

# **DISUNITED IN DIVERSITY: FORMATION OF THE EU ENERGY POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA**

By  
Olha Koshchiyenko

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Department of International Relations European Studies

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Supervisor: Professor Xymena Kurowska

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## **ABSTRACT**

The current study attempts to contribute to the debate on formation of the EU energy policy towards Russia. The main purpose of the thesis is to establish, how the EU Member States' perception of Russia influences their energy policy choices and contributes to the formation of the official EU position in the EU-Russia energy relations. The issue is analyzed from the constructivist perspective, thus departing from the assumption that international relations are a social construction, where identities and perceptions of the actors substantially influence the actual decision making. The research question is answered by means of analysis of official positions of the two EU Member States and the EU itself concerning the two recent cases on the EU-Russia energy relations agenda. The two considered cases are the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction and the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009.

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## Introduction

The issue of the EU-Russian relations enjoys particular popularity among the scholars of International Relations (IR) for already a significantly long period of time. The scholars' interest towards this issue is easily accountable: the two powers are the major political and economic players in Europe and far beyond its borders. Due to the high level of geopolitical, economic and cultural influence of both actors in the region, Russia and Europe have always been of particular importance for each other. The two actors have been traditionally portrayed as each others *significant Other* centuries before the European Union started to exist in its contemporary form, thus contributing to each other's identity formation<sup>1</sup>. Many of the EU Member States are connected with Russia with the ties of common memories and history, as well as with strong economic and political ties.

As the Estonian historian Kaido Janson has reasonably noted, in the realm of contemporary EU-Russia relations there is "one united Europe and 25 Russias"<sup>2</sup>. To be more specific, one can say that after 2007 two more Russias have emerged in the European political outlook. Indeed, although 27 European states are united into a union and are actively developing their common foreign policy line, each of them has its own perception of Russia and therefore a different point of view on the EU policy towards its big Eastern Neighbour.

The discrepancies in the creation of the EU foreign policy became especially pronounced after the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007. The attitude of the "new" and the "old" Member States towards Russia started to often come into conflict with each other, weakening the all-EU stance towards the Kremlin<sup>3</sup>. The desire of the "old" EU Member States to establish a special relationship with Russia led to their leaders often disregarding the pre-agreed EU positions and

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<sup>1</sup> Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other : "The East" in European identity formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

<sup>2</sup> Kristian Nielsen, "Opportunities and Limitations for the Baltic States of the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership," *Baltic Security & Defence Review* 9 (2007): 114.

<sup>3</sup> James Hughes, "EU relations with Russia: partnership or asymmetric interdependency?," Book Section, August 2006, 2, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/651/> (accessed June 3, 2010).

working on the bilateral relations of their countries with Russia<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, many of the “new” Member States expressed reluctance to closely co-operate with Russia, in a large measure due to their disagreement with Russia’s interpretations of the past and their common history<sup>5</sup>. Such division within the EU has substantially weakened the position of the Union towards Russia, and allowed Moscow to assume that the EU as a whole should not be taken seriously<sup>6</sup>. Russia did not fail to use the confusion in the ranks of its economic and political partner, successfully proceeding with the “divide et impera” strategy<sup>7</sup>.

The issue of how the all-EU policy towards Russia is formed and what is the actual influence of the EU Member States on its formation attracts attention of many IR scholars. A number of scholarly works have analyzed the Member States’ positions towards Russia, dividing the Member States into groups on the basis of various criteria. Thus, Branghiroli and Carta suggested that the Member State’s attitude towards Russia “is influenced by the strength of economic flows, energy dependence, preferences for projects of regional security, and existence of disputes and projects of energy supply”<sup>8</sup>. Leonard and Popescu consider that the attitude of the Member States towards Russia is predetermined by their history, geography and interests<sup>9</sup>.

The growth of the oil prices in the 2000s, followed by growing economic and political confidence of Russia has changed the scope of the EU-Russia relations, putting energy in the forefront. The issue of energy in the EU-Russia relations started to be strongly politicized since

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<sup>4</sup> Katinka Barysh, “Russia, realism and EU unity,” *Centre for European Reform Policy Brief* (2007): 2.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas Gomart, “EU-Russia Relations. Toward a Way Out of Depression,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (July 2008): 4.

<sup>6</sup> Barysh, “Russia, realism and EU unity,” 2.

<sup>7</sup> Katinka Barysch, *The EU and Russia: Strategic partners or squabbling neighbours?* (Centre for European Reform report, May 2004).

<sup>8</sup> Stefano Braghiroli and Caterina Carta, “The EU’s attitude towards Russia: condemned to be divided? An analysis of the

Member States and Members of the European Parliament’s preferences” (draft article): 1.

<sup>9</sup> Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, *A power audit of EU-Russia relations*. (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2007), 9.

2004, since the vast majority of the new EU Member states is almost fully dependent on Russian energy supplies<sup>10</sup>.

Most of the scholars researching the question of the EU-Russia energy relations look at the issue from the standpoint of either realism or liberalism, thus making a stand for either pursuit of power or pure economic interest to be the most crucial determinant of the MS's energy policy choices. Although both theories provide plausible explanations for the issue, it seems that these approaches still fail to explain some of the controversies in the EU-Russia energy relations. I believe that a number of other important factors, such as the influence of mutual perceptions formed by common memories, history and interpretation of the past, as well as identities and self-identification of the states are somehow neglected by the scholars. One of the few encountered papers, which suggest that identities and history of the Member States might have an influence on the formation of the EU-Russia relations, is the "Power audit of EU-Russia relations" by Leonard and Popescu. However, in their study the authors do not go beyond mere subdivision of the Member States into subgroups, not looking specifically into the realm of the two powers' energy relations formation.

### **1. The aim of research and its importance**

My research will attempt to contribute to the debate on the formation of the EU energy policy towards Russia. I will analyze the issue from the constructivist perspective, thus departing from the assumption that international relations are a social construction, where identities and perceptions of the actors substantially influence the actual decision making.

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<sup>10</sup> Tatyana Romanova, "The Political Economy of EU-Russian Energy-relations," in *Political Economy of Energy in Europe: Forces of Fragmentation and Integration*, ed. Gunnar Fermann (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2009, 2008), 76.

In my research I will intend to answer the following research question:

***How does the EU Member States' perception of Russia influence their energy policy choices and contribute to the formation of the official EU position in the EU-Russia energy relations?***

The answer to the suggested research question might help the EU to better understand its weaker and stronger points and to further improve its position in the EU-Russia energy dialogue. It might help the EU Member States understand the reasons for their own and their opponents' positions, which would lead to a more successful dialogue and achievement of a consensus on the issue of energy relations with Russia within the EU. Recent developments and events in the sphere of the EU-Russia energy relations make current research relevant and up-to-date for contemporary international relations.

## **2. Organization of the research**

The analysis of the influence of the EU Member States' perception of Russia on the formation of the EU energy policy towards Russia will be held within two parts.

The First chapter of my thesis will be dedicated to the theoretical framework of my research. It will discuss the constructivist approach to International Relations, giving a closer look to the role of interaction in the creation of identities and interests of states, as well as to the influence of identities, interests and perceptions on the decisions taken by the state officials. Further on, I will introduce the conceptual framework of my research, with particular attention being granted to the description of analyzed cases. In the final subchapters of the first chapter I will discuss the sources of the analyzed data, as well as will give a detailed description of the chosen research methodology.

The empirical part of my research will consist of the consecutive analysis of the Polish, German and the all-EU visions of the EU-Russia energy relations. I have chosen to analyze the



positions of particularity Poland and Germany, as I believe that these two countries are the most significant representatives of the most extreme “camps” within the EU, often advocating the opposite policy lines, which they believe the EU should pursue towards Russia (whereas Poland in the judgment of most of the scholars belongs to the “camp” of the so-called “Eastern Divorced”<sup>11</sup> or the “New Cold Warriors”<sup>12</sup>, Germany is a representative of the camp of “Strategic Partners”<sup>13</sup>). Due to the time constraints I will limit down my research to the analysis of the official positions of both states towards the two particular cases: the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction and the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009. I have selected these concrete cases for my analysis, as to my opinion they best represent the two possible variants of the Member States’ attitude towards the event that occurred. Both of the states analyzed were united in their criticism of the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009 and the sequential cut off of the gas supplies to the EU. On the other hand, the official positions of the two states on the appropriateness of the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction are antithetic. In my analysis I will dedicate particular attention to establishing both states’ perception of Russia and their vision of the wishful EU energy policy. Further on, I will analyze the official EU position on both cases, thus examining which country (and thus which camp) had more influence within the EU to upload its political choice to the EU level.

Based on the analysis of the official positions of Poland, Germany and the EU, I will draw conclusions about which of the “camps” within the EU has been more successful in uploading its ideas to the all-EU level, as well as about the influence of identities of the states and their perception of Russia on their position concerning the desired EU energy policy towards Russia.

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<sup>11</sup> Braghiroli and Carta, “The EU’s attitude towards Russia: condemned to be divided? An analysis of the Member States and Members of the European Parliament’s preferences,” 13.

<sup>12</sup> Leonard and Popescu, *A power audit of EU-Russia relations.*, 2.

<sup>13</sup> Leonard and Popescu, *A power audit of EU-Russia relations.*

# Chapter 1 – Theoretical framework

## 1.1 Constructivism

The term “constructivism” first entered the lexicon of International Relations (IR) in the end of 1980ies<sup>14</sup>. At that time it was applied to a wide range of modern and postmodern approaches, “which shared an assumption that the political world is a social and constructed phenomenon as opposed to given and objective”<sup>15</sup>. However, it was recognized to be one of the three main approaches to IR studies (besides realism and liberalism) only in the late 1990ies<sup>16</sup>. According to Adler, constructivism occupies the “middle ground” between the rationalist and poststructuralist approaches to IR<sup>17</sup>. Whereas rationalists assume that the world is static and consists of “asocial egoists who are primarily concerned with material interests”<sup>18</sup>, constructivists, who in principle do not deny the role of the interests, would tie them more directly to the identity of the subject<sup>19</sup>. In their turn, identities and interests can not be detached from the social meaning<sup>20</sup>. Further difference between rationalists and constructivists lies in the sphere of perception of rationality of decisions. Whereas rationalists consider self-interest to be the predominant determinant of rationality of decisions thus minimizing the role of context, constructivists add a social dimension thereto<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen, *Constructing international relations: the next generation* (M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 115.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> V. Kubáľková, *Foreign policy in a constructed world* (M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 4.

<sup>17</sup> Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground:: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (September 1, 1997): 319-363.

<sup>18</sup> Karin Fierke, “Constructivism,” in *International relations theories: discipline and diversity*, by Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford University Press, 2007), 171.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 172.

### 1.1.1. The role of interaction

As well as neorealism, constructivism by Wendt (who is one of the main theorists of constructivism) argues that state is the primary actor in the world politics. Constructivists suggest that states are “self-organized units constructed from within by the discursive practices of individuals and social groups”<sup>22</sup>. Moreover, being self-organized entities, each of the states possesses an identity as a sovereign actor, which is not tied to interaction with the other states<sup>23</sup>. Further on, Wendt argues that states “possess certain essential needs that arise from their nature as self-organized political units: needs for physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem”<sup>24</sup>. Wendt suggests that “it is only with this starting point – the state as a “pre-social” actor with certain basic needs – that we can see the impact of interaction at the system level on the interests and identities of states”<sup>25</sup>.

Constructivists suggest that global politics is guided “by the intersubjectively shared ideas, norms, and values held by actors”<sup>26</sup>. In their approach to IR constructivists focus on the intersubjective dimension of knowledge, as they aim to emphasize the social aspect of human existence, i.e. the role of shared ideas as the ideational structure that constrains and shapes behaviour<sup>27</sup>. Wendt suggests that states form their identities by means of participating in the system of “intersubjective understandings” that affect their perceptions of *the Self* and *the Other*<sup>28</sup>. According to Wendt, states base their view of each other on the experiences of previous interaction, which form their expectations for the future<sup>29</sup>. The intersubjective knowledge, which creates identities and interests, is constructed every day in the process of interaction<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup> Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,” *International Security* 25, no. 2 (October 1, 2000): 192.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 189.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics.,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 394.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 393-395.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 403-405.

As Hopf suggests, “[t]he meanings of actions of members of the community, as well as the actions of *the Others*, become fixed through practice; boundaries of understanding become well-known”<sup>31</sup>. Thus, daily social practice leads to predictability of the actions of *the Other*. Wendt argues that while interacting with other states, actors might significantly redefine themselves. In the process of interaction the two actor states entitled Ego and Alter take on certain roles in the emerging situation and endow the other actor with the corresponding counter-roles<sup>32</sup>. Wendt suggests that in the initial stage of interaction between states, the most likely behaviour of the both states is that of the egoistic self-help type. However, in the course of interaction states might learn to be more other-regarding and interactive<sup>33</sup>.

Having engaged into contacts, the actor states define and redefine their roles and interests; Alter forms its views basing on the interpretations of the actions of Ego<sup>34</sup>. The assumption about the intentions of Ego cause a responsive action of the Alter, which results in a cyclic interaction, forming an environment for the formation of stable perceptions of *the Self* and *the Other*<sup>35</sup>.

### 1.1.2 Identities, interests and perceptions

The concepts of identity and interests belong to the main concepts of constructivism. They are vital for understanding the constructivist explanation of why states behave the way they do. Wendt’s explanation of the both notions and of their interconnectedness sounds in the following way:

“Identities refer to who or what actors *are*. They designate social kinds or states of being. Interests refer to what actors *want*. They designate motivations that

<sup>31</sup> Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 179.

<sup>32</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 328-329.

<sup>33</sup> Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism,” 193.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 192-193.

<sup>35</sup> Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics,” 405.

help explain behavior. ... Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests. Identities may themselves be chosen in light of interests, as some rationalists have argued, but those interests themselves presuppose still deeper identities. However, identities by themselves do not explain action, since being is not the same the thing as wanting, and we cannot “read off” the latter from the former. This suggests that the efforts of partisans of each concept to ignore or trump the other are misguided. Without interests identities have no motivational force, without identities interests have no direction”<sup>36</sup>.

The behaviour of states as actors in the international stage is motivated by various interests, rooted in collective, corporate, type and role identities. As mentioned in the previous subchapter, the four main interests of the state according to Wendt are physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem<sup>37</sup>. Whereas the first three interests are of predominantly economic and political nature, the fourth one can be rather explained by an internal desire of each of the individuals in the state for respect or status.

Naturally, different states form the identity of their *Selves* in different ways, which leads to differences in their interests. Thus, the interests of the EU, which positions itself as a normative power, will differ from the interests of Russia, which is the carrier of a great power identity. It might thus be expected that the EU will develop interests basing on its Self-perception as a supporter of the European norms, and the main interest of Russia will be to defend (or return) it status of a great power.

This thesis will approach the issue of formation of the EU energy policy towards Russia through the theoretical framework of constructivism. In my research I will consider the EU a

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<sup>36</sup> Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 231.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 235.

complex actor, whose identity and perception of Russia might be influenced by the Member States' identities and perceptions of Russia.

The two earliest and most significant constructivist scholarly works dedicated to Russia's and Europe's perception of each other were written by Iver Neumann. In his books "Russia and the idea of Europe: a study in identity and international relations"<sup>38</sup> and "Uses of *the Other*: "The East" in European identity formation"<sup>39</sup> Neumann discussed the role of Russia in the formation of the European *Self*, as well as the role of Europe in the formation of Russian identity. Taking the works of Neumann as a starting point, I will borrow Neumann's categories of *the Other* and *the Self* and integrate them into my research methodology. Departing from the concept introduced by Neumann, I will look at how identities and perceptions of the EU (which is the contemporary representation of Europe) influence the formation of its policy towards Russia in the modern times.

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<sup>38</sup> Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the idea of Europe: a study in identity and international relations* (Routledge, 1996).

<sup>39</sup> Neumann, *Uses of the Other : "The East" in European identity formation*.

## **1.2 Research methodology**

### **1.2.1 Conceptual framework**

Looking for the answer to my research question, I will vastly deal with the concept of uploading. In the IR terminology uploading means “projecting ideas from the national to the EU level and the emergence of new structures at the EU level”<sup>40</sup>. This process can be also called “Europeanization upside down”, as opposed to downloading – “domestic change caused by an EU-generated impact”<sup>41</sup>. According to Major, “the way in which European integration affects a state is shaped by how successful it has been in ‘uploading’ its institutional models, policy preferences and ‘ways of doing things’ to the EU level”<sup>42</sup>. By successful uploading of their ideas to the EU level states in a way “shape” the EU according to their views, standards and needs.

In my research I will attempt to find out, which of the “camps” within the EU has so far been more successful in uploading their ideas about how the EU-Russia energy relations should look like to the EU level, i.e. “whose” ideas actually make the EU energy policy towards Russia the way it is.

### **1.2.2 Case selection justification**

The two cases I have selected to be the focus of my study are the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which goes from Russia to Germany bypassing the traditional transit countries, and the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute of 2009, which resulted in considerable reduction of gas supplies from Russia to the European Union for several weeks in January 2009.

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<sup>40</sup> Claudia Major, “Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy - Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?1,” *Politics* 25, no. 3 (9, 2005): 177.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

### 1.2.2.1 The Nord Stream gas pipeline

The Nord Stream (which was originally called the Northern European Gas pipeline) is a gas pipeline that is planned to be built under the Baltic Sea to link the Portova Bay (Russia) with Greifswald (Germany). The gas pipeline is to be 1220 km long and it is planned to consist of two parallel lines. As reported in the official Nord Stream website, the first one, with the transmission capacity of 27.5 bcm a year is due to be completed in 2011. The second one with the annual transmission capacity of 55 bcm, is due for completion in 2012<sup>43</sup>. It is expected that the Nord Stream will transport natural gas to supply both the EU businesses and private households<sup>44</sup>. Initially 51 per cent of the shares in the project were owned by the Russian energy company Gazprom, and the two German participants of the project – BASF and E.ON controlled 24.5% each. In November 2007 the Dutch company N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie joined the project, receiving a 9 per cent share in the company from the two German partners<sup>45</sup>. Thus, the Nord Stream gas pipeline is a joint project of the four major gas companies: OAO Gazprom, BASF SE/Wintershall Holding GmbH, E.ON Ruhrgas AG and N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie.

The Nord Stream gas pipeline belongs to the most important contemporary developments in the sphere of energy. Successful realization of this project will enable Russia's biggest energy company Gazprom to supply Russian gas to Gazprom's most important market in Germany circumventing the transit countries located between Russia and the Western Europe. Depending on which attitude towards cooperation with Russia in general and towards this project in particular is predominant in the European Union, this project might be seen either as a beneficial opportunity or as a threat<sup>46</sup>.

Looking at the current state of the debate on the European Union energy security, it is noticeable that Germany belongs to the countries that are most enthusiastic about the Nord

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<sup>43</sup> "The Pipeline- Nord Stream AG," <http://www.nord-stream.com/en/the-pipeline.html> (accessed May 26, 2010).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Jakub Godzimirski, "Energy Security and the Politics of Identity," in *Political Economy of Energy in Europe: Forces of Fragmentation and Integration*, by Gunnar Fermand (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts Verlag), 173-206.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.



Stream gas pipeline construction, whereas Poland is one of the countries that are most unsatisfied with the Nord Stream project development.

#### **1.2.2.2 The Russia-Ukraine gas dispute - 2009**

The relations of Russia and Ukraine were quite strained since the very collapse of the USSR. One of the major spheres of misunderstandings and disagreements has always been the issue of gas. The pre-conditions for misunderstandings in this sphere can be traced back to the 1930ies, when the infrastructure for the Soviet gas industry was started to be built from Ukraine. Although with the course of time the focus of energy activity moved to Western Siberia, Ukraine still remained the central part of the gas pipeline network. Thus after the collapse of the USSR the vital assets of Gazprom are situated in Ukraine and therefore not under the Gazprom's direct control, which made the ties between the industries of the two countries massive, difficult to unwind and putting a lot of constraints on both of them. The disputes about the gas between Russia and Ukraine started already in 1992, when the USSR has fallen apart. From the beginning of 1990ies Ukraine was not able to fully pay for the Russian gas deliveries. In addition, Russia was accusing Ukraine of stealing gas from the transit pipelines. As a result, there occurred short-term cuts to gas deliveries to Western Europe in 1992 and 1993<sup>47</sup>. After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 the relations between the two countries became aggravated, and soon after it in January 2006 the first 'gas war' occurred, when Ukraine didn't agree with the prices for gas suggested by Russia, and Russia limited the gas supplies to Ukraine in response<sup>48</sup>.

Despite a number of agreements signed between Russia and Ukraine in the period between 2006 and 2009, the gas conflict came at its zenith in January 2009. In December 2008, Ukraine stated that it is not able to pay off its debt for the gas on time. After a long dispute and a long-lasting period of negotiations, Ukraine has paid the debt on the 30<sup>th</sup> of December 2008.

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<sup>47</sup> Jonathan Stern, "The Russian Natural Gas 'Bubble': Consequences for European Gas Markets," (1995 ): 60.

<sup>48</sup> "Gazprom Website - History", <http://old.gazprom.ru/eng/articles/article31044.shtml>

However, Gazprom demanded additional \$614 million as a penalty for late payment, which Ukraine refused to pay. On January 1, 2009, as there was no further contract for gas supplies for the Ukrainian consumer, as well as no financial guarantee from the Ukrainian side, the gas supplies to Ukraine were cut<sup>49</sup>.

On January 2, 2009, the European Union Member States that received gas from Russia through the gas pipeline going through the territory of Ukraine (namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland and Slovakia) reported that gas pressure in their pipelines had significantly dropped. Starting from January, 7 several EU countries reported a major fall in Russian gas supplies, Bulgaria and Slovakia being the most affected. The EU insisted on the immediate renewals of the gas supplies. The official Russian and Ukrainian interpretations of the reduction of gas supply to Europe were completely opposite: whereas Russia declared that Ukraine has blocked all the transit pipelines<sup>50</sup>, Ukraine stated that it was Russia to reduce the volume of gas delivery to the European consumers<sup>51</sup>. After two weeks of tough negotiations the gas supplies to both the EU and Ukraine restarted on January 20, 2009<sup>52</sup>.

The reaction of the EU Member States was split: some of them believed that it was Russia to stop the gas supply to Europe; the others considered that it was Ukraine to block the transit gas pipelines. However, all of the Member States were united in that a prompt and constructive dialogue between the authorities of the two involved states is needed. Altogether, the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine has negatively influenced the image of both states: the reliability of Ukraine as a transit state and of Russia as an energy supplier was severely undermined in the eyes of the European Union.

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<sup>49</sup> "Gas Supplies to Ukraine Cut 100 Per Cent", <http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2009/january/article67879/>

<sup>50</sup> "Ukraine Has Closed the Last Remaining Pipeline to Europe", <http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2009/january/article67854/>.

<sup>51</sup> "Bolhariya Perestala Otrymuvaty Rosijskyj Haz ["Bulgaria Stopped Receiving the Russian Gas"]", <http://eunews.unian.net/ukr/detail/189717>.

<sup>52</sup> "Russian gas reaches Europe again | Reuters," <http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5091KI20090121?sp=true> (accessed May 27, 2010).

### 1.2.3 Sources of data

My research will consist of an analysis of official speeches, interviews and press-conference statements of the German and Polish statesmen and of the EU officials, in which the issues of the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction and the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute of 2009 are touched, as well as of an analysis of their critical evaluation in the German and Polish press.

For analysis of the official position of the Republic of Poland I will consider significant the positions of the incumbent President and Prime Minister of Poland, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Polish Minister of Environment. I will also consider significant the positions of the Polish officials, who are currently not in office, but occupied corresponding positions for any period of time since 2001 (for the case of Nord Stream gas pipeline project) or in 2008-2009 when the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009 occurred.

For analysis of the official position of the Federal Republic of Germany I will consider representative the positions of the incumbent President and Federal Chancellor of Germany, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, German Minister of State for Europe, and German Minister of Environment. As well as in the Polish case, I will also consider significant the positions of the German officials, who are currently not in office, but occupied corresponding positions for any period of time since 2001 (for the case of Nord Stream gas pipeline project) or in 2008-2009 during the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009.

For the analysis of the official EU position I will consider significant the positions of the EU President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the European Commission, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Commissioner for Energy as well as the Communications of the European Commission.

The document will be considered topic-related if it contains mentions about Russia and the Nord Stream gas pipeline and/or the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009.

The speeches, interviews and press-conference statements for analysis will be retrieved from the official web-sites of the President and Prime Minister of Poland, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Environment; from the official web-sites of the President and Federal Chancellor of Germany, and the Ministry of Environment of Germany, as well as from the official web-site of the European Commission. The newspaper interviews and press analysis will be retrieved from the Polish newspapers “Gazeta Wyborcza”, “Rzeczpospolita” and “Polska the Times”; the German newspapers “Die Zeit”, “Süddeutsche Zeitung” and “Die Welt”; and the EU edition “European Voice”.

The research will base on the analysis of texts in their original languages, i.e. in the languages in which they appear in the official web-sites of the Presidents and Ministries, and in the newspapers. Therefore the majority of the texts in the analyzed text corpus will be in German and Polish. The citations provided in the practical part of my research will be translated by me into English where needed, while references to the web-sites from which the documents in their original languages can be retrieved will be available in the bibliography.

### 1.2.4 Content and discourse analysis

The methodology I have chosen to analyze my data will be predominantly discourse analytic, with content analysis forming the initial part of it. The reason why I consider discourse analytic methodology to be suitable to deal with my research question is that it is founded on a strong social constructivist epistemology<sup>53</sup>. It is used to explore how the socially produced ideas are created and thus how the social reality is produced<sup>54</sup>.

As Crawford puts it, “discourse analysis assumes that discourse – the content and construction of meaning and the organization of knowledge in a particular realm – is central to social and political life”<sup>55</sup>. Discourse establishes the terms of intelligibility of thought, speech and action. Therefore understanding of discourses leads to understanding of the underlying logic of the social and political organization of a certain field of action<sup>56</sup>.

According to Neuendorf, “content analysis is a summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method, including an observance of the standards of objectivity/inter-subjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability ... and replicability”<sup>57</sup>. Content analysis measures data as they “naturally” occur, focusing on the message component and the unit of data collection<sup>58</sup>.

Besides the fact that discourse and content analysis view the texts from completely different philosophical bases, I believe that these methodologies can successfully complement each other. I will try to combine the two methodologies, using the more structured and formal

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<sup>53</sup> Bill Harley, Nelson Phillips, and Cynthia Hardy, “Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?,” *Qualitative Methods*: 20.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>55</sup> Neta Crawford, “Understanding Discourse: A Method of Ethical Argument Analysis,” *Qualitative Methods* (Spring 2004): 22.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Kimberly Neuendorf, “Content analysis: A contrast and complement to discourse analysis.,” *Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Qualitative Methods* 2(1) (2004): 33.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

forms of discourse analysis and the more interpretative forms of content analysis in my study<sup>59</sup>. The role of content analysis in my research will be to demonstrate the performative links underlying the discourse analysis<sup>60</sup>. Using solely the techniques of content analysis would be not appropriate for my research, as classical content analysis assumes that an independent reality exists rather than is socially constructed, which would contradict the constructivist perspective of my study. On the other hand, being a part of a broader discourse analytic methodology, it brings in more objectivity as well as helps structure the data.

In order to use content analysis as a part of discourse analytic methodology, I will weaken the basic assumption of content analysis that “meaning is stable enough to be considered in an objective sense”<sup>61</sup>. While using content analysis within the discourse analytic approach, I will modify slightly in order for the two approaches to become more compatible. Thus, the categories in my analysis will emerge from the data rather than will be taken for granted from some external theory. In contrast to classical content analysis, which focuses on the text abstracted from the context in which it was produced, the discursive content analysis will locate the text into the social context, as well as well relate it to other texts and discourses. The issue of validity will be dealt with in a similar way as it is dealt with in the discourse analysis, i.e. the results will be considered to be valid as long as they will demonstrate how patterns in the meanings are constitutive of reality<sup>62</sup>. In general, I will use content analysis in order to find out what is rhetorically stated in the texts concerning the analyzed issues. It will help me establish which themes are stressed as important in the speeches and thus might be considered important for the state.

For better structuring and organization of content analysis of the selected texts I will use ATLAS.ti – the scientific software package for qualitative and quantitative data analysis. I will

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<sup>59</sup> Harley, Phillips, and Hardy, “Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis,” 22.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 21.

import the texts selected for analysis into the ATLAS.ti programme, thus creating a text corpus – a structured set of texts, which will be stored as a hermeneutic unit within the programme and further electronically and manually processed. Further on, I will subdivide the created text corpus into three text subcorpora, each containing selected texts representing the Polish, the German and the EU position correspondingly. Having established, which topics in the analyzed texts (further on called categories) are of major importance for my research, I will create an ATLAS.ti coding system by assigning the names of the categories to the ATLAS.ti codes. Codes will be used as classification devices in order to create sets of related information units for further comparison and analysis<sup>63</sup>.

Having performed the content analysis of the texts, I will proceed to the discourse analysis, which will be used to further contextualize the statements. I will try to further explore, how participants construct categories. Further on, I will try to interpret the received results and to draw conclusions basing on the results received through the framework of both content and discourse analysis.

#### **1.2.4.1 Limitations of the chosen research methodology**

As any other research methodology, the chosen research method has its disadvantages and limitations.

The first and probably the most important limitation of the chosen research methodology is the difficulty to identify the bounds of the relevant discourse. The notion of discourse may refer to a particular group of texts, but more importantly – to the social practices which these texts discuss<sup>64</sup>. Therefore, as Roxanne Doty puts it, “any discourse is intrinsically open-ended and incomplete. ... Any fixing of a discourse and the identities that are constructed by it, then,

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<sup>63</sup> *ATLAS.ti 5.0 Help Manual*, 2010.

<sup>64</sup> Crawford, “Understanding Discourse: A Method of Ethical Argument Analysis,” 24.

can only ever be of a partial nature.”<sup>65</sup> In order to if not eliminate than at least reduce this limitation, I have delimited sources of data to be under analysis, as well as limited down my research to analysis of the official positions of the two states and the EU concerning the two selected cases. I have decided to stop adding texts to the analyzed text corpus, when the data analyzed will reach the point of saturation, i.e. when every next added text will not significantly influence the received results.

The second and the most often addressed limitation of the chosen research methodology is the issue of validity and reliability of the obtained results. The reliability of results received by means of discursive methodology is sometimes brought into question, as the research data interpretation is claimed to be rather subjective. Indeed, every researcher tends to come up with his own set of categories, as well as tends to pay attention to some specific background information, which might be not noticed by his colleague. However, I believe that in the case when the same case studies are selected for analysis, the same research question is addressed and more or less the same text corpus is analyzed, the difference in categories should not in principle lead to big discrepancies in the conclusions, which might be drawn from the analysis.

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<sup>65</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial encounters* (U of Minnesota Press, 1996), 6.



## Chapter 2 -The Polish vision of the EU-Russia energy relations

In order to establish the Polish vision of the EU-Russia energy relations, I have analyzed the speeches and press conference statements of the Polish officials, as well as their analysis in press. For my analysis I have chosen eight texts concerning the issue of the Nord Stream gas pipeline and four texts in which the issue of the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute - 2009 is discussed. Most of the texts analyzed are speeches of Donald Tusk, who has been the Prime Minister of Poland since November 2007. I have also considered significant analysis of his speeches, statements and press conference addresses in the Polish press. Being one of the key figures in the Polish policy-making, Donald Tusk is one of the main representatives of the official position of the state. One more important figure in the Polish foreign policy is Radosław Sikorski, who has been the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland since November 2007. There are two speeches of him in the corpus of texts I have selected for my analysis. The first one is the speech held by him in 2009, in which he gives an account of the Polish foreign policy of 2009 to the Polish President, the Prime Minister and the Head of Parliament. The second one is his interview to “Gazeta Wyborcza” in January 2009 concerning the role of the EU in the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute -2009. Further on, the text corpus also includes a speech of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (the Prime Minister of Poland in October 2005 - July 2006), held in June 2006 in the Baltic Sea States Summit in Reykjavik. Two more documents analyzed are an official statement of Władysław Stasiak, who was the Chief of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland in July 2009-April 2010, and an interview of the former deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economy of Poland Janusz Steinhoff to “Polska The Times”.

Having gone through the speeches of the Polish officials touching upon the issues of the Nord Stream gas pipeline and the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute - 2009 as well as through their analysis in press, I have singled out the following categories in them:

1. ***The Self.*** Depending on their audience and on the issues brought up in their speeches, Polish officials mention two different *Selves* in their speeches – Poland itself and the European Union. Thus, there are two subcategories here:
  - a. **Self (Poland);**
  - b. **Self (the European Union, or Europe).**
2. ***The Other.*** There are two *Others* that can be singled out in the speeches of the Polish officials touching upon the issues of the Nord Stream gas pipeline and the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute - 2009. The first one is Russia; the second one can be conventionally called *the Other within the EU* – these are the countries within the EU that do not share Polish view on the EU energy policy towards Russia. Thus, here as well there are two subcategories:
  - a. **The Other (Russia);**
  - b. **The Other (within the EU).**
3. ***Relations with Russia.*** The Polish officials would touch upon two major topics that can be attributed to this category: the overall Polish-Russian relations and the possible opportunities for cooperation with Russia. Therefore, this category can be split into the following subcategories:
  - a. **Poland-Russia relations vision;**
  - b. **Cooperation with Russia.**
4. ***Polish vision of the EU energy policy.*** This category includes all the statements of the Polish officials concerning the desirable EU energy policy.

In order to further analyze the text corpus, I have imported the selected texts into the ATLAS.ti software. I have created a coding system by assigning the names of the abovementioned categories and subcategories to the ATLAS.ti codes. Further on, I have assigned the codes to the parts of the texts discussing the corresponding issues.

According to the results output automatically generated by ATLAS.ti, the issue most often touched upon in the analyzed documents is the Polish vision of the EU energy policy. This issue is mentioned in the analyzed texts nine times (see Table 1). Interestingly, the Polish officials have only expressed their view on the desirable EU energy policy towards Russia when talking about the Nord Stream gas pipeline. This issue was not touched upon in any of the analyzed documents concerning the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009. The second most often encountered subcategory is the subcategory of *the Other (Russia)*. This issue is mentioned in the texts seven times. In contrast to the previous category, the issue of *the Other (Russia)* is mostly discussed in the texts concerning the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009 (6 times), and mentioned only once in the text on the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline. The issue of *Self (the EU)* and *Self (Poland)* are touched upon in the texts five and four times correspondingly. The question of cooperation with Russia seems to be quite important as well, as it is mentioned in the analyzed

	<i>the Self</i>		<i>the Other</i>		Relations with Russia		Polish vision of the EU energy policy
	<i>Self (Poland)</i>	<i>Self (the EU)</i>	<i>the Other (Russia)</i>	<i>the Other (within the EU)</i>	Poland-Russia relations vision	Cooperation with Russia	
<b>Nord Stream gas pipeline</b>	3	2	1	1	1	2	9
<b>Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009</b>	1	3	6	0	0	3	0
<b>In total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>

Table 1. Categories representation in the speeches, interviews and statements of the Polish officials and their analysis in press

texts five times. In contrast to the majority of the issues, the issue of *the Other (within the EU)* enjoys significantly less popularity in the Polish official rhetoric, as it is mentioned only once in a text on the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline.

Looking at the text through the prism of content analysis I have got insight into the official rhetoric of the Polish officials. However, there are areas in the speeches that remained outside of the scope of analysis, therefore proceeding to the second stage of analysis and application of the methodology of discourse analysis is needed.

Discourse analysis of the category of *Self (Poland)* shows that Poland in the speeches of the Polish officials is represented as a successfully developing country that has recently “raised its profile enormously at the European and global stage”<sup>66</sup>. Particularly pronounced is the expression of the Foreign Minister of Poland Radosław Sikorski, who suggests that the contemporary “foreign policy of Poland is playing chess, not the Russian roulette”<sup>67</sup>. This metaphor of the Polish Prime Minister has an explicit double meaning. The direct interpretation of the metaphor shows an attempt of the Polish Minister to underline the recovered strength of the Polish foreign policy. However, the hidden message that Radosław Sikorski attempted to convey in his speech goes further: the metaphor suggests that the Republic of Poland is no longer willing to agree upon the unfavorable terms dictated by Russia, but is strongly inclined to conduct negotiations with Russia on equal footing. Overall, in their speeches the Polish officials attempt to create an image of Poland being a successful state, confidently gaining more and more power and recognition in Europe and in the world.

In the speeches of the Polish officials the EU is represented as a collective Self. The speeches aimed at the addressees from the other EU states tend to underline the community of

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<sup>66</sup> Donald Tusk, “PM Donald Tusk’s opening speech at the Conference “From Transformation to Modernisation” summing up the first two years of the PO – PSL cabinet 20 November 2009,” 11, 2009, [http://www.premier.gov.pl/en/prime\\_minister/speeches/id:3262/](http://www.premier.gov.pl/en/prime_minister/speeches/id:3262/) (accessed May 15, 2010).

<sup>67</sup> “Tusk: problemy w konflikcie gazowym stwarza Rosja (Tusk: problems in the gas conflict are created by Russia),” *Gazeta prawna*, 1, 2009, [http://biznes.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/105077,tusk\\_problemy\\_w\\_konflikcie\\_gazowym\\_stwarza\\_rosja.html,2](http://biznes.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/105077,tusk_problemy_w_konflikcie_gazowym_stwarza_rosja.html,2) (accessed May 15, 2010).

interests and aims within the EU. Thus, the speeches aimed at establishment of cooperation within the EU use such uniting slogans as “Together we can achieve more”<sup>68</sup> and “By common efforts ... we can strengthen the stabilizing role of the region”<sup>69</sup>.

However, the uniting ideas expressed in the speeches do not keep the Polish officials from mentioning *the Other within the EU*, which does not share the Polish views on the EU energy policy. Thus, talking about the Nord Stream gas pipeline, the Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk mentioned that “the Germans start to understand that the very beginning of that idea [building of the Nord Stream pipeline] was in sin”<sup>70</sup>. Such a description explicitly shows the attitude of the Polish official towards the Nord Stream project. The bright metaphor borrowed from the religious vocabulary is particularly expressive in an interview aimed at the predominantly Catholic Polish people. A similar idea although not so directly was expressed in a speech of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, who mentioned talking about the Nord Stream gas pipeline project that “if we are not guided by our narrow national egoisms, the vision of development of the Baltic Sea Region into an engine of progress in the European continent can be realized”<sup>71</sup>. This statement of Marcinkiewicz was most probably addressed towards Germany, Russia and other parties supporting the Nord Stream project, calling upon them to review their position.

Whereas *the Other within the EU* is mentioned occasionally in the speeches concerning the EU energy policy formation, the subcategory of *the Other – Russia* belongs to the most popular subcategories in the analyzed speeches of the Polish officials. Russia as *the Other* mostly

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<sup>68</sup> Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, “Wystąpienie Premiera RP Kazimierza Marcinkiewicza na posiedzeniu plenarnym szefów rządów państw Rady Państw Morza Bałtyckiego (Address of the Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in the plenary meeting of the Heads of Governments of states of the Council of the Baltic Sea States)” (Reykjavik, Iceland, czerwca 8, 2006), <http://www.environet.eu/pub/pubwis/rura/20061230003132.pdf> (accessed May 15, 2010).

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> “Premier: Gazociąg Północny narusza zasadę solidarności w UE (The Prime Minister: the Nord Stream gas pipeline breaks the basis of solidarity in the EU),” [http://www.ogrzewnictwo.pl/index.php?akt\\_cms=2031&cms=30](http://www.ogrzewnictwo.pl/index.php?akt_cms=2031&cms=30) (accessed May 15, 2010).

<sup>71</sup> Marcinkiewicz, “Wystąpienie Premiera RP Kazimierza Marcinkiewicza na posiedzeniu plenarnym szefów rządów państw Rady Państw Morza Bałtyckiego (Address of the Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in the plenary meeting of the Heads of Governments of states of the Council of the Baltic Sea States).”

appears in the speeches concerning the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009. The analyzed speakers are very outspoken about Russia's role in the conflict. Thus, Donald Tusk expressed an opinion that it's Russia that "creates problems in solving the gas conflict"<sup>72</sup>. Further on, Donald Tusk underlines that after the gas conflict 'the reliability of our Russian partner and of Gazprom is very much open to question'<sup>73</sup>. In his press-conference in Germany Tusk is even more negative about Russia. He underlines that nowadays Europe is strongly dependent on the Russian oil and gas dictate<sup>74</sup>. It is noticeable that in majority of the analyzed Polish speeches the image of Russia is rather negative. Mentioning of Russia and Gazprom in the speeches is often accompanied by such characteristic words as 'difficulties', 'conflicts', 'problems', 'disagreement' and 'dictate'.

Despite the common portrayal of Russia as *the Other* in their speeches, the Polish officials often underline the necessity of cooperation with their difficult Eastern Neighbour, as well as state that there is a considerable improvement in the Polish-Russian relations. As Radosław Sikorski has stated, Poland has "unblocked the dialogue in the Polish-Russian relations"<sup>75</sup>. However, as he maintains further on: 'We established that it is possible to talk to this state not budging an inch in the areas of our major interest'<sup>76</sup>.

Out of all the selected categories most of attention in the analyzed Polish speeches is dedicated to the Polish vision of the EU energy policy. From the analyzed speeches it is visible that the Polish officials are rather critical talking about the common EU energy policy. Janusz Steinhoff has mentioned in his speech that the EU lacks a common energy policy<sup>77</sup>. He has stated

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<sup>72</sup> "Tusk: problemy w konflikcie gazowym stwarza Rosja (Tusk: problems in the gas conflict are created by Russia)."

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Radosław Sikorski, "Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Pana Radosława Sikorskiego dotycząca zadań polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2009 roku. (Information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Radosław Sikorski about the achievements of the Polish foreign policy in 2009)," <http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Informacja,Ministra,Spraw,Zagranicznych,25358.html> (accessed May 15, 2010).

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> "Budowa Gazociągu Północnego to porażka całej Unii Europejskiej," [http://gazownictwo.wnp.pl/budowa-gazociagu-polnocnego-to-porazka-calej-unii-europejskiej,106796\\_1\\_0\\_0.html](http://gazownictwo.wnp.pl/budowa-gazociagu-polnocnego-to-porazka-calej-unii-europejskiej,106796_1_0_0.html).

further on that “building of the Nord Stream gas pipeline is a defeat of the whole European Union”<sup>78</sup>. This pronounced statement once more underlines the official Polish attitude towards the Nord Stream gas pipeline project. Donald Tusk expressed a similar opinion, stating that “the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which the Russian Gazprom wants to build with the Germans, increases the dependence of the European Union on the Moscow politicians”<sup>79</sup>. Further on in his speech, Tusk suggests the Europeans to try and make themselves at least partially independent from the Russian oil and gas<sup>80</sup>. He also stresses the importance of alternative sources of energy supplies<sup>81</sup>. Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in his speech suggests a more explicit outline of a common EU energy policy. He stresses the need in a free EU internal energy market as well as underlines the importance of equal rights for all the participants of the energy market (such as energy suppliers, distributors and consumers)<sup>82</sup>. Overall most of the analyzed speeches talk about the need for alternative energy sources and about the necessity for the EU to become less dependent on the Russian energy supplies. These seem to be the key positions of Poland concerning the EU energy policy towards Russia.

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Mariusz Jałoszewski, “Tusk zwalcza rurę z rosyjskim gazem (Tusk fights again the pipeline with the Russian gas),” *Polska*, 9, 2008, <http://www.polskatimes.pl/fakty/kraj/42840,tusk-zwalcza-rure-z-rosyjskim-gazem,id,t.html> (accessed May 15, 2010).

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Marcinkiewicz, “Wystąpienie Premiera RP Kazimierza Marcinkiewicza na posiedzeniu plenarnym szefów rządów państw Rady Państw Morza Bałtyckiego (Address of the Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in the plenary meeting of the Heads of Governments of states of the Council of the Baltic Sea States).”

## Chapter 3 – The German vision of the EU-Russia energy relations

In order to establish the German vision of the EU-Russia energy relations, I have analyzed the official speeches and interviews of the German officials, as well as their analysis in the German press. For my analysis I have selected eight texts concerning the issue of the Nord Stream gas pipeline and four texts concerning the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute 2009. As well as in the Polish case, the German officials have made significantly more statements concerning the first issue than concerning the second one. Most of the texts analyzed are speeches and interviews of Angela Merkel, who has been the Chancellor of Germany since November 2005. I have also considered significant the analysis of her speeches, press conference addresses and statements in the German press. Since 2005 Angela Merkel has been the key figure in the German policy-making, therefore I consider her position to be most representative of the official position of the Federal Republic of Germany. One more important figure whose position I consider significant for my analysis is Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany in November 2005 – October 2009, and the Vice Chancellor of Germany in November 2007 - October 2009. There are two interviews with him in the corpus of texts I have analyzed. The first one was conducted in March 2006 and embraces the issues of the Germany's energy policy, as well as the German foreign policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Middle East. The second one was conducted in January 2009, and it concerns the issues of security, the world economic crisis and the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute 2009. Further on, the text corpus includes two speeches of Günter Gloser, who has been the German Minister of State for Europe. The first one held in Ansbach, Germany in March 2008; the second one was held in Riga, Latvia in June 2008 in the Baltic Sea Business Forum. I also consider significant the statements of Gerhard Schröder, who has been the Chancellor of Germany in October 1998 – November 2005, encountered in several analytical articles in the German press.



Having gone through the speeches, statements and interviews of the German officials discussing the issues of the Nord Stream gas pipeline and the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009, as well as through their analysis in press, I have singled out categories that are quite similar to those touched upon in the speeches of the Polish officials:

1. ***The Self***. As well as the Polish officials, the German officials tend to refer to two different *Selves* in their speeches depending on the audience addressed:
  - a. **Self (Germany);**
  - b. **Self (the European Union, or Europe).**
2. ***The Other***. Similarly to the Polish speeches, the analyzed German speeches mention two *Others*: the first is Russia, the second is *the Other* within the EU, i.e. the countries within the EU that do not share the German view on the EU energy policy towards Russia. Thus, the two subcategories here are:
  - a. **The Other (Russia);**
  - b. **The Other (within the EU).**
3. ***Relations with Russia***. As well as the Polish officials, the German officials touch upon two topics that can be attributed to this category, namely:
  - a. **Germany-Russia relations vision;**
  - b. **Cooperation with Russia.**
4. ***German vision of the EU energy policy***. This category includes the statements of the German officials concerning the EU energy policy as they see it.

In order to perform further analysis of the text corpus, I have imported the analyzed texts into the ATLAS.ti software. I have supplemented the previously created coding system with the new codes carrying the names of the categories and subcategories inherent in the speeches and

interviews of the German officials. As previously done with the Polish texts, I have assigned the codes to the parts of the texts discussing the corresponding issues.

The results generated by ATLAS.ti for the corpus of the German texts differ from the results generated for the Polish texts. The issue most often touched upon in the analyzed German documents is the issue of *the Other within the EU*. This issue was mentioned in the analyzed documents ten times (see Table 2). Interestingly, the issue of *the Other within the EU* belongs to the least popular issues in the analyzed Polish rhetoric. In the analyzed German texts this issue is encountered solely in the texts concerning the Nord Stream gas pipeline, and was not touched upon in any of the analyzed documents concerning the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute 2009. The second most often encountered category is the category of the German vision of the EU energy policy. This issue was touched upon in the texts eight times. As well as the previous subcategory, this category was most often mentioned in the texts concerning the Nord Stream gas pipeline (seven times), and was mentioned only once in the texts concerning the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute 2009. The issue of cooperation with Russia was mentioned in the analyzed texts six times. Talking about the Self, the speakers would mostly refer to *Self (the EU)*. There was only one reference to *Self (Germany)* in the analyzed speeches. The most probable reason for that is that most of the speeches and interviews are addressed to the broader European public, and not just to the German people. The issue of cooperation with Russia was mentioned in the analyzed texts six times. The issue of the Germany-Russia relations enjoys little popularity in the analyzed German official rhetoric: this issue was mentioned only twice in the texts concerning the Nord Stream gas pipeline, and was not mentioned at all in any of the texts concerning the Russia Ukraine gas dispute 2009.

	<i>the Self</i>		<i>the Other</i>		Relations with Russia		German vision of the EU energy policy
	<i>Self</i> (Germany)	<i>Self</i> (the EU)	<i>the Other</i> (Russia)	<i>the Other</i> (within the EU)	Germany-Russia relations vision	Cooperation with Russia	
<b>Nord Stream gas pipeline</b>	0	1	1	10	2	4	7
<b>Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009</b>	1	5	1	0	0	2	1
<b>In total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>

Table 2. Categories representation in the speeches of the German officials and their analysis in press

In contrast to the category *Self* (*Poland*), the category *Self* (*Germany*) enjoys little popularity in the analyzed speeches of the German officials. As opposed to the Polish officials, who represent Poland as a successfully developing state, Germany as *Self* is mentioned in the speeches only once, and with a quite negative connotation: “Those who make themselves one-sidedly dependent on the energy policy make themselves susceptible to blackmail, as well as give up their independency in economy and foreign affairs”<sup>83</sup>.

In most of the speeches of the German officials, as well as in the speeches of the Polish officials, the EU is represented as a collective self. Talking to the all-European public, the German politicians attempt to demonstrate that the Europeans have much in common and that they all have the same foreign-policy goals. For example, Angela Merkel has stated in her

<sup>83</sup> “Merkel schaltet sich in Gastreit ein (Merkel joins the gas dispute),” <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,599983,00.html> (accessed June 2, 2010).

speeches: “Europe speaks here on many issues with one voice”<sup>84</sup>; “We have shown solidarity among the members of the European Union and also partially outside of the European Union”<sup>85</sup>; “We know that we can solve international conflicts only together”<sup>86</sup>; “We know that we the Europeans have to state our joint position to the outside world”<sup>87</sup>.

In contrast to the speeches of the Polish officials that quite often represent Russia as *the Other*, the subcategory of *the Other (Russia)* is encountered quite rarely in the German speeches and interviews. Out of all the allusions of Russia in the analyzed German documents, only one bears a slightly negative connotation: “Russia and Ukraine will also play an important and central role in the gas supply to Europe in the future. We have to give both states a clear signal that such a conflict can not repeat”<sup>88</sup>.

The subcategory of *the Other within the EU* is the most popular subcategory in the analyzed speeches of the German officials. However, as opposed to the Polish speakers who are rather critical about the countries that do not share their views on the EU energy policy (Germany in the first place), the German speakers express the ideas of desired mutual understanding, peace and cooperation among the EU Member States. Therefore, the subcategory of *the Other within the EU* receives quite a positive connotation in the speeches of the German officials. In contrast to rather aggressive speeches of the Polish officials, the speeches of the German politicians appear to be rather defensive in this respect: it seems that many of the arguments are expressed as a response to the negative comments of the opposing “camp”. The most often *Other within the EU* encountered in the speeches of the German officials is Poland. Thus, in one of her interviews Angela Merkel underlined the importance of the good neighbourly

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<sup>84</sup> Angela Merkel, “Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel anlässlich des Empfangs für das Diplomatische Corps (Speech of the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel on the occasion of the diplomatic corps reception)” (Berlin, 2, 2009), [http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn\\_914560/Content/DE/Rede/2009/02/2009-02-09-merkel-dipl-corps.html](http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_914560/Content/DE/Rede/2009/02/2009-02-09-merkel-dipl-corps.html) (accessed June 2, 2010).

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> “Merkel fordert EU-Hilfe (Merkel demands help from the EU),” 1, 2009, <http://www.manager-magazin.de/unternehmen/artikel/0,2828,604282,00.html> (accessed June 2, 2010).

relations of Germany and Poland for further development of the European Union<sup>89</sup>. In one of her further speeches she has stressed that never before were Germany and Poland so closely connected with each other<sup>90</sup>. “We are the central economic partners for each other.” – stressed Merkel further on<sup>91</sup>. She stresses the desire of the Germans to find a compromise in the strained situation with the Nord Stream pipeline: “Despite the partially different interests, it is possible to solve the sensible questions in a trustful and constructive dialogue”<sup>92</sup>. In one of her further interviews Merkel even states that “no Member State of the European Union has the right to oppress the other Member State by means of any of its projects”<sup>93</sup>. Further on, she states that Germany’s good relations with Russia will never develop at the expense of Poland<sup>94</sup>. By these statements Merkel clearly affirms the importance of good relations with Poland as well as with the other states from the “opposing” camp for Germany.

On the other hand, however, she expresses radically opposite opinions in a number of her speeches. Thus, in one of her interviews she states: “It is not that every single European state will be asked for their opinions while the [Nord Stream gas] pipeline is built. After all, there are pipelines built to Hungary or Greece. This is normal”<sup>95</sup>. In one of the speeches she suggests the Polish side to participate in the building of the pipeline, and, as if replying to the Polish complaints, she says: “I can not do anything with the lack of interest from the Polish side. If

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<sup>89</sup> “Gemeinsamen europäischen Energiemarkt schaffen (To create a common European energy market),” 10, 2006, [http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn\\_81362/Content/DE/Archiv16/Artikel/2006/10/2006-10-30-gemeinsamen-europaeischen-energiemarkt-schaffen.html](http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_81362/Content/DE/Archiv16/Artikel/2006/10/2006-10-30-gemeinsamen-europaeischen-energiemarkt-schaffen.html) (accessed June 2, 2010).

<sup>90</sup> “Nie wieder Politik zu Lasten unserer Nachbarn (No more politics that would harm our neighbour),” 12, 2005, [http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn\\_915730/Content/DE/Archiv16/Interview/2005/12/2005-12-02-nie-wieder-politik-zu-lasten-unserer-nachbarn.html](http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_915730/Content/DE/Archiv16/Interview/2005/12/2005-12-02-nie-wieder-politik-zu-lasten-unserer-nachbarn.html) (accessed June 2, 2010).

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> “Gemeinsamen europäischen Energiemarkt schaffen (To create a common European energy market).”

<sup>94</sup> “Nie wieder Politik zu Lasten unserer Nachbarn (No more politics that would harm our neighbour).”

<sup>95</sup> “Wir geben einander etwas” (“We give something to each other”), 1, 2007, [http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn\\_774/Content/DE/Archiv16/Interview/2007/01/2007-01-16-merkel-rzeczpospolita.html](http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_774/Content/DE/Archiv16/Interview/2007/01/2007-01-16-merkel-rzeczpospolita.html) (accessed June 2, 2010).

there was interest expressed for this project [from the Polish side], we would find ways to realize it together”<sup>96</sup>.

Talking about the Germany-Russia relations in the realm of the Nord Stream gas pipeline building, Merkel stresses that “the decision to build the Nord Stream pipeline is after all not the governmental decision”<sup>97</sup>. She underlines that this is a purely economic project of the three non-governmental enterprises, namely Gazprom, BASF and E.ON. The same idea is expressed in the speech of Günter Gloser: “The building of the Nord Stream pipeline is not at all a German-Russian project. It wouldn’t be correct to say that Germany in this project is a privileged partner of Russia. This project is a private economic initiative”<sup>98</sup>. Here the statements of the German officials clearly contradict the statements of their Polish counterparts: the Polish officials see the direct interests of the German and Russian parliaments in the Nord Stream gas pipeline project, as well as in other energy projects of the two states.

The German officials are quite expressive about the importance of the German as well as all-European cooperation with Russia. As expressed by Angela Merkel, “Russia borders on the European Union, we are neighbors. Russia is our energy supplier for the next decades; this is not even discussed.”<sup>99</sup> Therefore the strategic partnership of the EU and Russia is in the judgment of Merkel of vital importance for both sides. In her speech in the reception for the diplomatic corps Merkel stresses that Germany desires further development of the relationship of the EU with the neighboring countries, including Russia.

On the other hand, the credibility of Russia as a partner was clearly undermined in the eyes of the German officials after the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute 2009. Here the German and Polish officials are united in their judgment, although the Germans still express their opinions slightly milder than their Polish counterparts. The German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> “Rede von Günter Gloser, Staatsminister für Europa, anlässlich des Wirtschaftsforums des Ostseeratsgipfels” (Riga, Lettland, July 4, 2008).

<sup>99</sup> ““Wir geben einander etwas” (“We give something to each other”).”

Steinmeier stresses that after the conflict the EU “can not simply proceed to its usual agenda. It is concerned with the reliability of one of our most important supply states.”<sup>100</sup> Talking about the EU-Russia relationships after the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute 2009, Merkel says that “Russia has to aim at being a trustworthy partner, as it was for many decades. Russia has to be interested in this.”<sup>101</sup> However, in contrast to her Polish counterparts, Merkel doesn’t consider the cutoff in the gas supplies from Russia neither as an argument for, nor as an argument against the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction.

Most of the statements concerning the German vision of the EU energy policy in the analyzed articles touch upon the issue of the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction. Thus, in one of her interviews to a newspaper Angela Merkel stresses that she considers the Nord Stream pipeline construction very important, as this pipeline will enable the EU to diversify its energy supplies in the times when there are less and less natural resources available<sup>102</sup>. She stresses that other countries (especially Poland) will be able to profit from the Nord Stream pipeline. In one of her further interviews Merkel communicates that “they also think about the possibilities to transport gas from to the Baltic States and to Poland by means of the Nord Stream gas pipeline.”<sup>103</sup> She states that although till now it was only possible to transport gas from East to West, it is technically possible to make the gas supply system function the other way round<sup>104</sup>.

In his speech in the held in the Baltic Sea Business Forum Günter Gloser attempts to draw the public attention away from the ubiquitously discussed Nord Stream gas pipeline project, suggesting that “the planned Nord Stream pipeline is just one – even if the most important one – facet of the topic of energy security, with which we the Europeans will have to

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<sup>100</sup> “Interview mit Bundesaußenminister Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, - Fragen zu Energiepolitik, Naher und Mittlerer Osten (Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier - Questions concerning the energy policy, Near and Middle East),” 3, 2006, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2006/060330-BM-Handelsblatt.html> (accessed June 2, 2010).

<sup>101</sup> ““Wir geben einander etwas” (“We give something to each other”).”

<sup>102</sup> “Nie wieder Politik zu Lasten unserer Nachbarn (No more politics that would harm our neighbour).”

<sup>103</sup> ““Wir geben einander etwas” (“We give something to each other”).”

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

deal now and in the future”. As well as their Polish counterparts, the German officials dedicate much attention to the importance of energy supply diversification. However, whereas the Polish politicians mainly talk about the importance of diversification of sources of energy supply, the German politicians are more concerned with the diversification of means and routes of transportation. Thus, in one of her speeches Angela Merkel stressed that “the European Union should diversify the energy delivery and transportation ways. Therefore such projects as Nabucco, Nord Stream gas pipeline and South Stream should be politically wanted and supported in all the EU Member States.”<sup>105</sup> Thus, in contrast to the Polish speakers, who pay much attention to the importance of the alternative energy sources and the necessity for the European Union to become less dependent on Russia in terms of energy, the German officials do not discuss the necessity or possibility to look for alternative sources of energy supply. Overall, the majority of the German officials stresses the importance of Russia as the major energy supplier of the EU and considers important further development of cooperation and partnership with Russia.

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<sup>105</sup> “Merkel fordert EU-Hilfe (Merkel demands help from the EU).”



## Chapter 4 – The EU vision of the EU-Russia energy relations

In order to establish, which of the “camps” within the EU is more successful in uploading their ideas on how the EU-Russia energy relations should look like, I have analyzed the official EU vision of the EU-Russia energy relations. For my analysis I have taken the official speeches, statements interviews of the President of the European Commission, the European Commissioners, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the President of the European Union, as well as their analysis in the EU press. For my analysis I have selected six texts concerning the issue of the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction and six texts concerning the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute 2009. Most of the statements and speeches analyzed belong to Andris Piebalgs, who was the European Commissioner for Energy in November 2004 – February 2009 and is currently the European Commissioner for Development at the European Commission. I consider the position of Andris Piebalgs to be representative of the official position of the EU, as had been the main EU official dealing with the issue of energy during the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, as well as for a significant period of time when the discussion about the expediency of the Nord Stream gas pipeline was going on. The second equally important figure whose position I consider significant for my research is José Manuel Barroso, who has been the President of the European Commission since November 2004. Further on, there are several statements of Benita Ferrero-Waldner in the corpus of texts analyzed, who was the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy in November 2004 – December 2009 and the European Commissioner for Trade and European Neighbourhood Policy in December 2009 – February 2010. Finally, I have selected several official statements made by the representatives of the European Investment Bank and the European organization of natural gas industries (Eurogas).

The preliminary analysis of the text corpus has led me to conclude that the following categories relevant to my research can be singled out in the texts:

1. ***The Self***. In contrast to the analyzed texts representing the German and Polish view on the EU energy policy, there is only one *Self* in the speeches and statements of the EU officials, namely ***the Self (the European Union, or Europe)***.

2. ***The Other***. Similarly, the subcategory of *the Other (within the EU)* is missing in the speeches and statements of the EU officials. Thus, there is only the category of ***the Other (Russia)*** here.

3. ***Relations with Russia***. As well as in the case of the German and Polish officials, the EU officials touch upon the issue of the relations with Russia. Thus, as well as in the previous two analyses, the following two topics can be attributed to this category:

**a. the EU-Russia relations vision;**

**b. Cooperation with Russia.**

4. ***The EU vision of the EU energy policy***. This category includes the statements of the EU officials concerning the EU energy policy.

As well as in the previous two analyses, I have imported the analyzed text corpus into the ATLAS.ti software, having assigned the codes to the parts of the texts discussing the corresponding issues.

The results generated by ATLAS.ti suggest that the as well as in the case of Poland and similarly to the case of Germany, the issue most often touched upon in the analyzed EU documents is the EU vision of the EU energy policy. This issue was mentioned eleven times in the analyzed documents (see Table 3). The other issues received significantly less attention in the analyzed EU documents. Thus, the issue of the EU-Russia relations vision was touched upon six times. Interestingly, it was only mentioned in the documents concerning the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009. The issue of the Other (Russia) was touched upon four times in the documents under analysis. As well as the previous subcategory, this category was mentioned only in the

documents discussing the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute 2009. The issue of the Self (the EU) enjoys little popularity in the analyzed EU rhetoric: it was encountered in the analyzed documents only three times. Equally little attention was granted to the issue of cooperation with Russia, which was only mentioned two times in the texts on the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009 and one time in the texts in the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction.

	<i>the Self (the EU)</i>	<i>the Other (Russia)</i>	<b>Relations with Russia</b>		<b>The EU vision of the EU energy policy</b>
			<b>The EU-Russia relations vision</b>	<b>Cooperation with Russia</b>	
<b>Nord Stream gas pipeline</b>	1	0	0	1	7
<b>Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009</b>	2	4	6	2	4
<b>In total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>

Table 3. Categories representation in the speeches, interviews and statements of the EU officials and their analysis in press

Talking about the EU as the collective Self, the EU officials usually emphasize the significance and importance of the EU for peace and security in Europe, the neighbouring countries and the whole world. A bright example of the EU representation in the speeches of the EU officials could be the statement of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who in her speech concerning the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009 said that “The EU is fully aware of its responsibility to ensure peace, prosperity and security for itself and its neighbours. ... We may not always get the

outcome we seek, but to paraphrase Archimedes, “*Give me a firm place to stand and I will move the earth.*” The European Union is a firm place to stand.”<sup>106</sup>

Reflecting upon the EU as a political and economic entity, the EU officials often express their views on what the EU should work upon to achieve its goals. For example, despite the bright metaphors about the strength and all-mightiness of the EU used as an expressive conclusion in the speech of Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner realistically discusses the still-to-be-developed mechanisms and functions of the EU. She suggests that: “There are ... lessons to be learnt from January’s crisis. Most importantly – whether or not the EU is ready to pool sovereignty in the delicate area of energy security – we must react with solidarity, and with the weight appropriate to our value as a consumer. We need to develop the reflexes and mechanisms that enable us to exercise a coherent external energy policy, supported by a strategic energy security diplomacy.”<sup>107</sup>

In the speeches and statements of the EU officials Russia is referred to with both positive and negative connotations, depending on the issue discussed. Thus, most of the documents concerning the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009 unanimously denounce the actions of Russia. Benita Ferrero-Waldner commenting on the current EU-Russia relations in her speech on the Russia-Ukraine energy dispute – 2009 said: “What of our relationship with **Russia**? We now stand at cross-roads. The war in Georgia and the gas crisis seriously undermined the level of trust between us.”<sup>108</sup> Talking to journalists in a press-conference dedicated to the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso mentioned: “We have already ... stressed our strong condemnation of this kind of situation”<sup>109</sup>. Further on, he added that he thinks “the credibility of Russia ... will of course be affected if we have another gas

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<sup>106</sup> Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “After the Russia / Ukraine gas crisis: what next?” (London, March 9, 2009), <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/100>.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> “EU ‘very concerned’ about new gas row,” March 6, 2009, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-concerned-new-gas-row/article-180007> (accessed June 2, 2010).

crisis”<sup>110</sup>. In a joint statement of the Eurogas and the European Commission concerning the issue of the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute it was stated that “[b]oth parties should be aware of the negative impact and the damage this dispute might generate”<sup>111</sup>. The statement further recommends Russia and Ukraine that they should not only aim at reaching a solution to the immediate problem, but also try to arrive at a sound common agreement for the longer term to avoid the risk of future disputes<sup>112</sup>.

Despite the critical remarks and explicit dissatisfaction with some of the Russia’s actions, the EU officials generally admit that the EU still considers it important to cooperate with Russia. Thus, Benita Ferrero-Waldner in her speech said: “When I visited Moscow at the beginning of February with President Barroso and eight other Commissioners I found a growing recognition of the level of our mutual dependence and necessity to work together on many issues.”<sup>113</sup> In his speech concerning the EU-Russia energy cooperation, which was held in Moscow during the International Energy Week, Andris Piebalgs stated that “[w]hile the EU and Russian Federation are interdependent in the energy sector, we have our differences and it is important that we resolve them satisfactorily. The common interests and potential to work effectively together are vast, not least to help solve the world's energy and other challenges. We must therefore ensure that we continuously develop closer relations, based on openness, transparency and mutual respect for our legitimate interests.”<sup>114</sup> In one of his further speeches concerning the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute he mentioned that the Commission expects “stable and solid bilateral energy relations”<sup>115</sup> with Russia.

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> “Joint statement by Eurogas and the European Commission,”

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/9&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (accessed June 2, 2010).

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, “After the Russia / Ukraine gas crisis: what next?”

<sup>114</sup> Andris Piebalgs, “EU – Russia energy cooperation,” October 23, 2007,

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/654> (accessed June 2, 2010).

<sup>115</sup> “Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs welcomes the solution of the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute,”

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/223&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (accessed June 2, 2010).

Overall, the EU officials are quite positive and optimistic while talking about the EU-Russia relations. Thus, talking about the EU-Russia relations in a number of spheres, and predominantly in the sphere of energy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner states: that the EU wants to put its energy relations with Russia “on a firm and predictable basis. The principles of reciprocity, transparency and proportionality are the key. We ([the EU]) want to strengthen our energy dialogue with Russia, bringing it to accept binding arrangements based on these principles”<sup>116</sup>. However, further on in her speech she makes it clear that the EU is not going to abandon its position and its principles. She states: “We do not want to supplant Russia – which will remain a prime supplier for the medium and probably long term. But we need to be clear-headed about the situation. There’s much talk about our energy dependence on Russia, but it’s more accurate to talk of energy interdependence. The EU may depend on Russia for 25% of our gas and an oil supply, but 70% of Gazprom’s revenue comes from us”<sup>117</sup>. The European Commissioner underlines that the EU is fully aware of the differences in perception of multiple issues that exist between the EU and Russia. However, she believes that these differences should not prevent the EU and Russia “from hard-headed engagement on matters of mutual interest”<sup>118</sup>. However, the EU expects Russia to equally work for successful development of the EU-Russia relations, as Ferrero-Waldner mentioned in her speech: “Russia too has come up with new ideas, like its ambitious (though not yet fully precise) proposal to launch negotiations for a new international energy agreement. We are willing to discuss new ideas and look forward to hearing more details”<sup>119</sup>.

Much attention in the analyzed speeches of the EU officials is granted to the issue of the EU energy policy. The EU officials are very expressive when talking about the issue of the EU-Russia energy relations, with particular stress being put on the issues of the Nord Stream gas

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<sup>116</sup> Ferrero-Waldner, “After the Russia / Ukraine gas crisis: what next?”

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

pipeline construction and the necessity to briskly resolve the Russia-Ukraine energy dispute – 2009 and to prevent such disputes in the future. Thus, Benita Ferrero-Waldner said quoting the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, that the Russia-Ukraine energy dispute – 2009 was “the most serious security event in relation to gas that has ever happened in Europe”<sup>120</sup>. Further on she states that the EU is positive that “when problems arise the gas must still flow, even as solutions are sought”<sup>121</sup>. Overall, the EU officials are quite critical about the gas dispute – 2009. Interestingly, they do not express their opinion on which of the sides is guilty in the gas conflict that that arose: they are only concerned with timely gas supplies to the EU Member States. The statements of the EU officials run counter to the statements of the Polish officials, who consider that it is Russia “that creates problems in solving the gas conflict”<sup>122</sup>. On the other hand, they are rather similar to the statements of the German officials, who criticize both sides involved in the conflict and immediately underline the significance of Russia as the partner of Germany. Thus, the analysis of the speeches dedicated to the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009 leads to conclude, that so far the “friendly” camp has been more successful in uploading its perception of Russia to the all-EU level.

This conclusion seems to be true upon analysis of the texts on the Nord Stream pipeline construction as well. The only negative statement about the Nord Stream gas pipeline encountered in the analyzed EU texts is the newspaper analysis of the press-conference given by the European Commissioner Andris Piebalgs: “Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, a Latvian, has criticized the project as being more political than economic”<sup>123</sup>. Interestingly, the analyst didn’t fail to mention that the negative comment comes from the national of country which belongs to the anti-Russian camp. Bypassing the issue of ethical correctness and appropriateness of this specification, this comment stresses the existence of “camps” of anti-

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> “Tusk: problemy w konflikcie gazowym stwarza Rosja (Tusk: problems in the gas conflict are created by Russia).”

<sup>123</sup> “Barroso: EU to Monitor Baltic Pipeline,” March 30, 2007, [http://www.downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a\\_id=2265](http://www.downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a_id=2265) (accessed June 2, 2010).

Russian and pro-Russian countries in the EU. Moreover, it leads to imply that the opinion of the anti-Russian camp does not enjoy particular popularity in the all-EU level. Further statements encountered in the analyzed texts support this assumption: the majority of them seem to mimic the statements encountered in the German speeches. Surprisingly, most of the analyzed speeches of the abovementioned Andris Piebalgs strongly contradict the statement made in the EU newspaper, as in his speeches (uttered in the name of the EU) he strongly supports the Nord Stream project. Thus, in one of his speeches he states: “The European Commission has always been favourable to Nord Stream. With the progress being made in this project, and the recent signing of the Inter-Governmental Agreement on Nabucco, the EU is taking crucial steps towards securing energy supplies for the future. These projects have the full support of the European Commission”<sup>124</sup>. His statement is further supported by the piece of news published in the EU newspaper: “The European Union will require increasing volumes of natural gas over the coming years to meet its energy requirements. In order to ensure safe and reliable supplies, it sees an urgent need to expand the transport infrastructure. The EU Commission has therefore declared that the planned pipeline under the Baltic Sea is a priority energy project and it has confirmed the special status of the project as part of the Trans European Network”<sup>125</sup>. The significance of the Nord Stream pipeline project for the EU is further stressed in the speech of José Manuel Barroso, who says: “It ([the Nord Stream gas pipeline project]) is a very important issue for the entire Baltic region. The European Commission follows this project very carefully to make sure it is performed according to environmental regulations”<sup>126</sup>.

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<sup>124</sup> “Nord Stream and EU Energy Commissioner Reaffirm Importance of New Gas Supply Routes,” July 15, 2009, <http://blog.taragana.com/pr/nord-stream-and-eu-energy-commissioner-reaffirm-importance-of-new-gas-supply-routes-4195/> (accessed May 23, 2010).

<sup>125</sup> “Nord Stream: EU Makes Baltic Sea Pipeline a Priority,” October 4, 2006, [http://www.downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a\\_id=873](http://www.downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a_id=873) (accessed May 15, 2010).

<sup>126</sup> “Barroso: EU to Monitor Baltic Pipeline.”



## Conclusion

The aim of the present thesis was to establish, how the EU Member States' perception of Russia influences their energy policy choices and contributes to the formation of the official EU position in the EU-Russia energy relations.

I attempted to approach the research question through the prism of the constructivist theory, thus assuming that international relations are socially constructed, and identities, self-identifications and perceptions of the actors have an influence on their decision making. Particular emphasis was put on the analyzed states' perception of Russia.

Formation of the EU policy towards Russia became significantly complicated after the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007. Whereas many of the "old" EU Member States inclined to establishing bilateral relations with Russia, thus often disregarding the pre-agreed EU positions towards Kremlin, the majority of the "new" Member States are reluctant to build a close cooperation with Russia, to a big extent due to their unpleasant experiences with Russia in the past. A number of scholarly works assume the existence of the so-called "camps" of states within the EU, each having a different position on how the EU policy towards Russia should look like. The majority of the scholars agree on a gradation of these "camps", ranging from the "Eastern Divorced"<sup>127</sup> (otherwise called "the New Cold Warriors"<sup>128</sup>) to the "Loyal Wives"<sup>129</sup> (otherwise called "the Trojan horses"<sup>130</sup>). Due to the time limitations I have chosen to analyze the positions of the two most extreme "camps" within the EU, with Poland and Germany being the brightest representatives of the two. I attempted to establish the influence of the both states' perceptions of Russia on their energy policy choices. Further on, I attempted to find out, which of the two states

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<sup>127</sup> Braghiroli and Carta, "The EU's attitude towards Russia: condemned to be divided? An analysis of the Member States and Members of the European Parliament's preferences," 10.

<sup>128</sup> Leonard and Popescu, *A power audit of EU-Russia relations.*, 2.

<sup>129</sup> Braghiroli and Carta, "The EU's attitude towards Russia: condemned to be divided? An analysis of the Member States and Members of the European Parliament's preferences," 13.

<sup>130</sup> Leonard and Popescu, *A power audit of EU-Russia relations.*, 2.

(and thus which of the two “camps”) has been more successful so far in uploading their views on the EU energy policy towards Russia to the all-EU level.

I decided to focus on the official positions of the two states concerning the two recent cases on the EU-Russia energy relations agenda: construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which will go from Russia to Germany bypassing Poland and other traditional transit states, and the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute-2009, which resulted in significant reduction of gas supplies from Russia to many of the EU Member States in January 2009. The analysis of the official positions of Poland, Germany and the EU was carried by means of content and discourse analysis of speeches, press-conference statements and interviews with the official representatives of the two states and the EU, as well as of their analysis in press. The research methodology was predominantly discourse analytic, with content analysis constituting the initial part of the analysis.

Having analyzed the official Polish and German positions, I have come to the conclusion that they differ significantly in their views on how the EU energy policy towards Russia should look like.

In the analyzed corpus of the Polish texts Russia is portrayed as *the Other* of Poland and the EU. The Polish speeches and interviews are abundant in expressive metaphors underlining the antagonistic nature of the EU-Russia relations. Even though some of the documents talk about the necessity of cooperation with Russia, most of the fault for the problems and disagreements in the Polish-Russian and the EU-Russian relations is laid on Moscow. In contrast to the Polish position, the attitude of Germany towards Russia is much more positive. Germany perceives Russia solely as a good economic and political partner. Unlike the Polish texts, the German texts do not refer to any negative experiences encountered by the two states in the past; they only stress the successful cooperation developed between Germany and Russia and express hope for development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the future.

The two states' positions on the two analyzed cases are also significantly different. Thus, talking about the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction, the Polish officials unequivocally denounce the project. They consider this project to be of solely political nature. Moreover, they express dissatisfaction with the position of the EU Member States that support the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction. On the other hand, the German officials unanimously support the project and argue that the gas pipeline is built for solely economic reasons and there are no hidden political motives behind it.

Whereas disagreement of the two states on the issue of reasonability of the Nord Stream gas pipeline was expected, their difference of opinion on the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009 was more surprising. Although both states were united in that the gas supplies to the EU should be renewed as soon as possible, they had different opinions on which of the sides – Russia or Ukraine – was actually guilty in the reduction of the gas supplies to the EU. Thus, the Poland expressed the view that it was definitely Russia to be blamed. Germany didn't accuse any of the conflicting sides, and solely underlined the malignancy of the conflict for the image of both states.

The analysis of the Polish and German texts has revealed significant differences in the two states' vision of the EU energy policy towards Russia. Thus, most of the analyzed Polish speeches, interviews and statements expressively talk about the necessity for the EU to look for alternative energy sources in order to become less dependent on the Russian energy supplies. In contrast to them, most of the German officials underline the importance of Russia as the EU's major energy supplier and stress the importance of diversification of routes of Russian energy supply.

The analysis of the EU official rhetoric has shown that the EU is rather positive and optimistic about the EU-Russia relations. Further on, the EU officials suggest that the EU doesn't want to replace Russia with any other alternative gas supplier, and that Russia will

definitely remain the main supplier of energy to the EU in the forthcoming years. Moreover, the EU looks forward to strengthening its energy dialogue with Russia. This position of the EU runs counter to the Polish position, and mostly coincides with the position of Germany.

Talking about the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – 2009, the EU mostly underlined the necessity to solve the conflict as soon as possible. As well as Germany, the EU didn't express its opinion on which of the sides is guilty in the gas conflict: the speeches and interviews with the EU officials were only concerned with the renewal of gas supplies to the EU Member States.

The views on the Nord Stream gas pipeline construction expressed in the analyzed EU documents are also quite similar to the German point of view. Thus, the EU Commissioners state that the EU has always been favourable to Nord Stream, and that this project has always had the full support of the European Commission.

The analysis conducted has led me to conclude that besides other factors, the EU Member States' perception of Russia has a distinct influence on their energy policy choices. This conclusion is more evident in the case of Poland. However, certain implications in the analyzed German documents allow drawing such a conclusion for the German case as well.

The analysis of the EU official position suggests that Germany (as well as the other states from the "camp" of the Russia's strategic partners within the EU) is much more successful in uploading its ideas about how the EU energy policy towards Russia should look to the all-EU level.

While considering the results of my research, one should bear in mind that identities of the states involved in the analysis and their perception of Russia are certainly not the only factors influencing their energy policy choices and the all-EU stance on the issue of energy. My research rather aimed at providing an additional explanation to the Member States' and the EU energy policy choices, which would throw the light on the issue along with traditional explanations of the states being in pursuit of power or solely protecting their economic interests.

I believe that my research project and the results I have obtained will contribute to better understanding of the EU energy policy formation and of the influence of perceptions and identities on the states' policy choices in general. I consider that my research might contribute to deeper understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the EU, as well as of strengths and weaknesses of its position in the EU-Russia energy dialogue.

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