

**Position of national parties toward Common Foreign and Security Policy
of the European Union**

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Abstract

This paper researches positions that national political parties in Germany, France and United Kingdom have toward CFSP. The basis for research present parties' manifestos for the last two electoral periods. Comparison of these documents makes it possible to reveal similarities and differences in partisan stances toward CFSP. The attempt is made to measure the difference between parties' positions. The main aim of this paper is to find out why these convergences or divergences occur.

Several hypotheses are made, but only two of them prove to be valid: ideological and historical-cultural. However alone none of these hypotheses is able to produce explanations for the distance between partisan stances. Therefore an attempt is made to combine them and present a joint approach that is able to explain why differences and similarities in parties' positions toward CFSP occur.

List of Abbreviations

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy

EU – European Union

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SPD – Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)

CDU – Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union)

FDP – Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei)

UMP – Union for the popular movement (Union pour un mouvement populaire)

PS – Socialist Party of France (Parti Socialiste)

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Introduction

Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union is one of the most interesting fields for researchers. Before the Amsterdam Treaty all integration theories agreed that integration in this field is impossible due to its specific character of intervention in the sovereignty on nation states. This position had changed in the nineties, when due to the different factors member states of the European Union started development of the CFSP. However one can still speak about special character of this field, while integrational process in it goes slowly and not always successfully. Despite of all developments in the field it is still arguable whether European Union has a single foreign and security policy. Nevertheless cooperation in this field between member states continues, which makes research in it very interesting and actual.

Usual assumption about CFSP is that actors who shape it are national countries with their own national interests. However one can argue that states are not unitary actors and that there are different actors within it with their own interests. This aspect was pointed out by Moravcsik and Putnam. Moravcsik argued that national interest of the state is created on the internal level by the interaction of different groups¹. Therefore national interest is the outcome of difficult process on the national level. Putnam showed that position of state in the international negotiations depends largely on the constellation of interests of actors on the national arena². Therefore one can still argue that there is an objective notion of national interest, but it must be true that it is understood subjectively by different actors.

One of the main actors in the domestic arena is political parties, especially in Europe, where they can form governments. Therefore in Europe parties are probably the

¹ Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31:4 (1993): 473-523

² Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games," *International Organization*, 42:3 (1988), pp. 427-460.

main political actors in the domestic arena, because they are responsible for the elaboration and conduct of the policy in different areas. It is interesting however that usual assumption about the field of foreign policy is that partisan politics has no impact on it. The matters of the so-called "high politics" are so important for the state that difference in partisan views must have no reflection on this field. But if it is parties who elaborate and implement particular policies how can difference of views between parties have no impact on the foreign policy? It is possible here again to argue about the nature of the national interest. But even if it exists objectively, it is not given in this form to the political actors. Therefore parties form their own vision of national interests, which may differ from party to party. So, position of the political actors and first of all political parties must have an influence on the foreign policy of the country.

Unfortunately there is a visible lack of literature on this topic. One of the reasons is that foreign policy is usually said to be not salient issue for the voters. While this may be true for the small countries that have no or little weight in the international arena, in bigger countries issues of foreign policy while being probably not the main concern of voters, definitely have bigger salience and therefore necessitate elaborated positions of political parties. One of the few researchers in this field is Brian C. Rathbun, who argued that parties have influence on the foreign policy issues, because parties are policy-seekers and follow their ideological lines³. Therefore foreign policy of the state depends on the party, controlling the government.

So, if parties are important element in the development of the foreign policy of the state, they must as well have an influence on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. However there is a lack of literature researching this connection. While this issue is very interesting for research, this paper won't go too far in it. The main issue for this thesis is positions of national political parties towards CFSP. Research will

³ Brian C. Rathbun, *Partisan Interventions* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004).

cover only particular countries in the European Union, where issues of foreign policy are hypothesized to be salient for the voters. Namely these countries are Great Britain, Germany and France. The choice of these countries is also explained by the following facts. They are the most populous EU countries, their economies are largest in the Union, and they are top three defence spenders. Moreover several authors speak about them as "Big Three", claiming that position of these countries is crucial for the development of European foreign and security policy.⁴

Understanding the stance of political parties toward CFSP can be a first step in understanding the influence that they have on this field. This research is mainly concern with the factors that influencing positions of political parties toward CFSP. It won't cover the internal processes of decision-making in parties, while it can be a topic for the broader research and can lead in the different direction from one proposed here.

This paper won't cover positions of the parties in the European Parliament as well. One reason for this is that research on the manifestos of the Europarties was already made elsewhere⁵, so there is no need for duplication. Second, parties in the European Parliament don't have elaborated positions on the issues of Common Foreign and Security Policy, because this institute has almost no power in this field. So there is just no need to mention this issue in the party manifestos. Therefore European parties don't have influence on the CFSP and thus present no interest for this study.

Research will be limited to the positions of major parties in these three countries that are either at power in the given period of time, or pretend to it. One reason for it is that only parties that rule the country can influence its foreign policy while being in government. Another reason is that the researches covering difference between position of

⁴ Klaus Brummer, "Superficial, not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy," *European Security* 16:2 (2007): 187.

⁵ Matthew Gabel, Simon Hix, "Defining the EU Political Space: An Empirical Study of the European Elections Manifestos, 1979-1999," *Comparative Political Studies*, 35:8 (2002): 934-964

major and more marginal parties were already conducted (in the sphere of European integration and partly in CFSP as well).⁶

It must be underlined that there were and are still conducted researches on the national parties' positions towards the process of the European integration as a whole. Researchers were more concerned either in overall stance of the political parties towards the issue of integration or to the particular dimension of economic integration, failing to pay attention to the issues of CFSP. Pence is almost the only one who tried to understand party positioning regarding issues of integration in the field on foreign and security policy.⁷ In his work Pence tested several theories that claim to explain party positioning on the CFSP. He used expert surveys dataset and Party Manifesto project.⁸ This means that information used in the research is limited by the period of 1992-1999. There is hardly any work analyzing more recent information. It must be mentioned also that Pence measured only overall support or disapproval of CFSP. His research didn't touch particular dimensions of this issue.

In his paper Pence tested five theories, namely spatial theory, directional theory, cleavage theory, saliency theory and new vs. old politics theory. He added a national factor in his model as well. It seems to be necessary to elaborate a little about the essence of these theories.

The spatial theory argues that voters identify themselves with those parties that have their stance most closely to the preferences of the voter. Therefore parties have to be responsive to the preferences of their constituency. In other words, policy that particular party wants to promote must be a reflection of its voters' preferences, which means an existence of limitation to the stance that party can take. This leads to the fact that parties occupy particular policy area in the left-right continuum.

⁶ E.g. Pence, 2008, Hooghe et al., 2002

⁷ Kris Pence, "Beyond Economic Integration: Explaining National Political Party Positions Toward the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 3-6, 2008).

⁸ Ibidem.

Directional theory was elaborated as a critique of the spatial theory by Rabinowitz and MacDonald.⁹ According to it "voters will chose parties which have similarly directional tendencies in their policy preferences and allow for some variation in the intensity of positions being advanced by the party".¹⁰

Cleavage theory has its roots in the work by Lipset and Rokkan.¹¹ It postulates that parties' stance is a reflection of the ideology and the social structure that form a ground base for them. Therefore in analyzing any events and issues, parties use their ideological and social lenses, which enable them to have long-standing positions with minor changes.

Salience theory argues that parties define particular issues as salient for them and formulate their positions basing on this factor. This theory also incorporates notions from the spatial and cleavage theory by arguing that parties have their own reserved space in a political continuum and underlying the role of ideology.

Another theory adopted for the explanation of party positioning is a new versus old politics distinction. It was suggested by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson under the name of the GAL (green/alternative/libertarian)/TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) position.¹² Authors show that this continuum enables one to view the position of party towards the European integration. Thus, parties closer to TAN pole tend not to support integration processes, being in favour of traditionalist policies. Parties closer to GAL end of the continuum have more positive attitude towards the European Union and its policies, as they are representatives of the new political concerns and in favour of new methods in dealing with them.¹³

⁹ George Rabinowitz, Stuart MacDonald, "A Directional Theory of Issue Voting," *American Political Science Review* 83 (1989): 93-121

¹⁰ Kris Pence, "Beyond Economic Integration: Explaining National Political Party Positions Toward the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 3-6, 2008), 7.

¹¹ Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Crossnational Perspectives*, ed. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967)

¹² Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson, "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (2002): 965-989

¹³ Ibidem

The results of Pence's analysis are interesting. He shows that positions that party takes on the issue of CFSP can be explained in some ways by all theories that were tested. However he claims that the most important factor is nevertheless the type of interests the party represents according to the GAL/TAN spectrum. It means that position of political party towards integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy largely depends on whether party is closer to the so-called "new" politics or "old" one. Interestingly though Pence finds small correspondence between the party stance and its national location. According to his analysis there is statistically significant variation among national political parties in 1999, but it is minimal.¹⁴

Rathbun presented very interesting and insightful research on the influence that political parties have on the national foreign policy.¹⁵ He looked at three countries, namely Great Britain, Germany and France and tried to explain approaches of these countries' governments to the humanitarian interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. He found that role of partisan ideology in the left-right spectrum is very high for the explanation of the stance that partisan government takes on the foreign policy issues. Rathbun reveals several tendencies:

1. Historical experience is of crucial importance for the determination of the leftist parties' position toward use of military in the foreign policy.
2. Position of the party can change due to the important and salient event, but it will still reflect the basic ideological convictions.
3. Rightist parties tend to oppose peace enforcement since they don't connect it with national interest. They can support it if they see a possibility of its instrumentalization.¹⁶

¹⁴ Kris Pence, "Beyond Economic Integration: Explaining National Political Party Positions Toward the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 3-6, 2008), 28

¹⁵ Brian C. Rathbun, *Partisan Interventions* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004).

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 187-206.

Therefore from Rathbun's analysis it can be concluded that national origin of the party plays significant role in the formulation of the political stance.

This paper is aimed at looking at more recent data. Therefore party manifestos for the last two electoral cycles in each of the countries will be used. In Great Britain it will be also interesting and useful to look at manifesto presented for the upcoming elections. Unlike Pence's analysis this paper will concern not only with overall support of CFSP by political party, but will try to analyse partisan approach toward this issue in detail.

First step of research will consist in comparing electoral manifestos of major political parties for the last electoral period. This will enable me first of all to see the position of particular parties on the issue. Second, it will present a ground for comparison of parties' positions inside the countries as well as between states. This comparison is very likely to reveal differences between parties both on the domestic and interstate level. It is also very likely that the degree of difference between parties in one country will not be the same in other states. Therefore there is a necessity to create a scale on which the difference between parties will be measured. This is one of the tasks of the present research. This scale will assess party positions on three dimensions. First is overall assessment of necessity of the integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy. Second dimension concerns vision of main actor in the sphere of security, namely whether the European Union should have its own forces or be under protection of NATO. Third, the strategic vision of European common foreign and security policy in terms of aims and instruments. In this aspect difference can be viewed between more militaristic and civilian approaches, regional or global aims etc.

The primary task of the research is to explain why these differences occur, and why the degree of difference is dissimilar between countries. This statement of the question allows several testable assumptions to be made. Some of them can be applied for the comparison of parties in the domestic arena, some are better for the explanation of

differences between parties from several countries. For this research both dimensions are important.

First, the distinct positions of the parties can be explained by their ideologies. Conservative parties usually tend to be more nationalistic in the sense that they oppose deepening of the integrational process, especially in such vulnerable for the sovereignty spheres as foreign policy and security. Leftist parties are more pro-integrationists. Another distinction that can be made on the left-right continuum is that rightist parties are more "militaristic" (or at least more inclined to the forceful solution of conflict), whereas parties on the left usually argue for peaceful solutions and civilian power.

Second possible explanation is public opinion. If population in the country tends to be more pro-European, position of the parties should reflect this tendency and therefore be more pro-integrationist. If public opinion in particular state is not homogenous, but divided on the issue, it can also serve as an explanation for a difference in the partisan positions toward CFSP. One can argue here that position of the party can depend on the part of the electorate that it represents, but due to the modern tendencies in partisan politics, when parties tend to represent broad electorate, this explanation probably won't be valid.

Third explanation is connected with historical development of the country, while it has an influence on the emergence and development of political parties and overall political culture in the particular state. This hypothesis however requires additional assumptions about political culture in order to explain difference or convergence in positions of parties. In the case of Germany for example, this approach can argue that position of parties in this country are largely under influence of its World War II experience. Therefore common ground for parties must be antimilitaristic rhetoric. But this hypothesis will experience troubles in explaining difference in political views.

Forth explanation can be found in the realm of economy. Position of parties can be explained by the economical and trade significance of the European Union for the particular state. While common foreign policy has a reflection on the foreign trade of the countries, actual economic situation should have it share in the formation of attitudes. Again this hypothesis serves better for the explanation of the convergence of positions, than for the difference.

Fifth explanation is connected with adherence to particular religion within Europe. There are already some studies that show that confession is connected with economic development of the country. If the forth explanation about the role of economic interest in formation of parties' preferences towards CFSP is valid, then it is possible that religious factor can play a role in it. At least it has an impact on overall party politics, since there are parties underlining their confessions. The vivid example is Christian Democrats, which is common to many European countries.

Sixth explanation assumes that geographic location of country as well as its size might matter by formation of parties' preferences. State's position on the map of Europe determines its interests, while one must take into account close neighbors of the country, amount of resources that available to it, size of the population.

To test these hypotheses, I will turn to the practical data from the countries under research. Except from manifestos of the parties itself as a basis for research, there is a necessity of using such sources as public opinion polls, trade statistics of the countries, speeches by the representatives of parties, other official documents of parties and statistics on countries.

Results of this research will show positions of national parties in the European Union toward Common Foreign and Security Policy, whether the apprehension of different parties is same or not across countries and between parties within particular states. While it is very likely that at least some differences will occur, the scale for measuring

these differences will be produced. The explanations for the difference in parties' positions will be tested and it will be attempted to combine them together in order to have a full picture of factors influencing parties' stances toward CFSP. It is very likely that it will be impossible to explain differences in parties' positions by applying only one particular factor. Therefore there is a necessity to combine those explanations that will prove themselves to be valid.

Positions of parties

Great Britain

In the focus of analysis in Great Britain were two major parties – Labour party and Conservative party. Recent events show however that Liberal-democratic party is getting more influence, but this paper won't be concerned with it, because in previous elections Liberals failed to achieve outstanding results and didn't obtain a possibility to influence governmental politics. The period of analysis covers last two election periods, namely 2005 and electoral campaign that started recently in 2010.

Both parties show overall support to the cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy. The key word here is however "cooperation". Neither Labourists, nor Conservatives speak about integration in this sphere. The notion of sovereignty remains central in this connection. Interestingly though the notion of CFSP doesn't appear in the manifesto of British parties. It is always substituted by cooperation. Nevertheless two parties show different degrees of support for the EU's policy in this field. While supporting cooperation in foreign and security policy between European states, Conservatives strongly oppose the idea of creating military capabilities on the European level. Labourists come out in favour of cooperation in the military sphere in the EU in order to be able to cope with tasks that stand in front of the Union. They even state that the EU must have its own military capabilities for operations in the sphere of crisis management and for humanitarian operations, and show support the idea of European battle groups. But Labour party makes a reservation that such capabilities should only be developed in such spheres and cases where NATO as a whole is not concerned. Turning to the topic of transatlantic alliance, both parties admit that NATO is a cornerstone of the European security. But Conservatives seems to be more committed to it. While Labourists state that the European Union actually should have its own forces, which means

development of cooperation in the sphere of foreign and security policy outside the North-Atlantic Alliance (at least partly), Conservative party reject the idea of any cooperation in this sphere that won't be within NATO. They see the development of European defence capabilities only inside the Alliance, underlining that there must be no duplication between two organizations. The notion of duplication can be interpreted also as a reference to the position stated by state secretary of the United States Madeleine Albright in December 1998, known as "three Ds". Speaking about possibility of independent European military capabilities, she said that she welcomes them but with the condition that there will be "no diminution of NATO, no discrimination and no duplication".¹⁷ It is interesting to note that according to the Conservative party NATO is being weakened by the "concerted drive to independent military structure in the EU".¹⁸

In the analysis of threats for the European Union and for Great Britain in particular Labourists and Conservatives converge. List of threats and challenges reminds the one from the European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council in December 2003.¹⁹ There is an acceptance of the fact that it is hardly possible that some state will attack any European state or the European Union as the whole. The actual importance is given to the new type of threats like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and potentially dangerous technologies, extremism, international crime, instability in particular regions and rise of extremism. At the same time both parties acknowledge that modern threats don't have strictly military character. Many problems arouse from economical and social problems. Therefore Labourists and Conservatives alike emphasize danger of the side-effects of globalization (without taming this process as bad) and climate change. From the similar perception of threats follows similar arsenal of proposed instruments for tackling them. Both parties underline the necessity to combine

¹⁷ Madeleine Albright's Press conference at NATO HDQS, December 8, 1998:

http://www.fas.org/man/nato/news/1998/98120904_tlt.html

¹⁸ Conservative manifesto 2010

¹⁹ European Council (2003): "A Secure Europe in a Better World" - a European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council on December 12, 2003 - <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

militaristic and civilian approaches. However in partisan manifestos under the notion army usually it is British army that is usually understood not any European forces. Also both parties adhere to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, putting significant weight on the fact that Great Britain is a nuclear power.

Germany

Political arena in Germany enables one to concentrate analysis on the two main parties, namely Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU). After the last elections however the coalition government of CDU and Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) was formed, so there is a necessity to take their position into account as well. However it is plausible to assume that the point of view of FDP was reflected in the coalition agreement between this party and CDU. At least there are definitely no statements that this party won't support. So, in this paper position of FDP on the issues of foreign and security policy of the European Union won't be treated as different from that of CDU, especially taking into account the fact that leader of FDP Guido Westerwelle took the post of foreign minister in the new government.

German parties show their overall support for the integration in the field of foreign and security policy in the European Union. And it is exactly the integration that they speak of. Positions of CDU and SPD converge here, as they see their goal in strengthening of the EU and enabling it to speak with one strong voice in the international arena. They want to see Europe strong and full-fledged actor that would be seen as an equal partner to the United States. SPD even claims that CFSP is a prerequisite for building such equal transatlantic partnership.²⁰ In the question of Europe's own military capabilities CDU looks more reserved. It stated that the European Union should have its own army, but it is

²⁰ SPD manifesto 2009

a long term goal and there is a long way to it. Nevertheless it is necessary to move in this direction. SPD expresses its position more clear, arguing for Europe's military capabilities in the field of humanitarian and crisis management operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged. Both parties recognize North-Atlantic Alliance as the cornerstone of the security in the Europe. Having admitted this however neither CDU nor SPD state that NATO must be the only provider of security and defence on the European continent. On the contrary, without rejecting the necessity of the development of the cooperation within the Alliance, both parties argue for the stronger role of the EU in its own defence, in order to turn relations between two organizations into those of equal partnership.

In the listing of threats for the European Union and for Germany both parties show similar attitudes with minor differences. CDU and SPD also as it was the case in Great Britain stay in line with the European Security Strategy, making an accent on the new threats: terrorism, proliferation of WMD, local conflicts, side effects of globalization (with an accent on poverty) and climate change. As threats CDU also underlines resource dependence and increasing migration. SPD in its turn stresses proliferation of conventional arms as well as WMD and tendency for the decay of state monopoly on violence.

Both parties agree to the priority of civilian instruments in tackling these threats. Military capabilities are referred to as a means of last resort, when all other instruments failed to achieve necessary goals. While agreeing in general, parties somewhat diverge in particular instruments that should be applied. CDU underlines the importance of the neighborhood policy, stating that security and stability in the neighboring countries are of vital importance. It must be reached by the economic means sometimes with a prospect of enlargement of the EU. SPD, arguing mainly in the same line makes an accent on promoting the rule of law and democracy together with the economic aid. This party also stresses the importance of Russia for the European security. Therefore one of their proposals is a common security field that will include USA, Canada and Russia at the

same time – "common security field from Vancouver to Vladivostok".²¹ SPD stresses also the necessity of rejection of the nuclear weapons.

France

In France it is also possible to single out two leading parties - Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP) and Parti Socialiste (PS). Other parties usually don't get high percentage of votes (at least didn't get in last two electoral rounds). The French case is interesting, because of the unexpectedly low salience of the European topics in the elections. Drake shows that for French voters "the salience of Europe as a distinct and separate issue was...low...in 2002".²² In the election of 2007 topics that had top places on the electoral agenda were also closer to domestic politics than to the European issues.²³ Drake advances two arguments that can serve as a reason for this phenomenon: "either 'Europe' was so far integrated into the French national sense of identity and purpose that it was deemed irrelevant as a separate issue; or, on the contrary, Europe was still too controversial an issue...for candidates to risk their electoral chances by making an issue of it".²⁴ She however couldn't find enough support either for the first or for the second argument.

Despite the overall ignoring of the European issues, both parties actually mentioned CFSP in their manifesto even if not as an issue of first or second importance. PS mentions common foreign and security policy as an important part of the Building of the European Union. It underlines the necessity of strengthening of the single Europe that could act in the international arena with one voice and build equal partnership with United

²¹ SPD manifesto 2009

²² Helen Drake, "'Europe' in the 2002 French elections" (paper presented for the 8th EUSA Biennial International Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, USA, March 27-29, 2003), 2-3

²³ Colette Ysmal, "France," *European Journal of Political Research* 47 (2008): 976-984

²⁴ Helen Drake, "'Europe' in the 2002 French elections" (paper presented for the 8th EUSA Biennial International Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, USA, March 27-29, 2003), 19

States. Without ever mentioning NATO, PS shows support for the European military forces that would be engaged in crisis management.

UMP states that it will "contribute to the set-up of the real common foreign policy and reinforce synergy in the area of defence policy."²⁵ It underlines that France's future is in Europe. USA and NATO are not mentioned in their manifestos as well. From the positions taken by the French representatives on the European Convention it is also possible to understand partisan stance of UMP toward CFSP. Thus Dominique de Villepin stated that military actions of the European Union could make sense only if the limited number of decision-makers is involved, therefore CFSP should remain an intergovernmental area, where it is states who can actually influence and form it, but not European bureaucracy. At the same time they argue for the provisions for strengthened cooperation in this field.²⁶ Both parties also stress that France should take leading position in the EU; and with strong Europe it can exert its influence in the international arena.

As threats for the Europe PS underlines the side effects of globalization and in particular – poverty and widening gap between northern and southern countries. Logically it stems from here that as main instruments for tackling such threats socialists see active aid for the poor and developing countries and promotion of European values. However, military forces are also mentioned as an important instrument for the European foreign policy.

UMP's manifestos also contain analysis of threats that is very much the same as in socialist's ones, just without very strong emphasis on the problems of poverty and poor countries.

Positions of all six parties under analysis are summarized in the following table.

Table 1. Positions of the national parties towards CFSP.

²⁵ UMP declaration

²⁶ Christian Lequesne, "French views on the European Convention"(brief in the U.S.–France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution, January, 2003), 4

Party/Dimension	Overall support	Main actor	Strategic vision: threats	Strategic vision: instruments
Labour Party	Support of cooperation in a field of defence and foreign policy. No mentioning of CFSP and ESDP in manifestos.	NATO is a cornerstone of the European security. Europe's military capabilities for humanitarian and crisis management operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged. Support EU battle groups	Terrorism, proliferation of WMD and their use by rogue states or terrorists; climate change; poverty, extremism, international crime	Spreading liberty & justice overseas; armed forces as an instrument of advancing British interests and values. Aid, conflict prevention. Nuclear deterrence.
Conservative Party	Support of cooperation in a field of defence and foreign policy. Close to Intergovernmentalism. No mention of CFSP in text, mention of ESDP	NATO is a cornerstone of the European security. Adherence to the Atlantic alliance. EU is on the 2 nd place. No duplication between NATO and ESDP. Rejection of the idea of European army. Defence cooperation only inside NATO.	Natural hazards. Resource dependence. Population increase. Climate change. Side-effects of globalization. Conflicts, terrorism, instability. Proliferation of dangerous technologies. international crime	Theme of revival of national army. Underlined is its necessity. Nuclear deterrent. Civilian instruments in addition to the military ones.
CDU/CSU	Support for integration in this field.	NATO is a cornerstone of European security. European army is a long-term goal. Partner relationship with US and NATO.	Resource dependence. Conflicts (also in the neighborhood), side-effects of globalization, Climate change.	Militaristic and civilian instruments with priority to the latter
SPD	CFSP is a prerequisite for equal transatlantic partnership.	NATO is a cornerstone of European security. There is a necessity for the stronger EU in the field of foreign and security policy. Europe's military capabilities for humanitarian and crisis management operations where NATO as a whole	Proliferation of WMD and conventional arms. Decay of state monopoly on violence. Local conflicts. Terrorism. Poverty.	Use of military force as the last argument when all other instruments were ineffective. Conflict prevention. Rule of law. Support of democracy. Economic aid.

		is not engaged. Common security space including US and Russia		
PS	Mentioning CFSP in 2002 as an important part if the European building	Strengthen the role of the EU in the international arena. More integration and effectiveness. One voice for EU. Equal partnership with US. Necessity of European military forces for crisis management	Side effects of globalization	Necessity of military forces. Aid, diplomacy.
UMP	contribute to the set-up of a real common foreign policy, reinforce synergies in the area of defense	France's future is within Europe	Side effects of globalization	Aid, diplomacy

Comparing the parties' stances.

Comparison of parties' manifestos enables one to single out several dimensions on which partisan stances can be compared.

First dimension is overall support for the CFSP. It comes as no surprise that no party among those under analysis express opposition to the idea that EU should have its foreign, security and defence policy dimension. Different are views of the parties on the question of the form that this dimension should take. It is possible to place parties on the continuum from the support of cooperation and support for the integration in this sphere. Strongest differentiation will be between the national states. On the country level positions of parties are more convergent to each other on this issue than to the position of the parties from another country. Thus British parties don't even mention CFSP, adhering strictly to

the notion of cooperation. At the same time German parties treat the integration in the field of foreign and security policy as a matter of crucial importance for the future of the EU. French parties are closer to the "integrationist" part of the continuum. They express support for the integration and underline the necessity of the common European policy in this field.

Difference that exists between parties on the country level in this dimension can be said to be minimal and express itself mainly in different shades. So, it can be said that there is a national consensus among leading parties in each of the three countries under analysis on the issue of general necessity of CFSP.

Second dimension is parties' stance on the issue of the main actor in the questions of European security and defence. Two extremes here are NATO as organization that is solely responsible for the security on the continent and the European Union itself that can take this task from the hands of the Alliance. Very important aspect here is the question of the independent military structure within the EU. Acknowledging the NATO as the main and the only actor in the field of European security and defence entails the rejection of the idea of the independent European military capabilities. If the EU is claimed to be the maker of its own security, then it should have the possibility to act independently.

Interestingly, while it is possible to find parties on one extreme, there is no one on the other. Four from six parties under analysis state that NATO is a cornerstone of the European security and that its role in the continent is crucial. British conservative party takes the places directly on the one of the extremes, arguing that any European cooperation in the field of security and defence must be carried out only within NATO. They stand for the absence of any duplication between capabilities and tasks of the Alliance and the European Union. Strict adherence to NATO leads to the rejection of any military capabilities outside this organization. It was mentioned above that this party actually sees threat for the Alliance in the attempts of the EU to have its own forces.

Representatives of the same country, the Labourists, however, are more inclined to the more independent EU. Without rejecting the primacy of NATO for the security of the continent, this party acknowledges the fact that the EU should develop integration in the military sphere to be able to act in those cases where NATO as a whole is not concerned. So, Labour party express position more integrationist in this question than Conservatives, but still rather limited.

German parties are in the middle of the continuum. Without any surprise they underline that NATO is a cornerstone of the European security. At the same time both CDU and SPD not only acknowledge the necessity for the independent European military capabilities in the area where NATO as a whole is not involved, but set the formation of the European army as a long term goal that should be reached. Leading German parties also wish to see the EU speaking with a single voice in the international arena as an equal partner of the USA. Almost similar position has French Socialist party. They also argue for the development of military cooperation and strong European Union that will be able to act on equal with the US on the world stage. However socialists in France don't go too far to argue for the necessity of the European army even as a long term goal. This remark makes position of PS less integrationists then that of CDU and SPD. At the same time it doesn't make it closer to NATO pole. The Alliance is simply not mentioned in party manifestos. It doesn't appear in the manifestos of UMP as well. Position of this party on the question is rather vague, but it can be concluded that they support independent military cooperation in the European Union. So it is possible to put French parties closer then German parties to the EU extreme of the continuum. However the vagueness of the wordings doesn't let one to put either PS or UMP to the extreme as an absolute supporter of the European Union as an independent actor.

So, the tendency to the differences between states is clear in this dimension, with national parties occupying separate places on the continuum. However it is possible to

differentiate positions of the parties on the country level as well. While differences among parties in Germany and France are almost minimal, British Labourists are definitely closer to the CDU and SPD on the continuum than to the Conservative party.

Third dimension concerns with parties' strategic views on the European security. What do parties consider as threats to the European Union and what instruments they propose to apply to deal with them? Political parties in three countries under analysis show rare unanimity in the definition of threats for the European Union and for their respective states. All of them listed the same threats that were stated in the European Security Strategy, issued in December 2003. Among them are terrorism, proliferation of WMD and potentially dangerous technologies (with underlined danger that these weapons can be used by rogue states or terrorist groups), climate change, side effects of globalization (poverty, migration, gap in development between North and South), local conflicts, international crime and resource dependence. The difference is in degree of priority given by the different parties to the different threats. Thus socialists are more concerned with the global development and negative effects of globalization, whereas more rightist parties don't underline this issue among others.

In the question of instruments that should be used positions of the parties are also not far from each other. All six parties acknowledge the necessity of the combination of military and civilian means. But they put different weight on one or another side of it, varying from country to country. Both German parties acknowledge use of military only as an instrument of last resort. CDU and SPD clearly indicate the priority of civilian means in tackling the threats. British parties don't put the priority clearly on the military instruments. However Conservative party underlines the crucial necessity of army for dealing with modern challenges. Failing to show support for independent European military capabilities Tories speak primarily about British army, weakly connecting it to the defence of the European interests. As for non-military instruments, Conservatives vaguely

point at their secondary place in the hierarchy of means, stating that "in addition to military assets, the techniques that need to be brought to bear to gain advantage are likely to include a quite wide ranging number of civilian policy instruments".²⁷ Labour party also underlines importance that British army has for its country, but on the European level it favours the use of primary civilian instruments that include promotion of liberties, democracy and rule of law, aid to developing countries and diplomacy. The use of military power is however not seen as a mean of last resort. Referring to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, Labourists insist in the necessity of using hard power in those regions in order to fight terrorism and extremism. At the same time military instruments should be balanced by civilian means.

French parties also don't put priority either to the military or civilian instruments. Both UMP and PS underline the necessity of using hard power in some circumstances and soft power in another. They point out the necessity of having balance between them and clear differentiation in which situation it is more suitable to give priority either to military or to civilian means.

It is necessary to underline that British and French parties mention the importance of their nuclear programs, pointing out that nuclear deterrence in the modern world is a factor that can't be neglected. Both parties from Germany as a country that don't have nuclear weapons argue for the abolishment of it and stress the impossibility of its usage after the Second World War.

Picture obtained as the result of the party manifestos' analysis shows that on several dimensions connected with CFSP there are differences in party positions on country and interstate levels. At the same time several dimensions show consensus that appeared both on the country and European levels.

²⁷ Conservative manifesto

Hypothesis 1. Ideology

There were several attempts to link positions that political parties have on the left-right continuum or on the GAL/TAN continuum to the consequent stances on the foreign policy issues. In the above mentioned work Hooghe et al. test the relationship between left/right location of the party and support for the European integration.²⁸ Authors find that such relation exists. They show that parties located closer to left/right extremes tend to be more Euro-skeptical than those parties that are situated closer to center. This influence is stronger in issues that involve the basic division between more regulated or more liberal market policies. Their major finding is that more than left/right positioning, location on the GAL/TAN continuum has strong effect on the party positioning towards European integration. Effect is visible also on the major parties, not only with those who take extreme positions. According to authors even centrist parties that have inclination towards TAN pole (e.g. Conservatives in Great Britain or French Gaullists) tend to be Euro-skeptical.²⁹ Their core values are those including such notions as traditions and sovereignty, therefore integration is viewed more like danger that can destroy what they stand for.

Rathbun tried to project traditional right/left continuum on the partisan stance in foreign policy issues. According to him, positions that political parties have in foreign policy can be defined in three continua. First measures the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the national interest. Inclusiveness means that welfare of other countries is important for the security and welfare of their own country, whereas exclusiveness requires paying attention only to those issues in foreign policy that have direct impact for the country's interest and well-being.

Second continuum proposed by Rathbun measures the degree to which party finds it appropriate to use force in the foreign policy. Third dimension is one with

²⁸ Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson, "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (2002), 985

²⁹ *Ibidem*, 981

multilateralism and unilateralism as the extremes. For Rathbun it means the choice between commitment to particular international institutions and norms and preference to act independently with less regard to international institutions and cooperation.³⁰

Basing on these three continua Rathbun concludes that domestic preferences on the left/right continuum should be projected to the foreign policy issues in the following way. Leftist parties with their ideological accent on equality, non-acceptance of coercive measures from government are more inclusive, antimilitarist and multilateralist. Accordingly, parties to the right that are characterized by ideological stress on hierarchy, order and national sovereignty are said to be more exclusive, militarist and unilateralist.³¹

It is interesting to see now whether all these findings can be projected on the positions that parties have towards CFSP. First of all it is necessary to define the ideological family to which all 6 parties under analysis belong. Conservative party of the United Kingdom is defined as being center-right with ideological roots in conservatism and libertarianism. French UMP is also being positioned as center-right (however more right than Conservatives), with ideology of Gaullism and liberal conservatism. Ideas of Christian democracy also have some influence on the programs of this party. CDU as it follows from its name is a Christian democratic party with ideological roots in liberal conservatism as well. CDU is usually being positioned as center-right. Labour party of UK, SPD and PS are all being positioned as centre-left and as ideological adherents of social democracy and democratic socialism. It should be noted that SPD and Labourists are also representatives of the "Third Way" ideology that has as its way to establish a middle ideology between rightist and leftist ideas. According to this distribution it should be true that Conservative party, UMP and CDU will show more convergence among them and have positions different from those of Labourists, SPD and PS. Within these "camps" positions of UMP and CDU must be closer to each other than to the position of

³⁰ Brian C. Rathbun, *Partisan Interventions* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 19-20

³¹ Ibidem, 21-23

Conservatives, since they share ideology of Christian democracy (although to different degree). Due to the same logic Labourists should be closer to SPD as they are both representatives of the "Third Way" ideology.

Application of the findings of Rathbun and Hooghe et al should produce the following picture. British Conservative party should not show support for integration in the field of foreign and security policy as it is closer to TAN pole and also is more unilateralist in its approaches. UMP and CDU are expected to show more support for the integration then Conservatives, with CDU being more pro-integrative as the closest rightist party to the middle. It should be also true that all three parties must be in favour of military instruments in solution of international problems. Leftist parties (Labourists, SPD and PS) should show more support for the integration then rightist parties and be in favour of civilian instruments in foreign policy.

Analysis of parties' manifestos shows that ideological cut can provide only partial explanation for stances that parties take towards CFSP. Thus positions concerning necessity of integration in this sphere generally don't fit ideological lines well. British Labourists don't show the predicted support for it, being however more pro-integrationist then Conservatives, but definitely less then UMP and CDU. At the same time CDU in the question of the necessity of the integration in foreign and security policy is closer to the "integrationist" pole of the continuum then UMP (which was predicted) and PS (which is not explained by the ideology).

Ideological explanation can't cope with parties' positions towards NATO, whereas four from six countries mention it as a cornerstone for the European security. Only French parties (both right and left) don't mention NATO in their manifestos at all. It also fails to explain why Labourists support NATO as a main actor in the field of security in Europe.

Ideological prognoses are not fully confirmed in the dimension of instruments that should be applied for tackling the threats as well. Indeed parties manifestos' show that

rightist parties are more inclined (or at least don't have anything against) to apply military forces, whereas leftist parties are in favour of using them only if civilian instruments would fail. But there are two outliers, namely CDU and Labourists that show positions different from what was expected. Christian Democrats take leftist stand, claiming that military power must be an instrument of last resort. Labour party stress the importance of military means and nuclear power for the promotion of security.

The analysis of threats is also can be explained safely by partisan ideology, because it is visible that leftist parties put more importance on the negative effects of globalization, whereas rightist parties don't underline this issue among others.

Thus it can be concluded that predictions based on the parties' positions on the right/left or GAL/TAN continua don't fully correspond with actual positions that major parties in Great Britain, France and Germany take towards CFSP. It is more likely that positioning of parties on this particular continuum can yield more significant result when not only major but also more marginal parties are viewed. For the research limited with major parties there is a necessity for supplementary explanation. Only analysis of threats and instruments for tackling them applied by the parties coincide with predictions, but also not completely. On other dimensions particular parties tend to take stances that are viewed as non-characteristic for their announced ideology.

Hypotheses 2. Public opinion

Turning to the issue of public support for the CFSP, Pence finds support from statistical analysis for two hypotheses. First is that parties pursue policy towards CFSP that is congruent with their median supporter. Second finds a correlation between increase

of party's share of votes and its increase in support for the CFSP.³² From these findings a hypothesis can be derived that if level of public support for the common European foreign policy is high in particular country, major parties in this country should also show their support for it. Also parties will reflect opinion of voters in their manifestos.

Surveys of public opinion (like Eurobarometer) help to understand similarities and differences across countries as well as some common trends. It is usually understood that European citizens show general support for the CFSP. Brummer shows that it is not right to speak about any European opinion, because there are big differences across countries. Thus there is a huge gap between citizens in member states, who are top supporters of CFSP (Greece and Slovenia – 80 per cent) and those with least level of support (United Kingdom – only 48 per cent).³³ Another difference can be seen between public opinion in NATO-members and non-aligned countries. Support for European defence is above European average by two points, whereas in non-NATO countries it is below by 7 points.³⁴ Kernic et al. concludes on the basis of public opinion research that differences among countries can be generalized in the following way. French appear to be generally supportive of the European foreign and defence policy. British as one may expect are presented as Eurosceptics. Germans show strong commitment to peaceful conflict resolution, with readiness for the integration in the European military and defence structures.³⁵ However there are several trends that are similar across all European countries. Thus the main fears that Europeans express is that of non-military threats (among most mentioned terrorism, crime and accident at nuclear plant).³⁶ There is also a

³² Kris Pence, "Beyond Economic Integration: Explaining National Political Party Positions Toward the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 3-6, 2008): 28

³³ Klaus Brummer, "Superficial, not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy," *European Security* 16:2 (2007): 189-190

³⁴ Ibidem, 190

³⁵ Gerhard Kuemmel, review of *Public Opinion on European Security and Defence. A Survey of European Trends and Public Attitudes Toward CFSP and ESDP* (Studies for Military Pedagogy, Military Science & Security Policy, Vol. 7), by Franz Kernic, Jean Callaghan, and Phellippe Manigart, *Armed Force & Society*, Fall 2003, 169

³⁶ Ibidem, 168

general negative attitude towards military means in solution of conflicts, with clear preference for civilian means (86 per cent across Europe).³⁷ There is also no majority in the European states on the question of creation of the supranational European army, with 37 per cent of European citizens opting for having rapid reaction force in addition to national armies and only 20 per cent thinking that truly integrated European army is necessary.³⁸

All in all opinion polls show that knowledge about activities of the EU in fields of foreign and security policy is scant, with minority of citizens actually showing interest in it. Another interesting fact is that these fields are perceived by people as not having priority. They tend to be concerned firstly with domestic situation and economic issues. Therefore despite some existing correlations between public opinion and positions of political parties (in the sphere of threats analysis, use of instruments, overall assessment of CFSP and the role of NATO), it is hard to argue that later are formed because of the firsts. Hellstroem provides a statistical analysis of stances taken by parties and their electorates. He finds that actually it is political elites and political parties that form perception of the European integration at voters.³⁹ According to his analysis opinion of electorate has almost no influence on stances taken by party on the issue of the European integration, but parties are actually able to form public opinion on such issues. The same is true for the common policies of the European Union and for the CFSP in particular, while voters just don't show interests in them and reflect lack of knowledge about these issues. Therefore it is even easier for parties to shape attitudes toward it.

All above stated leads to the conclusion that despite the fact that there exist some correlations between public opinion and parties' stances on the issue of CFSP, it is

³⁷ Klaus Brummer, "Superficial, not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy," *European Security* 16:2 (2007): 192

³⁸ Gerhard Kuemmel, review of *Public Opinion on European Security and Defence. A Survey of European Trends and Public Attitudes Toward CFSP and ESDP* (Studies for Military Pedagogy, Military Science & Security Policy, Vol. 7), by Franz Kernic, Jean Callaghan, and Phellippe Manigart, *Armed Force & Society*, Fall 2003, 169

³⁹ Johan Hellstroem, "Re-examining the party-electorate linkages on European integration," *Journal of European Public Policy* 15:8 (2008): 1139

impossible to argue that public opinion influences positions taken by parties. Recent studies show that opposite is more probable to be true.

Hypothesis 3. Historical-cultural development

As it was noticed in the analysis of parties' stances toward CFSP there exist particular similarities on the country level. On several questions parties tend to converge not on the basis of their ideological family. The similarities are sooner traced across the national lines. This fact requires the examination of the national factors in partisan politics. The hypothesis can be formulated that national political culture has strong influence on the positions that major parties take toward CFSP. The classic formulation of the term "political culture" is given by Almond and Verba – it is "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation".⁴⁰ In general it is used for the reference to the system of beliefs and values used by nation. Berger notes that these beliefs are engaged in the reciprocal process. They are influenced by the external forces and events, but at the same time exactly they shape patterns for understanding and interpreting these events and forces inside the society.⁴¹

It is possible to separate two distinct approaches to the study of political cultures. First is anthropological approach. It deals with a culture on the level of deep structures of a society, like language, religion, way of socialization. Such notion of the culture requires a profound change in the very structure of society in order to be changed itself. Another approach is historical-cultural. It claims that orientations and beliefs can be born out of particular historical events and experiences that nation overcomes as a whole. The very important notion for this approach is interpretation. All historical events always can be

⁴⁰ Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), 13

⁴¹ Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: national security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 9

treated in different ways; therefore it is not only event itself, but also its interpretation in one or another direction that influence political culture. Rathbun notes that for the security policy and for the large part of the foreign policy such an experience for the nation is war.⁴² Outcome of it is highly influential for the whole society not only in terms of material losses, but in the moral and psychological senses as well. Exactly such an experience is able to shape nation's general attitude toward the ways and means with which their country should carry out foreign policy (in terms of defence and security as well). Once shaped, political culture appears to be highly stable and very difficult to change. In a short run it can be changed by practically the same experience that is able to create it. But this experience must be strong enough to discredit previously adopted set of beliefs and values.

Berger introduces the concept of political–military culture to describe such attitudes.⁴³ It is supposed to embody nation's orientation toward use of force in international relations, conceptions of defence and different security issues. This concept embraces the political field of countries, where political parties act. Therefore as very important political actors they should reflect elements of the political-military culture. As it was mentioned earlier Rathbun finds a strong influence of the historical events on the development of leftist parties' stances toward possibility of usage of the military instruments in international arena.⁴⁴ He however doesn't make such claim about rightist parties. But if they share fundamentally the same political-military culture they should also reflect the experience that nation underwent and probably in not very different way.

With war being the most influential event in this respect that can have the huge impact on nation's political-military culture, there are several other possibilities that can influence nation's orientation in the long run. After the Second World War that without

⁴² Brian C. Rathbun, *Partisan Interventions* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 9

⁴³ Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: national security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 15

⁴⁴ Brian C. Rathbun, *Partisan Interventions* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 187-206

saying changed attitudes of many people toward many different issues, probably the most influencing experience was that of the Cold War. It lasted for more than 40 years with several possibilities to turn into hot war. Almost constant tension and life in conditions of two hostile blocks should have made an impact on the political-military cultures of three countries under scrutiny.

Duffield lists two conditions under which political culture is likely to have the biggest influence on policy pursued by state. First is a situation in international arena, which is characterized by high level of complexity and uncertainty. This was exactly the circumstances in Europe (and probably in the whole world) after the end of the Cold War. Second condition named by Duffield is the situation when decision-making in foreign and security policy is not a prerogative of one person or small group.⁴⁵

There is a necessity to use the concepts of political and political-military cultures with cautiousness. It is definitely not able to explain foreign and security stances by political forces in the country by itself. But it can show the frames within which the decisions can be taken. Political culture forms an arsenal of themes and concepts that can be used in the national political arena and it also defines unacceptable rhetoric. So, it can be theorized that stances taken by national parties toward CFSP are influenced by the political–military culture of their country, especially if positions of major parties converge.

The comparison of parties' manifesto revealed very interesting tendency. Despite the fact that parties do have differences in their positions towards CFSP on the country level, there is only one case when a party is closer with its stance to the party from another country. This is the case with Labour party in Great Britain, which is closer to German parties on the issues of main actor in the European security and military capabilities of the European Union. In all other dimensions there is a tendency for convergence of parties'

⁴⁵ John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: political culture, international institutions, and German Security Policy after unification* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 27-28

positions inside the country. Therefore national origin of the party definitely plays an important role in the formulation of the partisan stance towards CFSP.

Traditional example for the development of political-military culture is Germany after the Second World War. Experience of Nazi regime and loss in the war created necessary experience for shaping it. Germany turned to path of being a "civilian power". As Pradetto mentions it, since the end of the Second World War German political culture was characterized by consensus, commitment to the Western civilization, renunciation of any kind of German special way (Sonderweg), aspiration for reliability and skepticism toward use of military power in foreign policy.⁴⁶ These patterns of political culture were even fixed in the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of FRG. It contains articles that clearly express commitments to peaceful solution of conflicts, cooperative internationalism and respect for human rights.⁴⁷ These elements of German political culture can be viewed also from the rational point of view. After two world wars, the only way for this country to gain influence in Europe and in the world was to show adherence to cooperation with other Western democracies and refuse any military way of gaining benefits in the international arena. While it is arguable who is to blame for the beginning of the First World War, Hitler's regime was without any doubt accused by the world society of having waged the Second World War. And there still was a traditional fear that Germany can become powerful again for starting another war. So for the political elites it was a rational step to adopt such culture, especially taking into account that previous attempts to gain influence in Europe with military means failed catastrophically for Germany. Therefore devoting oneself to the civilian power was the best option.

In favour of culturalist hypothesis speaks also the fact that after the end of the Cold War and reunification of Germany this country was expected to develop as a "normal"

⁴⁶ August Pradetto, "The Polity of German Foreign Policy: Changes since Unification," in *Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*, ed. Hanns W. Maull (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 21

⁴⁷ Ibidem, 16

powerful state, with a significant attention to the use of military forces. However FRG disapproved such expectations by continuing its development in the same pattern as it was before. Disputable here can be the changing pattern of non-usage of Bundeswehr outside the country in the nineties. German troops took part (and are taking nowadays) in several NATO-led operations. Kosovo was actually the first groundbreaking experience for this country. But two factors should be taken into account here. First of all, this change in political-military culture wasn't an easy one for both parties, and for people. There even had to be a ruling from the Constitutional court that allowed the participation of Bundeswehr in the mission and internal debates in both major parties. Second, this turn didn't oppose all other feature of German political-military culture. Soldiers of Bundeswehr were used only in the NATO or EU-led peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions. It shows the development of German adherence to the integrational processes in the first place and to the human rights and Western values in general in the second. These characteristic features stay unchanged and form partisan attitude towards foreign policy.

Positions that both major German parties take toward CFSP in their manifestos reflect exactly the patterns of national political-military culture that are pointed out by analysts. Aspiration for consensus and integration into Western structures favored the convergence of parties' positions. Agreement between SPD and CDU exists on all major questions, and there is no contradictions in general lines. Differences that exist are rather minor and concern concrete situations but don't influence the main patterns of partisan attitude towards CFSP. Both parties underline the necessity of European integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy. At the same time they acknowledge NATO as a keystone of the European security. It shows the adherence of major German parties to cooperation with western democracies. Continuing to stand on principles of pacifism, CDU and SPD see in NATO a provider of security for the continent that doesn't necessitate the development of national forces. However being situated in Europe, major

German parties attach big importance to the European integration in the military sphere as well, as a way of getting influence through Europe. Historical past and national culture leave open only one way for exerting power – through integration with other European countries. Therefore building of European military forces would promote the stability and security in the region and give more strength to the EU. Both major political parties in Germany seem to embrace this political-military culture and in questions of foreign and security policy follow strictly integrationist path.

Political-military culture that developed in France is also one of the consensus in the sphere of foreign and security policy. The major influence in this country has Gaullist ideology. It developed after the Second World War and what was perceived as a humiliation of France. There was a necessity (at least in de Gaulle's view) to restore the power that the country had before and return to the place among great powers where France should belong. Therefore main conceptions for Gaullism are rang (rank) and grandeur.⁴⁸ Such understanding of French place and role in the world leads to particular stances in foreign policy. Usual expression of Gaullism is an aspiration for the strong and independent France, which leads sometimes to tensions within NATO (e.g. French departure from Alliance's military structure), adherence to independent nuclear program. Characteristic is also Gaullist view on the European integration. Europe is seen as entity that should be a power by itself in the international arena. This also assumes leading role of France in the EU. Following this line Gaullist ideology necessitates a support for CFSP and ESDP as means for making Europe stronger.

What is especially interesting in this ideology is the fact that it can be called as a part of French political culture and the main feature of political-military culture. As Gordon underlines, Gaullism is a doctrine accepted by a wide majority of citizens and

⁴⁸ Vivien Schmidt, "Trapped by their ideas: French elites' discourses of European integration and globalization," *Journal of European Public Policy* 14:7 (2007): 998

politicians as a national consensus.⁴⁹ Both leftist and rightist parties adopted it as their own policy guidelines and stick to it in when formulating positions on foreign and security policy.

Analysis of French parties' manifestos confirms this culturalist hypothesis. Indeed two major French parties – UMP and PS have convergent positions toward CFSP. Moreover their positions follow the Gaullist line, despite the fact that only UMP positions itself as the Gaullist party, while PS are socialists. Both parties express their desire for strengthening the EU and its role in the international arena. UMP and PS alike stress the necessity for the military integration in the union as one of the most important means for achieving stronger position for Europe in the world. Despite the fact that they represent a member of NATO, none of parties mentions the Alliance as a cornerstone of European security in their manifestos. There is a clear aspiration for the more independent and strong Europe in questions of foreign, security and defence policy. Important feature of parties' position is mentioning of the leading role that France should play in European Union and consequently in the world. This position sounds very Gaullist as well. Interesting however is the fact that despite sharing the main ideas and principles of Gaullism in foreign and security policy, parties tend to use different lexicon. UMP still adheres to the Gaullist notions of "rang" and "grandeur", continuing to use them in party's manifestos. PS however avoids mentioning of these concepts in their official documents. This is probably the main difference that can be traced in approaches of two parties towards CFSP.

In case of Great Britain, notion of political-military culture ceases to be a good explanatory for convergence or divergence in partisan positions towards CFSP. Traditional view of British political-military culture presupposes several features. First of all there is a big attention devoted to the notion of national sovereignty that causes suspicion towards

⁴⁹ Philip Gordon, *A certain idea of France: French security policy and the Gaullist legacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 108

European integration and desire to participate in it on the minimal level that is beneficial for the country. Second there is an important notion of "special relationship" with the USA and also constant loyalty towards NATO. Such political-military culture was developed partly due to the imperial past and memories of the times when Great Britain was probably the most powerful country in Europe and in the world. Geographical position on the island always was one of the reasons for dissociating itself from other European countries. The influence of the Second World War is also of great importance. It has shown the weakness of this country and the fact that it lost the role of the world leader, which has gone to the United States. With this country Great Britain has historical and cultural ties that promoted creation of the "special relations". During the Cold War this partnership was fortified by the existence of common enemy and common threat.

At first glance, culturalist explanation is suitable in this case as well. Both Conservatives and Labourists in general terms don't welcome integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy, limiting themselves to the notion of "cooperation". Both parties also show loyalty to NATO as a cornerstone of European integration. But there are serious divergences in positions of parties towards CFSP. While Conservatives show almost hostile attitude to the integration in CFSP, the more so to the idea of European independent military forces outside NATO, Labourists are more positive on this account. They don't support idea of the European army, but clearly show their approval of European military capabilities for crisis management especially in the areas where NATO is not engaged as a whole. Such stance clearly contradicts the perceived anti-integrational character of British political-military culture and makes it impossible to speak about existence of the national consensus on the issue of CFSP in Great Britain.

Therefore it can be concluded that historical-cultural hypothesis can't serve as a successful explanation for all cases. While showing good capability to explain positions of

French and German parties it doesn't fully cope with British parties, which show significant divergence in their attitude toward CFSP and military cooperation in Europe.

This approach is able to embrace a hypothesis about influence of geographical location of country on partisan attitude towards CFSP. Indeed geographical position of the country plays a very significant role in its historical development and shouldn't be viewed separately. It is easy to trace this influence on the particular examples of three European countries that are under analysis in this paper. Position of Great Britain towards European continent was always the one of detachment, in many aspects due to its separate location on the island. It gave the feeling of security to the people living there, while it eliminated the direct threat of ground invasion. Therefore Great Britain could have paid less attention to the European affairs. The only thing which British rulers were always concerned of was that no country on the continent should grow too powerful and become a hegemon. This was the major danger for this state, but it didn't necessitate constant involvement in the European events and politics. Separated location on the island also caused the development of the naval forces that were the main weapon of Great Britain. This enabled the country to build a large empire and seize for particular period in history the leading place in the international arena. After beginning of the process of European integration Great Britain continued to hold to its culture of detachment from continental affairs.

After creation of German state, its rulers found themselves in the middle of the continent surrounded by three powerful empires. Until the end of the Second World War such position and the fact that unification of German lands occurred when the world was already divided between great powers contributed to the aggressive policy in the battle for resources and in search for the place in the world among the leaders. As it was noted earlier, experience of the war caused a profound change in the political-military culture of Germany. Geographical location continued to play significant role on the foreign policy of this country (e.g. it was of the basis for Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik), but it hadn't profound

effect on the attitude of parties to the security and military integration in the EU, which was formed by the previous experience. One of the consequences of German geographical location was its historical struggle with neighboring France for resources and influence. After the end of the Second World War French fear that Germany can once again become powerful enough to start another war was one of the incentives for the beginning of the integration process.

Geographical position of France contributed to its aspirations for the leading positions on the continent. This country never had that feeling of security that had Great Britain, thus it had to defend its borders in different ways. And it had to be powerful enough to remain independent and have possibility to influence the state of affairs in the international arena.

It can be said that geographical position indeed had important influence on the history of these countries and on the development of their political-military culture, by creating the basis for the future action of countries. For the modern condition more important is influence of the Second World War experience. Therefore, it is impossible to find the strong link between geographical location of the country and position of its main parties toward CFSP.

Two other hypotheses proposed at the beginning of this paper show even less explanatory power for convergence or divergence of partisan stances towards CFSP. Even brief look at the trade statistics of three countries enables one to see that all of them have bigger turnout in trade within the EU than with countries outside it. United Kingdom has the smallest turnout of intra-EU trade, which is at the same time not significantly bigger than turnout of extra-EU trade for this country.⁵⁰ However this doesn't allow one to make suggestions. Turnout of German's extra-EU trade is almost six times bigger than that of UK. And it should be noticed that development of CFSP is hardly touched economically

⁵⁰ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>. data are taken for the period of 2002-2007

sensitive fields for any of these countries. Trade balance is more likely to have influence on the overall assessment of the European integration in general and monetary integration in particular. Thus Great Britain is still not willing to leave its national currency behind, considering keeping the pound to be more beneficial than going for euro. But these issues are still separated from the field of CFSP and can't be explained with the help of each other.

The hypothesis about religious factor doesn't provide explanation as well. First of all as it was shown public opinion doesn't play significant role for the formation of partisan stance in the sphere of CFSP. Therefore the degree of religiousness of electorate has no or little influence for partisan position. It is also apparent on the example of CDU, the party, which openly acknowledges Christian roots and ideas in its ideology. However on the issue of CFSP position of this party converges with position of social-democratic SPD, which doesn't stress any connection with any religion. Therefore it seems to be impossible to establish any connection between religious factor and partisan position towards CFSP.

There is one thing that is necessary to mention here. Previously in this paper it was noticed that analysis of threats stated in parties' manifestos resembles heavily the one that was made in the European Security Strategy. However it is impossible to argue that this document influenced partisan positions. It is more likely that the opposite happened. First of all the so-called "new threats" appeared in manifestos already before the ESS was issued. Second there are several evidences that the content of this document was heavily influenced by German parties in the first line.⁵¹ So, the consensus that one can see on the threats analysis between major parties in three countries appeared before the ESS, and most probably reflects the reaction of parties on the changing international environment.

⁵¹ Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, Christian Schmidt (Fürth), Ulrich Adam, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU: <http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/031/1503181.pdf>

The failure of any of proposed hypothesis to give complete explanation of partisan stance necessitates at least an attempt of combining two hypotheses that proved themselves more valid in order to explain the divergence and convergence of partisan stance towards CFSP. One way of combination was already proposed by Rathbun, who argued that historical experience is crucial for determination of leftist parties' position.⁵² However Rathbun's aim was to understand partisan stance towards use of military force in international relations and possibility (and justification) for humanitarian interventions. According to him, historical experience of successful use of force makes leftist parties for favourable towards interventions.⁵³

The analysis showed that historical experience and political-military culture that developed due to it are able to influence positions of the leading political parties in foreign policy and forge national consensus on particular issue. This is the case in Germany and France where past experience shaped particular approach toward European integration as whole and CFSP in particular. However in Great Britain situation developed on another scenario, with historical experience having failed to create a consensus on the issue of CFSP. I would argue however that while historical development of the country failed to shape common political-military culture that would be shared by both major parties, it had profound influence on the stances that they have now on the issue of integration in the sphere of foreign and security policy.

It was noted earlier that the most important experience for the creation or change of the national political-military culture is war. For the three countries under analysis it was Second World War. But it is possible to differentiate type of experience that states took from it. Generally it can be said that for Germany and France it was more negative than for Great Britain. Germany lost the war and was divided. France, despite being in the camp of winners at the end of the war was severely humiliated. Great Britain despite all

⁵² Brian C. Rathbun, *Partisan Interventions* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 187.

⁵³ Ibidem

the destruction and gravity of war wasn't invaded and was one of the rightful winners. The main thing that it was losing was the leading positions in the world. However the war gave start to the close and "special" relationship between Great Britain and the USA. That was one of the main factors that predetermined its unfriendly attitude towards European integration. With the course of time more leftist Labourists elaborated more pro-integrationist stance than Conservatives. It is possible to argue that it occurred due to the fact that as leftist party Labourists tend to interpret national interest in more inclusive way and be more multilateralist in their policy approach. Therefore they see European integration as beneficial for Great Britain. Labour party in line with perceived leftist ideology also considers strengthening of EU's ability to act independently in the international arena of crucial importance for their country as well. However, historical development and political-military culture of Great Britain couldn't help leaving their trace on the position of this party as well. Despite the fact that Labourists' position is more pro-integrationist than that of Conservatives, it is definitely more moderate in comparison with German and French leftist parties. They don't argue for the totally independent European Union in the field of foreign policy, security and defence, giving the priority in these spheres to NATO, continuing to hold on to the "special relations". Acknowledging the necessity of European military forces they at the same time limit them to the areas where NATO is not involved as a whole.

Therefore position that Labour party takes towards CFSP can be seen as being under influence of leftist ideology and values on the one side and historical experience and national political-military culture that developed in Great Britain on the other.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to reveal positions of main political parties in three European countries (Great Britain, Germany and France) and make an attempt to explain why these positions converge or diverge. The analysis of parties' manifestos for two last electoral rounds revealed several interesting tendencies.

First of all, there exists a national consensus between major political parties in all three countries on the issue of necessity of integration of cooperation in the field of foreign policy and security. On this dimension national parties tend to be closer to each other within their country than to the foreign parties even from the same ideological family.

Second, there is an interesting pattern of partisan positioning on the issue of main actor in European security. There is visible convergence of partisan stances within France and Germany with infinitesimal differences; and there are differences between parties when compared between states. At the same time there is a very big gap between position of Conservatives and Labourists in Great Britain.

Third, there is an all-European consensus between all major parties about character of threats that present danger to their national countries and sort of instruments that should be used to tackle them. All six parties present almost the same list of threats and challenges to security and agree that there is a necessity of combination of civilian and military means. The differences that can be found in this dimension concern with priorities. Thus leftist parties put more weight to the threats, connected with side effects of globalization and namely with such problems as poverty and disproportional development of different countries. At the same time British parties (and especially Conservatives) indirectly stress the importance of military means in the combination with civilian ones.

In attempt to explain why picture of partisan stances looks exactly like this, several hypotheses were made. Only two of them appeared to have explanatory power, namely

ideological and historical-cultural hypotheses. Other proposed explanation has little or no connection with actual findings. Hypothesis about influence of public opinion despite having correlation with results of analysis was previously proven as not significant and not capable of explaining the partisan stances by other researchers.

It should be underlined however that by their own even those two hypotheses that seem to be valid can't explain all results. The one that stresses the importance of partisan ideology isn't capable of showing why position of parties in France and Germany are so close to each other and not always correspond with parties from the same ideological family but from the other country. And historical-cultural hypothesis fails to explain position of Labourists that have more pro-integrationist and pro-European stance than Conservatives.

These findings enabled an attempt to combine the two hypotheses that proved themselves partly valid. The result yielded an approach that mixes historical-cultural and ideological patterns. At the end of the day it is possible to argue that particular historical experience (and its interpretation) can be strong enough to drive positions of the major parties closer to each other and even forge consensus on particular issues of foreign policy. Negative (or even catastrophic) experience that makes decision-makers to rethink and reshape their approach to the international affairs and their own behaviour in the international arena has a stronger influence on the development of national political-military culture. But if the same event (in this case it is the Second World War) is interpreted in more positive way, it can have less influence and probably won't be able to forge consensus on the approaches towards foreign and security policy of the country. However it still contributes heavily to the development of the national political-military culture, leaving at the same time place for ideological differences in parties' approaches to this field.

This approach however can't be called a generalizing one. Despite the fact that it underlines particular common patterns for different countries, it demands at the same time to view every country separately, because of unique experience and interpretation of this experience that every country has.

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