PUBLIC DEBATES ON THE COMMUNIST PAST DURING LITHUANIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 1993 AND 1997: NARRATING ITS PAST AND FUTURE

By

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to analyze public debates on the communist past during Lithuanian presidential elections in 1993 and 1997 and to reveal how different memory groups, namely, native opposition, former communists, and diaspora members redefine their identities and search for a new place in the post-communist Lithuania. The debates are followed in the two largest Lithuanian newspapers: *Lietuvos Rytas* and *Respublika*. In this study, it will be revealed that the conciliatory dealing with the Lithuanian communist past does not reflect the choice of a policy of "closing the books" but rather symbolizes an emergence of a new political culture of dialogue and tolerance.

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INTRODUCTION

> Our conceptions of the past are affected by the mental images we employ to solve present problems, so that collective memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past in the light of the present. *Maurice Halbwachs*[1]

Maurice Halbwachs argues that collective memory, which he defines as "the result, or sum, or combination of individual recollections of many members of the same society," is nothing but a social construct.[2] It is "a matter of how minds work together in society, how their operations are structured by social arrangements."[3] Halbwachs claims that people acquire memories in society and that "it is also in society where they recall, reorganize, and localize their memories."[4]

In Lithuania, the localization of memories about the communist past was one of the most contested issues after its independence. The Soviet occupation and a distinct stance of different Lithuanians during the regime caused hostilities towards the former communists and created a network of the native opposition which highly criticized the political return of the former leaders. The prominent Lithuanian sociologist Rasa Čepaitienė claims that in Lithuania, Soviet memory "oscillates from rejection to nostalgia" and different social groups have adopted different strategies "to negotiate and accomomodate such a contradictory heritage."[5] Thus I would argue that the form of how different actors accomodate their memories, find their place in the post-independence Lithuania, and lead negotiations and debates on how one should deal with the past, serve as a cornerstone for builduing a new political culture in the post-communist Lithuania.

[1] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 34-39.
[2] Ibid, pp. 22.
[3] Jeffrey K. Olick, "Collective Memory", *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 2nd edition, pp. 7.
[4] Halbwachs, 1992, pp. 38.
[5] Čepaitienė, Rasa, "Sovietmečio atmintis – tarp atmetimo ir nostalgijos," [Soviet Memory – From Rejection to Nostalgia], *Lituanistica*, 2007, No.4 (72).

Therefore, the aim of this thesis is, by analyzing public debates on the communist past during Lithuanian presidential elections in 1993 and 1997, to see how different memory groups socialize and search for their new place and identity in the post-independence Lithuanian politics. My main question is how they manage to create a new political culture which includes not only the actors of native Lithuanian opposition, but also former communist elite and even the Lithuanian diaspora. My hypothesis is that the prevailing attitude to the Lithuanian communist past and its legacies does not reflect the choice of a policy of "closing the books"; nor does it simply reflect the strength of the communist successor party. I will claim that conciliatory attitude to the communist past is a part of a new political culture of dialogue and tolerance.

The focus of my research are public debates occuring during the Lithuanian presidential elections in 1993 and 1997. I am interested in the narratives of the presidential candidates, where they reveal their perception on the Lithuanian past and their visions for its future. It is important to notice that even if Lithuania is a semi-presidential state, the Lithuanian President is usually declared in public opinion polls as the most trusted political figure and *de facto* serves as a guardian of country's moral values, including the ones related to dealing with the past. The importance of the presidential figure goes back to the interwar period, when Lithuania was a presidential state. The last President of independent Lithuania, Antanas Smetona, is seen as one of the biggest heroes in twentieth century Lithuanian history.

A fight over the strength of the President has also emerged after independence, when the leader of the native opposition, Vytautas Landsbergis wanted to restore the Constitution of 1938 with its strong President. However, former communists "feared a strong President from the Right" because it could have limited "the power of an LDDP government to implement its programme" and eventually prevailed.[6] Therefore, in November 1992 when Lithuanian

[6] Thomas Lane, *Lithuania: stepping westward* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.132.

constitution was declared, President powers were limited, but the fact that Lithuanian President, in contrast to Lithuanian neighbours Latvia or Estonia, is elected directly actually means his larger influence and role in Lithuanian politics. He is responsible not only for the development of foreign policy but also has certain powers in domestic affairs and his approval, not a symbolic one, for important decisions, like the formation of a government, is required.

The historical importance of presidency in Lithuania is one of the reasons why the loudest debates about the questions of memory and transitional justice, in Lithuania, are always raised during different presidential elections. Therefore, these elections will be investigated. I have chosen to analyze the elections of 1993 and 1997 because they serve as fundamental ones in creating foundations for a new political culture in Lithuania. In these two elections, both the communist past and its future was debated. As Lane argues, the presidential victory of Valdas Adamkus in 1997 already marks "a significant turning point" in Lithuanian political culture and "the politics of post-independence."[7] However, this turn was a result of a gradual process and cannot be understood without the analysis of the first presidential elections after independence too.

I will analyze the two biggest and privately-owned Lithuanian newspapers: *Lietuvos Rytas* and *Respublika*. *Lietuvos Rytas*, under this name is published from 1990; it originated from the newspaper *Komjaunimo Tiesa* (*The Truth of the Communist Youth*). *Respublika* is published since 1989 and in the beginning was closely related with *Sąjūdis* Movement, later became an independent newspaper. Presidential elections were analyzed in these newspapers, one month before each election (this is also the official period of electoral agitation, according to the Law on Lithuanian Presidential Elections) and analysis ended approximately two weeks after the announcement of elections' results (for elections' results see Appendix No.1). The

[7] Ibid, pp. 131.

newspapers served not only as the secondary source, but also and most importantly, as the primary source. The candidates in their interviews, biographies, electoral programs, and posters, who all appeared in these two main Lithuanian newspapers, created a narration of their relation with Lithuanian communist past, presented their self-identification and expressed the ideas of future development of Lithuanian politics.

This work differs from many other studies on the Lithuanian communist past. The study of transitional justice issues in Lithuania is very dispersed ranging from history, philosophy, sociology to literature studies. In historical studies the main concentration lies on the controversial behavior during the regime, mainly the issues of adaptation and collaboration are analyzed (see the works of Klumbys (2009), Girnius (1996), and Pocius (2009). Philosophical studies discuss the nature of Lithuanian nationalism and its expression during occupation and in the post-communist Lithuania (see the works of Donskis (2005) or Venclova (1999). While sociology and literature studies concentrate on the phenomenon of collective memory and the creation of a new identity of the former *nomenklatūra*. One of the most comprehensive sociological studies was made by Čepaitienė in 2007. In literature the works of Balutytė (2007) and Rubavičius (2007), who analyzed the memoirs of the former communist elite, provide valuable insights on this issue.

However, very little attention is given to the redefinition of identities of other memory groups, namely, the Lithuanian native opposition and the diaspora. Usually the works present a very negative picture of how Lithuania is dealing with the past and only the legacies of the communist regime are claimed to be prevailing in Lithuanian politics and I would argue, in some works are even overemphasized. Thus the aim of this work is to fill the gap in study of transitional justice issues in Lithuania. My thesis, instead of repeating criticism towards former communists and their new ways of adapting in Lithuanian politics, will investigate the development of a new political culture in the post-communist Lithuania. I will attempt to see

how, despite the fact of the existing *nomenklatura*, other groups of actors, mainly the Lithuanian diaspora, succeeded in developing a more conciliatory approach to the communist past and did not criticize so harshly former communists for their past activities. It will be argued that such apologetic dealing with the past in Lithuania might be seen not solely as "a mistake" but also as one of the catalysts for a faster, than in other post-communist states, Lithuanian path towards democratic consolidation.[8]

In order to answer my research question, the thesis will be structured as follows. In the first chapter, the Lithuanian communist past will be explored. The aim of this section is to reveal the main actors and themes of public debates on the past during Lithuanian presidential elections. Not only the period of the Soviet occupation will be discussed but, also in the last sub-chapter, three stages of the Lithuanian transitional period will be presented. The second chapter will study the narrations and self-identifications of presidential candidates from different memory groups. The dynamics of identity will be highlighted. The third chapter will analyze the future of the past, namely, the strategies of dealing with the past will be discussed. In my conclusions it will be argued that similar political goals, economic crisis and the returned diaspora have played a significant role in creating a new political culture in the post-independence Lithuania, especially, the essential contribution of the Lithuanian diaspora towards the development of "politics of dialogue" will be acknowledged.

[8] See for this idea also Skulte (2005), whose work will be mentioned later.

CHAPTER 1: EXPLORING THE LITHUANIAN COMMUNIST PAST: ACTORS AND TOPICS OF PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE PAST

The aim of this chapter is to present the Lithuanian communist past and its nature in order to understand better the main topics, actors and their narratives that prevailed during Lithuanian presidential elections in 1993 and 1997. I will start the chapter by presenting the patterns of behavior under communism in Lithuania. Then, I will discuss the nature of "active" resistance and the ambiguity of "silent" resistance, regarding the thin line between adaptation and collaboration. Next, the transitional period will be discussed. This is the period during which a desire for independence and later the aim to consolidate democracy made Lithuanians experience a "historical amnesia." It will be argued that these moments of "historical amnesia" laid the foundations not only for the rehabilitation of the former communists but also opened a possibility for a new political culture, namely, laid the foundations for a new political dialogue among former opponents.

1.1 The Twofold Nature of the Lithuanian Communism: from Repression to Patriotism

In 1940, Lithuania was incorporated into the Soviet Union and was one of its republics. Till the breakthrough in 1990, the country was governed by the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) and its first party's secretary, who was subordinated to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The occupation started with an oppressive regime; Antanas Sniečkus, the first party secretary from 1940 to 1974 not only repressed any opposition within the country but also, together with Stalin, organized mass deportations of Lithuanians to Siberia and the Northern Part of Russia.[9] According to the conclusions of the

[9] Terry D.Clark and Jovita Pranevičiūtė, "Perspective on Communist Successor Parties: the Case of Lithuania," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 41, Issue 4, December 2008.

International Commission,[10] between 1944-1953, 118 000 Lithuanians, from all levels of society, were deported from the country and 186 000 people were imprisoned, with 80.000 political prisoners.[11] Many of these political prisoners were Lithuanian partisans, known as *Forest Brothers*, who fought for Lithuanian independence in the forests and were completely surpressed by the regime in 1953.[12]

The aim of the USSR leaders was to do away not only with physical but also with cultural borders within the Soviet Union. The concepts of ”Soviet man” and “Soviet patriotism” were promoted and the idea of “merging nations” appeared.[13] The history of the Russian nation was given priority in schools and Russian language became mandatory.[14] However, As Terry D. Clark and Jovita Pranevičiūtė argue, the Lithuanian Communist Party was quite “aggressive in its efforts to preserve Lithuanian culture from Sovietization”, and therefore, “was often criticized not only for economic chauvinism[15] but also for educational and cultural “nationalism.”[16] Sniečkus and later members of the LCP managed to achieve a certain degree of autonomy from the CPSU and to block the Russification of Lithuania, for example, by impeding the industrialization process and, in this manner, avoiding migration of ethnic Russians to Lithuania.[17] Nevertheless, as Lithuanian dissident Tomas Venclova[18]

[10]International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania, established in 1998 by President’s decree, period of investigation 1940-1990, still working (now 1953-1990 period). Conclusions mentioned refer to the period of 1940-1953.

[11] International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania, 20 April, 2005. Conclusions on deportations in 1944-1953 m. Available from: http://www.komisija.lt/Files/www.komisija.lt/File/2005%20m.%20posedis/1944-1953%20Tremimai_isvados.doc, (accessed April 7, 2010).

[12] Clark and Pranevičiūtė, 2008.

[13] Algirdas Jakubčionis (ed.), *The Un-armed Anti-soviet Resistance in Lithuania in the 1950s and 1960s*, (Vilnius: Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, 2007), pp. 5.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Economic chauvinism is understood as the nationalistic economic policies, for example, avoidance of labor migration of ethnic Russians into Lithuanian factories. It will be later, in this thesis also called, as economic nationalism of the former communists.

[16] Clark and Pranevičiūtė, 2008.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Tomas Venclova is famous Lithuanian poet and scholar. In 1976 he was one of the founders of Lithuanian Helsinki Watch group. In 1977, he was expatriated from Lithuania because of anti-Soviet activities. He immigrated to the USA, and now is the Professor at Yale University.

notices, the LCP relationship with Lithuanian nationalism was always twofold: "on the one hand they tried to break its back, and on the other, nourished it a little."[19]

It is also essential to understand the signficance of the ethnic composition of the LCP. As Vardys and Sedaitis notice, by 1953, 38 percent of the LCP members were ethnic Lithuanians; by 1965 Lithuanians comprised 63.7 percent of its membership, and finally on the eve of independence, in 1989, already 70.5 percent of the LCP members were ethnic Lithuanians.[20] Already in 1975 one-fifth of party members were intelligentsia, professionals with higher education.[21] These facts actually might serve as one of the explanations why in Lithuania[22]former communists could retain their political leadership after the Lithuanian independence.[23]

1.2 Patterns of Behavior under Communism: Resistance, Adaptation, and Collaboration

In Lithuania, for a long time, behavior under the communist regime was seen through a binary model, i.e. resistance versus collaboration.[24] However, according to Lithuanian historian Vytautas Klumbys, such a division could be used only till the death of Stalin.[25] During the thaw period and till the collapse of the Soviet Union, one should not speak only about these two oppositional patterns of behavior.[26] The model of behavior during this period was theorized by Kęstutis Girnius who also included the component of adaptation to the

[19] Tomas Venclova, *Forms of Hope*, Essays, (New York: The Sheep Meadow Press, 1999), pp. xi.
[20] V.Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis, *Lithuania: the Rebel Nation*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 61.
[21] Ibid, pp. 62.
[22] For example, in contrast to Latvia, which had less ethnic Latvians in the party.
[23] Jennifer Annemarie Skulte, "Returned Diaspora, National Identity and Political Leadership in Latvia and Lithuania," PhD Dissertation, the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, 2005, pp.124, http://www.lib.umd.edu/drum/bitstream/1903/2475/1/umi-umd-2347.pdf, , (accessed May 19, 2010).
[24] Valdemaras Klumbys, *Lietuvos kultūrinio elito elgsenos modeliai sovietmečiu*, [Behavioural Models of Soviet Lithuania's Cultural Elite], PhD Dissertation, University of Vilnius, Faculty of Humanties and History, pp.32, at: http://vddb.laba.lt/fedora/get/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2009~D_20100204_103051-05475/DS.005.0.01.ETD, (accessed April 7, 2010).
[25]Ibid.
[26] Ibid.

regime.[27] Girnius argues that "an individual can resist, adapt, or collaborate" and, according to him, this triple scheme not only emphasizes the most prevailing behavior under communism, namely adaptation, but also allows to define more precisely the past; to understand motivations and search for justifications for certain strategies of adaptation.[28] Therefore, the aim of the following parts of the work, is firstly, to define "active" Lithuanian resistance and dissident movements, and, secondly, to define "silent" resistance and to present the ambiguity of adaptation and collaboration in the communist history of Lithuania.

1.2.1 "Active" Resistance: from Underground to Public Opposition

"Active" Resistance to the Soviet regime in Lithuania can be defined as "underground or public activities of people, who fought directly against the regime, and demanded independence or protested against the regime's politics."[29] Lithuanian opposition has its roots in 1944, when partisans started their fight for the restoration of Lithuanian sovereignty.[30] 1944-1952 was the period of the armed anti-Soviet resistance, which was carried by the partisan movement, the so-called *Forest Brothers*.[31] Their ranks included around 30,000 armed men, who were actively fighting in forests till 1952.[32] After the partisan movement was defeated, the unarmed resistance emerged, mainly in the late 1960s and 1970s.[33] The main reasons for its emergence were the "restriction on national and cultural development" and also the worsened international relations of the Soviet Union.[34] The revolutions of 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in the Czechoslovakia served as the proof that in Lithuania "other forms of

[27] Ibid.
[28] Kęstutis Girnius, "Pasipriešinimas, prisitaikymas, kolaboravimas," [Resistance, Adaptation, and Collaboration], *Naujasis židinys*, 1996, Nr. 5, p. 268.
[29] Klumbys, 2009, pp. 7.
[30] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp. 80.
[31] Ibid, pp. 81.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Jakubčionis, 2007, pp. 3.
[34] Ibid, pp. 4

resistance were needed."[35] Thus, while a large part of society lived "double lives" and adapted, some part of society decided to organize illegal opposition and seek for Lithuania's independence.

Lithuanian "active" resistance can be divided into two main types, i.e. underground and public/civil resistance. Underground resistance was comprised of three different groups: (1) the Catholic Church; (2) human rights advocates; (3) nationalists, with some of them were former partisans and deportees.[36] The Catholic Church resisted the heavy restrictions on religion and started to publish periodicals in which they "disseminated anti-Soviet ideas and promoted national, Catholic and cultural values."[37] Human rights advocates emerged with the establishment of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group in 1976, whose members were former political prisoners whose aim was to record human rights violations and spread this information to the West; they also, like the Catholic Church, promoted ideas of the reestablishment of Lithuanian independence. [38] Finally, the nationalists were gathered around the Lithuanian Freedom League, which is defined as the "most radical organization in the unarmed resistance;" many leaders of this group were arrested because of their activities.[39] Their main and only task was "to give the nation back its freedom and to restore independence."[40]

Along with underground opposition, there were also signs of public/civil opposition, which came from time to time into violent clashes with the regime, for example, "politically motivated self-immolations" was a prominent way of protest in Lithuania, especially by Lithuanian youth.[41] These people were usually members of folklore societies, tourist or literary clubs and manifested their opposition by raising the national flag, writing anti-Soviet

[35] Ibid.
[36] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp. 84-85.
[37] Jakubčionis, 2007, pp. 21.
[38] Ibid, pp. 31- 33.
[39] Ibid, pp. 35.
[40] Ibid, pp. 39.
[41] Clark and Pranevičiūtė, 2008.

slogans or by "drawing symbols of Lithuanian statehood in public places."[42] According to Vardys and Sedaitis, in 1965-1978, 10.3 percent of all demonstrations and protests events in the USSR, excluding the underground resistance, occurred in Lithuania.[43]

Finally, it is important to note that Lithuanian dissidents did not have "prominent scholars or professionals"[44] in their ranks, because most of the intelligentsia were members of the LCP or belonged to the "silent" part of society. Therefore, the Lithuanian underground mostly included and "kept close ties with the underprivileged strata of the population, the workers and collective farm peasants."[45] However, later, during the period of *perestroika*, the whole society, including the LCP, was awakened and supported the goal of national independence. Nevertheless, "active" resistance played an important role not only in "fostering national self-awareness" and "free thinking" but also in "promoting the quest for independence."[46]

1.2.2 Ambiguity of the "Silent" Resistance: Between Adaptation and Collaboration and Existing Space for a New Narration and Identification in the Post-communist Lithuania

The aim of this part of the thesis is to present the controversial debate on who in Lithuania could be considered as part of the "silent" resistance.[47] The problem of dividing people into conformists, who successfully adapted to the regime, but still "silently" opposed it and collaborators is one of the most disputed and controversial issues in Lithuanian history. Both adaptation and collaboration with the Soviet regime were of different levels, and the dilemma arises which level of adaptation to the system can be already named as the collaboration with the communist regime. Some scholars, like Klumbys, refuse to use the

[42] Jakubčionis, 2007, pp. 23-27.
[43] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp.85.
[44] Some of the dissidents today are prominent scholars, but were not during the years of resistance, like, Venclova.
[45] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp. 85.
[46] Jakubčionis, 2007, pp. 44.
[47] In Lithuania, there is a tendency to call oneself a "silent" resistant, including the former members of the LCP. For this metaphor, see also Balutyte, 2007.

term "collaboration," because of its "political colour,"[48] while others argue that it is important to define and to keep the distinction between adaptation and collaboration.

The issue of adaptation to the communist regime is widely discussed by Klumbys, who describes it as the internal state of mind, when people lose hope in any radical changes of their situation and accept the existing order.[49] However, Klumbys, while analyzing Lithuanian history during the Soviet period suggests dividing adaptation into "internal adaptation" (conformity) and "external adaptation" (compliance).[50] Conformity or "internal adaptation" means that individuals adapt to a new regime, but the importance of this form of adaptation is that the person adapts *voluntarily*, without any resistance.[51] Such a person understands the possibility to receive personal advantages for such a position.[52]

On the other hand, compliance or "external adaptation" means that an individual adapts to a new situation and new normative values, not to achieve certain personal gains and public appraisal but to avoid punishment or troubles.[53] The most important difference between conformity and compliance is that the former does not absorb these new values and personally might be even against it.[54] Vardys and Sedaitis give an example of such people, who used to baptize secretly their babies despite the strong opposition of the communist regime towards the Catholic Church.[55] Therefore, many people that belonged to the group of "external adaptation," namely compliance, could also be called members of the "silent" resistance.[56] In the meantime, the definition of "internal adaptation" to the regime, mentioned above, is used by other scholars to define the term "collaboration."

[48] Klumbys, 2009, pp.7.
[49] Ibid, pp. 36.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid, pp. 37.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp.62.
[56] Elena Baliutyte, "Tyliosios rezistencijos" metafora ir prisitaikymo strategijos sovietmečio literatūros kritikoje," [The Metaphor "Silent Resistance and Strategies of Conformism in Soviet Literary Criticism], *Colloquia*, No.19, 2007, pp. 60, at: http://www.llti.lt/failai/Nr19_05_Baliutyte.pdf, (accessed April 7, 2010).

Scholars, who still argue that the distinction should be made not between different forms of adaptation but between adaptation and collaboration argue that collaboration is "a certain form of relations between a citizen of an occupied country and regime, i.e. when a citizen cooperates and helps to diminish or neutralize opponents of a new regime."[57] Girnius claims that the term "collaboration" incorporates such actions as *active* participation or holding responsible posts in the occupation regime, betrayal or denunciation of people to security services, or justification of a regime's crimes, which, according to Girnius, was the case among members of intelligentsia.[58]

Collaboration is also conceptualized and defined in the Lithuanian criminal code "as an act when Lithuanian citizens helped to fortify the occupation or annexation, suppressed the resistance of Lithuanians or in any other way aided an illegal regime to act against the Republic of Lithuania."[59] Five years of imprisonment is forseen as punishment for such crime. In the meantime, Lustration law (1999), which also uses the term "collaboration" decided to expose and "punish" just one form of collaboration, i.e. *secret* collaboration with security services of the USSR.[60]

In Lithuania, it is often claimed that everyone in a certain manner collaborated with the communist regime, or in Klumbys' terms was, both internally and externally adapted to the regime, and, therefore, a moral confusion exists as to what can be perceived as "silent" resistance and what only as an act of collaboration. This problem of "silent" resistance and its position between adaptation and collaboration will be discussed more broadly in the forthcoming chapters. I will demonstrate how candidates from the former communists' ranks

[57] Definition of K.Girnius found in: Mindaugas Pocius, *Kita mėnulio pusė: Lietuvos partizanų kova su kolaboravimu 1944-1953 metais*, [The Other Side of the Moon: The Fight of Lithuanian Partisans against Collaboration 1944-1953], (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos leidykla, 2009). Excerption from the book found at: http://www.luni.lt/index.php/2009_10_15_LUNI_Vilnius._Mindaugas_Pocius._Kolaboravimo_sampratos_problema, (accessed April 7, 2010).
[58] Ibid.
[59] Lithuanian criminal code, 2000, Article 120, at: http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=111555, (accessed April 7, 2010).
[60] Lustration Law, 1999, Article 2, at: http://aurmonas.home.mruni.eu/?page_id=154, (accessed April 7, 2010).

tried to redefine themselves as members of the "silent" resistance. Thus from the ambiguity and moral confusion of the distinction between adaptation and collaboration they will regain political and societal recognition and will retain their political capital in the new post-communist Lithuania.[61]

1.2.3 An Excursus on Resistance in the Lithuanian Diaspora

Another group of actors that was important during the Soviet occupation, next to members of resistance, both "active" and "silent" and the communists, was the Lithuanian diaspora. The Soviet occupation forced mass emigration from Lithuania and around 60,000 people fled to the West, mainly to the USA.[62] The people from this wave of emigration have received a special name, i.e. *dipukai* (in English, Dee Pees). This term means a "relationship to Displaced Person Camps of the World War II"[63] located in Germany and Austria. It is used for and by people who from these camps immigrated into the USA.[64] Many people, among these emigrants, came from the Lithuanian political and cultural elite.[65]

It is important to note that this Lithuanian diaspora was not a monolithic body and different ideological streams could be observed, namely, the catholic, or conservative, and the liberal one.[66] Lithuanian émigré and pedagogue Kazys Mockus in 1953 in the diaspora newspaper *Aidai* wrote that these emigrants have also brought with themselves their political and ideological differentiation.[67] This ideological division in Lithuania emerged in the 19th century, became stronger during interwar period and was later transferred to the Lithuanian

[61] Rubavičius, Vytautas. "Neišgyvendinamas sovietmetis: atmintis, prisiminimai ir politinė galia," [Inexterminable Soviet-Time: Memory, Recollection, and Political Power], *Colloquia*, No. 18, 2007, pp.129.
[62]Daiva Dapkutė and Ilona Balčinskytė, "Lietuvos išeivijos katalikų ir liberal ideologinių srovių archyvinis paveldas: aktualumas ir prieinamumas," [The Archival Foundation of Lithuanian Emigration Catholic and Liberal Ideological Movements: Relevance and Access], *Knygotyra*, No. 50, 2008, pp. 22.
[63]Vytis Čiubrinskis, "To Be of Use For Your Own Country" – Missionary Identity of the Lithuanian Transmigrants", *Social Sciences*, No. 3 (53), 2006, pp. 28.
[64]Ibid.
[65]Dapkutė and Balčinskytė, 2008, pp. 22.
[66]Ibid, pp. 23.
[67]Ibid.

diaspora, especially, in the USA.[68] Therefore, while speaking about the Lithuanian diaspora and its resistance to the Soviet regime, it is impossible to ignore this ideological fight, because each ideological stream not only favored different strategies of resistance but also after Lithuania's independence their representatives as candidates during the presidential elections opposed each other in 1993 and 1997, which will be broader discussed in the second chapter. Here, I will focus on their two main differences, namely their perceptions on how to retain Lithuanian national identity and how to communicate with the Soviet Lithuania.

The main conflict between these two ideological streams was not based on the religious issues because, as Kamičaitis notices, "among liberals there were also Catholic people," for example, the most famous liberal philosophers, such as Maceina and Girnius.[69] Their conflict was mainly based on the disagreements on how to retain Lithuanian national identity. Catholics argued that in order to maintain Lithuanian patriotism, one needs to establish Lithuanian schools and try to segregate from the "foreign" society.[70] On their part, the liberals argued that the Lithuanian diaspora needs to maintain its national identity not by a policy of segregation but rather by integrating more into the Western society.[71]

These two ideological groups were also divided on strategies how to act and save Lithuania from the Soviet Union. The more conservative side, i.e. the so-called Catholics were against any close ties with Soviet Lithuania and saw it as a threat of the Soviet regime and possible betrayal of the country.[72] In the meantime, the more liberal wing, mainly represented by the intellectual group *Santara-Šviesa* decided to use the possibility of

[68] Ibid, pp. 24.
[69] Darius Kamičaitis, "Lietuvos katalikų ir liberalų ideologiniai skirtumai egzilyje," [The Ideological Divisions in Exile among Lithuanian Catholics and Liberals], Išeivijos institutas, 2007, http://www.iseivijosinstitutas.lt/index.php?cid=534 (accessed May 16, 2010).
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.

establishing relations with the Soviet writers and intelligentsia during 1966-1967.[73] It was known that in such a way the Soviet Union wanted to find ideological support in the diaspora, still, *Santara-Šviesa* decided to accept this offer.[74] However, their aim was not to support communism, but, on the contrary, using these bilateral relations to bring to Lithuania forbidden literature and to foster critical thinking towards the Soviet regime.[75] Therefore, in this manner they managed to contribute to the development of Lithuanian opposition and to the "awakening of nonconformist moods."[76]

Two Lithuanian presidential candidates from the diaspora, namely Stasys Lozoraitis and Valdas Adamkus also belonged to the latter, namely the liberal group. In the meantime, another presidential candidate, Kazys Bobelis was a follower of the more conservative and nationalistic stream of the diaspora. However, as it will be presented in the following chapter, after the independence, dynamism of identity in the diaspora could be observed because it had to redefine its own position within the new independent Lithuania. The complete electoral failures of Bobelis and unexpected success of the liberals Lozoraitis and Adamkus, proved to the diaspora that a more liberal and less nationalistic stance was needed in order to be supported by native Lithuanians in the new political environment.

1.3 Lithuanian Transitional Period: Two Moments of "Historical Amnesia" or Foundations for a New Political Culture

I would suggest dividing Lithuanian transitional period into three stages,[77] referring to its approach to the communist past: (1) *period of consensus*, when the former members of the LCP started to support *Sąjūdis*, remained united and avoided dealing with the communist past

[73] Arūnas Streikus, "Sovietų Lietuva ir išeivija: kultūrinių ryšių projektas," [Soviet Lithuania and the Émigré Community: A Project for Cultural Ties], Studies of Lithuania's History, Research Papers, Issue 20, 2007, pp. 44.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid, pp. 48.
[76] Ibid.
[77] The period of consensus and the period of confrontation were identified and more broadly discussed by Krupavičius (see in Jankauskas and Žėruolis, 2004).

and its former actors for the sake of Lithuanian independence; (2) *period of confrontation* which emerged during the first parliamentary elections in 1992 between the reformed communists, the same ones that during the period of consensus supported *Sąjūdis*, and native opposition, led by Vytautas Landsbergis; in this period, the "sins" of former communists were emphasized and a process of lustration was started; and (3) *period of reconciliation* which emerged with the presidential candidate Lozoraitis in 1992 and finished in 1997 with the victory of Adamkus in the presidential elections. During this period of reconciliation, the diaspora played the role of mediator between the former communists and the native opposition. It promoted the idea of forgiveness and reconciliation. The periods of consensus and reconciliation were both marked by certain "historical amnesia," namely it was decided to forget the past, i.e. the activities of former communists in the Soviet regime. As Ernest Renan, a French philosopher and writer of the 19th century, argues "historical amnesia" sometimes might be "necessary for the building of a nation."[78]

In this part of the thesis, firstly, I will discuss the period of consensus, namely, the creation and development of the Lithuanian Reform Movement *Sąjūdis*, and its main characteristics. Secondly, the period of confrontation will be analyzed and the relationship of different opposition groups and the LCP will be outlined and the adaptation of the former communist party and its leader to the new transitional situation will be described. Finally, the conclusion referring already to the second chapter of my thesis will be presented.

[78]Kora Andrieu, "Transitional Justice a New Discipline in Human Rights," January 2010, *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence*, Sciences Po, Paris, at: http://www.massviolence.org/IMG/article_PDF/Transitional-Justice-A-New-Discipline-in-Human-Rights.pdf, (accessed April 7, 2010).

1.3.1 The Rise of *Sąjūdis*: the Period of Consensus

The year of 1988, when Lithuanian Reform Movement *Sąjūdis* was created, is usually perceived as the moment of "awakening"[79] and a starting point of Lithuanian transition to democracy. It is marked by the political consensus of formerly confronting actors, namely, the Lithuanian opposition and the communists' *nomenklatūra*. Vardys and Sedaitis claim that this was the time of a "sudden emergence of a civil society formerly hidden under the superficial monolith of Soviet political culture."[80] During this transitional period, all Lithuanians, namely ordinary people, dissidents, high officials of the LCP and intellectuals were united under one goal, namely the quest for Lithuanian independence and fight against one threat, i.e. the possible violent reaction of Moscow. Therefore, the transitional period was a "moment of forgiving" for most Lithuanians. Venclova, who was the leader of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group, criticizes the Lithuanian way of dealing with the past at the moment of transition and argues that Lithuania lacked critical intellectuals, like Havel or Michnik, who were critical not only towards communism but also towards their own tradition of thinking.[81] According to Venclova, one cannot justify "the apologetical dealing with communist regime" in Lithuania just because of the "dangerous situation of transition."[82]

In order to understand the awakening of Lithuania, one has to trace the creation and development of the *Sąjūdis* Reform Movement. It was created by Lithuanian intellectuals in the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, and in the beginning it was "a Lithuanian middle-class gathering, dominated by intellectuals."[83] Clark and Pranevičiūtė call the initial membership of *Sąjūdis* "an amalgam of intellectuals representing a mood for change and members of the

[79] Alfred Erich Senn, *Lithuanian Awakening*, (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1990.
[80] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp.101.
[81] Tomas Venclova, "Etninis nacionalizmas padėjo totalitarinei sistemai pratęsti savo valdymą," [Ethnical Nationalism Helped for Totalitarian System to Prolong its Ruling], *Lietuvos Rytas*, June 6, 2008, http://www.lrytas.lt/-12127553891212719115-p1-Istorija-T-Venclova-Etninis-nacionalizmas-pad%C4%97jo-totalitarinei-sistemai-prat%C4%99sti-savo-valdym%C4%85-video.htm, (accessed April 8, 2010).
[82] Ibid.
[83] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp. 104.

LCP keen to implement the reforms proposed by Moscow within the context of *perestroika*."[84] Vytautas Landsbergis was the leader of the *Sąjūdis* movement, who in Lithuania has been never perceived as a dissident, and his "oppositional position" is the most accurately defined by Vardys and Sedaitis, who call him an "apolitical intellectual", who belonged to the group of intellectuals which was never a monolithic one.[85]

Thus at the beginning, *Sąjūdis* did not represent the whole society. As Clark and Pranevičiūtė argue, Lithuanian society was in delay, because "non-involvement was a part of the general attitude of non-conformity that lay at the heart of opposition to the regime."[86] They notice that even dissident organizations could not mobilize society.[87] The first goals of *Sąjūdis* were "cultural resurrection, democratization and economic sovereignty" in cooperation with the LCP.[88] Only in the end of 1989, did the main goal of *Sąjūdis* become the re-establishment of Lithuanian independence.[89]

Therefore, in the begining, *Sąjūdis* tried to play the role of mediator between the Communist Party and the dissidents.[90] It offered a more moderate stance towards the Soviet regime than the Catholic Church or the Lithuanian Freedom League, the so-called nationalists.[91] In the beginning, it was even decided not to accept "extremists", namely "nationalist" dissidents, but in the end they also became its members.[92] Thus Lithuanian opposition to the communist regime, which was comprised of dissidents, intellectuals and Lithuanian communists, managed to unite their forces and to mobilize society. *Sąjūdis*

[84] Clark and Pranevičiūtė, 2008.
[85] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp. 95.
[86] Clark and Pranevičiūtė, 2008.
[87] Ibid
[88] Internet page *Alfa* staff, "*Sąjūdis*: the Cradle of Lithuanian Independence," at: http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/10320485/?Sajudis..the.cradle.of.Lithuanian.independence=2010-03-11_08-24, (accessed April 8, 2010).
[89] Ibid.
[90] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp.103.
[91] Clark and Pranevičiūtė, 2008.
[92] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp.103.

organized mass meetings and "served as the soil for growing diverse plants."[93] However, the diversity of opinions within its members was also the main reason of its later break-up.

The movement remained united only till the moment the main goal was achieved, namely Lithuanian independence was declared. As Krupavičius states, "the predominance of moderate political forces and the external character of political confrontation (conflict with Moscow) resulted in so-called *pulsating consensus* relations among the main political forces."[94] However, afterwards, when external threats disappeared, the "radicalization and political fragmentation of *Sąjūdis*" occurred[95] and, as Jankauskas and Zeruolis notice, "the *pulsating consensus* was overtaken by inner confrontations that rose to *ideological fever* in the first half of 1992."[96] *Sąjūdis* became completely fragmented and the fight between "patriots" who defended independence and the "Communists" "who were suspected of supporting a confederation with Russia" emerged.[97]

1.3.2 The Rebirth of the Former Communists: the Period of Confrontation

In 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party was declining because of the enormous people's support to *Sąjūdis* and could not act independently from it. As Vardys and Sedaitis notice, it "found itself a junior partner fighting for its political life."[98] Clark and Pranevičiūtė claim that the ability of the first secretary of the LCP, Algirdas Brazauskas, "to adapt rapidly to changing political realities and position himself on the middle ground" was one of the reasons why after the break away from the CPSU and the internal split, the LCP successor

[93] Ibid, pp. 125.
[94] A. Krupavičius (ed.), *Politinės partijos Lietuvoje: atgimimas ir veikla*, [Political Parties in Lithuania: Rebirth and Activities], Kaunas: Litterae universitatis, pp. 42, In: Algimantas Jankauskas and Darius Žeruolis, "Understanding Politics in Lithuania," DEMSTAR Research Report No. 18, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, February 2004, at: http://www.demstar.dk/papers/UnderstandingLithuania.pdf, (accessed May 18, 2010).
[95] Algimantas Jankauskas and Darius Žeruolis, 2004, pp. 8.
[96] Ibid, pp. 8-9.
[97] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp. 194.
[98] Ibid, pp. 151.

party, the LDDP,[99] managed to become "a major political force throughout the post-Soviet period" till this day.[100] The LCP actively participated in Lithuania's fight for independence and, in this manner, managed not to be "associated in the public mind with illusory communist ideals."[101] Brazauskas, in the end, was able to present himself and his party not only "as a credible supporter of independence" but also as a symbol of "Soviet-style prosperity."[102]

The members of former regime also managed to overcome the main challenge presented by a well-known communist journalist and writer, Raimundas Kašauskas, in 1989:

> In 1989 the Lithuanian Communist Party will accept responsibility for mistakes made in the past. But how will it restore its prestige, how will its decent members be able to face the nation, when they hear the echoes from Siberia [and various localities where heinous crimes were committed by party activists and by the Red Army] and when they know that "executioners of direct repression" are still accepted in the party ranks?[103]

Actually, the Lithuanian Communist Party not only circumvented the acknowledgement of responsibility but also had no problems of restoring its prestige. As Clark and Pranevičiūtė state "tolerance was clearly displayed in the 1992 legislative elections" where the majority of seats were given to the successor party of former communists, the LDDP.[104] The main reason why they succeeded was an economic plan they suggested to save Lithuania from its economic crisis. Brazauskas, the last first secretary of the LCP became the first president after independence and rehabilitated Lithuanian communists by stating that they, similarly to many other resistants, were Lithuanian patriots, especially

[99] Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania.
[100] Clark and Pranevičiūtė, 2008.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp. 148.
[104] Clark and Pranevičiūtė, 2008

concerning their economic policies.[105] Thus, with the rebirth of former communists, new ideological confrontation started again in Lithuania because the LDDP became a very strong political competitor for the remnants of the *Sąjūdis* and its newly found Homeland Party, led by Vytautas Landsbergis.

1.3.3 Conclusions: Moments of "Historical Amnesia" as Foundations for a New Political Culture

In this chapter, I have discussed the historical context of the Lithuanian communist regime and its different cultures of opposition. Firstly, it was claimed that Lithuanian communism was both repressive and patriotic. On the one hand, it acted harshly against any direct opposition. On the other hand, it tried to keep Lithuanian culture and traditions from Russification. However, the members of the LCP, in the beginning did not seek for complete Lithuanian independence. Therefore, their initial stance during the transitional period is seen as a betrayal by Lithuanian dissidents.

Secondly, the concepts of "active" and "silent" resistance and the controversy of collaboration were discussed. It was argued that as an "active" resistance can be seen actions of the Lithuanian underground opposition: (1) the Catholic Church; (2) human rights advocates; (3) nationalists; and public/civil resistance which fought directly against the regime. The problem of defining "silent" resistance was acknowledged. It is argued that people who adapted externally to the communist regime could be perceived as "silent" resistants. In the meantime, those who were active in suppressing opposition and praising communist values, as members of the LCP or secret agencies, could not be perceived as members of "silent" resistance but rather as collaborators with the regime. It is also argued

[105] Algirdas Brazauskas: "Ir tuomet dirbome Lietuvai," [And Then We Also Worked for Lithuania], *Lietuvos Rytas*, 28 September, 2007, Homepage of newspaper *Lietuvos Rytas* http://www.lrytas.lt/?id=11909530651190502837&view=4, (accessed April 8, 2010).

that the ambiguity of adaptation and collaboration created a new space for narration and interpretation for the former communists.

Finally, the transitional period of Lithuania towards democracy and its "historical amnesia" was discussed. It is claimed that Lithuanian opposition by closely cooperating with the LCP created conditions for their future "rebirth" and new interpretation of their past activities within the regime. During the period of consensus "historical amnesia" was necessary in order to move towards Lithuanian independence. In the period of reconciliation "historical amnesia" was directed towards democratic consolidation. As Barbara A. Misztal notices, sometimes "a fascination with a particular collective memory might become an obstacle to democracy" and encourage groups "to compete for recognition of suffering," and in this manner, might "undermine the democratic spirit of cooperation."[106] Therefore, in the Lithuanian case the forward-looking strategies were chosen. Such an apologetic or amnesic approach towards the communist past, mainly towards the former communists, who emerged in the post-communist Lithuania as new and influential political actors, was necessary and laid the foundations for the emergence of a new political culture based on reconciliation and political dialogue while searching for consensus in various issues related to Lithuanian future.

The following chapter will analyze more profoundly the emergence of this new political culture. Firstly, the adaptation of past actors in independent Lithuania will be revealed through their narratives during the Lithuanian presidential elections in 1993 and 1997. The interplay of different memory groups, the dynamics of memory and redefinition of identity in the new political environment will be discussed. Finally, the gradual development of a new political culture will be examined by analyzing the cross-points of communication of different actors. The similar strategies of these actors on how to deal with the past actually will present the new spaces for a dialogue in the post-communist Lithuania.

[106] Barbara A. Misztal, "Memory and Democracy," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 48, No. 10, June 2005, pp. 1326.

CHAPTER 2: NARRATIVES OF THE PAST DURING LITHUANIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 1993 AND 1997: LOCALIZATION OF MEMORIES OF THE COMMUNIST PAST

The aim of this chapter is to present the narratives of the Lithuanian presidential candidates in 1993 and 1997 and their claimed relation to the Lithuanian communist past. Firstly, I will discuss the diasporic candidates and their self-identification. It will be revealed the dynamics of returnees identity, mainly, I will present how and why the presidential candidate of the conservative and the nationalistic wing of the Lithuanian diaspora was forced to redefine himself and to support the candidates from the liberal part of the diaspora, who for long time were seen as the opponents or even enemies.

Secondly, the localization of presidential candidates from the circle of the former communists in the new Lithuanian political environment will be examined and will be shown that they managed to redefine and present themselves as a part of the Lithuanian "silent" resistance. Furthermore, the electoral victory of Brazauskas, and strong electoral support for Paulauskas will show that they also managed to overcome the challenge of their opponents, namely they liberated themselves from the accusations of their past activities. Thirdly, it will be also briefly studied the candidates from the Lithuanian dissidence, namely internal opposition to former communists, who has lost leadership and electoral support because of its accusatory discourse.

It will be also argued that the diaspora members have emerged as important actors in the Lithuanian political system and their peaceful and tactful dealing with the past managed to mollify or in some cases even enabled to forget the "past sins" of the former communists. Such a calm and tolerant style of behavior and "electoral language" of the diasporic candidates built new bridges among eternal native opponents and created the conditions and space for a peaceful conversation on the Lithuanian politics and its future.

2.1 Diaspora Candidates and Their Localization of Memories within the Communist Past of Lithuania

The term "diaspora" means dispersion of people, who were forced to leave their homelands but never abandoned the idea of returning home.[107] Today the term has received "a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community."[108] The term diaspora in this work will be used to define Lithuanian exile at the end of the Second World War when people left the country and fled to the West, usually, with the final destination at the USA. Among them were also future presidential candidates of Lithuania, namely, Stasys Lozoraitis, Valdas Adamkus, and Kazys Bobelis, who returned to their homeland with the interest of becoming new leaders of the independent Lithuania. Lozoraitis competed in the presidential elections in 1993. Bobelis was a candidate in both elections, i.e. in 1993[109] and 1997. Adamkus in 1993 served as the head of Lozoraitis' electoral campaign and in 1997 was running himself as a candidate for the Lithuanian President's office.

It is important to distinguish these presidential candidates. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Lithuanian diaspora was divided in two ideological streams, namely the Catholic or the conservative[110] and the liberal one. However, as it will be seen in this section of the thesis also the liberal diasporic group, in the post-independence Lithuania, claimed this Catholic identity. Therefore, this division could be better defined in the terms of nationalism and cosmopolitanism.[111] As Lachenicht and Heinsohn argue "diasporas can encourage

[107] Rogers Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 28, No.1, January 2005, pp. 3.
[108] Ibid.
[109] In end of the elections of 1993, Bobelis and other presidential candidates withdrew from the electoral competition (because their complete failure was forecasted and they decided to support two the most popular candidates. Bobelis supported Brazauskas.
[110] In this thesis, the terms "conservative wing of diaspora" and "Catholic wing of diaspora" will be used interchangeably.
[111] Susanne Lachenicht and Kirsten Heinsohn (ed.), *Diaspora identities: exile, nationalism and cosmopolitanism in past and present*, (Frankfurt; New York: Campus Verlag, 2009), pp. 8.

nationalism: the notion and the dream of the homeland become strong uniting elements."[112] In the meantime, other members of the diaspora "see cosmopolitan elements at the very heart of the nation in question."[113] This association of cosmopolitan way of looking to the nation-state provides negative reaction within the circles of the conservative diaspora and is seen "as a negative attitude, as being antagonistic to national interests, both for nations at home and abroad."[114] Similarly, in the Lithuanian diaspora, the liberals were against the conservative strategies of segregation from the host society and promoted the universalistic ideas of retaining national identity by integration. The liberals were also quite often accused by the conservatives of betraying the interests of their homeland, for example, the agreement of the liberals to cooperate with the Soviet Union on the cultural issues was met in the conservative circles of the diaspora as nothing else "but as a voluntary help to the Soviets to legitimize their aggression against Lithuania."[115]

Thus the diasporic presidential candidates represented these two different branches. Lozoraitis and Adamkus were known as liberal members of the diaspora, in the meantime, Bobelis was known as highly conservative and nationalistic. Therefore, the presidential elections were not only fight between the diaspora members and the native Lithuanian politicians but also an ideological contention within the diaspora itself. As it will be seen, the conservative and nationalistic presidential candidate, Bobelis, after his failure in the first presidential elections, later decided to redefine its identity and to approach closer the cosmopolitan stream of the diaspora; it was expressed in his support for Adamkus during the second round of presidential elections in 1997.

[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid, pp. 13.
[115] Kamičaitis, 2007.

2.1.1 Diasporic Returnees and Their Narration during Lithuanian Presidential Elections in 1993 and 1997

The aim of this section of the thesis is to reveal how candidates from the liberal and the conservative streams of the diaspora narrated their relation to the communist past of Lithuania. It is important to present their narrations for two reasons; firstly, we need to reveal their self-identification in the post-communist Lithuania, and, secondly, we need to see their differences and similarities in relation to other groups of actors. By identifying this, it will allow us not only to see the areas of limits but also to find common ground for possible future communication.

Lozoraitis, was a son of diplomat, raised abroad and later became engaged in diplomacy and, therefore, was already a "transnational Lithuanian." During the interwar period and during the Nazi and Soviet occupations he resided in Italy. After the death of his father, in 1970, Lozoraitis became Lithuanian representative in Rome and in 1987 became the leader of Lithuanian diplomatic service in exile which was based in the USA and represented the independent Lithuania of the interwar period.

Adamkus as many other Lithuanians in the West, was a displaced person, who fled the Soviet occupation. Prior to leaving Lithuania, he was active in the Lithuanian resistance. Adamkus, similarly, as Lozoraitis, was "born into a "political" family and his family was well connected to other members of the political elite in independent Lithuania."[116] In the USA, he was an active member of the Lithuanian community and raised the question of Lithuanian occupation within the US government. He was also a Vice-Chairman, from 1958 through 1965, of the intellectual group of the liberals *Santara-Šviesa* ("Accord-Light").[117] Adamkus

[116] Skulte, 2005, pp. 164.
[117] Ibid, pp. 193.

had also "highly successful professional live" and was "successfully adapted into the host society."[118]

Kazys Bobelis, a member of the conservative part of diaspora, was the son of the Lithuanian volunteer military officer. In 1941, Bobelis took part in the uprising against the Soviets.[119] In the end of World War Two, he left Lithuania, firstly, living in Germany, where he obtained the doctoral degree in medical studies and later settling down in the USA.[120] From 1962 to 1978 he was the President of the American Lithuanian Council and from 1979 till 1992 the President of the Supreme Lithuanian Liberation Committee (VLIK).[121] He also actively participated in activities directed against communism and towards the liberation of Lithuania from the Soviets. Bobelis used this background to show that he, in contrast to Lozoraitis and Adamkus, was a "bigger" nationalist and more conservative towards the perception of the Lithuanian identity and its communist past.

Thus Lithuanian presidential candidates came back to Lithuania with their own perception of the Lithuanian communist past and with a feeling of being a part of "common suffering." However, these returnees, especially from the conservative branch of the diaspora, had to realize that in order to adapt to a new post-communist Lithuania, they had to redefine themselves or at least to become more tolerant towards new political actors descending from the Lithuanian Communist Party, namely, they had to re-evaluate the communist past in order to offer the path for the Lithuanian future development.

Lithuanian presidential candidates from the diaspora, Stasys Lozoraitis, in 1992/1993, and Valdas Adamkus, in 1997, presented themselves during their electoral campaigns as part of shared national past. During the elections Lozoraitis proclaimed that "I feel part of our

[118]Ibid, pp. 164.
[119]Kazys Bobelis, "Biografija," [Biography], at: http://www3.lrs.lt/n/rinkimai/pr97/kandidatai/bobelis/biogr.htm, (accessed May 17, 2010).
[120]Ibid.
[121] Ibid.

nation, part of our history,"[122] and "I know more about Lithuanian past than people of the LDDP."[123] Similarly, Adamkus, in 1997, stated that, spiritually, he has never left Lithuania and his main goal was always to protect his homeland from the Soviet Union.[124] Bobelis also portrayed himself as a part of the Lithuanian past and as the country's representative abroad during occupation.[125] As scholar, Vyrautas Čiubrinskas, argues "such category of returnees claim that they "have never been away, but always "were" in Lithuania" and […] are comparable to the non-conformist local dissidents and the deported to Siberia."[126]

The analysis of the two Lithuanian newspapers, *Lietuvos Rytas* and *Respublika*, during the presidential electoral campaign revealed the main topics used by the candidates which show their identification with the past. Their discourse could be divided into three categories of topics: (1) ***nature of patriotism***; (2) ***Catholicism***; and (3) ***fight for Lithuanian independence***.

One of the most powerful arguments for the explanation of their special role during the communist period in Lithuania was the nature of their patriotism. In the case of Lozoraitis, patriotism had the traditions of the generational continuity. Lozoraitis pictured himself as a grandchild of Motiejus Lozoraitis, who was "varpininkas"[127] (also a close follower of Kudirka) and as a son of a renowned Lithuanian interwar period politician and a former foreign minister (1934-1938). He claimed that patriotic values were the cornerstone of his family education.[128]

[122] Vytis Šalna, "Lietuva iki šiol neturi valstybės strategijos," [Lithuania Still Has No State Strategy], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 26, February 10, 1993, pp. 7.
[123] Šalna (*Lietuvos Rytas*), 1993, pp. 7.
[124] Artūras Račas, "Po rinkimų naujos eros pradžios teks palaukti," [After the Elections We Still Will Have to Wait for a New Era], *Lietuvos Rytas*, January 12, 1998, pp. 4.
[125] *Respublika's* information, "Kas suvienys "vienytojus"?," [Who Will Unite the Unifiers?], *Respublika*, February 9, 1993, pp. 1.
[126] Čiubrinskis, 2006, pp. 30.
[127] Members of the Lithuanian National Movement in the beginning of the 20th century.
[128] Sigita Urbonavičiūtė, "Stasys Lozoraits: nėr žmogaus, turėjusio tiek progų pasidaryt turtingu ir tiek padaryt," [Stasys Lozoraitis: There Is No Person Who Had So Many Possibilities in Becoming Rich and Doing So Much], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No.27, February 11, 1993, pp. 17.

Likewise, Adamkus claimed that his patriotism did not emerge today or as a reaction to certain societal changes. He stated that if he had stayed in Lithuania after its Soviet occupation, he would have become a member of the partisan movement, because already during the Nazi occupation he was a member of the organization which fought for Lithuanian freedom.[129] Adamkus said that he left Lithuania at the age of eighteen against his will and told the media his story of how he was caught by his parents and put on the train leaving Lithuania.[130] According to him, his patriotism was expressed in his desire to stay in Lithuania and fight with the new occupiers.[131] Later, in the USA he communicated with the former president of Lithuania during the interwar period, Kazys Girnius, and claimed that he was influenced by his patriotism for Lithuania, even, if it was expressed from overseas.[132]

Bobelis understood his patriotism in the similar way; the participation in the uprising against the Soviets, active work in the Lithuanian-American community and participation in worldwide conferences, where he used to condemn the Soviet occupation.[133] However, one visible difference between Bobelis and the two other diasporic candidates was the fact that for him a patriot could not be considered a person, who did not foster national identity and patriotism in their own families. For example, Bobelis attacked Lozoraitis for lacking Lithuanianniness because his wife was an Italian and not a Lithuanian; he stated that for Lithuania it would be inappropriate to have a First Lady, who is a foreigner.[134]

Another important identification with the communist past was their strong support for the Lithuanian Catholic Church and its resistance fight. Lozoraitis was presented as an example of a Lithuanian Catholic, who not only practiced religion but also assisted the

[129] Valdas Bartasevičius, "Valdas Adamkus: gyvenimo kelionė į Lietuvos politkos viršūnes," [Valdas Adamkus: the Lifetime Trip to the Lithuanian Political Leadership], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No.3, 6 January, 1998, pp. 3.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Kazys Bobelis, "Biografija," [Biography], at: http://www3.lrs.lt/n/rinkimai/pr97/kandidatai/bobelis/biogr.htm, (accessed 17 May, 2010).
[134] *Respublika's* information, "Kas suvienys "vienytojus"?," [Who Will Unite the Unifiers?], *Respublika*, 9 February, 1993, pp. 1.

Lithuanian Church in its resistance against the Soviet regime. It was stated that all underground media, including the *Catholic Church Chronicles* used to be sent to Lozoratis, in order to use them in a political fight against the Soviet Union.[135] Lozoraitis was also closely associated with the Pope, and presented as his trustee. It is important to mention that, indeed, he was a Lithuanian representative to the Holy See and fought for the survival of this embassy during the occupation. During the electoral campaign period, in Lithuanian churches were published 200,000 booklets with the title "S.Lozoraitis. Lithuania needs a Catholic President" and with the picture of Lozoraitis and the Pope.[136] In the meantime, in Adamkus electoral campaign the topic of Catholicism was less visible; however, he was closely associated with Lozoraitis. It might be explained by the fact, that not only both were members of the diaspora but also Adamkus was the head of Lozoraitis electoral campaign. Therefore, Adamkus was closely related with his predecessor and his religious views. Thus Catholicism of the diaspora members, especially of Lozoraitis was presented as an advantage against the candidate of the former communists, who were seen as less religious or even atheists.

In Bobelis' campaign religion also played a significant role. In elections of 1993, there was a competition with Lozoraitis who is a "bigger" Catholic. Bobelis, in his biography, mentioned the fact, that in the USA he has re-established the Lithuanian Catholic youth organization *Ateitininkai*,[137] which combined "national identity with Catholic identity and religious believes."[138] Moreover, Bobelis, similarly as Lozoraitis, has also received an open support from the Church. Bobelis, was even supported by the Lithuanian Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, Vincentas Sladkevičius, who in his interview in *Respublika* stated

[135] Vytenis Andriukaitis, "Dešimt klausimų iš kelionės po Lietuvą," [Ten Questions From the Trip in Lithuania], ,*Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 23, February 5, 1992, pp. 16.
[136] Rimantas Stankevičius, "Šventasis Tėvas – S.Lozoraičio patikėtinis?..", [Is S.Lozoraitis Trustee of the Pope?..], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 28, February 12, 1993, pp. 8.
[137] Kazys Bobelis, "Biografija," [Biography], at: http://www3.lrs.lt/n/rinkimai/pr97/kandidatai/bobelis/biogr.htm, (accessed May 17, 2010).
[138] Genutė Gedvilienė and Aurimas Šukys, "Ateitininkų nuostatos puoselėjant tautinį identitetą," [The Standpoints of Ateitininkai to Preserve National Identity], *Acta Pedagogica Vilnensia*, Issue 19, 2007, pp. 114, at: http://www.leidykla.eu/fileadmin/Acta_Paedagogica_Vilnensia/19/102-114.pdf, (accessed May 17, 2010).

that he is going to vote for Bobelis, namely, "a person who was a real Catholic all his life, in such a manner educated his children, managed to preserve a "clean" Lithuanian language[139] and to retain the Lithuanian customs."[140]

Finally, the fight for independence in the diaspora was portrayed as the strongest relation of Lozoraitis, Adamkus, and Bobelis with Lithuania during its occupation and as the contrast to the former communists, who, similarly as many members of the "silent" resistance, adapted to the new regime and for long time remained apolitical and inactive. Both returnees, Lozoratis and Adamkus were depicted as part of "active" resistance. Lozoraitis was presented by the chairman of the Lithuanian World Community as "a veteran of diplomacy who carried the flag of free Lithuania overseas" during its occupation.[141] He was portrayed as a person who, in contrast to the Soviet *nomenklatūra*, sacrificed all his life to Lithuanian independence and, therefore, was seen as a "savior" for a new independent Lithuania who "would eliminate the consequences of a moral genocide of the Soviet times."[142] His main achievements were seen as his diplomatic activities, from Vatican to Washington, connections with the Lithuanian resistance and consolatory help during the independence period when the fundaments of a new Lithuanian statehood were laid.[143]

Adamkus, in the autobiographical article published in *Lietuvos Rytas* in 1998, emphasized his youth years in Lithuania, when he was a member of military troop fighting against the Nazi occupation.[144] Later in the USA he became the chairman of the organization of intellectuals *Santaros-Šviesa* which actively resisted the Soviet regime. However, its tactic, namely cooperation with the Soviet Lithuanian artists and academicians was seen very

[139] Lozoraitis and Adamkus spoke Lithuanian worse.
[140] Daiva Norkienė, "Kartais dar labai norisi bažnyčioje pasakyti pamokslą…", [Sometimes I Still Want So Much To Preach a Sermon in the Church…], *Respublika*, November 28, 1997, pp. 3.
[141] Vytautas Bieliauskas, "Ką rinksime Lietuvos prezidentu?," [Who Will We Elect To Serve As Lithuanian President?], *Respublika*, January 22, 1993, pp. 4.
[142] Leonas Mulevičius, "Ar per greitai, ar per lėtai?," [Is It Too Fast or Too Slow?], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 25, February 9, 1993, pp. 14.
[143] Vytenis Andriukaitis, (*Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 23, 1992), pp. 16.
[144] Valdas Bartasevičius, (*Lietuvos Rytas*, No.3, 1998), pp. 3.

skeptically by the conservative members of the diaspora. It is also noticed that Adamkus himself was even blamed of being communist by these conservative members of the diaspora.[145] After achieving independence this organization was evaluated very positively because of its mission of "enlightening" Soviet Lithuanians "about democracy and freedom."[146] Therefore, Adamkus was able to portray himself as a *knygnešys* (in English: "book smuggler"). "Book smugglers" originate from the Lithuanian history of the late 19th century, who, during the occupation of the Russian empire and its politics of Russification, used to bring forbidden books in the Lithuanian language. Adamkus remembered during his electoral campaign how he used to bring forbidden Western literature to the Soviet Lithuania and in this manner helped his nation.[147] Thus both Lozoraitis and Adamkus were shown as active fighters for the Lithuanian independence; Lozoraitis was depicted as a symbolic ambassador of the Lithuanian resistance overseas and Adamkus as the "book smuggler," referring to the old Lithuanian tradition of resistance.

Bobelis, in the elections of 1993, tried to question the "heroism" of Lozoraitis and to portray himself as a "more active" fighter for the Lithuanian independence. In a TV debate, some parts of which were later reprinted in the newspaper *Respublika*, he argued that Lozoraitis, in contrast to him, had never participated in any international conferences or other events in order to defend Lithuania and to present its interests.[148] During the electoral campaign, Bobelis emphasized his leadership in the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, which claimed to be legally representing Lithuania abroad.[149]

Thus, as one might observe, the conservative candidate from the diaspora Bobelis most of his electoral time in 1993 spent to raise hostility towards other the diasporic candidate

[145] Ibid.
[146] Čiubrinskis, 2006, pp. 30.
[147] Valdas Bartasevičius, (*Lietuvos Rytas*, No.3, 1998), pp. 3.
[148] *Respublika's* information, "Kas suvienys "vienytojus"?," [Who Will Unite the Unifiers?], *Respublika*, 9th of February 1993, pp. 1.
[149] Kamičaitis, 2007.

Lozoraitis. Bobelis presented the nationalistic part of the diaspora who claimed that the liberal diasporic stream lacked "Lithuanianiness," religious believes, and courage to speak for the Lithuanian liberation abroad. Such accusations were a sign of an internal long lasting ideological fight within the diaspora. However, Lozoraitis avoided attacking Bobelis. As it will be seen in the following section of this thesis, after the electoral failure in 1993, Bobelis became less nationalistic and used less incriminatory discourse towards his compatriots from the diaspora in the presidential elections of 1997.

2.1.2 Dynamics of Diasporic Returnees' Identity in Post-Communist Lithuania: Towards Ideological Reconciliation in the Homeland

W. James Booth argues that the "assertions of identity" seek, firstly, to "draw a boundary between group members and others," secondly, "to provide a basis for collective action," and thirdly, "to call attention to a life-in-common, a shared history and future."[150] The third function of identity, which is directed towards building a consensus on the past and seeking a dialogue, might serve as an explanation for the diasporic identity dynamics in the post-communist Lithuania. In the beginning, presidential candidate from the conservative part of the diaspora intended to draw certain boundaries between two ideological streams prevailing in the diaspora. Bobelis wanted to mobilize his supporters and to present himself as the leader of the Lithuanian dissidence in the diaspora by using the accusatory discourse towards the liberal diasporic candidate Lozoraitis.

However, his strong pro-Catholicism, nationalism, and heroic discourse was already used by the native Lithuanian opposition, mainly by its leader Vytautas Landsbergis. Such a discourse and a constant "politics of accusations" already became less popular among the Lithuanian voters and the failure of Landsbergis and Bobelis in the presidential elections of 1993 only confirmed it. In 1993, people showed confidence in the former communist Algirdas

[150] James Booth, *Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity and Justice*, (Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London), pp.3.

Brazauskas, who became a President. Also Lozoraitis who, despite the fact that remained the second in the elections, was still highly praised within society and was even named as "the President of Hope." Moreover, the activities of the liberal organization *Santara-Šviesa*, which Bobelis used to call a pro-communist one, after Lithuanian independence were evaluated very positively.

Therefore, such a political situation forced the conservative members of the diaspora, if they wanted to participate in the Lithuanian politics, to search for a new identity, namely to follow a more liberal position and follow their compatriots from the diaspora. As it might be seen in Appendix No. 2, which displays the electoral poster of Adamkus, printed in *Lietuvos Rytas*, during the presidential elections of 1997, Bobelis already actively supported Adamkus and presented himself as part of his political group. Thus a gradual change of the self-identification within the conservative branch of the Lithuanian diaspora occured. These dynamics of identity not only managed to unify the leaders of different ideological streams in the diaspora but also created a new possibility for their intercommmunication, which was before ruptured in the diaspora.

2.2 Former Communists and Their Redefinition of Memories of the Past during Electoral Campaigns

Lithuanian communists became the first to come back to power; in 1992, after the parliamentary elections, the *Wall Street Journal* wrote that "Lithuania, the first republic to break away from the Soviet Union, also became the first in which former communists have scored a political comeback"[151] This phenomenon was called a "Lithuanian syndrome"[152] and was repeated during the first presidential elections when the victory was celebrated by the former communist Brazauskas.

[151] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp. 197.
[152] Ibid.

Brazauskas came "from a middle-class Lithuanian family" and after his studies he "went to climb the Communist party career ladder."[153] He was the last leader of the Lithuanian Communist Party, later served as "a deputy premier in the *Sąjūdis* administration" and "assured the electorate that neither he" or his environment "had been communists by conviction."[154]Another presidential candidate afftected by the shadow of communism was Artūras Paulauskas, who was a former general prosecuter and was supported in elections by the LDDP and its leader Brazauskas.[155] However, Paulauskas despite his young age, "was associated in the public mind with the former *nomenklatūra*."[156] He was quite often compared to the Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski and was seen as a neo-communist.[157]

Thus the aim of the following part of my thesis is to reveal how these two presidential candidates, associated with the communist regime, managed to redefine their past and through a narrative succeded to localize themselves in the new Lithuanian political environment. It will be revealed that their main challenger, not in the electoral, but in the discursive level during the presidential campaign was the leader of the native opposition, Landsbergis. In the meantime, their main electoral candidates in the second rounds were diasporic candidates. In 1993 Lozoraitis and in 1997 Adamkus, who, instead of attacking, have chosen the strategy of compromise and tolerance towards their past activities and did not escalate this issue during the elections.

2.2.1 Former Communists and their Redefinition of Identity: From Communists to "Silent" Resistants

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, former members of the communist party were searching for a new group identity and their place within the new democratic political system of Lithuania. One of the most important tools to achieve a new status was a redefinition of

[153] Ibid, pp. 199.
[154] Lane, 2001, pp. 142.
[155] Ibid, pp. 147.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.

their past activities and an explanation of their contribution to the Lithuanian nation during the years of the Soviet occupation. As Rubavičius notices:

> Legitimization is especially prominent in the memoirs of the representatives of the former communist nomenclature: the notions of "silent resistance" and "work for the benefit of the Lithuanian working people" are used to justify the political and economic power of the former communist nomenclature and all sorts of party functionaries that form the core of the new political elite.[158]

As my content analysis of the two biggest Lithuanian newspapers reveals such a legitimization was also prominent in the presidential elections in Lithuania, when former communists justified their past by providing its interpretation of memories. The main issues of contention were (1) ***nature of patriotism***; and (2) ***fight for independence***. Political leaders of the former communist regime tried to portray themselves as a part of the Lithuanian "silent" resistance and as Lithuanian patriots who fought for its independence.

Former communists defined patriotism differently to the members of the diaspora. Patriotism for them was firstly related with the work for Lithuania and its economic achievements during the Soviet regime. The presidential candidate Brazauskas in his memoirs, published after his term in office, defined very well his understanding of patriotism:[159] "Who is bigger patriot: the one who during occupation was strengthened the rural agriculture or the one after independence turned it into ruins?"[160] According to him, to forget economic achievements during the occupation, and the people who work in order to attain them, would not be a sign of patriotism but rather a sign of new bolshevism."[161] Brazauskas argued that he did not work for the Soviet regime but for the "eternal" Lithuania.[162] Similarly, in the elections of 1992, a member of Brazauskas electoral

[158] Rubavičius, 2007, pp. 129.
[159] Referring to the patriotism expressed in economic policies which was mentioned in the first chapter of my thesis.
[160] Algirdas Brazauskas, *Ir tuomet dirbome Lietuvai*, [And Then We Worked for Lithuania], (Vilnius: Knygiai, 2007), pp. 10.
[161] Ibid, pp. 8.
[162] Ibid, pp. 14.

headquarters, the academic Raimondas Rajackas argued that Brazauskas has never been a "communist ideologist" but rather an "honest worker" and a "good specialist."[163] According to the former communists, there was a need for the Lithuanians to serve for the regime in order to avoid Russification, therefore, it might be also considered as a certain form of patriotism.[164]

In 1997, the theme of patriotism also entered the electoral agenda of Paulauskas, who was perceived as a neo-communist by his opponents.[165] He claimed that "one should beware of too loud patriotism, because such a patriotism is a shelter for losers," according to him, in such a manner many "real" patriots are being forgotten and ignored.[166] According to him, during the occupation the source of patriotism was "all people" and they did not need somebody to make them more patriotic, and independence was achieved only by the rule of this common sense of patriotism, and not solely influenced by the leadership of certain personalities.[167] Thus, in this manner, he minimized the contribution of his opponents, for example of Landsbergis, to the Lithuanian independence and questioned their patriotic slogans.

Another important identification of the former communists with the past is their constant claim of having fought for the Lithuanian independence. Indeed, one has to agree that Lithuanian independence was finally achieved through the cooperation of the seceded Lithuanian communists and the opposition movement. As Clark and Taylor argue Lithuanian transition was "negotiated between the former ruling elites and the opposition"[168] Still, former

[163] Linas Linkevičius, "R. Rajackas: Gal pirmiausiai derėtų suvienyti išeiviją?," [R.Rajackas: Maybe in the Beginning We Should Unify Diaspora], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 21, February 3, 1993, pp. 9.
[164] Ibid.
[165] Rimvydas Valatka, "Naujasis Prezidentas: privalumai ir trūkumai," [The New President: The Merits and Demerits], *Lietuvos Rytas*, January 12, 1998, pp. 4.
[166] Arvydas Juozaitis, "Prezidentu tampa ne tas, kuris nori, o tas, kuris gali," [Only Two Days Left Till the Light], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 277, November 26, 1997, pp. 7.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Clark and Pranevičiūtė, 2008.

communists tried to present themselves not as suddenly "converted people" but as constantly, even during occupation, seeking their way towards Lithuanian independence.

In their electoral campaigns, Brazauskas, similarly as Paulauskas, emphasized the role of "all people," including the Lithuanian communists, in the fight of independence. People, which, according to Lithuanian dissident and scholar Venclova during the occupation "did not display their convictions" and "waited for an opportune hour," were satisfied with compromises, "which sometimes led to profound demoralization."[169] In this manner, former communists managed to become "one of those people" who always cared about Lithuanian destiny.

As Rubavičius argues, one of the most dominant discourses of the former communists is their "silent" opposition to the regime.[170] During the elections Brazauskas presented himself as an ordinary person who worked for Lithuania and not for occupiers by claiming he has never believed in the communist ideology.[171] Thus, according to Rubavičius, in this case, such a new "resistant" not only escapes the necessity to deal with his own past but also receives a right to judge others.[172] In this manner, former communists became a part of the Lithuanian dissidence and their past activities could be portrayed as "forced" by Moscow and not as guided by their "freewill".[173]

2.2.2 Overcoming the Opponents' Challenge: Liberation from the Shadow of the Communist Past

In this section of the thesis, I will analyze how former communists managed to overcome the shadow of their communist past and received strong support from the Lithuanian electorate, namely I will examine their defensive discourse and self-representation.

[169] Venclova, 1999, pp. 85.
[170] Rubavičius, 2007.
[171] Linas Linkevičius, (*Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 21, 1993), pp. 9.
[172] Rubavičius, 2007, pp. 121.
[173] Ibid.

The elections of 1992 and 1997 were more than ordinary presidential elections; it was a conflict of opposing memories. The wife of Lozoraitis, Daniela Lozoraitienė, in an interview to *Lietuvos Rytas* on the 12th of February, 1993 declared that these elections are not simply struggle of two people for political power but it is a "fight between Past and Future," namely, fight for the democratic future without the remnants of the communist regime.[174] Likewise in 1997, the weekly columnist of *Lietuvos Rytas*, and today its editor, Rimvydas Valatka, wrote that the elections of 1997 proves that "Lithuania has not yet finished its investigation of the communist past" and according to him, "it can be finished only naturally, when the generation of Brazauskas and Landsbergis will disappear."[175]

One of the main challenges of the opponents to the members of the former regime during the elections was their past and their "collaboration" with the "invaders." As archbishop Sigitas Tamkevičius in the elections of 1997 states "Europeans would not understand a nation that suffered so much and has lost its memory," meaning that Lithuanian president could not be a person that had any contact with the repressive structures of the communist regime.[176] However, the former communists and their victory in the parliamentary elections in 1992 and the presidential elections in 1993 revealed not only their success of redefining their identity but also the dynamics of memory of ordinary people who voted for them.

During the presidential elections of 1993, the opponent, who mostly used the language of accusations, to the former communist candidate Algirdas Brazauskas was Vytautas Landsbergis, one of the founders and later leaders of the Lithuanian Independence Movement *Sąjūdis* and the leader of the native Lithuanian opposition. In the meantime, the strongest

[174] Neringa Lašienė, "Daniela Lozoraitienė: tapusi prezidentiene, ir toliau pati vairuosiu automobilį, vaikščiosiu į parduotuves, tvarkysiu namus," [Daniela Lozoraitiene: After Becoming a First Lady, I Will Continue Driving My Car, Doing Shopping, and Housecleaning], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No.28, February 12, 1993, pp. 9.
[175] Rimvydas Valatka, "Praeities baubai liks politikos varomoji jėga," [The Ghosts of the Past Will Remain the Driving Force in Politics], *Lietuvos Rytas*, December, 22, 1997, pp. 4.
[176] Vilius Kaminskas, "Sigitas Tamkevičius: „Atsakomybė saisto mus visus be išimties," [Responsibility Binds Us All Without Exceptions], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 296, December 18, 1997, pp. 13.

opponent of Brazauskas, the diaspora member Lozoraitis, instead of accusations about the opponent's communist past, decided to offer the path towards reconciliation. Even despite the fact that in the elections of 1997, Brazauskas was not even a candidate, still in his electoral campaign, Landsbergis mainly focused on the past wrongdoings of Brazauskas. In this manner, he tried to fight against the candidate of a "new generation" Paulauskas, who also had roots in the communist regime and was officially supported by Brazauskas. In the meantime, diaspora candidate Valdas Adamkus, who later won the elections of 1997, similarly as Lozoraitis decided to chose different electoral tactics proclaiming peace instead of constant fight about the "sins" of the past.

One of the biggest confrontations between Landsbergis and Brazauskas occurred with the publication of Landsbergis' memoirs named "Independent Lithuania: Political Autobiography of Vytautas Landsbergis" during the time of electoral campaign in 1997. In his book, he accused Brazauskas that in 1988 he did not want Lithuania to become independent and was too obedient to the desires of Gorbachev.[177] Brazauskas responded to this accusation by publishing an open letter to the Lithuanian people in the both newspapers analyzed. He argued that as a member of the Communist Party, even being against the politics of the USSR, he could not support openly Lithuanian independence and, therefore, he has chosen a "softer" tactics in his communication with Moscow.[178] However, he claimed that his goal was always to achieve independence and blamed Landsbergis for distorting the historical truth.[179]

Another target of Landsbergis, and of the whole right wing, namely, the Conservative Party, became his direct opponent in elections Paulauskas. During the elections, he was

[177] Audrius Bačiulis, "Prezidento laiškas: liudininkai praranda atmintį," [The Letter of the President: The Witnesses Lose Memory], *Respublika*, December 11, 1997.
[178] Algirdas Brazauskas, "J.E. Respublikos Prezidento Algirdo Brazausko atviras laiškas Lietuvos Respublikos piliečiams," [The Open Letter of the Interim President Algirdas Brazauskas to the Lithuanian citizens], *Lietuvos Rytas*, December 17, 1997, pp. 8.
[179] Ibid.

closely associated not only with the "new generation" of politicians but also with the communist past. His father used to work in the KGB, secret services of the USSR, and was responsible for many repressive actions against Lithuanians. The opponents made loud the fact that even now Paulauskas' father receives his pension for this work from Moscow.[180] It was also found out that the legal actions of the former State Prosecutor Paulauskas have also led to imprisonment into mental hospital of one Lithuanian, Eduardas Narkevičius, in 1984.[181] Paulauskas reacted to these accusations with newspaper's publications, where he stated that the is not going to condemn the actions of his father[182] and that Narkevičius was imprisoned by the decision of the court and not because of his personal actions and that the court defended the interests of the aggrieved party.[183]

However, all these negative allegations towards the former communists did not raise the popularity of the nationalist opposition. Landsbergis not only lost in both presidential elections and but also his conservative political party *Homeland Union* has also lost the first Lithuanian parliamentary elections in 1992. Furthermore, the former communist candidate Brazauskas won presidential elections in 1993 and Paulauskas together with Adamkus successfully overcame the first round of the presidential elections in 1997, where only there Paulauskas lost the elections to Adamkus. Adamkus, in contrast to Landsbergis has never used extreme nationalistic rhetoric or showed a strong antagonism to the former communists. Therefore, it might be argued that during the presidential elections in 1993 and 1997, former communists managed successfully to redefine their past identity related to the communist regime and succeeded in changing a public perception. As it was mentioned above, in 1993, Brazauskas won the presidential elections. Also in the elections of 1997 the Lithuanian

[180] Rimvydas Valatka, "Prieš rinkimus - paskutinės pretendentų lygtys," [Before Elections New Equations of the Candidates], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 293, December 15, 1997, pp. 4.
[181] Lina Pečeliūnienė and Dalius Stancikas, "Supuvusios teisėtvarkos šaknys," [Rotten Roots of Lithuanian Law and Order], *Lietuvos Rytas*, Decmeber 13, 1997.
[182] Interview with Artūras Paulauskas, "Artūras Paulauskas iš arti," [Arturas Paulauskas at Close], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 296, December 18, 1997, pp. 7.
[183] Ibid.

electorate decided to choose a politician who was more tolerant and apologetic regarding the communist past, namely the diaspora's candidate Adamkus was elected as a President.

2.3 "Active" and "Silent" Resistance: Search of the Native Opposition for a New Identity during Lithuanian Presidential Elections in 1993 and 1997

The leadership of the native opposition during the beginning of the transitional period was in the hands of the *Sąjūdis*. However, soon, after the elections of 1990, which were won by the *Sąjūdis* coalition, internal fragmentation emerged.[184] Žėruolis and Jankauskas observe that "ideological disputes, personal ambitions and power struggles dominated parliamentary activities."[185] According to them, it was based on the "ideological-personal grounds" and on "communist/anti-communist division," which later become "the basis of the bipolar party system and politics in general." [186] The radical and moderate parts of the former movement became more visible than ever and *Sąjūdis* was dispersed throughout many different and small political groupings. As a consequence new small political parties were created by dissident communities: the Union of Lithuanian Nationalists (LTS), the Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Exiles (LPKTS) and the Lithuanian Freedom League (LLL).[187] Former communist were defined as their "enemies" and were suspected "of supporting a confederation with Russia".[188] Therefore, during the presidential elections, they had to search for a new leadership in order to attain political power and to define their identity and place in the new post-communist Lithuania.

Lithuanian dissidence was quite skeptical towards both, the diasporic candidates and the former communists. Firstly, for them, for the ones, who actively fought against the regime in their homeland, it was difficult to accept the fact that the diasporic returnees defined

[184] Jankauskas and Žeruolis, 2004, pp. 9.
[185] Ibid, pp. 9.
[186] Ibid, pp. 10.
[187] Clark and Pranevičiūtė, 2008.
[188] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp. 194.

themselves not only as expatriates but also compared themselves with the Lithuanian dissidents. Antanas Terleckas in his interview, in December of 1992, claimed that members of the Lithuanian diaspora during their visits in the Soviet Lithuania usually avoided meeting the most active members of the opposition or political prisoners, and, therefore, perceived the situation in Lithuania through the eyes of the communist regime.[189] Secondly, some members of the resistance, especially the nationalist ones, felt betrayed by the Lithuanian diaspora of the USA.[190] As in 1989, Lithuanian community of the USA invited Brazauskas as a legitimate representative of Lithuania and presented him to the US officials.[191]

But the loss of leadership of the Lithuanian opposition was one of the factors which forced the members of the Lithuanian resistance to choose between the diaspora candidates and people related to the former regime in the second rounds of both elections, in 1993 and 1997. In this manner, the opposition had to choose between these two options, and naturally, priority over the former communists, especially in the circle of the members of the "active" resistance was given to the diasporic candidates (this electoral support to Adamkus, in 1997, is shown in Appendix No. 2). Therefore, such a political situation in Lithuania created a phenomenon of strong presidential candidates from the diaspora, who during electoral campaigns, in the case of Lozoraitis, or through their presidency in the case of Adamkus, who served as a Lithuanian President for two terms, namely ten years, inevitably mollified the radical wing of dissidence. Lane claims that Adamkus "brought with him to a society which was still trying to cast off the remnants of sovietism and authoritarianism a set of liberal-democratic values" aimed at consolidating post-communist society. [192]

[189] Antanas Terleckas, "Kodėl laimėjo komunistai," [Why Communists Won], Vilnius: Lietuvos Laisvės Lyga,1992, pp.3.
[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Lane, 2001, pp. 148.

2.4 Interplay of Different Memory Groups: A Framework for a New Communication

In this section, some comparative conclusions of the analysis of different memory groups will be presented. It will be argued that despite the fact that native opposition, former communists and the diaspora members have been in distinct positions during the Soviet occupation, nevertheless, all of them reached a consensus on their final goal, namely Lithuanian independence. However, as it will be outlined, later confrontation between the native opposition and the former communists emerged. The main reason of this contraposition was an accusatory stance of the native opposition towards the activities of former communists during the occupation. It will be claimed that the situation was "rescued" by the members of the diaspora, whose electoral discourse avoided imputations against the former communists. Therefore, they served in the Lithuanian political arena as a bridge between two hostile political sides.

2.4.1 Beyond Different Experience during the Communist Regime: Similar Imaginations on Lithuanian Statehood

The first chapter of this thesis discussed different experiences of Lithuanians during the Soviet occupation and argued that their behavior oscillated from resistance, adaptation to collaboration. However, the analysis of distinct memory groups' narratives, during the Lithuanian presidential elections in 1993 and 1997, namely of native opposition, former communists and the diaspora, have revealed that each group of actors perceived themselves as patriots. Even if all of them acted from different social positions: (1) from the underground opposition, (2) from the communist party, or (3) from overseas; still, all of them claimed to be fighters for Lithuanian independence.

In the diaspora, to be a patriot meant, for example, to struggle for the Lithuanian liberation through diplomatic channels or with open statements against the Soviet regime

abroad. For Lithuanian dissidents patriotism meant being in a constant and direct contention with the regime. In the meantime, former communists claimed to express patriotism through their leadership in the Communist Party and by striving to avoid Russification of the *nomenklatūra* in Soviet Lithuania. The factor that unified, during the era of *perestroika*, these different groups of actors, who were all in a certain sense patriotic, was an emergent possibility to regain Lithuanian independence.

Thus it might be observed that despite, previously described different patterns of behavior during the communist regime, after having regained independence, each group of the actors tried to create a relatively similar picture of their moral stance and activities during the occupation. The search for common denominators was needed in order to cooperate and survive in the post-communist Lithuania. Therefore, the fact that not only the dissidence and the diaspora but also the former communists condemned and later alienated from the politics of Moscow created a possibility for agreement, even if a fragile one.

However, the Lithuanian dissidence expected from the former communists a condemnation of their participation in the Communist Party but former communists did not see their own guilt here. As Brazauskas in his memoirs stated, "it is morally very difficult when you have to feel guilty for the faults of others"[193] and argued that Lithuania should rather look forward.[194] Thus I would argue that, finally, an open conflict, between the former communists and the native opposition, that could have damaged political communication so much needed for the democratic consolidation, was avoided only through the mediation of the liberal members of the diaspora.

[193] Gediminas Ilgūnas, *Apsisprendimo genezė*, [Genesis of the Decision], (Vilnius: Vaga, 2004), pp. 33.
[194] Ibid, pp. 14.

2.4.2 Style of Communication and Behavior: A New Possibility for Dialogue

The liberal members of the diaspora chose a more universalistic and idealistic approach during the presidential campaigns, giving priority to normative issues, such as a democratic culture and human rights. They promoted an idealistic picture of the future mainly through a messianic discourse claiming that "a savior is coming to rescue Lithuania from the Soviet past and the legacies of communism."[195] Lozoraitis expressed the ideas that all Lithuanians have to unite with each other and all politicians have to create a dialogue of peace and reconciliation. Adamkus spoke about the aim to achieve a stable democracy and a need to eliminate the communist culture and to foster tolerance towards the "others".[196]

In the meantime, native Lithuanian resistance had a very nationalistic and patriotic discourse. As Venclova notices, during the first years of independence, under the leadership of the *Sąjūdis*, "the fixation on the Nation with a capital letter intensified the conflict with Poles" and turned Lithuanians into the only ones who suffered during occupation by ignoring other national or ethnic minorities.[197]

Former communists avoided using patriotic or very normative discourse in relation to the communist past. Both, Brazauskas and Paulauskas, during the electoral campaigns used very "technical language." Their whole electoral programs mainly focused on the economic dimension.[198] The leitmotiv of Brazauskas electoral program was "work" leading to "civilized economy" and economic reforms.[199]

Thus the diasporic candidates, such as Lozoraitis and Adamkus, decided to avoid accusatory discourse towards former communists, in contrast to the native Lithuanian

[195] Brigita Balikienė, "Kelionė su kandidatu: artyn Lietuvos," [A Journey with the Candidate: Closer to Lithuania], *Respublika*, January 30, 1993, pp. 6.
[196] Interview with Valdas Adamkus, "Valdas Adamkus: pliusai ir minusai," [A Journey with the Candidate: Closer to Lithuania], *Respublika*, December 19, 1997.
[197] Venclova, 1999, pp. 91.
[198] Algirdas Brazauskas, "Darbas, darna, dora. Kandidato į Lietuvos Respublikos prezidentus Algirdo Brazausko rinkimų programa," [Work, Harmony, Honour. The Electoral Program of Candidate to the Lithuanian President Office], *Respublika*, January 28, 1993, pp. 6.
[199] Ibid.

opposition; the diaspora members not only presented themselves as “independent” from the communist regime but they were also more diplomatic and tactful towards their opponents. Such a behavior and a style of communication actually created a new possibility for political dialogue with the former communists and later contributed to softening the position of the native opposition and of the more radical wing of the diaspora. It was one of the main reasons why a new political culture based on certain consensus could be created.

CHAPTER 3: NARRATIVES OF THE PAST DURING LITHUANIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 1993 AND 1997: STRATEGIES FOR THE NEW FUTURE OF THE PAST

After having presented in the former chapter the dynamics of identity, namely the self-redefinition and localization of different memory groups in the post-communist Lithuania, in this section of my thesis, I will focus on the strategies which created conditions for "new memories" and fostered the emergence of the period of reconciliation in Lithuania. I will analyze how the strategies of political dialogue emerged and how they managed to create the cross-points of communication among the adversary political sides. It will be revealed that the liberal diasporic ideas, a severe economic crisis, and the "common goal" to enter the EU created the conditions for a new political socialization in Lithuania. A new political culture of dialogue started to emerge. In this manner, the opposing sides gradually started to channel their conflict more tactfully. Especially with the mediation and the leadership of the liberal diaspora, whose return could also be seen as one of the reasons why the actors of the communist past were seen from more tolerant position. Political leadership of returned diaspora might serve as well as one of the main reasons, in contrast to other post-communist states, why Lithuania, together with the other two Baltic States, succeeded much earlier to consolidate their democracies.[200]

3.1 Alternative: Towards a Culture of Dialogue and Reconciliation

During the presidential elections of 1993, some Lithuanian politicians of the native opposition, for example Vytenis Andriukaitis, a former member of the *Sąjūdis* and a follower of Landsbergis alienated from Landsbergis because of his strong confrontation with the former communists and started to speak about a new possibility of reconciliation.[201] He stated that the two presidential competitors, Brazauskas and Lozoraitis, could give a hand to each

[200] The idea of diasporic contribution to democratic consolidation originates from Skulte, 2005, pp.12.
[201] Vytenis Andriukaitis (*Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 23, 1992), pp. 16.

other and, similarly as in Spain, should sign a pact for peace where they would promise not to dissolve the Lithuanian Parliament, *Seimas* for the coming 4 years.[202] They argued that the creation of such a pact was the only solution for overcoming the economic crisis in Lithuania.[203]

The idea of reconciliation was also quite often mentioned in the electoral campaigns of the former communists, Brazauskas and Paulauskas. Brazauskas argued that Lithuanian political actors should communicate peacefully because as he stated "there are no people from the future, we all were born and grew up here and lived in the same unjust system."[204] Similarly, Paulauskas, in 1997, argued that he as a President would follow the existing tradition of "a President as a conciliator" and would feel a responsibility to reconcile the conflicting political sides."[205]

However, Lozoraitis was the first one, who wrote an official letter to his opponent Brazauskas, published in the first pages of *Lietuvos Rytas* and *Respublika* on the 10th of February, 1993. In this letter, he made an appeal to the Lithuanian political parties and suggested making a grand coalition and also offered to Brazauskas to be the Lithuanian Prime Minister.[206] Brazauskas, the following day, responded with another official letter, also issued in the two earlier mentioned newspapers, and greeted this initiative.[207] Brazauskas has also stated that he has been always seeking for a political peace.[208] However, he argued that he still could not accept Lozoraitis suggestion to serve as the Prime Minister because the presidential

[202] Ibid.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Kęstutis Jauniškis, "A.Brazauskas nuo partijos vairo persėda ant Prezidento žirgo," [A.Brazauskas Changes the Leadership in Party to the Presidential Horse], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 33, February 20, 1993, pp.2.
[205] Arvydas Juozaitis, "Iki šviesos – tik dvi dienos," [Only Two Days Left Till the Light], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 297, December 19, 1997, pp. 7.
[206] Stasys Lozoraitis, "Politinės santarvės paktas," [The Pact of Political Reconciliation], *Respublika*, No. 26 (904), February 10, 1993, pp. 1.
[207] Algirdas Brazauskas, "Gerbiamas pone, Stasy Lozoraiti, [Dear Mr. Stasys Lozoraitis], *Respublika*, No. 27 (905), February 11, 1993, pp.1.
[208]Ibid..

elections were still not over.[209] Nevertheless, this letter was seen as the first initiative from the side of the political opponents to create a peaceful political dialogue with the former communists. Because, in March of 1990, when Lithuanian independence was proclaimed in 1990, Landsbergis not only refused to shake hands with Brazauskas, which was seen as "a historical mistake" but also chose the path of confrontation.[210]

It is not a coincidence that the culture of a political dialogue was suggested by the diaspora member Lozoraitis and not by the native Lithuanian opposition. As already mentioned, Lozoraitis was from the liberal stream of the diaspora, foundations of which the last decades were laid by famous Lithuanian dissident Venclova, who was expatriated from the USSR and lived in the US. Together with Lozoraitis and Adamkus, he belonged to the intellectual group *Santara-Šviesa*.[211] Leonidas Donskis argues that Venclova can be seen "as the most influential social and cultural critic in the twentieth-century Lithuania" who criticized a "conservative nationalism"[212] and shaped the discourse of the liberal diaspora. It is important to mention that Venclova "has always been alienated from mainstream Lithuanian culture and from the Lithuanian intelligentsia"[213] and is defined by Donskis as "a citizen of the world" and as one of "the cosmopolitan exiles,"[214] like Lozoraitis or Adamkus.

Thus Lozoraitis and Adamkus came from the diasporic environment, which both, criticized Lithuanian conservative nationalism and promoted the "politics of dialogue."[215] Therefore, the members of this diasporic group were seen as "the second voice of Lithuanian politics and culture."[216] This "voice" became heard in Lithuania during the presidential

[209] Ibid.
[210]Bronius Genzelis, *Sąjūdis : priešistorė ir istorija*, [*Sąjūdis*: Prehistory and History], (Vilnius: Pradai, 1999), pp. 10.
[211]Leonidas Donskis, *Loyalty, dissent, and betrayal: modern Lithuania and East-Central European moral imagination*,(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), pp. 50.
[212]Ibid, pp. 47.
[213]Ibid, pp. 53.
[214]Ibid.
[215]Ibid, pp. 47.
[216]Ibid, pp. 33.

elections; firstly, these ideas were spread by Lozoraitis, and later by Valdas Adamkus. This liberal culture of "politics of dialogue" was one of the main reasons why the period of confrontation was followed by a period of reconciliation in the post-independence Lithuania.

3.2 Economic Argument: Economic Development as a Forward-Looking Strategy

In order to deal with the past peacefully, one may apply not only the strategy of the "politics of dialogue" between the adversarial memory groups, but also to convince people for the need to reconcile in order to solve economic stagnation and to move towards financially secure future. This pragmatic economic argument, differently than the impetus for the creation of a political dialogue, is more directly oriented towards "forgetting" the past and moving forward. In this case, one should "forget the past" and let the main actors of the past to re-enter the political scene with a "new moral face" and an ability to solve all the economic problems.

This was the main strategy used by the Lithuanian former communists, who argued to "close the books" and to look towards the future. Brazauskas in his electoral program mostly focused on the economic problems and argued that he as a President would improve Lithuanian economic situation.[217] He claimed: "we are not going to come back to the past" but "follow the way with fewer mistakes."[218] He presented himself as a successful state manager who was developing Lithuanian economy during the communist regime.[219] Such a discourse was strengthened by the good records of the Lithuanian economy during the Soviet years. As Vardys and Sedaitis, in their book, notice, in 1989, it was indicated that in "Lithuania enterprises paid even 2 percent higher wages than the Soviet average, after

[217] Algirdas Brazauskas, (*Respublika*, January 28, 1993), pp.6.
[218] Ibid.
[219] Gediminas Ilgūnas, 2004, pp. 12.

Estonia, Latvia and Russia."[220] Therefore, the Lithuanian economy during the Soviet regime is quite often labeled as one of "prosperity."[221]

The success of this economic strategy enabled former communists to enter not only the Parliament, in 1992, but also to win the Presidential Office, in 1993. It might be explained by the fact that after the independence an "economic liberalization produced hyper inflation and excessive hardships."[222] Therefore, during the elections "the theme of anti-communism" so strongly used by the native Lithuanian opposition remained in the background and the "suffering from inflation, unemployment and severe declines in living standards" came to the forefront.[223] The economic hardships were also one of the main reasons why Brazauskas has developed "more conciliatory approach to Moscow",[224] which had only two years before, on the 13th of January in 1991, organized a "bloody" *coup d'etat* in order to restore the Soviet rule.[225]

Thus it might be argued that people "forgave" the former leaders of the Communist Party because they were the hostages of the severe economic crisis. In this case, economic crisis and hardships have also played a significant role in developing a new political culture, marked by the re-entrance of the former communists in to the Lithuanian politics and people's belief in the birth of a "new *homus postsovieticus*."[226]

3.3 Historical Argument: Narrative of Returning to the West as a Strategy for Overcoming Divisions

After Lithuanian independence, one of the key goals of the Lithuanian foreign policy was membership in the EU. It was achieved in 2004 when Lithuania became a full member of

[220] Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, pp. 68.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Lane, 2001, pp. 141.
[223] Ibid.
[224] Ibid, pp. 142.
[225] Ibid, pp. 122.
[226] Algimantas Mankus, "Karališkiai," [*Karališkiai*], *Šiaurės Atėnai*," 2005, at: http://www.culture.lt/satenai/?leid_id=768&kas=straipsnis&st_id=4375, (accessed May 22, 2010).

the EU. As Inga Pavlovaite argues, "European integration was largely presented as a return to the natural place of belonging, a family of European states" and it was used as a way to distance from the "other", namely the Lithuania's communist past and Russia.[227] Moreover, Laurinavičius claims that with its membership in the EU, Lithuania integrated itself into the West democratic world and into a "common political, economic and cultural space."[228] Therefore, as states Pavlovaite "Europe is constructed as a way to get rid of the communist past; it stands for progress, the future, prosperity and security."[229]

In the elections of 1993, Brazauskas in his electoral program declared not only the necessity to deal in a "friendly" way with Russia but also expressed the imperative to join the European Community.[230] [231] According to him, the most important goal of Lithuania "was to balance its foreign policy between the East and the West" and it was "vital to join the European Community as fast as possible." [232] Similarly, the so-called neo-communist Artūras Paulaukas, during presidential elections in 1997, also declared that Lithuania "has to become a full-fledged European state" and the European Union membership was seen as "a door to come back to Europe."[233] Thus the expression of such political goals by the former communists which merged with the ideas of the native opposition and the diasporic candidates, created a space for communication and the opponents overcame divisions on the Lithuanian foreign policy issues.

Therefore, I would agree with the idea expressed by Pavlovaite and would also argue that the narrative of returning to the West might also be seen as a certain strategy, which

[227]Inga Pavlovaite , "Paradise Regained: The Conceptualization of Europe in the Lithuanian Debate", in Marko Lehti and David J. Smith (ed.), *Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences, (*London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 199–218.
[228]Č.Laurinavičius," New Vision of Lithuania's Foreign Policy," *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2006, pp.1.
[229]Pavlovaite, 2003.
[230]Today the European Union.
[231]Algirdas Brazauskas, (*Respublika*, January 28, 1993), pp. 6.
[232]Ibid.
[233]Artūras Paulauskas, "Artūras Paulauskas. Nusipelnėme gyventi geriau," [Arturas Paulauskas. We Deserve to Live Better], *Lietuvos Rytas*, No.274, November 22, 1997, pp. 7.

expresses historical continuity, and is aimed at forgetting the past, namely, the years of the Soviet occupation and belonging to the East. Membership of the European Union, even if it was not constructed exactly for this aim, did function as an arena for agreement among almost all Lithuanian politicians. It served as one of the tools of reconciliation between the former communists and their opponents. In this manner, with their commitment to the "European mission," former communists managed to prove their "new face" and their contribution to the westward-oriented foreign policy.

3.4 The Cross-Points of Communication on Dealing with the Communist Past: Gradual Development of a New Political Culture

Political culture could be defined as "the pattern of beliefs and assumptions ordinary people have towards the world, as these pertain to politics."[234] As Kamrava notices, political culture may play an important role "in such processes as state-building, political development or democratization."[235] This is similar to Larry Diamond, "who sees it as one of the primary elements in transitions to democracy."[236] Therefore, it is often argued that political culture is an important element of state's political system because "political culture plays an indispensable role in determining the overall shape and contours of that interaction between state and society."[237]

One of the key elements of the political culture is a way in which a certain country deals with its past. In order to develop a peaceful political environment a state and its actors should not only focus on punishing or condemning the perpetrators or "moral" criminals,[238] namely, on criminal justice, but also should include the dimension of reconciliation between

[234]Stephen Fischer, "Political Culture and Social Capital," Lecture notes from Political Sociology, University of Oxford, at: http://malroy.econ.ox.ac.uk/fisher/polsoc/PoliticalCultureLecture.pdf, (accessed May 17, 2010).
[235]Mehran Kamrava, "Political Culture and a New Definition of the Third World," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 16, Issue No. 4, 1995, pp.694.
[236]Ibid.
[237]Ibid.
[238]Referring to the leaders of the communist parties, who belonged but did not give any direct orders.

the two opposing sides. Naturally, to balance between these two options is an extremely challenging process.

As it has been demonstrated in this thesis, Lithuania during its transitional period has chosen the path of inclusion of the former actors, namely the communists, in their political system. Despite the short period of confrontation between the Lithuanian native opposition and the former communists, it was realized that a constant fight over the past is one the main hurdles in overcoming economic crisis and consolidating democracy. The "politics of dialogue" has offered a new future for the Lithuanian past and a new way to channel political conflicts.

In this chapter, it was possible to observe three main conditions, which might be also seen as certain strategies that allowed the development of a new political culture in Lithuania. Firstly, the conditions for communication were created by the diasporic returnees with the liberal views. Skulte, in her dissertation, which concentrates on the political leadership of the returned diaspora in Latvia and Lithuania, also notices that the political socialization of the diaspora members could have re-socialized the communist political elite.[239] I would argue that it has re-socialized not only the communist elite but also the Lithuanian native opposition and some conservative members of the Lithuanian diaspora. The significant role of the returned diaspora was also confirmed by her interviewees, Lopata, Jankauskas, and Lukosaitis, who are experts in Lithuanian politics; they argued that the political leadership of the diaspora members, and I would add their stance towards the past and tolerant behavior with the former leading actors, "has been good for democratic consolidation and overall stability in the region."[240]

The second strategy to escape the confrontation over the past, was to emphasize the need to eliminate economic hardships. However, one has to observe that this strategy was

[239]Skulte, 2005, pp. 180.
[240]Ibid.

one-sided and mainly used by the former communists. Indeed, from one hand, economic policies became a new battlefield among political actors; still, on the other hand, many voters, especially poor people or coming from the rural places,[241] who were disappointed with ruling party, led by Vytautas Landsbergis, started again to trust the former communist elite. The electoral victories of the former communists were the most visible signs of people's "forgiveness" and of emergence of a new hope. In this manner, inevitably, it did contribute to the development of a more conciliatory approach of the native opposition, who had to acknowledge people's will and to accept the loss of the nationalistic and anti-communist discourse. It became clear that the national opposition would have to communicate with the former regime.

The third condition of the development of a new political culture and communication was the entrance into the European Union. I would argue that the support of former communists not only for closer relations with Russia but also their interest in "returning to Europe" was one of the main cross-points and "common tasks" of all Lithuanian politicians. The new goals of foreign policy created a space for a mutual communication and common work. Thus I would argue that a new Lithuanian political culture, aimed at reconciliation and democratic consolidation, was gradually developed and influenced by the economic hardships, the entrance to the European Union, and mostly by the liberal ideas of the returned exiles. I would agree with Skulte, who comes to the similar conclusions, and claims that "the phenomenon of the diaspora members returning to participate in the politics of Latvia and Lithuania may help to explain (in part) the success of democratic consolidation in the Baltic States vis-à-vis some other post-communist States."[242]

[241]Lane, 2001, pp.141.

[242] Skulte, 2005, pp.12.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has shown that the conciliatory dealing with the communist past and the inclusion and success of the former communists in the post-independence Lithuania should not be solely seen as the lapse of societal memory, as many Lithuanian social scientists have claimed, but rather as an impetus for the development of a new political culture of dialogue and tolerance. This study has broadened the research on the Lithuanian communist past and suggested analyzing not only the behavior and the redefinition of identity of the former communists. It was revealed that in order to understand this apologetic dealing with the communist past, one has to investigate also other memory groups, namely the Lithuanian native opposition and the diaspora. Since these groups of actors were also active not only in Soviet Lithuania but also during its transitional period. It was shown that the Lithuanian approach to its past and its memories were not constructed in a vacuum or by one group of actors but through a political communication which was developed during the Lithuanian presidential elections in 1993 and 1997, in which not only the Lithuanian native opposition, the former communists were present but also the diaspora candidates.

I suggested that this period, from 1993 to 1997, should be defined as the period of reconciliation in transitional Lithuania. In this manner, I have extended the division of the Lithuanian transitional period, which before was divided only into two stages, namely the period of consensus and the period of confrontation. It was also revealed that the period of reconciliation was marked by a positive "historical amnesia" which was aimed not at forgetting the past but rather at consolidating democracy and moving forwards.

As the narratives of the candidates during Lithuanian presidential elections demonstrated almost all groups of actors, in order to find a place in the post-communist Lithuania, had to redefine their identities and mollify their stances towards their opponents. The dynamics of identity in the post-communist Lithuania was observed. Firstly, the

conservative members of the diaspora became more liberal because a nationalistic discourse proved to be unsuccessful and refuted by the voters in the presidential elections. Secondly, former communists in order to be accepted in the post-independence Lithuania came over the accusations of their past activities during the communist regime presented themselves as part of the "common suffering" of the Lithuanian society. Thus, the discourse of "victims" of the communist regime and of "silent" resistants emerged. Thirdly, the Lithuanian native opposition redefined their stance towards the former communists, as people lost confidence in their accusatory discourse and lack of tolerance; during both presidential elections the Lithuanian native opposition was defeated by the former communists and the diaspora candidates.

One of the most important observations of this thesis is the acknowledgement of the intermediary role of the diaspora and its influence on the democratic consolidation in Lithuania and its contribution to transitional justice process, namely Lithuanian way of dealing with its communist past. It was observed that next to possible catalysts for a politics of dialogue, such as the economic hardships and the integration into the EU, the Lithuanian diaspora turned to be one the most important elements of unification after independence. Their liberal stance towards the past and the Lithuanian nation itself, gave the possibility to launch a dialogue among different Lithuanian politicians.

All of these factors, revealed in my thesis, show why Lithuania could consolidate its democracy easier than many other post-communist states. Lithuania did not exclude the former communists from its political arena and avoided the politics of confrontation. It was demonstrated that such a conciliatory dealing with the past did not delete memories but rather localized them in the post-communist Lithuanian society in such a manner that a political dialogue could be developed. Due to the limitations of this thesis, I could not study the role of ethnic minorities, such as the Lithuanian Russians or Lithuanian Poles, and their role in the

transitional justice process in Lithuania. It might be predicted that they have also contributed to building a consensus in the post-communist Lithuania. Therefore, future scholars while analyzing Lithuanian transitional period and its dealing with the communist past, which I have argued also reflects the nature of the Lithuanian political culture, could develop the diasporic approach to this issue, meaning not only the analysis of the role of the returned Lithuanian diaspora but also the diaspora of other ethnicities residing in Lithuania. Because the development of Lithuanian politics, society, and the construction of its past memories, as it was shown, is highly a transnational phenomenon. Therefore, I would argue that in general while studying and comparing democratic consolidation and the political culture in the post-communist states, one should also consider this feature of the nation.

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APPENDIX NO.1: RESULTS OF THE LITHUANIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 1993 AND 1997

Table 1. Results of the Lithuanian Presidential Elections in 1993[1]

		%
Electorate	2,102,420	76.8[2]
Votes[3]		
Algirdas Brazauskas	1,211,070	60.1 (voting from abroad: 15.2)
Stasys Lozoraitis	767,437	38.1 (voting from abroad: 83.1)

Source: The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, http://www.vrk.lt/lt/pirmas-puslapis/ankstesni-rinkimai/rinkimai-pagal-rusi.html, (accessed May 25, 2010).

1. At the end of electoral campaign remained only two candidates because others decided to withdraw from the elections (in order to strengthen the electoral support for one of the two candidates, for example the diaspora member Kazys Bobelis declared his support for Brazauskas).
2. % from those citizens who had the right to vote.
3. Including invalid votes.

Table 2. Results of Lithuanian Presidential Elections in 1997

	1st round (December 24, 1997)	%	2nd round (January 4, 1998)	%
Electorate	1,852,468	71.45	1,921,806	73.66
Votes				
Valdas Adamkus	516,798	27.56	**968,031**	**49.96** (voting from abroad: 75.52)
Artūras Paulauskas	838,819	44.73	**953,775**	**49.22** (voting from abroad: 24.48)
Vytautas Landsbergis	294,881	15.73		
Vytenis Andriukaitis	105,916	5.65		
Kazys Bobelis	73,287	3.91		
Rolandas Pavilionis	16,070	0.86		
Kazys Bobelis	6,697	0.36		

APPENDIX NO.2: THE ELECTORAL POSTER OF VALDAS ADAMKUS IN THE LITHUANIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1998 (2ND ROUND)



Source: *Lietuvos Rytas*, No. 305, December 31, 1997, pp. 11.

Translations:

Catchwords of the Electoral Poster:

"Kartu – Lietuvos žmonių gerovei" - [Together for the Welfare of the Lithuanian People]

"Kviečiame sausio 4-ąją balsuoti už Valdą Adamkų" - [We Invite You on the 4th of January to Vote for Valdas Adamkus]

Personalities:

In the forefront: Valdas Adamkus, above on the left: Vytenis Andriukaitis, above on the right: Vytautas Landsbergis, in the middle: Kazys Bobelis, down on the right: Antanas Smetona (the grandchild of the first Lithuanian President, Antanas Smetona (April 1919 – June 1920)

Supporting words:

Vytenis Andriukaitis: "In his search for a peace, Adamkus is not dependent on any political forces."

Vytautas Landsbergis: "To those who asked for whom to vote, I answered, it is necessary to vote for Adamkus."

Kazys Bobelis: "Only democratic changes and peace will bring a better future."

Antanas Smetona: "We all are waiting for good changes, order, and justice. It is important to vote for Valdas Adamkus."