

AUSTRIA FACING THE RISE OF NATIONHOOD IN *FIN DE SIÈCLE* BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA

By
Philipp Decker

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Supervisor: Professor Anton Pelinka

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Abstract

This thesis deals with the nationalization process in nineteenth century Bohemia and Moravia. While a growing group of historians argues that the policies and legal reforms performed by the Imperial Austrian state led to the institutionalization and the enforcement of nationality as a category among a nationally indifferent population, this thesis is going to show that reforms and state policies were only one factor which occurred at a time where national alignments within society have already taken root.

The hypothesis is that the cultural and societal conditions in Bohemia and Moravia, in combination with the rise of Nationalism (as a consequence of several processes of modernization), led to national alignment along linguistic lines. This dynamic process of nationalization will be explained by referring to Karl Deutsch's theory of social communication. The thesis concludes that it was not so much the failure of the Imperial elite which led to the rise of nationhood but rather cultural conditions in combination with effects of modernization in several spheres. Mass-schooling, literacy and mass-printing led to an increasing importance of language as a cleavage.

The majority of the population did not care about 'nationality' in everyday life. However, through social communication a certain sense of commonality was transmitted which crystallized in certain situations of conflict. Liberalization and democratization led to a situation where nationality became an important political category. Legal reforms which tried to accommodate the category of nationality were primarily driven by the pragmatic motive of preventing escalations and destruction within the political system.

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Introduction

In my thesis I am going to argue that societal developments forced the Austrian state to find pragmatic solutions for settling the increasing politicization along the linguistic cleavages of Bohemian society in the second half of the nineteenth century. Nationality became an important societal category through several processes. The state was originally not voluntarily supportive of nationalists however, as an effect of its weakness it lacked coercive power to enforce policies against the national separation of many institutions, organisations, and the political sphere. As a result the Austrian state tried to settle conflicts by accommodating national rights.

In contrast to a growing group of historians I am going to argue that nationality became important not because of the Austrian state but rather as a result of modernization and the cultural foundation of Bohemian and Moravian society. I am going to show that the debate about language in Bohemia and Moravia has started long before the turn of the century. The crucial difference was that because of modernization processes language became more important for an increasing number of the population and the emerging mass-politics elevated former unimportant cleavages to become the dominant issues of political mobilization.¹

In the first chapter the foundation of my argument will be set up. Cultural developments and the work of intellectuals prepared the societal ground on which the Czech national movement could grow. After a critical review of existing literature in the concerned field the theoretical point of departure will be clarified. The cultural conditions serve as one important factor of explaining the development of national alignment. Karl Deutsch's social communication theory serves for the explanation of the nationalization process within society throughout the thesis.

¹ Language divisions within the population were unimportant for the political elite of the ancient regime.

In the second chapter the increasing role of nationality in the political sphere will be examined and explained. A certain conception of Bohemian nationhood, based on some dominant interpretations of nationality, became exclusive in terms of language and ethnicity. Some historians and scholars who identified themselves with something like an exclusively Czech-speaking Bohemian nation played key roles in this process. However, the most important hypothesis in this section is that personal identification and attachments have to be seen differentiated, depending on different social strata and social groups in distinct regions in Bohemia and Moravia.

The third chapter will show the procedural institutionalization of nationality as a societal and political category. There were multiple factors which created the social reality of nationality as a functional and effective category. As a result, political parties of all camps and even the Austrian state finally recognized nationality and adopted strategies to implement nationality into their political conceptions and legislation.

The fourth chapter departs from the view which dominated at the turn of the century. Nationality became an influential category in politics and even the international Austrian Social Democratic Party and its political elite - among them Austro-Marxist thinkers - adapted their ideology to social reality. Denial of cultural differences and Assimilation was not seen as a possibility anymore. Hence, Liberals and Socialists were confronted with a situation they did not expect. In the conclusion my findings and implications for further research will be summed up.

At this point some basic definitions will be presented which clarify the focus of my work. For practical reasons this thesis focuses on the geographical regions of Bohemia and Moravia which belonged legally to the Austrian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which I will refer to as Cisleithania or just Austria. The inevitable problem of how to define Austria has been illustrated in the 1840s when a Liberal politician stated following:

Austria is a purely imagined name, which means neither a distinct people nor a land or nation. It is a conventional name for a complex of clearly differentiated nationalities ... There are Italians, Germans, Slavs, Hungarians, who together constitute the Austrian Empire. But there exists no Austria, no Austrian, no Austrian nationality, and, except for a span of land around Vienna, there never did. There are no attachments, no memories of centuries-old unity and greatness, no historical ties which knit the various peoples of one and the same state together - the history of Austria is, all in all, small and sparse in factual material. None of these peoples is so much superior to any other in numbers, intelligence, or preponderant influence and wealth as to make it possible for any one to absorb the others in time.²

The term 'Austria' was commonly used in international affairs to refer to the Habsburg Empire in general. However, as a result of the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 the terminology changed by establishing the official dualism. From 1867 the Habsburg Empire was officially differentiated into an Austrian and a Hungarian half. In this paper the term Austria will be used as it was understood around 1900. There it was clear that one half of the Habsburg state was Hungary. "But if you were a Czech or Italian with strong national sympathies, then there was no question of belonging to an entity (even half of an entity) called 'Austria'."³ The term Austria, which will be used in this paper refers to the understanding of the people in Cisleithania, the eleven nationalities who belonged to a political entity which was legally not named "Austria" until the final year of the War when the last Emperor, Karl, decreed it to be 'Austria.'⁴

As a matter of the spatial limitation I consciously exclude Silesia from my discussion. The focus will be on Czech and German speakers in Bohemia and Silesia (I am aware that these were only the two dominant languages). The analysis will be reduced in complexity and hence easier to handle. Especially when examining legal reforms regarding language this reduction appears to be reasonable. When writing about multilingual regions, where Czech and German have been spoken by a significant part of the population, I try to refer to both names used at that time. By avoiding the usage of terms like "Germans" and "Czechs," I will not follow a nationalist frame of constructing definite groups *ex ante*. Instead of writing about

² Viktor von Andrian-Werbung, quoted in Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918*, Vol. I. (New York: Octagon Books, 1977), 3.

³ Jamie Bulloch, *Karl Renner: Austria* (London: Haus Publishing, 2009), 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

“nations” I am going to refer to Czech, German and Yiddish speakers. If I use the terms “Czech” and “German” in the text I do not refer to any nationalist concept of bounded communities but to rather dynamic and continually fluctuating social groups, which are imagined in social reality. In the following chapter I am going to examine the development of the idea of nationhood in Bohemia and Moravia.

1. The Development of the Idea of Nationhood in Bohemia and Moravia

This thesis tackles the question of how and why nationhood and the concept of nationality as political and cultural forms have been institutionalized in Bohemia and Moravia. Taking Rogers Brubaker's distinguished scholarly work on terminology in the field of nationalism studies into consideration, following premises shall be made clear from the very beginning: the question should not be "what is the Czech or the German nation?" but rather "how does the concept of 'nation' work as a practical category, as [a] classificatory scheme, as [a] cognitive frame?"⁵ Regarding terminology, Brubaker's advice of decoupling categories of practice, such as 'nation', from categories of analysis, like 'nationhood' as institutionalized form, and 'nationness' as an event, shall be adopted.⁶

Writing about a historical topic, namely the issue of identity politics and the process of nationalization in Bohemia and Moravia, requires being aware of national perspectives in historiography due to the agenda of many historians as agents of nationalistic discourses. Modern nation-states are keen on creating national historiography, and hence, reframing history by nationalizing its narratives and interpretations, and additionally, even removing a-national interpretations. As a matter of fact, historians are often part of this process. Reflecting on sources, motifs, and political agendas is of highest importance when it comes to assessing and using historical descriptions and historiographical analysis and interpretations for a social scientific analysis.

A second critical point is the usage of social theory. Social science is not a homogenous empirical science where data is quantified and hypotheses can easily be validated or falsified. Especially in the field of analyzing historical societal processes there

⁵ Cf. Rogers Brubaker, "Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event," *Contention*, 4/1 (Fall, 1994): 6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

exists a diversity of sometimes even contradictory theoretical approaches and schools. This complexity is reflected in the diversity of interpretations and explanations regarding the social processes and political activities examined in this thesis. To make the author's theoretical assumptions and his positioning regarding the existing theoretical perspectives clear, a critique on influential works within the field will be presented in this first chapter.

A danger lies in assuming that there existed *per se* a certain historical or even substantive concept of 'nation'. The paradigm of the nation as a modern invention created by nationalist activists is thoroughly accepted in the current field of nationalism studies.⁷ However, there is no homogenous position on the foundations and mode of operation of nationalism, nationalization, and its functionality. Whereas classic scholars like Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm argued against the rational logic of nationalism as an ideology and interpreted nationalism as a limited historical phenomenon, others like Rogers Brubaker attacked the use of 'nation' as an analytical term as "groupism" and proposed alternative terms like "nationhood" or "sense of belonging" by which he attempted to avoid the presumption of stable boundaries and the flaw of 'essentialism.'⁸ By taking Brubaker's argument into account the term "nation" will be avoided and replaced by the concept of personal identifications and constructed "nationhood".

When writing about processes of nationalization of politics and of certain individuals and social groups this does not mean that a bounded group of individuals - ethnic or national - is presumed. In contrast, in this thesis the argumentation runs against such an "ethnicism" which presumes the pre-existence of a bounded ethnic group before its transformation into a nation by 'awakening' its members' national consciousness or by 'national revival' led by

⁷ Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), Benedict Anderson, *Die Erfindung der Nation: zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts* (Frankfurt/Main, 1996).

⁸ Cf. Rogers Brubaker, "Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism," in John Hall (ed.), *The State of the Nation. Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 272-305 and Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 1.

intellectuals. If not doing so the analysis would be based on nationalist discourse and hence would become part of nationalist ideology itself. Jeremy King defines ‘ethnicism’ as “a vague, largely implicit framework that holds the nations of East Central Europe to have sprung primarily from a specific set of mass, mutually exclusive ethnic groups defined by inherited cultural and linguistic patterns.”⁹ King observes a tendency of changing argumentation and moderate language used by modern ‘ethnicists,’ who turned to include political and socioeconomic factors in their explanatory framework of “the” nationalization process. To make it clear, the category of national groups, German and Czech, would limit the very attempt to analyze the processes of nationalization. Starting from the assumption that the modern concept of ‘nation’ exists as an entity or as a proto-national ethnic or ethno-cultural group in the past would lead us to commit teleology.

It can be said for sure that the concept of an ethnic Czech nation is a fundamentally modern one. However, a crucial question of this thesis is, why did the idea of nationhood become such an influential factor in legitimizing politics in Cisleithania? Since the phenomenon of nationalization and its success in Bohemia and Moravia cannot be easily ascribed to pre-existing ethnic or linguistic groups we have to critically look for alternative feasible explanations. However, it is obvious that the rich *fundus* of nationalism-theories explains many dimensions of the multi-faceted phenomenon of nationalism and its related processes. Hence, it is highly important to focus on the specific societal processes and the activism of nationalists in Bohemia and Moravia.

⁹ Jeremy King, “The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond,” in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001), 123.

1.1. Nationalists and the Concept of Nationhood

After having refused ‘ethnicism’ as not only simplistic but even a flawed concept of explaining processes of nationalization - by explaining origins by its outcomes (teleology) - we have to find better categories of analysis than ‘ethnic groups’. One proposal is Jeremy King’s distinction between statehood and nationhood, based on Brubaker’s elaboration of Max Weber’s classical work.¹⁰ Following this understanding, the idea of nationhood is linked to the idea of statehood not by membership but by political legitimacy. Nationhood “boils down to a set of mutually exclusive and mutually reinforcing variants on the populist principle of political legitimacy, to a form of loyalty, to a modern discourse structurally capable of blanketing the political field.”¹¹

If it is about political legitimacy, how was it then possible for nationalist activists to persuade the a-national or at least indifferent population in Bohemia and Moravia to feel like belonging to a certain nation? Jeremy Kind argues that nationalist activists like historians worked on the political mission of nationalization of vastly indifferent people. He interprets the role of ethnicism as “a socially transformative category of practice” and refers to nationalist activists like the Bohemian historian and politician František Palacký (1798-1876).¹²

I am not a German – at least I do not feel myself to be one ... I am a Czech of Slavonic blood, and with all the little I possess and all the little I can do, I have devoted myself for all time to the service of my nation.¹³ (František Palacký)

It is well explored that historians have been supporting the nationalization process by reframing historiography in national terms.

¹⁰ Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in Germany and France* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), chapter 1.

¹¹ Jeremy King, “The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond,” in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001), 128.

¹² *Ibid.*, 130.

¹³ František Palacký, “Letter sent by František Palacký to Frankfurt,” *Slavonic Review*, 26 (1948): 304.

Similarly to Jeremy King, his colleagues Pieter Judson and Tara Zahra argue that the majority of the populations in the discussed area and period had been nationally indifferent. Judson describes nationalist organizations and activists as driving forces behind the project of nationalization and its discourse. “Activists developed discourses - and later added behaviors - of hostile national relations in order to project the idea of age-old conflict onto such regions. These discourses and behaviors in turn became tools used to constitute those very differences in local society.”¹⁴ In short, he concludes that if successful, nationalists owed their success to hard ideological work and not to any pre-existing factors of ethno-cultural conditions. This simplistic argumentation underestimates societal processes which will be argued throughout the paper by referring to Karl Deutsch’s theory of social communication.

Moreover, Judson even generalizes that the Austrian Empire is a positive example of how a multiethnic state (Austria recognized eleven official languages in its half of the dual-monarchy) can be successfully modernizing without being simultaneously nationalizing with the aim of creating a nation-state:

...the history of Habsburg Austria in the period 1867-1918 demonstrates that social, political, economic, and administrative modernization could easily occur without nationalization ... [T]hey [nationalist activists] repeatedly conflated the state’s modernizing program with their own nationalist agendas, embracing social and economic change and presenting it as their own distinctive contribution to the improvement of local society.¹⁵

This view is going to be debated and questioned. In fact it was the modernization process which made nationalist alignments among the population powerful. The state promoted modernization and hence, indirectly nationality as a category. However, it could not but react to the social reality of language as a main cleavage in Bohemia and Moravia. My opinion is clearly that nationalism is linked to modernization.

A second point is about the effects of nationalism. Judson brings up two arguments which oppose the traditional interpretation of perceiving nationalism and national conflict as

¹⁴ Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 5-6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

sources of instability and the final dissolution of the Empire.¹⁶ Rather, he sees nationalist rhetoric first as an instrument to gain “mastery over rival groups within their own nationalist movements and rarely to defeat the so-called national enemy.”¹⁷ He argues that the motive was primarily to appear as the “most legitimate representative of the nation.”¹⁸ His second argument is that nationalist movements “competed to demonstrate their loyalty to the emperor.”¹⁹ Their struggles aimed basically at gaining a better position in the political context of the multinational Empire and not at gaining territorial independence.

These arguments are indeed important ones and in some moments and for some actors they have been probably true. When looking at political ideas of nationalist leaders it appears that they mostly thought about improving their nation’s political power-relations within the overarching framework of the Empire. As an effect they were hardly persecuted (after the end of absolutism) and were able to work freely within the supranational Habsburg state. It even occurred that non-national populist movements like the Social Democrats had “far less success at realizing their rival, class-based worldview and received far less tolerant treatment from the authorities.”²⁰

1.2. Three Models of Explaining “Sense of Belonging”

Before turning to the development of a particular nationhood, let us once more discuss the analytical dilemma of nationalism theories. As Brubaker writes,

[w]e should think of the nation not as substance but as institutionalized form, not as collectivity but as practical category, not as entity but as contingent event, conjuncturally fluctuating, and precarious

¹⁶ Look at the brilliant study of Oscar Jászi, who analyzes different separate and also interdependent spheres of the Habsburg monarchy where, centrifugal and centripetal, societal and political forces occurred. Cf. Oscar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929).

¹⁷ Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 8.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 9.

²⁰ Jeremy King, “The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond,” in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001), 134.

frame of vision and basis for individual and collective action, rather than as a relatively stable product of deep developmental trends in economy, polity, or culture.²¹

The general trend of viewing the nation as an “imagined community,” to frame it in Benedict Anderson’s famous words, is reasonable without a doubt. There exists no current theorist who doubts that fact of constructed social reality.

However, there are doubts regarding the question why the sense of belonging towards a nation often gets a unique character. Anderson argues that “the rich multiplicity of historical, ethnic, and religious roots of national identity require acts of invention of a mythic common past ... and the suppression of the diversity of sectarian, clan, tribal, dynastic, and polyglot origins of the peoples who constitute the nation.”²² When Anderson compares this process metaphorically to childhood memory amnesia, he makes an important point. Similarly argued earlier by Ernest Renan in his famous lecture *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* at the Sorbonne, in 1882. Becoming a nation thus requires a common will of forgetting and inventing historical narratives.

As the ritual articulation of myths, commemorations and public celebrations play an important part in creating a usable national history. Because of the myths encoded within them, commemorations can help create national heritage - with a certain group as the legitimate heir - and erase reminders of a diverse pre- and subnational past. Myth and commemoration help establish the cultural characteristics of the ‘self’ and ‘other’, especially at times when one group challenges another for political dominance.²³

The so called reflexive sociological model of Pierre Bourdieu, Rogers Brubaker, and Benedict Anderson presents a good starting point in understanding the subjective and situational nature of the sense of belonging to a constructed ‘nation’, which can be termed as “nationness”.²⁴ However, the serious functionality of identification towards one’s nation is best pointed out by the fact that in situations of war and extreme crisis there sometimes exists the will to die

²¹ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 18-19.

²² Peter Loewenberg, “The Psychology of Creating the Other,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 247.

²³ Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, “Introduction,” in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001), 3.

²⁴ Rogers Brubaker, “Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event,” *Contention*, 4/1 (Fall, 1994): 8. Brubaker argues that the existing literature focuses mainly on structural, cultural and historical explanations - which he calls developmentalist - and that there is a lack of “eventful analysis”, which theorizes nationness as something that happens [sic!].

for one's nation. "People are demonstrably willing to die for these national identities, which evoke deeply stirring identifications with family and home, tradition, and emotionally freighted symbolism."²⁵ One impressive historical example which illustrates the persuasive power of identification with one's nation is the French Napoleonic army and its performance in comparison to the traditional armies of the dynasties in Austria and Russia.

The view of Brubaker and colleagues that the main function of nationalism as ideology is political legitimacy is not wrong, but it is undermined by its effective meaning for individuals in cases of crisis and national polarization. Secondly, it does not pay enough attention to the social foundations and societal processes in the construction of social reality. Ernest Gellner stressed the role of school-transmitted 'mass-public culture', as distinguished from family childhood socialization.²⁶ Gellner rejects the idea that nationalism is deeply based in the human psyche. However, he sees cultural factors as explanatory reasons for the modern phenomenon of nationalism. His structural approach, similarly to that of Eric Hobsbawm²⁷, views historical development as a process in which nationalism inhabits a new and limited place and became successful due to processes of modernization and its effects on society. Eric Hobsbawm even doubted the sustainability of nationalism as ideology as a whole.

One scholar who examined the roots of the success of nationalism at a very different level was Karl Deutsch. In a seminal work he points at "the intimate family socialization process as the essential building block of nationalism."²⁸ He basically differentiates between bureaucratic and social communication. The first kind of communication refers to efficient communication within one's professional field. The second one refers to intimate social

²⁵ Peter Loewenberg, "The Psychology of Creating the Other," in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 247.

²⁶ Cf. Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997).

²⁷ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

²⁸ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 98.

communication including “childhood memories, in courtship, marriage, and parenthood, in their standards of beauty, their habits of food and drink, in games and recreation, they are far closer to mutual communication and understanding with their countrymen than with their fellow specialists in other countries.”²⁹

Similarly to the Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer³⁰, Karl Deutsch defined a nation as a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*, a community of fate that is “shaped by shared experiences”, a “common history”, that “tied together the members of a nation into a ‘community of character.’ A ‘community of culture’ remains entirely dependent on a preceding ‘community of fate.’”³¹ In Deutsch’s view people’s strong identification with nationhood is grounded in a common social culture, which is “a personal, developmental, highly family- and home-oriented, learned pattern of life.”³² “We found culture based on the community of communication, consisting of socially stereotyped patterns of behavior, including habits of language and thought, and carried on through various forms of social learning, particularly through methods of child rearing standardized in this culture.”³³ He describes an in-group which creates a sense of belonging among its members through the feeling of understanding in the realms of taste, play, family and sexual life etc.

At every step we find social communication bound up indissolubly with the ends and means of life, with men’s values and the patterns of their teamwork, with employment and promotion, with marriage and inheritance, with the preferences of buyers and sellers, and with economic security or distress - with all the psychological, political, social, and economic relationships that influence the security and happiness of individuals. Nationality, culture, and communication are not the only factors that affect these, but they are always present to affect them.³⁴

Deutsch has built a “dynamic cultural-historical narrative explanation” of how nationalism is so sustainable. However, he does not explain the process of communication, transfer, and

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Cf. Otto Bauer, “Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie,” (1907), in Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode (eds.), *Austro-Marxism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 102-109.

³¹ Peter Loewenberg, “The Psychology of Creating the Other,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 249.

³² Ibid., 250.

³³ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 37.

³⁴ Ibid., 106.

internalization itself. Nowadays, these details are well researched and accessible in literature about childhood socialization.³⁵ After having outlined three major approaches of understanding and theorizing people's sense of belonging towards a nation, conceptualized as an imagined community, it becomes clear that the authors mentioned at the beginning reduce nationalism too much by perceiving it simply as a political ideology like any other.

However, I agree with Tara Zahra, Pieter Judson and Jeremy King when pointing out the flaws and the inherent ethnicism in national historiographies. It is also agreeable to argue that there was a significant proportion of people in Cisleithania who were nationally indifferent and primarily identified themselves with the region, as Budweisers, Prager, Tyroleans or Viennese, and, on the other hand, with the supranational Imperial dynasty, the Habsburgs.³⁶ Having elaborated the crucial role of nationalist activists as agents of the process of nationalization, and the ambiguous role of the Austrian state in tolerating and even accepting nationality as a political category, these authors provide us with a reflection of the flaws in some historical works on this issue.³⁷ Moreover, these insights are extraordinarily important for the next section on the development of nationhood in Bohemia and Moravia.

Despite the fact of their feasible critique on national historiographies and ethnicism, their underestimation of nationality as a social reality, and nationalism as an ideology and source of political legitimation, will not be shared in this thesis. The critique regarding their theoretical approach is the ignorance of the fact that human beings cannot be understood as being isolated from their cultural and societal environment. Cultural practices can be

³⁵ Cf. Daniel N. Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), Daniel Druckman, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective," in *Merston International Studies Review*, 38/ 1 (Apr. 1994): 43-68, and Philipp Decker, *Die Ablehnungsfront gegenüber der Europäischen Union in Österreich* (Thesis: University of Vienna, 2009), 65-74.

³⁶ Cf. Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), and Pieter M. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).

³⁷ Cf. Oscar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929).

influential in creating perceptions and beliefs of commonness. “This is the broad field of the *lieux de memoire*: monuments, celebrations, myths, heroes, holidays, hymns, flags, museums, pilgrimages.”³⁸ Karl Deutsch’s theory on family socialization fills the gap which is set aside by reflexive sociologists. When claiming that one social theory fits a particular case, this does not imply it does so when analyzing any other case study.

Even if do not to fully agree with authors like Anthony D. Smith who sees the cultural foundations of nations as crucial for their success and sustainability in modern society, I agree with his argumentation regarding the importance of symbols and historical myths.³⁹ Referring to the proto-national past, he argues that old ethno-cultural symbols, narratives, and stories are reconstructed and reinvented to create an ethno-history, which serves as the ethno-symbolic background for nations.⁴⁰ These ethno-symbols provide people, who feel like belonging to that nation, with the meanings and contents which are culturally meaningful to them and can remain sustainable in their function over generations, even if they are reconstructed and reinterpreted by every generation. This powerful force of shaping social reality differentiates, according to Smith, nationalism from other ideologies. This constructed cultural framework permits the durability, malleability and intergenerational transmission of feeling of belonging towards a nation.⁴¹ Another argument for structural factors explaining some dimension of the success of nationalism is its certain similarity with religion. When looking at Durkheim’s analysis of religion, we can find some grounds for viewing nationalism, based on its functionality, as secular religion.

Thus there is something eternal in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successively enveloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel

³⁸ Martin Kohli, ‘The Battlegrounds of European Identity’, in *European Societies 2/2* (London: Routledge, 2000): 121.

³⁹ Cf. Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).

⁴⁰ Anthony D. Smith defines ethnic communities or *ethnies* as “a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a specific ‘homeland’ and a measure of solidarity.” Compare Anthony D. Smith, “A Europe of Nations,” *Journal of Peace Research* 30 (1993): 130.

⁴¹ Cf. Anthony D. Smith, *The Cultural Foundations of Nations: hierarchy, covenant, and republic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

the need of upholding, and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and collective ideas which make up its unity and its personality.⁴²

All in all, cultural practices, historical narratives and stories, and ethno-symbols should be acknowledged as factors, among others, when it comes to explaining why and how nationalist activists succeeded in nationalizing politics in Cisleithania. This does not mean that one is blind to the fact that people generally identify themselves on many different levels such as gender, region, city or town, profession or supranational Empire, and that nationality has been first of all a 'category of practice'. Especially in the sphere of politics there were evidently dominant other objects/subjects of identification than the concept of "nation" on which originally only few intellectuals, nationalists, have drawn on in their first intellectual and later also political campaign.

1.3. Culture and Socialization as a Factor of Diversity and Commonness

The family socialization model provides us with a feasible explanation for the differences in identification between different social strata of society, and between rural and urban areas in Bohemia and Moravia. If socialization in the nineteenth century was influential for people's sense of belonging, then the societal environment played a crucial role for their individual identification. To state it clearly, we do not claim that Karl Deutsch's model explains all nationalization processes and their success, but it is useful in understanding the particular one analyzed in this thesis. The very fact of the existence of a-national individuals and the reported 'national indifference'⁴³ among certain Bohemians does not mean necessarily that nationalism did not find a fertile ground in Bohemia and Moravia.

One generalization in certain current literature on nationalism in Bohemia and Moravia is that the Austrian state by its legal reforms prepared the success of very few

⁴² Émile D. Durkheim (1915) quoted in Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 146.

⁴³ Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 4.

nationalist activists and left the overwhelmingly nationally indifferent population unprotected to nationalist agitators.⁴⁴ This simplification of a rather complex situation and dynamic process results firstly from a too narrow framing of analytical focus in combination with too broad and general claims made by certain authors. When focusing e.g. on Budweis and its inhabitants (Budweisers), as Jeremy King did,⁴⁵ it does not surprise me that in such a historical city one major aspect of personal identification is with the city and its historical meaning itself. Additionally one major factor constitutes an obstacle to King's claim of identifying a general trend of bilingual and a-national individuals in Bohemia and Moravia. When looking at language maps of nineteenth century Bohemia it is noteworthy that Budweis/České Budějovice was characterized as “‘mixed’ Czech-German,” while other regions had clear majorities or have been even entirely monolingual.⁴⁶ Taken the urban social strata and the linguistically mixed character of the city into account it appears more than critical to draw any generalizations regarding nationalism in the Bohemian lands from such a narrow case study. It is not surprising that a significant part of the urban population in Budweis identified themselves primarily as ‘Budweisers’ and secondly with the supranational Imperial dynasty which was closely linked to the Administration, the army and the person of the Emperor. A certain degree of Austrian-patriotism certainly existed.⁴⁷ It is peculiar that similar observations have been made about urban areas like Brünn, Vienna and Prague, where people identified themselves strongly with the local city as ‘Prager’, ‘Brünner’, or ‘Viennese’, and simultaneously with the supranational Empire.⁴⁸ The same can be said about

⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁵ Cf. Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).

⁴⁶ Catherine Albrecht, “The Bohemian Question,” in Mark Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multi-National Experiment in early Twentieth-Century Europe* 2nd ed. (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2002), 80.

⁴⁷ Cf. István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁴⁸ Jeremy King, “The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond,” in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001), 122.

people from distinct regions with a strong sense of historical uniqueness, such as Tyroleans and Styrians. However, this fact does not automatically prove that peasants in the rural areas of Bohemia and Moravia identified themselves in the same way as these urban social groups or historical regionalisms did.

Moreover, within urban population there developed a nationalist bourgeois class, which became the driving force of nationalist activism. This shows that even within the educated urban societal layers there was a diversity of social groups, with distinct political identifications and loyalties. This leads us to the conclusion that one should be doubtful and critical towards generalizations like the following: “More plausible, though, is that Czechs added their weight to a Budweiser, Habsburg-loyal electoral majority, which prevailed against a minority of Germans ...”⁴⁹ One has to keep in mind that the period discussed is the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Since identifications are nothing static or fixed but a variable of social and societal processes they were influenced by major changes. These processes will be examined in chapter 2 and 3.

Especially difficult are claims about the identification of peasants in the rural areas. We simply do not know from any scientific field research if there was any certain cultural or political identification dominant among a significant part of the population. The Czech speaking population cannot be proved to have had or not having had a certain cultural sense of commonness or commonality. When working on the basis of documents and texts from urban archives it is obviously a fundamentally flawed starting position, since one takes the educated urban writers as granted equals of rural Czech speaking peasants. The latter simply were rarely able to write papers, and if they did so, they were not collected and stored. This leads us to another weakness in arguing mainly with written sources. Even if the argumentation of this thesis sees legal reforms as one major factor of institutionalizing and

⁴⁹ Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 25.

supporting nationality as a political and legal category, and hence devotes the third chapter to legal reforms embedding the nationality principle, this does not prove that there were no other additional, maybe even more important factors for the success of nationalization.

It is clear that laws, written texts etc. are easier to work with than cultural and societal factors of social phenomena. Working strictly empirically with quantifiable factors leads one on the best way to getting a feasible argument. However, social processes are unfortunately rarely directly linked to legal reforms or to political activism like nationalist politicians or historians. This is the reason why one part of the argument in this thesis focuses on cultural and social factors in the process of nationalizing a significant part of the Bohemian population in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century. This however, does not undermine other factors which will be contained in the argumentation as well, namely, *inter alia* legal reforms, the tolerance of the Austrian state regarding nationalists, the census, and above all, political activism.

All in all, it is important to point out that cultural practices played an important role for the creation of ‘commonness’ among peasants and workers in Bohemia and Moravia. In the following chapter the development of Czech nationhood and its differentiation from Bohemian and German Nationhood will be elaborated. It will be explained why the development of a distinct supranational “Austrianness” among the majority of the population failed. Instead, several factors have promoted alignment along national and linguistic lines, which became the basis of nationalists’ success.

1.4. Applying Social Theory in a Historical Case Study

After having introduced and discussed the most important social theories concerning nationalism the task of this subchapter is to clarify the methodological approach of the following chapters. First of all, historiographical literature will be used for outlining particular

historical events and processes which are relevant for explaining the rise of nationalism in Bohemia and Moravia. Further, representative samples of statements will be provided to show intellectuals' views and activities at certain points of time. However, historiographical sources will not be uncritically used for the argumentation in this thesis. They will rather enable me to collect assessed facts and also several perspectives on important aspects of Bohemian, Moravian and Austrian society and its history of the nineteenth century.

Based on historical descriptions I am going to point out the most popular analyses of distinguished historians of this field and critically assess them. Moreover, the application of selected social theories will supply the thesis with new insights and a new direction of argumentation, which I think is missing in the contemporary literature. The first social theoretical assumption argued in this thesis is that nationalism fulfilled particular functions. As Michael Wiebe has pointed out, there is yet another dimension inherent in the very functionality of nationalism, which has an additional function to that of its instrumentalization as an ideological tool for political leaders.

How could people sort themselves in societies where the traditional ways no longer worked? Rather than a gigantic fraud perpetrated time and again on the mindless masses, nationalism thrived because it addressed basic human needs.⁵⁰

In the same way in which social scientists should not follow nationalists' framing of "nation" as a real entity, they should not underestimate or even ignore the functionality of nationalism in social reality. Charles Tilly has shown how nationalism provided modern states with the societal legitimacy they needed.⁵¹ Indirect rule shifted to direct rule as a result of centralization and the expansion of the state's influence into people's everyday life. The lack of popular support for the ancient regime and the destruction of the ancient legitimization of "divine right" have been powerfully shown by the French Revolution. Without exaggerating

⁵⁰ Robert H. Wiebe, *Who we are: a history of popular nationalism* (Princeton, 2002), quoted in Philipp Decker, "Die Ablehnungsfront gegenüber der Europäischen Union in Österreich." Mag. Dipl., University of Vienna, 2009, 61.

⁵¹ Cf. Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Munich, 1975).

the quality of nationalism as a political ideology, one has to keep by the facts: nationalism is in fact an extremely successful concept, fulfilled certain functions for modern states, and further shaped people's social reality.⁵²

When looking at the societal functions of nationalism this leads us necessarily to the question of how did societal alignments along national lines develop. This question will be answered in the course of the chapters 2 and 3 by referring to Karl Deutsch's theory of social communication.⁵³ The great insight which Deutsch's theory can provide us with is a feasible explanation of the actual process of how cultural information and the individuals' understanding of "commonality" within a community are transmitted, and hence how alignments along nationality came into existence.

The next section tries to examine different social 'groups' and social strata in Bohemia and Moravia and their distinct modes of political identification. Even if the general focus will be put on the nationalization of politics, another focus will be put on the different reactions on and effects of political modernization⁵⁴, aspects of nationalist activism, and effects of certain modernization processes. It is without any doubt that the period from 1848 until 1918 in Cisleithania can be characterized by progress and modernization in many spheres, and that *ex ante* evaluations in national historiographies are often flawed.

⁵² Some authors go even so far to say that after the age of religion, the nineteenth century started the new age of nationalism. Here, the author's position is one that does not go that far, since ideologies and/or social realities change quicker than one may notice. Just think of the powerful effects of political ideologies based on religion at the beginning of the twenty-first century, e.g. political Islamism.

⁵³ Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966).

⁵⁴ 'Political modernization' is understood as analyzed by Charles Tilly in his book, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Munich, 1975).

He sees *inter alia* the political change of indirect towards direct rule as having a crucial effect on the need of new modes of political legitimation. This opened *inter alia* the way for nationalism as an ideology of political legitimation. The modern phenomena of constitutionalism, emancipation, democratization and the concept of popular sovereignty have to be seen in connection with modernization in a broader sense (societal, economical, and cultural) as described in Gellner's structural analysis, cf. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). Further look at Benedict Anderson, *Die Erfindung der Nation: zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts* (Frankfurt/Main, 1996) where Anderson sees the development of capitalism and mass printing as crucial for the success of nationalism.

2. The Emergence of Czech Nationhood as a Political Factor

When asking for the beginning of the Czech national movement one should leave historical myths about the Hussite Revolution aside, however influential they may have been for the creation of Czech nationhood. Modern historians mainly agree that the so called “cultural and linguistic renaissance” generated by a small group of intellectuals and scholars started basically in the 1780’s and “had developed into a small national movement, still focused primarily on cultural expression in literature and the arts,” by the 1830’s.⁵⁵

One limitation of analyzing the real identification in cultural or linguistic terms before the nineteenth century is the fact that the Austrian state allowed only a very limited public space for ‘nationalists.’ “Strict limits on political activity in the Habsburg Monarchy confined national expression to privately organized balls, literary salons and informal meetings in cafes.”⁵⁶ By liberalizing reforms and a retreat of absolutism in the second half of the nineteenth century nationalists’ ideas and activities became more visible by openly influencing the press, the schools and many associations.

As mentioned above, a main obstacle to examining if there was a Bohemian cultural “sense of belonging” among peasants before the twentieth century is the fact that most documents available from the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century originated from intellectuals or the educated upper-class. That is why the analysis of the attitude of noblemen and the educated classes should not be equalized with the popular identification with certain understandings of cultural or social ‘groupness.’ The fact that we cannot find any proofs for the existence of a sense of commonality among Czech speaking people in Bohemia and Moravia at the end of the eighteenth or the beginning of the nineteenth century does not necessarily mean that certain cultural and social ties did not exist in their

⁵⁵ Catherine Albrecht, “The Bohemian Question,” in Mark Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multi-National Experiment in early Twentieth-Century Europe* 2nd ed. (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2002), 76.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

social reality. Let us first have a closer look at a historical statement of an aristocrat. Count Joseph Kinsky (1739-1805) defended the usage of Czech as language by Bohemians in 1773 as follows:

To the phrase ‘his mother tongue’ I ought to add: namely, Czech. I confess that as a good descendant of the Slavs I have inherited the prejudice that if the mother tongue of a Frenchman is French and of a German, German, then the mother tongue of a Czech [Böhmen] must be Czech.⁵⁷

Being careful of the translation, especially of the English term “Czech,” we have to be aware that *Böhmen* rather means Bohemian, which’s connotation and meaning changed over the course of history and should not be equalized to Czech, which only became popular relatively late. Kinsky was an Austrian general and a Bohemian aristocrat which makes his plea for the usage of the Czech language very interesting. The main point here is that *böhmisch* [Bohemian] did not have the meaning of the modern term Czech. At that time he could be consistently a Bohemian, an Austrian and a German. First of all, Bohemia was a territory and being Bohemian was defined by Bohemian patriotism [*Landespatritismus*], as loyalty towards the territory which was inhabited by German and Czech speakers.

However, why then would Kinsky feel the special need to defend the Czech language? Hugh LeCaine Agnew argues that for the sense of being *böhmisch* the territorial dimension alone does not explain its meaning. It was neither German nor Czech but culturally and historically shaped by both. “It was also the Czechs and their history, language, and culture that made it unique.” He further points at the fact that Kinsky distinguished between German and Czech speakers in Bohemia. “Already Kinsky’s distinction among his *Landsleute* between the so-called German Bohemians (*Deutschböhmen*) and the Czechs (*Böhmen*) points out that contemporaries differentiated between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia, ‘both of

⁵⁷ Francis Joseph Kinsky, “Erinnerungen über einen wichtigen Gegenstand, von einem Böhmen,” in *Des Grafen Kinskys, gesammelte Schriften*, 3 (Vienna, Wappler, 1786), 57.

them, the genuine Bohemian and the German Bohemian, by birth and country Bohemians to be sure, but otherwise in many respects quite different.”⁵⁸

Differentiating among different social groups and strata of society is a necessity for a careful analysis. It seems to be sure that for some groups of the educated elite, language was not seen as a hot issue at all. Often enough aristocrats, intellectuals, and members of the educated middle class were characterized by an outstandingly flexible identity, which was much, but never national. An outstanding example is Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), who was concerned about the hostility between German and Czech speaking students, who he experienced when lecturing in Prague. He saw the ideal concept of nation in uniting all Bohemians, Czech and German speaking, into one community of “a loving people.”

When he wrote about the fusion of the two peoples [*Volksstämme*] into one nation by assimilation, he thought already about a general principle and stated that “whoever could arrange it so that ‘only one language would be spoken by all the inhabitants of our land’ would be making a tremendous contribution to the well-being of the nation (*Volk*), just as the one who could introduce a single world language would be for all humanity. In the meantime, since this goal was not realistic, Bolzano called on Germans and Czechs to learn each other’s languages.”⁵⁹ Howsoever interesting and reasonable this may sound for us, his idea towards assimilation and forming a united Bohemian people in the long run never became popular.

In contrast to Bolzano’s idea, romantic intellectuals of the early nineteenth century often draw on Johann Gottfried von Herder’s idea of *Volk* and viewed language not as instrumental for communication, but rather, as something given by nature. The importance of the Czech language as an identity marker of Bohemians has been continually reinforced by

⁵⁸ Hugh LeCaine Agnew, “Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 57. For more details cf. Jan Křen, *Die Konfliktgemeinschaft Tschechen und Deutsche 1780 – 1918* (Oldenbourg: München, 1996).

⁵⁹ Hugh LeCaine Agnew, “Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 60.

historians, journalists and other Bohemian intellectuals. This focus on a linguistic concept of Bohemian nationhood excluded German speakers from this particular understanding of Bohemian or Czech nationness. Writing in the Czech *Herald*, Jan Nejedlý (1776-1834) identified Bohemian nationhood with language:

Each nation is separated from another by its mother tongue and customs, and according to these two traits alone it is distinguishable from all other nations; if it should alter these two fundamental characteristics, then it would cease to be the nation that it is, merging with the one whose language and customs it has adopted.⁶⁰

This understanding contradicts Bolzano's idea of creating a unified nation by assimilation and fusion. Moreover, the focus of nationalist writers has been put on constructing nationhood as a zero sum game. They created an ideology which made people believe that if one does not keep one's Czech language, customs and traditions, then one becomes automatically German. Vice versa, nationalist narratives on the German speaking side also argued that if German culture is too open for Czech elements it would destroy "Germanness." It seems obvious that these ideological concepts of essentializing and reifying a notion of culture, as a very distinct and unique national culture, is absurd, especially in Bohemia, where different cultures created a *mélange* in the course of centuries, and additionally, where bilingualism was not rare. However, by linking national culture to a linguistic framework it became easier for nationalists to argue in exclusive terms.

A typical nationalist historian was F. M. Pelcl. He published a history of Bohemia in 1791, and argued that "the greatest moment in the defense of the nation and language came during the Hussite era, when by about 1430 the completely German Bohemia has been made completely Czech again."⁶¹ One of the most famous historians, who prominently participated in enforcing the narrative of a historical struggle between Czech and German speakers, was

⁶⁰ Jan Nejedlý, "O lásce k vlasti," *Hlasatel Český* 1,1 (1806): 15, quoted in Hugh LeCaine Agnew, "Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848," in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 62.

⁶¹ Hugh LeCaine Agnew, "Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848," in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 63.

František Palacký from Moravia. Before moving to Prague and becoming a popular historian he wrote in a letter in 1819 following:

Some ruinous Fate placed our good Slavs amidst the gaping maws of thieving nations. What the Germans are doing to us is what they recently did to the Poles, too, without having suffered any injury from them. It is a farce to make high-sounding proclamations about equilibrium in the political system of Europe, and tear apart countries, raise up robbers' hands against the holy rights, against the lives of glorious but unhappy nations. I ought not to write about the ruin of those countries: I would write flames into the tyrants' souls with every word.⁶²

In his later work as a distinguished historian, Palacký's formulations sound less enthusiastic and more professional. However, he still drives forward his nationalist agenda when writing, "Czech history in general consists mainly of a struggle with Germandom, or of the acceptance and rejection of German ways and practices by the Czechs."⁶³ This political agenda of that time focused on nationalists' perception of an ongoing 'Germanization' of the higher educated strata of society. This was indeed not that wrong since bilingualism and cultural assimilation towards 'Germanness' appeared to be a way which provided upward social mobility for many Bohemians. Visiting a German school or Gymnasium was already a good opportunity to be prepared for a later career in the Imperial administration or other institutions.

Not only German schools but also exchange programs for children (*Kindertausch*) were seen as great opportunity to broaden children's education and social chances. Nationalist activists had great trouble to persuade parents that bilingualism was a betrayal of their national community, since uneducated parents were often nationally indifferent when it came down to the economic opportunities of their children. Tara Zahra writes that nationalists often appeared to be depressed and scared when they realized how indifferent the Czech speaking

⁶² František Palacký to Josef Jungmann, 14 July 1819, quoted in Hugh LeCaine Agnew, "Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848," in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 64.

⁶³ František Palacký, (1908), quoted in Hugh LeCaine Agnew, "Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848," in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 64.

rural population was towards their national ideas.⁶⁴ One is sure: economic upward mobility was a factor which supported German language use.

2.1 The Bohemian Nobility

This leads us to the crucial point of recognizing significant differences and varieties in political awareness and identification among different social groups. As mentioned above, urban elites, members of the Imperial administration and the supranational officer corps, the Czech speaking petty bourgeoisie, and the uneducated Czech speaking peasants of the rural areas were characterized by distinct socialization and cultural practices and hence must not be equated with each other by their patterns of identifications. A strategy used by nationalist activists was to pointing at the peasants as the true Bohemians or bearer of 'Czechness' in contrast to the assimilated upper classes which, in general, were opposed to any concept of exclusive identification.

As the idea of Bohemian nationhood became more ethnic and exclusive it became clear that it created an ideological barrier between the upper classes, identifying themselves as Bohemian and Austrian, and the new Czech speaking intellectuals, who supported an ethnic exclusive sense of Czech nationhood, promoting that the Czech speaking peasants are the true Bohemians. This development towards a more linguistic and cultural sense of Bohemian nationhood countered the traditional concept of noble *Landespatriotismus* (a form of political identification with one's historical region). The tone used by historians, politicians and journalists who participated in this mission of nationalization became rougher. They framed their ideological campaign in ethnic terms and used phrases like 'Czech blood', to be

⁶⁴ Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 24.

‘awakened to patriotic love’, to ‘consider each other as brothers’, and focused on the Czech language and Bohemia as their homeland.⁶⁵

Palacký’s and his colleagues’ vision of the ancient Czech past provided the Czech nationalists with a Czech historical imagination that legitimized their claims. “What Czech intellectuals drew from the past, in particular the Hussite imagery, was evidence of their right to exist as a separate and equal nation among the other European nations. In this they went beyond the attitude of most German Bohemians, who generally considered Bohemia and the Czechs part of the wider German political nation.”⁶⁶ This discourse of Bohemian nationhood based on an ethnic concept led to the newly imagined term *Čechen* [the Czech], meaning Bohemia as a Czech speaking, Slavic nation.

This ‘ethnicization’ of Bohemian nationhood put Bohemian Jews and the nobility into the situation of being seen as national indifferent elements by Czech nationalists. The Bohemian nobility was able to remain powerful and wealthy, transferring its resources and benefits into the age of industrialization and capitalism. During the nineteenth century their class was especially characterized by its flexibility and rapidness of adaptation. However, they did not withdraw from their loyalty towards the Empire but remained loyal - mostly by joining the Conservative camp - until the very end of the Empire.⁶⁷ This does not imply that nobles did not adapt to nationalist language. The examination of the nobility’s reaction towards nationalism leads us directly to an interesting observation of a phenomenon regarding the nationalization of the political sphere. As Eagle Glassheim concludes from his analysis:

In Bohemia, nationalism was a New Regime force, an assertion of popular sovereignty in opposition to authoritarian tendencies of the monarch and bureaucracy. Nationalists wanted power for themselves and for a broad population they claimed to lead; they were not tools of the aristocracy or a reactionary conservative cabal. Nationalism in fact made a mess of the political spectrum. Many liberals were nationalist; many

⁶⁵ Hugh LeCaine Agnew, “Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 67.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁶⁷ Cf. Eagle Glassheim, “Between Empire and Nation: The Bohemian Nobility, 1880-1918,” in Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit (eds.), *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005), 61-88.

conservatives were nationalist; even socialists were nationalist. Nationalism was, above all, a language of politics and interests. Nobles too tentatively employed a nationalist vocabulary in the late nineteenth century, sensing that without it they would be doomed to political impotence.⁶⁸

The Bohemian nobility exemplifies the dynamics of nationalization of the political sphere. Even if they remain basically loyal towards the dynasty and the Empire, they adapted their political and social interaction to the new environment, created by modernization. That they primarily used nationalist language to reach their own usually conservative goals shows the formability of nationalism as a political ideology. The reason for adapting to nationalist language was rather its functionality for gaining political legitimacy than any true belief in the concept of an 'ethnic' Czech nation. This is demonstrated by their remaining loyalty towards the dynasty and the supranational Empire.

2.2. Workers and Peasants as Subjects of Nationalization

Deriving from Tara Zahra's hypothesis of 'indifference to nationalism' as a general category among the Austrian population, we have seen already that the petty bourgeoisie, mainly historians, politicians, and journalists, have actively participated in nationalist activism. This did not start in the nineteenth century but earlier when writers draw on romanticist ideas of Johann Gottfried von Herder. The upper classes, the nobility, and a significant part of the urban population, were characterized by a significant identification with the dynasty and the supranational Empire. How was the state of the loyalties and layers of identities of the rural population, the peasants, and the less educated workers?

First of all, there are some peculiarities of these two big groups. Both have been mainly Czech speaking and less educated than the urban middle class. Processes of modernization, described by Gellner, Tilly, and Anderson, have prepared the ground for increasing political participation, democratization and modern mass-politics. These

⁶⁸ Ibid., 82.

developments put the peasants and the working class into the focus of attention of nationalist activists, who claimed to be leaders of the popular masses. Tara Zahra argues that before the beginning of the twentieth century the vast majority of the Bohemian population was indifferent to nationalism and this caused frustrations but also stronger activism among nationalists. “It may seem paradoxical to view indifference as an agent of change or as a cause of radical nationalism.”⁶⁹ Viewing the roots of the succeeding nationalization processes in Bohemia and Moravia as grounded in peasants’ and workers’ indifference towards nationalism sheds not much new light on the reasons why nationalization succeeded, neither on the process itself. It has been surely a motivating factor for nationalists’ activism, but does not explain the phenomenon itself.

As theorized at the beginning, there are no pre-existing, primordial nations. Neither is there something like a nation, existing as a fixed and enduring community. As Brubaker argues, nationhood and nationality “as institutionalized forms[,] comprised a pervasive system of social classification, an organizing ‘principle of vision and division’ of the social world.”⁷⁰ However, we have to revise his general view in this case. The process of nationalization in the analyzed region did not happen rapidly and suddenly, neither was the nationalization of peasants and workers accomplished without “contingent events”⁷¹, which reinforced nationalist framing of narratives and the reification of the practical category of nationality. Tara Zahra argues in her book *Kidnapped Souls* how education by nationalist teachers, socialization in nationalist clubs and *Vereine*, and the emerging welfare system socialized people and somehow induced a sense of national belonging among them. All these factors have been part of a process.

⁶⁹ Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 5.

⁷⁰ Rogers Brubaker, “Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event,” *Contention*, 4/1 (Fall, 1994): 7.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

To be clear, one has to avoid the flaw of teleology. Before 1918 the mere idea of having homogenous nation-states as ideal units in a heterogeneous and intermingled world of many different cultures, languages, and ways of life probably would have appeared to be undesirable and even impossible. Probably none of the nationalist activists themselves bore the idea of a totally independent and homogenous nation-state in mind. That is the reason why it is definitely useless and wrong to expect any peasant or worker living in the nineteenth century to have the modern concept of ‘nation’ elaborated in his or her mind. Rather, we should focus on grounds and existing specifications which allowed nationalists in the nineteenth century to become successful in nationalizing the political sphere, peasants’ and workers’ identifications.

One argument which could have helped Czech ‘ethnicists’ is the tradition of ‘state rights’ in the Bohemian movement, through which nationalists like Palacký claimed the whole historical Bohemian lands for the Czech nation. Nationalists like Palacký, Smetana, Wenzig, and “all Czech ethnicists contributed to erasing non-national categories and communities from the past, to downplaying their presence in the present, and thus to blighting their future. At the same time, such people helped to make the Czech nation (and necessarily the German nation as well) seem like an ancient and great people, destined soon for even greater greatness.”⁷² That is exactly what happened during every other nation-building process in history (e.g. in France, England, Italy etc.). Its success supports the hypothesis that there existed a variety of suitable ethno-symbols and ethno-historical patterns which could be re-interpreted in national terms, but we cannot prove it since we are still cautious of “Ethnicism” and teleology.

Here we face two problems. On the one hand we cannot know how many Habsburg loyalists there have been in the Bohemian lands since historiography was written from a

⁷² Jeremy King, “The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond,” in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2001), 134.

national perspective. Secondly, there exists no empirical research of the historical narratives evident in rural Bohemian and Moravian peasant families between 1100 and 1848. Drawing any general conclusion from the success of Czech nation-building would be mere speculation and has to be avoided. One possible approach to examine historical narratives, evident in the Bohemian rural vernacular culture, could be to analyze ancient novels and poems and if there are certain continuities over the course of the last centuries, before the nationalization of historical narratives took place. But we still cannot be sure if in peasant families there were other dominant intergenerational narratives.

As an example of such a possible historical narrative might serve one presented by the Enlightenment historian František Martin Pelcl (1734–1801), who argued that the Bohemians had been the most developed Slavic people, because “they had settled almost in the midst of the German lands and held their own there. They had always defended their country from violent attacks, resisting the unfriendly incursions of nations from near and far, gaining many victories, annexing other countries to their realm, and founding a kingdom.”⁷³ Further examples in Jiří Štaif’s article show that “as far back as the Middle Ages, some chroniclers made the frequent difficulties in the coexistence of Czechs and Germans a key theme in their expositions of Czech history.”⁷⁴

By comparing historical narratives one could bring to light if there was a certain ethno-historical basis - inherent in popular vernacular historical memories (stories, intergenerational transmitted narratives of commonality etc.) - for being instrumentalized by nationalist ideology. A more obvious factor which has been implemented into the ethnic concept of Czech nationhood is its linguistic frame. However, it is dangerous to make simplistic generalizations. One has to differentiate carefully between national-historiography

⁷³ Jiří Štaif, “The Image of the Other in the Nineteenth Century: Historical Scholarship in the Bohemian Lands,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (ed.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 83.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 82.

and reflective historians who take a more neutral stance. Kann and David have dated the beginning of the Czech national movement to the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The effect of the “Germanization process” was not clear at the time.

“The largest reservoir of potential strength for a national movement was the Czech-speaking peasants, who, quite naturally, were more concerned with social and economic issues than ethnic ones, as they had demonstrated in the major uprising in Bohemia in 1775. On the other hand, the formation of the modern Czech nation was favored by the reforms of enlightened absolutism, in particular the patent of 1775, which had limited the service obligations of the peasants, and by their subsequent personal emancipation of 1781. The introduction of widespread secular primary education also helped greatly. Furthermore, the increasing integration of the Czech-speaking lower classes with the rest of society was to make the use of Czech in government and in secondary and higher education an increasingly real and even pressing issue.”⁷⁵

A fact which made the situation complex was the existence of a significant percentage of German speakers, especially in the peripheral areas, the Bohemian rim. Estimations count the ratios of Czechs to Germans toward the end of the eighteenth century as 60 to 40 in Bohemia, 70 to 30 in Moravia, and 22.5 to 42.5 percents plus 35 percent who spoke Polish, in the small Silesia. ‘Germanization’ under Maria Theresa was increasing the German speaking population and by 1775 full ‘Germanization’ of the school system in Bohemia was completed.⁷⁶ Centralisation caused a further decrease of official use of the Czech language, which has caused attention by Czech nationalists.

Even before the end of the eighteenth century the use of Czech within the Bohemian Lands disappeared from the internal operations of those administrative and judicial agencies that had been converted into state bureaucracies, such as the Courts of the Land (in both Bohemia and Moravia) and the town magistracies. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Czech persisted as an internal official language only in the agencies still left outside the formal framework of state officialdom, particularly in manorial

⁷⁵ Robert A. Kann and Zdeněk V. David, *A History of East Central Europe*, vol. VI: *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918* (London: University of Washington Press, 1984), 196.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

offices and in the councils of towns too small to have a formal magistracy. In addition, the estates used Czech as a ceremonial language, particularly to open and close the diet.⁷⁷

On the one hand, there was clearly a trend in Entente propaganda of interpreting the Empire as *Völkerkerker* [dungeon of peoples], which was motivated by means of weakening the support for war among the Austrian population. This narrative is congruent with some of the nationalist historical interpretations of Imperial Austria and its relationship towards its populations and hence became powerful after 1918. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch showed in their distinguished historical examination that a majority identified with the Emperor as a supranational symbol of unity and the multinational Empire. They point at the respect which the development within the Austrian half of the Empire between 1848 and 1918 has received, and at the loyalty showed by so many sacrifices performed by the majority of the Empire until 1918. An important symbol was definitely the figure of the old Emperor Francis Joseph. The more serious was the effect of his death in 1916. Wandruszka and Urbanitsch argue that while the nationalist political elites were already elaborating their plans of nation-states, the majority of the population was still characterized by loyalty with the Empire.⁷⁸ One has to be careful before drawing conclusions from that. This does not imply that the majority was nationally indifferent or even indifferent to nationalism. The Empire after the compromises was not a supranational one anymore, but a multinational, where the nationality principle was recognized by the state.

2.3. Explaining the Success of Nationalists in Bohemia and Moravia

Nationalist propaganda before and during WWI had definitely an impact on the perception of Austria as a repressive relict of the *ancien régime* and overwrote the fact that a majority of the population identified themselves with the Empire. On the other hand, one must not fall into

⁷⁷ Ibid., 199.

⁷⁸ Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, “Notwendiger Völkerverein oder ‘Völkerkerker’,” in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 III: Die Völker des Reiches* (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), XV.

the danger of argue in an “either ... or” fashion. Despite the fact of nationalist and entente propaganda, and the usage of nationalism as a political tool for claiming legitimacy for sometimes very diverse interests of political actors, there is still the social phenomenon of the success of the concept of Czech nationhood. When we look at different aspects and possible roots of commonality among the Bohemian uneducated lower classes, we can find some interesting events that provide us with evidence of some existing ‘feeling of commonness’ below that of identification with the Empire, and above people’s identification with their locality.

Following Brubaker’s view of ‘nationhood’ as “practical category, not as entity but as contingent event, conjuncturally fluctuating, and precarious frame of vision and basis for individual and collective action”⁷⁹, we have to look at the year of the publicly hot debated constitutional reform (the Hungarian compromise), namely to 1867. Historians found good reasons to believe that the years from 1868 until 1871 was that period when the politicization of the Bohemian masses reached its peak. At these political events it became obvious that there was some sense of ‘commonness’ through which the Czech speaking urban petty bourgeoisie (*städtisches Kleinbürgertum*), the rural peasants and workers, could identify with each other. In these three years there were more than one hundred of “meetings” (like in Ireland), gatherings with ten thousands of people in Bohemia. In Moravia and Silesia there have been around forty. The nationalist opposition press in Bohemia probably exaggerated the number of participants towards the one and a half million. However, the official state authorities reported that the participation of ten thousands at such meetings were no exception.⁸⁰ The reasons for the success of (nationalist) mass mobilization can not be empirically proven and remains speculative. The two historians Jiří Kořalka and R.J.

⁷⁹ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 18-19.

⁸⁰ Jiří Kořalka and R.J. Crampton, “Die Tschechen,” in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 III: Die Völker des Reiches* (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 504-505.

Crampton see economical crisis, the politically one-sided reform for Hungary, and a common feeling of unrest and disaffection as primary reasons.

A further reason which can be added here is that - following Brubaker's concept of nationalization through "contingent events" and their "transformative consequences"⁸¹ - these meetings of ten thousands of Bohemians and Moravians reinforced as an effect a 'sense of belonging' among the participants. Nationalization has to be seen as a dynamic process. This does not imply that any of the participants (probably not even the nationalist activists of the petty bourgeoisie themselves) bore the modern concept of "the nation" in mind. Any attempt of modern nationalists to view these meetings as 'awakening of national consciousnesses' must be rejected as teleological and even nationalist itself.

But in one point the author disagrees with Brubaker's insightful argumentation. The social phenomena of nationhood and its establishment as a social reality are not just "happening" suddenly. When he describes such processes as "the relatively sudden and pervasive 'nationalization' of public and even private life" which has "involved the nationalization of narrative and interpretative frames, of perception and evaluation, of thinking and feeling" he views human identities as being formable within moments.

If following Brubaker, 'nationness' has in fact less to do with structural historical developments as Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Anthony D. Smith, and Eric Hobsbawm argue. Culture and society would not play this developmental role in understanding the success of nationalization. Rather, 'nationness' is seen as something that "suddenly crystallizes ... as a contingent, conjuncturally fluctuating ... frame of vision and basis for individual and collective action."⁸² He does not doubt the effects, namely, that Nationalism as a political ideology and nationhood as institutionalized category, explains mass mobilization and its usage as a tool by almost all political actors in the nineteenth century. He

⁸¹ Rogers Brubaker, "Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event," *Contention*, 4/1 (Fall, 1994): 9-10.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 9.

argues that nationness should be understood similar like identity: “as a ‘changeable product of collective action,’ not as its stable underlying cause.”⁸³

However, the crucial question remains unsolved. Why were ten thousands of Bohemians and Moravians willed to spend their time gathering and bothering about politics? Even if we can surely agree to the importance of “events” for understanding the “processual dynamics” of nationalism and the situational crystallizations of nationness, we have to point out that Brubaker’s proposal of “an eventful perspective” does not provide us with any insights of the reasons why people individually decide to go to such events and meet there collectively.⁸⁴ I share the perspective of so called structural “developmentalists”⁸⁵, who view societal and cultural developments as basis for effective nationalization. Modernist theories support a couple of reasons why nationalization made it possible to mobilize the masses. By refusing any objective factors⁸⁶ and merely following the subjective paradigm of Anderson’s concept of an “imagined community” it appears to be difficult for modern scholars of nationalism to find any feasible theory which could explain the roots of mobilization. The same can be said about Brubaker’s approach of an “eventful perspective”, by studying the “transformative consequences” of contingent events. Anthony D. Smith’s theory of “ethno-symbolism”, on the other hand, explains the strength and importance of historical symbols and narratives for constructing a persuasive - nationally reconstructed - ‘ethno-history’.⁸⁷ However, he fails to explain the individual processes which lead to nationalization, and their conditions.

⁸³ Ibid. Additionally Brubaker refers to Craig Calhoun, “The Problem of Identity in Collective Action,” in Joan Huber (ed.), *Macro-Micro Linkages in Sociology* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 59.

⁸⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 9-10.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁸⁶ A classical “essentialist” approach of conceptualizing nation and nationalism is the one by Joseph Stalin, who referred to a number of ‘objective’ factors. Cf. Joseph V. Stalin, *Joseph Stalin: Marxism and the National Question* (New York: International Publishers, 1942).

⁸⁷ Cf. Anthony D. Smith, *The Cultural Foundations of Nations: hierarchy, covenant, and republic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), and Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

If the Bohemian and Moravian peasants and workers in the middle of the nineteenth century have been nationally indifferent, why did they gather in ten thousands and why would the nationalist educated class be able to claim political power from the Austrian supranational state? Even if we follow the paradigm of nation as an ‘imagined community’, or nationhood as institutionalized political and cultural form, we have to look for social facts inherent in peoples’ social reality. That social reality is in fact real for human beings, since they imagine and process reality/social reality in their mind, even if constructed and permanently reconstructed in a dynamic process.

Departing from such an understanding of social reality we are prepared for finding the reasons for mobilized popular masses in nineteenth century Bohemia and Moravia. If nationally framed events have created or/and reinforced the self-understanding and self-images of ‘communities’⁸⁸ as nations, what have been the conditions for such events? Even if we agree with the view of “identity as a changeable product of collective action” we do not agree with Brubaker in viewing “collective action” as something happening surprisingly by highly “indifferent” people.⁸⁹ There might be coincidences and fortunes, but we do not take meetings of thousands of people as mere coincidences which are happening from time to time and even more often since the beginning of the nineteenth century. That is the point where we come back to Karl Deutsch’s classical theory of social communication where he includes the role of ‘a common culture’ and socialization into an otherwise subjectivist understanding of nation. He defines culture as follows:

A common culture ... is a common set of stable, habitual preferences and priorities in men’s attention, and behavior, as well as in their thoughts and feelings. Many of these preferences may involve communication; it is usually easier for men to communicate within the same culture than across its boundaries. In so far as a common culture facilitates communication, it forms a *community*.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Here, the term “community” is not used in an essentialist, bounded, ‘groupist’ way. Rather, it is seen as a fluctuating, and imagined social construct, similar to Anderson’s ‘imagined community’.

⁸⁹ Cf. Rogers Brubaker, “Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event,” *Contention*, 4/1 (Fall, 1994): 3-14.

⁹⁰ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: an inquiry into the foundations of nationality* 2nd ed. (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 88. Two comments: first, community is in italics in original as well

Deutsch draws the reader's attention on the fact that the term 'culture' is often used for objective (material) factors like institutions, habits and preferences, whereas 'community' usually refers to the collective of living individuals "in whose minds and memories the habits and channels of culture are carried."⁹¹ The problem of developing a concept which links both understandings of the same phenomenon occurs. Deutsch tries to overcome this difficulty by including theories of communication and information. He explains the separate concepts of society and culture⁹² and their interrelated processes by exemplifying it:

Societies produce, select, and channel goods and services. *Cultures produce, select, and channel information.* A railroad or a printing press is a matter of society. A traffic code or an alphabet is a matter of culture ... [C]ulture communicates patterns ... They may be patterns of action, such as games, dances, or models of graceful behavior. Or they may be patterns of preference, of do's and don'ts, such as standards of morality and taste. Or, finally, they may be codes and symbols, that is, patterns so arranged as to convey information about other patterns ...⁹³

The great insight which Deutsch's theory can provide us with is an explanation of the actual process of how cultural information and the individuals' understanding of "commonality" within a community are transmitted. This process of communication does necessarily include a physical process by which information is transmitted within society. Here the crucial point Deutsch makes is the difference between Society and community.

Individuals of different cultures often lived in one society, such as Czechs and Germans in Bohemia, or Moslems and Hindus in Bengal. For many years they may exchange goods and services but relatively little information. They may have very few complementary channels of communication. Many of their experiences in their common society may be similar, as were those of Czechs and German miners in the same mining town, but they are not necessarily shared. On the other hand, within each community of communication many experiences of certain individuals may be quite dissimilar, such as those of German minors and German mine owners, but they can be shared; in particular, information about some of the German mine owners' experiences may be shared vicariously by the German minors. Here are the baffling cases cited by Professor Chadwick: members of different peoples may live through the same

and second, the author's usage of the term "men" refers to men and women and does probably not imply any sexist intention of the author in the original text.

⁹¹ Ibid., 89.

⁹² His definition of 'culture' is as follows: One has to view it like a flame or a traffic pattern; it "is both a process and an entity. It consists of a changing collection of events, distributed in a specific manner, determined by their own past states and in part by other things or events which function as their channels, as updrafts do in a flame, or streets and intersections in a traffic pattern." Ibid., 284.

⁹³ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: an inquiry into the foundations of nationality* 2nd ed. (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 92.

events for generations and yet emerge from this supposed 'community of fate' quite dissimilar in behavior, or even bitterly opposed.⁹⁴

This conceptualization of the differences between society and community and the impact of culture lead us to the question of how does culture influence the possibility of transmitting the idea of 'a people' socially. With 'membership in a people' he describes the idea of nationality. Technically he explains it as "the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders." The functionality of nationality is wide complementarity of social communication. Hence his definition of 'a people':

A larger group of persons linked by such complementary habits and facilities of communication we may call a people ... The communicative facilities of a society include a socially standardized system of symbols which is a language, and any number of auxiliary codes, such as alphabets, systems of writing, painting, calculating, etc. They include information stored in the living memories, associations, habits, and preferences of its members, and in its material facilities for the storage of information, such as libraries, statues, signposts, and the like; ... If these elements are in fact sufficiently complementary, they will add up to an integrated pattern or configuration of communicating, remembering, and acting, that is, to a culture ...; and the individual who have these complementary habits, vocabularies, and facilities are what we call a people.⁹⁵

At first look this conceptualization seems to be simple. However, Deutsch consciously adds a critique where he points at a couple of complexities. First, he refers to Disraeli's observation of the social reality of social classes. In the simplest phrasing one can distinguish poor and rich social classes who are separated in the community by facts like education, careers, security, wealth and prestige. Deutsch writes that at "certain times and places the barriers of class may thus outweigh the ties of language, culture, and tradition."⁹⁶ By focusing our work on the Austrian half of the Empire the question which comes up is why did alignment along national lines succeed over international class alignment, an issue highly debated in the Austro-Marxist circle, on which will be focused in the third part of the thesis.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 95-96. Karl Deutsch refers here to H. M. Chadwick, *The Nationalities of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), 1. Additionally one has to point out that the term "community of fate" [*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*] was introduced by the Austro-Marxist thinker and politician Otto Bauer.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 96-97.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 98.

By taking classical political experiences and thought of Bismarck, Lenin and Otto Bauer into account he develops the hypothesis that effective and wide social communication is related to the integration of a people (idealistically becoming a nation at an advanced level of integration. Especially for the working class and peasants this seems to be crucial when trying to understand the processes of nation-building on Bohemia and Moravia:

if they find not merely factories and slums but schools, parks, hospitals, and better housing; where they have a political and economic 'stake in the country' and are accorded security and prestige, where the ties to their own people, to its folkways and living standards, education and tradition, will be strong in fact. There will be a greater stock of common experiences, a greater flow of social communication across class lines, more conviviality and informal social association, more vertical mobility and intermarriage, and, as a result of all these, probably far more effective complementarity of social communication within the people than across borders. Social reforms, as Bismarck knew, may knit a people more closely; high wages, as Lenin observed, may tend to assimilate the outlook of workers to that of their middle-class compatriots; and periods of democracy and social progress, as Otto Bauer predicted, may leave different peoples more unified internally, but more sharply marked off from each other.⁹⁷

This observations and the underlying thesis that social reforms increase societal integration and social communication are indirectly supported by Tara Zahra's and Pieter Judson's examination of the crucial influence of the welfare and education system in Bohemia and Moravia. They argue that the reason for nationalization and national separation was the nationalist divide and agenda of welfare organizations, schools and the education boards.

However, where they see the culturally and societal totally indifferent parents and children as mere objects of the ideological hard work of nationalist agitators, Deutsch brings in a deeper cultural and societal foundation for the success of nationalization. The welfare organizations and education were, as explained above, means for widening and deepening effective social communication within one's community. If defined in national terms or others, it had the real effect of integrating certain societal communities within Bohemia and

⁹⁷ Ibid., 99. When pointing at the historical observations Karl Deutsch refers to Bismarck's speech in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies in 1865, long before his social reforms of the 1880's. Look in Erich Eyck, *Bismarck*, vol. II (Zurich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1943), 36. Lenin's knowledge he derives from V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism*, translation (New York: International Publishers, 1939), 105-108. When pointing at Otto Bauer's account, he refers to following section in Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Brand, 1923), 135. "Modern capitalism slowly demarcates more sharply the lower classes of the various nations from each other, for they, too, gain a share in national education, national cultural life, and the national standard language ... [The] socialist society ... , through the differences in national education, ... will mark off the entire peoples sp sharply from each other, as today only the educated strata of the different nations are separated from each other."

Moravia, whose sense of belonging was rather defined very locally (e.g. Budweiser, Prager etc.) or supranational (Imperial/Austrian) in the past.

As examined in the sections above the leading nationalist groups have not been the nobility, aristocracy, or the wealthy upper class. Rather, it was new the middle or lower educated class which increased their claim for political participation. That especially these social groups saw the rising popularity of nationalist language as a chance of increasing their own political power and legitimacy in the name of the popular masses does not come surprising when we refer to Deutsch's explanation, that "a people forms a social, economic, and political alignment of individuals from different social classes and occupations, around a center and a leading group."⁹⁸

Following three factors are identified by Deutsch as the basis of alignment. The first basis is the "complementarity of communication habits." As second, he identifies "acquired social and economic preferences which involve the mobility of goods and persons"⁹⁹. Similarly to Gellner and Anderson he views modernization as the major factor of increasing the importance of such kinds of alignments:

the rise of industrialism and the modern market economy which offer economic and psychological rewards for successful group alignments to tense and insecure individuals - to men and women uprooted by social and technological change, exposed to the risks of economic competition, and taught to hunger for success ... In the political and social struggles of the modern age, *nationality*, then, means an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse, both indirectly from link to link and directly with the center ... A 'leading social group' ... may be, but need not be, the established 'upper class' of the moment ... If its main interests and ties, however, lie elsewhere, perhaps outside the country, or if it has accepted alien speech, habits or religion, or if, finally, it has come to care only for its own group interests in a quite narrow manner, then the national and social leadership may devolve upon the next class below it, or still farther down to whichever class is sufficiently strong, respected, and locally accessible to become in fact the 'leading group of the national movement.'¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Ibid., 101.

⁹⁹ Hereby, Deutsch means simply "widespread preferences for things or persons of 'one's own kind' (that is, associated with one's particular communication group) in such matters as buying and selling, work, food and recreation, courtship and marriage." Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 101-102.

When taking a look at the Bohemian elite, the nobility, we can conclude that even if they adopted nationalistic language, they were still closely linked to the old regime.¹⁰¹ Especially from an economical point of view their loyalty with the supranational Empire has been in their very interest. Nationalistic language can be explained by their struggle for political legitimacy in the regions outside the imperial centre of Vienna. Language choice and hence choice of one's national belonging in nineteenth century Bohemia and Moravia has been often interpreted as merely individual choice, often taking practical and economical considerations into account. This view of individuals choosing language use and other aspects of societal life has to be taken as a useful thought. However, if there was a tendency within certain regions and social groups to adopt rather one language or community than another, why did not they remain indifferent? There exist certain arguments why some social groups in certain situations appear to develop a 'sense of belonging'. The very same theoretical conceptualization of 'community' based on social communication explains the problematic role of the Bohemian nobility and the uncertain position of Jews in regard of the developing ethnic, linguistic understanding of Bohemian (or Czech) nationhood.

The concept of a 'leading social group' should not be overthrown by the critical connotation of the term "group". As explained in the beginning of this thesis the author is well aware of the flawed conception of "groupism", by essentializing the analytical concept of 'group' and viewing them as something stable, biologically or naturally given. Here, social group means a certain group of individuals who can change and do so during time. Deutsch even highlights this point by stating that he refers to the upper class which is perceived as being "above" the main groups being led at certain moment. The leading social group itself is changing over time but has influence of the shape of the national movement. By 'being above' he means:

¹⁰¹ Cf. Eagle Glassheim, "Between Empire and Nation: The Bohemian Nobility, 1880-1918," in Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit (eds.), *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005), 61-88.

at least in terms of current prestige, and usually in the long run in terms of economic, political, and social opportunities, skills, wealth, organization, and the like, so that a member of another social group, on joining this 'leading group' would have in some sense a real experience of 'rising in the world,' or, as some sociologists have termed it, of 'moving vertically in society' ... In a competitive economy or culture, nationality is an implied claim to privilege ... It promises opportunity, for it promises to eliminate or lessen linguistic, racial, class, or caste barriers to the social rise of individuals within it. And it promises security, for it promises to reduce the probability of outside competition for all sorts of opportunities, from business deals to marriages and jobs.¹⁰²

These general observations on the functionality of nationality and their framing into a theoretical structure by Karl Deutsch appears to be useful for understanding the ground on which the Bohemian and Moravian nationalists were able to mobilize and persuade a significant number of people.

All the noted aspects point out that the promised opportunity of social equality and lessen of barriers to the social rise of individuals might have motivated the lower classes to join the category of nationality. An additional psychological argument by Franz Borkenau supports this line of argumentation. Borkenau writes that a majority of Czech speakers in Bohemia and Moravia had on several occasions in their lives, from childhood on, experiences with discrimination because of their lack of German, their Czech accent or bad grammar.¹⁰³ These experiences of belonging to a lower social class (sometimes even humiliation in public institutions etc.) because of one's language must not be underestimated in its social psychological effects on seeking self-esteem in joining the category of nationality.

Following Deutsch's theory does not imply that the foundations of nationalization and the societal process itself are standardized phenomena. The fact is that there are significant variations among different regions and times. The claim of this thesis is not to explain every nationalization process in history, but the particular one in Bohemia and Moravia. The aim which distinguishes this work from others is that it shows societal, cultural, and political grounds and foundations of this particular nationalization process in the nineteenth century and does not get caught in either Habsburg nostalgia of ignoring the social fact of nationality

¹⁰² Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: an inquiry into the foundations of nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 102.

¹⁰³ Cf. Franz Borkenau, *Austria and After* (Faber and Faber: London, 1938).

as a socially and politically emerging powerful feature, nor in ‘ethnicism’ or nationalist framing of the past.

2.4. Ideas of German Nationhood

Unlike in states like France or England the Austrian state’s elite could not realize the political concept of a nation-state. Even if centralization and the attempt of unification by supporting a certain degree of ‘Germanization’ was attempted by enlightened absolutist rulers like Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II, all these attempts finally appeared to be useless. The imperial bureaucracy, together with the monarch and the army, basically upheld the cosmopolitan imperial ideal. The institutional forms within the monarchy were self-consciously cosmopolitan. However, during the course of history their content became more German. “Competing with France for leadership of monarchical Europe, Joseph II recognized the need for an administration unified by common culture.”¹⁰⁴ He definitely recognized the complex implications of his multi-ethnic and multi-lingual state and somehow looked to France as the model which should be followed. He found the basis of French solidarity and loyalty in their shared language and culture. Joseph II had the idea that only the German language would be able to unite his dominions in “brotherly love”.¹⁰⁵

Similar to Bolzano, who saw a common language as a medium for tolerance and understanding, and the basis for solidarity in the longer run, language has not been seen as an instrument of building a “German” nationhood. The very idea of choosing one language for the common administration, universities, trade, the economy, politics etc. was not driven by any ethnic understanding of nationhood, but a modern, enlightened concept of nation-building. “Brotherly love” was surely something needed in the state, especially after the

¹⁰⁴ John A. Armstrong, ‘Administrative Elites in Multiethnic Polities’, in *International Political Science Review*, 1/1 (1980), 114.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 115.

principle of rule by divine right became seen as outdated and the symbol of the ancient regime. However, after only ten years of reign, Joseph II's reforms have been reversed.

Interestingly, the revival of the term "Germanization" was driven not by the Austrian state's elites, but by the nationalist elites of the Bohemian nationalist movement who developed an ethnic-concept of Czech nationhood. The misunderstanding by which some historians get caught is mixing these two periods and the motifs behind "Germanization" up. Joseph II's support for implementing German as state-language should be seen as enlightened idea of modernizing the state. His idea of Austrian-German culture and its function for the Empire can be compared to the French concept of *la mission civilisatrice*, and hence is in contrast to any ethnic concepts of nationhood in the late nineteenth century.¹⁰⁶ The majority of the people who supported the idea of a German cultural mission as an inherent part of the Empire were logically opposed to the idea of breaking up the Empire and joining a greater German nation-state. The German speaking Austrian elite appeared to be very self-confident of the successful assimilatory qualities of what they called "German culture" (mainly they meant the German language).

The native Budweiser, Franz Schuselka wrote in 1843 confidently that even if they Slavs have been culturally influential in the past, Bohemia was "practically a completely

¹⁰⁶ For example Jeremy King distinguishes from his view the two opposite cases of US- American nationhood and statehood in Habsburg Central Europe: "In the United States, where nationhood has a strong civic component, 'ethnic' often denotes a cultural quality that distinguishes some American from others: thus Italian-American, African-American, and so on, in the sense of Italian or African by ethnicity but American by nationhood and by citizenship. From an ethnic perspective in Habsburg Central Europe, though, someone Czech or German by nationhood must be Czech or German by ethnicity as well." Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 13. Even if he noted that this formulation is "from an ethnic perspective" it is not wise for a historian to adopt nationalist language. I would not go as far as King and see the idea of Austrian nationhood so much away from the one of the United States. Both had intent to implement one official state language, even if a significant number in both states spoke other languages. Secondly, his own book shows the very significance of Austria, the Habsburg state, and the Emperor as an object of loyalty and identification. The crucial different is that instead of a civil war which would have functioned as a founding myth, and the following assimilation/nation-building process legislated by political elites, there was institutionalization of the nationality principle, and hence fragmentation, in Austria. Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: an inquiry into the foundations of nationality* 2nd ed. (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 32-37 and the examination of the civil war as a founding myth of the United States - reframed as a national narrative, as war between brothers, instead of a lost war of independence (as it was in reality) by the southern states - look in Benedict Anderson, *Die Erfindung der Nation: zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts* (Frankfurt/Main, 1996).

German land.”¹⁰⁷ Many of his contemporary Bohemian German speakers possessed the view that “only part of the peasantry and the small-town bourgeoisie were Czech.”¹⁰⁸ Most writers in the 1830s and 1840s have been a-national, and mostly perceived their primary loyalties as being with the region, city and Austria. Even Bolzano, who harshly criticized the uneven development between Czech and German speaker in Bohemia, has been convinced that assimilation and one language would have been best for Bohemia.¹⁰⁹

Things became more complicated when Czech speaking nationalists turned to the ideas of Johann Gottfried von Herder and viewed the Czech language as something naturally given by birth. They started to construct their idea of modern “Czechness” by constructing an ethnic concept of Bohemian nationhood based on the Czech language and history. These trends started as soon as around 1800 but finally lead to the exclusion of German speakers in Bohemian nationalists’ political language.¹¹⁰ That the debate about language in Bohemia and Moravia has started before 1800 and has since then never totally disappeared until 1945 is well documented.¹¹¹ The question is rather: how did the German speakers react when this described “identification of the common people [mainly peasants and lower middle class] and the language took another step toward separating the Czech nationalism of the patriots from the Bohemian identity that was shared by the upper classes.”¹¹² The very same confrontation with the changing meaning of “being Bohemian” tackled the Jewish, German or Yiddish

¹⁰⁷ Hugh LeCaine Agnew, “Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 59.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 59.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 60.

¹¹⁰ Karel Hynek Thám, for example, asked his listeners in Prague’s Old Town in 1803: “And does any nation [Volk], especially an uncultivated one, have anything dearer to it than the language of its fathers? Its entire intellectual treasury of traditions, history, religion, and principles lives in it, all its heart and soul. To take away or debase the language of such a nation means to take away its only undying possession, passing on from parents to children. Whoever suppresses my language also wants to rob me of my reason and way of life, the honor and rights of my nation.” Quoted in Hugh LeCaine Agnew, “Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 61.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 60-64.

¹¹² Ibid., 65.

speaking inhabitants who were suddenly defined by Bohemian nationalists in national terms, and hence, simply did not fit.¹¹³

Already in the 1810's Czech linguistic nationalist activists started campaigning against "enemies" of their language, "Germans and, alas! Some treacherous Czechs," who attempted "to make German the sole language used anywhere in the Austrian monarchy."¹¹⁴ As a result of some decades of nationalist campaigning, the spread of national historiography etc. the position of Czech and German nationalists have been very different in 1848, the year of the revolution. While Czech leaders like Palacký found their historical (ethnic) interpretation of Czechness already established among their national movement, the German speakers did not significantly react until 1848. One of the reasons is probably the self-confidence which was pointed at above. Interestingly, many Habsburg loyal German speakers, the educated upper classes in the partially German speaking cities/towns of Bohemia and Moravia did not feel frightened by Czech nationalist campaigning for a very long period. However, from 1848 this began to change.

At this point, we come back to Brubaker's proposal of adopting an "eventful" perspective for the analysis of the nationalizing effect of events. The revolutionary happenings of 1848 are surely such an occasion. Many events in 1848 created and supported the nationalist vision of historical rivalry and the stereotyping of 'the other'. However, the basis for the success of alignment was already laid through half a century of nationalist historiography and stereotyping which was transmitted through "social communication"¹¹⁵.

¹¹³ At the beginning most Yiddish speakers joined the Austrian, Bohemian-German community. Only when nationalists agitation became extremely aggressive and some so called 'Jews' have been turned into scapegoats, of secretly supporting German nationalism, a significant number decided to join the Czech-speaking movement. For more details cf. Michael L. Miller, Voice and Vulnerability: The Vagaries of Jewish National Identity in Habsburg Moravia, in *Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 159-171 and Michael L. Miller, *Reluctant Kingmakers: Moravian Jewish Politics in Late Imperial Austria*, in *CEU Jewish Studies Yearbook III* (2002-2003), 111-123.

¹¹⁴ Hugh LeCaine Agnew, "Czechs, Germans, Bohemians? Images of Self and Other in Bohemia to 1848," in Nancy M. Wingfield (eds.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 67.

¹¹⁵ Look at the section which explains Karl Deutsch's theory of 'social communication'.

The fact is that these nationalist discourses aimed consciously on creating an artificially constructed “other” or on nationalist terms, “enemy of the nation”.

The situation in which before mainly nationally indifferent or even a-national people found themselves was characterized by nationalists framing the political, public, and slowly even the private spheres. Following discourses have been used by nationalists:

The Czechs assailed the Germans with the assertion that Germans were no more than emigrants to Bohemia who had always damaged the country. The Germans attempted to wound the Czech side with the argument that the Bohemian lands owed all civilization and progress solely to German Culture ... When these arguments became part of popular histories, polemics in the press, caricatures, and street songs, they took on a particularly uncompromising and offensive character ... Until the end of the 1860s, however, the German side could not underpin its nationalism with as refined a concept of nation history as that which Palacký had given the Czech side.¹¹⁶

The Austrian-Germans have traditionally been characterized by their attachments with the supranational Monarchy and a regional *Landesbewußtsein* [regional patriotism], and saw their political goals in gaining more liberties. The very fact that German-Liberalism has been a strong force in Austrian politics supports this view. German Liberals believed that the ideal of liberalism is something which have all nationalities in common.¹¹⁷ There is one nationalist interpretation of the 1848 revolution, viewing the Czech nationalist movement as fighting for democracy and liberalism. That this narrative is an invention is shown by Berthold Sutter, referring to some sources. He states that the German speakers in Vienna, Lower Austria and the Bohemian lands - mainly in the industrialized regions of Austria - have been in general quite more liberal, democratic, and radical than the Czech nationalist leaders. In the critical phase of the revolution the Czech nationalist leaders even switched to the conservative, reactionary *Lager* to gain advantages.¹¹⁸ In the dynamics of an increasingly nationally framed political language this trend gave some support for German nationalists, who followed the

¹¹⁶ Jiří Štaif, “The Image of the Other in the Nineteenth Century: Historical Scholarship in the Bohemian Lands,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (ed.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 92.

¹¹⁷ Berthold Sutter, “Die Politische und Rechtliche Stellung der Deutschen in Österreich 1848 bis 1918,” in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 III: Die Völker des Reiches* (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 167-181.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 167.

romanticist string. Comparing to the Czech national movement, these group was not influential.

It is important to point out that first, despite nationalism the political-ideological cleavages ran through the nationalist movements which were not as homogenous as reported by nationalist historians. Second, the image of the Czech national movement as radical democratic and revolutionary against the Habsburg-German reactionary forces is wrong.¹¹⁹ German liberals saw the German language as necessary lingua franca and not as basis for an ethnic sense of nationhood. In their political claims German liberals did indeed oppose federalism, however, for the reason of guaranteeing individual civic rights and not for opposing democracy.

The German liberals were strict political centralists. Believing that federalism would allow noble dominated diets to trample on the civic rights, educational policy, and religious reforms they had just legislated, the liberals fought any program that would devolve significant state powers to the provincial diets. In their 1867 constitution most German liberals regarded the clause guaranteeing equality of language use a guarantee of basic civil rights for the individual and certainly not as a way to give constitutional standing to so-called nations. They had not intended to lend constitutional recognition to the claims that individuals might make as corporate groups; they had merely recognized the right of individuals to use their own languages in normal daily intercourse wherever this was practical. Implicit in this decision was a belief that although local or domestic relations might be transacted in a vernacular language, more serious public transactions would take place in German.¹²⁰

In fact, the political goals of their reforms were even contradicted by the results. Instead of diminishing nationalist debates over language use, especially regarding schools, the situation worsened and nationalists on both sides, German and Czech speaking alike, became more aggressive in their attempts to nationalize institutions and associations. A crucial turning point in Austrian politics concerning the German liberal movement were the political shocks of 1879-80 which led to a withdrawal of liberalism and to the addition of an ethnic strand to Germanness, similar to that of Czechness.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Pieter M. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 12-13.

¹²¹ Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 112.

3. The Role of the Austrian State - Institutions and Reforms

Embedded 'Nationality' as a Political and Legal Category

A growing group of historians see the political decisions made by the Austrian state after 1848 as decisive factors in nationalists' success. One example is Jeremy King, who formulated as follows:

Between 1848 and 1918, by setting and enforcing many rules to the political game, the Habsburg state influenced powerfully the political content and demographic dimensions of individual national movements - which kinds of Budweisers tended to become Germans, for example, and which kinds Czechs. The Habsburg state was also more accepting of national movements than of other kinds of movements. That policy perhaps contributed to the failure by believers in class, religious, or racial conflict to make 'the people' in popular sovereignty not 'nations' but workers and peasants, Christians, or Aryans. After 1900, the Habsburg state even embraced a cluster of nationhoods, by moving to institutionalize them as subcitizenships among which citizens had to choose.¹²²

The implicit argument of this hypothesis is that the Habsburg state supported or at least accepted nationalist movements rather than social democratic or religious ones. Here, one should relativize: nationalism was surely not successful merely because of the state's policies. State patriotism and Army administration tried hard to keep supranational loyalties strong. But, as chapter 1 explained, many factors supported the success of nationalism as a political ideology. The factor of the state's reluctance to actively fight and repress the political or societal category of nationality had multiple reasons.

First of all, structural changes in society, economy etc. (such as mass schooling, rise of print-media and literacy) supported societal changes supportive of nationalism. One of the effects was that language became a significant marker of social identity. The increasing importance of language explains the increasing significance of the linguistic cleavage, between German and Czech speakers in Bohemia and Moravia. As a second result, historical narratives, such as from the Hussite wars, could become powerful narratives in arguing for a strengthening of the Czech language and its embedding into an ethnic discourse of Czech nationhood. As the distinguished historian Robert Kann has elaborated, from the time of the

¹²² Ibid., 5.

Hussite wars on, language became an issue. This was also reinforced by the increasing number of German speakers:

The position of strength which the Czech language had gained in public life in the wake of the Hussite wars continued, though with certain setbacks, during the sixteenth century ... The advance of German in Bohemia and Moravia was due partly to demographic factors: the influx of German artisans into towns, and penetration of German peasants into the frontier areas, particularly in northern Bohemia. Another factor was the spread of Lutheranism, which introduced foreign preachers and bestowed on the German language a status akin to that of Latin in the Catholic Church. Finally, there was the influence of the Habsburg kings.¹²³

In the early seventeenth century the Bohemian diet even insisted on a resolution in 1615 “that only Czech could be used in the courts, parishes, and schools, that the knowledge of Czech was a prerequisite for the right of domicile, and that only natives of at least three generations could hold offices in towns and in the lands.”¹²⁴ Even if these attempts at language protection by legislation remained ineffectual, the mere fact of language law as a hot political issue in 1615 shows the serious historical past of this topic.

The increasing importance of language as a main cleavage in Bohemia and Moravia in the nineteenth century should not be seen as having arisen from a cultural and historical *tabula rasa* as some modern historians try to argue. Societal developments forced the state to find pragmatic solutions for settling the increasing politicization of the linguistic cleavage of Bohemian society in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Already in the eighteenth century the Austrian state began to develop a dense network of elementary schools in Bohemia, teaching standardized versions of either German or Czech. By the promotion of literacy and elementary mass education the state followed a general trend driven by enlightenment thought: “mass literacy in newly codified vernaculars was emerging, in a complex give-and-take with the rise of centralized states and social mobility. One scholar, Vladimír Macura, has written of a ‘shift in the center of gravity from an understanding of Czech culture as a partial cultural sphere within a culture tied to communication in German,

¹²³ Robert A. Kann and Zdeněk V. David, *A History of East Central Europe*, vol. VI: *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918* (London: University of Washington Press, 1984), 29-30.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

toward an understanding of Czech culture as an independent and self-contained [celistvý] configuration.”¹²⁵ Its effects shall become influential for the rise of language as a dominant cleavage in Bohemia and Moravia. Elizabeth Wiskemann, an American historian who did her research before World War II by interviewing people and historians in Bohemia, reports following narrative among Bohemian (German and Czech speaking) historians:

German settlers have everywhere created a political complication, because, arriving whether in the twelfth or the sixteenth or the eighteenth century, they have – unlike the Flemish weavers or the French Protestants who came to England – refused to be assimilated, on the general grounds that they were socially more advanced.¹²⁶

This image of the German settlers who were culturally too developed to assimilate is not new and can be traced back to the eighteenth century. This narrative has been used by both, German and Czech nationalists, the first to legitimize their claim for their cultural mission of civilization, the latter for claiming the right to (national) emancipation. Historiography after 1918 often phrased these narratives into nationalist terminology and hence became part of nationalist activism. An illustrative example of such a narrative is Franz Borkenau’s perspective in 1938:

In the beginning of the fifteenth century the Czech underclasses, peasants and craftsmen, together with the lower aristocracy, revolted against the German lords and merchants. The movement was coupled with the religious heresy taught by Jan Hus. But ‘Hussitism’ was in reality much more of a national and social than of a religious movement. In fact the Czechs have a right to claim that they first invented the modern form of nationalism, and performed one of the first typical social revolutions of European history.¹²⁷

He views the riots of the Czech speaking peasants and the lower aristocracy in fifteenth century Bohemia against the German lords as a social revolution, where the lower political elite formed a national and social movement by linking it to religion and the particular language of the “underclasses.” Even if we can reject his teleology inherent in calling the fifteenth century movement the first “invention of the modern form of nationalism,” we should nevertheless pay attention to the symbolic power of such a historical narrative. The

¹²⁵ Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 18.

¹²⁶ Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs & Germans: A study of the struggle in the historic provinces of Bohemia and Moravia*, 2nd ed. (MacMillan: New York, 1967), 1.

¹²⁷ Franz Borkenau, *Austria and After* (Faber and Faber: London, 1938), 25.

historical facts do not really matter for its social function for creating the myth that long ago a united and distinct Czech speaking mass was mobilized and revolted against German speaking lords.

A second explanation can be identified on the social level, how such narratives and historical symbols were processed and transmitted over many generations, and finally instrumentalized by nationalists who reframed them. As I have already argued in chapter one and two Karl Deutsch's theory of social communication prepared the ground for explaining national alignment of large groups of individuals. His theoretical elaborations provide us additionally with an explanation for the strength of a developing patriotic or nationalist process, which following Deutsch may depend on two major factors:

First, it may depend on the extent to which the ruling class itself promotes this process, not merely in its outward trappings, but in its social substance; the extent, therefore, also to which the ruling class remains accessible to the members of other classes for communication, entry, alliance, or alignment. Second, it may depend of the extent to which the masses of the people have become mobilized, with or without the cooperation of their rulers, for realignment with the new nationalist movement and the new changes in their old ways of life.¹²⁸

Both factors finally become questions of power, how nationalists can exercise power for forming a social hegemonic discourse of 'nationality.' The question which is tackled in this section is how such power can be exercised by nationalists. The historical narratives and symbols etc. upon which nationalist intellectuals could build, existed already:

The age of Enlightenment provides a starting point, however, because at this time a substantial body of literature containing sets of ethnic stereotypes appeared. The bias in these works is that of a group of anational intellectuals. This literature produces pictures and characterizations that remained influential for several generations. Although these stereotypes were redrawn in more divisive nationalist fashion during the second half of the nineteenth century, through the end of the 1820s no such redrawing had occurred and the set of stereotypes created some forty years before was still employed.¹²⁹

The question which is of major importance for this thesis is how nationalists could exercise power on their originally indifferent fellow men. This is where Deutsch's theory of 'nationalities' comes into the game. He basically departs from the assumption that in the

¹²⁸ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 104.

¹²⁹ András Vári, "The Functions of Ethnic Stereotypes in Austria and Hungary in the Early Nineteenth Century," in Nancy M. Wingfield (ed.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 40.

nineteenth century “a nationality” was a people that had been “pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over the behaviour of its members.”¹³⁰ Hence, nationality describes the status of a certain large group of individuals, whose elite enforces cohesion and attachment to group symbols. Its own dynamic and how such power can be processed are plausibly explained by Deutsch. The nationalist elite are striving for power:

with some machinery of compulsion strong enough to make the enforcements of commands sufficiently probable to aid in the spread of habits of voluntary compliance with them [the people]. As the interplay of compliance habits with enforcement probabilities, such power can be exercised through informal social arrangements, pressure of group opinion, and the prestige of national symbols. It can be exercised even more strongly through formal social or political organizations, through the administration of educational or economic institutions, or through the machinery of government. Whatever the instruments of power, they are used to strengthen and elaborate those social channels of communication, the preferences of behavior, the political (and sometimes economic) alignments which, all together, make up the social fabric of the nationality. All group power this acquired by members of the nationality leads them to ask for more. Formally or informally, dissenters find themselves pressed into line ...¹³¹

These processes of nationalization follow the processes of social communication. By using their power nationalists strengthen national alignments by elaborating adequate social channels of communication. If a nationality finds itself strong enough to gain control of relevant institutions of the state and adds this power to compel to its “cohesiveness and attachment to group symbols, it often considers itself a nation ...”¹³² Having explained some general modes of operation of “nationalization processes” by referring to Karl Deutsch’s theory of social communication, the following sections will show the functioning of such processes in nineteenth century Bohemia and Moravia by exemplifying them.

3.1. Statistics - Creating the ‘Other’

An interesting turning point in the Austrian state’s role of viewing and shaping the political discourse of nationality constitutes the rise of social science (statistics, census etc.) and its recognition by the Imperial state. The choice of categories and ascription through which the

¹³⁰ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 104.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid., 104-5.

population was “divided” is crucial for the understanding of cleavages in society. From an Imperial Habsburg perspective language mattered little. Except Joseph II’s policies which supported German as the official state language and hence promoted its dominance, Habsburg policies were usually reluctant in viewing ‘Germanization’ as a priority. A common language for administration was rather seen as a necessity for the modernizing state. “Only in 1841 was a small Statistical Office in Vienna enlarged into a Directorate of Administrative Statistics and granted enough resources to begin work on the first official study of language use throughout the monarchy.”¹³³

The head of the directorate (Karl Baron von Czoernig) relied on older studies and continued their usage of exclusive language categories. Bilingualism was ignored. “Whatever the reasons, von Czoernig’s *Ethnography of the Austrian Monarchy* placed the authority of the state behind an ethnic, mutually exclusive system of classification ... [h]is study did not appear until the 1850s, and ... his successors ... avoided the subject of language or ethnicity for a generation.”¹³⁴ As soon as it became obvious that categorization by ethnic distinctions gives support to nationalists the Imperial elite tried to stop it.

However, after 1848 it became fashionable to support such nationalist views as the Czech example, an *Ethnographic Survey of the Bohemian Kingdom*, shows. “Published in 1850, but based primarily on summaries of language used by parish priests in 1829, the survey was written (in Czech) by Josef Jireček¹³⁵, a man active in Czech circles in Prague. In his very first paragraph, he equates language with ‘nation’ or ‘people’ [*národ*], and argues that the state should collect data so that it might devise language policies that serve the population in better ways. He then explained that he had classified communities as ‘Czech’, ‘German,’ or ‘mixed,’ according to “the language used by residents as their mother tongue in

¹³³ Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 20.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Josef Jireček (1825-1888) was a scholar and active politician supporting education in the Czech language. He became a member of the Austrian *Reichsrat* in 1879.

communal intercourse.”¹³⁶ Yet he barely used his third category, and thus followed Kohl in “glossing over bilingualism.”¹³⁷ As we see, the sources used date back to 1829.

Since the reactionary policies of the Austrian state were continually loosened, nationalists used their liberties to promote their projects. Tara Zahra views the Austrian Imperial Census of 1880 as a crucial event which gave support to nationalist agitation:

That year, for the first time, the census asked all Austrian citizens to record their ‘language of everyday use.’ Although the census deliberately asked citizens only about language use, not nationality, this did not stop nationalists from depicting the census as a measure of the nation’s demographic health, or from identifying language use with national belonging.¹³⁸

The event of 1880 provided nationalists on both side with “scientific” facts for their political campaigns. However, a highly powerful side effect of the so-called *Statistik*, the empirical study of society, was its political consequences. Long before 1880 social scientists had been busy with creating statistical works. András Vári examined a variety of descriptive statistical works looking for embedded stereotypical group characterizations.¹³⁹ He looked at two generations of statisticians. The first group of authors was born between 1745 and 1770, the second between 1700 and 1800. The authors of first group, wherever they came from in the monarchy, were supported the social and political reforms by the enlightened-absolutist Emperor Joseph the II and his idea of internationalism.

According to András Vári, ethnic stereotypes “exemplify different ways of life, different attitudes, and values that fit into different types of societies and political communities.”¹⁴⁰ Ethnic stereotypes have often antecedents from the past however, the difference between the old images and patterns of stereotyping and those appearing in statistical science is that they often contain a political “message”. In the nineteenth century,

¹³⁶ Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 20.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 49-50.

¹³⁹ Cf. András Vári, “The Functions of Ethnic Stereotypes in Austria and Hungary in the Early Nineteenth Century,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (ed.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 39-55.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 41.

nationalists campaigning ethnic stereotypes were used to proliferate “politically charged distinctions among cultural groups” and to mobilize the politically and nationally indifferent masses.¹⁴¹ Unfortunately here is no space for explaining the social functions of stereotypes and the related social-psychological processes. The popularity of stereotypes is commonly explained by Tajfel’s “orienting function” in complex societies.¹⁴²

Statisticians of the first analyzed group clearly supported Joseph II’s enlightened understanding of civilization and modernity and promoted these attitudes (with a somewhat educational quality) as the positive cultural influence of “the Germans” as the *Musterknaben* [prigs] of progress and civilization, in contrast to the “wild peoples,” the *Naturmenschen*.¹⁴³ “The authors seldom acknowledged national affiliation, and when they did it was to a patria, a motherland, which was home to many groups, peoples, nations. The *Gelehrtenrepublik*, the republic of the learned, was their horizon.”¹⁴⁴

The intellectuals of the first generation were accompanied by new intellectuals who came from diverse backgrounds since the educated classes were theoretically open to everyone. What counted was education and usually the communicative practice was that “of pursuing a reasoned discourse over matters of public interest.”¹⁴⁵ Why did the annexes of stereotypical characterizations remain for about sixty years, until the 1850s? Vári’s answers are that firstly the readers perhaps liked them. Secondly, they tried to impress not only the normal people, but also the political elite, and thirdly he sees the *Zeitgeist* of the epoch as influential: various things have been counted and measured (roads, people, houses and settlements) in impression of modernization.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 41-42.

¹⁴² Henri Tajfel, “Social Stereotypes and Social Groups,” in John C. Turner and Howard Giles (eds.), *Intergroup Behaviour* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 144-67 and Henri Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

¹⁴³ András Vári, “The Functions of Ethnic Stereotypes in Austria and Hungary in the Early Nineteenth Century,” in Nancy M. Wingfield (ed.), *Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 45-46.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 46.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

All in all, these authors had no nationalist motive at all. In fact it was the case that they supported the implied “mission of civilization” (*la mission civilisatrice*) and the “[f]ragmentary descriptions of until then unfathomable collective behaviour of groups of people were quite suitable to impress public and élite alike.”¹⁴⁶

From 1815 on literature on descriptive statistical work increased significantly. Even if many of these writers empathically rejected thinking in exclusive, nowadays one would say “nationalist” terms - and also rejected unscientific subjective speculations on “which people had occupied which region first and which people were newcomers” - they created an image of distinct ethnic groups.¹⁴⁷

Important for us here is to point out that these authors at the beginning of the nineteenth century influenced the educated classes which slowly gained political influence and would become crucial for nationalist movements. Additionally, the patterns of later nationalist discourses of “others” already existed in the literature, as András Vádri points out. Hence it is not surprising that nationalists at the end of the nineteenth century used these cultural images. The main motive of the writers, supporting a program of social change and development, was obviously transported with descriptions of cultural images and stereotypes.

Before 1848 the imperial-royal [*kaiserlich königlich*] authorities pursued a reactionary course, hence there was little place in public life for Czech [Bohemian] nationalist agitation. It is worth pointing at the supposed lack of Bohemian nationalists before 1815: “At the end of the 1860s, when Palacký, the Czech historian, said that the entire Czech ‘nation’ might have perished had the roof caved in on a single gathering forty years earlier, he was exaggerating.”¹⁴⁸ The reality was rather that through structural changes (modernization, mass-

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 47.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 49.

¹⁴⁸ Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 22.

schooling, literacy etc.) and political changes (liberalism, emancipation) opportunities for nationalists participating in public life and discourses increased.

3.2. Institutionalization of the Nationality Principle through Legal Reforms

Howsoever insightful and useful the theory of social communication is for understanding the social setting, where language formed a cultural meaningful marker of identity, one has to additionally take into account the very logic inherent in nationalist ideology, which does not leave any place for nationally indifferent people or those who primarily identified with the Imperial supranational Austrian state. Especially after 1848, when nationalists were *de facto* opposing the original aims of the constitutional reforms pushed forward by the German liberals, language became a major factor in nationalist political discourse concerning the whole Austrian state:

Czech, Polish, and, later, Italian, Slovene, and Ukrainian nationalists argued successfully that state-supported secondary schools and often university faculties should be established in their respective languages, as well as in German (or, in the case of Galicia, in Polish). Subsequent Supreme Court and administrative interpretations of the constitution reinforced nationalist demands by construing the constitutional language guarantees in a far broader manner than the document's liberal authors had themselves envisioned. Although the courts and the governments refused to recognize the legitimacy of 'nation' as a legal category, the realization of nationalist programs through the attainment of specifically linguistic goals helped validate the concept of nation in popular discourse and informally in institutional life.¹⁴⁹

The argument brought up here is that the state was not just the main actor, but reacted to demands by political elites and such leaders who claimed to speak for the masses. Historians have recently paid attention to the democratization process during the second half of the nineteenth century, which is well worth pointing out. On the one hand there was the Imperial bureaucracy which ensured the well acknowledged quality of the Austrian state (Cisleithania) as *Rechtsstaat* [guaranteeing the rule of law]. On the other hand there was the "development of local governmental institutions that had a decidedly liberal stamp. In fact, governance in

¹⁴⁹ Pieter M. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 13.

the Austrian lands of the Habsburg Monarchy was a function of a hybrid political system that combined elements of both bureaucratic and democratic rule.”¹⁵⁰

Democratization, liberalization and enfranchisement played an important role for increasing political power of nationalists since the Habsburg state itself originally did not welcome nationalist ideas of federalization but saw its ideal rather in centralization. However, one attribute of Habsburg policies during the nineteenth century was finding workable solutions rather than being narrowly focussed on centralization. The fundamental dilemma for the Imperial elite was that both national movements in Bohemia and Moravia - German and Czech - were opposed in interest.

Since 1867, the German movement had gradually shifted from pursuing the administrative and political centralization of Cisleithania to pursuing its partition or federalization into ethnic units. The Czech movement, despite continuing to understand nationhood in primarily ethnic terms, had opposed ethnic federalization, and had advocated historical federalization instead, on the basis of the Bohemian state-rights program ... Habsburg leaders, for their part, had pursued not so much centralization or federalization ... as a workable solution to domestic conflicts. As those conflicts had grown more national, centralist solutions had grown less legitimate.¹⁵¹

Francis Joseph tried many times to find pragmatic solutions - whether proposing a settlement with historical federalists in 1871 (which was vetoed by the Hungarian and German movements) or switching to a moderate form of ethnic federalization in 1890 - however, nationalist movements were never satisfied. In 1900 the government proposed legislation “that would have made Bohemia’s internal administrative boundaries coincide with its linguistic ones,” a proposal which was rejected by the Young Czechs and Czech National Socials.¹⁵²

In 1897 the government has already tried to settle the political conflict regarding language by accommodating Czech demands in the Badeni language ordinances (applied originally to Bohemia only but with intention to extend them to Moravia).

¹⁵⁰ Eagle Glassheim, “Between Empire and Nation: The Bohemian Nobility, 1880-1918,” in Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit (eds.), *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005), 68.

¹⁵¹ Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 134.

¹⁵² Ibid., 134-35.

They allowed the Czech language to be used not only in external communication between citizens and the bureaucracy (the 'outer language') but also in communication among state officials in all parts of Bohemia (the 'inner language'). As a result, all state officials in the affected ministries would be required to gain competency in both languages of the province by 1901 ... Czech officials generally knew German well enough to satisfy the ordinances, but many German officials in Bohemia did not have a sufficient command of Czech.

In reaction Germans started with campaigns of public mobilization against the ordinances which in effect, would have meant the end of the many careers of educated German Bohemians, who enjoyed their dominant positions in the Imperial administration hence Bohemian economic life became more dominated by Czechs. Finally, Badeni suspended government in June to reconvene it in September 1897. What is important is that activists of both camps, German and Czech, successfully used the summer to mobilize their supporters.

Demonstrations, economic boycotts and street violence were common throughout the remainder of 1897. Efforts to pass ... the joint budget in the autumn of 1897 failed because of continued parliamentary obstruction, which escalated to the point of violence in November ... Demonstrators in Vienna called upon Badeni to resign, which he did in late November. In response, the Czech public initiated its own counter-demonstrations in Prague and other cities in Bohemia, which led to the imposition of martial law in Prague in December ... Demonstrations, particularly against German minorities in predominantly Czech areas or Czech minorities in the borderlands of the province, created a siege mentality and strengthened the role of national protection societies.¹⁵³

The attempt by the Austrian government to find a legal solution for the demands of the Czechs resulted in the total destruction of the parliament. The political campaigning of nationalists has surely supported the massive effect of mass-mobilization. Whatever the reason was that these events took place in the summer and autumn of 1897, the societal alignments and foundations have been created much earlier. Nevertheless the effects of mass-mobilization and politicization of society along national lines were far-reaching.

Albrecht identifies three main effects on Bohemian society. First, the parliament lost its legitimization.¹⁵⁴ Second, economic boycotts damaged traditional commercial relationships between Czechs and Germans and led to a climate of social pressure and hostility. A third consequence was the radicalization on both political camps. "Along with the expanded

¹⁵³ Catherine Albrecht, "The Bohemian Question," in Mark Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multi-National Experiment in early Twentieth-Century Europe* 2nd ed. (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2002), 81-82.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 82.

franchise, the crisis contributed to an increase in the strength and number of overtly nationalist parties. It also radicalized both their tactics and their demands.”¹⁵⁵ The Austrian state remained searching for a solution which should accommodate both demands, the one by the Germans and by the Czechs.

The Moravian Compromise of 1905, for example, ended direct national competition by establishing three separate houses in the Moravian diet, representing the aristocracy, the Germans and the Czechs ... The Compromise forestalled electoral reform and bolstered the position of the aristocracy and middle-class elites among both Czechs and Germans.¹⁵⁶

The Moravian Compromise, as argued by Jeremy King, not only reinforced the linguistically defined framework of nationalists, but even recognized nationality as a political category legally. Hence, he argues that the supra- or a-national Austrian Imperial state turned into a multinational state due to the reforms which took place in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹⁵⁷ A far more positive effect had the 1906-07 electoral reform which included the redrawing of districts following the principle of federalization to gain ethnic legitimacy. In May 1907 men in Cisleithania (enjoying equal suffrage) voted as a single, mass electorate. As a result the more national parties interestingly suffered relative losses.¹⁵⁸

The focus of this section is the legal aspect of institutionalization of nationality as a recognized category by the state. In legal terms Austria was at the time defined as a *Nationalitätenstaat*.¹⁵⁹ Legally there was equality among the eleven officially recognized languages. Officially, the fact that German inhabited a special status as

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 83.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 86.

¹⁵⁷ Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 114-115.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 135.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Rudolf v. Herrnritt, “Die Ausgestaltung des österreichischen Nationalitätenrechtes durch den Ausgleich in Mähren und in der Bukowina,” in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht* 1/5-6 (Wien, 1914), 583. By *Nationalitätenstaat* von Herrnritt means that Austria is a state that consists of a majority of peoples, which enjoy each the right to individual existence and equality by legislation. Hence the character of the *Nationalitätenstaat* is the protection and promotion of the distinct national groups. Following von Herrnritt such a state is the opposite of a nation-state (e.g. France, Germany). For the Austrian constitutional law in detail: cf. E. Bernatzik, *Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze* 2nd ed. (1911), XV and A. Fischel, *Das österreichische Sprachenrecht* 2nd ed. (1910).

*Vermittlungssprache*¹⁶⁰ [official language for mediation] was a bare necessity for administrative reasons. In article 19 of the constitution of December 1867 equality among the different peoples in the state is declared:

All peoples of the state are equal, and every people has an inviolably right to protect and cultivate its distinct nationality [*Nationalität*] and language ... The equality [*Gleichberechtigung*] of all historically spoken languages [*Landessprachen*] in schools, administration and public life is recognized by the state ... In countries inhabited by multiple peoples, the institutions of public education shall be arranged in such a way that every people is able to receive the resources for education without the obligation to learn a second language.¹⁶¹

Regarding the institutionalization of nationality as a legal category one has to look closer. By “equality” what does this law mean? Equality is not a juridical but a value term. It does not state any positive rights. It only describes equality of one subject in comparison to “equal” other subjects. More interesting for us is the meaning of “nationality” and “a people”. How can a group of people be seen as one single individualized people? In a distinguished discussion in 1914 Rudolf von Herrnritt sees the complexity regarding a definition of nationality. He concludes that the vast majority of scholars see nationality as a mental, psychological relationship, a question of consciousness and imagination. He states clearly that any ethnographic or physical criteria are useless since members of different peoples have got mixed and are continually doing so on a daily basis. Especially this inwardness of nationality makes the application of this legislation problematic. The legislation cannot grab a person’s consciousness and personal feelings.

The proposed solution is brought up by an analogy with religion and the institutionalization of religious choice by confession. Von Herrnritt points to the idea that the only externally obvious and clear individualizing marker of a people is its language, their national language.¹⁶² He does not think language is the only criteria of one’s sense of belonging, but due to the easier evaluation of language than of personal consciousness, it had

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 584.

¹⁶¹ Art. 19, StGG [Austrian constitutional law], 21. December, 1867, RGBl. Nr. 142. (translated by author)

¹⁶² Rudolf v. Herrnritt, “Die Ausgestaltung des österreichischen Nationalitätenrechtes durch den Ausgleich in Mähren und in der Bukowina,” in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht* 1/5-6 (Wien, 1914), 585-86.

implications for applying the nationality law. In short he concludes that as a result of the subjective determination of nationality the nationality law is in practice mainly a language law and provides national groups (certain language groups) with cultural rights.¹⁶³ This state ideology of protecting cultural groups is in clear contrast to modern nation-states' policies like in France, Italy or Germany where a top priority policy goal was linguistic homogenization.

Its special regard towards the personality principle made the constitution of 1867 a unique case in granting autonomy on a cultural level. Whether the personality or the territorial principle becomes relevant for the nationalities right depends on the particular law. Basically, article 19 of the constitution in its general version takes both principles into account. In general the personality principle is the ruling principle, according to which one is ensured his or her national rights (language rights). This means the place of residence and the allocation of peoples were theoretically not important. However, due to the impossibility of applying all languages in every public institution this principle finds its practical limits. This is the reason why the second paragraph in article 19 adds a territorial dimension in saying that there should be equality of all historically used languages of the regions [*Landessprache*].¹⁶⁴

The third paragraph of article 19 combines both principles when it comes to the language in schools of mixed regions. First the language has to be an officially recognized *Landessprache* in the concerned region/district. Second, members of the concerned nationality must prove that the number of children who are not yet enrolled in a school of their language reaches the necessary limit which is defined by law. The general logic was that where it was about making the administration more effective, the territorial principle was given ground, which was categorizing territories against national minorities. The personality

¹⁶³ Ibid., 587.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 589.

principle on the other hand viewed equality as a higher goal than the administrative costs and inefficiency because of a multilingual bureaucracy.¹⁶⁵

This discrepancy between the two principles and their effects created discussions among Austrian scholars and the Imperial elite. Language rights and cultural autonomy led to an institutionalization of nationality as category. The question of whether territorial or personality principle should dominate is crucial for understanding the conflicts arising in Bohemia and Moravia. In the German point of view the territorial principle was seen as desirable to recognize the closed German speaking rim and create a protected status of German domination. The usage of Bohemian (*böhmische Sprache*, not “Czech language”) should be limited to the external administrative communication. On the other hand, the Bohemians supported the view that the personality principle should guarantee every individual the usage of both languages in the whole of Bohemia. In fact, the language laws [*Sprachenverordnungen*], especially the *Stremayrsche Sprachenverordnung* of April 1880 for Bohemia and Moravia supported the second, the Bohemian position.¹⁶⁶

Especially paragraph 20 of the Moravian compromise, the so called *Lex Perek*, had far reaching consequences for Moravia’s children. It stated: “[a]s a rule children may only be accepted into an elementary school if they are proficient in the language of instruction.”¹⁶⁷ This created an atmosphere of competition for children and enforced nationalists’ competitive and exclusive language. The political implications of these different legal conceptions of the equality of nationalities will be discussed further in chapter four, especially in the section on ideas of ‘national cultural autonomy.’

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 590.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 590-92.

¹⁶⁷ Cit. in Gerald Stourzh, *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs, 1848 - 1918* (Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985), 216.

3.3. Nationalization of Everyday Life: Education, Associations, and Welfare

The vitality of a separated Czech speaking community in Bohemia and Moravia became outstandingly visible in the last decades of the nineteenth century. A highlight was put into the focus of public attention at the big economic exposition in Prague in 1891, which was boycotted by the Bohemian German speakers [Deutschböhmen]. The Czech industry was able to show successfully that it could compete in specialized fields with its German competitors. The Czech electro-technical industry was in fact even the only major electro-technical industry which was independent of German corporations.¹⁶⁸

Karl Deutsch has pointed to the importance of nationalizing formal and informal organizations of everyday life. Here one aspect is well worth being pointed out since it gives us an impression of the high degree of penetration of the Czech speaking population with a sense of nationality in the last decades of the century. Czech (speaking) public life showed its vitality through a notable amount of cultural institutions and associations which were all community funded by self-organization (e.g. the Prager national theatre). Fundraising among the Czech speaking population appeared to be extremely successful and even the petty bourgeoisie and the workers participated.

Concerning this aspect the Imperial Austrian democratization policy played into the hands of Czech nationalists' aim of educating the masses in the Czech language. It is remarkable that regarding literacy the Czech speakers ranked on the top of all language groups within the Habsburg Monarchy in 1900.¹⁶⁹ From 1849 on the number of Czech speaking schools expanded and a dense network of elementary and later even high schools

¹⁶⁸ Jiří Kořalka and R.J. Crampton, "Die Tschechen," in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 III: Die Völker des Reiches* (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 508.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 510.

has been developed. Finally, even the university in Prague became split and its Czech speaking faculties with its research soon reached an internationally respected level.¹⁷⁰

The crucial difference between a traditional nation-state and the system in Bohemia and Morava became visible with the rejection of participating in the state system in many areas. Both groups developed and increasingly expanded two separated systems of political, economic, cultural and other self-help associations and communities as a replacement of institutions of a nation-state.¹⁷¹

Jeremy King argues that between 1848 and 1871 a “political flux” began where nationality as a political category became to play a more important role in discourse about political conflict. Politics became generally less national and more multinational. However, the state apparatus remained for its vast majority Habsburg.¹⁷² The choice of nationality in Budweis/Budějovice did not really reach importance for the majority of its population, according to Jeremy King:

That choice, though, concerned only thin slices of life: elections, in which the great majority of Budweisers could not vote; associations, which the great majority could not or did not join; the press, which many people did not read; and schools, which were only beginning to offer a choice between Bohemia’s two languages.¹⁷³

As outlined in Karl Deutsch’s theory the *modus operandi* was that nationalists gained increasingly more power which was exercised through “informal social arrangements, pressure of group opinion, and the prestige of national symbols,” or even more strongly, “through formal social or political organizations, through the administration of educational or economic institutions.”¹⁷⁴

In my opinion King’s judgement that the people’s choice in 1871 “concerned only thin slices of life” has to be seen critically. He obviously does not take the ongoing processes of

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 512-13.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 517.

¹⁷² Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 46.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 46-47.

¹⁷⁴ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 104.

social communication by various communication channels into account. Especially, when looking at the figures of Czech speaking elementary schools one can see that choice of language had become a category of everyday life before 1871 since one could choose one's children's school.¹⁷⁵ King also argues that public life during the 1870s and 1880s expanded and also politics became more national. He describes Budweiser life during this period as follows:

Elections, associations, schools, and the press ceased to exhaust the list of principal political spaces, and a bourgeois elite, together with imperial-royal officials, ceased to exhaust the list of principal political actors in town. Municipal enterprises, the census, new and less local associations, the labour market, and both shops and shopping became important arenas for contestation. So, far that matter, did many nonbourgeois - at the same time that they became political actors in their own right.¹⁷⁶

The process of democratization as a supportive factor for nationalization of Bohemian society has been identified before. Another factor was Prague's development as the national centre of Czech nationalism by growing from 157.000 in 1850 to 514.000 in 1900 by mainly attracting people from the Czech speaking regions.¹⁷⁷ Similar trends can be observed with regards other originally rather mixed cities.

Tara Zahra argues in her book that nationalist associations and their influence on local education boards were fighting against national indifference. She describes the situation between 1900 and 1945, where nationalist activists created a political culture which made claims of viewing children as belonging more rightfully to national communities than to their parents. Her main argument is that indifference to nationalism "was itself a driving force behind escalating nationalist radicalism."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Number of elementary schools where teaching was in Czech only: 1864; 3.222; 1884: 4.129; 1914: 5.439; Cf. Jiří Kořalka and R.J. Crampton, "Die Tschechen," in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 III: Die Völker des Reiches* (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 510.

¹⁷⁶ Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 48.

¹⁷⁷ Jiří Kořalka and R.J. Crampton, "Die Tschechen," in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 III: Die Völker des Reiches* (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 509.

¹⁷⁸ Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 5.

It may seem paradoxical to view indifference as an agent of change or as a cause of radical nationalism. Indifference to nationalism was rarely a memorable historical event. It was not typically recorded in newspapers, broadcast in speeches and political manifestos, memorialized through public monuments, or celebrated with festivals and songs. There was no Association for the Protection of the Nationally Indifferent, no Nonnational People's Party, and no newspaper for the promotion of national apathy, opportunism, and sideswitching.¹⁷⁹

This argumentation is very simplistic and one sided. If a significant number of people were a-national, then they would have rather followed class alignments or other cleavages. Zahra does not even mention that language around 1900 was in fact one of the dominant cleavages in Bohemian society, which has become visible during the Badeni crisis of 1897. That this cleavage was connected to the ideology of nationality supports my argument that around 1900 there must have existed already an alignment within Bohemian society, along linguistic and national lines.

The nationally separated welfare systems after 1900 incorporated and institutionalized these existing alignments but they did not created its basis. Following Karl Deutsch, it was rather that after 1900 nationalists were able to gain even more power over traditional state-institutions of the welfare system (which Zahra identifies, like Kindergartens, day-care centers, orphanages, nurseries, health clinics, and summer camps)¹⁸⁰ to create what they called “a nation”, but they possessed enough power before to establish the “nationality.” That welfare associations, schools, kindergartens, sports associations played a crucial role is supported by Deutsch's theory of social communication. However, I argue that a sense of belonging along first linguistic and later national lines started before the beginning of the twentieth century.

One powerful argument supporting this claim is that people had been willing to pay for their own national associations and cultural institutions from the middle of the nineteenth century on. Of course mass schooling and further nationalization increased peoples' sense of belonging and provided nationalists with permanent communication channels. However, the

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 9.

fundamental question remains open: why were people more willing to pay for their own national community and than for the Austrian state? If they were indifferent, why did they spend money, especially why would even workers pay for cultural associations and institutions? Zahra only mentions the success of financial support for the welfare system when the Czechs got autonomy in the realm of social welfare.¹⁸¹ However, she even adds that people preferably gave money to exclusively nationalist welfare associations.¹⁸²

In fact, all observations point to the validation of Karl Deutsch's theoretical concept of social communication and the development of national alignment during the nineteenth century. In the course of time and the more power nationalists gained, institutions became nationalized (parties, welfare, education). However, there is no mono-dimensional explanation for the success of nationalism. National indifference as a major factor in the process can be dismissed. If people were so indifferent to nationalism and this outraged nationalists, this might motivate some particular persons however, it cannot be scientifically accepted as a main reason for the success of national alignment and mass mobilization. On the other hand, the argumentation that the Austrian state's reluctance reinforced nationalist categories has to be carefully differentiated.

First of all, the Austrian state was characterized by its weakness which forced the Habsburg elites to look for a pragmatic solution in case of political conflicts. The political system suffered from Austria's inability to adapt to the demands of a modern state. The archaic fiscal system was only one factor of many which illustrates the state's weakness.

The Bohemian diet was subject to repeated boycotts and acts of obstruction in the period from 1883 until 1913. On 26 July 1913, Emperor Franz Joseph closed the diet because Bohemia was insolvent. Although the financial collapse of the province was due in part to an archaic tax collection system that failed to keep pace with the fiscal demands of a modern state, it was also due to the inability of the various parties in Bohemia to work with each other to resolve crucial problems.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 94.

¹⁸² Ibid., 99.

¹⁸³ Catherine Albrecht, "The Bohemian Question," in Mark Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multi-National Experiment in early Twentieth-Century Europe* 2nd ed. (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2002), 86.

The Imperial state's weakness was surely used by nationalist associations and organisations to take over functions of the state, as argued in Deutsch's theory of nationalists' attempts to increase their power. However, Austria's strategy was rather to accommodate the category of nationality to decrease potential conflicts. Even if Austria had been a strong state with strong institutions, this does not mean that it would have been easy or even possible for the state to sustainably suppress or even remove nationalists and nationalism from the political scene.

A further argument based on Deutsch's theory is that one has always to take the processual dynamics into account. The mere aim to identify the exact year or even event of nationalist's success is implausible. The conclusion of this chapter is that historical, cultural, and societal factors have played a significant role in this process, which started at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the last chapter I want to outline possible political solutions for Austria's nationalities question.

4. Nationalists - Too Strong for a Weak State?

This last chapter is going to give an answer to the question of how much responsibility the Imperial Austrian state and its political elites bore for the inability to solve the nationalities question within the framework of a multinational state. First of all, I am going to explain the broader context of national alignments. In his early works Deutsch tries to explain the societal dynamics of social cooperation, based on his theory of social communication. The idea of national community can be seen as a large-scale coalition of people which should not be seen as simply arbitrary:

in politics and economics such coalitions will depend to a significant degree on social communication and on the culture patterns, personality structures, and communication habits of the participants. Their chances of success will thus depend to some degree on the links that make a people, the ties of nationality. Machiavelli's advice to princes to rely on soldiers native to their kingdom was sound: a policy along these lines became the basis of the military power of the rulers of Brandenburg-Prussia in the century that followed, with results that were to lead eventually to the emergence of a German nation-state ... Organization along ethnic or national lines is by no means the only type of alignment which may be tried in the competitive game. Yet of all these probable patterns of organization, ethnic or national alignments often combine the greatest strength and resilience with the greatest adaptability to a competitive world.¹⁸⁴

Social communication theory puts its focus on explaining why there can be the social phenomenon of "groupness," and on the larger scale, a feeling of commonality among a significant number of people. By drawing on the effect of social ties, he concludes that alignment along ethnic or national lines is not only successful in a competitive world, but also used by politicians. By being aware of its instrumentalization, Deutsch does not fall into the danger of essentialism, seeing the nation as a quasi-natural entity.

To develop thus the economic, intellectual, and military resources of a territory and a population, and to knit them together in an even in an ever tighter network of communication and complementarity based on the ever broader and more thorough participation of the masses of the populace - all this is sound power politics; and those who carry out such policies tend to be rewarded by the long-run outcome of this contest.¹⁸⁵

Does that mean that political elites could have been able to enforce a modern form of nation-building in the Austrian case? How was it possible for a traditional nation-state like France to

¹⁸⁴ Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," in *World Politics*, 5/2 (Jan., 1953): 183-184.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 184.

get rid of or at least oppress the sub-state national/provincial identities, the strong identities of the regions or potential minority nations (la Provence, la Bretagne, the Basque country etc.)? One possible answer is presented by Frank de Zwart's presented policy option of 'replacement', being a compromise between total 'denial' and 'accommodation'. He defines it as "a government pursues redistribution that benefits caste, ethnic, or racial groups, but constructs its own social categories they replace."¹⁸⁶ Historical examples of replacement policies are India's affirmative action (officially denying castes) and Nigeria's creation of the federal state.

De Zwart criticises both policies for having been unsuccessful. It is obvious that the social construction process which has to be successful in cases of replacement is difficult and very different from case to case. Engineered social construction is hard to control and as de Zwart points out it has failed in both cases. In India the social structure of the caste system is still the dominant social reality today and in Nigeria the division into a federal state system where ethnic identity does not play a major role in politics failed as well and the state became more and more fragmented and fragile. Replacement strategies signify modern national aspirations and had no success in the social context of "casteism" and "tribalism".¹⁸⁷

One could argue that the essential problem causing inequality and struggle between groups is still that the social reality of the traditional groups persists because the national, federal government's policies of replacement failed. One can blame the governments rather than the people who stick to their old established structures. This failure poses two problems for modern democracy. First, the better a social/ethnic group's mobilization capacity, the better off it is usually concerning redistribution. Second, if the national policies of replacement fail, they rather support oppositional established collectives.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Frank de Zwart, "The dilemma of recognition: Administrative categories and cultural diversity," *Theory and Society*, 34 (2005): 140.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 154.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 158.

However, let us turn to the classic example of France where there is a successful identification with the republican ideals of the unitary state even in the most historical regions. The introduction of *départements* in the year of the revolution 1789 and finally with a second constitutional change in 1790, prepared the ground for the functioning republican system. Before 1789 the country was divided in several provinces and historical regions which had very different sizes, identities and own histories. Due to these differences they also enjoyed different status of law in their relationship to the centre. The changes of 1789/90 were dramatic and can be seen as a successful replacement policy. Instead of different regions and provinces, a new unitary form - the departments – was introduced. Every department was of similar size and had the same constitutional basis. If one looks at the map of contemporary France the result becomes clear. All departments of continental France are of very similar size and former historical regionalisms are broken.

Here we can see the very difference between the policies of France as a traditional nation-state and of the old Austria, a multinational state. The case analyzed in this paper, where the historical unity of the Bohemian lands has basically always remained unchanged (following the idea of *Staatsrecht*) shows that autonomy and federalization was not solving the nationalities question within the framework of one state. Centralisation and fiscal reforms driven by the centre cannot be implemented easily in federalized historical states, where “national” interests oppose that of the supra-national Empire. It is questionable if any policy of “denial” or “replacement” like in France would have been successful. Rather the opposite have been the case during the period of enlightened absolutism. The reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II and the effects in their aftermaths have probably been crucial for the development of distinct nationalisms in Bohemia and Moravia, instead of successful nation-building with the result of a patriotic sense of “Austrianness.” The attempts of nation-building by a dominant coercive centre failed. While in France the nationalization process has been

pointedly described by Eugene Weber as transforming “peasants into Frenchmen”¹⁸⁹ the Austrian nationalization process can be described as peasants into a variety of nationalities.

De Zwart’s empirical findings show how serious the dilemma of the Austrian state must have been. It was impossible to grant autonomy and federalism along the old historical lines of the Bohemian lands, cultural autonomy along ethnic and linguistic lines, and simultaneously expect primary identification along another category, the Imperial Austrian state. De Zwart’s findings are not astonishing. By looking at the social theories of Karl Deutsch,¹⁹⁰ Michael Billig¹⁹¹ and Anthony D. Smith¹⁹² we find enough arguments for concluding that historical traditional symbols, especially when they are embedded in everyday life and become routine from early childhood on, have a strong effect on people’s sense of belonging and their personal identification. Michael Billig in his work on routines which embed symbols of belonging in everyday life has termed this phenomenon “banal nationalism.”¹⁹³

When it comes to the question of explaining why national alignments in Bohemia and Moravia took the path along linguistic lines one can point at the increasing importance of language as a main cleavage in society. However the situation was much more complex. Karl Deutsch in one of his articles in 1953 explained “group awareness” as follows:

Individual awareness of one’s language and people may appear to be a matter of personal psychology, even though there are social situations which make such awareness more probable. Group awareness, on the other hand, seems clearly a matter of social institutions. Some secondary symbols are attached to some aspects of group life and are repeated and disseminated over and over again by an organization or institution, often for a purpose that has nothing to do with nationality, or which might even be opposed to it ... A stream of memories has been started that is partly self-regenerating, and so long as the foundations for the ethnic group exist, and social mobilization and communication continue to weld its members together, national group awareness may be there to stay. It can hardly be expected to give way to a wider supra-national allegiance until a basis for the appeal of wider symbols has again developed in the realm of objective fact, in experiences at least as real, as frequent in daily life of individuals, and as

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992).

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966).

¹⁹¹ Cf. Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).

¹⁹² Cf. Anthony D. Smith, *The Cultural Foundations of Nations: Hierarchy, Covenant, and Republic* (Malden: Blackwell, 2008).

¹⁹³ Cf. Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).

relevant to their personal concerns, to their language, their communications, and their thoughts, as were those experiences which provided the basis for the awareness of nationality.¹⁹⁴

This description explains exactly the situation in Bohemia and Moravia where (based on social institutions like associations, education, history classes etc.) nationality became institutionalized as a societal category. This national group awareness undermined a wider supra-national allegiance with the Austrian Imperial state. This does not mean that only nationalist activists consciously enforced such social institutions neither that the Austrian state promoted consciously nationalist movements by its legal reforms. Moreover, symbols and institutions of group awareness were produced often quite unintentionally:

A process of social mobilization may even transform the function of existing symbols or institutions so as to turn them into agencies of group awareness, regardless of their original purposes. This nationalism was promoted sometimes by a supra-national church ... The names of patron saints of provinces and regions, such as St. Stephan for Hungary, St. Wenceslas for Bohemia, St. Patrick for Ireland, or the Virgin Czenstochowa for Poland, turned into patriotic battle cries ... Reinforcing the impact of these symbols there appear the institutions of modern economic life and of the modern state, all of which require more direct communication with large numbers of peasants, artisans, taxpayers, or conscripts than was the case before. In the eighteenth century, Austrian officers were taught Czech, so as to command better their Czech-speaking soldiers, and the revival of the teaching of the Czech language followed.¹⁹⁵

Karl Deutsch describes the same process as it has been in the Bohemian, Moravian case. After this process of “group consciousness” has started a group of ambitious scholars, intellectuals tried to revive the cultural heritage of their group. They purified language and tried to create a standard high language which they used for writing national historiography, folk epics, collect ancient documents etc. After these people have nationalized symbols and ancient history organizers found literary circles and try to promote the formerly despised native language.¹⁹⁶ Finally, nationalizing associations like singing societies, athletic organizations, and schools are founded.¹⁹⁷

As a result a dense network of social communication channels was established among a large number of people. Additionally it became possible for this group to reproduce and

¹⁹⁴ Karl W. Deutsch, “The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration,” in *World Politics*, 5/2 (Jan., 1953): 185-86.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 187-88.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. ibid. 188.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

absorb symbols and memories, and to guarantee their transmission. By some sort of “social learning” there developed some degree of what Deutsch describes as “the capacity to redirect, re-allocate, or form a new combination of economic, social, and human resources as well as of symbols and items of knowledge, habit, or thought.”¹⁹⁸ These processes were responsible that the old structure of the Austrian Imperial state found itself face to face with a societal form of Czech nationhood, which according to Deutsch, “represents a more effective organization than the supra-national but largely passive layer-cake society or the feudal or tribal localisms that preceded it.”¹⁹⁹

We have arrived at a point where we have set up several arguments into a feasible framework of explaining the nationalization process and the limited power of the Austrian state in Bohemia and Moravia. In the last two sections I am going to show why political alternatives failed: democratization as promoted by the Liberals and Social Democracy, and Austro-Marxist’s idea of accommodating nationality in a form of cultural autonomy.

4.1. National Culture and Democracy

Democratization in the second half of the nineteenth century did not, as liberals hoped, lead to more legitimacy for the political system. Nor did, as expected by Social Democrats, national alignments become overlaid with class alignments. Instead national cleavages became even more influential within the political system itself:

... the ever-widening curial system gave the middle classes of all nationalities substantial representation, and bourgeois parties tended to be nationalist. Given socialist hostility to the aristocracy, a cross-class ‘internationalist’ alliance against the nationalist parties was also unlikely. Moreover, by the late nineteenth century, Czech social democrats were almost as nationalist as the Czech bourgeois parties, finding little common cause with their Austro-German counterparts.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 190.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Eagle Glassheim, “Between Empire and Nation: The Bohemian Nobility, 1880-1918,” in Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit (eds.), *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005), 69.

The German Liberals which originally demanded further liberalization and democratization of Austria's political system finally realized that the resulting effects were not supporting their goals but rather nationalists'.

The Social Democratic Party suffered from similar experiences and had to acknowledge the social and political reality of national alignments overtrumping the Marxist theory which departs from predominant class-based alignments. However, the role of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, which declared its conciliation in 1889 in Hainfeld, was a unique one. All groups within the party (except the Polish) accepted the Austrian state as the basis of organisation.²⁰¹ The Austrian party viewed the German Social Democratic Party as a model and implicitly ignored any concerns about nationality at the beginning. Soon there appeared centrifugal forces within the Czech speaking parts of the organisation. While the Czech headquarter in Vienna and in Brünn/Brno accepted the international character of the party, Prague became the centre of an opposing Czech nationalist social democratic movement, which led to the foundation of a "Bohemian-national" labour party in May 1891.²⁰² In sum, the German speaking main organisation of the S.D.P. remained in its international character however, it became nationally federalized.

In the traditional discourse of democracy and liberalism no critical stance on the assimilation of minorities into an ethno-cultural core has been included. Michael Mann argues in his book *The Dark Side of Democracy* that democratization leads to coerced assimilation and in some cases even to ethnic cleansing.²⁰³ In many historical examples the ethno-cultural construct of the centre functioned as the hegemonic model of the *demos* toward which the periphery was forced to adapt. In the French case this led to the situation that being French meant in fact to speak the Parisian language and not Breton or Provençal nor any other

²⁰¹ Hans Mommsen, *Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1963), 156.

²⁰² Ibid., 185.

²⁰³ Cf. Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

regional language. Historically it is impressive that in France, where in 1863 more than fifty percent of the schoolchildren learned French as a foreign language and where dozens of languages have been spoken, French is the constitutional public language of the republic.²⁰⁴

The price of democracy is similarly described by Marx and Engels who did not find cultural identities worth being protected because of the intrinsic value of democracy and freedom. “The solution offered by Marx and Engels to these unfortunate peoples was either to be totally assimilated into the ‘superior’ German or Magyar nations with ‘democracy as compensation,’ or to be ‘obliterated’ in the course of the democratic struggle.”²⁰⁵ The same dismissal of minority rights is found in John Stuart Mill’s liberal thought. He states that “[a]mong people without fellow-feeling, especially if they different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist.”²⁰⁶

Even if accommodation of national cultures was rejected ideologically by Liberalism and traditional Marxism, Social Democratic leaders were concerned with the idea of accommodation. Next, the role of the originally international Social Democracy and Austro-Marxist perception of nationality will be presented.

4.2. Austro-Marxism and the Nationalities Question

First of all, how does Austro-Marxist thought fits into the context of Marxism and its ideas on the national question? It is obvious that the environment and the problems within the multinational state automatically draw many socialists’ attention on the nationalities question. That the question of nationalities and the search for a political solution of national conflict was holding a dominant position in the Austrian scientific community of that time is shown

²⁰⁴ Jeff Spinner, *The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 142.

²⁰⁵ Ephraim Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis* (London: Pluto Press, 1991), 124-25.

²⁰⁶ John Stuart Mill, quoted in Ephraim Nimni, “Nationalism, Ethnicity and Self-determination: a Paradigm Shift?,” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 9/2 (2009): 320-21.

by many authors. Moreover the decline of the liberals became definitive with the tremendous success of nationalism. Schorske expressed these paradoxical developments as follows:

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the program which the liberals had devised against the upper classes occasioned the explosion of the lower ... The new antiliberal mass movements – Czech nationalism, Pan-Germanism, Christian Socialism, Social Democracy, and Zionism – rose from below to challenge the trusteeship of the educated middle class, to paralyze its political system, and to undermine its confidence in the rational structure of history.²⁰⁷

The liberals' loss of confidence in the rational structure of history is said to be reflected, on the one hand, in the arguments of *fin-de-siècle* Austrian Platonism or theories of logical objectivism, and, on the other hand, by Freud's concept of psycho-analysis and his image of men being guided by irrational psychic forces. The wealthy middle class viewed the defeat of liberalism and democratic reform as necessarily bad. A feeling of (false) security prevailed.

That situation is described by authors like Stefan Zweig and Hannah Arendt.²⁰⁸ The former coined the phrase of calling this pre-war period "the Golden Age of Security".²⁰⁹ This is also the time where the Social Democratic Party, lead by the Austro-Marxist thinkers tried to reform the state and solve the problems of the monarchy like national conflicts and frictions and paradoxes inherent in the economic system. Their basic political direction was the support of democratisation, education, and the development of a welfare state which would in the long run enable the creation of a peaceful and just socialist society.

Turning to the historical development of Marxism at that time, one has to point out that the developments after the Second International were crucial for the crystallization of a distinct Austrian intellectual school of socialism. It must be "understood equally as a generational reaction against the ossification of Kautsky's orthodoxy; as a critical reaction to Bernstein's revisionism and the powerful intellectual critique of orthodox Marxism from the

²⁰⁷ Shorske, "Politics in a New Key," quoted in J. C. Nyíri, "Philosophy and National Consciousness in Austria and Hungary, 1848-1918," *Structure and Gestalt: Philosophy and Literature in Austria-Hungary and her successor states*, ed. by Barry Smith (Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1981), 252.

²⁰⁸ J. C. Nyíri, "Philosophy and National Consciousness in Austria and Hungary, 1848-1918," *Structure and Gestalt: Philosophy and Literature in Austria-Hungary and her successor states*, ed. by Barry Smith (Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1981), 254.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

neo-Kantian ethical socialists of the Marburg school, and as a response to the criticism of Marxist economic theory from the Viennese Marginalist school of economics.”²¹⁰

The point is that in contrast to the traditional Marxist view, the Austro-Marxists tended to recognize the existing state as a possible positive tool for social transformation which can also control and organize the economic system (in contrast to the traditional view of the repressive bourgeois state), and especially important for this work, they recognized nationalities as legitimate cultural collectives within the Austrian multinational state.

Following quotation provides one with the different views on the role of nations within Marxist thought by referring to Gramsci’s understanding of a unified nation-state as part of the solution for overthrowing the bourgeois elite:

The Gramscian conceptualization of the national community has a major advantage over the analysis developed by the theoreticians of the Second and Third Internationals (Austro-Marxists excluded) in that it is capable of comprehending the political importance of the cultural dimension as well as conceptualizing a form of autonomy for the political realm - in itself not an insubstantial achievement. However, by overcoming one form of reductionism - that of economism - Gramsci appears to be privileging another dimension - the political arena - instead of constructing a non-reductionist analysis of the national phenomenon ... For Gramsci, national state, national language and the organization of culture are all different aspects of the same process: ‘The problem of the intellectual and moral unity of the nation and the state is to be found in the unity of language.’²¹¹

Gramsci somehow seems to support the unifying idea of the Jacobins and their aim to eliminate *les patois* - Breton, Catalan, Occitan, Basque as well as many other languages which simply totally vanished. He argues that rural France accepted the hegemony of Paris and the cultural obliteration of the national minorities speaking other languages than Parisian-French. Hence this process led to the cultural and political unity of the national state, which prepared the condition for the ‘national popular collective will.’²¹²

The most distinctive feature of the Austro-Marxist school is the theoretical basis developed most clearly by Max Adler’s philosophy of science, namely the understanding of Marxism as a social science which provides the framework for social analysis. Adler thought

²¹⁰ Ephraim Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis* (London: Pluto Press, 1991), 131-132.

²¹¹ Ibid., 112.

²¹² Ibid. 112-113.

that Marx constructed a theory of society by introducing the concept of ‘socialized humanity’.²¹³ For them a Marxist theory of society was basically a sociological theory, whereas for pure universal principles like Carl Menger’s rational model of human action, or Hans Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’. Karl Renner developed an Austro-Marxist alternative in a study of the social functions of legal institutions.²¹⁴

Renner ... took as his starting point the conception of law as a system of norms which could be analyzed and interpreted in its own right, but he then proceeded to extend his inquiry in a sociological direction by investigating how the same legal norms could change their functions in response to changes in society, and particularly changes in its economic structure ... Renner quite clearly attributes an active role to law in conserving or modifying existing social relations and does not regard law as a mere reflection of economic conditions.²¹⁵

In the writings of Karl Renner and Rudolf Hilferding it becomes especially clear that the Austro-Marxists saw the important role of the state in organizing and changing the social structure and the economic system.²¹⁶ The following part of this subchapter focuses on Karl Renner’s personal dimension of collective cultural rights.

Similar to modernist theorists of nationalism, Renner too argues that for the least possible resistance for the machinery of the state, the state and the nation must coincide.²¹⁷

However, Renner is totally aware that this simply conclusion is a fallacy. When he asks:

how is it then that in reality state and nation never completely coincide? Precisely because the state has other tasks than that of guaranteeing the best possible level of national intellectual culture, tasks that appear to the state to be so much more important that it patiently accepts the aforementioned frictional and development resistance merely to achieve other objectives.²¹⁸

His understanding of the state and group interests represented in this state takes the territorial dimension into account. Here his Marxist background becomes visible:

Like all material, they exist in space and can be realized only within a particular territory. For this reason a state is not conceivable without exclusive territorial domination. State territorial development is dominated by the sphere of material interest of the dominant groups in the state. State and state territory are conceptually inseparable, whereas the nations mingle within the territory while pursuing

²¹³ Ibid., 16.

²¹⁴ Cf. Karl Renner, *Die Soziale Funktion der Rechtsinstitute, besonders des Eigentums*, published under the pseudonym K. Karner (Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1904).

²¹⁵ Bottomore and Goode, “Introduction”, in Bottomore and Goode (eds.) *Austro-Marxism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 18-19.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 26.

²¹⁷ Cf. Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997).

²¹⁸ Karl Renner, “State and nation“, 1899, in Ephraim Nimni (ed.) *National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics* (London: Routledge, 2005), 26.

their material interests; the struggle for existence has the effect of mixing them together. In conceptual terms, the nation is not a territorial entity.²¹⁹

Renner compares the feudal system with the modern nation-state ideal. In the past, the dominant group was usually an economic class, not a tribe. He refers to the Carolingian Empire, which united many tribes without destroying their cultures and languages. Even in the Roman provinces people remained their cultures and languages. However, the modern state enforced the territorial principle: “if you live in my territory, you are subject to my domination, my law and my language! It is the expression of domination, not of equal right; the domination by the established inhabitants of the newcomers, by the propertied, who is held fast by his property, of the propertyless, who must follow demand where it leads, at least by the majority of the minority, if not by the settled minority of the majority ... For this reason the Young Czechs support *Staatsrecht* for territory of the Crown of St Wenceslas, because it guarantees them domination of the minorities ... The territorial principle can never produce compromise and equal rights; it can only produce struggle and oppression, because its essence is domination.”²²⁰

Renner adds an additional strong argument against the territorial principle, which leads necessarily to the oppression of minorities. He refers to interaction of sovereign-states, where the Englishman enjoys more national rights in Prague than the German-Czech who may not speak German, display German signs because he is on Czech soil. “In a word, each Austrian nationality is accorded greater protection abroad than within Austria, each foreigner among us greater protection than the native within his own land, because intra-state existence does not provide a corrective to the territorial principle, because no one is protected by his nation, because a nation can protect no one except by means of reprisal, of revenge. This is not a lawful state of affairs, but one of nascent or open civil war.”²²¹

²¹⁹ Ibid., 26-27.

²²⁰ Ibid., 28.

²²¹ Ibid.

His proposal to solve this inherent intolerance is to establish the personality principle as the basis of regulation. Since no people exist without territory, the territorial principle should be implemented due to its organizational function. “If the personality principle forms the constitutive principle which brings about the separation of the nationalities and the union of individuals, then the territorial principle will have a significant role to play as an organizational principle.”²²²

Another Austro-Marxist thinker, Otto Bauer, was less concerned about minority rights, but saw in the power of nations and the realization of socialism close linkages. Similar to Kymlicka’s argument of liberal multiculturalism and the liberal necessity of people to participate a ‘societal culture’, Bauer argues that “only socialism will give the whole people a share in the national culture ... socialist society will, for the first time, abolish particularism within the nation.”²²³ By enabling the individuals to participate in the national cultural community of the socialist society, they all get the equal opportunity for the first time in history to become educated and participate in society as a whole. Deliberation, rational reasoning and conscious individual choices should create something which could be compared to Jürgen Habermas’ concept of ‘deliberative democracy’. “Only in this way can the individual be liberated from the traditions of restricted local circles, broaden his views, and be enabled to establish his own ends and make an intelligent choice of the means to those ends.”²²⁴ Otto Bauer’s international utopia was that there should be an international framework of law, which guarantees general principles for national cultures and through the ‘international division of labour’²²⁵ people and national communities would be able to migrate

²²² Ibid., 29.

²²³ Otto Bauer, ‘Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie’, (1907), in Bottomore and Goode, *Austro-Marxism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 110.

²²⁴ Ibid., 111.

²²⁵ Bauer refers to the classical model of David Ricardo and argues that due to national protection and competition this system serves the industrialists and the wealthy classes because they create cartels, monopolies and further try to expand and as a result create dumping in other countries. Similarly is Karl Renner’s analysis when he writes that “it is not the nation as a basic and primary phenomenon which uses the state as its tool; the primary fact is the state, and the nation is the object of patronage ... Capitalism is now passing from its industrial

within a just global economic system and would not be culturally and linguistically oppressed by nation states.²²⁶ In sum, the very aim of Austro-Marxist theory was basically to frame a constitutional legal framework which is able to accommodate national cultures in a way that there is no need for secessions.²²⁷ However, as history showed, they never got the opportunity to implement their ideas.

into its finance-capitalist stage ... It is a cartel tariff, which is intended not so much to hinder foreign imports, as to facilitate exports ... it is not so much manufactured goods, commodities, use-values, that are to be exported, as capital itself." [But Renner is aware that the economic volume in total is still dominated by export commodities] cf. Karl Renner, The Development of the National Idea (from Marxismus, Krieg und Internationale), in Bottomore and Goode, *Austro-Marxism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 122.

²²⁶ Otto Bauer, 'Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie', (1907), in Bottomore and Goode, *Austro-Marxism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 113-17.

²²⁷ The underlying idea was to find a solution at the global level, inspired by the problems in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. One of the founding fathers of the idea of legal accommodation on an international level instead of territorial struggles (which are *de facto* zero sum games) was Immanuel Kant. For a discussion of Kant's accommodation ideas cf. Jürgen Habermas, "The Kantian Project of the Constitutionalization of International Law: Does it Still have a Chance?," in Omid A. Payrow Shabani (ed.), *Multiculturalism and Law: a critical debate* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2007), 205-18.

Conclusion

In this thesis I have shown that nationalization of the Bohemian and Moravian society and the Austrian political sphere had multiple reasons. Only a few of them were caused by the Imperial state and those mainly because of its weakness. Rather, the state saw itself confronted with national alignment which mainly followed linguistic cleavages and hence prevented the state from centralization and ‘Germanization’ (promoting German as the *lingua franca* of the Austrian state).

At the end of the eighteenth century the population was nationally indifferent because of the very fact that nationalism is based on several processes accompanying modernization. However, as shown in chapter one, the cultural condition in the Bohemian lands was a fertile ground for nationalist activism. On the other hand, as explored in chapter three, modernization led to structural changes in society, economy etc. and to further developments which were supportive to the increasing importance of language (such as mass schooling, rise of print-media and literacy). As a result, national alignments among the population followed this division.

The very process of nationalization is explained by social communication. The dynamics of social communication and nationalism led to the strengthening of national alignments and its institutionalization in the nineteenth century. Indifference toward nationalism as a dominant phenomenon until 1900 or even longer can be refused. The majority of the population surely did not care about nationality in everyday life. However, this does not mean that they were not socialized in a way which transmitted a certain sense of commonality or difference which could become active and crystallize in certain situations (such as boycotts against shops of the other nationality or demonstrations for one’s language rights).

I have shown that even if the majority did not identify themselves in (modern) ‘national’ terms, nationalist activities were successful in acquiring money, mobilizing people, and controlling social institutions. Even in the early nineteenth century there existed probably ‘a sense of belonging’ which was nationalized by historians using the old narratives of the Hussite revolution, and the uniqueness of the Slavic ethno-cultural history and the Czech language. The fact that Czech speakers were a minority in their geographical region (surrounded by a mainly German speaking population) and the hegemonic status of the German speakers in the Austrian state (Cisleithania) provided further feed for nationalist discourse. Finally, modern national movements were able to politicize these originally cultural identities.

The best example of the existence of a sense of “commonality” among significant parts of the Czech speaking population is the happening of “meetings” where ten thousands of peasants participated. Even if “nationness” crystallized at certain nationally framed events and situations, a pre-existing sense of commonality (explained by social communication) provides the condition for mass-mobilization which made it possible that thousands of people gather. The incentives for “meetings” and joining particular groups in certain moments have not been money or food. Even if we cannot proof empirically what exactly the incentives for participants of mass meetings were, social communication theory argues feasibly that social communication leads to a sense of commonality among certain communities.

As I have argued and shown in this thesis, the main reason for the adoption of nationality as a recognized principle by the state was the social reality of national alignment which was given political importance through liberalization and democratization. Viewing the Imperial state as the cause of nationalists’ success would be narrow minded. Moreover, it was not only the state which was forced to recognize nationality as a powerful societal category.

Even Austro-Marxist thinkers, who ideologically should reject any importance of nationality, recognized the social reality of national alignments in their political thought.

In the last thirty years there developed a trend towards justifying certain minority rights in liberal democracies.²²⁸ According to the renowned liberal multiculturalist Will Kymlicka there should be certain cultural rights because “[c]ultures are valuable, not in and of themselves, but because it is only through having access to a societal culture that people have access to a range of meaningful options.”²²⁹ Further, he concludes that “any culture which is not a societal culture will be reduced to ever-decreasing marginalization.”²³⁰ Whereas national cultures which are culturally distinct, geographically concentrated and institutionally complete societies, can maintain a distinct culture. In general Kymlicka’s theory supports the ideas and claims of minority national movements in established states and tries to accommodate their claim for autonomy within the existing state. On the other hand this trend is attacked by traditional liberals who see the equality principle realized by granting individual equality only.²³¹ As Ephraim Nimni has recently argued, ‘national cultures’²³² still play a dominant role in modern societies and hence ‘post-national’²³³ theories should be seen sceptically. He argues for the accommodating of national cultures:

In an ideal world the problem of stateless nations could be resolved by the reorganisation of the nation state into multination states with enshrined collective rights for all participant cultural communities. The

²²⁸ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 75-106, Melissa S. Williams, *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, ‘Liberalism and the Right to Culture’, *Social Research*, 61 (1994), 491-505, Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and ‘the Politics of Recognition’* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 25-73.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 83.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 80.

²³¹ Jeremy Waldron, ‘What is Cosmopolitan?’, *The Journal of Political Philosophy* (2000) 8: 227-243 and Jeremy Waldron, ‘Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility’, Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds.), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 155-174.

²³² Cf. Ephraim Nimni, ‘Nationalism, Ethnicity and Self-determination: a Paradigm Shift?’, *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 9/2 (2009): 329. Nimni solves the difficulty of defining ‘national culture’ by bringing in its subjective dimension. Since culture of a large group of individuals cannot be interpreted in one single way by all members of the community he defines nationality not as something fixed but as “an arena for struggles between different interpretations.”

²³³ Cf. Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), chapter 8. Advocates of a post-national perspective like Yasemin Soysal even support the thesis that the international law regime guarantees an expanding set of rights which makes national citizenship less important in the long run.

National Cultural Autonomy (NCA) model and consociationalism use this organisational logic in deeply divided societies when the abodes of the constituent cultural communities overlap.²³⁴

I am not going to conclude that generally one proposal is better than another - neither denying nor accommodating cultural difference. To discuss the societal effects, advantages and disadvantages of cultural minority rights are not topic of this paper and have to be discussed in another place.

However, the category of nationality is still dominant in certain situations. Wilson's territorial principle of national self-determination transforms cultural demands into a zero-sum game which sees the only solution in secession and would in theory lead to an ever increasing number of sovereign nation states and would still not prevent the existence of minorities. The expansion and deepening of the European Union in the last decades shows that multinational legal constructions are possible. However, until now the member-states apply still a territorial principle of national cultures (e.g. language) within the Union. In case migration expands and accelerates, further debates on the accommodation of national cultures on the basis of a non-territorial principle will become a political issue again.

²³⁴ Ephraim Nimni, "Nationalism, Ethnicity and Self-determination: a Paradigm Shift?," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 9/2 (2009): 327.

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