VANISHING NATIONAL LIBERAL TRADITIONS

Slovene "Progressive" Political Parties During the Interwar Period

By

Oskar Mulej

Submitted to
Central European University
History Department

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Maciej Janowski

Second Reader: Professor Balázs Trencsényi

Budapest, Hungary
2010

ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with the case of Slovene progressive political parties, commonly labeled as "liberal" by Slovene historiography, during the interwar years. They are thereby being treated as the main Slovene political forces, which either descended from the pre-WWI national liberal tradition or were perceived as its heirs, and are put into the general context of Central European political history. The main aim and purpose of this case study is to analyze the policies and stances of the observed parties and politicians in order to determine the extent they departed from the liberal course. Some possible answers to the question, whether it is still proper to speak about continuity of national liberal party tradition in the interwar Slovene politics, are thereby being indicated.

Through the means of analyzing the features of progressives' nationalism and nationality discourse, their perspectives for modernization and different models for socio-economic order which they adopted throughout the observed era, it is shown that Slovene liberal forces were to a degree affected by the prevailing political atmosphere of interwar period. This leads to the conclusion that gradual vanishing of the national liberal tradition was indeed taking place but at the same time it did not lead to its complete disappearance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Political concepts vary in their content and meaning through time and space. In various national contexts the same designations have been employed for sometimes very different political phenomena. As a consequence of this, one can observe a similar heterogeneity of their use also in various national historiographies. One of prime examples of such a concept is certainly liberalism. Very broad and complex by itself, it has been used solely on the level of political history for labeling a broad variety of political forces in particular political cultures and environments. .

Liberalism is a notion, which can carry many diverse and sometimes even antithetical meanings. This is so not only in case one wanted to employ it on all the possible levels and in all its broadness and richness but also if the scope is strictly delimited to the interest standpoints of political history. When perceived 'only' as a label for certain factually existing (already vanished or still living) political traditions and agents in real politics (political parties, organizations, personalities, etc.), "liberalism" reveals itself as representing a very broad concept, covering a wide variety of political movements and ideologies. In contrast to "liberalism", treated as a political philosophy – albeit also a very diverse one, whereby it is perhaps better to speak about a set of philosophies than a single unified teaching – the aforementioned political phenomena represent forces which operate in dynamic, ever-changing and mutually different political landscapes of various states and nations.

Only in the Western world, different political cultures have experienced developments of different liberalisms – let us just remind ourselves, for instance, about the great difference in the common usage of that term in European and American political environments. Speaking about the context of Central Europe, especially during the 19th and early 20th century, a striking feature of liberalism was its very frequent connection with nationalism. One could

speak about traditions of "national liberalism" as a common designation for a number of related ideologies and movements, distinctive for Central Europe, of which the German "National Liberal Party" can serve as a prime example.

Slovene historiography has commonly applied the labels of "liberalism" and "liberal" to a number of political groupings, whose evolution could be traced back to mid-19th century and which formed first political party in the 1890's. Otherwise lacking a clear philosophical foundation, the distinctive common ground, present from the very beginnings, and uniting all the "liberal" groups (or "progressive" as they usually called themselves) also during the interwar period was the national idea.

In 1920's the pre-WWI Slovene "liberal camp", united in the "National-Progressive Party" (*Narodno-napredna stranka*) disintegrated into a number of parties. Mostly due to their origin, their political alliances with direct descendants of national liberalism, their anti-clericalism, as well as their national orientation, also the newly-emerged agrarian party and even minor radical nationalist groupings (for example ORJUNA - Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists) were seen as part of the liberal movement and are treated as such also in historiography. Still, the liberal core was represented by the Slovene parts of Yugoslav Democratic Party (up to 1924), the Independent Democratic Party (1924-1929), later joining the Yugoslav National Party (1933-1941) - parties which I therefore intend to focus on. The evolution of "Slovene liberal political camp" ended after the Second World War and subsequent communist takeover[1].

When I had been studying the history of political parties from the mentioned camp, certain issues caught my attention. Particularly I became attentive towards use of the label "liberal" in a manner, which seemed to me a rather uncritical one. This applies especially to the interwar

[1] Up to 1960's, two small groups of political expatriates in the USA and Argentina continued the tradition, being loosely organized under the banner of "Slovene Democratic Party" (*Slovenska demokratska stranka*), but had very little influence even in the émigré community.

period, which can in many aspects be described as very unfriendly towards liberal ideas of political and social order. The prevailing political climate at that time favored various collectivist (corporatist, socialist and solidarist) solutions, which were leading away from a free economic order and limited government. Nationalism also came to adopt new forms from the late 19th century on, leading to exclusivist, aggressive and even racially-based versions, quite incompatible with the liberal ideals. It has seemed to me that such attitudes were to a considerable extent reflected also in the policies and discourses of Slovene "liberals" in the interwar era.

Moreover, it should be mentioned also that the "liberals" themselves rarely used that label and mostly preferred words as "progressive", "free-minded", "national-progressive" or simply "national" when referring to their political position. This was especially distinctive during the interwar period, when the "liberals" were more or less named as such only by their political main opponents from the Catholic conservative camp, whom they called "clericals".

For these reasons, thereby also observing similar patterns of development in other parts of Central Europe as Austria and the Czech lands, I noticed that in case of the interwar period the liberal label seemed to become largely a negative one (in a formal logical sense). I would argue that such designation could be founded more or less on the supposed heirship of the national liberal traditions and in certain cases even only reflecting the relation and delimitation of the parties in question towards Christian conservative (sometimes marked as "clerical") and Marxist political movements.

In this paper I am going to focus on the parties of Slovene "progressive" or "liberal" political camp, representing the main political forces which descended from the pre-WWI national liberal tradition or were perceived as its heirs. I will thereby treat them as part of a broader Central European context, especially the one of pre-WWI Cisleithania as well as Germany, which will serve as a primary point of reference. The latter case should definitely not be left

aside, since the 19th century liberal developments in Germany were to a large extent paradigmatic for the whole region and were thus important for the 'prehistory' of my topic of interest. The case of Slovene "liberal" camp will be therefore treated as belonging to a common Central European political framework with "national liberalism" as its distinctive pre-WWI feature.

My main aim is to offer a detailed introduction and analysis of the case of interwar Slovene progressives, treated as part of the general context of interwar Central European party politics – especially that part which either adhered to tradition of national liberalism or was seen as such by the public. I will present this case also to try finding out, to what degree the Slovene progressives politics 'mutated' throughout the interwar era and how far they departed from the general courses of 19th century national liberalism. Taking into account the general features of other cases and the basic patterns of Central European political semantics, my aim will be to position Slovenia in that context and to show what were the meanings of designations such as "liberal", "progressive" and "free-minded".

In terms of contributing to historical knowledge, my main aim is to try to contextualize the case of Slovene liberal camp. Special stress will be laid on different meanings the notions of "liberal" and "liberalism" had been carrying during the era and are as such sometimes still applied by national historiographies. This should also provide a certain critical reflection on using these terms, when speaking about some of the above mentioned parties which were supposedly continuing the traditions of national liberalism. By doing this I will also be trying to develop the question, whether it is still proper to speak about continuity of national liberal party tradition in the interwar Slovene politics, and provide some possible answers to it.

In the first chapter the theoretical approaches to the subject will be thoroughly described and a broader contextual framework of Central European national liberalism established. Special

stress will be laid on the notions such as “liberalism”, “national liberalism”, “party tradition” and “political camp”. This general chapter will also provide a brief overview of other Central European parties, which could be treated as national liberal heirs and offer a brief outlook into the pre-WWI developments. After that the paper will proceed to a general introduction to the Slovene liberal parties, where their development throughout the interwar era will be described.

This will be followed by two problem-oriented chapters. First of these will deal with treatment of the nationality question by Slovene liberals, whereby the ‘liberality’ of their nationalism will be put in question. One of my aims will thereby be to describe and explain the extent of adopting the views of the radical right in the wider context. The second of these two chapters will be devoted to perspectives for modernizing the Slovene society, shared by Slovene progressives, and their attitudes towards the existing modernity. Models and paragons which they embraced, especially the ones regarding socio-economic order, will deserve a special focus.. Again, I will be pursuing the question, whether the progressives stances and policies on these issues could in any sense be labeled as liberal. Attitudes of the observed political organizations towards national socialism, fascism and bolshevism will thereby also be briefly touched upon.

The conclusion will turn back to the general level of political semantics, as well as to the question of the continuity of national liberal traditions. A summary of data presented and discussed through the thesis will be provided and the extent of remnants and traces of national liberalism pointed out. Answers or possible ways of answering to the general questions concerning the meaning of the notion “liberal” during the interwar period, the common patterns of using that term and inclusion of parties into “liberal” political camps and finally also the actual validity of applying the term during 1930’s, will be given.

1. THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND THE BROADER CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

First and foremost, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the notion of liberalism in general and point to the manner it will be employed in my analysis. This will be done in the first half. Due to the broadness of its topic, this part can also be read as an independent essay, but is at the same time in my view indispensable for the sake of clear usage of terms. Since my thesis is an introduction which includes comparative elements, the second part will establish a general contextual framework for the subject of my analysis.

1.1. CONCEPT OF LIBERALISM AND THE LEVELS OF ITS USE AND UNDERSTANDING

Before proceeding to the historical outline of Central European liberalism as a political force, some words have to be told about the concept of liberalism in general, as well as the different levels on which it can be contemplated. A very broad notion, "liberalism" points into many directions. First and foremost, liberalism is a political philosophy. More precisely, it represents a group of philosophies, usually perceived as beginning with the thought of John Locke, culminating during the 18th century with philosophers like Montesquieu, Hume, Kant and Adam Smith and continuing to develop through the next century up to John Stuart Mill and further. Throughout its evolution, the liberal political philosophy has been encountering many challenges and adopted different approaches in trying to provide answers to problems introduced by political and social realities. Due to diversity and lack of uniformity among different liberalisms, various 'schools' have emerged, building their arguments on diverse moral suppositions, touching upon different questions and providing different answers. Nevertheless this diverseness is still somehow connected. Liberalism in all its historical and

contemporary variations has been committed to certain fundamental values and principles, albeit they may have been very differently interpreted or derived from various reasons. It could be argued that common ideals, embraced by all strands of liberal political philosophy, include liberty, equality, tolerance and furthermore the principles of rule of law, limited government, neutral state, autonomous civil society, free economy and individual property.

Apart from the political philosophy, the "liberal" label can be applied also to a broader and even less unified set of *Weltanschauungen*, uniting individual ethical stances, common human ideals, as well as political views[2]. These can be perceived and interpreted as having certain philosophical foundations but are also very receptive to influences, emanating from concrete circumstances of space and time. Liberalism treated on this level reveals itself "as a complex and mutating set of beliefs (…) in which universal aspirations jostle against the furtherance of particular preferences and differences"[3]. For instance, a specific liberal world view, not necessarily attached either to political philosophy or to the narrower liberal political doctrines and independent of partisan adherence, was highly distinctive for the educated middle classes in 19th and early 20th century German and broader Central European space.[4]

Last but not least "liberalism" also designates a large and heterogeneous group of political traditions, presenting itself therefore as a common denominator of certain historical actors in real politics – movements, parties, personalities and similar. On this level, as it is usually treated by political history, "liberalism" reveals itself as a name for constantly changing

[2] Jörn Leonhard, *Liberalismus : zur historischen Semantik eines europäischen Deutungsmusters* (München: Oldenbourg, 2001), pp. 548-549.
[3] Michal Freeden, "Foreword" in Ivan Zoltan Denes ed., *Liberty and the search for identity* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2006), pp. ix-xi, p. xi.
[4] As Thomas Mann put it in 1918, being an apolitical person belonging to middle-class culture and nationally minded, he was liberal in terms of "liberality" and not "liberalism":
"*Bin ich liberal, so bin ich es im Sinne der Liberalität und nicht des Liberalismus. Denn ich bin unpolitisch, national, aber unpolitisch gesinnt, wie der Deutsche der bürgerlichen Kultur und wie der der Romantik, die keine andere politische Forderung kannte, als die hochnationale nach Kaiser und Reich.*"
(Thomas Mann, *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (1918) (Frankfurt a.M.: 1956), p. 108; Quoted from: Leonhard, Liberalismus, 552.)

political agents – forces acting inside dynamic and mutually different political environments of various states and nations. On the level of political realities, distinguished and determined primarily by the principle of political struggle, "liberalism" is therefore to be treated as a phenomenon, essentially dependent on its temporal and spatial locations. Since the regional, national and cultural contexts play a major role here, the content of political notions appears as more or less contingent from this point of view.

The three levels described are theoretically and practically irreducible to each other but at the same time usually act as intertwined and sometimes appear partly indiscernible. Political philosophies provide grounds and legitimacy for political programs and practices. On the other hand political realities challenge political philosophy with new problems. As mentioned, 'the middle ground' of hardly definable world views connects the both fields – particularly in form of political ideologies – at the same time extending above the realm of strictly political. Concepts, contemplated and sometimes created by philosophers through the course of time begin to be coined inside ideologies, which act as "specific configurations of concepts"[5], being "in a continuous state of flux and reconfiguration"[6] and appearing "as 'lived' traditions

[5] Michael Freeden, "Concepts, ideology and political theory," in Carsten Dutt (ed.), *Herausforderungen der Begriffsgeschichte* (Heidelberg: Winter, 2003), pp. 51-63**,** p. 52.

[6] Freeden, Foreword, ix.

Michael Freeden treats ideologies in relation to political concepts as "particular understandings of the meanings of those concepts, mediated in time and space, which compete with alternative particular understandings." (Freeden, Concepts, 59.)

As already indicated *Weltanschauung* and political ideologies are not identical, since the former extend well above the boundaries of political and can also be more open and eclectic in terms of employing political concepts. Ideologies, as defined by Freeden, are on the other hand "products *designed* for consumption (…) They are important communal resources, and their social role directs us to the ways in which they operate on individuals and groups who are close to central positions of decision-making in a polity." (Ibid., 61.). Nevertheless both the broader *Weltanschauungen* and ideologies stem from socio-cultural contexts and occupy the same mid-level between philosophy and phenomena of practical political life. Ideologies are thereby providing a more direct link to the latter, being partly deliberately formed and always dependent on specificities of the respective political landscape.

of political thought"[7]. Liberalism therefore also designates an ideology or, more precisely, a grouping of ideologies or an ideological pattern[8].

Particular political agents, movements for instance, are furthermore distinguished by adherence to such ideologies. Sometimes they represent themselves as being liberal by claiming to embrace either the principles of liberal philosophy or at least to follow the specific 'home-grown' traditions of liberal ideology. They may not even necessarily do that, but still get to be perceived as representatives of liberalism by the contemporary public or from the 'external' outlook of a historian or political scientist though. What is important here is to strive to understand the way liberal label has been applied, to find out the possible reasons for that and to take into the account all the mentioned levels, at the same time discerning between them as much as possible.

In this paper I am intending to focus onto the last of the levels mentioned, that is the level of political traditions, meaning the traditions of really-existing political phenomena. What will interest me, are political parties as agents acting inside historically and geographically fixed political landscapes. I will therefore be dealing mainly with parties, belonging to traditions of liberalism – or one may also say "liberalism as an organized political force". As it has been mentioned already, it is not always an easy task to entirely separate between the mentioned two levels, although the perspectives in question are distinct. This applies especially to the relation between political agents and adjoining ideologies. Since the subject of my analysis is defined by its location inside the political spectrum as a representative of a certain political "camp" and its adherence to certain traditions, the attentiveness to ideological questions will by no means be left out.

[7] Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and political theory: a conceptual approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 52.
[8] Cf. ibid., 83.

1.2. ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON METHODOLOGY

The levels or perspectives for treating the concept of liberalism, discussed in the previous subchapter, usually appear as mutually intertwined. Theory and practice are hard to discern as are also values and facts. For the task of this project, it has to be clarified that the level in question is one of political agents, bearing the liberal label. The leading question here is what exactly such label meant at a certain time in a certain region with all the appurtenant peculiarities of political life and the answer to it could also appear quite inconsistent with any liberal philosophy.

Therefore the notion of liberalism in question has to be treated from historical and phenomenological perspectives. Still, a position trying to be entirely 'nominalist' and relativistic does not seem to be of much value[9] and other levels should still be taken into account, though not as a part of the central focus. Ideally, when talking about liberalism proper, in my own view a hierarchy of levels should be considered. In case one would wish to assess, whether certain movement was liberal in the proper sense of word or not, this should be done in a manner where the first (philosophical) level is taken as a primary one from which the analysis can then proceed to the level of ideologies and further to political agents.

Nevertheless, spatial and temporal differences, as well as the consequent cultural and social ones, should always be taken into account, when writing history of liberalism as a political ideology and force. When treated as a political tradition(s) it should especially be stressed that its actual forms and contents differed from culture to culture[10], whereby one could argue that

[9] "…whereas we may agree with Rorty that there are no absolutely true standards independent of the vocabularies we employ, the absence of a 'view from nowhere' does not endorse the view from anywhere." (Freeden, Ideologies, 92.)

[10] From a historical comparative perspective liberalism is undefinable or in words of Jörn Leonhard "'definierbar ist nur Das, was keine Geschichte hat.' Nimmt man diese Prämise im Sinne einer komparativen Analyse methodisch Ernst, dann lost sich der ideengeschichtliche Singular des *Liberalismus* auf in den Plural verschiedener europäischer *Liberalismen*." (Jörn Leonhard, "Semantische Deplazierung und Entwertung : Deutsche Deutungen von 'liberal' und 'liberalismus' nach 1850 im europäischen Vergleich," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft*, No. 29 (2003): pp. 5-39: p. 35.)

a degree of distortion of the concept was present in all the Central and East Europe – the discrepancies between 'ideal' model of political liberalism and its actual form becoming greater when moving eastwards.

Moreover, it should also be added that it had also experienced radical transformations through time. These transformations could reach a point where the movements, although still bearing the designation of "liberal" (which stemmed from their supposed predecessors and was still employed by the general public or even themselves), adopted courses, which could, even if one takes into account the mentioned spatial and temporal differences, hardly be understood as corresponding to any kind of proper liberalism.

In such cases, the normative approach starting on the level of political philosophy seems to be of little use, as it is more or less clear that the phenomena in question are not liberal in the strict sense of the word. Still – the political label itself remains and, since it is based on a certain political tradition, is not a completely arbitrary one (as for instance in the case of modern Russian Liberal Democratic Party and similar movements which simply adopt the name, without having any other references to the liberal tradition).

Since the partly illiberal nature of such political agents can seem quite apparent, the liberal label should be observed and treated critically in such cases. At the same time it can still be used inside the context, as it represented a factual, gradually evolved term, being a part of political language of certain political landscape. Such "liberalism", should be understood as more or less a "negative" (in a logical, formal sense of the word) one, since it labeled political phenomena, which were not necessarily following liberal courses and policies, but were labeled as such also because of their position inside the political spectrum, their delimitation towards other political groups, as well as supposed historical connections to liberal tradition.

To stress it again, in my project I will treat liberalism as a political phenomenon, observing it on the last of the three levels – the level of real politics. The objects of my enquiry are going to be political parties, seen as representatives or at least heirs of certain political tradition and usually at the same time forming a certain "political camp". They were perceived either by themselves or by the public as "liberal", bearing that particular or one of the contextually related political labels as "progressive", "free-minded", "national-progressive" and "national". I will therefore limit my analysis to partisan and politicians' policies, stances and discourses, as they manifested themselves in manifestos, newspaper articles and speeches.

The parties, on which I am intending to focus, bore the designation of *liberal*, without necessarily following a 'proper' liberal course, i.e. the one which could be seen as founded on or corresponding to principles developed by liberal political thinkers from John Locke to John Stuart Mill. Moreover, I would argue that, due to the political transformations of fin-de-siecle and generational change, they also to a considerable extent departed from the 19th century national liberal ideology, significant for their predecessors. The crucial question will of course be, how far had they departed and which were the continuities, if any.

Albeit taking into account the complexity of the term *liberalism* on all the levels of usage, as well as the perspective that eastern uses of that term were distinguished by far-reaching distortions in meaning, my main aim will not be the one of judging whether certain political movement corresponded to certain ideal principals of liberalism or not. Much more, I will be trying to find out what "liberal" meant in certain spatial and temporal context and especially which courses did the movements bearing that label adopt. Nonetheless this will be done in a critical way, on the premise that the liberal label should not be taken at a face value and in the strict sense of the word.

I therefore understand my approach as a purely historical and essentially phenomenological one, observing certain political forces as political phenomena, operating inside concrete

historical political environments, thereby trying to understand what *liberal* meant in these concrete circumstances of time and space. The notion of "liberalism" will be used more or less for orientation and inside the context of Central European politics along with related designations as "progressive" and "free-minded", which were also distinctive for that region. My project is therefore not about liberalism in strict sense, but at the same time the notion itself can not be left completely ignored, as a critical evaluation of its use seems indispensable for the task. Excavation of surviving liberal elements in the case of liberal heirs and understanding their mutations thereby presents the most important challenge.

1.3. THE COMPARATIVE ELEMENT AND ITS SCOPE

My approach to the central topic of Slovene liberal parties will include elements of general contextualization inside the frame of Central Europe. I will thereby strive to position the subject of my analysis into a broader perspective of 19th and early 20th century political developments in that region and will treat it as something essentially arising from them.

By introducing a broader perspective, albeit a fairly general and superficial one, and establishing common reference points, the main subject ceases to be treated from a limited perspective of national history, as separated from the broader, transnational developmental patterns. This way, possibilities can arise for previously isolated, distinctly 'national' cases to be studied from a broader perspective, thus enriching the general historical knowledge (regional or global). Moreover, it can prove beneficial for better understanding of the narrowly perceived subject itself and respective national history, since it enables "questions that cannot otherwise be posed", as well as "answers that cannot otherwise be given".[11]

[11] Jürgen Kocka, "Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg," *History and Theory*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1999): pp. 40-50, p. 49.

Before proceeding to the central topic of Slovene "progressive" camp in the interwar period the general context of national liberalism as a distinctive feature of 19th and early 20th century Central European politics will be discussed. This Central European perspective encompasses Central Europe in the 'classical' sense of word, which includes Germany and excludes the Balkans and Ukraine for instance. Because of their specifically common historical background, those countries or lands will deserve special emphasis, which up to the First World War formed Cisleithanean part of the Habsburg monarchy.

One might legitimately wonder why the rest of Yugoslavia, the country comprising the largest and central portion of territory settled by Slovenes, is absent from this survey. The reason to leave other Yugoslav lands aside is that the newly-founded South Slavic state was composed of various former political units with different histories and cultural traditions. This was largely reflected in great differences among socio-political contexts and therefore also political landscapes and party traditions. Although Slovene politics became part of Yugoslav politics - as it had belonged to common Austrian politics previously – its main characteristics, particularly the pre-WWI division into political "camps", did not change substantially. Evolving inside a Central European cultural context and bearing the mark of old Austrian political developments, they differed greatly from those of other Yugoslav lands. It is worth noting that the core Slovene progressives after 1918 became members of all-state parties but at the same time retained their specificity as representatives of "liberal camp" in the internal context of Slovene society.

What has been told brings forward the question of Central European political peculiarities. Albeit being throughout the 19th century largely influenced by the Western European developments - primarily British and French - Central European socio-political contexts had their distinctive features upon whom the western models were imposed and thereby also remodeled. Moreover, the process can not be simply labeled as one of 'importing' and

'remodeling', as many political concepts and models, crucial for European political developments, originated from that region. A very fine example is liberalism, one of whose 'places of birth' apart from Great Britain and France was also Germany, where many important early contributions to both liberal thought and liberal politics originated. At the same time the German liberal developments, being largely paradigmatic for the whole Central European region, from early 19th century on embraced certain distinct features and adopted unique courses.

1.4. CENTRAL EUROPEAN NATIONAL LIBERALISMS

As discussed previously, 'materializations' of emerging liberalism and use of that label for political movements throughout various regions have been quite different, as well as their later mutations.[12] Moreover, specific socio-cultural contexts, political developments and resulting peculiarities of political landscapes have attributed to the fact that, as Michael Freeden has put it,

> "the political space available for liberalism has differed notably from country to country: sometimes squeezed out by both left and right, at other times infusing political and philosophical practices that are more recognizable under other names."[13]

In German lands for instance, the concept of liberalism has throughout its history experienced what Jörn Leonhard labeled as "gradual displacement"[14], which in his view led to "semantic devaluation"[15] of the term.

According to Michael Freeden, three aspects have to be observed when studying political concepts and ideologies – the temporal, the spatial and the morphological or structural.[16] The

[12] Cf. Freeden, Foreword, x: "What has been generally assumed to be a West European doctrine has undergone mutations and variations throughout Europe."
[13] Ibid.
[14] "Schleichende Deplazierung", what could perhaps also be translated as "gradual *mis*placement". (Leonhard, Semantische Displazierung, 21.)
[15] "Semantische Entwertung" (Ibid.)

latter regards relations between concepts comprising a certain ideological structure. In addition to the concepts building up the ideological core, however changeable their content might be, there are also the ones situated at the "perimeter" of an ideology.[17] Such concepts are not by themselves necessarily of central importance to the ideology in question (or could even be almost absent from its framework) but can nevertheless act as such inside certain spatially and temporally determined contexts. This is usually due to a contingent and occasional close connection between their content and the one of a core concept.

In case of liberal ideology with "liberty" as its primary core concept, one of such "perimeter concepts", especially distinctive for the 19th and early 20th century Central Europe, was the "nation". The national "awakenings" and unifications of 19th century were projects, pursued primarily by the liberals. It could be argued that liberty was perceived also - and sometimes even primarily - as "liberty for the nation", that is national emancipation and/or unification. Similar could also be said for related liberal ideas as citizenship, limited government, free trade, self-determination, reason, progress, individualism, civilization, civil society, with which "nationalism occasionally coalesced (…) or nested within"[18], at some other points also resisting at least some of them.[19] The struggle for constitutional order, civil liberties and equality before law went hand in hand with projects of nation building, based on notions of cultural or ethnic nation (often at the same time joined by arguments, based on historical rights). Different socio-cultural contexts and absence of nation states (up to 1867 in Hungary, 1871 in Germany and up to 1918 elsewhere) also impacted the emergence of political configurations and landscapes, different to those of Western Europe.[20]

[16] Freeden, Concepts, 59.
[17] Freeden, Concepts, 61.
[18] Freeden, Foreword, x.
[19] Ibid.
[20] This also affected the characteristics of the relation between liberals and conservatives. (Ivan Zoltan Denes, "Liberalism and Nationalism: An Ambiguous Relationship" in Ivan Zoltan Denes (Ed.), *Liberty and the search for identity* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2006), pp. 1-17; p. 6-7.)

It is possible to argue that in Central European region a distinctive political tradition of "national liberalism" emerged. During the 19th and early 20th century Central Europe, liberalism as a political force, visibly arising and becoming an increasingly important political factor after the uprisings of 1848, was especially marked by a strong connection with nationalism. One could therefore speak about traditions of "national liberalism" as a common designation for a number of related ideologies and movements, distinctive for Central Europe, of which the German "National Liberal Party" can serve as a prime example. A close relation between liberalism and nationalism thus evolved in the 19th century[21], albeit also an uneasy one, as proven for instance by the case of National Liberals getting to become the government party in the unified Germany.

National liberals also represented the main political force struggling for modernization, which strongly coincided with the projects of nation-building. Being "*the* national party constructing modern national culture and identity"[22], they also strived to create a modern middle-class civil society and to reach the western (primarily British) level of economic development in their own national contexts. Nation state, as the main nationalist goal, was at the same time also perceived a means for modernization, and therefore attributed a peculiarly powerful role.[23] In Central Europe "the foes of absolutism and promoters of constitutionalism did not seek to emancipate an existing middle-class society from the excessive domination of the state, but to build it out of nothing", for which they needed "a state that could be the instrument of social development and national integration – a liberal constitutional nation-state."[24]

As nationalists and modernizers the national liberals were usually statists, opponents of free trade and therefore proponents of economic protectionism. At the same time, however, they

[21] "In the greater part of nineteenth century, liberalism and nationalism, constitutionalism and national tradition, progress and identity were inter-referential, inseparable and often interchangeable concepts in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe." (Denes, Liberalism, 6.)
[22] Ibid., 1.
[23] Cf. Freeden, Foreword, x: "…moderate types of nationalism suggested that the state could be used as a modernizing engine, as a repository of democratic practices, and as an enchancer of cultural identity, and thus serve liberal ends."
[24] Denes, Liberalism, 6.

often advocated relatively free economic order inside their states, marked by a relative absence of state intervention. Strengthening of the national economy was perceived as a very important part and necessary step towards consolidation of the nation and general modernizatory efforts. This led to adoption of neo-mercantilist economic doctrines, as the ones of Friedrich List[25]. In cases of Catholic lands a distinct feature of national liberalism was moreover also a strong secularist orientation, as it was believed that the powerful, supranational 'universalist' institution presented a danger for the primacy of the national idea and an obstacle to social modernization.

The political traditions evolved through time, being influenced by emerging new ideas and general political and social developments during the second half of 19th century. This also affected the relation between liberalism and nationalism in question, as well as their actual types. Nationalism was gaining in strength and intensity and was also adopting new forms. Examining the German case for instance, one could see a gradual decline (although not an extinction) of liberal, moderate and relatively tolerant kind of nationalism in favor of more aggressive forms – for instance even ones based on racialist notions.

This process also gradually influenced the course of national liberal parties. As the notion of liberalism got "reduced to the party of modernity"[26] from the end of the century onwards, the parties, stemming from the national liberal traditions and finding themselves in changing political environments, adopted various courses. Some of them became conservative, thereby still clinging to certain liberal ideals - particularly the ones assumed to have been achieved.

[25] See: Roman Szporluk, *Communism and nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
Being opposed to each other on issues of nationalism and class conflict, Karl Marx and Friedrich List were at the same time both opponents of *laissez-faire* capitalism. Nationalism, as conceptualized by Friedrich List, is treated in the abovementioned book as a distinct and very influential ideological force, more or less hostile to the free market order, what also gives some light to the questions regarding the protectionist policies of Central European (national) liberalisms.

[26] Denes, Liberalism, 1.

On the other hand the old opposition between "liberal" and "radical"[27] also began to lose its meaning, especially in regard to the 'left' or – generally speaking – 'younger' liberalism. Parties and politicians from that wing began to flirt with the newly emerging socialist or radical nationalist streams (sometimes turning hostile towards the existing modernity), which contributed to the already begun fragmentation of liberalism as a political force. From the turn of the century on it is therefore perhaps more feasible to talk about "heirs of liberalism" in terms of party politics. It may well be argued that the liberals (in the strict sense of the word) ceased to be national by the end of the 19th century.[28] But at same time it is also true that parties continued to exist, inheriting the tradition of national liberalism and perceived as such by the public, although they might have been quite illiberal or less liberal in substantial sense than even for instance parties of political Catholicism or social democracy.

1.5. "PROGRESSIVE" AND "FREE MINDED" AS POLITICAL LABELS AND "POLITICAL CAMPS" AS PECULIAR FEATURES OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICS

Through the second half of 19th century an emergence of new, specifically Central European notions can be observed, which began to partly replace the "liberal" label. In a more developed social context of unified Germany, where a more diversified political landscape developed, this to a larger extent corresponded to the division between left and right liberalism.[29] Whereas the latter, united in the National Liberal Party retained the old liberal

[27] The notion "radical" itself started to gradually disappear after 1850 as a special party label only to reappear in a different form after 1900 and especially 1918, carrying more specific meanings like "radical right" (or "left") and "radical nationalist". See: Peter Wende, "Radikalismus" in: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe : historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland***,** Vol.5: Pro-Soz, 4. Auflage, Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck eds. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), pp. 113- 133, p. 131-133.
[28] Cf. Denes, Liberalism, 2.
[29] Jürgen R. Winkler, *Sozialstruktur, politische Traditionen und Liberalismus, Eine empirische Längsschnittstudie zur Wahlenentwicklung in Deutschland 1871-1933, Schriften des Zentralinstituts für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung der Freien Universität Berlin*, Band 75 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995), p. 63.

name, new labels as "progressive" (*fortschrittlich*) and "free-minded" (*freisinnig*) appeared on the left.[30] The term "liberalism" was becoming increasingly unpopular and similar patterns can be observed in other Central European lands also, although the split between the left and right liberalism was at least not so visible in those less diversified political environments. Both "progressive" (*napreden*) and "free-minded" *(svobodomiseln*) labels were adopted by Slovene liberals. The same was distinctive for the Czech lands as the latter was also in the official name of Young Czech Party (*Národní strana svobodomyslná*). The former name was adopted by the Radical Progressive Party (*Strana radikalně pokroková*) and later by Tomas Masaryk's Czech Progressive Party (*Česká strana pokroková*). In Austrian German context, other designations as "freedom"/"German freedom" (*deutschfreiheitlich*) and "German national" (*deutschnational*) prevailed, although the aforementioned two were also present. In Hungary the Liberal Party bore the name of *Szabadelvű Párt*, which could also be translated as "Free-minded Party".[31]

All this coincided with splits in organized liberalism, as well as adoption of certain originally liberal principles by parties, stemming from other traditions. Broadening of the electorate and diversification of political life in the last decades of the 19th century introduced new types of parties, whose characterization did not correspond to the simple dichotomy between "conservative" and "liberal" anymore. The mentioned new labels also point to certain ideological shifts, be they dependent on new realities of political life and resulting need for new political strategies and rallying calls or not.[32]

[30] Rudolf Vierhaus, "Liberalismus" in: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe : historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland***,** Vol.3 H-Me, 4. Auflage, Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck eds. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), pp. 741-785, pp. 743-744, 782.

[31] "the tradition of usage acts as a rough indicator of the presence or absence of a political concept, though not of its agreed content. Nor does this rule out the emergence of new political concepts as social and cultural conditions change, or as knowledge diversifies." (Freeden, Ideologies, 61.)

[32] "Understanding the past meanings of concepts is a way of shedding light on current concepts, and a means of appreciating the malleability of language and its interpretations because of the nature of conceptual indeterminacy. And it is also to recognize that language is a product of human choice, individual and collective, unintentional as well as intentional. That recognition is the key to a liberal disposition, to the introduction of

The nature of organized liberalism was deeply affected by general socio-political developments. Liberalism is primarily an idea about general political order, about boundaries of political power, the nature and purpose of law and similar, and does not necessarily point to certain policies and stances on concrete issues.[33] New manners of politics and changed party landscapes faced the "liberals" with lack of orientation, as well as diversity of orientations or alliances. Last but not least this also resulted in different approaches to politics in newly emerged realities of political life and therefore also different attitudes to the original liberal ideas.

In addition to the emergence of new labels, another feature of political life may be observed in the *fin-de-siecle* Central Europe. Political landscapes as they evolved by the end of 19th century were often marked by so-called political "camps" (*Lager*, *tabori*), comprising similarly oriented political parties and their broader following. The three principal camps could include the Christian (usually Roman Catholic) conservative, the Marxist and the third, more heterogeneous group, usually labeled as "liberal", "progressive" or "free-minded" what very often also corresponded to "national".

Besides the political circles, which could perhaps strictly-speaking be defined as proponents of liberalism, the latter camps could include parties and factions of various non-liberal orientations and ideologies. Usually still perceiving themselves as the main modernization force, they did not cling to one set of doctrines but stressed the notions of "free-mindedness" and "progress". Since they traced its roots back to 19th century national liberalism, it should be stressed though, that the national idea usually continued to be a distinctive common ground - or even the strongest one. Already before the turn of the century, national orientation

transparency into our control of language, and to a suitable modesty, and scholarly restraint, in the face of the overwhelming pluralism of political language and thought." (Freeden, Concepts, 62.)

[33] "Die Geschichte des Begriffs 'Liberalismus' ist jedoch mit der Geschichte der Benennung liberaler Parteien, auch mit der Geschichte der parteipolitischen Liberalismus nicht identisch. 'Liberalismus' als politischer Begriff meint von Anfang an ein Verständnis der politischen Welt und ein Konzept ihrer Gestaltung, das nicht bloß von einer oder mehreren Parteien vertreten wurde." (Vierhaus, Liberalismus, 744.)

distinguished Christian conservative and socialist movements also. Nevertheless, in contrast to the national liberals and their heirs the appeal to national idea still did not represent the strongest unifying link, central ideological concept and main point of identification. In addition to that, anticlericalism and sometimes also an aversion towards Marxism represented important common denominators.

It could therefore be argued that the parties of this "third camp" represented heirs of national liberalism as a political force. Their 'liberality' or 'illiberality' thereby varied from nation and nation, depending on the general political circumstances, as did the degree and nature of their nationalism.

In the interwar period - and to certain extent already from the turn of the century onwards - the situation changed further. The political landscapes experienced a process of thorough transformation. This happened due to different factors – the introduction of universal suffrage and advent of mass politics, as well as dissolution of empires and consolidation of new nation states with respective political landscapes, to name just the few most important ones. With the emergence of new types of political movements and specific ideologies, as agrarianisms and far right nationalisms for example, the mentioned tri-partite division of politics became partly obsolete.

In case of the "third camp" or national liberal heirs, this was accompanied by continued disintegration, loss of orientation and changes in party policies. Lacking a solid ideological fundament, except the national idea itself, its development was to a much higher degree influenced by the national contexts, as was the case in Catholic conservative or Marxist movements. Different national-political orientations between the German and Slavic areas, brought along also differences in ideological developments and stances, which became particularly clear in the interwar period.

Liberal politics were faced by especially great and troublesome challenges in adapting themselves to the developing realities of political life and gradual transformation of the party systems**.** Despite the already begun process of reorganization before 1914 the traditional liberal and conservative parties of Western, Northern and Central Europe still bore traits of elite parties (*Honoratiorenparteien*).[34] As such they hardly transformed themselves into mass or popular parties, although they strived to do so.

The case of Central European politics of that time was moreover particularly marked by illiberal tendencies and overall anti-individualist atmosphere with all of the countries, except Czechoslovakia, ruled by different forms of authoritarian rule at a certain point in time. And even in that country, democratic order was being secured only by means of permanent alliance between the five main political parties. Furthermore, the emergence of aggressive ideologies as bolshevism, fascism and National Socialism and establishment of respective regimes impacted the political atmosphere to a high level. Nevertheless, there still existed political parties, which were perceived either by themselves or by the public as representing the heirs or at least successors of the old national liberal traditions. As such they have also been closely examined by historiography.

A clear tri-partite camp division can be observed in case of the interwar Austrian republic. In addition to the Catholic and Marxist[35] camps, the far strongest political forces in the Austrian "2 ½ limping (*hinkend*) party system"[36], also a third, much weaker one was present. Most

[34] Gunther Mai, Europa 1918-1939, Gesellschaften und Staaten, Mentalitäten, Lebensweisen, Politik zwischen den Weltkriegen (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2001), p. 150.
"Vor allem die Liberalen hielten am konsequentesten an diesem Prinzip fest, das ihrem individualistischen Denken entsprach, während die Konservativen, auch von der or 1914 entstehenden radikalen Rechten beeinflusst, sich mit Hilfe von Vorfeldorganisationen zwar nicht zu Volksparteien, aber doch zu Wählerparteien zu verbreitern versuchten." (Ibid.)

[35] Although the existence of Austrian Communist Party cannot be left ignored, this camp can be to a large extent be treated as the identical to the strong Social Democratic Party and its following up to the end of parliamentary order in Austria in 1933/34. Only after the February events of 1934 and the ban on Social Democratic Party the underground organized Communists began to gain mentionable influence.

[36] *Lexikon zur Geschichte der Parteien in Europa* (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1981), p. 442.

often named by historiographers simply "the third camp" (*das dritte Lager*) or "German nationalist camp" (*Lager der Deutschnationalen*), it has been also referred to as the "middle classes camp" (*bürgerliches Lager*)[37] or "national liberal camp" (*national-liberales Lager*).[38] The main representative of the third camp was the Greater-German People's Party (*Grossdeutsche Volkspartei*), which loosely united 17 German nationalist and national liberal group but took a gradual path toward the far right to finally align itself with the National Socialist in the 1930's. There also existed an independent agrarianist party, the *Landbund,* having its own special agenda but at the same time more or less acting as an ally of the above mentioned GdVP. Common for both parties were German nationalist orientation, anti-clericalism and opposition to Marxism.

In interwar Czechoslovakia – more precisely its Czech part – the political landscape was more diversified and one could hardly treat it as divided into three camps. The non-Marxist and non-Catholic parties were more numerous, espoused various political leanings and did not form a uniform "camp". In addition to the National Socialists and Agrarians, far weaker Czechoslovak National Democrats (*Československá národní demokracie*), existed as part of ruling "petka" coalition. This party could be labelled as representing the most direct heir to the pre-WWI Young Czech Party (National Liberal Party), thereby also uniting some members of the former Czech Progressive Party.

[37] Krzysztof Glass, Barbara Serloth, *Das Selbstverständnis des österreichischen Liberalismus* (Wien/Poznań: Österreichische Gesellschaft für Mitteleuropäische Studien/Humanior, 1997), p. 160.
[38] Ibid., 183.

2. SLOVENE "PROGRESSIVE" CAMP, ITS GROUPS AND PARTIES DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

On following pages I intend to provide a general account concerning the Slovene "progressive" political forces, commonly referred to as "liberal" on part of the Slovene historiographers. The main purpose of this chapter is therefore to introduce the subject of my thesis and provide some general information on its interwar development, necessary for understanding the issues discussed in chapters which are going to follow. I will thereby devote larger part of my attention to the circle of 'young' progressives, led by Gregor Žerjav and Albert Kramer. During the 1920's and 30's this faction represented the core group of their camp. At the same time they were also the most vocal and principled proponents of Yugoslav nationalism, which acted - as it will be exposed later - as an important unifying factor of that camp in the observed era.

2.1. POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF SLOVENE LANDS AND PROGRESSIVE CAMP AS ONE OF ITS MAIN COMPONENTS

Slovene political landscape, as it developed towards the end of the 19th century and thereafter, was marked by division into three so-called political or ideological camps (*Gesinnungslager*; *nazorski tabori*), which comprised similarly oriented political parties, circles and their broader following. Such political structures represented a distinctive feature of the *fin de siecle* and early 20th century politics in Central Europe, especially the Cisleithanian part of (ex-) Habsburg Empire. Slovene lands were therefore no exception in that matter, although the mentioned divisions into camps differed from nation to nation and from land to land in their

actual form, various particular aspects and even more in regard to their developments after the First World War.

The three main camps, which largely distinguished Slovene politics up to the Second World War, were the Catholic conservatives, the "progressives" or "liberals" and the Marxist camp. Since they represented different ideological positions, as well as to a certain extent also social groups, a struggle went on between them from the very beginning. This was especially characteristic in case of Catholic and progressive camps, both resenting the weaker Marxists[39] but at the same time engaging in a bitter *Kulturkampf* on almost every issue, labeling each other as "clericals" and "liberals".

The first group, commonly labeled as "clericals" by their opponents, was throughout its history represented by a single political organization – the Slovene People's Party (*Slovenska ljudska stranka – SLS*)[40]. Its politics, embracing the ideals of Christian faith, tradition and social solidarity, which was primarily oriented towards the majority peasant population (even in 1940 about 55% of population living in Slovene part of Yugoslavia were employed in agriculture[41]), could to a large extent be paralleled to that of the Austrian Christian Social movement.[42] Since the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1907, Slovene People's

[39] In this regard it should be mentioned, though, that in the interwar period and especially after 1935 progressives and socialists started collaborating with each other against the far stronger Catholic party.

[40] Founded in 1892 as "Catholic National Party" (*Katoliška narodna stranka*), the party adopted the name "Slovene People's Party" in 1905. Initially only a Carniolan party, it merged with its sister parties from Görz-Gradisca, Styria and Carinthia into "All-Slovene People's Party" (*Vseslovenska ljudska stranka*) in 1909. In 1918 the prefix "All-" was abandoned.

[41] In 1918, this proportion was even higher (around 66%). All in all the interwar Slovene peasant population stood at roughly 60%. (*Slovenska novejša zgodovina: od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije : 1848-1992* (Slovene Modern History: from United Slovenia Program to the International Recognition of Republic of Slovenia: 1848-1992), Vol. 1: 1848-1945, Jasna Fischer et al eds. (Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2005), p. 441.)

[42] In its formative moments and up to the First World War and the following collapse of Austria Hungary, the Slovene political Catholicism indeed enjoyed a great degree of influence on part of its Austro-German counterpart. A large strain of Slovene Christian conservatives, which gradually became the dominant one, also commonly employed the label of "Christian social". Moreover, even after the war, when emergence of new states created essentially new political circumstances, the developments in Austrian and Slovene Catholic politics to a certain degree resembled each other. Similarly as in Austria the mainstream of Slovene People's Party represented one of the strongest proponents of democracy until the end of 1920's, but began drifting

Party represented the strongest Slovene political force. Its power increased even more in the interwar period and its electoral support stood at roughly 60% of the votes from 1923 on.

Index 1: Voting results of 1920's parliamentary elections in Slovene part of Yugoslavia[43]

	Catholic conservatives	**Progressives**	**Marxists**	**Others**[44]
1920 (Constitutient Assembly)	37.265% (58971 votes)	32.53% (51484 votes)	28.96% (45830 votes)	1.23% (1960 votes)
1923	60.46% (60.96%)[45] (107976 (108855))	19.34% (34525)	10.65% (19030)	9.545% (9.05%) (17046 (16167))
1925	56.32% (105303)	25.35% (23.13%)[46] (47390 (43251))	6.72% (12562)	11.61% (13.82%) (21712 (25851))
1927	59.94% (106247)	23.83% (42237)	10.15% (17988)	6.08% (10783)

The index on the next page shows the 1938 electoral results, where the picture is more blurry. Due to generally undemocratic circumstances and a heavily curtailed parliamentarian order they can not be treated as being highly representative of popular attitudes.[47] Still, it should be stressed that 1938 elections are at least relevant mentioning. In contrast to the ones of 1931 (when the governmental list represented the only option) and 1935 (when Slovene Catholics

towards authoritarian corporatism in the following decade, although perhaps to a lesser degree, due to a differences in internal and external political situations.

[43] Summarized on the basis of: Bojan Balkovec, "Rezultati parlamentarnih volitev v Sloveniji" (Parliamentary Election Results in Slovenia) in *Slovenska kronika XX. Stoletja* (Slovene XX. Century Chronicle), vol.1: 1900-1941, Marjan Drnovšek and Drago Bajt eds. (Ljubljana: Nova Revija, 1997), p. 329.

[44] In addition to parties and lists representing regional interests (for instance "Transmura List" which gained 1.23% of votes in 1920), Stjepan Radić's "Croatian Peasants' Party" (gained 16404 votes in 1925) and German national minority lists are listed under this category. (Ibid.)

[45] 879 (0.49%) votes went to "National People's Party", a conservative party led by pre-1918 Slovene People's Party leader Ivan Šušteršič. Since the main aim of the party was to counter Slovene People's Party, thereby also mildly criticizing 'clericalism', it is listed under the category of "other".

[46] 4139 (1.78%) votes went to "Slovene Republican Party of Peasants and Workers", led by Slovene 'Masarykian realist' Dragotin Lončar. Due to the Slovene realists' intellectual origins and the party's positioning outside the Marxist and Catholic camps, it can conditionally be treated as part of progressive camp.

[47] During 1930's all religious, "tribal" (ethnic) and regional parties were banned and only parties and lists appointing candidates in all the electoral districts could participate. There was no secret ballot and voters, particularly in rural areas and those employed in public sector could be subjected to different forms of pressure from the regime party.

did not participate and the overall turnout in Slovene lands was only 46.96%)[48], in 1938 67.61% of voters attended the elections and representatives of all the political camps participated.[49]

Index 2: 1938 electoral results in Slovene part of Yugoslavia[50]

Governmental list (Milan Stojadinović)	**United Opposition list (Vladko Maček)**		**Dimitrije Ljotić's list**
Catholic conservatives (Slovene People's Party as part of Yugoslav Radical Union)	**Progressives** (Yugoslav National Party) **and Socialists** (Socialist Party of Yugoslavia)	**Popular Front/United Slovene Opposition** (dissident fringe leftist groups from all camps)	Slovene section of ZBOR movement
78.60%	app. 14%	app. 7%	0.52%

During the interwar period, Marxist camp, the 'youngest' of the three and oriented more or less towards industrial workers, was marked by constant internal division between reformist Socialists (themselves splitting into a number of splinter groups) and the Communist Party which, despite being banned in 1921, continued to operate from the underground. Due to different causes, especially the mentioned fragmentation, this was by far the weakest of the three camps and did not represent a major political factor.[51]

The third camp, commonly referred to as "liberal" – especially by its opponents - but usually using names as "progressive", "national-progressive", "national" or "free-minded" when referring to itself, was the most heterogeneous of the three. In contrast to the other two, it lacked clear and definite ideological foundations (Catholicism, Marxism) and included

[48] According to Slovene People's Party's estimation the turnout was around 30%. (Slovenska novejša zgodovina, 359.).
[49] Ibid., 390.
[50] Summarized on the basis of: ibid. and Zdenko Čepič et al., *Ključne značilnosti slovenske politike v letih 1929-1955 : znanstveno poročilo* (Key Characteristics of Slovene Politics in years 1929-1955: a Scientific Report) (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 1995), p. 24.
[51] As it can be seen from the table on the previous page, at the 1920 elections to the Constituent Assembly Social Democrats and Communists together gathered almost 29% of the Slovene vote. Afterwards the electoral power of the Marxist camp diminished as socialists and legal organizations of the banned communists never attained more than around 10%.

factions of various orientations, which could be described as ranging from secular conservatism to moderate non-Marxist socialism. The common denominators were anti-clericalism and devotedness to constitutional order, civic achievements of the French revolution and general European political developments of the 18th and 19th centuries[52]. In any case, it is only conditionally proper to speak about liberalism in their case. This is especially so in regard to the interwar period, when that camp was divided into three to four parties (in the twenties) or at least groups (during the thirties) with distinct agendas and goals.

It has to be pointed out that that interwar Slovene lands represent an ingrate case. Whereas the German, Austrian and also Czech political contexts in one or other way correspond to legally existing political communities and perspective political landscapes, Slovenia was not even an administrative unit at that time. Nevertheless, as already stressed in the previous chapter and additionally described in the preceding paragraphs, a distinct internal political landscape developed, largely distinguished by division into three ideological camps. All-Yugoslav politics affected these divisions only to a limited degree and can be in this sense paralleled to the pre-war Austrian frame in which many national political traditions evolved – with the crucial difference that Slovenes in Yugoslavia possessed an incomparably larger power in framing the state politics. A significant novelty, impacting also the degree of support for different camps was thereby the division between Yugoslav unitarist forces and Slovene autonomists.[53]

Development of the Slovene liberal or progressive camp, whose roots could be traced back to the nationally oriented literary, intellectual and political circles of the first half of 19th century, followed by the "Young Slovenes" (*Mladoslovenci*) in the second half, and - in the strict

[52] Cf. Ervin Dolenc, "Slovenski intelektualci in njihove delitve" (Slovene Intellectuals and Their Divisions) in *Slovenska trideseta leta: simpozij 1995* (Slovene Thirties: Simposium 1995), Peter Vodopivec, Jože Mahnič eds. (Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1997), pp. 194-201, p. 199.

[53] Cf. Janko Pleterski, "Politika naroda v krizi dužbe, države in idej" (Politics of a Nation in Crisis of Society, State and Ideas) in *Slovenska trideseta leta: simpozij 1995* (Slovene Thirties: Simposium 1995), Peter Vodopivec, Jože Mahnič eds. (Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1997), pp. 43-57, p. 47.

partisan sense - to the founding of "National Party for Carniola" (*Narodna stranka za Kranjsko*) in 1894, presents us with another distinguishing feature. There was one distinctive common ground, present from the very beginnings and uniting all the progressive groups also during the interwar period – namely the national idea. Although also the Catholic and even Social Democrat movements strongly embraced Slovene national orientation, their politics were still resting primarily on other ideological foundations. In case of progressives, on the other hand, the national idea was emphasized especially and therefore represented one of the strongest uniting and guiding factors.

Progressive politics found followers and supporters among people coming from all social strata and belonging to various professional groups. Nevertheless, to a certain extent predominantly 'bourgeois' character could be ascribed to the progressive camp, as it indeed attracted the major part of economic and intellectual elites, as well as most of the people of liberal professions and small entrepreneurs.[54] Its strongholds were the cities, particularly Ljubljana, where it managed to retain a majority support even after 1907, whereas it was unable to gain a majority of votes in other municipalities. In the countryside, where the support for progressives was mostly limited to wealthier peasants and rural 'petty bourgeoisie' (storekeepers, innkeepers, lawyers and teachers)[55], the Catholics were leading strongly. Among industrial workers the progressive trade unions were very weak in comparison to the socialist and Catholic ones.

During the interwar period strong elements of cleavage and resulting distinct courses of development could be observed in the progressive camp, as different specific groupings evolved and became visible. This can at least partly be attributed to differences in social and

[54] Three years after the introduction of universal suffrage in 1907, to which National Progressive Party was opposed, the party leader, lawyer and writer Ivan Tavčar boasted about one quarter of votes at the same time representing three quarters of tax revenues. (Vasilij Melik, "Slovenski liberalni tabor in njegovo razpadanje" (Slovene Liberal Camp and its Disintegration), *Prispevki za zgodovino delavskega gibanja*, vol. 1-2/yr. 22 (1982): pp. 19-24, p. 23.)

[55] Cf. Jurij Perovšek, "Socialni, politični in idejni značaj slovenskega liberalizma v letih 1894-1918" (Social, Political and Ideal Character of Slovene Liberalism During the Years 1894-1918), *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, Yr. 32, No. 1-2 (1992): pp. 3-14, p. 5.

cultural milieus from which these groupings originated or which they claimed to represent. The same applies also to the distinct professional interests, being voiced through progressive politics. Sometimes views and interests of these groups mutually concurred and sometimes not. The already mentioned fragmentation of progressive politics into a number of parties at the end of First World War, a topic to be more precisely presented in the next subchapter, was to a certain extent a result of such differences, most importantly the one between urban-based middle class progressive core and its rural following. In the context of countryside another divide could be discerned between educated and half-educated groups like teachers and lawyers and the propertied strata of rural progressive supporters. Motives for political engagement or support for certain parties were at least partly different between these two groups, with the latter more concerned about specific economic issues of countryside.

Among progressive politicians generational divisions also profoundly marked the interwar era as three important generational circles actively forming the Slovene liberal politics can roughly be defined. The first and oldest group were the 'elders' (*starini*), comprising the pre-war prominent progressive political figures, most notably Ivan Tavčar (1851-1923), Ivan Hribar (1851-1941), Karel Triller (1862-1926) and Vladimir Ravnihar (1871-1954). In 1918 these politicians officially still held the leading posts but already had to share power with the circle of liberal 'youths' (*mladini*). During the first five years of newly established Yugoslav state, remaining political strength of the older circle swiftly diminished. Still, the elders, some of them even 'outliving' the most prominent 'youths', never completely left the interwar political stage.

The 'elders' sometimes – although rarely – still explicitly spoke about "liberalism" thereby identifying themselves with that label. Their newspaper *Slovenski narod*[56] published an article

[56] *Slovenski narod* (Slovene Nation) was a Slovene daily newspaper with the longest tradition, being published between 1868 and 1945.

with a title "Some Notice" ("*Malo poduka*")[57] where it was stated that "The word liberalism" being "a somehow hackneyed catchword of our political life" essentially meant "love for freedom in intellectual sense, love for internal freedom of thought and independence" and "a will for original life according to free laws of personal conscience". It was stressed that only such and no other type of liberalism had been advocated in Slovene lands "and is still appropriate, because it represents the only serious, factual and possible basis of cultural progress" being "in the intellectual field the same as democratism and parliamentarism were for political life after long centuries of slavish subservience in feudal and absolutistic eras of Europe".[58]

The case was different with the circle of 'youths' gathered around Gregor Žerjav (1882-1929) and Albert Kramer (1882-1943), who almost entirely abandoned the liberal label, associating it with "sterile German liberalism".[59] "Liberalism" in their view entered a state of "decadence" already before the World War. When on the occasion of death of liberal 'elder' leader Ivan Tavčar an article appeared in their daily newspaper *Jutro*[60] in order to mourn, bid farewell and praise the memory of the dead politician, it in fact above all spoke about the youths' credits for "regeneration" of progressive camp. Under Tavčar's leadership it supposedly suffered from abovementioned errors and the 'youths' – at the beginning of 20th century leaders of "national radical students" movement – provided a much necessary "shift towards the left".[61]

The Kramer-Žerjav group entered party politics in 1909 and, as it was mentioned, made their way there through academic movement of "national radicals". During the first decade this

[57] "Malo poduka" (Some Notice), *Slovenski narod*, August 23 1924.
[58] Ibid.
[59] "Umrl Ivan Tavčar" (Ivan Tavčar Died), *Jutro*, February 20 1923.
[60] *Jutro* (Morning) was published between 1920 and 1945. Originally founded as a party paper of the 'young' wing of progressives it by mid-1920's became the leading progressive newspaper, thereby also having the highest circulation among all the Slovene newspapers. During 1930's all the progressive press, including *Slovenski narod*, was concentrated and published by "Jutro Consortium" (*Konzorcij Jutra*) and "Progressive Press Co-operative" (*Zadruga napredni tisk*).
[61] "Umrl Ivan Tavčar" (Ivan Tavčar Died), *Jutro*, February 20 1923.

group of young students represented a progressive 'inner opposition' that pushed for radical reform in political, cultural and economic spheres in order to attain their main goal of "solving the Slovene national question"[62]. They criticized the liberal leaders as well as Slovene politicians and intellectuals in general for being indolent, lacking a true program and ignoring the existing circumstances. Influenced by Masaryk's ideas about "small work" among broad popular masses and adopting the slogan "From the nation to the nation" the national radicals organized a number of lectures and traveling libraries to educate the people in national spirit and contribute to the "all-round emancipation" of Slovene nation.[63] In their newspaper, edited by Žerjav and Kramer, national radicals – the future progressive 'youths' – already in 1905 stated that the youth "does not want to be liberal, but social-individualistic in a way of an individual seeing his own success in the happiness of the group and the group perceiving its own progress in the development of all good individual forces".[64]

The group of progressive 'youths', gathered around Kramer and Žerjav as the leading figures and most frequent Slovene progressive ministers in interwar Yugoslav governments, included many other locally important politicians as Otmar Pirkmajer, Dinko Puc, Adolf Ribnikar, Milko Brezigar and Pavel Pestotnik for instance. This group of politicians represented the core of progressive politics in the interwar period, what will be in greater detail described in the next subchapter from the point of view of party politics. At this point the name of Ivan Pucelj (1879-1945), the 1920's leader of Slovene independent agrarianist movement, should also be mentioned. Although not a member of the 'youths' circle, Pucelj during 1930's, when progressive politicians were united in a single party, represented the second most prominent figure next to Kramer.

[62] Irena Gantar Godina, *T. G. Masaryk in masarykovstvo na Slovenskem : 1895-1914* (T. G. Masaryk and Masarykianism in Slovene Lands: 1895-1914) (Ljubljana: Slovenska Matica, 1987), p. 80.
[63] Cf. Irena Gantar Godina, "Narodno radikalno dijaštvo" (National Radical Students), *Zgodovinski časopis*, nr. 36 (1982): pp. 219-230, p. 220.
[64] *Omladina*, nr. 11/yr. 1 (1905) (Quoted from: Zvonko Bergant, *Slovenski klasični liberalizem, idejno-politični značaj slovenskega liberalizma v letih 1891-1921* (Slovene Classical Liberalism, Ideal and Political Character of Slovene Liberalism in Years 1891-1921) (Ljubljana: Nova revija, 2000), pp. 138-139.).

Albert Kramer (in the middle) and Ivan Pucelj (on his right)

(Source: *Digitalna Knjižnica Slovenije* (Digital Library of Slovenia), http://www.dlib.si/v2/StreamDb.aspx?URN=URN:NBN:SI:img-1FNUNYQ1, accessed May 27 2010.)

In addition to 'elders' and 'youths', another generation of progressives appeared in the second half of thirties, bringing fresh spirit and new ideas. These were the young progressives or - as they most commonly called themselves – Yugoslav nationalists, belonging to a generation, which grew up in new circumstances of Yugoslav state and did not posses memories of the old Habsburg Empire. Gathered around Jože Rus (1904-1992) and Andrej Uršič (1908-unknown) and emerging from academic societies as *JNAD Jadran* (Yugoslav Progressive Academic Society "Adriatic"), they formed the youth wing of Yugoslav National Party in Slovene lands, determined to strengthen the party with "fresh fighting spirit, more dynamics and more populism [*ljudskost*]"[65]. Their development as an independent political group was in

[65] Jože Rus, "Naša pota, gledanja in težnje" (Our Ways, Viewpoints and Aspirations) in *Omladina Jugoslovenske nacionalne stranke: Banovinska skupščina 12. septembra 1937 v Ljubljani* (Provincial conference of the Yugoslav National Party Youth in Ljubljana 1937) (Ljubljana: 1937), pp. 9-15; p. 14.
(Archive of the Republic of Slovenia, dislocated unit III, AS1931: Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve Socialistične Republike Slovenije 1918-1982, t.e. 933, 600-19 OJNS.)

the end hindered by the beginning of the Second World War. For this reason they never succeeded in attaining political prominence and expressing their ideas through party politics.

2.2. PARTIES OF THE SLOVENE PROGRESSIVE CAMP DURING THE INTERWAR ERA

As already mentioned, the tradition of progressive politics, stemming from 19th century national liberal circles, independently entered the political stage in 1894 with the founding of its own political organization - the "National Party for Carniola". This party was renamed to "National Progressive Party" (*Narodno napredna stranka – NNS*) in 1905 and in June 1918 merged with other similarly oriented political organizations from other Slovene lands (most notably the "National Party for Styria" and "National Progressive Party for Görz and Gradisca") to form the joint "Yugoslav Democratic Party" (*Jugoslovanska demokratska stranka - JDS*). For a short time at the end of the WWI Slovene progressives were therefore united in a single party.

Yugoslav Democratic Party moreover quickly connected itself first with the "Serb-Croat Coalition" and some other Yugoslav nationalist and liberal groups from ex-Habsburg lands in February 1919 and finally also with the "National Liberals", "Progressives" and "Independent Radicals" from the former Kingdom of Serbia in May of the same year.[66] This way the first all-state party in the newly founded Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed. Bearing the same name as its Slovene predecessor the new Yugoslav Democratic Party, led by Serbian liberal politician Ljuba Davidović, became the strongest political force in the country, as well as the most vocal and radical proponent of Yugoslav national idea. In Slovene progressive press it was represented as an essentially centrist party and moreover a most

[66] Jurij Perovšek, *Liberalizem in vprašanje slovenstva : nacionalna politika liberalnega tabora v letih 1918-1929* (Liberalism and the Question of Slovenehood: National Politics of the Liberal Camp During the Years 1918-1929) (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 1996.), pp. 129-130.

important agent of state building, as well as a necessary safeguard against all instabilities and extremes.[67]

On the other hand, the Slovene progressive camp started to fragment, as two new parties were founded in 1919. They at least partly rooted in that tradition, were labeled by Catholics and Marxists as "liberal", but introduced different policies and adopted positions, which were sometimes opposed to those of JDS. First of them, the "Independent Agrarian Party" (*Samostojna kmetijska stranka – SKS*), led by a wealthy landowner and butcher Ivan Pucelj, was originally founded by rural members of JDS to weaken support for SLS among the peasantry but quickly adopted its own course becoming a special, essentially agrarianist oriented movement.[68] In the years 1926-1929, after it had transformed itself into "Slovene Peasants' Party" (*Slovenska kmetska stranka*), it also stepped into direct confrontation with the core progressives' views, as it started embracing ideas of Slovene national individuality.

The second new party, originating partly from progressive trade unions as well as some disappointed former social democrats, was the "National Socialist Party" (*Narodno socialistična stranka – NSS*), which strived to pursue a gradual path towards distinctly Yugoslav type of socialism[69]. Following the example of the Czech National Socialists, their Slovene counterparts attacked Marxism and internationalism, as well as economic liberalism, whose main representative they saw in the 'bourgeois' JDS[70]. They differed from the latter also in the treatment of the nationality question, being Yugoslav nationalists but demanding cultural autonomy for each of the 'tribes' and federal administrative organization at the same time. Despite all these differences, the then entirely weakened NSS in 1928 finally joined the

[67] "Political work of the Democratic Party has constantly been aimed towards hindering the dangerous extremes, (…) incitement of the masses from below, (…) debauchery from above, reaction from the right and demagoguery from the left." ("Uvodnik" (Editorial), *Jutro*, Jan 17 1923.)
"With its program and its solid power has Democratic Party held in balance both the reactionaries on extreme right and demagogues on extreme left, as well as tribal separatists and tribal hegemonists." (Ibid.)
[68] Cf . Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje, 115-116.
[69] Cf. ibid., 117.
[70] Ibid., 118.

mainstream Slovene progressive forces, thus merging with the "Independent Democratic Party" (*Samostalna demokratska stranka – SDS*).

Independent Democratic Party (1924-1929) was the second political organization after JDS, in which the core Slovene progressive politicians – or one could also say the most important direct heirs of the national liberal tradition - participated. In years 1923-24 it came to two political quarrels, second of which actually led to its foundation.

First in 1923, the so-called liberal 'elders', most of them already prominent figures of the pre-WWI National Progressive Party, representing mainly the well-to-do '*Burghers*' of Ljubljana[71], got into quarrel with the 'youths' and departed the JDS. This group, led by Vladimir Ravnihar, briefly awakened the old National Progressive Party but experienced a fiasco at 1923 elections, joining the Serbian "National Radical Party" in the following year. After that it ceased to possess any mentionable prominence in politics.

The mentioned dispute happened due to certain financial malversations, conducted by the 'young' liberal wing, gathered around Gregor Žerjav and Albert Kramer, who swiftly managed to establish themselves as the leading group in the progressive camp after 1918. Up to the very end of Slovene party politics after the outbreak of the Second World War, this circle represented the mainstream part of Slovene progressives and will thus receive largest degree of attention in my analysis. It deserves it even more, since it at the same time comprised the most persistent and uncompromising proponents of Yugoslav national idea, as well as the urban-based, middle class wing of the progressive camp.

The second quarrel occurred on the level of the whole JDS between its Serbian part around the party leader Davidović and politicians from ex-Habsburg lands, led by Svetozar Pribičević and Gregor Žerjav. Davidović started searching for a settlement between Yugoslav nations and adopted a new course, leading away from strict Yugoslav national unitarism. After that

[71] Ibid., 245.

the unitarist wing of the party, including all of the Slovene politicians, seceded and formed Independent Democratic Party (SDS) under the leadership of Pribičević. The new party was limited more or less to the ex-Habsburg lands, where it was supported mainly by the Serbs, as well as by the majority of Slovene progressive voters. SDS, comprising the younger generation of Slovene progressives thus became the main representative of that camp.

Index 3: Proportions of votes between the parties inside the progressive camp[72]

	Yugoslav Democratic Party, (1920, 1923) Independent Democratic Party (1925, 1927)	**Independent Agrarian Party (1920,1923, 1925) Slovene Peasants' Party (1927)**	**National Socialist Party**	**Others[73]**
1920 (Constitutient Assembly)	23.87% (12288 votes)	64.12% (33010 votes)	12.015% (6186 votes)	-
1923	42.46% (14661)	31.93% (11023)	11.29% (3898)	14.32% (4943)
1925	54.72% (23669)	28.51% (12332)	8.86%[74] (3834)	7.99% (3416)
1927	65,01%[75] (27460)	23.44% (9900)	-	11.55% (4877)

In different political circumstances of 1930's, marked first by a straightforward dictatorship of king Alexander I. and later by heavily curtailed parliamentarian order, where only all-state parties were allowed to exist, the leading progressives from former SDS and SKS, as well as some of the 'elders', joined the "Yugoslav National Party" (*Jugoslovenska nacionalna stranka – JNS*). Being the only permitted political organization until 1935[76], this was basically a regime party, functioning as a tool for implementing the policies of king Alexander, who, following a great internal turmoil, decided to abolish democracy and try to forcefully 'unite'

[72] Summarized on basis of: Balkovec, Rezultati.
[73] Under this section independent regional and local lists, as well as the National Radical Party, are listed.
[74] National Socialists collaborated with liberal 'elders' (members of National Radical Party) and Yugoslav Democratic Party (Davidović) in 1925. (Balkovec, Rezultati.)
[75] Independent Democratic Party achieved 65% in 1927 together with the National Socialist Party as its electoral ally. The latter officially dissolved itself to merge with SDS in 1928.
[76] Yugoslav National Party evolved from a ruling group of politicians, who stood as candidates on governmental list in 1931. They formed a party, called Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democracy, the next year, which in turn renamed itself into JNS in 1933.

Yugoslavia into a single, homogenous nation. Aims of the king, labeled also as the "Unifier", were in accordance with Slovene progressives' Yugoslav nationalist ideology, whereas the foundation of a single regime party coincided well with their common goal of crushing the power of political Catholicism in Slovene lands once and for all.

The latter did not succeed, despite the concentration of all administrative power in Drava Province[77] in hands of progressives, dissolution of major Catholic organizations, as well as various forms of political and economic pressure put upon the followers of officially dissolved Slovene People's Party. Soon after King Alexander was assassinated, the tables turned, as new governmental party "Yugoslav Radical Union" (*Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica – JRZ*), which included Slovene Catholic conservatives, was formed and took power in 1935.

JNS landed in opposition and its power quickly eroded, although it managed to consolidate itself again as a party after 1936. Its Slovene part, composed of progressives led by Albert Kramer and Ivan Pucelj, retained a comparatively small degree of political power more or less due to their entrenched positions and connections in economy, influential newspapers (*Jutro, Slovenski Narod, Domovina*) and mass organizations as the gymnastic society "Falcon of Kingdom of Yugoslavia" (*Sokol Kraljevine Jugoslavije*). They were encountering increasing internal cleavages, especially due to the rising unpopularity of Yugoslav nationalist course, to which they clang until the end, praising the "traditions of January the 6th"(the date of king Alexander's coup in 1929) and proclaiming themselves as the only ones, who did not betray the memory of the dead king. Weakness of progressive camp in the second half of the thirties reflected well in the self confident attitude of their Catholic opponents whose main newspaper

[77] Drava Province (or *Banovina*) encompassed the entire Slovene part of Yugoslavia.

Slovenec argued in 1936 that the Slovene future was going to belong to either Catholicism or to the communism but certainly not to the JNS.[78]

Due to beginnings of a gradual democratization process, which made foundation of new parties or awakening of old ones easier[79], groups of politicians, dissatisfied with the Yugoslav National Party and the ill repute connected to its dictatorial origins, began organizing Slovene branches of the old Independent Democratic and National Radical parties. The Second World War and Axis attack on Yugoslavia came too early for these parties to consolidate themselves though. Similarly, the process of emancipation of Yugoslav National Party Youth from the JNS leadership did not reach its conclusion before the war started. Officially, the youngest generation supported the leading progressive politicians and stood behind the official program of the Yugoslav National Party. By the end of the decade they began embracing critical stances towards it though, managing to secure themselves a certain level of independence and publishing their own manifesto bearing the title "Political, Economic and Social Principles"[80], in 1940.

[78] "Kje je sovražnik?" (Where is the Enemy), *Slovenec*, Jul 26 1936 (Quote from: Jurij Perovšek, "Idejni, socialnogospodarski in narodnopolitični nazori slovenskega meščanstva v času med svetovnima vojnama (1918-1941)" (Ideal, Socio-economic and National Political Views of Slovene Middle Classes in the Interwar Time (1918-1941)), *Zgodovinski časopis*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997): pp. 529-554, p. 541.).

[79] Slovenska novejša zgodovina, 393.

[80] *Politična, gospodarska in socialna načela* (Ljubljana: banovinski odbor OJNS, 1940).
(Archive of the Republic of Slovenia, dislocated unit III, AS1931: Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve Socialistične Republike Slovenije 1918-1982, t.e. 933, 600-19 OJNS.)
In that program their vision about needed social and political changes was outlined. It could be argued that their program reflected 1930's developments in the Slovene liberal camp under (semi)dictatorship and expressed views which were not limited only to its creators. I will thus use it, along with the newspapers, as one of the main sources for this decade.

3. TREATMENT OF NATIONALITY QUESTION AND THE NATIONALIST DISCOURSES

As already mentioned, all strains of the Slovene progressive camp had their distinctive common ground in the national idea, what can be generally attributed also to Austrian Greater Germans and other third camp groups, as well as to Czechoslovak National Democrats (and National Socialists). Moreover, the so-called 'young' liberal wing, led by Gregor Žerjav and Albert Kramer, began their political careers by organizing "national radical youth". During the interwar period, when it assumed a central role in progressive politics, this group united the most faithful and radical proponents of Yugoslav nationalism in Slovene lands.

The nation and national idea being the core values espoused by progressives, as well as the most important founding stones for their policies, can well be seen already in the 1918 program of Yugoslav Democratic Party, where the very first point proclaimed that:

"J.D.S. is a national party. Apart from community of language we perceive our nationality as community of cultural and social particularities that the folk [*ljudstvo*] created through centuries. These particularities guarantee to our nation its moral and material existence and we therefore demand that they be considered and fostered. To us nationality is a living creative power which must assert itself in all the public and private life: in family, in education, in common social upbringing, in science, art, literature, in policy implementation, in public administration, in legal and social ordinances."[81]

Such an accentuated national orientation became even more distinctive during 1930's when leading progressives formed Slovene part of Yugoslav National Party. Self-denomination as "nationalists" became quite prevalent then and to a certain extent overshadowed the otherwise still widely employed "progressive" label.

[81] "Program Jugoslovanske demokratske stranke" (Program of the Yugoslav Democratic Party (June 1918)) in *Programi političnih strank, organizacij in združenj na Slovenskem v času Kraljevine SHS (1918-1929)* (Programs of the Political Parties, Organizations and Associations in Slovene Lands during the Times of SHS Kingdom (1918-1929)), Jurij Perovšek ed. (Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo Slovenije, 1998), pp. 23-28, p. 23. During the JDS founding assembly Vladimir Ravnihar emphasized that for Yugoslav Democratic Party the nation was "everything" and that the "cultivation of nationality" was "the first and main task, to which everything else should be subordinated" (*Domovina*, July 5 1918 (Quoted from: Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje, 35.).)

This chapter intends to offer a deeper insight into certain features and elements of progressives' nationalism. The first subchapter will aim to provide an introduction to the Yugoslav idea, the role it had inside the context of progressive politics, the manner it was being understood by its Slovene champions and their reasons for adopting it. This will be followed by a short analysis of progressives' nationalist discourse, where the type and extent of their nationalism will be discussed.

3.1. YUGOSLAV NATIONAL IDEA AS THE INTERWAR SLOVENE PROGRESSIVES' CENTRAL POINT OF IDENTIFICATION

Yugoslav national idea – centered basically around the notion of one Yugoslav nation, either already existent or to-be-created and usually perceived as culturally, linguistically and ethnically one, but divided for centuries due to political factors - had evolved during the 19th century and was politically implemented after the creation of a common state in 1918. Early examples of it, especially the Illyrian movement, had a strong influence on strengthening the cultural and especially linguistic ties between the lands, which nowadays comprise Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro – lands of three different religions and a number of different dialects, which did not correspond to the religious (and later national) divisions. This differences also did not correspond to historical political divisions in case of Croats and Serbs, having a tradition of statehood and therefore both basing their nation-building on historical rights also.

There were quite successful attempts to unite these dialects into one language, which culminated in the 1850 agreement which based the Serbo-Croatian language on Shtokavian dialect (literary tradition of central Croatia was Kajkavian before that). But this did not apply to Slovene lands, where quite a different language was and is spoken, and where national idea was based on natural rights exclusively and thus evolved jointly with development of a

distinct Slovene literary language. Illyrian movement had certain brief influence in Slovenia, where its most visible representative was the poet Stanko Vraz. But the majority of Slovene writers, concentrating on creating Slovene literary language, at that time rejected such ideas. In the second half of the century a Neoillyrian strand emerged among some intellectuals, but did not have a greater impact on politics then.[82]

In any case, the motives and reasons behind the Yugoslav idea in Slovene lands, were to a certain extent different than in Croatia, Dalmatia or Serbia. Ideas of joining forces with other southern Slavs actually entered the foreground in the first decade of 20th century but the motives were primarily practical. Idea of trialism - that is transformation of Habsburg Monarchy into three political units instead of only two, with the third one uniting Slovenes, Croats and Serbs - became prominent in Slovene politics during the first decade of 20th century. It was only an idea of political union, though, and did not include aspirations for building up a new cultural nation. It grew mainly out of Slovene politicians' belief that Slovenes could not withstand the German pressure by themselves. Connection with other Southern Slavs – perceived as related but distinct - seemed a convenient solution to the rising German nationalist threat.

Among the university and high school students, on the other hand, movements emerged, which moved into direction of Yugoslav national idea in its fuller sense. Students from the liberal academic clubs formed the National Radical Youth movement between 1901 and 1914, among other also seeking cultural cooperation and reconciliation between all Southern Slavs (inside and outside Austria-Hungary). They brought in the notion of distinct Yugoslav identity, as in their own words Slovenes were first Yugoslavs and just secondly Slavs[83]. Although they did not directly pursue a political union, their leaders Gregor Žerjav and Albert

[82] See: Irena Gantar Godina, *Neoslavizem in Slovenci* (Neoslavism and Slovenes) (Ljubljana: Znanstveni inštitut Filozofske fakultete, 1994).
[83] Gantar Godina, Narodno radikalno, 220.

Kramer also began embracing the idea of unitary Yugoslav nation, after they had joined the National Progressive Party in 1909.[84] During the First World War they also had connections with Czech nationalist underground and the émigré "Yugoslav Committee", which signed the Corfu Declaration[85] in 1917, paving way for realization of Yugoslav statehood.

In 1918, when the Habsburg Empire was rashly approaching its end, leading to the establishment of independent "State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs" on 29th of October, rhetoric about one Yugoslav nation largely distinguished the nationalist fervor, which pervaded entire Slovene politics. Despite commonly shared enthusiasm for the coming common political (and perhaps also national) community, there from the very beginning existed major differences in views regarding the forms, means and dynamics of Yugoslav unification, as well as important nuances in understanding the idea of Yugoslav nation. All Slovene political forces were favoring unification then, thereby having different views on how the future state community should look like and what form should it take (federation, centralized state). They also differed in their views on the question of nationality – namely between at least partly retaining the idea of Slovene nation on one side and merging into unified Yugoslav nation on the other.

In contrast to Slovene People's Party, which advocated political autonomy for Slovenes, progressives from the very beginning adopted a Yugoslav unitarist outlook and argued for a

[84] It is important to mention that another movement, called "Rebirth" (*Preporod*), was formed among high school students on the eve of WWI. It functioned partly as a secret society (although it also published newspapers) and had clear goals – destruction of Austria-Hungary and unification of South Slavic lands with Serbia, Montenegro and eventually Bulgaria. They also embraced the notion of one Yugoslav nation. Many of them fought and died as volunteers in Serbian army in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, as well as in WWI. In contrast to the National Radical Youth, members of this movement did not have prominent roles in politics later, though.

[85] The Corfu declaration was signed in 1917 by the representatives of Serbian government and Yugoslav Committee, led by Ante Trumbić and comprising émigré politicians from Southern Slavic parts of Habsburg monarchy - among others also the Styrian progressive Bogumil Vošnjak. It already included the notion of One Yugoslav nation, composed of three tribes.

centralist state, as the best means for its implementation. They thus pushed for a quick and unconditional unification with Kingdom of Serbia, stating that the situation was urgent and one should not demand anything from Serbia but gratefully accept what she offers.[86] After the unification they supported the centralist organization of the state, voting in favor of 1921 *Vidovdan* constitution, and strictly pursued the then official idea of Yugoslavs as "three-named nation". According to the latter conception, Yugoslavs were one nation composed of three "tribes", which should undergo a process of amalgamation, thereby gradually overcoming all the historically caused differences among them.[87]

Reasons and motives for such a course were different and mutually intertwined. There were practical political reasons, arising from progressives' relative political weakness. Fearing the hegemony of political Catholicism if Slovenia gained autonomy, they argued that it would become a "papal province"[88] in such a case. Centralist organization of the kingdom, which they strongly advocated, moreover enabled progressives as members of the far strongest all-state party to partake in governments and by these means control local matters also. These considerations were joined by economic motives, as the entrepreneurs in the progressive camp saw great opportunities in a unified common market.

Furthermore, there was also a belief in necessity of a strong state, especially because of Italian territorial aspirations for territory settled by Slovenes and Croats but also due to political

[86] Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje, 80-83.

[87] One of the best examples of eagerness for rash national unification was the intervention made by Independent Agrarian deputy Bogumil Vošnjak during session of the Constitutional Board, which took place on 18th of February 1921. The governmental proposal stated that official language of the kingdom be Serbo-Croatian with an additional clause regarding Slovene lands where "Slovene dialect" was to be valid. Vošnjak protested and proposed "Serbo-Croato-Slovene" (*srbsko-hrvaško-slovenski*) as the name for official language. The action was successful and the constitution in the end included Vošnjak's formulation. (Jurij Perovšek, "Bogumil Vošnjak in 'srbsko-hrvaško-slovenski' jezik" (Bogumil Vošnjak and the "Serbo-Croato-Slovene" Language) in *kronika XX. Stoletja* (Slovene XX. Century Chronicle), vol.1: 1900-1941, Marjan Drnovšek and Drago Bajt eds. (Ljubljana: Nova Revija, 1997), p. 257.)
For more on projects of cultural amalgamation of Yugoslavs see: Andrew Baruch Wachtel, *Making a nation, breaking a nation: literature and cultural politics in Yugoslavia* (Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, 1998).

[88] Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje, 254.

paragons. A strong state could in progressives' views be achieved only by means of national integration and centralized administration. They followed examples of western European state nations here. Karel Triller from the 'elder' liberal generation, for instance, already in October 1918 referred to the French model, arguing that inhabitants of Bretagne and Gascoigne enjoyed the same administrative order, although being in all aspects much more dissimilar than people from different Yugoslav lands.[89] As it was stressed in the 1921 program of Yugoslav Democratic Party, any kind of special status for any part of the state was also perceived as contrary to democratic order.[90]

Last but not least, there was also a sincere belief present among progressives, especially the ones from younger generation, that integration into Yugoslav nation represented a new, necessary and higher evolutive stage for Slovene people. The following passage from a speech, delivered by Gregor Žerjav at JDS assembly in Ljubljana on 3rd of February 1924, touching upon the Slovene national question and providing an answer to it, illustrates that quite well:

"To convert the Slovene part of the nation into Yugoslavness [*jugoslovenstvo*], (…) in order that we grow into inseparable Yugoslav whole, to unite all the creative forces among Slovenes for this action – this is what the Slovene democracy longs for. This way the problem of small nation would be solved in a favorable way for the Slovenes."[91]

Progressive politicians, assembled in the Independent Democratic Party after 1924, followed the Yugoslav national idea strictly and persistently. They warned against the danger of hegemony by any of the three tribes including the Serbs, and thus criticized the National Radical Party and its Great-Serbian orientation, although they shared devotion to centralist

[89] Ibid., 60.
[90] "Iz programa vsedržavne Jugoslovanske demokratske stranke sprejetega na strankinem kongresu 30. in 31. oktobra 1921 v Beogradu" (From the Program of All-state Yugoslav Democratic Party Adopted at the Party Congress on 30th and 31st of October 1921 in Belgrade) in *Programi političnih strank, organizacij in združenj na Slovenskem v času Kraljevine SHS (1918-1929)* (Programs of the Political Parties, Organizations and Associations in Slovene Lands during the Times of SHS Kingdom (1918-1929)), Jurij Perovšek ed. (Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo Slovenije, 1998), pp. 44-46, p. 46.
[91] "Jugoslovenska demokracija na pohodu; Veličastni zbor zaupnikov JDS v Ljubljani" (Yugoslav Democracy on the March: Magnificent Gathering of JDS Trustees in Ljubljana), *Jutro*, Feb 5 1924.

administrative order with it. After Svetozar Pribičević became disillusioned with Yugoslav unitarism in 1927, noticing that the idea had constantly been abused by ruling circles in Belgrade, and started connecting SDS with Croatian autonomists, the Slovene wing of his party continued opposing federalist restructuring of Yugoslavia and creation of national autonomies.[92]

During the 1930's Slovene progressives, united in Yugoslav National Party, took an even more radical stance by adopting the idea of "integral Yugoslavism", which claimed that Yugoslavs represented a single, ethnically and culturally homogenous nation, abandoning thus even the notion of three "tribes". The party program from 1933 stated that "Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, living on continuous territory as geographic and ethnographic whole (…) form an uniform Yugoslav nation", distinguished by common "origins, language, lasting tendencies, equal historical fate and experience and a never extinct consciousness of community"[93]. Therefore the "Yugoslav national unity" was seen as an "undisputed and natural fact".[94]

Everyone disagreeing to the integral Yugoslavist outlook, most notably the Catholic conservatives, could get labeled by progressive press as "only-Slovenes" (*samoslovenci*), "tribally narrow-minded" or even "separatists" during the first half of 1930's when progressive camp represented the central regime in Slovenia and possessed complete administrative power. This sometimes reached the level of publicly tarnishing political adversaries as enemies of the state. Good example of this are the following lines from Ivan

[92] Due to his persistent opposition to the royal dictatorship the Independent Democrat leader Pribičević was persecuted and imprisoned during early 1930's and had to emigrate. Major part of his followers in Croatian lands and other parts of Yugoslavia continued to operate informally, were opponents to JNS and JRZ regimes and continued to collaborate with Croatian Peasants' Party. Slovene progressives represented a notable exception, joining the regime Yugoslav National Party.
[93] Quoted from: Slovenska novejša zgodovina, 333.
[94] "Načela in smernice Jugoslovenske nacionalne stranke" (Principles and Guidelines of the Yugoslav National Party), *Slovenski narod*, Jul 21 1933.

Pucelj's speech, taking place at a JNS party rally, when he addressed the issue of legal and other measures taken against the authors of autonomist "Ljubljana punctations".[95]

"Like a forbearing mother had the state looked upon its disobedient children, pardoning and exhorting them. But these children did not want to obey. (…) Their punctations, for which many say that they are only declamations, were striking directly against the existence of the state and against everything the nation had won for itself. When, however, the state hits its pest, then the fun ends, then the reckoning arrives. And this reckoning is now here. (…) In our own state we did not persecute our own people, we gave them time so that they could come to their senses. When, however, they did not want to do that, justice had to be done."[96]

After losing power in 1935 the progressives even radicalized their Yugoslav nationalist rhetoric. In "Pohorje Declaration", written by Albert Kramer and other prominent members of JNS, including Jovan Banjanin, they announced that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes "comprised one nation in ethnic sense".[97] It was stated that the only way out of political and economic crisis of the time was implementing "pure and sincere national policy, proclaimed as the basis of all our national and state life by the king Unifier".[98] In their struggle against ruling Yugoslav Radical Union and its vague national policies, as well as then factually existing Catholic domination in Slovenia, progressive leaders sometimes employed militant tones. Albert Kramer, for instance, concluded one of his speeches in Yugoslav senate in 1937, by referring to the followers of Yugoslav national idea as the "Yugoslav national army", warning the ruling circles thereby that this army had "its own ends and will never serve as an auxiliary force for anybody in this country."[99]

[95] Ljubljana punctations (*ljubljanske punktacije*), also known as the "Slovene declaration", were written in 1932 by leading representatives of Slovene People's Party. They expressed criticism against the undemocratic regime in Yugoslavia and solidarity with Croatian autonomist movement, containing a demand for federal rearrangement of Yugoslavia and creation of self-governing national entities. Regime reacted by organizing a trial, imprisoning or interning some of the supposed authors and confining the Catholic leader Anton Korošec to island of Hvar.
[96] "Dolenjska v taboru vsedržavne stranke" (Lower Carniola in the All-State Party Camp), *Jutro*, May 1 1933.
[97] Slovenska novejša zgodovina, 370.
[98] Darko Friš "Banovinska konferenca Jugoslovanske nacionalne stranke leta 1937 v Ljubljani" (1937 Provincial Conference of Yugoslav National Party in Ljubljana), *Zgodovinski časopis*, Yr. 59, Vol. 1-2 (2005): pp. 129-146, p. 132.
[99] "O političnih razmerah v Sloveniji" (About the Political Circumstances in Slovenia), *Domovina*, April 1 1937.

The second half of the thirties was a time of increased tensions with the ruling 'clericals' and wide-spread political violence, reaching over the levels of usual political struggle and expressing itself in bloody encounters between supporters of both camps - as well as with the leftists. During the year 1936 eucharistic crosses were blasted across Slovene countryside, for which JNS followers were accused. The culminating point of violence was reached on the occasion of Yugoslav National Party president's, general Petar Živković, tour through Drava Province in June 1937.[100] Riots erupted in Ljubljana, symbolically marked by a fight for Yugoslav national tricolor, which got 'conquered' and tattered by a mob bearing Slovene cockades to be finally wrested back by Yugoslav nationalists.[101] The act was labeled by JNS leaders as a deliberate attempt to damage the national symbol[102] and fights between Falcons and Slovene Boys (1930's successors of Catholic gymnastic society "Eagle" (*Orel*)) were taking place all across Slovenia. Member of a Catholic academic society was murdered by JNS followers, what was followed by arson against Falcons' pavilion in Ljubljana as a symbolical act of reprisal from the other side.

There are various kinds of reasons and motives, political as well as social, to which one could point when trying to explain the extent of political violence occurring in late 1930's Slovenia. The international, the Yugoslav as well as domestic atmosphere was electrified and the internal 'liberal-clerical' and 'Yugoslav nationalist-Slovene autonomist' quarrels represented only one aspect of it. From the perspective of this essay it could nevertheless well be argued that militant Yugoslav nationalist rhetoric perhaps additionally fuelled the erupting acts of aggression. Falcons and Members of Yugoslav National Party Youth took an essential part

[100] Cf. Darko Friš, "Turneja Petra Živkovića in vodstva Jugoslovanske nacionalne stranke po slovenskih krajih leta 1937" (Tour by Petar Živković and Yugoslav National Party Leadership Across Slovene Lands in Year 1937), *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, Yr. 45, No. 1 (2005): pp. 61 -78, p. 63.
[101] Friš, Banovinska konferenca, 138-139; "Petar Živković v Sloveniji" (Petar Živković in Slovenia), *Jutro*, Jun 8 1937.
[102] Friš, Turneja, 63.

during these battles and leaders of the latter were expressing similar views on nationality issue as the party leadership:

"Only corruption and cynicism of our Catholic press are able to call: protect Yugoslavia from Yugoslav nationalism and Yugoslav nationalists! Today it is not being spoken anymore about the Yugoslav nation but about nations of Yugoslavia, in the same manner as the Habsburgs spoke to their subject 'graceful nations'. In view of this crime against the Yugoslav idea, that is to say against our nation, our history and our future, the ones are right who claim that in nowadays Yugoslavia Yugoslav nationalists are not treated much differently than during times when they were the only bearers of the struggle for our liberation. (…) The treason against Yugoslav idea, the most powerful uniting force for our nation, and against its bearers, has by itself triggered and incited all the disintegrating separatist tendencies."[103]

3.2. THE DEGREE AND TYPE OF NATIONALISM, AS REFLECTED IN PROGRESSIVES' RHETORIC

Progressive nationalist rhetorics, as presented in the second half of previous subchapter, reached quite a high level of militancy and aggressiveness what was also accompanied by acts of political violence. Still, the discussed utterances acted essentially as an aspect of the Slovene and partly also Yugoslav context of inner political struggle. The question arising and to be discussed in this subchapter is one concerning the degree of progressives' nationalism, regarding their attitudes towards foreign, non-Yugoslav nations - especially 'foreign elements' inside the Yugoslav state. I will try to illustrate this by using the case of German national minority as it was treated by progressive press. Secondly, also the type of

[103] Andrej Uršič, "Naš čas, program Jugoslovenske nacionalne stranke in njena mladina" (Our Time, the Program of Yugoslav National Party and its Youth) in *Omladina Jugoslovenske nacionalne stranke: Banovinska skupščina 12. septembra 1937 v Ljubljani* (Provincial conference of the Yugoslav National Party Youth in Ljubljana 1937) (Ljubljana: 1937), pp. 9-15, p. 18.
(Archive of the Republic of Slovenia, dislocated unit III, AS 1931: Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve Socialistične Republike Slovenije 1918-1982, t.e. 933, 600-19 OJNS.)
The provincial conference took place well before the youth wing started pursuing its own course. Report is consisted mainly of speeches by leading representatives of Yugoslav National Party Youth. The speeches provide main points of the Yugoslav National Party program, especially in regard to its official positions on economic and social order and nationality problem. Many references are thereby made to special Slovene context.
By 1940 the youth, although still having a Yugoslav unitarist orientation, began to use milder tones, stressing primarily the practical meaning of strong Yugoslav state, as a "real good" of "all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs". (Politična, gospodarska in socialna, 14. (See: footnote 78))

nationalism, espoused by progressives will be briefly examined – namely the extent culturally based national discourse was being replaced by one based on the notions of "blood" and "race".

Germans represented one of the major national minorities of interwar Yugoslavia, most notably in the Banate. In Slovenia the main area of German settlement was the wooded, sparsely inhabited and economically undeveloped region of Kočevje (*Gottschee*), where German speaking peasants had been settled homogenously from 14th century onwards. Apart from that German speakers also represented a mentionable minority living all across Lower Styria (*Untersteiermark*) and Yugoslav part of Carinthia, most notably in cities and towns as Maribor (*Marburg a.d. Drau*), Celje (*Cilli*) and Ptuj (*Pettau*). In contrast to the *Gottscheer* peasants these were predominantly communities of well-to-do townspeople.[104]

During early 1920's the question of minority rights for German speaking population was very actual, especially regarding Lower Styria where most of the German schools had been closed after the first world war and much of the property belonging to German national societies had been confiscated. During the last decades of Habsburg monarchy interethnic struggle had been severe in that region, what influenced also the post-war treatment of Germans by Slovene administrative authorities and political parties.

Although the 1918 Yugoslav Democratic Party program did not even mention non-Yugoslav minorities and stated that all public officials should be "sons of the nation" and their language "solely the official language"[105], progressive politicians gathered in Yugoslav Democratic Party – as well as the ones which followed it throughout the interwar period - formally

[104] According to 1921 census approximately 41.500 Germans resided in Slovene part of Yugoslavia, which corresponded to 4%. When census was made, different forms of pressure were conducted and the number of Germans was in reality higher (some estimates reached the number of 70.000).
(Slovenska novejša zgodovina, 397-399.)
A very small but economically strong German community was also present in Ljubljana.
[105] Program JDS, 24.

supported the principle of minority rights. In case of Germans, however, they proved to be quite selective. This ambiguous attitude is well illustrated in following excerpts from *Jutro*, written during the hot debate about German cultural gathering, taking place in Celje in 1923:

"Germans, as far as they are autochtonous in Yugoslavia, can peacefully live among us and deserve that. They are equal and their safety is guaranteed, although they treated us differently under the Habsburgs. (…) We cannot allow however the Germans to participate in politics as a foreign body even in places, where they live scattered."[106]

"This is not a declaration of war on individual, who is of German nationality inside his household, his civil rights, but on all those who want to act as a group against the state nation."[107]

In progressive press the Styrian German speakers were even denied their Germandom, being labeled as "artificially bred by Austria"[108] or called by the common derogatory name of *nemškutar*.[109] Determination of nationality and national consciousness were not treated as matters of personal decision and feelings. On the contrary and in quite an illiberal manner they were perceived as something resting on supposedly objective criteria which could be imposed from outside, for instance by the state, and – if needed – also forcefully:

"They want to place the pseudo-German [*nemškutarja*] of Celje in the same line with Vojvodina Swabian or Gottscheer farmer (:..) This is exactly the error which we would want to pull out by the roots. In the former Lower Styria a couple of hundred Germans and a few more renegades live, *but the Germandom there we do not recognize to them*. Scattered immigrants, the real Germans are not numerous enough to be given rights of a minority, but to the pseudo-Germans we do not concede any right, they will have to realize that or bear the consequences. Germandom and therewith the German question is however non-existent here."[110]

The discourse regarding Styrian Germans was distinguished by pretty intolerant and aggressive tones and could also reach the point of expressing straightforward hostility. Franjo

[106] "Uvodnik" (Editorial), *Jutro*, Feb 3 1923.
The editorial discussed threat of German political organization in Styria, recalling the 1907 interethnic riots in Celje.
[107] "Uvodnik" (Editorial), *Jutro*, Feb 4 1923.
[108] Ibid.
[109] The word *nemškutar* emerged during 19th century to denote people of Slovene ancestry who adopted German identity or embraced German culture. Its meaning could be roughly expressed in English as "pseudo-German", "German imitator" or "want to be German".
[110] Ibid.

Lipold, the leader of Styrian section of Yugoslav Democratic Party (later also Independent Democratic and Yugoslav National parties) for instance denominated Germans as "our worst hereditary enemies" and "pseudo-Germans" as "degenerates of our nation".[111] The following lines from *Jutro* are in this sense telling as well:

"Germans in our lands at all do not represent nothing else than a dying-away caste, which has no roots in our land. We decimated them already with the overthrow, the second generation, which is going to grow up in new circumstances will be weaker every day, in terms of numbers and of inner resisting strength. It will die away by itself as an uprooted thistle."[112]

On the basis of German minority case and the manner it was being publicly addressed by progressive press and politicians, as well as in regard to certain aspects of their Yugoslav nationalist rhetoric discussed in the previous subchapter, one could argue that Slovene progressives espoused a quite aggressive and exclusive variant of nationalism. From this perspective they represented no exception among Central European national liberal heirs, for instance the Austrian Greater Germans or Czechoslovak National Democrats.

Despite appearing as very aggressive, the nationalist rhetorics presented above clearly did not bear racialist overtones. This brings forth the question regarding the nature of progressives' nationalism – namely whether it was affected by the paradigm-change starting in the late 19th century, introducing the notions of "blood" and "race" into nationality discourse and sometimes leading the whole way to full-blown racially based nationalism. This shift was very common for Central European heirs of national liberalism, the best example being perhaps the Austrian German ones from the Linz Program of 1882 onwards. The specific question therefore arising is one concerning the degree of this turn. Especially since introduction and usage of certain notions does not necessarily mean that a real shift in ideology had taken place. In the discussed context the mere presence of mentioned words can

[111] "Borbenost demokracije – referat dr. F. Lipolda, Maribor" (The Fighting Spirit of Democracy – a Report by dr. F. Lipold, Maribor), *Jutro*, Feb 20 1923
[112] Article without a title (p. 2), *Jutro*, Feb 4 1923.

also be attributed to older elements of romantic nationalism and not to the introduction of biological categories.

The aforementioned terms were indeed present in case of Slovene progressive politics throughout the interwar period. The political program of Yugoslav Democratic Party adopted in 1921 clearly stated in its first point that the "nation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" was considered to be one also "by blood", which was stressed in the first place, preceding the mention of a "common language, territory, feelings and living interests".[113] Despite that, the employment of notions as "blood", "race" and similar on part of progressive politicians seems to had been quite sporadic, especially during the 1920's.

During the Yugoslav National Party era this became more common but it could still very hardly be argued that there were ideological grounds behind it. Similar applies also to the political representatives of younger Yugoslav nationalist generation, although some of them argued that Yugoslavs were "one nation united by blood", existing "from time immemorial"[114], and even flirted with racial rhetorics about "forming a new Yugoslav" as "new representative of the Yugoslav race".[115] In their 1940 program it was written that the nation was "a fact of cultural, social, economic, biological and spiritual community"[116] and concluded that national rejuvenation was needed.[117]

Nevertheless the Yugoslav National Party Youth program taken as a whole did not reflect the presence of any racially-based ideology or fascist-like program of national palingenesis. Neither the aggressive nationalist rhetoric nor introduction of certain notions which could point to a paradigmatic shift meant that progressives, including the youngest generation, had indeed created or adopted an essentially new nationalist ideology. Sporadic use of terms as

[113] Iz programa vsedržavne JDS, 44.
[114] Uršič, Naš čas, 20-21.
[115] Anka Vidovič Miklavčič, "Vloga in organiziranost mladine v jugoslovanskem delu Slovenije v letih 1929-1941" (The Role and Organization of Youth in the Yugoslav Part of Slovenia during the Years 1929-1941) in *Slovenska trideseta leta: simpozij 1995* (Slovene Thirties: Simposium 1995), Peter Vodopivec, Jože Mahnič eds. (Ljubljana: Slovenska Matica, 1997), pp. 97-109, p. 98.
[116] Politična, gospodarska in socialna, 25.
[117] Ibid., 70.

"blood" and "race" and occasional treating of nation as a "natural" or even "biological" unit could be interpreted also as rhetoric adjustment to the general political and intellectual atmosphere of interwar period. These features only supplemented their discourse and did not reflect a worked-out program. Still the national discourse of young progressives was indeed sharpened and bore traits, far different from those of 19th century liberal nationalism, as it can also be seen from the views of *JNAD Jadran* (Yugoslav Progressive Academic Society "Adriatic"), which was closely connected to the Yugoslav National Party.

"J.n.a.d. 'Jadran' is the bearer of national thought. The mankind does not form a homogenous whole in order to be able to directly realize its goals. It is divided along unique marks into self-enclosed natural units – *nations*, which are the most powerful cultural, social and political factors. Only in them and through them lives the humanity. Alien and repulsive is therefore to J.n.a.d. 'Jadran' every cosmopolitanism and every internationalism."[118]

Although the leading progressive politicians did not embrace racialist nationalism, it should be mentioned that they nevertheless supported movements as *ORJUNA* (Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists), which in Slovene lands during 1920's represented a 'field army' of the Independent Democratic Party.[119] This organization was originally founded for purposes of national defense against Italian irredentism in Dalmatia, Istria and other Yugoslav-settled territories, annexed or claimed by Italy after the First World War. It gradually evolved into an all-Yugoslav nationalist movement, distinguished by violent acts against political enemies of Yugoslav Democratic and later Independent Democratic Party, the most common targets being Communists and "tribal separatists". ORJUNA's nationalist ideology was clearly racialist, as it can be seen from its program:

"Out of all values given by our past, only those have value for the future, which were given by our nation as a specific race. (…) Doctrine of nationalism involves above all the cult of race and therefore subordinates all life functions of individual and nation to the creation of a special organism which is to execute the ethical mission of the nation."[120]

[118] "Naša misel" (Our Thought) in *Petnajst let J.N.A.D. »Jadrana«* (Fifteen Years of Yugoslav Progressive Academic Club "Jadran") (Ljubljana: 1937), pp. 14-16; pp. 14-15.
[119] Cf. Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje, 255.
[120] "Program organizacije jugoslovenskih nacionalista" (Program of the Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists) in *Programi političnih strank, organizacij in združenj na Slovenskem v času Kraljevine SHS (1918-1929)*

"Internal work is intended first of all for members themselves and exists in bringing up a perfect Yugoslav type in cultural, physical, ethical and socio-economic sense. (…) Our positive work should: (…) educate the national youth by physical and psychical preparation into a combative and ideal fighter, uncover particular energies from it [*the national youth*] and develop them into a racial Yugoslav type, which should prove itself in service as the function of national organism."[121]

During 1930's progressive politicians also supported the creation of fringe movements as *Narodna odbrana* (National Defense) and *Omladina narodne odbrane* (National Defense Youth), which in their style and rhetoric to a certain degree imitated the fascists.[122] Also some of the Yugoslav National Party Youth leaders had been members of these organizations before entering party politics.[123] Part of progressive university students, united in the academic society *Edinstvo* (Unity), even started to represent the Slovene section of filo-fascist *ZBOR* movement, led by Dimitrije Ljotić. On the other hand the leading politicians denounced both fascism and National Socialism.[124] In a quite similar manner as the Czechoslovak National Democrat leader Karel Kramař treated the Czech fascist movement[125], they supported these groups more or less as means of political struggle using them as a 'field troops', at the same never sincerely adopting their ideas to implement them in real politics.

(Programs of the Political Parties, Organizations and Associations in Slovene Lands during the Times of SHS Kingdom (1918-1929)), Jurij Perovšek ed. (Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo Slovenije, 1998), pp. 49-51, p. 49.
[121] Ibid., 50.
[122] Janko Prunk, "Liberalni tabor med Ljubljano in Zagrebom" (Liberal Camp between Ljubljana and Zagreb) in *Slovenska trideseta leta: simpozij 1995* (Slovene Thirties: Simposium 1995), Peter Vodopivec, Joža Mahnič eds. (Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1997), pp. 69-74, p. 72.
[123] Vidovič Miklavčič, Vloga in organiziranost, 98.
[124] Perovšek, Idejni, socialnogospodarski, 536-537.
[125] See: Martina Winkler,. *Karel Kramář (1860−1937). Selbstbild, Fremdwahrnehmungen und Modernisierungsverständnis eines tschechischen Politikers* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002), pp. 327-340.

4. PROGRESSIVES' VIEWS ON MODERNIZATION AND MODERNITY AND THE PARAGONS OF POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORDER

In the following chapter I intend to provide an overview of perspectives for modernization of Slovene society, espoused by representatives of "progressive" political camp during the interwar period, an era marked by the "crisis of modernity". I will thereby focus on the general features of their respective visions and policies, as well as the intertwinement of these with nation building and secularization projects. Moreover I will be pointing to certain visible shifts, which occurred during 1930's and regarded general patterns and models of modernization. A Special subchapter will be devoted to changing views on social and economic order. By doing this I will also try to discern certain newly emerged elements, which could be associated with 'anti-modernism'. In the end progressives' attitudes towards National Socialism, fascism and bolshevism will be briefly touched upon.

4.1. YUGOSLAV NATIONALISM, ANTI-CLERICALISM, "FREE MINDEDNESS" AND "PROGRESS"

It could be argued that nation-building and modernization represented two intertwined projects in case of Slovene progressives, especially the 'younger' circles gathered around Gregor Žerjav and Albert Kramer, who sincerely believed that integration into Yugoslav nation represented a new, necessary and higher evolutional stage for Slovene people. A strong nation state would secure the continued existence of Slovene nation, whereas the amalgamation into Yugoslav whole would solve the Slovene "problem of small nation"[126] and

[126] "Jugoslovenska demokracija na pohodu; Veličastni zbor zaupnikov JDS v Ljubljani" (Yugoslav Democracy on the March: Magnificent Gathering of JDS Trustees in Ljubljana), *Jutro*, Feb 5 1924.

mutually enrich all the three "tribes", which had previously experienced separate developments due to "historical misfortune".

Adherence and especially persistent clinging to the Yugoslav national idea and radicalization of this stance during 1930's stemmed also from practical motives of combating the much more popular party of political Catholicism. Again these 'tactical' considerations coincided with the progressives' genuine secularist orientation and their 'anti-clericalism' could also be interpreted as integral and important part of their views on modernizing Slovene society. They believed that if Slovenia had received autonomy the 'clerical' "beast which has gotten its teeth into Slovene tribe"[127] would have won the political power also. Such a development would have led to "bishops' government"[128] with all the administrative powers and public security under "the command of bishops and politicizing clergy"[129], what certainly presented a lasting threat to the progressives' modernization perspectives:

"Every political apprentice knows nowadays that 'autonomy of Slovenia' means clerical dictatorship in Ljubljana, Slovene centralism under the banner of the Pope, subjugation of our schools, teachers and all the intelligentsia under the curved stick and hopelessness that our peasant would ever get rid of clerical wardship."[130]

They also denied political Catholicism the national orientation, which they claimed as their own monopoly:

"In senseless fear for cultural height of Slovenes and our literary language, many members of intelligentsia knowingly or unknowingly drew water on clerical mill. Fearing that our Slovene identity was going to be suppressed, many were taken in by the clericals who had been changing fronts overnight: earlier Austrians, at the time of overthrow Yugoslavs, for the election Slovenes, but in their hearts always the same cold Latins."[131]

I would therefore argue that strivings for progress and modernization, as understood by the progressives, their Yugoslav nation building project and their anti-clericalism represented

[127] *Jutro*, Jul 1 1924 (Quoted from: Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje, 253-254.).
[128] *Domovina*, Mar 25 1926 (Quoted from: ibid., 254.).
[129] *Jutro*, Jan 23 1926 (Quoted from: ibid.).
[130] "Uvodnik" (Editorial), *Jutro*, Feb 6 1923.
[131] "Uvodnik" (Editorial), *Jutro*, Feb 2 1924.

connected and interdependent endeavors and stances. The progressives conceded the Roman Catholic religion a role of an important and positive moral force, recognizing it as an essential part of Slovene traditions. At the same time they persistently demanded complete separation between the Church and state and together with their Serb liberal allies achieved the inclusion of a "*kanzelparagraf*", banning priests from political work, into 1921 constitution. Slovene People's Party received labels like "criminal clique who, acting for interests of clergy and its political and economic power, abuses the faith"[132] and even the one of "Catholic bolsheviks"[133]

Especially worried were the progressives about the Church's interference within the educational system. Believing in modern, enlightened education with strong national ingredient and coining the phrases of "progress" and "free-mindedness" representatives of progressive camp warned against "authoritarian world views, which, building on dogmatic fundaments, claim to be primarily entitled to discover truth (…) be they founded on basic dogma of religious or political nature."[134] Advocating free spiritual development of the youth and unhindered scientific and intellectual progress they perceived 'clericalism' and also the Church supporting it as "anachronisms".[135]

When political Catholicism, designated also as "the greatest evil for free cultural development of any nation"[136], got into power and de-facto ruled Slovene part of Yugoslavia after 1935, progressives spoke about "spoilt reactionaries practicing medieval methods"[137]. In those times, perceived as critical by the liberal camp, it used to be stressed even more that Yugoslav national thought in Slovene context represented "also the only certain sanctuary for freedom

[132] "Uvodnik" (Editorial), *Jutro*, Mar 16 1924.
[133] "Uvodnik" (Editorial), *Jutro*, June 6 1924.
[134] Naša misel, 14.
These lines, written by leading members of Yugoslav Progressive Academic Society "Adriatic" were pointed also against Marxism: "Above all turns JNAD Jadran against the materialistic world view, which denies the spirit, as the original source and moving force in human history, forming it out of the matter." (Ibid.)
[135] "Uvodnik" (Editorial), *Jutro*, Feb 20 1924.
[136] Rus, Naša pota, 14.
[137] Uršič, Naš čas, 17.

and progress"[138]. Yugoslav National Party Youth reproached the Slovene People's Party for usurping the role of sole representative of Slovene people at the same time bearing relatively little credit for its cultural and general progress. Andrej Uršič thereby argued in 1938 that Slovene culture would have been in a sad state, "had it been commanded by education and mentality of the parish clerks".[139]

As it has been shown, Yugoslav national idea, as well as anti-clerical attitudes - being mutually connected themselves - can be understood also as important if not crucial ideological elements and practical political means of progressives' modernization endeavor, centered around the notions of "free-mindedness" and "progress". Since I have up to this point largely ignored the question of actual models, espoused by Slovene liberal politicians, I am devoting the next subchapter to that problem.

4.2. MODELS, PARAGONS AND PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT EMBRACED BY PROGRESSIVES

Already in the second half of 19th century certain *Young Slovenes* embraced romantic ideas idealizing Russian and South Slavic peasant collectivism and thought that undesirable consequences and difficulties of industrialization and western individualism could be avoided by adopting the model of peasant community (*zadruga*) and socializing the labor.[140] Despite this progressives in general looked for developmental patterns mostly in the West. This varied in outlooks, especially regarding the path to modernity (like most of the Central European

[138] "Zaključek Živkovićevega obiska v Sloveniji" (Conclusion of the Živković's Visit to Slovenia), *Jutro*, Jun 10 1937.
[139] *Poročilo o drugi banovinski skupščini Omladine Jugoslovanske Nacionalne Stranke* (Report on the Second Provincial Assembly of the Yugoslav National Party Youth) (Ljubljana: Banovinski odbor OJNS, 1938). (Archive of the Republic of Slovenia, dislocated unit III, AS1931: Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve Socialistične Republike Slovenije 1918-1982, t.e. 933, 600-19 OJNS.)
[140] See: Peter Vodopivec, **"**Ruski 'mir', južnoslovanska zadruga in slovenski liberalci" (Russian 'Peace', South Slavic *Zadruga* and Slovene Liberals), *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, Yr. 46, No. 1 (2006): pp. 65-78.

national liberals, they were economic protectionists for instance), but the main model was throughout the one of industrialized, urbanized, secularized and plural western society. The main paragons were thereby England and France and of the closer, more direct sources of inspiration also the Czechs and – usually not stressed aloud but in reality in many ways imitated – the Germans. This largely remained so during the 1920's with slight changes observable in the 1930's development, which were again partly connected to new ideas and political courses evolved in the West itself, although the stress also moved more towards "home-grown" solutions.

The 1920's 'occidentalist' orientation of Slovene progressives can be seen in the future prospects for Yugoslavia they were hoping and pleading for, as for instance when it was argued that Ljubljana, the westernmost university city, should become "Yugoslav Heidelberg", most appropriate to represent the "educational center of Yugoslav youth"[141]. As the most consistent followers of Yugoslav national idea, believing in gradual creation of Yugoslav nation, in which none of the "tribes" or parts would prevail over others, they criticized the strivings for Serbian hegemony thereby also pointing to backwardness of southeastern parts of the state. During the late 1920's the liberal press stressed that the ex-Habsburg lands were "on a higher level of civilization" and that Yugoslavia should become "a European country with European customs".[142] This way a "genuine modern civilization" could be created.[143] The progressive leader Gregor Žerjav, speaking in favor of "ideas and culture of the West", argued that "there have been no historical examples of orient serving as an administrative or economic model to anyone" and that "the effort to push the more cultured west under the spiritual leadership of the east" was "unnatural".[144]

[141] *Jutro*, Sept. 10 1927 (Quoted from: Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje, 272.).
[142] *Domovina*, Dec. 6 1928 (Quoted from: ibid., 263.).
[143] *Jutro*, Nov 12 1927 (Quted from: ibid.).
[144] *Jutro*, Apr. 7 1928 (Quoted from: ibid.).

Which countries were treated as paragons in terms of political culture and general progress can well be observed in the following excerpt from progressive daily newspaper *Jutro*, commenting on the establishment of first Labour government in Britain:

"Up until now England for long generations knew the rotation of two major parties in government, the conservatives and the liberals. After long two centuries a third party has now for the first time resolutely arisen and taken over the government. Beside the still living slogans of 'protective customs' and 'free trade' a new slogan 'work, bread, peace' has set foot. Let 'peace' hold true as slogan in state policy: Peace to Europe, assuring peace, elimination of war threat, balance; and peace at home, appeasement between capital and labor, *entry of the working classes into civic life*. Thus the final consequence of French revolution is formulated: *Le Tiers Etat* are not only the middle classes, they are not followed by the 'fourth estate', nor by 'dictatorship of the proletariat', but the working people should get enbourgeoised [*naj se pomeščani*]. The leading slogan of new Macdonald's era is *democracy, a parliamentary democracy*. (…)
…As England led the development of Europe with her revolution, which took place long before the French one did, and as she led from the Magna Carta hither, in this way is she still leading today. She teaches us what is *common sense* - a common sense for the country and for the rights of all its citizens. This *common sense* permeates the inaugural statement of socialist Macdonald, whose speech has been followed by praise: You spoke, as you had been a democrat or a member of liberal party."[145]

On the basis of the examples cited above, it could well be argued that the progressives during 1920's represented an essentially western-oriented grouping and that modernization in their view largely corresponded to occidentalization.

This changed slightly during 1930's when Slovene progressive politicians collaborated in the all-state Yugoslav National Party. New rhetoric, stressing primarily the role of Balkans came to the foreground and *Jutro* proclaimed that "it is clear now that our destiny can not be resolved in Central Europe anymore but in the Balkans, where the natural and historical center and focal point of the new Yugoslav state nation lies."[146] Such a shift or adoption of a new 'stance' can of course be explained by the changed political situation at that time. Early thirties were years of royal dictatorship and forceful attempts to integrate Serbs, Croats and

[145] "Uvodnik"(Editorial), *Jutro*, Jan 23 1924.
[146] "Ob obletnici prevrata" (On the Anniversary of the Overthrow), *Jutro*, Oct 29 1931.

Slovenes (as well as other, non-recognized nationalities) into one nation in a swift manner. Slovene progressives were then cooperating in the second Živković government and later in the Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democracy and Yugoslav National Party, which were the only legal parties used by the regime to provide a trapping of democratic legitimacy for itself. The official state-sponsored Yugoslav ideology was quite Serb-centered at that time and Slovene progressives as prominent proponents of the regime by all means had to embrace it in order to retain their positions in the circumstances of dictatorship. The question, whether they really shifted their views, is hardly answerable, since most of their energy during 1930's was directed at fighting political Catholicism and the leftists and their rhetoric were formed accordingly.

Still, strong signs were present, pointing to the possibility that a considerable shift in progressives' modernization perspectives occurred during 1930's, especially in regard to the models adopted. As I have already mentioned earlier, the party's youth wing published their own manifesto in 1940, about which it could be argued that it reflected 1930's general developments in the Slovene liberal camp under (semi)dictatorship.[147] Along with a considerable turn to the left also a turn away from seeking models for societal progress in the west can be observed in their writings. Coining a "lesson" that they were "bound to pay regard to developments in the world, but to imitate no one"[148] – one formulated in a still fairly liberal fashion – they argued "liberal individualism" had proven itself as harmful and destructive for states and societies and that therefore new forms of concord between the society and the individual needed to be found.[149] Since foreign models could not be successfully imported and adapted to "living circumstances and living space" of a nation, home-grown solutions rising from "own powers" had to be introduced. Young progressives

[147] The program received an especially warm reception on part of the rural members of JNS.
[148] Politična, gospodarska in socialna, 9.
[149] Ibid., 20.

saw such solutions in "Slavic social ideas of brotherhood and cooperation [*zadruga*]" and in a "morally renewed social man".[150]

Although these lines were written, when the second world war had already started, and the special and uncertain circumstances definitely to a degree influenced the above mentioned views (what was stressed by the authors themselves), an enduring shift away from the western model had indeed occurred, accompanied also by a different style of rhetoric and introduction of new notions. This was apparent already in 1937 in the ideas, embraced by the leaders of academic society *JNAD Jadran*:

"We must improve and build our economic and social frame of the nation on the unique foundations, originating from our national life. We must not blindly transfer it from elsewhere. Who does that, denies his own nation the capability to form a proper system of society and economy for itself – one that only could serve its organic - and therefore the only healthy and successful - development."[151]

4.3. 1930's SHIFT IN PROGRESSIVES' VIEWS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORDER

As observed in previous chapter the developmental models, embraced by Slovene progressives to an extent changed from 1920's to 1930's. This was accompanied by changes in their views and stances on social and economic order, which deserve some special attention.

During 1920's the progressives advocated relatively liberal views on economic order. Although the 1918 program of Yugoslav Democratic Party demanded nationalization of vital infrastructure and big industry[152] and the party spoke in favor of progressive taxation, they strongly stressed the importance of private property and free individual economic initiative

[150] Ibid., 21.
[151] Naša misel, 16.
[152] Program JDS, 26.
It should be added that this was at least partly due to the progressives' protectionist and nationalist stances, as most of the big industry in Slovene territory was in foreign hands.

for general progress. They also argued in favor of equable increase in economic standard for all the strata of population and declared themselves as standing for economically weaker citizens. At the same time they rejected "any kind of politics, which would aim at one class to live at other classes' expense"[153]. In their view, democracy could not be "pure", in case the "economically weaker strata" had "exclusive predominance".[154] Although bearing some marks of national solidarism[155], this could still be labeled as an essentially (national) liberal orientation – in certain elements perhaps conservative and in others already 'neo-liberal'.

During the 1930's, when liberal economic principles were being abandoned in policies of most of the countries and profoundly different solutions were being tested, the attitude of Slovene progressives towards liberal economic and social order changed substantially. They started refuting liberal principles and arguing in favor of "disciplined democracy", state interventionist policies and planned economy[156], stressing that private property was a "limited right". The most striking novelty thereby was the adoption of corporatist model of national economy.

After Yugoslav National Party was constituted in July 1933 and corporatism included in its socio-economic program, it was accentuated in the daily newspaper *Jutro* that "JNS abandoned the obsolete liberal views on social and economic problems"[157]. In an article, published in progressive journal *Misel in delo*, the author analyzed the Italian socio-economic system and categorically stated that "liberal democracy" was "from political, economic and

[153] Ibid., 23.
[154] Ibid., 26.
[155] In February of 1923 when *Jutro* wrote on the Yugoslav Democratic Party as "the leading champion for national harmony" it was concluded that "only through mutual agreement of all the strata and with protection of the economically weaker from the exploitation by the big capital is it possible that the national thought ceases to represent a simple phrase and that the Yugoslav nation becomes internally and externally a sturdy bearer of culture and progress." ("Uvodnik" (Editorial), *Jutro*, Feb 18 1923.)
[156] Cf. Perovšek, Idejni, socialnogospodarski, 537-538.
[157] "Po kongresu JNS" (After the JNS Congress), *Jutro*, July 23 1933.

social viewpoint buried"[158]. A "new era" was being proclaimed, in which individual "initiative and liberality", could not act as "bearers of progress" anymore.[159] Following excerpts from a speech, made by the leader of Yugoslav National Party Youth Jože Rus in 1937 illustrate the new attitudes quite clearly:

"Yugoslav National Party can not be supporter of an idea that interests of various economic branches are in irreconcilable opposition. One of the leading principles of its economic policy is leveling [*nivelizacija*] of economic interests of all strata in the spirit of national solidarity."[160]

"The new era – era of great progress of civilization – brought forward larger demands on part of broader popular masses. As a logical consequence of that, demands for certain remedies of social order follow. It would be a fatal sin if the national youth did not comprehend the spirit of new era and tried to resist its natural demands. (…) For her [the national youth] it is certainly easier to understand the modern time and contemporary circumstances, as it can be for the generations brought up before the war in entirely different circumstances and in an entirely different milieu."[161]

"On every occasion should the hands of a peasant, an artisan and a worker, blistered and hardened by the plough, scythe and hoe, shovel and hammer, greet themselves in friendship with the hand of an official and an intellectual. A special range of activities and a special role in life is defined for every estate. Therefore, the favorable conditions for each and every citizen are guaranteed only through harmony of creative forces of all the estates."[162]

A prominent member of Slovene JNS and OJNS Branko Alujević on the same occasion also commented on the new role of the state, which was not perceived in a liberal manner as a *Nachtwachterstaat*:

"State administration can not be guided according to the bygone viewpoints of police order, since it is not enough for it just to take care of order and peace in the country without intervening into social and economic matters. State executive agencies can not stay inside the former narrow boundaries of executing laws in a more or less bureaucratic way. They must interfere into conflicts, which are not anticipated in advance or for which lawful prescriptions do not exist."[163]

[158] M.G.V., "Korporacijska država v Italiji" (Corporative State in Italy), *Misel in delo*, vol. I (1935): p. 123 (quoted from: Perovšek, Idejni, socialnogospodarski, 538.).
[159] Rus, Naša pota, 12.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Branko Alujević, "Naš socialni in gospodarski program" (Our Social and Economic Program) in *Omladina Jugoslovenske nacionalne stranke: Banovinska skupščina 12. septembra 1937 v Ljubljani* (Provincial conference of the Yugoslav National Party Youth in Ljubljana 1937) (Ljubljana: 1937), pp. 29-37; p. 31.

Corporatist solutions put forward by Slovene progressive politicians still did not present a complete and secluded system and it could also be argued that they were more or less phrases, expressing conformity to the general political developments of the era. In any case they differed substantially for instance from the otherwise similarly forward-looking national solidarist ideas advocated by Romanian theoretician Mihail Manoilescu[164] and did not include concepts of "differential rights" for estates, fixed hierarchy and authoritarian rule. The corporations were meant to be formed voluntarily with the state only "accelerating their formation by all means, which do not restrain free decision."[165] Progressives did not cease to defend inalienable individual rights to life, personal liberty, freedom of mind and conscience and equality of rights in society.[166] They continued to stress the importance of individual initiative and free self-development and also did not in any way push for revolutionary action towards establishment of corporatism as Manoilescu in his late years did.[167]

National solidarism, state interventionism and dirigisme, as well as (partial) corporatism, as advocated by the Yugoslav National Party was intended to deter "the social extremes of left and right" and to enable pursuit of "evolutional progress".[168] On this basis it could be argued that the manner of employing corporatist elements by the progressives – taking into account the general trends of the time – could also essentially mean an adoption of certain illiberal means for still liberal ends. Even more if one considers the fact that in 1930's Slovenia none of the major political forces espoused economic liberalism. The only visible political personality favoring free market order was Andrej Gosar (interestingly belonging to the

(Archive of the Republic of Slovenia, dislocated unit III, SI AS1931: Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve Socialistične Republike Slovenije 1918-1982, t.e. 933, 600-19 OJNS.)

[164] See: Philippe Schmitter, "Reflections on Mihail Manoilescu and the National Consequences of Delayed Dependent Development on the Periphery of Western Europe" in *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation*, Kenneth Jowitt ed. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1978), pp. 117–173.

[165] Alujević, Naš socialni, 33.

[166] Politična, gospodarska in socialna, 22.

[167] Schmitter, Reflections, 131.

[168] Alujević, Naš socialni, 36-37.

Catholic camp) and the ones closest to his views on merely upgrading capitalism were the young liberals.[169]

As an ending remark it should also be stated that the modernizatory and economic views of Slovene liberal camp, although in many aspects protectionist as well as 'neo-liberal', also differed from the ideas of another Romanian theorist Ştefan Zeletin.[170] The progressives did not advocate pursuit of economic closure and autarchy and were opposed to forcedly imposed industrialization, thereby stressing the importance of agriculture.[171]

"The social structure of our country is of crucial importance for our economic policy. Yugoslav nation is predominantly a nation of peasants. The first and fundamental task of our state economic policy must therefore be the concern for advancement of all the branches of agriculture and its profitability, which guarantees the peasant people a proper existence. (…) Co-operatives are a form of economic organization, which should especially be supported. Standing on the principle of private property, which should not be used to the detriment of the national whole, sees the party [*JNS*] the advancement and support for personal effort of every economic unit as the crucial condition for economical progress of the Yugoslav nation."[172]

Stemming from the Slovene national liberal traditions, stressing the notions of reason, progress and free-mindedness and being mainly the party of city and town-dwellers, as well as the major part of the well-to-do Slovene population, the interwar progressives continued to perceive themselves as the main force of modernization. This may well be discerned from their self-presentation as being the main (or even only) nation builders and bearers of high cultural values and progressive social ideas. The content of these perspectives for modernization has slightly changed during the interwar period though. In some aspects was

[169] Slovenska novejša zgodovina, 480-481.
[170] See: Daniel Chirot, "Neoliberal and Social Democratic Theories of Development: The Zeletin-Voinea Debate Concerning Romania's Prospects in the 1920's and Its Contemporary Importance" in *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation*, Kenneth Jowitt ed. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1978), pp. 31–52.
[171] Rus, Naša Pota, 12-13.
[172] "Načela in smernice Jugoslovenske nacionalne stranke" (Principles and Guidelines of the Yugoslav National Party), *Slovenski narod*, Jul 21 1933.

that change more perceptible and in others less. Apart from peculiarities arising from the nature of Slovene and Yugoslav interwar politics in general, one can notice the emergence of certain new elements, which could well be labeled as "anti-modernist" or at least expressing attitudes critical towards existing and unfolding modernity to an extent that was pointing to alternative models and solutions.

Slovene progressives perceived themselves as modernizers of Slovene society throughout the interwar period. Thereby they made certain drastic shifts, which were partly provoked by internal politics and partly by general international political developments. A departure from the occidentalist model of modernization can be observed, as well as a turn away from liberal ideas concerning socio-economic order. Still it could very hardly be argued that this meant any kind of substantial 'anti-modernist' turn, although certain elements of what could be best formulated as "perspectives of alternative modernity" and also certain sporadically employed expressions, usually associated with anti-modernist discourses, can indeed be traced.

As shown in the second part of the previous chapter, the latter can be observed as emerging as part of the progressives' nationalist discourse during the 1930's, when notions of "blood" and "race" started to appear frequently. Again this did not have any substantial consequences for the general course the liberals were taking. Despite their support for ORJUNA during 1920's and similar organizations as *Narodna Odbrana* during 1930's as well as adherence of some Slovene Yugoslav nationalists to filofascist *ZBOR* movement, the leading representatives of that camp denounced all the contemporary aggressive ideologies, which were competing to destroy the existing modernity in order to build a new one. Although they were often themselves accused of fascism by the leftists[173], were totalitarian ideologies and movements of the interwar period - fascism, National Socialism, as well as bolshevism – all alien to Slovene progressive politicians.[174] It is worth mentioning in the end that progressive press

[173] Friš, Banovinska, 137.
[174] Slovenska novejša zgodovina, 370.

also partook in inflamed polemics with the Catholics on the issue of the Spanish civil war, thereby expressing support for the republican side.[175]

[175] Janko Prunk and Anka Vidovič Miklavčič, "Španska državljanska vojna kot dejavnik difereciacije političnega življenja v Sloveniji" (Spanish Civil War as the Factor of Differentiation in Slovene Political Life), *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, Yr. 27, Vol. 1-2 (1987): pp. 64-80, p. 65, 75-76.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of my thesis was to present the politics of Slovene progressive camp during interwar period. Understood as heirs to the national liberal tradition and put into respective contextual framework, the political forces of Slovene "liberalism" and their policies, stances and discourses were analyzed in order to point to the vanished liberal elements and to excavate the remaining ones.

In the second chapter the general features of progressive camp, its interwar politics and the parties forming it were introduced. Political landscape of Slovene lands after the introduction of universal suffrage in 1907 was distinguished by the predominance of Catholic conservative camp embodied in the Slovene People's Party. Progressives as the second most important political force lagged far behind it in terms of popular support and the gap between the two even broadened itself during interwar era – among other also due to the unpopular Yugoslav unitarist course, persistently followed by the weaker party. Moreover, the progressive camp faced disintegration after 1918, which was also not surmounted during 1930's despite the renewed but politically conditioned unity of all major strains of progressive politics inside one party. One of the major divides was the one along generational lines, whereby the "Žerjav-Kramer circle" joined in 1930's by Ivan Pucelj represented the politically far most significant group.

Progressives, more precisely the core group gathered around Gregor Žerjav and Albert Kramer were the prime and most vocal advocates of Yugoslav national idea in Slovene lands. Their reasons for adopting it and clinging to it ranged from practical ones, connected to their never-ending domestic political struggle with Slovene People's Party, to more substantial and

long-term ones. These included the belief in a necessity of a strong state, where they followed the examples of western state nations, as well as a sincere belief that amalgamation into a unified Yugoslav nation represented a new, necessary and higher evolutive stage for Slovenes. During the 1930's Yugoslav nationalism became radicalized and highly militant tones began to be employed by progressive leaders, what perhaps contributed to the political violence distinctive for the second half of that decade.

The case example of treating the German national minority problem demonstrated a highly aggressive and exclusivist nationalist rhetoric on part of the progressives and indicated that they were by all means affected by the fin-de-siecle radicalization of nationalism, generally distinctive for Central European region. Furthermore the sporadic but increasing emergence of notions such as "race" and "blood" in the progressives' nationalist discourse showed that Slovene liberal heirs were to a degree affected by the newer and more radical versions of nationalism. They did not transform themselves into far-rightists, but they were also not liberal nationalists anymore.

As shown in the fourth chapter, progressives continued to perceive and present themselves as the main modernizing force in Slovene politics. Their emphasized secularist orientation as well as their Yugoslav nation-bulding perspective acted as important if not crucial ideological elements and practical political means of their vision of modernizing the Slovene society throughout the observed era. In contrast to that, the actual developmental models and paragons changed by 1930's, turning from a clearly occidentalist orientation towards search for 'home-grown' solutions.

Progressives' socio-economic views were far from economic liberalism and were marked by national solidarist overtones. In this view they were not unique among liberal political forces of Central Europe and broader, since classical liberalism had been vanishing everywhere from

the mainstream party politics. As far as the 1920's are concerned, progressives could therefore still without hesitation be labeled as liberals in the broader sense of that term, designating centrist and moderate politics.

During 1930's this changed, however, Slovene progressives began to flirt with the corporatist model of national economy and broader social organization, which could at least superficially be interpreted as a drastic shift. On the other hand corporatism, as it was being put forward by Slovene progressive politicians, did not present a complete and secluded system and could be interpreted as an adjustment to the general political trends. Moreover, judging on the basis of their own comments on it, it could also be argued that the shift in question meant an adoption of certain illiberal means for still essentially liberal ends.

To briefly sum up, the two main denominators of Slovene progressives during the interwar period continued to be nationalism and anti-clericalism. They represented the two central points of their politics and expressed themselves in an intensified manner. It could therefore also be argued that these two features, together with a never vanished basic belief in civic and political rights and the necessity of their protection by the state, corresponded to what "liberalism" and "proggresivism" essentially meant in interwar Slovenia. The changing courses in economical matters and developmental perspectives, as well as the partly radical nationalist discourse, reveal thereby a general disorientation and disintegration of the liberal camp, affected by the social and political contexts of the time. These phenomena furthermore point to a process of gradual vanishing of the national liberal traditions in Slovene politics, for which I would argue that it still did not represent a complete and irreversible one though. The usage of liberal label for political parties of interwar progressive political parties is in my view therefore conditionally valid, meaning that it should not be employed without a degree of critical reflection.

SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. ARCHIVAL SOURCES

Omladina Jugoslovenske nacionalne stranke: Banovinska skupščina 12. septembra 1937 v Ljubljani (Youth of the Yugoslav National Party: Provincial Conference on September the 12th 1937 in Ljubljana). Ljubljana: Banovinski odbor OJNS, 1937.
(Archive of the Republic of Slovenia, dislocated unit III, SI AS1931: Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve Socialistične Republike Slovenije 1918-1982, t.e. 933, 600-19 OJNS.)

Poročilo o drugi banovinski skupščini Omladine Jugoslovanske Nacionalne Stranke (Report on the Second Provincial Assembly of the Yugoslav National Party Youth). Ljubljana: Banovinski odbor OJNS, 1938.
(Archive of the Republic of Slovenia, dislocated unit III, SI AS1931: Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve Socialistične Republike Slovenije 1918-1982, t.e. 933, 600-19 OJNS.)

Politična, gospodarska in socialna načela (Political, Economic and Social Principles). Ljubljana: Banovinski odbor OJNS, 1940.
(Archive of the Republic of Slovenia, dislocated unit III, SI AS1931: Republiški sekretariat za notranje zadeve Socialistične republike Slovenije 1918-1982, t.e. 933, 600-19 OJNS.)

II. PUBLISHED SOURCES

"Program Jugoslovanske demokratske stranke" (Program of the Yugoslav Democratic Party (June 1918)) in *Programi političnih strank, organizacij in združenj na Slovenskem v času Kraljevine SHS (1918-1929)* (Programs of the Political Parties, Organizations and Associations in Slovene Lands during the Times of SHS Kingdom (1918-1929)). Jurij Perovšek ed., Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo Slovenije, 1998, pp. 23-28.

"Iz programa vsedržavne Jugoslovanske demokratske stranke sprejetega na strankinem kongresu 30. in 31. oktobra 1921 v Beogradu" (From the Program of All-state Yugoslav Democratic Party Adopted at the Party Congress on 30th and 31st of October 1921 in Belgrade) in *Programi političnih strank, organizacij in združenj na Slovenskem v času Kraljevine SHS (1918-1929)* (Programs of the Political Parties, Organizations and Associations in Slovene Lands during the Times of SHS Kingdom (1918-1929)). Jurij Perovšek ed., Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo Slovenije, 1998, pp. 44-46.

"Program organizacije jugoslovenskih nacionalista" (Program of the Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists) in *Programi političnih strank, organizacij in združenj na Slovenskem v času Kraljevine SHS (1918-1929)* (Programs of the Political Parties, Organizations and Associations in Slovene Lands during the Times of SHS Kingdom (1918-1929)). Jurij Perovšek ed., Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo Slovenije, 1998, pp. 49-51.

Petnajst let J.N.A.D. »Jadrana« (Fifteen Years of Yugoslav Progressive Academic Club "Adriatic"), Ljubljana: J.n.a.d. Jadran, 1937.

PERIODICALS

Jutro (Published in Ljubljana 1920-1945) – 1923, 1924, 1931, 1933, 1937

Slovenski Narod (Published in Ljubljana 1868-1945) – 1924, 1933

Domovina (Published in Ljubljana 1918-1944) - 1937

III. SECONDARY WORKS

MONOGRAPHIES

Bergant, Zvonko. *Slovenski klasični liberalizem. idejno-politični značaj slovenskega liberalizma v letih 1891-1921* (Slovene Classical Liberalism, Ideal and Political Character of Slovene Liberalism in Years 1891-1921). Ljubljana: Nova revija, 2000.

Freeden, Michael. *Ideologies and political theory: a conceptual approach*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

Gantar Godina, Irena. *T. G. Masaryk in masarykovstvo na Slovenskem : 1895-1914* (T. G. Masaryk and Masarykianism in Slovene Lands: 1895-1914). Ljubljana: Slovenska Matica, 1987.

Gantar Godina, Irena. *Neoslavizem in Slovenci* (Neoslavism and Slovenes). Ljubljana: Znanstveni inštitut Filozofske fakultete, 1994.

Glass, Krzysztof. Serloth Barbara. *Das Selbstverständnis des österreichischen Liberalismus*. Wien/Poznań: Österreichische Gesellschaft für Mitteleuropäische Studien/Humaniora, 1997.

Leonhard, Jörn. *Liberalismus, Zur historischen Semantik eines europäischen Deutungsmusters*, München: Oldenbourg, 2001.

Mai, Gunther. *Europa 1918-1939, Gesellschaften und Staaten, Mentalitäten, Lebensweisen, Politik zwischen den Weltkriegen*, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2001.

Perovšek, Jurij. *Liberalizem in vprašanje slovenstva : nacionalna politika liberalnega tabora v letih 1918-1929* (Liberalism and the Question of Slovenehood: National Politics of the Liberal Camp During the Years 1918-1929). Ljubljana: Modrijan, 1996.

Szporluk, Roman. *Communism and nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Wachtel, Andrew Baruch. *Making a nation, breaking a nation: literature and cultural politics in Yugoslavia*. Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, 1998.

Winkler, Jürgen R..*Sozialstruktur, politische Traditionen und Liberalismus, Eine empirische Längsschnittstudie zur Wahlenentwicklung in Deutschland 1871-1933. Schriften des Zentralinstituts für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung der Freien Universität Berlin*. Band 75, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995.

Winkler, Martina. *Karel Kramář (1860−1937). Selbstbild, Fremdwahrnehmungen und Modernisierungsverständnis eines tschechischen Politikers*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002.

COLLECTIONS AND GENERAL LITERATURE

Čepič, Zdenko et al.. *Ključne značilnosti slovenske politike v letih 1929-1955 : znanstveno poročilo* (Key Characteristics of Slovene Politics in years 1929-1955: a Scientific Report). Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 1995.

Denes, Ivan Zoltan (ed.). *Liberty and the search for identity*, Budapest: CEU Press, 2006.

Slovenska novejša zgodovina: od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije : 1848-1992 (Slovene Modern History: from United Slovenia Program to the International Recognition of Republic of Slovenia: 1848-1992), Vol. 1: 1848-1945. Fischer, Jasna et al eds.,Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2005.

Lexikon zur Geschichte der Parteien in Europa. Peter Wende ed., Stuttgart: Kröner, 1981.

STUDIES IN A COLLECTION

Chirot, Daniel. "Neoliberal and Social Democratic Theories of Development: The Zeletin-Voinea Debate Concerning Romania's Prospects in the 1920's and Its Contemporary Importance" in *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation*, Kenneth Jowitt ed., Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1978, pp. 31–52.

Dolenc, Ervin. "Slovenski intelektualci in njihove delitve" (Slovene Intellectuals and Their Divisions) in *Slovenska trideseta leta: simpozij 1995* (Slovene Thirties: Simposium 1995). Peter Vodopivec, Jože Mahnič eds., Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1997, pp. 194-201.

Freeden, Michael. "Concepts, ideology and political theory" in *Herausforderungen der Begriffsgeschichte.* Carsten Dutt ed., Heidelberg: Winter, 2003, pp. 51-63.

Pleterski, Janko. "Politika naroda v krizi dužbe, države in idej" (Politics of a Nation in Crisis of Society, State and Ideas) in *Slovenska trideseta leta: simpozij 1995* (Slovene Thirties: Simposium 1995). Peter Vodopivec, Jože Mahnič eds., Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1997, pp. 43-57.

Prunk, Janko. "Liberalni tabor med Ljubljano in Zagrebom" (Liberal Camp between Ljubljana and Zagreb) in *Slovenska trideseta leta: simpozij 1995* (Slovene Thirties: Simposium 1995). Peter Vodopivec, Jože Mahnič eds., Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1997, pp. 69-74.

Schmitter, Philip. "Reflections on Mihail Manoilescu and the National Consequences of Delayed Dependent Development on the Periphery of Western Europe" in *Social Change in*

Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation. Kenneth Jowitt ed., Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1978, pp. 117–173.

Vidovič Miklavčič, Anka. "Vloga in organiziranost mladine v jugoslovanskem delu Slovenije v letih 1929-1941" (The Role and Organization of Youth in the Yugoslav Part of Slovenia during the Years 1929-1941) in *Slovenska trideseta leta: simpozij 1995* (Slovene Thirties: Simposium 1995). Peter Vodopivec, Jože Mahnič eds., Ljubljana: Slovenska Matica, 1997, pp. 97-109.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Friš, Darko. "Banovinska konferenca Jugoslovanske nacionalne stranke leta 1937 v Ljubljani" (1937 Provincial Conference of Yugoslav National Party in Ljubljana). *Zgodovinski časopis*. Yr. 59, Vol. 1-2 (2005): pp. 129-146.

Friš, Darko. "Turneja Petra Živkovića in vodstva Jugoslovanske nacionalne stranke po slovenskih krajih leta 1937" (Tour by Petar Živković and Yugoslav National Party Leadership Across Slovene Lands in Year 1937). *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*. Yr. 45, No. 1 (2005): pp. 61 -78.

Gantar Godina, Irena. "Narodno radikalno dijaštvo" (National Radical Students). *Zgodovinski časopis.* vol. 36 (1982): pp. 219-230.

Kocka, Jürgen. "Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg." *History and Theory*. Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1999): pp. 40-50.

Leonhard, Jörn. "Semantische Deplazierung und Entwertung: Deutsche Deutungen von 'liberal' und 'liberalismus' nach 1850 im europäischen Vergleich." *Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Zeitschrift für Historische Sozialwissenschaft*. No. 29 (2003): pp. 5-39.

Melik, Vasilij. "Slovenski liberalni tabor in njegovo razpadanje" (Slovene Liberal Camp and its Disintegration). *Prispevki za zgodovino delavskega gibanja*. vol. 1-2/yr. 22 (1982): pp. 19-24.

Perovšek, Jurij. "Socialni, politični in idejni značaj slovenskega liberalizma v letih 1894-1918" (Social, Political and Ideal Character of Slovene Liberalism During the Years 1894-1918). *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*. Yr. 32, No. 1-2 (1992): pp. 3-14.

Perovšek, Jurij. "Idejni, socialnogospodarski in narodnopolitični nazori slovenskega meščanstva v času med svetovnima vojnama (1918-1941)" (Ideal, Socio-economic and National Political Views of Slovene Middle Classes in the Interwar Time (1918-1941)). *Zgodovinski časopis*. Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997): pp. 529-554.

Prunk, Janko. Vidovič Miklavčič, Anka. "Španska državljanska vojna kot dejavnik difereciacije političnega življenja v Sloveniji" (Spanish Civil War as the Factor of Differentiation in Slovene Political Life). *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*. Yr. 27, Vol. 1-2 (1987): pp. 64-80.

Vodopivec, Peter. **"**Ruski 'mir', južnoslovanska zadruga in slovenski liberalci" (Russian 'Peace', South Slavic *Zadruga* and Slovene Liberals). *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*. Yr. 46, No. 1 (2006): pp. 65-78.

LEXICAL, ENCYCLOPEDICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES

Balkovec, Bojan. "Rezultati parlamentarnih volitev v Sloveniji" (Parliamentary Election Results in Slovenia) in *Slovenska kronika XX. Stoletja* (Slovene XX. Century Chronicle), vol.1: 1900-1941. Marjan Drnovšek and Drago Bajt eds., Ljubljana: Nova Revija, 1997, p. 329.

Perovšek, Jurij. "Bogumil Vošnjak in 'srbsko-hrvaško-slovenski' jezik" (Bogumil Vošnjak and the "Serbo-Croato-Slovene" Language) in *kronika XX. Stoletja* (Slovene XX. Century Chronicle), vol.1: 1900-1941. Marjan Drnovšek and Drago Bajt eds., Ljubljana: Nova Revija, 1997, p. 257.

Vierhaus, Rudolf. "Liberalismus" in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe : historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland***,** Vol.3 H-Me, 4. Auflage. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck eds., Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992, pp. 741-785.

Wende, Peter. "Radikalismus" in: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe : historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland***,** Vol.5: Pro-Soz, 4. Auflage. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck eds., Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992, pp. 113- 133.

IV. OTHER

Photograph of Albert Kramer and Ivan Pucelj (193?).
Digitalna Knjižnica Slovenije (Digital Library of Slovenia),
http://www.dlib.si/v2/StreamDb.aspx?URN=URN:NBN:SI:img-1FNUNYQ1. accessed May 27 2010.