

CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY

**The democratic theory application of political and developmental approaches to
democratization process of Georgia (1992-2008)**

Petre Nebieridze

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of the Master of Arts

Supervisors

Zsolt Enyedi

Kate Coyer

Budapest, Hungary

2010

Abstract

Promotion of democracy in authoritarian and totalitarian states is one of the major challenges to western democracy promoters. After the fall of the Soviet Union this aid providers United States and European Union focused on Post-Soviet space. Their aim was to help those new independent states in complicated process of transition and bring them closer to western society in general. In case of Post-Soviet Georgia, main promoters and facilitators of democracy facilitators were, are and will probably stay United States and Europe. Their assistance through different organizations like Open society foundation, National Democratic Institute was and is very important to ongoing transition of Georgia.

This thesis tries to apply two theories of democratic assistance political and developmental to case of Georgia and examine findings of past democratic development. Major findings will be to find out what were major changes within civil society and NGO's and their role in 16 years of democratic development of Georgia. Puzzle here is that despite active development and participation in democratic processes until 2003, civil society and NGO's started to slowly decay after revolution. Factors that facilitated such surprising development of civil society and its decaying after revolution are that civil society should have clear aim and recourses to achieve it. When civil society had both aim and recourses in form of active professionals, they played important role in political life. However, after revolution rapid outflow of professionals from civil society and NGO's facilitated its decaying. In addition to that, this research proved success of political approach of democratic assistance in countries similar to Georgia, in terms of rapid democratization.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Zsolt Enyedi for his guidance and supervision, Kate Coyer for deepening my interest in civil society and media and my academic writing teacher David Ridout for being helpful and patient throughout the whole research process.

Table of contents.

INTRODUCTION.....	1
1 CHAPTER I METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL APPROACH.....	5
1.1 METHOD	5
1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	6
1.3 NGO-CIVIL SOCIETY DRIVEN DEMOCRACY?.....	12
2 CHAPTER II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NGO'S AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN GEORGIA.....	18
3 CHAPTER III ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGO'S ACROSS THREE MAIN PERIODS OF TRANSITION	20
3.1 FROM INDEPENDENCE TO ROSE REVOLUTION (1992 -2003)	20
3.2 SUMMARY OF FIRST PERIOD	30
3.3 ROSE REVOLUTION	31
3.4 MAIN ACTORS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION.	35
3.5 SUMMARY OF SECOND PERIOD	40
3.6 POST ROSE REVOLUTION	41
3.6 SUMMARY OF THIRD PERIOD	47
CONCLUSION.....	49
REFERENCES.....	52

List of abbreviations

CUG- citizens union of Georgia

CIPDD - Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development.

FPPHR - Former political prisoners for human rights

GYLA -The Georgian young lawyer association

GFSIS - Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

ISFED - The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy

NDI - National Democratic Institute

UDR- United Democratic revival

UND - United National Democrats

Introduction

General process of democratization is very complicated and lengthy. It requires the active involvement of multiple stakeholders, who are able to make as well as lead the process of changes by themselves or are eager to make their input in the overall democratization of country through cooperation with other stakeholders. In other words, successful democratization process cannot be driven with just involvement of external actors (donors), but also needs to be supported by key domestic actors. Iraq is clear example, how democracy not supported by domestic actors, but just imposed from outside cannot be successful. Some scholars like Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder argued against only external involvement, as it is dangerous to push country toward democracy, if there are no preconditions for it and that democracy promoters should pay special attention to fostering those preconditions (Kucharczyk, Lovitt, 2008, 17). In other words, donors should not try to impose democracy on state, which is not ready for it and has no strong foundation for democratic institutions.

Democratization of Post-Soviet space started after so called “Third wave of democracy” initiated by U.S and Europe, to help new independent states in transition process from old soviet rule to new democratic. It can be counted as U.S and Europe’s shared effort to bring Central and East European countries out of Russian influence, with their idea of “sovereign democracy” and instead integrate them into European Union structures and Western society in general (Kucharczyk, Lovitt, 2008, 18-19). However, this “Third wave” did not meet its expectations of institutionalized democracy; instead, majority of countries became so called “hybrid regimes”, regime which cannot be counted nor totalitarian and nor democratic. Further transition of those

“hybrid regimes” of Post-Soviet countries was sometimes bolstered by critical phrases or breakthroughs—revolution like in Georgia and Ukraine. To avoid backlash from imposing democracy as happened in Iraq or Armenia, aid providers direct their efforts toward strengthening economic, political and social institutions of authoritarian or already “hybrid regimes” to form preconditions for one more step forward democracy. In overall, whole process is generally aimed to give transitional countries possibility to achieve level of democracy as it is in U.S and Europe.

In case of Post-Soviet Georgia, first years of transition almost had no effect due to fact that country was ravaged by internal conflicts and had almost each sphere to develop from beginning. This very complicated process was further complicated to by corrupted regime that was in power until 2003. To simplify transition process in terms of corrupted regime, replacing old soviet cadres with new western educated young generation should have been great aid to Georgia. This change of people in general result in bringing in new ideas about various ways of democratic development and those ideas if they are approved by aid providers get implemented in results of various projects, trainings and reforms. However, in governmental structures this process proceeded according to theory of elite continuity developed by Colin Sparks. This theory is generally used for media reform’s, which defines that despite attempts to establish western style media it still remains under control and influence of ruling political elite and is strongly affiliated with it. (Jakubowicz, Sukosd, 2008, 46-47). In Georgia, this was not only happening in media, but also in majority of governmental structures were reforms were at least attempted to be help prior 1997, always ended with slightly changed corrupted system with same ruling elite. This is

why majority of western educated people went into NGO's and greatly bolstered their development and capacity to interact with government in political arena.

In aiding Georgia's democracy transition, major role was and is played by United States through different international organizations like NDI and Open Society Foundation. Those organizations were greatly influencing and strengthening Georgian civil society and NGO's in pre-revolutionary period and had almost direct involvement in Rose revolution. In general, aid providers like United States use two approaches for democratic assistance developed by Thomas Carothers, Political and Developmental. Both approaches have different scope and aims, while Political aims for strengthening and forming NGO's, Developmental aims for strengthening civil society and establishment of basic democratic institutions (Carothers, 2009, 7-9). It is interesting to dig deeper and to find out which approach was used in which period, which resulted in such progress, namely turned Georgia from authoritarian country to stable democracy in sixteen years, which is relative small timeframe

In Georgia, there are three major phrases of transition from old soviet rule to new democratic one. First phrase was from year 1992 to 2003; this period can be generally described as slow process on transition with corrupted government in power and authoritarian regime, along with rapid developing of NGO- Civil society and their increasing involvement in countries political life. Second phrase was Rose Revolution in 2003, event that surprised many in the world. Opposition parties, NGO's and active civil society speakers backed by masses of people peacefully changed government. Third phrase is from year 2003 to 2008, time when newly elected government started to make democratic reforms, established basic democratic institutions

and started to slowly move toward western democracies. This period was accompanied by paradox, which I will speak about in ending part. All three stages of development were supported by U.S, Europe, international donor organizations and international NGO's through ways of democratic assistance mentioned above. This thesis is divided into three chapters. First chapter is divided into three sub-chapters, methodology, were research question and hypothesis will be found, theoretical approach to case study of Georgia and debate around NGO-Civil society in transition process of Georgia. Second chapter is historical background of NGO's and civil society in Georgia. Third chapter is devoted to three main phases of transition of Georgia and Last parts are conclusion and references.

1 Chapter I Methodology and Theoretical approach

1.1 *Method*

While doing this research, I will be using qualitative method on content analysis to uncover which method did aid providers use in such rapid and still ongoing transition process of Georgia. Major scope of my work will be derived toward NGO's and civil society in Georgia. They were major recipients of aid in pre-revolutionary and revolutionary period and possibly played important role in democratization process of Georgia. Moreover, they are major targets of democratic assistance approaches, which makes them even more important for my research. Analyzing their development throughout all three periods of transition, cooperation with each other and with government in political arena, role they played in key periods or critical junctures and overall role in democratization process will be decisive to uncover which approach did aid providers use in democratic assistance to Georgia.

My main research question is why aid-providers decided on political approach of democratic assistance?

First hypothesis will be that aid-providers explicitly focused on the political approach with its development and creation of politically oriented civil society groups and non-governmental organizations, which as a result would create catalyst effect.

Second hypothesis will be that catalyst effect would work in favor of the long-term change of political and socio-economic sector, thus establishment of developmental approach

1.2 Theoretical Framework

Close analyze of democratic development and actors involved in it require substantive theoretical approach. In general, there are two ways of assistance for democratic development developed by Thomas Carothers: Political and Developmental. Each of these approaches has its own method of supporting and major aims during democratic assistance.

Political approach is generally associated with U.S democracy promotion. Political approaches basic idea is that supporting political system with ensure basic political and civil rights. They also argue that developing political system will contribute to developing social and economic systems. Their main focus during developing is focused of so-called Dahlian conception of democracy. Dahlian concept itself implies that competitive elections and respect for political and civil rights to ensure that people can participate in democratic political process. In addition to Dahlian concept, usually independence of judiciary, strong legislature and independent media are major targets of political approach (Carothers, 2009, 7-8). Above mention major targets all lead to major understanding of democratization by political approach, it is political struggle. Main actors of this political struggle are parties, which they divide into democratic and non-democratic ones. Further, this approach implies that democratization occurs only when Democratic Party gains upper hand. In addition, they include critical phrase's-junctures as a supporting factor for democratic development. Interesting part of this approach is their diverse ways of supporting democracy, which they divide into direct and indirect ways. Direct way implies supporting countries almost direct involvement into political processes of developing state, based on direct support of political actors, political associations or parties or politically oriented NGO's. Indirect way of support is support of key institutions in developing

state, like electoral commission, judicially and media. This indirect approach is generally used when direct support is not appropriate or is not giving enough progress. For example, authoritarian or totalitarian state with weak or no opposition. Pre-revolutionary Georgia directly resembles description of state mentioned above.

Here in connection with indirect method of political approach and its aim toward media assistance, I want to bring in theory of the elite continuity by Colin Sparks. This theory as mentioned in introduction concentrates on media reform in developing countries, when system changes, but overall leadership and affiliation is toward old ruling elite. This situation was common in Georgia after gaining independence in 1992. Major broadcaster at this period was governmental Pirveli Arxi (first channel), until challenged by Rustavi 2 as major opposition channel after 2000. This channel was used as propaganda machine by government of Eduard Shevardnadze and became one of its stakes of power in terms of controlling informational flow. This stake of power directly corresponds to one of the concept of this theory discovered after observation of Eastern European States (Jakubowicz, Sukosd, 2008, 47). After revolution, Pirveli Arxi was reformed into so-called public broadcaster, but as in pre-revolutionary period, it was and still is major, along with Rustavi 2 governmental channel for distributing information and tool for controlling informational flow. Here we have sort of paradox in media reform, due to fact that after revolution media system was reformed, but it still plays same role as it did before revolution. This itself points to possible “media deficit” in Georgia as it was noted in East European states (Jakubowicz, Sukosd, 2008, 73). Another interesting issue is governmental reluctance to accept critical media coverage. This was common during Shevardnadze’s era, with majority of soviet Nomenklatura still in power and from time to time is part of Georgia’s

everyday reality (Sukosd, Bajomi-Lazar, 2003, 13). This reluctance toward accepting critical media even resulted in shutting down of TV channel in Georgia, on November 7, 2007. In such situation, best way to bring country to democracy is to provide maximum support its reform's and rise people's awareness toward most troublesome issues. Troublesome issue in case of media is so called journalism culture, this means performance of journalism as institution and profession (Jakubowicz, Sukosd, 2008, 193). This means that journalists and media should be ready to any rapid change that occurs in any sphere of state and do all that is possible to avoid informational vacuum. High level of journalism provides free flow of information, which in their way are strengthening and ensuring democratic integrity. In other words, free flow of information inform and educate public, so they can make informed choices, particularly during elections (Gunther, Mughan, 2000, 5). Those reforms and rising awareness leads to critical phrase mentioned above, which is direct challenge to states current government from democracy-oriented people and political parties, with backup of supporting state. Major point of this method is to achieve rapid democratization of state with involvement of supporting country (Carothers, 2009, 7-8).

Political approach has its strength and weaknesses. Major strength of this approach is its strong emphasis on political competition. It helps promote institutional framework of competition, increase degree of freedom of political parties. In addition, tense political competition can serve as bases for critical juncture, which can play catalysts role in democratic development. Weakness of this approach is its main focus on political arena. In some cases, countries have achieved relatively free political competition, but low degree of representation and excluding citizens from political arena did not help democratic assistance. In addition,

critical junctures can backfire and make loss of control over developing state. This approach is typical to United State policy with their money-pumping projects. According to Carothers, U.S assistance model of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is based on analytical model, which consists of three phrases: Opening, Breakthrough and Consolidation (Perlin, 2003-2004, 20). This method probably is good to use when aid provider wants to achieve breakthrough in democratic development by critical juncture, because tension of political situation, forming and backing up politically oriented groups slowly increases tension, which will eventually lead to either successive critical juncture or loss of control over situation. Risk here for success and failure depends how aid provider manages process of critical juncture, if it will stay behind and do nothing, probability of failure will increase. On the other hand, at least unofficial involvement of aid state or its different representations (like international organizations based in this state) will surely maintain control over critical juncture and probably end with democratic breakthrough.

Developmental approach is more associated with Europe, due to its long term planning and executing. Main idea of this approach is based on evaluating countries basic features of democratic governance, transparency, accountability and responsiveness. Only if country shows substantial progress toward democracy by itself, followers of developmental approach can start aiding it. Their concept of democracy is based on equality, welfare and justice. Their view of democracy implies that equality in human rights and countries overall well-being can contribute to developing of political system. In addition to that, followers of this approach usually make levels of democracy; supported state should achieve certain level of democratization, before it goes further. (Carothers, 2009, 8-9) Developmental approach is usually inclined toward indirect

support of democratic development. They prefer to promote social and economic systems and in case of political system, they focus on state capacity and good governance. They usually avoid strengthening political actors or parties and stress instead importance of cooperation between all parties. On the other hand, if Europe wants to be key democratic promoter as noted by some scholars, they should extend and deepen its democratic involvement, provide more support for political parties and NGO's to develop democratic institutions (Kucharczyk, Lovitt, 2008, 24). Usually, supporters of this approach go into human rights development as major focus and through it try to achieve long-term goal. Major point in this method is to achieve long-term goals of democracy without or with minimum direct involvement of supporting state (Carothers, 2009, 8-9).

In connection with developmental theory, which makes emphasis on civil society it is necessary to clarify and underline what is civil society in modern states. According to Michael Edwards's civil society can be divided into three spheres: Associational life, Good society and Public sphere (Edwards, 2005, <http://www.infed.org>). Associational life means when people live together, share same values and beliefs. However, those values and beliefs treat everyone equally, will it be regular citizen or tyrannical ruler. This is why British writer John Keane stated that civil society "is riddled with danger, since it gives freedom to despots and democrats alike" (Edwards, 2005, <http://www.infed.org>). Good society means in civil society to be indeed "civil", thus to follow norms and practices that do not contradict morality and law. Public sphere means to provide arena with debates and sharing opinions-ideas within civil society and with government. This arena is crucial for sustaining democracy as some scholars note (Edwards, 2005, Splichal, Calabres, Sparks, 1994, 15). In overall, civil society should be equally treating everyone based on norms, rules, and should cooperate with government in order to achieve or

sustain democracy. In addition, civil society should be developing and evolving all time, to achieve better level of associational life and stronger links among its members and with government (Edwards, 2005, <http://www.infed.org>). On the other hand, civil society should be kept safe from governmental intervention and should not become just part to politics. It should keep control over government, because according to classical liberal theory state is consequence of civil society (Splichal, Calabres, Sparks, 1994, 6). In sum, civil society should be in the role of watchdog over government and provide assistance to it during democratic development.

Developmental theory has several strength and weaknesses. One of its strong side's is their small-scale approach with minimum political emphasis. This allows them to enter political arena of tense competition without increasing tension. Long term planning is also strong side. It allows to continuously develop different sectors of country to achieve democratic transition. Weaknesses of this approach are linked to its strong sides. Long-term approach as some skeptics say can produce programs, which will useless. In addition, long-term socio-economic project can contribute in general to democratization, but can produce larger political change (Carothers, 2009, 7-8). This approach bears direct signs of European politics, with their caution and long term planning. This method would be probably good when aid provider wants to slowly, but steadily transform any non-democratic state to democratic. Such caution almost excludes increase of tension in political sphere of state, thus significantly reduces chance of critical juncture. However, this causes negative effect in terms of financing, when long planning requires more money and more detailed planning of each stage, thus increases chance that something might go wrong and whole plan might crumble.

Both of those approaches of democratic assistance and theories linked to it can play important role in democratic development of different countries if done properly. Here I mean specific case's which can constitute either to one approach or another. I will not exclude possibility that there might be cases when both of those approaches might be used simultaneously.

1.3 NGO-Civil society driven democracy?

Let take a glance at statements that worldwide well-known politicians made about Georgia's democratization processes. During his official visit in 2009, the vice president Joe Biden claimed that Georgia is a "story of democratic success" and former US president George W. Bush in May of 2005 during his speech on the central square of Tbilisi (capital city of Georgia) has admitted that country is a "Beacon of liberty". Such statements of well-known politicians are not just bold words; they are grounded into progress that Georgia made in its first seven years after revolution. Indeed progress made after revolution was remarkable. Reforms in all key institution's, fight against corruption and rising of international prestige of country are just small part of successive stories. More important is to ask question how country made such progress. Answer to this question can be found in quotation of Thomas Carothers author of both approaches of democratic assistance, who described Georgia as "dominant power politics in which there is limited but still real political space, some political contestations by opposition parties and at least most of the basic institutional forms of democracy" (Wheatley, 2005, 217). This little quotation includes in it parts of both theories. While political space and political contestation is part of political

approach, an institutional form of democracy is part of developmental approach. From this, it can be concluded that both approaches were present in case of Georgia. However, question that arises is how we can test presence of both approaches in Georgia? Theory of political approach places its emphasis on political tension, political competition and NGO's for promoting democracy. Such situation was common to Georgia in pre revolutionary era, about which I will speak in later chapters. Important is Rose revolution, critical juncture that this very theory talks about. As for development theory, it emphasizes on civil society development (including NGO sector), democratic governance and on existence of basic democratic institutions. Those features were present after Rose Revolution that brought to power new government. Moreover, Georgian development directly constitutes to U.S assistance model of three steps: Opening, Breakthrough and Consolidation. In opening stage, aid providers were strengthening NGO sector and civil society, in absence of strong political opposition in Georgia. Only after year 2000, they started to officially support opposition block of Mikhail Saakashvili, which was slowly gaining strength. In breakthrough or revolutionary era, very important role was also played by third sector and civil society in cooperation with opposition. In consolidation stage or post-revolutionary era, where democratic benefits from revolution should have evolved into democratic institutions, which should have included active participation of all key domestic actors, political parties, NGO's and civil society went not as was expected.

Today, there are many opinions about the role of NGOs and civil society in Georgia's democratic transition. What was the role that they played during the crucial to the country times like "Rose Revolution" period, what has changed since that time for the third sector within

immediate or overall environment and are there any serious changes in their development nowadays in comparison with the previous years and regime?

On the other hand, there is question how did NGO sector and civil society acquire enough power to play at least some role in democratic processes. “One factor behind the relative strength of the NGO sector in Georgia in comparison with other former soviet republics was a favorable legislative framework” (Whitley, 2005, 145) or “Georgia’s disorder permitted NGO sector to grow, NGO’s were able to fill void created by governmental ineffectiveness” (Jaba Devdariani, www.eurasianet.org)

Jonathan Whitley’s comment is very interesting in terms of how this framework became favorable. In 1997 Georgia adopted new civil code, which greatly simplified registering of NGO’s in state, interesting fact is that this civil code was product of lobbying by several major NGO’s and also with assistance of “reformer’s wing” within government. (Whitley, 2005, 145). NGO’s lobbying legislative changes speaks of their authority and influence over government to some extent.

The opinion about Georgian disorder is also very plausible claim. The political situation during president Shevardnadze’s period was very tense. The majority of debates about any issue usually led to the deadlock, causing protest of either one side or another.

Before 1997, when the ruling party was still consolidating power in it’s hands, western oriented NGO’s were given the opportunity to enter the political arena and aid in the establishment of new NGO’s and in overall strengthening Third sector thought mostly different

parliamentary committees. (Whitley, 2005, 146) In overall, top governmental officials in this period were busy to get their piece of power in new government and they did not pay enough attention to the third sector.

Cooperation and western aided contacts established between NGO's and ruling party (Specifically "reformer's wing" within it) might also have been one of reasons of NGO strength in Georgia. For example, events of 1999, when for the first time three NGO representatives were elected into parliament on the ruling party list. Those representatives were from major Georgian NGOs at that time Zurab Adeishvili from The Georgian Young Lawyer Association (GYLA) and Liberty institute, Koba Davitashvili from GYLA, and Vano Merabishvili, Chairman of "Association for the protection of Landowners rights". Those names became very famous in next decade either as ministers or as opposition leaders. All three occupied high governmental positions, which allowed them to monitor economic and legislative policy in the country (Whitley, 2005, 147). This again points to high NGO involvement in governmental processes and their possible overall important role in democratization process.

As for the role of NGOs and civil society in critical junctures like "Rose Revolution", western funded NGOs and youth organizations played a prominent role in the peaceful revolution. The most notable from them were the Liberty Institute that was one of the major watchdogs from 1995 and the youth organization Kmara, which was established with the financial help of the Open Society Foundation based on the model of Serbian "Otpor" (A youth movement that played very active part in overthrowing of Slobodan Milosevic regime in Serbia in 2000). Even ex-president Shevardnadze acknowledged the role that NGOs played in his

peaceful departure. However, some critics suspect the president of exaggerating the NGO role in his resignation, like Ghia Nodia who claims that the role of NGOs should not be overestimated and that NGO's played an important but not decisive role"(Jaba Devdariani, www.eurasianet.org). One more opinion is stated by Whitley who claims that National Movement (Major political opposition party of Mikhail Saakashvili) was the actor who contributed most to the successful outcome of the Revolution (Whitley, 2005, 185). All of these opinions might be relevant and valid at this stage of research based on several facts: 1) NGOs and youth movements were main links between opposition politicians and ordinary citizens of Georgia. They rallied people to mass demonstrations; urged them to stand with political opposition in order to demonstrate to the government that it had lost support and trust of the majority of the population. Kmara also conducted acts of non-violent protests (experience shared from their Serbian colleagues) and investigations to uncover acts of corruption among government. 2) National movement was major political opponent with three leaders, Mikhail Saakashvili (future president), Zurab Jvania (future prime minister) and Nino Burjanadze (future speaker of parliament) and at that time, it was only possible replacement to ruling party. Moreover, like local NGOs who had a strong support of International NGOs, the National Movement had an unofficial or partly official support of West (Major aid providers). In addition, the support of population to National movement might have been determined by fact that this movement was only major and strong political opposition at that time.

Those opinions might fit better to each other if we combine them in next framework: NGO's and civil society were rallying people to aid only existent political opposition strong enough to remove existing government. This makes some sort of division – NGOs and civil society takes

part in civic actions, while National Movement was involved in political debates and was looking for peaceful way for power transition. From this can be said that “Rose Revolution” was successful cooperation between NGO’s and political parties aimed toward government change.

The role of the third sector in Georgia’s everyday life significantly changed after the “Rose Revolution”. Main impact on NGO sector was that majority of active NGO members left third sector and joined the new government in ranks of UND. This outflow of professional cadres continues up to today, due to act that government is more attractive for young professionals and it offers more perspectives now, then it was in the pre-revolution era (Rukhadze, 2009, 2). Another important impact was reducing of NGO influence on legislative and executive branches, due to new constitutional amendments performed right after presidential election on February 5, which many observers thought to be too early and also reform of 2006, which further strengthened presidential power and reduced parliamentary one, thus leaving committees with NGO members almost powerless in affecting state policy or other relevant issues (Wheatley, 2005, 194). It can be summarized that NGOs lost influence on government after the revolution and had their role significantly reduced in post- revolutionary time.

2 Chapter II Historical Background of NGO's and Civil Society in Georgia

The first Georgian NGOs and the germ of civil society had born in 19-th century. They were the mirror of that historical time and the country's status as part of Russian Empire. At late 19-th century Georgian citizens started active involvement into country's everyday life, understanding that Empire's state at that time did not allow officials to maintain strict rule over Georgia. The representatives of civil society mostly were well known public speakers from the high social classes, who were mostly educated in the best universities of Russian Empire. The most well known among those public speakers was Ilia Chavchavadze, the famous Georgian poet and belletrist. He and his fellow friends formed at that time one of the first NGO called "The Society Promoting Georgian Literacy". Bases of establishing NGO's in that time was not any law and framework, this was a tradition. This was noted by scholar who claimed that "the rule of law only weakly developed Georgia, traditions and informal practices are considered to be far more important than formal legal procedures" (Coppieters, Legvold, 2005. 272). Initially, the main fields of activities for such organizations were quite narrow and all affords were directed toward promoting Georgian history, poetry and improving the education system of country. However, after events, which soon led to WWI, already existing organizations changed tracks toward involvement into political debates, actively rallying people to mass meetings and discussions of everyday events.

World events soon led to collapse of Russian Empire and Georgian became independent. Unfortunately, the independence lasted only couple of years, until soviet invasion in 1921 and declaring soviet rule over Georgia for next 70 years.

The rebirth of civil society and NGOs in Georgia became possible only after the last soviet leader Mikheil Gorbachev, who initiated two revolutionary policies of liberalization of soviet system called “Perestroika” and “Glasnost”. These two policies allowed existence of independent political associations / groups and freedom-plurality of media to some extent.

Of course, Georgia was in the avant-garde of these historical changes and the chance of expressing national ideas was used by two well known at that time dissidents Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava, who established independent political groups and association's that were fully supported by the masses of people. Those masses achieved several prominent goals like halting building of Trans-Caucasus Railway or mass protesting against soviet army trainings near “Davit Gareji” monastery. This was clear example how people, even under tyrannical regime can peacefully achieve at first sight impossible goals. Seeing fracturing and upcoming collapse of soviet system, civil society and various political groups started anti-soviet movement, mostly shown in peaceful demonstrations aimed at returning the independence of Georgia from Soviet Union. On April 9 of 1989, the largest at that time demonstration took a place in Tbilisi with one single demand, Independence for Georgia. Soviet regime response was similar as it was always in previous times- brutal force. Military regiments from Trans-Caucasus Military District received order from their commander Igor Rodionov to disband demonstration by any means necessary. This resulted in brutal massacre of unarmed Georgians and death of 19 people, 17 of them women and hundreds fatally poisoned. However, soviet plan to establish order with fear and force ultimately failed, 9 April became Day of National Unity and increased society's confidence to continue peaceful protests for independence, which was achieved in 1992.

3 Chapter III Role of Civil society and NGO's across three main periods of transition

3.1 From independence to Rose Revolution (1992 -2003)

After the collapse of soviet system and declaring independence of Georgia, Western democracies started demonstrating their interest toward the newly independent country. This was part of politics of West and United States, for establishing democracy in Post-Communist sphere, so called “waves of democracy”. Promotion of civil society and establishing NGOs in Georgia became top priority for western donors on the way of achieving their goals. In the period of 1992-1995, the total number of NGOS reached several thousands, which indeed was remarkable. Majority of those NGO's were fully dependent on western countries in issue of funding, due to governments unwillingness to fund projects related to media, civil society and human rights. This unwillingness could have come either from Georgia's economic situation, which at that time was almost catastrophic and officials could not allocate needed funds or from corrupted nature of government, where majority was only concerned how to increase their personal gain. Most prominent was establishing offices of several international organizations like: Open-Society Georgia (Funded by George Soros), Eurasia and ISAR-Georgia (Both funded by US government) and US NDI (National Democratic Institute). All of them played an important role in developing of nongovernmental sector.

NGOs that were established during the pre Rose Revolution period, were fully western oriented as well as completely different from the first Georgian NGOs of 19th century. Here are four major differences:

1) The clear demarcation between political parties and NGOs. This allowed NGOs` at some instance to avoid the governmental influence.

2) The sphere and the scope of activities were expanded. NGOs started operations in civil education, environmental protection, conflict resolution and almost in all more or less important spheres at that time.

3) The professional and organizational level grew rapidly. People who formed or were members those NGOs were mostly educated in Western universities. They used their education to establish or redesign existing NGOs to aid country in democratic transition.

4) The cooperation between NGOs to achieve specific goal became very common. They created well-known Third Sector, which never existed before in Georgia. More developed NGOs has achieved certain level of public and political influence. (Nodia, 2005, 14)

Main advantage of NGO sector during Shevardnadze's era was the western educated youth in these organizations. Majority of them joined the ranks of the most well known NGOs like Liberty institute, The Georgian Young Lawyer Association (GYLA), The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) and Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. Those five

NGOs represented and still are considered as the think tanks of third sector with their authority in Georgia and the international support.

The real reason of how the NGO sector managed to attract so many educated people within their ranks is not quite clear up to today. Still there might be two following reasons: countries politicized situation and the western funding.

In pre- revolution era, Georgia had mainly two major political parties: 1) Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG, ruling party of President Edward Shevardnadze) and 2) Union of Democratic Revival (UDR, party of Aslan Abashidze, the leader of Adjara Autonomous Republic). CUG's power and authority was unquestionable in this period (Excluding Adjara Region, where UDR had almost 100% supports, possibly from fraud elections).

People who had made decision to play some role on political arena were mostly members of CUG or were joining the small parties allied and under patronage of CUG. On the other hand, NGO sector, at least major think tanks were relatively free from CUG and governmental influence in general. Their major role was to carry the function of watchdog over the governmental actions and to help the same government in legislative reforms. The NGO sector became involved in important political processes, without being controlled or supervised by government.

Western funding could have played another important role in attracting of new professionals into the third sector. Georgia was second biggest per capita recipient of foreign aid during

Shevardnadze's regime (Wheatley, 2004, 16). Flow of foreign money into Georgian third sector was vast. Those funds were aimed toward development, monitoring and watchdog functions, but to be frankly also, they meant high salaries. When high educated professional had to choose either corrupted governmental system with low salary or almost no possibility to express their own ideas or at least to implement them or NGO sector with formidable influence over governmental policies and also high income, which determined a lot in that period. Choice here was simple; majority of young professionals joined the third sector.

The political arena in those years was composed from nine political parties, with two major and other small parties. Major parties were: 1) Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG, ruling party of President Edward Shevardnadze), 2) Union of Democratic Revival (UDR, party of Aslan Abashidze). Rest was small parties like Socialist party of Georgia (SPG), National Democratic Party (NDP) and etc. Overall count of parties and blocks was approximately 35, but power was divided between CUG and UDR. This division was caused by de-facto autonomy of Adjara Region from official government. While Edward Shevardnadze was president of Georgia, Aslan Abashidze was chairman of Adjara Council, de-facto president of Adjara region, who always maintained almost total independence from Tbilisi, but still officially had title of opposition leader. There was constant struggle for power and recourses between those two centers of power, but this was not democratic struggle, because ordinary Georgian's played little or no role there (Wheatley, 2005, 123). Such political situation made perfect ground for corruption, censorship, constant violations of human rights and limiting freedoms of democracy. Those facts were repeatedly criticized by international organizations (Freedom house, NDI, Human rights watch) as well as local NGO (Liberty instate). Despite constant criticism about violation of democratic

freedoms, Georgia was still supported by West on its hard path to democracy. Funds and credits that Georgian government was getting were aimed to develop democracy; this included funding NGOs and their projects, developing media systems, improving living standards of people and democratic governance. However, there was little that government did to fulfill those goals on their behalf. NGO projects were mostly funded by international NGOs and USAID. Question that where did those funds go was and is clear, corrupted system with six-figure salaries consumed them (Wheatley, 2004, 16-17).

The third sector during Shevardnadze's era was working very actively on several issues either in cooperation with government ("Reformers Wing") or either by proposing suggestions. Year of 1999 was most prominent for them, because at this year they successfully concluded legislative reform in cooperation with government. This reform implemented several important changes into Georgian constitution: Most important was adaptation of new Civil code and administrative code, which made registering NGO's and legalizing their actions (like receiving donor funds) very easy and simple, another was creating special committees within parliament and different ministries (excluding ministry of internal affairs, after fierce opposition of Minister Kakha Targamadze), those committees included NGO members and were aimed toward monitoring and further improvement of governmental system. During legislative changes different NGO's were focused on different issues of reform, Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) was actively involved in drafting of civil code and several of its suggestions were adopted into the new constitution, Liberty Institute was also focused on drafting of new administrative code and the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy was involved in electoral law, changes in electoral system and its monitoring

(Wheatley, 2005, 146). Nevertheless, main achievement for NGO's in this reform, was creating of proper legal framework for NGOs that active interference into NGO activities, but also positively safeguarded the sector from abuse or arbitrary action by the authorities, and hold governments accountable for their actions and obligations towards NGOs as an organized form of civil society (OSCE meeting, 2000). In sum, this reform provided with improved legal protection and benefits for NGO's to function properly within political arena.

Such intensive involvement of different NGO's into the reformation process was very prominent, even in era, which is often described as corruptive and non-democratic. However, how could NGOs managed to play such an important role in reforms? Answer to this question might lie in level of professionalism of NGOs and their international supporters. As I described in previous chapter young, Western educated people mostly preferred to work with NGO sector rather than governmental bodies and this caused sort of lack of professionals within governmental system. This left no other choice for government, rather than to invite NGO's to participate into legislative changes and use their knowledge to modify existing constitution and make it closer to the Western examples. Moreover, another possible reason could be that government had to invite NGO's to participate into legislative change due to increased criticism from international NGOs and even US Department of State toward violations of democratic freedoms by police and government in general (<http://www.state.gov>). Whole process of legislative changes could be one of the reasons of why the local elections in 1998 were evaluated as "Step toward Georgia's compliance with OSCE commitments" (<http://www.state.gov>)

Despite the fact that NGOs played important role on political arena before 2000 it is still questionable how they served as bridge between people and government. As I mentioned above, several NGOs were in close cooperation with government in some issues, but did this cooperation really express people's opinion and will? According to survey carried by Arnold Bergstrasser Institute and ISFED in 1997, year of major legislative changes only 1,2 per cent of polled claimed to be NGO members. Based on this it can be said that very few Georgians participated in associational life and fewer were NGO members (Wheatley, 2005, 148). This also may lead to conclusion that NGOs and their leaders can be hardly counted as representatives of public. On the other hand, majority of people themselves did not participate in associational life, because it was something they had not experienced before in soviet time. As I mentioned majority of NGO members were young, western educated people and for them associational life was important, because they knew all benefits and possibilities that cooperation can achieve. Taking into consideration overall situation (Corruption, regional election fraud in 1995, human rights violation) in Georgia in 1997, it is easy to see why majority of people restrained from associational life, because they did not believe in possibility that people and current government can talk and cooperate about important issues.. Official governmental position was Western oriented democracy, but in fact it was merely corrupted authoritarian regime and first precedent of NGO- Government cooperation should have been greeted with hope among people, that soon more cooperation's, changes will occur and somehow improve Georgia's state. In sum, it can be said that despite low NGO membership among population, NGOs indeed represented people during reforms which were aimed toward more democracy in Georgia and were beneficial for NGOs and people in general. Active NGO –government cooperation continued up to 2001 and had number of NGOs involved into certain reforms increased. According to USAID report of

2001 Georgia had up to four thousand NGOs registered, but majority of them were in process of implementing their first program, 500-800 NGO's had one or more programs implemented, one hundred from them were considered as active NGO's in terms of full-time operation and twenty to fifty NGO's had ability to interact with government at national level policy formulation and decision making" (Wheatley, 2005, 145). Based on this report it can be said that NGOs and the civil society behind them had or could have had power to cooperate with government and affect legislative branches, while executive were solely in hands in President Shevardnadze, who was using them skillfully to remain in power.

Media in this period also played an important role in rising of citizen's awareness toward specific issues. Most active from TV channels was Rustavi 2, which was known for its criticism toward government, mostly on corruption grounds. This channel became almost only one, which hosted open debates about current political situation mostly between NGO members, because governmental officials always avoided speaking about this issue openly. Only high-ranking official that started constantly taking active part in debates about this issue was newly appointed minister of Justice Mikhail Saakashvili. He publicly announced that governmental system was totally corrupted and head of this system was president. His first actions as minister was almost total dismissing of high-ranking official from his ministry due to the corruption charges. He also started cooperation with several NGOs, international (NDI, Eurasia Foundation, and Human Rights Watch) and several local NGOs (Liberty Institute) to make "steps toward creating a prison inspection system that would include NGO participation" (www.state.gov). Such public announcements served as reason for inner pressure on Saakashvili, who resigned following open confrontation with minister of Internal Affairs Kakha Targamadze.

Following his resignation, governmental officials targeted Rustavi 2 channel and in October 2001 officials from Ministry of Internal Affairs attempted to shut it down, based on accusations that channel had unpaid taxes. This raid was recognized as brutal violation of democratic freedom of speech and caused very critical reaction from both west and inside country. NGO's here also played one of the leading roles. Liberty Institute took active part as organizer of demonstrations in defense of Rustavi 2. (Wheatley, 2004, 11) Raid on Rustavi 2 was start point for beginning mass NGO protests in Georgia and notably first open request for governmental resignation. Liberty Institute headed those protests and they campaign to end "Shevardnadze's era", which was at least partially successful in mobilizing people to play active role in changing the way they were governed. Liberty institutes long-term goal was to make network to civic organizations across country in attempt to unite everyone who opposed government (Wheatley, 2005, 148). This year was also beginning for student protests again facilitated by Liberty institute and headed by union of "student Self-government development". This union soon evolved in well-known youth organization Kmara, which played their important role in later years.

Political situation in Georgia became even tenser after failed Rustavi 2 raid. Two months of October and November were mainly decisive for next two years pre-revolutionary period. First Mikhail Saakashvili resigned from the post of Minister of Justice, he was followed by head of "reformers wing" and speaker of parliament Zurab Jvania who resigned following students protests in front of parliament. In his famous speech when he urged government not to draw a line between them and people otherwise he and his friends (Reformers wing) would stand on side where people stand (www.parliament.ge). This resignation chain was concluded by

president Shevardnadze's resignation as Chairman of ruling party CUG and his order to dismiss whole minister cabinet. Resigned officials formed their opposition parties, Saakashvili "National Movement" and Jvania "United Democrats". After approximately two weeks from dismissal of cabinet of ministers, President formed new cabinet. Members of this new cabinet were either president's close friends and their relatives or people strongly allied with him. As for "reformers wing" they were almost completely dismissed from governmental system, except Nino Burjanadze (new speaker of parliament), who never publicly expressed her sympathies to "reformers wing", but unofficially she was among their ranks. Before end of 2001, "National Movement" and "United Democrats" merged and created opposition party of "United National Democrats" (UND), which became strongest and leading among all opposition.

NGOs' opinion regarding the new opposition power UND was split into two parts. Part of NGOs like GYLA or Liberty institute immediately declared their support to UND, but mainly Human rights NGOs like Former political prisoners for human rights (FPPHR) were keeping distance from UND up to active revolutionary stage. Main reason of NGO support for UND was personal friendship and past experience of cooperation. Many leaders of NGO sector like Giga Bokeria or Alexandre Lomaia were friends of Mikhail Saakashvili, due to his openness to public debates and often criticism toward government. Also, many NGOs who took part in 1999 legislative reform, still remembered role of Zurab Jvania (speaker of parliament in that period) in the reform and his past cooperation's with many NGOs like GYLA or liberty institute (Wheatley, 2005, 147). One more reason could be fact that UND was strongest among opposition parties and most of its members were either former governmental officials (former "reformers wing") or former and current NGO members- activists.

After forming strong political opposition UND began drawing more and more attention from ordinary citizens of Georgia. NGOs arranged public debates between leaders of UND and governmental officials started to happen on regular bases, main aim of those debates was upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2003. Main demand of UND at this stage was to arrange parallel vote count by NGOs during elections to avoid mass fraud as it happened in all previous elections. Government's official position was against parallel vote count by NGOs, they only agreed about OSCE observers, which were present at number of previous elections. Excluding NGOs from observing process, continued corruption and human rights violations gradually increased public protests against government. Nino Burjanadze left CUG party and formed her own party "Burjanadze-Democrats" which was allied with UND. Their main political aim at that stage was to win upcoming parliamentary elections and with majority of seats force the government to make crucial reform.

3.2 summary of first period

In this period, we saw several implications of theoretical approach. First was forming politically oriented NGO's, which played important role in legislative reform, which itself was significant step toward democracy. Second, Political arena became very tense, especially after 2001, when first strong opposition block was formed. This increased chance of fair competition during elections. Strengthening of electoral monitoring also took place on behalf of OSCE and local NGO's. Mainly it can be concluded that pre-2000 it was indirect method of political

approach, which was strengthening Georgian democracy. After 2000 more direct involvement took place, based on U.S based international organizations support to opposition. In terms of my first hypothesis, at this stage it is confirmed, because process of forming and consolidating of political groups and NGO's was surely leading to something big. To what it led, I will speak in next chapter.

3.3 Rose Revolution

As parliamentary elections approached in November 2003, political situation started becoming very tense, followed by mass demonstrations led by UND and "Burjanadze-Democrats", which encouraged people that voting was only way to change situation in country. There were three major forces represented in those elections: 1) Block "For new Georgia" (reformed CUG), 2) UND and Burjanadze-Democrats, 3) UDR. Most active from those three was UND under Mikheil Saakashvili. Allied with major NGOs, UND was working on strategy how to win elections, what to do if there will be again the mass fraud and similar important political issues.

There were three key players during the revolution process: 1) NGOs and civil society, 2) UND under Mikheil Saakashvili and 3) media, specifically opposition channel Rustavi 2.

NGO's main achievement in pre-revolutionary month was forming of "Kmara", a youth organization that was established on the bases of union "student Self-government development". This organization grew rapidly in numbers due to their focus solely on youth, mostly students.

Head of Kmara was Giga Bokeria, one of the founders of Liberty Institute and close friend of Mr. Saakashvili. Leaders and activists of Kmara had several visits to Serbia, to meet former “OTPOR” members. Main aim for such visits was to understand what role can youth organizations play in power transition and how can they achieve it. In addition, several of “OTPOR” members were invited to Georgia to train majority of Kmara activists. Almost all Kmara trips and trainings were conducted with financial help of Open Society Foundation (Wheatley, 2004, 11). Kmara’s main objective was to rally youth to demonstrations and to perform acts of non-violent resistance (civil disobedience) which they learned from “OTPOR”. This acts of non-violent resistance involved often marches with flags, caricatures of current government members and drawing graffiti. Main advantage of Kmara was its distance from political parties, which they retained for all revolutionary period and showed people that their main goal was to take part in non-violent transfer of power. Another notable advantage in Kmara was total voluntarism and they did not have hierarchy at all. This means anyone who shared same ideas as Kmara could join their ranks and leave whenever he wanted and in case of arrest of its notable members (possibly leaders) it would continue to function as before (Forbrig, Demeš, 2007, 12-13).

Liberty institute was another major NGO, which took active part in revolutionary processes. Mainly it was cooperating with UND about different strategies for peaceful demonstrations, especially in regions. There were several mass and innovative acts of protests planned by Liberty Institute and organized by UND, like “March of angry men” or creating huge chains from people along streets. Also along with International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy it was working about effective plan of parallel vote count (Wheatley, 2005, 186)

The main aim of political opposition month before revolution can be summarized as radicalization of political situation. The leaders of UND knew that even with fair elections there would be needed several rounds of elections to win and they could not maintain their already vast political and civilian support for such long period (Forbrig, Demeš, 2007, 107). They needed reason for democratic breakthrough and they got it when November 2 elections turned out to be fraud.

Media involvement in pre-revolutionary month was one of the most active in recent years. Opposition channel Rustavi 2 often hosted UND leaders and different NGO members. Theme for discussion was mostly same, how to avoid fraud elections. The popularity of Rustavi 2 channel ensured that whole capital city would hear and see what was situation before elections, where will be future demonstrations and constant airing anti-governmental advertisements by Kmara. This all helped to present people reality, which fundamentally different to reality that ruling elite was showing them. (Wheatley, 2005, 187)

Last important event that took place right before November 2 elections was declaration of several international NGOs (NDI, Eurasia foundation, Open society) that they would finance US based polling agency Global Strategy Group to conduct pool parallel to elections (Wheatley, 2005, p182). This played crucial role in uncovering of fraud in this election.

Day of November 2 was very chaotic as expected. Many irregularities have been noticed by OSCE observers and local NGO representatives, which included poorly made voting listing,

pressure on voters and etc. Pools published by Global Strategy Group on November 2-3 indicated that UND block was leading with 26, 6% of total votes, while party for New Georgia, were on second place below 20%. Events of mass fraud, stealing of vote boxes and suppressing local observers, made clear that government was again falsifying elections. Report made by Kmara observation groups showed about 4 thousand violations of election process (Forbrig, Demeš, 2007, 111). This caused mass protest from both UND and NGOs and resulted in mass mobilization of people in Tbilisi to demand governmental resignation. Up to 50 thousand people gathered at freedom square headed by Liberty Institute and Kmara. Tension between opposition and people on one side and government on another was increasing with each day. Culmination was November 20 when official governmental report was published. According to this report, 1) For new Georgia won 21, 32% 2) UDR 18, 84% 3) United National Movement 18, 08%. (Wheatley, 2005, 184). This report placed National Movement on third place, which was clear evidence of total violations of electoral process. Through November 21, thousands of people were coming each hour in front of parliament to show government that it has lost peoples trust and that it should leave. On November 22 major act was played. President tried to open new parliament session based on fraud elections, when peaceful demonstrators broke into parliament and forced Shevardnadze to flee.

After that, he declared state of emergency and started to mobilize army. Such reversal of situation, draw attention of foreign countries, like US and Russia. Each of them sent their high-ranking officials to negotiate peaceful power transition, due to fact that everyone acknowledged fact that Shevardnadze has lost. US representative James Baker and Russian Minister Igov Ivanov both were arranging meetings either with UND leaders and NGOs or with Shevardnadze

and his inner circle in attempt to solution (Wheatley, 2005, 188-189). Such rapid involvement of external actors was caused by possible threat of using force against opposition in attempt to draw them from governmental buildings. Not only western democracies were looking for peaceful solutions, UND leaders and Liberty institute-Kmara leadership were arranging meetings with heads of power structures (Army, Special Forces and Internal security). Because using specifically power structures was only possible solution for president to restore power. After 1 day of constant negotiations with governmental officials, foreign ambassadors both sides UND and President achieved peaceful solution. On day of 23 November UND leaders (Saakashvili, Jvania, Burjanadze) had meeting with president and handed him his resignation letter, which he signed in exchange for his and his families immunity.

After signing resignation letter, temporary leader of government became Nino Burjanadze, because by Georgian law in case of president's inability to perform his duties, speaker of parliament becomes temporary leader of government, before next presidential elections. Those elections were held on January 4 2004, with Mikheil Saakashvili as only serious candidate for presidency. According to OSCE report, those elections showed notable progress in comparing to previous one and brought country closer to democracy, also in those elections was largest voter turnout in whole modern history of Georgia (Wheatley, 2005, 194).

3.4 Main actors and their contribution.

Rose revolution was turning point in Georgian history and NGO-civil society participation in this critical phase was more active then anytime before. Youth organization Kmara's such active

and successful performance among youth of Georgia was very surprising to many. As ex-president, Shevardnadze stated in his interview after revolution “I did not think I should pay serious attention to these young people running around waving flags and painting graffiti on streets. I was wrong” (Forbrig, Demeš, 2007, 105). These young people played crucial role in mass mobilizing of people for voting and protests. Majority of their campaigns like “get-out-the-vote” or “chain campaigns” performed in regions served one purpose, to raise civil awareness in Georgia, inform people on their rights and to show them that there is way to change government through elections. Kmara also was working with number of human rights organizations, in process of uncovering crimes that government has committed. Those reports were instantly covered by opposition channel Rustavi 2 and it helped people to see alternate, true face of government. Massive involvement of Kmara activists in almost every activity performed by opposition before 20 November, made image that this organization numbers were vaster then people or government thought. Government’s failed attempts to discredit this movement also served to draw this image. Even in the peak of revolution, Kmara had approximately 3 thousand members- activist. This three thousand people with smart planning of actions, good media cover and useful campaigns rallied tens of thousands people to protests (Forbrig, Demeš, 2007, 112-113). Important role in their campaigns played actions of non-violent resistance, which sometimes evolved in acts of indirect provocation for police. Blocking governmental buildings, roads and drawing “KMARA” on governmental buildings often resulted in arrest of their members by police. Through, media coverage people had impression that government is weak and cannot make dialogue with regular students, but prefers to arrest them. This was part of public image of Kmara and part of their propaganda, that they fight for democracy and others should stand with them for common goal. Kmara also brought in tradition the waiving roses,

which they gave to mostly police officers to show that they were peaceful protesters. Those actions evolved into mass waiving of roses during marches and meetings of people and name “Rose Revolution” was originated from those actions.

Spreading Kmara’s network through regions was also very interesting. Majority of regions were very poorly informed of events that were happening in capital. Leaflets distributed by Kmara among villages and regional centers, described overall situation in capital, told them about fraud elections and urged them to change government through elections. Despite such political involvement, Kmara was always on distance from any political party. Their official public image was just youth movement, which fights for democracy with peaceful methods. However, it is obvious that by rising people’s awareness toward elections and urging people to change government through elections, they pointed toward UND, as UND represented core and backbone of political opposition. To summarize main Kmara achievements in Rose Revolution is rising public awareness and rallying people to protest demonstrations. Their actions served as foundation of Rose Revolution, because if people are not concerned about their country’s future and do not want to protest, nothing will change.

Liberty Institute was another major local NGO involved in revolution, but its actions were different from Kmara’s. Apart from helping Kmara in organizing mass protests, their focus was political negotiations. Members of Liberty Institute were always accompanying UND leaders during different meetings with either governmental officials or while meetings with protesters. As I mentioned above, this NGO was working on plan how to force president out of office. Major part of this plan was public debates on opposition channel Rustavi 2 and uncovering

governmental crimes, mostly through Kmara. Above-mentioned debates covered most important themes of day, like corruption, election process and after 2 November planning of demonstrations. Differently from Kmara, Liberty Institute showed strong allegiance with UND in political debates and meetings. Resignation terms of president Shevardnadze were also discussed with Liberty Institute and other NGO members. Overall role of Liberty Institute in Rose revolution can be summarized to founding of Kmara, joined negotiations with government, monitoring election process and role of one of the authors of revolution, on behalf of people.

Media's and specifically Rustavi 2 channel role in Rose Revolution was mainly based on providing time for political debates, airing pro-opposition materials and informing people. Some scholars regard Rustavi 2 as key element in revolution, based on fact that it was only possible media channel to share with people pro-opposition views, "If Rustavi 2 had not existed, the Rose revolution would never have happened" (Wheatley, 2005, 186). This indeed points to importance of media for informing people. However, another question is how Rustavi 2 became one of key elements in revolution. Creation of positive image of NGO leaders and opposition and making them to look at true representatives of people was major reason of it. Constant political debates about governmental corruption, speaking about benefits that democracy can provide for Georgia and making NGO and opposition leaders look like fighters for democracy, cardinally shifted public attitude toward them. Clear evidence of it is more than fifty thousand people, which were coming to support opposition in November. To summarize role of Rustavi 2 in elections, I must underline crucial importance of creating public image, timely informational flow, detailed cover of daily important events and election process and the input that this channel played in rising of people's awareness.

The function of UND in revolution was the core and it was mainly leadership. On a daily bases the political opposition was making speeches in front of masses, meeting with foreign ambassadors and negotiating with government. Main actor among UND was still Mikheil Saakashvili, whose charisma made him “a hero in hearts of many Georgians” (Wheatley, 2005, 185). UND`s the most valuable decision in Rose Revolution was to gain trust of third sector, thus they got very strong foundation among civil society. Not whole third sector sided with UND in pre-revolutionary period, but after November 2 majority of NGOs headed by Liberty Institute stood by its side, which almost guaranteed UND mass support among population. Initially NGO`s and Kmara`s actions were to rally people to protest, to help them express their disobedience to corrupted regime. However, after the most NGOs sided by UND, people`s demonstrations evolved into supporting demonstrations for UND and their leaders. Main role of UND in Rose Revolution was the role of leader of political opposition, which gained through NGO sector mass support of people and assumed role of leader of Revolution.

There were two external actors in Rose Revolution apart from internal ones, first were International NGOs and second was United States and Russian Federation.

International NGOs played their crucial role in funding critical exit poll on November 2. Apart from it, Open Society Foundation provided main funding and support for Kmara and partial funding of Rustavi 2. It is difficult to say what role those actions played in revolution, but based on fact that those NGOs did not get involved in protests that took place after November 2, it can be concluded that their role was rather supporting.

As for United States and Russian federation, they officially remained neutral to processes in Georgia, only after parliamentary takeover performed by opposition they send their delegates to negotiate with both sides. Reason why those countries send their delegates is clear, everyone was aware of possibility of using power by president to disband demonstrations and thus bring country to a brink of second civil war. Still, opinions among people was that president will resign peacefully sooner or later, their claim was somehow supported by facts of total fragmentation of governmental regime, which became a weak kleptocracy and that president was too politically weak to give such orders (Mitchell, 2004 348). Thus, the role of external actors can be considered as supporting one also.

3.5 Summary of second period

In this period, we saw this very critical juncture that political approached implied. Political tension that slowly increased during pre-revolutionary era, reached critical moment in November 2003 and opposition parties did not let this opportunity go away. Role played in this event by politically oriented civil groups was indeed remarkable. In terms of theory of political approach, this period in sum with pre-revolutionary time was including each important part of theory. Starting with forming political groups, ending with critical juncture. As for my first hypothesis, it is confirmed based on content of previous two chapters. Those were creating of political groups and NGO's (third sector), which raised awareness of people, cooperated with political parties and was facilitator of catalyst effect of Rose revolution.

3.6 Post Rose revolution

After becoming president of Georgia on January 4, president Saakashvili's one of the first decisions was constitutional amendments, which significantly strengthened presidential power by giving him right to dismiss parliament as well as he has established the post of prime minister. Such action became target of criticism from third sector and his former allies, who protested that such decisions were taken without consulting NGOs and majority of UND members (Wheatley, 2005, 194). This was first step by new government on its way to further strengthening presidential power and moving Georgia from parliamentary system toward presidential.

Following those amendments government's next move was restoring its control over the Adjara Autonomous Republic. This process started after local elections of 28 March, when those elections were massively fabricated in Adjara in favor of UDR. NGOs and Kmara established themselves in this breakaway region and tried to force Aslan Abashidze for repeat elections under their monitoring. UDR leadership refused to let anyone to observe elections and even did not let head of Central Election Committee (CEC) Zurab Chiaberashvili (former head of ISFED) into region. This was followed by governmental decision to perform military exercise near this region and mass student demonstrations up to 15 thousand people in Batumi (Regional center of Adjara region). This led to further escalation of situation inside region, which ended on 5th May, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov, negotiated with UDR and UND representatives and accompanied Aslan Abashidze to Moscow. After those events, repeated elections were held in Adjara, which were won by pro-governmental block "Saakashvili- Victorious Adjara" (Wheatley, 2005, 196). Victory in Adjara can be counted as last large scale cooperation between third sector and government. Kmara played their already common role in rallying people to

demonstrations with tactics and methods they used during “Rose revolution”. ISFED played major role in organizing monitoring along with OSCE in repeated elections.

The next step for the new government in Georgia was fight against the corruption. To start this lengthy process of reforming various institutions, government needed professionals. Main source of those professionals became the third sector. Year of 2004 was starting point for rapid outflow of professional cadres from third sector to governmental structures. Many well-known NGO leaders and members occupied top governmental positions, Kakha Lomaia former head of Open Society Foundation became Minister of Education, Giga Bokeria, head of Kmara was appointed as Chairmen of Defense and Security Committee. Also newly established 20-member minister cabinet was mostly composed from former workers of NGOs and international organizations. These people brought their experience and the government started making the radical reforms in the most troublesome institutions in country: Ministry of Education, Internal affairs and Foreign affairs.

Educational system was the first institution, which had major changes. Minister of Education Kakha Lomaia implemented Western style National Educational Exams. This reform was focused on lowering of corruption level in educational system and gave a chance and fair opportunity to young generation to develop their skills and get European level education. Role of NGOs in this reform was generally voluntary. Distribution books among schools, assisting officials on several mass exams in role of observers were NGOs input in this process.

Ministry of internal Affairs, which was most troublesome institution in Georgia, experienced almost total reform. First, it was merged with Ministry of State Security and was headed by Irakli Okruashvili (old friend of president and one of his harsh critics in future) under the new name of Interior Ministry. Very clear definition of what was the police and how did whole ministry of Interior work before reform is “Police force, which operated more than mafia, then executor of state power” (Wheatley, 2005, 202). Majority of police officers were dismissed due to charges for drug taking, corruption and exceeding their power. Almost 15 thousand people were dismissed in the end of reform; others joined new established “Street Patrol” system, same like in United States. Despite the fact that this reform significantly improved overall reputation of police among people and more or less raised degree of trust toward them, there were and are many things left to be done, like more transparency in police work and reducing of human rights violations (www.freedomhouse.org). The Role of NGOs and civil society in this process was mainly providing evidence toward charged police officers. Work of Kmara during revolutionary period for finding evidence to show to people true nature of police officers proved to be very valuable.

Apart from institutional reforms, government’s major attention was directed toward fighting corruption. In first year after revolution, massive arrests of former officials took place with charges in massive corruption. Most of high profile arrested people (former ministers and wealthy businessman) were released after 3 month of pre-detention period in exchange of handing to the government either part of their business which they acquired in illegal way or substantive sums of money for state budget. Those arrests were very popular among people, because they saw that new government is indeed trying to change old system. Those popularity

was also caused by extensive media coverage of those arrests and public statements where they admitted their guilty. However, ways they were arrested was not always legal. Sometimes charges were not only corruption, but also keeping illegal arms in their homes and etc. Only sometimes same people got arrested several times. Such actions caused moderate protest of NGOs, especially GYLA, based on facts of illegal arrests of people. It can be said that government led by lawyers, who's aim was to create state based on rule of law, was using methods which were far from legal (Wheatley, 2005, 204).

After year of 2005, the situation in Georgia slowly escalated. NGOs and opposition parties (further United Opposition or just opposition) started to criticize government for turning into new ruling elite. Constitutional amendments carried in 2006, which allowed caring out parliamentary and presidential elections same time in 2008, thus delayed parliamentary elections by 2 years turned into mass protests of opposition and also Venice commission. Another case of criticism became murder of businessman Sandro Girgvliani, where several officials from Interior Ministry were involved (www.civil.ge). This case was and is up to today of the main cases that opposition and human rights NGO criticize government. Reason of such criticism was fact that guilty officials got away almost unpunished, about 3-4 years of home detention, which never was effective measure. Last, well-known event was case of Irakli Okruashvili resignation. Immediately after his resignation, he started to publicly criticize government and personally president for being new dictator. Soon after that criticism, he was arrested with corruption charges, but soon released and fled to France.

Those amendments and unsolved cases were facilitators of slowly growing protest among opposition and several NGOs (Liberty Institute). End of 2007 was major crisis for Georgia much like Rose Revolution. Following September 2007 thousands of people gathered in front of parliament each day with demand to abolish constitutional amendments of 2006 and soon after demanding resignation of president and new elections (www.news.bbc.co.uk). Leader of those protests was United Opposition, under leadership of Levan Gachechiladze. Following November 2 almost whole center of capital was paralyzed due to tenth of thousand protesters. International organizations like NDI, Open Society and local NGOs tried to make negotiations with both sides in order to deescalate situation, which was getting very dangerous. However, due to refusal of one of sides (it is still unclear which side refused to negotiate) those negotiations failed. On November 7 situation went out of control. Even today, it is hard to say who attacked first, but fact is that police forces started to press opposition supporters away from governmental buildings, which soon turned into clashes between them. By official report, at least 500 people were wounded during those clashes (www.civil.ge). After disbanding demonstrations, police force moved toward TV channel Imedi (Pro-opposition channel) and shut it down. Disbanding demonstrations and shutting down TV channel resulted in protest not only from people and local NGOs, but also from foreign states (www.en.rian.ru). Similarities between Rose revolution and November 7 incident, in terms of masses of people who demanded repeated election, governmental resignation and shutting down opposition channels, served as major blow for president's reputation inside country as democratic ruler.

As for NGO's and civil society in this period can be described as period of slow decaying of whole third sector. This decaying was rather surprising for many in Georgia because, they

thought that third sector would become government's strongest ally and develop even faster under conditions that are more democratic. However, majority of processes that took place resulted in weakening of third sector. Major blow to third sector was and is up to today, outflow of professional cadres and experienced people into governmental structures. At first stage, immediately after revolution only small part of prominent NGO workers left third sector and joined government. This can be explained by upcoming reforms and need of professionals to accomplish them. Moreover, NGO members in the ministers' position could be seen as step forward democracy in Georgia, because civil society and NGO leaders could have had more influence and input in positive development of third sector from high ranking official posts, then from being just NGO leader. However, constant departure of other members from third sector greatly reduced third sector's influence over government and their organizational capacities (Rukhadze, 2009, 3-4). Moreover, several very prominent NGOs disappeared from third sector after their leader or majority of them left to government, for instance Giga Bokeria, head of Kmara. His departure led to slow crumbling of whole movement yet holding with help of Liberty Institute, but after 2005 this movement dismissed and remaining core of its members returned to Liberty Institute.

Another problem that occurred after rose revolution was problem of funding. As I mentioned in the first chapter Georgian NGOs were financially mostly depending on international donors. Their grants helped third sector to develop. However, after revolution majority of donors were focusing on development of governmental structures and its institutions, thus redirecting the majority of funding from NGOs to government. This cut resulted in serious crisis in the third sector, because this was only source of funding. As for alternate sources, NGO membership fee

is not an option, because numbers of official members are mostly low and unable to cover costs (Rukhadze, 2009, 4-5).

Another issue related to funding was fact that majority of grants were going to one and the same NGO, leaving others without opportunity to accomplish their plans. This forced many small NGOs to merge to existing think tanks like GYLA or Liberty Institute. This merge had both positive and negative effects for third sector, positive was consolidation of third sector due those unifications into several major ones, on the other hand this merge made them vast and significantly reduced their organizing capacities. This reduction comes from huge variety of NGO's that merged, with their different ideals and plans, which makes very difficult to reach consensus on one single plan or action.

Last major obstacle that NGOs experienced was limiting of their rare grants to specific field, namely Democracy and Good Governance. Such focus on governmental institutions by donor organizations, forced grant seeking NGOs to work specifically in this field, almost abandoning others. I do acknowledge importance of governmental institutions, but in time when third sector is facing serious challenges from lack of professionals and funding, such focus could lead to further degradation of third sector in Georgia.

3.6 Summary of third period

After revolution, when basic democratic institutions were established and long-term reforms were started many thought that democracy was close, even too close. However, events that took

place soon after revolution caused also big negative impact. This negative can be divided into two major parts: 1) concentrating of power into executive branch of government. Two reforms that significantly strengthened presidential powers and gave him almost unlimited power over other structures of government. 2) Excluding active social groups and NGO's from countries everyday political life and slow decaying of both civil society and third sector. This comes from slow decaying of third sector in Georgia and that expectation of active and positive development of civil society and NGO's were not met. This negative impact makes my second hypothesis subject of refutation, even in existence of basic democratic institutions, because we cannot talk about long term social development, when social masses and NGO's are slowly losing their capacity to coordinate, aid each other and be involved into political life.

Conclusion

General process of democratization is very complicated as I mentioned in the beginning of this thesis. Throughout my work I tried to highlight major political events that took place in Georgia, discuss role of NGO's and civil society in it and use this material to test applicability of political and development approaches of democratic aid to different stages of democratization.

Based on material I read and use to write this thesis, my answer to research question is next: aid-providers decided to use political approach, because of its effectiveness in making short-time transitions. Case of Georgia proves that, in countries similar to it, escalation and critical juncture is best solution for rapid democratization. However, consequences of such rapid transition for Georgia are negative in sense of decaying of third sector and civil society, essential components of democratic state. In addition, my research confirmed existence of political approach of democratic assistance in pre-revolutionary and revolutionary stages. However, existence of developmental approach in post-revolutionary period was not confirmed, instead we have there actual traits of political approach.

In pre-revolution period, it was clearly visible how process was slowly escalating within political space. Mass creating of politically oriented social groups and NGO's were one of the major actors in this time. They cooperated with government, to help country make steps toward democracy. Then they aligned themselves with opposition parties, which further escalated situation and final of this escalation became critical juncture for Georgia's democratic development. In this stage, it was clearly political approach of democratic assistance. Same approach occurred in Ukraine couple of years later. Thus, I can conclude on example of Georgia

that in Post-Soviet regimes, one of the best options to achieve fast transition to democracy in to use political approach.

In revolutionary period, we saw how escalated situation ended with replacement of government by united opposition. This period was critical juncture of political approach. Traits of this period were extreme escalation within almost each sphere of life in Georgia. I do agree that revolution was huge step toward democracy, but such escalation of situation could have ended very negatively. My opinion here is that during such escalations it is important to negotiate with government and try to find most appropriate compromise.

Post-revolutionary time can be described as democratic in the beginning, maybe first two years. It was time when developmental approach should have started to replace political, due to establishment of basic democratic institutions. However, events I described above about decaying of third sector, not meeting civil society expectations, NGO sector losing its relevance in everyday life and events of November 7 2007, speak that developmental approach did not overcome challenges of newly established democracy. Instead, here we again have traits of political approach, with increasing tension among political parties and event, which almost ended with another revolution on November 7.

Here I want to summarize major changes that happened with NGO's and civil society in 16 years of development. First was slow establishment of NGO's and forming political groups, which actively participated in reforms and different democratic processes, thus increased third

sectors relevance in countries everyday life. Second was culmination of this development, Rose revolution where NGO's aided with media and opposition parties made peaceful change of government, Here NGO's facilitated creating of framework for debates between opposition and government, which unfortunately was not used with all its capacity (Storming of parliament building was end of official negotiations). Third was, surprising decaying of third sector and civil society after revolution, where it is expected that under good conditions civil society and NGO's would flourish. This was started by rapid outflow of professionals from third sector, which decreased overall capacities of third sector and made several their functions irrelevant, due to lack of professionals. This caused NGO's and civil society to be unable to achieve their goals in terms of strengthening and sustaining democracy. Here we have paradox that, civil society and NGO did not flourish, not stayed on same level as before revolution, instead they started to slowly crumble. This process is going on up to today and we can only doubt how this process will end.

In last, I hope this thesis will be contribution to scarce literature about Georgian NGO's and civil society, due to fact that major part of it is devoted to them. Detailed description and evaluation of their roles in different stages of transition might be used in future, for more detailed researches about Georgian third sector and civil society. However, we must remember that any conclusion is uncertain and is subject of future research.

References

Books

Coppieters Bruno and Robert Legvold, Ed. 2005, Statehood and Security: Georgia after Rose Revolution. Cambridge: American Academy of arts and science.

Gunther Richard and Anthony Mughan. 2000. Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jakubowicz Karol and Miklos Sukosd Ed. 2008. Finding Right Place on the Map: Central and Eastern European Media Change in the Global Perspective. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press Intellect Books.

Kucharczyk Jacek and Jeff Lovitt Ed. 2008. Democracy's New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement: Prague: Uniprint,

Kandelaki Giorgi and Giorgi Meladze. 2007. Enough! Kmara and the Rose Revolution in Georgia. In Reclaiming democracy: civil society and electoral change in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš, 105-113, Bratislava: GMF.

Sukosd Miklos and Peter Bajomi-Lazar Ed. 2003. Reinventing Media: Media Policy Reform in East-Central Europe, Budapest: Central European University Press.

Splichal Slavko, Andrew Calabrese and Colin Sparks. 1994. Information Society and Civil Society: Contemporary Perspectives on the Changing World Order West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

Wheatley Jonathan. 2005. Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union. Burlington: Ashgate

Journals and Articles

- Carothers Thomas. 2009. Democratic Assistance: Political vs Developmental. *Journal of Democracy*, volume: 20, number: 1.
<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Carothers-20-1.pdf> (June 1, 2010)
- Mitchell A. Lincoln. 2006. Democracy in Georgia since the Rose Revolution, *Orbis*, Volume 50, Issue 4, pp 669-676 doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2006.07.007 (June 1, 2010)
- Mitchell A. Lincoln. 2004. Georgia's Rose revolution. *Current History*, Volume: 103, Issue: 675 pp 342-348.
www.columbia.edu/~lam13/documents/Georgias%20Rose%20Revolution.pdf (June 1, 2010)
- Nodia Ghia. 2005. Civil society development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges. Tbilisi
http://www.cipdd.org/files/7_114_458194_CivilSocietyDevelopmentinGeorgia-textEng.PDF (June 1, 2010)
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, OSCE/ODIHR Background Paper 2000/1, 2000
http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2000/10/12360_141_en.pdf (June 1, 2010)
- Perlin George. 2003-2004. International Assistance to democratic development: A review. Institute for Research of Public Policy (IRPP).
<http://www.irpp.org/fasttrak/index.htm> (June 1, 2010)
- Rukhadze Vasili. 2009. The Georgian civil society: contemporary problems and dynamics, Kent state university.
http://www.irex.org/programs/us_scholars/programs/eps/research/09-10/Rukhadze.pdf (June 1, 2010)
- Wheatley Jonathan. 2004. Elections and Democratic Governance in the former Soviet Union: The case of Georgia. *Berliner Osteuropa Info*.
http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/en/projekte/cscqa/downloads/jw_pub_boi.pdf (June 1, 2010)

Web Sources

civil.ge. George Sephashvili. Mkalavishvili at Large, Despite Detention Warrant. 12 June.2003 <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=4373> (Last accessed may 23, 2010)

civil.ge. 508 People Injured in Unrests – Ministry. 8 November.2007
<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=16237> (Last accessed may 23, 2010)

civil.ge. Top MIA Officials Grilled over Murder Case. 22 February. 2006
<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=11902> (Last accessed may 23, 2010)

en.rian.ru.Georgian riot police use tear gas, water cannons on protesters. 07 November, 2007.
<http://en.rian.ru/world/20071107/86963219.html> (Last accessed may 23, 2010)

epfound.ge Eurasia partnership foundation, programs and activities
http://www.epfound.ge/index.php?article_id=3&clang=0 (Last accessed April 20, 2010)

Eurasianet.org. Jaba Devdariani. Georgia's Peaceful "Revolution" May Not Translate Easily December 15, 2003. <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav121603.shtml> (Last accessed may 23, 2010)

Freedom House Country Reports about Georgia in 2002 -2008 (Last accessed April 20, 2010)

2002
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2002&country=566>

2003
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2003&country=393>

2004
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2004&country=2936>

2005
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2005&country=6741>

2006
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2006&country=6967>

2007

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7181>

2008

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008&country=7398>

Lse.ac.uk. London School of economics and political science. What is civil society.
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm (last accessed may 23, 2010)

News.bbc.co.uk. Mass protest in Georgian capital. 3 November, 2007
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7074585.stm> (Last accessed may 23, 2010)

Infed.org. Michael Edwards, Civil society, 2005
http://www.infed.org/association/civil_society.htm (Last accessed may 30, 2010)

parliament.ge Parliament of Georgia (Last accessed may 23, 2010)
http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=385&info_id=5182

state.gov. U.S Department of State ,Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Last accessed may 23, 2010)

1999

<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/330.htm>

2000

<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/760.htm>