

DILEMMAS OF INTEGRATION: UKRAINIAN IMMIGRANTS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

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Abstract

Dilemma of accommodation of immigrant communities absolutely heterogeneous by their characteristics challenges all foundations of those societies receiving immigrants. In addition to this, the fact that even very similar immigrant groups in similar countries might pursue completely different integration strategies, which outcome very often turns out to be unpredictable, seems especially puzzling. The primary reason for this phenomenon is complicated intersection between the features of the immigrant community itself, other immigrant groups and the host society. Therefore, effective explanations for the rate of integration of certain community should be examined in each particular case. The present dissertation contributes to existing research through uncovering the determinants for the variable levels of integration on the example of Ukrainian communities in Spain and Portugal. The results of the inquiry demonstrate direct connection between higher indicators of integration rate in Portugal and huge demand for high-skilled labour force as the principal explanation for more successful integration of Ukrainian immigrants in comparison to Spain.

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Table of Contents

Abstract.....	ii
List of Tables	v
Chapter I - Introduction.....	1
Chapter II - Background to the Cases	20
2.1. The time of arrival.....	20
2.2. Immigration Networks.....	22
2.3. Dominant Age Groups.....	26
Chapter III - Alternative Explanations for Differential Integration of Ukrainians in Portugal and Spain.....	29
3.1. Settlement Patterns of Ukrainians in Spain and Portugal.....	29
3.2. Religious Affinity.....	33
3.3. Access to Political Representation	35
Chapter IV – Measuring Indicators of the Rate of Integration of Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal and Spain	39
4.1. Occupational Concentration of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain and Portugal.....	39
4.2. Unemployment Rate among Ukrainians in Spain and Portugal.....	45
4.3. Level of Income	47
4.4. Language Proficiency of Ukrainians in Portugal and Spain.....	48
Chapter V - Demand for High-skilled Labour Force	50
Chapter VI - Conclusions and Policy Implications.....	59
Bibliography	63

List of Tables

2.3.1 Ukrainian Immigrants in Spain According Major Age Groups.....	27
2.3.2 Ukrainian Immigrants in Portugal by Age Groups (2006).....	28
4.1.1 Work Contracts by Occupation Sector among Ukrainians in Portugal.....	43
4.1.2 Segmental occupation of Ukrainian Immigrants in Spain.....	44
5.1. Educational Attainment of Immigrants in Portugal	53
5.2. Educational Attainment of Immigrants in Spain.....	54
5.3. Educational background of Immigrant Communities in Spain.....	55
5.4. Unemployment rates by Level of Education in Spain and Portugal	56

Chapter I - Introduction

The challenge of how to effectively incorporate immigrants into their societies is a problem faced by many present-day policy-makers. This issue becomes even more complicated taking into account the heterogeneous nature of effective integration strategies. Why does one immigrant group adapt to the host society whereas the same immigrant community in another country faces enormous hurdles in integration? One of assumptions could depend upon ethnic identity of the immigrant group which very often determines type of relations it establishes with the receiving society. One might support this point of view with the examples of Turkish immigrants in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium or Sweden who pursue the integration pattern by keeping their distance with the native population and feeling strong ties with their homeland¹. The question arises how could different integration in terms of employment, housing, type of cultural adaptation of the same ethnic group in different countries be explained in such a case? Why, for instance, have Cape Verdeans in Rotterdam been more successful in political representation on the local level than Cape Verdeans in Lisbon, both being entitled to the same set of political rights? In this respect, accumulation of social capital and density of immigrant associations resulted in effective claims-making during local elections campaigns by Cape Verdean organizations in Rotterdam raising the issues of immigrants' social integration and access to citizenship more frequently than Cape Verdeans in Lisbon².

¹ Nuran Bayram, Hans Nyquist, Daniel Thorburn and Nazan Bilgel, "Turkish Immigrants in Sweden. Are They Integrated?" *International Migration Review*, vol. 43, no. 1 (March 2009): 105.

² Ana Paula Beja Horta, Jorge Malheiros and Antonio da Graca, "Ethnic Civic Communities and Political Participation: the Case Study of Capeverdean Associations in Three Municipalities of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area and in Rotterdam", in *Cities in Movement: Migrants and Urban Change*, ed. Maria Lucinda Fonseca (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Geograficos, 2008), 193-198.

Another puzzling moment surfaces when certain immigrant community having access to both voting rights and possession of language skills of the receiving society achieves no greater integration than an immigrant community without these advantages. For example, why being entitled to political representation and having Portuguese-language skills, are immigrants from Brazil still in low-skilled positions in Portugal? Can the overall lower educational level of this immigrant group become the determining factor in this respect?

Finally, by far the most debated and discussed cluster of explanations refers to influence of religious background of certain immigrant community at its integration. Is religious affinity between the immigrants and the receiving society sufficient to explain successful adaptation or integration? For instance, one might argue that it is the conflicting values, structure of family relations, attitude to “strangers” of Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu immigrants all over Europe that explain why certain immigrant communities are poorly integrated. In this respect, religious background indeed can provide the strongest explanation for low integration rate. On the other hand, can we argue that it is religion in case of predominantly Christian Africans in Canada that makes them the most vulnerable immigrant group in terms of access to employment and size of income in comparison to Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs? Or maybe it is the attitude of receiving society towards “visible communities” which makes difference?

What I intend to show by raising numerous questions regarding several aspects of immigrant integration in this introductory part is that there is no single correct answer for explaining successes and failures of immigrant incorporation. In addition, explanations providing us with the insight on the pattern of integration very often show certain degree of ambiguity. This is precisely the phenomenon which I would like to call “dilemmas of integration”.

1.1. The Research Question

The central research question I'm seeking to answer in my study is what explains the differential integration rates of similar or identical immigrant communities in very similar countries. There are at least three sets of explanations for the variable rates of integration which may be attributed firstly to the features of the immigrant community itself (time of arrival, predominant gender, level of education, types of occupation, religious affinity, previous experience of participation in social networks, the region of origin and its history of migration etc.); secondly, ties between the receiving society and the immigrant community (established historical links, cultural and linguistic differences, public opinion towards the immigrant community, rights of political participation); thirdly, relations between different immigrant communities (competitive or cooperative); and finally, the features of the receiving society which might indirectly determine either the overall favourable situation for the immigrant communities or only those immigrant groups which characteristics make them more successful in integration (underqualification of the native population).

In order to test possible explanations for divergent rates of integration, Ukrainian community in Portugal and Spain is selected for a paired comparative study. This particular case comparison allows me to isolate the most effective explanation (study variable) of differential rates of integration (dependent variable) because variables associated with the other arguments can be held more or less constant in determining the effect of the study variable. Ukrainian immigrant communities in Spain and Portugal were chosen for comparative analysis due to striking similarity in economic, political features and historical past of these two states. Furthermore, both countries became immigrant-receiving countries only around three decades ago. Secondly, Ukrainian immigrant communities exhibit a number of similar features (such as

their time of arrival, motivations for emigration, region of origin, type of immigration networks, settlement patterns, religious background and access to political representation) - factors that can be effectively controlled when comparing these communities against one another to determine the reason for variable rates of integration. It will be shown how occupational niche, unemployment rate, level of income and language proficiency which are the most crucial indicators of integration rate for labour immigrants differ in two cases. Finally, I will examine the principal explanation for differential rates of integration between Ukrainians in Spain and Portugal. It will be shown how Ukrainians due to their high level of previous education benefited from underqualification of Portuguese population and lack of high-skilled labour force there.

1.2. Literature Review

The differential rates of integration (the dependent variable) can be analyzed from different angles: as a social phenomenon (“desired social condition”), “policy objective” and “policy device”³. The level of integration can be also measured as the degree of adaptation of the immigrant community to the receiving society, namely, structural integration (access to education, training, employment), social integration (inter-ethnic cooperation patterns, membership in organizations) and cultural integration (values, beliefs, everyday practices)⁴.

In this literature review I will map out various explanations for immigrant integration which deserved particular scholarly interest. I will first address those determinants for integration attributed to traits of the immigrant group. The second cluster of explanations presented in the scholarly literature focuses on features of the receiving society (political representation, granting

³ Howard Duncan, “Immigration, Integration and Social Capital,” in *Multiculturalism Observed*, ed. Richard Lewis (Brussels: VUBPRESS, 2006), 52-54.

⁴ Friedrich Heckmann, “The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies,” in *Migrations in Society, Culture and the Library*, eds. Tom Kilton and Ceres Birkhead (Paris: Association of College and Research Libraries, 2004), 14 - 24.

of citizenship, liberal/restrictive policies, activity of immigrant associations). Thirdly, explanations that focus on differences between the receiving society and immigrants are going to be analyzed. The literature reviewed here mostly employs cases from the Southern European countries. However, I also examine existing scholarship on immigrant integration in other EU countries.

When speaking about individual traits of the immigrant community, its education level upon arrival to the country of destination plays an extremely crucial role in further integration even if the immigrants are occupied in low-skilled segments of labour market (as in case of Ukrainians, Cape Verdeans and Brazilians in Portugal; Romanians, Bulgarians, Moroccans, Senegalese in Spain). Qualifications or skills are an important determining factor of the level of integration due to the fact that they greatly influence the effectiveness of adaptation strategies and decrease the length of time spent on establishing immigrant organizations or maintaining contacts with governmental authorities⁵. Highly-educated people are better equipped than low-skilled immigrants to overcome numerous bureaucratic barriers and achieve greater levels of integration with the receiving society.

However, it is worth noting that the scholarly literature is mostly concerned with the problem of immigrant education and training after their arrival in the country. In doing so, Hagendoorn and Vollebergh link the concept of “citizenising”, language training and solution of the problem of unemployment using the case study of the Netherlands⁶. The authors discover that there is mutual causality between educational opportunities for immigrants provided by the state and their ability to overcome the burden of unemployment and overqualification. They also

⁵ Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America. A Portrait* (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1996), 68-76.

⁶ Louk Hagendoorn, Justus Veenman and Wilma Vollebergh, *Integrating Immigrants in the Netherlands: Cultural versus Socio-Economic Integration* (Ashgate, 2003), 1-2.

argue that it is the employer who should assist the immigrants with the language training and other types of education. This issue is of great relevance for Ukrainians in Portugal and Spain who are found to have one of the highest rates of overqualification in both countries⁷.

Considerable attention has been devoted recently to the issue of settlement of immigrants and the extent to which settlement patterns themselves provide evidence of the level of integration. A particularly interesting debate is evolving on the issue as to whether dispersed housing patterns can serve as sufficient evidence of immigrant segregation. This problem is especially relevant for Southern European states which urban policies possess unique features completely distinct from other EU countries. Lucinda Fonseca, for example, argues that dispersed settlement among immigrants, which is usually seen as proof of their inclusion, should not be regarded as such⁸. In fact, in determining the actual level of social incorporation with regard to immigrants, both settlement patterns, housing policies and proximity to essential infrastructure should be taken into consideration.

In this context, many authors still claim that the character of urbanization policies of the state and type of settlement strategies of the immigrant group directly correlate with the rate of their integration. For example, renovation of the city center and historical parts limits access to affordable housing by immigrants who are usually employed in occupations with lower income in comparison to native population. For this reason, immigrants attracted by greater opportunities of employment in large cities tend to settle in suburban and periphery areas very often

⁷ Miradas sobre la Inmigración, “Sobrecualificación y empleo de los inmigrantes en la Comunidad Valenciana”, http://www.ceimigra.net/observatorio/images/stories/mirada_02.cualificacin_y_formacin.pdf (accessed May 21, 2009).

⁸ Maria Lucinda Fonseca, “Immigration, Social-Spatial Marginalization and Urban Planning in Lisbon: Challenges and Strategies”, in *Metropolis International Workshop Proceedings* (Lisbon: Luso-American Foundation, 1998), 204-207.

characterized by less developed infrastructure⁹. In this respect, Jorge Malheiros suggests fundamental characteristics of Southern European countries shaping the settlement patterns of immigrant groups and impeding their integration, namely, significance of informal housing market, insufficient housing policies unable to meet demands of immigrants for affordable rented apartments and their concentration mostly in suburban areas¹⁰. In turn, Kitty Calavita's research expands Malheiros's theoretical argument in practice through detailed analysis of immigrants access to housing. She further demonstrates that large-scale projects directed at improving housing of immigrant communities enhance spatial cohesion and effective integration of immigrants, especially those that tend to settle in rundown areas¹¹. At the same time, she highlights numerous disadvantages of housing projects in Spanish case where immigrants received apartments without water, gas and in need of renovation. Moreover, Calavita turns attention to the fact that very often immigrants are expected to pay much higher rents for apartments than natives which reinforces their social exclusion¹².

Sonia Arbaci contributes to the debate on determinants of spatial segregation of certain immigrant community with the interesting argument that "ethnic groups with particular religious bonds show a tendency to cluster or to develop aggregative patterns of insertion irrespective of the socio-urban structure of the host society"¹³. In other words, she claims that religious background determines the level of spatial concentration of the immigrant community rather than

⁹ Audrey Singer, Susan W. Hardwick and Caroline B. Brettell (eds.) *Twenty-First Century Gateways. Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America*. (Washington D.C: Brookings Institute Press, 2008).

¹⁰ Jorge Malheiros and Natalia Ribas-Mateos, "Immigration and Place in Northern Mediterranean Cities: Issues for Debate", in *Immigration and Place in Mediterranean Metropolises*, eds. Maria Lucinda Fonseca and others, 293-308 (Lisbon: Luso-American Foundation, 2002), 302-303.

¹¹ Kitty Calavita, *Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race, and Exclusion in Southern Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 110-117.

¹² Ibid., 113.

¹³ Sonia Arbaci, "Housing and Urban Regimes in Southern European Multiethnic Cities: Structural Mechanisms of Ethnic Residential Marginalization by Spatial Dispersion", in *Cities in Movement: Migrants and Urban Change*, ed. Maria Lucinda Fonseca, 45-79 (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Geograficos, 2008), 58.

transformations attributed to restructuring of the cities. In making this assumption, Sonia Arbaci suggests innovative explanation for analyzing how settlement pattern, segregation and rate of integration are mutually connected.

However, the most profound research regarding association between immigrants' settlement pattern and their insertion into the labour market is undertaken by Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut in "Immigrant America". The authors examined positive and negative arguments regarding spatial concentration of immigrant groups. On the one hand, they argue that spatial dispersion of immigrant group risks

"losing a range of social and moral resources that make for psychological well-being as well as for economic gain. A large minority that becomes dispersed risks lacking a significant presence or voice anywhere; on the contrary, even a small group, if sufficiently concentrated, can have economic and political influence locally"¹⁴.

In this respect, the authors brought in the example of how Irish, Italian and Cuban communities made advantage of concentrated settlement through access to political representation and supporting candidates of their community in local or municipal elections. However, spatial concentration of immigrant community might also give rise to separatist moods, especially when this group rejects assimilation or integration into mainstream society¹⁵.

Third set of arguments on determinants of immigrant integration relates to the cultural aspect of immigration flows. Perceptions of immigrants as contributing to the receiving society, enriching its core values "positive typification" or, on the contrary, as a threat to the established rules and traditions, are extremely important in explaining the level of immigrant adaptation "negative typification"¹⁶. In this respect, the most crucial feature of the immigrant community

¹⁴ Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America. A Portrait*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 63-64.

¹⁵ Ibid., 64-66.

¹⁶ Geoffrey Van Orden, "Multiculturalism: A Destructive New Dogma?" in *Multiculturalism Observed*, in Louk Hagendoorn, Justus Veenman and Wilma Vollebergh, *Integrating Immigrants in the Netherlands: Cultural versus Socio-Economic Integration*, 71-99 (Ashgate, 2003), 72-75; Portes and Rumbaut, 94.

which influences its rate of integration is the religious affinity between the immigrants and receiving society. Recently, it turned into one of the most debated and controversial determinants of interaction within the host society. The religious identity of the immigrant is seen to be a key trait which will either facilitate or impede the immigrants' cultural integration¹⁷. This is especially true for non-Christian religions as Muslim and Hindu groups. Vertovec's and Wesseldorf's research shows that religious affinity is the most stable, static and important part of identity for the immigrants, even more than their linguistic skills and preferences, which are subject to change as a result of integration¹⁸. However, Jeffrey Reitz's research on "visible" immigrant communities in Canada showed that it is race that determines successful adaptation of immigrants, and not religious background. Reitz's point of view is confirmed by the example of immigrants from Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angola who despite having similar religious affinity with the native population, experience the highest level of discrimination among other communities in Portugal. This is thought to be due to visible racial differences.

Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the policies of the state, the second cluster of factors considered here, would be the most decisive in level of immigrants' adaptation. It is the state that takes decisions regarding the mode of immigrant incorporation and. For example, the Migration Integration Policy Index of EU-25 plus 3 non-EU countries measures state policy on immigration through more than 100 policy indicators¹⁹. The evaluation is made on the basis of key areas as access to nationality, anti-discrimination, family reunion, labour market access, political participation and long-term residence. According to this Index, Portugal occupies the

¹⁷ Maria Lucinda Fonseca and Alina Esteves, "Migration and New religion Townscapes in Lisbon," in *Immigration and Place in Mediterranean Metropolises*, ed. Maria Lucinda Fonseca et.al (Lisbon: Luso-American Foundation, 2002), 255-291.

¹⁸ Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, *Migration and Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity in Europe: An Overview of Issues and Trends* (Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy & Society, 2005)

¹⁹ Migration Integration Policy Index, available from <http://www.integrationindex.eu/>, Internet, accessed 20 March, 2009.

second place after Sweden for liberal and effective policies towards its immigrants, whereas Spain is left far behind, being only the tenth in the list.

Of all the features of the receiving society, access to political representation for immigrants is considered to be of greatest importance in determining the level of immigrant integration, as political representation is believed to enhance a group's social and economic privileges in society. Just ten years ago, the granting of citizenship to immigrants was considered the most crucial determinant of integration. However, nowadays its importance is a point of debate. Similar to Soysal, Morris and Baubock argue that permanent residency is a perfectly suitable substitute for citizenship in promoting immigrant integration²⁰. According to postnationalists such as Joppke, Morawska and Randall Hansen, traditional ties between citizenship and privileged economic and social position for the immigrants are being eroded²¹.

Rainer Baubock and Albert Kraler also contribute to the debate as to whether full membership in the host society is an important determinant of immigration²². They argue that citizenship (as a privileged form of membership) is the most discriminatory in relation to immigrants. The authors emphasize the growing significance of political transnationalism (increasing the rate of immigrant political activity in their home countries) as residential rights in EU countries gradually replace citizenship rights. In contrast, for Henry Back and Maritta Soininen, “the exclusion of significant groups of society's members from the political process is

²⁰ Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Rainer Bauböck, *Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in International Migration* (Avebury: Aldershot, 1994); Lydia Morris, *Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants Rights* (London: Routledge, 2002).

²¹ Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, *Towards assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Randall Hansen, “Citizenship and Integration in Europe,” in Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, *Towards assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.87-110.

²² Rainer Baubock et. al, “Migrants' Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation,” in *The Dynamics of International Migration and Settlement in Europe*, ed. Rinus Penninx et.al (Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 65-99.

incompatible with the argument for justice”²³. The authors favour access to national citizenship and voting rights as the most effective means by which immigrants can influence effectively the decisions taken in the host society. The argument is further expanded by emphasizing the necessity of inclusion of immigrant groups into the political participation due to the fact that the “best political decisions for society are those that are based on the experience of different social groups”²⁴.

The experience of the Ukrainian communities in Portugal and Spain supports both the phenomenon of decreased significance of citizenship for successful integration along with the rising significance of political transnationalism. Firstly, Ukrainian immigrants are not entitled to any political rights and have one of the lowest rates of naturalization in both countries. The causal logic would be their worse integration in comparison to Cape Verdeans in Portugal who established powerful, unified and old enough immigrant associations that have strong financial support and access to representation in municipalities²⁵. However, as was pointed out by Alina Esteves, even those immigrants with political rights remain mostly passive in national or municipal elections²⁶. Their passivity may be attributed to lack of trust that activism on the municipal level is going to help them integrate, therefore they focus on individual advancement through employment.

Another determinant of immigrant integration which gained considerable attention among researchers of immigrant integration are immigrant associations. Well-organized and unified immigrant associations of certain community encourage accumulation of social capital and provide crucial support for immigrant adaptation to the receiving society. Organizations

²³ Henry Back and Maritta Soininen, “Immigrants in the Political Process”, *Scandinavian Political Studies* 21, no. 1, 1998: 30.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Interview with Alina Esteves, 30 March 2009.

²⁶ Ibid.

representing interests of immigrants serve as a link between them and governmental institutions responsible for their integration. Moreover, immigrant associations help state institutions to identify the key problems faced by certain immigrant communities²⁷. Demetrios Papademetriou singles out such institutions as churches, trade unions, various charity organizations, NGOs dealing specifically with problematic spheres of immigrant adaptation (Caritas, La Strada, Red Cross, Jesuit Refugee Service) that always supplement the state integration policies²⁸.

In assessing ability of immigrant organizations to perform effectively interests of their constituencies, Meindert Fennema singles out two types of immigrant associations: “bridging organizations” without overlapping membership impeding political participation opportunities, whereas “bonding organizations” with overlapping leaders contribute to the strengthening of political activity²⁹. Secondarily, the role of social networks in immigrants’ political integration is highlighted by Vertovec’s research³⁰. The author has discovered a causal link between density of organizations and accumulation of social capital: the denser the social networks of the immigrant community, the more developed and stronger become their organizations, the higher is the social capital and ability to influence the processes inside the host society.

In turn, Margarida Marques and Ruis Santos suggest two types of immigrant mobilization, “top-down activation” and “bottom-up mobilization” (process through which immigrants use available resources with the aim of getting access to political representation; in case of “top-down activation” mobilization of these processes is the initiative of state

²⁷ Dirk Jacobs and Jean Tillie, “Introduction: Social Capital and Political Integration of Migrants”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 30, no. 3 (May 2004): 421-422.

²⁸ Demetrios Papademetriou, “Responding to the Southern European States’ Encounter with Large-scale Immigration: A New Integration Model”, in *Cities in Movement: Migrants and Urban Change*, ed. Maria Lucinda Fonseca (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Geograficos, 2008), 220-221.

²⁹ Meindert Fennema “The Concept and Measurement of Ethnic Community”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 30, no. 3 (May 2004):441.

³⁰ Steve Vertovec “Minority Associations, Networks and Public Policies: Re-assessing Relationships”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol.25, no.1 (January 1999): 21-42.

institutions; in case of “bottom-up” mobilization the source of initiative comes from the immigrant association) that allow to determine which institutions are the most crucial in promoting interests of immigrants³¹. Furthermore, the importance of existing structure of relations between already well-established immigrant communities and the host society for the new-comers is highlighted by Jean Tillie. He argues that “the denser the network of associations of a particular ethnic group, the more political trust they will have and the more they will participate politically”³². More importantly, the author uncovers the essential link between activity of immigrant organizations and access to political representation: “voluntary associations create social trust, which spills over into political trust and higher political participation”³³.

All of the considerations above point to the need for extensive research on which set of factors accounts for the best explanatory power in assessing the variable rates of immigrant integration. In this respect, exploring such determinants in case of Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal and Spain will shed light on the most influential determinants of immigrant incorporation.

1.3. The Argument

With the aim of contributing to existing academic research on the determinants of integration of immigrant groups, the core part of the thesis attempts to shed light on possible explanations why two very similar immigrant communities in two similar countries experience

³¹ M. Margarida Marques and Ruis Santos, “Top-down and Bottom-up Reconsidered: The Dynamics of Immigrant Participation in Local Civil Society”, in *Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies*, eds. Rinus Penninx and others (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2004), 107-127.

³² Dirk Jacobs and , Jean Tillie “Introduction: Social Capital and Political Integration of Migrants”, *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies*/30, No.3 (May2004):420.

³³ Ibid., 421.

different rates of integration. The cases of two Ukrainian immigrant communities in Spain and Portugal are used as a comparative case study to explore this phenomenon.

My first argument is that *structural integration occupies the leading position in the hierarchy of priorities for integration of Ukrainians in Portugal and Spain*. The measurement of integration rate in two cases will mostly focus upon its structural dimension defined by Friedrich Heckmann as “acquisition of rights and the access to membership, positions and statuses in the core institutions of the receiving society”³⁴. Absolutely necessary indicators of structural integration are type of occupation, stability of employment, language proficiency, level of income, settlement pattern (dispersion, concentration, segregation) and access to political representation and citizenship³⁵. It should be stressed that as Ukrainians in both cases are not entitled to political representation, this indicator does not possess explanatory power regarding difference in integration rates in the two cases. The reason why I have chosen structural integration as a central focus of my dissertation is because of its crucial role for Ukrainian immigrants both in Portugal and Spain as they are considered to be labour migrants. It is also worth emphasizing that successfulness in structural integration for certain immigrant community only recently settled in destination country, as Ukrainians in both cases, is determined as the most critical by scholarship³⁶.

Other dimensions of integration, as acculturation which is “ability of migrants or minorities to adapt to the language and culture of the host society”, will be also briefly considered in the present study. The reason why this dimension of integration deserves less

³⁴ Heckmann, 15.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Audrey Singer, Susan W. Hardwick and Caroline B. Brettell (eds.) *Twenty-First Century Gateways. Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America*; Leo Lucassen, David Feldman, Jochen Oltmer (eds.) *Paths of Integration. Migrants in Western Europe (1880-2004)*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996); Antonia Sanchez Urios, “Inmigración, Necesidades y Acceso a los Servicios y Recursos: los Inmigrantes Ucranianos en los Procesos de Inserción en la Comunidad Autónoma de Murcia” (Ph.D. diss., University of Murcia, 2007), available from <http://ldei.ugr.es/cddi/uploads/tesis/SanchezUrios2007.pdf>, accessed 28 May, 2009.

attention in case of Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal and Spain is two-fold. Firstly, Ukrainians do not face any significant barriers in keeping balance between preserving their own traditions and values and adaptation to the culture of the host society. In this context, pattern of cultural adaptation of Ukrainian immigrants supports hypothesis made by Portes and Rumbaut in their research on acculturation among immigrants in the US. The authors claim that “the best way of dealing with the challenge of acculturation is apparently to balance its progress with retention of select elements of the immigrants’ culture and a parallel reaffirmation of primary social ties within the ethnic community”³⁷. Therefore, stability in employment and access to high-skilled occupations is the most substantial problem determining extent of their integration into the receiving society.

For this reason, the core argument I make in the present study focuses on the *pattern of intersection between certain features of receiving state and immigrant community*. In this respect, I will show that the higher education level of the Ukrainians in Portugal helped them to take advantage of integration projects launched by Portuguese authorities in order to solve two problems: firstly, underqualification of Portuguese population and, secondly, the lack of access to high-qualified jobs (doctors, nurses). Despite the fact that these projects were aimed at immigrants throughout society, Ukrainians made up a disproportionate share of the beneficiaries. Meanwhile, the absence of demand for highly-skilled labor in Spain significantly limited the access of Ukrainian immigrants to employment in high-skilled occupations, which also restricted their chances for successful integration. Taking all things into consideration, I will further prove that requalification programs served as a critical link between solution to the problem of lacking high-skilled workers in certain occupations and opportunity for Ukrainians to surmount the

³⁷ Portes and Rumbaut, 199.

hurdles of employment available only at the bottom of occupational hierarchy and receive jobs corresponding to their qualifications.

1.4. Methodology and Case Selection

The comparative analysis of the two cases is undertaken using Stuart Mill's method of difference. Portugal and Spain with very similar characteristics, the same periods of harsh dictatorships, followed by dramatic transformations in the society, and periods of rapid economic growth along with radical expansion of informal labour market. Most importantly, the two countries went from being countries of emigration to countries with the fastest growing rates of immigration in the European Union at the same time. Again, the variable rate of integration of Ukrainian community in both countries is the phenomenon under consideration (dependent variable). Additional variables held constant by this comparison include the time of arrival, motivations for emigration, region of origin, type of immigration networks, settlement patterns, religious background and political representation of the two groups, allowing me to determine the effect of study variables on the dependant variable of integration.

During the course of evaluation, the leading explanation (study variable) was chosen as having the most weight in determining differential integration levels which is demand for high-skilled labour in Spain and Portugal. This variable is diverging in each case which allows me to conclude that the difference in the dependant variable can be attributed to these variables.

1.5. Sources of Data and Research Design

In the course of research semi-structured interviews were conducted: two with the Head of Ukrainian umbrella association in Portugal and Head of Ukrainian Saturday school in Lisbon

along with two semi-structured interviews with the academics involved in research on Eastern European immigration to Portugal; two telephone interviews were made with two Heads of Ukrainian associations in Spanish provinces accounting for significant concentration of Ukrainian immigrants (Madrid and Murcia)³⁸.

The key questions were the following:

How has unemployment and standard of living among Ukrainians evolved? 2) In which sectors of employment Ukrainians are particularly concentrated? 3) What is the situation with housing among Ukrainian immigrants? 4) How are Ukrainian immigrants perceived by the locals? 5) What are the key differences in integration among Ukrainian immigrants in comparison to Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking immigrant communities? 6) Which networks did Ukrainians use in order to get to Portugal and Spain at the initial stage of migratory flows and have they have changed over time? 7) Are there particularly favourable policies towards certain immigrant community in Portugal and Spain? 8) Why does competition among Ukrainian associations exist in Spain, whereas in Portugal this has not been the case? 9) Are there any common goals between Ukrainian and other immigrant associations that they pursue together? 10) Which are the areas where immigrant associations can effectively promote immigrant interest?

Most of the secondary literature, reports and statistics regarding integration of Ukrainian community in Portugal were obtained from Luso-American Foundation and documentation center of the High Commissariat of Integration and Intercultural Dialogue in Lisbon during the field work in Lisbon.

³⁸ Semi-structured interviews are interviews where a short list of open-ended questions is prepared in advance, but where spontaneous questions arise during the interview depending on the respondents' answers to the prepared open-ended questions; Mathew Miles, A. Michael Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis*, (SAGE Publications, 1994), 37.

1.6. Measurement of the variables

The study variables are measured for each case in the following way:

Each of the indicators will be measured separately to determine the rate of integration of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain and Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal	
Variable	Indicators
The dependant variable: rate of integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> percentage of immigrants working in a certain sector ; the predominant gender for each type of occupation rate of the average salary; unemployment among immigrants (Ukrainians); language proficiency.
The control variables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Time of arrival Age groups Immigration networks Settlement patterns (relative share of most significant age groups) Religious affinity (dominant religion) Political representation (access to participation in local and municipal elections)
The study variable: demand for skilled-labour force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Average level of education relative to that of the native population; level of education of immigrant communities in Spain and Portugal ; existence of government-sponsored projects aimed at filling the gap in high-skilled personnel among the natives through re-qualification of immigrants; share of Ukrainian participants in these projects.

The dependant, control and study variables are measured using statistics available from the National Institute of Statistics of Portugal and Spain, the data from Colectivo IOE (sociological investigations center in Spain), the Spanish Institute of Sociological Investigations and the High Commissariat of Integration and Intercultural Dialogue together. These measures are corroborated using OECD analytical reports on international migration trends and surveys conducted among Eastern European immigrants by Center of Geographic Studies of the University of Lisbon and Ukrainian immigrant community in Murcia, Spain.

Chapter II - Background to the Cases

Before proceeding to key explanation of difference in integration rates between Ukrainian communities in Portugal and Spain, it is necessary to introduce the reader to the background and key features of Ukrainian immigrant groups in Iberian peninsula. In the following two chapters I will focus upon control variables which are similar for both communities and therefore maybe ruled out as explanations for the differential rates in integration in Portugal versus Spain. In doing so, I will first outline in the second chapter the time of arrival, region of origin, push and pull factors, the demographics and immigration networks which determined immigrant flows from Ukraine to Spain. The third chapter will include the analytical part consisting of three sub-chapters with detailed analysis for variables of religious affinity, settlement patterns and political representation that might be powerful enough to explain successful integration for one immigrant community and failure in another.

2.1. The time of arrival

The first signs of intensive outflow of Ukrainians abroad emerged already in the beginning of 1990s having roots in times of Gorbachev's "perestroika" and received the name of the "Fourth wave" or "zarobitchanska hvylya"³⁹. This phenomenon was common for all countries of the post-Soviet space, resulting in mass emigration from Russia, Moldova and Belarus. The leading destination for this emigration wave quite unexpectedly became Southern European countries as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy. But what are the distinct features of the "fourth wave"? Ukrainian immigrants in Spain and Portugal during 1990s were pioneers

³⁹ Labour wave

because state integration policies turned out to be insufficient for adaptation of such a numerous, unknown and unexpected wave completely different from traditional Portuguese-speaking and Spanish-speaking immigrants from the countries' former colonies and from states with a similar historical past. In addition, hardly any pre-established immigration networks existed for Eastern European immigrants, the overwhelming majority of which became illegals until large-scale regularization campaigns were initiated in both cases. More importantly, Portuguese and Spanish citizens had no idea what Ukraine was nor where it was situated⁴⁰.

The western part of Ukraine is the main contributor to the immigration flows to Portugal and Spain, over 70% of immigrants come from Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivs'k, Khmel'nitsky, Rivne and Volyn' regions. This fact is hardly surprising as Western regions of Ukraine are distinguished by long and dynamic tradition of emigration which can be attributed to a combination of several determinants - to name but a few, common historical past and linguistic ties resulting in close links with Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, religious affinity leaning closer to Western Europe (dominance of Greek-Catholic and Catholic religions). Furthermore, Western Ukraine is a cradle of ideas of unified state for Ukrainians divided between Russian and Habsburg Empires and afterwards for the independent Ukrainian state in Soviet times. Finally, notwithstanding rich cultural heritage, poor economic status and high rate of unemployment in the region were the main contributing factors of outmigration.

⁴⁰ Interestingly enough, scholarship and mass media in Ukraine refer to "the Fourth Wave" as exclusively labour migration because it was considered to be of temporary character and guided by economic motivations. However, Ukrainians in Portugal and Spain considered themselves part of the diaspora and regarded the term "labour migrants" as an insult.

2.2. Immigration networks

So far we have highlighted the time of arrival and background of Ukrainian immigration to Iberian peninsula. The above logic leads us now to examining the transformation of immigration networks with the pace of time and gradual adaptation of Ukrainian immigrants to the receiving societies. According to Douglas Massey, migration networks are “set[s] of interpersonal ties that link migrants, former migrants and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through bonds of kinship, friendship and shared community origin”⁴¹. In this respect, of special relevance for a type of networks are the motivations for migration which are usually divided by scholarship into micro- (individual motivations) and macro-factors (demand for labour force in receiving state, salary rate, economic and political stability in sending and receiving countries, liberal/restrictive legislation).

The macro factors for emigration of Ukrainians, and Eastern Europeans as a whole, were of a clear economic nature, namely, the reluctance of Portuguese and Spanish nationals to be employed in low-skilled segments of labour market such as construction, agriculture and domestic service combined with unprecedented outburst in these sectors and demand for labour; the promise of higher-paying jobs served as another primary reason for emigration (the average salary in Ukraine in the beginning of 1990s was less than 100 USD/month; salaries were even lower in Western Ukraine)⁴². In addition, liberal Spanish and Portuguese immigration laws and lack of consistent immigration policies allowed them to become employed in both countries

⁴¹ Massey (1988:386) in Ivan Light, Parminder Bhachu, Stavros Karageorgis, “Migration networks and immigrant entrepreneurship” in *Immigration and Entrepreneurship*, eds. Ivan Light, Parminder Bhachu (Transaction Publishers, 2004), 25.

⁴² Maria Ioannis Baganha, Jose Carlos Marques and Pedro Gois, “The Unforeseen Wave: Migration From Eastern Europe to Portugal”, in *New Waves: Migration From Eastern to Southern Europe* (Lisbon: Luso-American Foundation, 2004), 34.

without submitting official documents. Once there, they had the opportunity to obtain legal residence and work permit under the numerous regularization campaigns⁴³.

Generally, motivations for migrating to Spain and Portugal fall into the same category as motivations of other immigrant groups, according to the Spanish Immigration Survey in 2009. The primary reasons were economic, including a better quality of life (40%), a better job (39.0%), and the lack of employment back home (23.3%)⁴⁴. The survey conducted in Portugal among 735 Ukrainian immigrants in June-December 2002 illustrates that 80% of respondents emphasized economic motivations; for 58% the decision to migrate was planned long in advance of departure⁴⁵. According to another survey conducted among 100 Ukrainians in autonomous province of Murcia, 44.9% of respondents gave economic situation as the primary cause of emigration; 33.2% - contacts or friends; 18.2% - family members already residing in Spain; finally, 3.2% - designated political reasons for decision to leave⁴⁶. Family reunification is not yet a major reason for migration of Ukrainians to Spain and Portugal. Among the micro determinants of the decision to migrate for Ukrainians is usually the intention to earn money either to purchase an apartment back in Ukraine or establish small and medium enterprises, feed family members who were very often unemployed or with negligible salaries, pay for the education of their children, and so on.

Previously, historical and linguistic ties between the sending and receiving state (e.g. former colonial links, language, religious animosity, length of relations) was the most important

⁴³ Interview with Pavlo Sadokha, March 31 2009.

The most significant regularization campaign for Ukrainians in Portugal took place between January and November 2001, as a result of which the number of legal Ukrainian residents in Portugal jumped from non-existence to 62,041 (the most numerous community) according to SEF statistics.

⁴⁴ Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes 2007, available from <http://www.ine.es/revistas/cifraine/0109.pdf>, accessed 13 May 2009

⁴⁵ Maria Ioannis Baganha, Jose Carlos Marques, Pedro Gois, 34.

⁴⁶ Antonia Sanchez Urios, 521, available from <http://ldei.ugr.es/cddi/uploads/tesis/SanchezUrios2007.pdf>, accessed 28 May, 2009.

determinant of migration to the Iberian peninsula. It seems that Massey's approach to defining migration networks fits more into this category, where already strong, old enough and well-organized immigrant community in the receiving state is established as in case of Cape Verdeans and Brazilians in Portugal or Ecuadorians in Spain who had access to political representation. In these cases, immigration occurs through family ties, friendship or through similarity in place of origin which guarantees easier access to information, assistance in the search for employment opportunities, renting dwellings, legal advice, contacts with governmental and non-governmental organizations helping immigrants in adaptation to the receiving society.

However, in case of Ukrainian immigration to Portugal and Spain, such networks only became operative seven or eight years ago. Prior to this, in the beginning of 1990s, the only opportunity to get access to labour opportunities in these countries were informal clandestine networks. They served as the main conduit for Eastern European immigration to Southern Europe. In this respect, several factors should be mentioned as contributing to rapid growth in immigration flows to Spain and Portugal. Firstly, recruitment of Ukrainians took place through so-called "tourist agencies" and "travel agencies," which emerged rapidly and offered attractive opportunities for employment and arranged transit, fake documentation and housing. Ukrainian citizens applied for short-term visas in the German embassy in Kyiv; having crossed the German border, they could freely travel to any other destination in borders of the Schengen zone⁴⁷.

In the end of 1990s tens of buses with Ukrainian "tourists" with short-term tourist visas were stopped by Spanish and Portuguese customs officials and instead of summer clothes and swimming suits they found in the suitcases instruments for construction works. Not surprisingly, these buses were then sent back to Ukraine⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ Interview with Yuriy Unhurian, April 1, 2009

⁴⁸ Interview with Yuriy Unhurian, April 1, 2009..

The activity of these “travel agencies” would not have been possible without umbrella organizations such as criminal mafia networks that appeared rapidly in the 1990s and competed among themselves for influence. Another facilitating factor was the assistance of corrupt officials in embassies, consulates and customs officials who were the links of one criminal chain. The field survey conducted among 735 Eastern European immigrants under the auspices of Center for Social Studies of University of Coimbra (Portugal) shows that 96% of immigrants entered Portugal with a short-term visa and 57% obtained this visa in the German embassy⁴⁹. In addition, 16 % of respondents suffered from mafia attacks⁵⁰. In this respect, Fred Krissman’s critique of Massey’s approach to migrant networks due to underestimation of informal migration channels during the initial stage of immigration is especially relevant⁵¹. Indeed, Massey’s definition fails to consider the interests of employers, networks of recruitment agencies and corrupted state officials.

Clear gender differences could be observed between the two immigrant communities. In the case of Portugal, males were recruited by such “travel agencies” in order to fill the gap in labour force due to unprecedented outburst in construction segment starting in middle 1990s. Such a huge demand for workers was determined by the necessity to build modern exhibition center for Expo-1998 in Lisbon, Vasco Da Gama bridge, the longest bridge in Europe (17 kilometers), the bridge of 25th April, another bridge connecting central and periphery parts of Lisbon. Of course the most significant construction project was hosting of European Football Championship “Euro-2004” entailing not only the reconstruction of major football stadiums but

⁴⁹ Maria Ioannis Baganha, Jose Carlos Marques and Pedro Gois, 29-30.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Fred Krissman, “Sin Coyote Ni Patron: Why the “Migrant Network” Fails to Explain International Migration”, *International Migration Review* 39 Number 1 (Spring 2005):4-44.

the complete renovation of infrastructure of the whole country⁵². In the case of Spain, recruitment was not gender-determined due to lower demand for construction workers, which was supplemented by huge agricultural segment and the need for domestic workers who were mainly female. This could explain the initially mixed flows of Ukrainians to Spain which later became predominantly female (65%)⁵³.

2.3. Dominant age groups

So far we have examined the time of arrival and background of Ukrainian immigration to the two countries on the Iberian peninsula. Now I would like to turn to analysis of predominant age groups for both communities. According to 2007 statistics in Spain, of the roughly 10,000 Ukrainians who arrived that year, three age groups were of approximately similar size, namely, 16-24, 25-34, 35-44 with slight dominance of the second (25-34)⁵⁴. The number of foreigners under 16 years amounted to almost 2,000 people, demonstrating noticeable growth since 2001 which allows us to make the assumption that the process of family reunification is gaining importance not exclusively for traditional immigrants to Spain as Latin Americans but also for Ukrainians. For comparison, in 2003 among 9,000 immigrants arrived, the age group under 16 years amounted only to 1,200 children with very clear predominance of the 25-34 age group⁵⁵.

⁵²Interview with Alina Esteves, March 30, 2009.


⁵³ “Ukrainci na Bat’kivschini Servantesa” (Ukrainians in Motherland of Servantes), *Lvivs’ka Gazeta*, no. 141 (10 August 2005), available from <http://www.gazeta.lviv.ua/articles/2005/08/10/7798/>, accessed 16 March, 2009. [In Ukrainian]

⁵⁴ National Statistics Institute of Spain, Residential Variations Statistics 2007, “Immigration coming from abroad by country of origin and nationality age groups” available from <http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.do>, accessed May 10 2009.

⁵⁵ National Statistics Institute of Spain, Residential Variations Statistics 2003, “Immigration coming from abroad by country of origin and nationality age groups”, available from <http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.do>, accessed May 10 2009.

As the table below demonstrates, two noticeable transformations can be observed in the age demographics of Ukrainian immigrants. Firstly, stable growth takes place in the age groups “under 16 years” and “16 to 24 years” with the only exception being 2003 and 2005 in the latter case. Simultaneously, the “25-34” age group still being predominant is decreasing in relative weight along with the “35-44” group. It should be emphasized that significance of young “16-24” and “25-34” age groups serves as the evidence of labour character of immigration among Ukrainians.

Table 2.3.1




Source: National Statistics Institute of Spain

So far we have examined the distribution of Ukrainian immigrants among major age groups. Now let us turn to similar analysis for the Portuguese case. The table 2.3.2 below demonstrates distribution of age groups among Ukrainian immigrants according to statistical data of 2006. In this respect, four largest age groups can be clearly defined, namely, “30-34”

(4,117), “35-39” (3,492), “40-44 years” (3,034) and 45-49 years (2,856). Furthermore, calculation of the relative share of three most significant age groups among Ukrainians in Portugal and Spain allows us to compare their significance for both cases⁵⁶.

Table 2.3.2



Source: Foreigners and Border Service of Portugal⁵⁷

Having done this, we can infer that for Ukrainians in Spain “25-34” age group accounts for 27.3 % which is the most significant result. The “16-24” amounts to 21.9% and the “35-44” age group – to 18.3%. Dominant age groups in Portugal are somewhat older than in the Spanish case with almost similar weight of “25-34” (29.2%), “35-44” (28.9%) age groups and noticeable gap with “16-24” group (only 5.8% of all immigrants). The statistical analysis of the relative weight of each of the age groups suggests that labour force in Spain is somewhat younger than immigrants in case of Portugal.

⁵⁶ Calculation is made on the basis of 2006 statistics for each country.

⁵⁷ Portal SEF, “População estrangeira residente em Portugal, por nacionalidade e sexo, segundo o grupo etário”, available from http://www.sef.pt/documentos/35/residentes_GE2005.pdf, accessed March 23 2009.

Chapter III - Alternative Explanations for Differential Integration of Ukrainians in Portugal and Spain

3.1. Settlement patterns of Ukrainians in Spain and Portugal

Ukrainian communities in Portugal and Spain exhibit similar settlement patterns with high levels of dispersion all over the country. In case of Portugal, the primary explanation is the immigrants' search for all kinds of available employment opportunities in construction where demand for labour exists all over the country due to the boom in renovation of infrastructure in Portugal to prepare to host two major events, Euro-2004 and Expo-1998⁵⁸. In the Spanish case, the major explanation for dispersed settlement pattern of Ukrainians is tied to huge demand for domestic workers all over the country. Furthermore, seasonal and permanent employment in agriculture is available in most regions unlike Portugal where it is concentrated only in the northern part. Therefore, immigrants in Spain very often either live in their employers' houses (in case of domestic workers) or rent an apartment nearby together with other immigrants.

In case of Portugal, the second reason for the dispersed settlement can be attributed to the fact that Ukrainians were not entitled to rehousing programs, such as PER launched in 1993-1998 under the auspices of the government for eliminating shanty towns and slums where immigrants mostly settled⁵⁹. Africans and Brazilians were the major beneficiaries of these programs, who settled the immigrants in certain areas of the cities in new buildings called "social housing". Instead of solving the problem of immigrant segregation, these programs increased it by creating immigrant ghettos. This is why, not being entitled to any housing project and due to

⁵⁸ Interview with Alina Esteves, March 30 2009.

⁵⁹ 5. The Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and Their Children in Portugal", *International Migration Outlook 2007* (OECD, 2007), 308-309.

predominantly illegal status of immigrants in 1990s, the only option left to Ukrainians was renting affordable apartments throughout the country. Finally, along with other Eastern European immigrants, Ukrainians pursued completely different housing strategies as compared to Africans, Asians or Latin Americans. This fact can be attributed to their experience in their home countries of renting shared apartments rather than living in shanty or segregated areas.

Having highlighted possible causes of the unique settlement patterns of Ukrainian immigrants in the Iberian Peninsula, let us verify level of their dispersion with statistics. According to the latest information (2007), Ukrainian community in Portugal accounts for roughly 40,000 people with around 5,000 of illegal residents⁶⁰. As statistics illustrates the most significant Ukrainian communities can be found in Faro (8,825), Lisbon (6,857), Leiria (4,321), Porto (3,708), Aveiro (3,205), Santarem (2,349), Setubal (1,845), Braga (1,329), Coimbra (1,247) and Madeira (950). From data illustrating the rate of concentration of Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal we can observe that there has been a fairly even distribution of immigrants across Portugal⁶¹. By comparison, Cape Verdeans and Brazilians exhibit extremely high levels of concentration in Lisbon. Taking into account that the Cape Verdean community accounts for 63,000, roughly 60% is concentrated in the Portuguese capital. In case of Brazilians around a third of their community (66,354) is also settled in Lisbon, whereas Ukrainians exhibit the lowest levels of concentration from all immigrant communities with only 1/8 of the population residing in the capital⁶².

⁶⁰ Portal SEF, “População Estrangeira em Território Nacional
http://www.sef.pt/documentos/59/Populacao_%20Estrangeira_TN06.pdf

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

At the same time, in Spain, there are roughly 48,000 legal residents from Ukraine and 150,000 illegal immigrants, three times higher than legal number⁶³. Having counted the annual inflows of Ukrainians from 2001 until 2009, we can infer that the largest communities are settled in Madrid (20,319), Malaga (8069), Alicante (6,514), Barcelona (6,345), Valencia (6166) and Murcia (5761)⁶⁴. It is worth emphasizing that reliable figures only exist for legal residents. Taking into account that legal immigrants constitute only third of total Ukrainian population in Spain, this amount becomes considerably higher.

Two major trends can be observed in pattern of settlement among Ukrainian immigrants in Spain and Portugal. Firstly, Ukrainians tend to reside mostly in large urban centers due to the fact that the availability of employment opportunities in cities is significantly higher. At the same time, in both countries, as it was already emphasized, these immigrants are equally dispersed all over the country. This is in particular confirmed by Residential Variation Statistics. In the year 2007, about 9,299 Ukrainian immigrants arrived in Spain, roughly 1/3 (3,256) of all newcomers have settled in provincial capitals and 1,398 in cities with a population of over 100,000 inhabitants⁶⁵. It should be also emphasized that Ukrainians are quite evenly distributed all over the country: from small villages (less than 10,000) to middle-size localities (from 20,000 to 50,000) which is also confirmed by the statistics⁶⁶.

Having analyzed the data from 2001 until 2007, we can observe that unlike Ukrainians, Latin Americans (Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba, Colombia) and Asians (India, Philippines, India,

⁶³ Interview with Vadim Plotnikov, May 3 2009.

⁶⁴ National Institute of Statistics of Spain, “*Immigrations coming from abroad by country of nationality and province of destination 2001-2009*”, available from <http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%2Ft20%2Fp307&file=inebase&L=1>, accessed March 24 2009.

⁶⁵ National Institute of Statistics of Spain, “*Immigration of foreigners coming from abroad classified by country of origin and size of destination municipalities*” available from <http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%2Ft20%2Fp307&file=inebase&L=1> accessed 27 April 2009

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Indonesia) without exception are characterized by extremely high levels of concentration in provincial capitals accounting for approximately half of the immigrant community. Curiously enough, the settlement pattern of Moroccans, Senegalese and Algerians looks very similar to that of Ukrainians with approximately one third of total population living in capitals of autonomous regions and the rest of immigrants evenly dispersed all over the country⁶⁷. The most plausible explanation for this phenomenon could be involvement in similar segments of the labour market. Settlement pattern of Romanians and Bulgarians is also quite different from that of the Ukrainians: with the highest percentage living in provincial capitals and towns less than 10,000 people. Taking all things into consideration, we can make a hypothesis that Ukrainians and Africans tend to be employed in similar occupations (construction, industrial sector) while Bulgarians and Romanians most probably are employed in agriculture and therefore exhibit high concentration in rural areas. Another interesting phenomenon is that since the first appearance in statistics in 2001, the pattern of settlement of newly-arrived Ukrainians is similar to that of Bulgarians, having transformed in 2002 and continuing until 2007, the last year of available statistics⁶⁸.

Having analyzed the settlement path pursued by Ukrainians in both Portugal and Spain, we can certainly emphasize particular pattern of their dispersion all over the country which can be explained by the fact that Ukrainians tend to look for various kinds of employment. Notwithstanding low levels of spatial concentration, the most significant groups are still settled in large urban centers which is attributed to abundant employment opportunities and probability

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ National Institute of Statistics of Spain, *“Immigration of foreigners coming from abroad classified by country of origin and size of destination municipalities”*, available from <http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.do?path=/t20/p307/a2001/11/&file=020622.px&type=pcaxis>, accessed 27 April 2009.

to find a job place in short amount of time, that is characteristic for immigrants occupied predominantly in low-skilled segments of labour market.

3.2. Religious affinity

Does religious affinity of immigrant groups influence their chances for integration? Jeffrey Reitz argues that it is the phenomenon of “visible communities” that has a decisive influence on integration rates and that religious views play only a secondary role in social integration⁶⁹. In this respect, the fact that the Catholic immigrant communities from Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Angola in Portugal experience higher rates of discrimination in employment than the non-Catholic Ukrainians confirms Reitz’s hypothesis⁷⁰.

Interestingly, a common feature of cultural integration policies in both Portugal and Spain is their assimilation character aimed at “absorbing immigrants both culturally and linguistically, while restricting ‘other’ languages and beliefs to the private realm. Assimilation is not an explicit policy, but a social demand”⁷¹. Nevertheless, Portugal and Spain have extremely divergent experiences towards incorporating immigrants with different religious backgrounds. From available statistical data we can infer that Portugal faces virtually no challenge in accommodating newcomers of various religious views. The most significant communities, Cape Verdeans, Brazilians and also citizens of Portuguese-speaking countries (PALOP) are Catholic. The percentage of immigrants of Muslim (0,06%), Hindu, Jewish (0,08%) or other religious backgrounds is so negligible that it does not raise any significant discussion in the Portuguese

⁶⁹ Jeffrey Reitz, Rupa Banerjee, Mai Phan and Jordan Thompson, “Race, Religion, and the Social Integration of New Immigrant Minorities in Canada”, University of Toronto, September 2008, available from <http://www.utoronto.ca/ethnicstudies/RaceReligion.pdf>, accessed May 23 2009.

⁷⁰ Interview with Alina Esteves, March 30, 2009.

⁷¹ Jan Niessen, Yongmi Schibel and Cressida Thompson (eds.), “Spain” in *Current Immigration Debates in Europe: A Publication of the European Migration Dialogue*, September 2005, available from <http://www.isp.org.pl/files/9023916790766642001129731818.pdf>, accessed May 12 2009.

society⁷². On the contrary, we can observe completely the opposite situation in Spain where Moroccan community is the most numerous and obstacles in employment, housing segregation and deteriorating public perception regarding this particular group are the factors prompting heated debate over immigration among politicians as well as Spanish citizens⁷³. Not yet repeating the path of Austria, France and the Netherlands, where extreme-right parties have gained popularity among local population, accommodation of cultural differences is considered to have serious repercussions for the Spanish society in the nearest future.

One of the reasons why Ukrainian immigrants enjoy positive public perception from native Spanish and Portuguese is their religious affinity and relatively close mentalities. First of all, most of the Ukrainian immigrants come from Western Ukraine regions which are predominantly Greek-Orthodox and Roman Catholic. Secondly, even Ukrainians of Orthodox faith face few problems in adapting to Spanish and Portuguese societies due to the absence of a wide gap between their traditions and those of the host societies in contrast to the experience of Muslims, Hindu, and Buddhists in Spain and Portugal⁷⁴. From this perspective, the cultural integration path pursued by Ukrainians perfectly fits the policies of assimilation of Portugal and Spain towards immigrants. Both immigrant communities are completely comfortable in learning traditions and values of the receiving society, its language at the same time keeping this adaptation in balance with protection of their own traditions and culture as well as religious practices⁷⁵.

⁷² Maria Lucinda Fonseca, Alina Esteves, "Migration and New Religious Townscapes in Lisbon", *Immigration and Place in Mediterranean Metropolises* (Lisbon: Luso-American Foundation, 2002), 261.

⁷³ Bettina Ambach, Spain's Muslims: Living on Society's Edge, available from <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1146159,00.html> (accessed June 1, 2009).

⁷⁴ Nuran Bayram, 106.

⁷⁵ Interview with Yuriy Unhurian, April 1 2009.

In roughly 10-15 years that Ukrainians have been in the Iberian Peninsula, their Greek-Orthodox communities have held Sunday mass in Portuguese Catholic churches and have even built their own churches in Lisbon, Evora, Faro, Fatima, Vila Nova de Gaia, Viseo and Toras Vedres with the permission of the Portuguese government. During the early years, attending Portuguese and Spanish religious prayers were the only way to socialize and worship. Weekly meetings in the Catholic churches laid foundation for establishing of first immigrant associations⁷⁶.

Having no separate building where we could do masses, on Sundays we gathered in one of the Catholic churches which kindly gave us shelter, turned on the recorder with church songs and were praying.... In times of desperation and turmoil, religion was the only thing which helped us to move on with faith in future⁷⁷

3.3. Access to political representation

Ukrainians do not enjoy access to political representation either in Spain or in Portugal. This is due to one main reason: both countries follow “the principle of reciprocity” in granting political rights to residents, meaning that only citizens of those states which have bilateral agreement with Spain or Portugal are entitled to access to political representation. In the Spanish case, citizens of Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Norway possess the right to vote on municipal elections whereas voting rights on national elections are only accessible to citizens of Spain and naturalized immigrants⁷⁸. Furthermore, immigrants from Latin America, Portugal, Andorra, the Philippines and Equatorial Guinea have also the right to naturalize after

⁷⁶ Interview with Larysa Ponomarenko, May 16, 2009.

⁷⁷ Interview with Larysa Ponomarenko, May 16, 2009.

⁷⁸ Carmen Gonzalez Enriquez, “Spain”, in *European Immigration : A Sourcebook*, eds. Anna Triandafyllidou, Ruby Gropas (Ashgate, 2007), 328.

two years of continuous uninterrupted legal residence in Spain⁷⁹. In other words, countries that have special traditional historical ties and linguistic affinity with Spain may have access to Spanish citizenship. Such a policy is aimed at preserving the Iberian-American heritage and facilitating immigration flows which are less likely to breed negative attitudes inside the receiving society towards foreigners. In accordance with Ley de Extranjería de España (Law on the rights of Aliens and Social Integration), other legal residents, including Ukrainians, receive the right to naturalize only after ten years of legal residence in Spain⁸⁰.

Similar model of political participation for foreigners applies to Portugal. Firstly, voting on local elections is exclusively a privilege for nationals of those countries which have concluded “reciprocal agreements” with Portugal. These are Cape Verde as Portuguese-speaking African country and main traditional sources of immigration to Portugal and Brazil, which citizens are entitled to the voting rights on local elections after two years of legal residence in Portugal and be elected after four years accordingly⁸¹. Unlike Cape Verdeans for example, which are the oldest and the strongest community with well-established transnational links and financial support, Ukrainians are not represented in municipal councils, they can not become members of political parties. For the reasons outlined above, the only source of political representation are immigrant associations which mostly perform social and cultural functions. Recently, a positive change for Ukrainian immigrants took place - the Portuguese law became even more liberal and the principle of privileged access to citizenship status of immigrants from countries having traditional historical and linguistic ties was abolished. This is to say, Ukrainians are placed on an

⁷⁹Ibid., 327

⁸⁰ Ley de Extranjería de España, available from <http://servicios.laverdad.es/servicios/especiales/leyextran/>, accessed 15 May, 2009.

⁸¹ Ana Teixeira and Rosana Albuquerque, *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Portugal*, (Oldenbourg: Politis research project, 2005), 19-20, available from <http://www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de/download/Portugal.pdf> (accessed, April 27, 2009)

equal footing with Cape Verdeans and Brazilians who are entitled to naturalization after only 6 years of continuous stay in the country⁸².

It should be stressed that the rate of naturalization is considered by scholars to be a significant indicator of political representation for immigrants. As Ruud Koopmans claims, high rates of acquisition of citizenship point to “an open political environment for migrant mobilization” where high levels of political activity among immigrant associations and their representatives could be observed⁸³. Although the importance of access to political representation can not be underestimated, rate of naturalization in both Spain and Portugal in case of Ukrainians is extremely low. This can be explained by the fact that dual citizenship is not allowed under Ukrainian law. Immigrants do not want to lose their Ukrainian citizenship because opportunity for visiting relatives and families will be significantly impeded⁸⁴. In addition, the Ukrainian state enforces policies aimed at prevention of naturalization among Ukrainians abroad, namely, new law will enter into force on January 1st 2010 reintroducing visas for European Union citizens.

The second explanation for low significance of political representation for immigrants including Ukrainians can be attributed to the priority of stable employment in the hierarchy of determinants of integration. This is not surprising because without employment the prospects for integration of a person entitled to citizenship are very low. It is questionable at all whether Ukrainians or any other immigrants deprived of political rights actually need them in order to achieve integration. The case of Ukrainians as well as of Eastern European immigrant community in both Spain and Portugal could be a perfect illustration of evolving “postnational

⁸² Interview with Fernando Machado, April 2, 2009.

⁸³ Ruud Koopmans, “Migrant Mobilisation and Political Opportunities: Variation Among German Cities and a Comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands”, *Journal of ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no. 3, (May 2004), 456.

⁸⁴ Interview with Pavlo Sadokha, March 31, 2009.

model of citizenship” first introduced by Yasemin Soysal⁸⁵. She claims that present realities diminished the importance of citizenship for achieving complete inclusion into the receiving society⁸⁶. It seems that entitlement to an equal set of rights with Portuguese and Spanish nationals (cultural, social), excluding political representation, for immigrants having permanent residence permit does not impede their integration for a short-term perspective as stable employment is the first priority. This is also true for those immigrants not planning to permanently settle in the receiving state.

In contrast, for those Ukrainians who might eventually stay in Portugal and Spain and still be reluctant to refuse Ukrainian citizenship, the lack of citizenship coupled with the lack of access to political representation in municipalities, consultative bodies and political parties might become quite a relevant issue for social integration. Put another way, without access to political sphere in long-term perspective, Ukrainian immigrants might have difficulty achieving full integration with their host societies.

⁸⁵ Yasemin Soysal, 136-163.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Chapter IV – Measuring Indicators of the rate of integration of Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal and Spain

So far we have focused on examining control variables being similar in each of the cases and therefore lacking explanatory power for differences in integration rates of Ukrainians in Spain versus Portugal. Through the course of research essential measures of integration rate were identified as plausible in order to confirm the variance in patterns of integration (dependent variable) in the two cases, namely, the community's predominant segment of occupation, relative salary rate, unemployment level and language proficiency. It should be emphasized that these four fundamental determinants are linked to each other directly. Each of these indicators will be tested for both cases and measured accordingly.

4.1. Occupational concentration of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain and Portugal

In this sub-chapter I will examine how available employment opportunities combined with division in gender produce more successful integration in the case of Portugal compared to Spain. There are a number of explanations for the gender divisions of the same immigrant community in the two cases. In “Laws of Migration” Ravenstein argues that males demonstrate higher levels of mobility than females in migration flows⁸⁷. Unlike males, women in search of employment opportunities abroad tend to generally make short-distance journeys. However, his theory is completely inapplicable for Ukrainian immigrant flows to Iberian peninsula. In the case

⁸⁷ Rachel Silvey, “Geographies of Gender and Migration: Spatializing Social Difference”, *International Migration Review*, vol. 40, no. 1 (Spring 2006), 67.

of Portugal, males are the dominant gender and in the case of Spain – females, taking into account that Ukrainians travel to another edge of Europe making the same long-distance journeys.

Explanations of gendered occupational concentration due to women's traditional subordination in households are also too weak to shed light on clear-cut division in employment among Ukrainian women and men in Portugal and Spain. It seems more appropriate, however, to look for the answer in scholarship arguing that transformations taking place inside the labour market prove to be the strongest determinants of occupation type. This is to say, division in employment opportunities between Ukrainian men and women is not considered to be “the result of inequalities in the attainment of human capital that are structured outside of the labor market”⁸⁸. As interviews with Heads of immigrant associations and academics have shown, Ukrainian immigrants in Spain and Portugal do not have the opportunity to choose their occupation even in low-skilled sectors: women go to clean flats, babysit or pick fruits and vegetables, while males work in construction, industry and more difficult types of agricultural work⁸⁹.

“(...) these demands [for female workers] are dependant on changes in employment for local women, changing conceptions of the family and the existence of weak welfare state regimes. In case of Spain, women usually find jobs rejected by local/Spanish women, as in the case of extended system of live-in domestic service in southern European countries”⁹⁰.

Domestic work, service industry and agriculture are traditionally regarded as female types of occupation. According to the 2007 statistics of Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration,

⁸⁸ Susan Hanson, Geraldine Pratt, *Gender, Work, and Space*. (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 5.

⁸⁹ Interview with Vadim Plotnikov, May 3, 2009; Interview with Pavlo Sadokha, March 31, 2009.

⁹⁰ Natalia Ribas-Mateos, 174.

89% of females turned out to be involved in segments of the labour market such as services and agriculture. A peculiar feature of such occupations is complete dependence of the worker's legal status on the employer; this is especially true for live-in domestic workers. Legal status of agricultural workers is also uncertain due to the seasonal character of their occupation and temporary work permits. Secondly, the lack of language skills limits the access of Ukrainian women to other types of domestic work as well as the more visible service industry including restaurants and hotels, where Brazilian women in case in Portugal are concentrated and Latin American females in the case of Spain⁹¹.

According to the Ukrainian Institute of Diaspora Studies research, 65% of immigrant women in Spain are females and 70% of immigrants in Portugal are males⁹². The determining factors for these gender divisions were addressed in Chapter 3 in "Immigration networks". In 2007 according to the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, among 38,118 Ukrainians registered with paying social security, the gender breakdown was approximately on the same level with slight predominance of females showing 3.4% increase since 2005 and 122.9% since 2004 (19,118 in comparison to 19,000 males)⁹³. Such a noticeable change in relative share of female immigrants in the previous few years suggests that previously they were illegal and therefore were not registered among workers with social security payments. As reported by the Spanish government the percentage of immigrant women is only slightly higher than the percentage of immigrant men, while according to the Ukrainian Institute of Diaspora the share of Ukrainian women is much higher than the share of Ukrainian men in Spain (65%). Such an

⁹¹ OECD International Migration Outlook, 2007, 298.

⁹² "Ukrainci na Bat'kivschini Servantesa" (Ukrainians in Motherland of Servantes), *Lvivs'ka Gazeta*, no. 141 (10 August 2005), available from <http://www.gazeta.lviv.ua/articles/2005/08/10/7798/>, accessed 16 March, 2009. [In Ukrainian]

⁹³ Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración (Ministry of Labour and Immigration of Spain), Trabajadores extranjeros afiliados a la Seguridad Social en alta laboral, según sexo, por país de nacionalidad (Foreign Workers with Social Security classified by sex and country of nationality) http://www.mtin.es/ESTADISTICAS/ANUARIO2007/TEX/tex07_top_HTML.htm

almost 15% difference in statistical results could be explained by the fact that Ukrainian women in Spain are mostly employed with informal type of work contracts compared to men. It is interesting that in the case of Portugal the gender division is even more lopsided, with 70% predominance of males throughout 2001-2005 and 30% of females⁹⁴. The data of the Ukrainian Diaspora Institute confirms these statistics, which can be explained by the fact that only approximately 5 thousand of 40 thousand of Ukrainians residing in Portugal are illegal⁹⁵. For the reasons outlined above, domestic work and agriculture will be classified as “non-autonomous” and “invisible” occupational sectors as compared to “autonomous” and “visible” sectors including construction, and manufacturing where workers are less dependent on their employers for housing and work contracts and have greater access to state institutions.

Analysis of the first indicator, occupational concentration of Ukrainian immigrants in both countries, allows to verify assumption concerning predominance of “visible” occupations among Ukrainians in Portugal versus “invisible” among Ukrainians in Spain. In the first case, available statistical data are somewhat old dating back to December 2002. Segmental breakdown of Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal illustrates that around 47% are occupied in construction, nearly 25% - in industrial sector, around 15% - in agriculture and fisheries, less than 10% - in hotel and restaurants industry and even less – in other kinds of services (domestic)⁹⁶. Therefore, we can make several important conclusions from available data: almost 75% of labour migrants are involved in “visible” sectors of labour market versus only 25% of those employed in occupations in which the probability of illegal employment is high. Furthermore, statistics


⁹⁴ Populacao Estrangeira Em Territorio Nacional Por nacionalidade segundo o sexo e distribuiçao por Distritos (Foreign Population in Portugal According to Gender and Distribution among Municipalities), available from http://www.sef.pt/documentos/56/DADOS_2007.pdf [In Portuguese]

⁹⁵ Interview with Pavlo Sadokha, March 31, 2009.

⁹⁶ Jose Sousa, *Os Imigrantes Ucranianos em Portugal e os Cuidados de Saude* (Ukrainian Immigrants in Portugal and Healthcare) (ACIME: Lisbon, 2006): 73. [In Portuguese]

concerning Ukrainian work contracts in 2003 illustrated in the table below confirms their concentration in “visible occupations”, construction sectors (41.3%) and manufacturing industry (24.2%). However, service industry still accounts for 13.1 % along with restaurants and hotel (6%) where predominantly women are employed.

Table 4.1.1




Source: Data from Maria Lucinda Fonseca and Maria Ioannis Baganha (eds.) *New Waves: Migration from Eastern to Southern Europe*, (Lisbon: Luso-American Foundation, 2004), 98.

In the case of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain, more detailed statistics is available allowing us to trace changes in the community’s occupational profile since 2004. Analysis of their employment patterns will be made from the first year of reliable data, 2004, until the latest data of 2007. The table below indicates the segmental concentration of Ukrainian immigrants throughout 2005-2007. We can see that roughly 54% of Ukrainian immigrants are employed in services and agriculture and this share remains relatively stable throughout the period of analysis. Generally speaking, we can also observe the trend that in all four sectors where Ukrainians are represented no noticeable transformations occur with regard to their relative proportions across

the occupational sectors. Therefore, assumption concerning predominance of Ukrainians in Spain in “invisible sectors” is also confirmed by statistics.

Table 4.1.2



Source: Data from the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration

Further evidence of the higher demand in Spain for agricultural and service workers can be inferred from data about Spanish quota system for immigrants. In accordance with Spanish Organic Law which underwent two transformations in the year 2000 and two in 2003, labour migrants are accepted through quotas for occupation sectors experiencing underemployment. On the basis of available statistics from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Spain, the highest demand for labour could be observed in agriculture with an annual quota of 18,389 workers (among them only 962 permanent permits), followed distantly by hotel services (a 3,280 quota with roughly 2000 permanent permits, the construction sector (2,722 total and 2,227 permanent permits) and metal industries (1,641 total with 1,616 permanent permits)⁹⁷. These

⁹⁷ Albert Serra (ed.), “Spain”, in *Current Immigration debates in Europe: A Publication of the European Migration Dialogue*, eds. Jan Niessen, Yongmi Schibel and Cresida Thompson (CIDOB Foundation: 2005), 9.

figures indicate the most vulnerable situation is in agriculture, which is not surprising due to the seasonal character of such employment calling for temporary work permits. After its validity expires, most of these immigrants without renewed work contracts are likely to fall into an irregular status. In contrast, construction and industries workers have predominantly permanent permits which makes their situation more stable in terms of legality and less dependent on the will of employer.

4.2. Unemployment rate among Ukrainians in Spain and Portugal

A second indicator testifying to the rate of integration of immigrants is the unemployment rate among immigrants. This measure is used as an essential evidence of economic integration in annual assessments of immigrant labour market insertion by OECD. Notwithstanding high-skilled or low-skilled occupation type, successfulness of immigrant integration is usually measured on the basis of comparison between unemployed native and foreign-born population⁹⁸. Barbara Dietz also singles out importance of unemployment figures for immigrant and native population because they allow determining the extent to which foreign-born population falls under “risk category”⁹⁹.

The number of Ukrainians in Spain receiving unemployment benefits increased dramatically in first quarter of 2009 with 117, 7 % rise in comparison with the previous year¹⁰⁰. Those Ukrainians registered with the need for employment by March 2009 amounted to 9,268

⁹⁸ *Jobs for Immigrants*, Vol. 1 Labour Market Integration in Australia, Denmark, Germany and Sweden (OECD, 2007), 32.

⁹⁹ Barbara Dietz, “Aussiedler in Germany: From Smooth Adaptation to Tough Integration”, in *Paths of Integration. Migrants in Western Europe (1880-2004)*, (eds.) Leo Lucassen, David Feldman, Jochen Oltmer, 118-136 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996), 128.

¹⁰⁰ Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración (Ministry of Labour and Immigration), Resumen Ultimos Datos (Februar 2009), available from <http://www.mtin.es/es/estadisticas/resumenweb/RUD.pdf>, accessed on May 19 2009.

which constitutes 116,1% increase in comparison with 2008¹⁰¹. More importantly, the most recent data indicate that their situation in the labour market is the second worst after Bulgarians and Romanians.

In the case of Portugal, especially peculiar feature of the labour market is higher employment level of immigrants in comparison to Portuguese native population. According to the Institute of Employment and Professional training, the most affected by economic downturn among immigrant communities are Brazilians (8,722), and the second are Ukrainians with 4,751 persons, which constitutes around 11% of total Ukrainian immigrant community¹⁰². In this respect, it is hardly surprising that even in such dramatic conditions Ukrainians are not hurrying back home because the situation in Ukraine is far worse than in Portugal and Spain and economic downturn together with mass unemployment are intensified by political crisis and instability. Taking all evidence into account, the unemployment among Ukrainians in Portugal is 7% lower than in Spain. This can be explained by the fact that now Spain experiences the worst crisis since the beginning of 1980s in construction sector and also less demand for female domestic workers due to a deteriorating economic situation among native Spaniards themselves¹⁰³. Because of the relatively worse employment situation in Spain, a significant number of Ukrainian immigrants are looking for employment opportunities in Portugal¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² The Institute of Employment and Professional Training, "Monthly statistics. January 2009", available from <http://www.iefp.pt/estatisticas/MercadoEmprego/EstatisticasMensais/Documents/2009/Estatistica%20MensalJaneiro2009.pdf>, accessed May 9, 2009.

¹⁰³ Natalia Ribas-Mateos and Laura Oso, "Filipinas in Spain Learning to do domestic labour", in *Asian Migrants and European Labour Markets*, (eds.) Ernst Spaan, Felicitas Hillmann and Ton van Naerssen, 159-176 (New York: Routledge, 2005), 170.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Yuriy Unhurian, April 1, 2009.

4.3. Level of Income

Relative salaries among Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal and Spain allow us to measure the integration level in each of the cases. This indicator is traditionally recognized as of highest weight in evaluating labour market integration by scholars. Conclusions are made on the basis of comparison of salary rate among immigrants and native population in same segment of occupation¹⁰⁵. The deeper the gap between indicators, the less chances exist for the immigrants to achieve desired occupational status and more discriminated the situation of foreign-born population in the labour market is considered to be. In addition, small average salary rate for certain immigrant group usually correlates with level of qualifications, language possession and length of stay in country¹⁰⁶. A survey conducted by group of researchers of Center of Geographic Studies of Lisbon University in June-December 2002 using a sample of 735 Eastern Europeans, 90% of which constituted Ukrainian immigrants, shows that 33% of respondents receive between the salary of 450-600 Euro per month, 28% of respondents – 301-450 Euro, nearly 14% - between 601-750 Euro and only 9,5% - 751-900 Euro per month¹⁰⁷.

According to the study of labour market conditions for immigrant population in Spain conducted in 2004, we can infer several important tendencies¹⁰⁸. Firstly, statistical analysis clearly demonstrates a direct relationship between the salary rate and level of qualification and gender of the immigrants. In this way, 53% of females earn between 301 and 600 Euros with average salary of 425 Euro, male immigrants earn on average 850 Euros with 40% of males

¹⁰⁵ Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America. A Portrait*. (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1996), 88.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 89.

¹⁰⁷ Maria Ioannis Baganha, Maria Lucinda Fonseca, 35.

¹⁰⁸ The study was conducted with assistance of Red Cross and government of Madrid autonomous community. The city of Alcala de Henares was chosen as case study due to density of immigrant population (12% of total population) and representation of all major immigrant groups, namely, Romanians (30%), Colombians (10%), Ecuadorians (6%), Ukrainians (6%), Moroccans (4%), Argentines (2%).

indicated a salary rate of more than 850 Euro per month¹⁰⁹. Immigrants in illegal situation receive an average salary of 450 Euro comparing to the average salary of legal immigrants of 790 Euros¹¹⁰. Therefore, the fact that only 1/3 of Ukrainians in Spain, according to the most optimistic accounts, are in a regularized situation and 65% of all immigrants are women employed in “invisible” segments of labour market, we can make an assumption that these factors (gender, legal situation and type of occupation) combined determine the lower rate of integration of Ukrainians in Spain.

4.4. Language proficiency of Ukrainians in Portugal and Spain

The last measure of integration rate which I will examine in my study is possession of language skills of the host country. It should be emphasized that this indicator is situated on the crossroads between the structural and intercultural integration dimensions serving at the same time as measure of successful insertion into the labour market, ability to adapt to the receiving society culture through everyday communication with the natives¹¹¹.

The only available source regarding the Spanish language proficiency level among Ukrainians is questionnaire conducted among 100 Ukrainians in the autonomous province of Murcia. The findings can be regarded as credible due to the fact that settlement of Ukrainians in this autonomous region is one of the most concentrated in Spain (accounting for roughly 10% of total population). In addition, the Head of Ukrainian association in Murcia also confirmed that the results of this research are telling. Thus, 65% of respondents possessed medium level of

¹⁰⁹ Carmen Marina Lopez Pino, El Mercado Laboral de la Poblacion Inmigrante en Espana, un Estudio de Caso. *INNOVAR*, no.23, (January-June 2004): 135, available from <http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/inno/v14n23/v14n23a10.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2009.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Barbara Dietz, 131; Audrey Singer, Susan W. Hardwick and Caroline B., 214.

Spanish proficiency which means that Ukrainians have more or less sufficient level of Spanish for using in everyday life, however, the largest share have huge problems with written and spoken Spanish. 20% of respondents indicated high level of Spanish language knowledge (spoken, written and read) and 15% demonstrated low level of proficiency in Spanish with little usage of Spanish even in everyday life.

At the same time, field work conducted among 735 Ukrainians in Portugal demonstrates the following situation with the Portuguese language proficiency: 72.2% of respondents indicated medium level of spoken Portuguese, 60.1% - written Portuguese and 60.5% - read Portuguese. Fairly good command of Portuguese language was emphasized by 13.3% regarding spoken language, 17.6% - read language and only 5.5% - written Portuguese. Finally, 17% of respondents could neither read, write nor speak the Portuguese language.

Analysis of language proficiency among Ukrainians in Spain and Portugal suggests that the relative share of people with poor command of both languages is approximately the same, whereas the percentage of Ukrainians with medium and high level of Portuguese is considerably higher than in Spanish case. Interestingly enough, we can also observe similar trend regarding worse possession of written and read language in both countries. Taking all things into consideration, higher proficiency in the Portuguese language confirms more successful integration among Ukrainians in Portugal in comparison to Spain.

Having measured employment situation of immigrants in both countries on the basis of occupational concentration, unemployment rate, average salary and language proficiency, we can argue that three indicators have confirmed hypothesis concerning more successful integration of Ukrainian immigrants in labour market in Portuguese case in comparison to Spain.

Chapter V - Demand for high-skilled labour force

For the purpose of evaluating the explanatory power of the last study variable, the following indicators will be measured: 1) rate of education of native population 2) rate of education of immigrants 3) the unemployment rate by educational level in Spain and Portugal 4) state-sponsored projects aimed at filling the gap in high-skilled occupations, and 5) the share of Ukrainians in these projects. In this part of evaluation, I argue that overqualification of Ukrainians in Spain and Portugal in comparison to native population facilitates their access to high-skilled occupations in Portugal because of its need for highly-qualified workers. While this is an urgent problem there, Spain does not suffer from a lack of high-skilled professionals, which explains its failure to implement comprehensive skills re-qualification projects for immigrants. Finally, the overall low level of qualification among immigrants in Portugal and their higher educational attainment among immigrants in Spain, allows Ukrainians to become the main beneficiaries of integration projects in Portugal.

Before proceeding to a comparison of the indicators, it is necessary to provide the reader with a brief background of the problem of underqualification in Portugal and the reasons for its absence in case of Spain. Despite striking similarities between Portuguese and Spanish historical past during the last decades, namely, dictatorships of Salazar and Franco that came to an end approximately at the same time, in 1974-1975, and whose policies had a lot in common, attention paid to educational policies was different. During Salazar's dictatorship, priority was given to employment as early as possible in order to contribute to economic growth of the country. For this reason, overwhelming number of Portuguese youth began to work already after the 4-6 years

in school, so that they rarely had more than 9 years of formal education¹¹². With little consideration for the long-term consequences of such an employment strategy, Portugal began to face a significant problem with respect to human capital. By the middle of 1970s, the illiteracy level of Portuguese rose to 20% in the age group of 15 to 64, and more importantly, only 5% had secondary education with 12 years¹¹³. Simultaneously, policies to promote education in Spain during Franco dictatorship were on the contrary directed at increasing the education rate among Spanish citizens and centralization of the education system. More importantly, education served as one of the tools to eliminate separatism in the Basque region and Catalonia by prohibiting instruction of the Basque and Catalan languages¹¹⁴.

The problem of underqualification of the Portuguese population was uncovered during interviews with academics from University of Lisbon Alina Esteves and Lisbon Institute of Sociological Research Fernando Machado. Both experts explained the higher rate of integration of Ukrainians in Portugal as a function of two core reasons. First, as it was emphasized above, Portuguese exhibit extremely low levels of education resulting in university supply for student places exceeding demand for them¹¹⁵. The medical sphere according to the interviews experienced the most severe lack of personnel. For a long time, this problem was addressed by inviting Spanish doctors to move to Portugal who are not needed in the Spanish labour market. However, the salaries for them had to be high enough to entice them to come. Facing the problem of integration of army of immigrants who are employed predominantly in low-skilled occupations, the Portuguese government solved two problems at the same time by launching re-

¹¹² Interview with Fernando Machado, April 2, 2009.

¹¹³ Review of National Policies of Education. Tertiary education in Portugal (OECD 2007), available from <http://books.google.com/books?id=VHp10Lm5rrMC&pg=PA73&dq=education+rate+of+Portuguese+population&ie=e2wWSvHWD56GyASer-jeAQ#PPA72,M1>, accessed May 21, 2009.

¹¹⁴ Daniele Conversi, *The Basques, Catalan and Spain. Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization*. (London, Hurst & Company, 1997), 111-125.

¹¹⁵ Interview with Fernando Machado, April 2, 2009.

qualification projects. First, immigrants received access to high-skilled jobs, which are in most cases restricted due to the lack of language knowledge in case of Eastern Europeans or lack of education in case of Africans and Brazilians, and free re-qualification in Portuguese universities. Secondly, the government would not have to pay higher salaries to attract Spanish doctors¹¹⁶. For the purpose of verifying the hypothesis concerning the lack of high-qualified workers in Portugal, let's now turn to measurement of statistical indicators.

Measuring the first statistical indicator, educational attainment of Portuguese and Spanish population, will further clarify the need for high-skilled labour force. According to 2005 OECD data, Portugal has the lowest educational attainment in tertiary education among OECD countries (leaving only Turkey behind) with only 9% for "45-54" years, exactly the generation which was born and received education during Salazar's dictatorship; by contrast, the percentage of persons with tertiary education in the "25-34" age group constitutes 21 %¹¹⁷. The same statistics concerning Spain demonstrates 20% attainment of tertiary education among "45-54" age group and 42% - in "25-34" age group. Analysis of the data indicates that educational attainment of both age groups of the Spanish population is two times higher than of similar age groups among Portuguese citizens.


Secondly, measuring the general level of educational attainment of immigrant communities in both Spain and Portugal helps us to understand why Ukrainians benefited from re-qualification projects in Portugal the most in comparison to other significant immigrant groups employed in low-skilled labour as Brazilians and Cape Verdeans. As OECD data in Table 5.1 illustrate, Portugal has the lowest share of male immigrants with upper-secondary/post-

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Education at Glance (OECD 2007), 29, available from <http://books.google.com/books?id=zTcJ9OyH8msC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Education+at+a+Glance+2007&ei=OXAWSqTVFZHAzQTC7bmFBw#PP1,M1>, accessed 21 May, 2009.


secondary education (28.3%) and tertiary education (18%) among the OECD member countries. Only Italy lags behind Portugal in percentage of immigrant population with tertiary education.

Table 5.1



Source: Data from OECD International Migration Outlook 2007, 292.


At the same time, data presented in Table 5.2 below allows us to compare the education levels among immigrant communities in Spain and Portugal. The proposition concerning overall successful performance of immigrants in the first case is confirmed by the fact that pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education levels are predominant among immigrants in Portugal whereas prevalence of highest qualification levels is typical of immigrants in Spain where the most significant groups of immigrants by educational attainment are those with upper-secondary (34,6% for females and 31,8% for males) and tertiary education (26,3% for females and 23,8% for males). Taking all evidence into consideration, higher educational background of immigrants in Spain is confirmed.

Table 5.2

Source: Data from OECD International Migration Outlook 2007, 292.

Third, the proposition needed to be verified is competition among immigrants in access to requalification programs in case of Spain and Portugal. I argue that Ukrainians are facing greater competition in access to requalification projects and high-skilled occupations in Spain due to the fact that other immigrant groups possess high educational levels received in their home countries. In the case of Portugal, Ukrainians face less competition from the other main immigrant communities, the Brazilians and Cape Verdeans. For example, Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal exhibit the highest percentage of tertiary education of 29.2% in comparison to 20.6% for Brazilians and 2.1% for Cape Verdeans¹¹⁸.

¹¹⁸OECD Migration Outlook 2007, 292.

Table 5.3¹¹⁹


As we can infer from the Table 5.3 the educational background of the most numerous immigrant groups in Spain is indeed higher than similar indicators in case of Portugal. The share of people in possession of university degree (Bachelor, MA) in most cases exceeds the 60% mark. Furthermore, relative number of immigrants with primary educations is also lower than in case of Brazilians, Cape Verdeans and other African communities.

Finally, the last indicator I'm going to measure analyses unemployment rates according to qualification level in Spain and Portugal. In doing so, I'm trying to get an idea of demand for people with higher education in both countries. Table 5.4 demonstrates a direct correlation

¹¹⁹ Ciudadanos del mundo, ciudadanos de Bulgaria, available from http://www.ceimigra.net/observatorio/images/stories/mirada_25.bulgaria.pdf, accessed May 4, 2009; Ciudadanos del mundo, ciudadanos de Argelia, available from http://www.ceimigra.net/observatorio/images/stories/mirada_26.argelia.pdf, accessed May 4 2009; Ciudadanos del mundo, ciudadanos de Bolivia, available from http://www.ceimigra.net/observatorio/images/stories/mirada_17.bolivia.pdf, accessed May 4 2009 ; Ciudadanos del mundo, ciudadanos de Rumania, available from http://www.ceimigra.net/observatorio/images/stories/mirada_11.rumania.pdf, accessed May 4 2009 ; Ciudadanos del mundo, ciudadanos de Colombia, available from http://www.ceimigra.net/observatorio/images/stories/mirada_12.colombia.pdf, accessed May 4 2009.

between the level of education and rate of unemployment in both countries. In Portugal, the unemployment rate among individuals with tertiary education is negligible (0.3%), suggesting a significant demand for highly-qualified persons in Portugal in comparison to Spain where unemployment rates for highly educated people are considerably higher.

Table 5.4



Source: Data from “Education at Glance”, OECD, 2007
<http://books.google.com/books?id=zTcJ9OyH8msC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Education+at+a+Glance+2007&ei=OXAWSqTVFZHAzQTC7bmFBw#PP1,M1> (accessed May 21, 2009).

Having done the measurements for indicators which statistically support the hypothesis concerning greater demand for high-skilled workers in Portugal, I now turn to the association between the demand for highly-skilled labor and rates of immigrant integration. In this respect, two unprecedented integration programs launched by Portuguese state deserve special attention. The first is the “Professional Integration of Immigrant Doctors” program launched in the framework of immigrant integration plan by Portuguese National Council of Ministers, ACIDI (High Commissariat for Integration and Intercultural Dialogue) and funded by Galoust Gulbenkian Foundation and Ministry of Health with assistance of Jesuit Refugee Service. It aims

at requalification of immigrant doctors¹²⁰. During the first phase, 120 successful applicants were chosen, including 50 Ukrainians, 18 Russians and 30 Moldavians¹²¹. 106 of 120 doctors were subsequently employed. The second phase of the integration project was already launched with 150 immigrant doctors taking part. Universities are responsible for translating documents, two-year education, free-of-charge language training, exams, internships in hospitals and free of charge recognition of diplomas. Successful applicants receive a monthly scholarship of 500 Euro and tuition waivers for two years of requalification and education in the Portuguese language. A similar integration project was launched for re-qualification of immigrant nurses funded by EQUAL initiative, which granted free re-qualification for 106 nurses among which 45 were Ukrainians¹²². As it is still in the process of implementation we can not make conclusions concerning the employment of applicants.

As interviews with Heads of Ukrainian associations have shown, language programs are also of greatest importance for Ukrainians as well as for other Eastern Europeans in Portugal. The most significant project, “Portugal Acolhe,” is currently in action¹²³. This is also an initiative of the Portuguese government and ACIDI providing immigrants with 150 hours of free of charge language courses and 50 hours of “citizenship courses”¹²⁴. From 2002 till 2007, approximately 7 thousand immigrants received language training. Unfortunately, statistics regarding nationalities participating in these courses is not available. However, it’s logical to assume that as there are no other significant communities in Portugal other than Eastern European (Ukrainian, Moldovan,

¹²⁰ Jesuit Refugee Service, available from http://www.jrsportugal.pt/projectos/ProgMedImig_en.asp , accessed 22 May 2009.

¹²¹ International Migration Outlook 2007 (OECD, 2007), 297.

¹²² Interview with Fernando Machado, April 2, 2009.

¹²³ Interview with Pavlo Sadokha, 31 March 2009.

¹²⁴ “Portugal Acolhe”, available from <http://www.iefp.pt/formacao/ModalidadesFormacao/ProgramaPortugalAcolhe/Paginas/ProgramaPortugalAcolhe.aspx> , accessed May 23 2009.

Russian) and Portuguese-speaking countries, the former are the main beneficiaries of this program. In the Spanish case, the same free-of charge requalification projects implemented in Spain are not operating¹²⁵. The Head of Ukrainian association in Murcia, Larysa Ponomarenko, confirmed the fact that the various integration projects regarding inclusion in employment, housing, health care exist in each of autonomous provinces. However, requalification, recognition of diplomas and language courses have to be paid for by the immigrants themselves, depressing the rates of participation¹²⁶.

The purpose of the present chapter was examination of the principal cause of variable rates of integration among Ukrainians in Spain and Portugal. Their explanatory power was tested through both statistical indicators and information gleaned from interviews with academics and leaders of Ukrainian immigrant associations in both countries. The concluding chapter will briefly address the results of the undertaken research.

¹²⁵ Interview with Vadim Plotnikov, May 3, 2009.

¹²⁶ Interview with Larysa Ponomarenko, May 16, 2009.

Chapter VI - Conclusions and policy implications

Why do some immigrant communities face obstacles in integration with the receiving society while other immigrant groups successfully overcome barriers of integration? It is hardly possible to grasp all of the crucial determinants in every case. My dissertation therefore specifically focused on explaining the divergent rate of integration of Ukrainian immigrants in Spain versus Portugal. In the course of research the core determinant of differential integration rates (dependent variable) was identified on the basis of its explanatory power. The following sub-chapters aim at analyzing briefly the essence of each of the stages I went through in order to determine the strength of the study variable.

In order to come up with viable explanations for differential rates of integration in both cases I have first mapped out other possible determinants for variations in the dependant variable. Through the course of research the time of arrival, region of origin, push and pull factors, the demographics, immigration networks along with similarity in religious affinity, settlement patterns and political representation which determined immigrant flows from Ukraine to Spain were singled out as control variables not in possession of explanatory power regarding the difference in the dependant variable.

In the second frame the core indicators accounting for variable levels of integration among Ukrainians in Portugal and Spain were measured. Occupation types, relative salary rate, unemployment level and language proficiency in each of the cases were evaluated using experience of previous research. In this respect, it should be emphasized that predominant occupation type combined with gender effectively demonstrates more successful integration in case of Portugal in comparison to Spain. It is worth mentioning that both in Portugal and Spain

the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian immigrants are involved into low-qualified segments of labour market. In this respect, two types of employment were distinguished, “autonomous” and “visible” versus “non-autonomous” and “invisible”. In the first case, construction and industrial sector were classified as “autonomous” due to structure of employer-worker relations which do *not* entail a complete dependence on one’s employer for one’s legal status, housing and permanent stay. Furthermore, these segments of the labour market are subject to constant state inspections and control and therefore they are classified as “visible”. Such occupation types are predominant for immigrants in Portugal, a fact confirmed by statistical data. At the same time, agriculture and service industry, in particular, domestic service, are classified as “invisible” due to almost complete dependence of workers on their employers for their work permit (very often being employed without legal job contract), and housing, as a lot of maids and baby-sitters are live-in workers. In addition, immigrants involved in agriculture are mostly entitled only to temporary work permits and very often after their expiration fall under irregular status.

The Ukrainian community in Spain is overrepresented in such “invisible” and “non-autonomous” occupations. The different gender profiles of the Ukrainian immigrants in Portugal versus Spain are also worth mentioning, because roughly 70% of males are settled in Portugal and roughly 65% of women in Spain. Another fact testifying to consequences of predominant occupation type is that nearly 66% of Ukrainians in Spain are illegal. Therefore, the direct correlation between employment of women in “invisible” and “non-autonomous” occupations in Spain versus predominance of males and “visible” occupations in Portugal indicated more successful integration level in the second case.

In addition, comparison of relative salary and unemployment rates indeed confirmed the hypothesis concerning limited scope of integration among Ukrainian immigrants in case of Spain

due to lower average income for women who constitute the 65% share of total Ukrainian population in this country. Furthermore, it was shown that the rate of salaries for immigrants employed in informal economy lag far behind the salaries in “visible occupations”. The comparison in last indicator of language proficiency between the two cases also pointed to lower possession of language skills among Spanish immigrants. For the reasons outlined above, the argument concerning more successful integration among Ukrainians in the Portuguese case was confirmed through measurements of the indicators of integration rate.

Finally, in the third frame I have shown how the high educational level of Ukrainians in Portugal allow them to benefit from the problem of underqualification of the Portuguese population. As OECD reports have shown, Portugal is the least educated country among OECD members. According to research and statistical data, Ukrainians in Portugal exhibit considerably higher educational attainment in comparison to the native population and therefore have a higher rate of overqualification than the traditional immigrants from Portuguese-speaking former African colonies and Brazil. In order to address the lack of high-skilled labour, the Portuguese government in partnership with non-governmental organizations launched an unprecedented set of re-qualification projects for immigrants. The first phase of such projects aimed at filling the gap in the medical professions, the most urgent problem to be solved for Portugal. Notwithstanding the fact that these re-qualification programs were aimed at all immigrants, it was proved that Ukrainians constituted the largest share of successful applicants in both of the projects. In this way, through participation in re-qualification initiatives, the Ukrainian community of Portugal obtained wider access to employment in high-skilled labour.

Spain, on the other hand, does not have such a huge problem of underqualification, which was also confirmed by statistics. The general educational background of immigrants in Spain is

higher due to significant communities of Romanians and Bulgarians along with highly-educated Filipinos and Latin American immigrants. Therefore, even if such integration projects were to be launched, Ukrainians would face much stiffer competition in applying for such programs.

By providing insight into the variable levels of integration between Ukrainians in Portugal versus Ukrainians in Spain, this dissertation seeks to contribute to the scholarship on immigrant integration. I show that the host society's need for highly-skilled labour, for example, may be used as a tool for elaborating policy strategies for immigrant inclusion by states experiencing a lack of high-skilled professions on one side and marginal situation of immigrants from the other. The example of Portugal is a perfect laboratory in this respect where during the last decade a breakthrough in immigrant integration was achieved through the creation of an effective network of coordinating institutions, governmental as ministries, ACIDI and non-governmental institutions for promoting immigrant integration (Galoust Gulbenkian Foundation, Jesuit Refugee Service, Caritas, Red Cross etc.). Such cooperation helped to pinpoint the precise areas where the immigrant community faced difficulties in integration. Secondly, governments very often face a lack of cooperation and contacts with certain immigrant communities. For this reason, well-coordinated immigrant associations can assist in establishing fruitful partnerships that can promote inclusion of immigrants in the host society. As a concluding thought, I would like to quote Mario Sepi's speech at the launching of European Integration Forum: "Immigrant integration should be seen not as a "problem" in our society but as "a resource"¹²⁷.

¹²⁷ New Integration Forum Sets Immigration Up as a Resource, Not a Problem, <http://beta.vita.it/news/view/91252> (accessed 27 May 2009)

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