UKRAINE OR MALORUSSIA? THE SOCIETY OF UKRAINIAN PROGRESSIVES AND THE KIEV CLUB OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS (1908-1914)

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Abstract

This thesis deals with the interaction between Russian and Ukrainian nationalists in Kiev during 1908-1914. Two rivaling groups, The Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists and the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, shaped their national projects in the process of debate, which took place on the pages of their press and other printed editions. The political, social and cultural agendas of these groups are discussed at length in a comparative manner. The ways in which they were formed and delivered to the public are intended to show the strategies of national activists at state and regional levels. The work challenges a tradition of viewing the nationality policy of Late imperial Russia as uniformly repressive, approaching its social processes in terms of disintegration, and depicting it as a history of separate ethnic communities.
Acknowledgements

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Introduction

Although there is a considerable amount of literature on Ukrainian and Russian nationalism in Kiev in the period between 1905 and 1914, the relation between these two movements is investigated quite poorly. Partly, this is because historians of late imperial Kiev tend to see it as a conglomerate of separate sub-communities: “Polish Kiev”, “Ukrainian Kiev,” “Russian Kiev,” and “Jewish Kiev”. This approach in due time offered some understanding of the inner logic of national movements development, their social preconditions and cultural spheres. However, it overshadows a number of real motivations that guided nationalist activists and the attempts that they used to mobilize populations. First, this approach tends to ignore interaction between the national groups. This may lead to misinterpretation of intentions of different actors: what may have had multiple purposes can appear as having only a single objective. The tendency to concentrate on a single actor also may be caused by biases related to the present day political views of the historian. Second, this approach may result in underestimating the role of local politics in creating new ideologies and practices. In this case the ultimate success of each national program is seen

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not as a victory in resolving quotidian local conflicts and establishing power over the community, but as a sequence of inborn, essential qualities of the group. Third, the history of the community is often depicted as the constant struggle with the ephemeral imperial order. A series of recent studies have challenged the assumption that nationality policy in late imperial Russia was uniformly repressive—or even consistent. Nevertheless, the question of political agency and the character of interplay of different actors remains open. Fourth, the history of separate ethnical communities denigrates the gradual character of nation formation. Apparently, it ignores transient states in this process. It should be noted that national identities are complex and vital, and the interaction between different nationalist groups plays an important role in forging national projects.

In this research I will endeavor to show that the Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms in Kiev in the period of 1908-1914 cannot be comprehended separately, as discrete political forces. It is of a crucial importance to acknowledge that both of these nationalisms had mutually exclusive objectives, and appealed to the same target group: Ukrainians/Malorussians/Russians of the Southwestern region of Russian Empire. This fact implies that the two national projects were developed in the circumstances of competition, which was marked both by contest and imitation. The debate which took place between

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Russian and Ukrainian nationalists on the pages of their press and other printed editions shaped their agendas and, apparently, attracted support among Southwest population.

The Revolution of 1905 in Russian empire briefly consolidated workers, professionals and intellectuals into the movement that undermined the authority of the autocratic system, demanded political rights and the convocation of imperial parliament (Duma). By the same token, the alleviation of legal restrictions opened new vistas for national movements. Among the most important achievements that Ukrainian nationalists gained after the Revolution of 1905 were factions in the first and second Dumas, the work of cultural and education societies of “Prosvita”, and a number of periodicals including one daily newspaper. All this gave an opportunity to disseminate Ukrainian national ideas not only among limited elite groups, but also within broader groups of population. However, the so-called Liberationist movement in Kiev was dwarfed by right-wing movements, which subsequently contributed to the image of Kiev as the center of Russian nationalism. Starting from 1908 Ukrainian nationalists met with a number of obstacles coming from the elitist right-wing Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists (KKRN). It was an organization that supported the national politics of Russian prime-minister Petr Stolypin. Although anti-Semitism was its most striking defining characteristic, since the Jews occupied the top position in the hierarchy of their enemies, the members of the club made large efforts to combat the spread of Polish and Ukrainian national ideas. Claiming that the Ukrainian nation is a product of “Polish intrigue,” KKRN dismissed all the cultural and political ambitions of its leaders as separatist. KKRN more or less successfully impeded the promotion of major Ukrainian undertakings, such as the project of the Ukrainian language as a medium of instruction in primary schools, the project of building monument to national poet Taras Shevchenko, the
proliferation of “Prosvita” networks, etc. This gave an opportunity for Ukrainian nationalists to accuse KKRN of being an agent of the reactionary, authoritarian regime of Russian Empire, and thus, posit themselves as political reformists.

Both groups widely used the press for propagating their ideas. The daily monarchist newspaper Kievliain had long experience in distribution, a well-established audience and a strong political and economic position in the society. On the contrary, the first daily Ukrainian newspaper Rada still had to gain its position, authors, and readers. The Ukrainian press, being heavily censored, used this fact to assert its significance. By investigation of the debate in these newspapers I try to inquire into a dialectical and dynamic development of Ukrainian and Russian nationalist movements, which was often a matter of contest and imitation rather than simple confrontation. Using this approach I try to challenge the tendency to write the political history of Late Russian Empire as a narrative of class and ethnic disintegration.

Aiming at political support and mass-mobilization, both groups appealed to a wide range of political, social, agrarian, cultural and aesthetic issues. The story of interaction between Ukrainian and Russian nationalists in Kiev is a story of attribution to the protagonist and antagonist groups a cluster of markers. These markers entered later stages of national debate anonymously and are palpable even in the present-day politics. The result of this was, naturally, segregation of a society along ethnic lines. It may be assumed, that the recipients tended to remain untouched by imposed political agendas. The language of national movements, often abstruse and malicious, was often perceived as alien and external.
The time frame of my research is 1908-1914. In 1908 the two political groups, which I investigate, emerged. In 1914, when World War I began, these groups went through many changes, and their interaction nearly ceased.

The use of the terms “Ukrainian,” “Malorussian,” and “Russian” needs to be clarified. The meaning and interpretation of these terms was a bone of contention between the Russian and Ukrainian nationalists, thus it is important to see who used these terms and in which situations. In my paper I will also use these terms depending on whom I talk about. This means that to reveal the position of Ukrainian nationalists I will follow their discourse and use the term “Ukraine”, and I will use the term “Malorussia” or “Russia” when discussing the position of Russian nationalists. This brings a certain vagueness and relativity into the text, however, it helps reveal better the views of both groups. In the cases where the term can be used by both groups, I will put both terms with a slash.

Similarly, I will use transliteration of the names and titles. Russian nationalists’ names would be translated according to Russian spelling, and Ukrainian nationalists’ – according to Ukrainian. The names and titles of historical figures and places will be transliterated according to Ukrainian spelling for practical reasons. The word “Kiev” will be used only in the name “Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists.” But when talking about the city the Ukrainian transliteration “Kyiv” is used.
Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework and Literature Overview

A single, universal theory of nationalism is impossible since our understanding of it is often based on certain historical combinations, which may have considerable alterations when applied to other cases. For the purpose of this work I will discuss only the most well-known theories of nationalism, highlight some of their most important elements, and state how they can be applied to this research.

The thinking of a majority of scholars of nationalism had been influenced by seminal works of Miroslav Hroch, benedict Anderson, and Ernst Gellner. All of these scholars placed nationalism within transition from traditional society to the modern. Miroslav Hroch in his book *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* elaborated a periodization of the national work of the intelligentsia in Central and Eastern Europe. It consists of three stages: “A,” – a period of scholarly interest, “B,” – the period of patriotic agitation, “C,” – the rise of a mass national movement. Although this scheme was criticized for the vague border between the first and the second stage, I will assume in this paper that the Ukrainian intelligentsia entered the second stage in the immediate aftermath of 1905 revolution.

Ernest Gellner’s argument is that nationalism is called to fulfill the need of industrial society

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5 Roman Shporliuk, “Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State,” *Daedalus* 126, #3 (1997): 85-119
6 This means that according to Hrochian scheme Ukrainian movement belongs to a “disintegrated” type. (However, only if we consider the Revolution of 1905 to play the role of a Bourgeois Revolution).
in a common codified culture, which was to be politically protected. Nationalism “is a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.”

Gellner’s emphasis on the centrally sponsored education in sustaining a codified standardized culture, which serves homogenization of the society, is of particular importance. As it will be shown in subsequent chapters, the main battlefield between Ukrainian and Russian nationalists took place over the control of educational recourses.

Benedict Anderson argues that before a nation becomes a political community it has to be imagined. This process could not take place without some cultural transformations which altered understanding of power and of religious elements of cultural identity. However, the idea that national identities were constructed almost freely, in the process of nearly unrestrained imagination was challenged by a number of scholars, who attempted to show that there were limits to this imagination and that the building blocks were already there before the mobilization of nationalism began.

In this study I will take a middle position between these approaches, and try to show how did both Russian and Ukrainian nationalists imagined their projects, and how the local context, including a struggle between the two, set limitations and directed the process of imagining community.

In this regard the “situational approach,” elaborated by Alexei Miller, stipulates that an analysis of the interaction between different political actors is necessary for proper

understanding of the nationalizing processes in the imperial peripheries. This approach implies, that “the focus shifts from the actors as such to the process of their interaction and to unveiling the logic, including the subjective logic, of their own behavior and the reactions to the contexts and activities of other actors.”¹⁰ As Miller suggests, all actors in the course of their activity were divided into several factions, which is important for this research since both Ukrainian and Russian Nationalists’ ultimate success depended on the combination of political forces at both on the local and imperial level.

Political modernization will be put in the context of local social and economic agendas, through examination of long-standing problems management, and through depicting processes of both integration and disintegration. In this we will take into account substantial criticism on the misleading usage of the term “identity,” which presupposes internal sameness, distinctiveness and a long-lasting self-understanding elaborated recently by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper. Instead of using simply term “identity” they recommend a more cautious choice of terms. Notions like “identification and categorization,” “self-understanding and social location,” “groupness, commonality and connectedness” are helpful in ascribing different roles that each group or individual played in a complex systems of identity formation.¹¹

The most elaborate work which deals with the Ukrainian-Russian encounter in the period of the Late Romanov Empire is the dissertation published in 1991 by a Canadian scholar of Ukrainian origin Olga Andriewsky, entitles *The Politics of National Identity: The*

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Ukrainian Question in Russia, 1904-12.\textsuperscript{12} This work is important for it observes with a minute detail the history of Ukrainian national movement, and also it comprises some very important facts about how Ukrainian nationalists treated other Russian political forces. Particularly this research is important for its encounter of the relationship between Ukrainian nationalists and the right faction of Russian liberals. However, two points of criticism should be expressed about this work. Firstly, Olga Andriewsky works within the tradition of national historiography, and thus presupposes that the Southwest was populated by Ukrainians, even though they could not regard themselves as such. Secondly, the relationship between the Society of Ukrainian Progressives and the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists is focused on the administrative restrictions, which were imposed on the former from the initiative of the latter. In this work I will try to show that these relations were not limited to this, on the contrary was a much more convoluted process of imagining Ukrainian and Russian community.

A number of burning issues was evoked in a recent dissertation by US scholar Faith C. Hillis “Between Empire and Nation: Urban Politics, Community, and Violence in Kiev, 1863-1907”. In the process of rapid urbanization and industrialization of Kiev in 1860-1870s a diverse capitalist elite, disproportionally consisting of Jewish entrepreneurs, was established in a city’s life. This group set an inclusive tone in the upper ranks of society, characterized by indifference to ethnic and social distinctions. In 1880s a coterie of non-Jewish ideologically extreme intellectuals developed a political program targeting plutocracy, which on the practical level provoked Jew-baiting. In the lead-up to the 1905

revolution the authority’s capacity to maintain order began to collapse, which subsequently fueled the emergence of right-wing mass-movements. Some methodological insights of this work deserve special attention. The dissertation challenges a tendency to depict national and political history of the Late Russian Empire as a narrative of class and ethnic disintegration. Instead, it focuses on forging new relationships between intellectuals and working class, as well as between Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish activists. Another important point is that the Jewish question is regarded as a sort of filter through which political issues, common for the majority imperial cities, came down to Kiev. Moreover, “the ultimate success of nationalists was due not to the superior logic of the ideas that they peddled, but rather to their ability to connect their agendas to quotidian and highly localized political issues” – claims the author. As regards this statement, it holds true only for the Russian nationalists in the period after 1905. Indeed, this group vindicated the necessity of repressive measures towards liberals by setting forth the idea of sustainable urban and social development promoted by state and local authorities. Members of the Ukrainian national movement, even though being represented in state and local authorities, preferred not to meddle with

13 Ibid, 4.
14 Although the Jewish Question is left behind the scope of present research, it is worth to mention an article by Natan Meir Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians in Kiev: Intergroup Relations in Late Imperial Associational Life” It touches upon the problem of the ambiguous status of Jewry in civic society of Kiev in the period after 1905. The author claims, that on the level of middle ground between state and individual, e.g. voluntary sector (associations, societies, clubs, and charities), Jews found an outlet for political energies and interacted with other ethnicities in a relatively peaceful manner. However, a number of cases illustrate the potential of major political forces and events to disintegrate social life along national lines. The bright example of ethnic segregation is a case the Kiev Branch of the Russian Society for the Protection of Women which established a special division for the Jewish women and girls in 1914. The Jewish chapter was initiated by outside activists and was implemented in contempt of generally benevolent attitude of its leaders (among which there was a number of Jewish teachers) to all nationalities within the group. This article provides a very sensitive account of the quotidian character of ethnic interaction and subsistence of external political factors. No doubt, the groups I will examine in this paper belong to the kind of political forces that ultimately aim at national segregation.
15 Ibid, 25
16 Ibid, 30
quotidian issues and attacked the existing state of things on a more abstract level.

As regards the KKRN and the TUP, these groups attracted little scholarly attention in spite of their pivotal role in Russian and Ukrainian national movements. After 68 members of KKRN were assassinated by Bolsheviks in 1919, the organization was condemned to oblivion for more than half a century. In 1980 Robert Edelman published a pioneering book, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of Russian Revolution*, which touched upon the activity of this group in the State Duma. According to his view, the Russian Nationalist party’s social base was Russian gentry from the western borderlands. The landed nobility’s economic and political domination had been challenged long before 1905 by a variety of modernizing forces. Because the state would no longer defend and support them at all times, land-owning aristocrats had to organize politically. Subsequently, Edelman discusses in his book ways in which the Nationalist Party lobbied their economic interests and defended their socially privileged status in the Duma and the Government. However, it would be a mistake to treat this organization as a purely conservative force obliged to comply with modern change, firstly, because the party included not only landowners, but also a lot of nouveau-riche, shabby-genteel aristocracy, and educated professionals. Secondly, the urban aspect of their activity prevailed over rural interests which signifies a broader range of current issues than mere protection of agricultural interests and high-status in social hierarchy. Thirdly, and of a major importance in this investigation, the Ukrainian and Polish questions, which were major concern of KCRN, were also left behind the scope of the
On the recent rise of interest in imperial right-wing parties Russian scholar Daniil Kotsiubinsky published a book dedicated to the ideological aspect of KKRN, *Russkiy natsionalizm v nachale XX stoletiya: Rozhdenie I gibel’ ideologii Vserosiyskogo natsionalnogo soyuza* (Russian Nationalism at The Beginning of XX cent. The Birth and Collapse of The Ideology of Russian National League). So far this is the most profound research of the ideological background of Russian nationalism in 1907-1917. Giving an ample overview of the political texts produced by leaders of KKRN and their allies in the All-Russian National Union, the author concludes that Russian nationalists failed to produce a uniform and coherent doctrine, which could compete with other ideological stances like monarchism, liberalism or socialism. Their political unity was founded on the charisma of their leader Petr Stolypin, but soon after his assassination in 1911 Russian nationalists disintegrated and different factions came under the influence of other political forces to the right and to the left. The thing which the author failed to emphasize, but which is implicitly imbedded in his text, is that these ambiguities and contradictions in the agenda of Russian nationalists often can be characterized as those “between tradition and modernity.” Russian nationalists in Kiev by the same token were inspired by Western traditions and political culture, and wanted to be intrinsically Russian, with their own historic path.

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It is important to mention a book by French historian Daniel Beauvois. *La bataille de la terre en Ukraine, 1863-1914: Les Polonais et les conflits socio-ethniques*, even though it doesn’t touch upon the issue of Ukrainian-Russian relationships. It provides a broad overview of imperial policy, which after the Polish uprising in 1963 aimed at eliminating the Polish nobility from the Western borderlands. The projects included restriction on real estate purchase and sale for Poles and allowances for Russian nobility. The enterprise had, however, limited assimilatory success. The Polish nobility found numerous ways to circumvent the laws which often fueled bureaucratic corruption; the Russian newcomers appeared to be weak economic executives and agents of Russification. Nevertheless, half century struggle over the land had a serious impact on the destiny of the peasantry, which was envisaged by imperial government as a category to be pulled to the Great Russianness. This, in its turn, generated in the Russian press another round of imagining the Pole as alien and hostile. The book is particularly valuable for this research as it reveals a wide range of connotations used by Russian nationalists in claiming Ukrainian nationalism as a product of Polish intrigue. It should be also mentioned that it is KKRN and Petr Stolypin that triggered in 1909 introduction of *zemstvo* in the Western borderlands with a highly protectionist policy towards Russian gentry in Western borderlands. The anti-Polish activity of KKRN can be seen, therefore, as a final stage of the struggle for land.

A book by Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czeches and Germans: a Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948*[^19] presents an interesting parallel case. The author depicts a story of how Budweis/Budejovice society was disintegrated into two rivaling national

groups – Czech and German. Both Budweis and Malorussia were bilingual in 19th cent. with no major conflicts on ethnic basis. The German and Russian languages were dominant in the regions, however Czech and Malorussian were recognized as legitimate for everyday purposes. Czech and Ukrainian national movements were imported and did not appear at the grass-root level. Within a couple of decades (or within a generation) interethnic differences radicalized. This led to a confrontation on a local level (for instance, battles over the language of instruction in primary schools). As a result, both Czech and German nationalisms in Budweis, and Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms in Malorussia/Ukraine triumphed. On one hand, Czech and Ukrainian national demands were satisfied, so that in the consecutive years more people accepted corresponding identities. On the other hand, Nazism found a large support within the German population of Budweis in 1930s; Russian nationalist organizations were grounded predominantly in the Malorussian region (1905-1914).

In spite of the striking similarities of the two cases, there is a number of differences, which are crucial for understanding modern politics and nationalisms in the areas. Whereas Budweis is a relatively small region with population in 19th cent. numbering a couple of dozens of thousands, Malorussia is a vast territory with no clear borders and includes no less than a couple of hundreds of thousands inhabitants. German and Czech are languages belonging to different linguistic groups, so there was no need for national movement leaders to prove the distinctness of their nations and cultures. Malorussian was considered as a dialect of Russian, which provoked Ukrainian national movement leaders to develop literary and scholar Ukrainian language in the direction of accentuating linguistic gap. As a result,
Malorussian perceived printed Ukrainian as alien and imposed artificially; this consequently hampered the proliferation of Ukrainian movement within Malorussians. Budweis/Budějovice remained the names of a province with the only difference that the Czech version Budějovice became dominant as the Czech nationalism won over the German. The name “Malorussia,” however, was superseded by “Ukraine” (under the dome of this term Galicia also found its place). The later term was little used before and signified in early 19th cent. a region on the north-east of Malorussia. It was popularized in romantic poetry.

A few remarks should be made about the set of primary sources which I use in this work. There is some asymmetry with the sources which stem from the Russian and Ukrainian milieu. The Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists functioned legally and openly, thus left for a historian their official yearbooks in which all of their most important documents and discussions were recorded. In contrast, The Society of Ukrainian Progressives left few if any official documents. Knowing this the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists Yevhen Chykalenko wrote a diary in which he discussed everything related to this organization. At the same time he was afraid that the police might confiscate his writing and use it against his colleagues. Therefore, the history of the TUP is implicitly imbedded in the text under the guise of his personal observations. The interpretation of this diary is a serious challenge for a historian, and requires both an elaborated methodological approach and a detailed knowledge of the contemporary situation. So far, for the purposes of my research, I will assume that Chykalenko’s views towards a number of questions were accepted or inspired by the members of the TUP, at least a dominant part of it. It is important to acknowledge
that he financed and managed the only daily newspaper of Ukrainian nationalists, and thus had enough power to impose his views on his community.
Chapter 2. The Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists: Political Framework, Social Composition and Intellectual Foundations

2.1. The Beginnings of the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists

The Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists (KKRN) was founded in 1908 under the auspices of Russian prime-minister Petr Stolypin, and together with a number of other newly emerged Russian nationalist organizations across the Empire served as a basis for his politics. The protection of Russian national interests in all spheres of state livelihood, modernization of industry, agriculture and financial system, confrontation to socialist aspirations and close cooperation of the State Duma with the Government were the key points in Stoplypin’s and his supporters’ program. After I and II State Dumas were dismissed as counterproductive, and the Election Law was changed in June 1907 (which favored landlords and merchants over restraining peasants, workers and petty bourgeoisie), Russian nationalists managed to form the second biggest faction in the Parliament.

In the work of Russian nationalist organizations, which in 1911 consolidated into “The All-Russian National Union,” Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists played a pioneering role. It was a well-organized political force that supplied Petersburg with public leaders, advanced intellectual ideas, and formed the agenda on a number of political and social questions. Also, compared to affiliated organizations, it had a special, local, concern. As stated in the first yearbook of the club, their goal was “to struggle against the pernicious influences of cosmopolitanism and anti-Russian, anti-government, and anti-social teachings,
primarily the struggle against Polish pressure and Ukrainophilism, and finally to unify people who believe in the principles of Russian national statehood. It is of critical importance that Russian nationalism was most active in the region traditionally regarded as Little Russia (or South Russia) – the same region which Ukrainian nationalists claimed had a separate historical tradition and distinct culture and, eventually, to be the domain of the Ukrainian nation.

This intensifying of interethnic conflict was caused by a number of factors. Firstly, the South-Western borderlands of the Russian Empire had for centuries been an ethnically contested area with a large number of Poles and Jews; the struggle against the influence of Polish nobility had been one of the major concerns of the imperial authority. Secondly, the Polish and Ukrainian national movements largely benefitted from the gains of the 1905 revolution, which gave an opportunity for mass agitation through mass-media and public meetings, thus their influence considerably increased in the period of 1905-1907. Thirdly, the deterioration of Russian-Austrian relations, caused by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, reinforced a suspicion that Ukrainian and Polish nationalists would support enemies of the state in case of a further deterioration in the international situation.

2.2. Political framework: Between Black Hundreds and Radical Liberals

The Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists identified their political stance as nationalist,

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conservative and moderately right-wing. Nevertheless, the question of their political agenda remains open and has acquired different interpretations in the research literature. A number of Soviet historians as well as contemporary scholars tend to see KKRN in a close alliance with radical right organizations, usually regarded as Black Hundreds. This position is based on a number of assumptions. As a supra-party organization, KKRN tended to unite “all patriotic elements” of Russia’s South-West, and thus in the roster of its members there was a number of leaders of Black Hundred parties. A list of texts produced by KKRN also display strikingly similar features to the radical right: anti-Semitism, the motto “Russia for Russians,” a deep veneration of the Russian Orthodox Church, etc. Moreover, at the elections to the IV State Duma in 1912 KKRN waged their campaign in cooperation with radical right parties.

However, upon a deeper inquiry into the political texts and political history of KKRN the question becomes far more tenuous. Firstly, the KKRN unlike the Black Hundreds was an elitist rather than a mass-oriented organization, and thus used different political strategies. For example, KKRN never engaged in Jewish pogroms, which sadly became the most striking characteristic of the Black Hundreds. Secondly, while radical right parties declared resentment of western institutions and found their ideal in pre-Petrine Russia, stood for inviolable autocracy and expressed deep dissatisfaction with the constitutional regime, members of KKRN vindicated the modernization of Russia following

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21 See the Soviet historiography chapter in Daniil Kotsiubinsky, *Russkiy natsionalizm v nachale stoletiya: rozdenie i gibel’ ideologii Vserossiyskogo natsionalnogo soiuza* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001)
23 Which is Moscow Tsardom. The Black Hundreds considered this period special, because then Russia was “not contaminated” by western influences. In fact, the name “Black Hundred” derives from the eponymous group, which saved Russia from Polish invasion at the beginning of XVI century.
the western experience, glorified Peter the Great for “opening a window into Europe”, and eagerly accepted the Parliament as a tool to promote their interests. Thirdly, and most importantly, KKRN within the period of 1908-1918 went through many changes, in the course of which reshaped its agenda. After the assassination of Petr Stolypin in 1911, his successor Vladimir Kokovtsov did not rely on Russian nationalists, which caused processes of disintegration within the party. While one group of the national faction, led by Petr Balashev, agitated for a close cooperation with the radical right, leaders from KKRN, Anatoliy Savenko, Vasily Shulgin, and Vsevolod Demchenko, took a course towards rapprochement with Octobrists and Progressives. After the beginning of World War I the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists renamed itself into the Kiev Club of the Progressive Russian Nationalists and joined the Progressive-National Group, which signified complete fusion with the right section of liberals.

Russian nationalists viewed nationalism as a set of ideas, which developed in Western Europe after the French Revolution. “The Great Revolution [French Revolution – OM] indeed marks the end of the age of cosmopolitanism and the beginning of the age of nationalism, which development came to the head within the sight of our generation,” – wrote Petr Ardashev, a member of KKRN. An active stage of nationalism began after 1814, when “western nations liberated themselves from the suppression of Napoleon.” This subsequently caused reawakening and union of Germany and Italy; Greece, Slavic nations, Norway and Sweden were liberated. Most often Russian nationalists cited

24 The aim of the Bloc was to provide the army with everything necessary since the government failed to do it.
25 Daniil Kotsiubinsky, Russkiy natsionalizm v nachale stoletiya, 41-43
26 Sbornik kluba russkih natsionalistov, 1911, 59-60
27 Cited in: Daniil Kotsiubinsky, Russkiy natsionalizm v nachale stoletiya., p. 77
28 Ibid
examples of Germany and England, less often – France and the USA, the exemplary political figures were usually Friedrich List and Otto von Bismarck. Russian nationalists thought that their predecessors in Russia were great writers, historians and political leaders of 1830s-early 1870s. Afterwards, they thought, Jewish, internationalist and a revolutionary spirit had contaminated the milieu of Russian reformists.

Some leaders of KKRN also expressed Darwinist interpretations of nationalism. While unconscious acts in the life of every person play much bigger role than conscious, the instinctive drives can be enhanced by special sort of emotional training. Nationalism, which unites people and warms their hearts, has a unique capacity to enrich the inner world of a personality. Thus, those nations which are well-consolidated, provide their members with superior instincts, wrote Vasiliy Shul'gin.

An interesting Darwinist interpretation of the unity of Russians and Little Russians was developed by club member, physical anthropologist and psychiatrist Ivan Sikorsky. In 1913 Sikorsky delivered a lecture in Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists under the title “Russians and Ukrainians,” which soon after was published in a separate brochure. Supporting general idea of the Club that Ukrainians do not form a distinct nation but constitute a part of Russian nation, he revealed his vision of the ethnogeny of Eastern Slavs, largely inspired by old-school Ukrainophile historian Nikolay Kostomarov. He explained that the difference between Russians (velikorosy) and Little Russians lays in the fact that Russians in the early part of the first millennium merged with Finns, while Little Russians...

29 Daniil Kotsiubinsky, Russkiy natsionalizm v nachale stoletiya. 78
30 Ibid
31 Sbornik kluba russkih natsionalistov (Kiev: Tipografiya Kushnerova, 1910), p. 39-40
preserved more of original Slavic features. In the course of creative mergence with Finns
Russians gained such features as a strong will and better self-control. Little Russians were
more flexible and intelligent, though. This resulted in the fact that Russians have a strong
nationhood (based on individualism) whereas Little Russians are less capable of building a
strong state, and thus are destined to keep a creative alliance with Russians.  

2.3. Social Composition and Social Base of Russian
Nationalism

The question of social composition of the KKRN, as well as of their social base, also offers room for speculation, even though the rosters of club members with relevant data are available in the yearbooks for 1910, 1911, and 1913 (see Table 1). In 1909 the total number of members counted 329, in 1910 - 360, in 1911 – 660, and in 1913 – 738. In the course of the years 1909-1913 the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists increased the number of its members almost in 2.5 times. As the organization gained popularity and political influence, more and more people with lower social status requested membership cards. However, there is a tendency of uneven change in social composition of the Club. While between 1911 and 1913 the total number of members increased by 78 persons, the number

33 Ivan Sikorsky, “Russkie I ukraincy. (Glava iz etnologicheskogo katehizisa): doklad v klube russkih
nazionalistov v Kieve 7 fevralia 1913 goda,” (Kyiv, 1913). http://www.velesova-
sloboda.org/antrop/sikorski03.html Access 15.01.2010
34 There is no doubt about the fact that members indicated their profession and social status on their own – the variety of abbreviations, confused word orders and punctuation proves this fact. A brief information about the average person included data about real estate ownership, profession, social rank and address. Very often some members indicated multiple items while others would state only their address. This is important to acknowledge, because the groups presented in the table are interrelated. For example, a merchant is also a house owner (as it is very often the case), therefore the dynamic of the former group would inevitably parallel the later.
of house owners, landowners, representatives of liberal professions, teachers and professors decreased, which means that representatives of the aforementioned categories dropped their membership. By the same token, the number of railway employees and some other groups increased.

The largest category between 1910-1913 in the membership rolls is employees of the Southwest Railroad. However, this doesn’t mean that they were a dominant interest group in the organization. In fact, they seem to play barely any role in the club activity and their interests were never voiced neither in yearbooks, nor in the press. There is evidence that in 1913, when some tensions appeared in the Club, its leader Anatoliy Savenko used the support of railwaymen against the attacks of rivals to maintain his leadership in the Club. Nevertheless, the reasons for a considerable support by railwaymen remain unclear.

According to Robert Edelman, the Russian Nationalist party’s social base was Russian gentry from the western borderlands. The landed nobility’s economic and political domination had been challenged long before 1905 by a variety of modernizing forces. Because the state would no longer defend and support them at all times, land-owning aristocrats had to organize politically. Simultaneously, a new economic order increased the demand for farm produce, so that “nobles could now forsake their parasitic roles and

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36 Robert Edelman suggests some possible explanations: “Since Kiev was an important transportation center, it was logical that railroad men would play a role in Kiev politics. The lower ranks of white-collar employees, although probably attracted by the club’s nationalism, may have been included to pad the membership rolls. […] The party’s special relationship with Rukhlov, now Minister of Communications, may also explain the presence of so many railroad employees on the club’s rolls.” Edelman, Robert. *Gentry Politics on the Eve of Russian Revolution*. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1980), p. 89. Olga Andriewsky also points to this misunderstanding and notes, that in general railroad workers were extremely politicized group: Olga Andriewsky, *The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question in Russia, 1904-1912* (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1991). p. 237.
become agrarian producers” 37 Edelman’s position was criticized for ignoring the strong urban aspect of the KKRN activity 38 Indeed, as can be seen from the table, the number of house owners and merchants considerably exceeds the number of landed nobility. Still, the impact of landowners on the activity of KKRN should not be underestimated. They were an active group widely presented in State Duma, and in 1909 boosted the project of introducing of a Western Zemstvo, which considerably favored Russian landowners over Polish ones.

A considerable support of the club was provided by Russian bourgeoisie, although in general this class was not numerous. The second largest category of members was constituted by house owners and merchants 39 In 1910 precisely this category of KKRN members won great support during the elections to the City Council and in subsequent years established a strong group in it, opposing Polish circle 40 Their leader Vsevolod Demchenko, one of the most active club members, successfully carried out a program of street paving, so that later on Moscow and Petersburg followed Kiev’s example. Interestingly, one of Demchenko’s key points was that paving stones should be produced in Russia and by Russian factories 41 Similarly, the Russian nationalist circle in City Council claimed that Jewish corporations should not be delegated the task of providing city with amenities, such

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39 Interestingly enough, this group received no scholarly attentions, neither did the related topic of urban development of late imperial Kiev.
40 See the campaign program in Sbornik kluba russkikh natsionalistov (Kiev: Tipografiya Kushnerova, 1910), p. 27-30
41 Anatoliy Savenko, “Zametki,” Kievlianin, June 7, 1908. Demchenko, also involved into railway construction, became a millionaire and gained tremendous popularity – in 1912 he was elected into State Duma from Kiev.
as sewage system and water supply. It is exactly this bourgeois group, that the KKRN spokesman Anatoliy Savenko claimed to be lacking in Russian society. In a series of articles he criticized Russians for they had always wanted to become bureaucrats and liberal professionals while Jews occupied the bourgeois niche and formed a middle class. “We [Russians. -OM ] have no middle class. We have more than enough of ‘third element’ but no middle class. How can we combat Jews in this situation?”

Interestingly, a relatively small number of members identified themselves as “bureaucrats” (chinovniki) – 5% in 1910, 4% in 1911, and 3% in 1913. In fact, their number was bigger, but instead of indicating themselves “bureaucrats,” they often stated their place of work, profession or senior rank. This can be interpreted as a decline in prestige of this occupation. This falls in a line with the general position of Russian nationalists who tended to see the worst vice of old regime in its bureaucratism. It was old Russian officialdom which made the ruling elite anti-national and gave capitals in the hands of foreign investors, they claimed.

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42 In 1909 KKRN held a number of public meetings trying to resolve a situation with the “water-supply question.” In the summers of 1908 and 1909 many buildings were cut off water supply, which caused anti-sanitary conditions in some houses. The problem for KKRN was that the water-supplying company was Jewish, thus they claimed that Jews stole municipal money and did nothing for the city. The meetings were attended by high-rank officials from provincial and municipal organizations, as well as the society of houseowners and professors. Sbornik kluba russkih natsionalistov (Kiev: Tipografiya Kushnerova, 1910), p. 59-60.

43 ‘Third element’ – was a typical expression in 19th cent. Russian Empire, signifying lower class intellectuals (raznocijintsy) employed in zemstvo organizations (agronomists, technicians, doctors, veterinaries, teachers, social insurance agents etc).


45 Daniil Kotsiubinsky, Russkiy natsionalizm v nachale stoletiya: rozczenie I gibel’ ideologii Vserossiyskogo natsionalnogo soiuza (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001) , p. 133
2.4. ‘Kievlianin’ and the Think Tank of Russian Nationalists

The Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists conducted their policy through the newspaper *Kievlianin* (“Kiever”). It was a well-established and widely recognized daily periodical. From its very foundation in 1864 by Vitaliy Shul’gin (father of the future leader of KKRN Vasiyl Shul’gin) the *Kievlianin* published frequent exposés of Polish and Jewish treachery consonant with its motto “This region is Russian, Russian, Russian”\(^{46}\). Since the beginning of the 1870s a newspaper published by a notorious Ukrainophile Mykhaylo Dragomanov called the *Kievs'kiy Telegraf* condemned the claims made by the *Kievlianin* as hate-filled propaganda.

Apart from anti-Jewish and anti-Polish attacks, the *Kievlianin* also was a sharp opponent of the Ukrainian movement. This, however, was combined with praising of the Little Russian language and culture. For example, the *Kievlianin* expressed warm approval and admiration of the young composer Mykola Lysenko, who created the first Ukrainian operas\(^ {47}\). In fact, a lot of *Kievlianin* journalists, as well as its second chief editor Dmitriy Pikhno\(^ {48}\) were sympathetic to Ukrainophile ideas, and some of them even regarded themselves as radical Ukrainophiles (like A.A. Reva).\(^ {49}\) They promoted the culture and the language of Little Russia and considered themselves local patriots and spokesmen of Little


\(^{47}\) Ibid. Lysenko later on became the Head of the “Ukrainian Club”, which was closed down after campaign led by KKRN in *Kievlianin* in 1912.


Russians. In 1880s the newspaper *Zaria* criticized the *Kievlianin* because it promoted Little Russianness on the basis of victimization in the hands of Poles and Jews. Faith Hillis writes that *Kievlianin’s* “populism in southwest was tremendously versatile: depending on political exigencies, it could be deployed against Poles (as the historical “oppressors” of the Little Russian people), Jews (the purported economic and political backers of the Poles) or the imperial state (for failing to protect Little Russians from the Polish and Jewish threat.”\(^{50}\)

The *Kievlianin* has also developed a critique of capitalism in Southwest and gained popularity as “a weapon of the weak.” After 1879, when the first editor of *Kievlianin* Vitaliy Shul’gin died, he was succeeded by Dmitriy Pikhno,\(^{51}\) a professor of economy in the University of St. Vladimir. In 1880 together with other contemporaries he became a sharp critic of state concessions granted to industrialists and the railroad policy of finance minister Sergei Witte. The State’s economic policy, claimed Pikhno, ignored the economic plight of the common men. However, Pikhno had never challenged the existing regime and state. He believed that it is responsibility of the state to develop industry and agro-business, which was the only way to escape poverty and ignorance in Southwest.\(^{52}\)

Pikhno’s views towards the agrarian and land question deserve special attention since they were later on fully adopted by the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists. He thought that the solution to the land question, e.g., land-hunger, is not the extension of land plots or transmigration, but the intensification of land use and farm production. Only a class of

\(^{50}\) Ibid

\(^{51}\) Pikhno not only inherited Shul’gin’s post, but also married his widow and after her death a few years later, he adopted Shul’gin’s young son, Vitalii (1878-1976) and eloped with Shul’gin’s underage daughter (who was his own step-daughter). Ibid.

\(^{52}\) Ibid
well-off peasantry\textsuperscript{53} can increase farm produce, deploy better technological equipment, and therefore gain a bigger surplus and spend it on wider consumption, provide amenities and home comforts, and eventually establish effective self-government.\textsuperscript{54}

After the revolution of 1905 the \textit{Kievlianin} antagonized with both liberal and socialist forces and thus combined an anti-Semitic agenda with an anti-revolutionary. In 1907 Pikhno became a member of the State Council (\textit{Gosudarstvennyi Soviet}) and in 1908 was one of the co-founders of the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists. Although the \textit{Kievlianin} never been in official alliance with any political force, it widely supported KKRN and the All-Russian National Union. Pikhno died in 1912 and the new chief editor of the \textit{Kievlianin} became his adopted son – Vasily Shul’gin (biological son of the first chief editor – Vitaliy Shul’gin). Vasily Shul’gin followed the political and economic views of his step-father, and eventually became one of the most notorious political figures in late imperial politics.\textsuperscript{55} Although he was famous for his anti-Semitic position, in 1913 he took an

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{53} In early Soviet time regarded as \textit{kulaks}
\textsuperscript{54} Pikhno’s views on land question were closely connected to national question. He explained that in Southwest old and new privileges favored Poles and Jews, and all the restrictions were directed towards peasantry. Thus, the upper class was formed by \textit{inorodcy}, while the lower class was Russian and at that time constituted a large category of free labour. Daniil Kotsiubinsky, \textit{Russkiy natsionalizm v nachale stoletiya: rozdenie I gibel’ ideologii Vserossiyskogo natsionalnogo soiuza} (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001). p. 351
\textsuperscript{55} Shul’gin started his career In 1907, when he managed to consolidate Russian voters of Volyn’ Gubernia before elections to II State Duma in a curious manner. Two weeks before the election day he had sent letters to all of the parochial priests in which as a representative of monarchist party asked to bring Orthodox peasantry to the voting. Eventually, the voting turnout appeared to be more than 90%. Thus, Russian landowners, clericals and peasants won over the Polish nobility, which had a large success on the previous elections. (Vasily Shulgin. \textit{Dni, gody}. 1920 (Moscow, 1990). P. 23-45). He was a deputy of II, III and IV State Dumas and earned a fame of one of the most passionate spokesmen. After WWI broke out he joined the army and together with members of the Octobrists and Kadets and other right-wing or centrist politicians established the Progressive National Group. Together with Alexander Guchkov he persuaded Nicolas II to abdicate the throne and held the ceremony of abdication. After 1917 he emigrated to Yugoslavia, where he published a number of memoirs and polemic articles (including those criticizing ideas of Ukrainian nation). In 1944, when the Soviet army entered Yugoslavia Shulgin was arrested and sentenced to 25 years for his "hostile to communism anti-Soviet activity." He was released in 1956 and in his later books argued that communism was no more a disaster for Russia since former Bolsheviks turned into patriots of Russia. In 1965 Shulgin was the main hero
\end{footnotesize}
independent position in the Beilis affair (a famous blood-libel case) – he vindicated Mendel Beilis and denied the possibility of murder out of religious motives. This resulted in the fact that the most anti-Semitic newspaper – Kievlianin – suddenly took a position of Jewish advocate. A number of KKRN members expressed dissatisfaction with Shul’gin’s position and in 1913 a couple of dozens of members left the club.

However, the most notorious figure in the KKRN was Anatoliy Savenko, who was at the early stage of its existence an informal leader, and after 1912 was officially at the head of this organization. He was born in a provincial town in the family of a petty official. Before 1905 he published several brochures about local history and culture, and subsequently entered a career as a journalist. After 1906 he became a columnist in the Kievlianin and soon gained wide popularity. His articles appeared in the newspaper every day, even after he was elected to State Duma in 1912 and moved to Petersburg. He touched upon nearly every issue in current politics – starting from observations of international situation and contemplating over Russian state interests, and ending with everyday social and cultural problems of Kiev and Little Russia.

Savenko followed a sharp line on the Ukrainian question. “I myself – am a pure-blooded Little Russian, and I warmly love my country, its wonderful nature, customs, language and traditions, history, as much as I love khokhly, lazy and open-hearted. But I hate from the depth of my soul Ukrainophilism, a treacherous and cowardly movement.”

During 1908-1912 he successfully led several campaigns glorifying local Little Russian

56 Anotoliy Savenko, “Zametki,” Kievlianin, May 15, 1908
history and condemning Ukrainian nationalists; after his initiative a number of monuments were erected. In 1909 and 1911 he was the head of the delegation meeting Tsar Nicolas II during his visit to Little Russia. In 1912 he was elected to the State Duma from Kiev province and since that time led the left wing of the nationalist faction. In 1914, when the tension between Russian and Ukrainian nationalists reached its crux and became a subject of a debate in Duma, he was the main spokesmen defending Russian nationalists’ views towards Little Russian question. In 1915 he initiated the National-Progressive Group.
Chapter 3: Society of Ukrainian Progressives: Political Framework, Social Composition, and Intellectual Background

3.1. The Foundation of TUP and Political Circumstances of 1908

The Society of Ukrainian Progressives (Tovarystvo ukrayinskikh postupovtsiv, TUP) was established a couple of months after the emergence of KKRN. Similarly to KKRN, which declared itself to be an apolitical organization, the Society of Ukrainian Progressives limited their official agenda to publicizing the Ukrainian cause, support of all existing Ukrainian periodicals, clubs and organizations. However, both groups were involved in politics on a much deeper level: while KKRN tried to consolidate Russian community in Malorussia to prove in the State Duma that this region was overwhelmingly devoted to the monarchy and is capable of cherishing its Malorussian culture within the existing political setting, the TUP attempted to consolidate miscellaneous Ukrainian groups under the guise of cultural activity in order to forge a uniform political strategy in the situation when Ukrainian interests were little expressed in the State Duma.

In 1908 Ukrainian nationalists resorted to the semi-legal political activity – TUP regularly held illegal general meetings, often during big religious holidays in the estates of its most well-off members. This turn was caused by a number of circumstances which

58 Tovarystvo Ukrayinskyh Postupovtsiv (TUP)
59 See notes in Chykalenko’s diary starting with a typical phrase “A lot of guest comers gathered during the holidays”. Yevhen Chykalenko in Yevhen Chykalenko, Shchodennyk (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004)
became palpable during the “reactionary” years of 1907-1908. The Election Law of June 1907 patronized right-wing and Octobrist parties, which limited the representation of constitutional democrats, Ukrainian allies. Thus, in the third State Duma only one deputy, Kievan Kadet Ivan Luchytskyy, was expected to voice Ukrainian concerns, but even he showed little enthusiasm in this.

More importantly, the new current within Russian public opinion of 1907-1908, liberal nationalism, seemed to bring troubling implications to the Ukrainian activists. This movement was liberal in its commitment to legality and constitutional order, and at once nationalist. The leader of Russian nationalist liberals, Petr Struve believed, that the Russian State invested too many efforts into the Far East affairs, while it should focus its attention on strengthening of Russian culture in the more culturally hospitable Black Sea region. This shift “homeward” implied that Russia should resolve the nationalities problem in the Southwest, particularly Jewish and Polish. The Ukrainian question was not regarded by him as a national question. Struve and Russian nationalist liberals “like the Russian intelligentsia as a whole, continued to regard ‘Ukrainophilism’ as a kind of epiphenomenon, as merely a symptom of a government repression rather than an authentic expression of autonomous values” writes Olga Andriewsky.

In the early part of 1908 Petr Struve together with Karel Kramář initiated the Neo-Slavic movement, which recognized that Russo-Polish rapprochement was an essential condition of any Slavic federation. The involvement of Roman Dmowsky’s party, Galician Russophiles, Panslavists, and Russian nationalist liberals in this project caused a genuine

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61 Ibid, 360
threat to Ukrainian nationalists, since all of these forces were clearly hostile to Ukrainian aspirations. Although Neo-Slavic movement did not gain any political success in the subsequent years, since 1908 Ukrainian nationalists were much concerned about the possibility that nationalist liberals would take the lead in the Kadet party, which anyway was not uniformly benevolent to Ukrainian nationalists. “The Ukrainian movement cannot put much trust in Russian liberals.” concluded the Ukrainian newspaper Rada in July 1908, “At every opportunity they are ready to betray us... and will do this by hiding behind progressivism and constitutionalism, in the name of the highest principles.”

Except for external threats, Ukrainian nationalists faced a number of internal challenges in 1907. Taking advantage out of the alleviation of legal restrictions in 1905 and particularly those regarding the use of Ukrainian language in printed media, Ukrainian activists founded 35 periodicals in the course of 1906. However, almost all of them were closed down within the next year because of little interest among the readers, which caused financial difficulties for its editors. So, after 1907 the Ukrainian movement could maintain only 3 periodicals, supporting them with considerable subsidies. This lack of interest frustrated the hopes of Ukrainian leaders who had expected after the revolution of 1905 more success among common people. Thus, one of the most important concerns of the TUP was development of more elaborate technique of winning grass-roots’ sympathies.

Last, but not least, the emergence of KKRN and the following attacks in Kievlianin
meant for Ukrainian activists that the potential obstacles for their movement were not limited to administrative restrictions and weak reception by their target groups. The KKRN became a public organization which expressed deep hostility to Ukrainian movement and could potentially forge an alternative to it. The *Kievlianin* constantly overestimated the strength of Ukrainian movement, claiming it to possess enormous financial support, a strong multidivisional structure, and a well-devised propaganda strategy. Therefore, Ukrainian nationalists were caught in a situation when they could not break through to the hearts of their recipients with their own media, but they received a wide publicity of a dangerous and treacherous force through the media of Russian nationalists.

3.1. Political Framework: The Question of “Autonomy” and Russian Constitutional Liberals

The Society of Ukrainian Progressives united different Ukrainian groups across the Empire, and among its members were people of various political views – ranging from social-democrats on the left to ultra-nationalists on the right. Similarly, an editorial staff of the party’s main organ – the daily newspaper *Rada* – presented a full spectrum of political currents. But at the same time, TUP, representing the Ukrainian movement in general, claimed it to be a democratic and liberal movement. Similarly, the newspaper *Rada* was presented as a democratic, liberal, and progressive periodical. Also, a number of times TUP and *Rada* distanced themselves from radical representatives of Ukrainian movement, trying

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67 *Ukrainskiy vopros* (Saint-Petersburg, 1914). P. 63
to keep it within the framework of legal activity and the established balance of political forces.\(^{68}\)

Although KKRN marked TUP and the Ukrainian national movement as separatist, the latter never overtly aspired to the independence of Ukraine. The political goal which TUP pursued was establishing a territorial autonomy of Ukraine, which entailed reorganization of the Russian Empire into a federation of territorial units. Ukrainian nationalists didn’t have a well devised program of pertinent political reforms, and different groups within Ukrainian milieu offered different readings of this issue.\(^{69}\) However, these projects inevitably implied that the Ukrainian language would become a medium of instruction in educational and administrative institutions.\(^{70}\)

The intellectual leader of Ukrainian nationalists, Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi, elaborated on the question of political autonomy in a series of writings.\(^{71}\) He considered that the


\(^{69}\) In 1905 there were three projects of the autonomy of Ukraine offered by different groups. The most radical of them, presented by the Ukrainian Democratic Party, suggested that the state should be governed by the bicameral parliament. One of the chambers should have been based on the federal principle with equal representation from the autonomous parts of the state. The State Parliament’s concerns were: the questions of war and peace, the budget for the general purposes, international relations, trade treaties of national importance. Ukraine was supposed to be governed by local parliament with wide responsibilities including development of financial and economic policy. Tatiana Khripachenko, “‘Avtonomiya’ i ‘feredatsiya’ v debatakh liberalov I ukrainskikh nacionalistov po ‘ukrainskomu voprosu’,” Manuscript. P. 14

\(^{70}\) Vindicating the need for autonomy Ukrainian nationalists combined national and economic argumentation. Because of the centralism of Russian Empire, the surplus from agrarian production was withdrawn from Ukraine to Central State treasury. These profits were accumulated in the central provinces and were not directed to Southwest as public goods, such as schooling and social infrastructure. The statistics gathered by Ukrainian nationalists indicated, that the rate of literacy in Southwest was much lower than in Central Russia, which further on hampered economic growth and exacerbated agrarian character of Southwest economy. Although in a daily press Ukrainian nationalists used soft terms for describing this situation, starting from 1914 they have published a number of texts where terms “colonialism” and “economic exploitation” were widely deployed. See Ukrainskiy vopros (Saint-Petersburg, 1914). P. 72-140, Petro Stebnytskyi, “Ukraina v ekonomeke Rossi,” in Petro Stebnytskyi, Vybrani tvory (Kyiv, Tempora:2009). P. 259-287

\(^{71}\) See Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi, Natsionalnyi vopros I avtonomiya (St. Petersburg, 1907); Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi, “O zrelosti I nezrelosti,” in Ukrains’kii vestnik, V. 4, 1906; Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi, ”Nashi trebovaniya” in Ukrains’kii vestnik, V. 5, 1906; Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi, Edinstvo ili raspadenie Rossii? (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaya pol’za, 1907)
question of autonomy is not limited to use of the Ukrainian language in public administration and promotion of Ukrainian culture. It was important to have a separate financial system and an army. The latter should function in a way that there would have been no interethnic mixing. Using the metaphor “the prison of the nations” for the Empire’s political setting, Hrushevs’kyi argued that each nation should gain as much freedom as possible, and therefore reform into a conglomerate of relatively independent units. Although it was a personal account of Hrushevs’kyi on this question rather than the reflection of Ukrainian nationalists’ ideas, after 1914 he became the most active advocate of Ukrainian autonomy in Russian society.

The question of autonomy and a federal system of Russian state was a bone of contention between Hrushevs’kyi and Russian constitutional democrats. The latter did not object that ultimately Russian Empire should be reorganized into a federation of territorial units; however this could be placed on the agenda only after basic democratic institutions were established. Hrushevs’kyi, on the contrary, claimed that first the national demands, including autonomy, should be satisfied, and then these nations would direct their efforts to democratic transformation. Moreover, the Kadets did not accept Hrushevs’kyi’s idea that the territorial units must coincide with the areas of inhabitance of certain nations. They thought that such demarcation was impossible since most areas were ethnically mixed. Thus territorial autonomy would anyway favor dominant nations.

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72 Tatiana Khripachenko, “‘Avtonomiya’ i ‘feredatsiya’ v debatakh liberalov I ukrainskikh natsionalistov po ‘ukrainskomu вопросу’,” Manuscript. P. 21
73 Ibid, 22
74 Ibid, 19
75 In regions such as Kingdom of Poland the autonomy was, however, possible because this area had distinct tradition of governing and the autonomy would not be national by essence. As an alternative Kadets suggested all national minorities of Russian Empire should achieve cultural and national self-determination. Practically
In 1914 the leader of Kadet Party Petr Milukov delivered a speech in the State Duma defending Ukrainian cultural and national aspirations, a speech which was first and foremost addressed to Russian nationalists. His argumentation was largely based on the preceding meeting with Ukrainian nationalists in Kiev, where 10 spokesmen presented key issues of the Ukrainian agenda. Miliukov claimed that formal and informal obstructions to the proliferation of Ukrainian culture initiated by KKRN exacerbated political situation, and would eventually result in radicalizing of the Ukrainian movement. Attacking Anatoliy Savenko for his misconception of the innate nature of Ukrainian movement, he argued that Ukrainian nationalists were far from separatism and acting against the unity of the Russian Empire. At the same time, Miliukov expressed deep disagreement with Ukrainians’ striving for autonomy and federation, “implementation of this program I regard harmful and dangerous.”

Ukrainian nationalists commented on this remark that even the outmost Russian liberal cherishes centralism in his heart. In fact, it was a bandied phrase within the Ukrainian social environment: “Russian liberalism ends at the point where the Ukrainian question begins.”

While the demand for autonomy remained for most of Ukrainian nationalists a distant prospect, the implementation of the Ukrainian language as a medium of instruction in primary schools appeared to be a matter of a prime importance in contemporary politics. They thought that the biggest problem of the Southwest was the low rate of literacy,

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76 Miliukov’s speech reprinted in Yevhen Chykalenko, Shchodennyk (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004), p.313-319

77 “Whatever the appearances are, but every Katsap, even the most progressive, is centralist deep inside” - Yevhen Chykalenko, Shchodennyk (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004), p. 320
especially compared to the Central provinces of Russia. Moreover, the Russian language of instruction in the areas where the majority spoke Malorussian dialect had hampered the educational process. In 1908 TUP initiated the project of introducing the Malorussian dialect in school education in State Duma. 37 deputies, including some peasant conservatives from Southwest, signed it up but The Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists started a campaign against it in *Kievlianin* and among the Duma deputies, which eventually buried down TUP’s aspirations.

### 3.3. Social Composition and Social Prospects: Between Intelligentsia and Peasantry

Conducting an accurate account of social composition of TUP is impossible; due to its semi-legal status any official documentation about its members is absent. However, there is little doubt that it consisted overwhelmingly of intelligentsia, which in general formed a majority of Ukrainian national activists until the beginning of the Great War. The University of St. Vladimir was traditionally the domain of Ukrainian national movement, and by the turn of the century Ukrainian circles emerged in other educational institutions of Southwest,

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78 A member of TUP, Petro Stebnytskyy in his work “Ukraine in Russian economics” presented an interesting data about literacy rate among men and women of different nationalities in Russian Empire based on census conducted in 1987. According to this table, 59.9 men and 58.6 women were literate among Germans; 52.0 and the 52.5 – Lithuanians and Latvians; 48.9 and 28.2 – Jews; 35.2 and 26.9 – Finns; 34.8 and 29.4 – Poles; 29.6 and 9.3 – Russians (including Belorussians and Ukrainians); 23.3 and 3.9 – Ukrainians. The way in which Ukrainians were “subtracted” by Stebnytsky from Russians was not explained, however the fact of low literacy in Southwest was often debated in the press. - Petro Stebnytskyi, “Ukraina v ekonomike Rossii,” in Petro Stebnytskyi, *Vybrani tvory* (Kyiv, Tempora:2009). P. 280

as well as in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Students and graduates of the universities, seminaries, technical institutes, and higher schools got together in ideologically eclectic groups, traditionally called *hromada.* There were neither peasants and workers in these groups, nor merchants and entrepreneurs. Throughout their history *hromadas* remained a preserve of educated professionals (regarded at that time as “third element”); there is evidence that one of their concerns was assistance in employment for its members in *zemstvos.*

The revolution of 1905 provided an opportunity for intelligentsia to pave a way to peasantry. Great expectations were placed on the organizations of “Prosvita” (‘Enlightenment’), which were established in major urban centers and had its units in smaller cities, as well as in many villages. While in the cities “Prosvitas” usually organized public lectures, celebrations, hobby groups etc., in the villages these were predominantly reading rooms and libraries. Although “Prosvitas” seemed to gain a large public interest, their ultimate success directly depended on literacy among peasants, which, again, remained very low in the Southwest. Some regions, like Kamianets-Podillya, Katerynoslav, Kiev, Chernihiv, and Poltava had vast, multiunit networks of “Prosvitas”, while other regions, like Volyn’, Rzytomyr, Odessa, Kherson, Donetsk displayed very little activity in this sense.

Nevertheless, KKRN trumpeted in the press that “Prosvitas” are centers of separatist propaganda and contamination of faulty ideas among peasantry, and thus must be prohibited in administrative order. By 1910 the central “Prosvitas” in Odessa, Chernihiv, and Kiev

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82 Ibidem
were closed down, which came as a great shock for Ukrainian nationalists. Interpreting these events, and also the constant fines levied against Ukrainian periodicals, as a return to pre-1905 political regime, Ukrainian nationalists evoked an argumentation that it was exactly legal restrictions which hampered the proliferation of Ukrainian consciousness in Southwest, disguising at the same time their internal failures in gaining mass support.

In fact, gaining the peasants’ hearts was an ideal of Ukrainian activists rather than a well thought-out plan. Ukrainian nationalists in Kiev and other large urban centers enjoyed gatherings with folk Ukrainian singings and dances, which were often visited by folk choirs and lute players, they posed in folk Ukrainian suits on photographs, but still remained an elitist coterie of upper class bourgeoisie with no intention of direct activity in the village. Yevhen Chykalenko who displayed a large concern with spreading Ukrainian nationalism among the masses often complained about limited efforts of his colleagues. For example, in 1908 Olena Pchilka initiated a heated dispute on the front pages of her periodical 

\[ \text{Ridnyi kray} \]

targeting Jews and particularly a Ukrainian intellectual of Jewish origin, prof. Perets. \[ \text{Rada} \]
criticized her anti-Semitic stance, and soon after a number of subscribers discontinued Pchilka’s journal. Chykalenko recommended her to rearrange \text{Ridnyi kray} into a peasant or a family organ, and thus win more readers. However, Pchilka responded that she wanted exactly the sort of journal it was, she wanted polemics between intellectuals. \[83\] Similarly, Chykalenko tried to persuade writer Volodymyr Vynnychenko to compose stage plays instead of philosophical novels, claiming that plays would have success in public and therefore turn him a profit, which was much desirable for him at that time. But Vynnychenko did not want to accept the taste of a majority, he wanted to combat old

\[83\] Yevhen Chykalenko, \textit{Shchodennyk}, V.1 (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004). p. 30
superstitions, build new morality and eventually set a new stage in Ukrainian literature.\textsuperscript{84}

Moreover, the plunder which took place during the 1905 revolution gave reasons to think about the peasant peril. In 1913 Yevhen Chykalenko wrote in his diary: “In case of war between Russia on one side and Austria with Germany on the other, we would probably have an internal war, much worse than the one of 1905. Probably, peasants would burn down and plunder landlords’ estates, for there would be no one to protect them. And in the cities the mob, led by Black Hundreds, would smash the Jews and the intelligentsia.”\textsuperscript{85}

However, there was one endeavor with which Ukrainian nationalists hoped to encourage politically conscious Ukrainians without active engagement of intelligentsia in the village. \textit{Rada} actively promoted the cooperative movement within the Ukrainian peasantry, which already had a big success in Galicia. Based on mutual assurance, ownership of common means of production, and/or assistantship in purchasing commodities, this movement exemplified a potential for self-government and self-education. Cooperatives could afford a newspaper subscription for all of its members, and thus Ukrainian nationalists hoped to gain adherents among the most progressive peasants. In 1910 one of the authors wrote about the intelligentsia and cooperative movement:

So long as those who in the first instance ought to be taking up the struggle with popular ignorance do not do so, the struggle falls to the lot of the politically conscious citizenry (the intelligentsia) of the country. With its own powers and finances it must spread enlightenment among the people, and lead the people on the path toward a better life. But as usual its powers and finances are not great enough to work successfully, especially due to the pitiful lack of enlightened people and capital resources in a place like Ukraine. And since these fall short, the work is hampered, or even lies completely undone. In these circumstances, the intelligentsia must ferret out resources and powers from among the very people [folk] upon whose

\textsuperscript{84} Yevhen Chykalenko, \textit{Shehodennyk}. V. 1. (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004), p. 83-84, 90
\textsuperscript{85} Yevhen Chykalenko, \textit{Shehodennyk}. V. 1. (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004), p. 266
[enlightenment] and well-being it is working. It is primarily here that the cooperative stands ready to aid the intelligentsia.\footnote{M. Mandryk, “Kooperatsiya bez ideyi.” in \textit{Rada}, January 15, 1910.}

Cooperatives were depicted in \textit{Rada} as centers of welfare and culture. It was exactly the type of relations in the village that Ukrainian nationalists dreamed about. Another author drew the following picture of cooperation in the village:

[The Koshmanivka village] can’t boast with the marvelous nature, which is the biggest pride of Ukrainian villages, neither it can boast with the peasants’ wealth and standard of culture. It has no special craft occupation, as it is often a case with other villages. Plethora of lonely shabby huts and cattle sheds in scattered across the slopes farmsteads, crooked figures of peasants, who are condemned to hoboing in richer estates instead of working on their own: this is a true picture of Koshmanivka. Only in the center of the village, around the square with the church, the picture has more cheerful colors: over there you see a bunch of houses of well-off farmers, merchants selling goods, there lives local intelligentsia, also you see the buildings of volost administration, school, hospital etc. Moreover, there a huge edifice was erected during the summer of 1909, which makes all Koshmanivka inhabitants proud in the eyes of neighboring villages, and which gives huge expectations to them. This edifice is the people’s [folk] house, built by agricultural cooperative society, which exists here for already a couple of years.\footnote{“Kooperatyvnyi rukh na seli,” in \textit{Rada}, April 29, 1910.}

But the ultimate success of the cooperative movement depended on the loan system. Ukrainian nationalists contemplated the establishment of a Cooperative Bank in 1913. However, the problem which they faced was the shortage of Ukrainian specialists in this sphere.\footnote{Yevhen Chykalenko wrote: “I’m afraid, that this bank, if we get a permit for its foundation, will fall into the Jewish hands, as it happened with the Kiev Commercial Mutual Loan Association, founded by Ukrainians. We have neither capital, nor people who could run such a serious business as a bank, just as we fell short of these resources for such a petty, one would think, business as The Mutual Loan Association. Yevhen Chykalenko, \textit{Shchodennyk,} V. 1. (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004), p. 263} They were afraid that if they simply hired professionals who didn’t sympathize with the Ukrainian cause, the bank would not fulfill its mission while seeking profit. In 1914
Petro Stebnytskyi suggested that they should involve “mercenaries” from Galicia, but the foreign citizenship turned to be an insurmountable problem. Experiencing difficulties with gaining peasants’ sympathies, the TUP had even less hopes for bourgeoise and urban middle class. While Savenko lamented that all the middle class consists of Poles and Jews, Chykalenko argued that for a couple of decades in the 19th century the urban population of many cities spoke Ukrainian (including Jews, for whom Ukrainian was a second language after Yiddish). And only after the turn of the century did urban citizens become overwhelmingly Russian speakers, so that Ukrainian was pushed into the private sphere. In his diary Chykalenko described his experiences of meeting this kind of people – urban dwellers who spoke Russian in public and Ukrainian in private life. One of them was a lady, whom Chykalenko met in a train car. A landowner from Kamysyn, a city on Volga river, she did not know the word “Ukrainian,” never read any book or article in Ukrainian, but spoke splendid Ukrainian language with her son and pure Russian with a train conductor. She regarded herself as “khokhol” and her language as “khokhlatska.” “One day, when our press becomes advanced, when we attain our school, these ‘rusyns’, ‘Malorussians’, and ‘khokhols’ will become nationally conscious Ukrainians, on the territory between the rivers San and Don,” wrote Chykalenko.

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91 Ibid, 228
3.4. ‘Rada’ and Personal Commitment of Yevhen Chykalenko

The Society of Ukrainian Progressives regularly had illegal meetings in which members from different cities got together. There is no evidence how many of these meetings took place, but according to the diary of Yevhen Chykalenko, in 1910 these gatherings were held almost monthly. However, Monday staff meetings at the newspaper Rada were the sites of the political discussions, usually engaging only some members of the Society. Also, Monday meetings were often visited by artists; literary readings and music performances regularly took place there.

The owner and a chief of the newspaper Rada, an informal leader of TUP, was Yevhen Chykalenko. He was a landowner, who gained a large profit from the implementation of intensive farming methods. At the turn of the century he started a series of brochures for peasants about the ways to improve farm production under the general title “Conversations about Farming.” Published in the Ukrainian language, “Grape”, “Autumn Fallow”, “Orchard”, “Cultivated Herbs”, and “Livestock” by 1914 were distributed in over half a million copies. Interestingly enough, Chykalenko wrote an extra brochure which finalized this series – “A Conversation about Language.” He depicted his dialog with a peasant, who doubted the necessity of learning Ukrainian at school, but agreed with every point of Chykalenko’s argumentation. The publishing of this brochure was not discontinued after 1917, when Ukrainians gained legal rights for Ukrainian language.92

Chykalenko declared that all the property which he had inherited from his father would be left to his children, while everything that he had acquired throughout his life would serve the Ukrainian cause. Apparently, *Rada* became his largest investment. Started in 1907 it gained soon after over 2000 thousand subscribers; however during subsequent years their number did not increase. Since the target group was peasants and rural intelligentsia (teachers, priests etc.), the price of the periodical was reduced to 6 rubles per year. This all caused a large deficit which was a topic in most of the entries in Chykalenko’s diary. Partly, the deficit was covered by the magnate Symyrenko, who sympathized to the Ukrainian movement. The rest was paid by Chykalenko, even though he saw it as a huge financial burden and a number of times resorted to bank loans. In fact, when *Rada* was closed down at the beginning of the Great War, Chykalenko viewed it as a sort of relief for by that time the deficit grew unbearably large.

On the eve of 1911 *Rada* printed a passionate appeal to its readers encouraging support either by donations or by engagement of other subscribers. This resulted in a certain out-turn, but still, by 1914 the newspaper had gained little more than 3000 subscribers. The editors explained relatively low interest among readers by multiple factors. Firstly, the readers complained about the language and orthography of the *Rada*. The journalists tried to use original Ukrainian expressions, and the titles of the articles often contained peculiar peasant sayings. However, this was a literary language, which was formed in Galicia in the last decades of XIX century. Thus, a number of words were unfamiliar to the readers. Also, the orthography was distinct from Russian language letters and the use of letters, which gave an unusual feeling upon the first discovery of such text. Secondly, the content of the

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newspaper was often abstruse and not interesting. Chykalenko complained that few Ukrainian writers were capable of producing interesting and comprehensible feuilletons. Articles on political and social problems found little interest among grass-roots. Thirdly, and it was frequently emphasized, the critique of Ukrainian undertakings in the *Kievlianin* created a negative image of *Rada*, which resulted in conflicts between subscribers and local officials. Yevhen Chykalenko in his diary published a number of letters in which people asked to discontinue their subscription for this reason.\footnote{Yevhen Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk*, V. 1. (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004). P. 262}

Although the daily newspaper did not win expected success, other printed publications were distributed in Southwest in a big quantity. By 1914 there were published 100,000 folk calendars, 200,000 copies of “Kobzar” by Taras Shevchenko, and 10,000 editions of “Illustrated History of Ukraine” by Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi.\footnote{Miliukov’s speech reprinted in Yevhen Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk* (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004), p.317}

To summarize, the Society of Ukrainian Progressives was a semi-legal organization, which in 1908 united miscellaneous political groups consisting predominantly of intelligentsia, aiming to combat the threat coming from the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists and the Nationalist faction of the Kadet party. TUP represented itself as a liberal-democratic political force and allied with Russian liberals, however this cooperation was not devoid of a number of conceptual misunderstandings. Ukrainian nationalists aspired to win mass support of the peasantry, however by 1914 achieved little success in this endeavor. The newspaper *Rada*, published by Yevhen Chykalenko, failed to have more than 3000 thousand subscribers, nevertheless, played an important role in shaping the social and political agenda of the TUP.
Chapter 4. Political Strategies and the Malorussian question

The quotidian political rivalry between the Kiev Club of Russian nationalists and the Society of Ukrainian Progressives took place on the pages of their newspapers, and the most sensitive questions became subjects of separate brochures and books. While solid editions had clearly defined topics and were addressed to a specific audience, the daily newspapers touched upon many issues, pursued multiple tasks, and appealed to various social groups across the Empire. It is impossible to distinguish accurately the policies of these groups since these were day-to-day complex endeavors with short- and long-term expectations, however certain peculiar features can be still shaped within the scope of this research.

For the practical reasons I will distinguish three levels of the debate: insider, regional and imperial. The insider level of the debate took place between the people who knew each other very well and were affiliated in the same institutions, in the majority of the cases in the University of St. Vladimir. These debates contained many references and inklings which only a limited coterie could understand, and it often represented a certain riddle for a scholar, and apparently for a contemporary reader. The second level, regional, targeted the population of Malorussia/Ukraine. The KKRN and the TUP attempted to gain mass support of Southwest population, and often used for this purpose not only an affirmative agenda, but also deployed critiques of each other. The third level, imperial, implies that both groups tried to earn sympathy in various quarters of St. Petersburg and Moscow, which was important since in these centers a number of crucial decisions could be made, and this, in turn, had considerable practical implications on the regional level.
4.1. Preliminary notes

It was already mentioned that the Kievlianin was a well-established periodical with many subscribers, among which were not only private individuals, but also bureaucratic institutions. Rada, on the contrary, was rather a newspaper for a close coterie of Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia with a relatively small number of subscribers. The Kievlianin published news from all over the world, and particularly the Russian Empire, which was possible due to a wide net of correspondents. Rada could not afford its own correspondents even in the largest cities of Russian Southwest, thus was often left behind the latest events. Kievlianin, having a status of a dominant periodical in Russian Southwest, had official and unofficial sections, while Rada did not have this division. Kievlianin paid large attention to the international political situation and the Empire’s state affairs. Rada, being first and foremost concerned with the Ukrainian cause, within international affairs focused mostly on the matters of “non-historical” nations.

Kievlianin was a conservative newspaper, which allied with the Novoe vriemia (St. Petersburg) and Moskovskie vedomosti (Moscow). It was opposed to the whole set of liberationist (osvoborzencheskie) periodicals – the most important of which in Kiev was Kievskaya mysł’. Rada allied with the monthly journal Ukrainskaya zhyzn’ published in Moscow by local Ukrainophiles, and supposed itself to be a part of liberationist press. The role of Rada among the liberationist newspapers was very insignificant, especially taking into consideration that the latter in general remained ignorant of the Ukrainian movement and its aspirations. However, the fact that Rada tailed along at the back of liberationist movement caused an interesting controversy. On the one hand, Rada enjoyed powerful
allies, which all together posed a serious threat to conservatives and Kievlianin particularly. Rada combined its own agenda with the demands of other liberal groups, which promised to catalyze its success among readers. On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalists as one of the weakest force within the liberationists, were extremely vulnerable to Kievlianin’s attacks, which heaped scorn on Rada’s role in the liberation movement.

It would be impossible to comprehend the essence of the debate between Kievlianin and Rada without acknowledging that a number of points in their agenda never gained criticism from the opponent. Such was the question of land. Both the KKRN and the TUP were aware of the acute problem of land hunger in Southwest. However, none of these groups considered the expropriation of land as a desirable solution. Moreover, both agreed that introduction of intensive methods of farm production could possibly alleviate the problem. Thus, numerous articles in Rada discussing the ways in which the village could be saved from poverty and ignorance received tacit support in Kievlianin, and vice versa. Neither Kievlianin commented on Rada’s deep concern with popularizing cooperative movement in Southwest. In its turn, Rada never criticized the program by Petr Stoplypin to resolve the land question.

Similarly, some important endeavors of KKRN of 1909 were more or less supported by TUP. When upon KKRN’s initiative the Kholm province was detached from the Kingdom of Poland TUP in general supported this undertaking, since they agreed with the argument that the majority of the Kholm population was Russian/Ukrainian (not Polish). Post factum Rada and Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi expressed some discontent with the Russian
politics in the province after annexation, however, they never bewailed this fact.\footnote{See Vas'ko Tkach, “Pid podviynoyu opekoyu,” in Rada, May 5, 1910} Also, KKRN ran a project of introduction of zemstvos in Western provinces which favored Russian landlords over the Polish ones. Ukrainian nationalists thought that self-government institutions in Western provinces would generally serve public good, and the restraint of Polish representation was expected to be advantageous for Ukrainian aspirations.\footnote{Ibid, 196-197}

A certain agreement between the two groups was caused not only by the fact that their political agendas appeared in some cases compatible, but also because their social status implied mutual support. For example, in 1912, when Chykalenko’s son’s application for the University of Petersburg was rejected for “political unreliability,” Chykalenko used his social contacts. The brother of a Ukrainian nationalist Volodymyr Leontovych had a reputation of a right-wing Octobrist. He wrote a letter to the Octobrist deputy of State Duma from Poltava Ippolit Kapnist, who solicited the ultra-right Minister of Education Lev Kasso for Levko Chykalenko’s enrollment.\footnote{Before the elections to the State Duma in 1912 KKRN campaigned together with Octobrists. In the Yearbook of KKRN it was stated that a person “I K…t” donated 2000 rubles to the Club. It is likely, that this person was Ippolit Kapnist. Sbornik kluba russkih natsionalistov. V. 4-5 (Kiev: Tipografiya Kushnereva i c°, 1913). P. 35} Interestingly, Kapnist’s sister was a wife of an influential member of KKRN Petr Armashevsksy, and Kapnist himself sympathized with this organization.\footnote{See Yevhen Chykalenko, Shchodennyk, (Kyiv: Tempora, 2007) \footnote{Ibid, 196-197} \footnote{Sbornik kluba russkih natsionalistov. V. 4-5 (Kiev: Tipografiya Kushnereva i c°, 1913). P. 35}
4.2. The insider level

The University of St. Vladimir was the domain where Ukrainian nationalism originated in the mid-19th century, and here Russian nationalism had some of its most prominent supporters. The tension between those scholars who advocated the Malorussian dialect as eligible for the use in academia and those who considered only Russian to be suitable for academic purposes was reinforced by the turn of the century. In 1894, when the future leader of TUP Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi defended his master’s thesis, Timofey Florinskiy, later one of the most prominent spokesmen of KKRN, mockingly wished him that the next dissertation he would defend in the same university would be in Malorussian. When in 1899 Hrushevkyi together with his colleagues from Galicia planned to deliver their speeches on the XI Archaeological Congress in Kiev in Ukrainian, a huge scandal was raised. In its aftermath Florinskiy has published a series of articles in *Kievlianin* attacking the idea of Ukrainian language use for academic purposes. In 1901 these articles came out in a separate brochure.

In 1904 Florinskiy as a Corresponding member of the Petersburg Academy of Sciences opposed other Members of the Academy who prepared a document intended to repeal the restraint imposed on the use of the Malorussian dialect. Thus he together with Alexei Sobolevskiy got the reputation of being conservatives, and the success of the document enraged him against Ukrainian nationalists in Kiev and Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi in particular. In 1909 he became a chief censor of Kiev, which gave reason for Ukrainian

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101 Ibidem
nationalists to think that he settled personal scores by means of fining Rada.\textsuperscript{102} It’s worth noting, that when Florinskiy applied for the status of a Member of Petersburg Academy of Science (since 1899 he was a Corresponding member), Ukrainian nationalist professor Peretts undertook a journey to the capital with a purpose to campaign against his nomination. His main argument was that it didn’t pertain to a member of Academy of Science to be a censor. Eventually Florinskiy’s application was refused\textsuperscript{103}

Florinskiy regularly published articles in Kievlianin claiming that Hrushevskyi had introduced an artificial version of the Ukrainian language forged in Galicia with a purpose to split not only the Russian Empire but first and foremost the Russian people. In 1910 the TUP member Modest Levytskyi published an article in the Kadet newspaper Rech’ attacking Florinskiy, which was reprinted in Ukrainian translation in Rada. Levytskyi wrote that scholars such as Florinskiy kept denying that Ukrainian language was more understandable for the Southwestern peasantry than Russian. Florinskiy sent a response to Rada in which he explained that Russian is more understandable for the peasant than the \textit{literary version of Ukrainian} used by Ukrainian nationalists. Rada agreed to publish his response, however, under the condition that the text would be translated into the Ukrainian literary language. Florinskiy brought this case before the court, but achieved no success. After this he published his correspondence with Rada in Kievlianin and his response in Rech’. After this the editors of Rada, knowing that there would be no legal punishment, republished the response from Rech’ in Ukrainian\textsuperscript{104}

This case is definitive for a number of reasons. First, it shows that in spite of

\textsuperscript{102} Yevhen Chykalenko, Shchodennyk, p. 87-88
\textsuperscript{103} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, 88
Florinskiy’s high administrative position as a chief censor, he could not trespass the limits established by the constitutional regime. Second, it demonstrates a common media space which indeed was a site for a debate between different political forces. Thirdly, it displays a convoluted interrelation between the question of language and the use of language. While “Ukrainian” for Russian nationalists meant only the literary version of Malorussian used by Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian nationalists used this word as an advanced synonym to “Malorussian.” Also, the translation of Florinskiy’s Russian text into literary Ukrainian was a gesture which changed the whole message.

Florinskiy together with other members of KKRN who wrote extensively on the Ukrainian/Malorussian question belonged to the scholars who were actively engaged in the Malorussian studies in the University of St. Vladimir in the 1880s. However, they distanced themselves from the “younger generation” who developed their ethnographic interest into the political program of Ukrainian nationalism. In 1908, when a prominent scholar of Malorussian literature and history Nikolay Dashkevych died, Florinsky wrote:

Malorussian by birth, he was since childhood close to the folk (narod) and sincerely devoted to the common people, and he made a critical contribution to the study of Malorussian history, ethnography and literature; however, he never shared those parochial national doctrines of late which aspire to interpose a deep gulf between the two Russian nationalities (narodnost’), and he did not sympathize with those efforts of the representatives of these doctrines to destroy the unity of Velikorussians and Malorussians in a common scientific language. In this respect, as well as in his views towards the contemporary political setting, he was not a son of his time, he was capable of standing above petty affairs of the day and popular superficial theories.

The issues concerning Malorussian studies had a number of practical implications in

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105 Andrey Stororzenko, Ivan Sikorskiy, Dmitriy Pikhno
106 Timofey Florinskiy, “Pamiati N.P. Dashkevicha,” in Kievljanin, February 6, 1908
University teaching. For example, in 1908 an author in *Kievlianin* under the nickname Russkiy (Russian) published an article criticizing a Russian literature course syllabus, which allotted 12 teaching hours to great Russian writers, and 11 teaching hours to Malorussian writings.\(^ {107}\) The author argued that 11 hours was way too much for the literature which had only regional and ethnographic significance, while the detailed knowledge of great Russian literature was a must for every student. Moreover, the author called to question the title “Malorussian literature XV-XVIII cent.” for upon the academic convention the Malorussian literature emerged only in late XVIII cent.\(^ {108}\)

The split within the scholars not only provoked misunderstandings and tensions, but it was tearing apart academic community. A very peculiar case was the 1908 XIV Archaeological Congress in Chernihiv. The Ukrainian nationalist scholars denounced their participation for its Russophile character. Eventually, the Congress was poorly attended, which caused frustration among Russian nationalist scholars, as well as among guests from Central Russia. Ukrainian nationalist scientists from Chernihiv were also put in a difficult position by their non-participation. A lot of them took an active part in the Congress organization, received salaries from Moscow committee, and put much hope on the exhibition of Chernihiv antiquities to the wide academic community.\(^ {109}\)


\(^{108}\) Ibiden

\(^{109}\) “XIV Vserossiyskiy sjezd v Chernigove” *Kievlianin*, August 4, 1908
4.3. The regional level

The political purposes which the KKRN and the TUP pursued were mutually exclusive – both groups aimed at winning mass support of Southwest. Their appeal to the recipients was inevitably enveloped into social and political debates. Moreover, they used each other to earn sympathies of local population. By distancing themselves from the opponent they estimated themselves as liberators from the danger threatening to the people.

Ukrainian nationalists endeavored to show that the problem of the Russian Empire was its centralization and domination of bureaucracy. For example, they never criticized Stolypin’s project of the resettlement of Ukrainian peasants to the Middle East, however, they wrote about the bad implementation of it. In this respect a short story published by Petro Stebnytskyi in Rada is very telling. During the years of bad harvests the people of a distant Far East country asked their sultan Al-Djafar to help with food from his own possessions. The sultan hesitated first, but later on agreed and gave all what he had. This first made people happy and grateful, but soon after they were bitterly disappointed. Sultan’s ancillaries failed to distribute equally sultan’s goods, and thus people still remained with nothing. Moreover, when they came to the central square the sultan’s troops started to fire.\footnote{Petro Stebnytskyi, “Bytyi shliakh,” in Petro Stebnytskyi, Vybrani tvory, (Kiev: Tempora, 2009), p. 234-244} Translating this allegorical tale into the language of politics, the biggest failure of the tsarist regime was bureaucratism and failure to maintain its vast territory and population.

Russian nationalists also criticized bureaucratism.\footnote{According to the views of Russian nationalists, bureaucratism was the biggest more of the Old Regime. Firstly, it was cosmopolitan and, therefore, acted counter Russian national interests. Secondly, it was deeply}
Ukrainian nationalists it was a problem of the State, for Russian nationalists it was the problem of the Russian people. Savenko many times complained in his writings that young Russian people seek the career of a bureaucrat, while Jews occupy a very important bourgeois niche. Savenko wanted Russian people to become a modern class of urban dwellers with their own businesses and commercial undertakings. Moreover, he believed that Russians could restore the health of capitalism and alleviate its predatory nature. In this sense it is interesting how he depicted two Malorussian multi-millionaires Tereshchenko and Kharytonenko, in a certain sense examples for imitation:

Both multi-millionaires were pure Malorussians and both possessed not only outstanding, but remarkably sober Russian minds. Both conducted their business directly and independently, and none of them ever rushed into ventures. Stock market manipulation always passed them by. They represented a healthy manufacturing force (promyshlennaya sila). They never supported bubble schemes. Noteworthy, both multi-millionaires as the sons of earth had always been drawn to the land, and invested their capital predominantly in land, greatly elevating the culture in their holdings/estates and spreading the influence of healthy agricultural and economic activity far and wide.

Saying this Savenko meant to show that it was absolutely normal for a Russian to be a capitalist, an owner of the enterprise. It is not a dirty business which a decent sort of man shouldn’t take up. On the contrary, a Russian entrepreneur is capable of running the business in a proper manner, and not breaking cultural conventions which exist in the society. Russian capitalist can at once seek profit and work for the benefit of the people.

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112 See for example Anatoliy Savenko, "Zametki," in Kievlianin, March 3, 1909
113 Anatoliy Savenko, “Zametki,” in Kievlianin, April 26, 1908
Ukrainian nationalists constantly tried to provide a negative image of the Russians as compared to the Ukrainians. “Russian” often meant backwardness, political passivity, savage habits, rough manners, and insensitivity, while Ukrainianness was associated with a more refined culture, mutual understanding based on tolerance, political consciousness, and artistry. Similarly, Malorussian was regarded as a symptom of imposed Russianness over the Ukrainian people. Being Malorussian was a state of unconsciousness, when a Ukrainian is not able to recognize oneself. Malorussianness inevitably lead to absurdity and inner conflict. In 1910 an author Pavlo Nedolia wrote down his impressions from a Malorussian troop staging the Ukrainian play “Natalka Poltavka”:

We could forgive prominent artists: not knowing their roles, twisting Ukrainian words into the Russian manner, impossible caricatures and other thespian charms of the “Malorussians.” But one thing we can in no way forgive: this senseless, frenzied and useless hopak dancing with which famous “Malorussians” have rewarded the public. Everyone capered, starting from the wise and god-fearing Natalka and ending with the no-less-god-fearing old Horpyna (Nikol’s’ka), or let’s say they danced. This was such a disgusting and unbearably painful spectacle that it reminded one not of artists but rather of *savages who have gotten a taste of moonshine and are heading off to celebrate* [text highlighting - OM].

This quote is very peculiar for a number of reasons. Russians are presented as savages who go wild dancing after drinking alcohol. Malorussians try to imitate this style, and thus go *hopak* dancing when it is not appropriate. The “Natalka Poltavka” was a splendid example of Ukrainian theatre; however, Malorussians constantly misinterpreted its artistic meaning because they tried to follow Russian style instead of cherishing their own.

For the Russian nationalists being Malorussian meant knowing their roots, veneration of the local culture and history. Similarly, Ukrainianness was something alien

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114 Pavlo Nedolia, “Malorosy, soyuznyky i natsional’na svidomist’” in *Rada*, May 21, 1910
and artificially imposed. Ukrainianness was an influence of newly emerged doctrines and ideas, which came from Galicia under the Polish influence. “I myself – am a pure-blood Malorussian, and I hold dearly my motherland, its marvelous nature, traditions, language and legends, history; just as I love lazy and kind-hearted khokhols. But I despise Ukrainophilia with all my strength, a treacherous and despicable movement.”115 – wrote Savenko.116 Moreover, Malorussianess in no sense contradicted with Russianness. Being Malorussian meant being Russian. “At the present time the Malorussian peasant doesn’t know the word “Malorussian” at all. If you ask Malorussian about his national origin, he will inevitably answer: “I am Russian.” The concept of the unity of Russian people is deeply imbedded in the minds of Southern Russians.”117

The political representation of the rival group displays a peculiar tendency. Ukrainian nationalist tried to depict the KKRN as a deeply reactionary and a very conservative group. On the pages of Rada the KKRN and the Black Hundreds were synonyms, which did not necessarily reflect the political situation. KKRN for Rada was inevitably representative of the State which ran against any positive social change. They ignored the affirmative program of the KKRN, and saw this organization’s objective as merely hampering any progressive initiative in the society. In 1914 Rada wrote about Russian nationalism: “Instead of the self-liberation, as in the real nationalism, they attempt to subjugate others, instead of struggling for one’s right – they struggle against rights of

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115 Anatoliy Savenko, “Zametki,” in Kievlianin, May 15, 1908
116 Savenko constantly emphasized that he was a pure-blooded Malorussian. “I am Malorussian, and nothing Malorussian is alien to me. I hold dearly my motherland – Ukraine, and basically I am Ukrainophile in the old meaning of the word.” Cited in Daniil Kotsiubunskiy, Russkiy natsionalism v nachale XX stoletiya. Rozdenie i gibel’ Vserossiyskogo natsionalnogo soyuza (Moscow: Rosspen, 2001), p. 303-304
117 Anatoliy Savenko, “Zametki,” in Kievlianin, May 15, 1908
others, instead of legitimate self-defense – they undertake a violent attack.”

Similarly, KKRN represented Ukrainian movement as the one intended only to split the Russian Empire and Russian nation into parts. They tried to show that the TUP sang the second part in the chorus of the liberationist movement and were eager to any compromise with any revolutionary force. This was especially true in the years of 1913-1914 when a great number of Ukrainian nationalist youth became social-revolutionaries. KKRN tried to show that in fact the Ukrainian movement was far from being nationalist, that under its guise there were a lot of cosmopolitans who never cared about the interests of the Russian Empire and Russian people.

4.4. The imperial level

Both the KKRN and the TUP constantly tried to win support in St. Petersburg and Moscow. These were the centers of decision-making, and public opinion was important for political success. Both groups considered that the opposite one works hard to win support in the Imperial centers and in this way has a lot of chances to impose power on the local level. Moreover, they considered that their allies, in the Russian nationalist case – Octobrists and right faction of Kadets, and in Ukrainian nationalist case – Kadets except for right faction, are inclined to take the agenda of the opposite group for granted and thus run contrary to their views.

118 A.P. Rada, February 28, 1914.
In 1908 Anatoliy Savenko wrote in the *Kievlianin* on the State Duma debates about the project of introduction of Ukrainian language as a medium of instruction in primary schools:

The situation becomes even more complicated because of Russian Octobrists’ incomprehension and ignorance in this question. They have the same vague idea about Malorussia as the French have about Russia. They think that we Malorussians live in cherry orchards, in white mud huts, eat dumplings all day long and swear in the Malorussian dialect. In these circumstances Russian Octobrists can swallow whole the offensively false claims contained in the explanatory note to the draft bill of the 37 Duma members. They can believe that Malorussians indeed don’t understand Russian, that Russian is indeed alien to Malorussians. For every lie relies upon the ignorance of those to whom it is offered.\(^{120}\)

This citation shows not only Savenko’s concern with the little knowledge of Russians from central provinces about the Southwestern circumstances. It gives evidence that Russian nationalists in Kiev tried to combat a number of superstitions towards Malorussia. Traditionally stereotypes about the “People of the South” were used in depicting Malorussians, often with female or animalistic characteristics. They were represented as relaxed, lazy, kind-hearted, with good sense of humor, witty, sensitive, hospitable, and skillful in music. The warm climate brought the fame to Malorussian cuisine and eating habits. A number of artists depicted serene rural sceneries with marvelous nature and nit mud huts. Although Savenko accepted many of these stereotypes, he tried to show to the Russian public that Malorussianness is not limited to the countryside lifestyle. He meant to show that a Malorussian could be an intelligent urban dweller with an active political position. Moreover, Savenko’s message was that Malorussia was not merely a region of Russia, but is a genuine Russia, because this was the place where Russia had originated, and

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\(^{120}\) Anatoliy Savenko, “Zametki,” in *Kievlianin*, May 15, 1908
this was the domain of Russian nationalism.

For the Ukrainian nationalists maintaining a daily newspaper was a heroic deed and act of bravery since it required a lot of efforts and financial support. But *Rada* had a huge symbolic meaning for them: it proved to the public that Ukrainian movement exists and was a force to be reckoned with. Yevhen Chykalenko in his diary many times repeated that in spite of the little success of *Rada* among readers in Southwest it was “a banner” of the Ukrainian movement as such. Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalists were much concerned with the fact that Russian public often learned about the Ukrainian movement from the media of Russian nationalists, who were widely represented in the State Duma and had stronger positions in St. Petersburg. Since the latter claimed the Ukrainian movement to have been a dangerous and treacherous force financed by the Austrian and German governments, they wanted to show that they were not separatists but still were a distinct nation.

In 1914 two Ukrainian nationalists from St. Petersburg, Petro Stebnytskyi and Oleksandr Lototskyi, wrote a brochure in the Russian language “The Ukrainian question,” addressed to the Russian progressive community. It had a certain success – until 1918 it went through 4 editions. This brochure aimed to show that the Ukrainian movement was “an organic” phenomena with deep roots in the folk life, and not an artificially constructed enterprise initiated by Russia’s state enemies. Also, the authors represented the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian national movement as democratic and liberal force. “The Ukrainian question” had 4 sections – “The Major Elements of Ukrainian National idea,” “Ukrainian National Movement in Its Past and Present as an Expression of Its Self-Determination,” “National Acquisitions of Ukrainians,” and “Ukrainianness in Regard to the Russian State
Culture.” The first part discussed the differences between Ukrainians and Russians in language, anthropological type, and economic traditions; the second presented a history of Ukrainian nationalism with the focus on the administrative restrictions imposed on the use of Ukrainian language; the third part was an overview of the gains of contemporary Ukrainian writers, scholars, journalists, theater-players, and artists. The fourth part was intended to combat vehement prejudices about Ukrainians created by Russian nationalists.

The authors argued that Ukrainians had always constituted a distinct nation from Russian, however, after 1654 fell under the Russian assimilation project, part of which was administrative repression. This assimilation failed for many reasons, but nevertheless a thin upper class of the society became the bearer of Russian culture. In the lower class more intrinsically Ukrainian features were preserved, but even the upper class had a spark of Ukrainianness deeply buried in their souls.

Even among the most conservative elements of Ukrainian society one can from time to time notice a peculiar form of national consciousness, however, very primitive one, revealed in the form of interest in Ukrainian ethnography and retrospective sympathies to the historical past of Ukraine. Such are nowadays’ Savenkos, Skoropadskies, Shul’gins, Kapnists, such is the monk of Pochaev Vitaliy with his cult of Cossack tombs.\footnote{The Ukrainian Question (St. Petersburg, 1914), p. 108}

As we see, the Malorussian culture was supposed by the authors to be a symptom of Ukrainian nature which brooded in the souls of the Russified Ukrainians. Malorussians had to peel off the artificially imposed Russian culture and discover Ukrainians in themselves. The dominant nation failed to absorb Ukrainianness, and the Malorussianness is a symbol of this transience. And during the World War I the Ukrainian movement gained well more opportunities to carry out their politics into
practice, claiming that Ukrainians had to reverse their historic path in order to purge themselves from alien Russian culture and its hybrid Malorussianness.
Chapter 5: The Interpretations of Cultural Heritage and Their Practical Implications

By 1908, when the confrontation between KKRN and SUP began, the Ukrainian movement had already possessed its own version of history, a dictionary of the Ukrainian language and a translation of the Holy Script. All of this gave Ukrainian nationalists a set of arguments to speak for a distinct culture. “The History of Ukraine-Rus,” published in 11 volumes by Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, presented a continuity of Ukrainian folk (narod) and thus challenged the official version of Russian history based on the history of a statehood, and widely used the notion of unity between three Russian peoples. This work, as well as many others, provoked a deep discontent among Russian nationalists. Although Russian nationalists never provided an alternative version of history of the same academic level, during 1908-1914 there were a lot of debates about the interpretation of Ukrainian/Malorussian history, and also about the key historical and literary figures. KKRN emphasized the loyalty of Malorussia to monarchism, and moreover, secured a special status of Malorussia as a domain of true Russian national consciousness. This mirrored their political agenda, which was expected to awaken national feelings among all Russians across the Empire.

In this chapter I will try to inquire into these debates and present the meanings which were ascribed to the key issues. Also, using the project of erection of a monument to Taras Shevchenko, I will endeavor to show which practical implication these debates had in daily life.
5.1. Kiev as “A Mother of All Russian Cities” and a Stronghold of Russian Nationalism

Tracing the history of Ukrainians from Slavic tribes, Hrushevsky claimed that the medieval Kievan Rus was ancestral home of Ukrainians, while Russian people emerged on the north a few centuries later. This posed a challenge to Russian nationalists who regarded Kiev as “A Mother of All Russian cities.” However, they claimed not only that Kiev is a Russian city, they tended to view it as the birthplace of Russianness (russkost’). In 1910 before the elections to city council Ivan Sikorsky said in his speech:

All of Russia looks at Kiev. St. Petersburg has never been a meaningful leader of national life in Russia. Moscow after 1905 has also lost its moral standing in the eyes of the nationally conscious Russian community. The significance of the center of Russian national life is moving to Kiev, and it is a supreme duty of Kievans towards their motherland and city to strengthen the newly built Russian stronghold. It is high time for us to say: we are the sons of a great nation, and in historic Kiev we are the masters!

Russian nationalists took much care about the archeological investigation of Kiev. In the first volume of the Yearbook, they advocated a need to buy out a manor where archaeologist Vikentiy Khvoyko allegedly had found remains of Kievan acropolis. It was stated, that the national idea is closely tight to knowledge of antiquity. Similarly, Kievlianin followed in detail The Archeological Congress in August 1908, and subsequently solicited implementation of projects of preservation of ruins of mediaeval churches in Kiev.

After 1908 Anatoliy Savenko wrote extensively that it was a shame to Kiev that it

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125 XIV Vserossiyskij sjezd v Chernigove, Kievlianin, August 4, 1908
had no monuments to its medieval heroes. Eventually, Russian nationalists came up with a project of “Historical pathway” – an ensemble of 10 monuments of historical figures of Medieval Kievan Rus’ which would stretch through the alley between St. Sophia and Mykhaylivsky cathedrals. These figures were: St. Olga, kniaz’ Jaroslav the Wise, Volodymyr Monomakh, Petro Sagaydachnyy, Petro Mogyla. The first monument was to be unveiled together with the monument of Alexandr II during Nicolas II and Petr Stolypin’s visit to Kiev in September 1911. The tsar supported undertaking by donating 10 thousand rubles. However, only the monument to St. Olga was put up in 1911, while the rest of the project remained unfinished. Supposedly, this happened because the day when monument to St. Olga was unveiled Petr Stolypin was assassinated, and KKRN redirected its activity towards erection of a monument to Stolypin.

### 5.2. Mazepa, Mazepians, and the New Russia

The name of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who allied in 1709 with Swedish king Karl XII against Peter I and was defeated afterwards in the famous battle of Poltava, served as a moniker for Ukrainian nationalists. Mazepian was synonymous to separatist, but also implied that the separatist collaborated with an enemy state. While in case of Mazepa these were the Swedes, Ukrainian nationalists would allegedly support Austria and Germany. The trait of Mazeppa had also one important implication: he was anathematized by Russian Orthodox Church. Thus, the Ukrainian movement was presented as heretical. In September 1908 Russian nationalists took part in a service in the main monastery of Kiev Kievo-
Pecherska Lavra, where Savenko delivered a speech. He praised Iskra and Kochubey, Mazepa’s two companions who had informed Peter I about Mazeppa’s trait. And in 1914 a monument to them was erected.

Nevertheless, the victory over Mazepa was interpreted by Russian nationalists also as a great event of a universal importance. A year before the celebrations of 200th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava Savenko wrote:

…the battle of Poltava accomplished the unification of Great and Malorussia, brought the undertaking of Bogdan Khmelnytsky to a final end. The treason of Mazepa and the Mazepists was the last vigorous demonstration by Ukrainian separatists. And the next year Hrushevsky’s party would go into mourning on the occasion of 200 anniversary of their first leader’s defeat… The Battle of Poltava created New Russia. Peter I consolidated his great deeds and opened a window into Europe, not on the banks of Neva, but rather accomplished all of this near Poltava. The Battle of Poltava appeared to be an important point not only in Russian history, but also in the history of Europe, for it brought Russia as a new factor into the forefront of world’s cultural and political life.

Interestingly enough, in 1909 Russian nationalists did not participate in a huge celebration of the Battle of Poltava, where the tsar Nicolas II was present. According to the II Yearbook of KKRN, its members applied for participation in the Celebration in Poltava, where they planned to deliver a speech on “the significance of the Battle of Poltava and the Defeat of Ukrainian separatism (the crushing failure of mazepians, and the loyalty of Malorussians to the unity of Russia (yedinaya Rossiya).” An Associate Commision, which was in charge of the celebration, disallowed these political speeches. KKRN refused to go to Poltava in protest, and organized a separate celebration in Kiev, where these political speeches were delivered. However, two years after, in 1911, KKRN took the most active part in hosting Tsar Nicolas II and Petr Stolypin.

126 Sbornik kluba russkih natsionalistov. (Kiev: Tipografiya Kushnerova i K°, 1909). P.&
127 Anatoliy Savenko, Zametki in Kievlianin, July 24, 1908
128 Sbornik kluba russkih natsionalistov. (Kiev: Tipografiya Kushnerova i K°, 1910). P. 60
129 Ibidem
5.3. The Genius of Gogol, and the Treason of Shevchenko

Russian nationalists had never expressed a clear-cut negative attitude towards Shevchenko and his literary works. On the contrary, they recognized him as one of the most talented artists of Malorussia and praised his sense of local tongue. By the same token, they constantly targeted the use of Shevchenko by Ukrainian nationalists and proved their reading of Shevchenko to be tendentious. In 1908 Savenko wrote: “Ukrainophiles are making a political demonstration out of the erection of the monument. In fact, it is not even about the monument - the latter serves only as a cause for Ukrainian-separatist demonstration. The Grushevskies and Naumenkos want to show clearly that a separate and independent Ukrainian nation not only exists, but is also conscious about its national and cultural ‘particularity’”\textsuperscript{130}. Savenko’s point was that Shevchenko and Ukrainian treatment of him are not compatible. For example, in 1909 he criticized the brochure encouraging donations for the monument because it contained a statement that Shevchenko in his poems nurtured ideals of freedom, brotherhood and equality of all nations. Savenko pointed at the uncompromising hatred of Shevchenko towards Jews and Poles. By this he meant to show that Shevchenko’s political agenda was neither liberal, not socialist. On the contrary, Shevchenko’s ideals were much closer to those cherished by Russian nationalists.\textsuperscript{131}

Savenko often juxtaposed Shevchenko with another prominent writer from Malorussia, Nikolay Gogol. He argued that although there already exists a monument to Gogol in Moscow, another should be erected in Kiev. “While a Malorussian monument to

\textsuperscript{130} Anatoliy Savenko, “Zamietki” in Kievlianin, 27.04.1908
\textsuperscript{131} Anatoliy Savenko, “Zamietki” in Kievlianin, 14.04.1909
Gogol would loudly and strongly tell the whole world that all Malorussia (and Gogol himself) considers itself an integral part of a unified Russia, an all-Russian monument would remain speechless in this sense,” – wrote Savenko in 1908. A Moscow monument was just a due respect to a genial writer, but the monument to Gogol in Kiev would be an aggrandizement of a great national and political activist.

In February 1911 Ukrainian nationalists were bitterly disappointed by a number of restrictions imposed on the upcoming celebration of the 50 Anniversary of Shevchenko’s death. The arrival of the Galician deputation was banned, and mass gatherings were forbidden on Kiev. However, the biggest shock was a confiscation of all “Kobzar” editions since 1906 in St. Petersburg. The official administration found some excerpts of Shevchenko’s poems highly inappropriate for they expressed abhorrent attitude towards members of Romanovs’ family. According to Chykalenko, this incident happened because of the elderly member of Ukrainian national movement Lobodovsky. The latter first tried to prove that Shevchenko’s poem “Maria” was forged and originally didn’t belong to Shevchenko – for the poem contains a large portion of sedition. In order to prove this Lobodovsky forged the original text. His fraud didn’t go unnoticed, and thus Lobodovsky launched an attack on Ukrainian activists by calling the Kharkov bishop’s attention to the seditive part of Shevchenko’s poerty. The bishop delivered this information to Synod and Kharkov governor, and the latter addressed this issue to Petr Stolypin.

Approximately at the same time Savenko revised his attitude towards Shevchenko, basing on his reading of the seditious poems. In order to justify his negative position he

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132 Anatoliy Savenko, “Zamietki” in Kievanin, 16.04.1908
133 Anatoliy Savenko, “Zamietki” in Kievanin, 16.04.1908
drew a distinction between the notions of motherland (rodina) and fatherland (otechestvo). As a patriot of his motherland, which was Malorussia, he was deeply touched by its local tongue, nature and history. This made him appreciate Shevchenko for he was a great master of Malorussian word, as well as a prominent painter. However, Savenko’s all-Russian patriotism, which was associated with the term “fatherland”, was much stronger and made him put Malorussian interests to a secondary role. On the contrary, Shevchenko was concerned with Malorussia much more than with Russia, and therefore expressed deep disdain towards unity of Russian empire and its prominent leaders. Savenko noticed that Shevchenko nurtured a negative attitude exactly to those historical persons that established strong ties between parts of empire. St. Volodymyr, who baptized ancient Rus and set a background for Orthodox church, Bogdan Khmelnytsky, under whose rule Hetmanate united with Moscow Tsardom, Peter I, who established Russian Empire as a European State, Empress Katherine II, who strengthened nobility in the South, - all these figures appeared in Shevchenko’s poetry as highly controversial. Therefore, Savenko claimed Shevchenko to be a typical mazepian. However, his political views, Savenko asserted, were influenced by Ukrainophile group of Cyrill and Methodius, which means that Shevchenko was not a traitor deep in his soul but rather a victim of separatist tendencies in South Russia. These two sides of Shevchenko, Malorussian and anti-Romanov, were played out by Russian nationalists in a curious manner – while vindicating the necessity of administrative restrictions towards Ukrainian nationalist endeavors Russian nationalists appealed to the “anti-Romanov” side of Shevchenko’s poetry. However, Russian nationalists organized their own editions of Shevchenko’s poetry for secondary schools where Shevchenko was

135 Sbornik Kluba Russkih natsionalistov. V. 3 (Kiev: Tipografia Kushnereva i K, 1911). p. 20
glorified as Malorussian patriot.\footnote{Juriy Chepela. Dyskusiyi navkolo monumenta Tarasovi Shevchenku v Kyyevi naperedodni yoho stolitniogo yuvileyu. MA thesis, manuscript. 2009}

In 1914 Russian nationalists regretted that the figure of Taras Shevchenko drew together all sorts of revolutionary groups. This was a direct response to mass demonstrations that occurred spontaneously. Celebrations of 100\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary after Shevchenko’s birth were forbidden, nevertheless, different revolutionary groups organized mass protest, which eventually resulted in clashes between socialist and black-hundred youth. An anonymous author, who published an article “Mazepian peril” in Kievlianin, made a statement that the participants of mass demonstrations against legal restrictions on the celebration of Shevchenko’s Anniversary were ignorant of any national feelings.

So, in the course of Shevchenko promotion by Ukrainian activists, Russian nationalists responded by providing more radical readings of his literary heritage. Although by 1911 they split Shevchenko’s figure into “bright” and “dark” sides, they kept vindicating him as a prominent Malorussian, not Ukrainian, artist.

\section*{5.4. The monument of Taras Shevchenko}

The monument to Taras Shevchenko was one of the most important endeavors for members of the Ukrainian movement between 1905 and 1914. Unveiling of a monument to the “father of Ukrainian nation” would create an image of a single body of the nation, which would be healthy and wouldn’t suffer from inner controversies. The figure of Shevchenko
was called to unite all of the scattered groups of Ukrainian nationalists as well as attract potential Ukrainians. Taras Shevchenko conveniently combined images of Ukrainian peasant, intelligent and cossack. Moreover, Shevchenko was praised equally by Galicians and those living in the Romanov Empire. Last, but not least, Shevchenko’s writings were suitable for any political interpretation.

As much as Ukrainian activists institutionalized the cult of Taras Shevchenko, Russian nationalists disdained their endeavors. This, however, doesn’t mean that Russian nationalists dismissed Shevchenko as a prominent poet of Malorussia and expelled him from a circle of great Russian writers. He was not regarded as a genius like Gogol and Leo Tolstoy, but his local significance was surely admitted. It was rather the political role that Ukrainian activists ascribed to Shevchenko that they attacked. They worked hard to show that there was a discrepancy between Shevchenko as an artist and the cult of him cherished by Ukrainian nationalists. This striving itself made Russian nationalists undertake a closer reading and rethinking Shevchenko’s heritage in order to face off Ukrainian claims.

In 1908 an Associate Committee for Setting up Shevchenko’s Monument started its work. It declared that the monument would be placed in Kiev on the 100th anniversary from Shevchenko’s death in March 9, 1914. The composition of the committee and its number

137 Although an idea to erect a monument to Taras Shevchenko appeared immediately after his death in 1861, the first serious campaign started in 1904-1905 by Poltava governorate council (Poltavskoe zemskoe upravlenie). The original idea was to put up a monument to mark the 100th Anniversary of Shevchenko’s birth in March 9, 1914. The provincial origin of this initiative is not haphazard - in Poltava region there was the biggest ratio of Malorussian population, also, it was a place of Shevchenko’s origin. After the Ministry of Internal Affairs gave its permission, Poltava council announced campaign for donations. Interestingly, the collection of donations was first allowed only in South-Western part of the Empire – Shevchenko was recognized to have only local, Malorussian, significance unlike Glinka and Gogol. However, in 1906 members of Poltava council solicited a permission to gather donations all-over Russian empire. Jurij Chepela. Dyskusiyi navkolo monumenta Tarasovi Shevchenku v Kyyevi naparododni yoho stolitniogo yuvileyu. MA thesis, manuscript. 2009
varied across its history, which lasted a decade from 1905 till 1914. However, in 1908 members of Ukrainian milieu managed to bring a considerable number of their candidates into the Committee, so that they played significant role in decision-making. Along with Ukrainian activists present in the Committee there was a number of artists and art-critics as well as members of the Kiev Council, a small number of whom were regarded as Russian nationalists. The major concerns of the Committee were donations collection, allotting a proper place for the monument and running competitions of artistic projects.

Although the Committee was highly active and received a large publicity in the press, by the year of 1914, when the monument was originally conceived to be finished, neither the place, nor the design was decided.

5.5. Sacred Space vs Downtown

The Kiev city council took up simultaneously two monument projects – to the tsar Alexandr II and Taras Shevchenko. Initially, the monument to Alexandr II was supposed to be located near Mykhaylivsky cathedral, but later on city council allotted a “better” place for it (Alexandr II square, today – European square). Therefore, the previous spot came to Shevchenko. Ukrainian nationalists were more than happy to accommodate their national hero in this area – Mykhaylivsky cathedral together with nearby St. Sophia cathedral were one of the most popular destinations of Orthodox Christian pilgrims, a large number of which were peasants. The whole area was traditionally seen as sacred place of Kiev, which
had a major significance for Orthodox Christianity. Ukrainian nationalists believed that placing the monument of Shevchenko on pilgrimage route to these churches would have a large impact on peasants. Chykalenko wrote in his diary a comment by one of the peasants: “[one] if not pray would at least take a look.”

However, in March 1911 Russian nationalists successfully held a campaign in the City Council to place St. Olga’s monument instead of Shevchenko’s monument on the square behind Mykhaylivsky cathedral. The Associate Committee was thus obliged to contemplate over another spot. Among the most widely discussed locations were: a square near Golden Gates, Peter’s alley on the slope of Kievan hills, and Karavaev Square.

The idea of placing Shevchenko’s monument in the square near medieval ruins called Golden Gates was expressed for the first time in 1908 as alternative to the one near Mykhaylivsky cathedral. The former place was “secular” comparing to the latter, yet the area was still in the part of old, sacred Kiev. Moreover, it fell perfectly into the line of proposed scheme of Ukrainian history since one of Grushevsky’s points was that Kievan Rus was originally a Ukrainian state while Russians emerged on the North few centuries later. Anatoliy Savenko commented trenchantly on this idea: “So, we have a perfect combination. The Golden Gates, these magnificent monuments of Kiev as a great power, the only remnant of Kiev fortress, and nearby this grey and sacred antiquity there will stand a monument of ‘unforgettable Taras’, as if saying that Shevchenko and Golden Gates are links in the history of one and the same nation, one and the same ‘Independent Ukraine’...

Some Ukrainian activists, nevertheless, also found this place inappropriate for the square.

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behind Golden Gates was small and shabby – these people wanted the monument of Shevchenko to be placed in the open space and on the crossroads where a lot of people pass by.

Another supposed place was at the end of Peter’s alley. This spot seemed very attractive to Evhen Chykalenko, for it would comply with the will of Taras Shevchenko to be buried on the slopes of hills near Dnipro river. The monument would be perfectly observed from the ships running down the river. These ships mostly delivered pilgrims to the churches, so that the “audience” was appropriate. However, the problem was that the monument itself would be hardly accessible from the shore. Moreover, peasants were denied access to the “Tsar’s gardens” (nearby area), and even if they weren’t, they wouldn’t “carry their bundles with themselves just to see the monument.”

The aforementioned places were rejected by the Associate Committee, which established on March 17, 1911 a place at Karavaev square (today’s Leo Tolstoy square). This place seemed appealing to some Ukrainian activists because there have been plans to build Ukrainian theatre nearby. This edifice with the monument could have created a nice ensemble. However, there were a lot of critics of this location. Among them Yevhen Chykalenko, who even dropped his membership in the Committee as a protest against this location in 1912. According to Chykalenko, Karavaev square was located in Jewish downtown, there were a lot of rows of shopping stalls, it was filthy and shabby. Peasants would never go to that place, nor intelligent people would. The traffic flow was huge, and this would disturb people while viewing the monument. Even more importantly, it was not relevant for the prominent Ukrainian poet to stand in the middle of the Jewish ghetto –

140 Taras Shevchenko v epistoliariiyi viddilu rukopysiv (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1966). P. 414
claimed Chykalenko\textsuperscript{141}. Yet, these issues did not exhaust all the points of criticism. A group of students had sent a protest letter to the Associate Committee, in which they wrote: “A monument to the best son of Ukrainian nation in a cramped corner in front of Karavaev saunas and in a close vicinity to the office of ‘Kieylvianin’ [emphasis – O.M.] doesn’t fall in a line with a virtue of the Great Kobzar.”\textsuperscript{142}

So, the commercial downtown areas were viewed by Ukrainian nationalists as a punishment, because they wouldn’t expect peasants to go there. By the same token, sacred space of Kiev was closed to them, particularly because Russian nationalists had enough resources to squeeze the monument to Shevchenko out of it.

\textbf{5.6. A Frock vs Sheepcoat: Shevchenko as a Peasant and as a Member of Intelligentsia}

There were four competitions for the artistic design of the monument to Taras Shevchenko were held by the Associate Committee within 4 years – 1910, 1911, 1912, and 1914. None of the projects presented on the competition was recognized as the one which would serve a base for the monument. In fact, the problem was that the organizers didn’t have a clear vision of the idea and general looks that the monument should display. The requirements were stated vaguely; the slogan of the monument and its appearance remained a matter of artists’ imagination.

\textsuperscript{141} Evhen Chykalenko, “Diary”, V. 1., (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004). p. 247
\textsuperscript{142} Cited in: Juriy Chepela. Dyskusiyi navkolo monumenta Tarasovi Shevchenku v Kyyevi naperedodni yoho stolitniogo yuvileyu. MA thesis, manuscript. 2009
Competitors were supplied only with a few photo and painted portraits of Shevchenko. There was a basic controversy settled in these pictures: half of them depicted him in a frock without a hat and with a neat hairdo, another half presented Shevchenko in a sheepskin coat and sheepskin hat. So, on the first type of pictures Shevchenko appeared as member of Intelligentsia, high-class noble artist, while on the other pictures he embodied the Ukrainian peasant.

The majority of the sketches presented on the first competition depicted Shevchenko in his “intelligent” and “bourgeois” style. Naturally, they were criticized for Shevchenko appeared to be an ordinary neat European, so that there was nothing intrinsically Ukrainian about him. “A half-intelligent – a butler, a retired petty officer, a dandy with English hairdo, dressed in frock, holding a walking stick, or wearing top-hat, with handlebars and a French beard”\textsuperscript{143} – characterized this type Yevhen Chykalenko.

In the consequent competitions more artists tended to depict Shevchenko in peasant clothes. But almost all European artists failed to present a decent image of Shevchenko as a peasant. Italian sculptor Antonio Siortino took part in three competitions and in 1914 was about to win grand-prix. He undertook a voyage to Chernigiv gubernia in 1912 and claimed that he had managed to sense the spirit of Ukrainian peasantry. However, his final project was criticized for Shevchenko as a peasant didn’t have a decent and attractive look. Olexandr Rusov complained that Siortino failed to understand that Shevchenko was a graduate of Art Academy and University of St. Vladimir, and not really a representative of a simple folk. Rusov said that instead of a shepherd on the pedestal should be placed a poet

\textsuperscript{143} Evhen Chykalenko, “Diary”, V. 1., (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004). p. 167
and an artist. Chykalenko was even more radical about Siortino’s image: “a poet after a lunch with good booze stretching on a sofa with a cigar.”

One of the most successful designs was presented by a local artist Mykhaylo Havrylko, who took part in every competition. His idea was to pose Shevchenko above an ensemble of the heroes of his poems. This ensemble included two warriors with the swords, two cossacks, a girl with a torchlight, a girl in cossack’s embrace and a hetman. According to Havrylko’s idea, this composition should have symbolized a “protest against everything that oppresses.” Apparently, his project was rejected as an overtly revolutionary. This made Havrylko publish his opinion about jury, he claimed that its members are stuck in “archaic kulturnitstvo” which praised Shevchenko as a romantic “love” poet and ignored a strong political aspect of his works. He became less radical towards 1914 though.

The finalist of the fourth competition was Leonid Sherwood. His work, in fact, didn’t satisfy any of the members of jury, and his design was accepted under the condition that the author would remake it according to the jury’s instructions. The artistic value of his work was not superior, and Associate Committee contemplated the possibility to request redesigning of the sketch by any prominent European artist (such a request was addressed only to August Rodin, whose answer was negative). The strong part of Sherwood’s work was simplicity of an ensemble of historical figures beneath the figure of Shevchenko. Unlike other artists, who wanted to place the poet on the unpolished rock, Sherwood placed him on a conical hill symbolizing “mohyla”. On the foot of this hill there were placed many figures

from Shevchenko’s poetry. It is significant that the Committee found the simplicity of his work as both advantage and disadvantage. On one hand, it would be easily perceived by a peasant. On the other hand, the design lacked artistic value and did not reveal the whole magnificence of Shevchenko.

To conclude, Russian and Ukrainian nationalists went through a long debate about the interpretation of their cultural heritage. The history of Ukraine/Malorussia, its writers and poets, its cultural symbols acquired new meanings which reflected and simultaneously forged the political agenda of Ukrainian and Russian nationalists. The figure of Taras Shevchenko became a bone of discord between them. While Russian nationalists initially praised him as a local man of outstanding personality, they gradually found his works to have an anti-Romanov and even social-revolutionary message. Ukrainian activists dreamed that the monument to Shevchenko would become a masterpiece that would show to the whole world Ukrainian genius. Yet, they fluctuated between the two avatars of Shevchenko which could not be easily reconciled. While Ukrainian activists were predominantly members of intelligentsia, their activity was ultimately directed on peasantry. They couldn’t transpass this barrier, neither could Shevchenko in their imagination, he just failed to be something in between.
Conclusion

There is little doubt that the history of Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms in Kiev in the period between 1908 and 1914 cannot be comprehended separately, as non-related movements. The debate which took place between the two on the pages of their printed editions clearly shows the rivalry and the struggle. Although both groups tried to win the sympathy of the population in the Southwest, none of them by 1914 managed to receive mass support.

The Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists and the Society of Ukrainian Progressives belonged to opposite political camps which were formed during the Revolution of 1905. The KKRN belonged to the “patriotic camp” and identified their political stance as nationalist, conservative and moderately right-wing. The TUP belonged to the “liberationist camp” and regarded themselves as liberal-democrats. This division had a huge significance for the debate between the groups. KKRN represented Ukrainian movement as the one intended to split the Russian Empire and Russian nation into parts. They tried to show that the TUP sang the second part in the chorus of the liberationist movement and were eager to any compromise with any revolutionary force. On the contrary, Ukrainian nationalists tried to depict the KKRN as a deeply reactionary and a very conservative group. TUP portrayed Russian nationalists as agents of reaction whose only purpose was to maintain the existing backward economics and police regime.
In fact, these opposite political stances were deployed in the struggle against each other rather than reflected earnest convictions of their representatives. The political agenda of KKRN comprised a number of statements which could be regarded as liberal, and after the beginning of World War I KKRN allied with liberals. As for TUP, it initially united miscellaneous political groups with people of various political views – ranging from social-democrats on the left to ultra-nationalists on the right. The case of the KKRN and the TUP shows that in the process of the interaction between them and with other political actors there emerged numerous factions within each group, and the political balance was more than shaky.

Both groups were concerned with the fact that the bourgeois class of the Southwestern society is thin and is predominantly Jewish. Both of them acknowledged that this hampered national movement. While for KKRN the solution of the question was to fight against the Jews and form a Russian bourgeois class, Ukrainian nationalists focused on the peasantry. This to a certain extent shaped their strategies. Ukrainian nationalists by means of their newspaper *Rada* appealed to the peasantry and made a number of important undertakings in this direction (“Prosvita”, Cooperative movement), while *Kievlianin* campaigned vehemently against Jewish domination in commerce and culture of urban centers.

The strategies which both groups deployed can be examined on three different levels – imperial, regional and insider. On the imperial level KKRN tried to convert Russian public from central provinces into Russian nationalism. They tried to show that the national question is very important and the future of Russian Empire depends on it. KKRN regarded
themselves as the most devoted Russian nationalists and the most patriotic force. At the same time they didn’t deny their Malorussianness which for them was not only a regional version of Russianness, but was intrinsic Russianness. Ukrainians also wanted to come into notice in the imperial centers. They worked hard to prove that Ukrainians culturally and historically constituted a separate nation, that their language had a right to its own existence. They believed that Ukrainian nature brooded in the souls of the Russified Ukrainians. Malorussianness was regarded as a symptom of the long lasting Russian domination over Ukrainians. For them it was a state of unconsciousness, which meant that one day Malorussians would realize the burden of Russian domination and reveal themselves from it.

On the regional level both groups appealed to local populations and discussed deep problems of the existing regime. Ukrainian nationalists endeavored to show that the problem of the Russian Empire was its centralism and domination of bureaucracy. Ukrainians had to alleviate themselves from the mores of Empire and become politically conscious citizens of an autonomous state. KKRN, on the contrary, emphasized the need to preserve a unity of the Empire and Russian people. They claimed that the Ukrainian national movement was a product of Polish intrigue, which intends to impose artificial institutions and practices on the Malorussian people.

Although KKRN and TUP were rival groups, some of their members knew each other very well and were affiliated in the same institutions. The split between scholars of Malorussian history, literature and ethnography in the University of St. Vladimir had large publicity in the press. The conflicts between them caused huge breakups in the work of the
University. A peculiar example of this is the split during the XIV Archeological Congress in Chernihiv.

Russian and Ukrainian nationalists went through a long debate about the interpretation of their cultural heritage. The history of Ukraine/Malorussia, its writers and poets, its cultural symbols acquired new meanings which reflected and simultaneously forged the political agenda of Ukrainian and Russian nationalists. The figure of Taras Shevchenko became a bone of discord. While Russian nationalists initially praised him as a local man of outstanding personality, they gradually found his works to have an anti-Romanov and even social-revolutionary message. Ukrainian activists dreamed that the monument to Shevchenko would become a masterpiece that would show the whole world Ukrainian genius. Yet, they fluctuated between the two avatars of Shevchenko, peasant and intelligent, which could not be easily reconciled.
Appendix

Table 1. Social representation of KCRN

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1913</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of members</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House owners</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landowners</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway employees</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal professions</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers and Professors</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military servicemen</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrats</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court officials</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior ranks</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
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Table 2. Representation of KKRN in State and Local Authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1913</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Parliament (<em>Duma</em>)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Council</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshal of Nobility</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative board of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
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