

# FROM ETHNIC TO CIVIC NATIONALISM

THE CASE OF THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY OF  
CATALONIA, SPAIN

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Submitted to  
Central European University  
Department of Political Science

In Partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

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Budapest, Hungary  
2010

## Abstract

This thesis sets out to explore the classic differentiation made by Anthony D. Smith between the two types of nationalism, ethnic and civic. Unlike previously thought, his theoretical model also applies in the case of Catalonia, Spain, where the current state of nationalism is still extremely controversial. The research question is: *As reflected in opinion polls and different governmental policies, are Catalans still characterized by sentiments of ethnic nationalism?* The research aims at proving that Catalan people experienced a transition from ethnic to civic nationalism in various aspects. In order to examine the nationalism development in Catalonia, the paper employs both quantitative and qualitative analyses in interpreting opinion polls conducted over the past 23 years in Catalonia, as well as establishing the levels of inclusiveness and openness of the regional government in implementing transitional justice legislation and media policy. All findings reflect that the autonomous community of Catalonia successfully moved from ethnic attitudes towards nationalism to civic nationalism.

## Acknowledgments

This two-year research was possible with the help of some important people that have substantially contributed to my work with their dedication and constant guidance. I would like to express my highest consideration for Professor Nenad Dimitrijevic, who wholeheartedly has given his support and encouraged me from the initial phases of the project until the final outcome. I am also extremely thankful to Professor Kate Coyer for guiding my interest in communication studies and enabling me to develop an understanding of the role of the media in constructing national identity. Last but not least, I am grateful to the Department of Political Science and the Central European University, staff, faculty, and colleagues for their professionalism, patience and assistance during the past two years.

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## Introduction

After 40 years of dictatorship, Spain (or the Kingdom of Spain) is today a multicultural nation that comprises 17 autonomous communities under the same constitutional monarchy. Having a different history, different language, but somewhat similar political aims, three of these 17 regions have shown constant nationalistic sentiments before and after the (re)instauration of the monarchy in 1975. Although their political activism has varied over time both in its intensity and scope, these regions seem to share attitudes of loyalty towards their own autonomous communities rather than Spain as a whole. Thus, the main focus of this thesis is rather on the regional identity that defines the people living in Catalonia, as reflected in surveys, transitional justice policies, as well as the public service broadcasting. The thesis will limit its interest to examining the past and current state of nationalism, on the basis of a longitudinal study on the Catalans' nationalist sentiments, their regional legislation concerning the victims of the Francoist regime (1939–1975), but also the organization of the broadcasting services.

Historically speaking, the Spanish nation has been torn by conflicts between the majority – perceived as Castilians – and the strong minority regions like Catalonia that displayed constant tendencies towards autonomy or even independence. However, this relationship is reversed in Catalonia, where the majority of people are Catalans. During the Franco regime, this problem has been tackled by the means of assimilation policies, which proved to have infringed upon universal rights in the case of ethnic minorities. The new constitutional monarchy, on the other side, granted considerable power to autonomous regional institutions giving official recognition to all

ethnicities. In fact, Catalonia was granted the status of autonomous community on December 18, 1979, and its regional power increased steadily ever since. (Nuñez 2001, 722–729)

Today, all 17 regions have become autonomous communities. Therefore, Spain is seen as a nation of diverse nationalities. In this context, the national government in Madrid must mediate between the demands that press on the Spanish state and the power and needs of the autonomous communities (Maxwell and Spiegel 1994, 20). Similarly, the nationalist discourse, here labeled as *nationalism*, can be differentiated between (mainstream) *ethnic nationalism* and *civic nationalism*. The tension between these two different political identities led to a clearer distinction between the two national identities, Spanish and Catalan.

What triggered the present research is that many scholars argue that Eastern nationalism corresponds to “ethnic nationalism”, while Western nationalism is identifiable with “civic nationalism”. The first chapter will extensively explore the differences between *ethnic* and *civic* nationalism in the literature. However, others rightly argue that the classic differentiation between the two types of nationalism made by Antony D. Smith (1986; 1991) is actually visible all across Europe. This thesis will develop on how Western countries, such as Spain, experienced ethnic nationalism bringing historical evidence, and how it evolved into more positive forms of what is called civic nationalism. In fact, the autonomous region of Catalonia, Spain, stands as an example for my claim that Catalan civic nationalism originates in ethnic nationalism.

Witnessing the emergence of academic research in an interdisciplinary fashion, scholars can now rely more than ever on complex views over their topics, determining better links between cause and effect. Following this principle, my purpose is not only to formulate concepts and develop a critique but explain the transitional progress from ethnic to civic nationalism in Catalonia.

The current state of nationalism in Catalonia will be assessed by using opinion polls and discussing their change over time. The research question: *As reflected in opinion polls and different governmental policies, are Catalans still characterized by sentiments of ethnic nationalism?* I hypothesize that the Catalan people experienced a transition from ethnic to civic nationalism due to a number of causes explained throughout the thesis. The last chapter will present the in-depth case of the Catalan public broadcasting which aims at proving that the regional government dedicated its resources to successfully maintain the balance between representing the Catalan national identity and the interests of others.

Due to the use of both *quantitative* and *qualitative* analyses, two different methodologies will be employed for each type. Firstly, I will interpret the results of four opinion polls from 1984, 1993, 2002, and 2007 on the topic of national identity. The years were selected based on availability of data, but also because the 10 years between one another can yield valid and comparable results about possible changes in the society. The empirical study is also valuable because it was developed every time by the same research institute, the Spanish Sociological Research Center, in the same region – Catalonia – with a similar representative sample of the region. So the results from the 4 different years can be compared and, based on them, the thesis will establish the possible existence of a certain trend in the development of nationalism.

Secondly, I will develop a qualitative analysis based on the peculiarities displayed by each of the selected legislations: transitional justice and broadcasting media. I will compare a number of important modifications in legislative acts during the years of democratic consolidation, after Catalonia had achieved its status of autonomous community, and conclude whether they are more inclusive and open towards accepting non-Catalan elements. Taken into consideration the



theoretically oriented approach of this theme, I will employ the *process-tracing* method to explain this micro-historical phenomenon. In their methodology book *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett describe process tracing as an attempt “to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanisms – between explanatory variables and the outcome of the response variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 206). In my inquiry, I will follow the policies adopted by the Catalan regional government from the times after the regime change, to the times of democratic consolidation and further. Tracing this process of transformation, I will concentrate on the attitudes that Catalans had towards nationalism, namely see if the outcome will disprove my hypothesis that *the Catalan people experienced a transition from ethnic to civic nationalism*. The process-tracing method also allows discovering and investigating possible alternative causal paths that could result into the same outcome or different (amended hypothesis) outcomes.

The originality of the present thesis lies with its comprehensive analysis of the diverse aspects that could portray the status of nationalism today. Instead of drawing conclusions about the state of Catalan nationalism based on one piece of evidence, the thesis gathers a relevant number of aspects that will be studied both quantitatively and qualitatively. On the one hand, I will analyze empirical data and see whether there is a pattern of change in the nature of Catalan nationalism. On the other hand, I will examine the legislation passed by the autonomous community of Catalonia during the years of democratic consolidation in two specific areas: transitional justice and media policy.

The first chapter begins with an overview of the most important authors in the field of nationalism. Due to the immense literature in the field, this part of the thesis is structured as a

four-type analysis, paired two by two due to their interdependency and overlap. Thus, the four varieties of nationalism that were considered are: traditional and ethnic nationalism, as well as liberal and civic nationalism. Acknowledging that all types of nationalism have a great common range and the differences between them is sometimes negligible, the present thesis argues that in the case of Catalonia, ethnic nationalism residing in its own history changed gradually to forms of civic nationalism. In order to clarify the reasons why ethnic nationalism emerged in Catalonia, this chapter ends with a brief history of Catalan nationalism from its origins until the end of the Spanish fascist regime.

The second chapter represents the core analysis of the thesis. It starts with an empirical study of four years scattered throughout 23 years of recent Spanish history, one for every decade. The reason for this is the possibility to detect linearity in the development of nationalism, virtually showing a pattern that could account for the transition from ethnic to civic nationalism. Deriving from the literature and the positioning of the self within his/her own collective identity, five indicators were selected for testing this nationalism development. The five indicators are: self-identification with the location where the participant belongs, the level of his/her nationalist sentiment, his/her satisfaction with the level of autonomy in Catalonia, self-identification as Spanish or Catalan, or both, and finally his/her personal attitudes towards immigration. These indicators are likely to prove whether nationalism did or did not, in fact, change from ethnic to civic forms. The last part of the second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of transitional justice policies. This particular choice is explained by the importance of dealing with victims of the Civil War, especially in Catalonia where this identity has been systematically suppressed, in the relation between Catalonia and Spain.

As I will argue in the last chapter of the thesis, the under-developed but already-existent independent media structures were maintaining the specific languages and cultural heritage despite their constant oppression but only in the last decade of Franco's regime. Before analyzing their mission and impact today, I will look at the development of these media policies, the way that they might have changed even before Franco's death, continuing throughout the transition to democracy and the Constitution of 1978, which reestablished the monarchy. In other words, the chapter will provide an insightful profile of the Catalan public broadcasting that deal with community-based issues, and see how ethnic vs. civic oriented they are in their public policies. Finally, I will see whether the Catalan government through its media legislation successfully managed to balance its won goals and the mainstream Spanish interest, therefore respecting media pluralism and the Spanish monarchy. Considering that Spain's main purpose after 1975 was to create a binding, unitary state, but at the same time respecting the integrity of the different ethnic groups such as Catalans, my claim is that its media policies reflect the changes in the nature of nationalism.

# Chapter 1 – Nationalism and Its Facets

Before going into the core of the thesis, this chapter will limit the span of my argument by establishing the working definitions of the term *nationalism*. In doing so, I will briefly review the most relevant theoretical concepts as they developed in the literature with a special focus on the Autonomous Region of Catalonia, Spain.

## 1. 1. *From Individual to Collective Identity*

National identity and the sense of belonging to a nation are the most general characteristics for any group of people that inhabit the same territory, speak the same language, and share the same culture and historical narrative (Calhoun 1997, 232), while the modern state is generally considered as a nation–state<sup>1</sup>. According to a well–known interpretation, a nation is set apart from other groups by the virtue of its members *imagining* themselves as a nation (Anderson, 1983). A nation views itself as an entity with a unique, or at least special culture, sharing loyalties or emotional bonds in the form of nationalism. When discussing nations, most authors take a dialectical approach because “[t]here is no adhesion to a group without exclusion”, simply because the sense of identity cannot be conceived outside a direct opposition to the sense of otherness (Allport 1987). Attachment of group members toward their country is expressed by a

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<sup>1</sup> The term is used starting with the 19<sup>th</sup> century to denote the first modern states: Greece in 1830, Belgium in 1831, Italy in 1861, Germany in 1871, Serbia and Montenegro in 1878.

sense of belonging, love, loyalty, pride, and care toward the group and land (Bar–Tal 1997, 246). However, I agree with Heywood that this emotional bond is not a *sine qua non* condition of the feeling of allegiance to a nation; even people who do not feel national pride may admit they “belong” to a nation (Heywood 2004, 127).

Nationalism continues to be today one of the most controversial concepts in political science, even more than two hundred years after its appearance as a social and ideological phenomenon. Its understanding as a political doctrine has attracted people from countries with tradition in liberal democracy, such as in the United Kingdom, in Scotland, or Spain, in Catalonia, and post–communist countries, like Hungary, with less experience in constitutional democracy. However, the present thesis will only limit its discussion to nationalism as an ideology. Acknowledging that *collective identity* represents the foundation of nationalism, this appeared following the consequences of Modernity on tradition and religion, with the emergence of the nation–states and due to the revolutions across Western Europe (Smith 1991, 96).

There are numerous classifications and typologies of nationalism and most of them will be excluded from this analysis. Instead, I will focus on four different types of nationalism, that are also the most discussed in the literature especially in the European context. Thus, I will refer to liberal nationalism and its twin concept, civic nationalism, and traditional (conservative) nationalism and its complementary concept, ethnic nationalism. Although for the purposes of this Chapter the concepts will be examined strictly on a theoretical level, the following part will deal with their measurable aspects consisting of specific observations in Catalonia.

It is generally accepted in the literature, and reinforced in the present thesis, that *nationalism* is not a unitary phenomenon. Rather, it is more suitable to discuss different *kinds* of nationalism,

depending on the perspective of analysis. In the case of this thesis the classification is based on Anthony D. Smith's distinction between *civic* and *ethnic nationalism* from a historical perspective.

In order to grasp the content of the term *nationalism* comprehensively, I will review the definitions given by the main theorists in the field. In his seminal work "The Idea of Nationalism", Hans Kohn (1967, 16) defines nationalism as a state of mind increasingly permeating the large majority of a population, based on the attitude of loyalty between the members of the society. Kohn acknowledges the nation state as the ideal form of political organization, and nationalism as the source of cultural values and economic prosperity. Similarly, Snyder (1969, i) argues that nationalism is a frame of mind emphasizing the emotional character of nationalism as a feeling shared by a group that lives in a well-defined geographical region, speaks a common language, has a culture that expresses the nation's aspirations, practicing the same tradition, and sometimes even adhering to the same religion. Shafer (1972, 15) is more concerned with the future and the (self-)preservation of the nation, describing nationalism as an idea shared by people who are united by (1) living on the same territory, (2) common cultural heritage, (3) common current interests and hope to live together in the future, and (4) common will to promote their own state. A.D. Smith (1991, 14) probably provides the most complete definition of nationalism referring to a given population sharing a common territory, common memory, common myths, public culture, common economy, equal rights and responsibilities for all of its members. Of course, these definitions rather complete than contradict each other.

For Ernest Gellner (1997, 9), nationalism is a political principle situated at the intersection between political and national unity. This means that the state drives its legitimacy from the idea of political representation; in other words decisions made by the state become binding for all citizens because they were made by representatives chosen by the majority of people. But what exactly is the connection between political representation and nationalism? The principle of political representation implies that individuals in a society have a sense of sharing, or sense of community, articulated in terms of citizenship, or national belonging. This collective identity legitimizes the political power and mobilizes the individuals to participate in public life for the sake of the nation's well-being. This membership has two facets. First, the political decisions are made collectively by citizens that have a common interest to advance their own society, and second, the passive members of the community who did not participate in the political process (e.g. did not vote) will accept the decisions imposed on them by the active members. So what unites individuals in the same nation to take collective decisions is their common ideology. According to Gellner (1997), the term ideology here refers to the society's most commonly accepted and prescriptive norms and values, which may be found implicitly or explicitly in different nationalistic discourses, without necessarily being part of a systematic doctrine. Seen as an ideology, nationalism is a complex merger between *cognitive* elements expressed in everyday life (such as national heroes, historical milestones, monuments, symbols, landscapes) and *emotions*, aspirations. Gellner rightfully summarizes the core of the nationalistic ideology in the following axioms:

- (1) The world is composed out of nations, each having its own destiny, history, and specific individuality;

- (2) The nation is the source of social and political power, therefore the national loyalty is prior to any individual obligation;
- (3) Liberty and personal development depends on the identification with the nation;
- (4) Nations can be free and safe only if justice and peace are ensured everywhere in the world.

Although this is a very wide definition referring to the most general assumptions behind the nationalistic rhetoric, it will be narrowed subsequently in the analysis on Catalonia, when the more relative assumptions will emerge from the different historical contexts. Nevertheless, the four most discussed *types* of nationalism are: liberal, traditional, civic, and ethnic. Although the thesis will widely explore the civic and ethnic types of nationalism, I will marginally discuss the liberal and traditional kinds of nationalism, too, due to the multiple inseparable associations that exist between them.

Liberal nationalism originates in the Enlightenment, when the “Young Italy” (La Giovine Italia) political movement was founded and guided by Giuseppe Mazzini’s (1805–1872) “humanistic internationalist” ideal. His domestic program, militating primarily for the unification of Italy, had an international endeavor, the “Young Europe”, formed by 11 independent nations with the intended purpose to counterbalance the Habsburg Monarchy. Mazzini’s view is relevant for the purpose of this thesis as it illustrates the incipient phase of a sense of nationalism engaging several peoples having a common scope, higher than one nation acting for its own sake.

The challenge of liberal nationalism is the apparent contradictory relationship between the principles of individual self-determination and national self-determination. John Stuart Mill discusses the consensus between the individual choice and the form of government, which is of



collective nature and needs to be decided by the governed (Mill 1861, 9), thus transferring the individual self-determination to the upper level and justifying national self-determination. For Harry Beram, the structure of the syllogism is the following: “Individuals have the right to personal self-determination. Consequently, the groups also have the right to self-determination; therefore groups that constitute nations have the right to national self-determination. However, this explanation seems to be incomplete, as it does not mention how the transition from individual to collective self-determination takes place without regarding the nation as superior in its relation to individual options. In essence, liberal nationalism does not establish the *locus* of the individual within the national context, nor can he/she reside outside the nation. (Beram 1987, 138). In other words, the connection between the individual and national self-determination is based on assumptions that are different for the person and the collectivity. If one agrees that individuals have the right to choose their own values and attachments, it is hardly acceptable that, at the same time, there are other values (the national ones), superior to the personal ones, that even determine them. Yael Tamir proposes a reconciliation of the liberal tradition, which focuses on the respect of individual autonomy and choice, with the nationalist tradition, which emphasizes the attachment, loyalty and solidarity. Indeed, there are certain nationalist sentiments that are extremely important for some, but they do not necessarily become absolute reference points for anybody. A liberal spirit will always believe that people are free to reconsider their convictions anytime, while a nationalist person would claim that there are some commonly accepted values that can never be questioned. (Tamir 1993, 6–14, 33)

Traditional or conservative nationalism was inspired by the cultural themes of Romanticism, and appeared as a reaction to the French Revolution (1789–1799) and to the rigid rationalism that was threatening the continuity of historical evolution. Edmund Burke and Joseph de Maistre

considered the nation as a superior expression of an organic community, opposed to a mere “corpus of citizens with equal rights”. In its German variant, under the influence of Herder and Fichte, the nation was the expression of “purity of language, cultural and popular mythology”. Of great importance was the reinforcement of old customs and traditions, which played an essential role in the emergence of nations.

Although associated, tradition and nationalism are two very distinct terms. Tradition represents an important factor in constituting identities, while the nation employs tradition for a particular objective: the affirmation of an abstract collective project. Just as any other social project with too strong emphasis on the past, tradition has a differentiated significance for the individual, thus ignoring the priorities of the present times. While I agree that the social context is essential especially from the cultural nationalism point of view, its force should derive from current necessities rather than past events. Tradition may be useful in defining certain behavioral types, but cannot constitute a feasible and infallible criterion for carrying out daily life. Furthermore, tradition cannot validate the way in which people choose their preferences and establish their priorities. What nationalistic projects share is exactly the intention to establish some scopes and criteria as a basis for individual options<sup>2</sup>.

Studies on nationalism and its role in Eastern European politics and culture often worked with the division of Europe into, on the one hand, a civilized West, whose nationalism was regarded as something more civilized and progressive, naturally advancing towards liberal democracy, and on the other hand a backward East whose nationalism borders barbarism (Auer 2004, viii–ix). Many scholars argued, in accordance with the above distinction, that as a result of the lack of

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<sup>2</sup> See Richard Rorty’s idea of modern anti–foundationalism, which claims that practical judgments cannot rely on abstract deontological laws. (Rorty 1989)

strong democratic traditions, people in Eastern Europe are especially inclined to what is extremist nationalism "by definition" (Greenfeld 1992, Schöpflin 2000, 52). It was thought that this type of nationalism would seriously jeopardize both the process of transition to democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996) and the chance to install a stable, liberal democratic order and the stamina to "return to Europe". Ironically, this division has been accepted even by the Eastern European nations, many of which often try to distance themselves from the "barbaric" East (often symbolized by Russian Stalinism, modern Russia, and recently the Balkans). They stress their (actual or alleged) allegiance to the West by protesting that liberal and democratic values are part of their cultures. There emerges a "new nationalist myth" – the widespread conviction about the Eastern European nations robbed of their real identity only due to an unfavorable historical event (Yalta agreements) (e.g. Kundera 2000). In this context, the present stereotypes and reluctance of Western countries to embrace Eastern Europe are based on narratives about a region trapped in its own history characterized by non-liberal regimes (Auer 2004, viii–ix).

Civic nationalism is associated with liberal nationalism, as it tries to combine the principles of national self-determination and individual self-determination. The denominator *civic* seems to confer this type of nationalism more popularity in the literature (and superiority) as it suggests, beyond the common understanding of nationalism, in its traditional (conservative) sense, the existence of a so-called "political community". This implies a set of rules, laws and political institutions that tie the members of the community around a type of authority different from historical or cultural. For Anthony D. Smith, the civic model of the nation is predominantly associated with the territory. Thus, nations own a well-defined territory, which is historical and sacred. Another important element is the *fatherland*, a community of laws and institutions with a single voice and political will expressing common goals and political interests. The political

community represents the substance of judicial equality, civic and economic rights of the society. The ultimate expression of this community is a set of values and common cultural traditions, aspirations, sentiments and ideas that hold people together on a historical territory. Therefore, according to A.D. Smith, the standard elements of the Western concept of a nation are the historical territory, a certain community, political and judicial equality, plus a civic culture. This type of nationalism developed especially in countries with relatively stable territories, like England and France, and for which the only problem was creating a common ideology that would correspond to the need of national unity. In countries from Eastern Europe, where territorial disputes are still current, there is a different type of nationalism which usually reclaims an original territory, or a region unjustly lost in the past.

Druckman characterizes civic nationalism as strong loyalty and attachments to one's own group without the corresponding hostility toward other groups (Druckman 1994). Michnik argues that from the perspective of civic nationalism the nation is not idealized, but critically evaluated (Michnik 1993, 151) and saw civic nationalism as a positive relation to the national community that does not need to be strengthened by the existence of any imaginary or real enemy. Therefore, civic nationalism is easily replaceable with the aforementioned liberal nationalism. It is clear by now that this brand of nationalism does not attempt to put the interests of one nation above those of another and supports the concept of equality of all nations. From this vantage point, nationalism provides the mechanics of achieving a peaceful, stable world order (Heywood 2004, 134).

In Kohn's vision, the ideology behind civic nationalism is the product of a dominant middle class already formed in the 18<sup>th</sup> century expressing an ideal of civic politics merging individual

liberties with “rational cosmopolitanism” (see Conversi 1997, 3). This concept emerged from the effort to create a nation out of “political realities and present struggles without any sentimental attachments to the past (Kohn 1967, 329–331).

In contrast, ethnic nationalism strongly emphasizes the birth (natal) community and the native culture. Regardless of where the individual lives, he/she is organically and inescapably connected to the community where he/she was born. Here, the common descent is the essential characteristic of the nation seen as a large family, thus this brand of nationalism centers the idea of ethnic community (Smith 1991, Horovitz 2000). Instead of common institutions and set of laws, the state functions by the “will of the people”, therefore popular mobilization has both a rhetoric and moral role (Gellner 1969, 330). Also, the idea of equality is replaced by the vernacular cultures model, popular traditions and customs, which contributed to the formation of an “imagined community” called the nation. This is how the fascination for national myths and historical ballads about anonymous heroes saving the country appeared. The ideology is impressively rich in this sense and it capitalizes the need of national affirmation for the sake of a glorious past with which the present cannot compare.

Ethnic nationalism can dangerously be misinterpreted and encourage attitudes involving liking one’s own group and disliking certain other groups (Druckman 1994, 63–64). The pursuers of this idea insist on the need of maintaining cultural purity and traditions, something which may also lead to perceiving immigrants and strangers as a threat, thereby promoting or at least giving a semblance of legitimacy to racism and xenophobia. There is a sharp division between “us” and “them” and sometimes this split is carried to the extreme as “they” are the foes that need to be

hated or ridiculed. Once “they” are clearly identified, the awareness about “us” is strengthened and the identities are experienced with more intensity (Heywood 2004, 138).

As Kohn argues, in Central and Eastern Europe, where there is no significant middle class, nationalism was the creation of the elites or groups of intellectuals that had no access to power but wished to seize it. The nationalist intellectuals created from the historical myths and national dreams an ideal *fatherland* powerfully linked to the past and marginally to the present, which soon had to become a political reality (Kohn 1967, 330). This is why ethnic nationalism is often regarded as “cultural nationalism”, as the cultural elites’ response to modernity and the “rational” culture found in Western Europe. The economic and social hardship in Eastern Europe determined an underdeveloped culture that had to be substituted by historical myths as a response to the uneasy present. Probably this is why the nation was conceived as an organic unity that had a mission that could be understood only by the intellectuals (see Kohn 1955). Unlike in Western Europe, these countries did not experience the Renaissance, nor did they undergo the Reformation with their specific individualism, rationalism and secularization. In turn, Eastern Europe remained anchored for a longer time in the abstract universalism of the Middle Ages, hence the essentialist nationalist rhetoric in which individuals identified only with their collective instances.

Now, it is important to restate that there are numerous overlapping aspects of these four types of nationalism. However, their specific articulation in the Autonomous Region of Catalonia is particularly interesting. Even though one of the most influential classifications of nationalism is Kohn’s differentiation between Western and Eastern nationalism, Western being more civic and moderate, and Eastern being more ethnic and bellicose, this thesis argues that Catalan

nationalism used to be essentially ethnic but it gradually transformed into civic. The origins of ethnic nationalism lie in the region's history that I will review briefly in the last part of this Chapter.

So despite Kohn's classification, why Catalonia represents a very insightful case study for ethnic nationalism is because it has an extremely long and eventful history, unique culture, and language that did not go extinct during the Castilian domination from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Along with Andalucía, Valencia, the Basque Country, ethnic nationalist movements also erupted in Catalonia at the end of the nineteenth century greatly due to industrialization and immigration (Beltran 1994). However, the histories of these regions were different from Catalonia's own story, which unlike the Basque Country, for example did not continue on the line of separatism and anti-capitalism, but quite the opposite, enforcing a so-called *policy of consensus* and economic prosperity, as I will show throughout the thesis.

## **1. 2. The Origins of Nationalism in Catalonia**

The Catalan state was formed between the 12<sup>th</sup> and the 14<sup>th</sup> centuries as a powerful economic power at the Mediterranean Sea. Soon, the Catalan-Aragonese state, which was much larger than today including Sicily, Sardinia and other territories, became the largest and most prosperous in the region. Interestingly, the representative system, already in the 1350s, was not imposed through violent revolutions but through peaceful consensus. Although during the following centuries the Castilian Empire took over the entire peninsula, Catalonia managed to keep its own

administration and finances at a regional level. Since then until the early 1800s, Catalonia has been independent and under the Spanish occupation intermittently. (Balcells 1996)

The standardization of Catalan language started in the 19<sup>th</sup> century with the foundation of the first Catalan newspaper, and the first Grammar book published by Pompeu Fabra under the auspices of the Catalan Studies Institute. Between mid 19<sup>th</sup> century and 1936, the renaissance of the Catalan culture was enhanced by rapid economic growth and favorable historical context, namely independence (Kaplan 1992). Edles identifies two different sources for the first revival of nationalism. The first source is the conservative Catholic tradition legitimized by its popularity in the Middle Ages and trying to recreate the hierarchical state structure inspired by the traditional symbols of the Church. The second source of nationalism at this stage finds its origins in the federal republicanism which proposed a democratic and secular nationalism, a modern and progressive Catalonia that would lead Spain. (Edles, 1999, 319–322)

The revival of nationalism together with economic power and immigration changed the Catalan landscape by the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. As Angel Smith argues, there were two “wars” happening at this time in Catalonia. The first war was the “nationalist struggle” against the centralist power from Madrid, a rather elitist one. The second war was the “class struggle”, between the Catalan bourgeoisie society and the working class. Of course, in such a social context it is not surprising that between 1919 and 1923 numerous workers’ strikes erupted in Barcelona that powerfully unbalanced the political system of Catalonia and weakened its autonomy from Spain. (Smith 1996, 179)

Eventually, after many scandals and attempts to take over the region, the Catalan Parliament managed to stop the strikes and restore equilibrium and peace. However, the consequence was



that republicanist groups and Catalan nationalists became more and more powerful and eventually won the elections in April 1931. The former army colonel Francesc Macià became the first president of the Catalan regional government, the *Generalitat*. In 1932 Catalonia was granted the statute of autonomy, Catalan was declared official language to be studied mandatory in schools, and Catalonia altogether continued to expand until 1936. (Payne 1971, 24)

In the period following the civil war (1936–1939), Catalonia suffered severe cultural repression, as almost all Catalan public, cultural, and educational institutions were made strictly illegal and big placards were introduced everywhere in the big cities encouraging people to speak the “language of the Empire”. Even more profoundly, due to the new boom of the Catalan textile industry from the 1950s, a large number of workers especially from Andalucía were brought to work in Catalan factories, in order to homogenize the Catalan-speaking population with the Spanish-Speaking one. Additionally, the traditional Catalan small-scale businesses could hardly compete with the modernizing Spanish economy forcefully implemented in Catalonia, obliging many Catalans to seek solutions outside their region. Unlike very few times in its history, Catalan finance has become increasingly weak because its resources were not proportionate to the total weight of the Catalan economy as part of Spain as a whole. (Payne 1971, 32)

However, with the relaxation of government restrictions during the 1950s, a second Catalan revival started to occur. Due to the fact that the Francoist regime was more authoritarian, rather than totalitarian, Catalan cultural activities blossomed once more, and, since the majority of the inhabitants of the region were able to use their language at home, so they soon reached a rather impressive volume. Eventually, one hour of daily school instruction in Catalan was accepted by the fascist government, as well as in other regions of Spain. Although they were generally

repressed, regional nationalist movements remained active in the political opposition both at home and outside the region, in the countries where they were sent into exile. Such dissidents have organized themselves to such an extent that they managed to maintain the “headquarters” of the Catalan National Council in Mexico City in parallel with the *Generalitat*’s “government-in-exile” established in Paris. (Payne 1971, 33–37)

Other numerous factions and regionalist parties were organized in Catalonia and their leaders were often arrested, and still, the Catalan movement still never sized to exist. Although all odds seemed to be favorable to Spain especially due to its minority position in Europe after 1945, Franco’s policies chose to dismiss the need for at least cultural autonomy (referring to the use of Catalan language, own institutions, publications, etc.) for Catalonia, as well as Galicia and the Basque Country. Even under these conditions with no state incentives whatsoever, ethnic nationalism remained rooted in Catalonia and survived until the end of the Fascist regime.

Such nationalist movements occurred in other European nations, too, and they are visible especially within smaller ethnic groups who feel somewhat endangered by the more powerful national identities situated in their vicinity, hence Flemish nationalism or Scottish nationalism. Although economic development represented an impulse for Catalan nationalism, it is not the only variable that contributed to its amplification. Rather, the cultural and social changes of the second half of the twentieth century have sharpened identity crises and aggravated moral and spiritual problems that were left to be solved by the democratic generation that came to the political stage after the reestablishment of the monarchy in 1975.

## **Chapter 2 – Explaining the Transition Process from Ethnic to Civic Nationalism**

If the previous chapter set the working definitions for the concepts of nationalism, the second part of the thesis aims at identifying the main expressions of nationalism in the consciousness of Catalan people using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The first analysis, the empirical one, is of survey results based on descriptive statistics. The following analysis is qualitative, examining the underlying mechanisms of the autonomous institutions and their relation with the Spanish government. Here, I will show that, within the years of transition to democracy, Catalonia shifted one of its most enduring policies, related to transitional justice, in order to better fit its more important goals to preserve national identity.

### ***2.1. Quantitative Analysis of Catalan Nationalism from 1984 to 2007***

The Spanish Sociological Research Center or CIS – Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas is, since 1984, regularly conducting a survey centered on the theme of national identity. Its reliability is beyond question for several reasons. The Center was established 1963 and remodeled in 1977 during the transition, and has won many sociological awards ever since. Its funding comes directly from the Prime–Minister’s Cabinet, and not the Parliament, ensuring a high degree of institutional autonomy. In addition, its research encompasses all 17 autonomous communities from Spain, making my single choice to study Catalonia possible. The study I will

refer to, called “National Identity in Spain”<sup>3</sup> uses 5 indicators that are expected to reflect all aspects of nationalism discussed previously. The first criterion for selecting these indicators was their emergence from the literature, as they represent fairly accurate empirical tools for approximating the nationalist feelings in Catalonia. The second criterion was the potential of these indicators to express the individual choice of identification with certain aspects of the society they live in. They represent items of self-identification of the self in relation with his/her own point of reference, which is, in this case, the Catalan society. The opinion poll was based on 3,213 interviews in 2007, 3,192 interviews in 2002 and a similar size in the other two years on a representative sample of individuals over the age of 18.

In order to reach the conclusion whether Catalan nationalism has, indeed, changed from ethnic to civic, I will look at the developing trend of the indicators in every decade since CIS started with this line of research. Thus, the selected years are 1984, 1993, 2002, and 2007. The reasons why particularly these years were chosen are as follows. 1984 is the first year when this type of survey was performed by CIS, 1993 is the year after the Olympic Games were held in Barcelona, which could possibly enhance the nationalist sentiments in Catalonia and I testing the validity of this assumption seems noteworthy, 2002 is almost a decade after the second selected year, and finally 2007 is the most recent year when CIS issued results on this topic. Therefore this panel study based on longitudinal and descriptive data over almost 25 years has enough explanatory power to establish whether my hypothesis of Catalan nationalism developing from ethnic forms to civic is rejected or not.

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<sup>3</sup> Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), *La identidad nacional en España*: [http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Marginales/2660\\_2679/2667/e266701.html](http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Marginales/2660_2679/2667/e266701.html)

Rather than explaining the indicators' origin in their specific historical context, the main purpose of this analysis is to see if there is any pattern in their evolution over the years and what the meaning could be. Unfortunately, the previous research in the field is insufficiently developed and cannot explain the nationalist feeling in Catalonia (see Hjerm 2003) and this study is aimed at filling this gap.

### **2.1.1. Self-Identification with Catalonia or Elsewhere**

The first employed indicator is the self-identification with a certain territory, the birth place, or the place where the individual lives currently, either the country or the region, or the world as a whole. Its relevance lies with the person's attachment to a certain geographical region, a very relevant criterion when discussing nationalism. If the individual identifies more with Catalonia than Spain as a whole, one can infer that ethnic nationalism rather than feelings are present. The less an individual identifies with a certain geographical location, the more inclusive of other territories and people living in them the person is, thus the more inclined towards civic nationalism.

The question from the survey where this indicator was extracted from is: *We all feel more or less tied with the location where we live, but some feel more related to a certain place than another. Which environment you identify more with? In your answer, please use a scale from 1 to 10, in which 0 means you feel "not at all" identified and 10 means that you feel "much identified".*

**Table 1: Self–Identification with Catalonia or Elsewhere**

Locations of self – identification	Averages			
	1984	1993	2002	2007
The city/village where you live	9.2	8.55	8.3	8.20
Autonomous community	9.45	8.72	8.60	8.60
Catalan–speaking territories	8.86	8.9	7.0	7.12
Spain	6.7	6.9	7.1	7.12
Europe	6.3	6.77	6.2	6.8
Spanish–Speaking territories	5.0	5.24	5.1	5.45
Humanity as a whole	6.9	6.8	7.0	7.18

As shown in Table 1, in 1984 Catalans felt approximately one scale less attached to their motherland than nowadays. Although people had roughly the same attitudes towards the humanity as a whole, and the Spanish–Speaking territories (including Latin America), their self–identification with Europe evolved one the scale from 0 to 10 by 0.5 (6.3 in 1984 to 6.8 in 2007, with an exceptional decrease to 6.2 in 2002). However, it is clear from this indicator that Catalans identified themselves with Catalonia more during the times of democratic consolidation than in 2007. Judging by the relatively higher averages in the upper part of the table, one can also conclude that Catalans have always been more attached to their own land than to other territories: Spain, Europe, or to the World.

### 2.1.2. Nationalist sentiment

The second indicator, “nationalist sentiment”, defines the self–perception of the respondent as more or less nationalist, but referring to their attachment to Catalonia and not Spain. If the person considers himself/herself very nationalist, then one can infer that the loyalty or the emotional bond is much more powerful, thus more inclined towards ethnic nationalism. The less the

respondent perceives himself/herself as nationalist, the more likely the person's openness outside the national context, thus more liable to be civic nationalist.

The original question from the survey referring to this indicator is: *In relation with the nationalist sentiment (Catalan), please place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "minimal nationalism" and 10 means "maximal nationalism"*.

**Table 2: Nationalist sentiment**

Scales of Nationalism	Percentages of Respondents			
	1984	1993	2002	2007
Minimal nationalism (0–1)	11.6	12.7	9.2	15.2
(2–3)	5.7	5.9	5.4	6.3
(4–6)	27.4	28.9	38.1	33.2
(7–8)	27.1	25.6	23.0	21.5
Maximal nationalism (9–10)	24.3	22.8	19.9	19.3
DK	3.2	3.5	3.6	3.6
No answer	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

According to the results displayed in Table 2, the first observation is that minimal nationalism, with the exception of 2002, increased from 11.6% in 1984 to 15.2% in 2007, while maximal nationalism steadily decreased over the 23 years of analysis (from almost a quarter of the Catalans who qualified themselves as “maximal nationalists” in 1984 to less than a fifth in 2007). With 2002 being an exception, the general trend clearly shows that nationalism changed from its ethnic nature to a milder forms of civic nationalism. It is also noteworthy the large percentage of respondents, 27.4% – 33.2%, who placed themselves in the middle of the 0–10 scale. This finding contradicts some of the literature if the field that qualifies Catalans as extreme nationalists, proving that as much as one third of the Catalans in 2007 with nationalist sentiments were neither extreme, nor minimal, but rather moderate in their feelings of nationalism.

### 2.1.3. Satisfaction with the level of autonomy

The third indicator refers to the status of autonomy that Catalonia enjoys in Spain, as well as to the current territorial organization of the Spanish state. If, on average, the individual is fairly satisfied with the level of autonomy, then no further steps to increase autonomy are necessary, meaning that the respondents perceive their community inside the multicultural environment and do not need independence from Spain. In turn, if the individuals express dissatisfaction with the current territorial organization, thus claiming an increased level of autonomy or even independence, then territorial separation is part of the arguments supporting ethnic nationalism, rather than civic.

The question asked in the survey yielding this indicator is: *I will now present some alternative forms of territorial organization of the Spanish state. Please express your agreement with one of these formulations/statements.*

**Table 3: Satisfaction with the level of autonomy**

Levels of autonomy	Percentages of respondents			
	1984	1993	2002	2007
A state with a unique central government without autonomous regions.	5.2	6.9	7.5	8.7
A state of autonomous regions like today.	21.3	27.4	27.1	29.5
A state of autonomous regions with more power than today.	43.6	38.2	36	35,1
A state in which the autonomous communities would have the possibility to become independent.	26.8	22.8	25.3	22.5
DK	2.1	2.9	2.7	2.8
No answer	1	1.8	1.4	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0



As Table 3 shows, a bit over one third of Catalans would like their region to have more power than today. However, this number shows a clear decreasing trend from 23 years ago, when 43.6% of them wanted Catalonia to have more power than it had at the time. There are two possible explanations of this trend. First, that Catalonia increased its autonomy over time satisfying more and more citizens, and second, that the question of autonomy was much more discussed in 1984 than it is today. This finding is confirmed by the dramatic change of satisfaction with the state of autonomous region on the date of the interview, from 21.3% in 1984 to 27.4% in 1993 and the percentage stayed approximately the same until today. This means that during the 9 years between 1984 and 1993 Catalonia increased its autonomy at a level acceptable to one third of its population. Nevertheless, a significant percentage of Catalans showed their dissatisfaction with the region's autonomy expressing their will for more power, thus decreasing the power of the central government. Interestingly enough, although more than 20% of the respondents in 2007 wanted a state in which Catalonia would have the possibility to become independent, this percentage was 4.3% higher in 1984. Although this figure is too small to draw an unequivocal conclusion about Catalans' inclusiveness vs. exclusiveness with regard to the status of their region within vs. outside Spain, the trend supporting my hypothesis is still visible. Instead, it is safe to agree that Catalans continuously want an increased level of autonomy, and not independence.

#### **2.1.4. Self-identification as Catalan vs. Spanish**

The self-identification with the ethnicity is probably one of the most important indicators in my analysis. The possibility of having dual identity has been widely discussed in the literature but

poorly proved empirically on either side (McRoberts 2001, Moreno 1995, Miley 2007). While I agree that the likelihood of Catalans feeling both as Catalans and Spanish is quite high, it is still not the degree to which Flemish people consider themselves both Flemish and Belgian. According to the Belgian General Electoral Study (1995), approximately 85% of the Flemish ethnics consider themselves as Belgian as Flemish. Likewise, as much as 79% of the Quebecois feel equally Canadian and Quebecois (Mendehilson 2002). It is clear by now that if Catalans consider themselves both Catalans and Spanish, then they reflect the idea of civic nationalism, and not the exclusiveness and closeness typical for ethnic nationalism.

The question illustrating this indicator is: *Which of the following statements best describes your sentiments?*

**Table 4: Self-identification as Catalan vs. Spanish**

Identities	Percentages of Respondents			
	1984	1993	2002	2007
I consider myself only Spanish.	6.9	7.4	7.6	7.6
I feel more Spanish than Catalan.	5.7	7	9.5	7.5
I feel Spanish and Catalan equally.	34.8	38.6	37.3	40.9
I feel more Catalan than Spanish.	29.2	27.7	27.5	26.6
I consider myself only Catalan.	19.5	16.2	14.8	14
None of the above.	3.4	2.9	3	3.1
No answer	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.3
Total	100	100	100	100

The results grouped in Table 4 seem to confirm the expectations about a large number of Catalans having a dual national identity. Nevertheless, one can observe that the percentage of respondents who feel Spanish and Catalan equally has risen from 34.8% in 1984 to 40.9% in 2007, showing that this dual identity improved over the years. Although the percentages are not comparable with the high level of duality registered in Belgium and Canada, it seems that

Catalonia is more civic nationalist than the Great Britain, where as much as 37% of the Scottish population consider themselves only Scottish (Moreno 1995). Another dimension that should be stressed concerns the percentages that rank one of their identities as primary and the other as secondary. Thus, the number of respondents who felt Catalan more than Spanish steadily decreased from 1984 when they represented 29.2% of the total, to 26.6% in 2007, although with a slight oscillation in 2002. In contrast, the people who felt primarily Spanish (who were less due to the ethnic composition of Catalonia) and secondary Catalans increased from 5.7% in 1985 to 7.5 % in 2007, again with a notable exception when it unusually rose to 9.5. Interestingly, all percentages experience a dramatic change between 1984 and 1993, after which they remain somewhat constant, with the exception of 2002, showing that the deepest change in the Catalan society happened between the 1980s and the 1990s. In other words, the ethnic self-identification indicator demonstrates the trend from ethnic to civic nationalism given that double identification is a clear sign of openness and inclusiveness.

### **2.1.5. Attitudes towards immigration**

The last indicator of my empirical analysis is the Catalans' attitude towards immigration. The relevance of this indicator lies with Catalonia's major importance in Spain as an economic power that attracts immigrants from both Spain (especially from Andalucía) and worldwide (especially Latin America and North Africa). Thus the immigrants' possibility to become Catalans, although they were born there, depends on the majority's willing to include them in their society. If Catalans prove have positive attitude towards immigration, then this would be consistent with the

narrative supporting civic nationalism. If Catalans prove to be closed or negative towards immigration, then their attitude would be more associated with ideas of ethnic nationalism.

The questionnaire's formulation of this indicator is the following: *People express different opinions regarding the immigrants who live in Catalonia. Please express your agreement with the statement <The immigrants enrich the Catalan culture>.*

**Table 5: Attitudes towards immigration**

Scale of agreement	Percentages of Respondents			
	1984	1993	2002	2007
Strongly agree	7.1	8.1	8.6	8.7
Agree	25.8	29.7	28.2	33.7
Don't matter / indifferent	9.8	10.4	10.1	11.9
Disagree	33.6	30.1	30	29.1
Strongly disagree	18.4	16	17.8	11.1
DK	5	5.3	5.1	5.1
No answer	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.3
Total	100	100	100	100

The contrasts between the different kinds of attitudes are particularly interesting in this case, as presented in Table 5. The main observation is that the people who (mildly) agree and strongly disagree with immigration are fairly equal in percentages, 33.7% and 29.1%, showing that Catalonia is still a divided society with regard to immigration. Nevertheless, it is clear that respondents registered a crescendo trend in accepting immigrants. If in 1984 only a quarter of the Catalans believed that immigrants can enrich their culture, 23 years later the percentage gradually increased to over a third, while the number of Catalans who had extremely positive attitudes towards immigration remained almost equal. Similarly, the number of Catalans who (moderately) disagreed with the statement that immigrants enrich their culture slightly decreased

over the 23 years of this longitudinal analysis, confirming that, to a certain extent, ethnic nationalism developed into more inclusive forms of civic nationalism. Moreover, the number of Catalans who were in strong disagreement with immigration decreased significantly from 18.4% in 1984, to 11.1% nowadays, which reinforces the findings reflected by all the other indicators that nationalism based on ethnic-specific considerations changed into forms of civic nationalism and liberal values.

It seems from this 5-indicator analysis that, in general lines, the pattern of transition from ethnic to civic nationalism is confirmed. Although the results are not spectacular as the differences are not extremely large, an ascending trend from closeness to openness, from exclusiveness to inclusiveness is still very visible. This implies that the Catalan society changed over the years, especially from 1984 to 1993 when the indices register the larger differences. However, it is worth mentioning that, in most cases, the year of 2002 represents a peculiar year when this ascending trend towards civic nationalism is interrupted. Indeed, the trend continues, as proved by most percentages registered in 2007, but 2002 still remains the exceptional year for which my hypothesis does not apply.

Shortly, a possible explanation for this minor oscillation in the otherwise linear trend is the replacement of the Spanish peseta with the Euro currency in 2002. The replacement of the monetary mass in 12 countries in 2002 affected their peoples not only economically, but also socio-culturally. As Katja Meier-Pesti and Erich Kirchler (2003) rightfully argue in their study of the attitudes towards the Euro and its impact on national identity status in Austria, the citizens could feel a sudden opposition to the Euro and indicate more powerful emotions towards one of their most representative national symbols (see Anderson 1983, Helleiner 1998, Breakwell

1986): the currency. Although the authors found no impact of the Euro currency in Austrian national identity, I would argue based on the previous analysis that Catalans were quite affected, hence their unexpected slight turn to feelings of ethnic nationalism.

## **2.2. *Qualitative Analysis of Catalan Transitional Justice***

In this part of the chapter, I will qualitatively examine the Catalan policies regarding transitional justice, or rather the lack of such policies. In this sense, this analysis will prove that transitional justice was not absent but postponed for the purpose of strengthening Catalan identity without emphasizing its opposition with the Spanish identity, seen as an enemy especially during the fascist regime. With such legislation, Catalonia proved to have policies inclined towards civic nationalism, as it did not harm its communication channels with the central government. Quite the opposite, Catalonia chose to look into the future for building its democracy as part of the Spanish state without holding a grudge.

According to some authors, in societies such as Catalonia (especially during the Franco regime and the years after) where ethnic animosity is present, transitional justice has the potential to reshape identities and to weaken those aspects of people's identities that have been the source of conflict, and replace them with a strengthened sense of shared identity related to common membership in the political community. This part of the chapter examines why the Catalan identity experienced such a successful revival during the transition to democracy (1975–1978)

without experiencing the apparently necessary transitional justice. In this sense, Catalonia would be a somewhat negative example where transitional justice was not absent, but rather postponed until after strengthening national identity.

Central to the topic of transitional justice is the capital question of its own necessity. It is still argued whether to consider transitional justice a *conditio sine qua non* for democratic transition and consolidation, or whether to forget about the past in exchange for a better and more peaceful future. But is it possible to step into the future without settling the stories of the past? Scholars on the one side argue that the right of victims to justice is fundamental and cannot be restricted. Others defend peace and stability and believe that reconciliation and punishment cannot be achieved without creating further animosities between victims and former political adversaries. However, it seems that transitional justice is neither a virtue, such as public services, nor a failure of democracy, but a complex policy process through which a society tries to deal with the victims of dictatorships, civil wars, and other such impunities in order to forward or return to democratic normalcy.

Transitional justice is a fairly new and challenging discipline in social science situated at the convergence between ethics, international law, constitutional law, criminal law, public policy and political science. The Norwegian sociologist Jon Elster (2004) argues that transitional justice is mainly composed of criminal proceedings, cleansing and reparations that occur after the transition from one political regime to another had taken place. Interestingly enough, the author argues that the intensity in the demand of retribution decreases with the time interval between the atrocities and transition, and between the transition and judicial proceedings. Transitional justice appeared as a legal concept in connection with precedents of abusive political regimes in

countries from all corners of the world. African states, Latin Americans, Asians and Europeans alike struggled throughout the second half of the twentieth century to undergo various ways to combine truth, memory, punishment, cleaning, reparation, reconciliation, forgiveness, and forgetting. Their immediate goal was to honor the victims of political injustice, but their long-term endeavor was to establish or restore constitutionalism and democracy.

If most political transformations from one authoritarian regime to liberal democracy include formal acknowledgement of wrongdoings and punishing the former perpetrators for their crimes and abuses, Spain experienced a different path mainly characterized by refusal to deal with the past. By analyzing the main aspects of the Catalan transition, the general purpose of this subchapter is to show that the so-called Spanish amnesia regarding its Francoist past was a compromise for maintaining the unity of the Spanish people, rather than dividing them.

Before discussing the reasons why Spain preferred “closing the books” (Aguilar 2001) rather than confronting its collective past, it is fundamental to understand the origins of separation between the Spanish people. Franco’s regime was established after the victory of the Nationalists over the Republicans during the civil war (1936–1939). The 40 years that followed had deep consequences in all aspects of social and political life. Andrew Rigby (2001) gives the tragic account of atrocities<sup>4</sup> committed by the Francoists in the name of the fascist cause. The Movimiento Nacional excluded any other parties except for the Falange, infringed basic human rights, allowed for mass executions of republicans, forbade the use of minority languages (Basque, Catalan, Galician) and monopolized the public life (Catholic Church, institutions,

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<sup>4</sup> approximately 1 million civilians were either killed or sent into exile during the Spanish civil war (Rigby 2001, 40).



universities, mass media). Only two days after Franco's death in 1975, Juan Carlos I was coronated as King of Spain, which marked the fulminant transition to democracy.

It is acknowledged by most scholars that Franco's regime was already becoming looser at the beginning of the 1970s. According to Rigby, the institutional framework was favorable to democratization ever since the leaders of the opposition realized that Franco's expected death also meant the end of his brutal regime. The new king also favored immediate reformation of the former fascist institutional system first because he needed to legitimize his ruling, and second, because of the elite-led pressure to pact a transition that would allow Spain to move forward. Aguilar argues that this translated into rapid steps taken to dismiss all Franco's loyalists from their public offices, perpetrators were purged from state institutions, massive judicial reformation was implemented, etc.

When looking at Catalonia, one can realize that Franco's regime was even harsher on Catalans. Not only have they lost their civic liberties like all the Spanish people, but Catalans were restricted from publicly using their own language, reading their own authors, and governing their own institutions. Thus, my argument will deal with the interplay between the Catalan nationalism during the Spanish transition to democracy by arguing that Catalonia experienced a fairly successful transition to democracy in the *absence* of transitional justice. Although the literature vastly discusses the "Catalan problem" in relation to its national identity and the lack of transitional justice in Spain, very few authors make the connection between the two. My argumentation aims at establishing how Catalonia managed to undergo transition without punishing the Francoist perpetrators and offering reparations for the victims, thus managing to build a favorable climate for cohabitation between Catalans and Spanish.

But how did the Catalans managed to revive their national identity without overcoming the legacies of the Francoist regime? First of all, Catalan nationalism traces back to the 9<sup>th</sup> century as a completely different population speaking a romance language that used to enjoy their own kingdom, and has always been distinct from Spain. By implication, this means that Catalan is a rather exclusive identity and its members do not want to be included within a newly overarching Spanish identity. For this reason, Spain and Catalonia alike are promoting a multicultural (or postnational) reconciliation between all the peoples who live in Spain, without returning to the specificities that characterized Franco's attitudes towards minority groups, but rather forgetting about them.

Secondly, even though Catalonia is an autonomous community that enjoys a lot of privileges with regard to its own government, it is still impossible to promulgate such an important law regarding the past but it should subject itself to the laws and regulations established at a central level. Thus, in the absence of legislation package regarding transitional justice in the *Cortes*, Catalonia had and still has no other option but to act within its constitutional limitations.

A third reason why Catalonia developed well to democracy without implementing transitional justice is its purposefully established public agenda. As argued before, the elites who pacted the transition prioritized the pro-Catalan programs, eventually managing to gain quite an increased level of autonomy for their region. It is my argument that transitional justice was left out of the Catalan agenda due to a "bargaining compromise" made in favor of obtaining other rights for their minority such as: formation of a regional government, institutions, domestic security, control over their own fiscal and educational matters, media, as well as formal recognition as a separate nationality in Spain. With this being said, it is becoming clearer why Catalonia managed

to achieve its level of stability in a diffused context when instead for demanding for historical reconciliation, the Catalan elites preferred negotiating for retrieving their rights already obtained before the 1930s plus additional benefits that would increase the Catalan nationalist sentiments.

Lastly, this sub–chapter claims that transitional justice issues were rather postponed for the second generations to resolve. Instead of risking another conflict with the Spanish, the Catalans most likely opted for a gradual process of increasing their autonomy, and reestablishing themselves as the main economic power in Spain. With more bargaining power, Catalonia can now make new demands including the restoration of their Francoist memory. In fact, my argument is reinforced by Georgina Blakely (2005) who discusses the current Spanish attitudes towards this issue. Drawing upon Sidney Tarrow’s theory on political opportunities, Blakely explains why civil society was silent before and it is becoming louder now by requesting the recovery of the bodies of their relatives who disappeared in the years of the civil war. In this sense, the Association of the Recovery of Historical Memory (ARMH) was established in 2000 and despite its modest successes so far, it raises the question whether the Spanish people really wanted to leave their past behind or it a matter of future agenda.

## Chapter 3 – In-Depth Case Study: Expressions of Nationalism in Catalan Public Broadcasting

The present chapter aims at examining the main aspects that characterize the evolution of the relationship between Spain and the autonomous community of Catalonia with regard to national identity and its articulation in public service broadcasting. Special attention is paid at the period following Franco's totalitarian regime, and at the policy-making throughout the democratic transition and consolidation of media pluralism until the present day. The findings reflect that Catalonia has successfully accomplished its mission to preserve its national identity, and maintain a satisfactory balance between its own goals and the interests of others, thus demonstrating strong characteristics of civic nationalism. Additionally, Catalans were among the first to move forward and enabled the new Audiovisual Media Services Directive of the European Union through a new communication act, which broke the state monopoly and allowed private media to share the power over broadcasting. Ultimately, this showed the Catalan government's opening not just toward Spain, but also Europe.

Central to the studies about the Kingdom of Spain has always been its national identity. The tensions existing between the three so-called "separatist" regions: Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia on the one side, and the rest of Spain on the other side, are centuries-long and never seem to cease. Most scholars call them "separatist" due to their constant self-perception as culturally and linguistically distinct from the other Spaniards. As this chapter will show, Catalan is a highly standardized language that has been guarded by its speakers by all

possible means, including media policy, until it received official recognition and satisfactory level of autonomy. In my argumentation, I will focus on the period *after* Franco's dictatorship during which Catalonia obtained its own parliament and administration.

Catalonia's contemporary linguistic controversy originates in the 9<sup>th</sup> century, when Catalans enjoyed their own independent kingdom. The Spanish dynasty known from the times of the colonization of the Americas (15<sup>th</sup> century) resulted from the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile in 1469. Since it became part of Spain, Catalonia experienced an atypical evolution mainly because of the parallel functioning of both Catalan and Spanish. With their ups and downs, Catalans were generally a persecuted minority. The history culminates with Francisco Franco's republic (1939–1975), when the Catalans were subjected to aggressive assimilation policies. After Franco's death in 1975 and the reinstauration of democracy, the new constitutional monarchy granted considerable power to autonomous regional institutions giving official recognition to all ethnicities. In fact, Catalonia achieved the status of autonomous community on December 18, 1979 (Nuñez 2001, 722–729; Grant and Docherty 1992, 154–157; Rees 1996, 313–114).

The level of political decentralization reveals a lot about the relationship between the central and regional government of Catalonia. On the basis of the division of power as stipulated in articles 148 and 149 of the Constitution, and of their evolution over time, Ferran Ferrer distinguishes between three levels of jurisdiction. The first level corresponds to the areas controlled exclusively by the national government. The second level corresponds to the areas controlled exclusively by the regional government. The third level includes areas of decision making which falls under the direct responsibility of both regional and national governments (Ferrer 2000,

188). Clearly, the third level is the most complex creating the puzzle which generated the need for further investigation. The present chapter will shed more light on the relationship between the national and regional governments in Catalan broadcasting regulation.

The regional aspirations of Catalonia started to shape between 1975 and 1978. Going through a fast transition process that Linz and Stepan named *reforma pactada – ruptura pactada*, as it was consensually pacted by the political elites. Among other important political leaders, the two authors praise the reformist Adolfo Suarez<sup>5</sup> who proposed free elections as the essence of democracy, the formal recognition of the Spanish pluralist society, and called for a referendum to pass the new Law for Political Reform, which meant the dissolution of the *Cortes* (Parliament) and the entire authoritarian system itself. Additionally, Adolfo Suarez had a significant role in engaging the members of the civil society to participate in the negotiations for the new democratic political system (Linz and Stepan 1996, 94–100).

Indeed, Adolfo Suarez and his cabinet were key actors of the transition (Gunther 1993, Preston 1986). However, as mentioned above, Spain is not ethnically homogeneous, so the transition did not end with the creation of a pact (1978 Constitution) between all political forces. Its further implications extend to the historical communities that were seeking for official recognition by the state after so many years of repression. After Franco's death in 1975 but also before that, Catalonia had different discourses of patriotic affirmation: religious – related to Catholicism, historical – related to their own past, economic – related to the fiscal (de)centralization, and, finally, political – related to the territorial organization and recognition of their region. My research question belongs to the sphere of the latter, as it focuses on the articulation of autonomy in terms of media policy at the regional level.

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<sup>5</sup> Prime-minister of Spain between 1976 and 1981.

This chapter aims at examining the media regulations and its effects, if any, in strengthening Catalonia's autonomy. The main underlying assumption of my argument is that the extent to which the Catalan language is used has “automatic spin-off benefits for the survival of the culture” (Grant and Docherty 1992, 160). Thus, the Catalan media cannot be analyzed outside a thorough understanding of language policies and the use of Catalan in education and society. Another assumption is that state-owned media, particularly television broadcasting, plays a key role in ensuring the preservation of Catalan language and identity. In my approach, I will answer three important questions: do Catalan media serve the regional interests of Catalonia? Should constitutional jurisprudence extend toward maintaining a balance between minority rights and their representation in the media? And finally, is Catalonia a good example of positive coexistence of majority and minority groups?

I will start with analyzing the main theoretical considerations on national identity in the mass-media and the role of public broadcasting in pluralist societies. For this, I will draw upon Monroe Price's “Market for Loyalists” (2003) as well as on Sandra Basic-Hrvatin and Mark Thompson's “Public Service broadcasting in plural and divided societies” (2008). But before discussing in general terms, I will first narrow the research to the case of Catalonia. Due to the fact that Catalan public broadcasting is almost exclusively discussed by indigenous authors and their views are inherently biased, I will employ many primary sources such as legislation, decrees, and directives, which are more reliable and conclusive in regard to my research question(s). In the last part, I will focus more on the present Catalan audiovisual legislation and the regulatory authorities that exercise the public mandate. Finally this chapter tries to establish whether the Catalan media is successful or not in *maintaining* and *increasing* its legitimacy to protect and move forward the Catalan national identity.

### 3.1. *Som Catalans, no som espanyoles!*<sup>6</sup>

Before discussing the Catalan broadcasting system, I will review briefly the existing literature on national identity, its representation in the media, and apply its concepts to the Catalan case. Catalonia's cultural identity is particularly interesting to analyze due to its recent history of repression during Franco's dictatorship (1939–1975). I expect a territorial minority seeking cultural affirmation to be more powerful if its past is characterized by abuses of a fascist system. Franco's punitive measures hit even stronger considering a much looser previous regime during the Second Republic in the 1930s, which allowed for a significant degree of political autonomy emphasized by the creation of the *Generalitat*<sup>7</sup>, granted control of educational policies, and regional administration (Grant and Docherty 1992, 157). After the Civil War (1936–1939), which was won by the rebel forces led by General Franco, the situation turned against the Catalans who witnessed an extremely rapid centralization of power from Barcelona to Madrid. For as long as 40 years Catalonia underwent cultural assimilation including Castilian dominance in the Catalan school system, renaming the streets, secularization, censorship, etc. Franco also shut down seven daily newspapers in Catalan and outlawed the anthem *Els Segadors*. The most profound punishment was banning the use of Catalan in public administration, schools, courts, and military (Grant and Docherty 1992, 158–159). However, Rees argues that Catalan continued to be utilized universally except for official functions. “In spite of repressive restrictions, Catalan language and culture survived and perhaps gained strength as they regenerated regional consciousness at the onset of the 20<sup>th</sup> century” (Rees 1996, 314).

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<sup>6</sup> In Catalan: *We are Catalans, not Spaniards!*

<sup>7</sup> The name of the autonomous government structure of Catalonia.



After the regime change, things improved significantly for the eight million Catalans. Under King Juan Carlos a major step was made in adopting the 1978 Constitution (Constitución Española), which establishes the basis for a modern and democratic state. It also constitutes the administrative structure of the state, namely the autonomous communities that finally satisfy the demands for regional autonomy. The constitutional act further provisions that Spanish is the official language of the state but other languages spoken in the autonomous communities also become official. According to the Article 3.3 all languages must be respected and protected as they are essential to the country's cultural heritage (Ferrer 2000, 187–188). For these reasons, the Catalans call the 1978 Constitution the *constitució de los catalanes*<sup>8</sup>. By 1983, the constitution led to the consolidation of the autonomous community of Catalonia. During the same year, *Generalitat* enacted the Linguistic Normalization Law with the purpose of encouraging and extending the presence of the Catalan language in public administration, education and mass-media at the expense of Spanish (Rees 1996, 315). However, due to concerns about its constitutionality and political debate, this law was only passed in 1994 and has been reinforced by the Language Policy Law in 1998, which called for Catalan language quotas in the mass-media (TV and radio), an increase in films dubbed in Catalan, and many other such prescriptive measures (Ferrer 2000, 192; Rees 1996, 315). It does not need more clarification that the “Catalan renaissance” did not necessarily come in a natural way, but rather in a highly interventionist one. I shall present more evidence for the pro-Catalan programs when discussing the media policy in more detail.

In broad terms, I believe the main objectives of the *Generalitat de Catalunya* to promote the use of Catalan were successfully achieved. In his comparative study about education in minority

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<sup>8</sup> In Spanish: *the constitution of the Catalans*.

languages, Ferrer concludes that “Catalonia has been the most successful in increasing regional language instruction and use (Ferrer 2000, 189). Grant and Docherty also agree that Catalans have been successful over the long term in resisting hostile politicians, insisting that this was due to effective “safeguards that ensured Catalan development as a minority group” despite their formal integration into a fairly powerful state such as the Kingdom of Spain (Grant and Docherty 1992, 158). Catalonia’s successes have also been acknowledged by the world with the occasion of two major events: the admission of Spain into the European Union in 1986, and the 1992 Olympic Games hosted in Barcelona. Another important factor that advantaged the “Catalan renaissance” was its political stability<sup>9</sup> (Hargreaves 2000, Ferrer 2000, 190) and economic power, which not only sustained the policies throughout their implementation process but also encouraging people to stay (Grant and Docherty 1992, 157). Thus, it comes as no surprise the expression *Som Catalans, no som Espanyoles* (We are Spanish, not Spaniards), emphasizing the Catalan national pride and hints to the independence of their cultural survival (Rees 1996, 319).

Regarding national identities, Benedict Anderson rightly points out that communities *imagine* themselves rather than *knowing* their actual substance. Because of their mandate to address the general public, the mass-media are responsible to create these “imagined communities”. The language used to address the Catalan general audience, as well as the contents to which they are exposed, are extremely relevant and I have already showed why. Since Catalans trace themselves back to the 9<sup>th</sup> century, it is not surprising that Franco’s regime, however restrictive, did not manage to destroy their community. Moreover, it is due to its powerful image that the Catalan identity survived the waves of Spanish acculturation. Interestingly enough, Anderson’s theory of

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<sup>9</sup> Catalonia has been governed for 20 years by the same president and centrist-nationalist coalition that came to power in 1980, when Catalonia held its first regional elections of the post-Franco era. The political climate is consequently very stable, and free of major ideological or political shifts.

nationalism further defines the nation as a community “imagined both as inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 1983). Contextualizing this definition, one must acknowledge that Spain trespassed both the limits and the sovereignty of the Catalan community especially during Franco’s time. Nevertheless, as I will prove later, the idea of *multiple nationalism*<sup>10</sup> (see Maxwell 2005), which is perfectly accommodated within Anderson’s theoretical framework, is feasible in defining the Catalan identity in the realm of linguistic and cultural plurality of Spain.

In connection with the role of the media to project a certain image of the nation, I argue that the most noteworthy aspect about Spain is its multiculturalism. Therefore, not one nation but more nations fight over the media to convey their own images. The logical implication of this is the emergence of the collective identities in Spain, which strive to get the largest share of the public sphere (see Habermas 1996), such as Catalan, Basque, or Galician. Most importantly, the relationship between these identities is characterized by *competition*, rather than complementarity (Solis 2004, 91). Based on this, one can conclude that in Spain there is a keen “market of loyalties” (Price 2003), which consists of the national and regional governments on the one side, and citizens, on the other side. Price suggests that governments are in charge of creating a national identity on the basis of “true” and “historic” facts, and they regulate media according to this otherwise questionable principle. The author himself concludes that in real-life politics, the power structures have the loudest voices and, consequently, the greatest influence. Granted its present autonomy, the broadcasting regulatory body of Catalonia is the Consell de

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<sup>10</sup> Or *postnationalism*; idea according to which a political nation *can* invoke more than one community at the same time.

l'Audiovisual de Catalunya<sup>11</sup> (the Audiovisual Council of Catalonia), which I will discuss in more detail in the subsequent section.

The current views on the market for loyalties are changing towards regional policies, which represent an effort to reflect the interests of such autonomous regions as Catalonia. On a larger scale, the European Union – for instance – has established trade barriers to limit non-European entertainment industries. Obviously, these measures are taken to limit foreign ideologies that compete with the mainstream identity. It should be clear by now that the market for loyalties supports some groups and, thus, disadvantages others. Assertions of national identity, dreams and history, represents the means of exploitation not only by governments and political interest groups, but also businesses. Thus, mass-media are a real battlefield for representing both Spanish and Catalan interests. Eventually, the question to be answered is: Who is the winner?

The “market of loyalties” theory primarily discusses broadcasting in single societies. In relation to this, other authors reinforce that the public service broadcasting should, ideally, strengthen and serve the dominant concept of national identity, as defined by governments. Just like in most countries, Spanish (and Catalan) public service broadcasting is funded by public money, in most cases in the form of fees, and operated by the government. Because the public service broadcasting serves both public and private interests, it is supposed to raise the level of information of the respective citizens, provide unbiased news, limit commercials, maintain the level of integrity, and promote both political and cultural democratic values. Thus, what broadcasting services should do is to reflect the complex image of the nation itself, and therefore governments should assure and preserve media pluralism, and restrain from any political control (Basic-Hrvatin and Thompson 2008). Considering that presently Catalans can enjoy both

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.cac.cat/>

Televisión Española<sup>12</sup> (Spanish Television) and Televisió de Catalunya<sup>13</sup> (Catalan Television) in their respective languages, I conclude that the Catalan broadcasting service fulfils the criteria for pluralist mass-media.

### **3.2. *Catalan Broadcasting is Moving Forward***

This section will draw mainly upon Joan Barta i Mir's "Bibliographic Treatment of the Audiovisual Regulatory Model" in Catalonia, published in 2007 for the *Revista Catalana de Dret Públic* (Catalan Journal for Public Law) and other policy papers published in the same year, but also on primary legislative acts regarding audiovisual regulations. In doing so, I will analyze the Catalan legislation in this sphere, the current situation of public media, the functions of the Consell de l'Audiovisual de Catalunya (the Audiovisual Council of Catalonia) as the regulatory authority, and finally outline some perspectives for Catalan audiovisual regulations. The underlying assumption of this section is that – to a satisfactory extent – the Catalan broadcasting has achieved its goals to maintain and propel a high representation of the Catalan national identity.

Returning to the idea that the Spanish audiovisual legal framework is particularly characterized by rigidity and interventionism, it is important to clarify that already in 1980 the Statute for Radio and Television established that private media should be licensed under a strict system underlining even more the state's monopoly in the area of broadcasting. The problems appeared as soon as legislators, journalists, and judges alike realized that the state-owned service model was not coherent with the Spanish Constitution article 20, regarding the right to information and communication. However, with the evolution of new digital technology the state had to accept

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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.rtve.es/>

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.ccrtv.cat>

that the electromagnetic spectrum is no longer the only means to broadcast, therefore the public service must lose its monopoly (Bayona 2007, 18).

Consequently, the audiovisual legal framework had to be redesigned to fit the new challenges of the digital era in which public service and private media interact to a great extent. In other words, Catalonia had to adopt a hybrid act on audiovisual communication that provided both state-owned and private media, virtually reconsidering the authority to allow private broadcasting via permits or licenses. This initiative came neither from the regional administration, nor from the national one, but from the European Union. In December 2007, the EU adopted the new Audiovisual Media Services Directive<sup>14</sup> which, without abandoning the old Television Without Frontiers Directive (1989), aims to adapt the regulatory framework in Europe to the new structural changes discussed previously. Consequently, also in the light of the previous section of this chapter, the new Catalan audiovisual communication act had to satisfy both the European directive and its own goals of national affirmation. Luckily, at the same time with the passage of the European directive, Catalonia was developing its own broadcasting system, so the correspondence between the Catalan law and the European general framework was an achievable endeavor. At the same time, it was the chance to systematize a fragmented legal area.

For our purposes, the most important elements of the new framework established by the 2005 audiovisual communication act are: 1) the liberalization of audiovisual communication in lines with article 20 from the Constitution, 2) the obligation of all media to reflect the truth and hold responsibility for their information, 3) the establishment of an independent regulatory authority that will guarantee the compliance with the disciplinary measures regarding publicity.

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<sup>14</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32007L0065:EN:NOT>

As it has already been mentioned, in Catalonia the audiovisual communication act has led to the end of the public monopoly over audiovisual communication insofar as it establishes a regime of necessary competition between publicly-owned and private media. The structure of the Catalan audiovisual service has a dual composition: on the one hand, the media owned by the Catalan government and, on the other, the media owned by local bodies. In accordance with the act, both must be managed directly, the former by the *Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals* (the Catalan Corporation of Audiovisual Media or CCMA in Catalan) and the latter by the municipalities themselves or by consortiums set up for this purpose (Bayona 2007, 21).

Returning to Hrvatin and Thompson (2008) arguments, public service radio and television must be aimed at fulfilling public service missions. It is therefore not a question of competing with private television in the content broadcast, but of providing society with a service that prioritizes certain values, which so far, as it turns out, have been linked to plural programming that respects people's dignity and content quality, without this necessarily leading to the abandonment of content of an entertaining or generalist nature. Fernando León Solís (2004) tackles this issue asking why were Catalan audiences identically interested in *Operación Tiunfo*<sup>15</sup> as the rest of Spain, considering that it was aired on Televisión Española and not on Televisió de Catalunya. The show was a huge success in Spain, just as in Catalonia, and scared the most skeptical nationalists of the threat that it posed in eroding the Catalan public sphere and a true danger to Catalan national identity (Solís 2004). However, the author seems to disregard the dual identity of the Catalans (people who regard themselves as primarily Catalan and secondarily Spanish or vice versa), and does not acknowledge the implications of audience choice in a plural configured

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<sup>15</sup> *Operación Tiunfo* is the Spanish counterpart of the *American Idol* show.

media context, nor does he focus enough on “audience freedom”, biasing the “media effects” view.

On the other hand, the establishment of a public service regime involves the need to ensure pluralism. This guarantee is achieved via different means, as stated by article 29 of the act, among which is the recognition of the executive bodies’ independence from the government in management terms, the participation of parliament and the Consell de l’Audiovisual de Catalunya in choosing the top executives for these bodies and the guarantee of professionalism in management. The internal aspect of this pluralism is complemented with the duty to ensure the participation of the most representative social and political groups in managing the public service by them forming part of an advisory council (Laguna de la Paz 2007).

With regard to private audiovisual communication, it has already been implied that this conceptual change has an effect on the conditions for carrying out this activity. In accordance with state legislation, and apart from cable and satellite television, private audiovisual communication is carried out as a concession for a state-owned public service. However, in accordance with the audiovisual communication act of Catalonia, this private activity in the autonomous community or local area is carried out by means of administrative authorization, so that the private nature of the operator appears with more or less clarity and transparency (Bayona 2007).

This does not mean, however, that there are no conditions or limits to exercising this right. In this respect, the differentiation made by the act between private audiovisual communication that uses the electromagnetic spectrum and that which uses other transmission technologies is essential. In the first case, given that the spectrum is limited, private communication remains subject to



obtaining authorization (license), while the other is free, the only obligation being to notify the Administration prior to starting.

Before concluding this chapter, I will to assess tow key weaknesses of the present Catalan media policy and underline the aspects that can be improved in the future. Although it has been noted by experts (Ariño 2007, Bayona 2007, Laguna de la Paz 2007) that the new communications act successfully managed to break the public monopoly in the Catalan audiovisual sphere, it is evident that the system is still sometimes dysfunctional. First of all, the liberalization of the public sphere and its openness is somewhat overdone. My argument here is that this “invisible hand” controlling the Catalan media market is so invisible that it might disappear. Because the rightful tenders award too many licenses, the number of media outlets is arguably much higher than the capacity of the market to absorb, creating an increased difficulty to assimilate all the media content. Consequently, I propose a certain limitation in the number of licenses awarded yearly.

Lastly, the same experts noted above realized that the content seems to deteriorate specifically due to the great numbers of media outlets making it impossible for the regulatory bodies to follow the correct implementation of the rules. This further leads to negative social consequences on the most vulnerable segment of the audience, namely minors. At this point, self-regulation is only present *de jure* and not necessarily reflected in real life, so it cannot be granted a high level of trust. As a possible solution, I propose regulating a minimum level of quality in content including the private media outlets that they are always in line with the public service missions they have been commissioned with.

## Conclusions

The present thesis started with identifying and defining the key concepts that served for the intended analysis. It was established that the notion of nationalism is so broad that it needs to be discussed more narrowly, in a certain historical context. Thus, conservative nationalism and ethnic, as well as liberal nationalism and civic were contextualized in the Catalan case, prefacing the analysis and case study chapters.

The first chapter ended with examining the origins of Catalan nationalism, tracing it back to the 9<sup>th</sup> century as a completely different population speaking a romance language that used to enjoy their own kingdom, and has always been distinct from the Spanish Empire. The anomaly of the Catalan case is the parallel use of both Spanish and Catalan in good times, and in bad times – such as during Franco’s totalitarian regime. However, Catalan language and culture survived and even experienced a true “renaissance” during the transition to democracy. In fact, Catalonia was the first Spanish region to obtain its autonomy and has been the most effective in implementing regulations for maintaining and increasing the visibility of its own culture.

The second chapter started with an empirical analysis based on 5 different indicators extracted from an opinion poll run in Catalonia in 1984, 1993, 2002, and 2007. The findings are very similar in all of the examined indicators. As it turns out, the Catalans felt less attached to their native land then today. However, there is a slight increase in the Catalans’ self-identification as Europeans, which implies that their openness towards non-Catalan elements has increased, displaying attitudes of civic nationalism.

The second indicator measuring the Catalans' self-perceived level of nationalism shows that their feelings of nationalism were higher in 1984 and have decreased gradually until nowadays with the exception of 2002. This implies that my hypothesis about ethnic nationalism having developed to forms of civic nationalism is correct, and that Catalans do not have, in fact, such strong feelings of nationalism towards their region.

The third indicator measuring the Catalans' satisfaction with the level of autonomy reinforces that there are more Catalans who are satisfied with the current level of autonomy, then those who would like to live in a more autonomous Catalonia. Additionally, there are somewhat significantly less respondents who want an independent Catalonia then in 1984.

The forth indicator measuring the Catalans self-identification as Catalans, Spanish, or both confirms the literature and the position of the thesis that most Catalans perceive themselves as having a dual identity – Catalan and Spanish. Interestingly enough, the number of Catalans who consider themselves both Spanish and Catalan has increased, while the people who consider themselves only Catalans has decreased. Of course, double identification is a clear sign of openness and inclusiveness, thus reconfirming that civic nationalism is now more prevailing in Catalonia.

The last indicator showing the level of acceptance towards immigration shows that Catalonia is still a divided society on this matter. Although the results show that people are more open today to accept immigrants than how they used to in 1984, the percentages of respondents who have a positive attitude towards immigration is almost equal with the ones who disagree with it, while the third largest category represents the people who are indifferent to this issue.

In general lines, although the numbers do not show an unusual increase in openness and inclusiveness of civic nationalism elements, it is safe to conclude that Catalonia did experience a transition from ethnic to civic nationalism since the years of democratic consolidation. These empirical findings are enforced by the qualitative analyses on transitional justice legislation and policy in broadcasting.

Complementary to the qualitative analysis, the second chapter started with defining transitional justice as the main key to settle the stories of the past. Although Spain, including Catalonia, did not experience this legal proceeding it *does* have the historical origin necessary for such a cleansing. So the emerging secondary research question was: how did Catalonia manage to undergo transition without demanding punishment for the Francoist perpetrators and moral, as well as material, rehabilitation for their victims? I found that Catalonia, just as Spain, focused on reviving their national identity rather than coming to terms with the past. In addition, the literature shows that Spain is a unique case and therefore has come a paradigm of a peaceful transition, of which Spanish people are proud and wanted to maintain.

The last part of chapter two focuses on the consequences that Catalonia handled after renouncing transitional justice. However, after reviewing the main aspects of Catalan transition to democracy, it turned out to be successful and I tried to determine the reasons behind this. The chapter contributes with four original explanations. Firstly, Catalans are an exclusive ethnic minority, thus do not intend to become part of the larger Spanish community but rather maintain a multicultural (postnational) approach. Secondly, even if Catalonia wanted to have its own legislation regarding transitional justice, it still would have been impossible to the country's constitutional arrangements. Thirdly, and probably most importantly, Catalonia was more

determined during the transition to obtain its autonomy back, rather than make a justice-specific case. Lastly, judging by the current developments, it is very likely that Catalans postponed dealing with the past until after they have dealt with their political endeavors to keep their political stability and a friendly relation with the government in Madrid, favoring liberal values and

The key issue of in-depth case study was to establish whether Catalonia is a good example of positive coexistence of majority and minority groups. I have argued that the Catalan broadcasting system was well established from the beginning and it effectively served its purpose to protect the Catalan national identity against all odds. Presently, Catalan TV networks broadcast exclusively or to a great extent in Catalan language, while other state-channels, such as Televisión Española ensure the plurality by airing Spanish programs. This situation proves without any doubts that the linguistic preferences of the regions are not antagonizing the customers, but rather maintain a large variety of programs from which they can choose. Thus, the Catalan experience provides a good example of the survival and indeed flourishing of a minority culture when not obstructed by the central government (Grant and Docherty 1992, 160–161).

However, Catalan advocates proved that their policies were rather balanced and moderate than extremist and truly separatist (such in the Basque case, for instance). Although the legislation can be seen prescriptive and even interventionist, it cannot be denied that their activism was the key of success (Rees 1996, 319). From an objective and formal point of view, the parliament of Catalonia has been particularly active in legislating for audiovisual communication. This has even more merit if we take into account the very small margin for action provided by the statutory framework in the 1980s, which was subsequently extended with the Statute of 2006

(Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña 2006). In conclusion, the “Europeanization” and “liberalization” of the Catalan public broadcasting, too, proves that ethnic nationalism successfully changed into civic nationalism.

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