CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2010
| Author | Milic, Ivan |
|---|---|
| Title | Causality and the Nature of Mental States |
| Summary | Behaviorist doctrine has been renounced with severe criticisms and followed by functionalism which turned out to be the leading theory in the philosophy of mind. In light of this fact, the aim of my essay is rather controversial. I intend to argue for conceptual behaviorism by discarding functionalist theory on the number of issues. In the first chapter, I outline the main features of functionalism: topic-neutrality, typical causes and effects, inner mental states and the multiple realizability thesis. The anti-functionalist arguments against these features: general arguments, cognitive arguments, triviality arguments and the multiple realizability arguments are evaluated in the second chapter. By accepting the soundness of these objections, I use them as a guide in defending conceptual behaviorism in the philosophy of mind. Finally, in the third chapter, I argue for conceptual and criteria behaviorism, by arguing against rival alternatives. |
| Supervisor | Ben-Yami, Hanoch |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2010/milic_ivan.pdf |
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