. Was this the case in your Representation?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………

c) One of the most used theories that seek to provide an explanation for the how the EU administrative staff works is commonly labeled as Brusselization/Europeanization. Judging from your experience, do you feel that there is a European trend in how the Ambassadors from the Permanent Representatives interact?

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Set 3- Level of interaction

a) How do Romania and Bulgaria interact inside the Political Security Committee? How do you perceive their relation given the fact that they are the newest members in the club? Do you feel that Romania and Bulgaria influence in any respect the general framework or decision making process inside the PSC?

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b) The fact that Romania and Bulgaria entered together, does this create certain bonds or does this translate in certain cooperation?

……

c) For example have there been any contexts in which Romania and Bulgaria have adopted common approaches to different situations, did they ally in any respects or on the other hand, were there any instances in which the two representatives disagreed inside the Council- for example the Kosovo issue, the Russian-Ukraine gas crisis?

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Appendix 2

Semi-structured Interview- Dutch and Hungarian Representations

Brussels – 6th-10th April 2009

General guidelines

Thesis working title: Multi-level diplomacy? The Europeanization of Permanent
Representatives- Romania and Bulgaria- a comparative case

Set 1: General- Introduction

a) Would you please briefly describe your current activities of the Representation, or what are
the main projects/foreign policy issues that are underway at the moment?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

 b) One present idea in the literature is that the members of the diplomatic staff in Brussels
know each other very well. How do you think this fact can explain the interaction between
acceding member states- and their delegations and the PSC, before they enter the European
Union?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

c) One of the most used theories that seek to provide an explanation for the how the EU
administrative staff works is commonly labeled as Brusselization/Europeanization. Judging
from your experience, do you feel that there is a European trend in how the Ambassadors
from the Permanent Representatives interact?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

Set 2- COPS

a) Do you find any difference in the attendance rates of Romania and Bulgaria inside the
Committee? Concomitantly, this can be linked to the speed of adjustment to the PSC norms
and rules. For example, Romania considers to have a proud a foreign policy tradition, is this
felt in any of its positions, in comparison to the Bulgarian one?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

a) In the same note, comparing the size of the Bulgarian and Romanian Foreign Ministries, do
you think their Representatives are left room for maneuver? Or from your experience does
every Representative get instructions (detailed) of what decisions they are to take in the
Political and Security Committee?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

b) How did the representatives of Romania and Bulgaria integrate in the COPS meetings after their accession period? The academic position is that it takes more for the newcomers to adapt to both the formal and informal rules of the working committee's. Do you think there are differences in how the two countries have adapted, in comparison for example with the 2004 Central and Eastern European countries?

…………………………………………………………………………………………..

Set 3- Level of interaction

a) How do Bulgaria and Romania interact inside the Political Security Committee? How do you perceive their relation given the fact that they are the newest members in the club? Do you feel that Bulgaria and Romania have influenced in any respect the general framework or decision making process inside the PSC?

…………………………………………………………………………………………

b) In addition to the previous question, do you think Romania and Bulgaria tend to caucus with one another inside the Committee or do they often manifest different views?

…………………………………………………………………………………………

c) For example have there been any contexts in which Bulgaria and Romania have adopted common approaches to different situations, did they ally in any respects or on the other hand, were there any instances in which the two representatives disagreed inside the Council- for example the Kosovo issue, the Russian-Ukraine gas crisis?

………………………………………………………………………………………….

d) I know that your schedule is very busy, but do you think informal networking is important; do you manage to fulfill social functions during the evening? How would you appreciate the importance of networking for the RO and BG newcomers, are they a permanent presence?

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