

**INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
RECONSIDERED: PATTERNS OF
CONFIGURATION OF POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES**

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Abstract

This thesis undertakes a configurational approach to institutional design in divided societies. Following the appropriate literature which says that any one model of institutional design is unlikely to be implemented in its pure form, this thesis aims at finding empirical patterns of configuration of five crucial political institutions in 18 divided societies. Using the exploratory capacities of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis, I first test the frequency of occurrence of ideal models which dominate the field of institutional design in divided societies. Later I explore the possible other patterns which cover the remaining cases. The research sheds doubt on the empirical relevance of the ideal models, showing that ideal models are rarely implemented in the real world, while some of them do not have their empirical references at all. Through an exploratory analysis of the data I identify seven patterns of configurations of institutions in plural societies which cluster to each other following the common logic of institutional design and regularities of bi-variate relationships. The research also finds that the commonly accepted regularities of relationships among institutions are weak in divided societies, where crucial intervening variables influence these relationships.

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1. Introduction

Institutional design in divided societies has been one of the most heated topics in the comparative politics for the last decades. The reason for such an interest is the arising necessity of finding institutional solutions to the democracy problems existing in plural societies. This is a tough task as the existing mechanisms developed for homogeneous societies do not match the necessities of divided societies. The main problem which divided societies present is the unique context of the political cleavage which might include, but is not restricted to the combination of ethnic, racial, religious, cultural and linguistic cleavages as well as social class, regional and other components. These cleavages make some groups with objective social characteristics underprivileged with regard to their opportunities for political and economic representation, practice of language, religion, and cultural traditions. Thus it is generally assumed that minority groups will feel insecure and create intergroup tensions, start a civil war and finally demand secession and refer to any other form of social unrest and ethno-political violence unless special institutions are designed to meet their demands on political and economic representation and cultural autonomy.

The literature in this subfield of comparative politics can roughly be divided into three sections: (1)major theoretical concepts on institutional design in divided societies consociationalism and incentive approach found in different works by Lijphart and Horowitz. Alternative theories of institutional design which discuss only some aspect of institutional design such as the institutional models discussed by Reilly (2004), McGarry, O'Leary and Simeone, Kymlicka (1995, 1998, 2006) and O'Flynn (2006). (2)The second group is composed of a huge number of case studies assessing specific institutional solutions given in specific cases of plural societies. (3) The third group of studies in the field represented by works of Cohen (1997), Saideman et al (2002), Reynal-Querol (2002a, b; 2004) Schjolset

(2008) Lee (2007) etc. puts the stress on the application of different, rather sophisticated statistical methods to prove the effectiveness of specific institutional devices in representing minority groups, solving the ethnic conflict, reducing the probability of revolt and rebellion and other forms of ethno-political violence.

Despite the promotion of their own theoretical approaches, scholars have realized that no single model of institutional design has been applied in its complete and pure form. (Lijphart 2004; Horowitz 2004) Though this fact has been widely acknowledged, literature on coherence and combination of different institutions has not been dealt with much. The study of possible empirical combinations of institutions has till now been missing from the literature on democratization in divided societies and institutionalism literature. The aim of this research is to raise the issue of coherence and compatibility of different institutions and find patterns of empirical configurations of five crucial political institutions in plural societies.

The approach undertaken here regards an empirical instance of institutional design as a process of designing a complex of institutions, configuration of measures rather than viewing institutions in isolation. The assumption here is that in the empirical reality constitutional designers divert from one single theory of democratic institutional design in plural societies regarding the theoretical models as pools of institutions which are selected to better adjust to the context specific requirements of institutional design. The purpose of this thesis is to find the patterns of configuration of five political institutions which have been identified as crucial in the literature on institutional design in divided societies.

The study of the empirical configurations of institutions is of great importance for both theoretical and empirical dimensions of institutional design for three reasons. First, the study

of empirical configurations will help to refine the already known functional and causal relationships among sets of institutions. Second, finding the patterns of configuration of institutions will help scholars to reconsider the theoretical underpinnings of the ideal models and their assumptions. The third and the most important contribution will be made to the wider institutionalism literature through finding patterns of configuration of political institutions in plural societies. Though dealing with a very specific type of societal set-up namely divided societies, the research will unintentionally provide insights into the configurations of institutions and institutional coherence in homogeneous societies. Though, at this stage of elaboration of the project I do not come up with any causal hypothesis, the outcomes of the research will indirectly point to superiority of some configurations of institutions for reducing ethnic unrest.

The subject area of this thesis is institutional design in plural, divided societies. Before going further there is a need to specify the terms plural and divided societies, which are used interchangeably as the cases for the study have been selected according to the criterion of plurality of society. Following Lijphart (1977) this thesis defines plural society as a society divided by segmental cleavages. Lijphart refers to Eckstein saying that segmental cleavages exist where “political divisions follow very closely and especially concern lines of objective social differentiation, particularly salient in a society.” (ibid: 3) A Segmental cleavage is separate from other political divisions by specific disagreements over policy and procedural issues with the cultural differences resulting from the different modes of interpreting the political world and divided or plural societies. (Zuckerman 1975). The classic volume by Lipset and Rokkan identifies 4 types of segmental cleavages: religious, ethnic, regional and social-class (Lipset Rokkan 1967). This literature on segmental cleavages has one crucial limitation for this thesis: it does not discuss ideological cleavage as a type of societal

cleavage. Ideological segmentation as a type of objective social differentiation was later discussed within case studies on consociational systems of Austria, Netherlands and Italy. Following this tradition in the consociational literature, I consider in this thesis ideological segmentation as a type of segmental cleavage.

The choice of methodology of this research is closely related to its purpose and theoretical underpinning. The purpose of this paper is to find the patterns of configuration of institutions in plural societies. To explore the complex causality of institutions this thesis will make use of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (hereinafter QCA). This technique of social science research has specifically been introduced into social sciences to deal with complex causality of social phenomena. Unlike multivariate statistical methods which measure the influence of separate response variable(s) on the explanatory variable(s), QCA rather deals with complex causality of explanatory variables, conditions of a certain phenomenon with the response variable, the outcome of the research. (Hall 2003, Ragin 1987)

First I am going to test the empirical relevance of the ideal models present in the literature. After testing the analytically models I will get hands to exploratory analysis of configurations of institutions. For the purposes of the analysis variables of the executive type, namely parliamentarism (abbreviated Parl. in solution formulas and tables), presidentialism (abbreviated Pres. in solution formulas and tables) and semi-presidential semi-parliamentary (abbreviated Semi. in solution formulas and tables) will be set as outcomes while other necessary institutional elements of the models as conditions. QCA is expected to produce frequencies of combination of institutions set as conditions with the institution set as an outcome.

The institutions which are analyzed in this thesis have been prioritized in the theoretical literature on institutional design in divided societies by Lijphart, Horowitz, Reilly, Reynolds, Kymlicka etc. The empirical applications of these institutions have been studied in the case-study literature. To simplify the procedure the variables have been clustered into groups according to the type of institution. Thus the variables are grouped into seven clusters of Electoral Systems, Party System type, Territorial organization type, Government type, Executive type. The empirical analysis is done using data on political institutions from 18 plural societies. Twenty binary variables indicating presence or absence of a certain political institution have been taken from “A Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions” compiled by Lundell and Karvonen (2003) at the Department of Political Science, Åbo Akademi, Finland.

The findings of this research indicate that the pure models of institutional design have been extremely rare. Consociationalism and Westminster model have both had two empirical instances of implementation of the ideal models while Horowitz’s incentive approach has so far never been implemented. Refuting the empirical existence of ideal models the research found out seven patterns of configurations of institutions which cluster around the common logic of institutional design and associational links among variables. The research also finds that the commonly acknowledged types of relationships among institutions are very weak in plural societies.

This thesis has certain limitations. First of all a number of developing countries have been excluded from the analysis due to the lack of data. The absence of these countries in the analysis deprives it of useful insights into regularities of choosing specific set of institutions under certain, historical, demographic, economic and other conditions as most of our cases are

rather developed countries with certain democratic experience. Secondly, due to problems with data extraction only five institutional variables have been studied leaving out from the analysis a number of other crucial institution such as decentralization, group autonomy, mutual veto and quota systems. Finally, the research at this stage does not control for any contextual factors such as type of cleavage, number of cleavage groups, level of democracy in the country, years of democratic governance, economic development and other factors which might be conflating the analysis.

This thesis consists of an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter introduces the theoretical background. It starts with the discourse on different approaches to institutional design in plural societies. The chapter raises the issue of the complex approach to institutional design and discusses the literature on the coherence of different institutions. The second chapter is devoted to the empirical part of the research. It introduces hypothesis, deals with the description of methodology, variables, their operationalization and measurement. In the third chapter I report and discuss the findings as to their correspondence to the initial expectations, and provisions present in the literature. The chapter ends with making implications of the findings for the literature within which this thesis is located as well as suggesting further path of development of the research.

2. Institutional Design in Plural Societies: Theoretical Considerations

2.1 Consociational-Incentive Dilemma

Theoretical accounts on institutional design in plural societies began to emerge at the end of the 1960s when Lijphart published his first account on Consociational democracy (1969). At the same time Lehmbruch, analyzing political systems in Austria and Switzerland, came up with the concepts of "proporzdemokratie" (1967) and concordant democracy (1969).

¹ Mc Garry and O'Leary find first applications of consociational principles in Dutch politics from 1917 till the 1960s, Lebanese political system between 1943 and 1975, and Malaysian politics in 1955-1969 (McGarry and O'Leary 1993: 35). However, Lijphart was the first to formulate the normative principles (1977) and set of institutions which have to bring to life the normative principles.

Lijphart identifies four principles on which institutions have to be built in plural societies: a grand coalition of the leaders of all the significant segments of the society, the mutual veto principle, the proportionality principle and the segmental autonomy principle (Lijphart 1977:25). The idea of a grand coalition is to include all the significant groups into decision deliberation and exclude possibility of a decision making highly undesirable for any segment of a society. The second principle is the mutual veto principle. The decisions are expected to be arrived at through consensus and each segment in principle should be able to veto a decision which is contrary to its interest. The proportionality principle assures that political representation, appointment of administrative bureaucracy, and allocation of public

goods is based on the proportionality principle. This principle assures that none of the segments is left underrepresented, none is marginalized, and all of them are engaged in decision making and distribution of public goods. The fourth principle of segmental autonomy means that segments are sovereign in decision making within the policy areas of their narrow segmental concern. (ibid.)

In his later works Lijphart developed a special institutional framework which in his opinion should be able to implement the four principles. The most important institution in the overall institutional design, as both Lijphart and Horowitz agree, is the choice of electoral system. Once we consider the aim to be the election of a broadly based parliament with all the significant segments of society represented, then the best choice is a Proportional Electoral System (hereinafter PR) (Lijphart 2004:100). The point of unacceptability of majoritarian system is supported by Diamond who claims that majoritarian electoral systems are ill-advised for plural societies as the ultimate imperative in the context of a plural society is to avoid broad and indefinite exclusion from power of any significant group. Among the different modifications of PR, as well as mixed systems the best choice for Lijphart is an open list PR with large district magnitude. This system shall provide greater proportionality, provide preferential election of Multi Party System (abbreviated MPS in solution formulas and tables) and thus greater accountability and responsibility of Multi Party System and contribute to formation of strong parties. (Lijphart 2004:100-101).

With regard to the system of government, Lijphart's preference is towards parliamentary system. Parliaments are by their essence collegial bodies where decisions are arrived at through consensus, and thus the power sharing capacity is greater in parliamentary systems. Governments are formed on the basis of parliamentary elections, as opposed to presidential

elections are not majoritarian in their nature. (ibid 101) To provide for greater inclusion of all segments into decision making Lijphart recommends collegial cabinets with either grand coalitions of parties or a collegial government with a constitutionally institutionalized inclusion of all the segments of society, as for example the collegial governments in Lebanon and Belgium. To assure the segmental autonomy of the groups in the plural society Lijphart considers it necessary to introduce a federal system of government and implement decentralized mechanisms of decision making and policy implementation. Decentralization is especially crucial for regionally non concentrated segments in the plural society to administer issues of their immediate concern.

Lijphart also prioritizes a number of other institutions which are important from the theoretical point of view, but will be left out from this research due to the absence of systematic data measuring these variables. Thus to prevent government instability, which could be expected in collegial governments and with big number of effective parties it is reasonable, in Lijphart's opinion, to introduce the institute of the constructive vote of non-confidence. To assure the proportionality of the distribution of public offices Lijphart finds necessary to introduce group quotas on the nomination on public offices. (Lijphart 2004: 103-106)

The opposite of Lijphart's worldview on institutional design in plural societies has been suggested by Donald Horowitz and his "incentive" approach (Horowitz 1985, 1991, 1999, 2008). Horowitz generally shares the necessity of power sharing; however, he disagrees with the institutional design, the purpose, nature and methods of power sharing. While consociationalism is inclined towards institutionalizing the segments of the society, deepening the differences and providing the group leadership with the mission to represent group

interests, the “incentive” approach creates incentives for the ethnic parties to go beyond their narrow segmental interest and cooperate with moderate elites of the other groups. It is aimed at majorities that are cross-ethnic and at governments formed by moderate interethnic coalitions (Horowitz 2008:1217).

The basic mechanism which is suggested by Horowitz is to appeal to voters other than one’s own and to form interethnic coalitions in a conflict-prone society; ethnically based parties must demonstrate that they are moderate and willing to compromise on ethnic issues. To reach the designed aim Horowitz suggests a number of institutional solutions of which the choice of electoral system is of paramount importance. The electoral systems which provide such an outcome vary. The one most preferred by Horowitz is the Alternative Vote Electoral System (hereinafter AV) when voters rank the candidates in preferential order. The winner is usually the candidate who has got the majority of the second and third preferences. (Reynolds and Reilly 2005:47) Thus the moderate parties which have more moderate platforms can attract second preferences from the ethnic groups and win. Horowitz considers that plurality electoral systems combined with ethnic “gerrymandering” can also induce candidates to become more pan-ethnic in their orientations.

The incentive approach, as well as the consociational one, favors Federalism as an institution favoring interethnic reconciliation. The idea behind implementation of federalism is that it will “blunt the effect of stark opposition among solidary ethnic groups at the center by allowing sub ethnic differences within homogeneous units of a federation. Within the context of heterogeneous federal units federalism will foster intergroup cooperation as a form of socialization of moderate ethnic parties into the political system.” (Horowitz 1991:216-217, 2008:1218) Thinking about Horowitz’s cross-ethnic accommodative logic Reilly (2006:89)

concludes that the preference should be given to unitary state or a non-ethnic federation, as these institutions will be more supportive of centripetalism and cross ethnic accommodation.

The boldest point by Horowitz, which also seems the most controversial, is the choice of the presidential model, over parliamentary one. A separately elected president can in Horowitz's opinion perform two important functions: it will make power sharing more probable by preventing any one ethnic group from "capturing" the executive branch and a president elected through vote-pooling method will be another important area of intergroup conciliation. (Horowitz 1991) Thus a group excluded from power in parliament will find ways to represent their interest by gaining access to the presidency. At the same time the group which wins the presidency might not have the majority in the parliament. An important consideration in here is that the president can perform conciliatory functions only if presidentialism is combined with the vote pooling electoral systems and no other system like First Past the Post (hereinafter FPTP). Criticizing this point by Horowitz, Lijphart claims that presidentialism with the election of a single person on the highest executive position is incompatible with interethnic power sharing as the election of a president is exclusively a majoritarian enterprise and thus ruins the whole power sharing mechanism. (Lijphart 1990:75)

While not suggesting any alternative, Horowitz is rather skeptical about the durability of coalition governments in plural societies as the rank and file members of ethnic groups might not be happy with the grand coalition and in this case the grand coalition will become a minority coalition of the moderate middle confronted on both sides by radical members of the segments. (Horowitz 1991: 1220). Another important institutional difference between the two models refers to the party system. While Lijphart's grand coalition and inclusion of all the significant segments into political life implies existence of a Multi Party System (abbreviated

MPS in tables and solution formulas) with every group being represented by at least one party. Horowitz's incentive approach implies existence of one or two broadly based parties which can appeal beyond group borders and get the votes in the center. (Diamond cited in Reilly 2006:86).

The approaches discussed in this part have formed the core of the debate on institutional design in plural societies. They come up with their own theory, logic and appropriate institutional design of the core political institutions, presenting an elaborate picture of how ethnic unrest can be regulated. However, three main criticisms should be made. The debate between Lijphart and Horowitz is concentrated on the discussion of the forms of government and electoral system. Considerably less developed is the discussion of variations of the use of other institutions such as federalism, decentralization, group autonomy and quota systems. The discussion of the influence of party systems is also omitted from the wider debate and is thus underdeveloped.

The second criticism refers to the polarity of consociationalism and centripetalism. Though the two models both share the ends of the institutional engineering i.e. a power sharing arrangement, the opposite the logic of the power sharing arrangements as well as the opposite institutional elements of power sharing regimes make the two approaches contradictory to each other and thus theoretically do not allow for convergence and combination of the two models. While following the debate, it sometimes seems that such polarization of approaches and sharpening of the differences is purposeful and is driven by the necessity to justify the originality of the two models. The final criticism is that the two models do not to control for societal conditions which might determine the application of their models

in a specific societal set up with varying intensity of conflict, political and economic development criteria.

2.2 Beyond Consociational-Incentive dilemma

Besides the above described approaches of consociationalism and incentive approach, there exist also other accounts which deal with democratization, institution building and interethnic reconciliation in plural societies. Though these accounts do not provide detailed institutional guidelines as consociationalists and centrepetalists do, it is necessary to introduce them to show the presence of alternative approaches in the field.

The first alternative approach belongs to Ted Gurr (1995) claims that segmental groups have four types of orientations towards the state that claims sovereignty over them: exit, access, autonomy and control (ibid: 292). The exit orientation is materialized through secession demands and implemented through respective constitutional procedures that provide the ethnic groups this opportunity (ibid: 294-298). Thus, a flexible mechanism of bloodless secession of a segment of society is an important institution which can be a solution to interethnic tensions and hostility. Access refers to the opportunities of the minorities to pursue their political economic and cultural interest. Autonomy means presence of a power base of the minority which is usually regionally concentrated. Finally the control refers to the orientation of the segmental group to establish group's hegemony over other groups. The only way to accommodate this dangerous orientation of the segmental group is a combination of power sharing and autonomy (ibid).

Gurr further develops his concept of autonomy considering five types: confederalism, federalism, regional autonomy, regional administrative decentralization and community

autonomy (ibid:298). He also identifies six areas where autonomy policies should be implemented:

- The so called cultural autonomy i.e. practice of language, religion, customs, protection of traditional values and lifestyle
- Group control of its land, water and mineral resources
- Fiscal funds from the central government towards social needs
- Control of internal security and administration of justice
- Opportunity to participate in the central government's decision making, to modify and veto policies of group concern
- Protection of the members of the group who live outside the regional boundaries.(ibid:299)

The second alternative approach comes from Ian Flynn (2006) who considers the concept of deliberative democracy to be the most appropriate one for divided societies. The concept of deliberative democracy assumes that all the decisions should be arrived at through public reasoning and discussion among equal citizens. This concept presupposes first of all some degree of trust and mutual understanding among citizens which is not the case with the divided societies. From my perspective the shortcoming of the concept is that it has remained on a purely normative, philosophical level and did not develop into a coherent model. Secondly for this concept the actor of the political life is the citizen and not the group. This last feature is not really appropriate for divided societies for there the cleavage runs along groups, their perceptions, interest and policies and not along atomized citizens.

Finally, the third alternative approach which has evolved in the theoretical works by Kymlicka (1995, 1998, 2006) and at a more practical level with some reference to specific

institutional design in Kymlicka (1993) McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon (2004) and Reilly (2004). These authors present identical models of institutional design but label it differently. Reilly labels this approach “communalism” while McGarry, O’Leary and Simeone and Kymlicka label it “multiculturalism”. Not to confuse the reader and to take into consideration the different labeling by the authors I will refer to this model as “communalism-multiculturalism.” McGarry, O’Leary and Simeone define multiculturalism as accommodation, maintenance and protection of multiple communities in public and private realms. This approach recognizes group identities as the building blocks of the political system and makes sure that all the representation ratios are constitutionally determined to make the representation more explicit (Reilly 2004: 92). McGarry O’Leary and Simeone (2004) define multiculturalism in two respects: respect for the groups self-governance in issues of narrow group concern, as well as guarantee of the principle of proportional representation in all fields of public life: military, judiciary, academia etc. (2008: 57) They see the implementation of multicultural principles also through consociational methods of proportional representation, power sharing in the executive, mutual veto as well as through pluralist federations or unions which give territorial and administrative autonomy to different segments (like in cases of the UK or Spain).

Justifying the use of group quotas, Kymlicka claims that there is no guarantee whatsoever that even with the most proportional electoral system the underprivileged segments of society will be proportionally represented and quota system is the institution which guarantees such representation. Defending the group-centered rather than individualistic approach to representation Kymlicka (1993:65) cites the ruling of the Royal Constitutional Commission of Canada on this issue which says:

”neither the franchise nor representation is merely an individualistic phenomenon; both also take expression through collective or community functions. The individualistic perspective is based upon a partial and incomplete understanding of the electoral process and representation. In advancing the ideal of equally weighted votes, it does promote a critical constitutional right. But in ignoring the community dimension, this perspective is unrealistic at best; at worst it ignores the legitimate claims of minority groups.”

A good account of the use of quota systems is provided by Lijphart (1996) with the case of India which implements quota system for underprivileged and geographically dispersed segments have been implemented. To better illustrate the main features of the models of institutional design presented in this chapter I have the key theoretical characteristics and institutional mechanisms in Table 1 and Table 2:

Table 1. Theoretical underpinnings and institutional elements of the building consociationalism-incentive approach dichotomy

	Theoretical underpinnings	Institutional elements
Consociationalism	Emphasizing cleavages and institutionalizing segments of the society, Deepening the differences and providing the group leadership with the mission to represent group interests. Is based on 4 principles: grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, segmental autonomy	• Electoral system: PR (open list) electoral system • Parliamentarism • Collegial governments • Federalism • Decentralization • Multiple parties • Constructive vote of non-confidence • Quota systems allocating public offices
Incentive approach	Dulling the cleavages, accommodating groups and creating incentives for intergroup cooperation. Appealing to the median non-extremist members of cleavage groups	• Electoral system: AV (FPTP + ethnic gerrymandering) • Presidentialism • Federalism(Horowitz), Unitarism (Diamond) • Minimum size coalition governments • Few (1-2) effective parties

Table 2. Alternative Approaches to Institutional design in divided societies

3.1 Gurr (1993)	• Combination of power sharing and group autonomy • Broadening the concept of autonomy • Peaceful Session
3.1 O'Flynn	Deliberative democracy: all the decisions should be arrived at through public reasoning and discussion among equal citizens. No institutional specifications.
3.1 Kymlicka (1995, 1998, 2006); McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon (2004); Reilly (2004)	• Group identities as the building blocks of the political system. • Respect for the group's self-governance in issues of narrow group concern as well as guarantee of the principle of proportional representation in all fields of public life Main tools: quota systems guarantying proportional representation to every group, power sharing in the executive, pluralist federations, mutual veto.

As already mentioned these alternative approaches are not as elaborate as consociationalism and centripetalism. However, they are important for two reasons. First, they break the monopoly of the two frameworks within which the debate on institutional design has been developing. Though not presenting complex institutional menus, they concentrate and develop the discussion of previously underdeveloped and totally unattended institutions. Gurr elaborates on group autonomy and secession while Kymlicka scrutinizes the use of quota systems. Finally, though combining separate elements of consociationalism they allow for a partial implementation of institutional tools. In these regard the models of institutional design discussed in this part are less dogmatic and are more flexible. This feature is crucial as is a first step towards the development of the configurational approach to institutional design which claims that in the empirical reality designers of institutions tend pool institutional tools from different models of institutional design to better adjust to the purposes of the institutional design as well as societal factors.

Not to confuse the reader with the plurality of theoretical models it is necessary to emphasize that the empirical analysis of the configurations of institutions is based on the models and institutional elements discussed by Lijphart and Horowitz. The remaining three models are not included in the analysis due to problems with operationalization and data extraction for group autonomy, quota systems and other institutional elements discussed. These theoretical models can be included in the analysis at further stages when the problem with relevant data will be solved. In addition, it is necessary to note here that other models of institutional design which are not considered appropriate by divided societies literature such as Westminster model and its modifications, classic presidential system discussed in Latin American democratization literature are included in the analysis to see whether these models of institutional design are empirically irrelevant for plural societies i.e. have rare empirical occurrence.

3. Institutional Design: Beyond Ideal Theories

3.1 Complex Approach to Institutional Design: Configurations of Institutions and their Coherence

In the previous chapter I presented the two major theoretical approaches as well as three alternative approaches to some degree incomplete approaches to conflict settlement in plural societies. Despite acknowledging the merits of all these approaches, I see a huge problem with the empirical validity of these models. Though the models are practical in the sense that they offer detailed description of qualities and effects of different institutions, they are abstract in the sense that they miss the fact that the ideal models can rarely be applied in their pure form. The designers of institutions are likely to divert from the majoritarian/consensual/consociational/incentivist approaches and adopt hybrid forms of institutional design which are likely to combine institutions from different theoretical approaches. The myopia and obsession of the institutional design literature with discussing the ideal models leaves the study of empirical configurations of institutions unattended. Researchers rather prioritize some institutions mostly electoral systems, form of the government and Federalism undermining the importance of other institutions and what is most important look at these institutions in isolation rather than in the complexity of institutional design.

There has been wide consensus among scholars (Horowitz 2004; Lijphart 2004) that there is no “one size fits all system and recommendation,” (Lijphart 2004: 99) that in empirical reality constitutional designers divert from one single theory of institutional design and prefer hybrid solutions taken from the above mentioned theories, majoritarian systems as well as implementing elements of direct democracy; in other words combining different

devices which in the opinion of the designers of institutions best meet the requirements of the specific institutional design. Lijphart (2004:99) explicitly claims that power sharing systems before 1960s as well as later show great variance in the choice of institutions. Lijphart also realizes that not all of these combinations have been successful as “the relative success of a power-sharing system is contingent upon the specific mechanisms devised to yield the broad representation that constitutes its core.” (ibid: 99)

Horowitz makes this point even more explicit, saying that adoptions of certain models are at best to be partial. Reasons for such volatility are several. First, the very nature of constitution making process is uncongenial to deriving institutions from one single model of institutional design. (Horowitz 2004:26) The reason for such volatility is also the preferences of the minority and majority differ. Another conflating factor is the multiplicity of actors representing segments of the society as well as international mediators and other actors of constitutional design. The multiplicity of participants implies also multiplicity of objectives all of which, or at least a significant percent, have to be accommodated.

The process of institutional choice appears even more complicated if we follow some studies in institutional choices (e.g. Benoit 2004; Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2006) where participants of institutional design follow a number of orientations: such as rationality,² values and ideology. There are also a range of other conditions which determine choice over institutional design character and number of cleavages, socio-demographic factors, and geographical distribution of the cleavage groups, colonial legacy, economic development and years of democratic governance. The conclusion from the above mentioned discussion is that institutional design is a multi-preferential, multi-actor and multi-objective process which

² engage in bargaining over institutional design aiming at maximizing their utility be that an office, a policy or anything else

depends on a number of social, political, economic and historical factors. Adoption of a list of institutions from one model is rather unlikely.

As I have previously mentioned, besides some remarks of theoreticians of institutional design on improbability of adoption of one single model of institutional design the theoretical and empirical literature in the field of coherence and configurations of institutions is not rich. There is substantive literature on the combinations of two or three institutions. While studying the experience of presidential systems in 31 countries, Mainwaring concludes that institutional combinations make a difference. His main conclusion is that the combination of presidential form of government and multiparty system is rare among the world's 31 stable democracies with only Chile in 1933-1973 having this institutional configuration. Such a configuration is highly problematic as will likely produce immobilizing executive/legislative deadlock, and such a deadlock can destabilize democracy, is likely to produce ideological polarization, will complicate the interparty coalition building interparty coalition building (Mainwaring 1993). Discussing the merits and shortcomings of presidentialism and parliamentarism, Horowitz (1990: 75) says that we can not condemn an institution without examining the total configuration of institutions proposed for a given country. The strength of presidentialism depends in his opinion on the character of the party system. The latter in its turn depends on the territorial division (federalism) which underpins the way president is elected.

Another study in the field by Feng-yu Lee measures the effect of configuration of electoral systems and government forms on the frequency of ethnic protest and rebellion controlling for the context of the conflict such as the groups size, geographical distribution and character of the cleavage. (Lee 2007) This research specifically concentrates on six

configurations of the three government forms: (presidential, semi presidential and parliamentary) and two electoral systems: (PR and single member majoritarian). Lee's analysis shows that for spatially concentrated minorities facing one rival group Presidential PR should be more desirable than all the others. For concentrated ethnic groups facing a number of rival groups Parliamentary-PR and Presidential-SMD constitute the most preferable combinations. (Lee 2007:222-225). Lee considers that parliamentary-PR combination has the highest power sharing capacity. The Presidential-SMD combination is the second in the ranking of power sharing capacity. Combination of Semi presidentialism and PR is also ranked second. Semi presidential- PR and Presidential-PR combinations have the third strongest power sharing capacity. The worst possible combination is the combination of SMD with parliamentary form of government. (Lee 2007:54-58)

Schneider (2008) regards the specific configuration of institutional design and contextual variables as explanatory variables for the level of consolidation of democracy. Having at the core of his study the power dispersing and power concentrating effects of configurations of institutional and contextual factors on his dependent variable, Schneider studies three institutional variables: form of the government, party system and decentralization. (ibid: 47-51). The importance of Schneider's contribution for this thesis is also that he uses QCA as a research method with the consolidation of democracy taken as an outcome and contextual and institutional variables considered as conditions. The above mentioned studies show that institutions change their qualities and produce different effects depending on the other institutions with which they are combined. Thus there is a need of complex study of how institutions combine and how the different combinations influence their qualities and what are the expected outcomes of these different combinations.

A review of the relevant, but scarce literature shows that the recent studies have dealt with a restrictive set of institutions. The scholarship dealt with configurations of institutions not as a self intended purpose, but rather as means for proving their original hypothesis usually being the effectiveness of the configurations of institutions for solving ethnic conflict or producing consolidation of democracy. Besides, research on configurations of institutions has also been restricted and focused on configurations of electoral systems and government form as well as party system, and decentralization in case of Schneider (2008). In contrast to the existing literature this research intends to investigate the configurations of the whole range of political institutions crucial for democratization in plural societies.

The approach undertaken here regards institutional design as a process of creating a complex of coherent institutions which mutually reinforce each other. The assumption here is that constitutional designers divert from one single theory of democratic institutional design in plural societies regarding the theoretical models as pools of institutions which are selected to better adjust to the context specific requirements of institutional design. The purpose of this thesis is to find the patterns of configuration of five types of institutions which have been identified as crucial in the literature on institutional design in divided societies. The research question guiding the research process is:

R: What are the patterns of configuration of political institutions in plural societies?

To arrive at the patterns of configuration of institutions there is a need to define why I would expect some institutions to combine with others while not combining with the rest; in other words there is a need to explore the relationships between variables and their coherence. It is necessary in this regard to state that institutions are in a certain functional relationship. The functional criterion means that some institutions work only in combination with other specific institutions and can not operate if are combined with others. As Horowitz (1991:217)

states, institutions in plural societies are mutually connected and reinforcing i.e. one institution can work only if combined with another one and will fail if combined with some other institutions. Horowitz himself brings the example of a vote pooling electoral system which can work only if combined with specific territorial division of the country. It is important to remind the reader that Lijphart (2004:101) also claims that presidential system is incompatible with power sharing institutions as the election of the president is majoritarian in its essence.

There is also a certain causal criterion in the configuration of institutions: some institutions are associated or contribute to the emergence of other institutions. There is vast literature discussing the causal relationship among institutions when one institution creates or is supportive of the emergence of another institution. This mainly refers to the relationships among electoral system, party system, and coalition type. The third criterion of combination of institutions is a historical legacy, certain path dependence of institutional design. As Reilly and Reynolds note in their study of electoral systems in plural societies, colonial legacy has been an important source of electoral system design. According to their study, out of the 53 of former British colonies 37 (70 %) use FPTP electoral system, 11 of 27 francophone countries use two round systems, and 15 out of 17 Spanish speaking countries use PR as in Spain itself (Reilly and Reynolds 1999 23-24).

Thus in this thesis I assume three main lines, criteria of configuration of institutions:

- institutions in plural societies are mutually connected and reinforcing i.e. one institution can work only if combined with another one and will fail if combined with some other institutions- functional criterion

- some institutions create or are supportive of emergence of a specific type of another institution- causal criterion
- some institutions have historically clustered with other institutions, though this might be contrary to functional or causal logic- historical-cultural criterion

The associational relationships between different institutions have been discussed in the literature widely. The largest share of such studies examined the interrelationship between electoral system and party system and party system and government (coalition) size. The associational relationship between electoral system and party system was first elaborated by Duverger who came up with a law and a hypothesis explaining these relationships. The law claims that plurality single member electoral system brings party system dualism. Duverger's hypothesis says that the proportional electoral systems lead to multi party politics (Groffman and Reynolds 2001:130; Taagepera 2007:103). These statements have been refuted on a number of empirical studies as well as criticized for their strong deterministic character. Despite this major criticism the scholarship did not go further than trying to refine these interrelationships in a less categorical and rather probabilistic than deterministic manner. The most important empirical contradiction has been brought while electoral outcomes in countries where minorities are geographically concentrated plurality electoral system produced three party systems.

A further refinement of the interrelationship came from Sartori (1994) who considered that the causal arrow does not only run from the electoral system to the party system but the reverse direction as well. His argument is that the FPTP has a reductive effect on the vote choice and consequently is supportive of the two party outcomes. However, the Two Party Systems (abbreviated TwoPS in solution formulas and tables) itself, once consolidated, is

supportive of the plurality system (Sartori 1994:37- 40). Taagepera, first through the empirical analysis of the 46 electoral systems in 28 countries (2002) then through experimental research (2007), finds the regularities of the formation of party systems under different electoral systems. According to his research FPTP produces 3.57, AV produces 3.54 while the different degree proportional systems produce from 4.29 (Single transferable vote) to 10 (Single non-transferable vote) effective parties.

The relationship between the type of party system and coalition size and the joint effect of the electoral system and party system on coalition size has been less researched. The government (coalition) types have been studied from rational choice and game theoretic perspective as a result of interactions of parties. Lijphart (1999) in his analysis of 36 democracies, finds a strong relationship between the type of the party system and the type of coalition, particularly that as the effective number of parties increases the incidence of one party minimal winning coalitions decreases and every increase in the number of parties by one party is associated with a 23.5 % decrease in one party majority cabinets. (Lijphart 1999: 112-123)

In addition to some insights from the literature on association among different variables it is necessary to see in what relationship are my institutional variables, particularly as they are based on the cases with a very specific societal set up which might influence the nature of relationship. To see the character of relationship between my variables I have counted the odds ratio of my binary variables. I expect to find positive relationships among centripetal institutions such as FPTP, One Party Systems (abbreviated OnePS in solution formulas and tables) and Two Party System, Unitarism and restrictive governments (see Table A1) Another generally expected stream of positive relationships is between high degree power

sharing institutions such as PR Multi Party System, Federalism and coalition governments. Following the prescriptions of Horowitz's incentive approach I expect high relationship among AV, Two Party System, Federalism and restrictive governments.

Calculation of the odds ratios (see Table A2 in the Appendix) revealed a positive relationship between FPTP and One Party System (1.25) and Single Party Majority Government (abbreviated SinG in solution formulas and tables) (1.64), negative relationship between FPTP and Multi Party System (0.64), Minority Winning Coalition Government (abbreviated MinWG in solution formulas and tables) (0.73) and Surplus Government (abbreviated SrplG in solution formulas and tables) (0.83). Strangely enough, I did not find a strong positive relationship between FPTP and Two Party System with the odds ratio barely exceeding the positive threshold. A closer exploratory study of the empirical configurations of the Two Party System variable revealed that it has been combined with the FPTP in 13 cases only (around 10% of the total cases)³. Even more interestingly, FPTP has been combined with Multi Party System in 14 cases.⁴ This means that the extension of the duvergerian law claiming that FPTP is likely to result in a Multi Party System in countries where there exist regionally concentrated minorities. However, a closer look at the cases of combination of FPTP-Two Party System and FPTP- Multi Party System shows that these are the same countries with different regimes occurring in different years (only Papua New Guinea has solely had a FPTP- Multi Party System combination). Additional research is thus necessary to find what other intervening conditions influenced the formation of party systems in these countries.

³ The cases are: canada 1963,canada 1968,canada 1979,fiji 1977,india 1978,india 1979,malaysia 1990,new zealand 1960,new zealand 1995,south africa 1960,sri lanka1972,united kingdom 1960,united kingdom 1974

⁴ canada 1962,canada 1972,canada 1997,canada 2004,fiji 1992,india 1977,india 1989,india 1990,india 1998,malaysia 1972,new zealand 1987,papua new guinea 1997,papua new guinea 1982,papua new guinea 1985

Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) emphasize the importance which ethnic heterogeneity has on the way electoral systems influence party system formation. Studying the party systems in Africa's emerging democracies which are mostly severely divided societies Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich (2003) find that in plural societies the mechanical rules of emergence of party systems are strongly influenced by socio-demographic variables such the ethnic fragmentation and geographical location of cleavage groups. As a matter of fact they find that party systems are a result of interactive effect of these three variables. Particularly they find that higher ethnic fragmentation and lower geographical concentration result in fewer effective parties (ibid: 388)

Going back to the bi-variate relationships between my variables I found that AV despite the Horowitz's prescriptions has quite high positive relationship with Multi Party System (1.8). Also, contrary to incentive approach's institutional prescription AV has a negative relationship with Federalism which together with AV is supposed to assure vote pooling across group lines and a very high positive relationship with Unitarism (3). PR has negative relationship with One Party System and has a close to positive odds ratio of 0.92 with Two Party System and a modestly positive relationship with Multi Party System (1). PR has negative relationships with restrictive Single Party Majority and Minority Governments (abbreviated MinG in solution formulas and tables) Government and low positive relationship with Surplus Coalition Government (1). One Party System and Single Party Majority Government have odds ratio of 5 indicating a very high positive relationship. Two Party System has low positive relationship with Minority Government (1.19) and Single Party Majority Government (1.08). Finally, Multi Party System has positive relationships with Minority Winning Coalition Government (1.23) and Surplus Government (1.19).

The relationships between form of the government and territorial division have not been studied that widely. A significant attention has been paid by the scholars of Latin American democratization (Mainwaring 1993; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997; Mainwaring 1997) to the interrelationship between electoral systems, multipartism and federalism on the way presidential systems work. Particularly, Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) claim the number of parties and their discipline which are determined by the specificities of territorial organization and electoral system affect the work of presidential regimes. PR list electoral systems and “robust” federalism contribute to the formation of fragmented party systems with undisciplined party behavior. The latter in their turn deprive the president of a stable support in the parliament and thus the president is solely relying on a minority government. This configuration of institutions is undesirable as it makes the political system highly unstable. (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997:394-398) However, no regularities of combination of these institutions have been identified by the authors.

The correlation of territorial division variables with the rest of the variables shows the following outcomes. Federalism has high positive relationship with FPTP (1.9) and negative with PR (0.72). Federalism has low correlation with One Party System (1.69) and negative relationships with Two Party System and Multi Party System. Federalism has a positive relationship with restrictive governments and negative relationship with coalition governments. Unitarism has negative relationship with FPTP (0.85) and PR (0.91). It has negative relationship with restrictive party systems and positive relationship with Multiparty System (1.11). Unitarism appears in positive relationship with all types of coalitions except the Minority Government. It has an odds ratio of 1 with Minority Winning Coalition Government and Single Party Majority Government and a little bit higher relationship with Surplus Coalition Government (1.25)

Finally, Imperfect Federalism (abbreviated IFed) has a negative relationship with FPTP and AV and positive relationship with PR (1.73). Imperfect Federalism has a negative relationship with One Party System but positive relationships with Two Party System (1.11) and Multi Party System (1). IFed has positive relationship with all the coalition types except for Single Party Majority Government. Imperfect Federalism has odds ratio of 1.17 with Minority Government of 1 with Minority Winning Coalition and surplus Coalition Government. .

These bi-variate relationships shed a bit of doubt on the strong association between electoral systems and party system with supposedly similar logic. The only strong expected relationship is between FPTP and One Party System. Relationship between FPTP and Two Party System on the one hand and PR and Multi Party System though above the positive threshold are quite modest. At the same time PR and Two Party System have odds ratio very close to reaching the positive threshold. Another striking finding could be considered the high relationship of the AV with Multi Party System and Unitarism. This comes to suggest the generally accepted relationships between electoral systems and party systems are flawed under such specific societal set up. In addition, I found positive relationships among institutions such as FPTP, One Party System and Single Party Majority Government which restrict participation of the potential cleavage groups in the formation of the legislature and the government. On the other hand there is a visible association among power sharing institutions such as PR and Multi Party System and Minimal Winning coalition and Multi Party System and Minimal Winning Coalition which provide extensive opportunities for the cleavage groups to be elected to the parliament and participate in the formation of the government. However, two variables, namely Two Party System and Surplus Coalition

Governments did not show noteworthy relationships with other variables. The relationships of the territorial division variables are also surprising. Despite the general opinion federalism is not associated with power dispersing institutions such as PR Multi Party System and coalition governments, but the other way round, with power restrictive institutions. Unitarism has weaker association with centralized institutions such as FPTP one or Two Party System and restrictive governments. Imperfect Federalism, on the other hand appears to be associated with power dispersive institutions more than Federalism and Unitarism.

Some glimpse on the compatibility of the executive form variables come from Lijphart and Horowitz. Lijphart claims that presidentialism as a majoritarian institution is incompatible with the logic of power sharing power sharing institutions like PR, multiparty system, Minimal Winning or Surplus Government (2004:101). However, as Lane and Ersson (2000:216) argue this is not entirely true as presidential power limited by additional set of institutions such as the simplified procedure of impeachment and extended veto rights by the parliament can be a power sharing institution as well. I have not tested the relationships of executive type variables with the other ones as Presidentialism and Semi-presidentialism have been implemented rather rarely and thus I do not expect to receive noteworthy relationship.

Following the literature on association of institutions, the causal-functional and historical criteria of association and my own exploratory research of association between the different variables I construct the model of probable configurations of institutions. First I am testing the underlying assumption of the whole approach of this thesis which says that pure theoretical models are rarely implemented. I constructed the model of a configuration of a pure lijphartian model which combines institutions supposed to have highest power sharing capacity

M1 Parliamentary + PR + Federal + MPS + Surplus Coalition Government

Secondly, I constructed a model a pure horowitzian model which combines institutions supposed to have a centripetal power distribution.

M2 Presidential + AV + Federal + 2 Party System + Single Party Majority Government

The configuration of Presidentialism with FPTP and Federalism has been widely discussed in the literature on Latin America as an example of functional relationship as the most efficient configuration of institutions which have presidential form of government. Particularly, I want to see whether this logic of a strong centralized executive power has ever been employed in divided societies. Thus I suggest the following configuration.:

M3 Presidential + FPTP + Federal + Two Party System + Single Party Majority Government.

Many of the countries which are included in the analysis (and even more third world countries which have not been included) are former British colonies. Following the historical-cultural criterion I expect these countries to have borrowed the dominant Westminster model, though such a configuration does not fit any of the models of institutional design in plural societies and does not promise to have high capacity for solving ethnic tensions and conflicts. Thus, I suggest testing a Westminster-type configuration of institutions.⁵

M4 Parliamentary + FPTP + Unitary + Two Party System + Single Party Majority Government

⁵ Similarly in the presence of former French colonies I should have hypothesized a configuration of institutions characteristic of French tradition combining Semi presidentialism, two ballot system, Unitarism, multiparty system and minimal winning or single party majority government.

Following Duverger law, causal-functional criterion and the exploratory study of the association between electoral system, party system and coalition size variables I expect deviation of the Westminster type configuration when FPTP is combined with a federal territorial division producing a Multi Party System which in its turn should result in Minimal Winning coalitions. A necessary condition for such a configuration is territorial concentration of a cleavage group which due to the specific combination of the FPTP and federalism can elect a third and more parties. Thus I suggest testing the following configuration of institutions:

M5 Parliamentary + FPTP + Federal + MPS + Minimal Winning Coalition Government

Another possible configuration which to be highlighted should reflect a non-democratic institutional design. My data set has been measuring institutional design since 1960 when many countries in the world have been democratic. Besides, some of the countries in the analysis have newly emerged and it took time for them to implement democratic institutional configurations supportive of accommodation of cleavage groups. I expect that many of the countries which are analyzed here did not aim to create an institutional design supportive of power sharing but on the other hand might have designed in a way to exclude any of the groups through extreme centralization of the power and restriction of interest delegation. Thus I suggest testing the following configuration of institutions:

M 6 Presidential+FPTP+Unitary+1PS+Single Party Majority Government

Along with testing the ideal models I will run an exploratory analysis of the configurations to identify those configurations which have been overlooked by the ideal models. I expect the whole analysis to have a rich exploratory capacity.

3.2 Research Design: Method, Data and Analysis

On comparing the main strategies to power sharing in democratic societies Belmont, Mainwaring and Reynolds (2002) define three main institutions which are crucial for the democratic conflict management in divided societies: form of government: presidential vs. parliamentary; territorial division: federative vs. unitary, symmetrical/asymmetrical federative systems and the specific electoral system. Lijphart in his classic work on consociationalism (1977) finds the grand coalition (i.e. the composition of the government) as the most crucial institution. The other institutions which are crucial are choice over government form, electoral system, territorial division of the state, decentralization, distribution of the executive positions among cleavage groups and group autonomy (Lijphart 2004:99-106). While Lijphart and Horowitz do not explicitly indicate any direct concern with the size of the party system, Diamond considers a Two Party System a necessary condition of the incentive approach. The importance of the party system is logical as the above discussed scholarship clearly indicates a high association between the type of the electoral system and party system size on the one hand and the size of the party system and the government coalition size on the other hand.

In this research I have studied five dimensions which are prioritized in the theoretical literature on democratization in divided societies by Lijphart (1977, 2004), Horowitz (1991, 2008), Reilly (2001a, 2001b) and Belmont, Mainwaring and Reynolds (2002). The dimensions are the following:

1. Form of the government: whether presidential, parliamentary or hybrid regime. This is one of the traditional lines of democracy typologies. With regard to divided societies this dimension has been widely debated between Lijphart and Horowitz. Lijphart considers that the most appropriate system is the parliamentary one which will prevent concentration of power in one actor's hands (Lijphart 2004) Horowitz on the contrary considers that the best system is presidential where the strong president will be an independent arbitrator and settle the conflicts and build compromise among the groups. (Horowitz 1991, 1999, 2008)
2. The electoral system. Lijphart suggest PR electoral systems and particularly the open list systems. Horowitz considers that the most appropriate in this regard is the majoritarian AV which will create incentives for the more powerful groups to go to compromise and extend their platform. Other solutions can be reservation of seats for the minority groups, introduction of quotas as well as mixed electoral systems (Reilly and Reynolds 1999)
3. The territorial organization: Both Lijphart and Horowitz welcomed implementation of Federalism. The multicultural/communal approaches as well as Ted Gurr also prefer certain federalist solutions which will allow for group autonomy. This variable will be operationalized as a categorical variable with three categories: federal, unitary, de facto (or semi) federal.
4. Composition of the government. Referring to coalition building theories Lijphart (1977) distinguishes threefold classification (1) minimal winning cabinets, which are "winning" in the sense that they control a majority of parliamentary seats but "minimal" in the sense that the cabinet does not include any party that is not necessary to reach a majority in parliament, (2) oversized cabinets, which contain more parties than are necessary for majority support in the legislature, and (3) minority or "undersized" cabinets, which are not supported by a parliamentary majority.
5. Party system. It was Gabriel Almond who first came up with discussion on the place of party systems in differentiating between types of institutional regimes. Later on it has been

Larry Diamond's contribution who claimed that consociational power sharing with every segment of the society being represented in the legislature necessitates a multi or fragmented party system. At the same time the accommodative effect of the centripetal model would go best with one or two broad based parties which would accommodate different ethnic groups' interests.

The use of a specific research method stems from configurational approach to institutional design undertaken in this thesis. To better catch the complexity of institutional design and indicate the pattern of institutional coherence QCA is used. In comparison to inferential statistical methods QCA as a research method is particularly meant for researches which assume "multiple conjunctural causation" when a phenomenon is caused not by one or two variables operating independently but by combinations of independent variables-conditions which operate in some of the cases but do not matter in others. (Hall 2003:389) This method is useful for revealing how many independent variables provide the particular outcome and which of the independent variables are necessary and sufficient. (ibid) QCA deals with complex causality of the variables: outcomes and their conditions

Ragin (1987:27) justifies the creation of a special method for investigating complex causality by the nature of social phenomena which rarely have only one single cause. Besides, these causes rarely function in isolation; a specific cause may have a different effect in another context. Every large scale social phenomenon is a combination of conditions that produce that phenomenon. The complex causality in fact is concerned with intersection of conditions. A phenomenon or a social change emerges from the intersection of appropriate preconditions the right ingredients for change and when any of the significant conditions is absent the phenomenon is also absent. Thus complex causality is conjunctural. At the same

time several combinations of conditions that might produce the same outcome i.e. social phenomena are equifinal. Thus, according to Ragin (1987: 24-26) the purpose of social scientists is to unravel the empirically relevant causal combinations. In other words it is necessary to examine how different conditions fit together and in how many different combinations to produce a particular outcome.

The configurational approach to institutional design undertaken here does not assume a complex causality which QCA actually deals with. Nevertheless, the use of the QCA is appropriate as far as it shows how several variables combine to produce an outcome. Following Berg-Schlosser et al (2008: 15-17) suggestions on the possible ways of application of the QCA I will use this method used in two ways. First I will test the empirical relevance of the ideal models. Secondly, through a descriptive use of QCA I will identify patterns of institutional configurations overlooked by ideal models.

The main tool of the QCA which will be used in this research is the Crisp Truth Table. Crisp Truth table lists the logically possible combinations of binary variables-conditions along with the outcome which are the result of the combination of conditions. The truth table considers all logically possible combinations of conditions considering their presence as well as absence. The goal of truth tables is to identify the empirically and logically relevant combinations of causal conditions and outcomes (Ragin 2008:23-25).

I find it necessary to briefly introduce some QCA terminology which will later be used in the research. QCA has two measures of fit: consistency and coverage. The measure of consistency expresses the proportion of cases with the condition X where we also find the outcome Y, relative to all cases with X (Grofman and Schneider 2009:665) If the consistency

score is 100 then is X can be interpreted as sufficient for Y. For any condition X which is sufficient for Y, coverage is the proportion of cases with Y where we also find X, relative to all cases with Y. The higher the coverage scores for X, the more cases displaying Y are covered by this sufficient condition (ibid.). It is necessary to differentiate three subtypes of coverage raw coverage is the proportion of (1) outcome cases that are covered by a given term; unique coverage is the proportion of (1) outcome cases that are uniquely covered by a given term. Finally, solution coverage, the proportion of cases that are covered by all the terms (Rihoux and De Meur 2008:64)

The analysis is based on 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Israel, Macedonia, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Spain, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Switzerland and the UK. The cases of the analysis have been selected according to one single criterion; all of the cases are plural societies. To justify case selection I have imported a measure of ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation (see Table 3) by Alesina et al (2003) widely used in the literature for its comprehensive conceptualization and measurement of ethnic groups. This prevents from a false homogenizing perception of societies which other indexes such as Fearon (2003) and most widely used Ethno Linguistic Fragmentation. This index counts identifiable ethnic, linguistic and religious groups exist in the respective country. The table shows that all of our cases (with the exception of Austria Italy Spain and Sri Lanka) are at least moderately fragmented in at least one of the three dimensions.

Fragmentation indexes being the only numerical measure of division of societies are, however, unsatisfactory criterion for defining a country as a divide society for two reasons. First, these indexes do not differentiate ideological division within the society for which for example Austria, Netherlands and Italy stand. Though ideological polarization is not

considered to be a segmental cleavage, I justify the inclusion of these countries into the analysis by a substantive tradition of analyzing these countries within the literature on institutional design in plural societies and consociationalism literature in particular. Secondly, and most importantly, the indexes only indicate a numerical composition of the society and do not tell us anything of the intensity of group cleavage as the numerical number of groups still does not mean a presence of division, tension and hostility among groups and thus also necessity of implementation of special institutional measures. An additional criterion of case selection for this reason has been the presence of previous studies of these countries by scholars working with institutional design in divided societies.

Table 3 Ethnic Linguistic and Religious Fractionalization of countries

Country	Ethnic Fractionalization	Linguistic Fractionalization	Religious Fractionalization
Austria	0.1068	0.1522	0.4146
Belgium	0.5554	0.5409	0.2127
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.6300	0.6751	0.6851
Canada	0.7124	0.5772	0.6958
Fiji	0.5479	0.5479	0.5682
India	0.4182	0.8069	0.3260
Israel	0.3436	0.5525	0.3469
Italy	0.1145	0.1147	0.3027
Macedonia	0.5023	0.5021	0.5899
Malaysia	0.5880	0.5970	0.6657
Netherlands	0.1054	0.5143	0.7222
New Zealand	0.3969	0.1657	0.8110
Papua New Guinea	0.2718	0.3526	0.5523
South Africa	0.7517	0.8652	0.8603
Spain	0.4165	0.4132	0.4514
Sri Lanka	0.4150	0.4645	0.4853
Switzerland	0.5314	0.5441	0.6083
United Kingdom	0.1211	0.0532	0.6944

Source: Alesina et al 2003. Data available at:

http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls

The present research is based on the Comparative Dataset of Political Institutions (CDPI) compiled by Krister Lundell and Lauri Karvonen (2003) at the Department of

Political Science, Abo Academy of Sciences, Finland. The data set contains measurements of different institutions from 1960 to 2008. Not all the countries however have been measured from 1960. The data set contains data since 1960 for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland and the UK. India has been measured since 1967, Fiji and Sri Lanka since 1972, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea and Spain since 1977, Macedonia since 1992 and Bosnia since 1996. The unit of analysis in this research is a configuration of five institutions in a country/year (e.g. Austria 1960 is one case and Austria 1961 is another case). Furthermore, to solve the problem of redundant configurations which are supposed to conflate the analysis and show false dominance of a certain configuration I have cleaned the data set leaving only one configuration from the set of identical configurations. After such a filtering of the data set I have been left with 92 different institutional configurations implemented from 1960-2008 in the 18 countries have been included in the analysis.

Table 4. Configuration of institutions in the countries under study

Country	Number of institutional configurations/years
Austria	1) 1960-65; 1983-1989 2) 1966-1969; 1971-1982; 3) 1970; 4) 1990-2008
Belgium	1) 1960 2) 1961-1963 3) 1964 4) 1965-1972 5) 1973; 6) 1974-1976 7) 1977-1981 8) 1982 9) 1983-1987; 1992; 10) 1988-1991; 11) 1993-1998; 12) 1999-2008
Bosnia	1) 1996-2008
Canada	1) 1960-1961; 2) 1962; 1972-1973; 2004-2008 3) 1963-1967, 1979 4) 1968-1971, 1974-1978, 1980-1983 1988-1996, 2000-2003 5) 1979; 6) 1984-1987 7) 1997-1999; 8) 2004-2008
Fiji	1) 1972-1976; 1982-1986; 2) 1977; 3) 1978-1981; 4) 1992-1998; 5) 1999-2005; 6) 2006-2008
India	1) 1967-1976; 1985-1986; 2) 1977; 3) 1978; 1980-1984, 1987-1988; 4) 1979; 5) 1989; 5) 1990-1997; 6) 1998-2008
Israel	1) 1960; 2) 1961-1965; 1977-1980; 1992-1994, 2000 3) 1966-1975; 1984-1989; 1996-1999, 2001-2008; 4) 1976; 1981-1983; 1990-1991; 1995; 5) 1999; 2001-2002; 6) 2000; 7) 2003-2008
Italy	1) 1960-1961, 1963, 1968-1969, 1976-1979; 2) 1962, 1971; 3) 1964-1970, 1980-1993; 4) 1972; 5) 1973-1974; 6) 1975; 7) 1994-1995, 2000-2005; 8) 1996-1997; 9) 1998-1999; 10) 2006-2008
Macedonia	1) 1992-2001; 2) 2002-2007; 3) 2008;
Malaysia	1) 1972-1973; 2) 1974-1989, 1995-2007; 3) 1990-1994, 2008
Netherlands	1) 1960-1965, 1973-1976, 1981, 1998-2001; 2) 1966; 1972, 1982; 3) 1967-1971; 1977-1980; 1983-1997; 2002; 4) 2003-2008
New Zealand	1) 1960-1986; 1990-1994; 2) 1987-1989; 3) 1995; 4) 1996; 5) 1997-2002; 6) 2003-2007; 7) 2008
Papua New Guinea	1) 1977-1981; 2) 1982-1984; 3) 1985-2001; 4) 2002-2008;

Spain	1) 1977-1981, 1996-1999 2) 1982; 1993-1995, 2000-2008; 3) 1983-1988; 4) 1989-1992;
South Africa	1) 1960-1965, 1970-1993; 2) 1966-1969 3) 1994-2008
Sri Lanka	1) 1972-1976; 2) 1977-1988; 3) 1989-1993; 4) 1994-1996; 5) 1997-2000; 6) 2001-2008
Switzerland	1) 1960-2008
UK	1) 1960-1973; 1975-2008; 2) 1974;

Based on the initially identified dimensions I have exported 5 variables from the CDPI data set: electoral system, government form, territorial division, composition of government, and party system measured through the effective number of parties index. Data for these variables are present in the database on annual basis.

For the purpose of QCA I recoded these variables into a number of binary variables which indicate the presence (1) or absence (0) of an institution in the cases. The initial variables will be called hereinafter as blocks of variables. Electoral systems: Plurality Electoral System, Alternative Vote Electoral System, Second Ballot Electoral System, Proportional Electoral System, Mixed Member Majoritarian Electoral System, Mixed Member Proportional Electoral System. Party System Block: One Party System, Two Party System, Multi Party System. For the purpose of our analysis score ranging from 0-1.7 have been regarded as One Party Systems, scores ranging from 1.7-2.7 were regarded as Two Party System, cases with scores above 2.7 as Multi Party System. Territorial Division: Federal, Imperfect Federalism (unitary systems with federative features), Unitary. Government composition: Minority Government, Minimal Winning Coalition (all participating parties are necessary to form majority government), Single Party Majority Government, Surplus Coalition (exceeds the minimal winning coalition). Government Form: Parliamentary system, Presidential system, Mixed system. It is necessary to specify here that the initial variable effective number of party systems is measured on scale.

4. Patterns of Configurations of Political Institutions in Plural Societies

4.1 *Findings of the research*

Having introduced the expected configurations of institutions and having discussed the methods, operationalization of the variables and description of the data let me now proceed to testing the expected models of configuration and find configurations which have not been covered by analytical models.

First I constructed a model with the Parliamentary system as an outcome and PR, Multi Party System, Federalism and Surplus Coalition Government as conditions. The truth table algorithm provided in Table A3 shows that the pure consociational model in the 18 countries under study and within the years for which there has been available data only one case, namely, Belgium in 1999-2008 has had all the institutions prescribed by pure consociationalism. Another case, Switzerland in 1960-2008 is considered a Contradiction and is marked with a C in the Outcome column because of the missing data on its form of government. Once we consider the form of the government in Switzerland as parliamentary then we can regard the whole political system as a pure consociational model. Most of the solutions show a perfect measure of fit equaling 1 with only two solutions failing to meet the threshold of consistency of 0.8 and one case barely exceeding the threshold. There are three types of deviations of the consociational model with a number of cases falling within these models. The first type is a model with deviation in the form of the government variable when some other government form and not Surplus coalition was formed. The second type is a model with deviation in the territorial organization, namely seven cases having non-federal type of territorial division. Finally, the third type is a model with deviation in electoral system with two cases having other than PR electoral system.

The test of the second ideal model constructed as a combination of Presidentialism, Alternative Vote, Two Party System, Federalism and Single Party Government shows that the pure incentive model has not been applied in the cases which I am studying. (See Table A4.). The closest to the ideal incentive model is Fiji in 1970-76; 1982-1986 and most probably 2006-2008 which had three of the five necessary characteristics: AV, Two Party System and Single party Majority Government.⁶

The third model investigates a model discussed in the presidentialism vs. parliamentarism literature as the best combination of institutions for presidential system (see Table A5). The analysis shows that this pattern has never been applied in the plural societies included in this research. The measures of fit show a lowest possible value. It is necessary to highlight here that applications of presidential form of government has been extremely rare. Among the cases included in the analysis Presidentialism has been used only in one institutional setup, namely in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996. Among the configurations one pattern is closest to the constructed model: have all the conditions but lacks the most important, the outcome. The cases are Canada (1968-71; 1974-1978; 1980-1983; 1988-1996; 2000-2003), India (1978; 1980-1984; 1987-1988) and Malaysia (1990-1994; 2008). In these regimes the form of the government is parliamentarian and they present an extension of the Westminster model with the federal territorial organization instead of unitary.

My fourth model investigates Westminster style configuration of institutions which is not considered a useful tool for settling intergroup tensions in plural societies, but is expected to have a frequent use by former British colonies which are present in my study (see Table

⁶ Data on coalition size for 2006-2008 are missing thus I do not know whether Fiji had a Single party majority government.

A6). However, the analysis did not show a frequent occurrence of the pure pattern. The initial model included Parliamentarism, FPTP, Two Party System, Unitarism and Single Party Majority Government. The Truth table with the unitary variable standing for territorial division revealed two cases of the occurrence of this pure model: New Zealand in 1960-1986 and 1990-94 and Fiji in 1970-76 and 1982-86. Two slightly deviant cases with only one condition missing for meeting the pure model are New Zealand between 1987-1989 and Fiji in 1978-1981 when they changed from a Two Party System to a multiparty system. Another group of deviant cases are New Zealand in 1995 and Fiji in 1977 when these countries changed their coalition type (New Zealand into a Minority Government and Fiji into a Surplus Government). A third group of slightly deviant cases with variance in the territorial organization variable Canada 1968-1971 1974-1978 1980-1983, 1988-96, 2000-2003; Malaysia in 1990-1994 and in 2008; India in 1978, 1980-1984, 1987-1988; and most importantly the UK in 1960-1973, and 1975-2008.

The UK has been classified by the authors of the data set as Imperfect Federalism which has some features of federation but still is a unitary form of territorial division. To see the configuration of the Westminster model with Lundel and Karvonen's interpretation of the territorial organization type I ran another truth table algorithm with Imperfect Federalism replacing Unitarism. The analysis with Imperfect Federalism (Table A7) revealed even less distinctive pattern with only the UK in 1960-1973 and 1975-2008 strictly matching the pattern. The deviant cases are the UK in 1975, when a Minority Government was formed instead of a single Party Majority Government; Spain in 1983-1988 (the deviation being the PR electoral system instead of the FPTP) and finally Sri Lanka, which in 1972-1976 had a Surplus Government and in 1989-1993 had a PR Electoral system. However, Sri Lanka misses

the most important: it lacks the outcome (that's the reason for the C-Contradictory label in the truth table).

The fifth model to be tested investigates a model which is expected to occur due to causal and functional links between the different institutions and a change in one of them causes a range of changes in the rest of the others (see Table A8). The logic behind this model is that there is a sequence of causal and functional effects originating from the specific combination of FPTP electoral system and a federal territorial division coupled with geographic concentration of cleavage groups which all result in a Multi Party System which in its turn is likely to trigger formation of coalition governments. Here concentrated minorities are able to fight the party system dualism and promote their candidates to the office.

The analysis shows that this pattern of institutional design has not been very popular, while its slight deviations are quite frequent. The case strictly fitting this pattern is India in 1989. The deviant cases are Papua New Guinea from 1982-1984 when an Imperfect Federal system was applied instead of the Federal and Fiji in 1992-1998 when a unitary territorial division was applied. The second group of deviant cases is far larger and the variation in this group is in the coalition size which is rather an informal institution than formal. Canada in 1962 and 1972-1973 had a Minority Government while in 1997-1999 had a Single Party Coalition Government. India in 1977 had a Single Party Government in 1990-1997 had a Minority Government instead and in 1998-2000 (it is possible that this pattern has continued till 2008 though the data on these years is missing) India had a Surplus Coalition Government. Malaysia in 1972-1973 had a Single Party Coalition Government. The general expectation is that in the presence of multiple parties the probability of a forming a Minimum Winning coalition or a Surplus Government is higher because under the conditions of a divided society

the effective parties are expected to be included in the government rather than being neglected. Such a large number of deviant cases with variance in the coalition size mean that the expected relationship between Multi Party System and size of coalition government is very weak.

My final constructed model is a centralized regime of governance which is expected to prevail in non democratic countries or countries at their initial stage of state building when the issue of engaging of significant minorities and cleavage groups is either not realized or purposefully neglected. The model is expected to have a FPTP electoral system, One Party System, Unitary form of territorial division and a Single Party Government. The type of the government is irrelevant in this regard, in my opinion, as in the presence of all the above mentioned institutions the difference in power sharing capacity among parliamentarism, presidentialism and mixed form should be marginal. Thus I will examine all these combinations first with parliamentarism, then presidentialism and then semi- form. The first modification of this model with the outcome set on the parliamentarism (see Table A9) shows that my expectations were not met. Such a regime existed only in Fiji in 1978-1981. The deviant cases come both from New Zealand where in 1960-1986 and 1990-1994 a Two Party System was implemented. The second deviant case is the regime in New Zealand which in 1987-1989 had a Multi Party System, though the whole institutional context is not supportive of the emergence of a Multi Party System. The second and third models with presidentialism (Table A10) and a mixed model (Table A11) respectively as outcome showed even less compliance with the expected model. None of the cases showed a combination of these types.

Besides testing the analytically developed models I found it necessary to do also an exploratory analysis of configurations of institutions and identify the patterns which have not

been covered by the models. For this purpose I ran three truth table algorithms with Parliamentarism, Preseidentialism and Semi- variables consequently set as outcome while the other variables set as conditions. The similar configurations presenting distinct logical patterns were later grouped. Some configurations which have not fitted any logic have been singled out and are presented separately.

The exploratory analysis with parliamentarism revealed seven patterns of configuration of institutions. As testing the pure models has shown ideal models rarely occur. Regimes show considerable variance and deviations from ideal models. The first pattern (see Table A12) is a group of configurations with very high power sharing capacity and institutional setup supportive of inclusion of wider societal groups into decision making. These configurations have Coalition cabinets as well as Multi Party Systems with the exception of three cases. The prevalent electoral system is PR with the exception of India in 1979 where FPTP was combined with a Two Party System, Federalism and a surplus coalition. This pattern is the prevalent with 20 cases out of 92 having this pattern of configuration.

The second pattern (Table A13) presents configurations which follow Westminster logic of institutional design. The patterns main feature a power fusion effect reached through a restrictive number of effective parties and single party and/or Minority Governments. The configurations listed in this group all have a FPTP electoral system, two and one⁷ party system and restrictive governments. The cases nevertheless show considerable variance in the territorial organization. The pattern is prevalent in the UK and its former colonies at the initial

⁷It should be kept in mind that the term OnePS does not mean that there was only one party in the state but rather that there was only one effective party (the threshold for coding into OnePS was 1.7) with other parties having insignificant seta share in the lower house of the parliament.

stage of post colonial state building. The pattern is the second most dominant pattern with 14 cases matching this institutional logic and design.

The third visible configuration (see Table A14) of institutions is an extension of Westminster model which is derived from a deviation of Duverger's Law. In this group of configurations FPTP combined with a Federal-type territorial division results in a Multi Party System. The centrifugal effect of the FPTP and Federalism is furthermore supportive of the emergence of coalition cabinets. This sequence of causal effects turns Westminster system from a centripetal into a centrifugal regime which is able to accommodate the multiple cleavage groups which exist in the given society. This pattern is present in six cases and it is prevalent among former British colonies with large territory and regionally concentrated cleavage groups. In contrast to some of the cases listed in the previous group these deviations of Westminster model did not restrict small parties' participation in the government. Again, a more in depth study of the case is necessary to investigate the systematic character of this pattern.

The fourth (see Table A15) which is visibly differing from the other is a rather large group of cases with inclusive electoral and party system but with restrictive number of parties in the government. The electoral system prevalent in the group is the PR as well as FPTP combined with Federalism which assures multiparty system. This group of configurations can roughly be subdivided into two smaller groups: former British Colonies with large territory and concentrated cleavage groups and non-British colonies with centrifugal institutional design.

The study of these cases shows that though there are many of them, the temporal duration of each of these configurations is not long averaging 2-3 years each. If one takes into consideration the fact that the variance is in the informal institutional variable and not in the formal ones it would be speculative to suggest that the restrictive governments were or weren't a systematic institutional mechanism aimed at restricting the participation of multiple parties in the government. The small number of parties in the cabinet could have been a result of other intervening variables which determine coalition building such as the character of distribution of seats in the parliament, ideological and policy orientations of the parties, bargaining strategies of the parties etc. A further, in-depth historical study of the particular case studies is necessary to determine the systematic nature of this configuration.

The following two groups of configurations present rather strange combinations of institutions and raise some questions on the commonly accepted functional and causal relations among institutions. They do not follow any pattern and institutional logic discussed in the literature. However, they need to be separated from the rest of the configurations due to distinctiveness of their configurational pattern. The first group (Table A16) presents another puzzle. In this group of configurations the formation of Two Party Systems is less disturbing as the PR is combined mostly with Unitarism. The problem with these configurations is that coalition governments were formed with two effective parties in the party system. This means that the whole political spectrum of society was present in the government. As in previous cases a more in depth case studies need to be done to find out the societal conditions which necessitated the formation of such inclusive governments. The second group (see Table A17) is a combination of electoral system and territorial division type supportive of formation of inclusive Multi Party System and coalition governments and Two Party Systems with

restrictive governments. What I find strange in this combination is the emergence of Two Party Systems with a PR electoral system and federal or semi-federal territorial division.

The final seventh pattern (see Table A18) is a group of configurations of utterly centralized and restrictive nature. This includes the combination of FPTP One Party System and Single Party Governments and quite a variation of government forms.

I decided to compute the share and duration of each of the ideal models and empirical patterns to better illustrate their interrelationship.

Table 5. Share and Duration of Ideal Models

Pattern	Share of total number of cases (in %)	Duration (in years)
Ideal Consociational Model Parl*PR*Fed*Mps*Surpl	2	59
Ideal Incentive Model Pres*AV*Fed*TwoPS*SinG	0	0
Ideal Westminster Model 1 Parl*FPTP*Unit*TwoPS*SinG	2	44
Ideal Westminster Model 2 Parl*FPTP*Ifed*TwoPS*SinG	1	48
Strong Executive Pres*FPTP*Fed*TwoPS*SinG	0	0

Table 5 shows the share and duration of each of the ideal models. As noted above the ideal models have negligible share in the overall number of cases. Consociationalism occupies only 2 %, Westminster Model 1 2% and Westminster Model 2 1 % of total number of cases.

At the same time it should be note that pure consociationalism appears to be a very durable system of cumulatively 59 years spent with this institutional regime.

Table 6. Share and Duration of Empirical Patterns

Pattern	Share of total number of cases (in %)	Duration (in years)
Configurations of high power sharing capacity	22.8	156
Westminster-logic configurations	9.8	132
Extension of Westminster model	5.4	27
Configurations of inclusive electoral and party systems and restrictive governments	15	67
Configurations of inclusive electoral system and decentralized territorial division with restrictive party system and government.	5.4	37
Configurations of restrictive party system and inclusive governments	4.3	18
Restrictive participation and centralized governance	6.5	65

Table 6 on the other hand shows share and duration of each of the patterns which have been identified though the empirical analysis and have been discussed above. As it can be seen the most widespread pattern is the pattern combining inclusive power sharing institutions which has 22.8 % of all the cases. This pattern is not only the most widespread one but also a very durable one with 156 of cumulative years spent with this regime. The second and third most spread pattern is the fourth pattern with configurations of inclusive electoral and party systems and restrictive governments (15 %) and Westminster-logic configuration (9.5 %).

However, it should be noted that while Westminster logic pattern is a very durable one with 132 years spent with this regime, the fourth pattern has a relatively short duration of 67 years. A possible explanation could be the wide variance and short duration of restrictive governments which have been formed in these regimes which had a Multi Party System. The remaining patterns have relatively small share and short duration. Cumulatively ideal models and identified patterns cover 74% of cases. The remaining 26 % refer to the cases with AV, presidentialism, semi-presidentialism as well as the cases which have been deleted in the process of analysis due to the number of missing data.

To better investigate the use of AV I have separated the cases and their configurations into another group (see Table A19). First of all, it needs to be mentioned that the use of AV widely advocated by Horowitz and his centripetal approach has been rather rare. Besides, the configurations which Horowitz preferred to see AV do not exist in the empirical reality. As it is shown in the table AV has only been combined with parliamentarism, Unitarism and a Multi Party System and not presidentialism, Federalism, and Two Party Systems. Unfortunately the data on the government size are missing for these cases and it is impossible to trace the behavior of government size variable in these configurations. Centripetalism, which was supposed to appeal to the moderate voters and accommodate the cleavage groups into one–two parties and later into Single Party Majority Governments should have failed in these societies. None of the cases has had a federal territorial division advocated by Horowitz. Even more important is that AV in two cases out of the overall three resulted in multiparty system and has always been combined with parliamentarism. The configuration with multiparty system and parliamentarism eliminates the possible centripetal effect which this electoral system is supposed to create.

The exploratory analysis of the configurations of presidentialism (Table A20) revealed only few cases of the use of presidential system among the cases under study-Bosnia since 1996 and South Africa since 1960. Even more important is the institutional configuration in which presidentialism has been used. Bosnia combined presidentialism with PR, Multi Party System and Federalism. Most disturbing is the combination of presidentialism and multiparty system, which following the above mentioned arguments by Mainwaring is the worst possible combination of presidential system. The configurations with which presidentialism was used in South Africa are more reasonable. In South Africa presidentialism has been combined with few effective parties and Imperfect Federalism. This combination makes the presidency a powerful institution with stable support (or opposition) in the parliament. However, if we consider that PR was introduced only in 1994 after the demise of the apartheid regime, giving the black majority an opportunity to be represented in the parliament, then all the regimes preceding the demise of apartheid and introduction of PR appear to be thoroughly authoritarian and repressive with no possible ways for the two non-dominant groups of the society to win representation in the decision making bodies.

The exploratory study of configuration of semi-presidentialism in Table A21 shows two patterns of the combination of the semi-presidential model. One pattern is a centripetal pattern which combines Two Party Systems with restrictive governments, the regime employed over years in Sri Lanka. The second pattern is the type of regime introduced in Macedonia after Ohrid agreement where semi-presidentialism was combined with PR, two and Multi Party Systems and inclusive governments. Due to the great variance in different modifications of semi presidentialism, the amount of the power vested on the president the combination can both have centripetal and centrifugal effects. The combination of semi presidentialism can both be used for group accommodative and group repressive purposes.

4.2 Discussion

In the previous subchapter I have reported in detail findings of the tests of ideal models and exploratory research of patterns of configuration of institutions. In this final part I discuss the findings of the research, putting them into a generalized framework highlighting their implications, giving particular emphasize to the broader implications of tested models and the exploratory findings. The most crucial for the reader, however, is to highlight and discuss the patterns of configurations of institutions observed in this research.

The empirical research has shown that none of the pure models: consociationalism, incentive approach and Westminster model, exist in more than three empirical examples. The deviations of the institutions with one institutional deviation considerably outnumber the pure models. Institutions show high variance and do not follow the established theoretical prescriptions. The results available for the studied countries and years shed doubt on the empirical validity of these ideal models. Previous researches (e.g. Bogaards 2000) have discussed whether the above studied approaches are ideal models in general and if an ideal model as such needs empirical references. It is out of the scope of this research to discuss whether ideal models should have their empirical reference or not. What is evident at this point is that the empirical references of the ideal models of consociationalism and Westminster model are few while those of incentive approach do not exist at all. However, I think that efforts should be spent on determining the purpose of these ideal models. If the existence of an empirical reference is necessary for the validity of ideal models then the conceptualization and institutional elements of consociationalism, incentive approach and Westminster model should be revisited.

Another important finding which emerged as a result of testing the analytically constructed models is the absence of strong executive regimes in divided societies. Such a regime would imply existence of an executive branch headed by the president or a president together with a Prime Minister which will rely on a Two Party System and government with stable majority able to execute the decision of the majority. Additional requirement would be a functional Federalism and FPTP electoral system. However, as the research showed divided societies have been indifferent to such a regime. The only model which comes close to this model is the South African regime before the abolition of apartheid. Looking back at the repressive nature of this regime one could speculate that existence of such a regime in a society strongly divided along ethnic lines would inevitably lead towards some kind of repression of one of the groups at the expense of others.

The analytical and exploratory analysis has shown 7 patterns of configuration of institutions:

The first pattern (see Table A12) is a group of configurations that have a functionally and causally interconnected sequence of institutions with high power sharing capacity, assuring wide opportunities for representation of cleavage groups in legislative and executive branches. This pattern includes institutions supportive of the emergence of Multi Party Systems and coalition governments. This includes combinations of PR with Multi Party Systems or FPTP systems combined with federal or semi-federal territorial division which together produce Multi Party System. Here are also included regimes which, despite the dualism of the party system have coalition governments and thus include the whole political spectrum in the government and no cleavage group is excluded.

The second pattern (see Table A13) is a group of the British type regimes called in the literature Westminster model. As in the previous case the institutional variation is quite high, especially for government size and territorial division variables, and the patterning is rather around logic of the overall institutional configuration and not presence of specific institutions. The logic of the pattern as opposed to the previous one is a restricted, but strong executive power and party system dualism which are provided through FPTP electoral system and centralized territorial division. The cases following this pattern include the UK and its former colonies. This pattern is not inclusive and does not have high power-sharing capacity. However, as I expected, considerable number of cases follow this pattern because the system has historically been dominant due to British colonial rule and has become a part of political culture. The spread of this majoritarian pattern among divided societies is the best embodiment of the historical-cultural assumption.

The third pattern (see Table A14) is an extension of the Westminster model which is a result of a sequence of causal influences when the introduction of a federal and semi federal territorial division systems combined with a FPTP trigger formation of Multi Party Systems and subsequently of inclusive governments. The pattern is common for former British colonies with large geographic territory where Unitarism could be problematic. The change in the territorial division variable mutated the influence of the electoral system causing a chain of change in the whole institutional design configuration.

The fourth, highly spread pattern (see Table A15), is a group of configurations combining both centripetal and centrifugal characteristics. The pattern has many cases following it. The electoral and party systems have a centrifugal character, meaning that it is either PR or a FPTP electoral system combined with Federalism which produce Multi Party

Systems. However, this pattern does not continue with a power sharing logic but restricts the participation of the cleavage groups in the executive rather a majoritarian logic as despite the presence of multiple parties.

The fifth pattern (see Table A16) is a combination of power sharing electoral system and coalition governments but restrictive number of parties. This not-so-widely-spread pattern appears to be an all encompassing regime. First of all, through PR is supportive of proportional allocations of seats among different cleavage groups. Despite the failure of PR to break party system dualism this institutional regime has implemented inclusive, coalition governments incorporating the whole political spectrum of the society in the executive.

The sixth type (see Table A17) is a pattern of a rather strange configuration of PR, Two Party System and restrictive governments. This pattern can be interpreted as a failed attempt of widening the participation of cleavage groups in the government. Despite, PR electoral system and centrifugal territorial division, party dualism and restrictive governments have been sustainable here. This has resulted in a rather strange combination of institutions hypothetically supportive of the emergence of power sharing institutions but has in practice produced centripetal, restrictive outcome.

The final pattern (see Table A18) is a group of configurations of utterly centralized and restrictive nature. This include the combination of FPTP One Party System and single party governments and quite a variation of government forms. With the exception of Canada this institutional regime is found in countries within the years when repressive and non democratic political regimes have been in power. Additional analysis with the involvement of control variables measuring differentiating democracies and authoritarian regimes would show

whether this is the only institutional configuration which creates autocratic governance in divided societies or there are other institutional variations which are disposed to authoritarian rule.

Among the important findings of the research is the rare and utterly strange use of the AV (see Table A19). Despite Horowitz's promotion of the AV as a tool for intergroup reconciliation and moderation of ethnic cleavages, tensions and conflict, AV has historically been used in three regimes only. Along with that, AV has never been used in the institutional configuration preferred and advocated by Horowitz. On the contrary, it has been combined with institutions such as Multi Party System or Unitarism or parliamentary form of government which are unable to have "incentive" effect on the political system. This sheds doubt on credibility of the most crucial element of the incentive approach and Horowitz's efforts to come up with an alternative to consociationalism.

Findings on relationships among the institutions are also important as they hint on a non-conventional "behavior" of institutions in divided societies. Despite the assumptions, first in the theoretical literature underlining the combination of institutions within different power sharing approaches, as well as in the literature on the associational relationship among institutions, some of the commonly accepted relationships among institutions appeared to be quite vague for divided societies. First of all, the association between the electoral systems and party systems appeared to be blurred for the cases studies in this research. The relationship between FPTP and Two Party System has appeared quite weak. The relationship between PR and Multi Party System also appeared to be weaker than one would expect as in considerable number of cases PR has resulted in Two Party System. The logical expectation that in such societies, where exclusion of any segment of society is dangerous for the stability

of the whole system, the emergence of Multi Party System would lead to formation coalition governments did not always stand as well.

As briefly discussed above the intervening variables which conflate the relationship between electoral system and party system could be the degree of fragmentation, the nature of societal cleavage and “distance” between the groups, meaning how much different and potentially how severe the conflict among the groups could be. The sources cited in the text on this regard provide one example of an intervening mechanism saying that under conditions of higher fragmentation the party system would be inclined towards dualism and centralization in general as none of the cleavage groups could emerge with a strong party of its own. On the other hand where fragmentation is lower multiple parties are likely to emerge as the

Along with electoral system-party system and party system-government size relationship, the nature of the type of territorial division has also appeared to be surprising. In particular Federalism, which was considered to be a power sharing institution (see for example Cohen 1997 for that purpose), has appeared most frequently in centripetal configurations. Unitarism on the other hand is not so closely related to centralized systems. Finally, Imperfect Federal type of territorial division appeared most often in wide power sharing configurations. A possible explanation might be that this type of territorial division, combining the functional qualities of Federalism, is not risky from a political point of view, meaning that it is unlikely to lead to secession demands.

The specific behavior of the government type variable should also be noted. This variable which is the most important in determining the whole logic of the regime appeared to be the most volatile one, providing for a considerable variance among the cases. Possible

explanation volatility could be the informal nature of this institution. The type of the government does not depend mechanically on the electoral system and the number of parties. The cleavage structure of the society, the degree of polarization of the society, the strategies of the parties along with other institutional factors determine the size of the government. Thus, the presence of restrictive governments does not necessarily mean a purposeful strategy on the exclusion of minority parties from the participation in the executive.

5. Conclusion

Institutional configurations have been an underresearched in comparative politics. The topic has been overlooked both by theorists of institutionalism and scholars engaged in empirical research on the association, compatibility and effectiveness of crucial political institutions. The literature on institutional design in divided societies with few exception have also ignored the importance of configurational approach to institutional design. This thesis has on the contrary regarded institutional design as a process of designing a complex of institutions, configuration of measures rather than viewing institutions in isolation. My assumption here has been that in the empirical reality constitutional designers divert from one single theory of democratic institutional design in plural societies regarding the theoretical models as pools of institutions which are selected to better adjust to the context specific requirements of institutional design. The purpose of the thesis has been to find the empirical patterns of configuration of five types of institutions which have been identified as crucial in the literature on institutional design in divided societies.

The research was divided into five parts. First, I introduced the subject matter of the thesis, introduced the thesis statement and purpose of the research, provided with brief introduction of the main concepts and methodological tools and summarized the findings of the research. The first chapter started with the overview of the debate between Lijphart and Horowitz and their respective consociational and incentive approaches to institutional design in divided societies. The chapter continued with emphasizing the narrowness of the debate and overview of alternative approaches to institutional design. The second chapter started with criticism of the isolationary view on institutional design advocating the importance of configurational approach to institutional design. Here I also reviewed some of the recent studies which have touched upon configurations of institutions. After this I introduced the

research question and models of the research. The second part of the second chapter justified case selection choice of the methodology, described the variables and the data. The third chapter started with reporting the findings of the research. First I reported the findings of testing the analytically derived models. Then I went on reporting the findings of exploratory research of the patterns of configuration of institutions. The second part of the third chapter discussed the findings of the research putting them into a more general framework. Conclusion once again summarizes the whole research process providing for implication of the main findings of the research, describing the limitation and future paths of development of the research.

I expected the research to produce three main blocks of findings: first, most important finding and contribution of the research was expected to be the identification of patterns of configuration of political institutions in plural societies. Second, finding patterns of configuration of institutions was expected to help the scholarship working in the field of institutional design in divided societies to reconsider the theoretical underpinnings of the ideal models and their assumptions. Thirdly, research of empirical configurations of political institutions was expected to help refining the already known functional and causal relationships among sets of institutions.

Through exploratory analysis I have distinguished seven patterns of configuration: high power sharing pattern, Westminster logic pattern, a pattern with an extension of Westminster logic, a pattern combining centrifugal characteristic in the election of the legislative and centripetal in the formation of the executive, a reverse pattern combining centripetal characteristic in the formation of party system but centrifugal in the formation of the executive, and finally a pattern of configurations of utterly centralized and restrictive nature.

These configurations do not follow theoretical models but are clustered in each of the pattern following particular logic and purpose of institutional design as well as following the regularities of association among different institutions. The research has shown that the ideal models widely discussed in the literature do not have their equivalent empirical references. Consociationalism and Westminster model have had two pure empirical implementations while incentive approach has never been implemented. This finding sheds doubt on the empirical validity of these models. To serve as a reference point for real world institutional solutions and generate applicable models of institutional design in divided societies the theoretical underpinnings and institutional tools of these concepts should be revisited.

Finally, the research has found a considerable diversion in the relationship between electoral system and party system variables and party system-government size variables. This means that divided societies have a logic of their own and intervening factors which break the commonly known knowledge on association among institutional variables. Further studies could study in more detail the nature of the relationship between institutional variables in divided societies and single out the factors which influence these relationships. Besides, the research has shown that conventional assumptions on the character of the different types of territorial division undergo changes in configurations with other institutions.

The research has had several considerable limitations which need to be highlighted and taken into consideration while discussing the findings of the research and which need to be addressed in further research. Firstly, only 18 countries have been analyzed. Countries are mainly western democracies and only few of them are developing countries. Those few developing countries are from mainly South East Asia and are former British colonies. This biases of course the findings giving particular importance to Westminster model and its

extension. Inclusion of a number of cases from the Middle East, and Africa, where most of worlds severely divided countries are could provide better insight into patterns of configurations. Another important limitation is that a limited number of variables have been studied within this research. Some other institutional variables such as decentralization and group autonomy have been excluded from the analysis because of the problems with data extraction and categorization. Other important variables left out include mutual veto, quota systems, bicameralism and judicial review. A final limitation of the research is the absence of control variables. One of the most common criticisms I got during discussion is that the countries which I have studied have different character and level of ethnic tensions (conflict). Thus measuring them is inappropriate unless control variables are introduced to show their crucial differences.

At further stages the research could develop in several ways eliminating the limitations of the present research. Firstly, the future research on configurations of institutions in divided societies should also consider important variables listed in the previous paragraph. Secondly, further research could introduce contextual variables, societal factors which first of all determine the specific choice of institutions and influence the way institutions function. Such factors are the character of societal cleavage, number of cleavage groups, economic development, democratic or authoritarian type of regime, and colonial background which would provide additional explanation for the occurrence of particular configurations. Finally, further research could look at the effectiveness of the above mentioned patterns of institutional design and societal factors in coping with ethnic tensions and conflicts. Using the methodological advantages of QCA the research could provide a complex explanation to the success or failure of specific institutional regimes under different societal factors.

The study of institutional configurations, being under researched topic in the comparative literature, is of great importance for refining theoretical models of institutional design, explaining relationships among institutions, clarifying the qualities of different institutions, and providing comprehensive insight into institutional mechanism of regulating tensions and conflicts in divided societies. Further efforts should be taken to address the limitations of the research, refine theoretical and methodological aspects of configurational approach to institutional design.

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7. Appendix

Table A1. Expected bi-variate positive and negative relationship between variables

	FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	IFed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG
FPTP	*												
AV		*											
PR			*										
OnePS	+	+	-	*									
TwoPS	+	+	-		*								
MPS	-	-	+			*							
Fed	+	+	+	-	+	-	*						
Unit	-	-	-	+	+	-		*					
IFed	-	-	+	-	-	+			*				
MinG	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	*			
MinWG	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+		*		
SinG	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	-			*	
SrplG	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+				*

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Table A2. Bivariate, Odds ratio relationship between the variables.

	FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	IFed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG
FPTP	*												
AV		*											
PR			*										
OnePS	1.25	0.91	0.84	*									
TwoPS	1	0.83	0.92		*								
MPS	0.62	1.8	1			*							
Fed	1.9	0.67	0.72	1.69	0.97	0.9	*						
Unit	0.85	3	0.91	0.84	0.94	1.11		*					
IFed	0.61	0.73	1,73	0.77	1.11	1			*				
MinG	1.1	0.74	0.96	0.89	1.19	0.89	1.04	0.78	1.17	*			
MinWG	0.73	0.75	1.32	0.74	0.87	1.23	0.92	1	1		*		
SinG	1.64	0.74	0.67	5	1.08	0.78	1.3	1	0.78			*	
SrplG	0.83	0.74	1	0.72	0.92	1.19	0.83	1.25	1				*

Table A3. Pure Consociational model (Truth Table Algorithm Parl*PR*MPS*Fed*Srpl)

PR	MPS	Fed	SrplG	Outcome (Parl)	raw consist.	PRI consist.	product	id
1	1	1	1	C	1	1	1	Belgium 1999, Switzerland 1960
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Belgium 1964, Belgium 1973, Belgium 1977, Belgium 1988, Israel 1966, Italy 1964, Netherlands 1960
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	India 1998, Canada 2004(Srplg:1)/
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Austria 1990, Belgium 1993
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	Belgium 1965, Belgium 1974, Belgium 1982, Belgium 1983, Israel 1960, Israel 1961, Israel 1976, Italy 1960, Italy 1962, Italy 1971, Netherlands 1966, Netherlands 1967, Spain 1977, Spain 1989
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Austria 1960, Austria 1966, Austria 1970, Austria 1983
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	Belgium 1961, Italy 1973
0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Canada 1962, Canada 1972, Canada 1997, India 1977, India 1989, India 1990, Malaysia 1972, Canada 2004
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Fiji 1999, Fiji 2000, Papua New Guinea 1997
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	India 1979
0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	Fiji 1992, New Zealand 1987, New Zealand 1996, New Zealand 1997, Papua New Guinea 1982, Papua New Guinea 1985
M	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Canada 1960, Canada 1963, Canada 1968, Canada 1979, Canada 1984, India 1967, India 1978, Malaysia 1974, Malaysia 1990

Table A4. Pure Centripetal model (Truth Table Algorithm Pres*AV*TwoPS*Fed*SinG)

AV	TwoPS	Fed	SinG	Outcome (Pres)	raw consist.	PRI consist.	product	id
1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1970
0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	Austria 1966, Canada 1968, India 1978, Malaysia 1990
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Fiji 2006
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	Austria 1960, Austria 1970, Austria 1983, Canada 1963, Canada 1979, India 1979
0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	New Zealand 1960, Spain 1983, Sri Lanka 1989, United Kingdom 1960
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1970, Macedonia 1992, Papua New Guinea 2002
0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	Canada 1984, Canada 1997, India 1967, India 1977, Malaysia 1972, Malaysia 1974
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1999, Fiji 2000, Macedonia 1992, Papua New Guinea 2002
0	0	1	0	C	0	0	0	Austria 1990, Belgium 1993, Belgium 1999, Canada 1960, Canada 1962, Canada 1972, India 1989, India 1990, India 1998, Switzerland 1960
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Belgium 1960, Belgium 1961, Fiji 1977, Italy 1972, Italy 1973, Italy 1975, Italy 1994, Italy 1996, Italy 1998, New Zealand 1995, Spain 1982, Sri Lanka 1972, Sri Lanka 1994, United Kingdom 1974
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1978, New Zealand 1987, New Zealand 1996, Spain 1989, Sri Lanka 1977
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Belgium 1964, Belgium 1965, Belgium 1973, Belgium 1974, Belgium 1977, Belgium 1982, Belgium 1983, Belgium 1988, Fiji 1992, Israel 1960, Israel 1961, Israel 1966, Israel 1976, Italy 1960, Italy 1962, Italy 1964, Italy 1971, Netherlands 1960, Netherlands 1966, Netherlands 1967, New Zealand 1997, Papua New Guinea 1997, Papua New Guinea 1982, Papua New Guinea 1985, Spain 1977

Table A5. Classic Presidential model (Truth Table Algorithm Pres*FPTP*TwoPS*Fed*SinG)

PTP	TwoPS	Fed	SinG	Outcome (Pres)	raw consist.	PRI consist.	product	id
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	Canada 1968, India 1978, Malaysia 1990
0	0	1	Missing	1	0	0	0	Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996
0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	Austria 1966
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	Canada 1963, Canada 1979, India 1979
1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	Canada 1984, Canada 1997, India 1967, India 1977, Malaysia 1972, Malaysia 1974, Canada 2004
1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	New Zealand 1960, United Kingdom 1960
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	Austria 1960, Austria 1970, Austria 1983
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Canada 1960, Canada 1962, Canada 1972, India 1989, India 1990, India 1998, Canada 2004
0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	Spain 1983, Sri Lanka 1989
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1978, New Zealand 1987, Sri Lanka 1977
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1977, New Zealand 1995, Sri Lanka 1972, United Kingdom 1974
0	0	1	0	C	0	0	0	Austria 1990, Belgium 1993, Belgium 1999, Switzerland 1960
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Belgium 1960, Belgium 1961, Italy 1972, Italy 1973, Italy 1975, Italy 1994, Italy 1996, Italy 1998, Spain 1982, Sri Lanka 1994
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1992, Papua New Guinea 1997, Papua New Guinea 1982, Papua New Guinea 1985
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	New Zealand 1996, Spain 1989, Fiji 1970, Italy 2006, Macedonia 1992, Macedonia 2002, Netherlands 2003, New Zealand 2003, Papua New Guinea 2002, Sri Lanka 2001
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Belgium 1964, Belgium 1965, Belgium 1973, Belgium 1974, Belgium 1977, Belgium 1982, Belgium 1983, Belgium 1988, Fiji 1999, Fiji 2000, Israel 1960, Israel 1961, Israel 1966, Israel 1976, Italy 1960, Italy 1962, Italy 1964, Italy 1971, Netherlands 1960, Netherlands 1966, Netherlands 1967, New Zealand 1997, Spain 1977, Italy 2006, Macedonia 1992, Macedonia 2002, Netherlands 2003, New Zealand 2003, Papua New Guinea 2002, Sri Lanka 2001

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Table A.6 Westminster model 1 (Truth table Algorithm Parl.*TwoPS*FPTP*Unit*SinG)

FPTP	TwoPS	Unit	SinG	Outcome	raw	PRI	product	id
------	-------	------	------	---------	-----	-----	---------	----

				(Parl)	consist.	consist.		
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	New Zealand 1960-1986; 1990-1994, Fiji 1970-1976 1982-1986
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Fiji 1977, New Zealand 1995
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Canada 1968, India 1978, Malaysia 1990, United Kingdom 1960
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Fiji 1978, New Zealand 1987
1	1	0	0	C	1	1	1	Canada 1963, Canada 1979, India 1979, Sri Lanka 1972, United Kingdom 1974
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Fiji 1992
0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Belgium 1960, Belgium 1961
0	1	0	1	C	1	1	1	Austria 1966, Spain 1983, Sri Lanka 1989
1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	Canada 1960, Canada 1962, Canada 1972, India 1989, India 1990, India 1998, Papua New Guinea 1997, Papua New Guinea 1982, Papua New Guinea 1985
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	New Zealand 1996
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Belgium 1964, Belgium 1965, Belgium 1973, Belgium 1974, Belgium 1977, Belgium 1982, Fiji 1999, Fiji 2000, New Zealand 1997
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	Spain 1989
0	0	0	0	C	1	1	1	Austria 1990, Belgium 1983, Belgium 1988, Belgium 1993, Belgium 1999, Israel 1960, Israel 1961, Israel 1966, Israel 1976, Italy 1960, Italy 1962, Italy 1964, Italy 1971, Netherlands 1960, Netherlands 1966, Netherlands 1967, Spain 1977, Switzerland 1960
0	1	0	0	C	0.9	0.9	0.8	Austria 1960, Austria 1970, Austria 1983, Italy 1972, Italy 1973, Italy 1975, Italy 1994, Italy 1996, Italy 1998, Spain 1982, Sri Lanka 1994
1	0	0	1	C	0.86	0.86	0.73	Canada 1984, Canada 1997, India 1967, India 1977, Malaysia 1972, Malaysia 1974, Sri Lanka 1977

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Table A7. Westminster model 2 (Truth Table Algorithm Parl*TwoPS*FPTP*IFed*SinG)

FPTP	TwoPS	IFed	SinG	Outcome	raw	PRI	product	id
------	-------	------	------	---------	-----	-----	---------	----

				(Parl)	consist.	consist.		
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	United Kingdom 1960
1	1	1	0	C	1	1	1	Sri Lanka 1972, United Kingdom 1974
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Canada 1968, India 1978, Malaysia 1990, New Zealand 1960, /Fiji 1970
0	1	1	1	C	1	1	1	Spain 1983, Sri Lanka 1989
1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	Sri Lanka 1977, South Africa 1966/
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Papua New Guinea 1997, Papua New Guinea 1982, Papua New Guinea 1985
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	Canada 1963, Canada 1979, Fiji 1977, India 1979, New Zealand 1995
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Austria 1966
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	Canada 1984, Canada 1997, Fiji 1978, India 1967, India 1977, Malaysia 1972, Malaysia 1974, New Zealand 1987
1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	Canada 1960, Canada 1962, Canada 1972, Fiji 1992, India 1989, India 1990, India 1998
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Spain 1989
0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	Austria 1960, Austria 1970, Austria 1983, Belgium 1960, Belgium 1961
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Belgium 1983, Belgium 1988, Israel 1960, Israel 1961, Israel 1966, Israel 1976, Italy 1960, Italy 1962, Italy 1964, Italy 1971, Netherlands 1960, Netherlands 1966, Netherlands 1967, Spain 1977
0	0	0	0	C	1	1	1	Austria 1990, Belgium 1964, Belgium 1965, Belgium 1973, Belgium 1974, Belgium 1977, Belgium 1982, Belgium 1993, Belgium 1999, Fiji 1999, Fiji 2000, New Zealand 1997, Switzerland 1960
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	New Zealand 1996
0	1	1	0	C	0.875	0.875	0.76	Italy 1972, Italy 1973, Italy 1975, Italy 1994, Italy 1996, Italy 1998, Spain 1982, Sri Lanka 1994

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Table A8. Duvergerian Extension of the Westminster model (Parl*FPTP*MPS*Fed*MinWG)

FPTP	MPS	Fed	MinWG	O	raw	PRI	product	Id
------	-----	-----	-------	---	-----	-----	---------	----

				(Parl)	consist.	consist.		
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	India 1989
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Fiji 1992, Papua New Guinea 1982
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Canada 1962, Canada 1972, Canada 1997, India 1977, India 1990, India 1998, Malaysia 1972,
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Austria 1990, Belgium 1993
0	1	1	0	C	1	1	1	Belgium 1999, Switzerland 1960
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	Austria 1960, Austria 1983
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Belgium 1965, Belgium 1982, Belgium 1983, Israel 1961, Italy 1962, Italy 1971, Netherlands 1967, New Zealand 1997
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	New Zealand 1987, Papua New Guinea 1997, Papua New Guinea 1985
1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	South Africa 1960, South Africa 1966
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Austria 1966, Austria 1970
0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	Belgium 1964, Belgium 1973, Belgium 1974, Belgium 1977, Belgium 1988, Fiji 1999, Fiji 2000, Israel 1960, Israel 1966, Israel 1976, Italy 1960, Italy 1964, Netherlands 1960, Netherlands 1966, New Zealand 1996, Spain 1977, Spain 1989
1	0	0	0	C	1	1	1	Fiji 1977, Fiji 1978, New Zealand 1960, New Zealand 1995, Sri Lanka 1972, Sri Lanka 1977, United Kingdom 1960, United Kingdom 1974
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	Belgium 1960, Italy 1972, Italy 1998
0	0	0	0	C	1	1	1	Belgium 1961, Italy 1973, Italy 1975, Italy 1994, Italy 1996, Spain 1982, Spain 1983, Sri Lanka 1989, Sri Lanka 1994
1	0	1	0	1	0.875	0.875	0.76	Canada 1960, Canada 1963, Canada 1968, Canada 1979, Canada 1984, India 1967, India 1978, India 1979, Malaysia 1974, Malaysia 1990

Table A9. A model of an authoritarian regime 1 (Parl*FPTP*OnePS*Unit*SinG)

FPTP	OnePS	Unit	SinG	O (Parl)	raw consist.	PRI consist.	product	Id
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Fiji 1978
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	New Zealand 1960, New Zealand 1987
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Fiji 1970
0	0	0	1	C	1	1	1	Austria 1966, Spain 1983, Spain 1989, Sri Lanka 1989
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Belgium 1960, Belgium 1961, Belgium 1964, Belgium 1965, Belgium 1973, Belgium 1974, Belgium 1977, Belgium 1982, Fiji 1999, Fiji 2000, New Zealand 1997
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	Canada 1960
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	Canada 1968, Canada 1997, India 1977, India 1978, Malaysia 1972, Malaysia 1990, United Kingdom 1960
1	1	0	1	C	1	1	1	Canada 1984, India 1967, Malaysia 1974, Sri Lanka 1977
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Fiji 1977, Fiji 1992, New Zealand 1995
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	New Zealand 1996
0	0	0	0	C	0.96	0.96	0.93	Austria 1960, Austria 1970, Austria 1983, Austria 1990, Belgium 1983, Belgium 1988, Belgium 1993, Belgium 1999, Israel 1960, Israel 1961, Israel 1966, Israel 1976, Italy 1960, Italy 1962, Italy 1964, Italy 1971, Italy 1972, Italy 1973, Italy 1975, Italy 1994, Italy 1996, Italy 1998, Netherlands 1960, Netherlands 1966, Netherlands 1967, Spain 1977, Spain 1982, Sri Lanka 1994, Switzerland 1960
1	0	0	0	C	0.92	0.92	0.85	Canada 1962, Canada 1963, Canada 1972, Canada 1979, India 1979, India 1989, India 1990, India 1998, Papua New Guinea 1997, Papua New Guinea 1982, Papua New Guinea 1985, Sri Lanka 1972, United Kingdom 1974

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Table A10. A model of an authoritarian regime 2 (Pres*FPTP*OnePS*Unit*SinG)

FPTP	OnePS	Unit	SinG	O (Pres)	raw consist.	PRI consist.	product	Id
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1978, Fiji 1970
0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1970
1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	New Zealand 1960, New Zealand 1987, Fiji 1970, Macedonia 1992
1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	Canada 1984, India 1967, Malaysia 1974, Sri Lanka 1977
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Canada 1960
0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	New Zealand 1996, Fiji 1970, Fiji 2006, Macedonia 1992, Macedonia 2002, Macedonia 2008, New Zealand 2003, New Zealand 2008
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Canada 1962, Canada 1963, Canada 1972, Canada 1979, India 1979, India 1989, India 1990, India 1998, Papua New Guinea 1997, Papua New Guinea 1982, Papua New Guinea 1985, Sri Lanka 1972, United Kingdom 1974
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Austria 1966, Spain 1983, Spain 1989, Sri Lanka 1989
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Belgium 1960, Belgium 1961, Belgium 1964, Belgium 1965, Belgium 1973, Belgium 1974, Belgium 1977, Belgium 1982, Fiji 1999, Fiji 2000, New Zealand 1997, Fiji 2006, Macedonia 1992, Macedonia 2002, Macedonia 2008, New Zealand 2003, New Zealand 2008
0	0	0	0	C	0	0	0	Austria 1960, Austria 1970, Austria 1983, Austria 1990, Belgium 1983, Belgium 1988, Belgium 1993, Belgium 1999, Israel 1960, Israel 1961, Israel 1966, Israel 1976, Italy 1960, Italy 1962, Italy 1964, Italy 1971, Italy 1972, Italy 1973, Italy 1975, Italy 1994, Italy 1996, Italy 1998, Netherlands 1960, Netherlands 1966, Netherlands 1967, Spain 1977, Spain 1982, Sri Lanka 1994, Switzerland 1960

Table A11. A model of an authoritarian regime 3 (Semi*FPTP*OnePS*Unit*SinG)

FPTP	OnePS	Unit	SinG	O (Semi)	raw consist.	PRI consist.	product	Id
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1978, Fiji 1970
1	1	0	1	C	0.25	0.25	0.0625	Canada 1984, India 1967, Malaysia 1974, Sri Lanka 1977
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Canada 1960, South Africa 1966,
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Fiji 1977, Fiji 1992, New Zealand 1995
1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	New Zealand 1960, New Zealand 1987
0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	/Fiji 1970(FPTP:0)(Oneps:1)/
1	0	0	0	C	0.07	0.07	0.005	Canada 1962, Canada 1963, Canada 1972, Canada 1979, India 1979, India 1989, India 1990, India 1998, Papua New Guinea 1997, Papua New Guinea 1982, Papua New Guinea 1985, Sri Lanka1972, United Kingdom 1974
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Canada 1968, Canada 1997, India 1977, India 1978, Malaysia 1972, Malaysia 1990, United Kingdom 1960, Canada 2004, South Africa 1960(Sing:1)/
0	0	0	1	C	0.25	0.25	0.06	Austria 1966, Spain 1983, Spain 1989, Sri Lanka 1989
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Belgium 1960, Belgium 1961, Belgium 1964, Belgium 1965, Belgium 1973, Belgium 1974, Belgium 1977, Belgium 1982, Fiji 1999, Fiji 2000, New Zealand 1997
0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	New Zealand 1996
0	0	0	0	C	0.03	0.03	0.001	Austria 1960, Austria 1970, Austria 1983, Austria 1990, Belgium 1983, Belgium 1988, Belgium 1993, Belgium 1999, Israel 1960, Israel 1961, Israel 1966, Israel 1976, Italy 1960, Italy 1962, Italy 1964, Italy 1971, Italy 1972, Italy 1973, Italy 1975, Italy 1994, Italy 1996, Italy1998, Netherlands 1960, Netherlands 1966, Netherlands 1967, Spain 1977, Spain 1982, Sri Lanka 1994, Switzerland 1960

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Table A12 Exploratory Pattern 1

FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	Ifed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG	O (Parl)	Id
		1			1	1				1			1	Austria 1990-2008 Belgium 1993-1998
		1			1	1						1	1	Belgium 1999-2008
1				1		1						1	1	India 1979
		1			1		1			1			1	Belgium 1965-1972 Belgium 1982
		1			1		1					1	1	Belgium 1964 Belgium 1973 Belgium 1977-1981
		1			1			1		1			1	Belgium 1983-1987, 1992 Israel 1961-65 1977-1980 1992-1994 2000 Italy 1962, 1971 Netherlands 1967
		1			1			1		1			1	Israel 1961-1965 1977-1980 1992-1994 2000
		1		Collection	1			1				1	1	Belgium 1988-1991, Israel 1966-1975 1984-1989 1996-1999 2001-2008, Italy 1964-1967 1970 1980-1993, Netherlands 1960-1965 1973-1976 1981 1998-2001
		1						1		1			1	Italy 1972
		1						1				1	1	Italy 1973-1974

Table A13. Exploratory Pattern 2

FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	Ifed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG	O (Parl)	Id
1				1				1			1		1	United Kingdom 1960-1973 1975-2008
1				1				1	1				1	United Kingdom 1974
1				1		1			1				1	Canada 1963-1967 1979
1				1		1					1		1	Canada 1968-1971 1974-1978 1980-1983 1988-1996 2000-2003 India 1978 1980-1984 1987- 1988, Malaysia 1990-1994 2008
1				1			1		1				1	Fiji 1977
1				1			1				1		1	New Zealand 1960-1986 1990- 1994
1			1				1				1		1	Fiji 1978-1981,

Table A14. Exploratory Pattern 3

FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	Ifed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG	O (Parl)	Id
1					1	1				1			1	India 1989,
1					1			1		1			1	Papua New Guinea 1982-1984
1					1		1			1			1	Fiji 1992-1998
1					1	1						1	1	India 1998 -2008
1					1			1				1	1	Papua New Guinea 1977-1981

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Table A15. Exploratory Pattern 4

FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	Ifed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG	O (Parl)	Id
1					1	1			1				1	Canada 1962 2004-2008, Canada 1972-1973 India 1990-1997
1					1	1					1		1	Canada 1997-1999 India 1977 Malaysia 1972-1973
		1			1		1		1				1	Belgium 1974-1976
1					1		1				1		1	New Zealand 1987-1989
		1			1			1	1				1	Israel 1976,1981-1983, 1990-1991, 1995 Italy1960-1961 , 1963 , 1968-1969, 1976-1979 Netherlands 1966, 1972, 1982 Spain 1977-1981, 1996-1999
		1			1			1			1		1	Spain 1989-1992
1					1			1	1				1	Papua New Guinea 1985-2001

Table A16. Exploratory Pattern 5

FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	Ifed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG	O (Parl)	Id
		1		1			1			1			1	Belgium 1960
		1		1		1				1			1	Austria 1960-1965, 1983-1989,
		1		1			1					1	1	Belgium 1961-1963
1				1			1					1	1	New Zealand 1995

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Table A17 Exploratory Pattern 6

FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	Ifed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG	O (Parl)	Id
		1		1				1	1				1	Italy 1975 Spain 1982, 1993-1995, 2000-2008
		1		1		1			1				1	Austria 1970
		1		1				1			1		1	Spain 1983-1988
		1		1		1					1		1	Austria 1966-1969, 1971-1982

Table A18 Exploratory Pattern 7

Ftp	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	Ifed	MinG	MinwG	SinG	Srpl	Outcome	Id
1			1					1			1		Semi	Sri Lanka 1977-1988
1			1					1	M	M	M	M	Pres	South Africa 1966-1969
1			1				1				1		Parl	Fiji 1978-1981
1			1			1					1		Parl	Canada 1984-1987 India 1967-1976 1985-1986 Malaysia 1974-1989 1995-2007

Table A19 Exploratory analysis of the use of Alternative Vote Electoral System

FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	Ifed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG	O (Parl)	Id
	1				1		1					1	1	Fiji 1999,
	1			tion	1			1	M	M	M	M	1	/Papua New Guinea 2002
	1			1			1		M	M	M	M	1	Fiji 2006

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Table A20. Exploratory analysis of the use of presidentialism

FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	Ifed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG	O (pres)	Id
1				1				1	M	M	M	M	1	South Africa 1960
1			1					1	M	M	M	M	1	South Africa 1966
		1			1	1			M	M	M	M	1	Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996
		1		1				1				1	1	South Africa1994

Table A21. Exploratory analysis of the use of semi presidentialism

FPTP	AV	PR	OnePS	TwoPS	MPS	Fed	Unit	Ifed	MinG	MinWG	SinG	SrplG	O (Semi)	Id
		1		1				1	1				1	Sri Lanka 1994
		1		1				1			1		1	Sri Lanka 1989
1				1				1				1	1	Sri Lanka1972
1			1					1			1		1	Sri Lanka 1977
		1			1		1			1			1	Macedonia 2002
		1		1			1		M	M	M	M	1	/Macedonia 2008