

CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY

EUROPEANIZATION OF SWITZERLAND AND SLOVAKIA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE DEGREE MASTER OF ARTS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES DEPARTMENT

BY

Milan Zvara

PROFESSOR LÁSZLÓ CSABA, SUPERVISOR

BUDAPEST, HUNGARY

3 JUNE 2009

15 589 WORDS

Abstract

This thesis tries to shed more light on the phenomenon of Europeanization of two different sets of countries, the EU member state, Slovakia and non-EU member state, Switzerland and highlight that Europeanization without membership is possible and could be even deeper and more successful. The comparison of party politics and labor and migration policies in both states is carried out with the help of the number of veto players as a variable. The methodology which is used is mostly the qualitative analysis which is the last chapter combined with quantitative analysis. Unexpectedly, even though the Switzerland has higher number of veto points and is not a member state, in both areas is either equally or even more Europeanized than Slovakia.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my girlfriend, Kristína Dudová, to whom I am very thankful for her support and patience throughout the both, the time of writing my thesis and studies at the CEU.

Table of contents

ABSTRACT	II
DEDICATION	III
TABLE OF CONTENTS	IV
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: HOW EUROPEANIZATION FITS INTO THE CONTEXT OF SWITZERLAND AND SLOVAKIA	4
CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	11
2.1 Slovakia.....	11
2.2 Switzerland	12
CHAPTER 3: PARTY POLITICS IN SWITZERLAND AND SLOVAKIA AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT UNDER EUROPEANIZATION PRESSURE	14
3.1 Slovakia.....	15
3.1.1 Before and during 1998 parliamentary elections	15
3.1.2 Post- 1998 elections developments	19
3.1.3 Post-2006 development	23
3.2 Switzerland	26
3.2.1 Opposition to the EU	27
3.2.2 Governmental behavior	31
3.2.2.1 Road transport negotiations	32
3.2.2.2 Taxation of savings, bank secrecy.....	33
3.3 Commonalities and differences	35
CHAPTER 4: LABOR AND MIGRATION POLICY IN SWITZERLAND AND SLOVAKIA AND THEIR INTERACTION WITH EUROPEANIZATION	37
4.1 Slovakia.....	37
4.2 Switzerland	40
4.3 Commonalities and differences.....	44

CONCLUSION	45
BIBLIOGRAPHY	48

Introduction

Europeanization is a process closely connected with globalization and the main process which shapes the face of current Europe. More visible is in the cases of small and open economies such as Switzerland and Slovakia. Both of these countries face this phenomenon with the same objective and that is to become successful, raise its standard of living and take advantage of the new economic order, where globalization dominates.

Seemingly very different countries, with Switzerland facing Europeanization from outside and on the other hand Slovakia from the inside, have also a lot of commonalities such as size, population, lack of resources, mountainous terrain with its typical way of life, multi-ethnic consistency of states, openness, export orientation and heavy dependency of their economies on the EU. Slovakia is fostering the whole Europeanization process with the consensus of the elites and general population while Switzerland is trying to withstand whole process with support of elites and only minority of population.

In spite of the fact that Europeanization is mostly thought of as an influential phenomenon which contributes significantly to changes in key areas of member states such as politics and policies, in reality very often the changes are just outcomes of domestic peculiarities and developments, which could have some origin in Europeanization but also do not have to. On the other hand there are also special cases in Europe such as Switzerland undeniably is, which are often thought of as a just marginally influenced by the Europeanization phenomenon, but in reality the changes which are present in domestic politics and policies are sometimes even more influenced and Brussels-origin than changes in some member states. My two case studies, Switzerland and Slovakia are good examples of the aforementioned peculiarities in the context of

Europeanization. I describe below two areas of public life, politics and labor with closely connected immigration policy and prove that in spite of the stereotypical view of these two countries' Europeanization, the former seems to be influenced at the same scale than the latter or even in some aspects more and Europe driven changes more deeply rooted than on the other hand, Slovakia which seems at the first sight already fully integrated. I will use two different methodology of comparison.

Why are party politics and labor and migration policy chosen for a comparison? As Borzel points out, there are three main categories which allow analyzing the effect of the EU on member states, polity policy and politics.¹ Due to lack of space I chose just two, politics and policy and compared them within the framework of Europeanization in the member state and in the non-member state. The main hypothesis here is to be that member state with lower number of veto players and lower or similar degree of misfit to EU is expected to be more Europeanized in the context of these two chosen areas than non-member state, Switzerland, which has higher if not the highest number of veto players in Europe and similar or lower degree of misfit. Even though the Europeanization theories shows opposite and despite the Switzerland has the highest number of domestic veto players in Europe Europeanization here is deeper and more rooted, although often not so evident than in the Slovakia, which has a low number of veto players and is considered as a textbook case of Europeanization-driven changes.

Throughout the work is taken into consideration the impact of veto players in both states on Europeanization. The reason behind choosing the number of veto players is explained below in the first chapter in which is also elaborated the issue of Europeanization literature. In the

¹ Tanja A. Borzel, "Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States," in *The Member States of the European Union*, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christiann Lequesne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 49.

second chapter are described the historical events which are closely connected with developments in both countries. The third chapter is comparative chapter of party politics in both states using qualitative analysis and at the end of the chapter are preliminary findings. The fourth chapter compares labor and migration policies of both countries using quantitative analysis method partially qualitative with analysis. Similarly at the end of the chapter are preliminary findings which also with the finding from previous chapter are later elaborated in the last part, conclusion. In the conclusion I will draw some new insights on the aforementioned Europeanization theories, which will come out of comparisons of these two areas.

Chapter 1: How Europeanization fits into the context of Switzerland and Slovakia

There has not been written anything in the comparison of Switzerland and Slovakia. In the case of Europeanization of Switzerland and alignment with the EU were written several books and articles in journals both at home and in several important research centers throughout Europe. The books, such as *Switzerland and the European Union*², *The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change*³ or single chapters in books, such as *Migration and the Externalities of the European Integration*⁴ and *Managing European Union Enlargement*⁵ talk mostly about the general developments and Swiss interaction with the EU rather than going deeper to the Europeanization theories and Swiss place within them. For Europeanization theories in the context of the Switzerland are more theoretical sources articles from variety of journals or research institutes written by Haverland,⁶ Church,⁷ Fischer et al.⁸ and Sciarini et al.⁹ Contributing are also papers presented by Ehs¹⁰ and Jochun and Mark¹¹ at the international conferences in Montreal and Berlin.

² Clive H. Church, ed., *Switzerland and the European Union*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).

³ Hanspeter Kriesi and Alexander H. Trechsel, *The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁴ Grete Brochman and Sandra Lavenex, "Neither In nor Out," in *Migration and the Externalities of the European Integration*, ed. Sandra Lavenex and Emek Ucarer (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 55 – 75.

⁵ Jaime de Melo, Florence Miguet, and Tobias Müller, "The Political Economy of Migration and EU Enlargement: Lessons from Switzerland," in *Managing European Union Enlargement* ed. Helge Berger and Thomas Mouts (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 129 - 169.

⁶ Markus Haverland, "Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? Improving Case Selection in Europeanization Research," *West European Politics*, 29, No.1 (January 2006), 134 - 146.

⁷ Clive Church, "The Context of Swiss Opposition to Europe," ('Opposing Europe Research Network,' Working Paper No 11, 2003).

⁸ Alex Fischer, Sarah Nicolet and Pascal Sciarini, "Europeanization of a Non-EU Country: The Case of Swiss Immigration Policy," *West European Politics* 25, no. 4 (October 2002): 143 - 170.

⁹ Pascal Sciarini, Alex Fischer, and, Sarah Nicolet, "How Europe hits home: evidence from the Swiss case," *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 3, (3 June 2004): 353 – 378.

¹⁰ Tamara Ehs, "An Unwritten History: The Europeanization of Switzerland" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007).

However, in the case of the Europeanization of Slovakia, not like in Switzerland, this phenomenon was just scarcely researched at home, mostly abroad and there was not any dedicated conference which dealt with this issue. Unlike in Switzerland there are not whole books dedicated to Slovakia, just single chapters written by Rybar¹² or Henderson,¹³ then majority of Europeanization writing is in articles of journals or research papers. The works of Pridham,¹⁴ Octavian,¹⁵ Mair¹⁶ or Haughton¹⁷ talk about the EU leverage and conditionality which is either effective or ineffective and writings of others such as Harris¹⁸, Divinsky¹⁹, Metzger²⁰ and Olejarova²¹ describe the Europeanization processes in Slovakia more generally. There is also numerous literature which deals with Europeanization of new member states in theoretical perspective such as contributions by Sedelmeier²², Schimmelfennig²³ and Bulmer et al.²⁴

¹¹ Margit Jochum and Jeannette Mak, "Europeanization without membership, membership without Europeanization?" (paper presented at the International Conference on 'Europeanization of public spheres?', Political Mobilization, Public Communication, and the European Union, Berlin, June 20 – 22 2003).

¹² M. Rybar, "Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia," in *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party System* ed. S. Jungerstam-Mulders (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 147 - 177.

¹³ Karen Henderson, "Slovak Political Parties and the EU: From Symbolic Politics to Policies," in *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. by P. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldova (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 134 – 167.

¹⁴ Geoffrey Pridham, "The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: Mečiar and Dzurinda Governments Compared," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54, No. 2, (2002): 203 – 229.

¹⁵ Aron Octavian, "The Impact of Europeanization upon Party Systems in Slovakia and Romania," *Transition Studies Review* 15, no. 2 (September 2008): 273 – 280.

¹⁶ Peter Mair, "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems," *West European Politics* 23, no.4 (October 2000): 27-51.

¹⁷ Tim Haughton, "What role has Europe played in Party Politics in Slovakia?" 2005, under www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/wp2timhaughton.doc (accessed on May 26, 2009).

¹⁸ Erika Harris, "Europeanization of Slovakia," *Comparative European Politics* 2, (2004): 185 – 211.

¹⁹ Boris Divinsky, *Labor Market - Migration Nexus in Slovakia: Time to Act in a Comprehensive Way*, (Bratislava: International Organization for Migration, 2007).

²⁰ Megan M. Metzger, "Slovakia and the European Union: Complexities and Contradictions," (Honors Thesis, Macalester College, 2007).

²¹ Eva Olejarova, "Labor Migration as a Socio-Economic Phenomenon – Slovakia and the Czech Republic in a Comparative Study" (master's thesis, CEU, Budapest, 2007).

²² Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Europeanization in the new and candidate states," *Living Reviews in European Governance* 1, no. 3 (9 November 2006), under <http://livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-3> (accessed May 25, 2009).

²³ Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union" in *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, eds. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (New York: Routledge, 2005), 143-172.

²⁴ Simon Bulmer and Christiann Lequesne, ed., *The Member States of the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

In the real world comparison of the Europeanization effect, according to Haverland, there are just two options, first, to compare a member state with another member state, and, second, a member state with a non-member state.²⁵ If there is a chance to choose a non-member state for Europeanization comparison, there are also two options, either Norway or Switzerland, which are in a way similar to member states.²⁶ The problem with choosing the non-member state is that most of the Europeanization theories with their definitions were constructed for changes in the relations of the European Union to its member states and just Kux eleven years ago for the first time indirectly included Switzerland, when he defined the term as: “Decision-making in the western European states is becoming more Europeanized in the sense that what happens now at the level of the European Union (EU) penetrates more and more areas of national policy-making.”²⁷

I started my research with connection with M. Haverland, who claims that if the effect of the *acquis communautaire* is confined just to the EU borders, learning and other indirect mechanism can also be developed outside the EU in the countries such as Norway and Switzerland.²⁸ Similarly Fischer et al. based on the studies of non-EU member states such as Switzerland, claims that EU influence on domestic politics is not limited to member states.²⁹ Therefore they needed a broader definition of the Europeanization, which was one defined by Ladrech:³⁰ “Europeanization is an incremental process reorienting the direction and the shape of

²⁵ Markus Haverland, “Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? Improving Case Selection in Europeanization Research,” *West European Politics*, 29, No.1 (January 2006), 139.

²⁶ Ibid, 139.

²⁷ Tamara Ehs, “An Unwritten History: The Europeanization of Switzerland” (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 5.

²⁸ Markus Haverland, “Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? Improving Case Selection in Europeanization Research,” *West European Politics*, 29, No.1 (January 2006), 140.

²⁹ Alex Fischer, Sarah Nicolet and Pascal Sciarini, “Europeanization of a Non-EU Country: The Case of Swiss Immigration Policy,” *West European Politics* 25, no. 4 (October 2002): 146.

³⁰ Ibid, 46.

politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organization logic of national politics and policy-making.”³¹

In Switzerland, Europeanization takes mainly two forms: direct and indirect.³² Direct Europeanization was carried out mostly during the process of negotiations over the EEA treaty and then after its rejection in 1992, during negotiations over bilateral treaties in the nineties and two thousands. Indirect Europeanization is when non-EU state adapts to existing EU rules. For example, since 1988, all the changes to federal law are automatically checked for their compatibility with EC/EU law. This process is optional, not imposed under pressure from Brussels and thus this optional adaptation is known as ‘autonomous implementation (autonomer Nachvollzug)’ and can be compared to the transposition of secondary EU legislation into national law among EU member states.³³ The level of Europeanization of national legislation of Switzerland can be then compared or even higher than Slovak level because it began more than one decade earlier.

According to Borzel and Risse, to expect that Europeanization will make some domestic changes two conditions have to be met.³⁴ Firstly, there has to be a degree of misfit between domestic policies, institutions and the EU requirements. Secondly, there have to be some ‘facilitating’ or ‘mediating factors’ which will respond to adaptational pressures. Borzel

³¹ Simon Bulmer and Christiann Lequesne, “The EU and Its Member States: An Overview, in *The Member States of the Europan*, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christiann Lequesne, Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 12.

³² Alex Fischer, Sarah Nicolet and Pascal Sciarini, “Europeanization of a Non-EU Country: The Case of Swiss Immigration Policy,” *West European Politics* 25, no. 4 (October 2002): 354.

³³ Alexander Trachsel, “Direct Democracy and European Integration,” in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routlage, 2007), 44.

³⁴ Alex Fischer, Sarah Nicolet and Pascal Sciarini, “Europeanization of a Non-EU Country: The Case of Swiss Immigration Policy,” *West European Politics* 25, no. 4 (October 2002):145.

recognizes four main ‘mediating factors,’ which are: low number of veto points, supporting formal institutions, norm entrepreneurs, the cooperative informal institutions.³⁵

Similarly and briefer, Sedelmeier³⁶ and also Schimmelfennig³⁷ combine two institutionalist approaches, rationalist institutionalism and sociological/constructivist institutionalism. Within these two schools of thoughts several domestic facilitating factors are present, which are formal institutions, veto points and their impact in the former school and the role of entrepreneurs and epistemic communities for the domestic learning process in the latter.

I claim that the misfit between both countries’ politics and particular labor, migration policies and the EU have been either at similar level or bigger misfit on the Slovak side. Similar level was caused by Swiss isolationism and the Slovak communist heritage. Bigger misfit on Slovak side was due to longer Swiss alignment with the EU/EC which goes back to seventies. So for the misfit in both researched areas in both states indicates that Europeanization would be stronger in Slovakia, because the lower the compability between EU’s and member states politics and policies, the higher is the adaptational pressure of Europe, i.e. the Europeanization.³⁸ Misfit would be then the variable on which is difficult to rely in the comparison, due to its similar values in both states.

If not using the aforesaid variable, there is a need for another variable which would be suitable for both countries. In the Europeanization literature which deals with Switzerland, there

³⁵ Tanja A. Borzel, “Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States,” in *The Member States of the Euroepan Union*, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christiann Lequesne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 49-56.

³⁶ Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanization in the new and candidate states,” *Living Reviews in European Governance* 1, no. 3 (9 November 2006), under <http://livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-3> (accessed May 25, 2009).

³⁷ Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union” in *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, eds. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (New York: Routledge, 2005), 153-154.

³⁸ Tanja A. Borzel, “Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States,” in *The Member States of the Euroepan Union*, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christiann Lequesne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 50.

is one repeating variable, number of veto points. As Borzel and Risse show in their studies the degree of misfit is not the only condition for adaptational change.³⁹ They together with Haverland claim that adaptation will depend also on factors facilitating or hindering the changes, from which are highlighted domestic institutional veto points.⁴⁰ Fischer et al. prefer rationalist conception⁴¹ and in their research adaptation process in Switzerland depends on three facilitating factors, differential empowerment, mediating institutions, and actor's strategies. The number of veto points facilitating factor was present in all three factors, from which in the first two was the main dependant of a change.

In Europeanization literature which deals with Europeanization of member states, thus also in Slovakia, Borzel recognize four facilitating factors, which are low number of veto points, supporting formal institutions, norm entrepreneurs, cooperative informal institutions.⁴² In case of Slovakia the last two factors are part of Europeanization as a process of socialization,⁴³ which does not fit neither to Slovak, nor to Swiss case. Actors in Slovakia and Switzerland do "not seek to do the right thing" but rather "maximizing their subjective desires."⁴⁴ Both states during the alignments seek mostly the economic benefit for their countries and not alignment with the European values. I crossed out of potential variables the process of socialization, which correspond with Sedelmeir's Constructivist institutionalism.⁴⁵ Combining both states in the search for the Europeanization variable, rationalist institutionalism was the only option and due

³⁹ Pascal Sciarini, Alex Fischer, and, Sarah Nicolet, "How Europe hits home: evidence from the Swiss case," *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 3, (3 June 2004):353.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 353.

⁴¹ Alex Fischer, Sarah Nicolet and Pascal Sciarini, "Europeanization of a Non-EU Country: The Case of Swiss Immigration Policy," *West European Politics* 25, no. 4 (October 2002): 168.

⁴² Tanja A. Borzel, "Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States," in *The Member States of the European Union*, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christiann Lequesne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 49-56.

⁴³ Ibid, 54.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 54.

⁴⁵ Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Europeanization in the new and candidate states," *Living Reviews in European Governance* 1, no. 3 (9 November 2006), under <http://livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-3> (accessed May 25, 2009).

to its importance in both countries, its main facilitating factor, veto players, was chosen and whole my thesis will use it as the main variable.

My thesis hypothesis is that “the presence of multiple veto points in a country’s institutional system decreases likelihood of domestic adaptation to European requirements,”⁴⁶ i.e. the depth of Europeanization. Therefore in the Swiss case one would expect that Europeanization would not be so deep in the country with several layers of governance and strong direct democracy instruments, in comparison to the country such as Slovakia, where the adaptational process was very smooth and brief and its negotiation behavior was described as “an obedient dog faithfully following its master’s instructions.”⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Alex Fischer, Sarah Nicolet and Pascal Sciarini, “Europeanization of a Non-EU Country: The Case of Swiss Immigration Policy,” *West European Politics* 25, no. 4 (October 2002): 149.

⁴⁷ Tim Houghton, “What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU’s Active Leverage?” (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 7.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 *Slovakia*

For a proper understanding of the processes in the context of how Slovakia has been approaching the European Union in the nineties and two thousands is necessary to explain history of the interaction between this Central European country and the EU.

EU membership was perceived as a symbol of rightful return to Europe, to where its place is and which was several times denied in the past century. But the Slovak way to Europe, likewise the Swiss was not straightforward and easy. Slovakia oscillated between pro-Western oriented liberal democracy and isolationist autocratic state. Since the establishment of the independent state, it continued the policy of Czechoslovak rapprochement to the EU and in 1995 officially send a request for the EU membership. But EU membership required some reforms from Slovakia to be able to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria which was the basic precondition for starting accession negotiation and subsequent membership. From the economic point of view, the transformation was carried out with moderate speed and was sufficient for the EU, but from the political point of view, democratic condition deteriorated and Slovakia failed to fulfill the political criteria. This had a consequence in its exclusion from the Euro-Atlantic structures which were NATO rejection at the 1997 Madrid summit and at Luxemburg the EU did not invite Slovakia to start the negotiation process. Only after parliamentary elections in 1998 the Slovakia under new leadership get back on the right track. New prime minister Dzurinda visited Brussels just days after the elections and established the European Commission/Slovakia High Level Working Group whose main objective was to improve relations with the Union and obtain the invitation to start accession negotiation. This was approved at Helsinki Summit in December

1999 and Slovakia finally started accession negotiation in 2000. Other candidates were two years ahead in negotiations, so it required enormous energy to finish all negotiated chapters by 2002. Finally, on May 1, 2004 Slovakia together with nine other countries joined the EU. This was also the end of the transition process from totalitarian state to liberal democracy.

Harris divided this transition into three periods,⁴⁸ the first from 1989 till 1993 was the time of Czechoslovakia, the first democratic elections and independence, the second phase between 1993 and 1998 was dominated by Mečiar's authoritarianism and isolation from pro-Western movements present in all Central and Eastern Europe. The last period of transition Harris counts from the 1998 elections till EU accession, and is dominated by the EU negotiations and improvements in the fields of democracy and economy.

2.2 Switzerland

Interactions between this Alpine country and the EU/EC began well before the changes in the Eastern Europe but the situation changed dramatically at the same period as was the beginning of the Slovak rapprochement towards the EU. The integration processes launched by the Single European Act in the late eighties left Switzerland out of the European mainstream. The country realized that regime of Free Trade Agreement between EFTA and EC was not sustainable and would not bring any benefits from newly-formed single market. Almost 63 percent of export and 82 percent of import goes and comes from the EU⁴⁹ what proves a heavy dependence of its economy on the European markets and what forced neutral Switzerland to follow the other EFTA members in joining EEA (European Economic Area). But these aspirations were turned down by popular vote in 1992 just before signing the accession treaty. In minds of its citizens, neutrality, direct democracy and federalism are the main attributes of Swiss

⁴⁸ Erika Harris, "Europeanization of Slovakia," *Comparative European Politics* 2, (2004): 189.

⁴⁹ Tamara Ehs, "An Unwritten History: The Europeanization of Switzerland" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 6.

Confederation which are feared to be endangered by the EU or EEA. But the elites are aware of actual economic danger if staying out and asked Brussels to govern their economic relations with bilateral agreements. Brussels agreed but also chose the other areas for negotiation, convenient more for the EU, such as internal security, asylum, environment and culture.⁵⁰ The common areas were negotiated and signed in two packages of bilateral agreements, Bilateral One and Bilateral Two. The negotiations over Bilateral One began in December 1994 and ended in December 1998. The next round of negotiations over the second Bilateral package started in June 2002 and lasted until May 2004. This period of negotiations was at the same time as the transformation of Slovakia and its integration to the EU. Similarly to Slovak experience it was also full of oscillation and complication; because the agreements were challenged several times by referenda which could cause whole packages of treaties to be terminated. This quasi-integration partially substitutes the economic advantages of membership and allows Switzerland to stay formally neutral. This new position proves also 2006 Europe Report issued by Federal Government, which is interpreted as a withdrawal of full EU membership as a long term objective and preserving the current bilateral status as a convenient substitution for a membership.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Ibid, 18.

⁵¹ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), Federal Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA), "Information file on the Europe 2006 Report, June 2006," under <http://www.europa.admin.ch/dokumentation/00437/00460/00684/index.html?lang=en> (accessed on May 26, 2009).

Chapter 3: Party Politics in Switzerland and Slovakia and their development under Europeanization pressure

Even though Europeanization in both countries in the sphere of politics should be strikingly different because of the membership status in the case of Slovakia and non-membership status of Switzerland, the actual developments in the past ten years in both countries show similar or quite unexpected patterns. Slovakia as an acceding and then as a member state should be exposed to a bigger degree of Europeanization in the area of politics than a non-member state Switzerland. The former state, particularly in the second half of the nineties and beginning of two thousands, was seen as an excellent example of the EU's active leverage at work.⁵² Many scholars argue that its changes on the way to the EU in this period were caused by EU political conditionality, i.e. one of the 'weapons' of Europeanization. Another argument is also low level of veto points, particularly since 1998 elections there were no real opponents to Europeanization. On the other hand the isolationist policy in the surge for neutrality in Switzerland would suggest that the party politics would be not influenced by the EU's leverage or by indirect Europeanization which is highlighted with high number of veto layers in the country. Another hypothesis is that if there were some Europeanization, it would be very different than the processes in Slovakia.

However, the reality seems to be rather different. The processes which stems from the EU are not so strikingly different from each other and it is due to similar consequences of adaptation to Europeanization in both countries. In the case of Slovakia, the EU adaptational pressure should not be overestimated and did not cause all the most important changes in the politics of the

⁵²Tim Houghton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 2.

country. On the other hand, in the case of Switzerland, the EU topic should not be underestimated in Swiss politics and can be attributed as a source of important changes.

3.1 Slovakia

As mentioned before, Slovakia undertook a very difficult journey towards EU membership. The turning point was the governmental change after 1998 parliamentary elections which paved the way of pro-European forces to power. This Pro-European government was very successful in thwarting the march of Slovakia to complete isolation and returns it to the integration process. The post-1998 elections period was filled with prompt and sometimes even hasty process of catching-up accession negotiations. Still the new government at first had to obtain the invitation for these negotiations which was finally granted in December 1999 Helsinki Summit.

3.1.1 Before and during 1998 parliamentary elections

The behavior and actions of government under leadership of The Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar deteriorated the external image of the country, therefore causing the rejection of Slovakia from international organizations such as EU and NATO.⁵³ The parties in this government were ZRS (The Workers' Association of Slovakia), HZDS (The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) and SNS (Slovak National Party). Mečiar's only political opponent who could exert real political power over the ruling coalition was President Michal Kovac, whose office expired in March 1998 and since that time Mečiar and Ivan Gasparovic, Speaker of the parliament and number two person in Mečiar's party, seized presidential functions till the elections in September 1998. The opposition at that time was under pressure and could not exert real influence on the governmental policy. So the authoritarian style of government was not interfered by anybody since the seizure

⁵³ Aron Octavian, "The Impact of Europeanization upon Party Systems in Slovakia and Romania," *Transition Studies Review* 15, no. 2 (September 2008):273.

of presidential competencies in March 1998. But the coming elections could endanger their authoritarian position. Pre-elections opinion polls showed that at that time Mečiar's ruling coalition would not gain a majority of votes, HZDS itself would gain not more than 28% and opposition parties in survey constantly reached over 50% majority.⁵⁴ Mečiar was not willing to lose this election so he made several anti-democratic steps to secure his position. He changed electoral law, established just one electoral district with one candidate list for each party and created the new 5% threshold for a political party to gain the place in parliament.

Many scholars such as Lord, Schimmelfenning, Sedelmeier and Harris argue that Slovak case of successful turn from isolationism to pro-western path demonstrates the power of EU's political conditionality.⁵⁵ Harris claims in his article that "Europeanization has been a positive and contributory factor in the slow transformation of Slovakia from a failing democracy towards a European multinational one."⁵⁶ He attributes the EU the biggest share of aforementioned positive changes: "Europeanization became synonymous of intensification of the democratization from behind the state's boundaries."⁵⁷ He goes even further to name this process of Europeanization which is carried out by national politics in Central Europe as a merger of domestic and international politics, merged into a tight and at times uncomfortable connection.⁵⁸ The Europeanization characterized by two aforementioned features, may at the expense of nationhood and statehood, involve in conflict with nationalistic mobilization which was characteristic for Mečiar period and cause democratic and pro-western changes.⁵⁹ But Haughton claims that this view is mistaken. He argues that the EU had a little impact on the development

⁵⁴ Erika Harris, "Europeanization of Slovakia," *Comparative European Politics* 2, (2004): 192.

⁵⁵ Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 3.

⁵⁶ Erika Harris, "Europeanization of Slovakia," *Comparative European Politics* 2, (2004): 185.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 188.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 188.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 189.

in party politics in the mid-nineties.⁶⁰ Even though the EU frequently warned the Slovak government of its exclusion from the first wave of the accession negotiations with Central European States and even issued demarches, which are strong diplomatic notes or official criticisms and are rare and diplomatically significant decisions, all of these had a little influence on the Slovak way of doing politics in the period between 1994 and 1998. On the contrary these demarches had an opposite influence as some of the high Slovak political figures claimed at that time (Keltosova, Sitek, Baco), and had probably helped to shore-up the bunker mentality of the government and had a little effect on its policy.⁶¹

Similarly criticism of Mečiar's treatment of Michal Kovac, president at that time, was ignored and even more intensified.⁶² He and other opposition groups were blamed for giving Slovakia a bad name abroad because there was a proof of informing the EU about the political practices of the government.⁶³ So the governmental approach to the EU's criticism that is to indirect Europeanization, was from just denial, downplaying of a problem, denunciation of foreign interventions and claiming that they don't understand Slovak problems to more serious actions such as attacks on the opposition parties, organization and president itself.⁶⁴

Europeanization with EU leverage also played a marginal role in the opposition parties' behavior, according to Haughton.⁶⁵ The opposition parties, whose common objective was the EU accession, were aware that "EU accession without Mečiar was impossible"⁶⁶ as he was the leader

⁶⁰ Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007): 3.

⁶¹ Ibid, 3.

⁶² Ibid, 4.

⁶³ Geoffrey Pridham, "The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: Mečiar and Dzurinda Governments Compared," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54, No. 2, (2002): 210.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 210.

⁶⁵ Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 4.

⁶⁶ M. Rybar, "Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia," in *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party System* ed. S. Jungerstam-Mulders (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 173.

of the strongest party in Slovakia. The motivation to remove Mečiar and his allies from power was then not to improve the responses of Commission's regular reports, but rather to improve the domestic political and economic situation and remove those responsible for deteriorating economic and social situation in the country where the political elites were more occupied by lining their own pockets with murky privatization.⁶⁷

Similarly establishment of all the parties which were shaping the Slovak political scene in the mid and mostly in the late nineties were formed not due to external factors but rather internal factors, for example creation of the biggest opposition party SDK (The Slovak Democratic Coalition) was due to the combination of government's handling of 1997 NATO referendum and new electoral law⁶⁸ and thanks to concerns about the domestic policies.⁶⁹ Different priorities prove also the fact that in both party's founding declaration and its 1998 election manifesto is lack of prominence for EU entry.⁷⁰ In the former, the EU entry is mentioned in the last of ten points and in the latter is rarely mentioned apart from the short section on foreign relations.⁷¹ The creation of the SMK (Party of the Hungarian Coalition) was due to the combination of government's discriminatory policies towards Hungarian minority and also new electoral law.⁷² Earlier in 1993 and 1994 respectively, Milan Knazko and Jozef Moravcik left the HZDS due to Mečiar's heavy-handed style of party and governmental leadership.⁷³ Latter was also leader of the temporary government in pre 1994 election period. Similarly, ZRS, Mečiar's ally in 1994-98

⁶⁷ Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 4.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 6.

⁶⁹ Tim Haughton, "What role has Europe played in Party Politics in Slovakia?" 2005, under www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/wp2timhaughton.doc (accessed on May 26, 2009), 6.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 6.

⁷¹ Ibid, 6.

⁷² Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 6.

⁷³ Tim Haughton, "What role has Europe played in Party Politics in Slovakia?" 2005, under www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/wp2timhaughton.doc (accessed on May 26, 2009), 5.

government, was created by discontented members of the communist successor party, SDL (Party of the Democratic Left), who felt that the party had become too intellectual and lost its class base.⁷⁴ Two other parties, SMER (Direction) and SOP (Party of Civic Understanding), which were established in the late nineties were created as a response to the polarization of the Slovak politics into the two camps⁷⁵ and sought to be alternatives to the polarized political scene.

3.1.2 Post- 1998 elections developments

These elections were the turning point in the transformation of Slovakia from a totalitarian state with the command economy to a democracy with the functioning market economy. This marks also the beginning of the third and at the same time the last phase of transition from communism to democracy.⁷⁶ The elections brought about the end of Mečiar government with his authoritarian and nationalistic way of carrying out of politics. The elections brought new government consisting of four parties which were SDK, SOP, SDL', SMK and from which two were actually coalitions. SDK as the name indicates (the Slovak Democratic Coalition) was amalgam of five parties (Christian Democrats, liberals, market liberal, Social Democrats and Greens) and SMK (Party of the Hungarian Coalition) was amalgam of three parties, so in reality the coalition consisted of ten parties.⁷⁷ Later in 2000, KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) broke away from SDK and consequently acceded to coalition agreement and thus became the fifth official coalition partner. This broad coalition was also called the 'coalition of coalitions'⁷⁸ and that was its problem, because it consisted of whole political spectrum, from reformed communists to conservative Christian party.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 5.

⁷⁵ Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 6.

⁷⁶ Erika Harris, "Europeanization of Slovakia," *Comparative European Politics* 2, (2004): 189.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 208.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 190.

Mair also argues that European integration has little impact on national party system in member states.⁷⁹ As Slovakia changed from failing candidate to real candidate and after 1998 elections to the acceding state, the situation remained similar in spite of the acceleration of Europeanization. Splits of the main political parties similarly to the nineties were caused by domestic concerns.⁸⁰ The split of SNS, ally of Mečiar's HZDS, in 2001 was caused purely and simply by deep hatred between the leader Anna Malikova and her predecessor Jan Slota.⁸¹ Moreover, the defection of Ivan Simko and his allies from SDKU and forming of the Free Forum in 2003 was also caused by internal conflict between Simko and Prime Minister Dzurinda.⁸² Simko claimed that this conflict was caused by Dzurinda's increasingly domineering style as a leader of the government. Finally, the SDKU (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union) created by Dzurinda and his allies was also product of inner-political competition not a product of EU influence.

Another controversial aspect of the policy outcome of the first Dzurinda's government were some institutional changes such as pushing through the Law on the use of Minority Languages in July 1999 and appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights and Minority Affairs, as well as establishment of a parliamentary committee and a government committee with the same names.⁸³ According to Pridham these changes were the result of the stance of the EU and Slovak reaction to please it.⁸⁴ But with inclusion of the ethnic Hungarian

⁷⁹ Peter Mair, "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems," *West European Politics* 23, no.4 (October 2000): 27-51.

⁸⁰ Tim Haughton, "What role has Europe played in Party Politics in Slovakia?" 2005, under www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/wp2timhaughton.doc (accessed on May 26, 2009), 5.

⁸¹ Ibid, 5

⁸² "Ivan Šimko: Z vývoja v SDKÚ som sklamaný" [Ivan Simko: I am disappointed from the developments in SDKU], *Sme*, October 12, 2003 <http://korzar.sme.sk/c/4604179/ivan-simko-z-vyvoja-v-sdku-som-sklamany.html> (accessed May 4, 2009).

⁸³ Tim Haughton, "What role has Europe played in Party Politics in Slovakia?" 2005, under www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/wp2timhaughton.doc (accessed on May 26, 2009), 16.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 16.

party (SMK) in the government for the first time in the history of Slovakia, the aforementioned measures would have been introduced anyway.⁸⁵

The second important milestone besides the 1998 elections were 2002 parliamentary elections in which the dilemma of Mečiar's return was again awakened. These elections were important from the aspect of finishing the EU negotiations and successful joining the Euro-Atlantic Structures. Mečiar's return to power could endanger the accession the previous several years' long laborious negotiation process. EU officials and Western politicians made it clear that his return to power would jeopardize the accession process.⁸⁶ That is why Harris labeled the 2002 Elections as "Elections ... [with] 'Europeanization' as a paramount domestic issue...[and]...the most important aspect of these elections, thus far not seen in any other Eastern/Central European state, was the extreme importance given to the accession to both NATO and especially the EU."⁸⁷ It was up to Slovak electorate to choose any government they wished, but still the EU had the right to choose its partners"⁸⁸ In spite of the EU entry was an important topic in the election campaign, Haughton and Gyarfassova⁸⁹ from the Slovak Think-tank IVO argued that EU entry was not the major theme of the elections and was not decisive for the overwhelming majority of voters.

Another pattern of politics in the whole period of post-1998 development in Slovakia was that in spite of the Europeanization was perceived as a synonymous with democratization, when intensification of the former brought about the intensification of the latter,⁹⁰ the fast accession

⁸⁵ Ibid, 17.

⁸⁶ Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 5.

⁸⁷ Erika Harris, "Europeanization of Slovakia," *Comparative European Politics* 2, (2004): 194.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 195.

⁸⁹ Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 5.

⁹⁰ Erika Harris, "Europeanization of Slovakia," *Comparative European Politics* 2, (2004): 188.

negotiation in reality helped strengthen the executive at the expense of parliament.⁹¹ As Malova and as well Haughton comment, incorporation of 80 000 pages of *acquis communautaire* into domestic law in Slovak case meant that fast-tracking mechanisms in parliament were used almost exclusively by government⁹² and which was also stressed in 2001 change of constitution, where the government was granted the exclusive right to implement the ordinances with the power of the statute if related to the implementation of European Law.⁹³ Several questions were raised whether this fast tracking implementation and EU demands actually helped consolidating democracy or rather harmed it.⁹⁴

Party behavior, particularly the examples of the SNS and the SMER and their unchanged rhetoric has not changed since mid-nineties even though the fact that the country is in the Union and the party is now a ruling party of the coalition. But even though the aforesaid examples indicate that the EU has the power to influence important decisions as the formation of the government, the latest development shows that it is not always the case. In 2006 elections SMER's leader, Robert Fico, in spite of protests from Brussels formed a government with discredited Mečiar and Slota.⁹⁵

In spite of the overestimated importance of the EU on the party system and the party behavior since 1998, there are several noticeable patterns where the EU leverage could exert the appropriate reaction in Slovak environment. In the period of post-1998 elections the only aspect of party politics where the EU influence was significant was in coalition formation and

⁹¹ Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 9.

⁹² *Ibid*, 9.

⁹³ *Ustava Slovenskej republiky*, Chapter Six, Part two, article 120, 44.

⁹⁴ Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 9.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 7.

maintenance.⁹⁶ In Dzurinda's first government, where "joining the EU was the focal point for cooperation keeping the ideologically broad-based 1998-2002 government together,"⁹⁷ many examples showed that this was the only glue which held the coalition, for example in 2001 SMK was on the verge of walking out of the coalition and external influence, in the form of politicians and political parties with an interest in Slovakia's accession to the EU, persuaded the party to remain in the government. Similarly in 2002 the importance of accession to the EU was the main factor which influenced the populist party SMER's decision not to form the coalition with HZDS.⁹⁸ In November 2000 Commission's regular report criticized Slovakia for insufficient independence of the judiciary, the unsatisfactory state of the fight against corruption, poor preparedness of institutions and overall administrative capacity of the country, caused the immediate reaction in the government and already on 23 February 2001 the Slovak Parliament adopted the most extensive amendment to the Slovak Constitution since independence.⁹⁹ This amendment later allowed a broader reform of the judiciary and public administration.

3.1.3 Post-2006 development

In spite of the occasional rhetoric and actions of Slovak political parties, generally they do not represent effective veto tool against the European integration. Example is the rhetoric of SMER before it formed government and real actions after it formed the government in 2006. Similar to Switzerland, the rising of this party to become the most successful in the country was based on populism, which was often based on the opposition to the SDKU's unconditioned

⁹⁶ Ibid, 7.

⁹⁷ Milada Anna Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 178, quoted in Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 7.

⁹⁸ Aron Octavian, "The Impact of Europeanization upon Party Systems in Slovakia and Romania," *Transition Studies Review* 15, no. 2 (September 2008): 276.

⁹⁹ Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 8.

support to the EU.¹⁰⁰ During 2002 election campaign, Fico, SMER's leader, took political advantage by exploiting the voters' concerns about the quick accession negotiation carried out by the government and promised that he would renegotiate some of the chapters of the implemented EU law.¹⁰¹ Moreover, one of the SMER's elections billboards showed a row of naked posteriors accompanied by the slogan, "The EU but not with bare bottoms."¹⁰² Since 2002 elections he has even intensified his anti-EU rhetoric, declaring if Slovakia were Norway, Iceland or Switzerland, I would definitely shout out with pleasure 'no' to the EU.¹⁰³ But after 2006 his government was responsible for deepening of the European integration with successful adopting Euro and thus joining the EMU.

But except of actions which are beneficial for the interest of his party, the behavior and party politics of his government do not converged with the EU. Formation of the government in 2006 proves that he follows the Brussels just when it is convenient for him and if not, follow the similar pattern of political culture present in the nineties in Slovakia. EU pressure was not a strong enough incentive to prevent Fico to form a government with discredited nationalists Slota and Mečiar. Consequently, Fico's party SMER was suspended from PES (The Party of European Socialists) and interestingly Fico made no attempt to negotiate with PES. PES's leader commented Fico's indifference that he "can't imagine why Robert Fico would be so passive."¹⁰⁴ The populist rhetoric of the new government later changed into the democracy deficit when several cases showed the decreasing transparency of the government and free access to

¹⁰⁰ Aron Octavian, "The Impact of Europeanization upon Party Systems in Slovakia and Romania," *Transition Studies Review* 15, no. 2 (September 2008): 276.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 277.

¹⁰² Tim Haughton, "What role has Europe played in Party Politics in Slovakia?" 2005, under www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/wp2timhaughton.doc (accessed on May 26, 2009), 13.

¹⁰³ "Fico: Keby sme boli Nóri, zakričím únii nie," [Fico: If we were Norwegian, we would shout 'no' to the Union], *Sme*, 3 March 2003, <http://dennik.sme.sk/c/830010/Fico-Keby-sme-boli-Nori-zakricim-unii-nie.html> (accessed on May 5, 2009).

¹⁰⁴ "Smer Indifferent About PES Membership," *Slovak Spectator*, February 19, 2007, <http://www.slovakspectator.sk/clanok.asp?vyd=2007007&cl=26774> (accessed on May 6, 2009).

information about governmental proceedings. The international community and NGOs since the beginning of Fico's rule have strongly criticized the democracy deficit in area of free access to information¹⁰⁵ of accusation of widespread corruption and also defects in minority protections, altogether not just due to the nationalist rhetoric of SNS.

The most visible case of the derailment of current Slovak government from European mainstream of making policy was behavior of the Prime Minister and leader of the strongest party SMER, particularly in dimension of the foreign policy. His visit of Belarus and particularly the Cuban embassy in Bratislava in honor of the communist revolution in that country was interpreted as a tacit support of these undemocratic regimes.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, Dusan Caplovic, defended Fico's presence at the event claiming that Fidel Castro was not a dictator and downplaying human rights abuses in that country.¹⁰⁷

Later, in March 2008, the adoption of new Press Code raised the strong criticism from the EU¹⁰⁸ and OSCE¹⁰⁹ because it restricts freedom of the press. The statute prescribes to press to publish corrections, replies and impose also the obligatory protection of sources with high fines.¹¹⁰

These examples show that not only the creation but also the behavior and policymaking of the parties were not influenced to such a high degree as one would think. Between the strongest

¹⁰⁵ "Smer Versus the Media?," *Slovak Spectator*, October 23, 2006, <http://www.slovakspectator.sk/clanok.asp?vyd=2006041&cl=24927> (accessed on May 6, 2009).

¹⁰⁶ Megan M. Metzger, "Slovakia and the European Union: Complexities and Contradictions," (Honors Thesis, Macalester College, 2007), 45.

¹⁰⁷ "Fico Giving New Face to Slovak Foreign Policy," *Slovak Spectator*, January 22, 2007, <http://www.slovakspectator.sk/clanok.asp?vyd=2007003&cl=26315> (accessed May 7, 2009).

¹⁰⁸ "EU: Tlacovy zakon je nasa hanba," [EU: Press code is our shame], *Pravda*, March 28, 2008, http://spravy.pravda.sk/eu-tlacovy-zakon-je-aj-nasou-hanbou-dt7-sk_domace.asp?c=A080328_181524_sk_domace_p32 (accessed May 30, 2009).

¹⁰⁹ "Tlacovy zakon opat napadla OBSE," [Press code again under strong criticism of the OSCE], *Pravda*, April, 11, 2008, http://spravy.pravda.sk/eu-tlacovy-zakon-je-aj-nasou-hanbou-dt7-sk_domace.asp?c=A080328_181524_sk_domace_p32 (accessed May 30, 2009)

¹¹⁰ "Opposition takes Press Code to Constitutional Court," *The Slovak Spectator*, September 25, 2008, http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/33032/10/opposition_takes_press_code_to_constitutional_court.html (accessed May 30, 2009).

supporters of the profound importance of Europeanization of the party politics are Henderson claiming that the “strong influence of EU membership issues on the very shape of the party system”¹¹¹, and Vachudova, who claims that EU leverage was “decisive in determining what kind of political parties were on offer to be elected. However, the EU and Europeanization play important but not the crucial role in party politics and behavior.”¹¹² As Haughton argued in his article “the EU entry was not the dominant issue in Slovak politics in the 1990s.”¹¹³ It was not the Europeanization which came to Slovakia and allegedly caused the main changes. For the EU is the most important fact not shaping parties’ politics in accession or member countries but rather it is its concern whether a state sticks to liberal democratic values and can take on the burden and obligation of membership.¹¹⁴ So that is on each state how to deal with the EU issues and use it in its advantage, because Europe is used and often also abused by politicians to bolster their own arguments and positions and to lambaste the stances of their opponents on a whole raft of issues.¹¹⁵ “In most member states of the EU, Europe has been an important issue, but its importance is tied to other issues. ...Europe wrapped up with other issues (economic reform, social welfare provision and cultural and moral issues) is likely to be significant.”¹¹⁶

3.2 Switzerland

The whole system of Swiss political life was very consensual based and until the beginning of this century it used to be said that the Swiss political system was one of the most

¹¹¹ Karen Henderson, “Slovak Political Parties and the EU: From Symbolic Politics to Policies,” in *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. by P. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldova (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 150.

¹¹² Ibid, 3.

¹¹³ Tim Haughton, “What role has Europe played in Party Politics in Slovakia?” 2005, under www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/wp2timhaughton.doc (accessed on May 26, 2009), 19.

¹¹⁴ Tim Haughton, “What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU’s Active Leverage?” (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 6.

¹¹⁵ Tim Haughton, “What role has Europe played in Party Politics in Slovakia?” 2005, under www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/wp2timhaughton.doc (accessed on May 26, 2009), 19.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 19.

stable in the world, sometimes thought as ‘ultra-stable.’¹¹⁷ But these days thanks to European and global pressures it is changing more than ever before¹¹⁸ and becoming more similar to trends which dominates whole European Union not only its Western part. European pressures, either direct or indirect Europeanization have two major and interconnected political outcomes which shape Swiss polity and Switzerland as general. On the one hand it is the adaptational process of Swiss government to the EU pressures and on the other hand opposition groups and parties which emerged as a consequence of the governmental politics and EU’s direct or indirect interference to Swiss affairs. Both, federal government with also Eurosceptic representatives and campaigning organizations, are part of the strong veto layers which according to hypothesis should prevent effective Europeanization. Another veto layer, typical and only present in Switzerland is the power of referenda which are the main tools of direct democracy and are used by people, opposing parties and campaigning organizations.

3.2.1 Opposition to the EU

Integration and political processes at the end of the eighties had a direct impact on Switzerland, too. That was the time when also ended traditional alliance between people and Swiss government in perception of detachment from European affairs.¹¹⁹ Government felt forced by circumstances to seek new ways of defending Swiss interests in Europe but this moves have had minority support from the population.¹²⁰ Building on this rift between governmental and people’s idea on further development, a very strong and well organized movement of opposition to Europe emerged. But as Church argues this movement is not operating in a vacuum, but is in

¹¹⁷ University of Kent, Centre for Swiss Politics, “Twelve Key Points about Swiss Politics and Democracy,” under “Research,” <http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/cfs/csp/pdf/CHTWELVE%20KEY%20POINTS%20.pdf>, (accessed on May 10, 2009).

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Clive Church, “The Context of Swiss Opposition to Europe,” (‘Opposing Europe Research Network,’ Working Paper No 11, 2003), 9.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 9

relationship with broader popular uncertainties about Europe which are shared throughout continent.¹²¹ The Swiss case demonstrates that the phenomenon of opposition to Europe is not restricted just to countries inside the EU or seeking to join the EU.

The most important opposition movements are SVP party and AUNS, campaigning organization. Both formations are closely related to the most controversial public figure in Switzerland in the last twenty years, Christoph Blocher, who is the Swiss People's Party's leader and at the same time clearly dominates in AUNS. Formally the latter is run by a committee which includes other Eurosceptics, but in reality the organization often follows policies and intentions of Blocher,¹²² because he is the most popular politician and leader of the biggest political party in Switzerland. However, it does not always do what is it told and in 2000, AUNS ignored Blocher's advice not to campaign against bilaterals because according to him, they did not involve a challenge to independence, neutrality and security. The reason is the fact that organization is composed of not just SVP's followers but also of true believers of the notion that the EU is a something fundamentally wrong for Swiss people.¹²³

On what basis the Swiss opposition to the EU rests? According to Church there are five arguments against the EU.¹²⁴ First is the Swiss self-perception as a special case in Europe, in German 'Sonderfal Schweiz' which is based on 350 years of independence from war-torn Europe and unparalleled prosperity and stability particularly since the end of the second World War. Secondly, the belief that joining of the EU would be economically disastrous and would bring increase of taxes, higher unemployment and more strikes. This claim is also supported by the fact that prophecies of not joining the EEA in 1991 would be disastrous have eventually not come

¹²¹ Ibid, 5

¹²² Clive Church, "The Context of Swiss Opposition to Europe," ('Opposing Europe Research Network,' Working Paper No 11, 2003), 26.

¹²³ Ibid, 26.

¹²⁴ Ibid, 15.

true. Thirdly, there is a view of the EU as a political threat because it may become a super state and it would imply the transfer of competences from both cantons and communes to Berne and Brussels. Fourthly, alongside this there is a belief that social fabric of the country would be under threat by CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) and opened borders which would bring more traffic and immigrants. Finally, the opposition in Switzerland claims that EU is politically wrong itself because of dominance of Germany and France and ‘Brusseler Demokratie’ at the same time.¹²⁵ So the EU is in the centre of aforementioned organization’s actions and shapes also their behavior in the public life.

One of the most typical and influential behavioral patterns is campaigning against governmental integration policies and treaties. In Switzerland constitutional amendments, the binding treaties have to be decided obligatory by the populace and any other decisions or laws optionally if 50,000 signatures are collected within 100 days.¹²⁶ This is very powerful weapon which is often used by opposition parties or organizations to gain political capital. In the last two decades there were several popular votes directly related to Switzerland’s integration strategy.¹²⁷ In December 1992 it was the mandatory referendum on Swiss adhesion to EEA which was rejected by people. Similarly rejected was the referendum launched in June 1997 by popular initiative which would put condition of referendum on future EU membership negotiations and lastly in March 2001 was also rejected the referendum on immediate start of EU-membership negotiations. On the other hand, in May 2000 was the first from the series of optional referenda on Bilateral Treaties with the EU, from which all were approved in spite of fierce campaign against them. Other bilateral treaties and their extension were held in June 2005, September 2005

¹²⁵ Ibid, 16.

¹²⁶ University of Kent, Centre for Swiss Politics, “Twelve Key Points about Swiss Politics and Democracy,” under “Research,” <http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/cfs/csp/pdf/CHTWELVE%20KEY%20POINTS%20.pdf>, (accessed on May 10, 2009).

¹²⁷ Alexander Trachsel, “Direct Democracy and European Integration,” in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 39.

and the last one in February 2009. The last vote raised a lot of controversies when parliament was forced by Brussels to put on vote both extension of key labor treaties on free movement of labor which were part of a Bilateral One package and at the same time the extension of this accord to the new EU member states, Romania and Bulgaria.¹²⁸ The key opponent, the SVP, was deeply divided on this issue, when leadership and Blocher, the strongman of the party, recommended boycotting the vote but at the same time some of the influential local members were eagerly campaigning against the treaty. The division was also visible in the fact that the referendum itself was launched after popular initiative of the party's youth wing, the Lega dei Ticinesi without having any support from top leadership of SVP.¹²⁹

The style of politics of the main Eurosceptic opposition movements, particularly of SVP, not only takes advantage of governmental pro-EU policies for their own political benefits but also changes whole Swiss political culture. According to writer Tim Krohn, in his critical look at Swiss politics, SVP's style of politics is endangering Switzerland's consensus form of politics on the one hand and on the other hand this new development "move Switzerland closer to democratic systems used in the rest of Europe."¹³⁰ The debate which is now in present in Switzerland became more similar to debate between governments and opposition parties in other EU member countries. Moreover, he claims, that "The Swiss People's Party introduced a European style of political campaigning" and "Blocher is leading Switzerland to Europe."¹³¹ Entire political spectrum has moved to the right in the past twenty years and Switzerland is

¹²⁸ "Voters endorse labour accord with EU," *Swissinfo*, February 8, 2009, http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/internal_affairs/Voters_endorse_labour_accord_with_EU.html?siteSect=1511&sid=10302545&cKey=1234436717000&ty=st (accessed May 11, 2009).

¹²⁹ "EU labour treaty goes to third public ballot," *Swissinfo*, December 12, 2008, http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/internal_affairs/EU_labour_treaty_goes_to_third_public_ballot.html?siteSect=1511&sid=9811410&cKey=1224488204000&ty=st (accessed May 11, 2009).

¹³⁰ "Swiss Politics become more confrontational," *Swissinfo*, October 28, 2007, http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/elections/parliamentary_elections_2007/index.html?siteSect=1535 (accessed on May 11, 2009).

¹³¹ Ibid.

following this trend, too.¹³² So process of Europeanization brought to Swiss politics more populism and xenophobia which is now becoming common throughout the EU.

3.2.2 Governmental behavior

The Swiss Federal Council, which is the collective head of the state and Swiss government at the same time represented Switzerland during bilateral talks with the EU and thus and thus formed one of the numerous veto layers in the country. The Swiss Federal Council has since 1959 always consisted of the same four main political parties, SVP (Swiss People's Party), SP (Swiss Social Democratic Party), FDP (Radical Free Democratic Party - Liberals), CVP (Christian Democrat People's Party), which divided seven ministerial posts between themselves and formed grand coalition governments.¹³³ This was the common feature until the 2007 parliamentary elections, where SVP reached 29 percent share of votes, the best result of a political party for nearly ninety years.¹³⁴ In December 2007, the SVP's leader was not reelected to the ministerial post and for a first time, "magic formula" of division of the power was breached and the biggest party in parliament went to opposition.¹³⁵ As a consequence of unexpected events in December 2007, Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf and the Graubudnen cantonal party where she belonged were subsequently excluded from national SVP in 2008. She joined newly formed BDP (Conservative Democratic Party). It was for the first time that such a small grouping has been represented in government.¹³⁶

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Hanspeter Kriesi and Alexander H. Trechsel, *The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 85.

¹³⁴ "A Very Stable Political Spectrum," *Swissinfo*, January 15, 2008, http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/political_system/political_parties/A_very_stable_political_spectrum.html?siteSect=1561&sid=7829153&cKey=1197369015000&ty=st (accessed May 19, 2009).

¹³⁵ "Swiss MPs Eject Populist Leader," *Newser*, December 12, 2007, <http://www.newser.com/story/13922/swiss-mps-eject-populist-leader.html> (accessed May 11, 2009).

¹³⁶ Federal Chancellery, "The Swiss Confederation a Brief Guide 2009", under "Documentation," <http://www.bk.admin.ch/dokumentation/02070/index.html?lang=en> (accessed May 30, 2009).

Furthermore, the process of Europeanization of Swiss politics has produced big changes not only in Swiss polity but also in Swiss politics. But the most visible case of latter is the changing behavior of the Swiss government during the long period of negotiations with the EU after the failure of the referendum over the EEA entry. The process of this one way rapprochement is divided in two packages of bilateral agreements Bilateral One and Bilateral Two. The negotiations over Bilateral One began in 1994 and ended in 1998, over second one started between 2002 and 2004. Deriving from the length and long pauses between them one can claim that negotiations were more difficult and more quarrelsome than negotiations in case of Slovakia, which covered wider area and lasted just over two years. From the first round of negotiations one of the most controversial were negotiations over road transport. From the second round of negotiations was the most difficult the banking policy. All controversial areas of negotiations were imposed on Switzerland by the EU as an exchange for allowance of Swiss companies to enter the EU market and other concessions.

3.2.2.1 Road transport negotiations

The negotiations from March 1995 till 1998 were just the re-negotiation of the EEA treaty provisions, but still required a lot of effort and were marked with the series of stalemate situations. The situation of government was more complicated than at the beginning of the nineties which was due the emergence of Alps Initiative and subsequent successful public referendum which imposed highly constraining measures, such as complete transfer of North-South traffic from road to rail after ten years.¹³⁷ Hence, the position of Swiss government at the beginning of the negotiations was quite clear, not to allow passage of trucks heavier than 28 tons

¹³⁷ C. Dupont and P. Sciarni, "Back to the Future: bilaterals I," in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 203.

and 600 Swiss francs transit tax for one-way North-South crossing.¹³⁸ After four years of negotiations EU pressed Switzerland into following compromise, the ban on trucks heavier than 28 tons was abandoned and transit tax was much lower than desired, i.e. there was gradual removal of 28 ton limit so in 2005 40 ton trucks could pass the Swiss territory and tax was just 325 CHF.¹³⁹ As is obvious, the government had to yield significantly in spite of the pressure from domestic electorate and opposition groups. Even though it looks like Swiss defeat, the firm position of government had a reverse effect and influenced also one of the most important EU policy, transport and travel; especially Trans-European Transport Networks TEN-T and thus good relations are also in the vital interest of the EU.¹⁴⁰ The case how Swiss politics has impact on EU politics is a good example of the bottom-up processes of Europeanization but typical in member states' versus EU relations.

3.2.2.2 Taxation of savings, bank secrecy

Switzerland was for a long time considered as a 'tax haven', notably because of its well-known banking secrecy. Thus the efficiency of present and future tax unification approaches would be undermined if such a place were right at the heart of the EU. In 2003 as a part of Bilateral Two Agreement the EU forced Switzerland to levy a withholding tax on EU citizens' bank accounts.¹⁴¹ Switzerland was not just forced to introduce a new tax but also had to agree to forward 75 percent of the tax back to fiscal authorities of those states whose citizens are investing in Swiss interest-bearing accounts.¹⁴² With the issue of taxation the EU demanded Switzerland reconsiders its policy about banking secrecy. But negotiations were very difficult because

¹³⁸ Ibid, 204.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 204.

¹⁴⁰ Tamara Ehs, "An Unwritten History: The Europeanization of Switzerland" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 10.

¹⁴¹ David Fairlamb, "Switzerland: In the EU's tentacles?" *Business Week*, May 24, 2004, 69.

¹⁴² Clive Church at al., "Sectors, structures and suspicions" in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 138.

government held a strong position in this typical Swiss feature of banking tradition mainly due to strong opposition at home. According to survey, 76 percent of the population support bank confidentiality and thus this issue was fiercely defended by populist, mostly by strong EU-skeptic organizations and parties.¹⁴³ In order to hold the line, SVP raised the question of writing the principle into the Confederal Constitution.¹⁴⁴ Finally in March 2003 Council of Finance Ministers and representatives from Switzerland reached the compromise, which prescribes Swiss bankers to impose withholding tax, send information about their clients to EU countries in case of tax fraud or the second option was to allow voluntary notification for EU citizens instead of paying the withholding tax.¹⁴⁵ The compromise which was renegotiated between both sides, where the EU finally changed her stance over total prohibition of banking secrecy is an example of the Swiss influence over the stance of the whole EU and thus influential ‘uploading’ power of the non-member state towards member states and Brussels.

Not only areas as a part of Bilaterals One and Two packages were the policies where the Swiss government had to face the strong Europeanization pressure. Recently, on February 2007, the European Commission accused Switzerland of offering unfair company tax advantages that violate the FTA (Free Trade Agreement) provision of 1972, what was strongly rejected at home.¹⁴⁶ On the one hand, “Hans-Rudolf Merz, Minister of Finance, said that it would be dishonorable for a sovereign state like Switzerland to negotiate with the EU on tax rules,” but on the other hand he “promptly announced an autonomous fiscal reform that would fulfill the EU’s requirements.”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³ Ibid, 143.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 143.

¹⁴⁵ A. Afonso and M. Maggetti, “Bilaterals II: reaching the limits?” in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 217.

¹⁴⁶ Tamara Ehs, “An Unwritten History: The Europeanization of Switzerland” (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 23.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 23.

3.3 Commonalities and differences

Just as the Slovak government's behavior before 1998 and after 2006 elections shows the lack of interest in the EU and marginal influence of the Brussels on its politics, the similar situation could be seen in Swiss politics where government seems to be pro-EU only in the cases where it is necessary to guard the Swiss interests. Borzel's socialization definitely is not a case in both countries. Both parties' behavior show strong prevalence of populist and nationalist ideas which are getting more and more common throughout the continental EU and thus it can be said the level of Europeanization in both countries shows the same intensities despite different levels of inclusion into the EU. In some respects, one could claim that Swiss parties' politics are more Europeanized than the Slovak counterparts' which support the post 2006 election development in Slovakia and some democratic deficits in minority rights protection, press freedom and transparent governmental and state policy in areas of state procurement a treatment of media.

The Europeanization of Switzerland, then, can be seen as alienation of the political class and the people which accompanies the process of rapprochement of Switzerland to the EU which is carried out in not very visible way.¹⁴⁸ Tamara Ehs claims that alienation is evidence of Europeanization seen as modernization or assimilation, as "a process whereby national political elites began to reconceive of national interests relative to broader European framework. Europeanization...emerged as a modernization process spearheaded by national and bureaucratic elites"¹⁴⁹ And this alienation of political elites is then caused by bigger influence of EU leverage than in the case of Slovakia which has also bigger consequence on the Swiss politics. The Europeanization of Swiss politics than seems to have bigger impact than in Slovakia.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 22.

¹⁴⁹ Robert Harmsen and Thomas M. Wilson, "Introduction: Approaches to Europeanization," *Yearbook of European Studies*, vol. 14 (2000) quoted in Tamara Ehs, "An Unwritten History: The Europeanization of Switzerland" (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 22.

Europeanization of Slovakia most of the scholars see as democratization.¹⁵⁰ To follow-up on earlier research of Featherstone and O’Leary on Europeanization of Greece and Ireland¹⁵¹ one can apply the same on the Europeanization of Slovakia and describe this process as a historical process of modernization which brings the country back on the European mainstream connected with its assimilation and normalization.

In this case the normalization processes of party politics in both countries are very similar, adopting the pattern of European conflict-based political competition mixed with xenophobic and populist and EU-centered rhetoric. These patterns of politics are becoming denominators of European politics because it spread throughout Europe in the last twenty years and in the same period also influenced and penetrated both countries’ politics. However, the development in Slovakia after 2006 parliamentary elections somehow shows mild derailment from this trend. Populist and xenophobic behavior is in the line with aforementioned European trends but anti-democratic steps of governmental parties are against the line of democratization either as a main or partial outcome of Europeanization. Press freedom and unprecedented spread of corruption bear the trails of unchanged non-democratic behavior of the politics in the nineties, except more pro-European rhetoric, which is as I showed before also disputable.

To sum up, even the changes of national politics are substantial; the effect of the EU seems to be big in both countries, despite their different numbers of veto players. In regard to stability of the political system, Europeanization brought less stability to both states.

¹⁵⁰ Tim Haughton, “What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU’s Active Leverage?” (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 3.

¹⁵¹ Tamara Ehs, “An Unwritten History: The Europeanization of Switzerland” (paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007), 9.

Chapter 4: Labor and Migration Policy in Switzerland and Slovakia and their interaction with Europeanization

The level of Europeanization in Switzerland and Slovakia from the institutional point of view is very similar, in that both countries are fully integrated into EU's main pillar of the single market, the regime of the free movement of persons. Slovakia, as a full member state of the Union raise no question about its status and "Switzerland is de facto becoming a full member state in the EU's migration regime even if not formally participating in the broader context of EU asylum or immigration legislation."¹⁵² Thus the only areas of comparison are the general stances of population and policy-makers towards this policy and at the same time the implications of the free movement of persons for the economy and society. In Slovakia there was no debate about the progress and implication of these policies, but in Switzerland the process of opening its labor market was accompanied by several referenda and fierce campaigns. Like in the previous chapter, the hypothesis about the importance of the veto points will be taken into consideration. So here I will be comparing two policies and find out how much are they affected with Europeanization.

4.1 Slovakia

The Slovak population can be characterized by a 'culture of migration.'¹⁵³ This phenomenon is not new: throughout the centuries Slovaks moved to work abroad for a several reasons, mostly better socio-economic conditions. In 2000 about 50,000 Slovaks left the country to find a job, after the joining the Union, this number doubled to 100,000 people and increased till 2007 when it was estimated that about 177,000 Slovaks were working abroad.¹⁵⁴ Since then

¹⁵² P.Koch and S.Lavenex, "The human face of Europeanization," in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 162.

¹⁵³ Eva Olejarova, "Labor Migration as a Socio-Economic Phenomenon – Slovakia and the Czech Republic in a Comparative Study" (master's thesis, CEU, Budapest, 2007), 55.

¹⁵⁴ "Slovaks returning from abroad," *The Slovak Spectator*, April 20, 2009, http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/35057/3/slovaks_returning_from_abroad.html (accessed on May 15, 2009).

the trend is decreasing, for example the number of people leaving the country to work abroad in June 2008 was 165,000.¹⁵⁵ The reasons behind the return of Slovak workers are several, first of all, the world financial crisis and rising unemployment, and at the same time the weakening currencies of other popular target countries and the appreciation of the Slovak currency is one of them.¹⁵⁶ Enlargement itself did not have such a big influence on the migration in countries with ‘migration culture,’¹⁵⁷ such as Slovakia. According to AMS the highest numbers of immigrants from new member states were from Slovakia and Poland, but since 2007 this trend is decreasing, and these immigrants are superseded by those from Romania.¹⁵⁸

At the same time the share of foreign population in Slovakia is increasing, but still is the lowest in the entire EU-25.¹⁵⁹ In 2006 there were 32,100 foreigners, which makes up 0.6 percent of overall population in the country.¹⁶⁰ From that stock the number of EU citizens is 17,900 persons,¹⁶¹ which makes up something above the half of them. And as Koch and Lavenex claim, the size of the foreign population indicates how much the country is part of the Europe.¹⁶²

Based on the size of the foreign population, the economic effect of immigration is just marginal but on the other hand, labor emigration, the government claims, has a positive effect on

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ “Slovaks returning from abroad,” *The Slovak Spectator*, April 20, 2009, http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/35057/3/slovaks_returning_from_abroad.html (accessed on May 15, 2009).

¹⁵⁷ Rozšírenie a pracovná migrácia spolu nesúvisia,” [Enlargement and labor migration are not interconnected], *Euroactive*, 16 January 2008, <http://www.euractiv.sk/mobilita/clanok/rozsirenje-a-pracovna-migracia-spolu-nesuvisia> (accessed on May 17, 2009).

¹⁵⁸ Weniger Arbeitskräfte aus neuen EU-Ländern, “[Less Workers from New EU-member states], *OE24*, January 15, 2008, <http://www.oe24.at/zeitung/oesterreich/politik/article209053.ece> (accessed on May 17, 2009).

¹⁵⁹ Boris Divinsky, *Labor Market - Migration Nexus in Slovakia: Time to Act in a Comprehensive Way*, (Bratislava: International Organization for Migration, 2007), 186.

¹⁶⁰ OECD, “International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI - 2008 Edition,” under <http://ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/publications/doifiles/812008071P1T029.xls> (accessed on May 16, 2009).

¹⁶¹ Boris Divinsky, *Labor Market - Migration Nexus in Slovakia: Time to Act in a Comprehensive Way*, (Bratislava: International Organization for Migration, 2007), 186.

¹⁶² P. Koch and S. Lavenex, “The human face of Europeanization,” in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 161.

unemployment in Slovakia,¹⁶³ which is still very high. Labor migration contributed with 2.2 percent to the decrease in country's unemployment rate.¹⁶⁴ Another positive economic effect originates from remittances sent back to Slovakia, which in 2006 were at a high of 2 percent of GDP.¹⁶⁵ But what matters more is the impact of emigration on the economy and social system in the future. On a smaller scale, currently due to rising emigration, there is a shortage of skilled labor force in some regions, particularly in the automotive, the electro-technical industry and the construction sector.¹⁶⁶ Another negative effect is the brain drain. Even though it is difficult to measure this impact, it is estimated that one fourth of all graduates in the country are leaving annually.¹⁶⁷ And as Divinsky in study shows, the survey conducted between entrepreneurs in Slovakia shows their fears of negative effect of the labor migration from Slovakia.¹⁶⁸

Another difference from Europe is the problem of Slovak society. "It is just at the beginning of its metamorphosis into a pro-migration society. The country's modern and comprehensive migration policy is still in its very infancy."¹⁶⁹ In substance, public opinion is more xenophobic towards foreigners than other EU states. For example, just 12 percent of Slovak respondents fully or partly agree with statement that immigrants contribute to the country, the

¹⁶³ "New EU citizens see both benefits and drawbacks to mobility," *Euroactive*, 11 July 2006, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/mobility/new-eu-citizens-see-benefits-drawbacks-mobility/article-156688> (May 17, 2009).

¹⁶⁴ The Institute for Labour and Family Research, "Sprístupnenie trhov práce vo vybraných krajinách EÚa vývojové trendy na trhu práce v SR," [Opening of the labor markets in particular member states and trends in Slovak labor market], (Bratislava, 2006), http://www.sspr.gov.sk/texty/File/vyskum/2006/Reichova/Sprístupnenie_TP.pdf (accessed May 18, 2009), 36.

¹⁶⁵ Boris Divinsky, *Labor Market - Migration Nexus in Slovakia: Time to Act in a Comprehensive Way*, (Bratislava: International Organization for Migration, 2007), 186.

¹⁶⁶ "V nitrianskom regióne chýbajú investorom kvalifikované pracovné sily," [Skilled workers shortage for investors in Nitra region], *Zoznam*, February 2, 2008, <http://openiazoch.zoznam.sk/info/zpravy/zprava.asp?NewsID=59649> (accessed on May 18, 2009).

¹⁶⁷ Boris Divinsky, *Labor Market - Migration Nexus in Slovakia: Time to Act in a Comprehensive Way*, (Bratislava: International Organization for Migration, 2007), 186.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 207.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 205.

worst result among all EU states.¹⁷⁰ In contrast, Switzerland is in similar surveys above the EU average.¹⁷¹ Gradual adoption of legal norms and positions and all the activities in the EU are slowly performed by Slovakia since its accession in 2004 and thus “increasingly bringing Slovakia closer to other EU Member States’ stances.”¹⁷²

4.2 Switzerland

During the negotiations over Bilaterals One, it was the EU and not Switzerland which brought the free movement of persons on the negotiation table. At that time Swiss immigration policy was well-known for its restrictiveness. The strict control of immigration was managed by system of quotas and permits and this was also applied to other member states of the EU.¹⁷³ The negotiations were very difficult and after two years both parties finally found a compromise. The EU achieved what was wanted, not immediately but by granting Switzerland transitional periods and provisions ensuring its gradual opening of labor markets. The agreement came into force on 1 June 2002 and defined three successive stages of opening labor market, 2002-2004, 2004-2007, 2007-2014 and if nothing happens, in the very last year of the third stage, the unrestricted freedom of movement will come into effect.¹⁷⁴ This agreement was the most controversial in the public opinion from the whole package of bilateral treaties known as Bilaterals One.¹⁷⁵ The difficulties were not just between Bern and Brussels but also within Switzerland itself. As the agreement would be the most convenient for Swiss business as general, this sector had to do a lot

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, 203.

¹⁷¹ P.Koch and S.Lavenex, “The human face of Europeanization,” in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 152.

¹⁷² Boris Divinsky, *Labor Market - Migration Nexus in Slovakia: Time to Act in a Comprehensive Way*, (Bratislava: International Organization for Migration, 2007), 186.

¹⁷³ C. Dupont and P. Sciarni, “Back to the Future: bilaterals I,” in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 204.

¹⁷⁴ P.Koch and S.Lavenex, “The human face of Europeanization,” in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 156.

¹⁷⁵ Grete Brochman and Sandra Lavenex, “Neither In nor Out,” in *Migration and the Externalities of the European Integration*, ed. Sandra Lavenex and Emek Ucarer (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 58.

of side-payments to trade-unions and left the parties to avoid the opposition which could campaign in referendum. Only after several rounds of tough negotiations in tripartite committee was the compromise finally found.¹⁷⁶

Closely connected with the free movement of the persons is the issue of the opening of borders to non-controlled flow which was granted by Schengen Agreement. Populist and Euro-skeptic movements were strongly against. The leader of SVP, the strongest one, and at the same time Minister of Justice, Blocher, proposed a 'light version of the Agreement comprising merely access to the EU's SIS database (Schengen Information Service) and excluding the lifting of controls at the Swiss border, which was firmly refused by the EU.¹⁷⁷ When finally in May 2004 the government agreed and closed all nine chapters, including the chapter on Schengen/Dublin agreement as a one package deal named Bilaterals Two, SVP and AUNS launched a referendum to challenge the Schengen agreement. In June 2005 the majority of citizens accepted this agreement. Ironically, the leader of the main Euro-skeptic party and controversially at the same time in charge of the ministry which dealt with Schengen Agreement had to yield and curb his rhetoric under EU pressure, which symbolically shows the strength of Switzerland in the 'ocean of Europeanization.'

An observer from outside could claim that the Swiss are more xenophobic than other European nations, but according to several surveys the Swiss are no more xenophobic than the other European countries and even contrary, they are more foreigner-friendly than the EU average.¹⁷⁸ However, success of xenophobic parties, popular votes, such as rejection of easier citizenship for second- and third-generation foreigners in 2004 and popular initiatives for

¹⁷⁶ Alex Fischer, Sarah Nicolet and Pascal Sciarini, "Europeanization of a Non-EU Country: The Case of Swiss Immigration Policy," *West European Politics* 25, no. 4 (October 2002): 162.

¹⁷⁷ A. Afonso and M. Maggetti, "Bilaterals II: reaching the limits?" in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 222.

¹⁷⁸ P.Koch and S.Lavenex, "The human face of Europeanization," in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 152.

reduction of the number of foreigners living in Switzerland does not indicate aforementioned, but as Lahav , Koch and Lavenex claimed, these trends are also visible in other European countries,¹⁷⁹ so it indicates that Europeanization of the perception of the issue by population and political parties has reached the same level both in the EU and Switzerland. The roots of the aforementioned tendencies are also in the size of the foreign population in Switzerland. By 2006, 20.3 percent of population were foreigners¹⁸⁰ and about 87% of foreign permanent residents are of European origin, two-thirds of whom are nationals of an EU or EFTA member state.¹⁸¹ Comparing the stock of foreign population in both countries, in two different years, one can see the clear difference in the importance of the issue of stocks of foreign population in both countries. When in 2001 in Switzerland 19.7 percent of the population were foreigners, in Slovakia it was just 0.5 percent of population and similarly in 2006 in the former it was 20.3 percent share to 0.6 percent.¹⁸² Respecting the claims of Koch and Lavenex, that the number of foreigners in Switzerland indicates how much Switzerland is a part of Europe,¹⁸³ i.e. how much it is Europeanized; one can argue that the level of Europeanization in Switzerland is much higher than in the case of Slovakia with low numbers of foreigners.

What are the implications of the Europeanization of these policies for Switzerland? According to Lavenex and Koch, the effects of free movement and conditions for labor competition vary across economic sectors.¹⁸⁴ The Swiss health sector was already Europeanized,

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 152.

¹⁸⁰ OECD, "International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI - 2008 Edition," under <http://ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/publications/doifiles/812008071P1T029.xls> (accessed on May 16, 2009).

¹⁸¹ Federal Administration, "Foreign resident population by nationality," under http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01/02/blank/key/auslaendische_bevoelkerung/staatsangehoerigkeit.html (accessed on May 16, 2009).

¹⁸² OECD, "International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI - 2008 Edition," under <http://ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/publications/doifiles/812008071P1T029.xls> (accessed on May 16, 2009).

¹⁸³ P.Koch and S.Lavenex, "The human face of Europeanization," in *Switzerland and the European Union*, ed. Clive H. Church (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 161.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 160.

because it relied heavily on a European workforce and thus the effect was minimal.¹⁸⁵ In contrast, the construction sector was the most affected. The creation of similar measures present in the EU such as creation of tripartite commissions and closer cooperation with the state in labor market controls were started to prevent the similar developments present in Germany, where freedom of movement has gone with gradual dissolution of social partnership and with wage and social dumping.¹⁸⁶ Economic demand for more foreign workers is still unabated¹⁸⁷ and thus heavily dependent on the European common policy of free movement of persons. So approximation to the EU immigration policies was a consequence of a mixture of domestic politic choices and adaptation to externalities of the European influence.¹⁸⁸ Thus Swiss interest in respect of immigration converges to high degree with the interests of other Western European states and thus can be claimed that this policy is fully Europeanized.¹⁸⁹

Another proof of Europeanization of the Swiss migration and labor policy is its actual influence on the member states of the Union. Swiss successfully absorbed a large inflow of immigrants thanks to its system of annual quotas by worker categories combined with limited mobility and exemptions allowing the progressive transfer of immigrants from temporary to permanent status.¹⁹⁰ And many of these elements were used by old member states towards immigration from new member states after 2004 enlargement.¹⁹¹ Thus this is an example of the upload from bottom to top level of the EU policies. The similar upload was not present in the

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 160.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 160.

¹⁸⁷ Grete Brochman and Sandra Lavenex, "Neither In nor Out," in *Migration and the Externalities of the European Integration*, ed. Sandra Lavenex and Emek Ucarer (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 60.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 65.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, 69.

¹⁹⁰ Jaime de Melo, Florence Miguet, and Tobias Müller, "The Political Economy of Migration and EU Enlargement: Lessons from Switzerland," in *Managing European Union Enlargement*, ed. Helge Berger and Thomas Moutos (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 160.

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 160.

Slovak case, which has just used the top-down adaptational process, even though it is a full member and recently also fully integrated economy in the EMU.

4.3 *Commonalities and differences*

The share and importance of immigrants in the economy of both countries is very different. In Switzerland the share reaches more than 20 percent of the population and consists mostly of EU citizens, plus it is very beneficial to the economy. In Slovakia this share is less than one percent of the population, which is the lowest number in the EU-25, just half of them are EU citizens, and overall effect on the economy is minimal. Thus Switzerland is more Europeanized in regard to the share of Europeans and their importance on the labor market. Controversially, position of the population toward free labor mobility is friendlier in Switzerland, which could be a consequence of deeper Europeanization of this sphere in the country. The countries' stances and policies on labor migration are also, as stated above, more converged to the European model in the Swiss case which reminds the position of incumbents, whereas Slovakia is still just developing and gradually adjusting to these European policies and thus is somewhere at the beginning of the Europeanization of its labor policy. The levels of Europeanization of both countries' policies is similar but tends to be stronger in the case of Switzerland, which is contrary to the expectation that Europeanization level would be stronger in the country which is fully integrated into the EU and which has just minimum veto points.

Conclusion

As I have already claimed, even though the existence of the multiple veto levels in Switzerland makes it more difficult to adapt to Europeanization pressure, two areas, politics and policy, show the contrary. Despite the fact that behavior of Slovakia reminded ‘obedient dog’ and all the political parties present in the parliament express the approval of the EU concept, Europeanization in both areas has similar or even lower level than in Switzerland.

The difference in Europeanization of both countries’ politics was not such as substantial than in the case of Europeanization of Labor and migration policies of both countries. The difference in the level and implication on the latter area is bigger in the case of Switzerland and similarly also the impact of the Swiss labor and migration policy on the higher level of the EU, i.e. in bottom-up Europeanization. Some of the decisions and features of the Swiss policies and politics had a significant impact on the behavior of the member states and EU as a whole, compared with the minute influence of bottom-up process in the case of Slovakia. For example strict Swiss policies towards immigrants were also imitated and modified by other older member states towards new member states’ accession in 2004. The same is true of the impact of Swiss federal government’s behavior and stance on some policies during the negotiation process over Bilaterals One and Two. Its firm position over certain issues changed and modified the EU’s initial plans of tax havens, banking policies and Trans-European Networks.

Final assessments of advantages also vary and are quite unequal in the case of these two areas. In the first area, party politics, the implications for the Swiss consensual party system is negative, because its system became more heterogeneous and competitive, which brought instability. The example of less Europeanized politics, particularly its slowing down in Slovakia

in the last three years shows a high degree of stability but on the other hand also the high degree of corruption and somewhat authoritarian way of doing politics, which also erode democratic standards.

However, in the second area of comparison, in the migration and labor policy, the result of deeper Europeanization is more straightforward. In Switzerland the inflow of labor immigrants help to foster the growth for several decades and still in some sectors is crucial and beneficial to economy and is indirectly related to bigger alignment with EU stances and policies. In contrast in Slovakia this policy is less aligned with EU positions and the importance of immigrants is marginal. Contrary to Switzerland the outflow of skilled labor force has negative long term effect, even short term positive effect in relieving unemployment.

From the above comparisons it is possible to derive some insights to the problematic of both countries' Europeanization and also the Europeanization in general. First of all, from the two case comparisons is evident that relation between Europeanization and membership status is not in equation, i.e. being a part of the Union does not necessarily mean that Europeanization level will be the same like in the case of non-members.

Secondly, domestic environment and peculiarities still matter in the relations between states, union and membership status. The evidence of more Europeanized Switzerland which is, due to domestic conditions, still not part of the Union, contrasts with peculiarities of fully integrated Slovakia, which also, due to its domestic peculiarities, stands away from deeper Europeanization even there is absence of real domestic veto instruments.

Thirdly, as the thesis showed several times, the bottom-up processes of Europeanization, for which it is necessary to be part of the Union, is present on a bigger scale in Switzerland compared to Slovakia, and thus the leverage which could be imposed over the Union, does not necessarily depend just on the official status of membership but very often on the economic

weight which is in the case of Switzerland incomparably higher than economic weight of Slovakia.

Fourthly, the number of veto instruments within the country is not the sufficient tool to withstand or otherwise, to foster Europeanization, but just like in the case of these two countries, this ability depends on other characteristics present within the particular country. Thus Europeanization without membership is possible as much as Europeanization with membership.

Finally, other variables, namely proximity, passing time to the core EU states and influence and importance of the single market on small and dependant economies, should be taken into consideration more than it is in the Europeanization literature. As my cases showed, once typical Europeanization variables such as institutions, veto players and socialization do not play such a substantial role, there have to be other factors. And these factors, implying from the geographical difference of both countries and also starting time of their interaction with the EU, could be very influential variables, worth taking into consideration and further research.

Bibliography

Afonso A., and Maggetti M. "Bilaterals II: reaching the limits?" In *Switzerland and the European Union*, edited by Clive H. Church. Abingdon: Routlage, 2007.

Borzel, Tanja, A. "Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States." In *The Member States of the European Union*, edited by Simon Bulmer and Christiann Lequesne Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Brochman, Grete, and Lavenex, Sandra. "Neither In nor Out." In *Migration and the Externalities of the European Integration*, edited by Sandra Lavenex and Ememk Ucarer. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002.

Bulmer, Simon, and Lequesne, Christiann. "The EU and Its Member States: An Overview." In *The Member States of the European Union*, edited by Simon Bulmer and Christiann Lequesne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Church, Clive at al. "Sectors, structures and suspicions." In *Switzerland and the European Union*, edited by Clive H. Church. Abingdon: Routlage, 2007.

Church, H. Clive. "The Context of Swiss Opposition to Europe." 'Opposing Europe Research Network,' Working Paper No 11, 2003.

Church, Clive H., ed. *Switzerland and the European Union*. Abingdon: Routlage, 2007.

Divinsky, Boris. *Labor Market - Migration Nexus in Slovakia: Time to Act in a Comprehensive Way*. Bratislava: International Organization for Migration, 2007.

Dupont, C., and Sciarni P. "Back to the Future: bilaterals I." In *Switzerland and the European Union*, edited by Clive H. Church. Abingdon: Routlage, 2007.

Ehs, Tamara. "An Unwritten History: The Europeanization of Switzerland." Paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007.

Fairlamb, David. "Switzerland: In the EU's tentacles?" *Business Week*, May 24, 2004.

Federal Administration. "Foreign resident population by nationality." http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01/02/blank/key/auslaendische_bevoelkerung/staatsangehoerigkeit.html (accessed on May 16, 2009).

Federal Chancellery. "The Swiss Confederation a Brief Guide 2009." <http://www.bk.admin.ch/dokumentation/02070/index.html?lang=en> (accessed May 30, 2009).

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), Federal Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA). "Information file on the Europe 2006 Report, June 2006." <http://www.europa.admin.ch/dokumentation/00437/00460/00684/index.html?lang=en> (accessed on May 26, 2009).

Fischer, Alex, and Nicolet, Sarah, and Sciarini, Pascal. "Europeanization of a Non-EU Country: The Case of Swiss Immigration Policy." *West European Politics* 25, no. 4 (October 2002): 143 - 170.

Harmesen, Robert, and Wilson, Thomas M. "Introduction: Approaches to Europeanization" *Yearbook of European Studies*, vol. 14 (2000). Quoted in Tamara Ehs, "An Unwritten History: The Europeanization of Switzerland." Paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007.

Harris, Erika. "Europeanization of Slovakia." *Comparative European Politics* 2, (2004): 185 – 211.

Haughton, Tim. "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" Paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007.

Haughton, Tim. "What role has Europe played in Party Politics in Slovakia?" 2005, www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/wp2timhaughton.doc (accessed on May 26, 2009).

Haverland, Markus. "Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? Improving Case Selection in Europeanization Research." *West European Politics*, 29, No.1 (January 2006): 134 - 46.

Henderson, Karen. "Slovak Political Parties and the EU: From Symbolic Politics to Policies." In *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*, edited by P. Lewis and Z. Mansfeldova. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.

Jochum, Margit and Mak, Jeannette. "Europeanization without membership, membership without Europeanization?" Paper presented at the International Conference on 'Europeanization of public spheres?, Political Mobilization, Public Communication, and the European Union, Berlin, June 20 – 22 2003.

Koch, P., and Lavenex, S. "The human face of Europeanization." In *Switzerland and the European Union*, edited by Clive H. Church. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Trechsel, Alexander H. *The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Mair, Peter. "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems." *West European Politics* 23, no.4 (October 2000): 27-51.

Melo, Jaime de, and Miguet, Florence, and Muller, Tobias. "The Political Economy of Migration and EU Enlargement: Lessons from Switzerland." In *Managing European Union Enlargement*, edited by Helge Berger and Thomas Moutos. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004.

Metzger, Megan M. "Slovakia and the European Union: Complexities and Contradictions." Honors Thesis, Macalester College, 2007.

Octavian, Aron. "The Impact of Europeanization upon Party Systems in Slovakia and Romania." *Transition Studies Review* 15, no. 2 (September 2008): 273 - 280.

OECD. "International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI - 2008 Edition." <http://ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/publications/doi/files/812008071P1T029.xls> (accessed on May 16, 2009).

Olejarova, Eva. "Labor Migration as a Socio-Economic Phenomenon – Slovakia and the Czech Republic in a Comparative Study." Master's thesis, CEU, Budapest, 2007.

Pridham, Geoffrey. "The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: Mečiar and Dzurinda Governments Compared." *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54, No. 2, (2002): 203- 229.

Rybar, M. "Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia." In *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party System*, ed. S. Jungerstam-Mulders. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." In *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Sciarini, Pascal, Fischer, Alex, and Nicolet, Sarah. "How Europe hits home: evidence from the Swiss case." *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 3, (3 June 2004):353 – 378.

Sedelmeier, Ulrich. "Europeanization in the new and candidate states." *Living Reviews in European Governance* 1, no. 3 (9 November 2006). <http://livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-3> (accessed May 25, 2009).

The Institute for Labour and Family Research. "Sprístupnenie trhov práce vo vybraných krajinách EÚa vývojové trendy na trhu práce v SR," [Opening of the labor markets in particular member states and trends in Slovak labor market] (Bratislava, 2006). http://www.sspr.gov.sk/texty/File/vyskum/2006/Reichova/Sprístupnenie_TP.pdf (accessed May 18, 2009).

Trachsel, Alexander. "Direct Democracy and European Integration." In *Switzerland and the European Union*, edited by Clive H. Church. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.

University of Kent, Centre for Swiss Politics. "Twelve Key Points about Swiss Politics and Democracy." <http://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/cfs/csp/pdf/CHTWELVE%20KEY%20POINTS%20.pdf>, (accessed on May 10, 2009).

Ustava Slovenskej republiky,[Constitution of Slovak Republic]. (Bratislava: Poradca podnikatela, 2000).

Vachudova, Milada, Anna. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 178. Quoted in Tim Haughton, "What Does the Case of Slovakia Tell Us About the EU's Active Leverage?" Paper presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17 – 19 2007.